Talcott Parsons - Toward A General Theory of Action (1962, Harvard University Press) - Páginas-9-15,19-45

H
I n the fall of 1948 some members of the Department of So-
cial Relations of Harvard University had an informal discussion with the offi-
cers of the Carnegie Corporation of New York about the possibility of a "stock-
taking" of the theoretical resources of the field of Social Relations. It seemed
to both groups that a careful analysis of the theoretical foundations underlying
the synthesis which had been worked out on the organizational level through
the foundation of the Department of Social Relations two years before might
be useful not only in the Department itself but for the development of the so-
cial sciences generally. Within the Department it seemed likely to help greatly
in clarifying the problems we faced individually in our teaching and research

as well as in our corporate capacity as a department.
After some exploration of the feasibility of the project, the Carnegie Cor-
poration kindly placed a grant at the disposal of the Department. This grant
was supplemented by funds from the Laboratory of Social Relations at Har-
vard. Through the cooperation of Provost Paul H. Buck of Harvard, I was re-
lieved of teaching and administrative duties for the fall term of 1949-50, and
two distinguished scholars, Professor Edward C. Tolman of the University of
California and Professor Edward A. Shils of the University of Chicago, were
invited to come to Harvard for the term to collaborate in the project. In addi-
tion, the services of Richard C. Sheldon, Fellow of the Russian Research Cen-
ter and a social anthropologist, were made available on a full-time basis. The
four of us constituted the staff of the project.
In addition to the direct work of the staff, we decided to hold a series of dis-
cussions with each of two groups, out of which it was hoped that clear lines of
hinking would emerge. Because of the great advantages of discussion in a
mall group, especially when such subtle questions are at issue, one such group
.vas organized. This, besides the four staff members, consisted in the five who
have collaborated with the staff in the present volume. However, this policy, if
adhered to alone, would have meant going without the extremely valuable
contributions of many other, especially the younger, members of the Depart-
ment. Hence all interested members of the Department were invited to partici-
pate with the staff in a second discussion group on theoretical problems.
Many of the more important ideas published here owe much to this larger,
and younger, group.
Both of these groups met weekly from late September 1949 through Janu-
ary 1950. A highly informal procedure was followed. There had previously
been circulated within the Department some three versions of a document
It 94536
vi Preface
entitled "Assumptions of Basic Social Science," which had been formulated

in connection with the departmental proseminar on Problems and Concepts
of Social Relations.* This document was taken as the point of departure, and
various attempts to begin a revision of it were made. Some members of the
group also drafted memoranda on particular theoretical problem areas.

In November we reached agreement that the general theoretical scheme in
which we were interested could be couched within what we agreed (in the
smaller group) to call the "action" frame of reference. Shortly after that, stim-
ulated especially by Clyde Kluckhohn's presentation, before the smaller group,

of his approach to the analysis of values, the staff evolved a number of new
theoretical insights and developments. All of the subsequent meetings were de-
voted to discussion of various aspects of these developments and their possible
implications.
Work was not, however, limited to the weekly meetings; we had many per-
sonal discussions and applied ourselves to writing as well. After many long
discussions with Edward Shils, I undertook the first draft of what appears in
this volume as Part II, "Values, Motives, and Systems of Action"; Professor
Shils took the lead in the draft's extensive revision. Professor Tolman began
work on his "Psychological Model," which forms Part III of this book. Mr.
Sheldon's contribution, "Some Observations on Theory in Social Science,"
appears as Chapter II of Part I.f
The question of exactly what the material outcome of the project would be
had to be left in abeyance until we could explore the implications of some of
the new developments. It finally was agreed to prepare the present volume for
publication and to include contributions from the staff and also papers from
the other participants in the smaller discussion group. It was decided that
the non-staff collaborators would write on a subject of particular personal in-

terest which would be relevant to the general theoretical field of the project.
These papers make up Part IV of this volume. This made such a large book
that, unfortunately, contributions from members of the larger discussion
group were precluded; hence, as noted, the book fails to do justice to their
important part in the project.
It gradually became clear that what originally had been drafted as an
introductory chapter of Part II contained the basis of an agreed statement
of general principle. Though this draft, which in turn was based on many
discussions, provided the starting point, was subjected to several severe
it
— indeed radical —
revisions before it emerged as the "General Statement"
which forms the first chapter of Part I. All members of the group contributed
careful and detailed critical comments on several of the drafts, so that as far
The principal authors were Professors Kluckhohn and Murray.

*
Mr. Sheldon also carried the heavy burden of supervising the production of a record
t
of the weekly meetings; this unfortunately limited the time he could devote to theoretical
work as such.
Preface vii
as humanly possible, the statement represents both a carefully considered and

a collaborative product. To be sure that no member of the group was hav-
ing views attributed to him which he did not really share, we agreed that each
one should have the privilege of including over his own initials notes of ex-
plication or dissent on particular points. The fact that only two members have
availed themselves of this privilege, one of them mainly for clarification,
is, we feel, an index of the fullness of the measure of agreement we have been
able to attain.
This volume thus is the product of nine individual social scientists. The
whole character of the enterprise, however, and the constitution of the group,
which included four psychologists, three sociologists, and two anthropologists,
make its relation to current movements some in-
of thought in the field of
terest. Many and sources are discernible in the material here set
influences
forth. Perhaps the two most important sources in the field of psychology
are the study of human personality and the study of animal behavior. The
former involves Freud, and the movements stemming from his work, per-
haps more than any other influence, but this stream has flowed through sev-
eral channels — and in its course has influenced the sociologists and an-
thropologists in the group as well as the psychologists. Other influences
have also been important in their effect on personality theory, particularly
those documented Gordon AUport's book on that subject. The study of
in
animal behavior is, we believe, relatively catholic in its influence upon us.
Sociologically, we have been strongly influenced, especially through two
of the group, by the work of the Europeans, Durkheim and Max Weber.
Professor Stouffer, however, can be said to represent an almost wholly Ameri-
can influence, with the ideas of W. I. Thomas and Park especially promi-
nent in his theoretical thinking. Finally, on the anthropological side, we also
have a variety of sources: Boas, Kroeber, and Sapir stand out, but there
are many others as well.
Another significant feature of the background of the group is that quite
clearly the major trend of thinking of each member has been notably in-
fluenced by more than one "school" and more than one discipline. It might
perhaps be said that the very fact that we do embody so many different in-
fluences has made it all the more urgent for us to attempt to synthesize our
thinking. The process has not been altogether easy. Some of us have been
closely associated over a considerable span of years. But when we tried to
drive mutuality of understanding to deeper theoretical levels than was usual
in our discourse, we frequently found unexpected and apparently serious
differences — some of which, of course, were attributable to our having been
educated in different academic disciplines, each with its sensitivities and blind
spots. However, with patience and persistence, we have found it possible to
make what, to us, is substantial progress toward agreement.
This fact, combined with the very diversity of the influences which, through
viii Preface
their importance to us, have gone into this product, seems to us to bring out
with peculiar vividness the fact that these many streams of thought are in the
process of flowing together. We feel that the present effort belongs in the
context of amajor movement, whose significance to the future of social science
far transcends the contributions of any one particular group. If we have
helped to deepen the channel of the river and remove some obstacles to its
flow, we are content.
on the regular Harvard staff must acknowledge our
Finally, those of us
special debt to our two visiting collaborators. They contributed not only
their great knowledge, acute understanding, and fresh points of view, but
through unfailing tact were able to serve as most effective catalytic agents.
Their value to the project has been incalculable.
Talcott Parsons
Contents
PART 1 The General Theory of Action
1 Some Fundamental Categories of the Theory of Action:

A General Statement
Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Shils, Gordon W. Allport, Clyde Kluckhohn, Henry
A. Murray, Robert R. Sears, Richard C. Sheldon, Samuel A. Stouffer, Edward
C. Tolman
(1) Introduction. (2) The frame of reference of the theory of

action. (3) Some fundamentals of behavior psychology. (4) Inter-
action and the development of personality. (5) Cultural aspects
of action systems. (6) The social system. A
note on the place of
economic theory and political theory in the general theory of
action.
2 Some Observations on Theory in the Social Sciences ... 30

Richard C. Sheldon
PART 2 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action

Talcott Parsons, Edward A. Shils, with the assistance of James Olds
Introduction 47
1 Categories of the Orientation and Organization of Action . . 53

Action and its orientation. Components of the frame of reference
of the theory of action. Commentary on the frame of reference.
Classification of objects. Orientation to the situation. Dilemmas of
orientation and the pattern variables. The definition of pattern
variables. The interrelations of the pattern variables. Classification
of need-dispositions and role-expectations. Classification of com-
ponents of the object situation. The basic structure of the inter-
active relationship. The concept of system and the classification
of types of systems.
2 Personality as a System of Action 110

Motivational concepts. Need-dispositions. Functional prerequisites
of the personality system. Learning processes and performance
processes. The mechanisms. Subintegrations in the personality sys-
tem. The articulation of personality and social systems. Need-
dispositions and role-expectations. Individuality. Deviance.
X Contents
3 Systems of Value-Orientation 159
The place of value-orientation patterns in the organization of
culture. The classification of the elements of culture. Cognitive
symbols. Expressive symbols. Evaluative symbols. Pattern con-
sistency and sources of strain. The integration of systems of value-
orientations into the social system. Systems of personal values.
The problem of classification of value systems.
4 The Social System 190

Major features and prerequisites. The foci of organization. The
allocation of rewards. The integration of the social system. Classi-
fication of social systems and
components: structural types.
their
The content of roles. consensus and power. The
Integration:
analysis of social structure. Motivation and the dynamics of social
process. The problem of social change.
5 Conclusion 234
Figures 1-15, Pages 247-275
PART 3 A Psychological Model

Edward C. Tolman
1 Introduction 279
The independent variables. The dependent variable of behavior
(action). Intervening variables. Postulated causal connections.
2 The Model 285

Need system (A), Belief- value matrix (B). Behavior space (C).
Locomotion in and resultant restructuring of the behavior space.
Capacity and temperamental traits (T).
3 Learning and the Psychodynamic Mechanisms 303
4 Further Problems Connected with the Model 319

The need system. Further problems concerning matrices and their
effects upon the behavior space. The discourse use of symbols and
social relationship units. Operational definitions.
5 Value Standards, Pattern Variables, Social Roles, Personality 343
6 Summary and Conclusions 355

For psychology. For social science.
Bibliography 360
Contents xi
PART 4 The Theory of Action and Its Application
1 Prejudice: A Problem in Psychological and Social Causation 365

Gordon W. Allport
Is research on prejudice basic? Stimulus approach. The phenome-

nological approach. Personality dynamics and structure: the func-
tional significance of structure. Conformity. Socialization. The
situational approach. Culture and subculture. The historical ap-
proach. Conclusion. Bibliography.
^2 Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action: An

Exploration in Definition and Classification 388
Clyde Kluckhohn
Normative and existential propositions. Definition of value for the

theory of action. Operational indices. Operations for the study of
values. Toward a classification of values and value-orientations.
Differentiation from related concepts.
3 Toward a Classification of Interaction 434

Henry A. Murray
A few assumptions. Opinions unfavorable to the classification of

tendencies (needs). Varieties of activities, actions, needful states.
Debated issues and possible solutions. Criteria for the classifica-
tion and discrimination of needs. Final suggestion. Bibliography.
4 Social Behavior and Personality Development 465

Robert R. Sears
Action. Monadic and dyadic units. Dynamics. Personality as

antecedent. Personality Development. Bibliography.
5 An Empirical Study of Technical Problems in Analysis of

Role Obligation 479
Samuel A. Stouffer
Role conflict and personality. Note on Lazarsfeld's latent distance

scale as applied to role conflict data.
Some Fundamental Categories of the Theory
of Action: A General Statement
1. Introduction
I he present statement and the volume which it introduces

are intended to contribute to the establishment of a general theory in the
social sciences. Theory in the social sciences should have three major func-
tions. First, it should aid in the codification of our existing concrete knowl-
edge. It can do so by providing generalized hypotheses for the systematic
reformulation of existing facts and insights, by extending the range of impli-
cation of particular hypotheses, and by unifying discrete observations under
general concepts. Through codification, general theory in the social sciences
will help topromote the process of cumulative growth of our knowledge. In
making us more aware of the interconnections among items of existing
knowledge which are now available in a scattered, fragmentary form, it will
help us fix our attention on the points where further work must be done.
Second, general theory in the social sciences should be a guide to research.
By codification it enables us to locate and define more precisely the bound-
aries of our knowledge and of our ignorance. Codification facilitates the
selection of problems, although it is not, of course, the only useful technique
for the selection of problems for fruitful research. Further than this, general
theory should provide hypotheses to be applied and tested by the investiga-
tion of these problems. If research problems are formulated in terms of
systematically derived theoretical hypotheses, the resulting propositions will
in turn contribute toward both the validation and revision of the theory.
Third, general theory as a point of departure for specialized work in the
social sciences will facilitate the control of the biases of observation and in-
terpretation which are at present fostered by the departmentalization of edu-
cation and research in the social sciences.
This statement does not itself purport to be the general theory which will
adequately fulfill these three functions. It is rather a formulation of certain
fundamental categories which will have to enter into the formulation of this
general theory, which for many years has been developing through the con-
4 The General Theory of Action
vergence of anthropological studies of culture, the theory of learning, the

psychoanalytic theory of personality, economic theory,^ and the study of
modern social structure.
2. The Frame of Reference of the Theory of Action

The present discussion will begin with an exposition of the fundamental
concepts from which it is intended to develop a unified conceptual scheme
for theory and research in the social sciences. In accordance with already
widespread usage, we shall call these concepts the frame of reference of the
theory of action. In order to make the rest of the exposition comprehensible,
we shall define a considerable number of the concepts ^ and state their more
general bearing on our problem.
ORIENTATION AND SITUATION
In the theory of action the point of reference of all terms is the action
of an individual actor or of a collectivity of actors. Of course, alljndividual
actors are, in one aspect, physiological organisms; collectivities of actors are
made up of individual actors, who are similarly physiological organisms.
The interest of the theory of action, however, is directed not to the physio-
'"''^
logical processes internal to the organism but rather to the organization of the
actor's orientations to a situation. When the terms refer to a collectivity as the
acting unit, it is understood that it does not refer to all of the actions of the in-
dividuals who are its members, but only to the actions which they perform in
their capacity as members. Whether the acting unit is an individual or a col-
/-^ lectivity, we shall speak of the actor's orientation of action when we describe
the action. The concept motivation in a strict sense applies only to individual
actors. The motivational components of the action of collectivities are or-
ganized systems of the motivation of the relevant individual actors. Action has
an orientation when it is guided by the meaning which the actor attaches to it
in its relationship to his goals and interests.
Each orientation of action in turn involves a set ^ of objects of orientation.

V These are objects which are relevant in the situation because they afford
alternative possibilities and impose limitations on the modes of gratifying the
* See note at end of chapter.

*The authors are fully aware of the difficulty of standardizing terminology in the
present state of social science. The difficulty is great particularly in view of the hetero-
geneity of the sources from which the terms here used have been drawn and the new
emphasis we have often given them. We are not all equally satisfied with every term, and
we do not regard ourselves as bound to use exactly this terminology each in his own work.
We have merely endeavored to be as clear as possible, to avoid violent neologisms, and to
use terms which would be as nearly acceptable to all members of the group as possible.
^ The word set is used to designate a plurality of entities determinately limited in num-
ber and range of variation but not necessarily conceived as interdependent so as to

constitute a system.
'
A General Statement 5
needs and achieving the goals of the actor or actors.^ A situation provides
two major classes of objects to which the actor who is the point of reference
may be oriented. These are either (1) nonsocial, that is, physical objects or
accumulated cultural resources, or (2) social objects, that is, individual ac-
tors and collectivities. Social objects include the subject's own personality
as well as the personalities of other individuals. Where collectivities are
objects, sectors of the action systems of a plurality of individual actors form
a system which is an object for the actor or actors who are our point of ref-
erence. A specific combination of selections relative to such objects, made

from among the possibilities of selection which were available in a specific
situation, constitutes an orientation of action for a particular actor. The or-
ganized plurality of such orientations of action constitutes a system of action.^

The orientation of action to objects entails selection, and possibly choice.
Selection is made possible by cognitive discriminations, the location and
characterization of the objects, which are simultaneously or successively ex-
perienced as having positive or negative value to the actor, in terms of their
relevance to satisfaction of drives ^ and their organization in motivation,
^his tendency to react positively or negatively to objects we shall call the
cathectic mode of orientation. Cathexis, the attachment to objects which are
gratifying and rejection of those which are noxious, lies at the root of the
selective nature of action.'^ Furthermore, since selection must be made among
^ternative objects and gratifications at a single point of time or through
time, there must be some evaluative criteria. The tendency of the organism
toward integration requires the assessment and comparison of immediate
cognized objects and cathectic interests in terms of their remoter consequences
for the larger unit of evaluation. Evaluation rests on standards which may
be either cognitive standards of truthfulness, appreciative standards of ap-
propriateness, or moral standards of rightness. Both the motivational orien-
tations and the value-orientations are modes of distinguishing, testing, sort-
ing, and selecting. They are, in short, the categories for the description,
* The establishment of a definite relationship with objects (e.g., their possession or

modification) or the creation of objects may be among the goals sought by actors. Objects
once created may in turn become objects of orientation in ensuing actions.
" The word system is used in the sense that determinate relations of interdependence
exist within the complex of empirical phenomena. The antithesis of the concept of system
is random variability. However, no implication of rigidity is intended.
' By drive we mean the organic energy component of motivation with whatever ele-
ments of organization and directionality may be given with the genetic constitution of the
organism.
^ Human beings do much which is inhibiting
or destructive of their interests in its con-
sequences; hence the naive hedonism which maintains that the gratification of a wish
explains every overt act is clearly untenable. However, to deny that even self-destructive
acts are motivated equally fails to make sense. The postulate that the course of behavior,
at least at certain points where alternatives were open, has had motivational significance
to the actor, that in some sense he "wanted" to do it, is essential to any logical theory
of behavior.
on the most elementary level, of the orientation of action, which is a con-

stellation of selections from alternatives.
It is essential to point out that a description of a system of action must
refer not only to the particular constellation of orientations and sets of ob-
jects actually selected, but also to the alternative sets from which the selec-
tions might have been made but were not. In other words, we are concerned
not only with how an actor actually views a situation, but also with how he
might view it. This inclusiveness is required for the purposes of a dynamic
theory of action which would attempt to explain why one alternative rather
than another was selected.

The range of the alternatives of action orientation is determinate; it is
inherent in the relation of the actor to the situation and derives ultimately
from certain general properties of the organism and the nature of objects in
their relation to such organisms. This determinate range of the alternatives

which are available for selection marks the limits within which variability
is possible.
DESCRIPTIVE AND DYNAMIC ANALYSIS
The complete analysis of a system of action would comprise description

both of the state of the system at the given moment and of the changes in the
system through time, involving changes in the relations of the constituent

variables. This dynamic analysis would treat the processes of action and
is the proper goal of conceptualization and theory construction. But we
feel that it is uneconomical to describe changes in systems of variables be-
fore the variables themselves have been isolated and described; therefore,
we have chosen to begin by studying particular combinations of variables
and to move toward a description of how these combinations change only
when a firm foundation for such analysis has been laid. Hence, it should
be understood that when we describe the orientations of action in a given
system, we are describing the state of the system at a given moment. The
variables to which we refer in the analysis of given orientations are also
those referred to in the analysis of the processes which maintain one system
of orientation rather than another; these same variables are also dealt with
in the analysis of the processes in which, through change in the values. of the
variables, one orientation changes into another. There is, thus, no difference
between the variables involved in description of the state of a system and
analysis of its processes. The difference lies in how the same variables are
used.
PERSONALITY, SOCIAL SYSTEM, AND CULTURE
The frame of reference of the theory of action applies in principle to any

segment of the total round of action or to any process of action of any
complex organism. The elaboration of behavior to which this conceptual
scheme is especially appropriate, however, occurs above all in human action.
In the formation of systems made up of human actions or the components

of human action, this elaboration occurs in three configurations. .First, the ,
orientation of action of any one given actor and its attendant motivational
processes becomes a differentiated and integrated system. This system will
be called the personality, and we will define it as the organized system of the
orientation and motivation of action of one individual actor.^ Secondly, the
action of a plurality of actors in a common situation is a process of inter- \
action, the properties of which are to a definite but limited extent independent
of any prior common culture. This interaction also becomes differentiated
and integrated and as such forms a social system. The social system is, to be
sure, made up of the relationships of individuals, but it is a system which is
organized around the problems inherent in or arising from social interaction

of a plurality of individual actors rather than around the problems which
arise in connection with the integration of the actions of an individual actor,
who is also a physiological organism. Personality and social system are very
i
intimately interrelated, but they are neither identical with one another nor
explicable by one another; the social system is not a plurality of personalities/
Finally, systems of culture have their own forms and problems of integration
which are not reducible to those of either personality or social systems or
both together. The cultural tradition in its significance both as an object
of orientation and as an element in the orientation of action must be articu-
lated both conceptually and empirically with personalities and social sys-
tems. Apart from embodiment in the orientation systems of concrete actors,
culture, though existing as a body of artifacts and as systems of symbols, is
not in itself organized as a system of action. Therefore, culture as a system
is on a different plane from personalities and social systems.^ ^\
Concrete systems of action — that is, personalities and social systems —
have psychological, social, and cultural aspects. For one thing, the state of
the system must be characterized in terms of certain of the motivational prop-
erties of the individual actors. The
description of a system of action must
employ the categories of motivational orientation: cognition, cathexis, and
evaluation. Likewise, the description of an action system must deal with the
properties of the system of interaction of two or more individuals or collec-
tive actors — this is the social aspect — and
must note the conditions which
it
interaction imposes on the participating actors. It must also take into ac-
count the cultural tradition as an object of orientation as well as culture pat-
terns as internalized patterns of cognitive expectations and of cathectic-
evaluative selection among possible orientations that are of crucial sig-
nificance in the personality system and in the social system.
* The physiological aspect of the human organism is relevant to action theory only as
itimpinges on the orientation system. However, phantasies and imaginative productions,

though they may not refer directly to any realistic situational objects, are unequivocally
part of the orientation of personality as a system of action.
'
' Mr. Sheldon dissents from this view. His grounds are stated in Chapter H. v^
Cultural elements as constituents of systems of action may be classified

in two ways. First, they may be differentiated according to the predominance
of types of interests corresponding to the predominance of each of the modes
of motivational orientation. Second, culture patterns as objects of the situa-
tion may be distinguished from culture patterns as internalized components
of the orientation system of the actor. These two classifications cut across
each other.
In the first method of classification it is convenient to distinguish the
following three major classes of culture patterns. (1) Systems of ideas or
Although cathexis and evaluation are always present as orientational
beliefs.
components, these cultural systems are characterized by a primacy of cog-

nitive interests. (2) Systems of expressive symbols; for instance, art
forms and styles. These systems are characterized by a primacy of cathectic
interests. (3) Systems of value-orientations. Here the primary interest
is in the evaluation of alternatives from the viewpoint of their consequences
or implications for a system of action or one of its subsystems.
With respect to the second classification, it is quite clear that culture pat-
terns are frequently objects of orientation in the same sense as other types
of objects.^^ knows their properties (for example, he understands
The actor
an idea) he "responds" to them (that is, he is attracted or repelled by them)
; ;
and he evaluates them. Under certain circumstances, however, the manner

of his involvement with a cultural pattern as an object is altered, and what
was once an object becomes a constitutive part of the actor. When, for ex-
ample, he cannot violate a moral rule without intense feelings of guilt, the
rule is functioning as a constitutive part of his system of orientation; it
is part of his personality. Where this occurs a culture pattern has been
internalized.
Before we continue with an elaboration of each of the above three major
types of system into which the components of action become organized and
differentiated — personality, cultural systems, and social systems — it is
essential to review briefly certain other categories of action in general, par-

ticularly those that have been developed in behavior psychology.
3. Some Fundamentals of Behavior Psychology

needs and the organization of behavior
Certain trends in psychological theory have placed the primary sources

of the organization of behavior into the constitution of the organism. They
^°
A special position is occupied by physical artifacts which are the products of action.
Like the objects of the natural environment they do not interact with the actor. They are
situational objects which cannot be internalized into the orientation system of the actor.
They might serve as instrumental objects in action systems or they might have "meaning"
conferred on them by value-orientation systems, in the same way that meaning is con-
ferred on objects of the natural environment.
'
have done this through some version of the "instinct" theory. This tendency
has continually been challenged by demonstrations of the range of plasticity
of the organism and the corresponding importance of "learning" —a chal-
lenge which has been greatly accentuated by the cultural relativity disclosed
through the work of social anthropology and sociology.
The present analysis will observe a rule of parsimony with regard to as-
sumptions about the constitutional organization of the tendencies of behavior.
There is certainly a system of viscerogenic needs which are grounded in the
interchange of the organism as a physiological system with its environment.

Some of them are highly specific the need for food is relatively specific
:
;
the needs for sleep and for breathing are much more so. The object which
is constitutionally most appropriate for the cathexis of a viscerogenic need
is, however, seldom absolutely specific. But, on the other hand, the range
of variability open to action and cultural definition always has some limits.
Among these needs which come to be of primary importance for action,

however, the degree of specificity usually tends to be slight, particularly in
the mode as distinct from the fact of gratification. In general, there is a
wide range of variability of the objects and modes of gratification of any

constitutionally given need. In addition to the viscerogenic needs there seem
to be certain needs for "social relationships." These might be constitutionally
given or they might, by being indirectly necessary for the gratification of
viscerogenic needs, be derivative in their origin and come subsequently to
acquire autonomy.
We assume then a set of needs which, although initially organized through\
physiological processes, do not possess the properties that permit these physio-
logical processes to be exclusively determinative in the organization of action.
In other words, the direction and modes in which these needs can determine
action is modifiable by influence emanating from the situation of action.
Moreover, the needs themselves can be modified, or at least their effect on
action is modifiable, by the process of becoming embedded into need-
dispositions.
However, even though the set of viscerogenic needs has initially a physio-
logical organization, it possesses one persistent property which plays a

central role as the set of needs evolves into the system of need-dispositions.
It is incipiently organized with respect to a positive-negative discrimination;
that is, it discriminates between need-gratifying and need-blocking or need-
depriving aspects ^^ of the situational object system. This discrimination is
"^Deprivation is to be understood here as subsuming: (1) the withdrawal of gratify-

ing objects already possessed by the actor; (2) the obstruction of access to gratifying
objects which the actor does not possess and for which he is striving; (3) the enforced
relationship with objects which are not gratifying, e.g., physical or psychological suffering
of positive pain or injury (this category includes both actively encountering and passively
receiving pain, etc.) ; (4) the threat of any of the foregoing. Responses by the actors to
each of these types of deprivation might vary considerably.
the point of departure of a complex process of further differentiation into

need-dispositions ^^ which might possess varying degrees of specificity. In
addition to the specific viscerogenic needs and the wider discrimination be-
tween gratification and deprivation, the human organism has a constitutional
capacity to react to objects, especially otherhuman beings, without the spe-
cific content or form of the reaction being in any way physiologically
given. This reactive capacity or potentiality may be likened to the capacity

to learn language, which is certainly not constitutionally specific to any par-
ticular language, and if the individual is not exposed to speech of other hu-
man beings, may not be activated at all. The human organism has a "sen-
sitivity" to other objects, a potentiality of cathecting them as objects in va-
rious ways, depending on the context of orientation and situation.
This sensitivity extends to nonsocial objects but it is especially significant
where interaction is involved. Moreover, this sensitivity is, like the discrim-
inatory tendency to which we have already referred, inherently responsive to

experience in interactive relationships. On the one hand, gratifying experience
with an object engenders a positive attachment-seeking and -forming tendency;
on the other, deprivation from an object predisposes the actor to a reaction
of flight, escape, or aggression, a tendency to avoid or injure the object in
order to control or forestall the deprivational effect of its action.
COGNITIVE AND CATHECTIC ORIENTATION IN THE ORGANIZATION OF ACTION
Impelled by its drives and needs, the acting organism is oriented to social
and nonsocial objects in two essential, simultaneous, and inseparable modes.
'
\\ First, it "cathects" particular objects or classes of objects through attribut-
ing to them significance for direct gratification or deprivation of impulse-
may become attached to an object as a source of gratification ^* or
needs.^^ It
"The term need-disposition has been chosen to emphasize that in action the unit of
motivation faces two ways. On the one hand, it is involved in the equilibrium of the actor
as a personality (and organism), and on the other, it is a disposition to act in relation to
one or more objects. Both references are essential. It is to be distinguished from need
by its higher degree of organization and by its inclusion of motivational and evaluative
elements which are not given by viscerogenic needs.
" A distinction between affect and cathexis is desirable for present purposes. Affect
refers to a state of the organism —
a state of euphoria or dysphoria or qualitative variants
thereof. Cathexis refers to a state of the organism —
a state of euphoria or dysphoria —
in relationship to some object. Thus the term cathexis is broader in its reference than the
term affect; it is affect plus object. It is object-oriented affect. It involves attaching af-
fective significance to an object; although it involves attachment to one or more proper-
ties of the object, as used here it does not itself refer to a property of the object, but to a
relation between actor and object. Furthermore, there is no conno'ation either of activity
or passivity in the actor's relation to the object implied in the concept.
" The content of the gratifications need not be specified here. Gratifications may of
course include those experiences or states which are normally viewed as pleasures, such as
love, physical comfort; they may also under certain conditions include certain experiences
ordinarily conceived as deprivational, such as pain, horror, disgust, but which because
of the organization of a given personality system may have gratifying consequences.
repelled by it as a source of deprivation. Second, it cognizes the object field,
discriminating any particular object from others and otherwise assessing its
properties. Only when the actor knows the relations of objects to one an-
other and to his own needs can his behavior become organized with reference
to cathectic-cognitive discriminations.
The essential phenomena in motivational orientation are thus cognitive

and cathectic discriminations among objects. When these discriminations
become organized in a stable way, they form a system of orientation. The
actor selects or is committed to culturally imposed selections among accessible
objects with respect to their potentialities for gratification; he also selects
from among the modes of their possible significance to him. The most prim-
itive forms of this selectivity are perhaps acceptance —
for instance, incor-
poration of food, remaining in a comfortable place, etc. and rejection — —
spitting out, withdrawal from, or avoidance.
Cathectic-cognitive orientation toward the object world, in any system of
behavior extending through time, always entails expectations concerning grat-
ifications or deprivations receivable or attainable from certain objects and
classes of objects. Action involves not merely discrimination and selection
between immediately present objects, and the directly ensuing striving, ac-
ceptance, or rejection, but it involves also an orientation to future events with
respect to their significance for gratification or deprivation. A discrimina-
tion between immediately available and future gratifications and the assess-
ment of their relative value is an essential aspect of action.
EXPECTATIONS AND EVALUATIONS
Where there are alternative opportunities for gratification in a present

situation and alternatives distributed among present and expected situations,
the actor must have some means of deciding which of the alternatives or com-
binations of alternatives he should follow. The process of deciding among "^W
alternatives, of assessing them in the light of their ramified consequences, is
called evaluation. Evaluation is the more complex process of selection built
upon the discriminations which make up the cognitive-cathectic orientation.
There is a variety of possible ways in which action can be organized with
respect to expected events. One of the most important categories of reaction
to expectations is that oi activity-passivity. On the one hand, the actor may
actively seek out objects and manipulate them in the interest of his goals,^^ Jpr
or he may explore the situation seeking previously unrecognized opportuni- //^
ties. Alternatively, he may passively await the impact of expected situations
" The cognitive-cathectic and evaluative orientations are connected by the "effort"
of the actor. In accordance with a value standard and/or an expectation, the actor through
effort manipulates his own resources, including his own body, voice, etc., in order to
facilitate the direct or indirect approximation to a certain cathected goal — object or
state.
)
and renounce interest in positive but still unattained goals. (There are va-
rious possible combinations of active and passive elements, such as the posi-
tive effort to escape from a situation expected to be threatening or enlisting
the aid of others to cope with a threat.
LEARNING
Learning ^^ becomes relevant at this point in the development of the frame

of reference of the theory of action. Learning is not merely the acquisition of
"information" (that is, specific items of cognitive orientation) about the
properties of the object world; it is also the acquisition of new "patterns of
orientation." That is, it involves acquiring new ways of seeing, wanting, and
evaluating; these are predispositions to approach or avoid, to seek actively
in certain types of situation or to "lie low" and wait, to keep away from
noxious objects or to control them.
Of fundamental importance in learning is the degree and incidence of
generalization ^^ which is introduced into the actor's orientations to his
object world. Generalizations are modes of defining the actor's orientations

to particular objects of which he has not yet had experience. This entails the
categorization of the particular, concrete objects of his situation into general
classes. In the acquisition of systems of cultural symbols, generalization is
perhaps the most important of the learning mechanisms. As frames of ref-
erence, as the content of communication, and as the foci of common orienta-

tions, cultural patterns must possess content with a degree of generality which
transcends the particularity of all concrete situations and experiences. Gen-
eralization through a cognitive process has consequences for the cathectic
aspect of orientation. For example, through generalization it is possible to
cathect categories of objects as well as particular objects.
Generalization as a cognitive mechanism orders the object world and
thereby defines the structure of alternatives open to the orientation of action.
The world in the actor's expectations comes to be composed of classes of
objects, as well as particular objects, defined and differentiated by properties
significant to the actor. Furthermore, the experiences of gratification or dep-
rivation from particular objects may be generalized to other objects which
are, in the actor's definition of the situation, classified with the original objects.
"Learning is the acquisition of changed modes of orientation to the object world,

including in the latter the acior's personality, ideas, culture, social objects, etc.
"It is recognized that the term "generalization" has two principal current meanings:
(1) the discrimination of the objects in what had previously been a single undifiFeren-
tiated category to constitute two or more classes still possessing certain common features,
and (2) the discernment of common properties in a group of events previously discrimi-
nated as different. The common element of the two meanings is the organization of the
object world into categories. If it is important to distinguish the two meanings, the ap-
plicable meaning will be made clear.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEARNED COMPONENTS OF

GENERALIZED NEED-DISPOSITIONS
Anxiety is one type of generalized expectation of deprivation from a class

of objects to which the actor is also simultaneously attached. There is a con-
stitutional basis for the reaction to danger which is usually called fear. We
speak of anxiety when this reaction to danger is generalized and organized
as a need-disposition to anticipate a large class of deprivations. Anxiety exists
where the actor "cries before he is hurt" ; whether the anticipated deprivation
is attributed to his inadequacy, to others, or to "circumstances" is a further
distinction which we need not consider here. An anxiety, which might have
originated in the fear of a specific class of objects, might become so highly
generalized as to permeate virtually the whole system of orientation of a per-
sonality. Corresponding to anxiety and fear is the obverse generalized expec-
tation of gratification in what is commonly referred to as optimism or a sense
of security.
Some psychologists have tended to treat "aggressiveness" as a set of im-
pulses constitutionally given in the organism.^® It seems probable that a dis-
position to "strike back" if attacked or under certain types of intense strain

is at least latent in normal human organisms. This disposition will be acti-
vated under certain conditions and if it is not overlaid by conflicting motives.

However, such an innate disposition does not in any simple way determine
responses to an experience or expectation of deprivation. Such responses,
when organized as part of the actor's orientation, and if they include a dis-
position to injure or destroy the object felt to be the source of the deprivation,
may be called aggressiveness. Aggressiveness, powerful and fundamental as
it is, may take many forms; by itself it is one among a set of alternative re-
sponses to threats of deprivation. The other responses include withdrawal and
avoidance or simply waiting passively for deprivations to occur. Further-
more, aggressiveness as a need-disposition may well be associated with ac-
tionswhich overtly are not aggressive. Which of these alternatives is chosen
seems to depend on the prevalence of integrative predispositions ^® in the
actor's personality system, which may suppress the expression of aggressive
impulses in favor of alternative actions, such as a general tendency to "mas-
tery" over situations as against a tendency to "passivity." Aggressiveness,
then, is here treated as the manifestation in the organized orientation of ac-
tion of the need-disposition to remove, injure, or destroy an object; the
constitutional capacity for anger is a part of the organized need-disposition
of aggressiveness.
'*
The capacity to experience anger may be different from the disposition to strike
back if attacked. Both, of course, may be learned; but they seem to have some innate
foundation.
" Including internalized cultural norms and the influence of the particular situation.
CONFLICT, EVALUATION, AND MOTIVATIONAL BALANCE

The individual actor possesses a large set of need-dispositions, some of
which are active at the same time that others are quiescent. The gratification
and quiescence of one need-disposition may be the signal for the activation
of another and vice versa. Two or more need-dispositions are often concur-
rently activated, pressing the actor toward the performance of conflicting
actions which are incompatible in the sense that gratifying one of the need-
dispositions entails the deprivation of others. The actor seeking to a:\ieve
gratification and avoid deprivation is seldom, within a short time, capable
of extirpating or extinguishing a well-established need-disposition even though
its overt gratification may entail serious consequences for him. Through the
process of evaluation, which operates unconsciously as well as deliberately,
he will very often strike some sort of compromise among his conflicting need-
dispositions, both simultaneouslyand over a period of time. Since deprivation

is to be avoided or minimized, and since the situation makes some deprivation
unavoidable, the compromise represents in some sense the best available in

the circumstances, given both the exigencies of the situation and the actor's
own personality structure. He will often perform actions which, taken alone,
are self-deprivational but which, when seen in the wider constellation of his
need-disposition system, represent the most gratifying total balance of action
possibilities which could be performed under the circumstances.
So far, little has been said of the internal differentiation of the actor's
object world except that it is differentiated along the axis of potentialities for
gratification or deprivation. But even on this elementary level it has been
possible to show the roles in action of the fundamental categories of orienta-
tion and their derivatives, of cognition and need, of evaluative and instru-
mental orientation, of discrimination and choice, of learning and generaliza-
tion. When all of these elements are organized into a relatively coherent sys-
tem of action, then a stable balance between the interest in increasing grati-
fication and in the minimization of deprivation is made possible. This or-

ganization would consist of a relatively stable, interrelated set of discrimina-
tions or choices which has as a necessary counterpart a relatively stable set of
expectations.
INTERACTION AND THE COMPLEMENTARITY OF EXPECTATIONS

Before entering into further discussion of the organization of systems of
action, it is necessary to discuss one of the differentiations in the structure
of the object world which is very crucial in relation to the actor's gratifica-
tion interests. Only the potentiality of gratification or deprivation from ob-
jects is more crucial. We refer here to the distinction between objects which
interact ^^ with the acting subject and those objects which do not. These
^ This is a technical usage of the term interaction. It implies a relationship both parties
to which are actors in the technical sense. It is thus distinguished from the sense in which
interaction is synonymous with interdependence.
A General Statement "
interacting objects are themselves actors or egos ^^ with their own systems
of action. They will be referred to as jsocial objects or altersj A potential
food-object, at least as it approaches the state of edibility, is not an alter,
because does not respond to ego's expectations and because it has no ex-
it
pectations of ego's action; another person, a mother or a friend, would be

an alter to ego. The treatment of another actor, an alter, as an interacting
object has very great consequences for the development and organization of
the system of action.
When we analyze the interaction of ego and alter, we shift from the analy-
sis of the orientation of a single given actor to the consideration of two or
more interacting actors as a system. In this case, the expectations of ego
are oriented both to the range of alternatives for alter's actions (i.e., the
alternatives open to alter in the situation) and to alter's selection, which is
intentionally contingent on what ego himself does, within the range of al-
ternatives. The obverse is true for alter. Ego does not expect the behavior of a
nonsocial object to be influenced by expectations regarding his own behavior,
although, of course, ego's behavior is influenced by his expectations concern-
ing the behavior of the nonsocial object. It is the fact that expectations operate
on both sides of the relation between a given actor and the object of his orien-
tation which distinguishes social interaction from orientation to nonsocial
objects.
This fundamental phenomenon may be called the complementarity of
expectations, not in the sense that the expectations of the two actors with re-
gard to each other's action are identical, but in the sense that the action of
each is oriented to the expectations of the other. Hence the system of inter-
action may be analyzed in terms of the extent of conformity of ego's action
with alter's expectations and vice versa. We have seen that an actor's system
of action is oriented to the polarity of gratification and deprivation. Social
interaction introduces a further complication in that the motivational signifi-
cance is no longer attributed only to the properties of the immediate object
alone, but also to alter's expectations with regard to ego. The contingent re-
actions of alter to ego's action may be called sanctions. Their efficacy derives
precisely from the gratificational significance to ego of alter's positive re-
actions and the deprivational significance of his negative reactions. The sig-
nificance of these secondary gratifications and deprivations to ego rests on

two bases: (1) Any need-disposition can be directly or indirectly gratified
or deprived through the consequences of alter's reactions to ego's actions. (2)
Personalities certainly develop need-dispositions directly for certain types
of response from actors who are significant objects to them, whatever the
^ This usage of the term ego is different from that current in psychology. Here it
refers only to an actor taken as a point of reference in his relation to another actor re-
ferred to as alter. The term as here used is parallel to anthropological usage in the de-
scription of kinship systems.
constitutional basis of this fact. In other words, they develop social-rela-

tional needs.
Thus, sanctions have two kinds of significance to ego. First, alter's inten-
tional and overt action,which can change ego's objective situation, may have
direct significance to ego by increasing his opportunities for gratification or
limiting them, insofar as alter controls important aspects of ego's situation
of action. But ego through generalization also becomes sensitive to alter's at-
titudes toward him and his action, so that even where alter has no specific
intentions in the situation, it will still matter to ego whether alter approves
or disapproves of his action — whether he shows love, hostility, or some other
attitude toward him.
Thus consideration of the place of complementarity of expectations in
the processes of human interaction has implications for certain categories
which are central in the analysis of the origins and functions of cultural pat-
terns. There is a double contingency inherent in interaction. On the one hand,
ego's gratifications are contingent on his selection among available alterna-
tives. But in turn, alter's reaction will be contingent on ego's selection and
will result from a complementary selection on alter's part. Because of this
double contingency, communication, which is the precondition of cultural pat-

terns, could not exist without both generalization from the particularity of the
(which are never identical for ego and alter) and stability
specific situations
of meaning which can only be assured by "conventions" observed by both
parties.
Furthermore, the double contingency implies the normative orientation
of action, since alter's reaction of punishment or reward is superadded to
alter's "intrinsic" or direct behavioral reaction to ego's original selection.
If punishment or reward by alter is repeatedly manifested under certain con-
ditions, this reaction acquires for ego the meaning of an appropriate conse-
quence of ego's conformity with or deviation from the norms of a shared sym-
bolic system. A shared symbolic system is a system of "ways of orienting,"
plus those "external symbols" which control these ways of orienting, the sys-
tem being so geared into the action systems of both ego and alter that the
external symbols bring forth the same or a complementary pattern of orienta-
tion in both of them. Such a system, with its mutuality of normative orienta-
tion, is logically the most elementary form of culture. In this elementary social
relationship, as well as in a large-scale social system, culture provides the
standards (value-orientations) which are applied in evaluative processes.
Without culture neither human personalities nor human social systems would
be possible.
4. Interaction and the Development of Personality

The interactive element in the system of action, when joined with the
fundamental variables of the organization of behavior discussed above, ac-
A General Statement 13^
counts for the enormously complicated differentiation and organization of

the socialand personality systems. In interaction we find the basic process
which, in various elaborations and adaptations, provides the seed of what
its
on the human level we call personality and the social system. Interaction
makes possible the development of culture on the human level and gives cul-
ture its significance in the determination of action.
SOCIALIZATION
Before we begin our analysis of the personality system, we shall examine

briefly the significance of interaction in the socialization process. We have
referred above to the social-relational needs ^^ of the infant. The importance
of these needs centers on the infant's state of initial dependency. As a result
of this dependency, the social-relational context in which viscerogenic needs
are gratified or deprived becomes perhaps just as important as the intrinsic
gratification or deprivation of the viscerogenic needs themselves. The child's
overwhelming sensitivity to the reactions of the significant adult objects, par-
ticularly to the reactions of the mother, opens the door to new possibilities of
frustration and even trauma. The child develops needs for appropriate atti-
tudes on the part of these adults. It is on the basis of these new needs that the
human attains levels of organization beyond those open to animals.
The learning of the behavior patterns characteristic of the adult culture
requires new kinds of generalization, including symbols which abstract from
particular situations and which refer to classes of objects by means of lan-
guage. In order to learn such generalizations, particularized attachments
which are essential in the earliest stages must be superseded. This substitu-
tion takes place through a mechanism like the following: the child forms a
social attachment which transcends any particular viscerogenic gratification
which the object confers. This attachment makes it possible for the child to
accept the necessary deprivations which are involved in renouncing earlier
types of gratification and to acquire the new attachment in that although con-
tinuance of the old gratifications is made more difficult still favorable
reactions from the significant social object are received. The newly learned
generalization is acceptable if the child feels that the adult wants it to do
the things in question and that it is loved.
Although the problem is still obscure, there is approximate agreement that
the development of identification ^^ with adult objects
is an essential mecha-
nism of the socialization process. For present purposes the most significant
**
When subsequently we use the term relational needs it should be understood to refer
to what we are here calling social-relational needs.
**
It is well known that use of this term is by no means consistent. It seems essential
to distinguish (1) the internalization of the values but not the role of the model from
(2) internalization of his specific role. Though there are still other meanings of the
term, these two seem to be the most important for present purposes. In both cases, what
is taken over is a value pattern and not an action.
characteristic of identification in this sense is the child's acceptance of the

adult's values in the relevant contexts; in other words, what the adult wants
for the child, the child comes to want for itself. The extent to which this
necessarily involves the child's formation of an ideal image of itself as similar
to the adult in all respects (for example, with respect to sex, even though the
adult is of the opposite sex) remains an open question.
The value-orientations and other components of the culture, as well as the
specific accumulated objects which make up the cultural tradition in the form
of skills, knowledge, and the like, are transmitted to the on-coming generation.
Through the process of socialization, however, expectation systems become
organized into patterns of selection in which the effective criterion is the
differential significance of the various alternatives for the gratification-depri-
vation balance of the actor. To say then that a system of action has a degree
of stability as a system is to say that there is a certain stability and consistency
in its choice patterns. Such stability and consistency are prerequisites of the
development of the higher levels of cultural behavior.
Because the child is dependent on the adult, the latter's reaction patterns
become crucially important factors in the organization of the child's choice

patterns. The child becomes oriented to the wishes which embody for him
the values of the adult, and his viscerogenic needs become culturally or-
ganized needs, which are shaped so that their gratification is sought in direc-
tions compatible with his integration into this system of interaction.
PERSONALITY AS A SYSTEM
The child's development of a "personality" (or an "ego structure") is
to be viewed as the establishment of a relatively specific, definite, and con-w

sistent system of need-dispositions operating as selective reactions to the alter-
natives which are presented to him by his object situation or which he or-
ganizes for himself by seeking out new object situations and formulating
new goals. What will be needed, therefore, for the coherent description and
analysis of human personality as a system will be the categories and hypoth-
eses bearing on four main sets of variables.
1. Fundamentals of behavior psychology of the sort discussed above:

motivation, the gratification-deprivation balance, primary viscerogenic and
and learning, as well as the basic
possibly social-relational needs, cognition
mechanisms of cognitive and cathectic-evaluative learning and adjustment.
The latter involves the examination of such learning mechanisms as differen-
tiation and generalization, where cognitive interests have primacy, and re-
inforcement, extinction, inhibition, substitution, identification, and imitation,

where cathectic or evaluative interests have primacy.
2. The allocative processes,^^ by which the strivings toward gratification
" By we mean the distribution of significant components within a system

allocation
insuch a way as to be compatible with the functioning of the system in a given state.
The term is borrowed from economics.
A General Statement "
are distributed among the different available objects and occasions and grat-
ification opportunities are distributed among the different need-dispositions.
These processes keep conflict and anxiety within the limits necessary for the
working of the personality system; the failure of their smooth operation calls
the special mechanisms of defense and adjustment into play.
3. The mechanisms, classifiable as those of defense and adjustment,^^ by
which the different components of need-dispositions are integrated internally

as a system and directed toward objects.
4. The integration of the various need-dispositions into an "on-going"
personality capable of some degree of self-control and purposeful action.
The character of the on-going personality cannot be understood without ref-

erence to the relatively independent subintegrations within the personality
structure and the adjustive mechanisms which relate them to each other.
The constitutional foundations of the need-disposition structure of person-
ality continue to function throughout life. But because of the plasticity of the
human organism they directly determine the behavior of the human adult far
than in many other species. Through learning and interactive experience
less
they become integrated with the symbolic structures of the cultural tradition
to form an interdependent system of acquired need-dispositions, many of the
latter being closely fused into specific object attachments and systems of role-
expectations. In comparison with its physiological base, the structure of human

personality is highly autonomous and socialized. In addition, the personality
usually has a high degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the social situation at any
particular moment, in the sense that the variations in the social situation do
not bring about completely corresponding variations in the personality
systems.
PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL ROLE
One particular crucial aspect of the articulation of personality with the

social system should be mentioned briefly. Once an organized system of in-
teraction between ego and alterbecomes up reciprocal
stabilized, they build
expectations of each other's action and attitudes which are the nucleus of
what may be called role-expectations. Alter expects ego to behave in given
situational conditions in certain relatively specific ways, or at least within
relatively specific limits. Alter's reaction will then, contingent on the fulfillment
or nonfulfillment of his expectations, be different; with fulfillment leading
to rewards and/or favorable attitudes, and nonfulfillment leading to the
reverse. Alter's reaction is in turn meaningfully interpreted (not necessarily
correctly — distortion is of course possible and frequent) by ego and this
* By mechanisms of defense we mean the motivational processes by which conflicts

internal to the need-disposition system of a personality are resolved or the severity of
their consequences mitigated. Mechanisms of adjustment, on the other hand, are the proc-
esses by which strains on the actor's relations to objects are coped with. Complete resolu-
tion may occur through normal learning, but short of this special mechanisms operate.
interpretation plays a part in shaping the next stage in the process of his ac-
tion toward alter (all this, of course, takes place in reverse too). The pattern
of expectations of many alters, often generalized to include all of those in the
status of ego, constitutes in a social system the institutionalized ^' definition
of ego's roles in specified interactive situations.
Ego's system of need-dispositions may or may not predispose him to con-
form with these expectations. There are, of course, many complex possibilities
of variation between dispositions to complete conformity and to drastic
alienation — that is, predispositions to avoid conformity, to withdraw, or to
rebel. There are also many complex possibilities of accommodation between
dispositions not to conform, in varying modes and and interests in
degrees,
avoiding the sanctions which nonconformity might incur.
Moreover, alienative and conformist responses to institutional role-expec-
tations do not exhaust the possibilities. Some actors possess, to a high degree,
the potentialities of elaborating their own goals and standards, accepting the
content of institutional role-expectations but simultaneously modifying and
adding something new to them. These are the creative personalities whose
conformity or alienation is not motivated mainly by a need-disposition to
accept or reject the given institutional role-expectations, but rather by the
need to discover, elaborate, and conform with their own ego-ideal.
The group of problems centering around conformity, alienation, and
creativity are among the most crucial in the whole theory of action because
of their relevance to problems of social stability and change. It is essential,
in order to make progress in this area, to have conceptualized both the per-
sonality and social system adequately so that the points of empirical articu-
lation where integration and unintegratedness are in balance can be an-
alyzed.^^
5. Cultural Aspects of Action Systems
internalized orientations and cultural objects
We have already stated that the organization of the basic alternatives of

selective orientation is fundamental to any system of action. Without this
organization, the stable system of expectations which are essential to any sys-
* By institutionalization we mean the integration of the expectations of the actors in a

relevant interactive system of roles with a shared normative pattern of values. The integra-
tion is such that each is predisposed to reward the conformity of the others with the
value pattern and conversely to disapprove and pimish deviance. Institutionalization is
a matter of degree, not of absolute presence or absence.
" Although many schemes will allow the ad hoc analyses of some of the points of articu-
lation, the scheme presented here seems to have the advantage of proceeding systematically
from the elements of orientation. This permits the formulation of concepts which reveal
the points of conceptual correspondence among the different types of systems and this —
in turn offers a basis for a more comprehensive and more rigorous analysis of the points
of empirical articulation.
tern of action could not Not only does the child receive the major organi-
exist.
zation of his own from adults through the socialization

selective orientations
process, but consensus with respect to the same fundamental selections among
alternatives is vital to a stable social system. In all societies the stabler and
more effective patterns of culture are those which are shared in common —
though in varying interpretations with varying degrees of conformity, idio-
syncrasy, creativity, and persistence —
by the members of societies and by
groups of societies. The pattern of "commitment" to a particular set of such
selections among the potentially open alternatives represents the point of

empirical articulation of systems of actions.
Once the analysis of the organization of systems of action is pursued to
the levels of elaboration which are necessary for the analysis of the structure
of personalities, it becomes necessary to examine the direct articulation
also
with the patterns of cultural orientation, which have come to be one of the
principal objects of anthropological study. The same basic set of categories
of the selective alternatives which is relevant for the analysis of personality
structures will also be involved in the macroscopic differentiation and classifi-
cation of the cultural orientations or traditions of social systems.
THE ORGANIZATION OF CULTURE PATTERNS IN SYSTEMS
A cultural system is a highly complex constellation of elements. We may

refer here to the two parallel classifications of the actor's modes of motiva-
tional orientation as cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative, and of the basic
cultural orientations as systems of ideas or beliefs, systems of expressive
symbols, and systems of value- orientation (as set forth above). Each type of
culture pattern might then be regarded as a solution of a type of orientation
problem — systems of ideas are solutions of cognitive problems, systems of
expressive symbols are solutions of problems of how "appropriately" Jo
express feelings, and systems of value-orientations are solutions of problems
of evaluation, particularly but not exclusively in social interaction.
Value-orientation patterns are of particularly decisive significance in the
organization of systems of action since one class of them defines the patterns
of reciprocal rights and obligations which become constitutive of role-expecta-
tions and sanctions. (Other classes of value-orientation define the standards
of cognitive and appreciative judgments.)
Cultural patterns tend to become organized into systems. The peculiar
feature of this systematization is a type of integration which we may call
consistency of pattern. Whether it be the logical consistency of belief system,
the stylistic harmony of an art form, or the rational compatibility of a body
of moral rules, the internal coherence of a body of cultural patterns is always
a crucial problem for the student of culture.
The determination of the extent of the consistency of pattern and devia-
tions from it in a given culture presents serious difficulties to the analyst. The
overt or explicit culture almost always appears fragmentary at first, and its
parts seem disconnected. Only under special conditions — for example, in

highly sophisticated systems of ideas or legal systems — is explicit systemati-
zation carried out by the creators and bearers of the culture themselves. In
order therefore to determine the existence of systematic coherence where there
has not been explicit systematization, it is necessary for the student of culturi
to uncover the implicit culture and to detect whatever common premises maj
underlie apparently diverse and unconnected items of orientation. Very clos(
approximations to complete consistency in the patterns of culture are prac-
tically never to be found in large complex social systems. The nature and
sources of the mal-integration of cultural patterns are as important to the
theory of action as the integration itself.
THE INTERNALIZATION OF CULTURE PATTERNS
It made clear that, whatever its systematic form, a cul-

has already been
tural pattern may be involved in action either as an object of the actor's
situation or it may be internalized to become part of the structure of his
personality. All types of cultural patterns may be internalized, but particular
importance is to be attributed to the internalization of value-orientations, some
of which become part of the superego structure of the personality and, with
corresponding frequency, of institutionalized role-expectations.^^
when internalized become constitutive elements of per-
Cultural patterns
sonalitiesand of social systems. All concrete systems of action, at the same
time, have a system of culture and are a set of personalities (or sectors of
them) and a social system or subsystem. Yet all three are conceptually inde-
pendent organizations of the elements of action.
Because of a dynamic theory of
this empirical interrelatedness, there is
culture which corresponds to that of the dynamic theory of personality and

social systems. It is concerned with the conditions under which certain types
of systems of culture can exist in certain types of personalities or societies.
Il analyzes the processes of cultural innovation and change in terms of their
motivational determinants, as these operate in the mechanisms of the social
system and in the mechanisms of personality. It is concerned with the im-
perfections in the integration of cultural patterns and accounts for them in
terms of the empirical interdependence of culture orientations with the
strains and processes of the social and personality systems.
" This was independently and from different points

fact of the internalization of values
of view discovered by Freud in and by Durkheim in his
his theory of the superego
theory of the institutionalization of moral norms. The fact that the two men, working
from different premises, arrived at the same conclusion is one of the landmarks of de-
velopment of modern social science.
6. The Social System

When, in the above discussion of action, we reached the point at which
interaction of an actor with other persons or social objects became crucial,
we disclosed the nucleus of the development of social systems. Personality
as a system has a fundamental and stable point of reference, the acting organ-
ism. It is organized around the one organism and its life processes. But ego
and alter in interaction with each other also constitute a system. This is a
system of a new order, which, however intimately dependent on them, does not
simply consist of the personalities of the two members.
ROLE AS THE UNIT OF SOCIAL SYSTEMS: SOCIAL SYSTEM AND PERSONALITIES

In the present terms a social system is a system of the interaction of a
plurality of persons analyzed within the frame of reference of the theory of ^
action. It is, composed of relationships of individual actors and
of course,
only of such relationships. The relationships themselves are constellations of
the actions of the parties to the relationship oriented toward one another.
For most analytical purposes, the most significant unit of social structures is
not the person but the role. The role is that organized sector of an actor's
orientation which constitutes and defines his participation in an interactive
process. It involves a set of complementary expectations concerning his own
actions and those of others with whom he interacts. Both the actor and those
with whom he interacts possess these expectations. Roles are institutionalized
when they are fully congruous with the prevailing culture patterns and are or-
ganized around expectations of conformity with morally sanctioned patterns of
value-orientation shared by the members of the collectivity in which the role
functions.
The abstraction of an actor's role from the total system of his personality
makes it possible to analyze the articulation of personality with the organiza-
tion of social systems. The structure of a social system and the functional im-
peratives for its operation and survival or orderly change as a system are
moreover different from those of personality.^^ The problems of personality
and social structure can be properly treated only if these differences are recog-
nized. Only then can the points of articulation and mutual interdependence
be studied.
When we recognize that roles rather than personalities are the units of
social structure, we can perceive the necessity of an element of "looseness"
in the relation between personality structure and the performance of a role.
Role situations are situations with potentially all the possible significances to
*A further distinction between social and personality systems lies in the fact that a
social system is not tied to any one particular aggregate of organisms. Furthermore, there
is no reason to believe that when, having undergone a change of personnel, the social
system remains the same, the new actors who have replaced those which were lost are
necessarily identical in all the details of their personality with their predecessors.
an actor that situations can have. Their significance and the resuhant effect on
the motivation of behavior will be different with different personalities. But,
in the organization of the latter's reactions where the stability of the sector
of the social system in question is maintained, there are certain "control

mechanisms" which serve to keep the potential dispersion of the actor's re-
actions within limits narrower than would be produced by the combination
of the total situation and the actor's personality without this specificity of
role expectations.
An important feature of a large proportion of social roles is that the ac-
tions which make them up are not minutely prescribed and that a certain
range of variability is regarded as legitimate. Sanctions are not invoked
against deviance within certain limits. This range of freedom makes it pos-
sible for actors with different personalities to fulfill within considerable limits
the expectations associated with roughly the same roles without undue strain.
It should also be noted that role-expectations and sanctions do exert "pres-

sures" on individual actors which may well generate types of strain which
have important repercussions in various parts of the personality. These will
be manifested in types of action which in turn have a variety of social con-

sequences and often result in either the development of further mechanisms
of social control or the generation of pressures toward change, or in both. In
this manner, personality and role structure constitute closely interdependent
systems.
ROLE TYPES AND THE DIFFERENTIATION AND INTEGRATION OF

SOCIAL SYSTEMS
The structural roles of the social system, like the structure of need-dispo-
sitions of the personality system, must be oriented to value alternatives.
Selections are of course always actions of individuals, but these selections
cannot be inter-individually random in a social system. Indeed, one of the
most important functional imperatives of the maintenance of social systems
is same social system
that the value-orientations of the different actors in the
\ must be some measure in a common system. All on-going social

integrated in
systems do actually show a tendency toward a general system of common
cultural orientations. The sharing of value-orientations is especially crucial,
although consensus with respect to systems of ideas and expressive symbols
are also very important determinants of stability in the social system.
The range of variation and the shape of the distribution of the types of
roles in a social system is neither parallel to nor fully congruous with the
range of variation and the distribution of the personality types of the actors
filling those roles. The actual operation of this structure of roles as an on-
going system is, of course, possible in the last analysis only because the
component personalities are motivated to act in the requisite ways and suffi-
cient gratification is provided to enough individuals within the immediate
system of roles itself or in the more embracing system of roles. There are
functional imperatives limiting the degree of incompatibility of the possible
kinds of roles in the same action system; these imperatives are ultimately re-
lated to the conditions of maintenance of a total on-going social system of the

type in which the more constitutive of these roles are found. A social system,
like a personality, must be coherently organized and not merely a random
assortment of its components.
As in the case of personality, the func tional problem of social systems may
be summarized as the problems of allocation and integration. There is always
a differentiation of functions within any action system. There must accord-
ingly be an allocation of such functions to different classes of roles; the roles
must be articulated for the performance of collaborative and complementary
tasks. The life span of the individual being limited, there must be a continual
process of replacement of personnel within the system of roles if the system is
to endure. Furthermore, both the facilities necessary to perform functions and

the rewards which are important to the motivation of individual actors are
inherently scarce. Hence their allocation cannot be left to an unregulated
competitive process without great frustration and conflict ensuing. The regu-
and the performance of the functions
lation of all these allocative processes
which keep the system or the subsystem going in a sufficiently integrated man-
ner is impossible without a system of definitions of roles and sanctions for
conformity or deviation. With the development of a considerable complexity
of differentiation there emerge roles and subsystems of roles with specifically
integrative functions in the social system.
This determination of functions and allocation and integration of roles,
personnel, facilities, and rewards in a social system implies a process of

selection in accordance with standards of evaluation applied to characteristics
of the objects (individual and collective). This does not mean that anyone
ever deliberately works out the "plan" of most social systems. But as in the
other types of action systems it is not possible for the choices of the actors to
fall atrandom and still form a coherently organized and functioning social
system. The structure of the social system in this respect may be regarded as
the cumulative and balanced resultant of many selections of many individuals,
stabilized and reinforced by the institutionalization of value patterns, which
legitimize commitment to certain directions of selection and mobilize sanctions
in the support of the resultant orientations.
The patterns of commitment which, in their function as institutional role-
expectations, are incorporated into the structure of social systems are, in at
leastone fundamental aspect of their content (that is, in the commitments
which define rights and obligations) identical with the cultural value-orienta-
tion discussed above. The latter, in the form of the general moral consensus re-
garding rights and obligations, constitutes therefore one fundamental com-

ponent of the structure of the social system. The structural differences between
different social systems will often be found to reside in differences in the con-
tent and range of this consensus.
Although the moral consensus of the pattern of value-orientation provides
the standards and sets the limits which regulate the allocations, there must
also be special institutional mechanisms through which the allocative decisions
are made and implemented. The institutional roles to which power and prestige
are attached play a preponderant part in this process. The reason for this lies
in the fact that power and prestige possess a highly general significance for
the distribution of other facilities and rewards. The distribution of power and
prestige and the institutional mechanisms which regulate that distribution
are therefore especially influential in the working of a social system.
The general requirement for integration, therefore, demands that the con-
trol of allocative and integrative processes be associated with the same, or with
closely interacting, roles; and that the mechanisms regulating the distribution
of power and prestige apportion sufficient power and prestige to these alloca-
tive and integrative roles. And finally, it is essential that the occupants of
these roles perform their allocative and integrative functions with a view to
conforming with the value consensus of the society. These allocative and in-
tegrative roles (whether they be roles filled by individuals or by subcollectiv-
ities) may be considered to be important integrative mechanisms of the
society. Their absence or defectiveness causes conflicts and frustrations.

It must be recognized that no social system is ever completely integrated
just as none is ever completely disintegrated/'From the sectors of unintegrated-

ness —
where expectations cannot be fulfilled in institutional roles or where
need-dispositions are frustrated by institutionalized expectations or where
the strain is not absorbed in safety-valve mechanisms —
from these sectors
some of the most important sources of change and growth are to be found/
Any system of interactive relationships of a plurality of individual actors
is a social system. A society ^^ is the type of social system which contains
within itself all the essential prerequisites for its maintenance as a self-sub-
sistent system. Among the more essential of these prerequisites are (1) or-
ganization around the foci of territorial location and kinship, (2) a system
for determining functions and allocating facilitiesand rewards, and (3) in-
tegrative structures controlling these allocations and regulating conflicts and
competitive processes.
With the institutionalization of culture patterns, especially value-orienta-

tion patterns, in the social structure, the threefold reciprocal integration of
personality, social system, and culture comes full circle.^^ Such value pat-
*°
Partial social systems, so long as their relation to the society of which they are parts
is made clear, are certainly legitimate objects of empirical investigation.
**
Although —
as must almost inevitably be the case with each individual signer —
there aresome things I should prefer to see said somewhat difiFerently, there is only one
point on which I remain slightly uncomfortable. This is the relation of social structure.
terns, institutionalized in the social structure, through the operation of role

mechanisms, and in combination with other elements, organize the behavior
of adult members of society. Through the socialization process, they are in
turn constitutive in establishment of the personality structure of the new adult
from the plasticity of early childhood. The process of socialization, it is clear
from the above, is dependent upon social interaction. Adults in their orienta-
tion to the child are certainly acting itt roles, very largely institutionalized,
and almost from the beginning the child which
niniself develops expectations
rapidly become role-expectations. framework of the person-

Then within the
ality structures thus formed, adults act both fa maintain and to modify the
social system and the value patterns in which anosby which they live, and to
modify or keep within the pattern the personality stnictures of their living
descendants.
The reader should bear in mind that what we have presented in the fore-
going pages is a highly general and abstract scheme. We are fully aware that
by itself it cannot do justice to the immense richness and particularity of the
human scene. But it can help us to analyze that scene and organize our knowl-
edge of it.
The general outlines of the nature of action systems sketched here, the in-
terrelations of the various components and the interdependence of the system
levels of organization of those components, seems to be quite clearly implied
in much contemporary theory and research. But the empirical complexity is im-
mense, and the unexplored areas are, in the light of present knowledge, Stygian
in their darkness. To us, progress toward unraveling that complexity and il-
luminating some of the obscurity depends, along with empirical investigation,

on more precise and explicit conceptualization of the components of action
and of the ways in which they are interrelated.
Talcott Parsons Henry A. Murray, Jr.
Edward A. Shils Robert R. Sears

Gordon W. AUport Richard C. Sheldon
Clyde Kluckhohn Samuel A. Stouffer
Edward C. Tolman
social system, role, and culture. Many anthropologists (and certainly the undersigned)
will agree today that there is an element in the social (i.e., interactive) process which
is not culturally patterned, which is in some sense autonomous from culture. Nevertheless,
one whose training, experiences, and prejudices are anthropological tends to feel that
the present statement does not give full weight to the extent to which roles are culturally
defined, social structure is part of the cultural map, the social system is built upon girders
supplied by explicit and implicit culture. On the other hand, whatever my reservations,
I welcome the publication of the statement in its present form because I am convinced that
in the present stage of social science it is highly useful to behave experimentally with
reference to conceptual schemes —
Clyde Kluckhohn.
A Note on the Place of Economic Theory and Political Theory in the

General Theory of Action
The general preoccupations and terminology of the foregoing statement
are those current in the disciplines of psychology, sociology, and social anthro-
pology. It is reasonable to ask about the relevance of the theoretical interests
of the well-established social science disciplines of economics and political
science.
Economics istoday, in a theoretical sense, probably the most highly elabo-
rated, sophisticated, and refined of the disciplines dealing with action. It was
by far the earliest to conceive of the relevant phenomena in terms of a system
of interdependent variables and thus to interpret particular phenomena in the
light of their interrelations with others in a system. It has also achieved a high
level of technical refinement of its concepts and analytical methods.
Most certainly economic theory a part of the theory of action in the
is
present technical sense. It has not, however, been explicitly dealt with above
because most of its problems arise only at points of elaboration and differen-
tiation in the development of social systems beyond those to which we have
carried our analysis.
It is true that there is an "economic" aspect of all empirical action sys-
tems — that aspect which we have designated as the "allocative," by borrowing
a term from economics. But this concept of economics is so general as to pre-
clude its being used as the basis of a technical theoretical development. This
latter occurs only with the emergence of specially differentiated types of
orientation of action within a correspondingly differentiated social system.
Only with the development of money, of markets, and of the price mechanism
or other differentiated mechanisms of allocation of resources do the phenomena
of special technical interest to the economist appear on a substantial scale.
Economic theory is the conceptual scheme for analyzing such phenomena
as production — as oriented to a set of market conditions or allocative policies
— exchange, and determination of particular prices and of price levels. As such
its technical basis rests on the fundamentals of action theory as here set forth
— particularly instrumental orientation as an action type and the conditions
of mutuality of such orientation. Its empirical relevance, on the other hand,
rests on certain types oi development of social systems. Just as the economic
variant of instrumental orientation must be placed relative to other types and
the particular combinations of action components they involve, so must the
empirical processes of special interest to the economist be placed in terms of
their relations to those other aspects of the total social system which are not
susceptible of analysis in terms of economic theory.
Economic theory, then, is the theory of a particular set of processes or of a
subsystem within a class of highly differentiated social systems. This sub-
system is of very great strategic significance in these societies. Economic theory
has its conceptual foundations in the categories of action theory here set forth,
but only becomes a distinctive subtheory of the general theory on a consider-
ably more elaborate level of differentiation than that reached here.
The case of political science is somewhat different. Its historical focus
has been much more on a class of concrete phenomena, those of government,
than on a disctinctive conceptual scheme. What has traditionally been called
political theory has contained more of philosophical and ethical explication
of the problems of government than of empirical analysis of its processes and
determinants. In the sense of a distinctive empirical conceptual scheme,

political theory has clearly not been in the same category with economic
theory.
Since government constitutes one of the most strategically important
processes and foci of differentiated structures within social systems, its study
is clearly a legitimate basis for the specialization of a discipline within the
social sciences. But, like economics, its special relevance does not emerge
until degrees of differentiation on both theoretical and empirical levels be-
yond those reached in the present general statement have appeared.
It appears, furthermore, that the processes and structures of government
necessarily have highly diffuse functions in social systems. It seems likely,
therefore, that if the empirical focus of political science is to remain on the
phenomena of government, it will not as a discipline be able to attain a
sharpness of theoretical focus comparable to that of economics. It is more
likely to draw from a much wider range of the components of the general
theory of action and to find its distinctiveness in the way it combines these
components in relation to its special empirical interests, rather than in the
technical elaboration of a narrow and sharply focused segment of the theory
of action, as is the case with economics.

Talcott Parsons - Toward A General Theory of Action (1962, Harvard University Press) - Páginas-9-15,19-45

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Talcott Parsons - Toward A General Theory of Action (1962, Harvard University Press) - Páginas-9-15,19-45

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Talcott Parsons - Toward A General Theory of Action (1962, Harvard University Press) - Páginas-9-15,19-45

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

H

I n the fall of 1948 some members of the Department of So-

in clarifying the problems we faced individually in our teaching and research

entitled "Assumptions of Basic Social Science," which had been formulated

group also drafted memoranda on particular theoretical problem areas.

ulated especially by Clyde Kluckhohn's presentation, before the smaller group,

the non-staff collaborators would write on a subject of particular personal in-

The principal authors were Professors Kluckhohn and Murray.

as humanly possible, the statement represents both a carefully considered and

1 Some Fundamental Categories of the Theory of Action:

(1) Introduction. (2) The frame of reference of the theory of

2 Some Observations on Theory in the Social Sciences ... 30

PART 2 Values, Motives, and Systems of Action

1 Categories of the Orientation and Organization of Action . . 53

2 Personality as a System of Action 110

4 The Social System 190

PART 3 A Psychological Model

2 The Model 285

3 Learning and the Psychodynamic Mechanisms 303

4 Further Problems Connected with the Model 319

5 Value Standards, Pattern Variables, Social Roles, Personality 343

6 Summary and Conclusions 355

PART 4 The Theory of Action and Its Application

1 Prejudice: A Problem in Psychological and Social Causation 365

Is research on prejudice basic? Stimulus approach. The phenome-

^2 Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action: An

Normative and existential propositions. Definition of value for the

3 Toward a Classification of Interaction 434

A few assumptions. Opinions unfavorable to the classification of

4 Social Behavior and Personality Development 465

Action. Monadic and dyadic units. Dynamics. Personality as

5 An Empirical Study of Technical Problems in Analysis of

Role conflict and personality. Note on Lazarsfeld's latent distance

of Action: A General Statement

I he present statement and the volume which it introduces

vergence of anthropological studies of culture, the theory of learning, the

2. The Frame of Reference of the Theory of Action

ORIENTATION AND SITUATION

their capacity as members. Whether the acting unit is an individual or a col-

in its relationship to his goals and interests.

Each orientation of action in turn involves a set ^ of objects of orientation.

* See note at end of chapter.

ber and range of variation but not necessarily conceived as interdependent so as to

erence. A specific combination of selections relative to such objects, made

ganized plurality of such orientations of action constitutes a system of action.^

* The establishment of a definite relationship with objects (e.g., their possession or

on the most elementary level, of the orientation of action, which is a con-

It is essential to point out that a description of a system of action must

than another was selected.

their relation to such organisms. This determinate range of the alternatives

DESCRIPTIVE AND DYNAMIC ANALYSIS

The complete analysis of a system of action would comprise description

system through time, involving changes in the relations of the constituent

PERSONALITY, SOCIAL SYSTEM, AND CULTURE

The frame of reference of the theory of action applies in principle to any

In the formation of systems made up of human actions or the components

organized around the problems inherent in or arising from social interaction

nificance in the personality system and in the social system.

itimpinges on the orientation system. However, phantasies and imaginative productions,