Federico Paredes For Petitioners. Demetrio V. Pre For Private Respondents

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G.R. No.

L-41715 June 18, 1976

ROSALIO BONILLA (a minor) SALVACION BONILLA (a minor) and PONCIANO BONILLA (their father) who
represents the minors, petitioners,
vs.
LEON BARCENA, MAXIMA ARIAS BALLENA, ESPERANZA BARCENA, MANUEL BARCENA, AGUSTINA NERI,
widow of JULIAN TAMAYO and HON. LEOPOLDO GIRONELLA of the Court of First Instance of
Abra, respondents.

Federico Paredes for petitioners.

Demetrio V. Pre for private respondents.

MARTIN, J:

This is a petition for review 1 of the Order of the Court of First Instance of Abra in Civil Case No. 856, entitled
Fortunata Barcena vs. Leon Barcena, et al., denying the motions for reconsideration of its order dismissing the
complaint in the aforementioned case.

On March 31, 1975 Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla and wife of Ponciano
Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over certain parcels of land located in
Abra.

On May 9, 1975, defendants filed a written motion to dismiss the complaint, but before the hearing of the motion to
dismiss, the counsel for the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint in order to include certain allegations therein. The
motion to amend the complaint was granted and on July 17, 1975, plaintiffs filed their amended complaint.

On August 4, 1975, the defendants filed another motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that Fortunata
Barcena is dead and, therefore, has no legal capacity to sue. Said motion to dismiss was heard on August 14, 1975.
In said hearing, counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the death of Fortunata Barcena, and asked for substitution by her
minor children and her husband, the petitioners herein; but the court after the hearing immediately dismissed the case
on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no legal personality to sue.

On August 19, 1975, counsel for the plaintiff received a copy of the order dismissing the complaint and on August 23,
1975, he moved to set aside the order of the dismissal pursuant to Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. 2

On August 28, 1975, the court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by counsel for the plaintiff for lack of merit.
On September 1, 1975, counsel for deceased plaintiff filed a written manifestation praying that the minors Rosalio
Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla be allowed to substitute their deceased mother, but the court denied the counsel's
prayer for lack of merit. From the order, counsel for the deceased plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration of
the order dismissing the complaint claiming that the same is in violation of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule 3 of the Rules
of Court but the same was denied.

Hence, this petition for review.

The Court reverses the respondent Court and sets aside its order dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 and
its orders denying the motion for reconsideration of said order of dismissal. While it is true that a person who is dead
cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The records of
this case show that the death of Fortunata Barcena took place on July 9, 1975 while the complaint was filed on March
31, 1975. This means that when the complaint was filed on March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena was still alive, and
therefore, the court had acquired jurisdiction over her person. If thereafter she died, the Rules of Court prescribes the
procedure whereby a party who died during the pendency of the proceeding can be substituted. Under Section 16,
Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "whenever a party to a pending case dies ... it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform
the court promptly of such death ... and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or
other legal representatives." This duty was complied with by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff when he manifested
before the respondent Court that Fortunata Barcena died on July 9, 1975 and asked for the proper substitution of
parties in the case. The respondent Court, however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on
the ground that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the Civil Code
provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." From the
moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and
obligations of the decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods provided for by
law. 3 The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a definite right to the inheritance whether
such right be pure or contingent. 4 The right of the heirs to the property of the deceased vests in them even before
judicial declaration of their being heirs in the testate or intestate proceedings. 5 When Fortunata Barcena, therefore,
died her claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation in Civil Case No. 856, was not extinguished by her death but
was transmitted to her heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and
became parties in interest in the case. There is, therefore, no reason for the respondent Court not to allow their
substitution as parties in interest for the deceased plaintiff.

Under Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the
deceased, within such time as may be granted ... ." The question as to whether an action survives or not depends on
the nature of the action and the damage sued for. 6 In the causes of action which survive the wrong complained
affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in
the causes of action which do not survive the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property
affected being incidental. 7 Following the foregoing criterion the claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to
quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation affects primarily and principally property and property rights and
therefore is one that survives even after her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal
representative of the deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. But what the respondent Court did,
upon being informed by the counsel for the deceased plaintiff that the latter was dead, was to dismiss the complaint.
This should not have been done for under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, it is even the duty of the
court, if the legal representative fails to appear, to order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal
representative of the deceased. In the instant case the respondent Court did not have to bother ordering the opposing
party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased because her counsel has not only asked
that the minor children be substituted for her but also suggested that their uncle be appointed as guardian ad litem for
them because their father is busy in Manila earning a living for the family. But the respondent Court refused the
request for substitution on the ground that the children were still minors and cannot sue in court. This is another grave
error because the respondent Court ought to have known that under the same Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, the court is directed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. Precisely in the instant case, the counsel
for the deceased plaintiff has suggested to the respondent Court that the uncle of the minors be appointed to act as
guardian ad litem for them. Unquestionably, the respondent Court has gravely abused its discretion in not complying
with the clear provision of the Rules of Court in dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 856 and
refusing the substitution of parties in the case.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the order of the respondent Court dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 856 of
the Court of First Instance of Abra and the motions for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of said complaint are
set aside and the respondent Court is hereby directed to allow the substitution of the minor children, who are the
petitioners therein for the deceased plaintiff and to appoint a qualified person as guardian ad litem for them. Without
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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