Tejano v.

Ombudsman
G.R. No. 159190. June 30, 2005

FACTS:
The report of Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan implicated petitioner as persons involved in the
irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas ordered petitioner to file their respective counter-affidavits. Graft Investigation Officer
Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing of the proper information against petitioner and was
thereafter referred for review to the Office of the Special Prosecutor who affirmed the resolution of
Graft Investigation Officer. Deputy Special Prosecutor recommended the approval of the
memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer. Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor,
concurred in the approval. Ombudsman concurred thereto. Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an
Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Motion for a Period of Time to File
Motion for Reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation. Petitioner filed
his motion for reinvestigation in the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan ordered the
Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation. The reinvestigation was assigned to
Special Prosecution Officer. Convinced that no probable cause existed to indict petitioner Special
Prosecutor Micael recommended the dismissal of the case.

The recommendation was approved by Deputy Special Prosecutor Kallos and concurred in by Special
Prosecutor Tamayo. Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminary
investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case
with the marginal note “assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively.”
Special Prosecutor Micael filed a Manifestation, to which was attached a copy of his memorandum,
informing the Sandiganbayan of the disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of his recommendation to
dismiss the case. On 10 February 2000, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
disapproval by Ombudsman Desierto of the recommendation of Micael. Apparently, petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration was not resolved on the merits because on 27 June 2000, Special
Prosecution Officer III Joselito R. Ferrer filed a Motion to Set the Case for Arraignment alleging
therein that the prosecution did not give due course to the motion for reconsideration on the ground
that it was the second motion which is prohibited under the Ombudsman Act of 1989. He added that
the results of the reinvestigation were already submitted to the respondent court before receiving the
motion for reconsideration. Petitioner manifested before the Sandiganbayan the Office of the Special
Prosecutor’s failure to resolve his motion for reconsideration. Thus, in a resolution dated 24 March
2003, the respondent court directed the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the said motion. In a
memorandum dated 09 June 2003, Special Prosecutor Joselito R. Ferrer recommended the denial of
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos changed
his previous position and recommended that the memorandum for the dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration be approved, with Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio concurring in the denial.
Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who succeeded Ombudsman Desierto when he retired, approved
Joselito Ferrer’s memorandum recommending the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Petitioner
thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal Case. The First Division of this Court issued the
temporary restraining order prayed for. The instant petition was transferred to the Second Division of
this Court.

ISSUE: W/N Ombudsman Desierto committed grave abuse of discretion and a violation to due
process

HELD: Yes
It attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation
of the instant case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of
the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing of the
information before the Sandiganbayan. Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the
instant case and having recommended the filing of appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman
Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the reinvestigation. (He
should have delegated the review to his Deputies.)

The infirmity of the resolution was not cured by the fact that the motion for reconsideration of the
petitioner was denied by two commissioners and without the participation of Commissioner Aquino.
The right of petitioner to an impartial review of his appeal starts from the time he filed his appeal. He is
not only entitled to an impartial tribunal in the resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Moreover,
his right is to an impartial review of three commissioners. The denial of petitioner’s right to an impartial
review of his appeal is not an innocuous error. It negated his right to due process.

Samartino v. Raon
 G.R. No. 131482. July 3, 2002

FACTS:
Respondents Leonor Bernardo-Raon and Agustin G. Crisostomo are the surviving sister and spouse,
respectively, of the late Filomena Bernardo-Crisostomo, who passed away on May 17, 1994. Among
the properties left by the deceased was her one-half share in a parcel of land in Noveleta, Cavite,
registered under the name of co-owners Lido Beach Corporation and Filomena Bernardo. On January
25, 1996, respondents instituted against petitioner Regalado P. Samartino a complaint for ejectment
alleging that during the lifetime of Filomena Bernardo, she leased her share in the property to
petitioner for a period of five years counted from 1986; that the said lease expired and was not
extended thereafter; and that petitioner refused to vacate the property despite demands therefor.
Summons was served on Roberto Samartino, brother of petitioner. At the time of service of summons
at petitioner’s house, he was not at home as he was then confined at the National Bureau of
Investigation Treatment and Rehabilitation Center (NBI-TRC), Tagaytay City since January 19, 1996,
where he was undergoing treatment and rehabilitation for drug dependency. Thus, on February 2,
1996, a liaison officer of the NBI-TRC appeared before the trial court with a certification that petitioner
will be unable to comply with the directive to answer the complaint within the reglementary period,
inasmuch as it will take six months for him to complete the rehabilitation program and before he can
be recommended for discharge by the Rehabilitation Committee.

ISSUE: W/N the right of petitioner to due process is violated.

RULING: Yes.
The trial court’s failure to give petitioner a reasonable opportunity to file his answer violated his right to
due process. There being no valid substituted service of summons, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. It should be emphasized that the service of summons is not
only required to give the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, but also to afford the latter
an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him. Thus, compliance with the rules regarding
the service of summons is as much an issue of due process as of jurisdiction. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of his defense. It is elementary that before a person can be deprived of his property,
he should first be informed of the claim against him and the theory on which such claim is premised.
 Bautista v. CA
G.R. No. 157219. May 28, 2004

FACTS:
On August 12, 1999, petitioners Natividad E. Bautista, Clemente E. Bautista and Socorro L. Angeles
filed a complaint against respondent Manila Papermills, International, Inc. for quieting of title. This
complaint was later amended to implead respondents Adelfa Properties, Inc. and the spouses Rodolfo
and Nelly Javellana. fter several delays spanning more than two years, the case was finally set for
trial. However, on May 2, 2002, petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Postponement to cancel the
hearing on the ground that Atty. Michael Macaraeg, the lawyer assigned to the case was in the United
States attending to an important matter. The trial court denied petitioners motion for postponement
and considered them as having waived the presentation of their evidence.

ISSUE: W/N there is a violation to due process.

RULING:

No, due process is not violated. Petitioners’ contention that they were denied due process is not well-
taken. Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so,
he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. Due process is satisfied as long as the party is
accorded an opportunity to be heard. If it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without
violating the constitutional guarantee.
 Lorbes v. CA
G.R. No. 139884. February 15, 2001

DOCTRINE: Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders ofdefault, for
judgments of default are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearlyappears that the reopening of
the case is intended for delay. Where the order of default is immoderate, there is violation of due
process.

FACTS:
Petitioners were the registered owners of a parcel of land which they mortgaged to the Carloses in the
amount of P150,000. The mortgages would increase to P500,000 and fearing foreclosure, petitioners
ask their son-in-law, delos Reyes, for help in redeeming their property. Delos Reyes agreed but
because he allegedly had no money then, he solicited the help of Josefina Cruz, a family friend and
an employee of the Land Bank.

It was agreed that petitioners will sign a deed of sale conveying the mortgaged property in favor of
Cruz and thereafter, Cruz will apply for a housing loan with Land Bank, using the property as
collateral. It was further agreed that out of the proceeds of the loan,P500,000.00 will be paid to the
Carloses as mortgagees, and any such balance will be applied by petitioners for capital gains tax,
expenses for the cancellation of the mortgage to the Carloses, transfer of title to Josefina Cruz, and
registration of a mortgage in favor of Land Bank. Moreover, the monthly amortization on the housing
loan which was supposed to be deducted from the salary of Cruz will be reimbursed by delos Reyes.

Thereafter, the Land Bank issued a letter of guarantee in favor of the Carloses, informing them that
Cruz’s loan had been approved. The old TCT was cancelled and a new one, in the name of Josefina
Cruz, was issued in lieu thereof. Eventually the mortgage was discharged thereafter.

Sometime later, petitioners notified delos Reyes that they were ready to redeem the property but it
was refused. Aggrieved, petitioners filed on a complaint with the RTC. In the complaint, petitioners
claimed that the deed was merely a formality to meet the requirements of the bank for the housing
loan, and that the real intention of the parties in securing the loan was to apply the proceeds thereof
for the payment of the mortgage obligation. They alleged that the deed of sale did not reflect the true
intention of the parties, and that the transaction was not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage,
considering that the price of the sale was inadequate considering the market value of the subject
property and because they continued paying the real estate taxes there to even after the execution of
the said deed of sale.

Petitioners averred that they did not see any reason why delos Reyes and Cruz would retract from
their original agreement other than that they and the members of their family resigned en masse from
the Mahal Namin Organization, of which delos Reyes was the president and chairman of the board of
directors, and Cruz was the treasurer.

Delos Reyes and Cruz filed their answer beyond the reglamentary period, thus, petitioners filed a
motion to declare delos Reyes and Cruz in default, which the RTC granted. As such, petitioners
presented their evidence ex parte. Delos Reyes and Cruz filed a motion to lift order of default and to
strike out evidence presented ex parte, which the court denied. Eventually, the RTC ruled in favor of
the petitioners.

On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC, finding that delos Reyes and Cruz were denied
due process by the refusal of the trial court to lift the order of default against them, and that the
transaction between petitioners and Cruz was one of absolute sale, not of equitable mortgage.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in ruling that the by declaration of delos Reyes and Cruz in default
amounted to denial of due process of the law.

RULING: Yes
It amounted to denial of due process. Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting
aside orders of default, for judgments of default are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly
appears that the reopening of the case is intended for delay. The issuance of orders of default should
be the exception rather than the rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the
defendant to comply with the orders of the trial court.

Under the facts of this case, the RTC was indeed remiss in denying the motion to lift the order of
default and to strike out the evidence presented by petitioners ex parte, especially considering that an
answer was filed, though out of time. The Court thus sustained the ruling of the CA that the default
order of the RTC was immoderate and in violation of delos Reyes and Cruz’s due process rights.

In this case summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon the private respondents. When
the private respondents filed their answer beyond the reglementary period, the petitioners filed a
motion to declare the private respondents in default, which the trial court granted. Thereafter, the
petitioners presented their evidence ex parte before the trial court. The private respondents filed a
motion to lift the order of default and to strike out the evidence presented ex parte. The court denied
the motion. Later, a judgment by default was later rendered against the private respondents.

If the Court were to follow the tenor of the rule strictly, the trial court, under the facts, would not
technically be faulted for the issuance of its orders. Under Sec. 3 of Rule 9, “If the defending party
fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court, shall, upon motion of the claiming party with
notice to the defending party, and proof, of such failure, declare the defending party in default.” The
phraseology of the provision by the use of the term ‘shall,’ seems to give the court no choice but to
declare the defending party in default. The rules on default however, have not been spared by the rule
on liberal construction, with the Court declaring, thus:

“Well-settled is the rule that courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default for judgments of
default are frowned upon, unless in cases where it clearly appears that the reopening of the case is
intended for delay. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, to
be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the orders of the
trial court.

Under the factual milieu of the case, the RTC was indeed remiss in denying private respondents’
motion to lift the order of default and to strike out the evidence presented by petitioners ex parte,
especially considering that an answer was filed, though out of time. The Court thus sustained] the
holding of the Court of Appeals that the default order of the RTC was immoderate and in violation of
private respondents’ due process rights.

However, the Court did not think that the violation was of a degree as to justify a remand of the
proceedings to the trial court, first, because such relief was not prayed for, and second, because the
affirmative defenses and evidence that delos Reyes and Cruz would have presented before the RTC
were capably ventilated before the CA, and were taken into account by the latter in reviewing the
correctness of the evaluation of petitioners evidence by the RTC and ultimately, in reversing the
decision of the RTC. This is evident from the discussions in the decision of the CA, which cited with
approval a number of delos Reyes and Cruz’s arguments and evidence, including the documents
annexed to their opposition to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction filed with the RTC.