Abraham M.

Denmark

Managing the Global

Commons

T he geopolitical theorist Sir Halford Mackinder once observed that

democracies find it difficult to think strategically in peacetime. It should not be
surprising then that one of the United States’ core peacetime strategic objectives
for more than half a century
the development of a robust international system
based on free trade, international law, and international institutions
was born
in wartime. The 1944 Bretton Woods agreement laid the foundation for this
system to reconcile and reconstruct the Axis powers and avoid another world
war. This strategy was further developed in 1950 with ‘‘NSC 68,’’ which claimed
that the development of a healthy international community should be pursued
by the United States even without the existence of a Soviet threat.1
The international system is inextricably interwoven with the continued
openness and stability of the world’s common spaces.2 Open commons allow large
container ships to connect manufacturers to customers all over the world, like-
minded individuals to share information as well as ideas, and global militaries to
coordinate movements over vast distances. These capabilities did not happen by
accident; they are the result of decades of effort by governments and private
corporations to build a ‘‘system of systems’’ that allow for global commerce. These
systems exist within and between the global commons: the sea, air, space, and
cyberspace.
Today, over 90 percent of global trade
worth over $14 trillion in 2008

travels by sea.3 Every year, 2.2 billion passengers and 35 percent of the world’s
manufactured exports, by value, travel through the air.4 Governments, militaries,
and corporations around the world rely on space for communications, imagery, and
accurate positioning services. Any computer in the world with access to the

Abraham M. Denmark is a fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He is
the coeditor and coauthor of ‘‘Contested Commons: The Future of American Power in a
Multipolar World’’ (CNAS, January 2010). He can be followed on twitter: @AbeDenmark.
Copyright # 2010 Center for Strategic and International Studies
The Washington Quarterly • 33:3 pp. 165
182
DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2010.492347

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 Abraham M. Denmark

Internet can access and transmit information to any place in the world within
seconds, allowing unprecedented connectivity for global financial transactions,
social networks, commercial enterprises, and militaries.
Since the end of World War II, and especially since the end of the Cold War,
the openness and stability of the global commons have been protected and
sustained by U.S. military dominance and political leadership. The U.S. Navy
and Coast Guard have dissuaded naval aggression and fought piracy around the
world, ensuring unprecedented freedom of the seas. The United States led the
creation of international agreements on air transportation, enabling the creation
of a global air industry. Washington also forged an international consensus on
the openness of space, ensuring that all countries with the means to do so
can utilize orbital space for scientific, commercial, and military purposes.
Lastly, research funded by the U.S. government led to the creation of a
decentralized network of connections now
F our key elements called the Internet, which connects physi-
cally dispersed markets, capital, and people.
are reshaping U.S. For the past 65 years, U.S. power has been
hard power to help derived in part from providing global public
goods that also service vital U.S. interests,
manage the global
including stability in key regions, a vibrant
commons. and interconnected global economy, and open
access to the global commons. Leading
American theorist Joseph Nye has argued
that considering the relationship of U.S. power to global public goods helps to
unveil ‘‘an important strategic principle that could help America reconcile its
national interests with a broader global perspective and assert effective
leadership.’’5 Geography made the United States a natural sea power, while
successful exploitation of air, space, and U.S. technological prowess made the
United States a power in the other commons as well. Yet, globalization
by
lowering trade barriers, spreading advanced technologies, and enabling the rise of
new economic powers
has given birth to new military powers capable of
changing the military dynamics within the global commons, heralding a new era
in which unilateral U.S. military power alone will be insufficient to preserve their
openness and stability.
To address these changes, the United States must adapt its military and
diplomatic approaches to the global commons. While U.S. hard power is already
being adjusted to account for these threats, Washington has yet to articulate a
diplomatic strategy to sustain access to the commons. Just as the Obama
administration has emphasized ‘‘mutual interest’’ in pushing initiatives from
nuclear nonproliferation to engaging the Muslim world, Washington should now
emphasize the international system’s dependence on the global commons in

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order to build support for international regimes and agreements that bolster their
openness and stability.

Challenges to Unilateral Dominance

U.S. dominance of the global commons has driven some states and non-state
actors to pursue military capabilities to undermine the U.S. military’s ability to
access and operate within the commons. Analysis of U.S. war-fighting practices
since the 1991 Persian Gulf War have repeatedly demonstrated the tremendous
advantage enjoyed by the U.S. military because of its unfettered use of the global
commons. Potential adversaries are now pursuing these capabilities in the hope
that, if successful, the U.S. military could be more easily deterred, dissuaded, or
defeated. Two trends
the emergence of new military powers pursuing high-end
asymmetric capabilities and the distribution of disruptive technologies to state
and non-state actors
will enable potential adversaries to fundamentally
challenge the U.S. military’s ability to maintain dominance within the global
commons, with profound implications for the international economic order.
First, enabled by free trade and post —Cold War stability, new economic powers
are emerging, giving rise to a multipolar world with new centers of power.6 Several
of these states are using their newfound wealth to modernize their militaries,
which will inevitably increase the number of players within the global commons.
According to data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute (SIPRI), since 1998 the major emerging and revanchist states with
significant defense budgets (e.g., Brazil, China, India, Russia, and Saudi Arabia)
have collectively more than doubled their military spending in the past decade.
These major emerging states are already beginning to orient their militaries
toward the global commons, fielding significant maritime capabilities including
advanced surface combatants, increasingly capable submarines, sophisticated
anti-ship cruise missiles, and (in China’s case) ballistic missiles designed to strike
major ships at sea.7 Likewise, emerging states are acquiring advanced air
capabilities, including fourth-generation fighters and advanced integrated air
defense systems. States are also developing the ability to operate within and
potentially challenge the ability of an adversary to access space, along with
challenging their potential within cyberspace.8
The second trend caused by globalization
lowering the threshold for states
and non-state actors to acquire disruptive military technologies
will also
challenge the ability of the United States to maintain the openness and
stability of the global commons. States like Iran, and non-state actors like
Hezbollah, have been able to acquire advanced military capabilities that would
otherwise be far out of reach for their indigenous defense bases. Armed with a
small fleet of frigates and fast patrol craft, along with submarines, mines, and

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advanced anti-ship cruise missiles, Iranian military doctrine and recent exercises
suggest that it will employ asymmetric tactics to exploit the advanced systems that
it has acquired. The constricted geographic character of the Persian Gulf will also
enable Iran to target an adversary’s naval assets or, potentially, threaten the
disruption of oil trade to deter a military confrontation.9
The ability to acquire advanced military technologies also allowed Hezbollah to
acquire and use an Iranian-supplied anti-ship cruise missile to strike an Israeli
corvette during Israel’s 2006 invasion of southern Lebanon. While terrorist groups
like Hezbollah have yet to develop the ability to sustain threats against the
maritime commons or press them beyond the littoral waters of the Middle East,
their ability to acquire and successfully employ advanced anti-access capabilities is
an example of a lowering threshold for acquiring disruptive technologies, and may
be a harbinger of future developments. Access to technologies also poses new risks
amidst U.S. military operations. For example, Iranian-backed militants in Iraq
have been able to intercept live video feeds
A djustments in U.S. from U.S. Predator drones using $26 off-the-
shelf software.10 In the future, terrorist
hard power are vital organizations with sufficient technological
but insufficient to know-how may use satellite jammers,
available all over the world, to disrupt
address the
satellite communications that are vital to
challenges in the everything from global financial transactions
global commons. to U.S. military command and control.
Yet, for small states and non-state actors,
the cyber commons represents a unique
opportunity to strike the United States or undermine its military operations. In
cyberspace, innovation and agility allow small states and non-state actors to
mitigate many of the traditional advantages enjoyed by larger states. The
distributed, anonymous, and easily accessible nature of the cyber commons gives a
natural advantage to organizations that are themselves distributed. For actors
with relatively limited resources, the cyber commons offer an inexpensive weapon
that can be used to directly attack an enemy with little risk to personal or
organizational safety and without fear of certain reprisal. For example, the world’s
millions of internet cafes and undefended networks can be used by any
organization with access to technological expertise to conduct distributed,
quickly-shifting attacks against U.S. infrastructure networks. This is especially
true for actors whose adversary is the United States, with a military fundamentally
reliant upon the cyber commons for everything from command and control to
logistics.
Combined, these two trends represent a profound challenge to the U.S.
military and its continued ability to sustain the openness and stability of the

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global commons on its own. U.S. military primacy has not, and will not, dissuade
some rising powers from investing in capabilities designed to contest U.S. power
on the sea and in the air, space, and cyberspace. Thus, the United States will
both have to adjust its military capabilities to ensure that it can counter anti-
access threats posed by a state as well as non-state actors in the global commons,
and to lead an international effort to build international regimes that sustain
global access to the commons.

Shifting U.S. Hard Power

With the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the fiscal year 2011
budget request, the Obama administration has signaled its intention to respond
robustly to these challenges in the global commons. The 2010 QDR explicitly
identifies ‘‘maintaining secure access to the global commons’’ as a goal for the
evolving U.S. defense posture,11 and notes the challenge of ‘‘future adversaries
likely to possess and employ some degree of anti-access capability
the ability to
blunt or deny U.S. power projection
across all domains.’’12 Examining four
elements highlighted in the 2010 QDR and FY11 budget request
flexibility; air-
sea battle; long-range strike and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR); and partner capacity-building
reveals how the Obama administration
intends to shape U.S. hard power so that it may respond to the challenges
presented by managing the global commons. Although much work remains to be
done, it has successfully laid the foundation upon which the U.S. military can help
sustain the security of the global commons.

Complexity Requires Flexibility

The 2010 QDR, and other Pentagon assessments, are founded on the judgment
that ‘‘the United States faces a complex and uncertain security landscape in which
the pace of change continues to accelerate’’ with a greater number of threats,
across a broader spectrum of warfare, in a more geographically diverse and
challenging number of hotspots than it has in the past.13 This complexity drove
the Pentagon’s shift away from its traditional ‘‘two-war’’ guidance to its new
direction for the U.S. military to ‘‘plan and prepare to prevail in a broad range of
operations that may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping time frames.’’14 This
will mean that platforms will have to be useful across the spectrum of conflict, from
counterinsurgency to countering high-end asymmetric threats in the global
commons.
The Pentagon is already moving in this direction. At sea, the Obama
administration’s request for two Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers and
two littoral combat ships (LCS) signals the Pentagon’s recognition that the U.S.
military will confront lower-end naval challenges in littoral waters, as well as
high-end threats from missiles and advanced surface and subsurface ships.

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Arleigh Burke-class destroyers will have a

role in counterpiracy and missile defense
T he United States operations, and the LCS is intended to
must now share the enhance the U.S. Navy’s ability to pro-
responsibility of vide security in the constrained maritime
environments that pirates often operate in.
managing the global In the air, the decision to favor the F-35
commons. over the F-22 as the primary air power
workhorse for the United States perfectly
exemplifies the Pentagon’s emphasis on
flexibility. As an exportable multi-role fighter, the F-35 can be used by all
services and U.S. partners and allies to capably strike air, land, and sea targets.
The bleeding-edge technologies used by the F-22 make it the world’s most
capable air-to-air platform. Yet, it also limits its utility to a unidimensional
weapon by one U.S. service that can not be exported to friends and allies. Thus,
the Pentagon has implicitly accepted the risk of a slightly less capable air-to-air
platform in order to accomplish more goals with less money.
The Pentagon also plans to maintain flexibility by building in platform
interoperability with allies and partners that procure U.S. military hardware. By
ensuring that U.S. allies and partners use the same equipment, and their doctrine
is based on the same capabilities, the United States can better ensure that
necessary military capabilities are available throughout the world to respond to
fast-emerging threats or crises that require a coalition response. Moreover, the
Obama administration’s efforts to reform the defense export laws and certain
bilateral defense trade treaties (such as with Australia and the United Kingdom)
will further improve the U.S. military’s ability to work with allies and partners
who have access to U.S. military hardware.

Air-Sea Battle
The 2010 QDR commits the U.S. military to confront challenges in the sea and
air commons by calling for the U.S. Navy and Air Force to develop an ‘‘air-sea
battle’’ concept. While details on what that concept will be remain undeveloped,
the QDR describes the concept as addressing ‘‘how air and naval forces will
integrate capabilities across all operational domains
air, sea, land, space, and
cyberspace
to counter growing challenges to U.S. freedom of action.’’15
With little insight into the Pentagon’s thinking about air-sea battle, one is left
to examine military procurement developments. Platforms that would be most
applicable to operate within
and eventually undermine
threats in the global
commons are already in active production. The Virginia-class nuclear-powered
attack submarine, with its ability to conduct covert insertions and extractions,
its ability to quietly strike surface and subsurface targets, and its long-range

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stand-off strike capability makes it a particularly capable challenge to anti-access

threats. As is the F-22 with its ability to penetrate advanced integrated air
defense networks and strike targets at long range.

Long-Range Strike and ISR

The 2010 QDR also calls for a close examination of several long-range strike
options, including both penetrating platforms and stand-off weapons, as a
response to anti-access threats in the global commons.16 The logic behind all
this is clear
if an adversary prevents the United States from operating within a
given area, the United States should be able to strike from beyond that anti-access
envelope both because doing so might be necessary to protect the country, and
because the threat of such a strike should deter state as well as non-state actors
from thinking they can threaten the United States with impunity. Interestingly,
the QDR hints at the continuing advantages the United States sees for itself in
stealth technology in the air and sea commons.17 Although it seems a lot, much
remains to be decided when it comes to long-range strike and ISR, the Pentagon
may be looking to submarines as a staging platform to literally undercut an
adversary’s anti-access capabilities, to develop a conventional, global-strike
capability, and to upgrade and modernize the bomber fleet.18
Today’s unmanned aircraft
the Predator, Reaper, and Global Hawk
offer an
impressive capability to loiter on station for several hours and strike with
precision. Yet, weapons on the drawing board today, especially the Naval
Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS, aka the X-47), represent a
potentially revolutionary advance in long-range strike and ISR by adding
stealth and the ability to take-off and land from carriers. Such a capability, if
and when available, would greatly enhance the U.S. military’s flexibly and ability
to respond to threats to the global commons more effectively and responsively.

Partner Capacity-Building
As missions and responsibilities for the U.S. military multiply, and as its
dominance within the global commons becomes increasingly contested, the
status quo
in which the United States is the sole guarantor of the openness of the
global commons while other states free ride
is unsustainable. While the United
States should continue to develop military capabilities to ensure that it can
counter anti-access threats, it must recognize that it cannot
and should not

protect the commons alone. The 2010 QDR primarily focuses on partner capacity-
building as a tool of U.S. military assistance to local security forces in conjunction
with two ongoing wars and counterterrorism operations. Partner capacity-
building, however, should be understood in a much broader context. Working
with and through like-minded partners will be key to the ability of the

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United States to share the responsibility of

T he Strait of
managing the global commons. Yet, what
this will look like remains unclear.
Malacca could be an U.S. assistance to the littoral states sur-
important model for rounding the Strait of Malacca, with en-
hanced local control of a strategic choke
future efforts to point without increasing U.S. or foreign
engage pivotal actors. military commitments, could be an impor-
tant model for future efforts to engage pivotal
actors to secure the global commons. As one
of the world’s most important shipping lanes, the rise of piracy in 2004
threatened to undermine a significant segment of global trade. Yet, piracy attacks
have fallen drastically since then
from 38 in 2004 to only 2 in 2008
due to
increased coordination of sea and air patrols and intelligence-sharing among
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.19 In the background of this newfound
cooperation were Australia, Japan, and the United States, quietly facilitating
increased coordination and providing technical assistance and training. Thus,
the United States and its allies were able to help like-minded partners to
maintain the openness of a commons without violating the regional state’s sense
of autonomy or taking on additional burdens for the U.S. military.
Cooperation between like-minded partners need not be limited to the
maritime commons. Engaging responsible emerging space powers, such as
India and South Korea, could contribute to increased cooperation on
everything from space exploration to orbital debris mitigation. Similarly,
engaging like-minded states with robust technical capabilities, from Europe to
India to South Korea, could enhance international cooperation to maintain a
clean and open cyber commons.

Building New Regimes

Though vital, adjustments in U.S. hard power will, in themselves, be insufficient

to address the systemic challenges to the global commons posed by rising
military and political powers. Building a robust system of international
regimes that buttress the openness of the global commons against potential
disruption from new military powers will be an essential element of any future
U.S. strategy.
The air commons offers an important model for how international norms and
widely-accepted agreements can combine to sustain the openness of a commons.
Along with a long international tradition of supporting the freedom of the skies,
the over 4,000 bilateral air transport agreements registered with the International
Civil Aviation Organization ensure that civil air transport through the air commons

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is organized, safe, and efficient. The state of international regimes within the other
global commons varies widely, however. Key principles, outlined here, can guide U.S.
diplomatic efforts toward the commons.

Maritime Regimes
From international agreements to norms of responsible seamanship, the
maritime commons also has a rich tradition promoting the freedom of the
seas. Yet, existing agreements are being challenged by the emergence of new
maritime powers who are using their newfound naval capabilities to enforce
long-standing claims over disputed waters. Though not alone, China’s claims
over the South China Sea and the Spratley Islands are the most egregious.
As defined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a state
maintains sovereign control of coastal waters out to 12 miles beyond its beach, and
the sole right to extract resources as much as 200 miles from its shores. The area
between 12 and 200 miles is known as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). As
stated in UNCLOS, the EEZ remains an international waterway through which
warships may make innocent passage. Yet, China claims that states must first
obtain permission from Beijing before transiting its EEZ, in direct contradiction to
the spirit of traditional laws of the sea and the letter of UNCLOS’s language.
The implications of China’s interpretation would have drastic consequences
for the openness of these strategically vital waterways, and would set a highly
problematic precedent for the openness of the maritime commons around the world.
If states are able to determine who is able to sail in what have traditionally been
international waters, and exclude maritime traffic at will, navies would be forced to
request permission before sailing through what would normally be international
waters
in effect extending sovereign claims 200 miles beyond the coastline.
The openness of the maritime commons demands freedom of navigation within the
EEZs, and restrictive interpretations of UNCLOS would fundamentally undermine
that openness. While four other countries (Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, and
Vietnam) dispute Beijing’s claims, none would be nearly large enough to resist
sustained Chinese pressure. The United States must be involved if Chinese claims
are to be resisted. Further, U.S. leadership is necessary to ensure that maritime
disputes are resolved and adjudicated in a way that are conducive to U.S. interests.
Yet, Washington’s long-standing failure to ratify the UNCLOS prevents the
United States from having a seat at the table as continental shelves are
identified, sovereign control of coastal waters is assigned, and the UNCLOS
provisions are interpreted. Ratifying the UNCLOS is not a radical idea
former
presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary
Roughead, former Secretary of State James Baker, and Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton have all expressed support for ratification.20 The key

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 Abraham M. Denmark

for the Obama administration is to utilize such a broad set of supporters to make
the case for ratification, and let the Congress tangibly support efforts to sustain
the openness the of the maritime commons.

Space Regimes
Unlike the air and maritime commons, space is in serious need of stronger
international regimes. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty does not address most issues
that the international community is grappling with today, while other agree-
ments are non-binding and have largely been ineffective. For international
regimes to contribute to the openness of the space commons, they must focus on
behavior, not capability, and should first tackle the common enemy of all space-
faring nations: orbital debris.
The vulnerability of the space commons, and the international system’s
dependence on it, makes a stronger set of international agreements essential to
their future security. Satellites themselves are highly susceptible to kinetic- and
directed-energy attacks, as well as jamming
B ut Washington has and hacking from the surface of the Earth.
Further complicating the openness of space
yet to articulate a
is the growing problem of orbital debris

diplomatic strategy there are more than 19,000 objects in orbit
to sustain access to larger than 10 cm and more than 1.5
million objects less than 10 cm. Small
the commons. pieces of debris can be lethal because of
the tremendous speeds of orbit. It is
estimated that a pea-sized ball moving in
orbit would cause as much damage to a satellite or manned spacecraft as a 400-
pound safe travelling at 60 miles per hour.21
The primary enemy to the continued openness of the space commons is not
anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons or even kinetic weapons. The real enemy to all
space capabilities is the debris kinetic weapons create
about 50 percent of all
trackable objects in orbit were created by explosions or collisions inside the
orbit.22 A broad kinetic anti-satellite campaign in orbit would be analogous to
fighting a conventional war on land in an environment where all the stray
bullets, mortars, and bombs do not simply fall to Earth, but continue to fly
around the world for decades, rendering much of the surface of the Earth
uninhabitable. Similarly, orbits littered with debris from a kinetic anti-satellite
campaign would be useless for the satellites upon which the global economy, and
the U.S. military, depend.
In 2008, China and Russia proposed an international treaty banning the
development of ‘‘space weapons.’’ The proposal was largely seen in the West as
disingenuous because it would not prevent the development of land-based ASAT

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weapons as China has tested in January 2007 and January 2010. Furthermore, its
definition of what constitutes a ‘‘space weapon’’ is imprecise, at best. Despite its
disingenuity, the proposed treaty’s stated goal
keeping outer space from turning
into an area for military confrontation, in assuring security in outer space, and safe
functioning of space objects
is laudable. To accomplish these objectives and
sustain the openness of the space commons, the United States and the
international community should develop realistic and implementable regimes
that focus on behavior, not capabilities, and ensure that agreements strike an
appropriate balance between ensuring stability in the commons while preserving
U.S. freedom of action.
An international regime should focus on behavior and capabilities because, as
reflected in the Chinese/Russian draft treaty’s definition of what constitutes a
space weapon, anything in orbit can be used as a weapon, or given enough of
another function to plausibly be in orbit for a non-offensive purpose. Focusing on
behavior will both allow the international community to avoid vexing
definitional issues and enable the United States to develop deterrent military
capabilities.

Cyber Commons
Where the space commons is in need of stronger international agreements, the
cyber commons is positively anarchic. Foundational concepts about the nature of
warfare and military competition in the cyber commons
such as deterrence,
response, and escalation
remain ambiguous and not well understood. Today,
security in the cyber commons is similar to that of the West in the United States
in the nineteenth century
any security you enjoyed is what you brought with
you. Existing international agreements, namely the Council of Europe’s
Convention on Cybercrime, are limited in scope and even more limited on
enforcement. Effective international agreements at this point should not be too
ambitious. It is better to understand the dynamics of the cyber commons before
international regimes can hope to be effective.
Still, basic agreements to improve cooperation between major actors in the
cyber commons, and to generally support an open and stable cyber commons,
would greatly improve its health. A ‘‘clean,’’ healthy cyber commons
with
realistic identification information built-in
would make it easier to identify the
source of attacks and reduce the spread of botnets and other threats by malicious
actors. A cleaner commons would also reduce risks to U.S. military systems and
operations that require cyberspace to conduct network-centric warfare and to
project U.S. power globally. Moreover, a cleaner commons would also be in the
interests of the broader international community, as global commerce and
communications would be a great deal safer and more reliable.

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Such ‘‘cleanliness’’ would require a loss of privacy and anonymity that could
generate a great deal of backlash, especially within the United States. While
legitimate, these concerns overlook the fact that the cyber commons was
completely man-made, and the rules can be changed at any time. Still, U.S.
leadership
as the internet grew from a DOD project
ensured that it would
become a truly global commons. By encouraging its open architecture, and by
encouraging market-based governance that included people, groups, and
governments around the world, the United States produced a remarkably
flexible and effective global network of networks. Yet, an open and market-based
approach has created a commons that today is highly anarchic and full of bad
actors like hackers, state-sponsored and freelance alike.

Where to Go from Here

Ensuring the future openness and stability of the global commons will require a
concerted, long-term effort encompassing all elements of national power.
Specifically, the United States must reexamine its approach to forward-basing
in order to account for emerging challenges in the commons, secure the ‘‘final
frontiers’’ of space and cyberspace, and engage pivotal actors who can contribute
to efforts for sustaining the stability of the global commons.

Reexamine Forward-basing
U.S. power projection capability has long been dependent on a worldwide
network of forward bases. As these bases come under threat of ballistic missile
strikes and adversarial capabilities within the global commons, and their utility
becomes increasingly constrained by political sensitivities of the host countries,
the United States should continue to pursue a robust and flexible force posture
and logistics chain while investing in base-hardening and missile defenses. U.S.
strategists should not forget that, even under threat from ballistic and cruise
missiles, U.S. forward bases play a vital role in preserving stability throughout
the world, assuring U.S. allies and partners of its continuing commitments, and
deterring the use of force by potential adversaries. Threats should not force the
United States to leave but to adapt.
Yet, better bases is not the complete answer. In order to obviate the threat
posed by accurate missiles or host nations with uncertain levels of support for
possible U.S. military operations, U.S. power must become more expeditionary
and less dependent on easily-targeted fixed bases. For example, a promising
basing concept proposed by retired U.S. Marine Colonel Pat Garrett imagines
the use of Guam and the Caroline, Marshall, Northern Mariana, and Solomon
islands as an important basing zone outside the range of China’s current anti-
access capabilities.23 Proposing a ‘‘regional presence in being,’’ Garrett proposes
a dispersed collection of ships that avoids fixed forward bases in Japan and Korea,

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instead operating in a constantly-moving (and hence difficult to target) fashion

during a time of conflict with China.

Secure the Final Frontiers

While the QDR had specific recommendations to preserve U.S. military
capabilities in the sea and air domains, its handling of space and cyberspace
was strikingly unspecific. The QDR recognizes the role space and cyberspace
play in enabling U.S. military operations, but limits declaratory actions for calls
to assure access to space and cyberspace, to improve the ability to attribute
attacks and hold aggressors responsible, and to work with like-minded nations to
develop norms of behavior.24 Though understandable, given that the Pentagon’s
reviews of space and cyberspace capabilities and posture are ongoing, this lack of
specificity leaves open the question of how the U.S. military will ensure its
ability to utilize space and cyberspace.
In space, DOD commits to engage the private sector, state, and non-state
actors, promote spaceflight safety, improve space situational awareness, reduce
vulnerabilities, and field capabilities for
rapid augmentation and reconstitution of S pace regimes should
space capabilities.25 The Obama adminis-
focus on the common
tration’s approach, however, will become
clearer once it updates the national space enemy: orbital debris.
policy and completes the national security
space strategy (formerly known as the space
posture review), which are expected early this summer.
The president’s FY11 budget suggests an approach to space that is less
ambitious than years past. President Barack Obama’s decision to cut $81 billion
for NASA’s constellation manned spaceflight program will have significant
strategic implications. By cutting this capability, the United States will lose its
ability to access very high orbits, some that have important military applications.
The ability to access the moon, as well as so-called ‘‘Lagrange points’’ (points in
space where the gravitational pull of the earth is cancelled out by that of the
moon, allowing a satellite to sit between the two without expending fuel), puts
the United States at the good will of other states to abide by existing
international agreements. At a time when new space powers are emerging, the
Obama administration’s decision to cut heavy-lift capabilities will have profound
strategic implications, especially considering that the loss of demand for heavy-
lift rocket motors from NASA may double the cost of building future rockets
necessary to reach high orbit with large payloads, a potential death sentence in
tomorrow’s likely budget-constrained environment.26
Specifically, the United States should lead a global effort for the international
community to adopt two mutually-supporting agreements. First, a kinetic

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 Abraham M. Denmark

no-first-use in space agreement would help prevent the creation of orbital debris.
Given exceptions to allow kinetic strikes in cases to protect human populations
from out-of-control satellites, such an agreement would protect U.S. and
international interests in preserving the openness of the space commons
without restricting U.S. military interests in dissuading threats in space.
Second, an international agreement against harmful interference of space
objects during peacetime would prohibit jamming, blinding, and hacking
satellites, and would further promote the openness of the global commons
without restricting U.S. military interests. With these agreements in place, the
United States would be able to research kinetic and non-kinetic military
capabilities for use in extremes while developing defenses against a condensed
range of threats. The international community would also benefit since the use
of kinetic weapons would be restrained, as would the creation of orbital debris.
As with space, the QDR features an
entire section calling on the U.S. military
F ully-realized to operate effectively in cyberspace.27 Yet,
strategies and the initiatives it proposes to accomplish this
objective
develop a comprehensive approach
capabilities for the to DOD operations in cyberspace, develop
cyber commons greater cyberspace expertise and awareness,
appear beyond the centralize command of cyberspace opera-
tions, and enhance partnerships with other
U.S. reach today. agencies and governments
signals a
profound focus on how to think about and
organize for cyberspace, suggesting that
fully-realized strategies and capabilities to ensure the openness of the cyber
commons is still beyond the United States’ reach. Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense Kathleen Hicks described the QDR’s focus on cyber as:

. . . first, helping to propel forward the establishment of Cyber Command, and

ensuring we have a locus within the Department that really takes seriously as its first
mission the growth of cyber expertise within DOD . . . . And second, ensuring that
we begin down the path with a vision and a strategy for cyber . . . to set out the
range of DOD missions and responsibilities in a whole-of-government context.28

At this point, concrete proposals to operate effectively in cyberspace seem far off.
Still, an international regime to clean up the cyber environment is well within
U.S. capabilities. While there are existing programs to build the capacity of
national Computer Emergency Readiness Teams, the United States should move
beyond working with governments to engage and support global multi-stakeholder
organizations, such as the Internet Engineering Task Force or Internet
Cooperation for Assigned Names and Numbers. Moreover, the United States
should encourage nongovernmental organizations, such as network operator

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 Managing the Global Commons

groups, to play active roles in ensuring that technological systems as well as

operations of the cyber commons are more resistant to abuse by malicious actors
and more resilient in the face of attacks.

Engage Pivotal Actors

The United States has a unique opportunity to shape the world’s approach to the
commons. If a larger number of existing and emerging powers can be persuaded
to promote the openness and stability of the commons, the international
political and economic order will be strengthened. If states and non-state actors,
however, are able to disrupt the commons, international order will be
fundamentally undermined.
The QDR’s focus on building the capacities of partner states is focused on
current wars, but it will also be vital to enabling like-minded states to contribute
to efforts protecting the commons. The global commons should also be a major
element of U.S. security engagement with allies, partners, and potential
adversaries alike. By engaging allies and partners, the United States will be able
to share the burden of commons sustainment and enlist the support of nations that
possess comparative advantages in certain security sectors. For example, as two
states with burgeoning military capabilities that generally share U.S. interests in
the openness and stability of the global commons, India and South Korea represent
two pivotal actors that the United States should engage in this area. Both are
improving their air and sea capabilities, have nascent space programs, and boast
private sectors with world-leading expertise in cyberspace.
Even further, by discussing the global commons with potential adversaries,
the United States would be able to explain its intentions and approaches
while attempting to improve mutual understanding, reduce the chances of
miscalculation, and encourage positive forms of behavior. For its part, China
represents the largest question mark vis-à-vis the global commons. China’s
dependence on the commons to import resources and export goods should make it
a significant contributor to the commons’ health. And some aspects of China’s
behavior, such as conducting counterpiracy operations off the coast of Somalia,
demonstrate an interest in stability. But China’s insistence on an exclusionary
definition of its rights over the EEZs, its development of anti-satellite missiles, and
its acquisition of advanced anti-access capabilities in the seas and air suggest a
more exclusionary intention.
Pivotal actors will also be essential in creating effective international regimes,
especially in the space and cyber commons. Broad disagreements between the
United States and potential adversaries mean that international support for
effective international regimes on the global commons will be won or lost with
the pivotal states whose approaches are not yet solidified. U.S. allies and partners
with significant interests in the global commons will be, if properly engaged and

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 Abraham M. Denmark

consulted, pivotal centers of support in any U.S. effort to build effective

international regimes.

U.S. Leadership in the Global Commons

The United States’ power and the stability of the existing international
economic system depend upon the openness and stability of the global
commons. Goods flow, ideas promulgate, militaries operate, and people travel
through them with little thought to how and why they are kept open. Since
World War II, the responsibility of maintaining their openness has fallen to the
United States.
The emergence of a multipolar world and the proliferation of disruptive military
technologies to state and non-state actors, many of whose intentions toward the
global commons are circumspect, will contest the U.S. military’s dominance in
these commons. The implications for the continued viability of the international
economic system as well as for the future of

T he United States
the U.S. military’s ability to project power are
significant. As these challenges emerge, the
has a unique U.S. military must adapt its capabilities while
opportunity to shape recognizing that partners and allies will play
an increasingly pivotal role as bulwarks
the world’s approach against the forces of exclusivity and chaos.
to the commons. The Obama administration’s develop-
ment of an air-sea battle concept to
confront anti-access challenges, its commit-
ment to pursue long-range strike and ISR
capabilities, and the concomitant investment in advanced air and sea platforms
demonstrate a commitment to maintain the U.S. military’s dominant position in
the air and at sea. Yet, more remains to be done. The Pentagon’s approach to space
and cyberspace is underdeveloped, which is particularly disconcerting considering
the U.S. military’s reliance upon these commons for almost every element of its
operations. Further, the Pentagon’s current approach to building partner capacities
is profoundly focused on Afghanistan and Iraq. Broadening this focus to the global
commons and identifying pivotal actors who can partner with the United States
will contribute to the stability of the commons while reducing the burden on the
U.S. military to defend and sustain them.
The U.S. commitment to the commons will be demonstrated by its rhetoric,
its strategy, and its investments. While globalization and the rise of new and
revanchist powers will inevitably change the military balance of power within
the global commons, not all powers are created equal. Intentions toward the
commons, and the willingness to confront destabilizing threats, will be key to the

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commons’ openness. With the 2010 QDR and FY11 budget requests, the Obama
administration has demonstrated that the United States has the will to confront
these challenges at sea and in the air. Going forward, it will be incumbent on
the Pentagon to develop the appropriate concepts and capabilities to maintain
the openness of the space and cyber commons, while engaging like-minded states
and non-state actors to share the burden of their defense and construct
international regimes. These actions will not only help secure the commons
in the coming decades, but will also send clear deterrence and dissuasion
messages to U.S. adversaries and actors whose intentions are unclear.
In the end, protecting the global commons will depend on cooperation between
great and emerging powers, and U.S. willingness to lead them. No other country
has the ability to project military power into the commons, and none can
challenge the U.S. legacy of building global institutions to advance shared goals.
This act of leadership will protect vital U.S. interests and those of the
international community for years, and even decades, to come.

Notes

1. National Security Council, ‘‘NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for
National Security,’’ April 14, 1950, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm.
2. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), ‘‘Quadrennial Defense Review,’’ February 2010,
p. 8, http://www.defense.gov/QDR/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf.
3. See International Maritime Organization, ‘‘International Shipping: Carrier of World
Trade,’’ 2005, http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D18900/Int
ShippingFlyerfinal.pdf.
4. See Air Transport Action Group, ‘‘The Economic & Social Benefits of Air Transport,’’
2008, pp. 2—9, http://www.icao.int/ATWorkshop/ATAG_SocialBenefitsAirTransport.pdf.
5. Joseph Nye, ‘‘Recovering American Leadership,’’ Survival 50, no. 1 (February 2008): 63.
This study is also informed by A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History,
1660—1783 (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1987); Barry Posen, ‘‘Command of the
Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony,’’ International Security 28, no. 1
(Summer 2003): 5 —46; Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, ‘‘The Contested
Commons,’’ U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 135, No. 7 (July 2009), http://
www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/story.asp?STORY_ID1950.
6. See National Intelligence Council, ‘‘Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World,’’
November 2008, http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025_Global_Trends_Final_Report.pdf.
7. See DOD, ‘‘Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic
of China,’’ 2009, http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/China_Military_Power_Report_
2009.pdf.
8. For an excellent summary of the rise of states with anti-access capabilities, see Andrew
F. Krepinevich, ‘‘Why AirSea Battle?’’ February 2010, http://www.csbaonline.org/
4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20100219.Why_AirSea_Battle/R.20100219.Why_AirSea_
Battle.pdf.
9. See Fariborz Haghshenass, ‘‘Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare,’’ Policy Focus, no. 87,
September 2008, http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pubPDFs/PolicyFocus87.pdf;

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 Abraham M. Denmark

Nasser Karimi and Lee Keath, ‘‘Iran Begins War Games in Persian Gulf Oil Route,’’
Associated Press, April 22, 2010, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100422/ap_on_re_mi_
ea/ml_iran_war_games; Caitlin Talmadge, ‘‘Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian Threat
to the Strait of Hormuz,’’ International Security 33, no. 1 (Summer 2008): 82 —117; U.S.
Office of Naval Intelligence, ‘‘Iran’s Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern
Naval Strategy,’’ Fall 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/iran-navy.pdf.
10. Siobhan Gorman, Yochi Dreazen, and August Cole, ‘‘Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones,’’
Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126102247
889095011.html.
11. Quadrennial Defense Review, p. xiv.
12. Ibid., p. 9.
13. Ibid., p. iii and Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, ‘‘The Contested Commons.’’
14. Quadrennial Defense Review, p. vi.
15. Ibid., p. 32.
16. Ibid., pp. 32 —33.
17. Ibid., p. 33.
18. John T. Bennett, ‘‘Flournoy Defends QDR, Budget Focus on ‘High-End’ Ops,’’
FederalTimes.com, February 3, 2010, http://www.federaltimes.com/article/20100203/
DEPARTMENTS01/2030303/0/TWITTER.
19. Michael Schumann, ‘‘How to Defeat Pirates: Success in the Strait,’’ Time, April 22,
2009, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1893032,00.html.
20. See Pew Charitable Trust, ‘‘Ratify Law of the Sea: U.S. National Security,’’ n.d., http://
ratifylawofthesea.org/?page_id17 and ‘‘Transcript of Hillary Clinton’s Confirmation
Hearing,’’ Council on Foreign Relations Essential Documents, January 13, 2009, http://
www.cfr.org/publication/18225/transcript_of_hillary_clintons_confirmation_hearing.html.
21. See Timon Singh, ‘‘Space: The Final Junkyard,’’ EU Infrastructure, August 24, 2008,
http://www.euinfrastructure.com/news/Space-The-Final-Junkyard/.
22. Ibid.
23. See Robert D. Kaplan, ‘‘The Geography of Chinese Power,’’ Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3
(May/June 2010): 39 —40.
24. Quadrennial Defense Review, pp. 14 —15.
25. Ibid., pp. 34 —35.
26. Remarks by Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH), ‘‘Hearing of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on the Status of United
States Strategic Forces,’’ March 16, 2010.
27. Ibid., pp. 37 —39.
28. DOD, ‘‘Bloggers Roundtable with Michael Nacht, Assitant Secretary of Defense for
Global Strategic Affairs, and Kathleen Hicks, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense,’’
February 3, 2010, http://www.dodlive.mil/files/2010/02/0203qdr-Nacht-and-Hicks.pdf.

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