People vs. Valdez, G.R. No.

L-75390, March 25, 1988

Summary:

While Eleno Maquiling was in his home’s yard with his family, he was shot dead from a distance. Danilo
Valdez, holding a firearm, and Simplicio Orodio were seen fleeing from the direction where the gunshot
came. The Court found them guilty of murder, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation, which was based on circumstantial evidence. The Court also found from
circumstantial evidence the existence of conspiracy, holding Simplicio Orodio principally liable as co-
conspirator despite not firing the fatal shot himself.

Facts:

At about 8pm in the evening, Eleno Maquiling with his family were in their yard, illuminated by a lamp. A
relative arrived and asked Eleno’s mother, Esmenia, to accompany her to prayer meeting. She refused
and asked Eleno. As Eleno was about to stand up, a gunshot was fired and Eleno fell to the ground.
Esmenia looked at the direction where the gunshot came from and saw Danilo Valdez, holding a gun, and
Simplicio Orodio, running away from the scene. Danilo was a relative and Simplicio was an acquaintance.

Three days after the shooting, Juanito, Eleno’s father, executed a sworn statement before the police that
he had not seen the accused at the night of the shooting. But he was told by Eleno that in case something
bad happened to him, Danilo and Simplicio should be held responsible as he had quarreled with them
because of their stealing and robbing. Ten days later, Esmenia made a statement to the police. Eleno’s
brother Dionisio also gave a statement. Both of them identified Danilo as Eleno’s killer.

Danilo and Simplicio were charged with murder. The information alleged conspiracy, treachery, evident
premeditation, and aggravating circumstance of nighttime.

Issue:

1. Whether or not evidence of the prosecution establishes guilt beyong reasonable doubt. - YES
2. Whether or not Simplicio is principally liable even if he was not the one who shot Eleno. – YES

Ruling:

1. Yes. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstances;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Tested by the rule stated above, and considering that Eleno was killed by a shot in the back and
suffered eight (8) pellet wounds from one gunshot only; that the accused were immediately seen
running down-hill away from the scene after the gunshot report with accused Danilo v. Valdez
carrying a long firearm; that three (3) days before the incident there was already bad blood
between the victim and accused Danilo Valdez as the victim confided to his father Juanito
 Maquiling that if ever he would be shot accused Danilo Valdez is the one to be blamed; that when
the place where the crime was committed is an isolated place and it is highly probable that some
other malefactors could have been present; and that footprints were seen by the police
investigators behind the bamboo grove where the accused were seen to come from immediately
after the shooting that Esmenia Maquiling even described the clothing of accused Danilo Valdez;
that the two accused are well known to the victim's family thereby precluding the possibility of
mistaken Identity; all these proven facts afford sufficient or a reasonable inference that the two
accused were indeed the killers of the victim.

2. Yes. Orodio was present with Valdez at the time Eleno Maquiling was killed by a shotgun blast at
his back. He was in the company of a man running with a shotgun, at approximately 8:00 o'clock
in the evening, immediately after the fatal shooting, just outside the Maquilings house where he
had no business being if he were not acting in concert with Danilo Valdez, the accused-appellant
who carried the shotgun. He was a close friend (barkada) of the accused Danilo Valdez, both of
whom the deceased victim had identified as probably responsible should any untoward event
befall the victim. Simplicio Orodio completely failed to explain what he was doing with Danilo
Valdez the night of the killing, on the one hand. Upon the other, both Danilo Valdez and Simplicio
Orodio pleaded the same alibi. Valdez and Orodio both testified that they were in Cervantes,
Ilocos Sur, when Eleno was shot to death. Their common alibi remained uncorroborated for both
failed to present either the mother of accused Danilo Valdez who was supposed to have come to
Cervantes Ilocos Sur, to inform them that Eleno Maquiling had been shot to death, or any other
witness for that matter. The trial court found the accused common defense of alibi as non-credible
as it was not impossible for the accused to be present at the scene of the crime.

People vs. Patano, G.R. No. 129306, March 14, 2003

Facts:

James Patano, Ramil Madriaga and Rosendo Madriaga, Oswaldo Banaag, Manolo Babac, Allan Duarte and
Jose Doe, appealed last 15 May 1996 to the crime charged against them which was Kidnapping for
Ransom. The aforementioned accused allegedly grouped themselves together, conspired, confederated
and mutually helped one another on 25 March 1996 to unlawfully and feloniously detain and kidnap
Vicente Uy Chua in Antipolo Rizal to extort ransom and demand an amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php
10,000,000.00). The kidnapped victim Vicente Uy Chua was rescued on 27 March 1996, and the trial court
convicted appellants James Patano, Ramil Madriaga, and Rosendo Madriaga of kidnapping for ransom,
while the co-accused Oswaldo Banaag was acquitted.

It was argued that the total circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was not sufficient to
establish the guilt of the appellants to conspire and propose to commit felony of kidnapping for ransom,
because not one of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual abduction. The witness Dimal admitted
during cross-examination that he did not see the appellants kidnapping or abducting the kidnap victim,
Vicente Uy Chua.
Issue:

Whether or not the convicted appellants are all or separately and individually guilty of crime of kidnapping
for ransom, conspiring and proposing to each other to commit such felony on the strength of
circumstantial evidences presented.

Ruling:

No. All told, while the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom has been proven, appellants' participation therein
had not been adequately proven beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, all three appellants must be acquitted.

The trial court declared that the evidence for the prosecution is purely circumstantial on which basis it
ruled that appellants conspired in perpetrating the crime of kidnapping with ransom.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The following
elements must concur: (1) there must be more than one circumstance; (2) the facts on which the inference
of guilt is based must be proved; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In the present case, the totality of the pieces of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution is
not sufficient to establish the guilt of appellants. Not one of the prosecution witnesses saw the actual
abduction. Witness Dimal admitted during cross-examination that he did not see appellants actually
kidnap or abduct Uy.

SC acquitted them of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as charged for failure of the prosecution to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

People vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158754, August 10, 2007

Petitioner's argument diminishes as grave abuse of discretion the public respondent's rejection of the
theory of overlapping conspiracies, which, in the abstract, depicts a picture of a conspirator in the first
level of conspiracy performing acts which implement, or in furtherance of, another conspiracy in the next
level of which the actor is not an active party.

Facts:

As an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph Ejercito Estrada, then President of the
Republic of the Philippines, five criminal complaints against the former President and members of his
family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. One of the
Information was for the crime of plunder under Republic Act [RA] No. 7080 and among the respondents
was herein petitioner Jose "Jinggoy" Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.

The amended information referred to, like the original, charged respondent Jinggoy, together with the
former President and several others, with plunder under RA 7080, as amended by section 12of RA 7659.
Jinggoy Estrada interposed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court claiming that respondent
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining the charge against him for alleged
offenses and with alleged conspirators with whom he is not even connected. Jinggoy then filed a petition
for bail before the Sandiganbayan which was subsequently granted in his favor. Hence, the present
petition argues that respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting bail to Jinggoy considering the well-established theory of overlapping consipiracies
and thus disregarding the application of accepted criminal law precepts, thereby setting a dangerous
precedent.

Issue:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the theory
of overlapping conspiracies when in granted bail to Jinggoy. (NO)

Ruling:

No. Petitioner's argument diminishes as grave abuse of discretion the public respondent's rejection of the
theory of overlapping conspiracies, which, in the abstract, depicts a picture of a conspirator in the first
level of conspiracy performing acts which implement, or in furtherance of, another conspiracy in the next
level of which the actor is not an active party. As the petitioner's logic goes following this theory,
respondent Jinggoy is not only liable for conspiring with former President Estrada in the acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth from "jueteng" under par. (a) of the amended information. He has also a culpable
connection with the conspiracy, under par. (b), in the diversion of the tobacco excise tax and in receiving
commissions and kickbacks from the purchase by the SSS and GSIS of Belle Corporation shares and other
illegal sources under par. (c) and (d), albeit, he is not so named in the last three paragraphs. And since the
central figure in the overlapping conspiracies, i.e., President Estrada, is charged with a capital offense, all
those within the conspiracy loop would be considered charged with the same kind of non-bailable offense.
Revoking the bail thus granted to respondent Jinggoy, as the petitioner urges, which necessarily implies
that the evidence of his guilt is strong, would be tantamount to preempting the Sandiganbayan's ongoing
determination of the facts and merits of the main case.

People vs. Liad (EDGARDO LIAD and JUN VALDERAMA) G.R. No. 133815-17, March 22, 2001

Facts:

Lydia Cuenca was driving on her way home when she was approached by three men. The three men
managed to force open the vehicle and shot her twice. Manuel, Lydia’s husband, who was also driving and
right behind Lydia in a convoy, witnessed the event. Manuel then tried to catch up with the car with the
three men and his wounded wife. Meanwhile at Police Station 6, Commonwealth Avenue, the desk officer,
SPO Bernarte, received a telephone call from a concerned citizen informing them that a robbery-hold-up
was in progress along Commonwealth Avenue. The desk officer immediately dispatched SPO4 Raul
Espejon, SPO1 Ricardo Inamac, SPO2 Faustino and SPO1 Diaz. Before they could leave the police station,
however, their office received another report from Batasan Hills Barangay Captain Arturo Ison regarding
the same incident. The police thus proceeded to Commonwealth Avenue and Ilang-Ilang Street where
they saw the victim, Lydia Cuenca, lying on the front door of the Tamaraw FX. SPO4 Diaz and SPO1 Faustino
brought the victim to the hospital while the rest of the force proceeded to the Trans-World Compound
along Filinvest Road, about 400 yards from Ilang-Ilang Street. A security guard as well as members of the
barangay commando informed them that the three suspects were in the compound.

Upon approaching the suspects, the police were met with a barrage of gunfire. The police returned fire.
The exchange lasted a few minutes until one of the suspects, a certain "Baeng," was hit. Baeng sprawled
to the ground, still holding his .38 calibre paltik. Accused-appellants, who were hiding behind the banana
plants, then surrendered to the police. SPO4 Espejon immediately apprehended accused-appellant Jun
Valderama and disarmed him of his .38 calibre paltik revolver. He also recovered Baeng’s gun.

SPO1 Inamac arrested the other accused-appellant, Edgardo Liad, and confiscated the latter’s firearm,
likewise a .38 paltik revolver. SPO1 Inamac also recovered the victim’s jewelry and wallet, which was
pointed to by Liad. The victim’s bag was wedged in the trunk of a banana plant. The police brought the
accused-appellants to the police station while Baeng, who was gasping for breath, was rushed to the
Fairview Hospital. Baeng eventually died.

Edgar Liad and Jun Valderama were subsequently charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
with Robbery with Homicide.

Issue:

Whether or not that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a conspiracy
between accused-appellants and the deceased.

Held:

Yes. The Court finds that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of a
conspiracy between accused-appellants and the deceased. In conspiracy, direct proof of a previous
agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be deduced from the mode and manner by which
the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such point to a
joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Conspiracy may be inferred from
the conduct of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime. In this case, there were
several circumstances immediately before, during and after the robbery indubitably which show that the
perpetrators were one in their purpose to rob the victim. Where conspiracy is shown, the precise extent
of participation of each accused in the crime is secondary and the act of one may be imputed to all the
conspirators.

The SC held that the trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accused-appellants of robbery with
homicide. Whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery,
all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals for the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide.

In cases involving illegal possession of firearm, the requisite elements are: (a) the existence of the subject
firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess. The latter is a negative fact that constitutes an essential
ingredient of the offense of illegal possession, and it is the duty of the prosecution not only to allege it but
also to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. The Court agrees with accused-appellants and the Solicitor
General that the prosecution in this case failed to prove the second element.

The SC does not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that since a paltik is a homemade gun,
is illegally manufactured as recognized in People v. Fajardo, and cannot be issued a license or permit, it is
no longer necessary to prove that it is unlicensed. This appears to be, at first blush, a very logical
proposition. The Court, however, yield to it because Fajardo did not say that paltiks can in no case be
issued a license or a permit, and that proof that a firearm is a paltik dispenses with proof that it is
unlicensed.
In Criminal Case No. Q-96-65118, Accused-appellants Edgardo Liad y Beigar and Jun Valderama y Caspe
are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide and are sentenced to each
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellants are ordered to pay in solidum the heirs of
the deceased Lydia Cuenca the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, P50,000.00 as moral
damages and P305,265.00 as funeral and burial expenses.

In Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-65119 and Q-96-65120 for illegal possession of firearm, Accused-appellants
are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

People vs. Pinto, 204 SCRA 9 (DANIEL PINTO, JR. and NARCISO BUENAFLOR, JR.)

Accused both denied that they were the ones who fired at the victims. But the evidence were strong
against them and Daniel Pinto Jr and Narciso Buenaflor Jr were both charged of 3 counts of murder and 1
frustrated murder.

Issue:

Are the accused guilty of crime charged against them?

Ruling:

Yes. It is not even necessary to pinpoint who between Pinto and Buenaflor actually caused the death of
Richard or the wounding of Maria Theresa in the presence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that they
acted in conspiracy with each other. Prior agreement between the appellants to lull their intended victim
is not essential to prove conspiracy as the same may be inferred from their own acts showing joint purpose
and design. In this case, such unity of purpose and design is shown by the fact that only the two of them
fired their guns when the Anduiza jeep with the Tiongsons passed by. This they did in defiance of the order
of their superior not to shoot unless ordered to do so. Conspiracy having been proved, the guilt or
culpability is imposable on both appellants in equal degrees.

The same conspiracy was evident in the killing of Bello and Andes. The appellants' concerted action was
shown by the manner by which they killed the two. In this incident, however, they invoke self-defense as
a justifying circumstance. Evidence at hand, however, do not favor their claim.

The decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed subject to the modifications that appellants shall
solidarily be liable for the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000) for each of the three murders they
committed and, for the frustrated murder of Maria Theresa Tiongson, each of them shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years of prision correccional maximum as minimum to ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as maximum.

People vs. Comadre, G.R. No. 153559, June 8, 2004

Facts:

Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio (drinking grioup) were
having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father (Jaime). As the drinking session
went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano
(appellants) walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio
suddenly throw a hand grenade, ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Drinking group were hit by
shrapnel (fragments of the grenade) and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the
Hospital. However, Robert died before reaching the hospital. The trial court found appellants guilty of
complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murder.

Issue:

Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano.

Ruling:

Yes. It was established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe and
Gerry Bullanday were able to identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre
and Danilo Lozano because there was a lamppost in front of the house and the moon was bright.
However, there was no conspiracy. A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence.
It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence
of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends
companionship. The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any
participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the
scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy
considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime.

Only Antonio is liable for the crime. When Antonio Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade,
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without uttering a single word of encouragement
or performed any act to assist him.
People vs. Talaogan, G.R. No. 178198, December 10, 2008

Facts:

The victim, Steven Alston Davis (Steven), a 31-year old British national, together with his business
associate and long-time friend Michael Thomas Dunn (Michael), resided at a two-storey apartment unit
at No. 5958 Firmina Street, Barangay Poblacion, Makati City.

Steven married appellant Evelyn Bohol in Hong Kong sometime in March 1997, when the latter was only
17 years old. Together with their two minor children, Steven and the appellant shared a house at No. 1823
Fifth Street, Villasol Subdivision in Angeles City, Pampanga. Steven spent his weekdays in the Makati
apartment, and stayed with his family in Angeles City during weekends.

On July 17, 2002, three individuals, later positively identified during the trial to be Arnold Adoray (Arnold),
Alexander Dagami (Alexander), and accused-turned-state-witness Robin Butas (Robin), went inside the
victim’s apartment and shot him to death.

After the incident, Michael tried to contact Evelyn to tell her about what happened but he only managed
to do so after some time. When Michael met Evelyn at ten o’clock in the morning, he readily observed
that appellant showed no signs of sadness or mourning despite the violent death of her husband.

Arnold and Alexander were thus charged with murder on August 16, 2002.13 Trial thereafter ensued. The
information was later amended charging the appellant, together with Robin, with the crime of murder, in
conspiracy with Arnold and Alexander. A separate trial for the appellant was held. Upon arraignment, the
appellant pleaded "Not guilty."

The RTC rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified
by treachery, and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The court also made her
liable to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.

The court found sufficient evidence to establish conspiracy to kill Steven.

Issue:

Is Evelyn part of the conspiracy to commit the crime?

Ruling:

Yes. While it is true that appellant did not directly participate in shooting Steven, nevertheless, evidence
clearly shows that she was part of the conspiracy to commit the crime. There is conspiracy when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.42
It must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself. However, direct proof is not
required, as conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. It may be established through the
collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of a felony that all the accused
aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another for the attainment
of the same objective; and that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of
sentiments. First, Evelyn [appellant herein] provided for the effective and compelling inducement for
Arnold to carry into effect the killing of Steven. Second, Evelyn personally summoned and "recruited"
Robin to come along with them for possible backup or perhaps as "additional ammunition" in case of
resistance or retaliation on the part of their target. Third, it is apparent that the three men were not aware
of Steven’s location, and thus Evelyn acted as the guide who directed the group towards the residence of
Steven at Makati. And fourth, Evelyn provided the group with the keys in order for them to enter the
apartment with ease and unnoticed.

Indubitably, conspiracy was established.

Siton vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94065, December 2, 1991

Facts:

A free-for-all fight between the group of the accused-appellant, Roberto Siton, and group of the deceased,
Roylan Holgado, occurred. The accused-appellant was charged to have conspired with others in murdering
the vicitim. RTC found Siton guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. Court of Appeals
affirmed in toto.

Issue:

Did Court of Appeals err in finding that there is conspiracy in a free-for-all?

Ruling:

Yes. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. In the present case, there is no showing that there was a previous
agreement relating to the commission of the crime, it appearing that the meeting between the group of
Notar and the group of Holgado was casual and unarranged, and the aggression ensued at the spur of the
moment. Although proof of the agreement may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the conspirators
disclosing a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense, we have
also invariably ruled that like the offense itself, conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Decision was modified. Appellant-accused only guilty of less serious physical injuries.

People vs. Escobal, G.R. No. 206292, October 11, 2017

Facts:

In the late evening of April 14, 2007, SPO1 Renato Gaabucayan (deceased-victim) met with accused-
appellant Escobal. Auxtero, the eyewitness, presumed that the two were talking as he saw accused-
appellant Escobal place his left hand on the right shoulder of Gaabucayan while accused-appellant Abaño
was at the back of accused-appellant Escobal urinating. He can see them as the area where the three
persons were at was well-lit by a street light situated about four (4) to five (5) meters away. Shortly after,
gunshots were fired and Gaabucayan lying flat on the ground face up, while accused-appellant Escobal
was standing at the footside of Gaabucayan holding a nickel-plated gun pointed at the latter with accused-
appellant Abaño standing beside accused-appellant Escobal facing the left shoulder of Gaabucayan in a
position of pointing a gun. Gaabucayan raise his hand and plead accused-appellant Escobal to stop, saying
"stop it partner" (ayaw na partner).

Auxtero then came to the aid of Gaabucayan but the latter did not survive.

Estrillo Escobal y Salvacion and Melvin E. Abaño were found and declared guilty of murder for the killing
of the late SPO1 Fernando Gaabucayan, Jr. under the decision rendered on November 26, 2009 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, in Cagayan de Oro City. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed their
conviction on December 20, 2011. Hence, they appeal to the Court for exoneration.

Issue:

Is the mere presence at the scene of the crime enough to establish conspiracy?

Ruling:

No. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony, and decide to commit it; hence, the agreement concerning the commission of the crime must be
shown to precede the decision to commit it. Indeed, the acts of Abaño adverted to did not necessarily
reflect his community of purpose with Escobal in the killing of the victim. The former's mere passive
presence at the scene of the crime did not constitute proof of concerted action between him and Escobal.

Knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to
a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance
of the common design and purpose.

The Supreme Court ACQUITS accused MELVIN E. ABAÑO of the crime charged, and DIRECTS his
IMMEDIATE RELEASE FROM DETENTION, unless there are other lawful causes warranting his continuing
imprisonment.

People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. Nos. 134823-25, January 14, 2003

1. Yes. In the case at bar, as the trial court correctly held, conspiracy may be deduced from the
appellants' acts that show concerted action and community of interest. If it can be proven that
two (2) or more persons aimed their acts toward the accomplishment of the same unlawful object
— so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment — then conspiracy may
be inferred, even though no actual meeting among them to concert means can be shown.
Consequently, the conspirators shall be held equally liable for the crime, because in a conspiracy
the act of one is the act of all.
 Undoubtedly, in perpetrating the kidnapping for ransom, conspiracy existed among herein
accused-appellants. Viewed in its totality, the individual participation of each of them pointed to
a joint purpose and criminal design. Notarte and Yambot snatched the victim from his office in
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Pangilinan and Yambot sandwiched him in the car and transported
him, together with the others, to a house where he was detained for ten days. Lopez negotiated
with the victim's wife for the ransom payment.

2. No. The Court has consistently ruled that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any
other crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms.

Ladonga vs. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005

Facts:

In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam’s regular customers in his
pawnshop business. Sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him,
guaranteed by United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to July 7, 1990 issued
by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga
spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to
July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan
in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by
Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason “CLOSED ACCOUNT”; when the
Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint
against them. While admitting that the checks issued by Adronico bounced because there was no
sufficient deposit or the account was closed, the Ladonga spouses claimed that the checks were issued
only to guarantee the obligation, with an agreement that Oculam should not encash the checks when they
mature; and, that petitioner is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance
thereof. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction of petitioner.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner who was not the drawer or issuer of the three checks that bounced but her
co-accused husband under the latter’s account could be held liable for violations of Batas Pambansa Bilang
22 as conspirator.

Held:

No. The conviction must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that “a conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.” To
be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an
overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist
of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to
his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the
prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged
conspiracy. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she
was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean
concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive
and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of
the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in
the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555

Facts:

The respondent was sentenced with the punishment of reclusion perpetua for violating the Dangerous
Drug Act (RA No. 6425). He allegedly sold four tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics Command during a
buy-bust operation which was sold for P40.00. The said buy-bust operation was executed on or about
October 22, 1988. In this case, the respondent was praying for a lesser punishment under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC).

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment pursuant to Art. 22 of the RPC.

Held:

Yes, the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment prescribed by Art 22 of the RPC. Although Republic
Act No. 6425, amended further by Republic Act No. 7659, albeit originally amendatory and in substitution
of the previous Articles 190 to 194 of the Revised Penal Code, it has long been settled that by force of
Article 10 of said Code the beneficient provisions of Article 22 thereof applies to and shall be given
retrospective effect to crimes punished by special laws.

Republic Act No. 7659 already took effect on December 31, 1993 after its publication on December 16,
1993 while the respondent was still serving his sentence.

Hence, the respondent was given an indeterminate penalty of arresto mayor or prision correctional
instead of serving its full sentence of reclusion perpetua.

People vs. Martinada, G.R. Nos. L-66401-03, February 13, 1991

Facts:

February 13, 1982, Segundina Naboya was awakened by the barking of their dog; that her husband
Alejandro, herein victim, descended from their house after having been awakened by a gun report; that
at about the same time, Pascual Naboya, brother of Alejandro Naboya who was residing about 50 meters
away from the latter's house, also heard the barking of the dog; that Pascual stepped down from his house
to verify why the dog was barking, whereupon, he heard a gun burst which made him walk towards
Alejandro's house armed with a bolo; that he heard a second shot and then saw Alejandro already lying
on. the ground; that the victim was hit at the neck; that Segundina recognized Mesias and Martinada as
the assailants; that Pascual Naboya also recognized Martinada, Mesias and Maroto as the culprits; that
after Alejandro was shot, appellant Martinada untied the carabao and the latter and his companions took
the carabao away; and that the victim's wound required seven to nine days to heal. Francisco Martinada
and Bonifacio Mesias, together with one Bondoy Maroto and two John Does were all charged with (a)
qualified theft of large cattle or cattle rustling; (b) illegal possession of firearms and (c) frustrated murder.

Issue:

Is the shooting of Alejandro Naboya only a qualifying aggravating circumstance to the crime of cattle
rustling, therefore absorbing frustrated murder?

Ruling:

Yes. The crime of cattle-rustling is a modification of the crime of theft of large cattle. So Presidential
Decree No. 533, punishing cattle-rustling, is not a special law, but a law amending provisions of the RPC
(Arts. 309 and 310). It can absorb the crime of murder. If in the course of cattle rustling, murder was
committed, the offender cannot be prosecuted for murder.

People vs. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-13981, April 25, 1960

Facts:

On October 30, 1956, Elias Rodriguez was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The
accused filed a motion to quash on the ground that the crime with which he is charged is already alleged
as a component element or ingredient of the crime of rebellion with which he was charged in Criminal
Case No. 16990 of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

Issue:

Whether or not illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed in the crime of rebellion.

Held:

Yes. The Court held that, "any or all of the acts described in Art. 135, when committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the subversive ends described in Art. 134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and
cannot be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in themselves; and cannot be considered as giving rise
to a separate crime that, under Art. 48 of the code, would constitute a complex one with that of rebellion"
(People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil., 90; 53 Off. Gaz., 68), the conclusion is inescapable that the crime with
which the accused is charged in the present case is already absorbed in the rebellion case and so to press
it further now would be to place him in double jeopardy.

People vs. Macatanda, G.R. No. L-51368, November 6, 1981

Facts:

Charged with and convicted on a plea of guilty, in the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch
IV in Iligan City, for the crime of cattle rustling, Saglala Macatanda. From the judgment of conviction,
Saglala Macatanda (hereinafter referred to as appellant) appealed direct to this Court. The Solicitor
General comes up with a reply that Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply to penalties
prescribed by special laws. He considers P.D. 533, otherwise known as "Anti- Cattle Rustling Law of 1974"
as a special law, and in accordance with existing rulings, the penalty should not be governed by the Revised
Penal Code.
Issue:

Whether the contention of the Solicitor-General is valid.

Ruling:

No. The court do not agree with the Solicitor General that P.D. 533 is a special law, entirely distinct from
and unrelated to the Revised Penal Code. From the nature of the penalty imposed which is in terms of the
classification and duration of penalties as prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, which is not for penalties
as are ordinarily imposed in special laws, the intent seems clear that P.D. 533 shall be deemed as an
amendment of the Revised Penal Code, with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle (Art. 310), or
otherwise to be subject to applicable provisions thereof such as Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code on
civil liability of the offender, a provision which is not found in the decree, but which could not have been
intended to be discarded or eliminated by the decree. Article 64 of the same Code should, likewise, be
applicable, under which the presence of two mitigating circumstances, as found by the trial court, that of
plea of guilty and extreme poverty, without any aggravating circumstances to offset them, entitles
appellant to a lowering by one degree of the penalty for the offense, which under P.D. No. 533 is prision
mayor, maximum, to reclusion temporary medium.