N Industrial Disputes Act 1947 Pnarangoffice Gmailcom 20200917 095803 1 160

SCC Online Web Edition, Copyright © 2020
Page 1 Thursday, September 17, 2020

Printed For: Mr. Pavan Narang
SCC Online Web Edition: http://www.scconline.com
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
The
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(Industrial Disputes Act, 1947)
[Act 14 of 1947 as amended up to Act 7 of 2017]1

[11th March, 1947]
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY
1. Short title, extent and commencement
2. Definitions
2-A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute
CHAPTER II
AUTHORITIES UNDER THIS ACT
3. Works Committee
4. Conciliation officers
5. Boards of Conciliation
6. Courts of Inquiry
7. Labour Courts
7-A. Tribunals
7-B. National Tribunals
7-C. Disqualifications for the presiding officers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National
Tribunals
7-D. Qualifications, terms and conditions of service of Presiding Officer
8. Filling of vacancies
9. Finality of orders constituting Boards, etc
CHAPTER II-A
NOTICE OF CHANGE
9-A. Notice of change
9-B. Power of Government to exempt
CHAPTER II-B
GRIEVANCE REDRESSAL MACHINERY

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
9-C. Setting up of Grievance Redressal Machinery
CHAPTER III
REFERENCE OF DISPUTES TO BOARDS, COURTS OR TRIBUNALS
10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals
10-A. Voluntary reference of disputes to arbitration
CHAPTER IV
PROCEDURE, POWERS AND DUTIES OF AUTHORITIES
11. Procedure and powers of conciliation officers, Boards, Courts and Tribunals
11-A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in
case of discharge or dismissal of workmen
12. Duties of conciliation officers
13. Duties of Board
14. Duties of Courts
15. Duties of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals
16. Form of report or award
17. Publication of reports and awards
17-A. Commencement of the award
17-B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher courts
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding
19. Period of operation of settlements and awards
20. Commencement and conclusion of proceedings
21. Certain matters to be kept confidential
CHAPTER V
STRIKES AND LOCK-OUTS
22. Prohibition of strikes and lock-outs
23. General prohibition of strikes and lock-outs
24. Illegal strikes and lock-outs
25. Prohibition of financial aid to illegal strikes and lock-outs
CHAPTER V-A
LAY-OFF AND RETRENCHMENT
25-A. Application of Sections 25-C to 25-E
25-B. Definition of continuous service
25-C. Right of workmen laid off for compensation

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
25-D. Duty of an employer to maintain muster-rolls of workmen
25-E. Workmen not entitled to compensation in certain cases
25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen
25-FF. Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings
25-FFA. Sixty days' notice to be given of intention to close down any undertaking
25-FFF. Compensation to workmen in case of closing down of undertakings
25-G. Procedure for retrenchment
25-H. Re-employment of retrenched workmen
25-I. Recovery of moneys due from employers under this Chapter
25-J. Effect of laws inconsistent with this Chapter
CHAPTER V-B
SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO LAY-OFF, RETRENCHMENT AND CLOSURE IN CERTAIN

ESTABLISHMENTS
25-K. Application of Chapter V-B
25-L. Definitions
25-M. Prohibition of lay-off
25-N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen
25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking
25-P. Special provision as to restarting of undertakings closed down before commencement of

the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1976
25-Q. Penalty for lay-off and retrenchment without previous permission
25-R. Penalty for closure
25-S. Certain provisions of Chapter V-A to apply to an industrial establishment to which this
Chapter applies
CHAPTER V-C
UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES
25-T. Prohibition of unfair labour practice
25-U. Penalty for committing unfair labour practices
CHAPTER VI
PENALTIES
26. Penalty for illegal strikes and lock-outs
27. Penalty for instigation, etc
28. Penalty for giving financial aid to illegal strikes and lock-outs
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
29. Penalty for breach of settlement or award
30. Penalty for disclosing confidential information
30-A. Penalty for closure without notice
31. Penalty for other offences
CHAPTER VII
MISCELLANEOUS
32. Offence by companies, etc
33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during
pendency of proceedings
33-A. Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc., changed
during pendency of proceedings
33-B. Power to transfer certain proceedings
33-C. Recovery of money due from an employer
34. Cognizance of offences
35. Protection of persons
36. Representation of parties
36-A. Power to remove difficulties
36-B. Power to exempt
37. Protection of action taken under the Act
38. Power to make rules
39. Delegation of powers
40. Power to amend Schedules
FIRST SCHEDULE
SECOND SCHEDULE
THIRD SCHEDULE
FOURTH SCHEDULE
FIFTH SCHEDULE
———
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

[Act 14 of 1947 as amended up to Act 7 of 2017]1 [11th March, 1947]
An Act to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes, and for
certain other purposes
Whereas it is expedient to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial
disputes, and for certain other purposes hereinafter appearing;
It is hereby enacted as follows:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Statement of Objects and Reasons.—Experience of the working of the Trade Disputes Act,
1929, has revealed that its main defect is that while restraints have been imposed on the rights
of strike and lock-out in public utility services no provision has been made to render the
proceedings institutable under the Act for the settlement of an industrial dispute, either by
reference to a Board of Conciliation or to a Court of Inquiry, conclusive and binding on the
parties to the dispute. This defect was overcome during the war by empowering under Rule 81-
A of the Defence of India Rules, the Central Government to refer industrial disputes to
adjudicators and to enforce their awards. Rule 81-A, which was to lapse on the 1st October,
1946, is being kept in force by the Emergency Powers (Continuance) Ordinance, 1946, for a
further period of six months; and as industrial unrest, in checking which this rule has proved
useful, is gaining momentum due to the stress of postwar industrial readjustment, the need of
permanent legislation in replacement of this rule, is self-evident. This Bill embodies the
essential principles of Rule 81-A, which have proved generally acceptable to both employers and
workmen, retaining intact, for the most part, the provisions of the Trade Disputes Act, 1929.
The two new institutions for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes provided for
in the Bill are the Works Committees consisting of representatives of employers and workmen,
and Industrial Tribunals consisting of one or more members possessing qualifications ordinarily
required for appointment as Judges of a High Court. Power has been given to appropriate
Government to require Works Committees to be constituted in every industrial establishment
employing 100 workmen, or more and their duties will be to remove causes of friction between
the employer and workmen in the day to day working of the establishment and to promote
measures for securing amity and good relations between them. Industrial peace will be most
enduring where it is founded on voluntary settlement, and it is hoped that the Works
Committees will render recourse to the remaining machinery provided for in the Bill for the
settlement of disputes infrequent. A reference to an Industrial Tribunal will lie where both
parties to any industrial dispute apply for such reference, and also where the appropriate
Government considers it expedient so to do. An award of a Tribunal may be enforced either
wholly or in part by the appropriate Government for a period not exceeding one year. The power
to refer disputes to Industrial Tribunals and enforce their awards is an essential corollary to the
obligation that lies on the Government to secure conclusive determination of the disputes with a
view to redressing the legitimate grievances of the parties thereto, such obligation arising from
the imposition of restraints on the rights of strike and lock-out, which must remain inviolate,
except where considerations of public interest over-ride such rights.
The Bill also seeks to re-orient the administration of the conciliation machinery provided in
the Trade Disputes Act. Conciliation will be compulsory in all disputes in public utility services
and optional in the case of other industrial establishments. With a view to expedite conciliation
proceedings time limits have been prescribed for conclusion thereof—14 days in the case of
conciliation officer and two months in the case of Board of Conciliation, from the date of notice
of strike. A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings will be binding for
such period as may be agreed upon by the parties and where no period has been agreed upon,
for a period of one year, and will continue to be binding until revoked by a 3 months’ notice by
either party to the dispute.
Another important new feature of the Bill relates to the prohibition of strikes and lock outs
during the pendency of conciliation and adjudication proceedings, of settlements reached in the
course of conciliation proceedings and of awards of Industrial Tribunals declared binding by the
appropriate Government. The underlying argument is that where a dispute has been referred to
conciliation for adjudication a strike or lock out in furtherance thereof, is both unnecessary and
inexpedient. Where on the date of reference to conciliation or adjudication, a strike or lockout is
already in existence, power is given to the appropriate Government to prohibit its continuance
lest the chances of settlement or speedy determination of the dispute should be jeopardized.
The Bill also empowers the appropriate Government to declare, if public interest or
emergency so requires, by notification in the Official Gazette, any industry to be a public utility
service, for such period, if any, as may be specified in the notification.
Statement of Objects and Reasons of Amending Act 41 of 1956.—Doubt has been
raised whether retrenchment compensation under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, becomes
payable by reason merely of the fact that there has been a change of employers, even if the
service of the workman is continued without interruption and the terms and conditions of his
service remain unaltered. This has created difficulty in the transfer, reconstitution and
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
amalgamation of companies and it is proposed to make the intention clear by amending Section
25-F of the Act.
2. Questions have also been raised whether a workman who is laid off for more than forty five
days continuously is entitled to lay off compensation for any period beyond the first forty five
days. Opportunity has been taken to remove the ambiguity by specifying the circumstances
under which such compensation beyond the first forty-five days would be admissible to a
workman.
Statement of Objects and Reasons of Amending Act 36 of 1964.—The Bill seeks to
make changes in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The important changes in the Act were
discussed at various tripartite meetings like the Indian Labour Conference and the Standing
Labour Committee and have their approval.
2. Section 7-A of the Act lays down the qualification for appointment as the Presiding Officer
of a Tribunal. The State Government have been experiencing difficulty in getting suitable
persons for appointment as Presiding Officers of Tribunals. Many of the State Governments have
accordingly amended this section in its application to their States enabling District and Sessions
Judges to be appointed to these posts. It is now proposed to provide for the appointment of a
serving or a retired District Judge or Additional District Judge of not less than three years’
standing as a Presiding Office of the Tribunal.
3. In order to encourage arbitration, it is proposed to provide (1) for the appointment of
umpires in case of difference of opinion between an even number of arbitrators, (2) for
prohibition of strikes and lock-outs during arbitration proceedings, and (3) for application of
Section 33 during the pendency of any arbitration proceedings. Further, an arbitration award is
binding at present only on the parties to the arbitration. This position is discouraging employers
from agreeing readily to voluntary arbitration as they cannot enforce it on the workers who are
not a party to the agreement. It is now being provided in the Bill that the arbitration award
shall have the same binding force as an award of a Tribunal provided that the appropriate
Government is satisfied that the parties to the agreement represent the majority of each party.
4. The Supreme Court have held that a notice to terminate an award can be given by a group
of workmen acting collectively either through their union or otherwise, and it is not necessary
that such a group or the union should represent the majority of the workmen bound by the
award. In order to prevent any irresponsible or dissatisfied group of workmen from terminating
the settlement or an award without any regard for the effect of such termination on the entire
body of the workmen, it is proposed to amend the Act so that in future only a majority of
workmen shall have the right to terminate a settlement or award.
5. Opportunity has been availed of to propose a few other essential amendments which are
mainly of a formal or clarificatory nature.
“Notes on Clauses explain the important provisions of the Bill”—Gazette of India, 2-12-1963,
Pt. II, Section 2, Extra., page 910.
Statement of Objects and Reasons of Amending Act 35 of 1965.—In order to simplify
the existing procedure for handling disputes in respect of the Air Corporations, it is considered
necessary to bring the Indian Airlines and Air India Corporations within the jurisdiction of the
central sphere as in the case of some other corporations of all India importance such as the
Agricultural Refinance Corporation, the Deposit Insurance Corporation etc.
2. In construing the scope of industrial dispute, Courts have taken the view that a dispute
between an employer and an individual workman cannot per se be an industrial dispute, but it
may become one if it is taken up by a union or a number of workmen making a common cause
with the aggrieved individual workman. In view of this, cases of individual dismissals and
discharges cannot be taken up for conciliation or arbitration or referred to adjudication under
the Industrial Disputes Act, unless they are sponsored by a union or a number of workmen. It is
now proposed to make the machinery under the Act available in such cases.
3. Section 25-C of the Act provides that a workman (who has completed not less than one
year of continuous service) on being laid off, is entitled to receive compensation up to a
maximum period of forty five days during the course of any twelve months. Where, however,
the period of lay off after the expiry of the first forty five days comprises continuous periods of
one week or more, the workman is to be paid compensation for all the days comprised in every
such subsequent period of lay off, unless there is an agreement to the contrary between the
workman and the employer. This provision is open to abuse inasmuch as workmen could be
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
denied lay off compensation by being made to work for some days in each week after the first
forty five days of lay off. With a view to prevent such an abuse, it is now considered necessary
to make a provision that lay off compensation would become payable for all the days of lay off
beyond the first forty five days, whether the period is continuous for a week or not.
4. Section 29 of the Act provides for the imposition of a penalty for breach of a settlement or
an award, which may be imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or fine, or
both. There is no provision for enhanced penalty in the event of continued breach of settlements
or awards with the result that some unscrupulous employers are able to successfully thwart the
implementation of settlements or awards by paying a fine once, which may be far less than
what the obligation would otherwise entail. Consequently, the workmen are unable to get the
benefits flowing from the award though the employer might have been convicted for the breach.
Thus, the absence of provisions for deterrent penalties for continued breach of settlements and
awards is acting as an impediment in the way of implementation of settlements and awards,
and it is therefore, now proposed to make a suitable provision for the imposition of punishment
in case of a continuing breach of a settlement or an award after conviction for the first breach.
5. Many of the above proposals have also received the approval of the Standing Labour
Committee at its 21st session.
6. The present Bill seeks to amend the Industrial Disputes Act to give effect to the above
proposals and opportunity has also been availed of to make two other amendments of
procedural nature.
Statement of Objects and Reasons of Amending Act 45 of 1971.—In Indian Iron and
Steel company Limited v. Their Workmen (AIR 1958 SC 130 at 138), the Supreme Court, while
considering the Tribunal's power to interfere with the management's decision to dismiss,
discharge or terminate the services of a workman has observed that in cases of dismissal on
misconduct, the Tribunal does not act as a court of appeal and substitute its own judgment for
that of the management and that the Tribunal will interfere only when there is want of good
faith, victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc., on the part of the management.
2. The International Labour Organisation, in its recommendation (No. 119) concerning
“Termination of employment at the initiative of the employer” adopted in June, 1963, has
recommended that a worker aggrieved by the termination of his employment should be entitled
to appeal against the termination, among others, to a neutral body such as an arbitrator, a
court, an arbitration committee or a similar body and that the neutral body concerned should be
empowered to examine the reasons given in the termination of employment and the other
circumstances relating to the case and to render a decision on the justification of the
termination. The International Labour Organisation has further recommended that the neutral
body should be empowered (if it finds that the termination of employment was unjustified) to
order that the worker concerned, unless reinstated with unpaid wages, should be paid adequate
compensation or afforded some other relief.
3. In accordance with these recommendations, it is considered that the Tribunal's power in
an adjudication proceeding relating to discharge or dismissal of a workman should not be
limited and that the Tribunal should have the power, in cases wherever necessary, to set aside
the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and
conditions, if any, as it thinks fit or give such other relief to the workman including the award of
any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may
require. For this purpose, a new Section 11-A is proposed to be inserted in the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947.
4. Section 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, provides for payment of
compensation to workmen in case of closing down of an undertaking and the amount is
calculated at the rate of fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous
service or any part thereof in excess of six months. But, in the case of closure on account of
unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the ceiling limit of
compensation is the average pay for three months. A central workers’ organisation suggested an
amendment of Section 25-FFF of the Act to remove the ceiling limit of compensation in case of
closure of a mining undertaking by reason of exhaustion of its reserves. According to its
suggestion such closing down should not be deemed to be on account of unavoidable
circumstances beyond the control of the employers because the employers have definite
knowledge of the exhaustion of the area reserves of mines. The Industrial Committee on Coal
Mining, in its ninth session (Calcutta 10th, 11th August, 1964) and the Industrial Committee on
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Mines other than Coal in its fourth session (New Delhi 20th, 21st February, 1965) have agreed
to the suggestion to amend the Act for the aforesaid purpose. Accordingly, it is proposed to
amend Section 25-FFF to provide for payment of full compensation to workmen in the event of
closing down of a mining undertaking due to exhaustion of its reserves subject to the condition
that no retrenchment compensation would be payable to the workmen concerned when an
employer provides them with alternative employment with effect from the date of closure at the
same remuneration as they were entitled to receive, and on the same terms and conditions of
service as were applicable to them, immediately before the closure.
5. It is also proposed to make the Central Government as the appropriate Government in
relation to the industrial disputes concerning the Industrial Finance Corporation and the Life
Insurance Corporation of India. It is also proposed to declare service in, or in connection with,
the working of major ports and docks as permanent public utility service.
6. The Bill is designed to give effect to above proposals.
Statement of Objects and Reasons of Amending Act 32 of 1972.—The problem of
closure of industrial undertakings resulting in loss of production and unemployment of large
numbers of workmen has of late become very serious. Employers have declared sudden closures
of industrial establishments without any notice or advance intimation to the Government,
Several factors appear to have led to these closures, amongst which are accumulated losses
over a number of years and mismanagement of the affairs of the establishments. The
unsatisfactory state of industrial relations (in the sense of labour unrest making it difficult to
sustain regular production) has been pleaded as a precipitating factor. Certain other causes like
financial difficulties and non-availability of essential raw materials have also been mentioned.
2. Since the problem of closure has been acute in the State of West Bengal, a President's Act
— The Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Amendment) Act, 1971 — was enacted on the 28th
August, 1971. This provided that an employer who intended to close down an undertaking
should serve at least sixty days’ notice on the State Government stating clearly the reasons for
the intended closure of the undertaking. While enacting this legislation for West Bengal,
Government considered it desirable to promote Central legislation on the subject, since the
problem of closure was not limited to West Bengal but was found in varying degrees in other
States as well.
3. It was, however, felt that before Central legislation was enacted, the matter should be
considered by the Indian Labour Conference. The Indian Labour Conference which met on the
22nd and 23rd October, 1971, generally endorsed the proposal for Central legislation.
4. The Bill seeks to give effect to the recommendation of the Indian Labour Conference. It
provides for the service of a notice, at least sixty days before the intended closure of an
undertaking is to become effective, so that within this period prompt remedial measures could
be taken, where the circumstances permit to prevent such closure. No notice will be required to
be served in the case of undertakings set up for construction of buildings, roads, canals, dams
and other construction works and projects or in the case of small establishments employing less
than fifty persons. The Bill also provides for penalty for closing down any undertaking without
serving the requisite notice.
Statement of Objects and Reasons of Amending Act 32 of 1976.—The Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 does not contain any provision for preventing lay off and retrenchment.
Though the Act provides for 60 days’ notice by the employer prior to closing down an
establishment employing 50 or more persons, it does not provide for any prior scrutiny of the
reasons for such closure. The employers have an unfettered right to close down an
establishment subject to the provision of 60 day's notice.
2. There have been many cases of large scale lay offs, particular by large companies and
undertakings. Cases of large scale retrenchment as well as closures have also been reported
time and again. This action on the part of the management has resulted in all-round
demoralising effect on the workmen. In order to prevent avoidable hardship to the employees
and to maintain higher tempo of production and productivity, it has become now necessary to
put some reasonable restrictions on the employer's right to lay off retrenchment, and closure.
This need has also been felt by different State Governments.
3. This Bill, therefore, seeks to amend the Industrial Disputes Act to make prior approval of
the appropriate Government necessary in the case of lay off, retrenchment and closure in
industrial establishments where 300 or more workmen are employed. This is sought to be
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
achieved by inserting a new Chapter V-B in the Act. In the interests of rehabilitation of
workmen and for maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community,
there is a provision in the Bill for restarting the undertakings which were already closed down
otherwise than on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer.
4. It is also proposed to provide for more stringent penalties for the contravention of the
provisions of Chapter V-B. For the purposes of this chapter, it is also proposed to make the
Central Government the appropriate Government in respect of companies in which not less than
fifty one per cent of the paid-up share capital is held by the Central Government and of
corporations established by or under law made by Parliament.
5. The Bill is designed to give effect to the above proposals.
Disputes Act, 1947, provides the machinery and procedure for the investigation and settlement
of industrial disputes. The provisions of the Act had been amended from time to time in the
light of experience gained in its actual working, case laws and industrial relations policy of the
Government. The National Commission on Labour (1969) which made an in-depth study of the
industrial relations and procedures had identified a number of areas in which the Act needed to
be amended to promote industrial harmony. The recommendations of the National Commission
on Labour were discussed at various forums.
2. The objectives of the Bill are mainly to ensure speedier resolution of industrial disputes by
removing procedural delays and to make certain other amendments in the light of some of the
recommendations of the National Commission on Labour. The Bill seeks to make the following
amendments in the Act, namely:—
(i) Difficulties have arisen in the interpretation of the definition of the expression “appropriate
Government” as contained in the Act in respect of certain industrial establishments. It is
proposed to remove these difficulties by making the Central Government the appropriate
Government in respect of those establishments.
(ii) The Supreme Court in its decision in the Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v.
Rajappa, [(1978) 2 SCC 213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215 : AIR 1978 SC 548] had, while
interpreting the definition of “industry” as contained in the Act, observed that Government
might restructure this definition by suitable legislative measures. It is accordingly
proposed to redefine the term “industry”. While doing so, it is proposed to exclude from
the scope of this expression, certain institutions like hospitals and dispensaries,
educational, scientific, research or training institutes, institutions engaged in charitable,
social and philanthropic services, etc., in view of the need to maintain in such institutions
an atmosphere different from that in industrial and commercial undertakings and to meet
the special needs of such organisations. It is also proposed to exclude sovereign functions
of Government including activities relating to atomic energy, space and defence research
from the purview of the term “industry”. However, keeping in view the special
characteristics of these activities and the fact that their workmen also need protection, it is
proposed to have a separate law for the settlement of individual grievances as well as
collective disputes in respect of the workmen of these institutions. All these have been
taken into account and the term “industry” has been made more specific while making the
coverage wider. The scope of the term “workman” has also been enlarged to cover the
supervisory staff whose wages do not exceed Rs 1,600 per month.
(iii) A model grievances redressal procedure had been commended for adoption. But this
voluntary arrangement has not proved effective. It is, therefore, proposed to make it
obligatory for every industrial establishment employing 100 or more workmen to set up a
time-bound grievance redressal procedure.
(iv) There has been dissatisfaction with delays involved in the adjudication of industrial
disputes. It is proposed to fix a time limit for the adjudication of individual and collective
disputes, as also for the disposal of claims, applications and other references by the
Labour Court, the Industrial Tribunal or the National Industrial Tribunal with a view to
securing speedier justice to workmen. It has also been provided that no case will lapse
merely on account of the fact that the time limits specified had expired.
(v) There have been conflicting decisions about the right of legal heirs of a workman in the
event of the death of the latter pending proceedings before the authorities under the Act.
Provision is being made to make it clear that pending disputes will not abate in the event
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
of the death of the workman.
(vi) It is observed that when Labour Courts pass awards of reinstatement, these are often
contested by an employer in the Supreme Court and High Court. The delay in the
implementation of the award causes hardship to the workmen concerned. It is, therefore,
proposed to provide for payment of wages last drawn by the workmen concerned, under
certain conditions, from the date of the award till the case is finally decided in the
Supreme Court or the High Courts.
(vii) It is proposed to provide that workmen in mines could be laid off for reasons of fire,
flood, excess of inflammable gas or explosion without previous permission.
(viii) Taking into consideration the observations of the Supreme Court in the Excel Wear case,
[(1978) 4 SCC 224 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 509 : AIR 1979 SC 25], it is proposed to recast the
provisions relating to closure of industrial establishments as contained in the Act to
provide for the following, namely:—
(a) The employer will have to apply to Government to obtain permission for closure ninety
days before the intended date of closure and a copy of such application will have to be
served by him on the representatives of the workmen also;
(b) On receipt of such application, Government, after giving a reasonable opportunity of
being heard to the applicant and the representatives of the workmen, and after taking
into consideration the guidelines laid down in the provision, may grant or refuse to
grant the permission asked for. Permission shall be deemed to have been granted if no
order of the Government granting or refusing to grant permission is communicated
within the specified period;
(c) The order of the Government granting or refusing to grant permission is being made
final subject to a review by the Government or a reference to the Industrial Tribunal;
(d) Where an undertaking is permitted to be closed down, the workmen shall be entitled
to closure compensation equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed
year of continuous service or part thereof in excess of six months.
(ix) The special provisions relating to lay-off, retrenchment and closure as contained in
Chapter V-B of the Act apply at present to establishments employing 300 workmen or
above. With a view to extending this statutory protection to workmen of smaller
establishments also, it is proposed to reduce the existing employment limit from 300 to
100.
(x) There is at present no Central law specifying unfair labour practices on the part of
employers, workmen and the trade unions of employers and workmen and for imposing
any penalty for resorting to such undesirable practices. Certain State laws as well as
voluntary Codes of Discipline laid down by the Indian Labour Conference specify certain
practices as unfair labour practices. The National Commission on Labour which examined
this aspect in detail suggested a list of such unfair practices. It is proposed to make
suitable provision in the Act to specify certain practices as unfair labour practices on the
part of employers, workmen and trade unions and to provide for penalties for those
indulging in such practices.
3. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objects and to provide for certain other consequential
and clarificatory changes in the Act.
Disputes Act, 1947, provides the machinery and procedure for the investigation and settlement
Government.
2. The amendments proposed in the Bill are mainly to clarify certain doubts expressed by
Courts on the validity of certain provisions of the Act. The Bill, inter alia, seeks to make the
following amendments in the Act, namely:—
(i) Difficulties have arisen in the interpretation of the expression “retrenchment”. It is
proposed to exclude from the definition of “retrenchment” as contained in the Act
termination of the service of a workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of
employment on its expiry and of the termination of such contract in accordance with the
provisions thereof;
(ii) Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the Excel Wear case [(1978) 4 SCC 224 :
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
1978 SCC (L&S) 509], some High Courts have declared invalid the special provisions
relating to lay-off and retrenchment contained in the Act which applied to establishments
employing 300 or more workmen. It is proposed to redraft these provisions on the same
lines as the amended provision relating to closure, which was inserted by the Industrial
Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 (46 of 1982), after taking into consideration the
observations of the Supreme Court in the above case.
3. The Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 was passed by Parliament in August,
1982. A number of provisions of that Act confer considerable benefits to workmen. In order to
provide that the various sections of that Act can be notified for enforcement separately and with
effect from different dates, it is proposed to amend suitably Section 1(2) of that Act.
Disputes Act, 1947 provides the machinery and procedure for the investigation and settlement
Government.
2. At present the workman, whose services have been discharged, dismissed, retrenched, or
otherwise terminated under Section 2-A of the Act, is unable to approach the Labour Court or
Tribunal in the absence of a reference of industrial dispute by the appropriate Government to
Labour Court or Tribunal. This causes delay and untold suffering to the workmen. The Industrial
Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 provided for an in-house Grievance Settlement Authority for
the settlement of industrial disputes connected with an individual workman employed in the
Industrial establishment, but it does not permit the workman to approach Labour Court or
Tribunal until such dispute has been decided by the Grievance Settlement Authority. The Labour
Courts and Tribunals have no power under the Act to enforce the awards published by the
appropriate Government.
3. In view of the above, it is considered necessary to provide for workman a direct access to
Labour Court or Tribunal in case of disputes arising due to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
termination of service of workman. It is also proposed to establish a Grievance Redressal
Machinery as an in-house mechanism in an Industrial establishment with twenty or more
workmen without affecting the right of workman to raise an industrial dispute on the same
matter under the provisions of the Act.
4. Accordingly, the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 2009, inter alia, seeks to provide
for—
(i) amendment of the term “appropriate Government” defined under Section 2(a) of the Act
to amplify the existing definition;
(ii) enhancement of wage ceiling of a workman from one thousand six hundred rupees per
month to ten thousand rupees per month under Section 2(s) of the Act;
(iii) direct access for the workman to the Labour Court or Tribunal in case of disputes arising
out of Section 2-A of the Act;
(iv) expanding the scope of qualifications of Presiding Officers of Labour Courts or Tribunals
under Sections 7 and 7-A of the Act;
(v) establishment of Grievance Redressal Machinery in every Industrial establishment
employing twenty or more workmen for the resolution of disputes arising out of individual
grievances;
(vi) empowering the Labour Court or Tribunal to execute the awards, orders or settlements
arrived at by Labour Court or Tribunal.
5. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.
► Object of the Act.—The Industrial Disputes Act was designed to provide a self-contained code to
compel the parties to resort to industrial arbitration for the resolution of existing or apprehended disputes without
prescribing statutory norms for varied and variegated industrial relation norms so that the forums created for
resolution of disputes may remain unhampered by any statutory control and devise rational norms keeping
pace with improved industrial relations reflecting and imbibing socio-economic justice. That being the object of
the Act, the Court by interpretative process must strive to reduce the field of conflict and expand the area of
agreement and show its preference for upholding agreements sanctified by mutuality and consensus in larger
public interest, namely, to eschew industrial strife, confrontation and consequent wastage. Workmen v.
Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1984) 1 SCC 728 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 183.
The Industrial Disputes Act was brought on the statute-book with the object to ensure social justice to both
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
the employers and employees and advance the progress of industry by bringing about the existence of
harmony and cordial relationship between the parties. It is a piece of legislation providing and regulating the
service conditions of the workers. The object of the Act is to improve the service conditions of industrial labour
so as to provide for them the ordinary amenities of life and by the process, to bring about industrial peace
which would in its turn accelerate productive activity of the country resulting in its prosperity. The prosperity of
the country in its turn, helps to improve the conditions of labour. Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum-
Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC 82 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1054.
Narrow and restricted meanings to the expressions in the Act should be avoided. A pragmatic and not a
pedantic approach must be adopted. S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra, (1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S)
510.
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is principally to pre-empt industrial tensions and to create climate of goodwill,
so that energies of partners in production may not be dissipated in counterproductive battles. Duty of Industrial
Courts and Tribunals under this Act, is to take decisions in consonance with such purpose, to consider what is
due to a person in equity and judice and not apply the cold letter of statutes mechanically, U.P. State
Brassware Corpn. Ltd. v. Uday Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 250.
► Scope of the Act.—The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is a progressive piece of legislation and designed
to settle the disputes on a new pattern hitherto unknown to the judicial machinery set in the country.
The Act applies to an existing and not to a dead industry. The object of all labour legislation is to ensure fair
wages and to prevent disputes so that production might not be adversely affected. Banaras Ice Factory Ltd. v.
Workmen, AIR 1957 SC 168; Hari Prasad Shivshankar v. A.D. Divelkar, AIR 1957 SC 121.
The Act generally applies to all industries irrespective of the religion or caste of the parties. It applies to
industries owned by the Central and State Governments too. Hospital Employees' Union v. Christian Medical
College, (1987) 4 SCC 691 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 53.
Special service rules, framed under Article 309 of the Constitution may expressly or impliedly exclude the
provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Director of Postal Services v. K.R.B. Kaimal, (1984) 1 LLN 751(Ker)
(FB) : 1984 Lab IC 628 : (1984) 1 LLJ 484; Bijoy Kumar Bharti v. State of Bihar, (1984) 1 LLJ 214(Pat)(FB) :
1983 Lab IC 1884.
► Decision or award of Tribunal: If Law.—A decision or award of the Industrial Tribunal is not “Law”
within the meaning of Article 13, which could be challenged on the ground of repugnancy. East India
Industries (Madras) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras, (1954) 2 LLJ 418 (Mad HC).
Chapter I
PRELIMINARY
1. Short title, extent and commencement.—(1) This Act may be called the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947.
2 [(2) It extends to the whole of India.3
4 [* * *]]
(3) It shall come into force on the first day of April, 1947.
2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,—
(a) “appropriate Government” means,—
(i) in relation to any Industrial Disputes concerning 5 [* * *] any industry carried on by
or under the authority of the Central Government 6 [* * *] or by a railway company 7
[or concerning any such controlled industry as may be specified in this behalf by the
Central Government] 8 [* * *] or in relation to an Industrial Dispute concerning 9 [10 [a
Dock Labour Board established under Section 5-A of the Dock Workers (Regulation of
Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948), or 11 [the Industrial Finance Corporation of India
Limited formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956], or the Employees'
State Insurance Corporation established under Section 3 of the Employees' State
Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), or the Board of Trustees constituted under Section
3-A of the Coal Mines Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1948 (46 of
1948), or the Central Board of Trustees and the State Boards of Trustees constituted
under Section 5-A and Section 5-B, respectively, of the Employees' Provident Fund
and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952), [* * *]12 , or the Life Insurance
Corporation of India established under Section 3 of the Life Insurance Corporation
Act, 1956 (31 of 1956), or 13 [the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited registered
under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956)] or the Deposit Insurance and Credit
Guarantee Corporation established under Section 3 of the Deposit Insurance and
Credit Guarantee Corporation Act, 1961 (47 of 1961), or the Central Warehousing
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Corporation established under Section 3 of the Warehousing Corporations Act, 1962
(58 of 1962), or the Unit Trust of India established under Section 3 of the Unit Trust
of India Act, 1963 (52 of 1963), or the Food Corporation of India established under
Section 3, or a Board of Management established for two or more contiguous States
under Section 16 of the Food Corporations Act, 1964 (37 of 1964), or 14 [the Airports
Authority of India constituted under Section 3 of the Airports Authority of India Act,
1994 (55 of 1994)], or a Regional Rural Bank established under Section 3 of the
Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976 (21 of 1976), or the Export Credit and Guarantee
Corporation Limited or the Industrial Reconstruction Corporation of India Limited]],
or 15 [the Banking Service Commission established, under Section 3 of the Banking
Service Commission Act, 1975, or] 16 [an air transport service, or] 17 [a banking or an
insurance company, a mine, an oilfield] 18 [, a Cantonment Board,] or a 19 [major port,
any company in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital is
held by the Central Government, or any corporation, not being a corporation referred
to in this clause, established by or under any law made by Parliament, or the Cental
public sector undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking
and autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the Central Government, the Central
Government, and]
20 [(ii) in relation to any other industrial dispute, including the State public sector
undertaking, subsidiary companies set up by the principal undertaking and

autonomous bodies owned or controlled by the State Government, the State
Government:
Provided that in case of a dispute between a contractor and the contract labour
employed through the contractor in any industrial establishment where such dispute
first arose, the appropriate Government shall be the Central Government or the State
Government, as the case may be, which has control over such industrial
establishment.]
21 [(aa) “arbitrator” includes an umpire;]
STATE AMENDMENTS
RAJASTHAN.—After clause (aa) insert the following new clauses, namely:
“(aaa) ‘arbitration proceeding’ means—
(i) any proceeding under Chapter III-A of this Act before an arbitrator, or
(ii) any proceedings before an Industrial Tribunal in arbitration,
(aaaa) ‘arbitrator’ means an arbitrator to whom a dispute is referred for arbitration under the
provisions of Chapter III-A of this Act and includes an Umpire.”—Vide Rajasthan Act
XXXIV of 1958, w.e.f. 1-7-1960.
WEST BENGAL.—In its application to the State of West Bengal, clause (aaa) shall be
renumbered as clause (aaaa) and before clause (aaaa) so renumbered, the following clause shall
be inserted:—
“(aaa) ‘Authorised Officer’ means Labour Commissioner, Additional Labour Commissioner,
Joint Labour Commissioner, Deputy Labour Commissioner, Assistant Labour Commissioner,
or such other officers as may be authorised by the State Government, by notification in
the Official Gazette;” [Vide W.B. Act 17 of 2007, S. 3]
22 [ 23 [(aaa)] “average pay” means the average of the wages payable to a workman—
(i) in the case of monthly paid workman, in the three complete calendar months,
(ii) in the case of weekly paid workman, in the four complete weeks,
(iii) in the case of daily paid workman, in the twelve full working days, preceding the
date on which the average pay becomes payable if the workman had worked for
three complete calendar months or four complete weeks or twelve full working days,
as the case may be, and where such calculation cannot be made, the average pay
shall be calculated as the average of the wages payable to a workman during the
period he actually worked;]
24 [(b) “award” means an interim or a final determination of any industrial dispute or of any
question relating thereto by any Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Industrial
Tribunal and includes an arbitration award made under Section 10-A;]
STATE AMENDMENTS
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
RAJASTHAN.—In clause (b), for the words, figures and letter “under Section 10-A” substitute
the words, figures and letter “under Chapter III-A.”—Vide Rajasthan Act 34 of 1958, w.e.f. 1-7-
1960.
25
[(bb) “banking company” means a banking company as defined in Section 5 of the
Banking Companies Act, 1949 (10 of 1949), having branches or other establishments in
more than one State, and includes 26 [the Export-Import Bank of India,] [the Industrial
Reconstruction Bank of India,]27 [the National Housing Bank established under Section
4 of the National Housing Bank Act, 1987,]28 [* * *]29 [the Small Industries
Development Bank of India established under Section 3 of the Small Industries
Development Bank of India Act, 1989,]30 the Reserve Bank of India, the State Bank of
India, 31 [a corresponding new bank constituted under Section 3 of the Banking
Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970], 32 [a corresponding
new bank constituted under Section 3 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and
Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1980, and any subsidiary bank], as defined in the State
Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act, 1959 (38 of 1959);]
(c) “Board” means a Board of Conciliation constituted under this Act;
33 [(cc) “closure” means the permanent closing down of a place of employment or part
thereof;]
STATE AMENDMENTS
GUJARAT.—After clause (c), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:
“(cc) ‘closure’ means the permanent closing down of a place of employment or part thereof;”.
—Gujarat Ordinance No. 6 of 1984 (7-6-1984) which has been repealed by Gujarat Act 20
of 1984, Section 4 (22-10-1984) see Section 4(2) of Gujarat Act 20 of 1984.
(d) “conciliation officer” means a conciliation officer appointed under this Act;
(e) “conciliation proceeding” means any proceeding held by a conciliation officer or Board
under this Act;
34 [(ee) “controlled industry” means any industry the control of which by the Union has
been declared by any Central Act to be expedient in the public interest;]

35 [* * *]
STATE AMENDMENTS
GUJARAT.—After clause (ee), insert the following:
“(eee) ‘council’ means a Joint Management Council for any industrial establishment
constituted under Section 3-A;”—Gujarat Act 21 of 1972, Section 6, w.e.f. 20-1-1973.
RAJASTHAN.—After clause (eee), insert the following:
“(eeee) ‘member’ means a person who is an ordinary member of a Union and who has paid
subscription of not less than four annas per month:
Provided that no person shall at any time be deemed to be a member if his subscription is
in arrears for a period of three months or more next preceding such time.—Vide Rajasthan
Act 34 of 1958, w.e.f. 1-7-1960.
(f) “Court” means a Court of Inquiry constituted under this Act;
(g) “employer” means—
(i) in relation to an industry carried on by or under the authority of any department of 36
[the Central Government or a State Government], the authority prescribed in this
behalf, or where no authority is prescribed, the head of the department;
(ii) in relation to an industry carried on by or on behalf of a local authority, the chief
executive officer of that authority.
STATE AMENDMENTS
RAJASTHAN.—After sub-clause (ii) in clause (g), insert the following:
“(iii) Where the owner of any industry in the course of or for the purpose of conducting in the
industry contracts with the person for the execution by or under the contract of the whole
or any part or any work which is ordinarily a part of the industry, the owner of the
industry.”—Vide Rajasthan Act 34 of 1958, w.e.f. 1-7-1960.
(2) Existing sub-clause (iii) of clause (g) deleted. Prior it was inserted by Rajasthan Act 34 of
1958, w.e.f. 1-7-1960. [Vide Rajasthan Act 21 of 2014, S. 2(a) (w.e.f. 12-11-2014)]
37 [(gg) “executive”, in relation to a trade union, means the body by whatever name called,
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
to which the management of the affairs of the trade union is entrusted;]
(h) 38 [* * *]
(i) a person shall be deemed to be “independent” for the purpose of his appointment as
the chairman or other member of a Board, Court or Tribunal, if he is unconnected with
the industrial dispute referred to such Board, Court or Tribunal or with any industry
directly affected by such dispute:
39
[Provided that no person shall cease to be independent by reason only of the fact that
he is a shareholder of an incorporated company which is connected with, or likely to be
affected by, such industrial dispute; but in such a case, he shall disclose to the
appropriate Government the nature and extent of the shares held by him in such
company;]
(j) “industry” means any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture or calling of
employers and includes any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial
occupation or avocation of workmen;
Section 2(j) shall stand substituted as under w.e.f. the date to be notified:
40 [(j) “industry” means any systematic activity carried on by cooperation between an
employer and his workmen (whether such workmen are employed by such employer
directly or by or through any agency, including a contractor) for the production, supply
or distribution of goods or services with a view to satisfy human wants or wishes (not
being wants or wishes which are merely spiritual or religious in nature), whether or not,
—
(i) any capital has been invested for the purpose of carrying on such activity; or
(ii) such activity is carried on with a motive to make any gain or profit, and includes—
(a) any activity of the Dock Labour Board established under Section 5-A of the Dock
Workers (Regulation of Employment) Act, 1948 (9 of 1948);
(b) any activity relating to the promotion of sales or business or both carried on by
an establishment,
but does not include—
(1) any agriculture operation except where such agricultural operation is carried on
in an integrated manner with any other activity (being any such activity as is
referred to in the foregoing provisions of this clause) and such other activity is the
predominant one.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-clause, “agricultural operation” does
not include any activity carried on in a plantation as defined in clause (f) of
Section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951; or
(2) hospitals or dispensaries; or
(3) educational, scientific, research or training institutions; or
(4) institutions owned or managed by organisations wholly or substantially engaged
in any charitable, social or philanthropic service; or
(5) khadi or village industries; or
(6) any activity of the Government relatable to the sovereign functions of the
Government including all the activities carried on by the departments of the
Central Government dealing with defence research, atomic energy and space; or
(7) any domestic service; or
(8) any activity, being a profession practised by an individual or body of individuals,
if the number of persons employed by the individuals or body of individuals in
relation to such profession is less than ten; or
(9) any activity, being an activity carried on by a co-operative society or a club or
any other like body of individuals, if the number of persons employed by the co-
operative society, club or other like body of individuals in relation to such activity
is less than ten;]
(k) “industrial dispute” means any dispute or difference between employers and
employers, or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen,
which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of
employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person;
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
STATE AMENDMENTS
GUJARAT.—In clause (k), the words and letters “but does not include the termination of the
service of a workman in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V-D” shall be added at the
end.—Vide Gujarat Act 12 of 2004, S. 2 (w.e.f. 10-2-2004).
41 [(ka) “industrial establishment or undertaking” means an establishment or undertaking
in which any industry is carried on:

Provided that where several activities are carried on in an establishment or undertaking
and only one or some of such activities is or are an industry or industries, then,—
(a) if any unit of such establishment or undertaking carrying on any activity, being an
industry, is severable from the other unit or units of such establishment or
undertaking, such unit shall be deemed to be a separate industrial establishment or
undertaking;
(b) if the predominant activity or each of the predominant activities carried on in such
establishment or undertaking or any unit thereof is an industry and the other activity
or each of the other activities carried on in such establishment or undertaking or unit
thereof is not severable from and is, for the purpose of carrying on, or aiding the
carrying on of, such predominant activity or activities, the entire establishment or
undertaking or, as the case may be, unit thereof shall be deemed to be an industrial
establishment or undertaking;]
42 [(kk) “insurance company means an insurance company as defined in Section 2 of the
Insurance Act, 1938 (4 of 1938), having branches or other establishments in more than
one State;]
43
[(kka) “khadi” has the meaning assigned to it in clause (d) of Section 2 of the Khadi and
Village Industries Commission Act, 1956 (61 of 1956);]
44 [ 45 [(kkb)] “Labour Court” means a Labour Court constituted under Section 7;]
46 [(kkk) “lay-off” (with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions) means the
failure, refusal or inability of an employer on account of shortage of coal, power or raw

materials or the accumulation of stocks or the breakdown of machinery 47 [or natural
calamity or for any other connected reason] to give employment to a workman whose
name is borne on the muster-rolls of his industrial establishment and who has not been
retrenched;
Explanation.—Every workman whose name is borne on the muster-rolls of the industrial
establishment and who presents himself for work at the establishment at the time
appointed for the purpose during normal working hours on any day and is not given
employment by the employer within two hours of his so presenting himself shall be
deemed to have been laid off for that day within the meaning of this clause:
Provided that if the workman, instead of being given employment at the
commencement of any shift for any day is asked to present himself for the purpose
during the second half of the shift for the day and is given employment then, he shall
be deemed to have been laid off only for one half of that day:
Provided further that if he is not given any such employment even after so presenting
himself, he shall not be deemed to have been laid off for the second half of the shift for
the day and shall be entitled to full basic wages and dearness allowance for that part of
the day;]
STATE AMENDMENTS
MAHARASHTRA.—In the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in its application to the State of
Maharashtra in Section 2, in clause (kkk) after the words “the breakdown of machinery”, the
following shall be inserted, namely:—
“or on account of discontinuance or reduction of the supply of power to the industrial
establishment for contravention of any provisions of the Bombay Electricity (Special Powers)
Act, 1946, or of any orders or directions issued thereunder”.—Mah. Act 22 of 1981, Section 2
(w.e.f. 1-7-1981).
WEST BENGAL.—In the explanation to clause (kkk) of Section 2 of the said Act, for the words
beginning with “Every workman” and ending with “so presenting himself”, the following shall be
substituted, namely:
“No workman whose name is borne on the muster-rolls of the industrial establishment and
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
who presents himself for work at the establishment at the time appointed for the purpose
during normal working hours on any day and is given employment by the employer can be
laid off for that day but if any such workman is not given employment by the employer within
two hours of his so presenting himself, he.”—Vide W.B. Act 37 of 1974.
(l) “lock-out” means the 48 [temporary closing of a place of employment] or the suspension
of work, or the refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number of persons
employed by him;
49
[(l-a) “major port” means a major port as defined in clause (8) of Section 3 of the Indian
Ports Act, 1908 (15 of 1908);
(l-b) “mine” means a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the
Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952);]
50 [(ll) “National Tribunal” means a National Industrial Tribunal constituted under Section 7
-B;]
51
[(lll) “office bearer”, in relation to a trade union, includes any member of the executive
thereof, but does not include an auditor;]
(m) “prescribed” means prescribed by rules made under this Act;
(n) “public utility service” means—
(i) any railway service 52 [or any transport service for the carriage of passengers or goods
by air];
53 [(i-a) any service in, or in connection with the working of, any major port or dock;]
(ii) any section of an industrial establishment, on the working of which the safety of the
establishment or the workmen employed therein depends;
(iii) any postal, telegraph or telephone service;
(iv) any industry which supplies power, light or water to the public;
(v) any system of public conservancy or sanitation;
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDHRA PRADESH.—After sub-clause (v), the following sub-clause shall be inserted, vide A.P.
Act 22 of 1968:
“(v-a) any service in hospitals and dispensaries.”
(vi) any industry specified in the 54 [First Schedule] which the appropriate Government
may, if satisfied that public emergency or public interest so requires, by notification in
the Official Gazette, declare to be a public utility service for the purposes of this Act, for
such period as may be specified in the notification:
Provided that the period so specified shall not, in the first instance, exceed six months
but may, by a like notification, be extended from time to time, by any period not
exceeding six months, at any one time, if in the opinion of the appropriate Government,
public emergency or public interest requires such extension;
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDHRA PRADESH AND T.N.—In sub-clause (vi) of clause (n) omit the words “specified in the
Schedule”.—Vide Madras Act 12 of 1949, w.e.f. 14-6-1949.
ANDHRA PRADESH.—(1) In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, after sub-clause
(v), the following sub-clause shall be inserted, namely—
“(v-a) any service in hospitals and dispensaries.” [Vide A.P. Act 22 of 1968]
(2) In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, in Section 2, in clause (n) to sub-clause
(vi), after the proviso the following proviso shall be added, namely—
“Provided further that in respect of the services of 100% Export Oriented Units and units
located in Export Processing Zones/Special Economic Zones included in the First Schedule,
the period so specified shall not, in the first instance, exceed three years but may, by a like
notification, be extended, from time to time, by any period not exceeding three years, at any
one time, if in the opinion of the appropriate Government, public emergency or public
interest requires, such extension.”. [Vide A.P. Act 5 of 2011, S. 2 (w.e.f. 17-1-2011)]
GUJARAT.—In its application to the State of Gujarat, in Section 2, in clause (n), for the
existing proviso to sub-clause (vi), the following proviso shall be substituted, namely:—
“Provided that the period so specified shall not, in the first instance, exceed one year but
may, by a like notification, be extended from time to time, by any period not exceeding two
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
years, at anyone time, if in the opinion of the appropriate Government, public emergency or
public interest requires such extension;”. [Vide Gujarat Act 29 of 2015, S, 3, w.e.f. 1-1-
2016].
(o) “railway company” means a railway company as defined in Section 3 of the Indian
Railways Act, 1890 (9 of 1890);
55
[(oo) “retrenchment” means the termination by the employer of the service of a
workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way
of disciplinary action, but does not include—
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of
employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a
stipulation in that behalf; or
56
[(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its
expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf
contained therein; or]
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health;]
STATE AMENDMENTS
GUJARAT.—In clause (oo),—
(i) in sub-clause (c), the word “or” shall be added at the end;
(ii) after sub-clause (c), the following sub-clauses shall be added, namely:—
(d) termination of the service of a workman in an industrial establishment situate in the
Special Economic Zone declared as such by the Government of India;—Vide Gujarat Act
12 of 2004, S. 2 (w.e.f. 10-2-2004).
RAJASTHAN.—After clause (oo) insert the following clauses:
“(ooo) ‘Registrar’ means the person for the time being appointed to be the Registrar of
Unions under this Act and includes in respect of such powers and duties of the Registrar as
may be conferred and imposed on him, an Assistant Registrar of Unions;
(oooo) ‘Representative Union’ means a union for the time being registered as a
representative union under this Act.”—Vide Rajasthan Act 34 of 1958, w.e.f. 1-7-1960.
WEST BENGAL.—(1) In Section 2 of the principal Act,—
in clause (oo)—
(i) after the words “termination by the employer”, the words “by notice or otherwise” shall be
inserted,
(ii) sub-clause (c) shall be omitted.—W.B. Act 57 of 1980, Section 3.
(2) In its application to the State of West Bengal, clause (oo) shall be renumbered as clause
(ooo) and before clause (ooo) so renumbered, the following clause shall be inserted:
“(oo) ‘Recovery Officer’ means any officer of the State Government who may be authorised
by the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to exercise the power of
the Recovery Officer under this Act;” [Vide W.B. Act 17 of 2007, S. 3 (w.e.f. the date to be
notified)]
57 [(p) “Settlement” means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding
and includes a written agreement between the employer and workmen arrived at
otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding where such agreement has been
signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof
has been sent to 58 [an officer authorised in this behalf by] the appropriate Government
and the conciliation officer;]
(q) “strike” means a cessation of work by a body of persons employed in any industry
acting in combination, or a concerted refusal, or a refusal under a common
understanding, of any number of persons who are or have been so employed to
continue to work or to accept employment;
STATE AMENDMENTS
GUJARAT.—After clause (q), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:—
“(qa) ‘termination’ means discontinuation by the employer of the service of a workman in an
industrial establishment situate in the Special Economic Zone declared as such by the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Government of India for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted
by way of disciplinary action, but does not include—
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of
employment between the employer and the workman concerned; contains a stipulation
in that behalf; or
(c) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its
expiry or of such contract being terminated; under a stipulation in that behalf contained
therein; or
(d) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health”.—Vide
Gujarat Act 12 of 2004, S. 2, (w.e.f. 10-2-2004).
59 [(qq) “trade union” means a trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926
(16 of 1926);]
60
[(r) “Tribunal” means an Industrial Tribunal constituted under Section 7-A and includes
an Industrial Tribunal constituted before the 10th day of March, 1957, under this Act;]
61
[(ra) “unfair labour practice” means any of the practices specified in the Fifth Schedule;
(rb) “village industries” has the meaning assigned to it in clause (h) of Section 2 of the
Khadi and Village Industries Commission Act, 1956 (61 of 1956);]
62 [(rr) “wages” means all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money,
which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable
to a workman in respect of his employment, or of work done in such employment, and
includes—
(i) such allowances (including dearness allowance) as the workman is for the time
being entitled to;
(ii) the value of any house accommodation, or of supply of light, water, medical
attendance or other amenity or of any service or of any concessional supply of
foodgrains or other articles;
(iii) any travelling concession;
63 [(iv) any commission payable on the promotion of sales or business or both;]
but does not include—

(a) any bonus;
(b) any contribution paid or payable by the employer to any pension fund or provident
fund or for the benefit of the workman under any law for the time being in force;
(c) any gratuity payable on the termination of his service;]
STATE AMENDMENTS
RAJASTHAN.—After clause (rr) insert the following:
“(rrr) ‘Union’ means a trade union of employees registered under the Indian Trade Unions
Act, 1926 (Central Act 16 of 1926).”—Vide Rajasthan Act 34 of 1958, w.e.f. 1-7-1960.
64
[(s) “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to
do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for
hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the
purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes
any such person who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with,
or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment
has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person—
(i) who is subject to the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), or the Army Act, 1950 (46 of
1950), or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957); or
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison;
or
(iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding 65 [ten
thousand rupees] per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties
attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a
managerial nature.]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDHRA PRADESH.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, in Section 2, for clause
(s), the following clause shall be substituted, namely:—
“(s) ‘workman’ means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to
do any manual, unskilled, skilled technical, sales promotion, operational, clerical or
supervisory work or any work for the promotion of sales for hire or reward, whether the terms
of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this
Act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed,
discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose
dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such
person—
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six
hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to
the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial
nature.” [Vide A.P. Act 22 of 2008, S. 2 (w.e.f. the date to be notified)].
ASSAM.—In its application to the State of Assam, in Section 2, in clause (s), in between the
words “or supervisory work” and “for hire or reward”, the words “or any work for the promotion
of sales”, shall be inserted. [Vide Assam Act XXII of 2007, S. 27].
JHARKHAND.—In its application to the State of Jharkhand, clause (iv) of sub-section (s) and
first para of sub-section (s) of Section 2 shall be amended as follows:
(i) In first para of sub-section (s) of Section 2 the expression “or any work for the promotion
of sales” shall be inserted between the words “or supervisory work” and “for hire or
reward”.
(ii) In clause (iv) of sub-section (s) of Section 2 the expression “wages exceeding Ten
thousand rupees” shall be substituted by “draws wages exceeding the amount as specified
in sub-section (6) of Section 1 of the Payment of Wages Act”. [Vide Jharkhand Act 22 of
2017, S. 2 (w.e.f. 4-12-2017)]
KERALA.—In Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act 14 of 1947), in
clause (s), for the words “ clerical or supervisory work”, the words “ clerical, supervisory work or
any work for the promotion of sales” shall be substituted. [Vide Kerala Act 12 of 2017, S. 2, dt.
30-8-2017].
MAHARASHTRA.—In Section 2, in its application to the State of Maharashtra, in clause (s), in
sub-clause (iv), for the words “one thousand six hundred rupees”, the words “six thousand five
hundred rupees”, the words “six thousand five hundred rupees” shall be substituted. [vide Mah.
Act 23 of 2006, S. 2, w.e.f. 26-6-2006]
PUNJAB.—In its application to the State of Punjab, in Section 2, for clause (s), the following
clause shall be substituted, namely:—
‘(s) “workman” means any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to
do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, sales promotion, operational, clerical or
supervisory work or any work for the promotion of sales for hire or reward, whether the terms
of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act
in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person, who has been dismissed,
discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as a consequence of, that dispute, or whose
dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such
person,—
(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a prison; or
(iv) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding one thousand six
hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties attached to
the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
nature.’ [Vide Punjab Act 15 of 2009, S. 2]
RAJASTHAN.—In its application to the State of Rajasthan, in clause (s), the existing
expression “by an employer or by a contractor in relation to the execution of his contract with
such employer” shall be deleted. [Vide Rajasthan Act 21 of 2014, S. 2(b) (w.e.f. 12-11-2014)]
TAMIL NADU.—In its application to the State of Tamil Nadu, in Section 2, in clause (s), after
the expression “technical,”, the expression “sales promotion,” shall be inserted. [Vide Tamil
Nadu Act 7 of 2015, S. 2, w.e.f. 23-9-2015]
WEST BENGAL.—In Section 2 of the principal Act, in clause (s), after the words “or
supervisory work”, the words, “or any work for the promotion of sales”, shall be inserted.—Vide
W.B. Act 33 of 1986.
► Clause (a): Appropriate Government.—Proper question to decide the ‘appropriate Government’ is
‘where did the dispute arise’. Workmen v. Shri Ranga Vilas Motors, AIR 1967 SC 1040 : (1967) 2 LLJ 12.
‘Appropriate Government’ for referring a dispute regarding service conditions between management and
the separate staff maintained at Calcutta head office of a mine situated in Orissa would be State of West
Bengal and not the Central Government. Sirajuddin & Co. v. Workmen, AIR 1966 SC 921 : (1962) 1 LLJ 450.
For employees controlled by Delhi office but employed outside Delhi the “appropriate Government” would be
State of Delhi. Lipton Ltd. v. Employees, AIR 1959 SC 676 : (1959) 1 LLJ 431.
In a dispute arising in respect of a unit of a company, which was an instrumentality of the Central
Government, the “appropriate Government” is the Government of the State where that unit was situated and not
the Central Government. Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur, (1993) 1 LLJ 1168 (Raj) :
(1993) 2 LLN 181.
Merely because an industry is controlled under the Industries (Development & Regulation Act, 1951, Section
2(a)(i) is not attracted unless the Central Government specifies that the appropriate Government for such
industries is the Central Government. Bijay Cotton Mills v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 692 : (1960) 1 LLJ 262.
The words ‘under the authority of’ in Section 2(a) mean pursuant to the authority, such as where an agent
or servant acts under or pursuant to the authority of his principal or master. An incorporated company has a
separate existence and the law recognises it as a juristic person separate and distinct from its members. (In
what respect a company is distinct from its shareholders discussed.) Therefore the fact that the President of
India and certain officers have all shares of the Heavy Engineering Corporation does not make the company an
agent either of the President or the Central Government. Heavy Engg. Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar, (1969)
1 SCC 765.
Merely because National Research Centre receives financial support of the Central Government, no
inference can be drawn that the institution is run by or under the authority of the Central Government,
Duryodhan Hiraman Ingole v. Icar, (2009) 5 Mah LJ 195.
Relevant considerations to determine whether an industry is under the authority of the Central Government,
that the employer society was a State instrumentality, held, is not relevant. The business must be a government
business and the Industry must be an industry belonging to Central Government, that is to say, its own
undertaking. Even listing of an institution or organisation under the allocation of business and Minister's power
to appoint Directors cannot make the organisation a government business and bring it within authority of
Central Government under Section 2(a)(i). So also mere performance of public functions by Society cannot
make it a government business.
Merely because the government companies, corporations and societies are instrumentalities or agencies of
the Government, they do not become agents of the Central or the State Government for all purposes. Business
which is carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government must be a government business. Any
industry to be carried on under the authority of the Central Government means that it must be an industry
belonging to the Central Government, that is to say, its own undertaking. The Business Rules cannot be
conclusive to show that any institution or organisation listed under the allocation of business, would be part of
any department of the Government of India. Mere power to appoint the Directors does not warrant a conclusion
that the particular under taking is a Central Government undertaking. Even if a Minister appoints the Directors,
gives directions, calls information or supervises business, that will not make the industry an agent of the
Government. Merely because the government companies/corporations and societies are discharging public
functions and duties that does not by itself make them agents of the Central or the State Government. The
industry or undertaking has to be carried under the authority of the Central Government or the State
Government. That authority may be conferred either by a statute or by virtue of a relationship of principal and
agent, or delegation of power. When it comes to conferring power by statute, there is not much difficulty.
However, where it is not so, and whether the undertaking is functioning under authority is a question of fact. It
is to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case, Tata Memorial Hospital Workers Union v. Tata
Memorial Centre, (2010) 8 SCC 480 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 649.
Section 12-A privatisation (a) does not change meaning of “appropriate Government” under Section 2
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Industrial Disputes Act and Section 2(1)(a) r/w Section 2(1)(e), Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act,
1970 and (b) is in tune with policy of privatisation, Delhi International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011)
12 SCC 449.
Noti. dt. 26-7-2004 under Section 10(1) prohibiting contract labour of trolley retrievals in establishments of
Airports Authority of India (AAI) and other specified airports is applicable to “air transport service” under
Section 2(a), ID Act and Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. Trolleys at airports relate to air
transportation, just as they relate to “a single flight or a series of flights”, Delhi International Airport (P) Ltd. v.
Union of India, (2011) 12 SCC 449.
The authors of the ID Act, in listing the enumerated industries, simply wanted to ensure that those industries
were covered by the ID Act, without meaning to affect the separate issue of whether those industries were also
acting “under the authority of the Central Government”. Further, while it is fair to assume that the legislature
attempts to avoid tautology, such canons are not necessarily dispositive. It is well-established canon of statutory
construction that the legislature is known to avoid tautology and redundancy, Delhi International Airport (P) Ltd.
v. Union of India, (2011) 12 SCC 449.
Central Government is appropriate Government for: (a) industries under authority of Central Government, (b)
industrial disputes concerning AAI, and (c) industrial disputes concerning air traffic services, Delhi
International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 12 SCC 449.
► Clause (b): Award.—Awards are not in the nature of interim relief. Hotel Imperial v. Hotel Workers
Union, AIR 1959 SC 1342 : (1959) 2 LLJ 544.
An award passed by the Tribunal on merits on consideration of evidence on record is an award. Tata
Consulting Engineers & Associates Staff Union v. Tata Consulting Engineers, (2002) 1 Cur LR 71 (Bom)(DB).
Rejection of a reference for default of the workman is not an award. N.M. Naik v. Labour Court, (1998) 1
LLN 937 : (1998) 1 Cur LR 801 : (1977) 77 FLR 914 (Kant).
Award and settlement are comparable. Law laid in respect of one holds good in respect of other. LIC of
India v. D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111.
Tribunal's decision as to the scope of the reference under which the order of the Tribunal is made is an
‘award’ appealable under Article 136 of the Constitution. Central Bank of India v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 12 :
(1959) 2 LLJ 205. The word ‘determination’ in the definition is the important one. Where the Industrial Tribunal
allows parties to withdraw the matter before, there is no award. Maharaja Mills Kamdar Union v. N.L. Industrial
Tribunal, AIR 1960 Bom 29 : (1959) 2 LLJ 172.
► Clause (e): Conciliation proceeding.—The mere presence of the person, who is the Conciliation
Officer, at a meeting convened by the Chief Minister between the parties to a dispute will not make the
conciliation proceedings to be covered under the Act. Where there is no evidence to show that the proceedings
were in the presence of the Conciliation Officer as such, any settlement arrived at during the proceedings
would not be binding under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and no award can be based thereon. Nagercoil
Electric Supply Corporation v. Industrial Tribunal, 5 FJR 208 (TC HC).
► Clause (g): Employer.—The Act applies to all industries carried on by individual or association also.
Western Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay, 1 FJR 97 (Federal Court of India).
The definition of ‘employer’ is not exhaustive and refers only to special cases enumerated in clauses (g)(i)
and (g)(ii) of the Act. Province of Bombay v. Western India Automobile Association, 11 FJR 12 (Bom HC).
Sarpanch is not employer of persons in service of Gram Panchayat, such as respondent 1 herein, but it is
village panchayat who is the employer, Ahmedabad Muninipal Corpn. v. Rajubhai Somabhai Bharwad, (2015)
7 SCC 663 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 568.
► Clause (j): Industry.—The main aim of Section 2(j) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is to regulate and
harmonise relationship between employers and employees for maintaining industrial peace and social harmony.
State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 1 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 642. It is necessary to interpret the
definitions of ‘industry’, ‘workman’, ‘industrial dispute’ etc., so as not to whittle down, but to advance the object
of the Act. A pragmatic approach must be adopted. S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra, (1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983
SCC (L&S) 510.
‘Undertaking’ in Section 2(j) must be read as meaning an undertaking analogous to trade or business.
Exemptions to charitable institutions under Section 32(5) of Payment of Bonus Act is not relevant to the
construction of Section 2(j). Federation of I.C.C.I. v. Workmen, (1972) 1 SCC 40. There is an industry in the
enterprise, provided the nature of the activity, namely the employer-employee basis bears resemblance to what
is found in trade or business. This takes into the fold of industry undertakings, callings, services and adventures
‘analogous to the carrying on of trade or business’. Absence of profit motive or gainful objective is irrelevant for
‘industry’, be the venture in the public, joint, private or other sector.
Where there is (i) systematic activity (ii) organised by co-operation between employer and employee (the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
direct and substantial element is chimerical) and (iii) for the production and/or distribution of goods and
services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes (not spiritual or religious but inclusive of material things
or services geared to celestial bliss), prima facie, there is an industry in the enterprise. Bangalore Water
Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215. See also AIR 1960 SC
610.
Public Works Department (B&R) is an industry, Jasmer Singh v. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 458 :
(2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 46.
Law Department cannot be considered as an industry, State of Rajasthan v. Ganeshi Lal, (2008) 2 SCC
533 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 465.
► Sovereign functions.—Sovereign functions strictly understood alone qualify for exemption, not the
welfare activities or economic adventures undertaken by Government or statutory bodies. Even in departments
discharging sovereign functions, if there are units which are industries and they are substantially severable
then they can be considered to come within Section 2(j). Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A.
Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215. (PER MAJORITY).
The principles laid down in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 :
1978 SCC (L&S) 215, are not exhaustive. Physical Research Laboratory v. K.G. Sharma, (1997) 4 SCC 257 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 1057.
The function of public welfare of the State is a sovereign function. Hence, the State while discharging such
function, is not an industry. Executive Engineer v. K. Somasetty, (1997) 5 SCC 434 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1229.
Whether a particular function of the State is or is not a sovereign function depends on the nature of the
power and the manner of its exercise. Pachgaon Parwati Scheme in Pune District and social foresting work in
Ahmednagar District undertaken by the Forest Department of the State Government of Maharashtra is an
industry and not part of sovereign functions of the State. Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti
Kondhare, (1996) 2 SCC 293 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 500.
Applying the dominant nature test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa,
(1978) 2 SCC 213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215, it was held by a three-Judge Bench in General Manager Telecom v.
A. Srinivasa Rao, (1997) 8 SCC 767 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 6 [overruling Sub-Divisional Inspector of Post v.
Theyyam Joseph, (1996) 8 SCC 489 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1012 and Bombay Telephone Canteen Employees'
Association v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 723 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 386] that “industry” as defined in Section
2 (j) (as it stands prior to enforcement of 1982 amendment) covered Telecom Department of Union of India.
In view of this decision, the two-Judge Bench decision in Union of India v. Kamlesh Kumar Bharti, (1998) 9
SCC 727 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1535 holding that Post Office was not an industry, appears to be not good law.
However, in Executive Engineer (State of Karnataka) v. K. Somasetty, (1997) 5 SCC 434 : 1997 SCC (L&S)
1229, a two-Judge Bench had held that the Telecommunication Department was not an industry. Again, relying
on the Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board case (supra), it was held in All India Radio v. Santosh
Kumar, (1998) 3 SCC 237 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 833 that the word “industry” covered “All India Radio” and
“Doordarshan”. However, doubting the correctness of the tests laid down in Bangalore Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215 and pointing out the damaging
effects of the extended meaning given to “industry” in that case, a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has,
in Coir Board v. Indira Devi P.S., (1998) 3 SCC 259 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 806, referred the matter to a larger
bench to reconsider the Bangalore Water Supply decision.
If a department of a municipality discharges many functions, some pertaining to ‘industry’ and others to non
-industrial activities, the predominant function of the department shall be the criterion for the purposes of the
Act. Corpn. of City of Nagpur v. Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675 : (1960) 1 LLJ 523.
Government Guest House run by Tourism Department is an industry. Tourism Department v. Industrial
Tribunal, Kollam, (2005) 106 FLR 788 (Ker) (DB).
Local bodies doing public utility service are ‘industry’. D.N. Banerjee v. P.R. Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58 :
(1953) 1 LLJ 195.
A Panchayat Samiti providing drinkable water and installing hand pumps and getting them maintained and
repaired, is an industry. Akhil Raj, Rajya Hand Pump Mistries Sangathan v. State of Rajasthan, 1994 Lab IC
345 (Raj)(FB) : (1995) 86 FJR 167.
Following departments of municipality, held, to be ‘industry’—(i) Tax Department; (ii) Public Conveyance
Department; (iii) Fire Brigade Department; (iv) Lighting Department; (v) Waterworks Department; (vi) City
Engineers Department; (vii) Enforcement (Encroachment) Department; (viii) Sewerage Department; (ix) Health
Department; (x) Market Department; (xi) Public Gardens Department; (xii) Education Department; (xiii) Printing
Press Department; (xiv) Building Department, and (xv) General Administration Department. Corpn. of City of
Nagpur v. Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675 : (1960) 1 LLJ 523; Baroda Borough Municipality v. Workmen, AIR
1957 SC 110; (D.N. Banerjee) Budge-Budge Municipality v. P.R. Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
► Hospitals and Charitable institutions.—Charitable institutions fall into three categories— (a) those that
yield profit, but the profits are siphoned off for altruistic purposes; (b) those that make no profit but hire the
services of employees as in any other business, but the goods and services which are the output, are made
available at a low or no cost to the indigent poor; and (c) those that are oriented on a humane mission fulfilled
by men who work, not because they are paid wages, but because they share the passion for the cause and
derive job satisfaction. The first two are industries but not the third, on the assumption that they all involve co-
operation between employers and employees. (PER BHAGWATI, KRISHNA IYER AND DESAI, JJ.) Bangalore Water
Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215.
Following institutions have been held, ‘industry’:
(1) State hospital. State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1960 SC 610 : (1960) 1 LLJ 251.
(2) Ayurvedic pharmacy and hospital. Lalit Hari Ayurvedic College Pharmacy v. Workers Union, AIR
1960 SC 1261 : (1960) 1 LLJ 250.
(3) Indian Red Cross Society, Haryana State Branch. Indian Red Cross Society v. Additional Labour
Court, Chandigarh, (1992) 1 LLN 211 (P&H)(DB).
(4) Indian Cancer Society, Bombay. Pramodini Patkar Sadhana v. Indian Cancer Society, (1992) 2 LLN
447 : (1993) 1 LLJ 97 : (1992) 65 FLR 394 (Bom).
(5) Activities of Panjrapole. Bombay Panjrapole v. Workmen, (1971) 3 SCC 349.
(6) A real estate company leasing out mansions and for their maintenance employing workers like
sweepers, durwan, plumbers, bill collectors, mistries, lift-men etc. Karnani Properties Ltd. v. State of
W.B., (1990) 4 SCC 472.
(7) Running of tube-wells by Government or Government owned corporation. Gurmail Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 189 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 147.
(8) Dandakaranya Project is an industry. Management of Dandakaranya Project v. Workmen, (1997) 2
SCC 296 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 434.
(9) Telecom Department is an industry. Asha Ram v. Divisional Engineer, Telecom Deptt., (2001) 9
SCC 382 : 2001 Lab IC 98; General Manager, Telecom, Nagpur v. Naresh Brijlal Charote, 2001 Lab
IC 2127 (Bom); Asha Ram v. Divisional Engineer Telecom, (2000) 3 Cur LR 403 (SC); Shri Dutt v.
P.O. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal, (1999) 2 LLJ 842 (Del); Ram Kishan v. Mahanagar
Telephone Nigam Ltd., (1999) 1 Cur LR 1199 (Del); Laxmikant Jha v. P.O. Central Government
Industrial Tribunal, (1999) 2 LLN 906 (Del).
(10) Zilla Sainik Board is an industry. State of Punjab v. Kedar Nath, (1999) 1 LLJ 234 (P&H)(DB).
(11) Central Public Works Department is an industry. Executive Engineer, CPWD v. Madhukar
Purshottam Kolharkar, (2002) 9 SCC 622 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 1087.
(12) Agricultural operations in an organised manner like a business or trade is an industry. Director,
Central State Farm, Suratgarh v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 86 FLR 116 (Raj).
(13) Forest department's work of manufacturing polythene bags. State of Gujarat v. Ramesh Mopabhai
Rathod, (2004) 2 LLJ 434 (Guj) (DB).
(14) PWD is an industry. Bangalore Water Supply v. Sewerage Board decision still holds the field. State
of Gujarat v. PWD Employees Union, (2002) 10 SCC 147; Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage
Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215, followed.
Sports Authority of India is an industry. Sports Authority of India v. Sports Authority of India Kamgar
Union, (2005) 106 FLR 648 (Del).
► Clubs if industry.—A restricted category of professions, clubs, Cooperatives and even Gurukulas and
little research laboratories may qualify for exemption if, in simple ventures, substantially and going by the
dominant nature criterion substantively, no employees are entertained, but in minimal matters marginal
employees are hired without destroying the non-employee character of the unit. Bangalore Water Supply &
Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215. (PER MAJORITY).
The larger clubs are ‘industry’. (PER BHAGWATI, KRISHNA IYER AND DESAI, JJ.)
Ibid., overruling Madras Gymkhana Club Employees' Union v. Gymkhana Club, AIR 1968 SC 554 : (1967)
2 LLJ 720.
University and research institutions are industries. (PER BHAGWATI, KRISHNA IYER AND DESAI, JJ.)
Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215,
overruling AIR 1963 SC 1873.
(1) Textile Research Institution. Ahmedabad Textile Industry v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 484 :
(1960) 2 LLJ 720.
(2) Tocklai Experimental Station. Tocklai Experimental Station v. Workmen, AIR 1962 SC 1340 : (1961)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
2 LLJ 694.
(3) Indian Standards Institute held ‘industry’. Workmen v. I.S.I., (1975) 2 SCC 847 : 1976 SCC (L&S)
16.
A solicitor's establishment can be an industry. (PER CHANDRACHUD, CJ).
If in a pious or altruistic mission, many employ themselves free or for small honoraria or like return, mainly
drawn by sharing in the purpose or cause such as lawyers volunteering to run a free legal services clinic or
doctors serving in their spare hours in a free medical centre or ashramites working at the bidding of the
Holiness, Divinity or Central personality and the services are supplied free or at a nominal cost and those who
serve are not engaged for remuneration or on the basis of master and servant relationship, then the institution is
not an industry even if stray servants manual or technical are hired. Such eleemosynary or like undertakings
alone are exempted. (PER MAJORITY). Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2
SCC 213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215.
Following are also held to be ‘industries’—
(1) Cooperative Societies. Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC
213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215. See also Corpn. of the City of Nagpur v. Employees, AIR 1960 SC 675 :
(1960) 2 SCR 942.
(2) Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce. Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce &
Industry v. Workmen, (1972) 1 SCC 40 : AIR 1972 SC 763 : (1971) 2 LLJ 630.
(3) Company carrying on agricultural operations. Hari Nagar Cane Farm v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC
903 : (1963) 1 LLJ 692.
(4) Khadi and Village Industries Board. Chief Executive Officer, Khadi and Village Industries Board v.
S. Thangavelu, (2000) 2 LLN 343 (Mad).
(5) Bihar Khadi Gramodyog Sangh. Gopalji Jha Shastry v. State of Bihar, (1983) 2 SCC 4 : 1983 SCC
(L&S) 262.
(6) Indian Navy Sailors' Home. Indian Navy Sailors' Home v. Bombay Gymkhana Club, (1986) 2 LLN
500 (Bom) : 1986 Lab IC 1118 : (1986) 2 LLJ 154, holding Indian Sailors' Home Society v. R.D.
Tulpule, (1974) 2 LLN 227 (Bom)(DB) as no longer good law.
(7) A Panchayat Samiti. Kewal Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (1986) 2 LLN 637 (Raj).
(8) Kuanria Irrigation Division. R.K. Prusty v. Govt. of Orissa, (1986) 1 LLN 189 (Ori)(DB) : 1985 Lab
IC 1770.
(9) Irrigation department of the State Government. Desh Raj v. State of Punjab, (1988) 2 SCC 537 :
1988 SCC (L&S) 631; State of U.P. v. Labour Court, Dehradun, (2000) 4 LLN 59 (All); State of U.P.
v. Industrial Tribunal IV, Agra, (2002) 2 Cur LR 316 : (2002) 3 LLN 134 (All); Tungabhadra Board v.
Sri Easu, (1999) 83 FLR 353 (Kant)(DB). But see Executive Engineer, State of Karnataka v. K.
Somesetty, (1997) 5 SCC 434 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1229; Shankarji Challaji Thakar v. State of
Gujarat, (2000) 3 Cur LR 86 (Guj)(DB).
(10) Irrigation and canal works undertaken by Narmada Water Resources and Water Supply
Department. Gujarat Forest Producers, Gatherers v. Forest Workers Union, Ahmedabad, 2004 Lab
IC 2589 (Guj) (FB).
(11) Water Resources Department. State of Bihar v. Presiding Officer, (2002) 2 LLJ 233 : 2002 LLR
427 (Pat).
(12) Public Health Department of the State Government and Primary Health Centres. Gulab Singh
Chauhan v. State of M.P., (1984) 1 LLN 589 (MP).
(13) State Insurance & P.F. Department. Hemraj Gurjar v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 2 LLJ 167 :
(1993) 66 FLR 345 : (1993) 1 Cur LR 400.
(14) Social Welfare Department of Rajasthan. Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (1994) 2 LLJ 474 :
(1993) 1 Cur LR 929 (Raj).
(15) Kerala State Tourism Department. Mohanan v. State of Kerala, (1994) 2 LLJ 1041 : (1994) 1 Cur
LR 419 : (1994) 1 LLN 416.
(16) State Insurance and Provident Fund Department of Government of Rajasthan is an industry. Ram
Prasad etc., etc. v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 1 LLJ 766 : 1992 Lab IC 2139 : (1993) 1 LLN 601.
(17) U.P. Jal Nigam is an industry. Zonal Chief Engineer, U.P. Jal Nigam, Gorakhpur v. P.O. Labour
Court, (2001) 4 LLN 1190 (All).
(18) Central Ordinance Depot of the Union of India. Union of India v. Presiding Officer, Central
Government, Industrial Tribunal, 1995 Lab IC 108 : (1995) 1 LLJ 994 (MP)
(19) Directorate of Punjab State lotteries. State of Punjab v. Parvesh Kumar, (1994) 2 LLN 668 (P&H).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(20) Tamil Nadu Water Supply & Drainage Board. Tamil Nadu Water Supply & Drainage Board
Employees' Union v. Tamil Nadu Water Supply & Drainage Board, (1993) 1 LLN 449 : (1993) 1 LLJ
410 : (1993) 83 FJR 552 (Mad).
(21) Kerala State Science and Technological museum. J. Rajan v. State of Kerala, 1994 Lab IC 1321
(Ker) : (1994) 1 LLN 761 : (1994) 69 FLR 78.
(22) Industrial Development Centre for Tools and Dies, set up by Government of Haryana. Harjinder
Singh v. State of Haryana, (1993) 1 LLJ 68 : (1992) 2 LLN 574 : (1992) 65 FLR 108 (P&H).
(23) Corporation set up by State Government for the upliftment of women or weaker section of the
society by giving financial help and training. Haryana Woollen Development Corporation v. P.O.,
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, (1993) 2 LLJ 318.
(24) M.P. Legal Aid and Legal Advice Board. Mahesh Bhargawa v. State of M.P., (1994) 1 LLJ 1113 :
(1994) 1 LLN 247 : (1993) 2 Cur LR 809 (MP).
(25) Indian Institute of Petroleum. Indian Institute of Petroleum v. State of U.P., 1985 Lab IC 198 (All) :
(1985) 1 LLN 31.
(26) Rajasthan Cooperative Credit Institutions Cadre Authority, Rajasthan Rajya Sahkari Samitiyan
Vyavasthapak v. Industrial Tribunal, 1985 Lab IC 1023 (Raj).
(27) A trust for promoting religious, social and educational life but also undertaking commercial activities.
Shri Cutchi Visa O.D.J.M. v. Industrial Tribunal, (1986) 2 LLN 904 (Bom) : (1987) 1 LLJ 81.
(28) M.P. Khadi and Village Industries Board. Gopal v. M.P. Khadi & Village Industries Board, (1985) 4
SCC 138 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 962.
(29) Management of a private educational institution. R.C.K. Union v. Rajkumar College, (1987) 2 LLN
573 (MP).
(30) Bank Note Press, Dewas. General Manager, Bank Note Press, Dewas, (1991) 2 Cur LR 551 :
(1991) 2 LLN 532 (MP)(DB).
(31) Agricultural Produce Market Committee. Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. K.S.
Nirvanappa, 1998 Lab IC 1312 (Kant).
(32) Horticulture Department. MGMT of Horticulture Deptt. of Delhi Administration v. Trilok Chand,
(2000) 1 Cur LR 780 (Del).
(33) Government guest house run by Tourism Departments. Tourism Department v. Industrial Tribunal,
Kollam, 2005 Lab IC 1808.
A mandi a creation of statute, Sachiv, Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Sanawad v. Mahendra Kumar, 2004
LLR 405 (MP).
Following are held to be not ‘industries’:—
(1) Visakhapatnam Dock Labour Board, Visakhapatnam Dock Labour Board v. Stevedores Association,
(1969) 2 SCC 801 held by AP High Court in Dock Labour Board v. Industrial Tribunal, (1995) 1 Cur
LR 648 to be no longer good law after the overruling of Madras Gymkhana Club Employees' Union v.
Gymkhana Club, AIR 1968 SC 554 : (1967) 2 LLJ 720 by Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage
Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215.
(2) Calcutta Dock Labour Board. Workmen, Calcutta Dock Labour Board v. Employees, (1974) 3 SCC
216 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 484. But see Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa,
(1978) 2 SCC 213 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 215.
(3) Physical Research Laboratory is not an industry. Physical Research Laboratory v. K.G. Sharma,
(1997) 4 SCC 257 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1057.
(4) Forest Department of State is not an industry. State of Gujarat v. Pratamsingh Narsinh Parmar,
(2001) 9 SCC 713, distinguishing Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare,
(1996) 2 SCC 293 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 500. But see Marathwada Sarwa Shramik v. Asstt. DIR,
Department of Social Forestry, (2002) 95 FLR 727 (Bom); Haribhau v. State of Maharashtra, (2002)
1 Cur LR 383 : (2002) 92 FLR 1011 (Bom)(DB).
(5) Forest and Environment Department of State Government. Cook Ayodhya Pandey v. Union of India,
2004 Lab IC 2589 (Guj) (FB).
(6) Apartment owners society constituted for purposes of members to engage services of domestic
servants is not industry. Som Vihar Apt. Owners Housing Maintenance Society Ltd. v. Workmen c/o
Indian Engg. & General Mazdoor, (2002) 9 SCC 652 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 1099.
(7) A hospital run by a charitable trust imparting training in general nursing and midwifery, held, is not
industry. Dhanrajgiri Hospital v. Workmen, (1975) 4 SCC 621 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 342.
(8) State of Gujarat in the Department of Industries, Mines and Power. Vinodrai N. Ratnotar v. State of
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Gujarat, (1994) 1 Cur LR 113 : 1994 Lab IC 881 : (1995) 1 LLJ 388 (Guj).
(9) Central Institute of Fisheries. P. Jose v. Director, C.I.F., 1986 Lab IC 1564 (Ker).
(10) Construction and maintenance of national and State Highways. State of Punjab v. Kuldip Singh,
1983 Lab IC 83 (P&H)(FB).
(11) Department of Social Forestry. Marathwada Sarwa Shramik Sanghatna v. Asstt. DIR, Department
of Social Forestry, Parbhani, (2002) 3 Cur LR 349 (Bom).
(12) Central Public Works Department. Executive Engineer, CPWD v. Madhukar Purshottam Kobarkar,
(2000) 3 Cur LR 850 (SC).
(13) Jawahar Rojgar Yojna. Vikas Adhikari Panchayat Samiti v. Surendra Kumar Sharma, 2000 Lab IC
1261 (Raj).
(14) Housing Society. Som Vihar Apartment Owners Housing Maintenance Society Ltd. v. Workmen,
Indian Engineer and General Mazdoor, (2001) 1 LLJ 1413 (SC).
(15) Flat owners Co-op. Society. Shyam Kunj Occupant's Society v. Co-op. Society Building Workers'
Union, (1999) 82 FLR 595 (Cal).
(16) Irrigation Department of State Government. State of Gujarat v. Deenanji Bidhaji Thakore, (2003) 3
LLJ 630 (Guj) (DB).
(17) Census Department of Government of India, Mohd. Rajmohammad v. Industrial Tribunal-cum-
Labour Court, (2003) 2 LLJ 1149 (AP).
A directorate of census operation discharging purely sovereign function. Mohd. Rajmohammad v. Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, (2003) 2 LLN 917 (AP).
A circulating library run by the employees of Central Railway. Suhas Bhaskar Gadre v. V.V. Savjee, (1993)
1 LLN 537 : (1993) 1 LLJ 1001 : (1993) 66 FLR 717 (Bom)(DB).
A temple in which the activities of Dharm, Dhyan, Bhakti and Puja are carried on. Manager, Shri
Panchasara Jain Derasar v. Mahamandkha Gajikha Baloch, (1993) 66 FLR 808 : (1993) 1 LLJ 523 : (1993) 1
Cur LR 103.
Octroi department of Gram Panchayat, whether an industry. Question left open. Dhari Gram Panchayat v.
Saurashtra Mazdoor Mahajan Sangh, (1987) 4 SCC 213 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 433.
Work-charged employee, can claim protection under the ID Act, Punjab SEB v. Jagjivan Ram, (2009) 3
SCC 661 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 769.
► Clause (k): Industrial Dispute.—The term ‘industrial dispute’ connotes a real and substantial difference
having some element of persistency and continuity till resolved and likely if not adjusted to endanger the
industrial peace of the undertaking or the community. Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda, (1978) 2 SCC
353. See also AIR 1958 SC 353 : 1958 SCR 500. When once a dispute is referred for adjudication the
presumption is that it is an industrial dispute. Workmen v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1984) 4 SCC 392; S.K.
Verma v. Mahesh Chandra, (1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 510; Workmen in Geetha Coffee Centre v.
Geetha Coffee Centre, (1959) 1 LLJ 316. Industrial dispute in the section means dispute relating to existing
industry. Sita Ram Sah v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 Pat 288. Written demand is not necessary for bringing into
existence an ‘industrial dispute’. Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda, (1978) 2 SCC 353.
An industrial dispute can arise only when a demand is made by the workman and denied by the employer.
Village Papers (P) Ltd. v. State of H.P., (1993) 1 LLJ 99 : 1993 Lab IC 99 : (1993) 1 LLN 253.
The expression “any person” as used in Section 2(k) covers an employee not falling within the definition of
“workman”. Indian Bank, Madras v. Industrial Tribunal (Central Government), Madras, (1977) 51 FJR 76
(Mad) dissenting from Andhra Bank Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (Central), (1977) 51 FJR 68 (AP) and followed
in Workmen v. Industrial Tribunal, (1994) 2 Cur LR 155 : (1994) 2 LLN 331 (Cal).
“Any person” does not include a person who was offered appointment but was not allowed to join the service
by not accepting his joining report. Existence of employer-employee relationship necessary. Bongaigaon
Refinery & Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Samijuddin Ahmed, (2001) 9 SCC 557 : (2001) 90 FLR 1167 : (2001) 2 LLJ
1149, distinguishing Workmen v. Dimakuchi Tea Estate, AIR 1958 SC 353.
The expression ‘terms of employment’ would ordinarily include not only the contractual terms and conditions
but those terms which are understood and applied by the parties in practice or habitually or by common
consent without ever being incorporated in the contract. Workmen v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1984) 4 SCC
392 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 6.
The term ‘industrial dispute’ includes a claim of an employee who has ceased to be a ‘workman’. Triangilar
Motors Ltd. v. Bombay Automobile Employees' Union, 2 FJR 179 (LAT).
The term ‘individual dispute’ includes even an individual dispute between a single workman and his
employers. Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Buckingham and Carnatic Mills Staff Union, (1959) 2 LLJ
338 : AIR 1960 Mad 106. Individual dispute espoused by the union becomes an ‘industrial dispute’. Workmen
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
v. Shri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1040 : (1967) 2 LLJ 12; Bombay Union of Journalists v.
The Hindu, AIR 1963 SC 318 : (1961) 2 LLJ 436. But this is not the universal test. Workmen v. Dharam Pal
Prem Chand, AIR 1966 SC 182 : (1965) 1 LLJ 668. The only condition for an individual dispute turning into an
industrial dispute is the necessity of a community of interest and not whether the concerned workman was or
was not a member of the union at the time of his dismissal. Western India Match Co. v. Workers' Union,
(1970) 1 SCC 225 : AIR 1970 SC 1205 : (1970) 2 LLJ 256. See also Workmen v. Dahingeapara Tea Estate,
AIR 1958 SC 1026. It is however not necessary that a registered body should sponsor a workman's case.
Newspapers Ltd. v. U.P. State Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1960 SC 1328 : (1960) 2 LLJ 37. See also State of
Bihar v. Kripa Shankar Jaiswal, AIR 1961 SC 304. Sometimes some or all of the workmen of an establishment
having no union of their own may join the union of another establishment belonging to the same industry. If
such a union takes up the cause of workmen of that establishment the dispute would be nonetheless an
industrial dispute. U.P. Trade Union Congress v. Labour Court, (1997) 1 LLN 761 (All). A minority union or
minority group of workmen can raise an ‘industrial dispute’. Associated Cement Co. v. Workmen, AIR 1960
SC 777 : (1960) 1 LLJ 491; Pradip Lamp Works v. Workmen, (1970) 1 LLJ 507; State of Punjab v. Gandhara
Transport Co., (1975) 4 SCC 838 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 483; Workmen v. Indian Express Newspaper (P) Ltd.,
(1969) 2 SCC 228.
Where the cause of the workman has been espoused by a union which has absolutely nothing to do with the
establishment from which the workman comes, then it is not an industrial dispute. Motor and Machinery
Manufacturers Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, (1963) 1 LLJ 222. Where the union which took up the cause
of the dismissed workmen itself came into existence after the date of dismissal and the dismissed workmen
joined the union thereafter, it would be a valid industrial dispute. Workmen of Jamadoba Colliery of Tata Iron &
Steel Co. v. Jamadoba Colliery of Tata Iron & Steel Co., (1967) 2 LLJ 663 : 32 FJR 439. Even if the trade
union withdrew support to a workman owing to settlement with the company, the dispute regarding the
workman's dismissal, held, did not cease to be an industrial dispute. Binny Ltd. v. Workmen, (1972) 3 SCC
806. Industrial dispute can be raised in respect of non-workmen. Workmen v. Greaves Cotton & Co. Ltd.,
(1971) 2 SCC 658. See also Kays Construction Co. v. Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 208 : (1958) 2 LLJ 660. There
can be an industrial dispute regarding retrenchment of a workman who had ceased to be a workman.
Cawnpore Tannery Ltd. v. S. Guha, AIR 1967 SC 667 : (1961) 2 LLJ 110. Dispute of workmen whose cases
left unsettled, held, constituted industrial dispute. Bata Shoe Co. (P) Ltd. v. D.N. Ganguli, AIR 1961 SC 1158 :
(1961) 1 LLJ 303. On disapproval by Conciliation Officer of settlement between the company and the union the
industrial dispute did not become an individual dispute. Bata Shoe Co. (P) Ltd. v. D.N. Ganguli, AIR 1961 SC
1158 : (1961) 1 LLJ 303. Industrial dispute will subsist in spite of closure or take over of industry. U.P. Electric
Supply Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, (1971) 3 SCC 495 : AIR 1971 SC 2521 : (1971) 2 LLJ 528. A demand can be
made by the workman through the President of the Union. Ariana Afghan Airlines v. K.S. Sidhu, (1988) 1 LLN
202. See also Needle Industries v. Presiding Officer, (1986) 1 LLJ 405 (Mad)(DB) : (1986) 2 LLN 275.
Following, held, amounted to industrial disputes: Pipraich Sugar Mills v. Mazdoor Union, AIR 1957 SC 95 :
(1957) 1 LLJ 235; Banaras Ice Factory v. Workmen, AIR 1957 SC 168.
(1) When closure is a pretence.
(2) Dispute on lock-out in disguise of closure. Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC
569 : (1962) 2 LLJ 227.
(3) Dispute regarding contract labour. Standard Vacuum Refining Co. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 948 :
(1960) 2 LLJ 233.
(4) Demand for modification of standing orders. Shahadra (Delhi) Saharanpur Light Railway Co. Ltd. v.
S.S. Rly. Workers' Union, AIR 1969 SC 513 : (1969) 1 LLJ 734.
(5) Alteration of conditions of service of employees of a co-operative society. Co-operative Central Bank
Ltd. v. Addl. Industrial Tribunal, (1969) 2 SCC 43.
(6) Dispute between workmen and employer regarding confirmation of workmen officiating in a higher
grade is an industrial dispute. Workmen v. Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1984) 4 SCC 392.
Following, held, did not amount to industrial disputes:
(1) Employer's failure to keep his verbal assurance. Express Newspapers (P) Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR
1963 SC 569 : (1962) 2 LLJ 227.
(2) Claim for compensation for loss of business. Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff
Union, (1976) 2 SCC 82 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 200.
(3) Dispute of workmen who though not employees of the purchaser who purchased the Estate, were yet
the workmen of the Estate directly interested in their employment. Workmen v. Dahingeapar Tea
Estate, AIR 1958 SC 1026 : (1958) 2 LLJ 498.
(4) Lock-out. A.P. Electric Equipment Corpn. v. Staff Union, 1986 Lab IC 1851 (AP).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
When there is a dispute with regard to the reinstatement of a worker, who has been dismissed, it is covered
by the expression “dispute” connected with the non-employment of “any person” used in the definition of
“Industrial Dispute” in Section 2(k). Therefore, a question regarding the reinstatement of a dismissed employee
is an “industrial dispute”. Province of Bombay v. Western India Automobile Association, 1 FJR 12 (Bom HC);
Santa Cruz Colins & Melad, etc., Bombay v. Workmen, (1954) 2 LLJ 446. See also 1954 FJR 84 (Mad HC).
Pension can be the subject matter of an industrial dispute. ICI India Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, (1993) 2 LLJ
568 : (1993) 1 Cur LR 753.
A dispute relating to transfer of a workman can be adjudicated by Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal only
when it becomes industrial dispute. Otherwise only the civil court can decide the validity of transfer. Jagdish
Narain Sharma v. Rajasthan Patrika Ltd., (1994) 2 LLJ 600 : 1994 Lab IC 388 (Raj).
The scheme of the Act impliedly excludes the jurisdiction of civil court in respect of remedies which are
available under the Act and for which a complete procedure and machinery has been provided. Jitendra Nath
Biswas v. Empire of India & Ceylone Tea Co., (1989) 3 SCC 582 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 552.
Any dispute connected with employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or conditions of
labour of any person can be said to be an industrial dispute, Birla Corpn. Ltd. (Unit Soorah Jute Mill) Sramik
Union v. Birla Corpn. Ltd., (2009) 121 FLR 332 (Cal).
Dispute raised by son, daughter or legal heir of deceased workman by Trade Union would be an Industrial
Dispute, Dda v. Sudesh Kumar, (2009) 121 FLR 366 (Del).
A dispute in order to constitute Industrial Dispute as defined under Section 2(k) of the Act has to be
espoused by a Union or a number of workmen under same employer as on the date of reference. A dispute
between an employer and a single employee cannot per se be an Industrial Dispute. Such of those persons
who seek to support the cause of workmen may themselves be directly and substantially interested in the
dispute. Thus, the test to be adopted would be whether on the date of reference the dispute was taken up or
supported by the Union of the workmen of the employer against whom the dispute is raised is by a substantial
number of workmen. A dispute to be construed as an Industrial Dispute it is not a pre-condition that such
dispute should be sponsored by a recognised Union or all the workmen of a establishment should be parties to
it. The representation of the Union throughout the proceedings is a condition precedent to constitute a dispute
as an Industrial Dispute. Further held, as to whether a dispute raised by an individual has acquired the
character of an Industrial Dispute, has to be examined with reference to date of reference of dispute, and
whether it was taken up and supported by the Union of the workmen of its employer against whom the dispute
has been raised by a considerable or appreciable number of workmen. It is to be tested as on the date
reference was made since the reference would become valid only if an Industrial Dispute exists as on said
date, since it has to be preceded by support of considerable number of workmen and community of interest
has to exist as on the date of reference and the defect even if any cannot be cured by converting it into a
Industrial Dispute by merely passing a resolution subsequently, Bharath Electronics Contract Labour Union v.
Bharath Electronics Ltd., ILR 2012 KAR 1653.
When appellant Company denying respondents to be its workmen and respondent workmen asserting that
they continued to be employees of the appellant Company. It is “dispute” within meaning of Section 2(k) which
has to be determined by means of adjudication, TISCO Ltd. v. State of Jharkhand, (2014) 1 SCC 536 : (2014)
1 SCC (L&S) 183.
“Industrial dispute” connotes live, real and substantial difference having element of persistence, and if not
adjusted, likely to endanger industrial peace. Expression “dispute” means a controversy fairly definite and of
real substance, connected with employment or non-employment or with terms of employment or conditions of
labour of any person and is one in which contesting parties are directly interested in maintaining respective
contentions, Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149.
Dispute whether principle of “first come last go” applicable while affecting termination is an industrial dispute
under Section 25-G, Chief Engineer, Hydel Project v. Ravinder Nath, (2008) 2 SCC 350 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S)
940.
► Clause (kkk): Lay-off.—‘Lay-off’ means to discontinue work or activity; to dismiss or discharge
temporarily.
Such lay-off comes under Item 6 (ii) in Schedule III of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, Priya
Laxmi Mills Ltd. v. Mazdoor Mahajan Mandal, (1977) 1 SCC 28 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 97. See also R.B. Bansilal
Abirchand Mills v. Labour Court, (1972) 1 SCC 154 and Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., (1976) 3
SCC 819 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 504. If there is strike or slow down of production in one part of the establishment
then subsequent lay-off in other parts would be similar to the reasons specified in the definition. Kairbetta
Estate v. Rajamanickam, AIR 1960 SC 893 : (1960) 2 LLJ 275. The definition clause does not confer any
power on the management to lay-off workers. Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., (1976) 1 LLJ 493.
Power to lay-off must be found out from the terms of contract of service or the standing orders governing the
establishment. Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., (1976) 3 SCC 819 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 504.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Financial stringency cannot constitute a ground for lay-off. Hope Textiles Ltd. v. State of M.P., (1993) 1
LLJ 603 : (1992) 65 FLR 770 : (1993) 1 Cur LR 952.
The muster-roll is a record of only those workmen who are employed on a regular basis. Mahipal Singh v.
Trade Fair Authority of India, (1993) 2 LLN 122 : (1993) 1 LLJ 876 : (1993) 66 FLR 321 (Del).
Work-charged employee, can claim protection under the ID Act, Punjab SEB v. Jagjivan Ram, (2009) 3
SCC 661 : (2009) 1 SCC (L&S) 769.
► Clause (l): Lock-out.—In lock-out the employer refuses to continue to employ the workmen employed
by him even though the business activity was not closed down nor intended to be closed down. Even if the
suspension of work is ordered it would constitute lock-out.
On the other hand closure implies closing of industrial activity as a consequence of which workmen are
rendered jobless.
When it is claimed that the employer is not guilty of imposing a lock-out but has closed the industrial activity,
the industrial court or tribunal must, keeping in view all the relevant circumstances at the time of closure, decide
and determine whether the closure was a bona fide one or was a device or a pretence to terminate the services
of the workman. General Labour Union v. B.V. Chavan, (1985) 1 SCC 312.
The liability of the employer in case of lock-out would depend upon whether the lock-out was justified and
legal or not. Where the Manager was violently attacked and other members of the staff were threatened the lock
-out was fully justified. Kairbetta Estate v. Rajamanickam, AIR 1960 SC 893 : (1960) 2 LLJ 275. Lock-out
indicates the closure of the place of business and not the closure of business itself. Express Newspaper (P)
Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 569 : (1962) 2 LLJ 227. Lock-out does not include discharge. Ferozdin v.
State of W.B., AIR 1960 SC 363 : (1960) 1 LLJ 244. Refusal to give work in pursuance of illegal change of
weekly rest day without notice amounts to lock-out. TISCO Ltd. v. Workmen, (1972) 2 SCC 383 : 1973 SCC
(L&S) 113.
Suspension of work due to trade reasons cannot be treated as lock-out. Gordon Woodroffe Ltd. v. Govt. of
T.N., (1997) 2 LLJ 64 (Mad).
Where a company closes down its business and terminates the services of its workmen, the act of the
company cannot in law be regarded as a lock-out. Shree Ram Silk Mills Co., Rishra v. Workmen, 5 FJR 185
(LAT).
Retrenchment of some workmen on the ground of rationalisation of the concern does not amount to lock-out.
Termination of services is one thing and lock-out another. Presidency Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Employee Union,
1952 LAC 62. Where there is retrenchment, there is complete termination of service, 6 FJR 222. Retrenchment
on the ground that workmen were surplus to requirements does not amount to lock-out, 1952 LAC 220.
If the employer had terminated the services of the workmen it was no lock-out to prevent them from coming
into the place of work, 1953 LAC 306 : 1954 LAC 285.
Mere refusal by an employer to allow late comers on a day to work on that day does not amount to a lock-
out. Lock-out like strike implies a collective dispute which must be either antecedent to or simultaneous with the
refusal to employ or to work. A subsequent dispute in consequence of the refusal would not make it a lock-out
or a strike. Talcher Coal Field Ltd. v. Secretary, Talcher Coal Field Workers' Union, 1952 LAC 594 : 5 FJR
180. See also Workmen of the Durga Khonoa Tea Estate v. Management, 1954 LAC 353 (LAT).
► Clause (n): Public utility service.—Public utility services may be carried on by private companies or
business corporations. D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee, AIR 1955 SC 58. The workers or the management are
not entitled to hearing before declaration of service in particular industry as a public utility service. Johnson
and Johnson Employees Union v. Principal Secretarys', Ministry of Labour, (1993) 2 LLN 915 : (1994) 2 LLJ
170 : (1993) 67 FLR 1053 (Bom).
► Clause (oo): Retrenchment.—The definition of ‘retrenchment’ in Section 2(oo) is conclusive. Uptron
India Ltd. v. Shammi Bhan, (1998) 6 SCC 538 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1601. The definition of the word
‘retrenchment’ in Sections 2(oo) and 25-F is not retrospective in operation. Pipraich Sugar Mills v. Mazdoor
Union, AIR 1957 SC 95 : (1957) 1 LLJ 235. ‘Retrenchment’ means ‘to end, conclude, cease’. SBI v. N.
Sundara Money, (1976) 1 SCC 822 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 132. ‘Retrenchment’ means that the business itself is
being continued but that a portion of the staff or the labour force is discharged as surplusage and the
termination of services of all the workmen as a result of the closure of business cannot, therefore, be properly
described as retrenchment. Pipraich Sugar Mills v. Mazdoor Union, AIR 1957 SC 95 : (1957) 1 LLJ 235. See
also Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A.D. Divelkar, AIR 1957 SC 121. Since employer has a right to
terminate the services of a workman, his power to retrench presents no difficulty. Workmen v. Firestone Tyre
& Rubber Co., (1976) 3 SCC 819 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 504.
Retrenchment does not include termination due to ill-health. Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Labour Court,
Varanasi, (2001) 9 SCC 178.
Automatic termination of service on efflux of contractual period amounts to retrenchment. Hindustan Steel
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, (1976) 4 SCC 222 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 583; SBI v. N. Sundara Money, (1976) 1 SCC
822 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 132.
Termination of service not falling within the exceptions (a), (b) and (c) amounts to retrenchment. (1984) 1
SCC 509 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 144.
See also Hari Mohan Rastogi v. Labour Court, 1984 Supp SCC 428.
‘Retrenchment’ includes all kinds of termination of service by employer for any reason whatsoever except
those not expressly included in Section 25-F or not expressly provided for in Sections 25-FF and 25-FFF.
Discharge of a workman on ground of his failure to pass confirmation test would amount to retrenchment.
Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, (1980) 3 SCC 340 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 409. The scope of
‘retrenchment’ is not confined to discharge of surplus labour and staff. Punjab Land Development and
Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, (1990) 3 SCC 682 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 71 : 14 ATC 71.
The striking off of the name of a Tikka Mazdoor, appointed for helping examiners of coins/notes, from the
rolls amounts to retrenchment covered by Section 25-F. H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India, (1985) 4 SCC
201 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 975.
Termination of service on ground of reduction in volume of business amounted to retrenchment. (1984) 1
SCC 509 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 144.
Termination simpliciter of services of a temporary workman which does not fall within the excepted or
excluded categories mentioned in Section 2(oo) would amount to retrenchment. Mohan Lal v. Bharat
Electronics Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 225 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 478.
Termination of service for very long unauthorised absence from duty does not amount to retrenchment.
Managing Director v. Babasahib Devgonda Patil, 1987 Lab IC 288 (Bom) : (1987) 2 LLN 883; distinguishing L.
Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, S.R., (1982) 1 SCC 645 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 124.
Loss of lien in terms of a standing order for absence beyond leave period amounts to retrenchment. Rolston
John v. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 549 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 142.
The termination of service of a probationer Development Officer in LIC in terms of the appointment letter and
in accordance with service regulations falls within clause (bb) of Section 2(oo) and, therefore, does not amount
to retrenchment. M. Venugopal v. Divl. Manager, LIC of India, (1994) 2 SCC 323 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 664.
Followed in LIC of India v. Raghavendra Seshagiri Rao Kulkarni, (1997) 8 SCC 461 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 9.
Sub-clause (bb) of clause (oo) does not cover a contract like that of a daily wager, and is rather intended to
cover more general classes of contracts where a regular contract of employment is entered into and the
termination of service comes about because of non-renewal of contract.
Hence, it cannot be invoked to exclude the discontinuance of employment of a daily wager, who was in
continuous employment for more than 240 days, from the scope of retrenchment so as to deny him the
protection of Section 25-F. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Orissa Road Transport Co. Ltd. v. Ramesh
Chandra Gouda, (1994) 2 LLJ 1127 (Ori)(DB) : (1995) 70 FLR 468 : (1995) 1 Cur LR 62.
Clause (bb), added in 1984, is not retrospective in effect. Punjab State Seeds Corporation, Chandigarh v.
Labour Court, Jullundhar, (1995) 1 Cur LR 895 : (1995) 1 LLN 606 (P&H).
Termination of services owing to genuine closure or takeover of the “undertaking” by another employer,
Barsi Light Rly. Co. v. K.N. Jogelkar, AIR 1957 SC 121 or discharge due to ill health is not retrenchment.
Workmen v. Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk Mills, AIR 1962 SC 1363 : (1962) 1 LLJ 213. As a result of
bona fide closure of business, retrenchment will not entail any compensation. General Produce Ltd. v.
Ambalapuzeh, Taluk Head Load Conveyance Workers' Union, Alleppy, AIR 1985 Tra Co 268.
The question whether termination of services in terms of a stipulation of terminability in the contract of
employment would be covered by clause (bb) of Section 2(oo), was left open in S. Govindaraju v. Karnataka
SRTC, (1986) 3 SCC 273 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 520.
Clause (bb) contemplates a contract expressly providing for certain circumstances or situations in which
termination can be effected. D. Chenniah v. Divl. Manager, APSRTC, (1987) 2 LLN 446 (AP) : 1987 Lab IC
1259.
A termination simpliciter in terms of the order of appointment is not covered by this clause. Ibid.
Termination of service on the ground of lack of confidence, is stigmatic and does not amount to
retrenchment. Chandu Lal v. Pan American World Airways, (1985) 2 SCC 727 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 535; Kamal
Kishore Lakshman v. Pan American World Airways, (1987) 1 SCC 146 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 25; contra (1987)
1 LLN 573 (MP) : 1985 Lab IC 509 (Cal)(DB). In absence of a domestic enquiry termination on such a ground
is illegal. Ibid.
Re-employment on fresh contract after retirement on reaching age of superannuation and drawal of retiral
benefits did not amount to continuation in service. Termination of the subsequent employment on completion of
contractual period is not retrenchment. Binoy Kumar Chatterjee v. Jugantar Ltd., (1983) 3 SCC 289 : 1983
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
SCC (L&S) 377. See also Kunjumohammed v. Chairman, (1994) 1 LLJ 612 (Ker)(DB) : (1993) 2 LLN 850 :
(1994) 1 Cur LR 87.
The expression ‘any reason’ in Section 2(oo) does not rule out investigation of an allegation that the
retrenchment was mala fide. To see if retrenchment is justified the question of good faith has to be considered
and it may depend whether retention of all the existing workmen would mean the deadweight of an uneconomic
surplus and it can operate at any level of profits and it is not unlawful for an employer to make more profits by
getting rid of the deadweight of an uneconomic surplusage. Management of India Tyre and Rubber Co. India
(P) Ltd. v. Workers, AIR 1958 Mad 205.
The termination of service of a person appointed de hors the rules cannot be considered as retrenchment.
Koodaranji Service Co-op. Bank v. M.M. Lissy, (1994) 2 LLJ 97 : (1993) 2 LLN 800 : (1993) 67 FLR 1039
(Ker) dissenting from Prabhu Dayal Jat v. Alwar Sahkari Bhoomi Vikas Bank Ltd., (1991) 2 LLJ 130 (Ker)
(DB).
If retrenchment is effected under ID Act, question of compliance with principles of natural justice does not
arise, State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi, (2006) 1 SCC 667 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 190.
When retrenchment is held bad, the employee is entitled to back wages. Sukhdev Raj v. Union of India,
1987 Supp SCC 36 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 281.
Declaration as to whether an industrial workman was terminated from service rightly and in accordance with
law is a relief which can be granted by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal and not by the civil court,
Dagadu Sakharam Lad v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 Mah LJ 693.
A temporary worker who has put in 240 days of service in the previous year, cannot be terminated from
service without following the provisions of Section 25-F, Raigad Zila Parishad v. Gajanan H. Patil, (2009) 1
Mah LJ 792.
Termination of service is not retrenchment, Kurukshetra University v. Prithvi Singh, (2018) 4 SCC 483.
► Section 2(oo)(bb).—Provisions of Section 2(oo)(bb) does not apply in U.P., Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Samiti v. Ist Labour Court, (2009) 123 FLR 113 (All).
Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Act contains an exception. It is in two parts. The first part contemplates termination
of service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment or on its expiry;
whereas the second part postulates termination of such contract or employment in terms of stipulation
contained in that behalf, Municipal Council, Samrala v. Raj Kumar, (2006) 3 SCC 81 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 473.
If a workman was appointed on contractual and temporary basis, with condition that his/her services could
be terminated without notice when the terms and conditions of appointments were accepted without any demur
then in such a case Section 2(oo)(bb) is applicable, Municipal Council, Samrala v. Sukhwinder Kaur, (2006) 6
SCC 516 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1436.
Once the period of contract is fixed and the same is done keeping in view the nature of job, it cannot be said
that the act of the employer in terminating services is actuated by any malice, Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens
Ltd., (2007) 1 SCC 533 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 346.
► Clause (oo)(c): ‘Continued ill health’: Scope.—Held, covers only that illness which interferes, with the
usual orderly functioning of the duties of the post. Defective or sub-normal eyesight in case of a bus driver,
amounts to such illness. Anand Bihari v. Rajasthan SRTC, (1991) 1 SCC 731 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 393 : (1991)
16 ATC 449.
“Continued ill-health” is referable to a state of physical condition of the worker incapacitating him for an
indefinite period though the same need not necessarily be correlated to any organic disease in the system. P.
Muthukrishan v. Central Cinema, Dindigul, (1992) 1 LLN 1052 : (1992) 65 FLR 370 : (1992) 1 Cur LR 743
(Mad).
► Clause (p): Settlement.—Settlement accepted by majority of workers, must be presumed to be just and
fair and tribunals' interference with it on the basis of its subjective view or minority workers' opposition would be
unwarranted. TELCO Ltd. v. Workmen, (1981) 4 SCC 627 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 1.
Memorandum of settlement signed by office bearers of union without being authorised either by the
constitution of the union or by the executive committee of the union or by the workmen to enter into any
agreement with the management does not amount to ‘settlement’. Brooke Bond of India v. Workmen, (1981) 3
SCC 493 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 521.
In view of Section 2(p) and Rule 58 of the Central Rules, a settlement is a written one. Hence, it cannot be
varied or modified by an oral agreement. Fabril Gasosa v. Labour Commr., (1997) 3 SCC 150 : 1997 SCC
(L&S) 667.
The withdrawal of an agitation by the employees on a Minister's assurance that he would use his good
offices to implement their demands does not amount to a settlement. Hence, the dispute can be referred to the
Labour Court under Section 12(5). Bachi Singh v. Union of India, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 173 : 1993 SCC (L&S)
348 : (1993) 24 ATC 81.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Where there is no valid settlement, Rule 62(2)(b) of Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957 and Rule 58
(2)(b) of Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 would not be applicable. Brooke Bond of India Ltd. v.
Workmen, (1981) 3 SCC 493 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 521.
Settlement arrived in a conciliation proceedings on a holiday, held, is not ipso facto invalid. National Engg.
Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 1 SCC 371.
► Clause (q): Strike.—Strike is a recognised weapon of the workmen to be resorted to by them, for
asserting their bargaining power and for tacking of their collective demands upon an unwilling employer. It is to
be used as a last resort when all other avenues for settlement of industrial disputes as provided for in statutory
machinery have proved futile. Strikes are not banned even in the case of public utility services. Chemical &
Fibres of India Ltd. v. D.G. Bhoir, (1975) 4 SCC 332 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 288. Pen-down strike is a ‘strike’.
Punjab National Bank v. All India PNB Employee's Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 : (1959) 2 LLJ 666.
Fomenting trouble and indulging in violent acts are not matter connected with a strike, whether strike is legal or
illegal. MGMT of Oriental Transport Ltd. v. B.T. Ramakrishna, (2006) 1 LLN 598 (Kant). Non-permitted
stoppage of work of two hours, held, amounts to ‘strike’. Buckingham & Carnatic Mills v. Workmen, AIR 1953
SC 47 : (1953) 1 LLJ 181. Refusal to act according to a Rationalisation Scheme which is introduced contrary
to Section 33 of the Act, held, does not constitute ‘strike’. North Brook Jute Co. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC
879 : (1960) 1 LLJ 580. When the Management substituted weekly rest day without giving a notice of change
then refusal to work on substituted holiday will not amount to strike. TISCO Ltd. v. Workmen, (1972) 2 SCC
383 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 113. Mere absence from work does not amount to taking part in a strike within the
meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. There should be some evidence to show that absence of the
workmen was the result of some concert between him and other persons that they would not continue or there
should have been a refusal on the workmen. Ram Swarup v. Rex, 1 FJR 131 (All HC). See also (1967) 1 LLJ
381 : AIR 1967 Pat 397. On illegal strike, management can carry on the work of the factory by employing other
workmen. Oriental Textile Finishing Mills v. Labour Court, (1971) 3 SCC 646.
The employer cannot be given an unqualified right to dismiss a workman simply because he has joined a
strike which is ultimately found to be unjustified. But at the same time to withhold the right from the employer in
every case of unjustified strike may lead to various consequences on the economy of the country. A
responsible adjustment, shall therefore be made in such a manner that the national interest and the interest of
the industry may be safeguarded with as little curtailment of the strength of the bargaining power of the
workmen as possible.
There is however no fundamental right to strike or to give speech or demonstration in support of strike.
Radhey Shyam Sharma v. Post Master General, AIR 1965 SC 311.
Wages can be proportionately deducted for not doing work during strike. Bank of India v. T.S. Kelawala,
(1990) 4 SCC 744 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 170 : (1991) 15 ATC 747.
► Clause (ra): Unfair labour practice.—The termination of the service of a daily wages labour on his
passing matriculation examination, where the terms and conditions of appointment contained no such
stipulation, has been held unfair and by way of victimisation. H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India, (1985) 4
SCC 201 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 975.
Offering work on rotation basis to workmen treating them as badli worker and continuing them as such for
years together amounts to an unfair labour practice. H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India, (1985) 4 SCC 201 :
1985 SCC (L&S) 975.
The termination of services of a workman in violation of a statutory provision amounted to failure to
implement an implied condition of the settlement and, hence, constituted an unfair labour practice. S.G.
Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union v. Management, (1986) 2 SCC 624 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 303,
overruling Maharashtra General Kamgar Union v. Glass Containers, (1983) 1 LLJ 326 (Bom).
Issuance of repeated orders of appointment and termination with a view to bypass the provisions of Section
25-B amounts to an unfair labour practice. Ferozpore Central Co-operative Bank v. Labour Court, (1986) 1
LLN 204 (P&H). See also Kapurthala Central Co-operative Bank v. Labour Court, (1984) 2 LLN 180 (P&H)
(DB) : 1984 Lab IC 974.
The ID Act prohibits an employer or workman or a trade union from “committing” any unfair labour practice
while the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971
prohibits an employer or union or an employee from “engaging” in any unfair labour practice. The prohibition
under the ID Act is aimed at preventing the commission of an unfair labour practice while the 1971 Act
mandates that the parties concerned cannot be engaged by any unfair labour practice. The word “engage” is
more comprehensive in nature as compared to the word “commit”, Siemens Ltd. v. Siemens Employees
Union, (2011) 9 SCC 775 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 593.
Labour Court/Tribunal to decide question of unfair labour practice committed in Government or private
undertaking pursuant to reference made by appropriate Government. In matter of appointment in service of
“State” including public establishment or undertaking, Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution attracted. An
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
undertaking of Government cannot justify illegal action including unfair labour practice nor can ask for different
treatment on ground that public undertaking is guided by Articles 14 and 16, Durgapur Casual Workers Union
v. Food Corporation of India, (2015) 5 SCC 786 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 232.
► Clause (rr): Wages.—No wage structure can or should be revised to the prejudice of workmen if the
structure in question falls in the category of the bare assistance or the minimum wage. If, however, the wage
structure in question falls in a higher category, then it would be open to the employer to claim its revision even
to the prejudice of the workmen provided a case for such revision is made out on the merits to the satisfaction
of the tribunal. Crown Aluminium Works v. Workmen, AIR 1958 SC 30 : 1958 SCR 651 : (1958) 1 LLJ 1.
The principle of region-cum-industry, the doctrine that minimum wage is to be assured to the labour
irrespective of the capacity of the industry to bear the expenditure in that regard, the concept that the fair wage
is linked with the capacity of the industry, the rule of relevancy of comparable concerns, and the recognition of
the totality of the basic wage and D.A. that should be borne in mind in fixation of wage structure are some of
the well-settled and recognised principles which should be kept in mind in fixing wages. Hindustan Antibiotics
Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 948 : (1967) 1 SCR 652 : (1967) 1 LLJ 114.
See also Hindustan Times Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1332 : (1963) 1 LLJ 108; Hindustan Hosiery
Industries v. F.H. Lala, (1974) 4 SCC 316 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 27; Crown Aluminium Works v. Workmen, AIR
1958 SC 30 : (1958) 1 LLJ 1; Ahmedabad Millowners' Assn. v. Textile Labour Assn., AIR 1966 SC 497 :
(1966) 1 LLJ 1 in regard to fixation of wages.
Commission paid to Sirdars in the mine for recruiting miners and supervising their work, held, falls within the
definition of wages. Bhagaband Colliery v. Workmen, (1962) 2 LLJ 356.
Commission paid to Commission Agents/Deposit Collector of banks, held, falls within the definition of wages.
Indian Banks Assn. v. Workmen of Syndicate Bank, (2001) 3 SCC 36 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 504.
Car allowance and benefit of telephone or newspaper can be taken into account in fixing fair wages and
calculation of gratuity. Bennett, Coleman & Co. v. P.P. Das Gupta, (1969) 2 SCC 1.
An “ex-gratia” payment cannot come within the main or first part of Section 2(rr). Vayitri Plantations Ltd. v.
Babu Mathew, (1994) 1 LLJ 1131 : 1994 Lab IC 632 : (1993) 2 LLN 446 (Ker)(DB).
Leave encashment does not amount to wages under Section 2(y), Northern India Textile Research Assn. v.
Presiding Officer, (2009) 121 FLR 442 (All).
► Clause (s): Workman.—Having regard to the nature of the work there should be due control and
supervision by the employer for a master and servant relationship. Dhrangadhra Chemical Works v. State of
Saurashtra, AIR 1957 SC 264 : (1957) 1 LLJ 477. The test as to who is entitled to give orders or make
payments is, however, not of universal application and decisive. Kirloskar Oil Engines v. Hanmant Laxman
Bibwabe, (1963) 1 LLJ 126. Test of ‘workman’ is what is the main work assigned to an employee. Medical
representatives, held, are not workmen. May & Baker India Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 678 : (1961) 2 LLJ
94.
See also Arkal Govind Raj Rao v. CIBA Geigy of India Ltd., (1985) 3 SCC 371 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 808.
A medical representative is not a workman. H.R. Adyanathaya v. Sandoz (India) Ltd., (1994) 5 SCC 737 :
1994 SCC (L&S) 1283 affirming Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distribution Co. of India Ltd. v. Burmah Shell
Management Staff Association, (1970) 3 SCC 378 and limiting S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra, (1983) 4 SCC
214 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 510.
A sales/medical representative with the duty to call on doctors, hospitals, stockists, chemists and druggists
and to explain to them the efficacy of his principal's products and to promote sales thereof, is not a workman.
Glaxo Laboratories (India) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (1992) 1 LLN 822 (Ker) : (1992) 65 FLR 110 : (1992) 1 Cur
LR 512.
[In respect of medical representatives see also the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act,
1976.]
A salesman, whose duties included manual as well as clerical work such as to attend to the customer,
prepare cash memos, to assist the manager in daily routine etc., is a workman. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. v.
Labour Court, (1993) 1 LLN 300 : (1993) 66 FLR 266 (P&H).
A sales representative doing clerical work and repair of radios, collection of accounts, tally of accounts,
taking stock of goods, collection of amounts is ‘workman’. Promer Sales (P) Ltd. v. Manohar Sondhur, (1993)
2 LLJ 997 : 1993 Lab IC 1762 : (1993) 2 LLN 235 (Bom).
A Chemist-in-charge discharging the functions of Chemist, although discharging some supervisory function
incidental and ancillary to that work, is nonetheless a workman. Sudhir Kumar v. Ferro Alloys Corpn. Ltd.,
(1992) 1 Lab IC 657 (Bom).
Technician-cum-Designer in the knitting department would not cease to be a workman even if he performs
some supervisory duties. Gwalior Co. (P) Ltd. v. K.M. Desai, Member, Industrial Court, (1993) 1 LLJ 127 :
(1992) 65 FLR 489 : (1992) 2 Cur LR 406.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
A shop-manager, although incidently doing some clerical work, is not a workman. S.K. Maini v. Carona
Sahu Co. Ltd., (1994) 3 SCC 510 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 776.
Occasional entrustment of supervisory, managerial or administrative work, will not take a person, mainly
discharging clerical duties, out of the purview of Section 2(s). D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Admn., (1983) 4 SCC
293 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 527. Once the basic relationship of master and servant is satisfactorily proved the terms
of contract and the problem as to whether the work is supervised by the employer or not, becomes unimportant.
Tandur & Navandgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd. v. Workmen, (1964) 1 LLJ 737.
In order to determine whether an employee charged with multifarious duties is or is not a workman the
nature of his duties and not his designation is important. In such a case the main duties of and not some work
incidentally done by such an employee are decisive. S.K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd., (1994) 3 SCC 510 :
1994 SCC (L&S) 776.
In deciding about the status of an employee, his designation alone is not decisive and what really should go
into consideration is the nature of his duties and the powers conferred upon, as well as the function assigned to
him. Hussan Mithu Mhasvadkar v. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board, (2001) 7 SCC 394.
An appraiser was engaged by a bank purely on commission basis for weighing and testing gold ornaments
offered to be pledged to the bank to secure loans, with a fair element of freedom in the manner of doing his
work and without obligation on the part of the bank to allot him work. Such an appraiser, although undertaking to
indemnify the bank in case of any loss, was held to be not a workman. Puri Urban Coop. Bank v. Madhusudan
Sahu, (1992) 3 SCC 323 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 675 : (1992) 20 ATC 753.
The designation given to an employee is not conclusive to bring him within the definition of ‘workman’ given
in Section 2(s) of the Act nor he becomes ‘workman’ if he does some manual or clerical work as ancillary or
incidental to such an employment. The main feature, the pith and substance of his employment must be manual
or clerical before the definition is attracted. Question whether employee is a workman is a question of
jurisdiction of Tribunal although within its jurisdiction to decide, is open to examination in proceedings under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Malabar Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Trivandrum, AIR 1958 Ker
202. See also Guest Keen Williams v. Asstt. Labour Commr., 1986 Lab IC 1663 (Cal)(DB) and Enamelnagar
Development Corpn. v. 2nd Industrial Tribunal, 1986 Lab IC 1741 (Cal)(DB) : (1986) 2 LLN 134.
The principal factor to determine whether a person is a workman or not is the main or substantial work for
which he has been employed and engaged and not his designation any incidental work done, or required to be
done, by him. G.M. Pillai v. III Labour Court, (1998) 2 LLJ 44 : (1998) 2 LLN 690 : (1998) 1 Cur LR 281
(Bom).
A person not engaged in ‘skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work’, even though
employed in an industry, is not a workman. A. Sundarambal v. Govt. of Goa, (1988) 4 SCC 42 : 1988 SCC
(L&S) 892.
Internal Auditor of a company with duties mainly to report or check up but without any authority to take
decision and bind the company thereby has been held to be a workman. National Engg. Industries Ltd. v.
Kishan Bhageria, 1988 Supp SCC 82 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 428.
A part-time worker is a workman. Simla Devi v. Presiding Officer, (1997) 2 LLN 305 : (1997) 1 Cur LR 693
(P&H)(DB); General Manager, Telecom, Nagpur v. Naresh Brijlal Charote, 2001 Lab IC 2127 (Bom).
Teachers are not workmen, though educational institutions are industry. A. Sundarambal v. Govt. of Goa,
(1988) 4 SCC 42 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 892. Contra, Jagdish Prasad Sinha v. P.O., Labour Court, (1992) 2 LLJ
33 (All).
A teacher in handicrafts in Indian Cancer Society is a workman. Pramodini Parkar v. Indian Cancer
Society, (1993) 1 LLJ 97 : (1992) 2 LLN 447 : (1992) 65 FLR 394 (Bom).
A person employed to play any musical instrument must be held to be a ‘workman’ as the word is now
defined. Prabhat Brass Band v. Workmen, (1959) 1 LLJ 78. The designation of employee could not be but
what duties he carries be basis whether he is a workman or not. East Asiatic Co. v. Workmen, (1960) 1 LLJ
383; P.A.S. Press Madras v. Labour Court, (1960) 1 LLJ 192.
The effect of Section 2(a)(i) of the Central Act and Section 2 of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act is that the
industries specified in the former provisions are excluded from the definition of Industrial Disputes in the U.P.
Act. Upper Doab Sugar Mills Ltd., Shamli v. State of U.P., AIR 1957 All 643. The words ‘Industry carried on
under the authority of the Central Government’ and the words ‘Controlled industry’ do not mean the same thing.
Bharat Glass Works (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., AIR 1957 Cal 437.
What determines whether a person is a workman or an independent contractor is whether he has agreed to
work personally or not. If he has, he is a workman although he gets other persons to work along with him and
these persons are controlled and paid by him. Chemicals Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1957 SC
264. By the mere existence of a contract to employ until the contract is performed and the servant is actually
employed the relationship of employer and workman is not constituted. Ibid. Could the workmen be compelled to
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
work if they did not choose to, would be one of the tests to decide the term ‘Employed’. Mohan Match
Industries v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Madras, AIR 1957 Mad 688.
Where the system of direct payment by the employer to its workers was introduced and contract system
abolished, having regard to the scheme it was held that the workers became direct workmen of the employer.
Workmen v. Food Corporation of India, (1985) 2 SCC 136 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 420.
Only such employees are covered by the definition ‘workman’ which in conjunction with their employers can
be considered as ‘industry’ under Section 2(j). Safdar Jung Hospital v. Kuldip Singh Sethi, (1970) 1 SCC 735.
Expression ‘employed in any industry’, includes works incidentally connected to main industry. J.K. Cotton
Spg. & Wvg. Mills v. Badri Mali, AIR 1964 SC 737 : (1963) 2 LLJ 436.
If Labour Court after considering the entire evidence records a positive finding that a person was
discharging duties of clerical nature and was therefore, a workman, High Court under Article 226 is not justified
in disturbing that finding and taking a different view. Supreme Court could interfere with the High Court's order
in such case. D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Admn., (1983) 4 SCC 293 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 527.
Payment on piece rate by itself does not disprove the relationship of master and servant. Shining Tailors v.
Industrial Tribunal, (1983) 4 SCC 464 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 533.
Development Officers working in LIC — held, are not “workmen” under Section 2(s), Chauharya Tripathi v.
LIC, (2015) 7 SCC 263 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 438.
Medical doctors discharging functions of medical officers i.e. treating patients in ESI dispensaries/hospitals,
held, are not “workmen”. They are entrusted with task of examining and diagnosing patients and prescribing
medicines and they are basically and mainly engaged in professional and intellectual activities to treat patients.
Persons performing such functions cannot be seen as workmen within meaning of Section 2(s), ESI Corpn.'s
Medical Officer's Assn. v. ESI Corpn., (2014) 16 SCC 182 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 527.
Person to be “workman” under the ID Act must be employed to do work of any of the categories viz. manual,
unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory. Driver employed by school being a skilled
person, is “workman” for purpose of ID Act, Raj Kumar v. Director of Education, (2016) 6 SCC 541 : (2016) 2
SCC (L&S) 111.
If employee of cooperative society is covered by definition of “workman” under ID Act, and claimed relief of
reinstatement, such relief cannot be granted by Cooperative Court but can only be granted by Labour
Court/Industrial Court i.e. as jurisdiction of civil court stands ousted in such cases. Thus, even if it is accepted
that Cooperative Court is substitute for civil court, since jurisdiction of civil court to grant relief of reinstatement
is barred, a fortiori, jurisdiction of Cooperative Court shall also stand barred. Further held, civil court does not
have jurisdiction to grant relief of reinstatement as giving of such relief would amount to enforcing contract of
personal service which is specifically barred under Section 14 r/w Section 41(e), Specific Relief Act, 1963
subject to stipulated exceptions, Maharashtra State Coop. Housing Finance Corpn. Ltd. v. Prabhakar Sitaram
Bhadange, (2017) 5 SCC 623.
For determining the question as to whether a person employed in an industry is a workman or not, not only
the nature of work performed by him but also the terms of the appointment in the job performed are relevant
considerations, Anand Regional Coop. Oil Seedgrowers' Union Ltd. v. Shaileshkumar Harshadbhai Shah,
(2006) 6 SCC 548 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1486.
Professionals can never be termed as workmen under any law, Muir Mills Unit of NTC (U.P.) Ltd. v.
Swayam Prakash Srivastava, (2007) 1 SCC 491 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 312.
Temporal effect of broadening of definition of ‘workman’ under Section 2(s) [as amended by Act 46 of 1982
w.e.f. 21-8-1984 is prospective, C. Gupta v. Glaxo-Smithkline Pharmaceuticals Ltd., (2007) 7 SCC 171 :
(2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 605.
A bare perusal of the definitions of “workman” and “continuous service” reveals that their applicability is not
limited to only full-time employees but requirement is that the workman claiming continuous service must fulfil
the specific conditions amongst others laid down in the two provisions so as to seek the shelter of Section 25-F.
A workman employed on a part-time basis but under the control and supervision of an employer is a workman
in terms of Section 2(s) of the Act, and is entitled to claim the protection of Section 25-F, New India Assurance
Co. Ltd. v. A. Sankaralingam, (2008) 10 SCC 698.
Work of purchase officer is managerial or administrative in nature not pertaining to manufacture or
production. It is excluded from the definition of “workman”, Twenty First Century Printers Ltd. v. K.P.
Abraham, (2009) 1 Mah LJ 434.
A temporary worker who has put in 240 days of service in the previous year, cannot be terminated from
service without following the provisions of Section 25-F, Raigad Zila Parishad v. Gajanan H. Patil, (2009) 1
Mah LJ 792.
Source, of employment, method of recruitment, terms and conditions of employment/contract of service,
quantum of wages/pay and mode of payment are not at all relevant for deciding whether or not a person is a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
workman within meaning of Section 2(s). Definition of workman also does not make any distinction between full
-time and part-time employee or a person appointed on contract basis. Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal is
required to consider whether the person is employed in an industry for hire or reward for doing manual,
unskilled, skilled, operational, technical or clerical work in an industry. Once the test of employment for hire or
reward for doing the specified type of work is satisfied, employee would fall within definition of “workman”,
Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sanaur, (2011) 6 SCC 584 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 153.
Person placed in executive cadre, ceases to be a “workman”, Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Union of India,
(2012) 1 SCC 619.
Whether a person is a workman or not is a mixed question of law and fact and unless there is an evidence
on this behalf, the court cannot for the first time in a writ petition decide the issue, N.M. Wadia Charitable
Trust Hospital v. Ashok Vyankatesh Apte (Dr.), (2011) 5 Mah LJ 444 (Bom).
Person employed in supervisory capacity and drawing a salary in excess of Rs 1600 (at relevant point of
time) is a workman, Management of Athoor Pudhupettai Primary Agricultural Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. P.
Krishnan, (2012) 4 CTC 739 (Mad).
► Following were held to be workmen:
(i) Dismissed or discharged workers. Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal
Patwardhan, AIR 1957 SC 104 : (1957) 1 LLJ 27.
(ii) Retrenched workmen. Cawnpore Tannery Ltd. v. S. Guha, AIR 1967 SC 667 : (1961) 2 LLJ 110.
(iii) Ex-employees. Bennett, Coleman & Co. v. P.P. Das Gupta, (1969) 2 SCC 1. See also (1971) 2
SCC 658.
(iv) Part time employee. Coal India Ltd. v. P.O., Labour Court, (2001) 2 Cur LR 502 (Del); General
Manager, Telecom v. Naresh Brijlal Charote, 2001 Lab IC 2127 (Bom).
(v) Daily wager. Executive Engineer, Garhwal Jal Sansthan v. Chhotey Singh, (2000) 3 LLN 549.
(vi) Malis employed by Mill for looking after gardens attached with officer's bungalows which are situated
in the Mill's colony, held; J.K. Cotton Spg. & Wvg. Mills v. Badri Mali, AIR 1964 SC 737 : (1963) 2
LLJ 436.
(vii) Transport Engineers; Blending Supervisors; Foreman; Depot Supdts.; District Engineers; Foreman
(Chemicals); Sales Engineering Representatives; District Sales Representatives. Burmah Shell
Storage & Distribution Co. of India Ltd. v. Association, (1970) 3 SCC 378. See also AIR 1961 SC
941 : (1961) 3 SCR 167 : (1961) 1 LLJ 323.
(viii) Employees of municipality. Howrah Municipality v. Mansa Das Dev, (1965) 2 LLJ 135.
(ix) Inspectors and salesmen in the employment of the company. Western India Match Co. v.
Workmen, AIR 1964 SC 472 : (1963) 2 LLJ 459; Indian Farmers Fertilizers Co-operative Ltd. v.
P.O., Labour Court, Chandigarh, (2000) 2 LLN 790 (P&H)(DB).
(x) Manager of a hotel who had to write ledgers, file correspondence, enter cash book etc. Indian Iron &
Steel Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1958 SC 130 : (1958) 1 LLJ 260.
(xi) An employee doing occasionally supervisory work. Anand Bazar Patrika (P) Ltd. v. Workmen,
(1970) 3 SCC 248.
(xii) A lower division clerk in technical educational institute discharging clerical work. Ram Kishan
Sharma v. Samrat Ashok Technical Institute, Vidisha, 1995 Lab IC 654 : (1995) 1 LLJ 944 (MP).
(xiii) Clerk of a university. Suresh Chandra Mathe v. Jiwaji University, Gwalior, (1994) 2 LLJ 462 (DB) :
(1994) 2 LLN 611 : (1993) 2 Cur LR 1032 (MP)(DB).
(xiv) Clerks in the State Insurance & P.F. Department. Hemraj Gurjar v. State of Rajasthan, (1993) 2
LLJ 167 : (1993) 66 FLR 345 : (1993) 1 Cur LR 400.
(xv) Commercial Inspectors in the Railways. R.M. Nerlekar v. Chief Commercial Superintendent,
Central Rly., (1991) 2 LLN 1135 : (1991) 2 Cur LR 789 (Bom) : (1992) 64 FLR 96.
(xvi) Accountants who are merely senior clerks with supervisory duties. South India Bank Ltd. v. A.R.
Chacko, AIR 1964 SC 1522 : (1964) 1 LLJ 19. See also (1975) 4 SCC 696 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 394 :
(1968) 1 LLJ 589 & (1968) 1 LLJ 840.
(xvii) Clerks in the audit department of a Bank. Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. P.N. Gupta, AIR 1967 SC 428 :
(1961) 1 LLJ 18.
(xviii) Development Officers of LIC are ‘workmen’. S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra, (1983) 4 SCC 214 :
1983 SCC (L&S) 510; Life Insurance Corpn. of India v. Industrial Tribunal, (2001) 91 FLR 1104
(Ker).
(xix) Assistant Medical Officer, Class II in the Railways. Surendra Kumar (Dr) v. Union of India, 1986
Lab IC 1516 (All)(DB).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(xx) Legal assistant. Darshan Lal v. Director, State Transport, (1999) 1 LLJ 695 (P&H).
An employee of sugar factory who distributes seeds and manure among cane-growers under the
management, holding no position of command or direction is workman. Lokshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Moti
Lal Singh, 6 FJR 24. Salesmen doing work on fixed pay, not on commission, selling goods, giving cash memos,
preparing accounts and writing reports. Muller and Phipps (India) Ltd. v. Workmen, 6 FJR 171; National
Tobacco Company v. Hafiz Ahmed, (1954) 1 LLJ 156, a foreman though designated as such, with no power of
control or direction. M.A. Majawar v. General Motors India Ltd., 7 FJR 149; an auditor, employed as a touring
auditor, preparing figures for sale, compiling sales-tax figures etc. doing mainly clerical work. National
Tobacco Company v. G.P. Sarathi, (1954) 1 LLJ 160; depots superintendents whose duties were clerical.
Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. v. Employees, (1954) 1 LLJ 21; secretary employed to do
stenographical work, (1954) 1 LLJ 21; draughtsmen employed to make original drawing of machineries, etc., in
accordance with the instructions, East Asiatic Company Staff Union v. East Asiatic Company India Ltd.,
(1954) 2 LLJ 730; time keeper exercising no supervisory control, doing clerical work. East India Industries v.
Industrial Tribunal, Madras, (1954) 2 LLJ 418; piece-rated employees warned and charge-sheeted by the
management. Haji Abdul Khalil Trunk Factory v. Workmen, (1955) 1 LLJ 282; probationer, Motor and
Machinery Manufacturers Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, (1963) 1 LLJ 322, held to be workmen.
In order that a person can be designated as a workman, it is not enough that a person is not covered by
either of the four exceptions to the definition. Burden lies on the person who assets the status of a workman
under Section 2(s) to establish with reference to the dominant nature of his/her duties that the work which is
performed falls within one of the stipulated categories in Section 2(s), Standard Chartered Bank v. Vandana
Joshi, (2001) 2 Mah LJ 22.
► Following were held to be not workmen:
(i) Employees working in the head office of a managing agency which manages several concerns.
Sitaram Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1966 SC 1670 : (1960) 1 LLJ 558.
(ii) Person authorised to assign duties and distribute works in a Bank. All India Reserve Bank
Employees Assn. v. Reserve Bank of India, AIR 1966 SC 305 : (1965) 2 LLJ 175. See also (1969)
2 SCC 1 and (1971) 2 SCC 658.
(iii) Head Clerk in the State Transport Authority. Bihar State Road Transport Corpn. v. State of Bihar,
(1970) 1 SCC 490.
(iv) Car driver engaged by Bank Manager, who gets car allowance from the Bank. Punjab National Bank
v. Ghulam Dastgir, (1978) 2 SCC 358.
(v) Blending supervisors. Fuelling superintendents. Burmah Shell Storage & Distribution Co. v. Assn.,
(1970) 3 SCC 378.
(vi) Supervisor. Union Carbide (India) Ltd. v. Ramesh Kumbla, (1999) 1 Cur LR 193 (Bom).
(vii) Station Masters. Orissa State Road Transport Corpn. Employees' Association of Union v. Orissa
State Road Transport Corpn., (2001) 2 LLN 520 (Ori).
(viii) Traffic Inspectors. Orissa State Road Transport Corpn. Employees' Association of Union v.
Orissa State Road Transport Corpn., (2001) 2 LLN 520 (Ori).
(ix) Inspectors. Hussan Mithu Mhaswadkar v. Bombay Iron & Steel Labour Board, (2001) 7 SCC 394 :
2001 SCC (L&S) 1190.
(x) Accounts Officer. Umakant S. Deshpande v. G.E.B., (2001) 3 Cur LR 270 (Guj)(DB).
(xi) Artists in Bharat Bhawan Trust. Bharat Bhawan Trust v. Bharat Bhawan Artists' Assn., (2001) 7
SCC 630 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1225.
(xii) Doctor. Joseph Sunder Kalingarayar (Dr) v. Tuticorin Port Trust, (2001) 4 LLN 884 (Mad).
(xiii) Salesman. Madhya Pradesh Tractors v. P.O., Labour Court, Jabalpur, (1999) 4 LLN 544 (MP).
(xiv) Ticket canvassor in Bus Stand. R. Kumaravel v. T.N. State Transport Corpn., (2000) 4 LLN 626
(Mad).
(xv) Research and Development Manager. Chem Crown (India) Ltd. v. P.O. First Addl. Labour Court,
(2000) 2 Cur LR 759 (Mad).
(xvi) Resident Medical Officer. Ardeshir Dalal Memorial Hospital v. State of Bihar, (2000) 3 LLN 1060
(Pat).
(xvii) Licensed porters. Thiruvalluvar Pokuvarathu Kazlaka Sumai Thookuwar Pothu Nala Sangam v.
State Express Transport Corpn., (2000) 1 LLJ 1570 (Mad).
(xviii) Medical Officer. Ardeshir Dalal Memorial Hospital v. State of Bihar, (2000) 85 FLR 572 (Pat).
(xix) Secretaries of Primary Agricultural Credit Co-op. Societies. Nagnath v. Common Cadre
Committee, Bidar, 2000 Lab IC 3714 (Kant)(DB).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(xx) Teachers. Karthiayani v. Union of India, (1984) 1 LLN 720 (Ker)(DB) : (1984) 1 LLJ 259; Bokaro
Steel Plant v. P.O., Labour Court, Bokaro Steel City, (1999) 82 FLR 685 (Pat); Sonepat Coop.
Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ajit Singh, (2005) 3 SCC 232 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 387.
(xxi) An apprentice governed by Apprentices Act, 1961. Hanuman Prasad Choudhary v. R.S.E. Board,
(1986) 2 LLN 976 (Raj) : 1986 Lab IC 1014; Babulal v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn.,
1999 Lab IC 2772 (Raj)(DB). But see Madras Aluminium Company Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1992) 1
LLN 1047.
(xxii) Maintenance Engineer, performing supervisory work and authorised to make temporary
appointments, grant leave, initiate departmental proceedings etc. Vimal Kumar Jain v. Labour Court,
1987 Supp SCC 40 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 283.
(xxiii) Pastor in Church. M.R. Damon v. Rev. M.M. Raja Dass, (2003) 2 LLJ 730 (Mad).
Finding of Labour Court that a person was a workman will not be interfered with by the High Court under
Article 226. Andhra Scientific Co. Ltd. v. A. Seshagiri Rao, AIR 1967 SC 408 : (1961) 2 LLJ 117. See also
Tandur and Navandgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd. v. Workmen, (1964) 1 LLJ 737 : (1964) 8 FLR 277 (SC).
Whether a Branch Manager of a Cooperative Bank was a ‘workman’, is a question of fact which the
Supreme Court cannot decide in absence of sufficient material. Nirmal Singh v. State of Punjab, 1984 Supp
SCC 407 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 38.
Section 2(s) covers even a daily wager. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Orissa Road Transport Corpn.
Ltd. v. Ramesh Chandra Gouda, (1994) 2 LLJ 1127 : (1995) 70 FLR 468 : (1995) 1 Cur LR 62 (Ori)(DB).
A person employed, even though not completing the period postulated by Section 25-B (2)(ii) in a year, is a
workman. K.P. Motor & Mechanical Workers' Federation v. State of Kerala, (1993) 1 LLJ 401 : (1993) 66 FLR
839 : (1993) 1 Cur LR 943 (Ker).
A casual worker is nonetheless a workman. G. Yaddi Reddi v. Brooke Bond India Ltd., (1994) 1 Cur LR
207 : (1994) 1 LLN 282 : 1994 Lab IC 186 : (1994) 69 FLR 25 (AP)(DB).
Commission Agents/Deposit Collectors of banks although were not regular employees, held nonetheless a
workman. Indian Banks Assn. v. Workmen of Syndicate Bank, (2001) 3 SCC 36 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 504.
Manager or administrative officer and clerk: Distinction: Held, the former is generally vested with the power
of supervision in contradistinction to the stereotype work of the latter. S.K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd.,
(1994) 3 SCC 510 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 776.
The discharging of managerial duties and functions does not necessarily involve the exercise of power of
appointment and discharge of other employees. S.K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd., (1994) 3 SCC 510 : 1994
SCC (L&S) 776.
66
[2-A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute.—
67
[(1)] Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the
services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his
employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman
nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.]
68 [(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 10, any such workman as is specified in
sub-section (1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication
of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made
the application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the
dispute, and in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the
appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of
this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial
dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government.
(3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or
Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1).]
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDHRA PRADESH.—(1) Section 2-A of the principal Act shall be numbered as sub-section (1)
therefor and after the sub-section, as so renumbered, the following sub-section (2) shall be
inserted:—
“(2) Notwithstanding anything in Section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-
section (1) may, make an application in the prescribed manner direct to the Labour Court for
adjudication of the dispute referred to therein; and on receipt of such application the Labour
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Court shall have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any matter in the dispute, as if it were a
dispute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act; and
accordingly all the provisions of this Act, shall apply in relation to such dispute as they apply
in relation to any other industrial dispute.”—A.P. Act 32 of 1987.
(2) In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, in Section 2-A, after the existing sub-
section (2), the following shall be added, namely—
“(3) Notwithstanding anything in sub-sections (1) and (2), no such dispute or difference
between that workman and his employer connected with or arising out of, such discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute if such
dispute is not raised in conciliation proceeding within a period of three years from the date of
such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination:
Provided that the Labour Court or the Conciliation Officer, as the case may be, may
consider to extend the said period of three years when the applicant workman satisfies the
Court or Conciliation Officer that he had sufficient cause for not raising the dispute within the
period of three years.”. [Vide A.P. Act 12 of 2015, S. 2 (w.e.f. 22-7-2015)]
CHHATTISGARH.—(1) In its application to the State of Chhattisgarh, in sub-section (3) of
Section 2-A—
‘(i) for the punctuation full stop “,”, the punctuation colon “,”, shall be substituted; and
(ii) below sub-section (3), the following shall be inserted, namely—
“Provided that when a dispute or difference is raised in conciliation proceeding, the period taken
in such proceeding shall be excluded in calculating the period of three years.”. [Vide
Chhattisgarh Act 26 of 2015, S. 3 (w.e.f. 1-8-2015)]
(2) In its application to the State of Chhattisgarh, after sub-section (3) of Section 2-A, the
following shall be inserted, namely—
“(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) above, dispute
or difference between the workman and his employer, concerned with or arising out of
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall not be deemed to be an industrial
dispute unless such dispute or difference is not raised in conciliation proceeding within a
period of three years from the date of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
termination:
Provided that an authority, as may be specified by the State Government, may entertain
such disputes or difference after the expiry of the said period of three years if it is satisfied
that there was sufficient cause for not raising it within that period of three years.”. [Vide
Chhattisgarh Act, 26 of 2015, S. 3 (w.e.f. 1-8-2015)]
GOA.—In its application to the State of Goa, in Section 2-A,—
(i) in sub-section (3), for the words “three years”, the words “one year” shall be substituted;
(ii) after sub-section (3), the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely:—
“(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), no such
dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising
out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an
industrial dispute if such dispute is not raised before conciliation officer within a period of
one year from the date of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination:
Provided that an authority as may be specified by the State Government may condone
the delay beyond such period of one year if the applicant workman satisfies the authority
that he had sufficient cause for not raising the dispute within the period of one year.”.
[Vide Goa Ordinance No. 8 of 2020, S. 2, dated 26-6-2020]
GUJARAT.—In its application to the State of Gujarat, in Section 2-A, in sub-section (3), for
the words “three years”, the words “one year” shall be substituted. [Vide Gujarat Act 29 of
2015, S. 4 (w.e.f. 1-1-2016)]
MADHYA PRADESH.—In its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, in Section 2-A, in sub-
section (3), for the words, “the Labour Court or Tribunal”, the words “the Labour Court or
Tribunal or Conciliation Officer” shall be substituted; [Vide M.P. Act 21 of 2015, S. 11(i) (w.e.f.
27-11-2015)]
PUNJAB.—In its application to the State of Punjab, in Section 2-A, after sub-section (3), the
following sub-section (4) shall be added, namely:—
“(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), no such dispute
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial
dispute if such dispute is not raised in conciliation proceeding within a period of three years
from the date of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination:
Provided that an authority, as may be specified by the State Government, may consider to
extend the said period of three years when the applicant workman satisfies the authority that
he had sufficient cause for not raising the dispute within the period of three years.” [Vide
Industrial Disputes (Punjab Amendment) Ordinance, 2020, S. 2, dated 11-8-2020 (w.e.f. 11-
8-2020)]
RAJASTHAN.—In its application to the State of Rajasthan, in Section 2-A, after the existing
sub-section (3), the following new sub-section shall be added, namely—
“(4) Notwithstanding anything in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), no such dispute or
difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial
dispute if such dispute is not raised in conciliation proceeding within a period of three years
from the date of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchement or termination:
Provided that an authority, as may be specified by the State Government, may consider to
extend the said period of three years when the applicant workman satisfies the authority that
he had sufficient cause for not raising the dispute within the period of three years.”. [Vide
Raj. Act 21 of 2014, S. 3 (w.e.f. 12-11-2014)]
TAMIL NADU.—Section 2-A shall be renumbered as sub-section (1) of that section and after
the said sub-section (1) as so renumbered, the following sub-section shall be added, namely:—
“(2) Where no settlement is arrived at in the course of any conciliation proceeding taken
under this Act in regard to an industrial dispute referred to in sub-section (1), the aggrieved
individual workman may apply, in the prescribed manner, to the Labour Court for
adjudication of such dispute and the Labour Court shall proceed to adjudicate such dispute,
as if such dispute has been referred to it for adjudication and accordingly all the provisions of
this Act relating to adjudication of industrial disputes by the Labour Court shall apply to such
adjudication.”.—T.N. Act 5 of 1988, S. 2 (w.e.f. 1-11-1988).
TRIPURA.—In its application to the State of Tripura, in Section 2-A—
(i) in sub-section (3), the expression “three years”, shall be substituted with the expression
“one year”.
(ii) after sub-section (3), the following new sub-section shall be inserted, namely:—
“(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), (2) and (3), no such
dispute or difference between that workmen and his employer connected with, or
arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall he deemed
to be an industrial dispute if such dispute is not raised before conciliation officer within
a period of one year from the date of such discharge dismissal, retrenchment or
termination:
Provided that an authority as may be specified by the State Government may
condone the delay beyond such period of one year if the applicant workman satisfies
the authority that he had sufficient cause for not raising the dispute within the period of
one year.” [Vide Tripura Ordinance No. 5 of 2020, S. 2 (w.e.f. 21-8-2020)]
WEST BENGAL.—In Section 2-A of the principal Act,—
(a) after the words “dismisses, retrenches”, the words “refuses employment” shall be
inserted;
(b) after the words “dismissal, retrenchment”, the words “refusal of employment” shall be
inserted.—W.B. Act 33 of 1989, Section 3 (8-12-89).
► Nature and scope.—To understand what the words “refuses employment” and “refusal of employment”
in Section 2-A connote, the doctrine noscitur a sociis provides true and proper guidance. The words discharge,
dismiss, retrench are modes by which service of an employee may be terminated. Section 2-A also uses the
expression “otherwise terminates”. When the words “refuses employment” and refusal of “employment” have
been grouped together with discharge, dismiss, retrench and termination in Section 2-A, each word drawn
colour from the other words therein. This is the principle of noscitur a sociis. The said words in Section 2-A of
the Act ought not to be understood in the light of Section 2(1) thereof, for, the context does not require it to be
so understood and it would be inconsistent with the object of the statute, Jagadamba Motors v. State of W.B.,
(2009) 122 FLR 1083 (Cal).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
► Section 2-A(2), Applicability.—Section 2-A(2) (as in force in the State of A.P. is applicable even to
workmen engaged in a Central Government undertaking in that State. U. Chinnappa v. Cotton Corpn. of India,
(1998) 3 LLN 681 (AP)(DB); V. Chinnappa v. Cotton Corpn. of India, (1997) 77 FLR 331 (AP)(DB).
There is no overlapping between Section 2-A of this Act and Sections 40 and 41 of A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966. Hence, the provisions of the latter Act do not render Section 2-A inoperative.
A.P.S.W.I.C. Society Ltd. v. L.C., (1987) 1 LLN 192 (AP) (FB—5 Judges) : 1987 Lab IC 642 : (1987) 2 LLJ
66; overruling Visakhapatnam Distt. Mktg. Coop. Socy. v. Govt. of A.P., (1987) 2 LLN 62 (FB — 3 Judges).
► Maintainability of reference.—An application filed by the workman under Section 2-A during the
pendency of a reference of the same dispute before the Labour Court under Section 10 is nonetheless
maintainable. General Industrial Society Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour, (1997) 1 LLN 808 : (1997) 1
Cur LR 447 : (1997) 1 LLJ 15 (AP).
Where none of the situations contemplated by Section 2-A had happened on the date of filing of the suit, the
workman's suit for correcting the date of his birth was held to be maintainable and not barred by Section 2-A.
Ishar Singh v. National Fertilizers, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 649.
Security guards of Thermal Power Station of State Electricity Board (SEB) are workmen. Their service
conditions would be governed by Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 and relevant rules framed
by SEB. In case of their dismissal from service, they could raise industrial dispute, Bihar SEB v. Ram Deo
Prasad Singh, (2011) 12 SCC 632.
► Reference to dispute.—Reference of an individual dispute can be made even though the facts giving
rise to that dispute arose before Section 2-A came into force. Ruston & Hornsby v. T.B. Kadam, (1976) 3 SCC
71 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 381.
A dispute which is not covered by Section 2-A would become an industrial dispute only if the union or the
body of workmen supports the individual workman. Madura Coats, Ltd. v. Jayaraman, (2005) 2 LLN 944 (Mad).
► Time limit for reference.—There is no time-limit for making an application under Section 2-A for
consideration of the industrial dispute. Abdul Khalik Sk. Bhuru v. Dy. Commr. of Labour, (1997) 1 Cur LR
1075 : 1997 Lab IC 122 : (1997) 76 FLR 634 (Bom)(Nag).
► Power of appropriate Government to make reference.—Section 2-A does not affect the power of the
appropriate Government to make or not to make a reference of the dispute under Section 10(1). Radhey
Shyam v. State of Haryana, 1998 Lab IC 1200 (P&H)(FB).
► Jurisdiction of civil court.—Civil court's jurisdiction to try a suit is ousted only when events necessary
for application of Section 2-A arose on the date of filing of the suit. Ishar Singh v. National Fertilizers, 1991
Supp (2) SCC 649.
► Interference by High Court.—Where the High Court, after analysing the powers and responsibilities of
the employee and the evidence on record reversed the decision of the Labour Court and declared that the
employee was not a workman, held, the High Court rightly interfered with the Labour Court's finding as the
same was the very foundation of the Labour Court's jurisdiction. S.K. Maini v. Carona Sahu Co. Ltd., (1994) 3
SCC 510 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 776.
Chapter II
AUTHORITIES UNDER THIS ACT
3. Works Committee.—(1) In the case of any industrial establishment in which one hundred
or more workmen are employed or have been employed on any day in the preceding twelve
months the appropriate Government may by general or special order require the employer to
constitute in the prescribed manner a Works Committee consisting of representatives of
employers and workmen engaged in the establishment so however that the number of
representatives of workmen on the Committee shall not be less than the number of
representatives of the employer. The representatives of the workmen shall be chosen in the
prescribed manner from among the workmen engaged in the establishment and in consultation
with their trade union, if any, registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 (16 of 1926).
(2) It shall be the duty of the Works Committee to promote measures for securing and
preserving amity and good relations between the employer and workmen and, to that end, to
comment upon matters of their common interest or concern and endeavour to compose any
material difference of opinion in respect of such matters.
STATE AMENDMENTS
MAHARASHTRA.—In Section 3, to sub-section (1), the following proviso shall be added,
namely:—
“Provided that, where there is a recognised union for any undertaking under any law for
the time being in force, then the recognised union shall appoint its nominees to represent the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
workmen who are engaged in such undertaking.
Explanation.—In the proviso to sub-section (1), the expression ‘undertaking’ includes an
establishment”. [Vide Mah. Act 1 of 1972, Ss. 20(2) & Sch. I]
SECTIONS 3-A and 3-B
GUJARAT.—After Section 3 the following sections shall be inserted, namely:—
“3-A. Joint Management Council.—(1) If in respect of any industry, in relation to the
industrial dispute in which the appropriate Government is the State Government, the State
Government is of opinion that it is desirable in public interest to take action under this
section, it may, in the case of all industrial establishments or any class of industrial
establishments in such industry, in which five hundred or more workmen are employed or
have been employed on any day in the preceding twelve months, by general or special order,
require the employer to constitute in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time
limit a Joint Management Council consisting of such number of members as may be
prescribed comprised of representatives of employers and workmen engaged in the
establishment, so however that the number of representatives of workmen on the Council
shall not be less than the number of representatives of the employers. The representatives of
the workmen on the Council shall be elected in the prescribed manner by the workmen
engaged in the establishment from amongst themselves:
Provided that a list of industries in respect of which no order is issued under this sub-
section shall be laid by the State Government before the State Legislature within thirty days
from the commencement of its first Session of each year.
(2) One of the members of the Council shall be appointed as Chairman in accordance with
rules made in this behalf.
3-B. Functions of the Council.—(1) The Council shall be charged with the general duty to
promote and assist in the management of the industrial establishment in a more efficient,
orderly and economical manner, and for that purpose and without prejudice to the generality
of the foregoing provision, it shall be the duty of the Council—
(a) to promote cordial relations between the employer and employees;
(b) to build up understanding and trust between them;
(c) to promote measures which lead to substantial increase in productivity;
(d) to secure better administration of welfare measures and adequate safety measures;
(e) to train the employees in understanding the responsibilities of management of the
undertaking and in sharing such responsibilities to the extent considered feasible; and
(f) to do such other things as may be prescribed.
(2) The Council shall be consulted by the employer on all matters relating to the
management of the industrial establishment specified in sub-section (1) and it shall be the
duty of the Council to advise the employer on any matter so referred to it.
(3) The Council shall be entrusted by the employer with such administrative functions
appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the discharge by the Council of its duties
under this section as may be prescribed.
(4) It shall be the duty of the employer to furnish to the Council necessary information
relating to such matters as may be prescribed for the purpose of enabling it to discharge its
duties under this Act.
(5) The Council shall follow such procedure in the discharge of its duties as may be
prescribed.”. [Vide Gujarat Act 21 of 1972, S. 3 (w.e.f. 20-1-1973)]
RAJASTHAN.—After Section 3 insert the following section:
“3-A. Registrar and Assistant Registrar.—(1) The State Government shall, by notification
in the Official Gazette, appoint a person to be the Registrar of Unions for the purpose of this
Act for the whole of the State.
(2) The State Government may, by similar notification, appoint a person to be the
Assistant Registrar of Unions for any local area and may, by general or special order, confer
on such person all or any of the powers of the Registrar of Unions under this Act.”—Vide
Rajasthan Act 34 of 1958, w.e.f. 1-7-1960.
► Members of Works Committee.—Rule 39 of the Central Rules does not contemplate distribution of
constituencies in such a manner that there may be representatives on the Works Committee of different
sections and departments of the industry. Union of India v. M.T.S.S.D. Workers' Union, (1988) 1 SCC 640 :
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
1988 SCC (L&S) 419.
► Functions of Works Committee.—Works Committee is not intended to supplement or supersede the
unions for the purpose of collective bargaining. They are not authorised to consider real or substantial changes
in the conditions of service. Their task is only to smooth away frictions that may arise between the workmen
and the management in day-to-day work. They cannot decide any alteration in the conditions of service by
rationalisation. If the workman's representatives on the Works Committee agree to a scheme of rationalisation,
that is not binding either on workers or on the mills. North Brook Jute Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 879 :
(1960) 1 LLJ 580.
► Distribution of workers.—Where a trade union represents more than 50 per cent of the workers,
distribution of workers into constituencies is, under Rule 42, impermissible. Union of India v. M.T.S.S.D.
Workers' Union, (1988) 1 SCC 640 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 419.
4. Conciliation officers.—(1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, appoint such number of persons as it thinks fit, to be conciliation officers, charged with
the duty of mediating in and promoting the settlement of industrial disputes.
(2) A conciliation officer may be appointed for a specified area or for specified industries in a
specified area or for one or more specified industries and either permanently or for a limited
period.
5. Boards of Conciliation.—(1) The appropriate Government may as occasion arises by
notification in the Official Gazette constitute a Board of Conciliation for promoting the
settlement of an industrial dispute.
(2) A Board shall consist of a chairman and two or four other members, as the appropriate
Government thinks fit.
(3) The chairman shall be an independent person and the other members shall be persons
appointed in equal numbers to represent the parties to the dispute and any person appointed to
represent a party shall be appointed on the recommendation of that party:
Provided that, if any party fails to make a recommendation as aforesaid within the prescribed
time, the appropriate Government shall appoint such persons as it thinks fit to represent that
party.
(4) A Board, having the prescribed quorum, may act notwithstanding the absence of the
chairman or any of its members or any vacancy in its number:
Provided that if the appropriate Government notifies the Board that the services of the
chairman or of any other member have ceased to be available, the Board shall not act until a
new chairman or member, as the case may be, has been appointed.
6. Courts of Inquiry.—(1) The appropriate Government may as occasion arises by notification
in the Official Gazette, constitute a Court of Inquiry for inquiring into any matter appearing to
be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute.
(2) A Court may consist of one independent person or of such number of independent
persons as the appropriate Government may think fit and where a Court consists of two or more
members, one of them shall be appointed as the chairman.
(3) A Court, having the prescribed quorum, may act notwithstanding the absence of the
chairman or any of its members or any vacancy in its number:
Provided that, if the appropriate Government notifies the Court that the services of the
chairman have ceased to be available, the Court shall not act until a new chairman has been
appointed.
69 [7. Labour Courts.—(1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, constitute one or more Labour Courts for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating
to any matter specified in the Second Schedule and for performing such other functions as may
be assigned to them under this Act.
(2) A Labour Court shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the appropriate
Government.
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the presiding officer of a Labour Court,
unless—
70 [(a) he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or
(b) he has, for a period of not less than three years, been a District Judge or an Additional
District Judge; or]
(c) 71 [* * *]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
72
[(d)] he has held any judicial office in India for not less than seven years; or
73
[(e)] he has been the presiding officer of a Labour Court constituted under any Provincial
Act or State Act for not less than five years.]
74
[(f) he is or has been a Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) or Joint
Commissioner of the State Labour Department, having a degree in law and at least
seven years' experience in the labour department including three years of experience as
Conciliation Officer:
Provided that no such Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner or Joint Labour Commissioner
shall be appointed unless he resigns from the service of the Central Government or
State Government, as the case may be, before being appointed as the presiding officer;
or
(g) he is an officer of Indian Legal Service in Grade III with three years' experience in the
grade.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS.—(1) In clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in its application to the Union Territory of the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands for the words “seven years” the words “three years” shall be substituted.—Vide
Regulation 6 of 1964.
(2) For clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 7, the following clause shall be substituted,
namely—
“(b) he is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a District Judge or an Additional District
Judge; or”—vide Regulation 1 of 1985.
GOA.—In its application to the State of Goa, in Section 7, in sub-section (3), after clause (d),
the following clauses shall be inserted, namely—
“(d-1) he has practised as an advocate or attorney for not less than seven years in a High
Court or in two or more such Courts in succession, or any Court subordinate thereto, or any
Industrial Court or Tribunal or Labour Court constituted under any law for the time being in
force; or
(d-2) he holds a degree in law of a university established by law in any part of India or an
equivalent degree and is holding or has held an office not lower in rank than that of Deputy
Registrar of any Industrial Court or Tribunal or Labour Court constituted under any law for the
time being in force for not less than five years; or
(d-3) he holds a degree in law of a university established by law in any part of India or an
equivalent degree and is holding or has held an office not lower in rank than that of Deputy
Commissioner of Labour under a State Government or a Union territory administration for not
less than five years; or”. [vide Goa Act 5 of 1987, S. 2 (w.e.f. 21-10-1987)]
GUJARAT.—In sub-section (3), the following amendments made by Gujarat Act 28 of 1977
(w.e.f. 13-10-1977)—
(i) in clause (b), after the words “Additional District Judge”, the words “or a Joint Judge”
shall be inserted;
(ii) in clause (d), for the words “seven years” the words “five years” shall be substituted;
(iii) in clause (e), for the words “five years” the words “three years” shall be substituted and
the word “or” shall be added at the end;
(iv) after clause (e), the following clause shall be added, namely:
(f) he has practised as an advocate or attorney for not less than seven years in a High
Court or any court subordinate thereto or in any Industrial Court or Industrial Tribunal
or Labour Court constituted under any law for the time being in force.”.
HARYANA.—In sub-section (3), the following amendments made by Haryana Act 39 of 1976
(w.e.f. 12-8-1976)—
(i) for clause (b) the following clause shall be substituted, namely:—
“(b) he is qualified for appointment as, is, or has been, a District Judge or an Additional
District Judge, or”; and
(ii) after clause (c), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:—
“(cc) he has been a Commissioner of a division or an Administrative Secretary to
Government or an officer of the Labour Department not below the rank of a Joint Labour
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Commissioner for a period of not less than two years; or”.
MADHYA PRADESH.—(1) In the Central Act 14 of 1947 in its application to the State of M.P.—
(i) throughout the Act, for the words “in the Second Schedule” wherever they occur, the
words and letter “in Part A of the Second Schedule” shall be substituted; M.P. Act 43 of
1981, Section 3, w.e.f. 26-1-1982—(But see amendment by M.P. Act 26 of 2003, below).
(ii) in Section 7, after sub-section (1), the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely:—
“(1-A) In addition to the functions specified in sub-section (1), the Labour Court shall try
offences punishable under this Act and the Acts specified in Part B of the Second
Schedule.”; (M.P. Act 43 of 1981, S. 3 w.e.f. 26-1-1982).
(2) In sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the principal Act, for clause (e), the following clause
shall be substituted, namely:
“(e) he has been the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court constituted under the Madhya
Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (27 of 1960) for not less than three years.”—Vide
M.P. Act 32 of 1998, S. 3, w.e.f. 1-2-1999.
(3) In the Central Act 14 of 1947, in its application to the State of M.P.—
(i) throughout the Act, for the words and letters “in Part A of the Second Schedule” wherever
they occur, the words and letters “in the Second Schedule” shall be substituted.
(ii) in Section 7, sub-section (1-A) shall be omitted.—Vide M.P. Act 26 of 2003, S. 3 (w.e.f.
12-5-2003).
MAHARASHTRA.—In sub-section (3) after clause (d), the following clauses shall be inserted,
namely:
75
[(d-1) he has practised as an advocate or attorney for not less than seven years in the High
Court, or any court subordinate thereto, or any Industrial Court or Tribunal or Labour
Court, constituted under any law for the time being in force; or
(d-2) he holds a degree in law of a University established by law in any part of India and is
holding or has held an office not lower in rank than that of a Deputy Registrar of any such
Industrial Court or Tribunal for not less than five years; or]
76 [(d-3) he holds a degree in law of a University established by law in any part of India and is
holding or has held an office not lower in rank than that of Assistant Commissioner of
Labour under the State Government for not less than five years; or].
PUNJAB.—At the end of clause (b), sub-section (3) of Section 7, add the word “or” and the
following new clauses, namely:—
“(c) he is or has been a District Judge; or
(d) he has held the office of the Chairman or any other member of the Labour Appellate
Tribunal constituted under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 or of any
Tribunal for a period of not less than two years.”—Vide Punjab Act 8 of 1957.
TAMIL NADU.—[In Section 7 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as
the principal Act), in sub-section (3),—
(1) in clause (e), the word “or” shall be added at the end;
(2) after clause (e), the following clause shall be added, namely:
“(f) he has, for a period of not less than three years, been an Officer of the Government of
Tamil Nadu not below the rank of Joint Secretary to Government in Law Department or
Joint Commissioner of Labour, having a degree in Law of a University established by law
in any part of India.”—Vide T.N. Act 8 of 1998, S. 2 (w.e.f. date to be notified)].
UTTAR PRADESH.—After sub-section (3) add the following as a new sub-section:
“(3-A) In relation to an industrial dispute other than that referred to in sub-clause (i) of
clause (a) of Section 2 or in Section 4 of the Industrial Disputes (Banking and Insurance
Companies) Act, 1949, the provisions of sub-section (3) shall have effect as if—
(a) after clause (c) the following new clauses (d) and (e) had been added—
“(d) is or has been a Magistrate of the First Class for a period exceeding two years;
(e) is a person possessing more than two years' practical experience of adjudicating or
settling industrial disputes;”
(b) in the proviso after the words ‘clause (b)’ the words ‘or clause (d) or clause (e)’ had been
added.—Vide U.P. Act 25 of 1951.
WEST BENGAL.—(1) For clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the principal Act, the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
following clause shall be substituted:—
“(b) he is, or has been, a District Judge or an Additional District Judge; or”.—Vide W.B.
Act 35 of 1989, S. 3 (22-1-1990).
(2) For clause (e) of sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the principal Act, the following clause
shall be substituted:
“(e) he has been the Presiding Officer of a Labour Court constituted under any provincial
Act or State Act for not less than five years; or”; [Vide W.B. Act 26 of 2008, S. 3 (w.e.f. the
date to be notified)]
(3) After clause (e), the following clauses shall be inserted:
“(f) he has practised as an advocate for not less than seven years in a High Court or in any
Court subordinate thereto or in any Industrial Court or Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court
constituted under any law for the time being in force and is selected by the State Public
Service Commission; or
(g) he holds a degree in law of a University established by law in any part of India and is
holding or has field an office not below the rank of Deputy Labour Commissioner under the
State Government for not less than three years and is selected by the State Public Service
Commission.” [Vide W.B. Act 26 of 2008, S. 3 (w.e.f. the date to be notified)].
► “Judge of a High Court”, meaning.—The expression ‘a Judge of a High Court and a District Judge’ in
Section 7(3)(a) includes those Judges in the former State of Jodhpur by virtue of Section 34, Industrial
Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950. State of Rajasthan v. Mewar Textile Mills, AIR 1954 SC 396 : (1954)
1 LLJ 611.
The words ‘has been Judge of a High Court’ in clause (a) of Section 7(3) denote a past event, on the date
of his appointment, he must have been a Judge of a High Court. Same is the position under clause (e)
regarding the office mentioned therein. Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., (1973) 1 SCC 813 : 1973
SCC (L&S) 341.
► Qualifications.—Section 7(3)(c) does not import any qualification based on the age of the person to be
appointed. AIR 1982 SC 1100 : (1962) 1 LLJ 250.
Section 7(3)(d)—A person performing clerical duties, though associated with a judicial or quasi-judicial
body prior to such appointment, could not be said to have been holding a judicial office. State of Haryana v.
Haryana Coop. Transport Ltd., (1977) 1 SCC 271 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 113.
► Jurisdiction of High Court.—The High Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution only
when the Tribunal exceeds jurisdiction or acts without legal authority. Workmen of Bajrang Jute Mills v. Bajrang
Jute Mills, (1960) 1 LLJ 604. Where there is patent code of jurisdiction the writ by the High Court will be
granted otherwise it will not interfere. Prabhu Dayal v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 Punj 460. The quantum of the
wages payable under the award is not within the purview of the High Court jurisdiction exercised under Article
226. Madras Match Industries v. Labour Tribunal of India, Madras, AIR 1957 Mad 688.
► Relief.—If a matter falls within the jurisdiction of Labour Court, there is no restriction as to relief which
could be granted to the workman. Working Journalists of Tamil Nadu v. Tamil Nadu, Madurai, (1959) 2 LLJ
84.
► Jurisdiction of Labour Court — Limitation.—Delay of three years in approaching Tribunal against
termination order, inconsequential since no period of limitation is prescribed under the Act, Jasmer Singh v.
State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 458 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 46.
7-A. Tribunals.—(1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial disputes relating to
any matter, whether specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule 77 [and for
performing such other functions as may be assigned to them under this Act].
78 [(1-A) The Industrial Tribunal constituted by the Central Government under sub-section (1)
shall also exercise, on and from the commencement of Part XIV of Chapter VI of the Finance
Act, 2017, the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on the Tribunal referred to in Section
7-D of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952).]
(2) A Tribunal shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the appropriate
Government.
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the presiding officer of a Tribunal
unless—
(a) he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or
79
[(aa) he has, for a period of not less than three years, been a District Judge or an
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Additional District Judge; 80 [* * *]]
81 [(b) he is or has been a Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) or Joint
Commissioner of the State Labour Department, having a degree in law and at least
seven years' experience in the labour department including three years of experience as
Conciliation Officer:
Provided that no such Deputy Chief Labour Commissioner or Joint Labour Commissioner
shall be appointed unless he resigns from the service of the Central Government or
State Government, as the case may be, before being appointed as the presiding officer;
or
(c) he is an officer of Indian Legal Service in Grade III with three years' experience in the
grade.]
(4) The appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, appoint two persons as assessors to
advise the Tribunal in the proceeding before it.
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR ISLANDS.—For clause (aa) of sub-section (3) of Section 7-A, the
following clause shall be substituted, namely:—
“(aa) he is, or has been, or is qualified to be, a District Judge or an Additional District
Judge.”—Vide Regulation 1 of 1985.
ASSAM.—In its application to the State of Assam, the following new clause shall be inserted,
vide Assam Act 8 of 1962—
“(aa) he has worked as a District Judge or as an Additional District Judge or as both for a
total period of not less than three years or is qualified for appointment as a Judge of a
High Court:
Provided that the appointment to a Tribunal of any person qualified under this clause shall not
be made without consultation with the Assam High Court; or”.
BIHAR.—In sub-section (3), clause (aa) as under added by Bihar Act 20 of 1959 (w.e.f. 7-7-
1959)—
“‘(aa) he has worked as a District Judge or as an Additional District Judge or as both for a
total period of not less than three years:
Provided that the appointment to a Tribunal of any person qualified under this clause shall be
made in consultation with the High Court of the State in which the Tribunal has or is intended to
have its usual place of sitting; or”.
GOA.—In its application to State of Goa, in Section 7-A, in sub-section (3), for clause (aa),
the following shall be substituted, namely—
“(b) he is, or has been, a District Judge; or
(c) he has, for a period of not less than three years, been an Additional District Judge or an
Assistant Judge; or
(d) he is qualified for appointment as a Judge of the High Court.”. [vide Goa Act 5 of 1987,
S. 3 (w.e.f. 21-10-1987)]
GUJARAT.—(1) In sub-section (3) following amendments made by Gujarat Act 28 of 1977
(w.e.f. 13-10-1977)—
(i) in clause (aa), after the words “an Additional District Judge” the words “or a Joint Judge
or an Assistant Judge” shall be inserted;
(ii) in clause (b), the word “or” shall be added at the end;
(iii) after clause (b), the following clause shall be added, namely:
“(c) he has for not less than five years been the presiding officer of a Labour Court
constituted under law for the time being in force.”.
(2) In Section 7-A in sub-section (3), after clause (c), the following clause shall be added,
namely:—
“(d) he holds a degree in Law of a University established by law in any part of India and is
Labour under the State Government for not less than ten years.”—Gujarat Act 22 of 1981,
S. 5 (w.e.f. a date to be notified).
HARYANA.—In sub-section (3) following amendments made by Haryana Act 39 of 1976
(w.e.f. 12-8-1976)—
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(i) for clause (aa), the following clause shall be substituted, namely:
“(aa) he is qualified for appointment as, is, or has been, a District Judge or an Additional
District Judge or”; and
(ii) after clause (aa), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:
“(aaa) he has been a Commissioner of a division or an Administrative Secretary to
Government or an officer of the Labour Department not below the rank of a Joint Labour
Commissioner for a period of not less than two years, or”.
KARNATAKA.—After clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 7-A insert the following vide
Mysore Acts 6 and 35 of 1963—
“(aa) he is, or has been, a District Judge for a period of not less than three years, or”.
KERALA.—In sub-section (3) of Section 7-A, for clause (a) the following clause shall be
substituted, vide Kerala Act 38 of 1971—
“(a) he is, or has been, a Judicial Official not below the rank of a District Judge, or is qualified
for appointment as a Judge of a High Court;”.
MADHYA PRADESH.—(1) In its application to the State of M.P.—
words and letter “in Part A of the Second Schedule” shall be substituted;—(M.P. Act 43 of
1981, Section 3 w.e.f. 26-1-1982—(But see amendment by M.P. Act 26 of 2003, below).
(2) In Section 7-A for sub-section (3), the following sub-section shall be substituted,
namely:
“(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding Officer of a Tribunal
unless—
(a) he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court; or
(b) he is eligible for being appointed a Judge of a High Court; or
(c) he has worked as President of the Board of Revenue; or
(d) he has worked as a member of the Board of Revenue for a period of not less than three
years; or
(e) he has worked as Commissioner of Labour for a period of not less than three years; or
(f) he has worked as a member of the Industrial Court constituted under Section 9 of the
Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act, 1960 (27 of 1960), for a period of not less than
five years.”—Vide M.P. Act 19 of 1988 (w.e.f. 15-1-1989).
(3) Throughout the Act, for the words and letters “in Part A of the Second Schedule”
wherever they occur, the words and letters “in the Second Schedule” shall be substituted.—Vide
M.P. Act 26 of 2003, S. 3 (w.e.f. 12-5-2003).
MAHARASHTRA.—(1) In clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 7-A, after the words “a Judge
of the High Court” insert the words “or a District Judge or a person qualified for appointment as
a Judge of High Court.”—Vide Maharashtra Act 2 of 1963.
(2) In clause (aa), for the words “an Additional District Judge, or” the words “an Additional
District Judge or an Assistant Judge, or” shall be substituted.—Vide Mah. Act 56 of 1974.
(3) After clause (b), the following new clause shall be inserted, namely:
“(c) he has for not less than five years been a Presiding Officer of a Labour Court, constituted
under any law for the time being in force.”—Vide Mah. Act 56 of 1974.
(4) After clause (c), the following new clause shall be inserted, namely:
“(d) he holds a degree in law of a University established by law in any part of India and is
Labour under the State Government for not less than ten years.”.—Vide Mah. Act 22 of
1976, S. 3.
ORISSA.—After clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 7-A, insert the following—
“(aa) he has been a member of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service for a period of not less
than seven years.”—Vide Orissa Act 6 of 1960.
TAMIL NADU.—[In Section 7-A of the principal Act, in sub-section (3),—
(1) in clause (aa), the word “or” shall be added at the end;
(2) after clause (aa), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:
“(aaa) he has, for a period of not less than three years, been an Officer of the Government
of Tamil Nadu not below the rank or Joint Secretary to Government in Law Department
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
or Joint Commissioner of Labour having a degree in Law of a University established by

law in any part of India.”—Vide T.N. Act 8 of 1998, S. 2 w.e.f. date to be notified)].
WEST BENGAL.—(1) In clause (a) of sub-section (3) of Section 7-A after the words “High
Court” insert the words “or a District Judge” or an Additional District Judge.”—Vide W.B. Act 17
of 1958.
(2) For clause (aa) of sub-section (3) of Section 7-A of the principal Act, the following clause
shall be substituted:
“(aa) he has, for a period of not less than three years, been a District Judge or an
Additional District Judge; or;” [Vide W.B. Act 26 of 2008, S. 4 (w.e.f. the date to be
notified)]
(3) After clause (aa), the following clauses shall be inserted:
“(aaa) he has practised as an advocate for not less than ten years in a High Court or in any
Court subordinate thereto or in any Industrial Court or Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court
constituted under any law for the time being in force and is selected by the State Public
Service Commission; or
“(aaaa) he holds a degree in law of a University established by law in any part of India and
is holding or has held an office not below the rank of Joint Labour Commissioner for not less
than three years and is selected by the State Public Service Commission.” [Vide W.B. Act 26
of 2008, S. 4 (w.e.f. the date to be notified)]
► “District Judge” and “Judicial Service”, meaning.—The view taken in T.R. Mishra v. State of
Gujarat, (1990) 2 Cur LR 871 by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court that Labour Court and Industrial
Court were not covered by the expressions “District Judge” and “Judicial Service” within the meaning of
Articles 235 and 236 of the Constitution and that they were not under the administrative control of the High
Court, is not good law. Hence, the appointment, promotion or transfer of Labour Courts or Industrial Tribunals
cannot be made without complying with the provisions of Chapter VI of the Constitution of India. Gujarat
Mazdoor Sabha v. State of Gujarat, (1998) 2 Cur LR 319 : 1998 Lab IC 2472 (Guj)(FB), relying on State of
Maharashtra v. Labour Law Practitioners' Assn., (1998) 2 SCC 688 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 657.
► Powers of Industrial Tribunal.—The powers of Industrial Tribunal do not extend to examining the validity
of a reference. National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 1 SCC 371.
7-B. National Tribunals.—(1) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, constitute one or more National Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of industrial
disputes which, in the opinion of the Central Government, involve questions of national
importance or are of such a nature that industrial establishments situated in more than one
State are likely to be interested in, or affected by, such disputes.
(2) A National Tribunal shall consist of one person only to be appointed by the Central
Government.
(3) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as the Presiding Officer of a National
Tribunal 82 [unless he is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court].
(4) The Central Government may, if it so thinks fit, appoint two persons as assessors to
advise the National Tribunal in the proceeding before it.
7-C. Disqualifications for the presiding officers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National
Tribunals.—No person shall be appointed to, or continue in, the office of the presiding officer of
a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, if—
(a) he is not an independent person; or
(b) he has attained the age of sixty-five years.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
ASSAM.—In its application to the State of Assam, to clause (b) of Section 7-C, the following
proviso shall be added, vide Assam Act 8 of 1962:
“Provided that where such presiding officer of a Tribunal appointed by the State
Government attains the age of sixty-five years before the completion of any proceedings
pending before him, the State Government may, if, in the opinion of such Government,
public interest so requires, order his continuance in office for a period not exceeding six
months for completion of the proceedings.”.
PUNJAB.—For clause (b) substitute the following, namely:
“(b) he has attained the age of sixty-seven years.”—Vide Punjab Act 8 of 1957.
WEST BENGAL.—(1) To clause (b) add the following proviso vide W.B. Act 11 of 1959:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
“Provided that where such presiding officer of a Tribunal appointed by the State
Government attains the age of sixty-five years before completion of any proceedings pending
before him, the State Government may, if, in the opinion of such Government, public interest
so requires, order his continuance in office for a period not exceeding six months for
completion of the proceedings.”.
(2) In Section 7-C of the principal Act, after the proviso, the following proviso shall be
added:
“Provided further that the age of superannuation and the conditions of the service of the
Presiding Officers of a Labour Court appointed under clauses (f) and (g) of sub-section (3) of
Section 7 and of the Presiding Officers of a Tribunal appointed under clauses (aaa) and
(aaaa) of sub-section (3) of Section 7-A shall be such as may be prescribed.” [Vide W.B. Act
26 of 2008, S. 5 (w.e.f. the date to be notified)]
► Nature and scope.—Section 7-C does not prescribe age of superannuation and only prescribes a
condition of appointment or continuance. B.S. Sharma v. State of Haryana, (2001) 1 SCC 434.
83
[7-D. Qualifications, terms and conditions of service of Presiding Officer.—Notwithstanding
anything contained in this Act, the qualifications, appointment, term of office, salaries and
allowances, resignation and removal and other terms and conditions of service of the Presiding
Officer of the Industrial Tribunal appointed by the Central Government under sub-section (1) of
Section 7-A, shall, after the commencement of Part XIV of Chapter VI of the Finance Act, 2017,
be governed by the provisions of Section 184 of that Act:
Provided that the Presiding Officer appointed before the commencement of Part XIV of
Chapter VI of the Finance Act, 2017, shall continue to be governed by the provisions of this Act,
and the rules made thereunder as if the provisions of Section 184 of the Finance Act, 2017 had
not come into force.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
(Prior to amendment by Act 7 of 2017)
GUJARAT.—In its application to the State of Gujarat after Section 7-C the following section
shall be inserted, vide Gujarat Act 22 of 1962:
“7-D Certain District Judges qualified for appointment on Tribunal constituted by State
Government.—Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of Section 7-A:
(1) The State Government may constitute an Industrial Tribunal under that sub-section for
performing such other functions as may be assigned to it under this Act;
(2) Where the State Government constituted a Tribunal under Section 7-A, the Tribunal may
consist of a person who is, or has been, for a period of not less than 5 years, a District
Judge or Additional or Joint District Judge and, notwithstanding anything contained in sub
-section (3) of Section 7-A but subject to Section 7-C, such person shall be deemed to be
qualified for appointment as the presiding officer of the Tribunal;
(3) The appointment of a person qualified under clause (2) shall be made after consultation
with the High Court.”
84
[8. Filling of vacancies.—If, for any reason a vacancy (other than a temporary absence)
occurs in the office of the presiding officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal or in
the office of the Chairman or any other member of a Board or Court, then, in the case of a
National Tribunal, the Central Government and in any other case, the appropriate Government,
shall appoint another person in accordance with the provisions of this Act to fill the vacancy,
and the proceeding may be continued before the Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal,
Board or Court, as the case may be, from the stage at which the vacancy is filled.
9. Finality of orders constituting Boards, etc.—(1) No order of the appropriate Government or
of the Central Government appointing any person as the chairman or any other member of a
Board or Court or as the presiding officer of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall
be called in question in any manner; and no act or proceeding before any Board or Court shall
be called in question in any manner on the ground merely of the existence of any vacancy in, or
defect in the constitution of, such Board or Court.
(2) No settlement arrived at in the course of a conciliation proceeding shall be invalid by
reason only of the fact that such settlement was arrived at after the expiry of the period referred
to in sub-section (6) of Section 12 or sub-section (5) of Section 13, as the case may be.
(3) Where the report of any settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
before a Board is signed by the Chairman and all the other members of the Board, no such
settlement shall be invalid by reason only of the casual or unforeseen absence of any of the
members (including the Chairman) of the Board during any stage of the proceeding.]
► Nature and scope.—Section 9(1) cannot whittle down the rights conferred by Articles 226 and 227 of
the Constitution. State of Haryana v. Haryana Co-op. Transport Ltd., (1977) 1 SCC 271 : 1977 SCC (L&S)
113.
► Maintainability of suit.—A civil suit in order to get a decree invalidating the appointment of the Industrial
Tribunal is not maintainable. Mewar Textile Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1951 Raj 261.
85
[Chapter II-A
NOTICE OF CHANGE
9-A. Notice of change.—No employer, who proposes to effect any change in the conditions of
service applicable to any workman in respect of any matter specified in the Fourth Schedule,
shall effect such change,—
(a) without giving to the workman likely to be affected by such change a notice in the
prescribed manner of the nature of the change proposed to be effected; or
(b) within twenty-one days of giving such notice:
Provided that no notice shall be required for effecting any such change—
(a) where the change is effected in pursuance of any 86 [settlement or award]; or
(b) where the workmen likely to be affected by the change are persons to whom the
Fundamental and Supplementary Rules, Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, Revised Leave Rules, Civil
Service Regulations, Civilians in Defence Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)
Rules or the Indian Railway Establishment Code or any other rules or regulations that
may be notified in this behalf by the appropriate Government in the Official Gazette,
apply.
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDHRA PRADESH.—In clause (b) of Section 9-A for the words “within twenty-one days”, the
words “within forty-two days” shall be substituted, vide A.P. Act 32 of 1987.
MAHARASHTRA.—In Section 9-A of the principal Act, in the proviso,—
(a) In clause (b), the word “or” shall be added at the end;
(b) after clause (b), the following clause shall be added, namely;
“(c) where the change is effected due to updating or replacing of the existing machinery,
computerisation or increase in the immovable property and increase in production and that—
(i) such change shall not affect the total wages of the workmen and their hours of work; and
(ii) the employer provides all the legitimate and required facilities such as trainings etc., to
the workmen to acquire the skill of new job”. [vide Mah. Act 23 of 2006, S. 3, w.e.f. 26-6-
2006]
WEST BENGAL.—In clause (b) of Section 9-A of the principal Act, for the words “within twenty
-one days”, the words “within forty-two days” shall be substituted.—W.B. Act 57 of 1980,
Section 4.
► Conditions of service: Scope.—Payroll check-off facility, held, is a condition of service. Karnataka
SRTC v. KSRTC Staff & Workers' Federation, (1999) 2 SCC 687 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 566.
Notice conveying management's resolution for sale of carbide drums on concessional rates to its employees
held, was not a condition of service and therefore, stoppage of such concessional offer did not attract Section
9-A. Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Udaynath Singh, (1970) 2 LLJ 413 (SC).
Mere chances of promotion is not a condition of service. Reserve Bank of India v. C.T. Dighe, (1981) 3
SCC 545 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 534.
► Applicability.—In order to attract Section 9-A the employer must be desirous of effecting a change in
conditions of service in respect of any matter specified in Fourth Schedule. Since retrenchment cannot
constitute change in conditions of service in respect of any item mentioned in the Fourth Schedule, Section 9-A
would not be attracted in such case. L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Rly., (1982) 1 SCC
645 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 124. Wrongful discharge and termination of services are not conditions of service as
contemplated under Section 9-A of the Act. Oil Seed Mills Karamchari Mazdoor Union v. State of Rajasthan,
(1992) 1 LLN 678 : (1992) 64 FLR 210 : (1992) 1 Cur LR 503 (Raj).
When ad hoc employment which was given for a short period and purely as a humanitarian measure, and it
was put to an end after negotiation of a contract of labour with society formed by workers themselves, Section 9
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-A was not applicable, International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers' Union,
(2009) 13 SCC 374.
Section 9-A is equally applicable to the minority educational institutions, protected under Article 30(1) of the
Constitution of India. Hospital Employees' Union v. Christian Medical College, (1987) 4 SCC 691 : 1988 SCC
(L&S) 53.
A notice under Section 9-A is necessary for:
(1) Reintroduction of contract labour system by abolishing the system of direct payment. Workmen v.
Food Corporation of India, (1985) 2 SCC 136 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 420.
(2) Retrenchment consequential to mechanisation. Nav Bharat Hindi Daily v. Nav Bharat Shramik
Sangha, (1985) 1 LLJ 474 (Bom)(DB) : (1984) 2 LLN 132.
The preconditions to the applicability of Section 9-A are that:
(i) there must be a change in the conditions of service;
(ii) the change must be such that it adversely affects the workmen; and
(iii) the change must be in respect of any matter provided in the Fourth Schedule to the Act.
Harmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen Ambala Cantt., (2001) 5 SCC 540.
The provision in Section 9-A is limited only to the eleven conditions of service mentioned in Schedule IV and
does not extend to other changes. However, conditions of service other than those expressly mentioned therein
can be brought within the scheduled items by a process of interpretation. Harmohinder Singh v. Kharga
Canteen Ambala Cantt., (2001) 5 SCC 540.
Where certain medical benefits were available to the employees as part of service conditions, withdrawal of
such benefits without statutory notice in Form ‘E’ even subsequent to coverage of the employees by the
Employees' Insurance Act, 1948 has been held to be impermissible. Calcutta Electric Supply Corporation Ltd.
v. Workers' Union, (1994) 6 SCC 548 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 7.
Where a reference is made at the instance of the employer pursuant to an industrial dispute arising out of a
notice under Section 9-A to the detriment of the workmen, burden to justify the change lies on the employer.
Monthly Rated Workmen v. Indian Hume Pipe, 1986 Supp SCC 79 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 278.
A benefit prevailing for long making it a condition of service should not be allowed to be interfered with lightly
to the prejudice of the workmen in absence of compelling material. Monthly Rated Workmen v. Indian Hume
Pipe, 1986 Supp SCC 79 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 278.
Section 9-A is not attracted in the following cases:
(1) Change in conditions of service by operation of law. A.I.I.T.D.C.E. Union v. Hotel Ashok, (1984) 1
LLN 659 Kant.
(2) Retrenchment due to closure of a section of the business. A.A. Gaikwad v. Uni Abex Alloy Products,
(1988) 1 LLN 239 (Bom)(DB).
(3) Withdrawal of permission granted to a worker to attend to union work during office time.
T.N.E.B.A.S. Union v. T.N.E.B., (1985) 1 LLN 149 (Mad) : (1984) 2 LLJ 478; Secy., Tamil Nadu
Electricity Board Accounts Subordinates Union v. Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, (1998) 3 LLN 838
(Mad).
(4) Exclusion of an unrecognised Union from negotiations with Management. Neyveli Lignite Corporation
Labour & Staff Union v. Management, 1984 Lab IC 1865.
(5) Absorption in a different service subsequent to cessation of earlier one. G.M. Ordinance Parachute
Factory v. P.O., Labour Court, 1987 Lab IC 365 (All).
(6) Insertion of a provision in service regulations not creating any new categories and grades but merely
declaring certain categories of posts to constitute a separate cadre in each grade and making the
employees transferable within the cadre. Orissa State Warehousing Corpn. v. Employees' Union,
1994 Supp (2) SCC 488 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 1031 : (1994) 27 ATC 841.
(7) State Bank of India circulars dated 28-1-1987 and 7-3-1987 imposing additional conditions for
granting permission to Award Staff to seek election to any public/civic body are not violative of
Section 9-A. General Manager (Operations) State Bank of India v. State Bank of India Staff Union,
(1998) 3 SCC 506 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 912.
(8) The introduction of written and oral tests to judge the suitability for promotion does not amount to a
change in service conditions attracting Section 9-A. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay v.
Pandurang Dinkar Katkar, (1998) 1 Cur LR 1178 : 1998 Lab IC 2333 (Bom).
► ‘Alteration in conditions of service’: meaning.—The word ‘change’ in Section 9-A contemplates actual
change. North Brook Jute Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 879 : (1960) 1 LLJ 580. The expression
‘condition of service’ really implies the actual continuance of relationship of employer and employee. It would
not cover the case of wrongful discharge or termination of service. Manu v. Aspinwal and Co. Ltd., (1963) 1
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
LLJ 212 (Ker HC).
The section comes into operation the moment the employer proposes to change any conditions of service
applicable to any workmen. Indian Oil Corporation v. Workmen, 1975 SCC (L&S) 453.
Change in weekly holidays is a change in condition of service. TISCO Ltd. v. Workmen, (1972) 2 SCC
383 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 113.
An alteration of date of holiday however cannot be considered as alteration in the conditions of service
where the date is only shifted to the subsequent day and thus the workmen are not deprived of the holiday.
Assam Match Co. Ltd. v. Bijoy Lal Sen, (1974) 3 SCC 163 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 455. See also Workmen v. Sur
Iron and Steel Co. (P) Ltd., (1970) 3 SCC 618.
Where the management fixed 6½ hours of work when the workshop was under construction and after
completion of the workshop the management permanently fixed 8 hours of work, the change in the working
hours was held to be not a change in conditions of service. Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Workmen,
(1973) 3 SCC 535 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 153.
► Requirement of notice under the section.—The requirement of a notice to workmen would arise only if
they are likely to be affected prejudicially. A change in the conditions of service contemplated by the section
should be understood in that sense. It is not intended to cover a case where the proposal is, for instance, to
enhance the pay scales or to better the other terms by a unilateral decision of the employer. The whole object
of the section is apparently to prevent a unilateral action on the part of the employer changing the conditions of
the service to the prejudice of the workmen. Section 9-A would have no application to where the option is left to
the concerned workmen to accept the change or to continue under the existing terms. Tamil and Elec.
Workers Federation v. M.S. Electricity Board, (1962) 2 LLJ 136 (Mad HC). The prohibition in this section is
not applicable to regulating the conditions of service which are brought into force for the first time unless it
could be shown that since the employee entered the service the conditions of service are changed by the
regulations which are brought into force for the first time. C.I. Kannan v. Employees, (1967) 2 MLJ 212 :
(1967) 32 FJR 270.
If workload is increased by reorganisation introduced without notice then the workers can refuse to work
according to reorganisation scheme. Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ram Mohan Ray, 1973 SCC (L&S) 309.
Unilateral withdrawal of compensatory allowance without giving notice under Section 9-A would raise a
serious dispute. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Workmen, (1976) 1 SCC 63 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 453.
► Principles of Natural Justice.—Age of superannuation is integral part of service condition of employee.
Very moment order of enhancement of superannuation of employees came into force though temporary in
nature to achieve certain objectives and also it is not deniable that employees are governed by unamended
Service Rules and certified standing order, but it amounted to privilege to employees since it was special right
granted to them. Hence, any unilateral withdrawal of such privilege amounts to contravention of Section 9-A and
is unsustainable, Paradeep Phosphates Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2018) 6 SCC 195.
9-B. Power of Government to exempt.—Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that
the application of the provisions of Section 9-A to any class of industrial establishments or to
any class of workmen employed in any industrial establishment affect the employers in relation
thereto so prejudicially that such application may cause serious repercussion on the industry
concerned and that public interest so requires, the appropriate Government may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, direct that the provisions of the said section shall not apply, or shall
apply, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the notification, to that class of
industrial establishments or to that class of workmen employed in any industrial
establishment.]
87
[Chapter II-B
GRIEVANCE REDRESSAL MACHINERY
9-C. Setting up of Grievance Redressal Machinery.—(1) Every industrial establishment
employing twenty or more workmen shall have one or more Grievance Redressal Committee for
the resolution of disputes arising out of individual grievances.
(2) The Grievance Redressal Committee shall consist of equal number of members from the
employer and the workmen.
(3) The Chairperson of the Grievance Redressal Committee shall be selected from the
employer and from among the workmen alternatively on rotation basis every year.
(4) The total number of members of the Grievance Redressal Committee shall not exceed
more than six:
Provided that there shall be, as far as practicable, one woman member if the Grievance
Redressal Committee has two members and in case the number of members are more than two,
the number of women members may be increased proportionately.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the setting up of Grievance Redressal
Committee shall not affect the right of the workman to raise industrial dispute on the same
matter under the provisions of this Act.
(6) The Grievance Redressal Committee may complete its proceedings within thirty days on
receipt of a written application by or on behalf of the aggrieved party.
(7) The workman who is aggrieved of the decision of the Grievance Redressal Committee may
prefer an appeal to the employer against the decision of Grievance Redressal Committee and
the employer shall, within one month from the date of receipt of such appeal, dispose of the
same and send a copy of his decision to the workman concerned.
(8) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to the workmen for whom there is an
established Grievance Redressal Mechanism in the establishment concerned.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
RAJASTHAN.—After Section 9-B insert the following new Chapter vide Raj. Act 34 of 1958
(w.e.f. 1-7-1960), as amended by Raj. Act 14 of 1970 (w.e.f. 26-2-1970) and Raj. Act 21 of
2014, S. 4 w.e.f. 12-11-2014:
“*[CHAPTER II-C]
REGISTRATION OF UNIONS
**[9-CC]. Maintenance of register.—It shall be the duty of the Registrar to maintain in
such form as may be prescribed a register of unions registered by him under the provisions
of this Act.
9-D. Application for registration.—Any union which has for the whole of the period of [at
least three months during the period of six months immediately preceding the calendar
month in which it so applies] under this section a membership of not less than ***[thirty per
cent] of the total number of workmen employed in a unit of an industry may apply in the
prescribed form to the Registrar for registration as a Representative Union.
9-E. Registration of union.—(1) On receipt of an application from a union for registration
under Section 9-D and on payment of the fee prescribed, the Registrar shall, if, after holding
such inquiry as he deems fit, he comes to the conclusion that the conditions requisite for
registration specified in the said section are satisfied and that the union is not otherwise
disqualified for registration, enter the name of the union in the appropriate register in such
form as Section 9-C and issue a certificate of registration in such form as may be prescribed:
Provided that—
(i) here two or more Unions fulfilling the conditions necessary for registration under this Act
apply for registration in respect of the same unit of an industry, the union having the
largest membership of employees employed in the unit of the industry shall be registered;
and
(ii) the Registrar shall not register any union if he is satisfied that application for its
registration is not made bona fide in the interest of the workmen but is made in the
interest of the employers to the prejudice of the interest of the workmen.
(2) Once a union has been registered as a representative union under this Act the
registration of the union shall be held valid for a period of two years from the date of its
registration and shall continue to hold valid unless the registration is cancelled under Section
9-F of this Act or another union is registered in its place according to Section 9-G of this Act.
9-F. Cancellation of registration.—The Registrar shall cancel the registration of a union—
(a) If, after holding such an inquiry, if any, as he deems fit, he is satisfied—
(i) that it was registered under mistake, misrepresentation or fraud; or
(ii) that the membership of the union has for a continuous period of three months [at any
time after two years from the date of its registration] fallen below the minimum
required under Section 9-D for its registration:
Provided that where a strike or a closure not being an illegal strike or closure under this Act in a
unit of industry involving more than one-third of the workmen in the unit of the industry has
extended to a period exceeding fourteen days in any calendar month, such month shall be
excluded in computing the said period of three months:
Provided further that the registration of the union shall not be cancelled under the provisions of
this sub-clause unless its membership at the time of the cancellation is less than such
minimum; or
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(iii) that the registered Union is being conducted not bona fide in the interests of workmen
but in the interest of employers to the prejudice of the interests of workmen; or
(iv) that it has instigated, added or assisted the commencement or continuance of an
illegal strike.
(b) If its registration under the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926 (Central Act XVI of 1926) is
cancelled.
9-G. Registration of another union in place of existing registered union.—(1) If any union
(hereinafter in this section referred to as ‘applicant union’) makes an application to the
Registrar for being registered in place of the union (hereinafter in this section referred to as
‘representative union’) for a unit of an industry [at any time after a lapse of two years from
the date of registration of the representative union] on the ground that it has a large
membership of workmen employed in such unit of the industry, the Registrar shall call upon
the representative union by a notice in writing to show cause within one month of the receipt
of such notice why the applicant union should not be registered in its place. An application
made under this sub-section shall be accompanied by such fee as may prescribed.
(2) The Registrar shall forward to the Labour Commissioner of the State Government a
copy of the said application and notice.
(3) If, on the expiry of period of notice under sub-section (1) and after holding such
enquiry as he deems fit, the Registrar comes to the conclusion that the applicant union
complies with the conditions necessary for registration specified in Section 9-D and that its
membership was, during the whole of the period of [at least three months during the period
of six months immediately preceding the calendar months in which it so applies] under this
section, larger than the membership of the representative union he shall, subject to the
provisions of Section 9-D, register the applicant union in place of the representative union.
(4) Every application made under this section shall be published in the prescribed manner
not less than fourteen days before the expiry of the period of notice under sub-section (1).
9-H. Application for re-registration.—(1) Any union, the registration of which has been
cancelled on the ground that it was registered under a mistake or on the ground specified in
sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of Section 9-F may, at any time after three months from the date
of such cancellation and on payment of such fees as may be prescribed, apply for re-
registration. The provisions of Sections 9-D and 9-E shall apply in respect of such application.
(2) A union, the registration of which has been cancelled on any other ground shall not,
save with the permission of the State Government, be entitled to apply for re-registration.
9-I. Appeal to Industrial Tribunal from order of Registrar.—(1) Any party to a proceeding
before the Registrar may, within thirty days from the date of an order passed by the
Registrar under this Chapter, appeal against such order to the Industrial Tribunal:
Provided that the Industrial Tribunal may, for sufficient reason admit any appeal made
after the expiry of such period.
(2) The Industrial Tribunal may admit an appeal under sub-section (1) if on a perusal of
the memorandum of appeal and the decision appealed against it finds that the decision is
contrary to law or otherwise erroneous.
(3) The Industrial Tribunal in appeal may confirm, modify or rescind any order passed by
the Registrar and may pass such consequential orders as it may deem fit. A copy of the
orders passed by the Industrial Tribunal shall be sent to the Registrar.
9-J. Publication of orders.—Every order passed under Section 9-E or Section 9-F or Section
9-G and every order passed in appeal under Section 9-I shall be published in the prescribed
manner.”
——————————
*Subs. for “Chapter II-B” by Raj. Act 21 of 2014, S. 4, w.e.f. 12-11-2014.
**Renumbered for “9-C” by Raj. Act 21 of 2014, S. 5, w.e.f. 12-11-2014.
***Subs. for “fifteen per cent” by Raj. Act 21 of 2014, S. 6, w.e.f. 12-11-2014.
Chapter III
REFERENCE OF DISPUTES TO BOARDS, COURTS OR TRIBUNALS
10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals.—(1) 88 [Where the appropriate
Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any
time], by order in writing,—
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof; or

(b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court
for inquiry; or
89 [(c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the
dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court
for adjudication; or
(d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to the
dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third
Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication:
Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is
not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so
thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under clause (c):]
90 [Provided further that] where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice
under Section 22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall, unless it considers that the
notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a
reference under this sub-section notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in
respect of the dispute may have commenced:
91 [Provided also that where the dispute in relation to which the Central Government is the
appropriate Government, it shall be competent for that Government to refer the dispute to a
Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, constituted by the State
Government.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
MADHYA PRADESH.—In the Central Act 14 of 1947 in its application to the State of M.P.—
words and letter “in Part A of the Second Schedule” shall be substituted.—(M.P. Act 43 of
1981, Section 3 w.e.f. 26-1-1982.
(ii) throughout the Act, for the words and letters “in Part A of the Second Schedule” wherever
they occur, the words and letter “in the Second Schedule” shall be substituted.—Vide M.P.
Act 26 of 2003, S. 3 (w.e.f. 12-5-2003).
92 [(1-A) Where the Central Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is
apprehended and the dispute involves any question of national importance or is of such a nature
that industrial establishments situated in more than one State are likely to be interested in, or
affected by, such dispute and that the dispute should be adjudicated by a National Tribunal,
then, the Central Government may, whether or not it is the appropriate Government in relation
to that dispute, at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be
connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the
Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a National Tribunal for adjudication.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
WEST BENGAL.—In Section 10 of the principal Act, after sub-section (1-A), the following sub-
section shall be inserted:—
“(1-B)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act, where in a
conciliation proceeding of an industrial dispute relating to an individual workman, no
settlement is arrived at within a period of sixty days from the date of raising of the dispute,
the party raising the dispute may apply to the Conciliation Officer in such manner and in
such form as may be prescribed, for a certificate about the pendency of the conciliation
proceedings.
(b) The Conciliation Officer shall, on receipt of the application under clause (a), issue a
certificate within seven days from the date of receipt, in such manner, in such form and
containing such particulars as may be prescribed. A copy of the certificate shall also to sent
to the appropriate Government for information.
(c) The party may, within a period of sixty days from the receipt of such certificate or,
where such certificate has not been issued within seven days as aforesaid, within a period of
sixty days commencing from the day immediately after the expiry of seven days as aforesaid,
file an application in such form and in such manner and with such particulars of demands as
may be prescribed, to such Labour Court or Tribunal as may be specified by the appropriate
Government by notification. Different Labour Courts or Tribunals may be specified for
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
different areas or different classes of industries.
(d) The Labour Court or Tribunal specified under clause (c) shall, within a period of thirty
days from the date of receipt of an application under clause (c), give a hearing to the parties
and frame the specific issues in dispute, and shall thereafter proceed to adjudicate on the
issues so framed as if it were an industrial dispute referred to in sub-section (1).”— [W.B.
Act 33 of 1989, Section 4 (w.e.f. 8-12-1989)]
(2) Where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed manner, whether jointly
or separately, for a reference of the dispute to a Board, Court, 93 [Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal], the appropriate Government, if satisfied that the persons applying represent
the majority of each party, shall make the reference accordingly.
94 [(2-A) An order referring an industrial dispute to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal under this section shall specify the period within which such Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal shall submit its award on such dispute to the appropriate Government:
Provided that where such industrial dispute is connected with an individual workman, no
such period shall exceed three months:
Provided further that where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed
manner, whether jointly or separately, to the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for
extension of such period or for any other reason, and the presiding officer of such Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal considers it necessary or expedient to extend such period, he may
for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as he may think
fit:
Provided also that in computing any period specified in this sub-section, the period, if any,
for which the proceedings before the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal had been
stayed by any injunction or order of a Civil Court shall be excluded:
Provided also that no proceedings before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall
lapse merely on the ground that any period specified under this sub-section had expired without
such proceedings being completed.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDHRA PRADESH AND TAMIL NADU.—Sub-section (2-A) as under added by Madras Act 12 of
1949 (w.e.f. 14-6-1949):
“(2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), where a Tribunal
has been constituted under this Act for the adjudication of disputes in any specified industry
or industries and a dispute exists or is apprehended in any such industry, the employer or a
majority of the workmen concerned may refer the dispute to that Tribunal.”.
KARNATAKA.—In its application to the Madras area in the State of Karnataka, omit sub-
section (2-A) as inserted by Madras Act 12 of 1949.
MAHARASHTRA.—In Section 10, in sub-section (2), after ‘appropriate Government’ insert ‘on
such application being made by a union recognized for any undertaking under any law for the
time being in force, and in any other case’. [Vide Mah. Act 1 of 1972, S. 20(2) & Sch. I]
(3) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Board, 95 [Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal] under this section, the appropriate Government may by order prohibit the
continuance of any strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute which may be in existence
on the date of the reference.
96 [(4) Where in an order referring an industrial dispute to 97 [a Labour Court, Tribunal or
National Tribunal] under this section or in a subsequent order, the appropriate Government has
specified the points of dispute for adjudication, 98 [the Labour Court or the Tribunal or the
National Tribunal, as the case may be,] shall confine its adjudication to those points and
matters incidental thereto.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
DELHI.—In Section 10, in its application to the National Capital Territory of Delhi, after sub-
section (4), the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely:—
“(4-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 9-C and in this section, in the case
of a dispute falling within the scope of Section 2-A, the industrial workman concerned may,
within twelve months from the date of communication to him of the order of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or termination or the date of commencement of the Industrial
Disputes (Delhi Amendment) Act, 2003, whichever is later, apply in the prescribed manner,
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
to the Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be, for adjudication of the dispute and
the Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, shall dispose of such application in the
same manner as a dispute referred under sub-section (1).”—[Delhi Act 9 of 2003, Section 2
(w.e.f. 22-8-2003)]
KARNATAKA.—In Section 10, after sub-section (4), the following sub-section shall be
inserted, namely:—
“(4-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 9-C and in this section, in the case
of a dispute falling within the scope of Section 2-A, the individual workman concerned may,
within six months from the date of communication to him of the order of discharge,
dismissal, retrenchment or termination or the date of commencement of the Industrial
Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987, whichever is later, apply, in the prescribed
manner, to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute and the Labour Court shall
dispose of such application in the same manner as a dispute referred under sub-section (1).
Note.—An application under sub-section (4-A) may be made even in respect of a dispute
pending consideration of the Government for reference, on the date of commencement of the
Industrial Disputes (Karnataka Amendment) Act, 1987.”—Vide Karnataka Act 5 of 1988, Section
2, w.e.f. 7-4-1988.
(5) Where a dispute concerning any establishment or establishments has been, or is to be,
referred to a 99 [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] under this section and the
appropriate Government is of opinion, whether on an application made to it in this behalf or
otherwise, that the dispute is of such a nature that any other establishment, group or class of
establishments of a similar nature is likely to be interested in or affected by, such dispute, the
appropriate Government may, at the time of making the reference or at any time thereafter but
before the submission of the award, include in that reference such establishment, group, or
class of establishments, whether or not at the time of such inclusion any dispute exists or is
apprehended in that establishment, group or class of establishments.
100 [(6) Where any reference has been made under sub-section (1-A) to a National Tribunal,
then notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no Labour Court or Tribunal shall have
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon any matter which is under adjudication before the National
Tribunal, and accordingly,—
(a) if the matter under adjudication before the National Tribunal is pending in a
proceeding before a Labour Court or Tribunal, the proceeding before the Labour Court or
the Tribunal, as the case may be, in so far as it relates to such matter, shall be deemed
to have been quashed on such reference to the National Tribunal; and
(b) it shall not be lawful for the appropriate Government to refer the matter under
adjudication before the National Tribunal to any Labour Court or Tribunal for
adjudication during the pendency of the proceeding in relation to such matter before
the National Tribunal.
101
[Explanation.—In this sub-section “Labour Court” or “Tribunal” includes any Court or
Tribunal or other authority constituted under any law relating to investigation and settlement of
industrial disputes in force in any State.]
(7) Where any industrial dispute, in relation to which the Central Government is not the
appropriate Government, is referred to a National Tribunal, then, notwithstanding anything
contained in this Act, any reference in Section 15, Section 17, Section 19, Section 33-A, Section
33-B and Section 36-A to the appropriate Government in relation to such dispute shall be
construed as a reference to the Central Government but, save as aforesaid and as otherwise
expressly provided in this Act, any reference in any other provision of this Act to the appropriate
Government in relation to that dispute shall mean a reference to the State Government.]
102 [(8) No proceedings pending before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal in
relation to an industrial dispute shall lapse merely by reason of the death of any of the parties
to the dispute being a workman, and such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall
complete such proceedings and submit its award to the appropriate Government.]
► Reference: Object of.—The object of reference is to maintain industrial peace and not mere
adjudication of dispute between two private parties. Virendra Bhandari v. Rajasthan SRTC, (2002) 9 SCC 104 :
2002 SCC (L&S) 1061.
► Construction of reference.—Reference under Section 10 should be construed liberally and not
pedantically. Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees Union, (1978) 2 SCC 188; Agra
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Electric Supply Co. v. Workmen, (1983) 1 SCC 436 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 210.
Section 10 should be confined to words of the reference order and there is no need to import meanings
from definition clauses of the Act. Burmah Shell Oil Storage & Distribution Co. v. Workmen, (1961) 2 LLJ 124
(SC). Minute technicalities in the reference order have to be avoided. Hotel Imperial v. Chief Commr., Delhi,
AIR 1959 SC 1214 : (1959) 2 LLJ 553.
An application or complaint under Section 33-A, held, does not become a reference under Section 10(2-A).
Blue Star Employees' Union v. Ex Off. Principal Secy. to Govt., (2000) 8 SCC 94.
► Jurisdiction of Labour Court.—Jurisdiction of Labour Court under ID Act to decide service disputes
between cooperative society's employee and employer, not barred by Sections 69 and 70 of the Kerala
Cooperative Societies Act, 1969. The Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969 as well as ID Act both possess
concurrent jurisdiction to decide any service dispute arising between cooperative society's employee and
his/her employer (cooperative society). Further held, it is choice of employee concerned to choose any one
forum out of two forums available under two Acts to get service dispute decided which is however, subject to
satisfying test laid down under ID Act that employee concerned is a “workman”, dispute raised is “industrial
dispute” and cooperative society (employer) is “industry” as defined under ID Act, K.A. Annamma v. Cochin
Cooperative Hospital Society Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 729.
► Reference — Maintainability — Delay.—Limitation Act has no application to reference made by
appropriate Government to Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of existing industrial dispute.
Appropriate Government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 10(1)(c) can refer industrial dispute
“at any time” to Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, Raghubir Singh v. Haryana Roadways, (2014) 10 SCC 301.
► Delay/Laches: Effect.—Employer's plea of delay in seeking reference, unless coupled with proof of real
prejudice to him, held, not sufficient to deny relief to the workman. Ajaib Singh v. Sirhind Coop. Marketing-cum
-Processing Service Society Ltd., (1999) 6 SCC 82 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1054.
Reference pertaining to entitlement of respondent to reinstatement made in year 1995, where respondent
was dismissed in year 1968 and had superannuated in year 1992, not proper, State of Gujarat v. Bhanji Gopal
Karchhar, (2016) 12 SCC 645.
► Reference — Parity.—When cases of similarly situated persons were referred for adjudication without
any objection with regard to delay, it was directed that cases of appellants shall also be considered for
reference ignoring objection on ground of delay, Basant Singh v. State of H.P., (2017) 1 SCC 263.
► Reference of belated industrial dispute.—Policy of industrial adjudication to be kept in mind is that
very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory
explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after
long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the
employers’ financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry, Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt.,
(2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149 : AIR 2016 SC 2984 : (2015) 147 FLR 341 : 2016 Lab IC 3431 :
(2016) 4 ALD 175.
► Reference: Condition precedent for making.—Existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a
condition precedent for making a reference. National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 1
SCC 371, considering K.C.P. Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, (1996) 10 SCC 446 : 1996 SCC (Cri) (L&S) 1410.
Reference of dispute to boards, courts or tribunal is to be made only when the appropriate Government is of
opinion that Industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, Birla Corpn. Ltd. (Unit Soorah Jute Mill) Sramik Union
v. Birla Corpn. Ltd., (2009) 121 FLR 332 (Cal).
► When reference is barred.—Principles of res judicata apply to labour adjudication also. Bombay Gas
Co. v. Jagannath Pandurang, 1975 SCC (L&S) 388. But in certain classes of cases like disputes regarding
wage structure, service conditions etc., that principle may be inapplicable. Bharat Barrel and Drum
Manufacturing Co. v. Employees' Union, (1987) 2 SCC 591 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 113. See also Punjab Coop.
Bank v. R.S. Bhatia, 1975 SCC (L&S) 394; Mumbai Kamgar Sabha v. Abdulbhai, (1976) 3 SCC 32 : 1976
SCC (L&S) 517. A fresh reference is not barred on failure of settlement. Bata Shoe Co. v. D.N. Ganguli, AIR
1961 SC 1158.
Where the Labour Court's decision that the respondent was a workman became final in subsequent
proceedings between the same parties, the issue, held, was rightly barred by res judicata. Punjab Coop. Bank
Ltd. v. R.S. Bhatia, (1975) 4 SCC 696 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 394.
Reference regarding discharge or dismissal of workmen is not barred by prior permission taken under
Section 33(1) or corresponding provision in any State Act. Punjab National Bank v. All India Punjab National
Bank Employees' Federation, AIR 1960 SC 160 : (1959) 2 LLJ 666.
Cases which would appropriately be adjudicated under Section 10(1) are outside the purview of Section 33-
C(2). Jhagarkhan Collieries v. G.C. Agrawal, Presiding Officer, (1975) 3 SCC 613 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 63.
Second reference to the same Tribunal during the pendency of the first on a matter “connected with or
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
relevant to the dispute originally referred” held, did not interfere with the first reference. State of Maharashtra v.
Kamani Employees' Union, 1975 SCC (L&S) 486.
Where consequent to non-appearance of the workman the reference was not adjudicated on merits, held,
the dispute did not cease to exist. Hence, second reference of such dispute, held, is permissible. Virendra
Bhandari v. Rajasthan SRTC, (2002) 9 SCC 104 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 1061.
The dismissal of a reference made by the appropriate Government for the default of the workman is not an
award. Hence, even if published under Section 17, would not affect the maintainability of a subsequent
application under Section 10 (4-A) (as in force in Karnataka) in respect of the same dispute. N.M. Naik v.
Labour Court, (1998) 1 LLN 937 : (1998) 1 Cur LR 801 : (1977) 77 FLR 914 (Kant).
The contention that the questions referred to were regulated by the standing orders of the company and
those questions being pending before the certifying authority under Industrial Employees (Standing Orders)
Act, 1946, reference under Section 10 was precluded, was rejected. Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v.
State of Bihar, (1969) 1 SCC 765.
A dispute, which can be referred for adjudication under Section 10(1), of necessity, has to be an industrial
dispute which would clothe the appropriate Government with power to make the reference, and the Industrial
Tribunal to adjudicate it. The practice of raising frivolous preliminary objections at the instance of the employer,
questioning the dispute under reference as being not an ‘industrial dispute’, is motivated to delay and defeat by
exhausting the workmen the outcome of the dispute and therefore, should not be allowed. Workmen v.
Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1984) 4 SCC 392.
See also S.K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra, (1983) 4 SCC 214 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 510; Workmen v.
Hindustan Lever Ltd., (1984) 4 SCC 392 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 6.
Where the reference of dispute is valid conferring jurisdiction on the Labour Court or Tribunal to adjudicate
findings on jurisdictional facts recorded by it is not open to interference by the High Court under Article 226.
Moreover, interference on a mere technical ground is not proper. Sadhu Ram v. Delhi Transport Corpn.,
(1983) 4 SCC 156 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 507.
Stopping of the proceedings pending before the Tribunal by High Court under Article 226 for deciding the
preliminary issue as to whether the person concerned was a ‘workman’ or not was not proper in the interest of
expeditious adjudication of disputes. D.P. Maheshwari v. Delhi Administration, (1983) 4 SCC 293 : 1983 SCC
(L&S) 527.
Where a dispute is referred to the Tribunal/Labour Court under Section 10, the management must seek
opportunity to adduce further evidence, if any, against workman's charges in its reply statement itself and not
by any belated application. Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda, (1983) 4 SCC 491 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 1.
Existence of alternative remedy, such as by way of appeal to the Board of Management, would not confer
upon the Tribunal discretion to refuse to adjudicate the dispute referred to it. Jai Bhagwan v. Ambala Central
Coop. Bank Ltd., (1983) 4 SCC 611 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 21.
In view of the special procedure provided by Sections 55 and 64 of the M.P. Cooperative Societies Act,
1960, for decision of disputes between a society and its employees, a reference under Section 10(1) of the
I.D. Act for that purpose would not be maintainable. R.C. Tiwari v. M.P. State Coop. Marketing Federation
Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 125 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1128.
The adjudication by the Tribunal is by no means analogous to what an arbitrator has to do in determining
ordinary civil disputes according to legal rights of parties, and courts should not be astute to discover formal
defects and technical flaws to overthrow such settlement. Tarachand Collieries Ltd. v. Central Government
Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad, AIR 1957 Pat 471. It is not necessary that all the steps indicated in Section 10
should be taken seriatim one after the other. It cannot be said that particular steps taken by Government in its
discretion shall be stimulated with evil eye and an unequal hand. Niemla Textile Finishing Mills Ltd. v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 329.
Where an existing settlement provided for decision of individual disputes by arbitration of persons specified
therein, the raising of an industrial dispute under Section 10(1) of the Act in respect of such a dispute without
exhausting the procedure prescribed by the settlement would be illegal as the settlement was binding under
Section 18. Ballarpur Industries Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1995) 1 LLN 180 : (1995) 1 LLJ 184 : (1995) 70 FLR
650 (P&H).
When Tribunal is competent to adjudicate industrial dispute relating to any matter mentioned in second and
third Schedule but dispute not falling under the second and third Schedule it cannot be adjudicated by the
Tribunal, Birla Corpn. Ltd. (Unit Soorah Jute Mill) Sramik Union v. Birla Corpn. Ltd., (2009) 121 FLR 332
(Cal).
► Administrative Power of “appropriate Government”.—Power of “appropriate Government” to refer
industrial dispute for adjudication is an administrative function and it does not decide any question of law or
fact, Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149 : AIR 2016 SC 2984 :
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(2015) 147 FLR 341 : 2016 Lab IC 3431 : (2016) 4 ALD 175.
The satisfaction of the existence of an industrial dispute or the satisfaction that an industrial dispute is
apprehended is “a condition precedent to the order of reference”. An order of reference cannot be made
mechanically without forming an opinion. For formation of the necessary opinion, the “appropriate Government”
must also be satisfied that a person whose dispute is being referred for adjudication is a “workman”. If the
dispute is not between an employer and his workman, it is not an “industrial dispute” and the Government can
justifiably refuse to refer the dispute. From the material placed before it, the Government reaches an
administrative decision whether there exists an existing or apprehended industrial dispute. In either event, it can
exercise the power under this Section. Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC
(L&S) 149 : AIR 2016 SC 2984 : (2015) 147 FLR 341 : 2016 Lab IC 3431 : (2016) 4 ALD 175.
► Power of Government.—Government can refer the dispute not only where an industrial dispute exists
but when it is also apprehended. Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of Baroda, (1978) 2 SCC 353; See also 4 FJR
431 (SC). Reference of matters not involved in an industrial dispute is incompetent and an award given
pursuant to such a reference in unsustainable. Asoka Central Multipurpose Cooperative Society Ltd. v.
Industrial Tribunal, (1991) 2 LLN 183 (Ori)(DB). The order of the Government acting under Section 10(1) read
with Section 12(5) is an administrative and not a judicial or quasi-judicial order. Prem Kakar v. State of
Haryana, (1976) 3 SCC 433 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 460; Gurumurthi v. Ramulu, 2 Andh WR 335. Only if it
appears from the reasons given that the Government took into account any irrelevant or foreign consideration
that the court may in a given case interfere (supra). Government is entitled to make reference even after its
refusal. Western India Match Co. Ltd. v. Workers' Union, (1970) 1 SCC 225. Mere fact that on two previous
occasions Government had taken the view that no reference was called for does not entitle the court to
conclude that there could be no cause for subsequent reference. Binny Ltd. v. Workmen, (1972) 3 SCC 806.
When the Government once declined to refer the dispute on the ground of delay, it could not refer the same at
a still later stage. Karnal Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, (1994) 2
Cur LR 138 : (1994) 1 LLN 233 : (1994) 69 FLR 1006 (P&H). Government is entitled to go into prima facie
merits of dispute for deciding whether to refer the same or not. Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of
Bombay, AIR 1964 SC 1617 : (1964) 1 LLJ 351. While even an order of approval is passed under Section 33
(2) an industrial dispute can be raised by either party and an appropriate reference can be later made by the
Government under Section 10. Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Thiru R. Jambulingam, (1975) 3 SCC 254 :
1974 SCC (L&S) 537.
The appropriate Government is at liberty under Section 10 to refer the dispute to Industrial Tribunal or other
person. River Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Radhanath Hazarilal, AIR 1960 Ass 39. The reference once made
by the appropriate Government to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication cannot be amended, modified or
cancelled, Thambi Motor Service v. Labour Court, Coimbatore, 18 FJR 235, but it is within the competence of
the State Government to make a correction of a mere clerical error. (1967) 2 LLJ 863.
The Government cannot amend the reference in such a way as to supersede or cancel the original
reference but can amend or modify it so as to clarify, modify or add to it without cancelling it. Abdul Rahiman
Kunju v. State of Kerala, (1998) 2 Cur LR 418 (Ker).
There can be only one appropriate Government to refer a particular dispute. Fact Employees' Assn. v. Fact
Ltd., (1992) 2 LLN 277 : 1992 Lab IC 2359 : (1993) 66 FLR 134 (Ker).
An industrial dispute arose only in respect of promotion policy, which resulted in strike followed by lock-out.
The State Government while referring the said industrial dispute to the Industrial Tribunal prohibited under
Section 10(3) the continuance of both the strike and the lock-out. In absence of any material to indicate the
existence of any industrial dispute relating to lock-out, merely the said prohibitory order could not necessarily
mean the existence of a dispute concerning the lock-out so as to vest jurisdiction in Government to make a
reference as to legality of the lock-out. Kanshahal Mazdoor Union v. State of Orissa, 1994 Lab IC 1486 (DB) :
(1995) 1 LLJ 295 (Ori)(DB).
The appropriate Government is not bound to refer belated claims. Prem Singh v. Labour Commissioner,
(1994) 1 CLR 1110 : (1994) 1 LLN 538 (P&H)(DB).
It is not obligatory on the part of the State Government to make a reference in each and every case at the
instance of the union. It has to weigh the facts keeping in view the objective of industrial peace and smooth
industrial relations between the parties and if it finds that in the interest of industrial peace it is not necessary to
make a reference, it can refuse to refer the dispute. Workmen v. I.I.T.I. Cycles of India, Ltd., 1995 Supp (2)
SCC 733 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 1021.
In considering the question of making a reference the government cannot adjudicate the dispute itself on
merits. However, in exceptional cases it may, on proper examination of the demand come to the conclusion that
the demands being perverse or frivolous did not merit reference. The government could not decide as to
whether the persons raising the dispute were workmen or not. Telco Convoy Drivers Mazdoor Sangh v. State
of Bihar, (1989) 3 SCC 271 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 465. The Government cannot refuse to refer the dispute and
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
decide the same itself. Dhanbad Colliery Karamchari Sangh v. Union of India, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 10 : 1991
SCC (L&S) 1125.
Sections 10 and 10-A are alternative remedies. Once the parties chose their remedy under Section 10-A,
the dispute cannot be referred for adjudication under Section 10. Karnal Leather Karamchari Sanghatan v.
Liberty Footwear Co. (Regd.), (1989) 4 SCC 448 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 60.
Words “interested” and “affected” in Section 10(1-A) and 10(5): The union which sponsors the cause of an
individual workman is ‘interested’ in the dispute but the workmen who are the members of the union are not
necessarily ‘affected’ by the dispute. Workmen v. Sri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 1040 : (1967)
2 LLJ 12.
Government can make reference regarding workmen's claim for reinstatement. Jahiruddin v. K.D. Rathi,
Factory Manager Model Mills Nagpur Ltd., AIR 1966 SC 907 : (1966) 1 LLJ 430. Reference to Labour Court of
dispute relating to reinstatement or other relief would not become infructuous on sale of the company in
liquidation proceedings. Workmen v. Brahmaputra Tea, AIR 1968 SC 514 : (1969) 2 LLJ 685. The reference
does not come to an end on closure or take-over of the industry especially when the claim is for bonus for the
past period. U.P. Electric Supply Co. v. Workmen, (1971) 3 SCC 495.
Where some workers were employed by two employers, a reference of dispute between those workers and
both the employers was competent. Mahesh Transport Co. v. Transport & Dock Workers' Union, (1974) 4
SCC 355 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 310.
Where the conciliation proceedings initiated after strike notice failed but the Government referred only some
of the demands, held, it could not in exercise of its powers under sub-section (3), prohibit the continuance of
strike. State Transport Employees' Federation v. State of Orissa, (1991) 2 LLN 189 (Ori)(DB).
The State Government of the State where part of the cause of action arose, would also have jurisdiction to
make the reference, Bikash Bhushan Ghosh v. Novartis India Ltd., (2007) 5 SCC 591 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S)
242.
► Scope of judicial review regarding existence of live industrial dispute.—Adequacy or sufficiency of
material on which opinion is formed is beyond scope of judicial review. Reference power being an
administrative function, order of reference is open to judicial review if it is shown that appropriate Government
had no material before it or had not applied its mind or had not taken into consideration certain vital facts which
it ought to have taken. Likewise, where appropriate Government refuses to make reference, it is open to judicial
review if it is shown that “appropriate Government” did not take into consideration relevant material or reasons
for refusing to make reference were irrelevant or not germane to formation of opinion, Prabhakar v. Sericulture
Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149 : AIR 2016 SC 2984 : (2015) 147 FLR 341 : 2016 Lab IC
3431 : (2016) 4 ALD 175.
► Refusal to refer a dispute.—Reference is not adjudication. M.P. Karamchari Sangh v. State of M.P.,
(1985) 2 SCC 103 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 409 : See also Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC
189 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 623. The Government should be very slow to attempt an examination of the demand of
the workmen with a view to decline reference, though in exceptional cases it may, on a proper examination of
the demand, come to a conclusion of the demands being perverse or frivolous and not meriting a reference.
Ibid.
The Government may refuse to make a reference:
(1) If the claim is
(i) very stale, or
(ii) opposed to the provisions of the Act, or
(iii) inconsistent with any agreement, or
(iv) patently frivolous, or
(v) likely to have an adverse effect on general relations between the employer and the employees in
the region, or
(2) The person concerned is not a workman. Shaw Wallace & Co. v. State of T.N., (1988) 1 LLN 172
(Mad)(DB). See also Workmen v. Govt. of T.N., (1988) 1 LLN 167 (Mad)(DB).
The appropriate Government can refuse to make a reference under Section 10 in respect of a demand
regulated by the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. Philips Workers' Union v. State of
Maharashtra, (1986) 2 LLN 124 (Bom).
In a dispute arising out of termination of service the following grounds were held irrelevant to sustain the
State Government's refusal to make a reference:
(1) That in the Government's opinion the domestic enquiry was in conformity with the principles of natural
justice and the punishment was proportionate to the gravity of offence.
(2) That the Company was a supplier to the Defence.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(3) That the workmen concerned had admitted the charges.
(4) That considering the proved charges and the need to preserve industrial peace, the Government
considered the case not fit for adjudication. V. Veerarajan v. Govt. of T.N., (1987) 1 SCC 479 : 1987
SCC (L&S) 64.
Pendency of proceedings under Section 33(2)(b) is no bar to making of a reference of the dispute for
adjudication. I.T.C. Ltd., Bangalore v. Govt. of Karnataka, (1985) 2 LLJ 430 (Kant)(DB), upholding (1985) 1
LLN 329 : 1985 Lab IC 599 : (1985) 1 LLJ 227 and dissenting from Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd. v. Fourth
Industrial Tribunal, (1973) 1 LLJ 146 (Cal). However, in such a case the proceeding under Section 33(2)(b)
would stand concluded. I.T.C. Ltd., Bangalore v. Govt. of Karnataka, (1985) 2 LLJ 430 (Kant)(DB).
Disclosure of reasons for declining reference does not amount to adjudication. Workmen v. Sundaram
Industries Ltd., (1997) 3 LLN 346 : (1997) 2 LLJ 1090 (Mad)(DB).
► Reference of incidental matters.—Labour Court has also power under Section 10(4) of I.D. Act, to
decide incidental matter as while adjudicating the main reference. AMC v. Devjibhai Karsanbhai Vadher,
(2005) 1 LLN 104 (Guj). The expression ‘incidental thereto’ implies a subordinate and subsidiary point
concerning some other main or principal point requiring casual attention while considering the main point.
Rajya Gramin Vikas Sansthan v. State of M.P., 1991 Lab IC 346 : (1991) 2 LLN 144 : (1991) 2 Cur LR 156
(MP)(DB).
Question not directly raised in the reference cannot be considered indirectly while determining another
matter. Mathura Prasad Srivastava v. Saugar Electric Supply Co., (1956) 2 LLJ 307. See also AIR 1962 SC
676 : (1961) 1 LLJ 663.
Although the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to the adjudication of the industrial dispute, it is nowhere
provided in the Act as to what relief can be granted to the workmen on adjudicating upon the industrial dispute.
Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. A.N. Sen, 4 FJR 36. This must be read subject to Section 10(4) of the Act. If the
points in dispute are specified for adjudication, the Tribunal shall confine its adjudication to these points and
matters incidental thereto. The Government however is not bound to specify the points while referring an
industrial dispute for adjudication. 1 FJR 119 (FC) : 4 FJR 565 (LAT).
Tribunal cannot change the wage structure in the garb of allowing certain allowances. Hindustan
Aeronautics v. Workmen, 1975 SCC (L&S) 377.
► Referring a dispute after refusing the same: Principle of audi alteram partem not applicable.—
Even where the Government makes a reference on a second representation of the workman after rejecting an
earlier one, it need not afford prior opportunity to the employer. Sultan Singh v. State of Haryana, (1996) 2
SCC 66 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 751.
A reference can be made even before receiving the Conciliation Officer's report under Section 12(4).
Ramakrishna Mills v. Govt. of T.N., (1985) 1 LLN 483 (Mad)(DB) : (1985) 2 LLJ 259. A reference can be
made even without initiating conciliation proceedings. Jaslok Hospital & Research Centre v. Industrial
Tribunal, (1984) 1 LLJ 76 (Bom).
A writ petition against the Government's order refusing to make a reference of an industrial dispute, is
maintainable. Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 189 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 623.
An order of interim relief can be enforced by invoking Section 33-C. Darshak Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal,
(1986) 2 LLN 209 (Kant) : 1986 Lab IC 945 : (1986) 1 LLJ 253.
Power to consider incidental matters includes power to add parties. Hochtief Gammon v. Industrial
Tribunal, AIR 1964 SC 1746 : (1964) 2 LLJ 460.
Where reference was regarding reinstatement of workman who was alleged to have been unjustifiably
dismissed by the management, the question of unfair labour practice or discrimination by reason of subsequent
reinstatement on a permanent basis of some of the workmen as a result of a settlement, is neither a matter
which was referred to nor incidental thereto within the meaning of Section 10(4). Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co.
of India (P) Ltd. v. Workmen, (1981) 3 SCC 451 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 515.
Where the reference was whether retirement of a workman was justified and/or legal and if not then what
benefit/compensation was payable, the Tribunal was competent to consider the incidental question whether
gratuity was paid to the retired workman and if not, to direct for payment thereof as prevalent in industries in the
region. Agra Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, (1983) 1 SCC 436 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 210.
Where parties agreed not to raise a particular issue, Tribunal is not competent to suo motu consider it as a
preliminary issue even if the same is raised later by one of the parties. Workmen v. Hindustan Lever Ltd.,
(1984) 1 SCC 728 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 183.
Where the question referred is of reinstatement and compensation, interim relief can be granted. Hotel
Imperial v. Hotel Workers' Union, AIR 1959 SC 1342. Where the reference was confined to 100% D.A. to be
paid to the workers, the Tribunal could not grant additional percentage as D.A. Precision Bearings India Ltd. v.
Baroda Mazdoor Sabha, (1978) 1 SCC 235 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 62. Where the reference was regarding leave
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
facilities, the tribunal could not award festival holidays. D.C.M. Chemical Works v. Workmen, (1962) 1 LLJ
388. On a reference regarding promotion of ‘C’ rank officers, the Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide whether
such officers were workmen. Syndicate Bank Ltd. v. Workmen, (1966) 2 LLJ 194 (SC). Where the reference
was only regarding revision of pay-scales, award given for extra work was held to be not maintainable. Cochin
State Power Light Corpn. Ltd. v. Workmen, (1964) 2 LLJ 100 (SC). Reference whether termination was in
order held, includes the objection that the termination was not by competent authority. Hindustan Brown Boveri
Ltd. v. Workmen, (1968) 1 LLJ 571 (SC). Where the reference was regarding gratuity scheme, the Tribunal
was not competent to fix the age of retirement. Delhi Cloth & General Mills v. Workmen, AIR 1970 SC 919 :
(1969) 2 LLJ 755. Where the reference order was regarding suspension of a workman, the question of his
reinstatement cannot be considered. AIR 1958 SC 130 : (1958) 1 LLJ 260.
► Practice and procedure.—A Labour Court cannot dismiss a reference for non-prosecution on the part
of the workman. It must decide the reference on merits. K.K. Rattan v. Labour Court, (1993) 2 LLN 243 :
(1993) 2 Cur LR 62 (P&H)(DB); Abhey Raj Singh v. Labour Court, (1998) 1 LLN 668 (P&H)(DB).
The Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal, in industrial dispute, cannot go beyond the terms of the reference.
Village Paper (P) Ltd. v. State of H.P., (1993) 1 LLJ 99 : 1993 Lab IC 99 : (1993) 1 LLN 253.
Where in a reference, the Industrial Tribunal conceded the demand of the employees inter alia on the basis
of a provision which had not been referred to in the charter of demands or the reference, held, the Tribunal
could rightly do so as the strict rules of pleading governing the proceedings before a civil court do not govern
the pleadings before the Labour and Industrial Courts. Bombay Mothers and Children's Society v. General
Labour Union (Red Flag), (1991) 2 LLN 600 : 1991 Lab IC 1653 (Bom).
The vires of a particular rule or provision cannot be adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal. Orissa S.R.T.C.
v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, (1998) 2 LLJ 67 (Ori)(DB).
Reference has to be determined on the basis of the real issue and not merely on the basis of the words
used. Managing Director, A.P. SRTC v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, (2001) 2 SCC 695 : 2001 SCC
(L&S) 497.
Court competent to examine the validity of reference is High Court and not Industrial Tribunal. National
Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 1 SCC 371.
So far as delay in seeking a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is concerned,
no formula of universal application can be laid down. It would depend on facts of each individual case, U.P.
SRTC v. Babu Ram, (2006) 5 SCC 433 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1113.
Though the ID Act does not provide for a limitation period, if on account of delay, a dispute has become
stale or ceases to exist, the reference should be rejected. Delay when became fatal, Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop.
Milk Producers Societies Union Ltd., (2007) 9 SCC 109 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 703.
► Order of termination: Doctrine of relating back.—The question whether in a case where termination
order passed without domestic enquiry was upheld on evidence adduced before the court of reference under
Section 10, the order of the court would relate back to the date of the order of termination, was in
Vishweshwaraiah Iron & Steel Ltd. v. Abdul Gani, (1997) 8 SCC 713 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 4, referred to a
Constitution Bench by a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court.
► Termination by way of punishment.—Where termination is by way of punishment, preliminary issue to
be determined is validity of domestic enquiry. Where domestic enquiry is found legal and proper, next issue
would be adjudging proportionality of punishment imposed. Further held, where domestic enquiry is found illegal
and improper, issue which need determination is whether employer can be allowed to prove misconduct/charge
before Labour Court on merits by adducing independent evidence, Kurukshetra University v. Prithvi Singh,
(2018) 4 SCC 483.
► Sub-section (4-A) (as in force in Karnataka): Limitation under.—Where the order of dismissal was
approved by the Labour Court under Section 33(2)(b) on a date subsequent to the date of communication
thereof to the employee, held, limitation period under Section 10(4-A) (as in force in Karnataka) would
commence from the date of such approval and not from the date of communication. Hindustan Aeronautics
Ltd. v. Alfred Slim, 1996 Lab IC 267 : (1996) 1 LLJ 1187 (Kant).
The period of six months incorporated in Section 10(4-A) is not mandatory. K.S.R.T.C. Central Office v.
Govinda Setty, 1997 Lab IC 1361 : (1997) 76 FLR 423 (Kant).
Where the dismissed conductor raised an industrial dispute under Section 10(4-A) after the time-limit
prescribed therein and the dismissal was found to be wrongful, the Karnataka High Court granted relief not from
the date of dismissal but from the date of reference. K.S.R.T.C. v. I.A. Medleri, (1998) 1 LLJ 499 : (1998) 1
LLN 303.
The object of Section 10(4-A) [as inserted by Karnataka Act 5 of 1988 w.e.f. 7-4-1988] was to enable
workmen to apply directly to Labour Court without assistance of employees' union or seeking of reference
under Section 10(1), Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop. Milk Producers Societies Union Ltd., (2007) 9 SCC 109 :
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 703.
► Pre-emptory direction to refer dispute for adjudication.—Government has to satisfy itself after
applying its mind to relevant factors factum of existence of industrial dispute before taking decision to refer
same for adjudication. Further, held, it is not entitled to enter finding on merits of case and decline reference.
Only when Court finds that refusal by Government to make reference is unjustified, on irrelevant factors, may
Court issue direction to Government to make reference, Rahman Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (2016) 12
SCC 420 : AIR 2016 SC 551 : (2016) 148 FLR 976 : (2016) 2 All LJ 189 : 2016 Lab IC 1296.
► Words “at any time” used in Section 10 — Import of.—Words “at any time” used in Section 10 show
that there is no period of limitation for making reference. However, “appropriate Government” must ensure that
dispute is still existing or is live dispute and has not become stale claim. Whether dispute is live or stale claim
depends on facts and circumstances of each case and no hard-and-fast rule for making order of reference
can be laid down. Relief can be denied on ground of unexplained delay and laches and/or on presumption that
such person had waived his right or acquiesced and also to safeguard industrial peace. However, where court
finds existence of dispute, though raised belatedly, it is always open to court to mould relief accordingly either
by granting reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or granting compensation instead of
reinstatement, Prabhakar v. Sericulture Deptt., (2015) 15 SCC 1 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 149 : AIR 2016 SC
2984 : (2015) 147 FLR 341 : 2016 Lab IC 3431 : (2016) 4 ALD 175.
► Jurisdiction of Tribunal.—Courts/Tribunals are loath to interfere in matters with regard to grant of pay
scale since grant of pay scale is highly technical and complex matter which requires consideration of host of
other factors. Further held, merely because pay scale may have been and remained same cannot lead to
conclusion of conscious parity and a ground for grant of parity to Assistant Security Officer, Security Havaldar
and Security Guard also, DTC Security Staff Union v. DTC, (2018) 16 SCC 619.
► Claim to regularization.—Issue pertaining to regularisation of services should be adjudicated by
Industrial Tribunal, in reference under Section 10, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 since such dispute is required
to be adjudicated on facts and evidence, Sunil Kumar Biswas v. Ordnance Factory Board, (2019) 15 SCC
617.
103
[10-A. Voluntary reference of disputes to arbitration.—(1) Where any industrial dispute
exists or is apprehended and the employer and the workmen agree to refer the dispute to
arbitration, they may, at any time before the dispute has been referred under Section 10 to a
Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal, by a written agreement, refer the dispute to
arbitration and the reference shall be to such person or persons (including the presiding officer
of a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal) as an arbitrator or arbitrators as may be
specified in the arbitration agreement.
104 [(1-A) Where an arbitration agreement provides for a reference of the dispute to an even
number of arbitrators, the agreement shall provide for the appointment of another person as
umpire who shall enter upon the reference, if the arbitrators are equally divided in their opinion,
and the award of the umpire shall prevail and shall be deemed to be the arbitration award for
the purposes of this Act.]
(2) An arbitration agreement referred to in sub-section (1) shall be in such form and shall be
signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed.
(3) A copy of the arbitration agreement shall be forwarded to the appropriate Government
and the conciliation officer and the appropriate Government shall, within 105 [one month] from
the date of the receipt of such copy, publish the same in the Official Gazette.
106 [(3-A) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to arbitration and the appropriate
Government is satisfied that the persons making the reference represent the majority of each
party, the appropriate Government may, within the time referred to in sub-section (3), issue a
notification in such manner as may be prescribed; and when any such notification is issued, the
employers and workmen who are not parties to the arbitration agreement but are concerned in
the dispute, shall be given an opportunity of presenting their case before the arbitrator or
arbitrators.]
(4) The arbitrator or arbitrators shall investigate the dispute and submit to the appropriate
Government the arbitration award signed by the arbitrator or all the arbitrators, as the case may
be.
107
[(4-A) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to arbitration and a notification has
been issued under sub-section (3-A), the appropriate Government may, by order, prohibit the
continuance of any strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute which may be in existence
on the date of the reference.]
(5) Nothing in the Arbitration Act, 1940 (10 of 1940), shall apply to arbitrations under this
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
section.]
► Arbitration agreement.—An arbitration agreement between the management and the workmen would
mean arbitration under Section 10-A. U.S. Duggal & Co. v. Union of India, (1987) 2 LLN 622 (Pat). See also
T.U.C.S. Ltd. v. Loganathan, (1986) 2 LLN 286 (Mad)(DB) : 1984 Lab IC 1543.
► Publication of arbitration agreement.—Publication of arbitration agreement is mandatory but the one
month period prescribed for the purpose is directory. Karnal Leather Karmachari Sanghatan v. Liberty
Footwear Co. (Regd.), (1989) 4 SCC 448 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 60. The requirement of the arbitration agreement
being published within one month is merely directory. However, it must be published before the award is given.
Aftab-e-Jadid v. Bhopal Shramjivi Patrakar Sangh, 1985 Lab IC 164 (MP)(DB) : (1985) 1 LLJ 272.
Where an existing settlement provided for decision of individual disputes by arbitration of persons specified
therein it was held that the publication of the arbitration agreement given in pursuance of such a settlement
would not be necessary under sub-section (3) of Section 10-A of the Act. Ballarpur Industries Ltd. v. Labour
Court, (1995) 1 LLN 180 : (1995) 1 LLJ 184 : (1995) 70 FLR 650 (P&H).
► Validity of award.—An award made beyond the terms of reference is illegal. Union of India v. Santiram
Ghosh, 1989 Supp (1) SCC 68 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 218 : (1989) 9 ATC 320.
An award under the I.D. Act cannot be inconsistent with the law laid down by the legislature or by the
Supreme Court and if it does so, it is illegal and cannot be enforced. N.S. Giri v. Corpn. of City of Mangalore,
(1999) 4 SCC 697 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 906, relying on New Maneck Chowk Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. v. Textile
Labour Assn., AIR 1961 SC 867; Marina Hotel v. Workmen, AIR 1962 SC 1258; Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd.
v. Workers, AIR 1960 SC 413; Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1967 SC 209 : (1961) 2 LLJ
130; Hindustan Times Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1963 SC 1332 : (1963) 1 LLJ 108; State Bank of India v.
Workmen, (1959) 2 LLJ 205 : AIR 1960 SC 12; Workmen v. Hercules Insurance Co. Ltd., (1961) 1 LLJ 249 :
AIR 1961 SC 853 and distinguishing LIC of India v. D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111.
If the copy of arbitration agreement is not forwarded to the appropriate Government the award would not
come within the purview of the Act. Moorco (India) Ltd. v. Govt. of T.N., (1994) 2 LLJ 111 : 1993 Lab IC 1663 :
(1993) 1 LLN 441 (Mad)(DB).
► Binding effect of award.—Status of the arbitrator is that of a statutory tribunal and his award is equally
binding. Karnal Leather Karmachari Sanghatan v. Liberty Footwear Co. (Regd.), (1989) 4 SCC 448 : 1990
SCC (L&S) 60.
► Maintainability of writ petition.—If the findings of the arbitrator are perverse and not based on the
evidence available on record or contrary thereto or no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion
while interpreting and applying the provisions of Section 11-A, a writ-petition would lie against such an award.
Association of Chemical Workers v. B.D. Borude, 1993 Lab IC 711 : (1993) 1 LLJ 1196 : (1993) 1 LLN 539
(Bom).
STATE AMENDMENTS
SECTIONS 10-A and 10-B
MAHARASHTRA.—In Section 10-A:—
(a) in sub-section (1) after the words “workmen” the words “and where under any law for
the time being in force, there is a recognised union in respect of any undertaking, the
employer and such recognised union” shall be inserted;
(b) to sub-section (3-A), the following proviso shall be added, namely:—
“Provided that, nothing in this sub-section shall apply, where a dispute has been referred
to arbitration in pursuance of an agreement between the employer and the recognised union
under sub-section (1) of this section.”;
(c) in sub-section (4-A), after the words, brackets, figure and letter “sub-section (3-A)”
the words “or where there is a recognised union for any undertaking under any law for the
time being in force and an industrial dispute has been referred to arbitration” shall be
inserted. [Vide M.P. Act 1 of 1972, S. 20(2) and Sch. I].
KARNATAKA.—(1) In its application to State of Karnataka, in Chapter III after Section 10 of
the principal Act, the following section shall be inserted, vide Mysore Act 15 of 1953.
“10-A. Power to transfer cases.—The State Government may, by order in writing and for
reasons to be stated therein, at any stage transfer any industrial dispute pending before a
Tribunal constituted by the State Government to any other tribunal constituted by the State
Government for adjudication, and the Tribunal to which the dispute is so transferred may,
subject to any special directions in the order of transfer, proceed either de novo or from the
stage at which it was transferred.”.
(2) After Section 10-A of the principal Act, the following section shall be inserted, namely:—
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
“10-B. Power to issue order regarding terms and conditions of service pending settlement
of dispute.—(1) Where an industrial dispute has been referred by the State Government to a
Labour Court or a Tribunal under sub-section (1) of Section 10 and if in the opinion of the
State Government it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or
convenience or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life
of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the establishment
concerning which such reference has been made, it may, by general or special order, make
provision,—
(a) for requiring the employer or workman or both to observe such terms and conditions of
employment as may be specified in the order or as may be determined in accordance with
the order, including payment of money by the employer to any person who is or has been
a workman;
(b) for requiring any public utility service not to close or remain closed and to work or
continue to work on such terms and conditions as may be specified in the order; and
(c) for any incidental or supplementary matter which appears to it to be necessary or
expedient for the purpose of the order:
Provided that no order made under this sub-section shall require any employer to observe
terms and conditions of employment less favourable to the workman than those which were
applicable to them at any time within three months immediately preceding the date of the
order.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “public utility service” means—
(i) any section of an industrial establishment on the working of which the safety of the
establishment or the workman employed therein depends;
(ii) any industry which supplies power, light or water to the public;
(iii) any industry which has been declared by the State Government to be a public utility
service for the purpose of this Act.
(2) An order made under sub-section (1) shall cease to operate on the expiry of a period
of six months from the date of the order or on the date of the award of the Labour Court or
the Tribunal, as the case may be, whichever is earlier.
(3) Any money paid by an employer to any person in pursuance of an order under sub-
section (1), may be deducted by that employer from out of any monetary benefit to which
such person becomes entitled under the provisions of any award passed by the Labour Court
or the Tribunal, as the case may be.”—Vide Karnataka Act 5 of 1988, Section 3 (7-4-1988).
SECTION 10-B
ANDHRA PRADESH.—After Section 10-A of the principal Act, the following section shall be
“10-B. Power to issue order regarding terms and conditions of service etc.—(1)
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, if in the opinion of the State Government, it
is necessary or expedient so to do, for securing the public safety or convenience or the
maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the community or
for maintaining employment or maintaining industrial peace, it may by a general or special
order, make provision,—
(a) for requiring employers, workmen or both to observe for such period as may be specified
in the order such terms and conditions of employment as may be determined in
accordance with the order; and
(b) for prohibiting, subject to the provisions of the order, strikes or lock-outs generally or a
strike or lock-outs in connection with any industrial dispute.
(2) In case any industrial dispute is raised in respect of any provisions in the order of the
State Government made under sub-section (1) within a period of three months of the order,
it shall be referred by the State Government for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal or
Labour Court and the order shall lapse when the award of the Tribunal or Labour Court
becomes enforceable:
Provided, that the reference of the industrial dispute to adjudication shall not have the
effect of staying the operation of the order.”—Vide A.P. Act 32 of 1987.
KERALA.—After Section 10-A of the Central Act 14 of 1947, the following section shall be
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
“10-B.Power to issue orders regarding terms and conditions of service pending settlement
of disputes.—(1) Where an industrial dispute has been referred by the State Government to a
Labour Court or Tribunal under sub-section (1) of Section 10 and if, in the opinion of that
Government, it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or
of the community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the establishment
concerning which such reference has been made it may, by general or special order, make
provision—
(a) for requiring employers or workmen or both to observe such terms and conditions of
a workman;
(c) for any incidental or supplementary matters which appear to it to be necessary or
expedient for the purposes of the order:
terms and conditions of employment less favourable to the workmen than those which were
applicable to them at any time within three months immediately preceding the date of the
order.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “public utility service” means—
the Tribunal, as the case may be, whichever is earlier.
(3) Any money paid by an employer to any person in pursuance of any order under sub-
section (1) may be deducted by that employer from out of any monetary benefit to which
or the Tribunal, as the case may be.”—Kerala Act 30 of 1979, Section 2 (3-11-1979). See
also S. 29-A for penalty.
SECTION 10-B to 10-K
RAJASTHAN.—After Section 10-A insert the following new Chapter, vide Raj. Act 34 of 1958
(w.e.f. 1-7-1960) as amended by Raj. Act 14 of 1970 by which Section 10-K was added
(w.e.f. 26-2-1970):
“Chapter III-A
ARBITRATION
10-B. Submission.—(1) Any Employer and a Representative Union or, in the absence of
any registered Representative Union, any other Union which is representative of employees
may, by a written agreement, agree to submit any present or future industrial dispute or
class of such disputes to the arbitration of any person whether such arbitrator is named in
such agreement or not. Such agreement shall be called a submission.
(2) A copy of every such submission shall be sent to the Registrar who shall register it in
the register to be maintained for the purpose and shall publish it in such manner as may be
prescribed.
10-C. Submission when revocable.—Every submission shall in the absence of any provision
to the contrary contained therein be irrevocable:
Provided that a submission to refer future disputes to arbitration may at any time be
revoked by any of the parties to such submission by giving the other parties three months'
notice in writing:
Provided further that, before the expiry of the said period of three months the parties may
agree to continue the submission for such further period as may be agreed upon between
them.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
10-D. Proceedings in arbitration.—The proceedings in arbitration under this Chapter shall
be in accordance with the provision of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (Central Act X of 1940) in so
far as they are applicable and the powers which are exercisable by a Civil Court under the
said provisions shall be exercisable by the Industrial Tribunal.
10-E. Special case may be stated to Industrial Tribunal.—The arbitrator may refer any
question of law arising before him in any proceeding under this Act to the Industrial Tribunal
for its decision. Any award made by the arbitrator shall be in accordance with such decision.
10-F. Award by arbitrator.—The arbitrator shall, after hearing the parties concerned make
an award which shall be signed by him.
10-G. Dispute to be referred to Industrial Tribunal if no arbitrator appointed.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, if no provision has been made in any
submission for the appointment of an arbitrator or where by reason of any circumstances no
arbitrator is appointed such dispute may be referred by the State Government for
adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal.
10-H. State Government may refer industrial dispute to Industrial Tribunal for
adjudication.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter the State Government
may, at any time, refer an industrial dispute for adjudication by the Industrial Tribunal if on a
report made by the Conciliation Officer or otherwise it is satisfied that—
(A) by reason of the continuance of the dispute—
(a) a serious outbreak of disorder or a break of the public peace is likely to occur; or
(b) serious or prolonged hardship to a large section of the community is likely to be caused;
or
(c) the industry concerned is likely to be seriously affected or the prospects and scope for
employment therein curtailed; or
(B) the dispute is not likely to be settled by other means; or
(C) it is necessary in the public interest to do so.
(2) When the State Government makes a reference to the Industrial Tribunal for
adjudication of any industrial dispute, any submission or any award of an arbitrator with
regard to that industrial dispute shall stand as cancelled.
10-I. Notice of award to parties.—(1) The arbitrator or the Industrial Tribunal as an
arbitrator, as the case may be, shall forward copies of the award made by him or it to the
parties, the Commissioner of Labour, the Registrar and the State Government.
(2) On receipt of such award, the Registrar shall enter it in the register kept for the
purpose.
10-J. Completion of proceeding.—The arbitration proceeding shall be deemed to have
completed when the award is published under Section 17.
10-K. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, if in the opinion of the State
Government, it is necessary or expedient so to do, for securing the public safety or
of the community or for maintaining employment or maintaining industrial peace, it may by a
general or special order, make provision—
(a) for requiring employers, workmen or both to observe for such period as may be specified
in the order, such terms and conditions of employment as may be determined in
accordance with the order; and
(b) for prohibiting, subject to the provision of the order, strikes or lock-outs generally or a
strike or lock-out in connection with any industrial dispute.
(2) In case any industrial dispute is raised in respect of any provisions in the order of the
State Government made under sub-section (1) within a period of three months of the order,
it shall be referred by the State Government for adjudication to an Industrial Tribunal and the
order shall lapse when the award of the Tribunal becomes enforceable:
Provided, however, that the reference of the industrial dispute to adjudication shall not
have the effect of staying the operation of the order.
SECTION 10-B
TAMIL NADU.—After Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (Central Act XIV of
1947), the following section shall be inserted, namely:—
“10-B. Power to issue order regarding terms and conditions of service pending settlement
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
of disputes.—(1) Where an industrial dispute has been referred by the State Government to a
Labour Court or a Tribunal under sub-section (1) of Section 10 and if, in the opinion of the
State Govt. it is necessary or expedient so to do for securing the public safety or convenience
or the maintenance of public order or supplies and services essential to the life of the
community or for maintaining employment or industrial peace in the establishment
concerning which such reference has been made, they may, by general or special order,
make provision—
(a) for requiring employers or workmen or both to observe such terms and conditions of
a workman;
(c) for any incidental or supplementary matters which appear to them to be necessary or
expedient for the purpose of the order:
terms and conditions of employment less favourable to the workmen than those which were
applicable to them at anytime within three months immediately preceding the date of the
order.
Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section, “public utility service” means—
the Tribunal as the case may be, whichever is earlier.
(3) Any money paid by an employer to any person in pursuance of an order under sub-
section (1) may be deducted by that employer from out of any monetary benefit to which
or the Tribunal as the case may be.”—T.N. Act 36 of 1982, S. 2 (w.e.f. 15-8-1982)
► Jurisdiction of arbitrator.—An arbitrator is a ‘Tribunal’ within the meaning of the word used in Section
11-A and therefore, can review the punishment awarded by the management. Arbitrator can also do this under
Section 11. The arbitrator is also amenable to judicial review under Articles 226 and 227. Gujarat Steel Tubes
Ltd. v. Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 197.
Question of compensation by workers to the management for illegal strike is outside the jurisdiction of a
voluntary reference under Section 10-A. Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union, (1976) 2
SCC 82 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 200.
► Award passed by arbitrator.—An arbitrator under Section 10-A must decide keeping in view the spirit
of Section 11-A. Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 197.
► Existence of grounds.—In coming to the conclusion as to whether the grounds mentioned in Section 10
-B (as in force in Karnataka) exist or not, it is not necessary for the Government to hear the management.
Kanoria Industries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1997) 1 LLJ 95 : (1997) 1 Cur LR 487 (Kant).
Chapter IV
PROCEDURE, POWERS AND DUTIES OF AUTHORITIES
11. Procedure and powers of conciliation officers, Boards, Courts and Tribunals.—108 [(1)
Subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, an arbitrator, a Board, Court, Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall follow such procedure as the arbitrator or other
authority concerned may think fit.]
(2) A conciliation officer or a member of a Board, 109 [or Court or the presiding officer of a
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] may for the purpose of inquiry into any existing or
apprehended industrial dispute, after giving reasonable notice, enter the premises occupied by
any establishment to which the dispute relates.
(3) Every Board, Court, 110 [Labour Court, Tribunal and National Tribunal] shall have the same
powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), when
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely—
(a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) compelling the production of documents and material objects;
(c) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses;
(d) in respect of such other matters as may be prescribed;
and every inquiry or investigation by a Board, Court, 111 [Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal], shall be deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of Sections 193 and
228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
(4) A conciliation officer 112 [may enforce the attendance of any person for the purpose of
examination of such person or call for] and inspect any document which he has ground for
considering to be relevant to the industrial dispute 113 [or to be necessary for the purpose of
verifying the implementation of any award or carrying out any other duty imposed on him under
this Act, and for the aforesaid purposes, the conciliation officer shall have the same powers as
are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), 114 [in respect of
enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him or of compelling the production of
documents].]
115
[(5) A Court, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal may, if it so thinks fit, appoint
one or more persons having special knowledge of the matter under consideration as assessor or
assessors to advise it in the proceeding before it.
(6) All conciliation officers, members of a Board or Court and the presiding officers of a
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be public servants within the
meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).
(7) Subject to any rules made under this Act, the costs of, and incidental to, any proceeding
before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be in the discretion of that Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the
case may be, shall have full power to determine by and to whom and to what extent and
subject to what conditions, if any, such costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions
for the purposes aforesaid and such costs may, on application made to the appropriate
Government by the person entitled, be recovered by that Government in the same manner as
an arrear of land revenue.]
116 [(8) Every 117 [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] shall be deemed to be a Civil
Court for the purposes of 118 [Sections 345, 346 and 348 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(2 of 1974)].]
119 [(9) Every award made, order issued or settlement arrived at by or before Labour Court or
Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be executed in accordance with the procedure laid down for
execution of orders and decree of a civil court under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 (5 of 1908).
(10) The Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall transmit
any award, order or settlement to a civil court having jurisdiction and such civil court shall
executed the award, order or settlement as if it were a decree passed by it.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
KARNATAKA.—For sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the principal Act, the following sub-
sections shall be substituted, namely:—
“(4) A Conciliation Officer may, if he considers that any document or the testimony of any
person is relevant or necessary for the settlement of an industrial dispute or for the purpose
of verifying the implementation of any award or carrying out any other duty imposed on him
under this Act, call for and inspect such document or summons and examine such person.
For the aforesaid purposes, the Conciliation Officer shall have the same powers as are vested
in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of
1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:—
(i) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(ii) compelling the production of documents;
(iii) issuing commissions for examination of witnesses.
(4-A) Whoever refuses or fails to attend or take part in a conciliation proceeding or fails or
refuses to produce the documents in pursuance of an order issued under sub-section (4),
shall, on conviction, be punishable with imprisonment for a period which may extend to three
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
months or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees or with both.”—Karnataka Act
5 of 1988, S. 4 (7-4-1988).
TAMIL NADU.—For sub-section (4) of Section 11 of the principal Act, the following sub-
section shall be substituted, namely:—
“(4) A conciliation officer may, if he considers that any document or the testimony of any
person is relevant or necessary for the settlement of an industrial dispute or for the purpose
of verifying the implementation of any award or carrying out any other duty imposed on him
under this Act, call for and inspect such document or summons and examine such person.
For the aforesaid purposes, the conciliation officer shall have the same powers as are vested
in a Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of
1908), in respect of the following matters, namely:—
(i) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(ii) compelling the production of documents;
(iii) issuing commissions for examination of witnesses.”—T.N. Act 5 of 1988, S. 3 (w.e.f. 1-11
-1988)
► Power of Tribunals.—Sub-section (7) of Section 11 gives a discretion to the Tribunal and it has full
power to determine by and to whom and to what extent and subject to what conditions, if any, the costs are to
be paid. However, the discretion is a judicial discretion and must be exercised according to the rules of reasons
and justice—not by chance or caprice or private opinion or some fanciful idea of benevolence or sympathy.
The general rule is that costs follow the event unless the Court, for good reason, otherwise orders. The power to
order the payment of costs granted under it to industrial tribunals is made comprehensive and is not even
fettered by a provision like Section 35(2), CPC. Punjab National Bank v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC
276 : (1957) 1 LLJ 455. ‘Costs of and incidental to’ has no reference to costs payable in advance or to be
incurred in future by a party, for less do they refer to halting and travelling allowances to be incurred by a party
while attending the court on his own behalf. Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Sri Ram Kumar, AIR 1957 SC 276.
As the Code of Civil Procedure applies to the proceedings before Labour Appellate Tribunal, it has jurisdiction
to review its own order under Order XLVII of the CPC. Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1958 SC
153. Where the Tribunal has passed orders for inspection of documents in contravention of Order XI, Rules 15
and 18, CPC the order must be set aside. Shambhu Nath and Sons Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal,
Delhi, 12 FJR 203.
Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal cannot sit in judgment over conclusions of enquiry officer if not perverse,
State of Gujarat v. Bhanji Gopal Karchhar, (2016) 12 SCC 645.
► Technical rules of procedure.—Quasi-judicial Tribunals like the Industrial Tribunal, not hampered by
the rules of evidence applicable to proceedings in a court of law, would be entitled to rely on data available to it,
otherwise than from evidence adduced on behalf of the parties and it is not open to the court in an application
for an issue of a writ of certiorari to go into the matters of the conclusion of the Tribunal. Electric Mechanical
Industries Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, 2 FJR 102.
The Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Court are not bound by technical rules of procedure. Sarva Shramik
Sangh v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 386 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 627. Strict rules of pleading
governing the proceedings before a civil court do not govern the pleadings before the Labour and Industrial
Courts. Bombay Mothers and Children's Society v. General Labour Union (Red Flag), (1991) 2 LLN 600 :
1991 Lab IC 1653 (Bom).
Affording opportunity to the party against whom the award is to be passed, held, is a matter of procedure
and not power. Anil Sood v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II, (2001) 10 SCC 534.
All the issues arising in a reference whether jurisdictional or regarding merit must be decided together. It is
not obligatory on the Industrial Tribunal or Labour Court to frame a preliminary issue. Swarup Vegetable
Products Industries Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1997) 77 FLR 546 (All)(FB).
► Production of documents.—The power conferred on the Industrial forum for getting the documents
produced, is not intended to enable any litigant to embark upon a fishing enquiry, with a hope to search for
some material on which reliance could be placed. Kinariwala v. Mighty Labour Association, (1993) 1 LLN 677
(Guj)(DB).
► Revocation of decision.—The expression “submission” in the proviso to Rule 10-B(9) of the Central
Rules, which empowers the Labour Court or Tribunal to revoke its decision to proceed with the reference ex
parte, on an application filed before the submission of the award means actual submission of the award and not
mere a direction of the court for submission thereof. Northern Coal Fields Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal/Labour
Court, 1996 Lab IC 1800 : (1996) 2 LLN 960 (All).
► Power of review.—The provisions of ID Act, 1947 do not grant any power of review, either expressly or
by necessary implication, Kapra Mazdoor Ekta Union v. Birla Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Ltd., (2005) 13 SCC
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
777 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1635.
120
[11-A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief
in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen.—Where an industrial dispute relating to the
discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or
dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal
and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or
give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of
discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require:
Provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any
fresh evidence in relation to the matter.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
SECTIONS 11-B to 11-D
ANDHRA PRADESH.—After Section 11-A of the principal Act, the following section shall be
“11-B. Power of Labour Court or Tribunal to execute its award by decree.—A Labour Court
or a Tribunal shall have the power of a Civil Court to execute its award or any settlement as a
decree of a Civil Court.”—Vide A.P. Act 32 of 1987.
MADHYA PRADESH.—(1) After Section 11-A, the following sections shall be inserted, namely:
—
“11-B. Powers of Labour Courts in respect of criminal cases.—In respect of offences
punishable under this Act and the Acts specified in Part B of the Second Schedule, the Labour
Court shall have all the powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) of a
Judicial Magistrate of the First Class and in the trial of every such offence shall follow the
procedure laid down in Chapter XXI of the said Code for summary trial and the rest of the
provisions of the Code shall, so far as may be, apply to such trial.
11-C. Appeal.—(1) An appeal shall lie to the Industrial Court constituted under Section 9
of the Madhya Pradesh Audyogik Sambandh Adhiniyam, 1960 (27 of 1960)—
(a) against a conviction by a Labour Court by the person convicted;
(b) against an acquittal by a Labour Court by the State Government;
(c) for enhancement of sentence awarded by a Labour Court by the State Government.
(2) Every appeal shall be made within sixty days from the date of the conviction, acquittal
or sentence, as the case may be:
Provided that the Industrial Court may for sufficient reasons allow an appeal after the
expiry of the said period.
11-D. Powers of the Industrial Court hearing appeal under Section 11-D.—In respect of
offence punishable under this Act and the Acts specified in Part B of the Second Schedule,
Industrial Court hearing appeal under Section 11-C shall have all the powers of the High
Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), and shall follow such
procedure as it may think fit in disposing of the appeal.”—M.P. Act 43 of 1981, S. 3 w.e.f. 26-
1-1982.
(2) Sections 11-B, 11-C and 11-D shall be omitted.—Vide M.P. Act 26 of 2003, S. 3 (w.e.f.
12-5-2003).
SECTION 11-B
TAMIL NADU.—In its application to the State of Tamil Nadu, after Section 11-A, the following
section shall be inserted, namely:—
“11-B. Power of a Labour Court or Tribunal to execute its award by decree.—A Labour
Court or a Tribunal shall have the power of a civil court to execute its own award as a decree
of a civil court and also to execute any settlement as defined in clause (p) of Section 2 as a
decree.” [Vide T.N. Act 45 of 2008, S. 2, w.e.f. 7-11-2008].
WEST BENGAL.—After Section 11-A of the principal Act, the following section shall be
inserted:—
“11-B. Power of a Labour Court or Tribunal to execute its award by decree, etc.—A Labour
Court or a Tribunal shall have the power of a civil court to execute its own award as a decree
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
of a civil court and also to execute any settlement as defined in clause (p) of Section 2 as a
decree.”—W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 5.
► Object of.—Mandatory statutory duty cast on Labour Court to adjudicate dispute on merits on basis of
evidence produced. To examine proportionality of punishment imposed where alleged misconduct is proved,
Raghubir Singh v. Haryana Roadways, (2014) 10 SCC 301.
► Applicability.—Section 11-A is equally applicable to minority educational institutions, protected under
Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. Hospital Employees' Union v. Christian Medical College, (1987) 4
SCC 691 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 53.
Section 11-A applies only to disputes which are referred for adjudication after the section has come into
force. It has no retrospective operation. Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., (1973) 1 SCC 813 : 1973
SCC (L&S) 341; See also (1974) 3 SCC 601 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 102; East India Hotels Ltd. v. Workmen,
(1974) 3 SCC 712 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 245.
Section 11-A of the Act has no relevance to punishments other than dismissal or discharge. Rajasthan
SRTC v. Labour Court, (1994) 1 LLJ 542 : (1993) 67 FLR 484.
Section 11-A did not apply to proceeding under Section 33(2)(b). Hindustan Paper Corpn. Ltd. v. P.O.,
Industrial Tribunal, (2003) 2 LLJ 761 (Gau).
This section is applicable only in case of dismissal or discharge of a workman, South Indian Cashew
Factories Workers' Union v. Kerala State Cashew Development Corpn. Ltd., (2006) 5 SCC 201 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 988.
► Jurisdiction of Labour Court.—The Labour Court has got no jurisdiction under Section 11-A to
interfere with the punishment of removal or substitute it with a lesser punishment in cases of embezzlement or
misappropriation of public money. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Kailash Chand Sharma,
(1995) 1 Cur LR 920 : (1995) 1 LLJ 268 (Raj).
See also Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co. of India (P) Ltd., (1973) 1 SCC 813 : 1973 SCC (L&S)
341.
Labour Court or Tribunal has thus jurisdiction and power under Section 11-A to substitute its measure of
punishment in place of that awarded by the employer and the Supreme Court, exercising jurisdiction under
Article 136 over the decision of the Labour Court or Tribunal can examine whether the Labour Court or Tribunal
had properly approached the matter for exercising or refusing to exercise its power under Section 11-A. Rama
Kant Misra v. State of U.P., (1982) 3 SCC 346 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 26.
An Industrial Tribunal or a Labour Court may interfere with a quantum of punishment awarded by the
employer in exercise of its power under Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act but, ordinarily, the
discretion exercised by the employer should not be interfered with, U.P. SRTC v. Nanhe Lal Kushwaha, (2009)
8 SCC 772.
Labour Court or Tribunal has wide discretion in matters of awarding appropriate punishment, conditions of
reinstatement and entitlement and extent of back wages, P.V.K. Distillery Ltd. v. Mahendra Ram, (2009) 5 SCC
705 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 134.
Labour Court must advert to all the points raised before it in Reference petition, at least on facts and
evidence, Shriram Vishwanath Deshpande v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court, (2010) 1
Mah LJ 587.
Labour Court is expected to review the findings of the enquiry officer as an independent authority, Ramesh
K. Pullellu v. A-Dor Welding Ltd., (2009) 5 Mah LJ 738.
Powers under this section are discretionary in nature. Labour Court is required to exercise discretion in a
judicious manner, Haryana Roadways Engg. Corpn. v. Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court-I, (2009) 122
FLR 1059 (P&H).
Labour Court ought not substitute its own view merely because two views are possible on the basis of
evidence on record. However, Labour Court can examine aspect of proportionality, Mazdoor Sangh v. Usha
Breco Ltd., (2008) 5 SCC 554 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 298.
Power of Labour Court under ID Act has expanded vastly after introduction of Section 11-A. Hence, it can,
in an appropriate case, consider the evidence which has been considered by the domestic tribunal, Workmen
v. Balmadies Estates, (2008) 4 SCC 517 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 1066.
The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer only because
another view is possible. The Labour Court cannot substitute its own view of the matter for that of the enquiring
authority, A.P. Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, (2009) 3 AP LJ 174.
In BHEL v. M. Mani, (2018) 1 SCC 285, Respondent drivers who were supposed to remain present in
Transport Department so that on receiving call they would attend place of call with their respective vehicles
allegedly found involved in committing theft of “Face Milling Cutter” and caught in factory premises while on
duty. Labour Court though found that departmental enquiry was properly conducted held same to be vitiated
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
due to criminal court's order acquitting respondents from charge of theft. The Supreme Court held, once
Labour Court upheld departmental enquiry as legal and proper it should have confined its enquiry to examine
only one limited question as to whether punishment of dismissal was disproportionate to gravity of offence
proved, by taking recourse to Section 11-A, ID Act, 1947. Moreover, it also erred in setting aside order of
dismissal on ground that appellant failed to produce evidence to prove charge of theft.
► Jurisdiction of Tribunal.—The Tribunal has the absolute discretion to decide what punishment, in the
circumstances of each particular case, should be met out to the guilty workman. Unless that discretion
exercised by the Tribunal is shown to be perverse or illegal no interference can be made on a writ petition.
Sitapore Sugar Works Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 Pat 120. Only in case of violation of principles of
natural justice, perversity of findings, victimisation, mala fides or unfair labour practice the Industrial Tribunal
can interfere with the management's decision. East India Hotels Ltd. v. Workmen, (1974) 3 SCC 712 : 1974
SCC (L&S) 245.
Where the Tribunal found the punishment harsh and ordered to reinstate the dismissed employee, it acted
within its jurisdiction. Baldev Singh v. Presiding Officer, (1986) 4 SCC 519 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 1.
Where an order of dismissal was based on a domestic enquiry which was perverse and suffered from non-
application of mind, the Labour Court, Tribunal or arbitrator could, under Section 11-A, re-appreciate the
evidence on which the order of dismissal was passed and set aside that order. Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi
Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131.
The “matter” in the proviso to Section 11-A refers to the order of discharge or dismissal that is being
considered by the Tribunal. Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., (1973) 1 SCC 813 : 1973 SCC (L&S)
341.
The expression ‘materials on record’ occurring in the proviso to Section 11-A take in (1) the evidence taken
by the management at the enquiry and the proceedings of the enquiry, or (2) the above evidence and in
addition, any further evidence led before the Tribunal, or (3) evidence placed before the Tribunal for the first
time in support of the action taken by an employer as well as the evidence adduced by the workmen contra.
Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., (1973) 1 SCC 813 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 341.
If the enquiry held is defective then the employer can adduce evidence for the first time before Tribunal.
Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., (1973) 1 SCC 813 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 341. Section empowers the
Tribunal to reappreciate the evidence. Workmen v. Firestone Tyre & Rubber Co., (1973) 1 SCC 813 : 1973
SCC (L&S) 341.
Tribunal should give cogent reasons for differing from findings of enquiry. Workmen v. Firestone Tyre &
Rubber Co., (1973) 1 SCC 813 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 341.
Tribunal's wide powers to make appropriate award under Section 11-A is not ordinarily open to interference
by High Court under Article 227. Where the Tribunal awarded reinstatement with half back wages, High Court
was not justified in substituting its own award of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. Jitendra Singh v. Shri
Baidyanath Ayurved Bhawan Ltd., (1984) 3 SCC 5 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 333.
► Power conferred under the section.—The powers of Tribunals or Courts under Section 11-A are not
arbitrary, unguided and uncanalised. Hospital Employees' Union v. Christian Medical College, (1987) 4 SCC
691 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 53.
The power of the Labour Court is not without limitation. It can interfere only when punishment is
disproportionate to the proved guilt and it should give reasons in support of its decision. Karnataka SRTC v. N.
Nagendrappa, (1992) 2 LLJ 168 (Kant).
Section 11-A has not taken away the powers of the appropriate Government under Section 10 to refer an
industrial dispute relating to discharge or dismissal of a workman to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal for adjudication. Radhey Shyam v. State of Haryana, 1998 Lab IC 1200 (P&H)(DB).
Power under Section 11-A is to be exercised only when punishment is found to be shockingly
disproportionate to degree of guilt of the workman. To support its conclusion Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court
has to give reasons in support of its decision and mere use of words ‘disproportionate’ or ‘grossly
disproportionate’ by itself will not be sufficient, LIC of India v. R. Dhandapani, (2006) 13 SCC 613.
The Labour Court has jurisdiction to give direction for reinstatement even without back wages. Gujarat
SRTC v. Danaji Sukaji Kodiyar, (1994) 2 LLJ 1113 : (1994) 1 Cur LR 606.
► Proportionality of punishment.—The Tribunal or the Court has to be satisfied that even though
misconduct is proved and a penalty has to be imposed, the extreme penalty of dismissal or discharge was not
justified in the facts and circumstances of the case, meaning thereby that the punishment was either
disproportionately heavy or excessive. In order to avoid the charge of vindictiveness, justice, equity and fair
play demand that punishment must always be commensurate with the gravity of the offence charged. Rama
Kant Misra v. State of U.P., (1982) 3 SCC 346 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 26.
Where the punishment imposed by the employer is disproportionately excessive, Labour Court/Tribunal in
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
exercise of its discretion under Section 11-A can reduce the punishment. Punishment of stoppage of
increments for two years imposed by the Labour Court setting aside the employer's order of dismissal was not
open to interference by Supreme Court. Hindustan Machine Tools v. Mohd. Usman, (1984) 1 SCC 152 : 1984
SCC (L&S) 92.
Whether a misconduct is severe or otherwise depends upon the facts of each particular case. Dismissal of
a worker of a five star hotel for assaulting a co-worker with a cook's knife cannot be said to be a far too severe
punishment. Basu Deva Das v. M.R. Bhope, (1993) 2 LLJ 1022 : 1993 Lab IC 1677 : (1993) 2 LLN 509.
Where the charge against the workman was of abusing a co-worker in filthy language and no previous
adverse remarks against the delinquent workman was shown, the extreme penalty of dismissal was
disproportionately excessive. Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable India (P) Ltd., (1984) 2 SCC 569 : 1984
SCC (L&S) 281.
Where no enquiry was held prior to dismissal of a workman by the management, both the guilt and the
punishment are open to fresh determination by the Tribunal/arbitrator. Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Mazdoor
Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 197.
► Interference by High Court.—High Court exercising Tribunal's power under Section 11-A can go into
adequacy of punishment for misconduct. Workmen v. Bharat Fritz Werner (P) Ltd., (1990) 3 SCC 565 : 1990
SCC (L&S) 523.
High Court cannot interfere with Labour Court's finding of fact under Section 11-A, unless it is based on no
evidence. Tamil Nadu State Transport Corpn. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (2005) 3 LLJ 423 (Mad)
(DB).
The expression “materials on record” in the proviso to Section 11-A refers to materials on record before the
Tribunal and not only to the materials available at the domestic enquiry. Karnataka Electricity Board, Bangalore
v. Workmen of M/s Amalgamated Electric Co. Ltd., Belgaum, (1993) 1 LLJ 512 : (1992) 64 FLR 1019 : (1992)
2 Cur LR 283.
The power of the Court or Tribunal under Section 11-A may not be exercisable by the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution. Mohini v. General Manager, Syndicate Bank, (1995) 1 LLJ 351 : (1994) 69 FLR
1061 : (1995) 86 FJR 481 (Kant).
Even in case of an individual dispute under Section 2-A the Tribunal does not become functus officio nor
does the reference abate merely on account of death of the workman during the pendency of adjudication.
Rameshwar Manjhi v. Sangramgarh Colliery, (1994) 1 SCC 292 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 521 : (1994) 26 ATC 594.
► Illegal dismissal: Reinstatement when can be refused.—See Workmen v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., 1985
SCC (L&S) 260.
Where the findings of misconduct are based on no legal evidence and the conclusion is one to which no
reasonable man would come, the arbitrator appointed under Section 10-A or the Supreme Court in appeal
under Article 136 can reject the findings as perverse. Holding that the findings are perverse does not constitute
reappraisal of evidence, though in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Section 11-A both the arbitrator and
the Supreme Court can re-appraise the evidence led in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the
evidence led by the employer established misconduct against the workman. Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi
Administration, (1984) 4 SCC 635.
► Industrial Disputes (T.N. Amendment) Act, 2008.—There is no repugnancy between Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and Industrial Disputes (T.N. Amendment) Act, 2008, T.N. Act is wider in its application.
There is no apparent conflict between two statutes. Both amendments do not stand on collision course. T.N.
Amendment has received assent of President and it can be valid insofar as State of Tamil Nadu is concerned.
Both amendments deal with execution of awards, settlements and Central Act deems it decree of civil court and
empowers civil court to execute it, while State Act empowers Labour Court to execute it, S. Gunasekaran v.
Govt. of T.N., (2011) 4 CTC 118 (Mad).
12. Duties of conciliation officers.—(1) Where an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended,
the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice
under Section 22 has been given, shall, hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner.
(2) The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the
dispute, without delay, investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right
settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the
parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement for the dispute.
(3) If a settlement of the dispute or of any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the
course of the conciliation proceedings the conciliation officer shall send a report thereof to the
appropriate Government 121 [or an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate
Government] together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the
dispute.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(4) If no such settlement is arrived at, the conciliation officer shall, as soon as practicable
after the close of the investigation, send to the appropriate Government a full report setting
forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute
and for bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement of such facts and
circumstances, and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion, a settlement could not be
arrived at.
(5) If, on a consideration of the report referred to in sub-section (4), the appropriate
Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board, 122 [Labour Court, Tribunal
or National Tribunal], it may make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not
make such a reference it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons
therefor.
(6) A report under this section shall be submitted within fourteen days of the
commencement of the conciliation proceedings or within such shorter period as may be fixed by
the appropriate Government:
123 [Provided that, 124 [subject to the approval of the conciliation officer,] the time for the
submission of the report may be extended by such period as may be agreed upon in writing by
all the parties to the dispute.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
WEST BENGAL.—In sub-section (6) of Section 12 of the principal Act,—
(i) for the words “within fourteen days”, the words “after completion of the conciliation
proceedings within sixty days” shall be substituted; and
(ii) in the proviso, after the words “such period”, the words “not exceeding six months” shall
be inserted.—W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 6.
► Applicability.—Section 12 is equally applicable to the minority educational institutions protected under
Article 30(1) of the Constitution of India. Hospital Employees' Union v. Christian Medical College, (1987) 4
SCC 691 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 53.
► Duties and Powers of Conciliation Officer.—The Conciliation Officer acting under Section 12 cannot
make a decision relating to the industrial dispute or pass an interim or final order during conciliation
proceedings. Madhya Pradesh Handloom Weavers Coop. Federation Ltd., (1996) 2 LLN 745 (MP)(Jab).
The power conferred on the Conciliation Officer is limited to initiation of conciliation proceedings and
submitting a failure report to the appropriate Government. It is not for the Conciliation Officer to enter into the
merits of the Industrial dispute. The decision whether to make reference or not to make reference, if prima
facie industrial dispute exists is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate Government. The formation of
opinion whether an Industrial dispute exists is of the appropriate Government, Associated Cement Staff Union
v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 122 FLR 140 (Bom).
A Conciliation Officer can initiate conciliation proceeding only when prima facie an industrial dispute exists
or is apprehended pertaining to terms of employment and conditions of service. The Conciliation Officer cannot
enter into the merits of the dispute. What is relevant to note is that if ex facie on the consideration of the
demands, they do not partake or have the character of conditions of service or terms of employment, the
Conciliation Officer cannot be called upon to enter into conciliation proceedings as prima facie demands would
not fall within the definition of an industrial dispute. If he cannot enter into conciliation proceedings, the question
of submitting a failure report would not arise. The failure report is a consequence of entering into conciliation
proceedings. However, where on the Conciliation Officer being called upon to enter into conciliation
proceedings, if on the prima facie consideration he forms an opinion, that the predicates of an industrial
dispute do not exist, then it is open to him to decline to enter into conciliation, though normally the appropriate
course will be to sent his report to the appropriate Government and it is for the appropriate Government to
decide whether to make a reference or decline to make a reference, Associated Cement Staff Union v. State
of Maharashtra, (2009) 3 Mah LJ 915.
The Conciliation Officer or the State Government is expected to maintain minutes of conciliation
proceedings. But the company is not to be penalised in the absence of such minutes. Parties can produce
evidence to show details of the proceedings. Workmen of Sur Enamel (P) Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1972) 3 SCC
708.
► Conciliation proceedings and reference under Section 10.—Section 10 is independent of Section 12.
It is not necessary that the procedure laid down in Section 12 regarding conciliation proceedings should be
complied with before reference is made by the Government under Section 10(1). Raju Cafe v. Industrial
Tribunal, 2 FJR 155 (Mad HC); See also Karamchand Thappar and Bros. Ltd. v. Employees, (1952-53) 4 FJR
365 (Tri). The obligation to refer dispute relating to a public utility service under the proviso to Section 10(1) is
independent of duty to refer a dispute under Section 12(1) because (i) under the proviso a reference may be
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
made, notwithstanding that any other proceedings under the Act have commenced, and (ii) under Section 10(1)
the Government need not communicate the reasons while under Section 12(5) it must do so. Ram Chandra
Abaji Pawar v. State of Bombay, 4 FJR 93 (Bom HC).
► Conciliation proceedings and procedure.—When conciliation proceedings have commenced under
Section 12(1) the further procedure enjoined by the Act has to be followed. When no settlement is arrived at,
during conciliation proceedings, it is the duty of the appropriate Government to proceed under sub-section (5)
of the section either to make a reference or to record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons
for not making reference. Where Govt. refuses to make reference on irrelevant grounds, Supreme Court in
appeal can direct it to perform its statutory duty of making reference. Sankari Cement Alai Thozhitalar
Munnetra Sangam v. Govt. of T.N., (1983) 1 SCC 304 : 1983 SCC (L&S) 139.
Where as many as twenty meetings held by the conciliation officer yielded no result, a writ of mandamus
could be issued to him to forward a failure report to the Government. All India Bombay Tyres International
Employees' Federation v. C.B. Dinagre, 1993 Lab IC 817 : (1992) 2 LLN 887 : (1992) 2 Cur LR 225 (Bom).
A writ of mandamus can be issued directing the appropriate Government to discharge the duty cast on them
under Section 12(5). State of Madras v. Swadesamitram Labour Union, 3 FJR 431 (Mad HC); see also 5 FJR
456 (Tra Co HC).
If the Government's refusal to make a reference is based on irrelevant, extraneous and non germane
grounds the court may direct the Government to reconsider its decision on relevant and germane grounds.
Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 189 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 623.
► Settlement.—Settlement arrived at in a conciliation proceedings held, is a package deal and need not
specifically mention the demands left out. National Engg. Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, (2000) 1 SCC
371.
A “settlement” relegating the dispute to arbitration is not a settlement. T.U.C.S. Ltd. v. S. Longanathan,
(1986) 2 LLN 286 (Mad)(DB) : 1986 Lab IC 1871 : (1986) 2 LLJ 225.
In a dispute between two factions of workers in the same establishment, a memorandum of settlement made
by the Conciliation Officer, on the basis of a settlement between the employer and either of the two factions
only, is not a settlement in the eyes of the law. Mohanakumaran Nair v. Hindustan Latex, (1987) 1 LLN 730
(Ker): 1987 Lab IC 950 : (1987) 2 LLJ 318.
Settlement arrived at behind the back of the respondent Union is not a settlement in the eye of the law at all,
Akhil Dadra and Nagar Haveli Kamgar Sangh v. Krantikari Kamgar Union, (2011) 5 Mah LJ 88 (Bom).
► Refusal to make reference.—The Government is entitled to go into prima facie merits of dispute for
deciding whether to refer the same or not. The High Court under Article 226 cannot sit in appeal over
Government's order refusing to make a reference, Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, (1964) 1
LLJ 351. If however a party can show that the refusal to refer a dispute is not bona fide or is based on a
consideration of wholly irrelevant facts and circumstances a writ of mandamus would lie. Hochtief Gammon v.
State of Orissa, (1975) 2 SCC 649 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 362.
13. Duties of Board.—(1) Where a dispute has been referred to a Board under this Act, it
shall be the duty of the Board to endeavour to bring about a settlement of the same and for this
purpose the Board shall, in such manner as it thinks fit and without delay, investigate the
dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all
such things as it thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable
settlement of the dispute.
(2) If a settlement of the dispute or of any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the
course of the conciliation proceedings, the Board shall send a report thereof to the appropriate
Government together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the
dispute.
(3) If no such settlement is arrived at, the Board shall, as soon as practicable after the close
of the investigation, send to the appropriate Government a full report setting forth the
proceedings and steps taken by the Board for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating
to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement of
such facts and circumstances, its findings thereon, the reasons on account of which, in its
opinion, a settlement could not be arrived at and its recommendations for the determination of
the dispute.
(4) If, on the receipt of a report under sub-section (3) in respect of a dispute relating to
public utility service, the appropriate Government does not make a reference to a 125 [Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] under Section 10, it shall record and communicate to the
parties concerned its reasons therefor.
(5) The Board shall submit its report under this section within two months of the date 126 [on
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
which the dispute was referred to it] or within such shorter period as may be fixed by the
appropriate Government:
Provided that the appropriate Government may from time to time extend the time for the
submission of the report by such further periods not exceeding two months in the aggregate:
Provided further that the time for the submission of the report may be extended by such
period as may be agreed on in writing by all the parties to the dispute.
14. Duties of Courts.—A Court shall inquire into the matters referred to it and report thereon
to the appropriate Government ordinarily within a period of six months from the commencement
of its inquiry.
► Powers of Labour Court.—The Labour Court has no power to suo-motu permit the management to avail
the opportunity of adducing fresh evidence in support of the charges. J.B. Sanjeeva Rao v. Industrial Tribunal-
cum-Labour Court, 1995 Lab IC 540 (AP).
127 [15. Duties of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals.—Where an industrial
dispute has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication, it
shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and shall, 128 [within the period specified in the order
referring such industrial dispute or the further period extended under the second proviso to sub-
section (2-A) of Section 10], submit its award to the appropriate Government.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
WEST BENGAL.—For Section 15 of the principal Act, this following section shall be
substituted:—
“15. Duties of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals.—(1) Where an industrial
dispute has been referred to a National Tribunal for adjudication, it shall hold its proceedings
expeditiously and shall, within the period specified in the order referring such industrial
dispute or the further period extended under the second proviso to sub-section (2-A) of
Section 10, submit its award to the appropriate Government.
(2) Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Labour Court or Tribunal under sub-
section (1) of Section 10, it shall,—
(a) after the filing of statements and taking of evidence, give day to day hearing and
pronounce its award, other determination or decision in the manner specified in Section 17
-AA, and
(b) after hearing the parties to the dispute, determine, within a period of sixty days from the
date of the order referring such industrial dispute or within such shorter period as may be
specified in such order, the quantum of interim relief admissible, if any:
Provided that the quantum of interim relief shall, in the case of discharge, dismissal or
retrenchment of a workman from service or termination of service of a workman, be
equivalent to the subsistence allowance admissible under the West Bengal Payment of
Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969 (West Bengal Act XXXVIII of 1969).” Vide W.B. Act 33 of
1986.
► Constitutional validity.—Section 15(2) (inserted by West Bengal Act 57 of 1980) is constitutional.
G.P.I.F.E.I.C.S. Ltd. v. Seventh I.T., (1986) 1 LLN 111 (Cal) : 1985 Lab IC 1762.
► Nature.—Section 15(2) is directory. G.P.I.F.E.I.C.S. v. Seventh Industrial Tribunal, (1986) 1 LLN 111
(Cal): 1985 Lab IC 1762.
► ‘Industrial Disputes’.—See notes under Section 2(k) of the Act.
The Labour Courts have no power except those conferred by statute. The Labour Courts have no
supervisory powers. Mittur Industries Ltd. v. A.R. Verma, AIR 1959 Mad 479.
► ‘Tribunal’.—For the definition see notes under Section 2(r) of the Act.
For powers, jurisdiction, etc., see notes under Section 10 of the Act.
► Award of Tribunal.—Awards validly made, should not be disturbed by courts on hyper-technical
grounds. Calcutta Port Shramik Union v. Calcutta River Transport Assn., 1988 Supp SCC 768 : 1989 SCC
(L&S) 106.
Award of the Tribunal is in no way similar to award of arbitrator under Arbitration Act, 1940. S. Dutt v. Delhi
University, AIR 1958 SC 1050 : 1959 SCR 1236.
16. Form of report or award.—(1) The report of a Board or Court shall be in writing and shall
be signed by all the members of the Board or Court, as the case may be:
Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent any member of the Board or
Court from recording any minute of dissent from a report or from any recommendation made
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
therein.
(2) The award of a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be in writing and shall
be signed by its presiding officer.
► Form of award.—Award must be signed by all members constituting the Tribunal; else it will be void and
inoperative. Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank & Indian Staff Assn., AIR 1956 SC 746. Award made beyond the
time stipulated in the reference, rule or order cannot be validated. Straw Board Mfg. Co. v. Gutta Mill Workers'
Union, AIR 1953 SC 95 : (1953) 1 LLJ 186. If the last day of giving the award is Sunday or a holiday, it can be
given on the next working day. Vishwamitra Press v. Workers, AIR 1953 SC 41 : (1954) 2 LLJ 537.
► Partial award.—Partial award, held, should not have been passed when a big retrenchment scheme was
afoot. Dhrangadhra Chemical Works Kamdar Sangh v. Dhrangadhra Chemicals Works Ltd., (1966) 2 LLJ 311
(SC).
17. Publication of reports and awards.—(1) Every report of a Board or Court together with any
minute of dissent recorded therewith, every arbitration award and every award of a Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of its
receipt by the appropriate Government, be published in such manner as the appropriate
Government thinks fit.
(2) Subject to the provisions of Section 17-A, the award published under sub-section (1)
shall be final and shall not be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever.
► Award, what is not.—An arbitration award given without complying with sub-section (3) of Section 10-A
of the Act, would not be an award within the purview of Section 17. Moorco (India) Ltd. v. Govt. of T.N., 1993
Lab IC 1663 : (1994) 2 LLJ 111 : (1993) 1 LLN 441 (Mad)(DB).
The rejection of a reference for the default of the workman is not an award. Hence, even if published under
Section 17 would not become enforceable under Section 17-A and binding on the parties under Section 18(3).
N.M. Naik v. Labour Court, (1998) 1 LLN 937 : (1998) 1 Cur LR 801 : (1977) 77 FLR 914 (Kant).
► Publication of the award.—Provisions under Section 17(1) for publication of the award within 30 days
is directory, AIR 1964 SC 160 : (1963) 2 LLJ 647. Date of publication of award is the date of the notification by
the Government and not the date of its appearance in the Gazette. Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Indian
Staff Assn., AIR 1956 SC 745. When parties reach a settlement which is binding under Section 18(1), after the
award is sent to the Government by Tribunal, the Government has to withhold the publication of the award.
Sirsilk Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 160 : (1963) 2 LLJ 647.
Till the award is published in the manner contemplated by Section 17, it cannot be enforced. Hence, the
Labour Court's direction in the award requiring the employer to reinstate the worker forthwith on the
presentation of the order before it with all back wages and consequential benefits, is erroneous and contrary to
Sections 17 and 17-A. Pamwi Tissues v. State of H.P., (1998) 2 LLJ 138 (HP)(DB).
17-A. Commencement of the award.—(1) An award (including an arbitration award) shall
become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its publication under Section
17:
Provided that—
(a) if the appropriate Government is of opinion, in any case where the award has been
given by a Labour Court or Tribunal in relation to an industrial dispute to which it is a
party; or
(b) if the Central Government is of opinion, in any case where the award has been given
by a National Tribunal,
that it will be inexpedient on public grounds affecting national economy or social justice to give
effect to the whole or any part of the award, the appropriate Government or as the case may be,
the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that the award shall
not become enforceable on the expiry of the said period of thirty days.
(2) Where any declaration has been made in relation to an award under the proviso to sub-
section (1), the appropriate Government or the Central Government may, within ninety days
from the date of publication of the award under Section 17, make an order rejecting or
modifying the award, and shall, on the first available opportunity, lay the award together with a
copy of the order before the Legislature of the State, if the order has been made by a State
Government, or before Parliament, if the order has been made by the Central Government.
(3) Where any award as rejected or modified by an order made under sub-section (2) is laid
before the Legislature of a State or before Parliament, such award shall become enforceable on
the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which it is so laid; and where no order under sub-
section (2) is made in pursuance of a declaration under the proviso to sub-section (1), the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
award shall become enforceable on the expiry of the period of ninety days referred to in sub-
section (2).
(4) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1) and sub-section (3) regarding the
enforceability of an award, the award shall come into operation with effect from such date as
may be specified therein, but where no date is so specified, it shall come into operation on the
date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3), as the case
may be.]
► Constitutional validity.—Section 17-A is unconstitutional. Telugunadu Work-charged Employees State
Federation v. Government of India, (1997) 2 Cur LR 480 (AP).
► Jurisdiction of the Tribunal.—The Tribunal cannot entertain an application for setting aside an ex parte
award after 30 days from its publication. Warring Co-op. Agr. Services Society v. State of Punjab, (1986) 2
LLN 624 (P&H)(DB) : 1987 Lab IC 359; overruling Ram Sarup Jiwan Lal v. Gurdas Ram, (1985) 2 LLN 814
(P&H). See also Jagdamba Auto Industries v. Kamal Yadav, (1992) 1 LLN 169 (Del)(DB).
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal to give its award a retrospective operation cannot be questioned but the
period from which these terms may be enforceable will be the period mentioned in Sections 17-19. There is no
conflict between provisions of Section 17-A and Section 19. Management of Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk
Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Mysore, AIR 1958 Mys 85. The Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court can award relief with
effect from a date anterior to the date of raising the dispute. However, the propriety of the exercise of such
power has to be decided in the circumstances of each case. Sarva Shramik Sangh v. Indian Hume Pipe Co.
Ltd., (1993) 2 SCC 386 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 627. The Tribunal is not bound to give reasons for awarding relief
with retrospective effect. Remington Rand of India Ltd. v. Workmen, (1962) 1 LLJ 287 (SC). In giving
retrospective effect to the award, the financial capacity of the employer should not be ignored; else the
Supreme Court may modify the award to make it reasonable. Airlines Hotel (P) Ltd. v. Workmen, (1964) 1 LLJ
415 (SC).
Application for setting aside Tribunal's ex parte award made within thirty days from the date of publication of
that award can be validly entertained by the Tribunal. Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal,
1980 Supp SCC 420 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 309. See also Satnam Verma v. Union of India, 1984 Supp SCC 712 :
1985 SCC (L&S) 362.
Ordinarily Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction to decide the date of operation of the award. Court's
interference is called for only when unreasonable exercise of the jurisdiction is made out on substantial ground.
Workmen v. Metro Theatre Ltd., (1981) 3 SCC 596 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 546.
► Finality of award.—The awards under Sections 17 and 17-A are final, but the claim of finality must be
subject to the result of the determination of the appeal by special leave against such award. The provisions of
the Act must be read subject to provisions of the Constitution of India. India General Navigation and Railway
Co. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 219 : (1960) 1 LLJ 13.
Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution is open even after the award became final under Section 17-A.
India General Navigation and Railway Co. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 219 : (1960) 1 LLJ 13.
Jurisdiction of Labour Court/Tribunal to set aside an ex parte award is limited. It can set aside an ex parte
award provided the application therefor is preferred within 30 days from the date of publication of award. Upon
expiry of the said 30 days, the award having become enforceable, the Labour Court/Tribunal becomes functus
officio, Jammu Tehsil v. Hakumar Singh, (2006) 12 SCC 193 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 940.
STATE AMENDMENTS
SECTION 17-AA
WEST BENGAL.—After Section 17-A of the principal Act, the following section shall be
inserted:—
129 [17-AA. Pronouncement and commencement of award, etc.—Notwithstanding anything
contained in Sections 17 and 17-A—

(1) every award, other determination or decision by an arbitrator or a Labour Court or a
Tribunal shall be pronounced on a date notified for the purpose and shall be dated and
signed by the person or persons pronouncing the award, determination or decision and
such award, determination or decision once signed and dated shall not be altered save in
the manner provided in this Act;
(2) the award, determination or decision of an arbitrator shall be pronounced in his office and
the award, determination or decision of a Labour Court or a Tribunal shall be pronounced
in open Court;
(3) a copy of every award, other determination or decision referred to in clause (1) certified
in such manner as may be prescribed, shall be given by the arbitrator, Labour Court or
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Tribunal as the case may be, to each of the parties to the dispute free of cost and a copy
of the award, determination or decision as so certified shall be sent by the arbitrator,
Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be, to the appropriate Government;
(4) every award, other determination or decision referred to in clause (1) shall become
enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of its pronouncement:
Provided that if the appropriate Government is of opinion, in any case where the award, other
determination or decision has been given by an arbitrator or a Labour Court or a Tribunal, in
relation to an industrial dispute in which it is a party, that it will be inexpedient on public
grounds affecting national economy or social justice to give effect to the whole or any part of
the award, other determination or decision, the appropriate Government may, by notification,
declare that such award, determination or decision shall not become enforceable on the expiry
of the said period of thirty days;
(5) where any declaration has been made in relation to an award, other determination or
decision under the proviso to clause (4), the appropriate Government may, within ninety
days from the date of such award, determination or decision, by notification, make an
order rejecting or modifying such award, determination or decision, and shall, on the first
available opportunity, lay the same and a copy of such order (where any such order has
been made) before the Legislature of the State;
(6) where any award, other determination or decision is rejected by the appropriate
Government under clause (5) it shall not be enforceable;
(7) where any award, other determination or decision is modified by an order made under
clause (5) such award, determination or decision as so modified shall become enforceable
on the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which the order making the modification is
published in the Official Gazette;
(8) where a declaration under the proviso to clause (4) has been made but no order is made
under clause (5), the award, determination or decision shall become enforceable on the
expiry of the period of ninety days referred to in clause (5);
(9) subject to the provisions of clauses (6), (7) and (8) regarding the enforceability of an
award, other determination or decision, the same shall come into operation with effect
from such date as may be specified therein, and where no date is so specified it shall
come into operation on the date when the same becomes enforceable under clause (4),
clause (7) or clause (8), as the case may be;
(10) the award, other determination or decision pronounced under clause (1) shall, subject to
the provisions of this section, be final and shall not be called in question by any Court in
any manner whatsoever]—W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 8.
130 [17-B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher courts.—Where in
any case a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal by its award directs reinstatement of any
workman and the employer prefers any proceedings against such award in a High Court or the
Supreme Court, the employer shall be liable to pay such workman, during the period of
pendency of such proceedings in the High Court or the Supreme Court, full wages last drawn by
him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman
had not been employed in any establishment during such period and an affidavit by such
workman had been filed to that effect in such Court:
Provided that where it is proved to the satisfaction of the High Court or the Supreme Court
that such workman had been employed and had been receiving adequate remuneration during
any such period or part thereof, the Court shall order that no wages shall be payable under this
section for such period or part, as the case may be.]
► Constitutional validity.—Section 17-B is constitutional, Elpro International Ltd. v. Smt. K.B. Joshi,
(1987) 1 LLN 695 (Bom)(DB) : 1987 Lab IC 1468 : (1987) 2 LLJ 210.
► Object.—The Object of Section 17-B is to relieve to a certain extent the hardship that is caused to the
workman due to delay in the implementation of the award during the pendency of proceedings in which the said
award is under challenge before the High Court or the Supreme Court. Dena Bank v. Kiritikumar T. Patel,
(1999) 2 SCC 106 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 466.
The expression ‘higher courts’ occurring in title of Section 17-B embraces only Supreme Court and High
Court, and not any other court in the hierarchy of courts even if such court exercises appellate or revisional
power. Motor Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Deelip Daulat Deore, (1997) 2 LLJ 1162 : 1996 Lab IC 2799 (Bom).
► Applicability.—Section 17-B applies even to awards of Labour Court or Tribunal passed prior to coming
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
into force of the section i.e. August 21, 1964 if they have not become final. Bharat Singh v. New Delhi
Tuberculosis Centre, (1986) 2 SCC 614 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 335.
Section 17-B is applicable not only in cases of reinstatement by awards but also in case of rejection of the
employer's application under Section 33(2)(b) for the workman's dismissal. Sheikh Samser Ali v. Kesoram
Industries, (1987) 2 LLN 104 (Cal)(DB). See also Suresh Sakharam Patil v. Mahindra and Mahindra, (1987) 1
LLN 393 (Bom)(DB).
Section 17-B is not applicable to proceedings in High Court against an order passed by the conciliation
officer under Section 33(2)(b). G.S.R.T.C. v. Jarnal Singh D. Ramgadhia, (1997) 1 LLN 929 : (1997) 1 LLJ
774 (Guj); Westing House Saxby Farmer Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1998) 1 LLJ 654 : (1998) 1 Cur LR 81 :
(1998) 78 FLR 472 (Cal)(DB).
► Bar under the section.—Section 17-B is not a bar on Supreme Court or High Court to award an
amount higher than full wages. But they cannot deny, or award less than, the amount due under Section 17-B.
Dena Bank v. Kiriti Kumar T. Patel, (1999) 2 SCC 106 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 466. See also Rajasthan State
Road Transport Corporation v. Labour Court, (1998) 1 LLJ 831 (Raj)(DB).
► Wages last drawn, meaning.—The expression “full wages last drawn” means the wages which were
actually paid and not the full wages which would have been drawn on the date of award of reinstatement. Dena
Bank v. Kiritikumar T. Patel, (1999) 2 SCC 106 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 466. The expression “wages last drawn”
does not include yearly increments and dearness allowance admissible from time to time subsequent to the
impugned termination or dismissal. Rajaram Maize Products v. Brij Lal, 1999 SCC (L&S) 641.
The expression “full wages last drawn” occurring in Section 17-B includes back wages. Fouress Engg. India
(P) Ltd. v. Delhi Admn., (1987) 1 LLN 539 (Del) : (1987) 1 LLJ 485.
The expression “wages last drawn” occurring in Section 17-B does not include yearly increments and
dearness allowance admissible from time to time subsequent to the impugned termination or dismissal. Rajaram
Maize Products v. Brij Lal, (1999) 9 SCC 64 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 641.
The period for which the full wages last drawn are payable under Section 17-B is from the date of the award
till disposal of the proceedings. Vishveswaraya Iron and Steel Ltd. v. M. Chandrappa, (1994) 1 LLJ 555 :
(1993) 67 FLR 825 : (1993) 2 Cur LR 124 (Kant).
► Liability of employer.—The liability of the employer for the payment of full wages to workmen accrues
from the date of the institution of the petition and not from the date of award. Ramjee Jaisinh & Company v.
R.K. Meshram, (1994) 2 Cur LR 780 : (1995) 70 FLR 171 (Bom)(DB).
► Grant of wages.—Staying with father-in-law and helping him in his business for maintaining family
during the period of unemployment caused due to unjustified dismissal was held to be not a gainful employment
and therefore, full back wages must be granted. Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Administration, (1984) 4 SCC
635.
Under Section 17-B, Industrial Disputes Act the court can, in its discretion, award minimum wages or the
last drawn wages whichever is higher, Phool Singh v. Delhi Transport Corpn., (2009) 120 FLR 727 (Del).
Workman would be entitled to receive wages under Section 17-B from the date of award of Labour Court.
Indra Perfumery Co. v. Presiding Officer., (2004) 2 LLJ 413 (Del)(DB).
When necessary ingredients of Section 17-B exist, court has no jurisdiction to deny workman full wages last
drawn during the period of pendency of writ petition. Tata Workers Union v. State of Jharkhand, (2006) 1 CLR
1027 (Jhark).
Departure from the principles for paying full wages during the pendency of proceedings in High Court or
Supreme Court can be made only in rare cases where it is shown that award was made without jurisdiction or
was otherwise a nullity. Godrej and Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Madras v. Principal Labour Court, Madras,
(1992) 2 LLJ 201 : (1992) 1 LLN 140 : (1992) 64 FLR 358 (Mad)(FB).
► Reinstatement of workman.—If provisions of Section 17-B are complied with and full payment in terms
thereof made to workman by employer, reinstatement of workman is not necessary, U.P. SEB v. Sone Lal,
(2009) 16 SCC 301.
Payment received by the workman under Section 17-B during the pendency of the proceedings which
would really be in the nature of subsistence allowance and will not be adjustable. Desein Private Ltd. v.
Industrial Tribunal ITI, Delhi, 2004 LLR 173 (Del).
The High Court cannot grant an absolute stay of the award of reinstatement. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
v. Central Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur, (1993) 2 LLJ 26 : (1993) 2 LLN 758 : (1993) 2 Cur LR 309.
18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding.—131 [(1) A settlement arrived at
by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation
proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement.
(2) 132 [Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award] which has become
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to
arbitration.]
133
[(3)] A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act 134 [or
an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3-A) of
Section 10-A] or 135 [an award 136 [of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] which has
become enforceable] shall be binding on—
(a) all parties to the industrial dispute;
(b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute,
unless the Board, 137 [arbitrator,] 138 [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], as the
case may be, records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause;
(c) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is an employer, his heirs,
successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates;
(d) where a party referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) is composed of workmen, all
persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the
case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons
who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part.
STATE AMENDMENTS
MAHARASHTRA.—In Section 18, in its application to the State of Maharashtra,
(a) to sub-section (1) the following proviso shall be added, namely:—
the time being in force, then such agreement (not being an agreement in respect of
dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service, or suspension of an
employee) shall be arrived at between the employer, and the recognised union only; and
such agreement shall be binding on all persons referred to in clause (c), and clause (d), of
sub-section (3) of this section.”;
(b) in sub-section (3), after the word, figure and letter “Section 10-A” the words “or an
arbitration award in a case where there is a recognised union for any undertaking under any law
for the time being in force” shall be inserted. [Vide Mah. Act 1 of 1972, S. 20(2) and Sch. I].
► Binding effect of settlement.—A settlement entered into between the employer and a trade union
otherwise than in conciliation proceedings is binding even on dissenting members of such a union. K.C.P. Ltd.
v. Presiding Officer, (1996) 10 SCC 446 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1410.
Where a settlement between a bank and the union of its employees was arrived at otherwise than in the
course of conciliation and subsequently that bank amalgamated with another bank, it was held that the
settlement was binding only on the amalgamated bank and not on the successor bank. Indian Bank v. K. Usha,
(1998) 2 SCC 663 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 641.
A settlement under Section 18(3) is binding on all workmen of the establishment including those belonging to
the minority union which had opposed it, while a settlement under Section 18(1) is binding only on the parties to
the agreement. Barauni Refinery Pragatisheel Shramik Parishad v. Indian Oil Corpn., (1991) 1 SCC 4 : 1991
SCC (L&S) 1.
A settlement under Section 12(3) between the employer and the sole recognised union of the workmen is
binding on all workmen whether members of the union or not. Ram Pukar Singh v. Heavy Engineering
Corporation, (1994) 6 SCC 145 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 1314.
A settlement, although not on Form H but containing all the ingredients required to be filled in Form H, is
nonetheless binding in terms of Section 18. Punjab Kesri Printing Press v. Rattan Singh, (1991) 2 LLN 771 :
(1991) 2 Cur LR 123 (P&H)(DB).
When the main award is binding on a party, any order passed in execution of that award is also binding on
him. Sainalabdeen Musliar v. District Collector, (1993) 2 Cur LR 801 : 1994 Lab IC 57 : (1994) 1 LLJ 529
(Ker).
In absence of attribution of oblique motives based on concrete materials, a settlement reached between the
union, should be prima facie considered to be in the best interest of the employees. Gandhidham Nagarpalika,
Adipur v. R.C. Israni, (1993) 1 LLJ 432 : 1992 Lab IC 2236 (Guj)(DB).
The binding force of the settlement under Section 18(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act cannot be extended to
cover disputes or demands made on behalf of the workmen not specifically covered by such a settlement.
Indian Airlines v. Airlines Cabin Crew Association, 1992 Lab IC 1867 : (1994) 2 LLJ 587 : (1993) 1 LLN 92
(Del).
By virtue of Section 18(3) a settlement arrived at during the course of conciliation proceedings becomes an
express contract for the purposes of the definition of wages as contained in Section 2(22) of the Employees'
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
State Insurance Act, 1948. Wellman (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, (1994) 1
SCC 219 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 504.
Where a declaration regarding parties to the agreement was signed by some of the workmen asserting
themselves to be members of the union with which the settlement was arrived at and accepting the terms and
conditions of the settlement, the declaration would constitute presumptive proof that the signatories to it were all,
members of that union when they signed it. Onus to prove falsity of the assertion made in the declaration by
any particular workman rests on the party making the allegation. TELCO Ltd. v. Workmen, (1981) 4 SCC 627 :
1982 SCC (L&S) 1.
A settlement arrived at in a conciliation proceeding between the management and the workmen would be
binding on all the parties to the dispute even if not represented as provided in Section 36(1). However, it will not
bind such workman whose own dispute regarding his dismissal was not included in the charter of demands and
who had not signed the agreement nor had authorised any one to sign on his behalf. Ameteep Machine Tools
v. Labour Court, 1980 Supp SCC 355 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 253.
Settlement arrived at in conciliation proceedings is binding on all, Indian Rare Earths Ltd. v. Pramod
Chandra Panigrahi, (2005) 13 SCC 379 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 751.
Once an employee is placed in executive cadre, he ceases to be a workman and also ceases to be
governed by settlements arrived at between Management and workmen through trade union concerned. Such
settlements by operation of law, cease to have any binding force on the employee promoted by Management,
Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Union of India, (2012) 1 SCC 619.
► Binding award.—An award must be binding on the company and be enforceable against the company.
An award considering Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, which has become enforceable would be
binding on the parties. The consequence of an award not being enforced would visit the persons on breach to
imprisonment for the term which may extend to six months or with or with fine or with both, considering Section
29 of the Industrial Disputes Act. Under Section 32 if the person who commits an offence, is a company, then
the officers mentioned therein would be deemed to be guilty of such offence, Associated Cement Staff Union
v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 122 FLR 140 (Bom).
If an award is binding on a party, Tribunal can implead such party if it is proper and necessary party to the
dispute. Workman has right to challenge the award in his individual capacity, Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.
v. Presiding Officer, (2009) 120 FLR 223 (Mad).
► Award passed by Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal-Binding effect of.—Award passed by Labour
Court/Industrial Tribunal is binding till it is substituted by another award/court order/court compromise indicating
such substitution, or is replaced by another settlement, or terminated by either party under Section 19(6), T.N.
Terminated Full Time Temporary LIC Employees Assn. v. LIC, (2015) 9 SCC 62 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 738.
► Memorandum of settlement.—The memorandum of settlement must be read in the context the same
was made, Ceat Ltd. v. Murphy India Employees Union, (2006) 9 SCC 478 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1848.
► Terms of settlement.—The terms of a settlement by collective bargaining get incorporated in the
individual contract of service and become conditions of service. Sudhir Chandra Sarkar v. Tata Iron and Steel
Co. Ltd., (1984) 3 SCC 369 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 540.
Settlement should be considered as a whole. ITC Ltd. Workers' Welfare Assn. v. MGMT. of ITC Ltd.,
(2002) 3 SCC 411.
► New settlement.—Until new settlement comes into effect earlier one continues to operate, Air India Ltd.
v. Vishal Capoor, (2005) 13 SCC 42 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1041.
Where a settlement between the management and a union on behalf of all the workers, was already arrived
at in course of conciliation proceedings a subsequent settlement entered into otherwise than in course of
conciliation proceedings between the management and another union not representing all the workers would not
be binding on those who were not parties thereto and were not members of that union, more so in absence of a
notice under Section 19(2) terminating the earlier settlement. G.M. Security Paper Mill v. R.S. Sharma, (1986)
2 SCC 151 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 220.
► Purview of settlement.—Promotion of workmen to executive cadre, takes them out of purview of
settlements entered into when they were workmen, Air India Cabin Crew Assn. v. Union of India, (2012) 1 SCC
619.
19. Period of operation of settlements and awards.—(1) A settlement 139 [* * *] shall come
into operation on such date as is agreed upon by the parties to the dispute, and if no date is
agreed upon, on the date on which the memorandum of the settlement is signed by the parties
to the dispute.
(2) Such settlement shall be binding for such period as is agreed upon by the parties, and if
no such period is agreed upon, for a period of six months 140 [from the date on which the
memorandum of settlement is signed by the parties to the dispute], and shall continue to be
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
binding on the parties after the expiry of the period aforesaid, until the expiry of two months
from the date on which a notice in writing of an intention to terminate the settlement is given
by one of the parties to the other party or parties to the settlement.
141
[(3) An award shall, subject to the provisions of this section, remain in operation for a
period of one year 142 [from the date on which the award becomes enforceable under Section 17-
A]:]
Provided that the appropriate Government may reduce the said period and fix such period as
it thinks fit:
Provided further that the appropriate Government may, before the expiry of the said period,
extend the period of operation by any period not exceeding one year at a time as it thinks fit,
so, however, that the total period of operation of any award does not exceed three years from
the date on which it came into operation.
(4) Where the appropriate Government, whether of its own motion or on the application of
any party bound by the award, considers that since the award was made, there has been a
material change in the circumstances on which it was based, the appropriate Government may
refer the award or a part of it 143 [to a Labour Court, if the award was that of a Labour Court or to
a Tribunal, if the award was that of a Tribunal or of a National Tribunal] for decision whether the
period of operation should not, by reason of such change, be shortened and the decision of 144
[Labour Court or the Tribunal, as the case may be], on such reference shall 145 [* * *] be final.
(5) Nothing contained in sub-section (3) shall apply to any award which by its nature, terms
or other circumstances does not impose, after it has been given effect to, any continuing
obligation on the parties bound by the award.
(6) Notwithstanding the expiry of the period of operation under sub-section (3), the award
shall continue to be binding on the parties until a period of two months has elapsed from the
date on which notice is given by any party bound by the award to the other party or parties
intimating its intention to terminate the award.
146
[(7) No notice given under sub-section (2) or sub-section (6) shall have effect, unless it is
given by a party representing the majority of persons bound by the settlement or award, as the
case may be.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
MAHARASHTRA.—In Section 19,—
(a) after sub-section (2), the following sub-section shall be added, namely:—
“(2-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a union has been
recognised under any law for the time being in force, or where any other union is recognised
in its place under such law, then notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), it
shall be lawful to any such recognised union to terminate the settlement after giving two
months' written notice to the employer in that behalf.”;
(b) to sub-section (7), the following shall be added, namely:—
“and where there is a recognised union for any undertaking under any law for the time
being in force, by such recognised union.”. [Vide Mah. Act 1 of 1972, S. 20(2) and Sch. I]
WEST BENGAL.—In sub-section (3) of Section 19 of the principal Act, after the word, figures
and letter “Section 17-A”, the words, figures and letters “or Section 17-AA” shall be inserted.—
W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 9 and W.B. Act 34 of 1983, S. 5 (w.e.f. 30-11-1981).
► Applicability.—Section 19(3) indicates that Section 11, CPC is inapplicable to the industrial disputes, but
its principle as expressed in the maxim “interest rei publical ut sit finis litium” is founded on sound public policy,
so if the Court is to regard the award as intended to have long term operation and at the same time to hold that
they are liable to be modified by change in the circumstances on which they were based, the purpose of the
Legislature would be served. Workmen of Burn & Co. v. Burn & Co., AIR 1957 SC 38.
A settlement or an award continues to operate after service of notice and lapse of two months subsequent
thereto contemplated under sub-section (2) or (6) of Section 19 or notice proposing change in conditions of
service under Section 9-A and terminates only when replaced by another settlement or award. L.I.C. of India v.
D.J. Bahadur, (1981) 1 SCC 315 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 111.
► Binding effect.—A settlement made in total derogation of provisions of Section 59 of Factories Act, 1948
cannot be treated as binding on the workman in the garb of Section 19 of the Industrial Disputes Act.
Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1994) 1 LLN 256 : (1993) 2 LLJ 1219 (Raj).
► Termination of settlement.—There is no form prescribed for terminating settlements under Section 19
(2) and all that has to be seen is whether the provisions of Section 19(2) are complied with and in substance a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
notice is given as required thereunder. Cochin State Power Light Corpn. v. Workmen, (1964) 2 LLJ 100 (SC).
For termination of settlement, formal notice is not necessary. India Link Chain Manufacturers v. Workmen,
(1971) 2 SCC 759. Various representations made by the union to the employer, could be construed as notice
of termination within the meaning of Section 19(2). Workmen v. Western India Match Co., AIR 1966 SC 976 :
(1962) 1 LLJ 661. Charter of demands held to be sufficient evidence of termination of settlement. Cochin State
Power Light Corpn. v. Workmen, (1964) 1 LLJ 110.
Section 19(3) has to be read with Section 19(6). Hence, unless the award is terminated in accordance with
Section 19(6), liability for prosecution under Section 29 for its non-implementation continues. Guha & Co. v.
R.N. Misra, (1985) 1 LLN 544 (Cal) : 1984 Lab IC 1318. See also Trichur Urban Coop. Bank Ltd. v. D.L.O.,
(1987) 2 LLJ 38 (Ker).
When the union claims that the previous award has been terminated, it must establish the point of time of
termination. Mere going on strike subsequently will not fulfil requirements of Section 19(6) and similar is the
case of participation in the conciliation proceedings. The service of charter of demand also does not satisfy the
requirements of Section 19(6). Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Workmen, (1974) 3 SCC 167 : 1973 SCC
(L&S) 459.
► Notice of termination.—Notice under Section 19(2) of ID Act to terminate the settlement cannot be
issued during the period in which the settlement remains operative on its own terms. Karnataka SRTC v.
KSRTC Staff & Workers Federation, (1999) 2 SCC 687 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 566.
Notice of termination of award should give a specific date. Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk Mills Co. v.
Workmen, AIR 1968 SC 585.
Award binds the parties even after its expiry. But it would not estop the parties from challenging its
constitutionality. Air India v. Nargesh Meerza, (1981) 4 SCC 335 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 599.
► Liability for prosecution.—Section 19(3) has to be read with Section 19(6). Hence, unless the award is
terminated in accordance with Section 19(6), liability for prosecution under Section 29 for its non-
implementation continues. Guha & Co. v. R.N. Misra, (1985) 1 LLN 544 (Cal) : 1984 Lab IC 1318. See also
Trichur Urban Coop. Bank Ltd. v. D.L.O., (1987) 2 LLJ 38 (Ker).
20. Commencement and conclusion of proceedings.—(1) A conciliation proceeding shall be
deemed to have commenced on the date on which a notice of strike or lock-out under Section
22 is received by the conciliation officer or on the date of the order referring the dispute to a
Board, as the case may be.
STATE AMENDMENTS
WEST BENGAL.—For sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the principal Act, the following sub-
section shall be substituted:—
“(1) A conciliation proceeding shall be deemed to have commenced—
(a) in the case of an industry declared as “public utility service”, on the date on which a
notice of strike or lock-out under Section 22 is received by the conciliation officer.
(b) in the case of any other industry, on the date the conciliation officer issues notices asking
the parties concerned to attend a joint conference before him, and
(c) in the case where an industrial dispute is referred to a Board, on the date of the order
referring the dispute to a Board.”—W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 10.
(2) A conciliation proceeding shall be deemed to have concluded—
(a) where a settlement is arrived at, when a memorandum of the settlement is signed by
the parties to the dispute;
(b) where no settlement is arrived at, when the report of the conciliation officer is received
by the appropriate Government or when the report of the Board is published under
Section 17, as the case may be; or
(c) when a reference is made to a Court, 147 [Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal]
under Section 10 during the pendency of conciliation proceedings.
(3) Proceedings 148 [before an arbitrator under Section 10-A or before a Labour Court, Tribunal
or National Tribunal] shall be deemed to have commenced on the date of the 149 [reference of
the dispute for arbitration or adjudication, as the case may be,] and such proceedings shall be
deemed to have concluded 150 [on the date on which the award becomes enforceable under
Section 17-A].
21. Certain matters to be kept confidential.—There shall not be included in any report or
award under this Act any information obtained by a conciliation officer, Board, Court, 151 [Labour
Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or an arbitrator] in the course of any investigation or inquiry
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
as to a trade union or as to any individual business (whether carried on by a person, firm or
company) which is not available otherwise than through the evidence given before such officer,
Board, Court, 152 [Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or arbitrator,] if the trade union,
person, firm or company in question has made a request in writing to the conciliation officer,
Board, Court, 153 [Labour Court, Tribunal, National Tribunal or arbitrator,] as the case may be,
that such information shall be treated as confidential; nor shall such conciliation officer or any
individual member of the Board, 154 [or Court or the presiding officer of the Labour Court,
Tribunal or National Tribunal or the arbitrator] or any person present at or concerned in the
proceedings disclose any such information without the consent in writing of the secretary of the
trade union or the person, firm or company in question, as the case may be:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply to a disclosure of any such
information for the purposes of a prosecution under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of
1860).
► Nature and scope.—Section 21, does not prevent the inspection of documents by the adversary of the
party, who claims them to be confidential but produces them and intends to use them in evidence. The section
only prevents a conciliation officer, Board, Court or Tribunal to include in its report or award the contents of
any document claimed to be confidential. The Tribunal may, however without violating the provision of Section
21 take notice of the fact that the profit and loss account in the document discloses loss for the year. Kanpur
Hosiery Workers Union, Kanpur v. The Pakka Hosiery Mills, Kanpur, 1952 LAC 19 (LAT).
Chapter V
STRIKES AND LOCK-OUTS
22. Prohibition of strikes and lock-outs.—(1) No person employed in a public utility service
shall go on strike in breach of contract—
(a) without giving to the employer notice of strike, as hereinafter provided, within six
weeks before striking; or
(b) within fourteen days of giving such notice; or
(c) before the expiry of the date of strike specified in any such notice as aforesaid; or
(d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and
seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings.
(2) No employer carrying on any public utility service shall lock-out any of his workmen—
(a) without giving them notice of lock-out as hereinafter provided, within six weeks before
locking-out; or
(b) within fourteen days of giving such notice; or
(c) before the expiry of the date of lock-out specified in any such notice as aforesaid; or
(d) during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation officer and
seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings.
(3) The notice of lock-out or strike under this section shall not be necessary where there is
already in existence a strike or, as the case may be, lock-out in the public utility service, but the
employer shall send intimation of such lock-out or strike on the day on which it is declared, to
such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government either generally or for a
particular area or for a particular class of public utility services.
(4) The notice of strike referred to in sub-section (1) shall be given by such number of
persons to such person or persons and in such manner as may be prescribed.
(5) The notice of lock-out referred to in sub-section (2) shall be given in such manner as may
be prescribed.
(6) If on any day an employer receives from any persons employed by him any such notices
as are referred to in sub-section (1) or gives to any persons employed by him any such notices
as are referred to in sub-section (2), he shall within five days thereof report to the appropriate
Government or to such authority as that Government may prescribe, the number of such notices
received or given on that day.
STATE AMENDMENTS
HIMACHAL PRADESH.—In its application to the State of Himachal Pradesh, in Section 22, in
sub-sections (1) and (2), after the words “public utility service”, the words “and non-public
utility service” shall be inserted. [Vide Himachal Pradesh Ordinance No. 4 of 2020, S. 2, dated 6
-7-2020]
► Strike notice.—Section 22(1)(a) requires six weeks' advance notice and Section 22(1)(b) allows
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
fourteen days' time to employer to consider workers' demand(s). Reading clauses (a) and (b) together, valid
strike cannot commence before expiry of six weeks' time under clause (a) and fourteen days thereafter under
clause (b). Strike notice has to be given in Form ‘L’ to the employer who in turn is required to inform the
Government/prescribed authority under Section 22(6). There is no provision for sending the notice by workers
direct to Conciliation Officer. Strike notice not conforming to time periods laid down in Sections 22(1)(a) and
(b) is no notice in the eye of the law, Essorpe Mills Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (2008) 7 SCC
594 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 436.
► Legality of strike.—The legality of the strike depends on the provisions of Section 22 in the case of a
public utility service and the question whether it was provoked or not is immaterial. Mahalaxmi Cotton Mills Ltd.
v. Workers Union, 1952 LAC 220 : 1952 LAC 370 (Tri).
During pendency of conciliation proceedings between public utility concern and one of its unions, strike by
another union of the same concern, held, illegal. Ramnagar Cane & Sugar Co. v. Jatin Chakravarty, AIR 1960
SC 1012 : (1961) 1 LLJ 244.
A strike during pendency of a proceedings other than a conciliation proceedings is not illegal. State Bank of
India Staff Union v. State Bank of India, (1992) 65 FLR 234 (Mad)(DB).
► Legality of Lock-out.—Lock-out within 7 days of conciliation proceedings, held, not illegal if results as a
consequence of illegal strike already started. India General Navigation & Railway Co. v. Workmen, AIR 1960
SC 219 : (1960) 1 LLJ 13.
23. General prohibition of strikes and lock-outs.—No workman who is employed in any
industrial establishment shall go on strike in breach of contract and no employer of any such
workman shall declare a lock-out—
(a) during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before a Board and seven days after
the conclusion of such proceedings;
(b) during the pendency of proceedings before 155 [a Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal] and two months after the conclusion of such proceedings; 156 [* * *]
157 [(bb) during the pendency of arbitration proceedings before an arbitrator and two
months after the conclusion of such proceedings, where a notification has been issued
under sub-section (3-A) of Section 10-A; or]
(c) during any period in which a settlement or award is in operation in respect of any of
the matters covered by the settlement or award.
► Scope.—The words of clause (a) and clause (b) of Section 23 cover all strikes and lock-outs irrespective
of the subject-matter of the dispute pending before a Tribunal or conciliation officer. State of Bihar v. Deodhar
Jha, AIR 1958 Pat 51.
During pendency of a reference the employer applied to be discharged from the proceedings on the ground
that it did not concern its collieries and thereafter the employer and its workmen took no part in the
proceedings. The proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal involve larger pubic interest. The employer cannot
by expressing its desire to withdraw from the proceedings cease to be a party to the proceedings so as to avoid
the legal consequences flowing from Section 23(b). Ballarpur Collieries Co. v. Presiding Officer, (1972) 2 SCC
27.
► Legality of strike/lock-out.—In order to be hit by Section 23(c) the strike must be in breach of a
contract in respect of a matter covered by the settlement which is in operation at the time of the strike.
Ballarpur Collieries v. Presiding Officer, (1972) 2 SCC 27.
Section 23 does not cover strike in breach of settlement. Workmen v. Motor Industries Co., (1969) 2 SCC
13.
Section 23(c) which bans strike and lock-out in respect of matters covered by the award, will apply till the
award ceases to be in operation or binding. South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Chacko, (1964) 1 LLJ 19.
Assurance of Labour Commissioner that there would be no strike in future does not amount to a term of
settlement. Ballarpur Collieries Co. v. Presiding Officer, (1972) 2 SCC 27.
24. Illegal strikes and lock-outs.—(1) A strike or a lock-out shall be illegal if—
(i) it is commenced or declared in contravention of Section 22 or Section 23; or
(ii) it is continued in contravention of an order made under sub-section (3) of Section 10
158 [or sub-section (4-A) of Section 10-A].
(2) Where a strike or lock-out in pursuance of an industrial dispute has already commenced
and is in existence at the time of the reference of the dispute to a Board, 159 [an arbitrator, a] 160
[Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], the continuance of such strike or lock-out shall not
be deemed to be illegal, provided that such strike or lock-out was not at its commencement in
contravention of the provisions of this Act or the continuance thereof was not prohibited under
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
sub-section (3) of Section 10 161 [or sub-section (4-A) of Section 10-A].
(3) A lock-out declared in consequence of an illegal strike or a strike declared in consequence
of an illegal lock-out shall not be deemed to be illegal.
► Illegal strike/lock-out.—Legal lock-out does not give a licence to the management to act unreasonably.
Statesman Ltd. v. Workmen, (1976) 2 SCC 223 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 218.
Where a strike is unjustified and is followed by a lock-out which becomes unjustified a case of
apportionment of blame arises. India Marine Service (P) Ltd. v. Workmen, (1963) 1 LLJ 122. Illegal strike
cannot be half legitimate. Chandramalai Estate v. Workmen, (1960) 3 SCR 451 : (1960) 2 LLJ 243. Mere
breach of standing order cannot render strike illegal. Ballarpur Collieries Co. v. Presiding Officer, (1972) 2
SCC 27. Section 24(3) applies to lock-out declared as a consequence to illegal strike. Continuation of lock-out
even after calling off the strike though unjustified is not illegal. Legality of lock-out arising out of illegal strike
cannot be questioned. India General Navigation and Rly Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 219 : (1960) 1
LLJ 13. Strike commenced before actual receipt of conciliation officer's report by the Government is illegal.
Workmen v. Industry Colliery, AIR 1953 SC 88 : (1953) 1 LLJ 190. Where any strike is commenced without
giving notice as required by Section 22, or within seven days of the conclusion of conciliation proceedings, the
strike must be held to be illegal irrespective of whether it was provoked by the employer, and the workmen
would not be entitled to any pay for the period of the strike. Maha Laxmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Maha Laxmi
Cotton Mills Workers' Union, 4 FJR 248 (LAT). See also Punjab National Bank v. Workmen, (1952) 2 LLJ
648 (Tri); Mahalaxmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Workers Union, 1952 LAC 370 (Tri). An illegal strike, even if justified,
does not entitle the workman to wages. H.M.T. Ltd. v. H.M.T. Head Office Employees' Assn., (1996) 11 SCC
319 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 228.
► Payment of wages and lock-out.—Award of half wages is proper where a legal lock-out is caused by
illegal strike during pendency of proceeding. Statesman Ltd. v. Workmen, (1976) 2 SCC 223 : 1976 SCC
(L&S) 218.
Where the lock-out is declared to be illegal, the principle of ‘no work no pay’ does not apply. Nellimarla Jute
Mills Karmika Sangham v. State of A.P., 1995 Lab IC 1041 (AP).
► Maintainability of writ petition.—A writ petition seeking a direction to a registered company to lift illegal
lock-out is maintainable. Nellimarla Jute Mills Karmika Sangham v. State of A.P., 1995 Lab IC 1041 (AP).
25. Prohibition of financial aid to illegal strikes and lock-outs.—No person shall knowingly
expend or apply any money in direct furtherance or support of any illegal strike or lock-out.
162 [Chapter V-A
LAY-OFF AND RETRENCHMENT

► Nature.—Chapter V-A is not repugnant to Section 40 of A.P. Shops and Establishments Act, 1966.
Krishna Distt. Co-op. Mktg. Society Ltd. v. Puranchandra Rao, (1987) 4 SCC 99 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 366.
► Applicability.—Applicability of Chapter V-A is dependent on whether order for termination of service
comes within purview of definition of ‘retrenchment’ in Section 2(oo). If termination of service, in view of
exception contained in Section 2(oo)(bb), is not a ‘retrenchment’, question of applicability of Chapter V-A would
not arise, Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board v. Subhash Chand, (2006) 2 SCC 794 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 455.
► Chapter V-A and Chapter V-B.—Chapter V-A deals with the general provisions relating to lay-off and
retrenchment, while Chapter V-B deals with special provisions for the same in respect of certain
establishments, Rajinder Singh Chauhan v. State of Haryana, (2005) 13 SCC 179 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 739.
► Uncertainty.—The ID Act does not envisage application of its provisions where both recruitment and
termination are uncertain or when the workmen are not required to be recruited in a categorywise service e.g.
skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled, etc., Jaipur Development Authority v. Ramsahai, (2006) 11 SCC 684.
25-A. Application of Sections 25-C to 25-E.—(1) Sections 25-C to 25-E inclusive 163 [shall not
apply to industrial establishments to which Chapter V-B applies, or]—
(a) to industrial establishments in which less than fifty workmen on an average per
working day have been employed in the preceding calendar month; or
(b) to industrial establishments which are of a seasonal character or in which work is
performed only intermittently.
(2) If a question arises whether an industrial establishment is of a seasonal character or
whether work is performed therein only intermittently, the decision of the appropriate
Government thereon shall be final.
164 [Explanation.—In this section and in Sections 25-C, 25-D and 25-E, “industrial
establishment” means—
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948);
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
or
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of Section 2 of the Mines Act, 1952 (35 of 1952); or
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of Section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951
(69 of 1951)].
► Establishments of seasonal character, meaning.—The phrase “of a seasonal character”, has not
been defined in the Act. In order to decide whether a particular establishment is of a seasonal character it has
to be seen whether its entire work is seasonal in character. Where only one of the sections of the industrial
establishment works in a particular season, the answer to the question would depend upon various other
factors. If in other seasons such an industrial establishment continues to employ a sizable number of workmen
out of the total strength of the workman engaged in the factory, it cannot be said to be of a seasonal character.
Jagjiwan Bhimji Vaja v. Union of India, (1996) 1 LLJ 629 : (1995) 1 LLN 894 (Guj)(DB).
Where a workman is employed for a seasonal work or temporary period, the workman cannot be said to be
retrenched in view of Section 2(oo)(bb). In the normal course, it is the decision of the appropriate Government
which is final in determining whether the said industry is seasonal in nature, Govt. of Gujarat (Fisheries
Terminal Deptt.) v. Bhikubhai Meghajibhai Chavda, (2010) 1 SCC 47.
165
[25-B. Definition of continuous service.—For the purposes of this Chapter.—
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in
uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or
authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of
work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a
period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an
employer—
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months
preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually
worked under the employer for not less than—
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a
mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months
(i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has
actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which—
(i) he has been laid off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made
under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under
this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment;
(ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous year;
(iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment; and
(iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so however, that the total
period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.]
► Definition of ‘continuous service’.—The definition of ‘continuous service’ given in Section 25-B as
substituted in 1964 overrides the definition of the said term contained in Section 2(g) of the U.P. Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and to the extent of inconsistency/repugnancy in Section 2(g) of the U.P. Act is void by
virtue of Article 254(1) of the Constitution of India. U.P. Industrial Coop. Assn. v. Presiding Officer, Labour
Court, 1996 Lab IC 1347 : (1996) 2 LLN 529 (All).
► Expression ‘cessation of work’, interpretation.—The expression ‘cessation of work’ should be
interpreted ‘ejusdem generis’ in the light of illegal strike or lock-out and matters of a similar nature. G. Yadi
Reddy v. Management of Brooke Bond India Ltd., 1994 Lab IC 186 : (1994) 1 LLN 282 : (1994) 69 FLR 25 AP
(DB).
Employment of daily wager/casual employee in different establishments, even under the same employer or
controlling authority, held, would not amount to his being in ‘continuous service’, Haryana Urban Development
Authority v. Om Pal, (2007) 5 SCC 742 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 255.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Burden to prove that workman worked for continuous period of 240 days in a year lies on the workman so
as to entitle him to benefits of Section 25-F, Krishna Bhagya Jal Nigam Ltd. v. Mohd. Rafi, (2006) 9 SCC 697.
Employment of casual employee in different establishments, even under the same employer, would not
amount to his being in ‘continuous service’, Union of India v. Jummasha Diwan, (2006) 8 SCC 544 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 2037.
► Computation of period of 240 days.—The period of 240 days need not be in the same service or same
type of service. Kailash Paswan v. Union of India, 1985 Lab IC 433 (Pat)(DB). Section 25-B does not require
the completion of the requisite period of service in the same capacity. Prabhu Dayal Jat v. Alwar Sahakari
Bhumi Vikas Bank Ltd., 1991 Lab IC 944 : (1991) 2 LLJ 130 : (1991) 2 Cur LR 526 (Raj)(DB).
► Re-appointment.—When a temporary employee is re-appointed on a fresh basis then his previous
service cannot be taken into consideration. Sur Enamel & Stamping Works Ltd. v. Workmen, (1964) 3 SCR
616 : (1963) 2 LLJ 367.
Under Section 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the requirement of the statute of 240 days cannot
be disputed and it is for the employee concerned to prove that he has in fact completed 240 days in the last
preceding 12 months' period. Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar, (2002) 8 SCC 400, relying on Range Forest
Officer v. S.T. Hadimani, (2002) 3 SCC 25 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 367.
In computing 240 days' service notional breaks of service cannot be ignored. Eicher Goodearth v. Industrial
Tribunal, (1986) 1 LLN 219 (P&H).
Onus to prove 240 days' continuous service, held, lies on workman. State of M.P. v. Arjunlal Rajak, (2006)
2 SCC 711.
Sunday and other paid holidays have to be taken into account for the purpose of reckoning total number of
days on which workman can be said to have actually worked. Chaggan Lal v. Panchayat Samiti, (1992) 1 CLR
552 : (1992) 1 LLJ 419 (Raj).
“Actually worked… for not less than 240 days” includes paid holidays. Workmen v. American Express
International Banking Corpn., (1985) 4 SCC 71 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 940. See also H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank
of India, (1985) 4 SCC 201 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 975.
A workman after satisfying the test under Section 25-B need not further show that he has worked during all
the period he has been in the service of the employer for 240 days in a year. Ramakrishna Ram Nath v.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1970) 3 SCC 67.
Employer's failure to produce the attendance register to controvert the workman's claim as to the number of
days he had actually worked, will lead to an inference of the correctness of the workman's claim. H.D. Singh v.
Reserve Bank of India, (1985) 4 SCC 201 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 975.
► Conditions precedent to retrenchment.—Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen are in
pari materia with Section 6-N, U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v. Hindalco
Industries Ltd., (2014) 11 SCC 85 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 437.
166
[25-C. Right of workmen laid off for compensation.—Whenever a workman (other than a
badli workman or a casual workman) whose name is borne on the muster-rolls of an industrial
establishment and who has completed not less than one year of continuous service under an
employer is laid off, whether continuously or intermittently, he shall be paid by the employer for
all days during which he is so laid off, except for such weekly holidays as may intervene,
compensation which shall be equal to fifty per cent of the total of the basic wages and dearness
allowance that would have been payable to him had he not been so laid off:
Provided that if during any period of twelve months, a workman is so laid off for more than
forty-five days, no such compensation shall be payable in respect of any period of the lay-off
after the expiry of the first forty-five days, if there is an agreement to that effect between the
workman and the employer:
Provided further that it shall be lawful for the employer in any case falling within the
foregoing proviso to retrench the workman in accordance with the provisions contained in
Section 25-F at any time after the expiry of the first forty-five days of the lay-off and when he
does so, any compensation paid to the workman for having been laid off during the preceding
twelve months may be set off against the compensation payable for retrenchment.
Explanation.—“Badli workman” means a workman who is employed in an industrial
establishment in the place of another workman whose name is borne on the muster-rolls of the
establishment, but shall cease to be regarded as such for the purposes of this section, if he has
completed one year of continuous service in the establishment.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
MAHARASHTRA.—In Section 25-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947—
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(a) after the words “had he not been so laid off:” the following proviso shall be inserted,
namely:—
“Provided that, where the lay-off is on account of discontinuance or reduction of the supply of
power to the industrial establishment for contravention of any provisions of the Bombay
Electricity (Special Powers) Act, 1946, or of any orders or directions issued thereunder, the
compensation payable to the workman shall be equal to hundred per cent of the total of the
basic wages and dearness allowance that would have been payable to him had he not been so
laid off:”;
(b) in the existing first proviso, for the words “Provided that” the words “Provided further
that” shall be substituted;
(c) in the existing second proviso, for the words “Provided further that” the words “Provided
also that” shall be substituted.—Mah. Act 22 of 1981, S. 3 (w.e.f. 1-7-1981).
WEST BENGAL.—In Section 25-C of the principal Act, the second proviso shall be omitted.—
W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 11.
► Grant of lay-off compensation.—Principles of social justice have to be followed in awarding lay-off
compensation. Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh v. Apollo Mills, (1960) 2 SCR 231 : (1960) 2 LLJ 263.
A badli workman who has completed 240 days of continuous work is entitled to lay-off compensation. P.
Joesph v. Loyal Textile Mills, (1975) 1 LLJ 498. See also (1975) 1 LLJ 136.
25-D. Duty of an employer to maintain muster-rolls of workmen.—Not-withstanding that
workmen in any industrial establishment have been laid off, it shall be the duty of every
employer to maintain for the purposes of this Chapter a muster-roll, and to provide for the
making of entries therein by workmen who may present themselves for work at the
establishment at the appointed time during normal working hours.
25-E. Workmen not entitled to compensation in certain cases.—No compensation shall be
paid to a workman who has been laid off—
(i) if he refuses to accept any alternative employment in the same establishment from
which he has been laid off, or in any other establishment belonging to the same
employer situate in the same town or village or situate within a radius of five miles from
the establishment to which he belongs, if, in the opinion of the employer, such
alternative employment does not call for any special skill or previous experience and
can be done by the workman, provided that the wages which would normally have been
paid to the workman are offered for the alternative employment also;
(ii) if he does not present himself for work at the establishment at the appointed time
during normal working hours at least once a day;
(iii) if such laying-off is due to a strike or slowing-down of production on the part of
workmen in another part of the establishment.
STATE AMENDMENTS
WEST BENGAL.—In Section 25-E of the principal Act, after clause (ii), the following proviso
shall be inserted:—
“Provided that where lay-off extends beyond seven days at a stretch the workman may be
required to present himself only once in a week;”—W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 12.
► Alternative employment: Meaning of.—The expression “any alternative employment” in Section 25-E of
the Act must mean any other similar or like or equivalent employment to the original job. It does not mean that a
variety of jobs be offered; offer of one alternative job must be considered enough but that job must be like or
similar to the original job from which the workmen concerned were laid off. The clause “can be done by the
workman” is, however, significant in conditions of Section 25-E and means not only physical capability but also
its acceptability on the part of the workman. Offer of the job of coolie to a skilled workman cannot amount to the
offer of an alternative job. Industrial Employees' Union, Kanpur v. J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills
Company, (1956) 1 LLJ 327.
25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—No workman employed in any
industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall
be retrenched by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in
lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice;
167 [* * *]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be
equivalent to fifteen days' average pay 168 [for every completed year of continuous
service] or any part thereof in excess of six months; and
(c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government 169 [or such
authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the
Official Gazette].
STATE AMENDMENTS
HIMACHAL PRADESH.—In its application to the State of Himachal Pradesh, in Section 25-F, in
clause (b), for the words “fifteen days”, the words “sixty days” shall be substituted. [Vide
Himachal Pradesh Ordinance No. 4 of 2020, S. 3, dated 6-7-2020]
JHARKHAND.—In its application to the State of Jharkhand, clause (a) and clause (b) of Section
25-F shall be amended as follows:
(i) At the end of clause (a) of Section 25-F, the following para shall be inserted:
“Provided that in such industrial establishments where more than fifty workmen have been
employed on an average per working day in preceding twelve months, the workman has been
given forty five days notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of
notice has expired.”[Vide Jharkhand Act 22 of 2017, S. 3(i) (w.e.f. 4-12-2017)]
(ii) At the end of clause (b) of Section 25-F, the following para shall be inserted:
“Provided that in such industrial establishments where more than fifty and less than three
hundred workmen have been employed on an average per working day in preceding twelve
months, the workman shall be paid at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be
equivalent to forty five days average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any
part thereof in excess of six months.” [Vide Jharkhand Act 22 of 2017, S. 3(ii) (w.e.f. 4-12-
2017)]
MADHYA PRADESH.—In its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, in Section 25-F,—
(a) in clause (a), for the words “one month's notice”, the words “three months notice” shall
be substituted;
(b) for clause (b), the following clause shall be substituted, namely:—
“(b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be
equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any
part thereof in excess of six months, or an amount equivalent to his three months' average pay,
whichever is more; and” [Vide M.P. Act 21 of 2015, S. 11 (w.e.f. 27-11-2015)]
► Constitutional validity.—Section 25-F which directs an employer to pay retrenchment compensation is
not unconstitutional. District Labour Officer, Baroda v. Authority, Payment of Wages Act, 9 FJR 139.
► Object.—The underlying object of Section 25-F is two fold. Firstly, a retrenched employee must have
one month's time available at his disposal to search for alternate employment, and so, either he should be given
one month's notice of the proposed termination or he should be paid wages for the notice period. Secondly, the
workman must be paid retrenchment compensation at the time of retrenchment, or before, so that once having
been retrenched there should be no need for him to go to his employer demanding retrenchment compensation
and the compensation so paid is not only a reward earned for his previous services rendered to the employer
but is also a sustanance to the worker for the period which may be spent in searching for another employment.
Pramod Jha v. State of Bihar, (2003) 4 SCC 619.
► Chapter V-A.—Retrenchment of the workmen of an industry, though governed by A.P. Shops and
Establishments Act, 1966, must be in accordance with Chapter V-A. Krishna Distt. Co-op. Mktg. Society Ltd.
v. Puranchandra Rao, (1987) 4 SCC 99 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 366.
► Computation of period of 240 days.—Even if there is no ‘continuous’ and ‘uninterrupted’ service for
one year within the meaning of Section 25-F read with Section 25-B(1) because of an illegal strike by
workmen, the workmen would be entitled to the benefits of Section 25-F if even excluding the period of the
illegal strike, the number of days during which the workman actually worked under the employer was more than
240 as contemplated by Section 25-B(2)(a)(ii). Standard Motor Products of India v. A. Parthasarathy, (1985)
4 SCC 78 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 934.
The period of 240 days has to be counted from the date of joining even though it was on an ad hoc basis
and not from the date of regular recruitment. Haryana State Electricity Board v. Randhir Singh, Assistant
Lineman, (1994) 1 LLJ 1120 : (1993) 2 LLN 750 : (1993) 2 Cur LR 806 (P&H)(DB).
Sundays should be counted as actual working days for the purpose of calculating 240 days. Ram Kishan
Gurjar v. State of Rajasthan, 2006 Lab IC 56 (Raj) (DB), reversing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 565 of 1997 D/-
11-10-2001.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
For labour related matters terms “calendar year” and “block of twelve months” are interchangeable, H.S.
Rajashekara v. State Bank of Mysore, (2012) 1 SCC 285.
Onus to prove 240 days' continuous service lies on a workman, Haryana State Coop. Supply Mktg.
Federation Ltd. v. Sanjay, (2009) 14 SCC 43.
Section 25-F is applicable to ad hoc temporary employees also, if they have worked for more than 240 days
in a year continuously immediately preceding the order of termination of service. Umesh Saxena v. Labour
Court, (1993) 1 LLN 809 (All).
Section 25-F is applicable also to badli workmen continuing in service for one year. Sarabhai Chemicals v.
Subhash N. Pandya, (1984) 1 LLN 601 (Guj)(DB) : (1984) 2 LLJ 75; Mukunda v. K.S.R.T.C., (1986) 1 LLJ
470 (Kant); Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. V.C.S. Sonawane, 1993 Lab IC 1494: (1993) 1 LLJ 1162 : (1993)
67 FLR 94 (Bom).
Section 25-F is applicable even to a daily rated workman. Workmen v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi,
(1987) 2 LLN 118 (Del) : (1987) 1 LLJ 85.
Illegality of, or irregularity in, the making of appointment cannot be a ground to refuse to follow the
provisions of Section 25-F. Srirangam Coop. Urban Bank Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1996) 2 LLJ
216 : (1996) 1 LLN 647 (Mad)(DB). Following Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v.
Presiding Officer, Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682 and dissenting from Eranalloor Service Coop. Bank Ltd. v.
Labour Court, (1986) 2 LLJ 492 : (1986) 2 LLN 1132 (Ker).
In view of Section 2 (oo)(bb), termination of service in a manner provided by the contract of employment
would not attract Section 25-F. Om Prakash v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court,
(1998) 2 LLJ 542 (P&H)(DB) relying on M. Venugopal v. LIC, (1994) 2 SCC 323 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 664 :
(1994) 27 ATC 84.
Section 25-F is not applicable to a closed or dead industry. Hari Prasad Shiv Shankar Shukla v. A.D.
Divelkar, AIR 1957 SC 121 : (1957) 1 LLJ 243.
Section 25-F is not applicable in case of termination of service on expiry of contract of service for a fixed
term. Harmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen, Ambala Cantt., (2001) 5 SCC 540. Overruling Balbir Singh v.
Kurukshetra Central Coop. Bank Ltd., (1990) 1 LLJ 443 (P&H).
Section 25-F applies only in case of retrenchment. Non-renewal of contract or not giving fresh appointment
would not amount to retrenchment, Manik v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 2 Mah LJ 188.
► Non-compliance with Section 25-F — Retrenchment.—Termination of service not covered within the
excepted or excluded categories mentioned in Section 2(oo) amounts to retrenchment. Hence, non-compliance
with Section 25-F would vitiate such termination. Hari Mohan Rastogi v. Labour Court, 1984 Supp SCC 428 :
1985 SCC (L&S) 152.
Retrenchment without complying with Section 25-F would be void ab initio. Such action would entitle the
workman to a declaration for continuation in service with full back wages. Mohan Lal v. Bharat Electronics Ltd.,
(1981) 3 SCC 225 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 478. However, where 18 long years had lapsed since termination without
complying with Section 25-F, the Supreme Court awarded monetary compensation in lieu of reinstatement.
Rolston John v. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, 1995 Supp (4) SCC 549 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 142.
One month's notice of termination of service on ground of reduction in volume of business, which amounts
to retrenchment cannot be treated as notice under Section 25-F(a). In absence of compliance with pre-
requisites of Section 25-F, the retrenchment bringing about the termination would be ab initio void. Gammon
India Ltd. v. Niranjan Dass, (1984) 1 SCC 509 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 144. Hence, non compliance with Section 25
-F entitles to continuity of service with back wages and not merely to one month's pay in lieu of notice of
retrenchment and compensation. Narotam Chopra v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 97 :
1989 SCC (L&S) 565.
Compliance with Section 25-F in case of termination of service of probationer for unsuitability, which
amounts to retrenchment, is essential. Karnataka S.R.T.C. v. M. Boraiah, (1984) 1 SCC 244 : 1984 SCC
(L&S) 117.
Discharge of a workman on ground of his failure to pass confirmation test amounted to retrenchment for
which compliance with Section 25-F is necessary. Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala, (1980) 3 SCC
340 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 409.
Conditions precedent under Section 25-F are applicable to workman who has been in continuous service for
not less than one year, Zilla Parishad, Gadchiroli v. Prakash, (2009) 4 Mah LJ 628.
When there is a oral termination of the employee by authorities and no attempt is made by the employee to
get himself if reinstated by giving notice or giving application within sufficient time then it is clear that intention
of the employee was not to join duties or resume work and he would not be entitled for reinstatement on the
ground of non-compliance with provisions of Section 25-F, SDO v. Laxman, (2009) 6 Mah LJ 985.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
► Compliance with Section 25-F : Condition Precedent.—Retrenchment of workman “in continuous
service for not less than one year” under State or its establishment/undertaking without complying with
mandates of Section 25-F, illegal which cannot be sought to be justified by employer before Labour
Court/Tribunal, at stage of grant of relief to workmen, on ground that his initial appointment was in violation of
Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, when such ground was neither stated in retrenchment order, nor taken in
reference under Section 10. Although State or its establishment/undertaking can order retrenchment of
workman on such ground, but it cannot do so in contravention of Section 25-F as that would render order illegal
and may amount to unfair labour practice by employer with object of depriving workman benefits of the ID Act,
Ajaypal Singh v. Haryana Warehousing Corpn., (2015) 6 SCC 321 : (2015) 2 SCC (L&S) 279.
► Conditions precedent for retrenchment — Mandatory nature of.—There is nothing to indicate that
Section 25-F(c) was intended to be directory while the other two sub-sections of the same section were
mandatory in nature. Section 25-F(c) is a condition subsequent, but is still a mandatory condition required to
be fulfilled by the employers before the order of retrenchment of the workman is passed, Raj Kumar v. Director
of Education, (2016) 6 SCC 541.
► Retrenchment compensation.—Employer can bona fide reorganise his business resulting in
retrenchment provided he pays compensation. Parry & Co. Ltd. v. P.C. Pal, Judge of the Second Industrial
Tribunal, AIR 1970 SC 1334. Retrenchment compensation must be paid at the time of retrenchment. State
Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, (1976) 1 SCC 822 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 132. Retrenchment compensation is
linked with period of past service. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 251 : (1959) 2 LLJ
830. The payment of retrenchment compensation cannot affect the workman's claim for gratuity. Indian Hume
Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 251 : (1959) 2 LLJ 830.
If the retrenchment is proper then the workers are not entitled to compensation in addition to the
retrenchment compensation. Om Oil & Oil Seeds Exchange Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1966 SC 1657 : (1966) 2
LLJ 324.
Where the retrenchment infringed Section 25 but was otherwise bona fide and reinstatement was likely to be
destructive to the employer, the labour court can award suitable compensation in lieu of reinstatement and back
wages. Mount Mettur Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Second Addl. Labour Court, (1985) 1 LLN 801 (Mad)(DB) :
(1985) 2 LLJ 505.
To write into the order of appointment the date of termination confers no immunity from Section 25-F(b)
read with proviso to Section 25-F(a). State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money, (1976) 1 SCC 822 : 1976 SCC
(L&S) 132.
If the daily wage arrangement continued which was given for specific period and extended from time to time
for few months only then even if it is presumed that the provisions of Section 25-F were attracted, the appellant
could not have been given the relief of reinstatement with back wages but could get some compensation only,
Baljeet Singh v. State Farms of India Ltd., (2009) 120 FLR 127 (Del).
► Section 25-F Clause (c).—Section 25-F(c) is directory in nature. The requirement of notice under this
section is a condition subsequent. Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, AIR 1964 SC 1617 :
(1964) 1 LLJ 351.
The requirement of clause (c) as to the mode of service of the notice is only directory. Hence, notice sent
not by registered post but through peon book has been held to be nonetheless valid. Gurmail Singh v. State of
Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 189 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 147.
► Claim for regularisation.—Though regular appointment as per the constitutional scheme for public
employment must be the rule, there is nothing in the constitutional scheme which prohibits the Union or State
Governments or their instrumentalities from engaging persons temporarily or on daily wages in spite of the
constitutional scheme governing public employment, without following the required procedure, to meet the
needs of the situation. However, consistent with the scheme for public employment, unless the appointment is in
terms of the relevant rules and after a proper competition amongst qualified persons, the same would not confer
and right on the appointee. Therefore, a contractual appointment comes to an end at the end of the contract, an
appointment on daily wages or casual basis comes to an end when it is discontinued, and a temporary
appointment comes to an end on the expiry of its term. No employees so appointed can claim to be made
permanent on the expiry of their appointments. For, when regular vacancies in posts are to be filled up, a
regular process of recruitment or appointment has to be resorted to as per the constitutional scheme, and
cannot be done in a haphazard manner based on patronage or other considerations, State of Karnataka v.
Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753.
Though the question as regards the effect of the industrial adjudicators' powers was not directly in issue in
Umadevi (3) case, (2006) 4 SCC 1. But the foundational logic in Umadevi (3) case is based on Article 14 of
the Constitution. Though the industrial adjudicator can vary the terms of the contract of the employment, it
cannot do something which is violative of Article 14. If the case is one which is covered by the concept of
regularization, the same cannot be viewed differently only because it is before an industrial adjudicator. The
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
concept of regularization is clearly linked with Article 14 of the Constitution. However, if in a case the fact
situation is covered by what is stated in Para 45 of Umadevi (3) case the industrial adjudicator can modify the
relief, but that does not dilute the observations made by this Court in Umadevi (3) case about regularization,
U.P. Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Bijli Mazdoor Sangh, (2007) 5 SCC 755 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 258.
By virtue of Article 141 of the Constitution, the judgment of the Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka v.
Umadevi(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1, is binding on all the courts including the Supreme Court till the same is overruled
by a larger Bench. The ratio of the Constitution Bench judgment has been followed by different two-Judge
Benches for declining to entertain the claim of regularization of service made by ad hoc/temporary/daily-
wage/casual employees of for reversing the orders of the High Court granting relief to such employees.
However, in U.P. SEB v. Pooran Chandra Pandey case, (2007) 11 SCC 92, a two-Judge Bench has attempted
to dilute the Constitution Bench judgment by suggesting that the said decision cannot be applied to a case
where regularization has been sought for in pursuance of Article 14 of the Constitution and that the same is in
conflict with the judgment of the seven-Judge Bench in Maneka Gandhi case, (1978) 1 SCC 248. The
observations in Paras 16 and 18 of Pooran Chandra Pandey case, especially the observation that “Maneka
Gandhi case is a decision of a seven-Judge Bench, whereas Umadevi(3) case is a decision of a five-Judge
Bench of the Supreme Court. It is well settled that a smaller Bench decision cannot override a larger Bench
decision of the Court”, were not called for. The two-Judge Bench had no occasion to make any adverse
comment on the binding character of the Constitution Bench judgment in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi(3). It
is deemed proper to clarify that the comments and observations made by the two-Judge Bench in Pooran
Chandra Pandey should be read as obiter and the same should neither be treated as binding by the High
Courts, tribunals and other judicial foras nor they should be relied upon or made basis for bypassing the
principles laid down by the Constitution Bench in State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3). Official Liquidator v.
Dayanand, (2008) 10 SCC 1.
Setting aside of illegal termination as violative of Section 25-F does not necessarily follow that workman is
entitled to status of permanency and claim of regular pay scales and other benefits based on permanency. The
word “regular” and “regularisation” do not connote “permanence”, Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Ashok
Ranghba Ambre, (2008) 2 SCC 717 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 541.
► Termination and non-renewal of the contract.—Termination of service of workman as a result of non-
renewal of contract of employment on its expiry is not retrenchment, Zilla Parishad, Jalgaon v. Abdul Sami A.
Sayeed, (2010) 2 Mah LJ 53.
Any termination of services of an employee amounts to retrenchment, unless the termination is by way of
punishment, or on account of continued ill health of the workman or by way of voluntary retirement or on
account of retirement on the workman attaining the age of superannuation or as a result of non-renewal of the
contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned, Raigad Zila Parishad v. Gajanan
H. Patil, (2009) 1 Mah LJ 792.
► Termination due to unauthorised absence.—Termination of service for unauthorised absence from
duty amounts to retrenchment and therefore, the service of even a casual or seasonal workman who rendered
continuous service for one year or more cannot be terminated on such ground without complying with the
requirements of Section 25-A. L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Rly., (1982) 1 SCC 645 :
1982 SCC (L&S) 124.
► Relief of reinstatement.—Relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic even if
termination of employee is found to be illegal or in contravention of the prescribed procedure and monetary
compensation in cases of such nature may be appropriate, Telegraph Deptt. v. Santosh Kumar Seal, (2010) 6
SCC 773.
► Preference to waiting list candidate.—When the management chooses to employ a daily wager,
whenever a vacancy arises, it would be obligatory on the part of the management to give preference and
priority to a person in the waiting list unless there is something to show that he was not entitled to continue,
Chaganlal v. Parmatma Ek Sewak Nagrik Sahakari Bank Ltd., (2009) 6 Mah LJ 463.
► Termination of service without compliance.—Ordinary principle of grant of reinstatement with full back
wages, when termination is found illegal is not to be applied mechanically in all cases and may be applied
where services of a regular/permanent workman are termination illegally and/or mala fide and/or by way of
victimisation, unfair labour practice, etc. However, where services of daily-wager are terminated illegally for
some procedural defect he should be granted monetary compensation and not reinstatement with back wages
since it is always open to management to terminate services of that employee by paying him retrenchment
compensation because he has no right to seek regulations. Thus, granting relief of reinstatement, that too after
long gap, would serve no purpose, BSNL v. Bhurumal, (2014) 7 SCC 177 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 373.
► Violation of Section 25-F — Relief.—Relief by way of reinstatement with back wages is not automatic
and compensation instead of reinstatement would meet ends of justice, Lucknow University v. Akhilesh Kumar
Khare, (2016) 1 SCC 521.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
► Notice of retrenchment.—Notice of retrenchment to be sent to appropriate Government or notified
authority, is only directory and not mandatory, Manju Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 628.
► Impleadment of holding/parent company in ongoing industrial dispute.—Whenever an application is
filed for impleadment of a third party, who is not a party to the reference under Industrial Disputes Act or any
other proceedings pending before the court, what is required to be considered is whether such party is either
necessary or proper party to decide the lis and it all depends on facts of each case; allegations made and
nature of adjudication proceedings etc. Further, test to be applied while considering application filed under
Order 1 Rule 10 CPC is: (i) there must be a right to some relief against such party in respect of controversies
involved in proceedings; (ii) no effective decree can be passed in its absence, Globe Ground (India)
Employees Union v. Lufthansa German Airlines, (2019) 15 SCC 273.
170 [25-FF. Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings.—Where the
ownership or management of an undertaking is transferred, whether by agreement or by
operation of law, from the employer in relation to that undertaking to a new employer, every
workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking
immediately before such transfer shall be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance
with the provisions of Section 25-F, as if the workman had been retrenched:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a workman in any case where there has
been a change of employers by reason of the transfer, if—
(a) the service of the workman has not been interrupted by such transfer;
(b) the terms and conditions of service applicable to the workman after such transfer are
not in any way less favourable to the workman than those applicable to him
immediately before the transfer; and
(c) the new employer is, under the terms of such transfer or otherwise, legally liable to
pay to the workman, in the event of his retrenchment, compensation on the basis that
his service has been continuous and has not been interrupted by the transfer.
► Applicability.—Section 25-FF does not apply to transfer of a part of undertaking. It, however, applies to
transfer of one of the several separate businesses run by an undertaking. R.S. Madhoram & Sons v.
Workmen, AIR 1964 SC 645 : (1964) 1 LLJ 366.
► Claim for compensation.—Under this section compensation can be claimed against the previous
employer and not against the new employer, after transfer of business or undertaking. Madras State Electricity
Board Union v. South Arcot Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., (1966) 1 LLJ 380.
Purchaser of equity of redemption, held on facts, is not successor-in-interest and not liable to pay
compensation. Workmen v. Brahmputra Tea Estate, AIR 1968 SC 514 : (1969) 2 LLJ 685.
On transfer of the undertaking the retrenched employees are normally entitled to compensation only and not
to re-employment with continuity in service with the successor undertaking. But in certain exceptional
circumstances such as where both the transferor and the transferee are State or State instrumentalities, it is
open to the court to review whether the terms and conditions of the transfer ensure fairness in action and non-
arbitrariness and if not, to issue directions for granting continuity in service and consequential retiral benefits in
appropriate cases. Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab, (1991) 1 SCC 189 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 147.
Since Section 25-FF does not contain any conditions precedent and transfer and closure can validly take
place without notice or payment of a month's wages in lieu thereof or payment of compensation, Section 25-FF
can be said to have provided no time within which such compensation is to be paid. Payment of Wages
Inspector v. Surajmal Mehta, AIR 1969 SC 590 : (1969) 1 LLJ 762.
► Validity of transfer of ownership.—Consent of the workmen is not necessary for the validity of transfer
of ownership or management of an undertaking within the meaning of Section 25-FF. Spencer Group Aeriated
Water Factory Employees' Union v. Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, (1997) 1 LLJ 362 (Mad)(DB).
The common law rule that an employee cannot be transferred without consent, applies in master-servant
relationship and not to statutory transfers. There is nothing in the wording of Section 25-FF even remotely to
suggest that consent is a pre-requisite for transfer. The underlying purpose of Section 25-FF is to establish a
continuity of service and to secure benefits otherwise not available to a workman if a break in service to another
employer was accepted, Mettur Beardsell Ltd. v. Workmen, (2006) 9 SCC 488 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1858.
171 [25-FFA. Sixty days' notice to be given of intention to close down any undertaking.—(1)
An employer who intends to close down an undertaking shall serve, at least sixty days before
the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, a notice, in the prescribed
manner, on the appropriate Government stating clearly the reasons for the intended closure of
the undertaking:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to—
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(a) an undertaking in which—
(i) less than fifty workmen are employed, or
(ii) less than fifty workmen were employed on an average per working day in the
preceding twelve months,
(b) an undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or
for other construction work of project.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the appropriate Government
may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the
undertaking or death of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that
provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for such period as
may be specified in the order.]
► Applicability.—Section 25-FFA would not apply to the closure of a premises and factory as a result of
acquisition as it did not take place in pursuance of an intention of employer to close down the undertaking,
Agarwal Traders v. Ankush M. Bhabal, (2009) 1 Mah LJ 425.
► Notice.—Notice under Section 25-FFA is not a condition precedent for closure and non-compliance
therewith does not render the closure illegal and non-est from its very commencement. Poonvasi v. Crown Silk
Weaving Industries, (1994) 1 Cur LR 1047 : (1994) 69 FLR 341 : (1994) 2 LLN 126 (Bom).
► Section 25-FFA or Section 25-O.—Where more than one undertakings constitute a single industrial
establishment and employ a total of not less than 100 workmen, the closure of one of them, even if having less
than 100 workmen, would attract Section 25-O instead of Section 25-FFA. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading
Employees Union v. Management, (1986) 2 SCC 624 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 303.
25-FFF. Compensation to workmen in case of closing down of undertakings.—(1) Where an
undertaking is closed down for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such
closure shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), be entitled to notice and
compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-F, as if the workman had been
retrenched:
Provided that where the undertaking is closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances
beyond the control of the employer, the compensation to be paid to the workman under clause
(b) of Section 25-F shall not exceed his average pay for three months.
172
[Explanation.—An undertaking which is closed down by reason merely of—
(i) financial difficulties (including financial losses); or
(ii) accumulation of undisposed of stocks; or
(iii) the expiry of the period of the lease or licence granted to it; or
(iv) in a case where the undertaking is engaged in mining operations, exhaustion of the
minerals in the area in which such operations are carried on;
shall not be deemed to be closed down on account of unavoidable circumstances beyond the
control of the employer within the meaning of the proviso to this sub-section.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDHRA PRADESH.—In Section 25-FFF of the principal Act, in sub-section (1)—
(a) before the existing proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted, namely:—
“Provided that the prior payment of compensation to the workman shall be a condition
precedent to the closure of any undertaking;”
(b) in the existing proviso for the words “provided that” the words “provided further that”
shall be substituted.—Vide A.P. Act 32 of 1987.
WEST BENGAL.—In Section 25-FFF of the principal Act, in sub-section (1),—
(1) before the existing proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted:—
“Provided that prior payment of compensation to the workmen shall be a condition precedent to
the closure of any undertaking;”,
(2) in the existing proviso, for the words “Provided that” the words “Provided further that”
shall be substituted—W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 13.
173 [(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where an undertaking
engaged in mining operations is closed down by reason merely of exhaustion of the minerals in
the area in which such operations are carried on, no workman referred to in that sub-section
shall be entitled to any notice or compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
F, if—
(a) the employer provides the workman with alternative employment with effect from the
date of closure at the same remuneration as he was entitled to receive, and on the
same terms and conditions of service as were applicable to him, immediately before the
closure;
(b) the service of the workman has not been interrupted by such alternative employment;
and
(c) the employer is, under the terms of such alternative employment or otherwise, legally
liable to pay to the workman, in the event of his retrenchment, compensation on the
basis that his service has been continuous and has not been interrupted by such
alternative employment.
(1-B) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (1-A), the expressions “minerals” and
“mining operations” shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in clauses (a) and
(d) of Section 3 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (67 of
1957).]
(2) Where any undertaking set up for the construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals,
dams or other construction work is closed down on account of the completion of the work within
two years from the date on which the undertaking had been set up, no workman employed
therein shall be entitled to any compensation under clause (b) of Section 25-F, but if the
construction work is not so completed within two years, he shall be entitled to notice and
compensation under that section for every 174 [completed year of continuous service] or any part
thereof in excess of six months.]
► Applicability.—Section 25-FFF is applicable in a case falling under the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act as
there is no such provision in that Act. Workmen v. Straw Board Mfg. Co., (1974) 4 SCC 681 : 1974 SCC
(L&S) 406.
Closure of a unit or part of the establishment of the employer having no functional integrity with the
remaining units attracts Section 25-FFF irrespective of the fact that the latter units were not closed and resultant
automatic termination of the services of the workman employed in the unit so closed would entitle him only to
the relief of compensation calculated in accordance with Section 25-F. The automatic termination in such a
case does not amount to retrenchment requiring compliance with Section 25-F, District Red Cross Society v.
Babita Arora, (2007) 7 SCC 366 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 631.
► Validity.—Section 25-FFF does not impose unreasonable restrictions and is not violative of Article 19(1)
(g). Hatisingh Mfg. Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 923 : (1960) 2 LLJ 1.
Non-compliance with Section 25-FFF does not render the closure illegal. N. Narasimhulu v. Commr. of
Industries, (1987) 2 LLN 243 (AP) : (1987) 2 LLJ 482.
► Expression “unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer”, meaning.—The
expression “unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer”, comprehends a situation of
continuous industrial strife, strikes, complete lawlessness, violence and negligence by workmen over a course
of years resulting in heavy losses. Rameshwar Dass v. State of Haryana, 1987 Supp SCC 711 : 1988 SCC
(L&S) 355.
► Closure of an undertaking, meaning.—Closure implies closing of industrial activity as a consequence
of which workmen are rendered jobless. The closure cannot be said to be always permanent and irrevocable.
Change of circumstances may encourage an employer to revive the industrial activity which was really intended
to be closed. When unfair labour practice is alleged by the workmen on ground of resorting to lock-out, the true
test for the industrial court would be to determine whether, keeping in view all the relevant circumstances at the
time of closure, the closure was a device or pretence to terminate services of workmen or whether it was bona
fide and for reasons beyond the control of the employer. General Labour Union v. B.V. Chavan, (1985) 1 SCC
312.
Closure of an undertaking would not mean closure of entire business or industry. Hindustan Steel Ltd. v.
Workmen, (1973) 3 SCC 564 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 195.
Even in case of legitimate closure, the question of compensation has to be decided and the Tribunal must
consider whether proviso to Section 25-FFF(1) is applicable. Workmen v. Straw Board Mfg. Co. Ltd., 1974
SCC (L&S) 406.
Closure of an undertaking does not postulate closure of the branches of business. Isha Steel Treatment v.
Assn. of Engg. Workers, (1987) 2 SCC 203 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 91.
If an employer has decided to close down a particular unit he is entitled to close the same by stages.
Workmen v. Straw Board Mfg. Co., (1974) 4 SCC 681 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 406.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Word ‘undertaking’ covers even part of business of the employer. Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Workmen, (1973)
3 SCC 564 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 195.
► Retrenchment compensation.—On termination being found illegal the retrenchment compensation
received by the workmen was directed to be adjusted against their back wages but was not allowed to be
deducted from future wages. S.G. Chemicals and Employees' Union v. Management, (1986) 2 SCC 624 :
1986 SCC (L&S) 303.
► Entitlement to compensation.—Under Section 25-FFF(1), the workman is only entitled to notice and
compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-F as if he had been retrenched. Hindustan
Steel Ltd. v. Workmen, (1973) 3 SCC 564 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 195.
Question of compensation under Section 25-FFF can be referred under Section 10. Question of
applicability of proviso to Section 25-FFF has to be gone into carefully once closure is established. Workmen
v. Straw Board Mfg. Co., (1974) 4 SCC 681 : 1974 SCC (L&S) 406.
A closure of business as a result of a winding up order cannot be equated with retrenchment and does not
attract compensation which can be described as “retrenchment compensation”. But the workmen would be
entitled to benefit under Section 25-FFF and it will be a preferential claim under Section 530 of the Companies
Act, Ram Hari De v. Official Lquidator, Calcutta, 69 CWN 317 (HC). However, according to the Madras High
Court the closure of an undertaking as a result of an order of winding up at the instance of a creditor on the
ground of inability to pay the debts does not take away the right of the workman to claim full compensation
under Section 25-FFF and the proviso would not be attracted to such cases. A Shammugham v. Official
Liquidator, High Court, (1992) 2 LLJ 221 : (1992) 2 Cur LR 745 (Mad). Compensation need not be paid
simultaneously with notice. Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Workmen, (1973) 3 SCC 564 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 195.
► Motive behind closure.—A closure of transport undertaking on account of indiscipline on part of
employees is a bona fide closure. In such a case the Industrial Tribunal cannot examine the motive behind
closure. Savani Transport Private Ltd. v. Savani Transport Employees' Association, Ernakulam, 1994 Lab IC
1520 : (1994) 1 LLN 957 : (1994) 69 FLR 476 (Ker).
25-G. Procedure for retrenchment.—Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who
is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in
that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in
this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be
employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other
workman.
► Nature and applicability.—Section 25-G is not imperative in nature, Jaipur Development Authority v.
Ramsahai, (2006) 11 SCC 684.
If nature of termination of services does not come within purview of definition of ‘retrenchment’ in Section 2
(oo), question of applicability of Section 25-G does not arise, Haryana State Agricultural Marketing Board v.
Subhash Chand, (2006) 2 SCC 794 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 455.
Sections 25-G and 25-H have no application in a case where Section 2(oo)(bb) is attracted, Bhogpur Coop.
Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Harmesh Kumar, (2006) 13 SCC 28.
Where special department closed and its work divided among other employees, Section 25-G is not
attracted. Hotel Ambassador v. Workmen, (1963) 2 LLJ 87 (SC).
In case of reduction in clerical strength in consequence of closure of third shift, held, the provisions of
Section 25-G were not contravened. Amit Banaspati Co. v. S. Tahir Bilgrami, (1971) 2 SCC 633.
The terms of Section 25-G can be applicable only when there is one code governing the scales of pay
which is ordinarily possible when establishment is functioning at a given place. Indian Cable Co. v. Workmen,
(1962) 1 LLJ 409.
► Principle of last come first go.—Departure from the ‘last come first go’ rule is permissible on valid and
justifiable grounds. Burden is on the management to prove existence of such grounds. Gradewise classification
of workmen will not create different categories so as to exclude operation of Section 25-G in case of
retrenchment of some of the workmen falling under a different grade. Workmen v. Jorhaut Tea Co. Ltd.,
(1980) 3 SCC 406 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 427.
The provisions of Section 25-G are directory but a departure from the principle of last come first go can be
made only for sufficient grounds. G. M., Northern Rly., New Delhi v. Judge, Central Industrial Tribunal, (1992)
1 Lab IC 678 : (1992) 65 FLR 501 : (1992) 2 Cur LR 459 (Raj).
The principle of ‘last come first go’ is not applicable to termination of the services of a temporary employee
on the assessment of his work and suitability in accordance with terms and conditions of his service. State of
U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, (1991) 1 SCC 691 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 587.
Where the management bona fide retains staff possessing special aptitude in the interests of the business, it
cannot be assumed to have acted unfairly merely because the rule ‘first come last go’ is not observed. Om Oil
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
& Oil Seed Exchange Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1966 SC 1657 : (1966) 2 LLJ 324.
The principle of ‘last come first go’ is not applicable in case of loss of confidence but in such a case
reasons must be recorded and the provisions of rules must be complied with. Bhanwarlal v. Raj. SRTC, (1985)
1 LLN 391 (Raj)(FB) : 1984 Lab IC 1794.
Applicability of the principle of “last come first go” contained in Section 25-G is not confined only to the
workmen who were in continuous service for one year or above. Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam, (1996) 5
SCC 419 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1273.
25-H. Re-employment of retrenched workmen.—Where any workmen are retrenched and the
employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be
prescribed, give an opportunity 175 [to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer
themselves for re-employment, and such retrenched workmen] who offer themselves for re-
employment shall have preference over other persons.
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDHRA PRADESH.—Section 25-H of the principal Act, shall be renumbered as sub-section (1)
of that section and after sub-section (1) as so numbered, the following sub-section shall be
“(2) Where a closed unit is re-opened the workmen on the roll of the unit immediately
before its closure shall be given an opportunity to offer themselves for re-employment in the
manner provided in sub-section (1).”—Vide A.P. Act 32 of 1987.
WEST BENGAL.—Section 25-H of the principal Act shall be re-numbered as sub-section (1) of
that Section and after sub-section (1), as so renumbered, the following sub-section shall be
inserted:—
“(2) Where a closed unit is reopened the workmen on the roll of the unit immediately
before its closure shall be given an opportunity to offer themselves for re-employment in the
manner provided in sub-section (1).”—W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 14.
SECTION 25-HH
ANDHRA PRADESH.—After Section 25-H of the principal Act, the following section shall be
“25-HH. Condition of reinstatement in service by an award of Labour Court or Tribunal.—
Where a workman is reinstated in service by an award of a Labour Court or Tribunal, the
workman shall be deemed to be in service from the date specified in the award whether or
not the workman was earlier reinstated by the employer and his wages shall be recovered in
the manner provided in Section 33-C.”—Vide A.P. Act 32 of 1987.
WEST BENGAL.—After Section 25-H of the principal Act, the following section shall be
inserted:—
“25-HH. Condition of reinstatement of workman by an award of a Labour Court or Tribunal.
—Where a workman is reinstated in service by an award of a Labour Court or Tribunal, the
workman shall be deemed to be in service from the date specified in the award whether or
not the workman was earlier reinstated by the employer and his wages shall be recovered in
the manner provided in Section 33-C.”—W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 15.
► Applicability.—Section 25-H is applicable to all retrenched workmen and not only to those covered by
Section 25-F read with Section 25-B. Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam, (1996) 5 SCC 419 : 1996 SCC
(L&S) 1273.
► Retrospective application.—Section 25-H cannot be applied retrospectively. Rai Sahib Ramdayal
Ghasiram Oil Mills v. Labour Appellate Tribunal, AIR 1964 SC 567 : (1963) 2 LLJ 65.
► Entitlement for re-employment.—Section 25-H entitles a retrenched employee only to a preferential
treatment for re-employment and not to reinstatement with back wages. Jaswinder Singh Passi v. Registrar,
Coop. Societies, (1992) 2 LLJ 177 : 1992 Lab IC 549 : (1992) 2 Cur LR 707 (P&H).
► Bald allegation.—A bald allegation, in absence of any specific allegation will not allow the Industrial
Tribunal to hold that there has been a violation of provision of Section 25-H, State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v.
Anurag Sharma, (2009) 123 FLR 700 (All).
► Termination of service after expiry of contract.—Termination of service after expiry of contract does
not amount to retrenchment and consequently workmen cannot be reinstated under Section 25-H, Bhavnagar
Municipal Corpn. v. Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri, (2013) 14 SCC 456 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 1.
► Applicability.—To attract Section 25-H, it must be proved by workman that he was “retrenched
employee”, his ex-employer had decided to fill up vacancies and hence, he was entitled to claim preference
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
against other applicants, Barara Coop. Mktg.-Cum-Processing Society Ltd. v. Pratap Singh, (2019) 2 SCC
743.
25-I. Recovery of moneys due from employers under this Chapter.—[Rep. by the Industrial
Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 (36 of 1956), Section 19 (w.e.f.
10-3-1957).]
25-J. Effect of laws inconsistent with this Chapter.—(1) The provisions of this Chapter shall
have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law
including standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946
(20 of 1946):
176
[Provided that where under the provisions of any other Act or rules, orders or notification
issued thereunder or under any standing orders or under any award, contract of service or
otherwise, a workman is entitled to benefits in respect of any matter which are more favourable
to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act, the workman shall continue to
be entitled to the more favourable benefits in respect of that matter, notwithstanding that he
receives benefits in respect of other matters under this Act.]
(2) For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that nothing contained in this Chapter
shall be deemed to affect the provisions of any other law for the time being in force in any State
in so far as that law provides for the settlement of industrial disputes, but the rights and
liabilities of employers and workmen in so far as they relate to lay-off and retrenchment shall be
determined in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.]
► Applicability.—Section 25-J is not applicable to a standing order providing for a maximum period of
service or a retirement age. Harmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen, Ambala Cantt., (2001) 5 SCC 540.
► Chapter V-A.—The provisions of Chapter V-A have no overriding effect on other provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act itself. P. Virudhachalam v. Management of Lotus Mills, (1998) 1 SCC 650 : 1998 SCC
(L&S) 342.
► Lay-off compensation.—By virtue of Section 25-J the lay-off compensation provided by the statute
cannot be refused by reference to the standing orders. R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills v. Labour Court, (1972)
1 SCC 154.
177
[Chapter V-B
SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO LAY-OFF, RETRENCHMENT AND CLOSURE IN CERTAIN
ESTABLISHMENTS
25-K. Application of Chapter V-B.—(1) The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to an
industrial establishment (not being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is
performed only intermittently) in which not less than 178 [one] hundred workmen were employed
on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months.
Government thereon shall be final.
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDHRA PRADESH.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, in Section 25-K, the
following shall be substituted, namely—
“25-K. Application of Chapter V-B.—(1) The provisions of this chapter shall apply to an
industrial establishment (not being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work
is performed only intermittently) in which not less than three hundred workmen were
employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), the State Government may, if
satisfied that maintenance of industrial peace or prevention of victimization of workmen so
requires, by notification in the Official Gazette apply the provisions of this chapter to an
is performed only intermittently) in which such number of workmen which may be less than
three hundred but not less than one hundred, as may be specified in the notification, were
whether work is performed therein only intermittently, the decision of the State Government
thereon shall be final.”. [Vide A.P. Act 12 of 2015, S. 3 (w.e.f. 22-7-2015)]
ASSAM.—In its application to the State of Assam, in Section 25-K, for the words “one
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
hundred” appearing in between the words “than” and “workmen”, the words “three hundred”
shall he substituted. [Vide: Assam Act 22 of 2018, S. 2, dt. 2-8-2018].
BIHAR.—In its application to the State of Bihar, in Section 25-K, for the words “one
hundred”, the words “three hundred” shall be substituted. [Vide Bihar Ordinance No. 7 of 2020,
S. 2, dated 2-7-2020]
GUJARAT.—In its application to the State of Gujarat, in Section 25-K,—
(i) in sub-section (1), for the words “one hundred”, the words “three hundred” shall be
substituted;
(ii) after sub-section (1), the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely:—
“(1-A) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), the State Government
may, if satisfied that the maintenance of industrial peace or prevention of victimization of
workmen so requires, by notification in the Official Gazette, apply the provision of this
Chapter to an industrial establishment (not being an establishment of a seasonal character
or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which such number of workmen
which may be less than three hundred but not less than one hundred, as may be specified
in the notification, were employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve
months.” [Vide Gujarat Ordinance No. 5 of 2020, S. 3, dated 3-7-2020]
HIMACHAL PRADESH.—In its application to the State of Himachal Pradesh, in Section 25-K, for
the words “one hundred”, the words “two hundred” shall be substituted. [Vide Himachal
Pradesh Ordinance No. 4 of 2020, S. 4, dated 6-7-2020]
JHARKHAND.—In its application to the State of Jharkhand, for the existing Section 25-K, the
following shall be substituted, namely:—
“25-K. Application of Chapter V-B.—(1) The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to an
satisfied that maintenance of industrial peace or prevention of victimization of workmen so
requires by notification in the Official Gazette apply the provisions of this Chapter to an
three hundred but not less than one hundred as may be specified in the notification were
whether work is performed, therein only intermittently the decision of the appropriate
Government thereon shall be final.” [Vide Jharkhand Act 22 of 2017, S. 4 (w.e.f. 4-12-2017)]
KARNATAKA.—(1) In its application to the State of Karnataka, in Section 25-K, after sub-
section (1), the following sub-section shall be inserted:
“(1-A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the State Government may,
from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, apply the provisions of Section 25-O
and Section 25-R in so far as they relate to contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section
(2) of Section 25-O, also to an industrial establishment of a seasonal character or in which
work is performed only intermittently in which not less than one hundred workmen were
employed on an average per working day for the preceding twelve months.” [Vide Karnataka
Act 5 of 1988, S. 5 (w.e.f. 7-4-1988)]
(2) In its application to the State of Karnataka, in Section 25-K,—
(i) in sub-section (1), for the words “one hundred”, the words “three hundred”, shall be
substituted; and
(ii) in sub-section (1-A), for the words “one hundred”, the words “three hundred”, shall be
substituted. [Vide Karnataka Ordinance No. 15 of 2020, S. 2, dated 31-7-2020]
MADHYA PRADESH.—In its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, in Section 25-K, in sub
-section (1), for the words “one hundred”, the words “three hundred” shall be substituted. [Vide
M.P. Act 21 of 2015, S. 11 (w.e.f. 27-11-2015)]
MAHARASHTRA.—In its application to the State of Maharashtra, in Section 25-K, after sub-
section (1), the following sub-section shall be inserted, namely:—
“(1-A) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), the appropriate Government
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
may, from time to time, by notification in the Official Gazette, apply the provisions of Section
25-O and Section 25-R in so far as it relates to contravention of sub-section (1) or (2) of
Section 25-O, also to an industrial establishment (not being an establishment of a seasonal
character or in which work is performed only intermittently) in which such number of
workmen, which may be less than three hundred but not less than one hundred, as may be
specified in the notification, were employed on an average per working day for the preceding
twelve months.”—Maharashtra Act 3 of 1982, Section 2 (w.e.f. 27-10-1981).
ORISSA.—In Section 25-K, in sub-section (1), for the words “three hundred”, the words “one
hundred” shall be substituted.—Orissa Act 6 of 1983, Section 2 (w.e.f. 21-2-1983).
PUNJAB.—In its application to the State of Punjab, for Section 25-K, the following section
shall be substituted, namely:—
“25-K. (1) The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to an industrial establishment (not
being an establishment of a seasonal character or in which work is performed only
intermittently) in which not less than three hundred workmen were employed on an average
per working day for the preceding twelve months.
satisfied that maintenance of industrial peace or prevention of victimisation of workmen so
requires, by notification in the Official Gazette apply the provisions of this Chapter to an
is performed only intermittently) in which less than three hundred workmen but not less than
one hundred workmen, as may be specified in the notification, were employed on an average
per working day for the preceding twelve months.
Government thereon shall be final.” [Vide Industrial Disputes (Punjab Amendment)
Ordinance, 2020, S. 3, dated 11-8-2020 (w.e.f. 11-8-2020)]
RAJASTHAN.—In its application to the State of Rajasthan, for the existing Section 25-K, the
following shall be substituted, namely—
“25-K. Application of Chapter V-B.—(1) The provision of this Chapter shall apply to an
satisfied that maintenance of industrial peace or prevention of victimisation of workmen so
requires, by notification in the Official Gazette apply the provisions of this Chapter to an
three hundred but not less than one hundred, as may be specified in the notification, were
Government thereon shall be final.” [Vide Rajasthan Act 21 of 2014, S. 7 (w.e.f. 12-11-
2014)]
WEST BENGAL.—In sub-section (1) of Section 25-K of the principal Act, for the words “three
hundred”, the word “fifty” shall be substituted.—W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 16.
► Interference by High Court.—The finality given by sub-section (2) to the appropriate Government's
decision does not bar the High Court from striking down the same on the grounds of malafides, perversity or
being based on irrelevant facts. Special Officer and Jt. Registrar, Cooperative Societies v. Workmen
Vanivilas Coop. Sugar Factory, (1996) 2 LLJ 423 : (1996) 1 Cur LR 1153 : 1996 Lab IC 2531 : (1996) 3 LLN
99 (Kant)(DB).
► Benefit under Section 25-K.—This section is applicable if unit has more than 100 workers. Findings of
High Court regarding disputes as to whether unit has more than 100 workmen, status of employee, whether
workman or supervisor, did not warrant interference under Article 136 of the Constitution as it involved
questions of fact, National Kamgar Union v. Kran Rader (P) Ltd., (2018) 1 SCC 784.
25-L. Definitions.—For the purposes of this Chapter,—
(a) ‘industrial establishment’ means—
(i) a factory as defined in clause (m) of Section 2 of the Factories Act, 1948 (63 of
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
1948);
(ii) a mine as defined in clause (j) of sub-section (1) of Section 2 of the Mines Act,
1952 (35 of 1952); or
(iii) a plantation as defined in clause (f) of Section 2 of the Plantations Labour Act, 1951
(69 of 1951);
(b) notwithstanding anything contained in sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of Section 2,—
(i) in relation to any company in which not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up
share capital is held by the Central Government, or
(ii) in relation to any corporation [not being a corporation referred to in sub-clause (i) of
clause (a) of Section 2] established by or under any law made by Parliament,
the Central Government shall be the appropriate Government.
STATE AMENDMENTS
RAJASTHAN.—In clause (b) of Section 25-L for the expression “the Central Government shall
be the appropriate Government”, the expression “the State Government shall have no powers
under this Chapter” shall be substituted.—Raj. Act 8 of 1984, Section 3 (w.e.f. 14-4-1984).
25-M. Prohibition of lay-off.—(1) No workman (other than a badli workman or a casual
workman) whose name is borne on the muster-rolls of an industrial establishment to which this
Chapter applies shall be laid off by his employer except 179 [with the prior permission of the
appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by that Government by
notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this section referred to as the specified
authority), obtained on an application made in this behalf, unless such lay-off is due to shortage
of power or to natural calamity, and in the case of a mine, such lay-off is due also to fire, flood,
excess of inflammable gas or explosion].
180 [(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in
the prescribed manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended lay-off and a copy of such
application shall also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed
manner.
(3) Where the workmen (other than badli workmen or casual workmen) of an industrial
establishment, being a mine, have been laid off under sub-section (1) for reasons of fire, flood
or excess of inflammable gas or explosion, the employer, in relation to such establishment,
shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of commencement of such lay-off, apply, in
the prescribed manner, to the appropriate Government or the specified authority for permission
to continue the lay-off.
(4) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) has been
made, the appropriate Government or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it
thinks fit and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the
workmen concerned and the persons interested in such lay-off, may, having regard to the
genuineness and adequacy of the reasons for such lay-off, the interests of the workmen and all
other relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to
grant such permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the
workmen.
(5) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) has been
made and the appropriate Government or the specified authority does not communicate the
order granting or refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from
the date on which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have
been granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days.
(6) An order of the appropriate Government or the specified authority granting or refusing to
grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (7), be final and binding on all
the parties concerned and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order.
(7) The appropriate Government or the specified authority may, either on its own motion or
on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing
to grant permission under sub-section (4) or refer the matter or, as the case may be, cause it to
be referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication:
Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it shall
pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference.
(8) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where no
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
application for permission under sub-section (3) is made within the period specified therein, or
where the permission for any lay-off has been refused, such lay-off shall be deemed to be illegal
from the date on which the workmen had been laid off and the workmen shall be entitled to all
the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if they had not been laid off.
(9) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the
appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as
accident in the establishment or death of the employer or the like, it is necessary so to do, by
order, direct that the provisions of sub-section (1), or, as the case may be, sub-section (3) shall
not apply in relation to such establishment for such period as may be specified in the order.]
181 [(10)] The provisions of Section 25-C (other than the second proviso thereto) shall apply
to cases of lay-off referred to in this section.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, a workman shall not be deemed to be laid off
by an employer if such employer offers any alternative employment (which in the opinion of the
employer does not call for any special skill or previous experience and can be done by the
workman) in the same establishment from which he has been laid off or in any other
establishment belonging to the same employer, situate in the same town or village, or situate
within such distance from the establishment to which he belongs that the transfer will not
involve undue hardship to the workman having regard to the facts and circumstances of his
case, provided that the wages which would normally have been paid to the workman are offered
for the alternative appointment also.
STATE AMENDMENTS
RAJASTHAN.—In Section 25-M of the principal Act—
(a) in sub-section (1), between the expression “this Chapter applies” and the expression
“shall be laid off”, the expression “or is applied under sub-section (1-A) of Section 25-K”
shall be inserted and for the expression “appropriate Government”, the expression “State
Government” shall be substituted;
(b) in sub-section (2), for the expression “(Amendment) Act, 1976”, the expression
“(Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1984” shall be substituted;
(c) for the existing sub-section (3), the following sub-sections shall be substituted, namely:
—
“(3) In the case of every application for permission under sub-section (1) or sub-section
(2), the employer shall state clearly the reasons due to which he intends to lay-off or
continue the lay-off of a workman and a copy of such application shall be served on the
workman intended to be laid off or continued to be laid off by registered post with
acknowledgement due.
(4) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2) the authority to whom the application has been made, after making such
enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the
employer and the workman, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of
the reasons stated by the employer, the terms of contract of service and the standing
orders governing the establishment, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing
grant or refuse to grant such permission and such order shall be communicated to the
employer and the workman.”;
(d) the existing sub-section (4) shall be re-numbered as sub-section (5) thereof;
(e) after sub-section (5) as so re-numbered, the following sub-sections shall be inserted
namely:—
“(6) An order of the authority specified under sub-section (1) granting or refusing to grant
permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (7), be final and binding on
both the parties.
(7) The authority specified under sub-section (1) may, either of its own motion or on the
application made by the employer or the workman, review its order granting or refusing
to grant permission under sub-section (4) or refer the matter to the Labour Court
having jurisdiction for adjudication:
Provided that where a reference has been made to a Labour Court under this sub-section, it
shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference”; and
(f) the existing sub-sections (5) and (6) shall be renumbered as sub-sections (8) and (9)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
thereof.—Raj Act 8 of 1984, S. 4 (w.e.f. 14-4-1984).
WEST BENGAL.—In sub-section (4) of Section 25-M (prior to its amendment by Act 49 of
1984) of the principal Act, for the words “two months”, the words “three months” were
substituted.—W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 17.
► Validity of restriction.—The restriction imposed by Section 25-M on the right under Article 19(1)(g) of
large industrial establishments is not violative of Articles 19(1)(g) and 14 of the Constitution of India. Papnasam
Labour Union v. Madura Coats Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 501 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 339. See also Ashok Kumar Jain v.
State of Bihar, (1995) 1 SCC 516 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 353.
► Permission for lay-off.—The grant of permission for lay-off is vitiated by unreasonable delay in
commencement of lay-off in pursuance of such permission. R.M.E.K. Sangh v. Asstt. Lab. Commr., (1984) 2
LLN 697 (Bom)(DB) : 1984 Lab IC 324 : (1984) 2 LLJ 242.
182 [25-N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen.—(1) No workman employed in
any industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies, who has been in continuous service
for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until,—
(a) the workman has been given three months' notice in writing indicating the reasons for
retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in
lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice; and
(b) the prior permission of the appropriate Government or such authority as may be
specified by that Government by notification in the Official Gazette (hereafter in this
section referred to as the specified authority) has been obtained on an application made
in this behalf.
(2) An application for permission under sub-section (1) shall be made by the employer in the
prescribed manner stating clearly the reasons for the intended retrenchment and a copy of such
application shall also be served simultaneously on the workmen concerned in the prescribed
manner.
(3) Where an application for permission under sub-section (1) has been made, the
appropriate Government or the specified authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and
after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen concerned
and the persons interested in such retrenchment, may, having regard to the genuineness and
adequacy of the reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the workmen and all other
relevant factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such
permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(4) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1) and the
appropriate Government or the specified authority does not communicate the order granting or
refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on
which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been
granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days.
(5) An order of the appropriate Government or the specified authority granting or refusing to
grant permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (6), be final and binding on all
the parties concerned and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order.
(6) The appropriate Government or the specified authority may, either on its own motion or
on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing
to grant permission under sub-section (3) or refer the matter or, as the case may be, cause it to
be referred, to a Tribunal for adjudication:
(7) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the
permission for any retrenchment has been refused, such retrenchment shall be deemed to be
illegal from the date on which the notice of retrenchment was given to the workman and the
workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if no
notice had been given to him.
accident in the establishment or death of the employer or the like, it is necessary so to do, by
order, direct that the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such
establishment for such period as may be specified in the order.
(9) Where permission for retrenchment has been granted under sub-section (3) or where
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
permission for retrenchment is deemed to be granted under sub-section (4), every workman
who is employed in that establishment immediately before the date of application for
permission under this section shall be entitled to receive, at the time of retrenchment,
compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of
continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months.]
NOTE.—The Central Government, being the appropriate Government, has specified the
Secretary to the Government of India in the Ministry of Labour, to be the authority for the
purposes of Section 25-N prior to its amendment by Act 49 of 1984, vide S.O. 562(e), dt. 24-8-
1976.
STATE AMENDMENTS
CHHATTISGARH.—In its application to the State of Chhattisgarh, in Section 25-N, in sub-
section (9) after the words “in excess of six months”, the words “and an amount equivalent to
his three months average pay” shall be inserted.” [Vide Chhattisgarh Act 26 of 2015, S. 4
(w.e.f. 1-8-2015)]
GUJARAT.—In its application to the State of Gujarat, in Section 25-N,—
(i) in sub-section (1), in clause (a), the words “or the workman has been paid in lieu of such
notice, wages for the period of the notice” shall be deleted;
(ii) in sub-section (9), the words “and an amount equivalent to his last three months average
pay” shall be added at the end. [Vide Gujarat Ordinance No. 5 of 2020, S. 4, dated 3-7-
2020]
JHARKHAND.—In its application to the State of Jharkhand, clause (a) of sub-section (1) and
sub-section (9) of Section 25-N shall be amended as follows:—
(i) in clause (a) of sub-section (1) the existing expression “or the workman has been paid in
lieu of such notice wages for the period of the notice” shall be deleted; and
(ii) in sub-section (9) the expression “fifteen days average pay” shall be substituted by the
expression “three months average pay”. [Vide Jharkhand Act 22 of 2017, S. 5 (w.e.f. 4-12
-2017)]
PUNJAB.—In its application to the State of Punjab, in Section 25-N,—
“(i) in sub-section (1), in clause (a), the signs and words, “or the workmen has been paid in
lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice” shall be omitted; and
(ii) in sub-section (9), after the words “six months”, the following words shall be added,
namely:—
“and an amount equivalent to his three months average pay”. [Vide Industrial Disputes
(Punjab Amendment) Ordinance, 2020, S. 4, dated 11-8-2020 (w.e.f. 11-8-2020)]
RAJASTHAN.—In its application to the State of Rajasthan—
(1) In Section 25-N—
(a) in sub-section (1),—
(i) between the expression “this Chapter applies” and the expression, “who has been”, the
expression “or is applied under sub-section (1-A) of Section 25-K” shall be inserted;
and
(ii) for clause (c), the following clause shall be substituted, namely:—
“(c) three months' notice in writing stating clearly the reasons for retrenchment is
served on the State Government or such authority or may be specified by the State
Government by notification in the Official Gazette by registered post with
acknowledgement due, and the permission of the State Government or of such
authority is obtained under sub-section (2).”;
(b) for sub-section (2), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely:—
“(2) On receipt of a notice under clause (c) of sub-section (1), the State Government or
authority, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving reasonable opportunity of
being heard to the employer, the workman and the office-bearer of the representative union of
the concerned industrial establishment, may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of
the reasons stated by the employer, requirements of industrial peace, prevention of
victimisation and unfair labour practice, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing grant
or refuse to grant such permission and such order shall be communicated to the employer, the
workman and the office-bearer of such representative union.”;
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(c) in sub-section (4), for the expression “(Amendment) Act 1976”, the expression
“(Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1984”, for the expression “(a) of Section 25-F”, the
expression “(c) of sub-section (1)”, for the word “appropriate”, the word “State” and for
the expression “sub-section (2)”, the expression “the said clause of the said sub-section”
shall respectively be substituted;
(d) in sub-section (5), for the word “appropriate”, the word “State” shall be substituted;
(e) after sub-section (5), the following sub-sections shall be inserted, namely:—
“(6) An order of the State Government or the authority granting or refusing to grant
permission shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (7), be final and binding on all
the parties and shall remain in force for one year from the date of such order.
(7) The State Government or, as the case may be, the authority may, either on its own
motion or on the application made by the employer or the workman, review its order
granting or refusing to grant permission under sub-section (2) or refer the matter to a
Tribunal for adjudication:
pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference.”;
(f) the existing sub-sections (6) and (7) shall respectively be renumbered as sub-sections
(8) and (9) thereof; and
(g) in sub-section (9) as so re-numbered,—
(i) for the expression “(Amendment) Act, 1976”, the expression “(Rajasthan Amendment)
Act, 1984” shall be substituted;
(ii) The expression “or the Central Government” shall be deleted;
(iii) for the word “appropriate”, wherever occurring, the word “State” shall be substituted;
and
(iv) for the expression “and any order passed by such authority shall be final and binding
on the employer and the workman or workmen”, the expression “and such authority
while deciding such matter shall proceed to hold the enquiry in the manner and have
regard to the matters specified in sub-section (2). Any order passed by such authority
shall, subject to review under the proviso to this sub-section, be final and binding on
the employer and the workman or workmen:
Provided that such authority as aforesaid may, either on its own motion or on the application
made by the employer or the workman, review the order passed by it under this sub-section or
refer the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication and to such reference, the provisions contained in
the proviso to sub-section (7), shall, mutatis mutandis, apply,” shall be substituted—Raj. Act 8
of 1984, S. 5 (w.e.f. 14-4-1984).
(2) In its application to the State of Rajasthan, in Section 25-N,—
(a) in clause (a) of sub-section (1), the existing expression “or the workman has been paid in
lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice” shall be deleted; and
(b) in sub-section (9), after the existing expression “six months” and before the existing
punctuation mark “.”, appearing at the end, the expression “and an amount equivalent to
his three months average pay” shall be inserted. [Vide Rajasthan Act 21 of 2014, S. 8
(w.e.f. 12-11-2014)]
► Reference to the Government.—Word “or” is normally disjunctive and “and” is normally conjunctive but
at times they are read as vice versa to give effect to the manifest intention of the legislature as disclosed from
the context. However, as far as Section 25-N(6) is concerned had the legislature intended that the reference
could be made after the Government or the specified authority deals with the review power, it would have said
so specifically by specific words. It could have provided for a direct reference, Cable Corpn. of India Ltd. v.
Commr. of Labour, (2008) 7 SCC 680 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 581.
In making the reference (or declining to make the reference) under Section 10(1) State Government acts in
an administrative capacity. Under Section 25-N(3) its power and authority are quasi-judicial in nature.
Furthermore, a reference under Section 10(1) cannot be used to circumvent or bypass the statutory scheme
provided under Section 25-N, Empire Industries Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2010) 4 SCC 272.
Once the review application is rejected, the appropriate Government/specified authority cannot make
reference for adjudication. A plain reading of the provision make the position clear that two courses are open.
Power is conferred on the appropriate Government to either on its own motion or on an application made,
review its order or refer the matter to the Tribunal. Whether one or the other course could be adopted depends
on the fact of each case, the surrounding circumstances and several other relevant factors, Cable Corpn. of
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
India Ltd. v. Commr. of Labour, (2008) 7 SCC 680 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 581.
► Application for permission.—The notice under sub-section (1)(a) need not necessarily precede the
seeking of permission under sub-section (1)(b). A.P. Patel v. Gujarat State Machine Tools Corpn. Ltd., (1993)
2 LLJ 519 (Guj)(DB).
The period for deemed permission under sub-section (4) shall commence only when the application filed by
the employer is in order and complies with Section 25-N as well as Rule 76-A of the Central Rules. Cement
Mazdoor Union v. State of M.P., (1998) 79 FLR 705 (MP).
► Effect of expiry of thirty days period.—Expiry of the period of thirty days mentioned in the proviso to
sub-section (6) does not render the Tribunal functus officio nor does the reference lapse in such a case. Assn.
of Engg. Workers v. Indian Hume Pipe Co., (1985) 2 LLN 652 (Bom)(DB) : 1986 Lab IC 749 : (1986) 1 LLJ
450.
► Notice or opportunity to make representation.—Section 25-N (6) must be read down as containing
an in-built restriction that before the appropriate Government or the competent authority makes an order
thereunder it must give notice and hearing or an opportunity of making a representation, to the party likely to be
affected by the decision of the appropriate Government or competent authority. Maharashtra General Kamgar
Union v. Star Oxides and Chemicals Ltd., (1996) 1 LLJ 995 : 1996 Lab IC 362 : (1996) 2 Cur LR 356 (Bom).
183 [25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking.—(1) An employer who intends to close
down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall, in the
prescribed manner, apply, for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which the
intended closure is to become effective, to the appropriate Government, stating clearly the
reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application shall also be
served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed manner:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to an undertaking set up for the
construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or for other construction work.
(2) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1), the
appropriate Government, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and persons interested in such
closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by the
employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order and for
reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of such
order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(3) Where an application has been made under sub-section (1) and the appropriate
Government does not communicate the order granting or refusing to grant permission to the
employer within a period of sixty days from the date on which such application is made, the
permission applied for shall, be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said
period of sixty days.
(4) An order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall,
subject to the provisions of sub-section (5), be final and binding on all the parties and shall
remain in force for one year from the date of such order.
(5) The appropriate Government may, either on its own motion or on the application made by
the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission under
sub-section (2) or refer the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication:
(6) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made within the period
specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused, the closure of the
undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the workmen shall be
entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if the undertaking had
not been closed down.
accident in the undertaking or death of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by
undertaking for such period as may be specified in the order.
(8) Where an undertaking is permitted to be closed down under sub-section (2) or where
permission for closure is deemed to be granted under sub-section (3), every workman who is
employed in that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission under
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
this section, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days'
average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six
months.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
CHHATTISGARH.—In its application to the State of Chhattisgarh, in sub-section (9) of Section
25-O, after the words “in excess of six months”, the words “and an amount equivalent to his
three months average pay” shall be inserted.” [Vide Chhattisgarh Act 26 of 2015, S. 5 (w.e.f. 1-
8-2015)]
GUJARAT.—In its application to the State of Gujarat, in Section 25-O, in sub-section (8), the
words “and an amount equivalent to his last three months average pay” shall be added at the
end. [Vide Gujarat Ordinance No. 5 of 2020, S. 5, dated 3-7-2020]
JHARKHAND.—In its application to the State of Jharkhand, in sub-section (8) of Section 25-O,
after the existing expression, the expression “fifteen days average pay” shall be substituted by
the expression “three months average pay”. [Vide Jharkhand Act 22 of 2017, S. 6 (w.e.f. 4-12-
2017)]
MADHYA PRADESH.—For Section 25-O of the principal Act, the following section shall be
substituted, namely:—
“25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking.—(1) An employer who intends to close
down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall apply
for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to
become effective, to the State Government stating clearly the reasons for the intended
closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application shall also be served simultaneously
on the representatives of the workmen by registered post with acknowledgement due.
(2) Where a notice has been served on the State Government by an employer under sub-
section (1) of Section 25-FFA and the period of notice had not expired on the 5th August,
1983, such employer shall not close down the undertaking but shall, within a period of fifteen
days from the said date, apply to the State Government for permission to close down the
undertaking.
(3) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2), the State Government after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving
a reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and the persons
interested in such closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the
reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such
permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the
workmen.
(4) Where an application has been made under sub-section (1) of sub-section (2), as the
case may be, and the State Government does not communicate the order granting or
refusing to grant permission to the employer within a period of sixty days from the date on
which such application is made, the permission applied for shall be deemed to have been
granted on the expiration of the said period of sixty days.
(5) An order of the State Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall,
(6) The State Government may, either on its own motion or on the application made by
the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission
under sub-section (3) or refer the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication:
Provided that where a reference has been made to a Tribunal under this sub-section, it
shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference.
(7) Where no application for permission under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is made
within the period specified therein, or where the permission for closure has been refused, the
closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to be illegal from the date of closure and the
workmen shall be entitled to all the benefits under any law for the time being in force as if
the undertaking had not been closed down.
State Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
employed in that undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission
under this section, shall be entitled to receive compensation which shall be equivalent to
fifteen days' average pay for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof
in excess of six months.”—M.P. Act 32 of 1983, S. 3 (w.e.f. 28-10-1983).
MAHARASHTRA.—In the Act 14 of 1947 for Section 25-O, the following section shall be
“25-O. Application to be made for obtaining permission to close down any undertaking
ninety days before closure.—(1) An employer, who intends to close down an undertaking of
an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall submit, for permission, at
least ninety days before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, an
application, in the prescribed manner, to the appropriate Government, stating clearly the
reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking. A copy of such application shall be
served by the employer simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the
prescribed manner:
Provided that, nothing in this section shall apply to an undertaking set up for the
construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or other construction works.
(2) On receipt of an application under sub-section (1), the appropriate Government, after
holding such inquiry as it deems fit, and after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard
to the applicant and the representatives of the workmen, may, for the reasons to be recorded
in writing, by order grant the permission for closure, or if it is satisfied that the reasons given
for the intended closure of the undertaking are not adequate and sufficient, or are not urged
in good faith or are grossly unfair or unjust, and in any case such closure would be prejudicial
to the interests of the general public, it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, by order
refuse to grant the permission and direct the employer not to close such undertaking. A copy
of any decision given by the appropriate Government under this sub-section shall be sent by
it simultaneously to the representatives of the workmen.
(3) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1), and the
appropriate Government does not communicate the refusal to grant the permission to the
employer, within a period of sixty days from the date of receipt of the application by it, the
permission applied for shall be deemed to have been granted on the expiration of the said
(4) Any employer or any workman affected by any order made under sub-section (2) or
any workman affected by the permission deemed to be granted under sub-section (3), may,
within thirty days form the date of the order or from the date from which the permission is
deemed to be granted, as the case may be, prefer an appeal to such Industrial Tribunal as
may be specified by the appropriate Government by Notification in the Official Gazette for
such area or areas for the whole State, as may be specified therein. The Industrial Tribunal
shall, after holding such inquiry as it deems fit, as far as possible within thirty days from the
date of filing the appeal, pass an order, either affirming or setting aside the order of the
appropriate Government or the permission deemed to be granted, as the case may be.
(5) Any order made by the appropriate Government under sub-section (2) or any
permission deemed to be granted under sub-section (3), subject to an appeal to the
Industrial Tribunal, and any order made by the Industrial Tribunal in such appeal, shall be
final and binding on all the parties concerned.
(6) Any order refusing to grant permission for closure made by the appropriate
Government under sub-section (2) shall remain in force for a period of one year from the
date of such order, unless it is set aside earlier by the Industrial Tribunal in appeal.
(7) When no application for permission under sub-section (1) is made, or where the
permission for closure has been refused, the closure of the undertaking shall be deemed to
be illegal from the date of closure, and the workman shall be entitled to all the benefits under
any law for the time being in force, as if no notice had been given to him.
(8) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the appropriate Government
may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as accident in the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
undertaking or death of the employer or the like, it is necessary so to do, by order, direct that
the provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply in relation to such undertaking for such
period as may be specified in the order.
permission for closure is deemed to be granted under sub-section (3), every workman in the
said undertaking, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that
undertaking immediately before the date of application for permission under this section,
shall be entitled to notice and compensation as specified in Section 25-N, as if the said
workman has been retrenched under that section.”—Maharashtra Act 3 of 1982, S. 3 (w.e.f.
27-10-1981).
ORISSA.—For Section 25-O of the principal Act, the following section shall be substituted,
namely:
“25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking.—(i) An employer who intends to close
down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies shall, in the
prescribed manner, apply, for prior permission at least ninety days before the date on which
the intended closure is to become effective, to the appropriate Government, stating clearly
the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application shall
also be served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen in the prescribed
manner:
Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to an undertaking set up for the
construction of buildings, bridges, roads, canals, dams or other construction work.
(2) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1), the
appropriate Government, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving a
reasonable opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and the persons
interested in such closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the
reasons stated by the employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant
factors, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such
permission and a copy of such order shall be communicated to the employer and the
workmen.
(3) Where an application has been made under sub-section (1) and the appropriate
(4) An order of the appropriate Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall,
(5) The appropriate Government may, either on its own motion or on the application made
by the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission
appropriate Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances
as accident in the undertaking or death of the employer or the like it is necessary so to do, by
permission for closure is deemed to be granted under sub-section (3) every workman who is
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
in excess of six months.”— Orissa Act 6 of 1983, S. 3 (w.e.f. 21-2-1983).
PUNJAB.—In its application to the State of Punjab, in Section 25-O, in sub-section (8), after
the words “six months” the following words shall be amended, namely:—
“and an amount equivalent to his three months average pay.” [Vide Industrial Disputes
(Punjab Amendment) Ordinance, 2020, S. 5, dated 11-8-2020 (w.e.f. 11-8-2020)]
RAJASTHAN.—For Section 25-O of the principal Act, the following section shall be substituted,
namely:—
“25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking.—(1) An employer who intends to close
down an undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies including
an employer who has served a notice under sub-section (1) of Section 25-FFA on the State
Government of his intention to close down such an undertaking but the period of such a
notice has not expired at the commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Rajasthan
Amendment) Ordinance, 1983 shall apply for prior permission at least ninety days before the
date on which the intended closure is to become effective, to the State Government, stating
clearly the reasons for the intended closure of the undertaking and a copy of such application
shall also be served simultaneously on the representatives of the workmen by registered post
with acknowledgement due.
(2) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1), the State
Government, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving reasonable
opportunity of being heard to the employer, the workmen and the persons interested in such
closure may, having regard to the genuineness and adequacy of the reasons stated by
employer, the interests of the general public and all other relevant factors, by order and for
reasons to be recorded in writing, grant or refuse to grant such permission and a copy of
such order shall be communicated to the employer and the workmen.
(3) Where an application has been made under sub-section (1), and the State
(4) An order of the State Government granting or refusing to grant permission shall,
the employer or any workman, review its order granting or refusing to grant permission
State Government may, if it is satisfied that owing to such exceptional circumstances as
in excess of six months, *[and an amount equivalent to his three months average
pay].” [Vide Rajasthan Act 8 of 1984, S. 6 (w.e.f. 14-4-1984)].
* Ins. vide Rajasthan Act 21 of 2014, S. 9 (w.e.f. 12-11-2014)
(2) In its application to the State of Rajasthan, in sub-section (8) of Section 25-O, after the
existing expression “six months” and before the existing punctuation work “.”, appearing at the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
end, the expression “” shall be inserted. [Vide Rajasthan Act 21 of 2014, S. 9]
WEST BENGAL.—In Section 25-O of the principal Act,—
(a) in sub-section (1), after the first proviso, the following proviso shall be inserted:—
“Provided further that every application for permission to close down an undertaking shall,
having regard to the first proviso to Section 25-FFF, contain the particulars of the quantum,
mode, manner and time of payment of compensation to the workmen, in the manner
prescribed, and such employer shall furnish such guarantee as may be required by the
appropriate Government to discharge his liability for payment of compensation and other
statutory dues to the workmen in the event of such permission being granted under sub-
section (2) or deemed to have been granted under sub-section (3).”;
(b) after sub-section (1), the following sub-section shall be inserted:—
“(1-A) Where an application for permission has been made under sub-section (1), the
appropriate Government may, having regard to the reasons adduced in such application and
the interests of the undertaking and the concerned workmen, issue such directions as may be
necessary for maintaining normalcy and continuity of work during the notice period.”;
(c) to sub-section (6), the following explanation shall be added:—
“Explanation.—‘Benefits under any law’ shall include benefits under any contract,
agreement, award or settlement under any law”;
(d) after sub-section (7), the following sub-section shall be inserted:—
“(7-A) Every order of the appropriate Government under sub-section (7) shall indicate for
reasons to be recorded, the extent to which compensation computed under sub-section (8)
shall be payable in the case, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the same and
for securing such payment, the appropriate Government may obtain such information and
guarantee specified in the second proviso to sub-section (1) as may be considered
necessary.”
(e) in sub-section (8), after the words “shall be entitled to receive” the words and brackets,
“in addition to all legal dues (including gratuity)”, shall be inserted.—W.B. Act 33 of 1989,
S. 5 (8-12-1989).
► Nature and object.—Section 25-O as substituted in 1982 has been enacted to give effect to the
directive principles of the constitution and must be, therefore, regarded to be in the interest of the general
public. Orissa Textile & Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2002) 2 SCC 578.
Section 25-O is self-contained code. Appropriate Government is obliged to pass order on application for
closure either granting or refusing permission. Such order granting or refusing permission is final and binding
on parties and remains in force for period of one year from date of such order. Section 25-O(5) provides right
to aggrieved parties to file application for review by appropriate Government and/or reference to Industrial
Tribunal. Industrial Tribunal thereupon is expected to make an award. Section 25-O has to be read and
construed keeping in mind fact that: (i) to carry on or close a business is fundamental right of individual; and
(ii) this right can be controlled by specific reasonable restrictions or due safeguards. Industrial Law is intended
to create industrial harmony and ensure production and working of industrial units to aid and help national
economy. Section 25-O secures balance between interest and rights of employer on one hand and workmen on
the other without tilting balance in favour or against particular interest. Application for closure contains detailed
information and reasons on which the appropriate Government is expected to apply its mind either granting or
refusing permission for closure. Appropriate Government is to conduct enquiry. Nature of enquiry and
procedure for holding such enquiry has been left to discretion of appropriate Government and appropriate
Government has to give reasonable opportunity of hearing not only to employer or workmen but also to persons
interested in such closure. Appropriate Government should have regard to; (i) genuineness and adequacy of
reasons stated by employer; (ii) interest of general public; and (iii) all other relevant factors. Enquiry is of wide
nature and appropriate Government is expected to satisfy itself as regards genuineness of reasons that closure
is not adverse to interest of general public and all other relevant factors, Britannia Industries Ltd. v.
Maharashtra General Kamagar Union, (2009) 3 CTC 295 (Bom) (FB).
► Scope.—Section 25-O does not conflict with the provisions for winding up contained in Section 433(a),
(e) and (f) of the Companies Act, 1956. Bombay Metropolitan Transport Corporation v. Servants, (1991) 2
LLJ 443 (Bom)(DB).
► Applicability.—Section 25-O is applicable even to an undertaking forming merely part of an industrial
establishment. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union v. Management, (1986) 2 SCC 624 :
1986 SCC (L&S) 303.
Where more than one undertakings constitute a single industrial establishment and employ a total of not less
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
than 100 workmen, the closure of one of them, even if having less than 100 workmen, would attract Section 25-
O instead of Section 25-FFA. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union v. Management, (1986) 2
SCC 624 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 303.
► Validity.—Section 25-O as substituted in 1982 is void for violating Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of
India. Stumpp Schucle & Somappa Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1986) 1 LLN 245 (Kant) : (1985) 2 LLJ 543.
Section 25-O as substituted in 1982 is intra vires Article 19(6) of the Constitution. Orissa Textile & Steel
Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2002) 2 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 325.
► Enquiry.—The words “the appropriate government after making such enquiry, as it thinks fit” give the
Government a discretion about the nature of the intended enquiry and not the discretion to dispense with the
enquiry. Orissa Textile & Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2002) 2 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 325.
► Expression “the interests of the general public”, meaning.—The Phrase “the interests of the general
public” occurring in Section 25-O(2) as substituted in 1982 is a phrase of a definite connotation and a known
concept. Orissa Textile & Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2002) 2 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 325.
► Time period.—An order by way of review under Section 25-O(5) must be made within the statutory
period of operation of the order fixed by Section 25-O(4). Vazir Glass Works Ltd. v. Maharashtra General
Kamgar Union, (1996) 2 SCC 118 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 421.
The time-limit of thirty days prescribed by the proviso to Section 25-O(5) for passing the award, is not
mandatory. Ambika Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union, (1998) 1 Cur LR 425 : (1998)
79 FLR 1 (Bom).
The time limit of thirty days prescribed by the proviso to Section 25-O(5) would be a reasonable period for
passing the award and for disposing of a review also. Orissa Textile & Steel Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2002) 2
SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 325.
► Interpretation of legislative intent.—The proviso to Section 25-O(1) cannot be interpreted to operate
as a proviso to Section 25-N as such an interpretation would be contrary to the very legislative intent in enacting
Section 25-N without such a proviso. Lal Mohammad v. Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 596 :
1999 SCC (L&S) 335, reversing Indian Rly Construction Co. Ltd. v. Lal Mohd., 1998 All LJ 1875.
► Closure of an establishment.—For closure of one unit, it is not necessary that the entire industry or
business of other units be closed. Lal Mohammad v. Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 596 :
1999 SCC (L&S) 335.
Where one of the several units of the applicant Company had been incurring heavy loans for several years
held, the Government could not refuse permission to close such unit merely on the ground that the other units
were making profits or that the company had the means to raise loans for modernisation and diversification of
the unit in question. Bhartia Electric Steel Co. Ltd. v. State of Haryana, 1998 Lab IC 464 : (1998) 1 Cur LR
1168 (P&H)(DB).
A provision permitting an undertaking to stop, without notice or compensation in lieu thereof, any machine or
department for reasons beyond its control, has not the effect of exempting from the liability to pay closure
compensation in such cases. Prakash Cotton Mills v. Rashtriya Mills Mazdoor Sangh, (1986) 3 SCC 588 :
1986 SCC (L&S) 682. Section 25-O does not make any distinction between a closure for other reasons and a
closure on account of circumstances beyond the control of the management. Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Union
of India, (1997) 3 LLN 413 (Pat)(DB).
Badli workmen are not entitled to claim closure compensation. Prakash Cotton Mills v. Rashtriya Mills
Mazdoor Sangh, (1986) 3 SCC 588 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 682.
► Expression “matter” used in Section 25-O(5), meaning.—Expression “matter” used in Section 25-O
(5) and not an “application” or “order” is a pointer that the legislature did not intend to make a reference of an
application or an order alone, Britannia Industries Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar Union, (2009) 3 Mah
LJ 968 (FB).
Expression “Matter” used in Section 25-O(5) would include application or proceeding before appropriate
Government and order leading to invocation of remedy under sub-section (5) of Section 25-O, Britannia
Industries Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamagar Union, (2009) 3 CTC 295 (Bom) (FB).
► Review jurisdiction.—Both the appropriate Government as well as the Industrial Tribunal exercise quasi-
judicial functions while entertaining and deciding the application for closure. Though the scope of jurisdiction is
quite different, in exercise of its power of review under Section 25-O(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act the
appropriate Government exercises its jurisdiction which on the face of it is limited to review its order. Upon a
reference, Industrial Tribunal conducts a full-fledged inquiry by an adjudicating process and then finally comes
to the conclusion on its own wisdom as to whether the ingredients of Section 25-O(2) are satisfied or not and
whether it should permit the unit or undertaking to close. The power of review exercisable by the appropriate
Government would primarily be restricted to the record which led to passing of an order granting or refusing
permission for closure while the Tribunal would be looking into the matter entirely afresh and in accordance with
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
the prescribed procedure. The Tribunal applies the standard of judicial scrutiny and then has to pass an award
which finally terminates the proceedings before it, Britannia Industries Ltd. v. Maharashtra General Kamgar
Union, (2009) 3 Mah LJ 968 (FB).
The specified authority can on its own motion or on an application made to it, review its order under sub-
section (2) of Section 25-O of the Industrial Disputes Act or refer the matter to the Industrial Tribunal. The two
remedies are alternative remedies. If review jurisdiction is exercised and review application is rejected then
there can be no further order of reference, Paint Employees Union v. Kansai Nerolac Paints Ltd., (2009) 2
Mah LJ 722.
25-P. Special provision as to restarting of undertakings closed down before commencement
of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1976.—If the appropriate Government is of
opinion in respect of any undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter
applies and which closed down before the commencement of the Industrial Disputes
(Amendment) Act, 1976 (32 of 1976),—
(a) that such undertaking was closed down otherwise than on account of unavoidable
circumstances beyond the control of the employer;
(b) that there are possibilities of restarting the undertaking;
(c) that it is necessary for the rehabilitation of the workmen employed in such undertaking
before its closure or for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of
the community to restart the undertaking or both; and
(d) that the restarting of the undertaking will not result in hardship to the employer in
relation to the undertaking,
it may, after giving an opportunity to such employer and workmen, direct, by order published
in the Official Gazette, that the undertaking shall be restarted within such time (not being less
than one month from the date of the order) as may be specified in the order.
STATE AMENDMENTS
RAJASTHAN.—For Section 25-P of the principal Act, the following section shall be substituted,
namely:—
“25-P. Special provision as to restarting of undertaking closed down before
commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1984.—(1) Where
the undertaking of an industrial establishment to which this Chapter applies had been closed
down before the commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Rajasthan Amendment) Act,
1984 and the State Government, after giving reasonable opportunity of being heard to the
employer, workmen and the office-bearer of the representative union of the concerned
industrial establishment and after making such enquiry as it thinks fit, is satisfied that,—
(a) such undertaking was closed down otherwise than on account of unavoidable
circumstances beyond the control of the employer;
(b) there are possibilities of restarting the undertaking;
(c) it is necessary for the rehabilitation of the workmen employed in such undertaking before
its closure or for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the
community or both to restart the undertaking; and
(d) the restarting of the undertaking will not result in hardship to the employer in relation to
the undertaking,
it may direct, by order published in the Official Gazette, that the undertaking shall be
restarted within such time (not being less than one month from the date of the order) as
may be specified in the order.
(2) An order of the State Government directing the restarting of the undertaking under
sub-section (1) shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), be final and binding on all
the parties.
(3) The State Government may either on its own motion or on the application made by the
employer and after giving to such employer, the workmen and the office-bearer of the
representative union of the concerned industrial establishment an opportunity of being heard,
review its order directing the restarting of the undertaking under sub-section (1) or refer the
matter to a Tribunal for adjudication:
shall pass an award within a period of sixty days from the date of such reference and pending
award by the Tribunal, the undertaking shall continue to remain restarted.”—Rajasthan Act 8
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
of 1984, S. 7 (w.e.f. 14-4-1984).
WEST BENGAL.—For Section 25-P of the principal Act, the following section shall be
substituted:—
“25-P. Special provision as to re-starting of the undertaking closed down before the
commencement of the Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Second Amendment) Act, 1986.—
(1) If the appropriate Government is of opinion in respect of any undertaking of an industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies and which is closed down before the
commencement of the Industrial Disputes (West Bengal Second Amendment) Act, 1986,—
(a) that such undertaking was closed down otherwise than on account of unavoidable
circumstances beyond the control of the employer,
(b) that there are possibilities of re-starting the undertaking,
(c) that it is necessary for the rehabilitation of the workmen employed in such undertaking
before its closure or for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of
the community to re-start the undertaking or both, and
(d) that the re-starting of the undertaking shall not result in hardship to the employer in
relation to the undertaking,
it may, after giving such employer and the workmen an opportunity of being heard, direct,
by order published in the Official Gazette, that the undertaking shall be re-started within
such time (not being less than one month from the date of the order) as may be specified in
the order.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) the appropriate Government
may, either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer and after giving
the employer and the workmen an opportunity of being heard, review its order under sub-
section (1) or refer the matter to a Tribunal for adjudication:
shall pass an award within a period of sixty days from the date of such reference and pending
such award, the undertaking shall not be closed down.”—W.B. Act 33 of 1989, S. 6 (8-12-
1989).
SECTION 25-PP
RAJASTHAN.—After Section 25-P of the principal Act as so substituted, the following new
section shall be added, namely:—
“25-PP. Special provision as to reinstatement of workmen retrenched before the
commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Rajasthan Amendment) Act, 1984.—(1)
Notwithstanding any award or order of a Tribunal or any judgment, order or direction of any
Court upholding the validity of retrenchment of any workman employed in any industrial
establishment to which this Chapter applies who is retrenched at any time during six months
immediately before the commencement of the Industrial Disputes (Rajasthan Amendment)
Act, 1984, the State Government shall, either on its own motion or on the application made
by any such retrenched workman or by the office-bearer of the representative union of the
concerned industrial establishment, examine the validity of retrenchment of such workman
and if, after making such enquiry as it thinks fit and after giving reasonable opportunity of
being heard to the employer, the retrenched workman, or, as the case may be, to such office-
bearer, it is satisfied that,—
(a) the retrenchment of the workman was without genuine or adequate reasons;
(b) the retrenchment was by way of victimisation and unfair labour practice; and
(c) the reinstatement of the workman is required for maintaining industrial peace in the
industrial establishment,
it shall, by order and for reasons to be recorded in writing, direct the employer to reinstate
the retrenched workman within such time as may be specified in the order and if it is not so
satisfied, it shall by such reasoned order uphold the validity of retrenchment of the workman
and shall communicate its order to the employer and the workman.
(2) An order of the State Government under sub-section (1), subject to the order passed
by it as a result of review under sub-section (3) and, where a reference has been made by it
to a Tribunal under the said sub-section, subject to the award passed by the Tribunal, shall
be final and binding on the employer and the workman.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
the employer or the retrenched workman, review its order directing reinstatement of the
retrenched workman, or, as the case may be, the order upholding the validity of
retrenchment of the workman under sub-section (1) or refer the matter to a Tribunal for
adjudication:
shall pass an award within a period of thirty days from the date of such reference.”—
Rajasthan Act 8 of 1984, S. 8 (w.e.f. 14-4-1984).
25-Q. Penalty for lay-off and retrenchment without previous permission.—Any employer who
contravenes the provisions of Section 25-M or 184 [* * *] Section 25-N shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to one
thousand rupees, or with both.
STATE AMENDMENTS
RAJASTHAN.—For Section 25-Q of the principal Act, the following section shall be substituted,
namely:—
“25-Q. Penalties for lay-off and retrenchment without previous permission.—Any employer
who—
(a) lays off a workman without complying with the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-
section (2) of Section 25-M; or
(b) contravenes an order refusing to grant permission to lay-off or to continue the lay-off of a
workman under sub-section (4) of Section 25-M; or
(c) contravenes such an order as is referred to in clause (b) passed as a result of review
under sub-section (7) of Section 25-M; or
(d) contravenes the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (4) of Section
25-N; or
(e) contravenes an order refusing to grant permission to retrench a workman under sub-
section (2) or an order under sub-section (9) of Section 25-N; or
(f) contravenes such an order as is referred to in clause (e) passed as a result of review
under sub-section (7) or sub-section (9) of Section 25-N; or
(g) contravenes the direction to reinstate a retrenched workman given under sub-section (1)
of Section 25-PP or such a direction given as a result of review under sub-section (3) of
the said section,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months, or
with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.”—Rajasthan Act 8 of 1984,
S. 9 (w.e.f. 14-4-1984).
► Inevitability of the lay-off.—In view of the inevitability of the lay-off under compulsive and beyond
control circumstances and the lapse of a long period of about twelve years, the continuance of prosecution
under Section 25-M read with Section 25-Q was prohibited by the Supreme Court in Ashok Kumar Jain v.
State of Bihar, (1995) 1 SCC 516 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 353.
25-R. Penalty for closure.—(1) Any employer who closes down an undertaking without
complying with the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 25-O shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five
thousand rupees, or with both.
(2) Any employer, who contravenes 185 [an order refusing to grant permission to close down
an undertaking under sub-section (2) of Section 25-O or a direction given under Section 25-P]
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine
which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both, and where the contravention is a
continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to two thousand rupees for every day
during which the contravention continues after the conviction.
(3) 186 [* * *]
STATE AMENDMENTS
MADHYA PRADESH.—In Section 25-R of the principal Act,—
(a) for sub-section (2), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely:—
“(2) Any employer, who contravenes an order refusing to grant permission to close down
an undertaking under sub-section (3) of Section 25-O or a direction given under Section 25-P
shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine
which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both, and where the contravention is a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to two thousand rupees for every day
during which the contravention continues after the conviction;”;
(b) Sub-section (3) shall be omitted.—M.P. Act 32 of 1983, S. 4 (w.e.f. 28-10-1983).
MAHARASHTRA.—For Section 25-R of the Act 14 of 1947 the following section shall be
“25-R. Penalty for closure—(1) Any employer who closes down an undertaking without
complying with the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 25-O shall, on conviction, be
punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which
may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both.
(2) Any employer who contravenes a direction given under sub-section (2) of Section 25-O
or Section 25-P shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both, and
where the contravention is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to two
thousand rupees for every day during which the contravention continues after the
conviction.”—Mah. Act 3 of 1982, S. 4 (w.e.f. 27-10-1981).
ORISSA.—In Section 25-R of the principal Act,—
(a) in sub-section (2), for the words, brackets, figures and letters “a direction given under
sub-section (2) of Section 25-O or Section 25-P”, the words, brackets, figures and letters
“an order refusing to grant permission to close down an undertaking under sub-section (2)
of Section 25-O or a direction given under Section 25-P” shall be substituted;
(b) sub-section (3) shall be omitted.—Orissa Act 6 of 1983, S. 4 (w.e.f. 21-2-1983).
RAJASTHAN.—In Section 25-R of the principal Act,—
(a) for sub-section (2), the following sub-section shall be substituted, namely:—
“(2) Any employer, who contravenes an order refusing to grant permission to close down
an undertaking under sub-section (2) of Section 25-O or a direction given under
Section 25-P, shall be punishable with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to
one year, or with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees, or with both, and
where the contravention is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to
two thousand rupees for every day during which the contravention continues after the
conviction.”; and
(b) sub-section (3) shall be omitted.—Raj. Act 8 of 1984, S. 10 (w.e.f. 14-4-1984).
25-S. Certain provisions of Chapter V-A to apply to an industrial establishment to which this
Chapter applies.—The provisions of Sections 25-B, 25-D, 25-FF, 25-G, 25-H and 25-J in Chapter
V-A shall, so far as may be, apply also in relation to an industrial establishment to which the
provisions of this Chapter apply.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
RAJASTHAN.—In Section 25-S of the principal Act, after the expression “provisions of this
Chapter apply”, the expression “or are applied under sub-section (1-A) of Section 25-K” shall be
added.—Raj. Act 8 of 1984, S. 11 (w.e.f. 14-4-1984).
SECTION 25-SS
GUJARAT.—After Section 25-S add the following:
“25-SS. Removal of doubt as to effect of other laws.—For the removal of doubt it is hereby
declared that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force
in the State providing for settlement of industrial disputes, the rights and liabilities of
employers and workmen in relation to closure shall be determined in accordance with the
provisions of this Chapter.”—Guj. Act 20 of 1984, S. 2 (22-10-1984).
187 [Chapter V-C

25-T. Prohibition of unfair labour practice.—No employer or workman or a trade union,
whether registered under the Trade Unions Act, 1926 (16 of 1926), or not, shall commit any
unfair labour practice.
► Deprivation of legal right.—The ‘status’ and ‘privilege’ must emanate from statute. If a legal right has
been derived by workman to continue in service in terms of the provisions of the statute under which he is
governed, only then, would question of depriving him of any ‘status’ or ‘privilege’ arise, Haryana State
Agricultural Marketing Board v. Subhash Chand, (2006) 2 SCC 794 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 455.
► Burden of proof.—Burden to prove unfair labour practice is on workman, Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Ltd., (2007) 1 SCC 533 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 346.
► Role of Trade Union.—A trade union is supposed to represent interests of workers. When workers
themselves do not consider a scheme as unfair to them, trade union cannot take upon itself burden of saying
that scheme is unfair. It may be that number of workmen that may be members of trade union is reduced to
some extent pursuant to a promotional scheme to which workmen readily responded, but no union can insist
that all workmen must remain workmen perpetually otherwise it would be an unfair labour practice. Workmen
have a right to get promotion and improve their lot if management offers them a bona fide chance to do so,
Siemens Ltd. v. Siemens Employees Union, (2011) 9 SCC 775 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 593.
Trade union may be that number of workmen that may be members of trade union is reduced to some extent
pursuant to a promotional scheme to which workmen readily responded, but no union can insist that all
workmen must remain workmen perpetually otherwise it would be an unfair labour practice, Siemens Ltd. v.
Siemens Employees Union, (2011) 9 SCC 775 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 593.
25-U. Penalty for committing unfair labour practices.—Any person who commits any unfair
labour practice shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six
months or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or with both.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
GUJARAT.—After Chapter V-C, the following Chapter shall be inserted, namely:—
“CHAPTER V-D
25-V. Special provisions for Special Economic Zone *[and others].—(1) The
provisions of Chapters V-A and V-B shall apply to an industrial establishment to which
Chapter V-D applies.
**[(2) The provisions of this Chapter shall apply to the following, namely:—
(i) an industrial establishment set up in the Special Economic Zone declared as such by the
Government of India;
(ii) an industrial establishment set up in the Special Investment Region declared as such by
the Government of Gujarat;
(iii) an industrial establishment set up in the National Investment and Manufacturing Zone
declared as such by the Government of India;
(iv) hundred per cent export oriented industrial establishment.]
————
* Added by Guj. Act 29 of 2015, S. 5(2) (w.e.f. 1-1-2016).
** Subs. by Guj. Act 29 of 2015, S. 5(1) (w.e.f. 1-1-2016).
25-W. Definitions of continuous service.—For the purposes of this Chapter,—
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in
uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness
or authorised leave or an accident or a strike, which is not illegal, or a lock out or a
cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service; within the meaning of clause (1) for a
period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an
employer—
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a
mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months
preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made has actually
(i) ninety-five days, in case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.
Explanation.—For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has
actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which—
(i) he has been laid off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under
the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946) or under this Act or
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment;
(ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous year;
(iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and
in the course of his employment; and
(iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so however, that the total
period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.
25-X. Right of workmen laid off for compensation.—Whenever a workman (other than
a badli workman or a casual workman) whose name is borne on the muster rolls of an
industrial establishment and who has completed not less than one year of continuous service
under an employer is laid off, whether continuously or intermittently, he shall be paid by the
employer for all days during which he is so laid off, except for such weekly holidays as may
intervene, compensation which shall be equal to fifty per cent, of the total of the basic wages
and dearness allowance that would have been payable to him had he not been so laid off:
Provided that if during any period of twelve months, a workman is so laid off for more than
forty-five days, no such compensation shall be payable in respect of any period of the lay off
after the expiry of the first forty-five days:
Provided further that it shall be lawful for the employer in any case falling within the
foregoing proviso to terminate the workman in accordance with the provisions contained in
Section 25-ZA at any time after the expiry of the first forty-five days of the lay-off, and when
he does so, any compensation paid to the workman for having been laid off during the
preceding twelve months may be set off against the compensation payable for termination.
Explanation.—‘Badli workman’ means a workman who is employed in an industrial
establishment in the place of another workman whose name is borne on the muster rolls of
the establishment, but shall cease to be regarded as such for the purposes of this section, if
he has completed one year of continuous service in the establishment.
25-Y. Duty of employer to maintain muster rolls of workmen.—Notwithstanding that
workmen in any industrial establishment have been laid off, it shall be the duty of every
employer to maintain, for the purposes of this Chapter, a muster roll and to provide for the
making of entries therein by workmen who may present themselves for work at the
establishment at the appointed time during normal working hours.
25-Z. Workman not entitled to compensation in certain cases.—No compensation
shall be paid to a workman who has been laid off—
(i) if he refuses to accept any alternative employment in the same establishment from which
he has been laid off, or in any other establishment belonging to the same employer situate
in the same town or village or situate within a radius of five miles from the establishment
to which he belongs, if, in the opinion of the employer, such alternative employment does
not call for any special skill or previous experience and can be done by the workman,
provided that the wages which would normally have been paid to the workman are offered
for the alternative employment also;
(ii) if he does not present himself for work at the establishment at the appointed time during
normal working hours at least once a day;
(iii) if such laying off is due to strike or slowing down of production on the part of workmen in
another part of the establishment.
25-ZA. Conditions for termination of workman.—(1) No workman employed in any
industry, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer,
shall be terminated (otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action)
by that employer until—
(a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing and the period of notice has
expired, or the workman has been offered in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of
the notice;
(b) the workman has been paid compensation equivalent to *[sixty days] salary for every
completed year of continuous service in such manner as may be prescribed.
(2) Where the workman has been insured through insurance policy by the employer for
the social security to receive the compensation in the case of termination, equivalent to *
[sixty days] salary for every completed year of continuous service, the employer, instead of
making payment of compensation under clause (b) of sub-section (1), shall forward all the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
necessary documents of such workman to the Insurance Company within fifteen days after
termination.
————
* Subs. for “forty-five days” by Guj. Act 29 of 2015, S. 6(1) & (2) (w.e.f. 1-1-2016).
25-ZB. Compensation to workman in case of transfer of undertaking.—Where the
ownership or management of an undertaking is transferred, whether by agreement or by
operation of law, from the employer in relation to that undertaking to a new employer, every
workman, who has been in continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking
immediately before such transfer, shall be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance
with the provisions of Section 25-ZA, as if the workman had been terminated:
Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to a workman in any case where there has
been a change of employers by reason of the transfer, if
(a) the service of the workman has not been interrupted by such transfer;
(b) the terms and conditions of service applicable to the workman after such transfer are not
in any way less favourable to the workman than those applicable to him immediately
before the transfer; and
(c) the new employer is, under the terms of such transfer or otherwise, legally liable to pay
to the workman, in the event of his termination, compensation on the basis that his
service has been continuous and has not been interrupted by the transfer.
25-ZC. Sixty days' notice to be given of intention to close down any undertaking.
—An employer, who intends to close down an undertaking, shall serve at least sixty days'
notice before the date on which the intended closure is to become effective, a notice, in the
manner as may be prescribed, on the State Government stating clearly the reasons for the
intended closure of the undertaking.
25-ZD. Compensation to workman in case of closing down of undertaking.—Where
an undertaking is closed down for any reason whatsoever, every workman who has been in
continuous service for not less than one year in that undertaking immediately before such
closure shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-ZA,
as if the workman had been terminated.”.—Vide Gujarat Act 12 of 2004, S. 3 (w.e.f. 10-2-
2004).
► Prosecution under ID Act — Maintainability.—As there one allegations of improper implementation of
recommendations of Wage Board established under provisions of Working Journalists and Other Newspaper
Employees (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955, prosecution under provisions of ID
Act, 1947, not maintainable, Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (2015) 11 SCC 204.
► Unfair labour practice.—Extracting work of permanent nature continuously for more than three years
on contract basis is statutorily prohibited and hence, impermissible. Same amounts to unfair labour practice
and is punishable, Sudarshan Rajpoot v. U.P. SRTC, (2015) 2 SCC 317 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S) 451.
Chapter VI
PENALTIES
26. Penalty for illegal strikes and lock-outs.—(1) Any workman who commences, continues or
otherwise acts in furtherance of, a strike which is illegal under this Act, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to fifty
rupees, or with both.
(2) Any employer who commences, continues, or otherwise acts in furtherance of a lock-out
which is illegal under this Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
► Other reliefs.—The remedy indicated in Section 26 is designated statutory remedy and no other relief
outside the Act can be claimed on general principles of jurisprudence. Therefore, the relief of compensation by
proceedings in arbitration is contrary to law and bad. Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Staff Union, (1976) 2 SCC 82 :
1976 SCC (L&S) 200.
27. Penalty for instigation, etc.—Any person who instigates or incites others to take part in,
or otherwise acts in furtherance of, a strike or lock-out which is illegal under this Act, shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which
may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
► Meaning and scope of instigation.—There can be an incitement to a strike even on Sunday if workers
who are willing to work are incited to do so. Ram Naresh Kumar v. State, 1958 Cr LJ 1018. ‘Instigates’ and
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
‘incites’ signify something deeper than a mere asking of a person to do a particular act. The words seem to
convey the meaning ‘to goad or urge forward or to provoke or encourage the doing of an act’.
28. Penalty for giving financial aid to illegal strikes and lock-outs.—Any person who
knowingly expends or applies any money in direct furtherance or support of any illegal strike or
lock-out shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or
with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
188 [29. Penalty for breach of settlement or award.—Any person who commits a breach of any
term of any settlement or award, which is binding on him under this Act, shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both, 189 and
where the breach is a continuing one, with a further fine which may extend to two hundred
rupees for every day during which the breach continues after the conviction for the first,] and
the Court trying the offence, if it fines the offender, may direct that the whole or any part of the
fine realised from him shall be paid, by way of compensation, to any person who, in its opinion,
has been injured by such breach.]
► Scope.—Section 29 covers strike in violation of settlement. Workmen v. Motor Industries Co., (1969) 2
SCC 13.
► Liability for prosecution.—Prosecution for breach of the terms of the award can be made after the
expiry of the award. The fact that the award subsequently expired cannot affect the liability to be prosecuted
under Section 29. State of Madras v. C.P. Sarathy, AIR 1953 SC 53 : (1953) 1 LLJ 174.
► Bar of limitation.—Non-compliance with, or breach of, an award is a continuing wrong. Hence, action
taken under Section 29 in such a case beyond a period of one year from the date of publication of the award
does not attract the bar of limitation under Section 468 of CrPC. Executive Engineer v. Govt. Labour Officer,
(1998) 2 Cur LR 540 (Guj).
STATE AMENDMENTS
WEST BENGAL.—In its application to the State of West Bengal, for Section 29, the following
section shall be substituted:—
“29. Penalty for breach of settlement or award.—Any person who commits a breach of any
term of settlement or award, which is binding on him under this Act, shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and with a fine which may extend
to fifty thousand rupees and where the breach is a continuing one, with a further fine of five
hundred rupees for every day during which the breach continues after the conviction for the
first, and the court trying the offence, if it fines the offender, may direct that the whole or
any part of the fine realised from him shall be paid, by way of compensation, to any person
who, in its opinion, has been injured by such breach.” [Vide W.B. Act 17 of 2007, S. 4 (w.e.f.
the date to be notified)]
SECTION 29-A
ANDHRA PRADESH.—After Section 29 of the principal Act, the following section shall be
“29-A. Penalty for failure to comply with an order issued under Section 10-B.—Any person
who fails to comply with any provisions contained in an order made under sub-section (1) of
Section 10-B shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
six months but which may extend to one year and with fine:
Provided that the Court may, for reasons to be recorded in its judgment, award a sentence
of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.”—Vide A.P. Act 32 of 1987.
KERALA.—After Section 29 of the Act 14 of 1947, the following section shall be inserted,
namely:—
who fails to comply with any provision contained in any order made under sub-section (1) of
Section 10-B, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
six months but which may extend to one year and with fine.”—Kerala Act 30 of 1979, S. 3.
TAMIL NADU.—After Section 29 of the Act 14 of 1947, the following section shall be inserted,
namely:—
who fails to comply with any provision contained in any order made under sub-section (1) of
Section 10-B, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
six months but which may extend to one year and with fine.”—Tamil Nadu Act 36 of 1982, S.
3 (w.e.f. 15-8-1982).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
30. Penalty for disclosing confidential information.—Any person who willfully discloses any
such information as is referred to in Section 21 in contravention of the provisions of that section
shall, on complaint made by or on behalf of the trade union or individual business affected, be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which
may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
190
[30-A. Penalty for closure without notice.—Any employer who closes down any undertaking
without complying with the provisions of Section 25-FFA shall be punishable with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five thousand
rupees, or with both.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
GUJARAT.—In its application to the State of Gujarat after Section 30, insert the following:
“30-A. Penalty for failure to nominate members on Council by employer.—Any employer
who fails to nominate his representatives to be appointed as members of the Council within
the time limit specified for the constitution of the Council under sub-section (1) of Section 3-
A shall, on conviction, be punishable with fine which may extend to fifty rupees and in the
case of a continuing failure, with an additional fine which may extend to fifty rupees for every
day during which such failure continues.”—Guj. Act 21 of 1972, S. 8 (20-1-1973).
RAJASTHAN.—A new Section 30-A shall be inserted as follows:
“30-A. Penalty for contravention of an order made under Section 10-K.—Any person who
contravenes an order issued by the State Government in pursuance of Section 10-K of the
Act shall, on conviction, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to
one year, or with fine which may, extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.”—Rajasthan
Act 14 of 1970, S. 7 (26-2-1970).
31. Penalty for other offences.—(1) Any employer who contravenes the provisions of Section
33 shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with
fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.
(2) Whoever contravenes any of the provisions of this Act or any rule made thereunder shall,
if no other penalty is elsewhere provided by or under this Act for such contravention, be
punishable with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees.
STATE AMENDMENT
GUJARAT.—In its application to the State of Gujarat, in Chapter VI, after Section 31, the
following section shall be inserted, namely—
“31-A. Compounding of offences.—(1) Any offence punishable under Sections 25-Q, 25-R,
25-U, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30-A and sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 31 may, either before or
after the institution of the prosecution, on an application by the alleged offender, be
compounded by such officer or authority as the State Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, specify in this behalf for such amount as specified in the table below:—
TABLE
Sl. No. Section Compounding amount
1 2 3
1. 25-Q 25 days wages last drawn by each workman.
2. 25-R 60 days wages last drawn by each workman.
3. 25-U (i) By each workman ` 150 per day but not exceeding ` 3000 in
aggregate;
(ii) By employer ` 300 per day but not exceeding the amount in
aggregate as shown below:
Number of workmen employed in Amount not exceeding
the industry
1 to 50 ` 7000
51 to 100 ` 10,000
101 to 500 ` 15,000
More than 500 ` 20,000
4. 26 (i) In case of illegal strike, ` 150 per day by each workman but not
exceeding ` 3000 in aggregate;
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(ii) In case of illegal lock-out ` 300 per day by an employer but not
exceeding the amount in aggregate as shown below:
Number of workmen employed in Amount not exceeding
the industry
1 to 50 ` 7000
51 to 100 ` 10,000
101 to 500 ` 15,000
More than 500 ` 20,000
5. 27 and As per Section 26 above for illegal strike and lockout.
28
6. 29 ` 200 per day in respect of each of the workman.
7. 30-A 25 days wages last drawn by each workman.
8. 31(1) Number of For first offence For second for third offence
workmen offence
employed in the
industry
1 to 50 ` 10,000 ` 15,000 ` 20,000
51 to 100 ` 15,000 ` 20,000 ` 25,000
101 to 500 ` 20,000 ` 25,000 ` 30,000
more than 500 ` 30,000 ` 35,000 ` 40,000
9. 31(2) (i) For each workman, for the first offence ` 1000, for the second
offence ` 2000 and for the third offence ` 3000
(ii) For Employer:
Number of For first offence For second for third offence
workmen offence
employed in the
industry
1 to 50 ` 1500 ` 3000 ` 6000
51 to 100 ` 3000 ` 6000 ` 10,000
101 to 500 ` 4000 ` 8000 ` 15,000
more than 500 ` 5000 ` 10,000 ` 20,000:
Provided that the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, amend the
compounding amount specified in the table above:
Provided further that the offence committed of the same nature wherever applicable shall
be compoundable only for the first three offences:
Provided also that such offences shall be compounded only after the alleged offender has
acted to the satisfaction of such officer or authority that such offence is not continued any
further:
Provided also that when an offence is compounded on an application by the employer,
then the compounding amount received from him, shall be paid to the concerned workman or
equally amongst the workmen and if any workmen are not identifiable, then the remaining
amount shall be deposited in the Gujarat State Social Security Board constituted under the
Unorganised Workers' Social Security Act, 2008 (33 of 2008).
(2) Where an offence has been compounded under sub-section (1), no further proceedings
shall be taken against the offender in respect of such offence and the offender, if in custody,
shall be discharged.”. [Vide Guj. Act 29 of 2015, S. 8 (w.e.f. 1-1-2016)]
TRIPURA.—In its application to the State of Tripura, after Section 31, a new Section 31-A
shall be inserted, as follows:—
“31-A. Compounding of offences.—(1) Any offence punishable under Sections 25-Q, 25-R,
25-U, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30-A and sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 31 may, either before or
after the institution of the prosecution, on an application by the alleged offender, be
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
compounded by such officer or authority as the State Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, specify in this behalf for such amount as specified in the table below:
Sl .No. Section Compounding amount
1. 25-Q 25 days wages last drawn by each workman
2. 25-R 60 days wages last drawn by each workman
3. 25-U (i) By each workman Rs 150 per day but not exceeding Rs 3000 in
aggregate.
(ii) By employer Rs 300 per day but not exceeding the amount
aggregate as shown below:
Number of workmen employed Amount not exceeding
in the Industry
l to 50 Rs 7000
51 to 100 Rs 10,000
101-500 Rs 15,000
More than 500 Rs 20,000
4. 26 (i) In case of illegal strike, Rs 150 per day by each workman but
not exceeding Rs 300 in aggregate.
(ii) In case of illegal lock-out Rs 300 per day by an employer but
not exceeding the amount in aggregate as shown below:
Number of workmen employed Amount not exceeding
in the Industry
l to 50 Rs 7000
51 to 100 Rs 10,000
101-500 Rs 15,000
More than 500 Rs 20,000
5 27 and 28 As per Section 126 above for illegal strike and lockout
6 29 Rs 200 per day in respect of each of the workman
7 30-A 25 days wages last drawn by each workman
8 31(1) Number of For first offence For second For third offence
workmen employed offence
in the Industry
l to 50 Rs 10,000 Rs 15,000 Rs 20,000
51 to 100 Rs 15,000 Rs 20,000 Rs 25,000
101-500 Rs 20,000 Rs 25,000 Rs 30,000
More than 500 Rs 30,000 Rs 35,000 Rs 40,000
9 32(2) (i) For each workman, for the first offence Rs 1000 for the second offence
Rs 2000 and for the third offence Rs 3000
(ii) For employer:—
Number of For first offence For second For third offence
workmen employed offence
in the Industry
l to 50 Rs 1500 Rs 3000 Rs 6000
51 to 100 Rs 3000 Rs 6000 Rs 10,000
101-500 Rs 4000 Rs 8000 Rs 15,000
More than 500 Rs 5000 Rs 10,000 Rs 20,000
Provided that the State Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, amend the composition amount specified in the above Table.
Provided further that the offence committed of the same nature shall be
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
compoundable only for the first three offences.
Provided also that such offences shall be compoundable only after the
alleged offender has acted to the satisfaction of such officer or authority
that such offence is not continued any further.
(2) Where an offence has been compounded under sub-section (1), no
further proceedings shall be taken against the offender in respect of such
offence and the offender, if in custody, shall be discharged.” [Vide Tripura
Ordinance No. 5 of 2020, S. 3 (w.e.f. 21-8-2020)]
Chapter VII
MISCELLANEOUS
32. Offence by companies, etc.—Where a person committing an offence under this Act is a
company, or other body corporate, or an association of persons (whether incorporated or not),
every director, manager, secretary, agent or other officer or person concerned with the
management thereof shall, unless he proves that the offence was committed without his
knowledge or consent, be deemed to be guilty of such offence.
191 [33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during
pendency of proceedings.—(1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a

conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before 192 [an arbitrator or] a Labour Court or
Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall,—
(a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the
workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them
immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or
(b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by
dismissal or otherwise, any workmen concerned in such dispute,
save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is
pending.
(2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the
employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in
such dispute 193 [or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of
the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman],—
(a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service
applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding;
or
(b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by
dismissal or otherwise, that workman:
Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid
wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before
which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer.
► De novo apply.—Once complaint was decided, question of giving liberty to employer to de novo apply
under Section 33(2)(b) proviso does not arise, Rajasthan SRTC v. Satya Prakash, (2013) 9 SCC 232 : (2014)
1 SCC (L&S) 251.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), no employer shall during the
pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, take any action against any
protected workman concerned in such dispute—
(a) by altering, to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conditions of service
applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or
(b) by discharging or punishing whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected
workman,
save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is
pending.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, a “protected workman”, in relation to an
establishment, means a workman who, being 194 [a member of the executive or other officer-
bearer] of a registered trade union connected with the establishment, is recognised as such in
accordance with rules made in this behalf.
(4) In every establishment, the number of workmen to be recognised as protected workmen
for the purposes of sub-section (3) shall be one per cent of the total number of workmen
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
employed therein subject to a minimum number of five protected workmen and a maximum
number of one hundred protected workmen and for the aforesaid purpose, the appropriate
Government may make rules providing for the distribution of such protected workmen among
various trade unions, if any, connected with the establishment and the manner in which the
workmen may be chosen and recognised as protected workmen.
(5) Where an employer makes an application to a conciliation officer, Board, 195 [an arbitrator,
a] Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal under the proviso to sub-section (2) for approval
of the action taken by him, the authority concerned shall, without delay, hear such application
and pass, 196 [within a period of three months from the date of receipt of such application], such
order in relation thereto as it deems fit:]
197 [Provided that where any such authority considers it necessary or expedient so to do, it
may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such further period as it may
think fit:
Provided further that no proceedings before any such authority shall lapse merely on the
ground that any period specified in this sub-section had expired without such proceedings being
completed.]
► Section 33: Object of.—The object of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act that the conditions of
service will remain unchanged during pendency of proceedings is to ensure the interest of healthy growth and
development of trade union movement. Batra Hospital & Medical Research Centre of Ch. Aishi Ram Batra
Charitable Trust v. Batra Hospital Employees Union, 2004 LLR 630 (Del).
► Jurisdiction and powers of Tribunal.—Application for permission under Section 33 is necessary only
in case of pendency of industrial dispute. P.D. Sharma v. State Bank of India, AIR 1968 SC 985 : (1969) 1
LLJ 513.
Before granting or refusing approval under Section 33(2)(b), the Tribunal must give reasonable opportunity
of hearing to the parties concerned. G. K. Sengupta v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., (1994) 1 Cur LR
735 : (1994) 2 LLN 982 : (1994) 68 FLR 1117 (Bom).
The Tribunal must accord permission under Section 33 when it is satisfied with the evidence of misconduct
of the workmen. Sasa Musa Sugar Works v. Shobrati Khan, AIR 1959 SC 923 : (1959) 2 LLJ 388.
The Tribunal is not entitled to accord conditional acceptance of the application under Section 33. Caltex
India Ltd. v. E. Fernandes, AIR 1957 SC 326 : (1957) 1 LLJ 1.
Tribunal must not exercise appellate jurisdiction under Section 33. Bisra Stone Lime Co. Ltd. v. Industrial
Tribunal, (1970) 1 LLJ 626 (SC); Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 860 : (1961) 1 LLJ
211. The principle remains unaltered despite introduction of Section 11-A. Good Year India Ltd. v. Industrial
Tribunal, Haryana, (1987) 2 LLN (P&H) 201, applying Workmen v. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co., (1973) 1
SCC 813 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 341.
The Tribunal has no power under Section 33 to review the management's decision. G. McKenzie & Co. v.
Workmen, AIR 1959 SC 389 : (1959) 1 LLJ 285.
The Tribunal has jurisdiction to restore a case disposed of by it. Durga Glass Works v. Hazari Rout, (1976)
1 LLJ 80.
► Sub-section (2)(b), proviso, ‘One month wages’.—‘One month wages’ have to be computed from the
date of filing of approval application. When during this period the workman remained unemployed, the said
expression could not cover amounts payable on the basis of actual working, like night shift allowance. Bharat
Electronics Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, (1990) 2 SCC 314 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 255.
One month's wages referred to in the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) means all prior wages plus the wages for
the next month. Prabhakar H. Manjare v. Indian Telephone Industries Ltd., 1998 LLR 1044 (Kant)(DB).
Irrespective of the month in which the workman is dismissed, the amount of one month's wages to be paid
under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b) should be for a period of 30 days. Bombay Gas Public Ltd. v. Laxman
Dhaku, (1997) 1 LLJ 1209 : (1996) 2 Cur LR 1145 (Bom). See also Gandhi Prakashchandra Harikrishna v.
G.S.R.T.C., (1997) 1 LLJ 99 : (1996) 2 LLN 398 : 1986 Lab IC 1886 (Guj).
A breach of Section 33(2)(b) is merely technical. It does not invalidate the order of discharge or dismissal.
Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand, (1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165.
► Order of discharge or dismissal.—By passing the order of discharge or dismissal, the de facto
relationship of employer and employee is ended but not de jure, for that could happen when the Tribunal
accords its approval. S. Ganapathi v. Air India, (1993) 3 SCC 429 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 796.
Approval of dismissal of a worker granted after a full fledged enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) does not
render the dismissal immune from being challenged under Section 10(1) or 33-A. Bharat Electronics Ltd. v.
Labour Court, (1997) 3 LLN 238 (Kant).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
An employer's application for approval of discharge or dismissal should not be rejected merely on the
ground that he had deducted the amount of a statutory tax from the one month's wages as in such a case the
order of approval can be made conditional to payment of the deducted amount. S. Ganapathy v. Air India,
(1993) 3 SCC 429 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 796.
► Fresh inquiry.—Findings of the Industrial Tribunal in proceedings under Section 33 does not bar right of
the management to start a fresh enquiry in respect of the same incident which formed the subject matter of the
previous enquiry and thus the principles of res judicata are not applicable. G. McKenzie & Co. v. Workmen,
AIR 1959 SC 389 : (1959) 1 LLJ 285.
► Withdrawal of application.—The employer's withdrawal of his application under Section 33 is equivalent
to not filing an application. Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand, (1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978 SCC (L&S)
165.
It is desirable that there should not be any time lag between the action taken by the employer and the order
passed by the appropriate authority in an enquiry under the proviso to Section 33(2)(b). Lord Krishna Textile
Mills v. Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 860 : (1961) 1 LLJ 211. Dismissal order can first be passed and application
under Section 33(2)(b) can be made thereafter. But dismissal, payment of wages and the making of the
application should be parts of the same transaction. Straw Board Mfg. Co. v. Govind, AIR 1962 SC 1500 :
(1962) 1 LLJ 420. However, the employer can make an application under Section 33(2)(b) for approval of the
proposed action before the actual action is taken. State Bank of Bikaner v. Balai Chander Sen, AIR 1964 SC
732 : (1964) 4 SCR 403.
► Conditions of service.—Refusal to pay wages till the workers accept to work according to
reorganisation scheme constitutes alteration of service conditions. Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ram Mohan Ray,
1973 SCC (L&S) 309.
Mere chances of promotion is not a condition of service. Alteration in eligibility condition of employees of
one cadre affecting promotional chances of those of another cadre does not amount to alteration in service
conditions of the affected employees. Reserve Bank of India v. C.T. Dighe, (1981) 3 SCC 545 : 1981 SCC
(L&S) 534.
► Misconduct.—Concept of misconduct under Section 33(2)(a) cannot be limited by the standing orders
of the company. Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v. Hindustan Motors Ltd., (1976) 4 SCC 606 : 1977 SCC (L&S)
20. In case of termination of service simpliciter, not on account of misconduct, the employer is still required to
make an application under Section 33. Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v. Hindustan Motors Ltd., (1976) 4 SCC
606 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 20. Section 33(2)(b) makes it obligatory upon the employer to make an application to
the Tribunal under the proviso only when he discharges or dismisses a workman for misconduct. Mahendra
Singh Dhantwal v. Hindustan Motors Ltd., (1976) 4 SCC 606 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 20.
Even where the employee was dismissed after a defective domestic enquiry but on evidence adduced under
its permission the Labour Court found the misconduct as proved and the dismissal as justified, held, the order
of dismissal would be operative from the date of being passed by the employer and not from the date of Labour
Court's award. R. Thiruvirkolam v. Presiding Officer, (1997) 1 SCC 9 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 65. Contrary view
taken in some judgments of Supreme Court is not good law. Punjab Dairy Development Corpn. v. Kala Singh,
(1997) 6 SCC 159 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1434.
► Pendency of proceedings.—As per Section 33, during the pendency of proceedings, conditions of
service, etc. have to remain unchanged, Workmen of Taroda Opencast Mine of Western Coalfields Ltd. v.
Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-labour Court, (2011) 2 Mah LJ 313 (Bom).
198 [33-A. Special provision for adjudication as to whether conditions of service, etc., changed
during pendency of proceedings.—Where an employer contravenes the provisions of Section 33

during the pendency of proceedings 199 [before a conciliation officer, Board, an arbitrator, a
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], any employee aggrieved by such contravention,
may make a complaint in writing, 200 [in the prescribed manner,—
(a) to such conciliation officer or Board, and the conciliation officer or Board shall take
such complaint into account in mediating in, and promoting the settlement of, such
industrial dispute; and
(b) to such arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal and on receipt of such
complaint, the arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may
be, shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dispute referred to or pending
before it, in accordance with the provisions of this Act and shall submit his or its award
to the appropriate Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly.]
► Nature.—Section 33-A is a special provision and procedure to find out whether conditions of service,
etc. have been changed during the pendency of proceedings before Central Government Industrial Tribunal,
Workmen of Taroda Opencast Mine of Western Coalfields Ltd. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
labour Court, (2011) 2 Mah LJ 313 (Bom).
► Applicability.—The foundation of jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain a complaint under Section 33-A
is contravention of Section 33. Mahendra Singh Dhantwal v. Hindustan Motors Ltd., (1976) 4 SCC 606 : 1977
SCC (L&S) 20. Section 33-A is not applicable to automatic termination of service. National Engg. Industries v.
Hanuman, AIR 1968 SC 33 : (1968) 1 SCR 54 : (1967) 2 LLJ 883.
Application under Section 33-A is not maintainable when the condition of service, breach of which is
complained of, is not connected with the industrial dispute. Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Udaynath Singh, (1970) 2
LLJ 413 (SC).
Section 33-A is applicable in case of dismissal owing to illegal strike without seeking permission under
Section 33. Punjab National Bank v. Employees, AIR 1953 SC 296 : (1953) 1 LLJ 733 : 1953 SCR 686.
Section 33-A is attracted where the worker is dismissed during conciliation proceedings. Hindustan General
Electrical Corpn. Ltd. v. Biswanath Prasad, (1971) 2 SCC 605.
The essential requirement for maintainability of a complaint under Section 33-A, held, requires
consideration of two aspects, viz.,
(i) whether there was any violation of Section 33, and
(ii) whether the act complained of was justified or not. Blue Star Employees Union v. Ex Off. Principal
Secy. to Govt., (2000) 8 SCC 94, following Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Workmen, (1959) 2 LLJ
666 : AIR 1960 SC 160; Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand, (1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978 SCC
(L&S) 165; Syndicate Bank Ltd. v. K. Ramanath V. Bhat, (1967) 2 LLJ 745; Orissa Cement Ltd v.
Workmen, (1960) 2 LLJ 91 (SC).
► Who can apply.—The right to file a complaint rests with the aggrieved employee under the section. 1953
LAC 22.
A complaint can be filed under Section 33-A by the union if authorised by the aggrieved workman to make a
complaint on his behalf. Where a complaint was not filed by the aggrieved workman but by the union and it did
not appear even from the evidence of some of the workmen concerned, that they authorised the union to make
the complaint on their behalf, it was held that such complaint was not maintainable. M.M. Nagalinga Nadar
Sons, Alleppy v. Workmen, (1954) 1 LLJ 515 (LAT). See also (1952) 2 LLJ 442.
If an application is made by an employee under Section 33-A and it is shown that the impugned dismissal of
the employee has contravened Section 33, it is open to the employer to justify the dismissal on the merits by
adducing satisfactory evidence before the Tribunal. C.A. Rodrick v. Karam Chand Thapar, (1963) 1 LLJ 248 :
25 FJR 411 (SC).
► Procedure.—Tribunal should define the area of dispute referred to it for adjudication under Section 10
before proceeding to consider whether the alleged alteration of condition of service was in regard to a matter
connected with that dispute. Reserve Bank of India v. C.A. Dighe, (1981) 3 SCC 545 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 534.
Discharge or dismissal order does not become void on mere contravention of Section 33. The Tribunal has
to examine under Section 33-A the merits of the dismissal order considering all aspects of the case. In
appropriate cases it is entitled to treat the breach of Section 33 as mere technical breach and sustain the
dismissal order. Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand, (1978) 2 SCC 144 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 165.
A workman punished or discharged in contravention of the provisions of Section 33(2) does not become
automatically entitled to the relief by taking out a proceeding under Section 33-A. The employer can still
contend that the discharge or the other punishment was proper. Such a contention, if raised, must be decided
by the Tribunal. Guru Charan Mohanty v. Mgt. of Orissa Commercial Transport Corpn., (1994) 1 LLJ 1106 :
(1994) 2 LLN 642 : (1994) 2 Cur LR 147 (Ori) (DB).
► Powers of Industrial Adjudicator.—Section 33-A enjoins upon Industrial Adjudicator, firstly to find out
as to whether employer had contravened provisions of Section 33 and thereafter to decide whether punishment
imposed upon workman was justified in law, which is to be decided within contours of reference jurisdiction.
Once Tribunal had reached conclusion that domestic enquiry held against workman was fair and proper, no
further scrutiny of investigation of correctness of findings recorded could have been made unless said findings
disclosed perversity, Karur Vysya Bank Ltd. v. S. Balakrishnan, (2016) 12 SCC 221.
► Res judicata.—Once the Labour Court in a proceeding under Section 33-A decided upon the question
whether the respondent was a workman or not within the meaning of the Act, the same question cannot be tried
in a proceeding under Section 33-C between the same parties on the basis of the principle of res judicata.
Punjab Coop. Bank Ltd. v. R.S. Bhatia, (1975) 4 SCC 696 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 394.
► Service in another concern after discharge.—The fact that a workman whose services have been
terminated in contravention of Section 33 has secured employment in another concern does not affect the right
of the workman to his remedy under Section 33-A of the Act. Janardhana Mills Ltd. v. Workmen, 5 FJR 122
(LAT).
201 [33-B. Power to transfer certain proceedings.—(1) The appropriate Government may, by
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
order in writing and for reasons to be stated therein, withdraw any proceeding under this Act
pending before a Labour Court, Tribunal, or National Tribunal and transfer the same to another
Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, for the disposal of the
proceeding and the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to which the proceeding is so
transferred may, subject to special directions in the order of transfer, proceed either de novo or
from the stage at which it was so transferred:
Provided that where a proceeding under Section 33 or Section 33-A is pending before a
Tribunal or National Tribunal, the proceeding may also be transferred to a Labour Court.
(2) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1), any Tribunal or National Tribunal,
if so authorised by the appropriate Government, may transfer any proceeding under Section 33
or Section 33-A pending before it to any one of the Labour Courts specified for the disposal of
such proceedings by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette and the
Labour Court to which the proceedings is so transferred shall dispose of the same.
► Power to transfer proceedings.—The power to transfer the proceedings vests only in the appropriate
Government. There is no provision under the Act authorising the Labour Court to suo motu transfer the
proceedings itself to any other Court. Bennett, Coleman and Co. Ltd. v. State of Punjab, (1992) 1 LLN 665 :
(1992) 64 FLR 449 : (1992) 1 Cur LR 341 (P&H).
Government's power under Section 33(1)(a) to transfer the proceedings is discretionary. It can be exercised
suo motu as well as on representation of the parties. M.S. Nally Bharat Engg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1990)
2 SCC 48 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 189.
Pre-decisional opportunity and stating reasons are essential for a valid order of transfer of proceedings.
M.S. Nally Bharat Engg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1990) 2 SCC 48 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 189.
► Inaction of Tribunal.—Where the Tribunal ceases to function, transfer of the dispute to another Tribunal
under Section 33-B instead of taking action under Section 8 was proper. Shambhu Nath Goyal v. Bank of
Baroda, (1983) 4 SCC 491 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 1.
202
[33-C. Recovery of money due from an employer.—(1) Where any money is due to a
workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of 203
[Chapter V-A or Chapter V-B], the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in
writing in this behalf, or, in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may,
without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate
Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is
satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector
who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue:
Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which
the money became due to the workman from the employer:
Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said
period of one year, if the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient
cause for not making the application within the said period.
(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit
which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the
amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the
question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour
Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government 204 [within a period not
exceeding three months]:
205 [Provided that where the presiding officer of a Labour Court considers it necessary or
expedient so to do, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend such period by such
further period as he may think fit.]
(3) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it
so thinks fit, appoint a Commissioner who shall, after taking such evidence as may be
necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the
amount after considering the report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case.
(4) The decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the appropriate Government
and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner provided for in
sub-section (1).
(5) Where workmen employed under the same employer are entitled to receive from him any
money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money, then, subject to such rules
as may be made in this behalf, a single application for the recovery of the amount due may be
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
made on behalf of or in respect of any number of such workmen.
Explanation.—In this section “Labour Court” includes any court constituted under any law
relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State.]]
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDHRA PRADESH.—In sub-section (1) of Section 33-C of the principal Act, for the words “to
the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land
revenue”, the words “to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate having
jurisdiction and Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may
be, shall proceed to realise the money as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate” shall be
substituted.—Vide A.P. Act 32 of 1987.
ASSAM.—In its application to the State of Assam, in Section 33-C, in sub-section (1), for the
words “to the collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear
of land revenue”, the words “to the Chief Judicial Magistrate having jurisdiction who shall
proceed to realize as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate” shall be substituted. [Vide
Assam Act XXII of 2007, S. 3].
In sub-section (1) of Section 33-C of the principal Act, for the words “to the Collector who
shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue”, the words
“to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate having jurisdiction and
Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, shall proceed
to realise the money as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate” shall be substituted.—Vide
A.P. Act 32 of 1987.
RAJASTHAN.—In sub-section (1) of Section 33-C of the principal Act, after the expression
“Chapter V-A”, the expression “or under an order issued by the State Government under Section
10-K of the Act” shall be inserted.—Vide Raj. Act 14 of 1970 (w.e.f. 26-2-1970).
WEST BENGAL.—(1) In Section 33-C of the principal Act, in sub-section (1), for the words “to
the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land
revenue”, the words “to the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate having
jurisdiction and the Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case
may be, shall proceed to realise the money as if it were a fine imposed by such Magistrate” shall
be substituted.—W.B. Act 57 of 1980, S. 18.
(2) In its application to the State of West Bengal, after Section 33-C of the principal Act, the
following sections shall be inserted:—
“33-D. Recovery of money from the employer in respect of which the appropriate
Government under Section 2 is the State Government.—(1) Save as otherwise provided in
Section 33-C,—
(a) where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award
or under the provisions of Chapter V-A or Chapter V-B, the workman himself or any other
person authorised by him in writing, on his behalf, in the case of death of the workman,
his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an
application to the Authorised Officer for the recovery of money due to him, and if the
Authorised Officer is satisfied that any money is so due, he shall issue a certificate for that
amount to the Recovery Officer who shall proceed to recover the same in the manner as
laid down in this section:
Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the
money became due to the workman from the employer:
Provided further that any such application may be entertained after expiry of the said period of
one year if the Authorised Officer is satisfied that the applicant has sufficient cause for not
making the application within the said period;
(b) where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit
which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the
amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed,
then the question may be decided by the Authorised Officer within a period not exceeding
three months after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned:
Provided that where the Authorised Officer considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he
may, for reasons to be recorded in writing extend such period by such further period as he
may deem fit:
Provided further that if the Authorised Officer decides that any amount is due to a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
workman from an employer, he shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Recovery
Officer, who shall proceed to recover the same in the manner as laid down in this section.
(2) The Recovery Officer, on receipt of a certificate issued by the Authorised Officer for the
amount due to a workman from an employer, shall proceed to recover the amount specified
therein from establishment or, as the case may be, the employer by one or more of the
modes mentioned below:—
(a) attachment and sale of the movable or immovable property of the establishment or, as
the case may be, the employer:
(b) arrest of the employer and his detention in prison;
(c) appointing a receiver for the management of the movable or immovable properties of the
establishment or, as the case may be, the employer:
Provided that the attachment and sale of any property under this section shall first be
effected against the proportion of the establishment and where such attachment and sale is
insufficient for recovering the whole of the amount of arrears specified in the certificate, the
Recovery Officer may take such proceedings against the property of the employer for
recovery of the whole or any part of such arrears.
33-E. Recovery Officer to whom certificate is to be forwarded.—(1) The Authorised Officer
may forward the certificate referred to in Section 33-D to the Recovery Officer within whose
jurisdiction the employer—
(a) carries on his industry or within whose jurisdiction the principal place of his
establishment is situate; or
(b) resides or any movable or immovable property of the establishment or the employer is
situate.
(2) Where an establishment or the employer has property within the jurisdiction of more
than one of the Recovery Officer and the Recovery Officer to whom a certificate is sent by the
Authorised Officer—
(a) is not able to recover the entire amount by the sale of the property, movable or
immovable, within his jurisdiction; or
(b) is of the opinion that, for the purpose of expediting or securing the recovery of the whole
or any part of the amount, it is necessary so to do, he may send the certificate or, where
only a part of the amount is to be recovered, a copy of the certificate certified in the
prescribed manner and specifying the amount to be recovered to the Recovery Officer
within whose jurisdiction the establishment or the employer has property or the employer
resides, and thereupon that Recovery Officer shall also proceed to recover the amount due
under this section as if the certificate or the copy thereof had been the certificate sent to
him by the Authorised Officer.” [Vide West Bengal Act 17 of 2007, S. 5 (w.e.f. the date to
be notified)]
► Nature of proceedings under the section.—Proceedings under Section 33-C(1) are in the nature of
execution proceedings, and Section 33-C(1) can be invoked only for enforcement of a right. If existence of a
right is disputed, Section 33-C(1) would not be applicable. Thus, Section 33-C(1) cannot be invoked in a case
where ordinarily an industrial dispute can be raised, Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Dy. Labour Commr.,
(2007) 5 SCC 281 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 166.
Dispute as to employer-employee relationship could not be adjudicated in an application under Section 33-C
(2), Agricultural Produce Market Committee v. Nagnath Jyotiram Ghodke, (2010) 2 Mah LJ 313.
The proceedings under Section 33-C(2) initiated after seventeen long years should not have been
entertained by the Labour Court unless the delay was reasonably explained. E.S.I. Scheme v. Natvarlal
Amrutlal Shah, (1997) 1 LLJ 216 : (1996) 2 Cur LR 904 (Guj).
► Applicability.—Section applies to a case where dispute is between workers as a group on the one hand
and the employer on the other. R. B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Ltd. v. Labour Court, Nagpur, (1972) 1 SCC
154. The decision of the question referred under this section is made final and binding on all parties who have
been given an opportunity of being heard. Ballarpur Collieries v. Presiding Officer, (1972) 2 SCC 27.
► Claim for lay-off compensation after availing VRS.—Where VRS does not cover past dues like lay-off
compensation, subsistence allowance, etc. workman would be entitled to approach Labour Court under Section
33-C(2). Where the same are specifically covered or language of VRS shows that it covers such claims under
scheme, no forum would have jurisdiction to grant the same, A. Satyanarayana Reddy v. Labour Court, (2016)
9 SCC 462 : (2016) 2 SCC (L&S) 674 : AIR 2016 SC 4556.
► Jurisdiction of Labour Court.—The Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) has power to go into question
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
of equal pay for equal work, because it is incidental to the computation of wages that the claimants are entitled
to receive under law. Municipal Council, Latur v. Shivaji Vaijnath Kamble, (1995) 1 LLJ 1195 : (1995) 1 LLN
78 : (1995) 70 FLR 608 (Bom).
Where the workmen had been dismissed without obtaining approval but before the Industrial Tribunal the
management made a statement that it had withdrawn the dismissal order, held, the Labour Court should not
have rejected such workmen's claim to back wages and bonus merely on the ground of absence of a specific
order withdrawing the dismissal. Suresh Sakharam Chaugule v. Parel Cotton Press Factory (P) Ltd., 1994
Supp (3) SCC 704 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 206 : (1994) 28 ATC 717.
Where the application under Section 33-C(2) for wages due under the Minimum Wages Act was opposed
by the employer solely on the ground that the applicant, being a probationer, was not entitled to minimum
wages, held, the Labour Court could examine the question whether a probationer was an employee within
Section 2(i) of the Minimum Wages Act. Ajith Kumar v. Labour Court, (1998) 3 LLN 275 : (1998) 2 Cur LR
331 : (1998) 79 FLR 753 (Ker).
Under Section 33-C(2) the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to stay the revenue recovery proceedings
initiated under Section 33-C(4) & (1). C.J. Thomas v. Labour Court, (1993) 1 LLJ 278 : (1992) 1 LLN 539 :
(1992) 64 FLR 1142 (Ker).
The right to equal pay for equal work being an existing constitutional right, the Labour Court has under
Section 33-C (2). The jurisdiction to grant relief in claims is based on the said principle. Municipal Corpn. of
Delhi v. Ganesh Razak, (1994) 1 CLR 370 : 1994 Lab IC 733 : (1994) 1 LLN 660 (Del) (DB).
The Labour Court cannot adjudicate a dispute of entitlement or basis of the claim of workmen. It can only
interpret the award or settlement on which the claim is based. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak,
(1995) 1 SCC 235 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 296 : (1995) 29 ATC 93.
Labour Court can only decide existing rights or rights incidental thereto, Vishram Chandrakant Dalvi v.
Daily Publications, (2009) 5 Mah LJ 986.
Jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) is not available in the absence of relationship of
employer and employee, Empress Mills v. First Labour Court, (2011) 4 Mah LJ 753 (Bom).
In exercise of jurisdiction under Section 33-C(2), the Labour Court can merely compute the amount and
while doing so it can always conduct an incidental enquiry which would facilitate its decision while computing
the amount, Force Motors Ltd. v. Shantilal Hukumchand Sancheti, (2011) 3 Mah LJ 90 (Bom).
It is beyond jurisdiction of the Labour Court to determine under Section 33-C(2) whether or not claimants
are workmen under Section 2(s), D. Krishnan v. Vellore Coop. Sugar Mill, (2008) 7 SCC 22 : (2008) 2 SCC
(L&S) 210.
► Maintainability of application under the section.—Application under Section 33-C(2) is maintainable
only when workmen establishes that he has legal right regarding such claim. Employer is at liberty to raise all
defences there against. For establishing their claim of entitlement to wages for working on Saturday's and
Sunday's, respondent workmen must establish their legal right in proceedings under Section 33-C(2) wherefor
they had been granted liberty to move appropriate Labour Court, Nagar Council Kapurthala v. Davinder Kumar,
(2012) 10 SCC 280 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 980.
► Right of adjudication.—The appropriate Government has no right of adjudication of bona fide disputes
raised by the management on the right of a workman to claim of money under Section 33-C(1). Colcom Plastic
Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 1 LLJ 1230 (Del) (DB).
34. Cognizance of offences.—(1) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable
under this Act or of the abetment of any such offence, save on complaint made by or under the
authority of the appropriate Government.
(2) No Court inferior to that of 206 [a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the
first class] shall try any offence punishable under this Act.
STATE AMENDMENTS
MADHYA PRADESH.—(1) In Section 34, for sub-section (2), the following sub-section shall be
“(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of
1974), or any other law for the time being in force, every offence punishable under this Act
and the Acts specified in Part B of the Second Schedule shall be tried by the Labour Court
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed.”—(M.P. Act 43 of 1981, Section
3, w.e.f. 26-1-1982).
(2) In Section 34, for sub-section (2) as substituted by the Madhya Pradesh Labour Laws
(Amendment) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1981 (43 of 1981), the following sub-section
shall be substituted, namely:—
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
“(2) No Court inferior to that of Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first
class shall try and offence punishable under this Act.”—Vide M.P. Act 26 of 2003, S. 3 (w.e.f.
12-5-2003).
► Nature and scope.—Provisions under Section 34 are in the nature of a limitation on the entitlement of a
workman or a trade union or an employer to complain about the offences under the Act. The object behind the
said limitation is to restrain the complainant from making frivolous, vexatious or otherwise patently untenable
complaints. Mysore Structurals Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 1 SCC 477 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 146.
Section 34 does not debar the civil court from taking cognizance of a matter of civil nature relating to an
offence under the Act. Assn. of S.R.T. Undertaking v. Employees' Union, (1986) 2 LLN 915 (Del) : 1985 Lab
IC 1543.
Not only a delegate of the appropriate Government under Section 39 but even a non-government servant can
be authorised under Section 34(1) by the appropriate Government to file a compliant. Rajkumar Gupta v. Lt.
Governor, Delhi, (1997) 1 SCC 556 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 181.
► Complaint for unfair labour practice.—Adjudication of the issue of adoption of unfair labour practice in
a reference under Section 10 is not a condition precedent for maintaining an application to seek authorisation
to file a complaint for prosecuting the management for an unfair labour practice. Indian Hotel Co. Ltd. v. State
of Rajasthan, 1998 Lab IC 1933 (Raj).
35. Protection of persons.—(1) No person refusing to take part or to continue to take part in
any strike or lock-out which is illegal under this Act shall, by reason of such refusal or by reason
of any action taken by him under this section, be subject to expulsion from any trade union or
society, or to any fine or penalty, or to deprivation of any right or benefit to which he or his legal
representatives would otherwise be entitled, or be liable to be placed in any respect, either
directly or indirectly, under any disability or at any disadvantage as compared with other
members of the union or society, anything to the contrary in the rules of a trade union or
society notwithstanding.
(2) Nothing in the rules of a trade union or society requiring the settlement of disputes in
any manner shall apply to any proceeding for enforcing any right or exemption secured by this
section, and in any such proceeding the Civil Court may, in lieu of ordering a person who has
been expelled from membership of a trade union or society to be restored to membership, order
that he be paid out of the funds of the trade union or society such sum by way of compensation
or damages as that Court thinks just.
207 [36. Representation of parties.—(1) A workman who is a party to a dispute shall be
entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by—

(a) 208 [any member of the executive or other office bearer] of a registered trade union of
which he is a member;
(b) 209 [any member of the executive or other office bearer] of a federation of trade unions
to which the trade union referred to in clause (a) is affiliated;
(c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union, by 210 [any member of the
executive or other office-bearer] of any trade union connected with, or by any other
workman employed in the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in
such manner as may be prescribed.
(2) An employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any
proceeding under this Act by—
(a) an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member;
(b) an officer of a federation of associations of employers to which the association referred
to in clause (a) is affiliated;
(c) where the employer is not a member of any association of employers, by an officer of
any association of employers connected with, or by any other employer engaged in, the
industry in which the employer is engaged and authorised in such manner as may be
prescribed.
(3) No party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any
conciliation proceedings under this Act or in any proceedings before a Court.
(4) In any proceeding 211 [before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], a party to a
dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the
proceeding and 212 [with the leave of the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case
may be].]
STATE AMENDMENTS
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
MAHARASHTRA.—In Section 36, to sub-section (1), the following shall be added, namely:—
the time being in force, no workman in such undertaking shall be entitled to be represented
as aforesaid in any such proceeding (not being a proceeding in which the legality or propriety
of an order of dismissal, discharge, removal, retrenchment, termination of service, or
suspension of an employee is under consideration) except by such recognised union.”. [Vide
Mah. Act 1 of 1972, Ss. 20(2) & Sch. I]
► Constitutional validity.—Section 36 is not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or principles
of natural justice. Coop. Store Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, (1987) 1 LLN 786 (Del)(DB) : 1987 Lab IC 1557.
Section 36(4) of Industrial Disputes Act is violative of Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.
I.C.I. India Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1992) 1 LLN 972 : (1992) 64 FLR 968 (All).
► Who can represent?—Registration is sufficient to enable a trade union to represent a workman before
an industrial tribunal under Section 36(1) of the Act. It is not necessary that the trade union should be
recognised under the Trade Unions Act, 1926. South India Cashewnut Manufacturers' Assn. v. Travancore-
Cochin State, 5 FJR 456, (TC HC). See also (1953) ILR 18 TC.
Individual worker has no right to represent when the case is espoused by a union. Ram Prasad
Viswakarma v. Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1961 SC 857 : (1961) 1 LLJ 504.
Where representative union appears on behalf of the employees in proceedings before the labour court,
individual employee has no right to be impleaded and to appear. Santuram Khudai v. Kimatrai Printers &
Processors (P) Ltd., (1978) 1 SCC 162 : 1978 SCC (L&S) 38.
The authorities are not barred from permitting a person, not covered by the different clauses of sub-section
(1), to represent the workman. P. Adinarayana Reddy v. Industrial Tribunal, (1991) 2 LLN 747 : 1991 Lab IC
1477 : (1991) 2 Cur LR 360 (Ori) (DB).
The phrase “association of employers” occurring in sub-section (2) implies that the membership of the
association must be qua employers and not otherwise. It does not cover an association of persons enjoying
different and varieties of status of which some accidentally happen to be employers. Andhra Pradesh Power
Diploma Engineers' Assn. v. A.P. State Electricity Board, (1996) 1 LLN 688 (AP) (FB).
► Representation by a lawyer.—Section 14(1)(a) of the Bar Councils Act is limited by a saving clause
“save as otherwise provided by or under any other law for the time being in force”. That saving clause is
sufficient to take in the provision which is found in Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, which makes the
consent of the other party and the leave of the Court, pre-requisite before an advocate can represent a party in
the Labour Court. New Raman's Cafe, Madras v. Labour Court, Madras, (1965) 1 LLJ 87 (HC).
If a legal practitioner is appointed as an officer of a company or corporation and is in their pay and under
their control and is not a practising advocate, the fact that he was earlier a legal practitioner or has a legal
degree will not stand in the way of the company or the corporation being represented by him. Paradip Port
Trust v. Workmen, (1977) 2 SCC 329 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 253.
Where a legal practitioner appears in his capacity as an officer of the association in the case of an
employer or in the capacity of an officer of the union in the case of a workman, and not in the capacity of legal
practitioner, no objection can be taken against his appearance if the qualifications specified in Section 36(1)
and (2) are fulfilled by him. Punjabi Ghasitaram Halwai Karachiwala v. Sahadeo Shivram Pawar, (1994) 1 LLJ
1022 : (1994) 1 LLN 577 : 1993 Lab IC 2449 (Bom) (HC). See also Kalinga Studios Ltd. v. Presiding Officer,
Industrial Tribunal, (1994) 2 LLJ 108 (Orissa) (DB).
A person actually practising the profession of law, though not legally entitled to do so, is a “legal
practitioner”. J.S.&G. E. Union v. J.M. Baxi & Co., (1985) 1 LLN 97 (Guj) (DB).
The consent once given to a party for being represented by a lawyer, cannot be revoked. Calicut Coop.
Milk Supply Union v. Workers' Union, (1986) 2 LLN 1130 (Ker) : 1986 Lab IC 1681 : (1986) 2 LLJ 422.
The mere filing of vakalatnama by the counsel at a stage when the other party had not even been served
cannot at any stretch of imagination by construed as “implied consent”. The question of consent, express or
implied can arise only after the other party enters appearance and never before it. M/s Punjabi Ghasitharan
Halwai Karachiwala v. Sahadeo Shivram Pawar, (1994) 1 LLJ 1022 : (1994) 1 LLN 577 : 1993 Lab IC 2449
(Bom).
► Letter of authority : Sufficient for representation.—Where no rules have been framed under Section
36(1)(c) any letter of authorisation is sufficient to make a person a representative of the workers within the
meaning of that section. Standard Coal Co. Ltd. v. S.P. Verma, 5 FJR 441 (Pat HC) : AIR 1952 Pat 56.
► Absence of representation.—A settlement arrived at in conciliation proceedings between the
management and the workmen would be binding on all those who were parties to the dispute even if not
represented as provided under Section 36(1). Ameteep Machine Tools v. Labour Court, 1980 Supp SCC 355 :
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
1981 SCC (L&S) 253.
213 [36-A. Power to remove difficulties.—(1) If, in the opinion of the appropriate Government,
any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provision of an award or settlement,
it may refer the question to such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as it may think fit.
(2) The Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal to which such question is referred shall,
after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, decide such question and its decision
shall be final and binding on all such parties.]
► Scope.—Section 36-A of the Industrial Disputes Act speaks of the power of the appropriate Government
to remove difficulties viz. in difficult or doubt which arise as to the interpretation of any provision of a award or
settlement, then it can refer the issue to such Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal as it deems fit and
proper is based on the facts and circumstances of the case, Sri Ganapathy Mills Co. Ltd. v. Inspector of
Factories, (2010) 1 CTC 815.
► Binding effect of decision.—The decision of the question referred under Section 36-A has been
rendered final and binding on all parties who have been given an opportunity of being heard. This does not
contemplate consideration of the question whether any party was in fact feeling interested in the particular
subject-matter of difficulty or doubt. Ballarpur Collieries Co. v. Presiding Officer, (1972) 2 SCC 27.
► Power to modify award.—Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review or modify an award under Section 36-
A. Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1966 SC 1903 : (1961) 2 LLJ 675.
214
[36-B. Power to exempt.—Where the appropriate Government is satisfied in relation to any
industrial establishment or undertaking or any class of industrial establishments or
undertakings carried on by a department of that Government that adequate provisions exist for
the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in respect of workmen employed in such
establishment or undertaking or class of establishments or undertakings, it may, by notification
in the Official Gazette, exempt, conditionally or unconditionally such establishment or
undertaking or class of establishments or undertakings from all or any of the provisions of this
Act.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
TRIPURA.—In its application to the State of Tripura, after Section 36-B, a new Section 36-C shall be
inserted as follows—
“36-C. State Government's power to exempt.—Where the State Government is satisfied, in relation to
any new industrial establishment or new undertaking or class of new industrial establishments or new
undertakings that, it is necessary in the public interest to do so, it may, by notification in the official Gazette,
exempt, conditionally or unconditionally, any such new establishment or new undertaking or class of new
establishments or new undertakings from all or any of the provisions of this Act for a period of one thousand
days from the date of the establishment of such new industrial establishment or new undertaking or class of
new establishments or class of new undertakings, as the case may be”. [Vide Tripura Ordinance No. 5 of
2020, S. 4 (w.e.f. 21-8-2020)]
CASE LAW ► Scope.—Section 36-B does not empower the appropriate Government to exempt any
undertaking or establishment carried on by private enterprise or any other Government. K. Loganathan v. State
of Karnataka, (1998) 2 LLN 837 : (1998) 2 LLJ 212 : (1998) 1 Cur LR 1144 (Kant).
37. Protection of action taken under the Act.—No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding
shall lie against any person for anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done in
pursuance of this Act or any rules made thereunder.
38. Power to make rules.—(1) The appropriate Government may, subject to the condition of
previous publication, make rules for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act.
(2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules
may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:—
(a) the powers and procedure of conciliation officers, Boards, Courts, 215 [Labour Courts,
Tribunals and National Tribunals] including rules as to the summoning of witnesses, the
production of documents relevant to the subject-matter of an inquiry or investigation,
the number of members necessary to form a quorum and the manner of submission of
reports and awards;
STATE AMENDMENTS
WEST BENGAL.—In Section 38, after clause (a) of sub-section (2), the following clause be
inserted:—
“(a-1) the manner and the form in which an application for certificate shall be made, the
manner and the form in which a certificate is to be issued and the particulars which the
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
certificate shall contain and the manner and the form in which an application shall be filed
before a Labour Court or Tribunal, referred to in sub-section (1-B) of Section 10 and the
procedure to be followed by the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be,
on receipt of such an application under clause (c) of sub-section (1-B) of Section 10;”—W.B.
Act 33 of 1989, S. 7 (18-12-1989)
216
[(aa) the form of arbitration agreement, the manner in which it may be signed by the
parties, 217 [the manner in which a notification may be issued under sub-section (3-A) of
Section 10-A], the powers of the arbitrator named in the arbitration agreement and the
procedure to be followed by him;
(aaa) the appointment of assessors in proceedings under this Act;]
(ab) 218 [* * *]
(b) the constitution and functions of and the filling of vacancies in Works Committees, and
the procedure to be followed by such Committees in the discharge of their duties;
STATE AMENDMENTS
GUJARAT.—In Section 38, after clause (b) of sub-section (2), the following clauses shall be
“(b-1) the manner of constituting a Council and filling of vacancies therein, the number of
members of such Council, and the manner of electing the representatives of workmen under
sub-Section (1) of Section 3-A;
(b-2) the other things which a Council may do under clause (f) of sub-section (1) of
Section 3-B;
(b-3) the administrative functions with which a Council shall be entrusted under sub-
section (3) of Section 3-B;
(b-4) matters relating to which information shall be furnished to the Council by the
employers under sub-section (4) of Section 3-B
(b-5) the procedure to be followed by the Council in the discharge of its duties under sub-
section (5) of Section 3-B.”. [Vide Gujarat Act 21 of 1972, S. 9 (w.e.f. 20-1-1973)].
219 [(c) the salaries and allowances and the terms and conditions for appointment of the
presiding officers of the Labour Court, Tribunal and the National Tribunal including the
allowances admissible to members of courts, Boards and to assessors and witnesses;]
(d) the ministerial establishment which may be allotted to a Court, 220 [Board, Labour
Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal] and the salaries and allowances payable to
members of such establishments;
(e) the manner in which and the persons by and to whom notice of strike or lock-out may
be given and the manner in which such notices shall be communicated;
(f) the conditions subject to which parties may be represented by legal practitioners in
proceedings under this Act before a Court, 221 [Labour Court, Tribunal or National
Tribunal];
(g) any other manner which is to be or may be prescribed.
(3) Rules made under this section may provide that a contravention thereof shall be
punishable with fine not exceeding fifty rupees.
222 [(4) All rules made under this section shall, as soon as possible after they are made, be
laid before the State Legislature or, where the appropriate Government is the Central
Government, before both Houses of Parliament.]
223 [(5) Every rule made by the Central Government under this section shall be laid, as soon
as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament while it is in session for a total
period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in 224 [two or more successive
sessions, and if before the expiry of the session immediately following the sessions or the
successive sessions aforesaid] both Houses agree in making any modification in the rule, or
both Houses agree that the rule should not be made, the rule shall thereafter have effect only in
such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such
modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done
under that rule.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
Madhya Pradesh.—M.P. Act 21 of 2015, Part X, Part XI and Sections 17 and 18 in this
regard provides w.e.f. 27-11-2015:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
“PART X
EXEMPTION FROM MAINTAINING MULTIPLE REGISTERS SUBMISSION OF MULTIPLE RETURNS
17. Exemption from maintaining multiple registers and submission of multiple
returns under certain Labour Laws in the State of Madhya Pradesh.—Notwithstanding
anything contained in the provisions of the following Acts, namely—
(i) Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (No. 37 of 1970);
(ii) Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 (No. 25 of 1976);
(iii) Factories Act, 1948 (No. 63 of 1948);
(iv) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947);
(v) Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act,
1979 (No. 30 of 1979);
(vi) Labour Laws (Exemption from Furnishing Returns and Maintaining Registers by certain
Establishments) Act, 1988 (No. 51 of 1988);
(vii) Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (No. 53 of 1961);
(viii) Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (No. 11 of 1948);
(ix) Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (No. 27 of 1961);
(x) Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (No. 21 of 1965);
(xi) Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (No. 39 of 1972);
(xii) Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (No. 4 of 1936);
(xiii) Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976 (No. 11 of 1976);
the State Government by order may devise or notify forms for maintaining registers and records
and furnishing returns by an employer or establishment in lieu of the forms prescribed under
the said Acts and the rules made thereunder:
Provided that the State Government may allow the registers and records to be maintained
in computerised or digital formats.
PART XI
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
18. Power to make rules.—(1) The State Government, subject to the condition of
previous publication, may make rules for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this
Act.
(2) All rules made under this Act shall, as soon as after they are made, be laid on the
table of the Legislative Assembly.”
225
[39. Delegation of powers.—The appropriate Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, direct that any power exercisable by it under this Act or rules made thereunder
shall, in relation to such matters and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in
the direction, be exercisable also,—
(a) where the appropriate Government is the Central Government, by such officer or
authority subordinate to the Central Government or by the State Government or by
such officer or authority subordinate to the State Government, as may be specified in
the notification; and
(b) where the appropriate Government is a State Government, by such officer or authority
subordinate to the State Government as may be specified in the notification.]
226 [40. Power to amend Schedules.—(1) The appropriate Government may, if it is of opinion
that it is expedient or necessary in the public interest so to do, by notification in the Official
Gazette, add to the First Schedule any industry, and on any such notification being issued, the
First Schedule shall be deemed to be amended accordingly.
(2) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, add to or alter or
amend the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule and on any such notification being issued,
the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be
amended accordingly.
(3) Every such notification shall, as soon as possible after it is issued, be laid before the
Legislature of the State, if the notification has been issued by a State Government, or before
Parliament, if the notification has been issued by the Central Government.]
227 [FIRST SCHEDULE
[See Section 2(n)(vi)]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
INDUSTRIES WHICH MAY BE DECLARED TO BE PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICES UNDER SUB-CLAUSE

(vi) OF CLAUSE (n) OF SECTION 2
1. Transport (other than railways) for the carriage of passengers or goods 228 [by land or
water];
2. Banking;
3. Cement;
4. Coal;
5. Cotton textiles;
6. Foodstuffs;
7. Iron and steel;
8. Defence establishments;
9. Service in hospitals and dispensaries;
10. Fire Brigade Service;
229 [11. India Government Mints;
12. India Security Press;]

230 [13. Copper Mining;
14. Lead Mining;

15. Zinc Mining;]
231 [16. Iron Ore Mining;]
232 [17. Service in any oilfield;]
18. 233 [* * *]
234 [19. Service in the Uranium industry;]
235 [20. Pyrites mining industry;]
236 [21. Security Paper Mill, Hoshangabad;]
237 [22. Services in Bank Note Press, Dewas;]
238 [23. Phosphorite Mining;]
239 [24. Magnesite Mining;]
240
[25. Currency Note Press;]
241 [26. Manufacture or production of mineral oil (crude oil), motor and aviation spirit, diesel
oil, kerosene oil, fuel oil, diverse hydrocarbon oils and their blends including synthetic
fuels, lubricating oils and the like;]
242 [27. Service in the Airports Authority of India.]
243
[28. Industrial establishments manufacturing or producing Nuclear Fuel and Components,
Heavy Water and Allied Chemicals, and Atomic Energy.]
244 [29. Processing or production or distribution of fuel gases' (coal gas, natural gas and the
like).]
245
[30. Manufacturing of Alumina and Aluminium; and
31. Mining of Bauxite.]
246 [32. Services in the Bank Note Paper Mill India Private Limited, Mysore, Karnataka.]
STATE AMENDMENTS
ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR
247 11. Manufacture, marketing and distribution of petroleum products.
ANDHRA PRADESH
9. [Omitted vide A.P. Act XXII of 1968]
248 11. Manufacture, marketing and distribution of petroleum products industry.
249 13. Dairy farming.
250
14. Manufacturing heavy power equipment like steam turbines, turbo-alternators,
condensors, etc., industry.
251 15. Manufacturing pressure vessels, heat exchangers industry.
252 16. Chlorine production industry.
253
17. Nitrocellulose paints industry.
254 30. Hydrogen gas industry.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
255
31. Mishra Dhatu Nigam Ltd. industry.
ASSAM
256
10. Chemical fertilizer industry.
257 19. Electrical conductors.
BIHAR
258 Fertilizer including fertilizer (Planning and Development India Ltd.)
259
Copper reduction work.
260
Manufacture, marketing and distribution of petroleum products.
261
Manufacture, assembling and repairing of locomotives.
262 Manufacture and assembling of motor vehicles of all types.
263
Manufacture of motor vehicles, engines, parts and accessories.
264
Heavy Engineering Industry comprising of:
(a) major items of specialised equipment used in specific industries.
(b) general items of machinery used in several industries such as equipment required for
various unit processes,
(c) manufacture of machine tools.
265 Oxygen and Acetylene.
266 Explosive industry.
267 Ceramic and refractories industry.
268 Transportation of petroleum products by pipelines with all their installations and stations.
269 Aluminium industry.
DELHI
270 Chemical Fertilizer Industry.
271 Export oriented Units in Delhi, the entire production of which is exported.
GOA, DAMAN AND DIU

272 11. Production, supply and distribution of petroleum and petroleum products.
273 Service/Employment in Manufacture of Cement Pipes and Articles.
274 Distribution of essential commodities and Consumer goods to the members and the general
public by the Co-operative Societies.

GUJARAT
275 10. Oxygen and Acetylene.
276
11. Manufacture, marketing and distribution of petroleum products.
12. Fertilizers.
277 13. Rayon spinning industry.
278 14. Printing industry in which any process of printing by letter press, lithography,
photogravure or other similar work or work incidental to such process or book-binding is
carried on.
279
24. Polyester Filament yarn industry.
280 25. Any industry in relation to which State Government is the appropriate Government and
the entire production of which is exported.

HIMACHAL PRADESH
281
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
KARNATAKA
284 15. Manufacture, marketing and distribution of petroleum products industry.
285
16. Engineering industry (manufacturing machines, tools).
286 21. Aeronautical Engineering industry.
287 23. Aluminium industry.
288
25. Graphite industry.
289 29. Elevator Industry, Installation and service section.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
MADHYA PRADESH
290
13. Manufacture, marketing and distribution of petroleum products.
MAHARASHTRA
292
12. Mineral oil (crude oil), motor and aviation spirit, diesel oil, kerosene, fuel oil, diverse
hydrocarbon oils and their blends including synthetic fuels, lubricating oils and the like.
293
13. Vaccines.
294
14. Sera.
295
15. Antibiotics.
296 16. Catgut.
297 19. Rayon spinning industry.
298
20. Industry engaged in assembling and manufacture of aircrafts and their components.
299 21. Industry engaged in manufacture of Nylon and Polyester filament yarn.
300 22. Poultry farming.
301
23. Fresh yeast manufacturing, animal feed manufacturing industry.
302 24. Basic heavy organic chemicals.
MANIPUR
303
20. Any service in industry relating to manufacture, marketing and distribution of
petroleum products.
MEGHALAYA
304 Service in the National Airport Authority
ORISSA
305 Manufacture, marketing and distribution of petroleum products.
306
Chemical industry.
307 Ferro silicon industry.
308 Explosive industry.
309
Ferro chrome industry.
310 Aeronautic industry in Orissa.
PONDICHERRY
311
PUNJAB
312
11. Chemical fertilizer industry.
314 22. Harvesting through combines.
315 23. Manufacture, sale and supply of fertilizers.
RAJASTHAN
317
18. Manufacture and delivery of oxygen gas.
318
19. Works at Khetri Copper Project, Khetrinagar.
319 20. Works on Rajasthan Canal Project.
320 21. Works on Chambal Project.
321
22. Works on Mahi Bajaj Sagar Project.
322 23. Chemical and fertilizer industries.
323 24. Warehousing.
324
25. Works in dairy plant.
325 26. Works in chilling centres.
326 27. Works in milk producers cooperative union.
TAMIL NADU
327 11. Leather.
329
330 Rayon, Nylon and other synthetic fibre industry.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
331
Heavy Chemical Industry.
332
Industry in manufacture of steam generation equipments like high pressure boilers, valves
and fillings, pressure vessels and package boilers.
333
Production of aluminium.
334 Surgical and Pharmaceutical industry.
335
Heat Exchangers.
336
Magnesite Processing industry.
337
Electric goods manufacturing.
338
[Establishments engaged in the manufacture, distribution and service of vertical
transportation equipments.
339
[Industrial Establishments in the public sector, engaged in procurement, storage and
distribution of essential commodities such as—
(1) Rice (including paddy),
(2) Wheat and Wheat products,
(3) Jowar including milo,
(4) Bajra,
(5) Maize,
(6) Ragi,
(7) Sugar,
(8) Gram,
(9) Gram dhall,
(10) Toor,
(11) Toor dhall,
(12) Greengram,
(13) Urad,
(14) Urad dhall,
(15) Baby food,
(16) Groundnut oil, Gingelly oil, Coconut oil and imported edible oils including Palmolein
and R.B.D. Palm oil,
(17) Toilet and washing soaps,
(18) Kerosene.]
340 Hosiery industry.
341 Industries engaged in catering.
342 [The industrial units established in the Madras Export Processing Zone]
343
[Manufacture of boiler auxiliaries for high pressure boilers]
344 [Distilleries which produce industrial alcohol]
345
[Tea processing industry]
346
[All Co-operative institutions registered under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 engaged
in procurement, storage and distribution of essential commodities.]
347 [Newsprint paper manufacturing industry.]
348 [The service in National Airport Authority.]
349
[All industrial gases other than Oxygen and Acetylene manufacturing industry.]
350 [Industrial units whose entire production is exported.]
351 [Airports Authority of India (National Airports Division).]
352
[Services of the maintenance staff in the Project Offices of SIPCOT Industrial Complexes in
the State.]
353 [Industries manufacturing Heavy Duty Diesel Engines].
354 [Auto Components Manufacturing Industry.]
TRIPURA
355 Service in Airports Authority of India.
WEST BENGAL
356
11. Oxygen and Acetylene.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
357
12.Fertilizer.
358
13.Manufacture, marketing and distribution of petroleum products.
359
14.Yeast and distillery industries.
360 17.Battery manufacturing.
361
18.Graphite products.
362
19.Chemical.
363
20.Pharmaceutical.
364 21.Godown or any premises used for storing articles solely for export to foreign countries.]
THE SECOND SCHEDULE
[See Section 7]
MATTERS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF LABOUR COURTS
1. The propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing orders;
2. The application and interpretation of standing orders;
3. Discharge or dismissal of workmen including reinstatement of, or grant of relief to,
workmen wrongfully dismissed;
4. Withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege;
5. Illegality or otherwise of a strike or lock-out; and
6. All matters other than those specified in the Third Schedule.
STATE AMENDMENTS
MADHYA PRADESH.—(1) The Second Schedule shall be renumbered as Part A thereof and in
the Second Schedule after Part A as so renumbered the following Part shall be inserted, namely:
—
“PART B
[See Section 7-A]
CENTRAL ACTS OFFENCES WHEREUNDER TRIABLE BY LABOUR COURT
1. The Trade Unions Act, 1926 (16 of 1926).
2. The Payments of Wages Act, 1936 (4 of 1936).
3. The Factories Act, 1948 (63 of 1948).
4. The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (11 of 1948).
5. The Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948).
6. The Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952).
7. The Working Journalists and other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) and
Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 (45 of 1955).
8. The Motor Transport Workers Act, 1961 (27 of 1961).
9. The Maternity Benefits Act, 1961 (53 of 1961).
10. The Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 (21 of 1965).
11. The Beedi and Cigar Workers (Conditions of Employment) Act, 1966 (32 of 1966).
12. The Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (37 of 1970).
13. The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (39 of 1972).
14. The Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976 (11 of 1976).
15. The Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 (25 of 1976).
16. The Inter-State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service)
Act, 1979 (30 of 1979).”
—Vide M.P. Act 43 of 1981, S. 3 w.e.f. 26-1-1982. But see M.P. Act 26 of 2003, below.
(2) In the Second Schedule:—
(a) the words and letters “Part A” shall be omitted.
(b) “Part B” shall be omitted.—Vide M.P. Act 26 of 2003, S. 3 (w.e.f. 12-5-2003).
► Item 1.—The misconduct of committing theft of property worth rupee one does not justify dismissal.
National Textile Corporation v. Gurunath Vithal Tamase, 1993 Lab IC 1054 : (1993) 2 LLJ 176 : (1993) 65
FLR 242 (Bom).
► Item 6.—Regularisation cannot be claimed merely on the basis of completion of certain years of service
by an employee. It is for the employer to decide as to whether in view of the facts and circumstances of the
case, the services of those employees who were appointed on ad hoc/daily wage basis should be regularised.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Zakir Hussain v. Engineer-in-chief, Irrigation Department, (1994) 1 LLJ 5 : 1993 Lab IC 836 : (1994) 1 LLN
606 (All).
THE THIRD SCHEDULE
[See Section 7-A]
MATTERS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS
1. Wages, including the period and mode of payment;
2. Compensatory and other allowances;
3. Hours of work and rest intervals;
4. Leave with wages and holidays;
5. Bonus, profit sharing, provident fund and gratuity;
6. Shift working otherwise than in accordance with standing orders;
7. Classification by grades;
8. Rules of discipline;
9. Rationalisation;
10. Retrenchment of workmen and closure of establishment; and
11. Any other matter that may be prescribed.
► Item 1: Principle of relation back.—Where the domestic enquiry is found to be defective but the order
of dismissal in confirmed by the Labour Court on fresh evidence, the order of dismissal relates back to the date
of dismissal by the management are not entitled for back wages. B. Narayana v. District Manager, A.P. SRTC,
1994 Lab IC 2355 : (1994) 2 LLN 299 : (1994) 2 Cur LR 254 (AP). But where the dismissal is effected after an
illegal enquiry or without enquiry and the order of dismissal is confirmed by the Labour Court on fresh evidence
the order of dismissal comes into force from the date of the order of the Labour Court. Ibid.
THE FOURTH SCHEDULE
[See Section 9-A]
CONDITIONS OF SERVICE FOR CHANGE OF WHICHNOTICE IS TO BE GIVEN
1. Wages, including the period and mode of payment;
2. Contribution paid, or payable, by the employer to any provident fund or pension fund or
for the benefit for the workmen under any law for the time being in force;
3. Compensatory and other allowances;
4. Hours of work and rest intervals;
5. Leave with wages and holidays;
6. Starting, alteration or discontinuance of shift working otherwise than in accordance with
standing orders;
7. Classification by grades;
8. Withdrawal of any customary concession or privilege or change in usage;
9. Introduction of new rules of discipline, or alteration of existing rules, except insofar as they
are provided in standing orders;
10. Rationalisation, standardisation or improvement of plant or technique which is likely to
lead to retrenchment of workmen;
11. Any increase or reduction (other than casual) in the number of persons employed or to be
employed in any occupation or process or department or shift 365 [not occasioned by
circumstances over which the employer has no control].]
STATE AMENDMENT
GUJARAT.—In its application to the State of Gujarat, in the Fourth Schedule, entries at Serial
Nos. 6 and 11 shall be deleted. [Vide Gujarat Act 29 of 2015, S. 9 (w.e.f. 1-1-2016)]
366 [THE FIFTH SCHEDULE
[See Section 2(ra)]

I—On the part of employers and trade unions of employers
1. To interfere with, restrain from, or coerce, workmen in the exercise of their right to
organise, form, join or assist a trade union or to engage in concerted activities for the
purposes of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, that is to say—
(a) threatening workmen with discharge or dismissal, if they join a trade union;
(b) threatening a lock-out or closure, if a trade union is organised;
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(c) granting wage increase to workmen at crucial periods of trade union organisation, with
a view to undermining the efforts of the trade union at organisation.
2. To dominate, interfere with or contribute support, financial or otherwise, to any trade
union, that is to say—
(a) an employer taking an active interest in organising a trade union of his workmen; and
(b) an employer showing partiality or granting favour to one of several trade unions
attempting to organise his workmen or to its members, where such a trade union is not
a recognised trade union.
3. To establish employer-sponsored trade unions of workmen.
4. To encourage or discourage membership in any trade union by discriminating against any
workman, that is to say:—
(a) discharging or punishing a workman, because he urged other workmen to join or
organise a trade union;
(b) discharging or dismissing a workman for taking part in any strike (not being a strike
which is deemed to be an illegal strike under this Act);
(c) changing seniority rating of workmen because of trade union activities;
(d) refusing to promote workmen to higher posts on account of their trade union activities;
(e) giving unmerited promotions to certain workmen with a view to creating discord
amongst other workmen, or to undermine the strength of their trade union;
(f) discharging office-bearers or active members of the trade union on account of their
trade union activities.
5. To discharge or dismiss workmen—
(a) by way of victimisation;
(b) not in good faith, but in the colourable exercise of the employer's rights;
(c) by falsely implicating a workman in a criminal case on false evidence or on concocted
evidence;
(d) for patently false reasons;
(e) on untrue or trumped up allegations of absence without leave;
(f) in utter disregard of the principles of natural justice in the conduct of domestic enquiry
or with undue haste;
(g) for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without having any regard to the
nature of the particular misconduct or the past record or service of the workman,
thereby leading to a disproportionate punishment.
6. To abolish the work of a regular nature being done by workmen, and to give such work to
contractors as a measure of breaking a strike.
7. To transfer a workman mala fide from one place to another, under the guise of following
management policy.
8. To insist upon individual workmen, who are on a legal strike to sign a good conduct bond,
as a pre-condition to allowing them to resume work.
9. To show favouritism or partiality to one set of workers regardless of merit.
10. To employ workmen as “badlis”, casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for
years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent
workmen.
11. To discharge or discriminate against any workman for filing charges or testifying against
an employer in any enquiry or proceeding relating to any industrial dispute.
12. To recruit workmen during a strike which is not an illegal strike.
13. Failure to implement award, settlement or agreement.
14. To indulge in acts of force or violence.
15. To refuse to bargain collectively, in good faith with the recognised trade unions.
16. Proposing or continuing a lock-out deemed to be illegal under this Act.
II—On the part of workmen and trade unions of workmen
1. To advice or actively support or instigate any strike deemed to be illegal under this Act.
2. To coerce workmen in the exercise of their right to self-organisation or to join a trade
union or refrain from joining any trade union, that is to say—
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
(a) for a trade union or its members to picketing in such a manner that non-striking
workmen are physically debarred from entering the work places;
(b) to indulge in acts of force or violence or to hold out threats of intimidation in
connection with a strike against non-striking workmen or against managerial staff.
3. For a recognised union to refuse to bargain collectively in good faith with the employer.
4. To indulge in coercive activities against certification of a bargaining representative.
5. To stage, encourage or instigate such forms of coercive actions as wilful “go slow”,
squatting on the work premises after working hours or “gherao” of any of the members of
the managerial or other staff.
6. To stage demonstrations at the residences of the employers or the managerial staff
members.
7. To incite or indulge in wilful damage to employer's property connected with the industry.
8. To indulge in acts of force or violence or to hold out threats of intimidation against any
workman with a view to prevent him from attending work.]
STATE AMENDMENT
ANDHRA PRADESH.—In its application to the State of Andhra Pradesh, in the Fifth Schedule
under the Heading II on the part of workmen and trade unions of workmen, to Item 5, the
following explanation shall be added, namely—
“Explanation.—For the purpose of this paragraph, ‘go slow’ means any such activity by any
number of persons, employed in any industry, acting in combination or with common
understanding, to slow down or to delay the process of production or work purposely whether
called by work to rule or by any other name so as the fixed or average or normal level of
production or work or output of workman or workmen of the establishment is not achieved:
Provided that all necessary ingredients or inputs for standard quality production or work
are made available in time and in sufficient quantity.”. [Vide A.P. Act 12 of 2015, S. 4 (w.e.f.
22-7-2015)]
PUNJAB.—In its application to the State of Punjab, in Fifth Schedule, in Part II, after
Paragraph 5, the following Explanation shall be added, namely:—
called by work to rule or by any other name, so as the fixed or average or normal level of
production or work or output of workman or workmen of the establishment is not achieved:
are made available in time and in sufficient quantity.” [Vide Industrial Disputes (Punjab
Amendment) Ordinance, 2020, S. 6, dated 11-8-2020 (w.e.f. 11-8-2020)]
RAJASTHAN.—In its application to the State of Rajasthan, after the existing Paragraph 5 of
Part II to the Fifth Schedule, the following shall be added, namely—
called by work to rule or by any other name, so as the fixed or average or normal level of
production or work, or output of workman or workmen of the establishment is not achieved:
are made available in time and in sufficient quantity.”. [Vide Rajasthan Act 21 of 2014, S. 10
(w.e.f. 12-11-2014)]
► Part I: Item 7.—The dispute regarding the transfer of a clerk of a bank has to be decided by the forum
under the Industrial Disputes Act and not by the civil court. Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Ltd. v. T. Venkatesan,
(1992) 1 LLN 627 (Mad) (HC).
———
1.
For Statement of Objects and Reasons see Gaz. of India, 1946, Pt. V, pp. 239-240; for Report of Select Committee, see
ibid., 1947, Pt. V, pp. 33-35.
This Act has been amended in several States, the amendments being noted in the relevant places hereafter.
2.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 2 for the former sub-section (w.e.f. 29-8-1956).
3.
Extended to Sikkim vide S.O. 373(E), dt. 27-6-1979.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
4.
Proviso omitted by Act 15 of 1970.
5.
Certain words and figures inserted by Act 10 of 1963, S. 47, and Sch. II, Pt. II have been omitted by Act 36 of 1964, S. 2
(w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
6.
The words “by the Federal Railway Authority” omitted by the A.O. 1948.
7. Ins. by Act 65 of 1951, S. 32.
8.
The words “operating a Federal Railway” omitted by the A.O. 1950.
9.
Ins. by Act 47 of 1961, S. 51 and Sch. II, Pt. III (w.e.f. 1-1-1962).
10. Subs. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 2 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
11.
Subs. by Act 24 of 1996, S. 2 (w.e.f. 11-10-1995).
The words ‘or the “Indian Airlines” and “Air India” Corporations established under Section 3 of the Air Corporations Act,
12.
1953 (27 of 1953)’ omitted by Act 24 of 1996, S. 2 (w.e.f. 11-10-1995).

13.
14.
15.
Ins. by Act 42 of 1975, S. 29. This Act was repealed by Act 20 of 1978 and re-enacted as Act 44 of 1984. See S. 29 of
the latter Act.
16.
Ins. by Act 24 of 1996, S. 2 (w.e.f. 11-10-1995).
17.
Subs. by Act 54 of 1949, S. 3 for “a mine, oil-field”.
18.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 2 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
19.
20.
21. Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 2 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
22. Ins. by Act 43 of 1953, S. 2 (w.e.f. 24-12-1953).

23.
Cl. (aa) relettered as “(aaa)” by Act 36 of 1964, S. 2 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
24.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 3 for cl. (b) (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
25.
Subs. by Act 38 of 1959, S. 64 and Sch. III, Pt. II, for cl. (bb) which was inserted by Act 54 of 1949, S. 3.
26. Ins. by Act 28 of 1981, S. 40 and Sch. II.
27. Ins. by Act 62 of 1984 (w.e.f. 20-3-1985).
28.
Ins. by Act 53 of 1987.
29. The words “the Industrial Development Bank of India,” omitted by Act 53 of 2003, S. 12 and Sch. (w.e.f. 2-7-2004).
30.
Ins. by Act 39 of 1989, S. 53 and Sch. II (w.e.f. 7-3-1990).
31.
Subs. by Act 5 of 1970.
32.
Subs. by Act 40 of 1980.
33.
Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 2 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
34. Ins. by Act 65 of 1951, S. 32.

35.
Cl. (eee) ins. by Act 43 of 1953, S. 2 and omitted by Act 36 of 1964, S. 2 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
36.
Subs. by the A.O. 1948 for “a Government in British India”.
37.
Ins. by Act 45 of 1971 (w.e.f. 15-12-1971).
38.
Cl. (h) omitted by the A.O. 1950.
39. Ins. by Act 18 of 1952, S. 2.
40.
On enforcement of S. 2(c ) of Act 46 of 1982, clause (j) shall be substituted by this italicized version.
41. Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 2 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
42.
Ins. by Act 54 of 1949, S. 3.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
43.
Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 2 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
44.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 3 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
45.
Renumbered by Act 46 of 1982, S. 2.
46. Ins. by Act 43 of 1953, S. 2 (w.e.f. 24-10-1953).

47.
48.
49. Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 2 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
50.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 3 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
51.
Ins. by Act 45 of 1971 (w.e.f. 15-12-1971).
52.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 8 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
53. Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 8 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
54.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 2, for “Schedule” (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
55. Ins. by Act 43 of 1953, S. 2 (w.e.f. 24-10-1953).
56.
Ins. by Act 49 of 1984, S. 2 (w.e.f. 18-8-1984).
57. Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 3, for cl. (p) (w.e.f. 7-10-1956).
58.
Ins. by Act 35 of 1965.
59. Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 2 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
60.
Subs. by Act 18 of 1957, S. 2, for cl. (r) (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
61.
Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 2 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
62.
Ins. by Act 43 of 1953, S. 2 (w.e.f. 24-10-1953).
63. Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 2 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
64.
65.
Subs. for “one thousand six hundred rupees” by Act 24 of 2010, S. 2 (w.e.f. 15-9-2010).
66.
Ins. by Act 35 of 1965, S. 3 (w.e.f. 1-12-1965).
67.
Renumbered as sub-section (1) by Act 24 of 2010, S. 3 (w.e.f. 15-9-2010).
68. Ins. by Act 24 of 2010, S. 3 (w.e.f. 15-9-2010).
70.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 3 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
71. Omitted by Act 46 of 1982, S. 3 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
72.
Clauses (a) and (b) relettered as (d) and (e) respectively by S. 3, Act 36 of 1964 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
73.
Clauses (a) and (b) relettered as (d) and (e) respectively by S. 3, Act 36 of 1964 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
74.
Ins. by Act 24 of 2010, S. 4 (w.e.f. 15-9-2010).
75.
Ins. by I.D. (Mah) (Amendment) Act, 1974.
76.
Ins. by Mah. Act 22 of 1976.
77.
Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 4 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
78.
Ins. by Act 7 of 2017, S. 158(a) (w.e.f. 26-5-2017).
79.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 4 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
80.
Omitted by Act 46 of 1982, S. 4 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
81. Ins. by Act 24 of 2010, S. 5 (w.e.f. 15-9-2010).
82.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
83. Ins. by Act 7 of 2017, S. 158(b) (w.e.f. 26-5-2017).

84.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 5, for Ss. 8 and 9 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
85.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 6 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
86.
87.
88.
Subs. by Act 18 of 1952, S. 3, for “If any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the appropriate Government may”.
89.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 7, for cl. (c ) (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
90. Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 7, for “provided that” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
91.
Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 8 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
92.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 7 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
93.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 7, for “or Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
94.
Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 8 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
95. Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 7, for “or Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
96.
Ins. by Act 18 of 1952, S. 3.
97.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 7 for “a Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
98.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 7 for “the Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
99.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 7 for “Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
100.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 7 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
101. Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 5 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
102.
Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 8 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
103.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 8 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
104.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 6 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
105. Subs. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 6, for “fourteen days” (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
106.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
107.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
108.
Subs. for sub-s. (1) by Act 36 of 1956, S. 9 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
109.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 9, for “Court or Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
110. Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 9, for “and Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
111.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 9 for “or Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
112.
113.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 9 (w.e.f. 17-9-1956).
114.
Subs. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 9 for certain words (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 9, for sub-sections (5) to (7) (w.e.f. 10-3-1957), sub-section (7) was ins. by Act 48 of
115.
1950, S. 34 and Sch.
116.
Ins. by Act 48 of 1950, S. 34 and Sch.
117.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 9, for “Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
118.
119.
Ins. by Act 24 of 2010, S. 7 (w.e.f. 15-9-2010).
120.
Ins. by Act 45 of 1971, S. 3 (w.e.f. 15-12-1971).
121.
Ins. by Act 35 of 1965, S. 4 (w.e.f. 1-12-1965).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
122.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 10 for “or Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
123. Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 10 (w.e.f. 17-9-1956).
124.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 8 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
125.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 11, for “Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
126.
Subs. by Act 40 of 1951, S. 6, for “of the notice under S. 22”.
Ss. 15, 16, 17 and 17-A subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 12, for Ss. 15, 16, 17 and 17-A (w.e.f. 10-3-1957), S. 17-A was ins.
127.
by Act 48 of 1950, S. 34 and Sch.

128.
129.
Old S. 17-B renumbered by W.B. Act 34 of 1983, S. 4 (w.e.f. 30-11-1981).
130. Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 11 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
131.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 13 (w.e.f. 7-10-1956).
132. Subs. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 9, for “An arbitration award” (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
133.
S. 18 renumbered as sub-section (3) of that section by Act 36 of 1956, S. 13 (w.e.f. 7-10-1956).
134.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 9 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
135.
Subs. by Act 48 of 1950, S. 34 and Schedule, for “an award which is declared by the appropriate Government to be
binding under sub-section (2) of S. 15”.
136. Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 13 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
137.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 9 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
138. Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 13 for “or Tribunal”(w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
The words “arrived at in the course of a conciliation proceeding under this Act” omitted by Act 36 of 1956, S. 14 (w.e.f.
139.
7-10-1956).
140. Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 14 (w.e.f. 7-10-1956).
141.
Subs. by Act 48 of 1950, S. 34 and Sch., for sub-s. (3).
142.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 14 (w.e.f. 17-9-1956).
143.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 14 for “to a Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
144.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 14, for “the Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
145.
The words “subject to the provision for appeal” omitted by Act 36 of 1956, S. 14 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 10 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964). The former sub-section (7) was omitted by Act 36 of 1956, S. 14
146.
(w.e.f. 17-9-1956).
147. Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 15, for “or Tribunals” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
148.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 15, for “before a Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
149.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 15, for “reference of a dispute for adjudication” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
150.
Subs. by Act 18 of 1952, S. 4, for certain words and figures.
151.
152.
153.
154.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 16 for “Court or Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
155.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 17, for “a Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
156.
The word “or” omitted by Act 36 of 1964, S. 11 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
157. Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 11 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
158.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 12 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
159. Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 12 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
160.
161.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 12 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
162.
Ins. by Act 43 of 1953, S. 3 (w.e.f. 24-10-1953).
163.
Subs. by Act 32 of 1976, S. 2, for “shall not apply—” (w.e.f. 5-3-1976).
164. Subs. by Act 48 of 1954, S. 2, for the former Explanation (w.e.f. 1-4-1954).
165.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 13, for the former S. 25-B (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
166.
Subs. by Act 35 of 1965, S. 5.
167.
Proviso omitted by Act 49 of 1984, S. 3 (w.e.f. 18-8-1984).
168.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 14, “for every completed year of service”(w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
169.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 14 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
170.
Ss. 25-FF and 25-FFF subs. by Act 18 of 1957, S. 3, for the former section (w.e.f. 28-11-1956); S. 25-FF was ins. by
Act 41 of 1956, S. 3.
171.
Ins. by Act 32 of 1972, S. 2.
173.
Ins. by Act 45 of 1971, S. 4 (w.e.f. 15-12-1971).
174.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 15, for “completed year of service” (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
175.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 16, for certain words (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
176.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 17, for the former proviso (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
177. Ins. by Act 32 of 1976, S. 3 (w.e.f. 5-3-1976).
178.
Subs. for “three” by Act 46 of 1982, S. 12 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
179.
Subs. by Act 49 of 1984, S. 4(a) (w.e.f. 18-8-1984).
180.
Sub-sections (2) to (9) subs. by Act 49 of 1984, S. 4(b) (w.e.f. 18-8-1984) for sub-sections (2) to (5).
181.
Sub-section (6) renumbered as sub-section (10) by Act 49 of 1984, S. 4(b) (w.e.f. 18-8-1984).
182.
183.
184.
Words “clause (c ) of sub-section (1) or sub-section (4) of” omitted by Act 49 of 1984, S. 6 (w.e.f. 18-8-1984).
185.
186.
Omitted by Act 46 of 1982, S. 15 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
187.
Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 16 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
188.
189.
Ins. by Act 35 of 1965, S. 6 (w.e.f. 1-12-1965).
190.
Ins. by Act 32 of 1972, S. 3.
191.
192.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 18 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
193.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 18 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
194.
Subs. by Act 45 of 1971, S. 5, for “an officer” (w.e.f. 15-12-1971).
195.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 18 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
196.
197.
Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 17 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
198.
Ins. by Act 48 of 1950, S. 34 and Sch.
199.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
200.
201.
Ss. 33-B and 33-C ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 23 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
202.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 19 for the former section (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
203.
204.
Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 19 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
205. Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 19 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
206.
207.
Subs. by Act 48 of 1950, S. 34 and Sch., for the original section.
208. Subs. by Act 45 of 1971 (w.e.f. 15-12-1971).
209.
Subs. by Act 45 of 1971 (w.e.f. 15-12-1971).
210. Subs. by Act 45 of 1971 (w.e.f. 15-12-1971).
211.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 24, for “before a Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
212.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 24, for “with the leave of the Tribunal” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
213.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 25 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
214. Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 21 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
215.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 26, for “and Tribunals” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
216.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 26 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
217.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 20 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
Omitted by Act 24 of 2010, S. 8 (w.e.f. 15-9-2010). Earlier clause (ab) was inserted by Act 46 of 1982, S. 22. Prior to
218.
omission it read as:

“(ab) the constitution of Grievance Settlement Authorities referred to in Section 9-C, the manner in which industrial
disputes may be referred to such authorities for settlement, the procedure to be followed by such authorities in the
proceedings in relation to disputes referred to them and the period within which such proceedings shall be completed;”
219.
220.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 26 for “Boards and Tribunals” (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
221.
222.
Ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 26 (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
223. Ins. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 20 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
224.
Subs. by Act 32 of 1976 (w.e.f. 5-3-1976).
225.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 27, for S. 39 (w.e.f. 17-9-1956).
Subs. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 21, for S. 40 (w.e.f. 19-12-1964) which was ins. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 28. Original S. 40 was
226.
repealed by Act 35 of 1950, S. 2 and Sch. 1.

227.
First to fourth Schedules subs. by Act 36 of 1956, S. 29, for the original Sch. (w.e.f. 10-3-1957).
228.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 22, for “by land, water or air” (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
229.
Ins. by S.O. 2193, dt. 30-6-1965, published in Gaz. of India, Pt. II, S. 3(ii), dt. 10-7-1965, p. 2340.
230.
Items 13 to 15 added by Noti. No. 1444, dt. 3-5-1966.
231.
Ins. by S.O. 726, published in Gaz. of India, Pt. II, S. 3(ii), dt. 4-3-1967.
232. Ins. by Noti. No. 1776, dt. 10-5-1967.
233.
Deleted by Act 45 of 1971 (w.e.f. 15-12-1971).
234. Ins. by Noti. published in Gaz. of India, dt. 27-4-1968, Pt. II, S. 3(ii), p. 2004, 1968 Lab IC Item 792.
Ins. by S.O. 2061, dt. 30-5-1970, Gaz. of India, dt. 6-6-1970, Pt. II, S. 3(ii), p. 2616, 1970 Lab IC Item 726 : (1970) 38
235.
FJR 15.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
236.
As per Govt. of India publication (1980).
Ins. by S.O. 4697, dt. 26-11-1976, published in Gaz. of India, dt. 11-12-1976, Pt. II, S. 3(ii), p. 4286, 1977 Lab IC 115 :
237.
(1977) 50 FJR 49.

238.
Ins. by S.O. 47, dt. 17-12-1976, published in Gaz. of India, dt. 1-1-1977, Pt. II, S. 3(ii), p. 69, (1977) 51 FJR 72.
239.
Ins. by S.O. 2474, dt. 4-9-1980.
240.
Ins. by S.O. 2474, dt. 4-9-1980.
241. Ins. by S.O. 4207, dt. 20-11-1984.
242.
Ins. by S.O. 1919, dt. 8-7-1987 and substituted by S.O. 1808(E), dt. 5-8-2011.
243.
Ins. by S.O. 967, dt. 8-4-1995.
244. Subs. by S.O. 1955(E), dt. 20-6-2017.
245.
Ins. by S.O. 1431(E), dt. 27-6-2012.
246. Added by S.O. 251(E), dt. 25-1-2017.
247.
Ins. by Noti. published in A.P. Gaz., Ext., dt. 13-3-1968, 1968 Lab IC Item 796.
248.
Ins. by Noti. published in A.P. Gaz., dt. 30-11-1967, Pt. I, p. 2073, 1968 Lab IC Item 187.
249.
Ins. by Noti. published in A.P. Gaz., dt. 8-8-1968, Pt. I, p. 1477, 1968 Lab IC Item 1221.
250. Ins. by Noti. published in A.P. Gaz., dt. 1-4-1970, Pt. I, 1970 Lab IC 484.
251.
Ins. by Noti. published in A.P. Gaz., dt. 24-3-1972, Pt. I, Ext. No. 87, 1972 Lab IC Item 625.
252.
Ins. by Noti. published in A.P. Gaz., dt. 24-4-1972, Pt. I, p. 2, No. 100, 1972 Lab IC 811.
253.
Ins. by Noti. published in A.P. Gaz., dt. 24-4-1975, Pt. I, p. 33, 1974 Lab IC 335.
254.
Ins. by Noti. published in A.P. Gaz., dt. 18-2-1982, Pt. I, p. 204, 1982 Lab IC 50.
255.
Ins. by Noti. published in A.P. Gaz., Ext., dt. 22-2-1983, Pt. I, p. 1, 1983 Lab IC 261 : (1984) 64 FJR 246.
256.
Ins. by Noti. published in Assam Gaz., dt. 8-11-1967, Pt. II-A, p. 2487, 1968 Lab IC 196.
257. Ins. by Noti. published in Assam Gaz., dt. 26-5-1971, Pt. II-A, p. 1325, 1971 Lab IC 987.
258.
Ins. by Noti. published in Bihar Gaz., dt. 4-4-1979, Pt. II, p. 625, 1979 Lab IC 598. Noti. No. 111/D-1-2006/67 L&E 7852,
dt. 7-7-1967 cancelled—S.O. 628, dt. 14-12-1978.
Ins. by S.O. 143, dt. 28-2-1968, published in Bihar Gaz., dt. 27-3-1968, Ext. No. Pat 217, 1968 Lab IC Item 658 : 33 FJR
259.
141.
260. Ins. by Noti. published in Bihar Gaz., dt. 11-9-1968, Pt. II, p. 1876, 1968 Lab IC Item 1343.
261.
Ins. by Noti. published in Bihar Gaz., dt. 28-12-1968, Pt. II, Ext., p. 2, 1969 Lab IC Item 161.
262.
Ibid.
263.
264.
265.
Added by Bihar Act 8 of 1958, S. 2.
266.
Ins. by Noti. published in Bihar Gaz., dt. 3-11-1971, Pt. II, Ext. No. 722, 1972 Lab IC Item 33.
267.
Ins. by S.O. 666 published in Bihar Gaz., dt. 12-5-1973, Ext. p. 2, No. 571, 1973 Lab IC Item 1054 : 43 FLR 211.
268.
Ins. by Noti. published in Bihar Gaz., dt. 26-11-1975, Pt. II, p. 1660, 1976 Lab IC Item 319.
269.
Ins. by Noti. published in Bihar Gaz., dt. 8-3-1978, Pt. II, p. 197, 1978 Lab IC Item 591.
270.
Ins. by Noti. published in Delhi Gaz., Pt. IV, p. 146, dt. 12-4-1967.
271.
Ins. by Noti. published in Delhi Gaz., dt. 8-7-1994, Pt. IV (Extra.), p. 1.
272.
Ins. by Noti. published in Goa Gaz., dt. 26-8-1971, Sr. 1, p. 300, 1971 Lab IC Item 1514.
273.
Ins. by Noti. published in Goa Gaz., Sr. 1, p. 283, dt. 27-8-1987.
274.
Ins. by Noti. published in Goa Gaz., Sr. 1, p. 247, dt. 21-9-1995.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
275.
Ins. as Item 11 by Noti. dt. May 7, 1965, but renumbered as item 10 by Noti. dt. Oct. 28, 1965, Pt. I-L, dt. 4-11-1965,
p. 2771.
276.
Subs. by Noti. published in Gujarat Government Gaz., dt. 8-8-1968, Pt. I-L, p. 1675, 1968 Lab IC Item 1227.
277.
Ins. by Noti. published in Gujarat Government Gaz., dt. 8-8-1968, Pt. I-L, p. 1676, 1968 Lab IC Item 1228.
278.
Ins. by Noti. published in Gujarat Government Gaz., dt. 14-12-972, Pt. I-L, p. 6166, 1973 Lab IC Item 302.
279.
Ins. by Noti. published in Gujarat Government Gaz., dt. 24-4-1982, Pt. I-L, Ext. No. 32, p. 136, 61 FJR 102.
280.
Ins. by Noti. published in Gujarat Government Gaz., dt. 9-6-1982, Explanatory No. 50, Pt. I-L, p. 176, 61 FJR 102.
281.
Ins. by Noti. published in H.P. Gaz., dt. 29-3-1969, Pt. I, p. 308, 1969 Lab IC Item 521.
282.
Ins. by Noti. published in J&K Gaz., dt. 11-10-1972, Pt. I-B Explanatory (No. 27X), 1973 Lab IC Item 57.
283.
Added by Mysore Act VI of 1963.
284.
Ins. by Noti. published in Karn. Gaz., dt. 16-11-1967, Pt. IV-2C(ii), p. 5235, 1968 Lab IC 214.
285. Ins. by Noti. published in Karn. Gaz., dt. 27-2-1969, Pt IV-2C(ii), p. 1101, 1969 Lab IC 419.
286.
Ins. by Noti. published in Karn. Gaz., dt. 3-10-1968 Pt. IV-2C(ii), p. 4444, 34 FJR 223 : 1968 Lab IC 1472.
287.
Ins. by Noti. published in Karn. Gaz., dt. 1-3-1973, Pt. IV-2C(ii), p. 1028, 1973 Lab IC Item 595.
288.
Ins. by Noti. published in Karn. Gaz., dt. 31-7-1975, Pt. IV-2C(ii), p. 4372, 1975 Lab IC 1057 : 48 FJR 117.
289. Ins. by Noti. published in Karn. Gaz., dt. 28-7-1983, Pt. IV-2C(ii), p. 1434, 1984 Lab IC 54.
290.
Ins. by Noti. published in M.P. Gaz., dt. 22-1-1971, Pt. I, p. 115, 1971 Lab IC 308.
291. Added by Mah. Act 2 of 1963, S. 3.
292.
Added by Mah. Act 2 of 1963, S. 3.
293.
294.
295. Added by Mah. Act 2 of 1963, S. 3.
296.
297.
Ins. by Noti. published in Mah. Gaz., dt. 3-7-1969, Pt. I-L, Ext., p. 143, 1977 Lab IC Item 881.
298.
Ins. by Noti. published in Mah. Gaz., dt. 1-5-1969, Pt. I-L, p. 2306, 1969 Lab IC Item 608.
299.
Ins. by Noti. published in Mah. Gaz., dt. 3-7-1969, Pt. I-L, p. 3252, 1969 Lab IC 780 : 36 FJR 1.
300. Ins. by Noti. published in Mah. Gaz., dt. 5-10-1972, Pt. I-L, p. 6394, 1973 Lab IC Item 66.
Ins. by Noti. published in Mah. Gaz., dt. 15-3-1973, Pt. I-L, p. 2421 and Mah. Gaz., dt. 29-3-1973, Pt. I-L, p. 2765, 1973
301.
Lab IC Item 593.

302.
Ins. by Noti. published in Mah. Gaz., dt. 18-4-1977, Pt. I-L, Ext., p. 143, 1977 Lab IC Item 881.
303.
Ins. by Noti. published in Manipur Gaz., dt. 16-3-1970, Ext., p. 1, 1970 Lab IC Item 896.
304.
Ins. by Noti. Published in Meghlaya Gaz. Pt. V-A, p. 236 dt. 30-5-1991.
305.
Ins. by Noti. Published in Orissa Gaz., dt. 22-3-1968, Pt. III, p. 392, 1968 Lab IC Item 667.
306.
Ins. by Noti. published in Orissa Gaz., dt. 22-3-1968, Pt. III, p. 393, 1968 Lab IC Item 666.
307.
308.
Ins. by Noti. published in Orissa Gaz., dt. 20-2-1970, Pt. III-A, p. 22, 1970 Lab IC Item 401.
309.
310.
311.
Ins. by Noti. published in Pondi. Gaz., dt. 3-6-1969, p. 291, 1969 Lab IC Item 704.
312.
Ins. by Noti. published in Punjab Gaz., Extra., dt. 3-11-1967, Pt. I, p. 1069, 1968 Lab IC Item 216.
313.
Ins. by Noti. published in Punjab Gaz., dt. 29-3-1968, Pt. I, p. 441, 1968 Lab IC Item 670.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
314. Ins. by Noti. published in Punjab Gaz., Extra., dt. 23-5-1978, p. 793, 53 FJR 48.
315.
Ibid.
316.
Ins. by Noti. published in Raj. Gaz., dt. 4-11-1967, Pt. IV(Ga) Ext., p. 685, 1968 Lab IC Item 218.
317.
Ins. by Noti. published in Raj. Gaz., dt. 26-9-1969, Pt. IV(Ga) (ii), Ext., p. 1046, 1969 Lab IC Item 1110.
318.
Ins. by Noti. published in Raj. Gaz., dt. 23-12-1972, Pt. I (Kha) Ext., p. 1, 1973 Lab IC Item 320.
319. Ins. by Noti. published in Raj. Gaz., dt. 26-4-1973, Pt. IV (Ga), p. 79, 1973 Lab IC Item 899.
320.
Ins. by Noti. published in Raj. Gaz., dt. 26-4-1973, Pt. IV (Ga), p. 79, 1973 Lab IC Item 899.
321.
Ins. by Noti. published in Raj. Gaz., dt. 26-4-1973, Pt. IV (Ga), p. 79, 1973 Lab IC Item 899.
322. Ins. by Noti. published in Raj. Gaz., dt. 3-5-1973, Pt. IV (Gha), p. 23, 43 FJR 224.
323.
Ins. by Noti. published in Raj. Gaz., dt. 11-1-1975, Pt. IV (Ga)(ii), Ext., p. 417, 1975 Lab IC Item 312 : 47 FJR 263.
324. Ins. by Noti. published in Raj. Gaz., dt. 7-4-1980, Pt. V (Gha) Extra., p. 1, 57 FJR 144.
325.
Ins. by Noti. published in Raj. Gaz., dt. 7-4-1980, Pt. V (Gha) Extra., p. 1, 57 FJR 144.
326. Ins. by Noti. published in Raj. Gaz., dt. 7-4-1980, Pt. V (Gha) Extra., p. 1, 57 FJR 144.
327.
Added by Madras Act 9 of 1963.
328. Added by Madras Act 9 of 1963.
329.
Ins. by G.O.Ms. 1320, dt. 17-4-1967.
330.
Ins. by Noti. published in T.N. Gaz., dt. 13-5-1970, Pt II, S. I, p. 810, 1970 Lab IC Item 736.
331.
Ins. by G.O.Ms. 761, dt. 5-6-1970.
332. Ins. by Noti. published in T.N. Gaz., dt. 2-12-1970, Pt. II, S. 1, p. 1783, 1971 Lab IC 38.
333.
Ins. by Noti. published in T.N. Gaz., dt. 27-6-1973, Pt. II, S. 1, p. 324, 1973 Lab IC 1229 : 44 FJR 19.
334.
Ins. by G.O.Ms. 514, dt. 15-3-1980.
335.
Ins. by G.O.Ms. 2627, dt. 18-11-1980.
336.
Ins. by G.O.Ms. 1533, dt. 16-7-1981.
337.
Ins. by Noti. published in T.N. Gaz., dt. 13-4-1983, Pt. II, S. 2, p. 301 as amended by T.N. Gaz., 12-10-1983, Pt. II, S. 2,
p. 854, 63 FJR 231, 232.
338.
Ins. by G.O.Ms. 1206, dt. 20-5-1983.
339. Ins. by G.O.Ms. 1961, dt. 16-8-1983.

340.
Ins. by Noti. published in T.N. Gaz., dt. 6-6-1984, Pt. II, S. 2, Extra., No. 239, 65 FJR 126.
341.
Ins. by Noti. published in T.N. Gaz., dt. 30-5-1984, Pt. II, S. 2, p. 473, 64 FJR 314.
342.
Added by G.O. Ms. No. 2262, dated the 31st October, 1985 and amended by G.O. Ms. No. 684, Labour, 12th April, 1988.
343.
Added by G.O. Ms. No. 1886, dated the 29th September, 1986.
344.
Added by G.O. Ms. No. 1733, dated the 25th September, 1989.
345.
Added by G.O. Ms. No. 980, dt. 6th September, 1990.
346.
Subs. by G.O. No. 239, dt. 2nd December, 1994.
347.
Added by G.O. (D) No. 80, dt. 11th January, 1991.
348.
Added by G.O. Ms. No. 163, dt. 3rd June, 1991.
349.
Added by G.O. Ms. No. 209, (D-2), dated 29th September, 1992.
350.
Added by G.O. Ms. No. 90, dated the 20th May, 1994.
351.
Added by G.O. Ms. No. 90, dated the 30th May, 1995.
352.
Added by G.O. Ms. No. 135, dated the 17th July, 1995.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
353.
Added by G.O. Ms. No. 108, (D-2), dated the 22nd July, 1997.
354.
Added by G.O. Ms. No. 144, dated 3-12-2014.
355.
Ins. by Noti. published in Tripura Gaz. (Extra.), Pt. I, p. 1, dt. 2-8-1995.
356.
Added by W.B. Act 25 of 1961.
357.
Ins. by Noti. published in Cal. Gaz., dt. 25-1-1968, Pt. I, p. 183, 1968, Lab IC Item 802.
358.
Ins. by Noti. published in Cal. Gaz., dt. 25-1-1968, Pt. I, p. 183, 1968, Lab IC Item 802.
359.
Ins. by Noti. published in Cal. Gaz., dt. 28-3-1968, Pt. I, p. 715, 1968 Lab IC Item 671.
360.
Ins. by Noti. published in Cal. Gaz., dt. 14-11-974, Pt. I, p. 1807, 1975 Lab IC Item 221 : 48 FJR 87.
361.
Ins. by Noti. published in Cal. Gaz., dt. 5-12-1974, Pt. 1, p. 2074, 47 FJR 137.
362. Ins. by Noti. published in Cal. Gaz., dt. 28-10-1976, Pt. I, p. 2796, 1977 Lab IC Item 125.
363.
Ins. by Noti. published in Cal. Gaz., dt. 28-10-1976, Pt. I, p. 2796, 1977 Lab IC Item 125.
364. Ins. by Noti. published in Cal. Gaz., dt. 28-10-1976, Pt. I, p. 2796, 1977 Lab IC Item 125.
365.
Subs. by Act 36 of 1964, S. 23, for “not due to forced matters” (w.e.f. 19-12-1964).
366.
Ins. by Act 46 of 1982, S. 23 (w.e.f. 21-8-1984).
Disclaimer: While every effort is made to avoid any mistake or omission, this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/ regulation/ circular/ notification is being
circulated on the condition and understanding that the publisher would not be liable in any manner by reason of any mistake or omission or for any action taken or
omitted to be taken or advice rendered or accepted on the basis of this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/ regulation/ circular/ notification. All disputes will
be subject exclusively to jurisdiction of courts, tribunals and forums at Lucknow only. The authenticity of this text must be verified from the original source.

N Industrial Disputes Act 1947 Pnarangoffice Gmailcom 20200917 095803 1 160

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

N Industrial Disputes Act 1947 Pnarangoffice Gmailcom 20200917 095803 1 160

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

N Industrial Disputes Act 1947 Pnarangoffice Gmailcom 20200917 095803 1 160

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SCC Online Web Edition, Copyright © 2020

Page 1 Thursday, September 17, 2020

[Act 14 of 1947 as amended up to Act 7 of 2017]1

1. Short title, extent and commencement

2-A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute

AUTHORITIES UNDER THIS ACT

7-B. National Tribunals

7-D. Qualifications, terms and conditions of service of Presiding Officer

9. Finality of orders constituting Boards, etc

9-A. Notice of change

9-B. Power of Government to exempt

GRIEVANCE REDRESSAL MACHINERY

REFERENCE OF DISPUTES TO BOARDS, COURTS OR TRIBUNALS

10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals

10-A. Voluntary reference of disputes to arbitration

PROCEDURE, POWERS AND DUTIES OF AUTHORITIES

12. Duties of conciliation officers

13. Duties of Board

14. Duties of Courts

15. Duties of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals

16. Form of report or award

17. Publication of reports and awards

17-A. Commencement of the award

17-B. Payment of full wages to workman pending proceedings in higher courts

18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding

19. Period of operation of settlements and awards

20. Commencement and conclusion of proceedings

21. Certain matters to be kept confidential

STRIKES AND LOCK-OUTS

22. Prohibition of strikes and lock-outs

23. General prohibition of strikes and lock-outs

24. Illegal strikes and lock-outs

25. Prohibition of financial aid to illegal strikes and lock-outs

LAY-OFF AND RETRENCHMENT

25-A. Application of Sections 25-C to 25-E

25-B. Definition of continuous service

25-C. Right of workmen laid off for compensation

25-D. Duty of an employer to maintain muster-rolls of workmen

25-E. Workmen not entitled to compensation in certain cases

25-F. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen

25-FF. Compensation to workmen in case of transfer of undertakings

25-FFF. Compensation to workmen in case of closing down of undertakings

25-G. Procedure for retrenchment

25-H. Re-employment of retrenched workmen

25-I. Recovery of moneys due from employers under this Chapter

25-J. Effect of laws inconsistent with this Chapter

SPECIAL PROVISIONS RELATING TO LAY-OFF, RETRENCHMENT AND CLOSURE IN CERTAIN

25-K. Application of Chapter V-B

25-M. Prohibition of lay-off

25-N. Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen

25-O. Procedure for closing down an undertaking

25-P. Special provision as to restarting of undertakings closed down before commencement of

25-Q. Penalty for lay-off and retrenchment without previous permission

25-R. Penalty for closure

UNFAIR LABOUR PRACTICES

25-T. Prohibition of unfair labour practice

25-U. Penalty for committing unfair labour practices

26. Penalty for illegal strikes and lock-outs

27. Penalty for instigation, etc

30. Penalty for disclosing confidential information