43. LAUREL V.

GARCIA
187 SCRA 797 (1990)

FACTS: The subject Roppongi property is one of the properties acquired by the Philippines from
Japan pursuant to a Reparations Agreement. The property is where the Philippine Embassy was once
located, before it transferred to the Nampeidai property. It was decided that the properties would be
available to sale or disposition. One of the first properties opened up for public auction was the
Roppongi property, despite numerous oppositions from different sectors.

ISSUE: W/N rule of Lex Situs will apply.

HELD: No, rule of lex situs does not apply.

A conflict of law situation arises only when:

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. The issues are not concerned with validity of
ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the
authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State.  And the
validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex
situs does not apply.
CHAPTER 8

44. Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals

Facts: The Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., private respondent
herein, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. Upon the completion of the loading and
when the vessel was ready to leave port, an official pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour
authorities in Puerto Ordaz to navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. The Philippine
Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque Channel. The vessel proceeded on its
way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the
channel. The master (captain) checked the position of the vessel and verified that it was in the centre of
the channel. The Philippine Roxas ran around in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing the ingress and
egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a vessel owned by herein petitioner Wild
valley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. Subsequently, Wild
valley Shipping Company, Ltd. filed a suit with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch III against
Philippine President Lines, Inc. and Pioneer Insurance Company (the underwriter/insurer of Philippine
Roxas) for damages in the form of unearned profits, and interest thereon amounting to US
$400,000.00plus attorney's fees, costs, and expenses of litigation.
ISSUE: W/N Venezuelan law is applicable to the case at bar.

HELD: It is well-settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. For
a copy of a foreign public document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:

(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy;
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,
consul, vice consular or consular agent or Foreign Service officer, and with the seal of his office.

The latter requirement is not a mere technicality but is intended to justify the giving of full faith and
credit to the genuineness of a document in a foreign country. With respect to proof of written laws,
parol proof is objectionable, for the written law itself is the best evidence. According to the weight of
authority, when a foreign statute is involved, the best evidence rule requires that it be proved by a duly
authenticated copy of the statute. At this juncture, we have to point out that the Venezuelan law was
not pleaded before the lower court.

A foreign law is considered to be pleaded if there is an allegation in the pleading about the existence of
the foreign law, its import and legal consequence on the event or transaction in issue.

A review of the Complaint revealed that it was never alleged or invoked despite the fact that the
grounding of the M/V Philippine Roxas occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of Venezuela. We
reiterate that under the rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and
proved as a fact. In the absence of pleading and proof, the laws of a foreign country, or state, will be
presumed to be the same as our own local or domestic law and this is known as processual
presumption.

45. Atienza v. Philimare Shipping and Equipment Supply

FACTS: Atienza was engaged by PSES, as agent for Trans Ocean Liner Pte. Ltd. of Germany, based on
Singapore, to work as Third Mate on board the MV Tibati. The, Crew Agreement signed by the parties,
provided for insurance benefits "as per NSB Standard Format" and was validated and approved by the
National Seamen Board.

Atienza died as a result of an accident which befell him while working on the vessel.  In due time, his
father, the herein petitioner, filed a claim for death benefits computed at the rate of 36 months times
the seaman's monthly salary plus ten per cent thereof in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation
Law of Singapore, for a total of $30,600.00. The, private respondents, while admitting liability,
contended that this was limited to only P40,000.00 under Section D(1) of the NSB Standard Format.

POEA sustained the private respondent and held that the applicable law was Philippine law.   On appeal,
the decision was affirmed by the NLRC except that it increased the award. 

ISSUE: W/N Singaporean law should have been applied, in line with our ruling in  Norse Management Co.
v. National Seamen Board,  where the foreign law was held controlling because it provided for greater
benefits for the claimant.
HELD: No, Singaporean law should not be applied. The, reason is that in that case, it was specifically
stipulated by the parties in the Crew Agreement that "compensation shall be paid to employee in
accordance with and subject to the limitations of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Philippines or
the Workmen's Insurance Law of the registry of the vessel, whichever is greater.  That was why the
higher benefits prescribed by the foreign law were awarded. By contrast, no such stipulation appears in
the Crew Agreement now under consideration. Instead, it is clearly stated therein that the insurance
benefits shall be "as per NSB Standard Format," in the event "of death of the seaman during the term of
his contract, over and above the benefits for which the Philippine Government is liable under Philippine
law. 

46. Seagull Maritime Corp. v. Balatongan

FACTS: A "crew Agreement" was entered into by private respondent Balatongan and Philimare whereby
the latter employed the former as able seaman on board its vessel "Santa Cruz" (renamed "Turtle Bay").
Said agreement was processed and approved by the NSB. While on board said vessel the said parties
entered into a supplementary contract of employment which provides that the employer shall be
obliged to insure the employee during his engagement against death or permanent invalidity caused by
accident on board. Balatongan met an accident in the Suez Canal, Egypt as a result of which he was
hospitalized. Later, he was repatriated to the Philippines and was hospitalized at the Makati Medical. A
medical certificate was issued describing his disability as "permanent in nature."

Balatongan demanded payment for his claim for total disability but his claim was denied for having been
submitted to the insurers beyond the designated period. Thus, Balatongan filed a complaint against
petitioner before POEA for non-payment of his claim for permanent total disability. POEA ruled in favor
of the herein private respondent. On appeal, the NLRC dismissed the appeal and MR of petitioner for
lack of merit.

ISSUE: W/N the supplementary contract of employment was entered into between petitioner and
private respondent to modify the original contract of employment.

HELD: Yes, the supplementary contract of employment was entered into between petitioner and private
respondent to modify the original contract of employment. The reason why the law requires that the
POEA should approve and verify a contract under Article 34(i) of the Labor Code is to insure that the
employee shall not thereby be placed in a disadvantageous position and that the same are within the
minimum standards of the terms and conditions of such employment contract set by the POEA. This is
why a standard format for employment contracts has been adopted by the Department of Labor.
However, there is no prohibition against stipulating in a contract more benefits to the employee than
those required by law. Thus, in this case wherein a "supplementary contract" was entered into affording
greater benefits to the employee than the previous one, and although the same was not submitted for
the approval of the POEA, the public respondents properly considered said contract to be valid and
enforceable. Indeed, said pronouncements of public respondents have the effect of an approval of said
contract. Moreover, as said contract was voluntarily entered into by the parties the same is binding
between them.  Not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order, its
validity must be sustained.  By the same token, the court sustains the ruling of public respondents that
the provision in the supplementary contract whereby private respondent waives any claim against
petitioners for damages arising from death or permanent disability is against public policy, oppressive
and inimical to the rights of private respondent. The said provision defeats and is inconsistent with the
duty of petitioners to insure private respondent against said contingencies as clearly stipulated in the
said contract.

47. Mitsui O.S.K Lines Ltd. v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Petitioner Mitsui O.S.K. Lines Ltd. is a foreign corporation represented in the Philippines by its
agent, Magsaysay Agencies. It entered into a contract of carriage through Meister Transport, Inc., an
international freight forwarder, with private respondent Lavine Loungewear Manufacturing Corporation
to transport goods of the latter from Manila to Le Havre, France. Petitioner undertook to deliver the
goods to France 28 days from initial loading. Petitioner's vessel loaded private respondent's container
van for carriage at the said port of origin.

However, in Kaoshiung, Taiwan the goods were not transshipped immediately, with the result that the
shipment arrived in Le Havre only on November 14, 1991. The consignee allegedly paid only half the
value of the said goods on the ground that they did not arrive in France until the "off season" in that
country. The remaining half was allegedly charged to the account of private respondent which in turn
demanded payment from petitioner through its agent.

As petitioner denied private respondent's claim, the latter filed a case in the RTC which denied
petitioner's motion as well as its subsequent MR. On petition for certiorari, the CA sustained the trial
court's orders. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent's action is for "loss or damage" to goods shipped, within the
meaning of 3(6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA).

HELD: No, the suit is not for "loss or damage" to goods contemplated in 3(6). The question of
prescription of action is governed not by the COGSA but by Article 1144 of the Civil Code which provides
for a prescriptive period of ten years.

Although the Court agree that there are places in the section (Article III) in which the phrase need have
no broader meaning than loss or physical damage to the goods, we disagree with the conclusion that it
must so be limited wherever it is used. We take it that the phrase has a uniform meaning, not merely in
Section 3, but throughout the Act; and there are a number of places in which the restricted
interpretation suggested would be inappropriate. For example Section 4(2) [Article IV(2) exempts the
carrier, the ship, from liability "loss or damage" resulting from certain courses beyond their control.  

Indeed, what is in issue in this petition is not the liability of petitioner for its handling of goods as
provided by 3(6) of the COGSA, but its liability under its contract of carriage with private respondent as
covered by laws of more general application.

Precisely, the question before the trial court is not the particular sense of "damages" as it refers to the
physical loss or damage of a shipper's goods as specifically covered by 3(6) of COGSA but petitioner's
potential liability for the damages it has caused in the general sense and, as such, the matter is governed
by the Civil Code, the Code of Commerce and COGSA, for the breach of its contract of carriage with
private respondent.
 48. People v. Wong Cheng
46 Phil. 729 (1922)

FACTS: The Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the CFI of Manila, sustaining the
demurrer presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case and in which the
appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the
city. The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and
dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters.

HELD: Yes, the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard merchant vessels
anchored in our jurisdiction waters.

There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law;

 French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should
not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed, unless their commission affects the peace and security of the territory;

 English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to
which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the
country within territory they were committed.

Of this two rules, it is the last one (English Rule) that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at
present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this
court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere
possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory
those effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a
disturbance of the public order.

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in
mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.