PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA

By Dr. B.R. Ambedkar

_________________________________________________________________________________________

Contents
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
PROLOGUE
INTRODUCTION

PART 1 : MUSLIM CASE FOR PAKISTAN

Chapter I : What does the league demand ?
Chapter II : A nation calling for a home
Chapter III : Escape from degradation

PART II - HINDU CASE AGAINST PAKISTAN

Chapter IV : Break-up of Unity
Chapter V : Weakening of the Defences
Chapter VI : Pakistan and communal peace

Part III - WHAT IF NOT PAKISTAN ?

Chapter VII : Hindu alternative to Pakistan
Chapter VIII : Muslim alternative to Pakistan
Chapter IX : Lessons from abroad

PART IV : PAKISTAN AND THE MALAISE

Chapter X : Social stagnation
Chapter XI : Communal aggression
Chapter XII : National frustration

PART V :
Chapter XIII : Must there be Pakistan
Chapter XIV : The problems of Pakistan
Chapter XV : Who can decide ?

APPENDICES

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The problem of Pakistan has given a headache to everyone, more so to me than to anybody else. I
cannot help recalling with regret how much of my time it has consumed when so much of my other
literary work of greater importance to me than this is held up for want of it. I therefore hope that this
second edition will also be the last I trust that before it is exhausted either the question will be settled
or withdrawn.
There are four respects in which this second edition differs from the first.
*[f1] The first edition contained many misprints which formed the subject of complaints from many
readers as well as reviewers. In preparing this edition, I have taken as much care as is possible to
leave no room for complaint on this score. ,The first edition consisted only of three parts. Part V is an
addition. It contains my own views on the various issues involved in the problem of Pakistan. It has
been added because of the criticism levelled against the first edition that while I wrote about
Pakistan I did not state what views I held on the subject. The present edition differs from the first in
another respect. The maps contained in the first edition are retained but the number of appendices
have been enlarged. In the first edition there were only eleven appendices. The present edition has
twenty-five. To this edition I have also added an index which did not find a place in the first edition.
The book appears to have supplied a real want. I have seen how the thoughts, ideas and arguments
contained in it have been pillaged by authors, politicians and editors of newspapers to support their
sides. I am sorry they did not observe the decency of acknowledging the source even when they
lifted not merely the argument but also the language of the book. But that is a matter I do not mind. I
am glad that the book has been of service to
Indians who are faced with this knotty problem of Pakistan. The fact that Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah
in their recent talks cited the book as an authority on the subject which might be consulted with
advantage bespeaks the worth of the book.

The book by its name might appear to deal only with the X. Y. Z. of Pakistan. It does more than that.
It is an analytical presentation of Indian history and Indian politics in their communal aspects. As
such, it is intended to explain the A. B.C. of Pakistan also. The book is more than a mere treatise on
Pakistan. The material relating to Indian history and Indian politics contained in this book is so large
and so varied that it might well be called Indian Political What is What.
The book has displeased both Hindus as well as Muslims though the reasons for the dislike of the
Hindus are different from the reasons for the dislike of the Muslims. I am not sorry' for this reception
given to my book. That it is disowned by the Hindus and unowned by the Muslims is to me the best
evidence that it has the vices of neither and that from the point of view of independence of thought
and fearless presentation affects the book is not a party production.
Some people are sore because what I have said has hurt them. I have not, I confess , allowed
myself to be influenced by fears of wounding either individuals or classes, or shocking opinions
however respectable they may be. I have often felt regret in pursuing this course, but remorse never.
Those whom I may have offended must forgive me, in consideration of the honesty and
disinterestedness of my aim. I do not claim to have written dispassionately though I trust I have
written without prejudice. It would be hardly possible—1 was going to say decent—for an Indian to
be calm when he talks of his country and thinks of the times. In dealing with the question of Pakistan
my object has been to draw a perfectly accurate, and at the same time, a suggestive picture of the
situation as I see it. Whatever points of strength and weakness I have discovered on either side I
have brought them boldly forward. I have taken pains to throw light on the mischievous effects that
are likely to proceed from an obstinate and impracticable course of action.
The witness of history regarding the conflict between the forces of the authority of the State and of
anti-State nationalism within, has been uncertain, if not equivocal. As Prof. Friedmann*
[f2] observes:—

" There is not a single modem State which has not, at one time or another, forced a recalcitrant
national group to live under its authority. Scots, Bretons, Catalans, Germans, Poles, Czechs, Finns,
all have, at some time or another, been compelled to accept the authority of a more powerful State
whether they liked it or not. Often, as in Great Britain or France, force eventually led to co-operation
and a co-ordination of State authority and national cohesion. But in many cases, such as those of
Germany, Poland, Italy and a host of Central European and Balkan countries, the forces of
Nationalism did not rest until they had thrown off the shackles of State Power and formed a State of
their own . . . . . "

In the last edition, I depicted the experience of countries in which the State engaged itself in
senseless suppression of nationalism and weathered away in the attempt. In this edition I have
added by way of contrast the experience of other countries to show that given the will to live together
it is not impossible for diverse communities and even for diverse nations to live in the bosom of one
State. It might be said that in tendering advice to both sides I have used terms more passionate than
they need have been. If I have done so it is because I felt that the manner of the physician who tries
to surprise the vital principle in each paralyzed organ in order to goad it to action was best suited to
stir up the average Indian who is complacent if not somnolent, who is unsuspecting if not
ill-informed, to realize what is happening. I hope my effort will have the desired effect.
I cannot close this preface without thanking Prof. Manohar B. Chitnis of the Khalsa College,
Bombay, and Mr. K. V. Chitre for their untiring labours to remove all printer' sand clerical errors that
had crept into the first edition and to see that this edition is free from all such blemishes. I am also
very grateful to Prof. Chitnis for the preparation of the Index which has undoubtedly enhanced the
utility of the book.

1st January 1945,

22, Prithviraj Road,
B.R.AMBEDKAR
New Delhi.

PROLOGUE

It can rightly be said that the long introduction with which this treatise opens leaves no excuse for a
prologue. But there is an epilogue which is affixed to the treatise. Having done that, I thought of
prefixing a prologue, firstly, because an epilogue needs to be balanced by a prologue, and secondly,
because the prologue gives me room to state in a few words the origin of this treatise to those who
may be curious to know it and to impress upon the readers the importance of the issues raised in it.
For the satisfaction of the curious it may be stated that there exists, at any rate in the Bombay
Presidency, a political organization called the Independent Labour Party (abbreviated into I.L.P.) for
the last three years. It is not an ancient, hoary organization which can claim to have grown grey in
politics. The I.L.P. is not in its dotage and is not overtaken by senility, for which second childhood is
given as a more agreeable name. Compared with other political organizations, the I.L.P. is a young
and fairly active body, not subservient to any clique or interest. Immediately after the passing of the
Lahore Resolution on Pakistan by the Muslim League, the Executive Council of the I.L.P. met to
consider what attitude it should adopt towards this project of Pakistan. The Executive Council could
see that there was underlying Pakistan an idea to which no objection could be taken. Indeed, the
Council was attracted to the scheme of Pakistan inasmuch as it meant the creation of ethnic states
as a solution of the communal problem. The Council, however, did not feel competent to pronounce
at that stage a decided opinion on the issue of Pakistan. The Council, therefore, resolved to appoint
a committee to study the question and make a report on it. The committee consisted of my self as
the Chairman, and Principal M. V. Donde, B.A.; Mr. S. C. Joshi, M.A.,LL.B., Advocate (O.S.),
M.L.C.;Mr.R.R.Bhole,B.Sc., LL.B.,. m.l.a.i Mr. D. G. Jadhav, B.A., LL.B., M.L.A., and Mr. A. V.
Chitre, B.A., M.L.A., all belonging to the I.L.P., as members of the committee. Mr. D. V. Pradhan,
Member, Bombay Municipal Corporation, acted as Secretary to the committee. The committee
asked me to prepare a report on Pakistan which I did. The same was submitted to the Executive
Council of the I.L.P., which resolved that the report should be published. The treatise now published
is that report.
The book is intended to assist the student of Pakistan to come to his own conclusion. With that
object in view, I have not only assembled in this volume all the necessary and relevant data but have
also added 14 appendices and 3 maps, which in my judgement, form an important accompaniment
to the book.
It is not enough for the reader to go over the material collected in the following pages. He must also
reflect over it. Let him take to heart the warning which Carlyle gave to Englishmen of his generation.
He said:
"The Genius of England no longer soars Sunward, world-defiant, like an Eagle through the storms, '
mewing her mighty youth,'.......... . . . . . . the Genius of England—much like a greedy Ostrich intent
on provender and a whole skin ..........; with its Ostrich-head stuck into ...... whatever sheltering
Fallacy there may be, and so awaits the issue. The issue has been slow; but it now seems to have
been inevitable. No Ostrich, intent on gross terrene provender and sticking its head into Fallacies,
but will be awakened one day—in a terrible a posteriori manner if not otherwise! Awake before it
comes to that. Gods and men did us awake! The Voices of our Fathers, with thousand fold stern
monition to one and all, bid us awake".
This warning, I am convinced, applies to Indians in their present circumstances as it once did to
Englishmen, and Indians, if they pay no heed to it, will do so at their peril.

Now, a word for those who have helped me in the preparation of this report. Mr. M. G. Tipnis,
D.C.E., (Kalabhuwan, Baroda), and Mr. Chhaganlal S. Modyhave rendered me great assistance, the
former in preparing the maps and the latter in typing the manuscript. I wish to express my gratitude
to both for their work which they have done purely as a labour of love. Thanks are also due in a
special measure to my friends Mr. B. R. Kadrekar and Mr. K. V. Chitre for their labours in
undertaking the most uninteresting and dull task of correcting the proof sand supervising the
printing.
28th December, 1940,
'Rajagrah B.R. AMBEDKAR. Dadar, Bombay,
14.

INTRODUCTION

The Muslim Leagued Resolution on Pakistan has called forth different reactions. There are some
who look upon it as a case of political measles to which a people in the infancy of their conscious
unity and power are very liable. Others have taken it as a permanent frame of the Muslim mind and
not merely a passing phase and have in consequence been greatly perturbed.

The question is undoubtedly controversial. The issue is vital and there is no argument which has not
been used in the controversy by one side to silence the other. Some argue that this demand for
partitioning India into two political entities under separate national states staggers their imagination ;
others are so choked with a sense of righteous indignation at this wanton attempt to break the unity
of a country, which, it is claimed, has stood as one for centuries, that their rage prevents them from
giving expression to their thoughts. Others think that it need not be taken seriously. They treat it as a
trifle and try to destroy it by shooting into it similes and metaphors. " You don't cut your head to cure
your headache," " you don't cut a baby into two because two women are engaged in fighting out a
claim as to who its mother is," are some of the analogies which are used to prove the absurdity of
Pakistan. In a controversy carried on the plane of pure sentiment, there is nothing surprising if a
dispassionate student finds more stupefaction and less understanding, more heat and less light,
more ridicule and less seriousness.

My position in this behalf is definite, if not singular. I do not think the demand for Pakistan is the
result of mere political distemper, which will pass away with the efflux of time. As I read the situation,
it seems to me that it is a characteristic in the biological sense of the term, which the Muslim body
politic has developed in the same manner as an organism develops a characteristic. Whether it will
survive or not, in the process of natural selection, must depend upon the forces that may become
operative in the struggle for existence between Hindus and Musalmans. I am not staggered by
Pakistan; I am not indignant about it ; nor do I believe that it can be smashed by shooting into it
similes and metaphors. Those who believe in shooting it by similes should remember that nonsense
does not cease to be nonsense because it is put in. rhyme, and that a metaphor is no argument
though it be sometimes the gunpowder to drive one home and imbed it in memory. I believe that it
would be neither wise nor possible to reject summarily a scheme if it has behind it the sentiment, if
not the passionate support, of 90 p.c. Muslims of India. I have no doubt that the only proper attitude
to Pakistan is to study it in all its aspects, to understand its implications and to form an intelligent
judgement about it.
With all this, a reader is sure to ask : Is this book on Pakistan seasonable in the sense that one must
read it, as one must eat the fruits of the season to keep oneself in health ? If it is seasonable, is it
readable ? These are natural queries and an author, whose object is to attract readers, may well
make use of the introduction to meet them.
As to the seasonableness of the book there can be no doubt. The way of looking at India by Indians
themselves must be admitted to have undergone a complete change during the last 20 years.
Referring to India Prof. Arnold Toynbee wrote in 1915—

" British statesmanship in the nineteenth century regarded India as a 'Sleeping Beauty,' whom
Britain had a prescriptive right to woo when she awoke; so it hedged with thorns the garden where
she lay, to safeguard her from marauders prowling in the desert without Now the princess is awake,
and is claiming the right to dispose of her own hand, while the marauders have transformed
themselves into respectable gentlemen diligently occupied in turning the desert into a garden too,
but grievously impeded by the British thorn-hedge. When they politely request us to remove it, we
shall do well to consent, for they will not make the demand till they feel themselves strong enough to
enforce it, and in the tussle that will follow if we refuse, the sympathies of the Indian princess will not
be on our side. now that she is awake, she wishes to walk abroad among her neighbours; she feels
herself capable of rebuffing without our countenance any blandishments or threats they may offer
her, and she is becoming as weary as they of the thorn-hedge that confines her to her garden.

"If we treat her with tact, India will never wish to secede from the spiritual brotherhood of the British
Empire, but it is inevitable that she should lead a more and more independent life of her own, and
follow the example of Anglo-Saxon Commowealths by establishing direct relations with her
neighbours........"
Although the writer is an Englishman, the view expressed by him in 1915 was the view commonly
held by all Indians irrespective of caste or creed. Now that India the " Sleeping Beauty " of Prof.
Toynbee is awake, what is the view of the Indians about her ? On this question, there can be no
manner of doubt that those who have observed this Sleeping Beauty behave in recent years, feel
she is a strange being quite different from the angelic princess that she was supposed to be. She is
a mad maiden having a dual personality, half human, half animal, always in convulsions because of
her two natures in perpetual conflict. If there is any doubt about her dual personality, it has now been
dispelled by the Resolution of the Muslim League demanding the cutting up of India into two,
Pakistan and Hindustan, so that these conflicts and convulsions due to a dual personality having
been bound in one may cease forever, and so freed from each other, may dwell in separate homes
congenial to their respective cultures, Hindu and Muslim.

It is beyond question that Pakistan is a scheme which will have to be taken into account. The
Muslims will insist upon the scheme being considered. The British will insist upon some kind of
settlement being reached between the Hindus and the Muslims before they consent to any
devolution of political power. There is no use blaming the British for insisting upon such a settlement
as a condition precedent to the transfer of power. The British cannot consent to settle power upon
an aggressive Hindu majority and make it its heir, leaving it to deal with the minorities at its sweet
pleasure. That would not be ending imperialism. It would be creating another imperialism. The
Hindus, therefore, cannot avoid coming to grips with Pakistan, much as they would like to do.
If the scheme of Pakistan has to be considered, and there is no escape from it, then there are
certain points which must be borne in mind.

The first point to note is that the Hindus and Muslims must decide the question themselves. They
cannot invoke the aid of anyone else. Certainly, they cannot expect the British to decide it for them.
From the point of view of the Empire, it matters very little to the British whether India remains one
undivided whole, or is partitioned into two parts, Pakistan and Hindustan, or into twenty linguistic
fragments as planned by the Congress, so long as all of them are content to live within the Empire.
The British need not interfere for the simple reason that they are not affected by such territorial
divisions.
Further, if the Hindus are hoping that the British will use force to put down Pakistan, that is
impossible. In the first place, coercion is no remedy. The futility of force and resistance was pointed
out by Burke long ago in his speeches relating to the coercion of the American colonies. His
memorable words may be quoted not only for the benefit of the Hindu Maha Sabha but also for the
benefit of all. This is what he said:
" The use of force alone is temporary. It may endure a moment but it does not remove the necessity
of subduing again : a nation is not governed which is perpetually to be conquered. The next
objection to force is its uncertainty. Terror is not always the effect of force, and an armament is not a
victory. If you do not succeed you are without resource; for conciliation failing, force remains; but
force failing, no further hope of reconciliation is left. Power and Authority are sometimes bought by
kindness, but they can never be begged as alms by an impoverished and defeated violence. A
further objection to force is that you impair the object by your very endeavours to preserve it. The
thing you fought for (to wit the loyalty of the people) is not the thing you recover, but depreciated,
sunk, wasted and consumed in the contest."

Coercion, as an alternative to Pakistan, is therefore unthinkable.

Again, the Muslims cannot be deprived of the benefit of the principle of self-determination. The
Hindu Nationalists who rely on self-determination and ask how Britain can refuse India what the
conscience of the world has conceded to the smallest of the European nations, cannot in the same
breath ask the British to deny it to other minorities. The Hindu Nationalist who hopes that Britain will
coerce the Muslims into abandoning Pakistan, forgets that the right of nationalism to freedom from
an aggressive foreign imperialism and the right of a minority to freedom from an aggressive
majority's nationalism are not two different things; nor does the former stand on a more sacred
footing than the latter. They are merely two aspects of the struggle for freedom and as such equal in
their moral import. Nationalists, fighting for freedom from aggressive imperialism, cannot well ask the
help of the British imperialists to thwart the right of a minority to freedom from the nationalism of an
aggressive majority. The matter must, therefore, be decided upon by the Muslims and the Hindus
alone. The British cannot decide the issue for them. This is the first important point to note.
The essence of Pakistan is the opposition to the establishment of one Central Government having
supremacy over the whole of India. Pakistan contemplates two Central Governments, one for
Pakistan and the other for Hindustan. This gives rise to the second important point which Indians
must take note of. That point is that the issue of Pakistan shall have to be decided upon before the
plans for a new constitution are drawn and its foundations are laid. If there is to be one Central
Government for India, the design of the constitutional structure would be different from what it would
be if there is to be one Central Government for Hindustan and another for Pakistan. That being so, it
will be most unwise to postpone the decision. Either the scheme should be abandoned and another
substituted by mutual agreement or it should be decided upon. It will be the greatest folly to suppose
that if Pakistan is buried for the moment, it will never raise its head again. I am sure, burying
Pakistan is not the same thing as burying the ghost of Pakistan. So long as the hostility to one
Central Government for India, which is the ideology underlying Pakistan, persists, the ghost of
Pakistan will be there, casting its ominous shadow upon the political future of India. Neither will it be
prudent to make some kind of a make-shift arrangement for the time being, leaving the permanent
solution to some future day. To do so would be something like curing the symptoms without
removing the disease. But, as often happens in such cases, the disease is driven in, thereby making
certain its recurrence, perhaps in a more virulent form.
I feel certain that whether India should have one Central Government is not a matter which can
betaken as settled; it is a matter in issue and although it may not be a live issue now, some day it
will be.
The Muslims have openly declared that they do not want to have any Central Government in India
and they have given their reasons in the most unambiguous terms. They have succeeded in bringing
into being five provinces which are predominantly Muslim in population. In these provinces, they see
the possibility of the Muslims forming a government and they are anxious to see that the
independence of the Muslim Governments in these provinces is preserved. Actuated by these
considerations, the Central Government is an eyesore to the Muslims of India. As they visualize the
scene, they see their Muslim Provinces made subject to a Central Government predominantly Hindu
and endowed with powers of supervision over, and even of interference in, the administration of
these Muslim Provinces. The Muslims feel that to accept one Central Government for the whole of
India is to consent to place the Muslim Provincial Governments under a Hindu Central Government
and to see the gain secured by the creation of Muslim Provinces lost by subjecting them to a Hindu
Government at the Centre. The Muslim way of escape from this tyranny of a Hindu Centre is to have
no Central Government in India at all.*[f3]

Are the Musalmans alone opposed to the existence of a Central Government ? What about the
Hindus ? There seems to be a silent premise underlying all political discussions that are going on
among the Hindus that there will always be in India a Central Government as a permanent part of
her political constitution. How far such a premise can be taken for granted is more than I can say. I
may, however, point out that there are two factors which are dormant for the present but which some
day may become dominant and turn the Hindus away from the idea of a Central Government.
The first is the cultural antipathy between the Hindu Provinces. The Hindu Provinces are by no
means a happy family. It cannot be pretended that the Sikhs have any tenderness for the Bengalees
or the Rajputs or the Madrasis. The Bengalee loves only himself. The Madrasi is.bound by his own
world. As to the Mahratta, who does not recall that the Mahrattas, who set out to destroy the Muslim
Empire in India, became a menace to the rest of the Hindus whom they harassed and kept under
their yoke for nearly a century. The Hindu Provinces have no common traditions and no interests to
bind them. On the other hand, the differences of language, race, and the conflicts of the past have
been the most powerful forces tending to divide them. It is true that the Hindus are getting together
and the spirit moving them to become one united nation is working on them. But it must not be
forgotten that they have not yet become a nation. They are in the process of becoming a nation and
before the process is completed, there may be a setback which may destroy the work of a whole
century.
In the second place, there is the financial factor. It is not sufficiently known what it costs the people
of India to maintain the Central Government and the proportionate burden each Province has to
bear.
The total revenue of British India comes to Rs. 194,64,17,926 per annum. Of this sum, the amount
raised by the Provincial Governments from provincial sources, comes annually to Rs. 73,57,50,125
and that raised by the Central Government from central sources of revenue comes to Rs.
121,06,67,801. This will show what the Central Government costs the people of India. When one
considers that the Central Government is concerned only with maintaining peace and does not
discharge any functions which have relation to the progress of the people, it should cause no
surprise if people begin to ask whether it is necessary that they should pay annually such an
enormous price to purchase peace. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the people in
the provinces are literally starving and there is no source left to the provinces to increase their
revenue.

This burden of maintaining the Central Government, which the people of India have to bear, is most
unevenly distributed over the different provinces. The sources of central revenues are (1) Customs,
(2) Excise, (3) Salt, (4) Currency, (5) Posts and Telegraphs, (6) Income Tax and (7) Railways. It is
not possible from the accounts published by the Government of India to work out the distribution of
the three sources of central revenue, namely Currency, Posts and Telegraphs and Railways. Only
the revenue raised from other sources can be worked out province by province. The result-is shown
in the following table :—
Revenue raised by Revenue raised by
Provinces Provincial Central
Government from Government from
provincial sources central sources
Rs. Rs.
1 Madras 16,13,44,520 9,53,26,745
2 Bombay 12,44,59,553 22,53,44,247
3 Bengal 12,76,60,892 23,79,01,583
4 U.P. 12,79,99,851 4,05,53,030
5 Bihar 5,23,83,030 1,54,37,742
6 C. P. & Berar 4,27,41,280 31,42,682
7 Assam 2,58,48,474 1,87,55,967
8 Orissa 1,81,99,823 5,67,346
9 Punjab 11,35,86,355 1,18,01,385
10 N.W.F.P. 1,80,83,548 9,28,294
11 Sind 3,70,29,354 5,66,46,915

It will be seen from this table that the burden of maintaining the Central Government is not only
heavy but falls unequally upon the different provinces. The Bombay Provincial Government raises
Rs. 12,44,59,553; as against this, the Central Government raises Rs. 22,53,44,247 from Bombay.
The Bengal Government raises Rs. 12,76,60,892; as against this, the Central Government raises
Rs. 23,79,01,583 from Bengal. The Sind Government raises Rs. 3,70,29,354; as against this, the
Central Government raises Rs. 5,66,46,915 from Sind. The Assam Government raises nearly Rs. 2
1/2 crores; but the Central Government raises nearly Rs. 2 crores from Assam. While such is the
burden of the Central Government on these provinces, the rest of the provinces contribute next to
nothing to the Central Government. The Punjab raises Rs. 11 crores for itself but contributes only
Rs. 1 crore to the Central Government. In the N.W.F.P. the provincial revenue is Rs. 1,80,83,548; its
total contribution to the Central Government however is only Rs. 9,28,294. U.P. raises Rs. 13 crores
but contributes only Rs. 4 crores to the Centre. Bihar collects Rs. 5 crores for itself; she gives only 1
1/2 crores to the Centre. CJP. and Berar levy a total of 4 crores and pay to the Centre 31 lakhs.
This financial factor has so far passed without notice. But time may come when even to the Hindus,
who are the strongest supporters of a Central Government in India, the financial considerations may
make a greater appeal than what purely patriotic considerations do now. So, it is possible that some
day the Muslims, for communal considerations, and the Hindus, for financial considerations, may
join hands to abolish the Central Government.
If this were to happen, it is better if it happens before the foundation of a new constitution is laid
down. If it happens after the foundation of the new constitution envisaging one Central Government
were laid down, it would be the greatest disaster. Out of the general wreck, not only India as an
entity will vanish, but it will not be possible to save even the Hindu unity. As I have pointed out, there
is not much cement even among the Hindu Provinces, and once that little cement which exists is
lost, there will be nothing with which to build up even the unity of the Hindu Provinces. It is because
of this that Indians must decide, before preparing the plans and laying the foundations, for whom the
constitutional structure is to be raised and whether it is temporary or permanent. After the structure
is built as one whole, on one single foundation, with girders running through from one end to the
other; if, thereafter, a part is to be severed from the rest, the knocking out of the rivets will shake the
whole building and produce cracks in other parts of the structure which are intended to remain as
one whole. The danger of cracks is greater, if the cement which binds them is, as in the case of
India, of a poor quality. If the new constitution is designed for India as one whole and a structure is
raised on that basis, and thereafter the question of separation of Pakistan from Hindustan is raised
and the Hindus have to yield, the alterations that may become necessary to give effect to this
severance may bring about the collapse of the whole structure. The desire of the Muslim Provinces
may easily infect the Hindu Provinces and the spirit of disruption generated by the Muslim
Provinces may cause all round disintegration.
History is not wanting in instances of constitutions threatened with disruption. There is the instance
of the Southern States of the American Union. Natal has always been anxious to get out from the
Union of South Africa and Western Australia recently applied, though unsuccessfully, to secede from
the Australian Commonwealth.
In these cases actual disruption has not taken place and where it did, it was soon healed. Indians,
however, cannot hope to be so fortunate. Theirs may be the fate of Czechoslovakia. In the first
place, it would be futile to entertain the hope that if a disruption of the Indian constitution took place
by the Muslim Provinces separating from the Hindu Provinces, it would be possible to win back the
seceding provinces as was done in the U.S.A. after the Civil War. Secondly, if the new Indian
constitution is a Dominion Constitution, even the British may find themselves powerless to save the
constitution from such a disruption, if it takes place after its foundations are laid. It seems to be,
therefore, imperative that the issue of Pakistan should be decided upon before the new constitution
is devised.
If there can be no doubt that Pakistan is a scheme which Indians will have to resolve upon at the
next revision of the constitution and if there is no escape from deciding upon it, then it would be a
fatal mistake for the people to approach it without a proper understanding of the question. The
ignorance of some of the Indian delegates to the Round Table Conference of constitutional law, I
remember, led Mr. Garvin of the Observer to remark that it would have been much better if the
Simon Commission, instead of writing a report on India, had made a report on constitutional
problems of India and how they were met by the constitutions of the different countries of the world.
Such a report I know was prepared for the use of the delegates who framed the constitution of South
Africa. This is an attempt to make good that deficiency and as such I believe it will be welcomed as a
seasonable piece.
So much for the question whether the book is seasonable. As to the second question, whether the
book is readable no writer can forget the words of Augustine Birrell when he said:
" Cooks, warriors, and authors must be judged by the effects they produce; toothsome dishes,
glorious victories, pleasant books, these are our demands. We have nothing to do with ingredients,
tactics, or methods. We have no desire to be admitted into the kitchen, the council, or the study. The
cook may use her saucepans how she pleases, the warrior place his men as he likes, the author
handle his material or weave his plot as best he can; when the dish is served we only ask. Is it good
?; when the battle has been fought. Who won ? ; when the book comes out. Does it read ?

" Authors ought not to be above being reminded that it is their first duty to write agreeably. Some
very disagreeable men have succeeded in doing so, and there is, therefore, no need for anyone to
despair. Every author, be he grave or gay, should try to make his book as ingratiating as possible.
Reading is not a duty, and has consequently no business to be made disagreeable. Nobody is under
any obligation to read any other man's book."

I am fully aware of this. But I am not worried about it. That may well apply to other books but not to a
book on Pakistan. Every Indian must read a book on Pakistan, if not this, then some other, if he
wants to help his country to steer a clear path.

If any book does not read well, i.e., its taste be not good, the reader will find two things in it which, I
am sure, are good.

The first thing he will find is that the ingredients are good. There is in the book material which will be
helpful and to gain access to which he will have to labour a great deal. Indeed, the reader will find
that the book contains an epitome of India's political and social history during the last twenty years,
which it is necessary for every Indian to know.
The second thing he will find is that there is no partisanship. The aim is to expound the scheme of
Pakistan in all its aspects and not to advocate it. The aim is to explain and not to convert. It would,
however, be a pretence to say that I have no views on Pakistan. Views I have. Some of them are
expressed, others may have to be gathered. Two things, however, may well be said about my views.
In the first place, wherever they are expressed, they have been reasoned out. Secondly, whatever
the views, they have certainly not the fixity of a popular prejudice. They are really thoughts and not
views. In other words, I have an open mind, though not an empty mind. A person with an open mind
is always the subject of congratulations. While this may be so, it must, at the same time, be realized
that an open mind may also be an empty mind and that such an open mind, if it is a happy condition,
is also a very dangerous condition for a man to be in. A disaster may easily overtake a man with an
empty mind. Such a person is like a ship without ballast and without a rudder. It can have no
direction. It may float but may also suffer a shipwreck against a rock for want of direction. While
aiming to help the reader by placing before him all the material, relevant and important, the reader
will find that I have not sought to impose my views on him. I have placed before him both sides of
the question and have left him to form his own opinion.

The reader may complain that I have been provocative in stating the relevant facts. I am conscious
that .such a charge may be levelled against me. I apologize freely and gladly for the same. My
excuse is that I have no intention to hurt. I had only one purpose, that is, to force the attention of the
indifferent and casual reader to the issue that is dealt with in the book. I ask the reader to put aside
any irritation that he may feel with me and concentrate his thoughts on this tremendous issue :
Which is to be, Pakistan or no Pakistan ?
 PART I

[f1] * In the first edition there unfortunately occurred through oversight in proof correction a
discrepancy between the population figures in the different districts of Bengal and the map showing
the lay-out of Pakistan as applied to Bengal which had resulted in two districts which should have
been included in the Pakistan area being excluded from it. In this edition, this error has been
rectified and the map and the figures have been brought into conformity.

[f2] * The Crisis of (he National State (1943), p. 4.

[f3] * This point of view was put forth by Sir Muhammad lqbal at the Third Round Table Conference.
PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
_________________________________________________________________

Contents

PART 1 : MUSLIM CASE FOR PAKISTAN

Chapter I : What does the league demand ?

Chapter II : A nation calling for a home

Chapter III : Escape from degradation

PART 1 : MUSLIM CASE FOR PAKISTAN

The Muslim Case for Pakistan is sought to be justified on the following grounds:—

(i) What the Muslims are asking for is the creation of administrative areas which are ethnically more
homogeneous.

(ii) The Muslims want these homogeneous administrative areas which are predominantly Muslim to be
constituted into separate States,

(a) because the Muslims by themselves constitute a separate nation and desire to have a national home, and

(b) because experience shows that the Hindus want to use their majority to treat the Muslims as though they were
second-class citizens in an alien State.

This part is devoted to the exposition of these grounds.

CHAPTER I

WHAT DOES THE LEAGUE DEMAND ?

On the 26th of March 1940, Hindu India was startled to attention as it had never been before. On that day, the
Muslim League at its Lahore Session passed the following Resolution :—

" 1. While approving and endorsing the action taken by the Council and the Working Committee of the All-India
Muslim League as indicated in their resolutions dated the 27th of August, 17th and 18th of September and 22nd of
October 1939 and 3rd of February 1940 on the constitutional issue, this Session of the All-India Muslim League
emphatically reiterates that the Scheme of Federation embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, is totally
unsuited to, and unworkable in the peculiar conditions of this country and is altogether unacceptable to Muslim
India;
" 2. It further records its emphatic view that while the declaration dated the 18th of October 1939 made by the
Viceroy on behalf of His Majesty's Government is reassuring in as far as it declares that the policy and plan on
which the Government of India Act, 1935, is based will be reconsidered in consultation with the various parties,
interests and communities in India, Muslim India will not be satisfied unless the whole constitutional plan is
reconsidered de novo and that no revised plan would be acceptable to the Muslims, unless it is framed with their
approval and consent;

" 3. Resolved that it is the considered view of this Session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan
would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designated on the following basic
principle, viz. that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with
such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority
as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which
the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign;

" 4. That adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards should be specifically provided in the constitution for
minorities in these units and in the regions for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political,
administrative and other rights, and interests in consultation with them ; and in other parts of India where the
Musalmans are in a minority, adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards shall be specifically provided in the
constitution for them and other minorities for the protection of their religious, cultural, economic, political,
administrative and other rights, and interests in consultation with them ;

" 5. This Session further authorizes the Working Committee to frame a Scheme of Constitution in accordance with
these basic principles, providing for the assumption Finally by the respective regions of all powers such as defence,
external affairs, communication, customs, and such other matters as may be necessary."
What does this Resolution contemplate ? A reference to para 3 of the Resolution will show that the Resolution
contemplates that the areas in which Muslims predominate shall be incorporated into independent States. In concrete
terms, it means that the Punjab, the North-Western Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind in the North-West and
Bengal in the East instead of remaining as the provinces of British India shall be incorporated as independent States
outside of British India. This is the sum and substance of the Resolution of the Muslim League.

Does the Resolution contemplate that these Muslim provinces, after being incorporated into States, will remain each
an independent sovereign State or will they be joined together into one constitution as members of a single State,
federal or unitary ? On this point, the Resolution is rather ambiguous, if not self-contradictory. It speaks of grouping
the zones into " Independent States in which the Constituent Units shall be autonomous and sovereign." The use of
the term " Constituent Units " indicates that what is contemplated is a Federation. If that is so, then, the use of the
word " sovereign " as an attribute of the Units is out of place. Federation of Units and sovereignty-of Units are
contradictions. It may be that what is contemplated is a confederation. It is, however, not very material for the
moment whether these Independent States are to form into a federation or a confederation. What is important is the
basic demand, namely, that these areas are to be separated from India and formed into Independent States.

The Resolution is so worded as to give the idea that the scheme adumbrated in it is a new one. But, there can be no
doubt that the Resolution merely resuscitates a scheme which was put forth by Sir Mahomed Iqbal in his Presidential
address to the Muslim League at its Annual Session held at Lucknow in December 1930. The scheme was not then
adopted by the League. It was, however, taken up by one Mr. Rehmat Ali who gave it the name, Pakistan, by which
it is known. Mr. Rehmat Ali, M. A., LL.B., founded the Pakistan Movement in 1933. He divided India into two,
namely, Pakistan and Hindustan. His Pakistan included the Punjab, N. W. F. Province, Kashmir, Sind and
Baluchistan. The rest to him was Hindustan. His idea was to have an " independent and separate Pakistan "
composed of five Muslim provinces in the North as an independent State. The proposal was circulated to the
members of the Round Table Conference but never officially put forth. It seems an attempt was made privately to
obtain the assent of the British Government, who, however, declined to consider it because they thought that this was
a " revival of the old Muslim Empire." 1[f.1]

The League has only enlarged the original scheme of Pakistan. It has sought to create one more Muslim State in the
East to include the Muslims in Bengal and Assam. Barring this, it expresses in its essence and general outline the
scheme put forth by Sir Mahomed Iqbal and propagated by Mr. Rehmat Ali. There is no name given to this new
Muslim State in the East. This has made no difference in the theory and the issues involved in the ideology of Mr.
Rehmat Ali. The only difficulty one feels is that the League, while enlarging the facets, has not christened the two
Muslim States with short and sweet names as it might have been expected to do. That it did not do and we are left to
carry on the discussion with two long jaw-breaking names of Muslim State in the West and Muslim State in the East.
I propose to solve this difficulty by reserving the name Pakistan to express the ideology underlying the two-nation
theory and its consequent effect, namely, partition, and by designating the two Muslim States in the North-West and
North-East as Western Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan.

The scheme not only called Hindu India to attention but it shocked Hindu India. Now it is natural to ask, what is
there that is new or shocking in this scheme ?
II
Is the idea of linking up of the provinces in the North-West a shocking idea ? If so, let it be remembered that the
linking of these provinces is an age-old project put forth by successive Viceroys, Administrators and Generals. Of
the Pakistan provinces in the North-West, the Punjab and N. W. F. P. constituted a single province ever since the
Punjab was conquered by the British in 1849. The two continued to be a single province till 1901. It was in 1901 that
Lord Curzon broke up their unity and created the present two provinces. As to the linking up of the Punjab with
Sind, there can be no doubt that had the conquest of Sind followed and not preceded the conquest of the Punjab, Sind
would have been incorporated into the Punjab, for the two are not only contiguous but are connected by a single
river which is the most natural tie between them. Although Sind was joined to Bombay, which in the absence of the
Punjab was the only base from which it could be governed, the idea of disconnecting Sind from Bombay and joining
it to the Punjab was not given up and projects in that behalf were put forth from time to time. It was first put forth
during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Dalhousie; but for financial reasons, was not sanctioned by the Court of
Directors. After the mutiny, the question was reconsidered but owing to the backward state of communications along
the Indus, Lord Canning refused to give his consent. In 1876, Lord Northbrook was of the opinion that Sind should
be joined to the Punjab. In 1877, Lord Lytton, who succeeded Northbrook, sought to create a trans-indus province,
consisting of the six frontier districts of the Punjab and of the transindus districts of Sind. This would have included
the six Frontier districts of the Punjab, namely, Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu (except the Cis-indus tracts), Dera
Ismail Khan (with the same exception), Dera Ghazi Khan, and trans-Indus Sind (with the exception of Karachi).
Lytton also proposed that Bombay should receive the whole or part of the Central Provinces, in order to compensate
it for the loss of trans-indus Sind. These proposals were not acceptable to the Secretary of State. During the
Vice-royalty of Lord Lansdowne (1888—94), the same project was revived in its original form, namely, the transfer
of Sind to the Punjab, but owing to the formation of the Baluchistan Agency, Sind had ceased to be a Frontier district
and the idea which was military in its motive, lost its force and Sind remained without being incorporated in the
Punjab. Had the British not acquired Baluchistan and had Lord Curzon not thought of carving out the N. W. F. P. out
of the Punjab, we would have witnessed long ago the creation of Pakistan as an administrative unit.

With regard to the claim for the creation of a National Muslim State in Bengal, again, there is nothing new in it. It
will be recalled by many that in 1905, the province of Bengal and Assam was divided by the then Viceroy, Lord
Curzon into two provinces :

(1) Eastern Bengal and Assam with Dacca as its capital and

(2) Western Bengal with Calcutta as its capital. The newly-created province of Eastern Bengal and Assam included
Assam and the following districts of the old province of Bengal and Assam: (1) Dacca, (2) Mymensingh, (3)
Faridpur, (4) Backer gunge, (5) Tippera, (6) Noakhali, (7) Chittagong, (8) Chittag-ong Hill Tracts, (9) Rajashahl,
(10) Dinajpur, (II) Jalpaiguri, (12) Rangpur, (13) Bogra, (14) Pabna and (15) Malda. Western Bengal included the
remaining districts of the old Province of Bengal and Assam with the addition of the district of Sambalpur which
was transferred from C. P. to Western Bengal.

This division of one province into two, which is known in Indian history as the Partition of Bengal, was an attempt
to create a Muslim State in Eastern Bengal, inasmuch as the new province of Eastern Bengal and Assam was, barring
parts of Assam, a predominantly Muslim area. But, the partition was abrogated in 1911 by the British who yielded to
the Hindus, who were opposed to it and did not care for the wishes of the Muslims, as they were too weak to make
themselves felt. If the partition of Bengal had not been annulled, the Muslim State in Eastern Bengal, instead of
being a new project, would now have been 39 years old. 2[f.2]

III

Is the idea of separation of Pakistan from Hindustan shocking ? If so, let me recall a few facts which are relevant to
the issue and which form the basic principles of the Congress policy. It will be remembered that as soon as Mr.
Gandhi captured the Congress, he did two things to popularize it. The first thing he did was to introduce Civil
Disobedience.

Before Mr. Gandhi 's entry into the politics of India, the parties contending for power were the Congress, the
Liberals and the Terrorists of Bengal. The Congress and the Liberals were really one party and there was no
distinction between them such as divides them today. We can, therefore, safely say that there were only two parties
in India, the Liberals and the Terrorists. In both, the conditions for admission were extremely difficult. In the Liberal
Party, the condition for admission was not merely education but a high degree of learning. Without first establishing
a reputation for study, one could never hope to obtain admission to the Liberal Party. It effectively excluded the
uneducated from rising to political power. The Terrorists had prescribed the hardest test conceivable. Only those
who were prepared to give their lives for the cause, not in the sense of dedicating them but in the sense of dying for
it, could become members of their organization. No knave could, therefore, get an entry into the Terrorists'
organization. Civil disobedience does not require learning. It does not call for the shedding of life. It is an easy
middle way for that large majority who have no learning and who do not wish to undergo the extreme penalty and at
the same time obtain the notoriety of being patriots. It is this middle path which made the Congress more popular
than the Liberal Party or the Terrorist Party.

The second thing Mr. Gandhi did was to introduce the principle of Linguistic Provinces. In the constitution that was
framed by the Congress under the inspiration and guidance of Mr. Gandhi, India was to be divided into the following
Provinces with the language and headquarters as given below :—

Province Language Headquarters

Ajmere-Merwara Hindustani Ajmere.
Andbra Telegu Madras.
Assam Assamese Gauhati
Bihar Hindustani Patna.
Bengal Bengali Calcutta.
Bombay (City) Marathi-Gujarati Bombay.
Delhi Hindustani Delhi.
Gujarat Gujarati Ahmedabad.
Kamatak Kannada Dharwar
Kerala Malayalam Calicut
Mahakosal Hindustani Jubbulpore
Maharashtra Marathi Poona.
Nagpur Marathi Nagpur.
N. W. F. P. Pushtu Peshawar.
Punjab Punjabi Lahore.
Sind Sindhi Karachi.
Tamil Nadu Tamil Madras.
United Provinces Hindustani Lucknow
Utkal Oriya Cuttack.
Vidarbha(Berar) Maralhi Akola.

In this distribution no attention was paid to considerations of area, population or revenue. The thought that every
administrative unit must be capable of supporting and supplying a minimum standard of civilized life, for which it
must have sufficient area, sufficient population and sufficient revenue, had no place in this scheme of distribution of
areas for provincial purposes. The determining factor was language. No thought was given to the possibility that it
might introduce a disruptive force in the already loose structure of the Indian social life. The scheme was, no doubt,
put forth with the sole object of winning the people to the Congress by appealing to their local patriotism. The idea
of linguistic provinces has come to stay and the demand for giving effect to it has become so insistent and irresistible
that the Congress, when it came into power, was forced to put it into effect. Orissa has already been separated from
Bihar. 3[f.3] Andhra is demanding separation from Madras. Kamatak is asking for separation from
Maharashtra.4[f.4] The only linguistic province that is not demanding separation from Maharashtra is Gujarat Or
rather, Gujarat has given up for the moment the idea of separation. That is probably because Gujarat has realized that
union with Maharashtra is, politically as well as commercially, a better investment.

Be. that as it may, the fact remains that separation on linguistic basis is now an accepted principle with the Congress.
It is no use saying that the separation of Karnatak and Andhra is based on a linguistic difference and that the claim to
separation of Pakistan is based on a cultural difference. This is a distinction without difference. Linguistic difference
is simply another name for cultural difference.

If there is nothing shocking in the separation of Karanatak and Andhra, what is there to shock in the demand for the
separation of Pakistan ? If it is disruptive in its effect, it is no more disruptive than the separation of Hindu provinces
such as Karnatak from Maharashtra or Andhra from Madras. Pakistan is merely another manifestation of a cultural
unit demanding freedom for the growth of its own distinctive culture.
CHAPTER II
A NATION CALLING FOR A HOME

That there are factors, administrative, linguistic or cultural, which are the predisposing causes behind these demands
for separation, is a fact which is admitted and understood by all. Nobody minds these demands and many are
prepared to concede them. But, the Hindus say that the Muslims are going beyond the idea of separation and
questions, such as what has led them to take this course, why are they asking for partition, for the annulment of the
common tie by a legal divorce between Pakistan and Hindustan, are being raised.

The answer is to be found in the declaration made by the Muslim League in its Resolution that the Muslims of India
are a separate nation. It is this declaration by the Muslim League, which is both resented and ridiculed by the
Hindus.

The Hindu resentment is quite natural. Whether India is a nation or not, has been the subject-matter of controversy
between the Anglo-Indians and the Hindu politicians ever since the Indian National Congress was founded. The
Anglo-Indians were never tired of proclaiming that India was not a nation, that ' Indians 'was only another name for
the people of India. In the words of one Anglo-Indian " to know India was to forget that there is such a thing as
India." The Hindu politicians and patriots have been, on the other hand, equally persistent in their assertion that India
is a nation. That the Anglo-Indians were right in their repudiation cannot be gainsaid. Even Dr. Tagore, the national
poet of Bengal, agrees with them. But, the Hindus have never yielded on the point even to Dr. Tagore.

This was because of two reasons. Firstly, the Hindu felt ashamed to admit that India was not a nation. In a world
where nationality and nationalism were deemed to be special virtues in a people, it was quite natural for the Hindus
to feel, to use the language of Mr. H. G. Wells, that it would be as improper for India to be without a nationality as it
would be for a man to be without his clothes in a crowded assembly. Secondly, he had realized that nationality had a
most intimate connection with the claim for self-government. He knew that by the end of the 19th century, it had
become an accepted principle that the people, who constituted a nation, were entitled on that account to
self-government and that any patriot, who asked for self-government for his people, had to prove that they were a
nation. The Hindu for these reasons never stopped to examine whether India was or was not a nation in fact. He
never cared to reason whether nationality was merely a question of calling a people a nation or was a question of the
people being a nation. He knew one thing, namely, that if he was to succeed in his demand for self-government for
India, he must maintain, even if he could not prove it, that India was a nation.

In this assertion, he was never contradicted by any Indian. The thesis was so agreeable that even serious Indian
students of history came forward to write propagandist literature in support of it, no doubt out of patriotic motives.
The Hindu social reformers, who knew that this was a dangerous delusion, could not openly contradict this thesis.
For, anyone who questioned it was at once called a tool of the British bureaucracy and enemy of the country. The
Hindu politician was able to propagate his view for a long time. His opponent, the Anglo-lndian, had ceased to reply
to him. His propaganda had almost succeeded. When it was about to succeed comes this declaration of the Muslim
League— this rift in the lute. Just because it does not come from the Anglo-Indian, it is a deadlier blow. It destroys
the work which the Hindu politician has done for years. If the Muslims in India are a separate nation, then, of
course, India is not a nation. This assertion cuts the whole ground from under the feet of the Hindu politicians. It is
natural that they should feel annoyed at it and call it a stab in the back.

But, stab or no stab, the point is, can the Musalmans be said to constitute a nation ? Everything else is beside the
point. This raises the question : What is a nation ? Tomes have been written on the subject. Those who are curious
may go through them and study the different basic conceptions as well as the different aspects of it. It is, however,
enough to know the core of the subject and that can be set down in a few words. Nationality is a social feeling. It is a
feeling of a corporate sentiment of oneness which makes those who are charged with it feel that they are kith and
kin. This national feeling is a double edged feeling. It is at once a feeling of fellowship for one's own kith and kin
and an anti-fellowship feeling for those who are not one's own kith and kin. It is a feeling of " consciousness of kind
" which on the one hand binds together those who have it, so strongly that it over-rides all differences arising out of
economic conflicts or social gradations and, on the other, severs them from those who are not of their kind. It is a
longing not to belong to any other group. This is the essence of what is called a nationality and national feeling.

Now apply this test to the Muslim claim. Is it or is it not a fact that the Muslims of India are an exclusive group ? Is
it or is it not a fact that they have a consciousness of kind ? Is it or is not a fact that every Muslim is possessed by a
longing to belong to his own group and not to any non-Muslim group ?

If the answer to these questions is in the affirmative, then the controversy must end and the Muslim claim that they
are a nation must be accepted without cavil.
What the Hindus must show is that notwithstanding some differences, there are enough affinities between Hindus
and Musalmans to constitute them into one nation, or, to use plain language, which make Muslims and Hindus long
to belong together.

Hindus, who disagree with the Muslim view that the Muslims are a separate nation by themselves, rely upon certain
features of Indian social life which seem to form the bonds of integration between Muslim society and Hindu
society.

In the first place, it is said that there is no difference of race between the Hindus and the Muslims. That the Punjabi
Musalman and the Punjabi Hindu, the U. P. Musalman and the U. P. Hindu, the Bihar Musalman and the Bihar
Hindu, the Bengal Musalman and the Bengal Hindu, the Madras Musalman and the Madras Hindu, and the Bombay
Musalman and the Bombay Hindu are racially of one stock. Indeed there is more racial affinity between the Madras
Musalman and the Madras Brahmin than there is between the Madras Brahmin and the Punjab Brahmin. In the
second place, reliance is placed upon linguistic unity between Hindus and Muslims. It is said that the Musalmans
have no common language of their own which can mark them off as a linguistic group separate from the Hindus. On
the contrary, there is a complete linguistic unity between the two. In the Punjab, both Hindus and Muslims speak
Punjabi. In Sind, both speak Sindhi. In Bengal, both speak Bengali. In Gujarat, both speak Gujarati. In Maharashtra,
both speak Marathi. So in every province. It is only in towns that the Musalmans speak Urdu and the Hindus the
language of the province. Bu,t outside, in the mofussil, there is complete linguistic unity between Hindus and
Musalmans. Thirdly, it is pointed out that India is the land which the Hindus and Musalmans have now inhabited
together for centuries. It is not exclusively the land of the Hindus, nor is it exclusively the land of the Mahomedans.

Reliance is placed not only upon racial unity but also upon certain common features in the social and cultural life of
the two communities. It is pointed out that the social life of many Muslim groups is honeycombed with Hindu
customs. For instance, the Avans of the Punjab, though they are nearly all Muslims, retain Hindu names and keep
their genealogies in the Brahmanic fashion. Hindu surnames are found among Muslims. For instance, the surname
Chaudhari is a Hindu surname but is common among the Musalmans of U.P. and Northern India. In the matter of
marriage, certain groups of Muslims are Muslims in name only. They either follow the Hindu form of the ceremony
alone, or perform the ceremony first by the Hindu rites and then call the Kazi and have it performed in the Muslim
form. In some sections of Muslims, the law applied is the Hindu Law in the matter of marriage, guardianship and
inheritance. Before the Shariat Act was passed, this was true even in the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. In the social
sphere the caste system is alleged to be as much a part of Muslim society as it is of Hindu society. In the religious
sphere, it is pointed out that many Muslim pirs had Hindu disciples ; and similarly some Hindu yogis have had
Muslim chelas. Reliance is placed on instances of friendship between saints of the rival creeds. At Girot, in the
Punjab, the tombs of two ascetics, Jamali Sultan and Diyal Bhawan, who lived in close amity during the early part of
the nineteenth century, stand close to one another, and are reverenced by Hindus and Musalmans alike. Bawa Fathu,
a Muslim saint, who lived about 1700 A.D. and whose tomb is at Ranital in the Kangra District, received the title of
prophet by the blessing of a Hindu saint, Sodhi Guru Gulab Singh. On the other hand, Baba Shahana, a Hindu saint
whose cult is observed in the Jang District, is said to have been the chela of a Muslim pir who changed the original
name (Mihra), of his Hindu follower, into Mir Shah.

All this, no doubt, is true. That a large majority of the Muslims belong to the same race as the Hindus is beyond
question. That all Mahomedans do not speak a common tongue, that many speak the same language as the Hindus
cannot be denied. That there are certain social customs which are common to both cannot be gainsaid. That certain
religious rites and practices are common to both is also a matter of fact. But the question is : can all this support the
conclusion that the Hindus and the Mahomedans on account of them constitute one nation or these things have
fostered in them a feeling that they long to belong to each other ?

There are many flaws in the Hindu argument. In the first place, what are pointed out as common features are not the
result of a conscious attempt to adopt and adapt to each other's ways and manners to bring about social fusion. On
the other hand, this uniformity is the result of certain purely mechanical causes. They are partly due to incomplete
conversions. In a land like India, where the majority of the Muslim population has been recruited from caste and
out-caste Hindus, the Muslimization of the convert was neither complete nor effectual, either from fear of revolt or
because of the method of persuasion or insufficiency of preaching due to insufficiency of priests. There is, therefore,
little wonder if great sections of the Muslim community here and there reveal their Hindu origin in their religious
and social life. Partly it is to be explained as the effect of common environment to which both Hindus and Muslims
have been subjected for centuries. A common environment is bound to produce common reactions, and reacting
constantly in the same way to the same environment is bound to produce a common type. Partly are these common
features to be explained as the remnants of a period of religious amalgamation between the Hindus and the Muslims
inaugurated by the Emperor Akbar, the result of a dead past which has no present and no future.

As to the argument based on unity of race, unity of language and inhabiting a common country, the matter stands on
a different footing. If these considerations were decisive in making or unmaking a nation, the Hindus would be right
in saying that by reason of race, community of language and habitat the Hindus and Musalmans form one nation. As
a matter of historical experience, neither race, nor language, nor country has sufficed to mould a people into a nation.
The argument is so well put by Renan that it is impossible to improve upon his language. Long ago in his famous
essay on Nationality, Renan observed :—

" that race must not be confounded with nation. The truth is that . there is no pure race; and that making politics
depend upon ethnographical analysis, is allowing it to be borne upon a chimera . . . Racial facts, important as they
are in the beginning, have a constant tendency to lose their importance. Human history is essentially different from
zoology. Race is not everything, as it is in the sense of rodents and felines."

Speaking about language, Renan points out that :—

" Language invites re-union ; it does not force it. The United States and England, Spanish America and Spain speak
the same languages and do not form single nations. On the contrary, Switzerland which owes her stability to the
fact that she was founded by the assent of her several parts counts three or four languages. In man there is something
superior to language, —will. The will of Switzerland to be united, in spite of the variety of her languages,' is a much
more important fact than a similarity of language, often obtained by persecution."

As to common country, Renan argued that :—

" It is no more the land than the race that makes a nation. The land provides a substratum, the field of battle and
work; man provides the soul ; man is everything in the formation of that sacred thing which is called a people.
Nothing of material nature suffices for it"
Having shown, that race, language, and country do not suffice to create a nation, Renan raises in a pointed manner
the question, what more, then, is necessary to constitute a nation ? His answer may be given in his own words :—

" A nation is a living soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul, this
spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the common possession of a rich heritage of
memories ; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to preserve worthily the undivided
inheritance which has been handed down. Man does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of
a long past of efforts, and sacrifices, and devotion. Ancestor-worship is therefore, all the more legitimate ; for our
ancestors have made us what we are. A heroic past, great men, glory,—1 mean glory of the genuine kind,—these
form the social capital, upon which a national idea may be founded. To have common glories in the past, a common
will in the present; to have done great things together, to will to do the like again,—such are the essential conditions
for the . making of a people. We love in proportion to the sacrifices we have consented to make, to the sufferings we
have endured. We love the house that we have built, and will hand down to our descendant. The Spartan hymn, ' We
are what you were ; we shall be what you are,' is in its simplicity the national anthem of every land.

" In the past an inheritance of glory and regrets to be shared, in the future a like ideal to be realised ; to have
suffered, and rejoiced, and hoped together; all these things are worth more than custom houses in common, and
frontiers in accordance with strategical ideas; all these can be understood in spite of diversities of race and language.
I said just now, ' to have suffered together ' for indeed, suffering in common is a greater bond of union than joy. As
regards national memories, mournings are worth more than triumphs; for they impose duties, they demand common
effort."

Are there any common historical antecedents which the Hindus and Muslims can be said to share together as matters
of pride or as matters of sorrow ? That is the crux of the question. That is the question which the Hindus must
answer, if they wish to maintain that Hindus and Musalmans together form a nation. So far as this aspect of their
relationship is. concerned, they have been just two armed battalions warring against each other. There was no
common cycle of participation for a common achievement. Their past is a past of mutual destruction—a past of
mutual animosities, both in the political as well as in the religious fields. As Bhai Parmanand points out in his
pamphlet called " The Hindu National Movement":—"In history the Hindus revere the memory of Prithvi Raj,
Partap, Shivaji and, Beragi Bir, who fought for the honour and freedom of this land (against the Muslims), while the
Mahomedans look upon the invaders of India, like Muhammad Bin Qasim and rulers like Aurangzeb as their
national heroes." In the religious field, the Hindus draw their inspiration from the Ramayan, the Mahabharat, and the
Geeta. The Musalmans, on the other hand, derive their inspiration from the Quran and the Hadis. Thus, the things
that divide are far more vital than the things which unite. In depending upon certain common features of Hindu and
Mahomedan social life, in relying upon common language, common race and common country, the Hindu is
mistaking what is accidental and superficial for what is essential and fundamental. The political and religious
antagonisms divide the Hindus and the Musalmans far more deeply than the so-called common things are able to
bind them together. The prospects might perhaps be different if the past of the two communities can be forgotten by
both, Renan points out the importance of forgetfulness as a factor in building up a nation :—

" Forgetfulness, and I shall even say historical error, form an essential factor in the creation of a nation; and thus it is
that the progress of historical studies may often be dangerous to the nationality. Historical research, in fact, brings
back to light the deeds of violence that have taken place at the commencement of all political formations, even of
those the consequences of which have been most beneficial. Unity is ever achieved by brutality. The union of
Northern and Southern France was the result of an extermination, and of a reign of terror lhal lasted for nearly a
hundred years. The king of France who was, if I may say so, the ideal type of a secular crystalliser, the king of
France who made the most perfect national unity in existence, lost his prestige when seen at too close a distance. The
nation that he had formed cursed him ; and today the knowledge of what he was worth, and what he did, belongs
only to the cultured.

" It is by contrast that these great laws of the history of Western Europe become apparent. In the undertaking which
the king of France, in part by his justice, achieved so admirably, many countries came to disaster. Under the crown
of St. Stephen, Magyars and Slavs have remained as distinct as they were eight hundred years ago. Far from
combining the different elements in its dominions, the house of Hapsburg has held them apart and often opposed to
one another. In Bohemia, the Czech element and the German element are superimposed like oil and water in a glass.
The Turkish policy of separation of nationalities according to religion has had much graver results. It has brought
about the ruin of the East. Take a town like Smyrna or Salonica; you will find there five or six communities each
with its own memories, and possessing among them scarcely anything in common. But the essence of the nation is,
that all its individual members should have things in common; and also, that all of them should hold many things in
oblivion. No French citizen knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, or a Visigoth; every French citizen ought to
have forgotten St. Bartholomew, and the massacres of the South in the thirteenth century. There are not ten families
in France able to furnish proof of a French origin; and yet, even if such a proof were given it would be essentially
defective, in consequence of a thousand unknown crosses, capable of deranging all genealogical systems."

The pity of it is that the two communities can never forget or obliterate their past. Their past is imbedded in their
religion, and for each to give up its past is to give up its religion. To hope for this is to hope in vain.

In the absence of common historical antecedents, the Hindu view that Hindus and Musalmans form one nation falls
to the ground. To maintain it is to keep up a hallucination. There is no such longing between the Hindus and
Musalmans to belong together as there is among the Musalmans of India.

It is no use saying that this claim of the Musalmans being a nation is an after-thought of their leaders. As an
accusation, it is true. The Muslims were hitherto quite content to call themselves a community. It is only recently
that they have begun to style themselves a nation. But an accusation, attacking the motives of a person, does not
amount to a refutation of his thesis. To say that because the Muslims once called themselves a community, they are,
therefore, now debarred from calling themselves a nation is to misunderstand the mysterious working of the
psychology of national feeling. Such an argument presupposes that wherever there exist a people, who possess the
elements that go to the making up of a nation, there must be manifested that sentiment of nationality which is their
natural consequence and that if they fail to manifest it for sometime, then that failure is to be used as evidence
showing the unreality of the claim of being a nation, if made afterwards. There is no historical support for such a
contention. As Prof. Toynbee points out :—

"It is impossible to argue a priory from the presence of one or even several of these factors to the existence of a
nationality; they may have been there for ages and kindled no response and if is impossible to argue from one case to
another; precisely the same group of factors may produce nationality here, and there have no effect."

This is probably due to the fact, as pointed out by Prof. Barker, that it is possible for nations to exist and even for
centuries, in unreflective silence, although there exists that spiritual essence of a national life of which many of its
members are not aware. Some such thing has no doubt happened in the case of the Musalmans. They were not aware
of the fact that there existed for them the spiritual essence of a national life. This explains why their claim to separate
nationality was made by them so late. But, it does not mean that the spiritual essence of a national life had no
existence at all.

It is no use contending that there are cases where a sense of nationality exists but there is no desire for a separate
national existence. Cases of the French in Canada and of the English in South Africa, may be cited as cases in point.
It must be admitted that there do exist cases, where people are aware of their nationality, but this awareness does not
produce in them that passion which is called nationalism. In other words, there may be nations conscious of
themselves without being charged with nationalism. On the basis of this reasoning, it may be argued that the
Musalmans may hold that they are a nation but they need not on that account demand a separate national existence ;
why can they not be content with the position which the French occupy in Canada and the English occupy in South
Africa ? Such a position is quite a sound position. It must, however, be remembered that such a position can only be
taken by way of pleading with the Muslims not to insist on partition. It is no argument against their claim for
partition, if they insist upon it.

Lest pleading should be mistaken for refutation, it is necessary to draw attention to two things. First, there is a
difference between nationality and nationalism. They are two different psychological states of the human mind.
Nationality means

" consciousness of kind, awareness of the existence of that tie of kinship." Nationalism means " the desire for a
separate national existence for those who are bound by this tie of kinship." Secondly, it is true that there cannot be
nationalism without the feeling of nationality being in existence. But, it is important to bear in mind that the
converse is not always true. The feeling of nationality may be present and yet the feeling of nationalism may be quite
absent. That is to say, nationality does not in all cases produce nationalism. For nationality to flame into nationalism
two conditions must exist. First, there must arise the " will to live as a nation. Nationalism is the dynamic expression
of that desire. Secondly, there must be a territory which nationalism could occupy and make it a state, as well as a
cultural home of the nation. Without such a territory, nationalism, to use Lord Acton's phrase, would be a " soul as it.
were wandering in search of a body in which to begin life over again and dies out finding none." The Muslims have
developed a " will to live as a nation." For them nature has found a territory which they can occupy and make it a
state as well as a cultural home for the new-born Muslim nation. Given these favourable conditions, there should be
no wonder, if the Muslims say that they are not content to occupy the position which the French choose to occupy in
Canada or the English choose to occupy in South Africa, and that they shall have a national home which they can
call their own.

CHAPTER III
ESCAPE FROM DEGRADATION

"What justification have the Musalmans of India for demanding the partition of India and the establishment of
separate Muslim States ? Why this insurrection ? What grievances have they ? "—ask the Hindus in a spirit of
righteous indignation.

Anyone, who knows history, will not fail to realize that it has now been a well established principle that nationalism
is a sufficient justification for the creation of a national state. As the great historian Lord Acton points out :—

" In the old European system, the rights of nationalities were neither recognised by Governments nor asserted by the
people. The interest of the reigning families, not those of the nations, regulated the frontiers, and the administration
was conducted generally without any reference to popular desires. Where all liberties were suppressed, the claims of
national independence were necessarily ignored, and a princess, in the words of Fenelon, carried a monarchy in her
wedding portion. "

Nationalities were at first listless. When they became conscious—

" They first rose against their conquerors in defence of their legitimate rulers. They refused to be governed by
usurpers. Next came a time when they revolted because of the wrongs inflicted upon them by their rulers. The
insurrections were provoked by particular grievances justified by definite complaints. Then came the French
Revolution which effected a complete change. It taught the people to regard their wishes and wants as the supreme
criterion of their right to do what they liked to do with themselves. It proclaimed the idea of the sovereignty of the
people uncontrolled by the past and uncontrolled by the existing state. This text taught by the French Revolution
became an accepted dogma of all liberal thinkers. Mill gave it his support. ' One hardly knows, ' says Mill, ' what any
division of the human race should be free to do, if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of
human beings they choose to associate themselves.' "

He even went so far as to hold that—

" It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the
main with those of nationalities. "

Thus history shows that the theory of nationality is imbedded in the democratic theory of the sovereignty of the
will of a people. This means that the demand by a nationality for a national state does not require to be supported by
any list of grievances. The will of the people is enough to justify it.

But, if grievances must be cited in support of their claim, the Muslims say that they have them in plenty. They may
be summed up in one sentence, that constitutional safeguards have failed to save them from the tyranny of the Hindu
majority.

At the Round Table Conference, the Muslims presented their list of safeguards, which were formulated in the
well-known fourteen points. The Hindu representatives at the Round Table Conference would not consent to them.
There was an impasse. The British Government intervened and gave what is known as " the Communal decision ".
By that decision, the Muslims got all their fourteen points. There was much bitterness amongst the Hindus against
the Communal Award. But, the Congress did not take part in the hostility that was displayed by the Hindus generally
towards it, although it did retain the right to describe it as anti national and to get it changed with the consent of the
Muslims. So careful was the Congress not to wound the feelings of the Muslims that when the Resolution was
moved in the Central Assembly condemning the Communal Award, the Congress, though it did not bless it,
remained neutral, neither opposing nor supporting it. The Mahomedans were well justified in looking upon this
Congress attitude as a friendly gesture.

The victory of the Congress at the polls in the provinces, where the Hindus are in a majority, did not disturb the
tranquillity of the Musalmans. They felt they had nothing to fear from the Congress and the prospects were that the
Congress and the Muslim League would work the constitution in partnership. But, two years and three months of the
Congress Government in the Hindu Provinces have completely disillusioned them and have made them the bitterest
enemies of the Congress. The Deliverance Day celebration held on the 22nd December 1939 shows the depth of
their resentment. What is worse, their bitterness is not confined to the Congress. The Musalmans, who at the Round
Table Conference joined in the demand for Swaraj, are today the most ruthless opponents of Swaraj.

What has the Congress done to annoy the Muslims so much ? The Muslim League has asserted that under the
Congress regime the Muslims were actually tyrannized and oppressed. Two committees appointed by the League are
said to have investigated and reported on the matter. But apart from these matters which require to be examined by
an impartial tribunal, there are undoubtedly two things which have produced the clash: (1) the refusal by the
Congress to recognize the Muslim League as the only representative body of the Muslims, (2) the refusal by the
Congress to form Coalition Ministries in the Congress Provinces.

On the first question, both the Congress and the League are adamant. The Congress is prepared to accept the Muslim
League as one of the many Muslim political organizations, such as the Ahrars, the National Muslims and the
Jamiat-ul-Ulema. But it will not accept the Muslim League as the only representative body of the Muslims. The
Muslim League, on the other hand, is not prepared to enter into any talk unless the Congress accepts it as the only
representative body of the Musalmans of India. The Hindus stigmatize the claim of the League as an extravagant one
and try to ridicule it. The Muslims may say that if the Hindus would only stop to inquire how treaties between
nations are made, they would realize the stupidity of their view. It may be argued that when a nation proceeds to
make a treaty with another nation, it recognizes the Government of the latter as fully representing it. In no country
does the Government of the day represent the whole body of people. Everywhere it represents only a majority. But
nations do not refuse to settle their disputes because the Governments, which represent them, do not represent the
whole people. It is enough if each Government represents a majority of its citizens. This analogy, the Muslims may
contend, must apply to the Congress-League quarrel on this issue. The League may not represent the whole body of
the Muslims but if it represents a majority of them, the Congress should have no compunction to deal with -it for the
purpose of effecting a settlement of the Hindu-Muslim question. Of course, it is open to the Government of a country
not to recognize the Government of another country where there is more than one body claiming to be the
Government. Similarly, the Congress may not recognize the League. It must, however, recognize either the National
Muslims or the Ahrars or the Jamiat-ul-Ulema and fix the terms of settlement between the two communities. Of
course, it must act with the full knowledge as to which is more likely to be repudiated by the Muslims—an
agreement with the League or an agreement with the other Muslim parties. The Congress must deal with one or the
other. To deal with neither is not only stupid but mischievous. This attitude of the Congress only serves to annoy the
Muslims and to exasperate them. The Muslims rightly interpret this attitude of the Congress as an attempt to create
divisions among them with a view to cause confusion in their ranks and weaken their front.
On the second issue, the Muslim demand has been that in the cabinets there shall be included Muslim Ministers who
have the confidence of the Muslim members in the Legislature. They expected that this demand of theirs would be
met by the Congress if it came in power. But, they were sorely disappointed. With regard to this demand, the
Congress took a legalistic attitude. The Congress agreed to include Muslims in their cabinets, provided they resigned
from their parties, joined the Congress and signed the Congress pledge. This was resented by the Muslims on three
grounds.

In the first place, they regarded it as a breach of faith. The Muslims say that this demand of theirs is in accordance
with the spirit of the Constitution. At the Round Table Conference, it was agreed that the cabinets shall include
representatives of the minority communities. The minorities insisted that a provision to that effect should be made a
part of- the statute. The Hindus, on the other hand, desired that the matter should be left to be regulated by
convention. A via media was found. It was agreed that the provision should find a place in the Instrument of
Instructions to the

Governors of the provinces and an obligation should be imposed upon them to see that effect was given to the
convention in the formation of the cabinets. The Musalmans did not insist upon making this provision a part of the
statute because they depended upon the good faith of the Hindus. This agreement was broken by a party which had
given the Muslims to understand that towards them its attitude would be not only correct but considerate.
In the second place, the Muslims felt that the Congress view was a perversion of the real scope of the convention.
They rely upon the text of the clause 5[f.5] in the Instrument of Instructions and argue that the words " member of a
minority community " in it can have only one meaning, namely, a person having the confidence of the community.
The position taken by the Congress is in direct contradiction with the meaning of this clause and is indeed a covert
attempt to break all other parties in the country and to make the Congress the only political party in the country. The
demand for signing the Congress pledge can have no other intention. This attempt to establish a totalitarian state may
be welcome to the Hindus, but it meant the political death of the Muslims as a free people.

This resentment of the Muslims was considerably aggravated when they found the Governors, on whom the
obligation was imposed to see that effect was given to the convention, declining to act. Some Governors declined,
because they were helpless by reason of the fact that the Congress was the only majority party which could produce
a stable government, that a Congress Government was the only government possible and that there was no
alternative to it except suspending the constitution. Other Governors declined, because they became active
supporters of the Congress Government and showed their partisanship by praising the Congress or by wearing Khadi
which is the official party dress of the Congress. Whatever be the reasons, the Muslims discovered that an important
safeguard had failed to save them.

The Congress reply to these accusations by the Muslims is twofold. In the first place, they say that coalition cabinets
are inconsistent with collective responsibility of the cabinets. This, the Musalmans refuse to accept as an honest plea.
The English people were the first and the only people, who made it a principle of their system of government. But
even there it has been abandoned since. The English Parliament debated 6[f.6] the issue and came to the conclusion
that it was not so sacrosanct as it was once held and that a departure from it need not necessarily affect the
efficiency or smooth working of the governmental machine. Secondly, as a matter of fact, there was no collective
responsibility in the Congress Government. It was a government by departments. Each Minister was independent of
the other and the Prime Minister was just a Minister. For the Congress to talk about collective responsibility was
really impertinent. The plea was even dishonest, because it is a fact that in the provinces where the Congress was in
a minority, they did form Coalition Ministries without asking the Ministers from other parties to sign the Congress
pledge. The Muslims are entitled to ask ' if coalition is bad, how can it be good in one place and bad in another ? '

The second reply of the Congress is that even if they take Muslim Ministers in their cabinet who have not the
confidence of the

majority of the Muslims, they have not failed to protect their interests. Indeed they have done every thing to advance
the interests of the Muslims. This no doubt rests on the view Pope held of government when he said :

" For forms of government let fools contest ; What is best administered is best. "

In making this reply, the Congress High Command seems to have misunderstood what the main contention of the
Muslims and the minorities has been. Their quarrel is not on the issue whether the Congress has or has not done any
good to the Muslims and the minorities. Their quarrel is on an issue which is totally different. Are the Hindus to be a
ruling race and the Muslims and other minorities to be subject races under Swaraj ? That is the issue involved in the
demand for coalition ministries. On that, the Muslims and other minorities have taken a definite stand. They are not
prepared to accept the position of subject races.

That the ruling community has done good to the ruled is quite beside the point and is no answer to the contention of
the minority communities that they refuse to be treated as a subject people. The British have done many good things
in India for the Indians. They have improved their roads, constructed canals on more scientific principles, effected
their transport by rail, carried their letters by penny post, flashed their messages by lightning, improved their
currency, regulated their weights and measures, corrected their notions of geography, astronomy and medicine, and
stopped their internal quarrels and effected some advancement in their material conditions. Because of these acts of
good government, did anybody ask the Indian people to remain grateful to the British and give up their agitation for
self-government ? Or because of these acts of social uplift, did the Indians give up their protest against being treated
as a subject race by the British ? The Indians did nothing of the kind. They refused to be satisfied with these good
deeds and continued to agitate for their right to rule themselves. This is as it should be. For, as was said by Curran,

the Irish patriot, no man can be grateful at the cost of his self-respect, no woman can be grateful at the cost of her
chastity and no nation can be grateful at the cost of its honour. To do otherwise is to show that one's philosophy of
life is just what Carlyle called ' pig philosophy '. The Congress High Command does not seem to realize that the
Muslims and other minorities care more for the recognition of their self-respect at the hand of the Congress than for
mere good deeds on the part of the Congress. Men, who are conscious of their being, are not pigs who care only for
fattening food. They have their pride which they will not yield even for gold. In short " life is more than the meat ".

It is no use saying that the Congress is not a Hindu body. A body which is Hindu in its composition is bound to
reflect the Hindu mind and support Hindu aspirations. The only difference between the Congress and the Hindu
Maha Sabha is that the latter is crude in its utterances and brutal in its actions while the Congress is politic and
polite. Apart from this difference of fact, there is no other difference between the Congress and the Hindu Maha
Sabha.

Similarly, it is no use saying that the Congress does not recognize the distinction between the ruler and the ruled. If
this is so, the Congress must prove its bonafides by showing its readiness to recognize the other communities as
free and equal partners. What is the test of such recognition ? It seems to me that there can be only one—namely,
agreeing to share power with the effective representatives of the minority communities. Is the Congress prepared for
it ? Everyone knows the answer. The Congress is not prepared to share power with a member of a community who
does not owe allegiance to the Congress. Allegiance to the Congress is a condition precedent to sharing power. It
seems to be a rule with the Congress that if allegiance to the Congress is not forthcoming from a community, that
community must be excluded from political power.

Exclusion from political power is the essence of the distinction between a ruling race and a subject race ; and
inasmuch as the Congress maintained this principle, it must be said that this distinction was enforced by the
Congress while it was in the saddle. The Musalmans may well complain that they have already suffered enough and
that this reduction to the position of a subject race is like the proverbial last straw. Their decline and fall in India
began ever since the British occupation of the country. Every change, executive, administrative, or legal, introduced
by the British, has inflicted a series of blows upon the Muslim Community. The Muslim rulers of India had allowed
the Hindus to retain their law in civil matters. But, they abrogated the Hindu Criminal Law and made the Muslim
Criminal Law the law of the State, applicable to all Hindus as well as Muslims. The first thing the British did was to
displace gradually the Muslim Criminal Law by another of their making, until the process was finally completed by
the enactment of Macaulay's Penal Code. This was the first blow to the prestige and position of the Muslim
community in India. This was followed by the abridgement of the field of application of the Shariat or the Muslim
Civil Law. Its application was restricted to matters concerning personal relations, such as marriage and inheritance,
and then only to the extent permitted by the British. Side by side came the abolition, in 1837, of Persian as the
official language of the Court and of general administration and the substitution of English and the vernaculars in
place of Persian. Then came the abolition of the Qazis, who, during the Muslim rule, administered the Shariat. In
their places, were appointed law officers and judges, who might be of any religion but who got the right of
interpreting Muslim Law and whose decisions became binding on Muslims. These were severe blows to the
Muslims. As a result, the Muslims found their prestige gone, their laws replaced, their language shelved and their
education shorn of its monetary value. Along with these came more palpable blows in the shape of annexation of
Sind and Oudh and the Mutiny. The last, particularly, affected the higher classes of Muslims, who suffered
enormously by the extensive confiscation of property inflicted upon them by the British, as a punishment for their
suspected complicity in the Mutiny. By the end of the Mutiny, the Musalmans, high and low, were brought down by
these series of events to the lowest depths of broken pride, black despair and general penury. Without prestige,
without education and without resources, the Muslims were left to face the Hindus. The British, pledged the
neutrality, were indifferent to the result of the struggle between the two communities. The result was that the
Musalmans were completely worsened in the struggle. The British conquest of India brought about a complete
political revolution in the relative position of the two communities. For six hundred years, the Musalmans had been
the masters of the Hindus. The British occupation brought them down to the level of the Hindus. From masters to
fellow subjects was degradation enough, but a change from the status of fellow subjects to that of subjects of the
Hindus is really humiliation. Is it unnatural, ask the Muslims, if they seek an escape from so intolerable a position by
the creation of separate national States, in which the Muslims can find a peaceful home and in which the conflicts
between a ruling race and a subject race can find no place to plague their lives ?

Contents PART II

[f.1]Halide Edib— Inside India, p. 355.

[f.2]Government of India Gazette Notification No. 2832, dated 1st September 1905. The two provinces became
separate administrative units from 16th October 1905.

[f.3]This was done under the Government of India Act, 1935.

[f.4]Kamatak also wants some districts from the Madras Presidency.

[f.5]" In making appointments to his Council of Ministers, our Governor shall use his best endeavours to select his
Ministers in the following manner, that is to say, to appoint in consultation with the person who in his judgement is
most likely to command a stable majority in the Legislature, those persons (including so far as practicable, members
of important minority communities) who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the
Legislature. In so acting, he shall bear constantly in mind the need for fostering a sense of joint responsibility among
his Ministers. "

[f.6]See the announcement on 22nd January 1932 by the British Prime Minister on the decision of the cabinet to
agree to differ on the Tariff Question and the debate on it in Parliament.
PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
__________________________________________________________________

Contents

PART II - HINDU CASE AGAINST PAKISTAN

Chapter IV : Break-up of Unity

Chapter V : Weakening of the Defences

Chapter VI : Pakistan and communal peace

HINDU CASE AGAINST PAKISTAN

There seem to be three reasons present to the mind of the Hindus who are opposing this scheme of Pakistan. They
object to the scheme :—

1. Because it involves the breaking-up of the unity of India.

2. Because it weakens the defence of India.

3. Because it fails to solve the communal problem.

Is there any substance in these objections ? This part is concerned with an examination of the validity of these
objections.

CHAPTER IV
BREAK-UP OF UNITY

I
Before the Hindus complain of the
destruction of the unity of India, let
them make certain that the unity they
are harping upon does exist. What
unity is there between Pakistan and
Hindustan?
Those Hindus, who maintain the affirmative, rely chiefly upon the fact that the areas which the Muslims want to be
separated from India have always been a part of India. Historically this is, no doubt, true. This area was a part of
India when Chandragupta was the ruler; it continued to be a part of India when Hsuan Tsang, the Chinese pilgrim,
visited India in the 7th century A. D. In his diary, Hsuan Tsang has recorded that India was divided into five
divisions or to use his language, there were ‘ five Indies '1[f.1] : (1) Northern India, (2) Western India, (3) Central
India, (4) Eastern India and (5) Southern India and that these five divisions contained 80 kingdoms. According to
Hsuan Tsang, Northern India comprised the Punjab proper, including Kashmir and the adjoining hill States with the
whole of Eastern Afghanistan beyond the Indus, and the present Cis-Satlaj States to the west of the Sarasvati river.
Thus, in Northern India there were included the districts of Kabul, Jallalabad, Peshawar, Ghazni and Bannu, which
were all subject to the ruler of Kapisa, who was a Hindu Kshatriya and whose capital was most probably at
Charikar, 27 miles from Kabul. In the Punjab proper, the hilly districts Taxila, Singhapura, Urasa, Punch and
Rajaori, were subject to the Raja of Kashmir; while the whole of the plains, including Multan and Shorkot, were
dependent on the ruler of Taki or Sangala, near Lahore. Such was the extent of the northern boundary of India at the
time when Hsuan Tsang came on his pilgrimage. But as Prof. Toynbee points out :
" We must be on our guard against ' historical sentiment ', that is against arguments taken from conditions which
once existed or were supposed to exist, but which are no longer real at the present moment They are most easily
illustrated by extreme examples. Italian newspapers have described the annexation of Tripoli as recovering the soil
of the Fatherland because it was once a province of the Roman Empire; and the entire region of Macedonia is
claimed by Greek Chauvinists on the one hand, because it contains the site of Pella, the cradle of Alexandar the
Great in the fourth century B.C. and by Bulgarians on the other, because Ochrida, in the opposite corner, was the
capital of the Bulgarian Tzardom in the tenth century A. D., though the drift of time has buried the tradition of the
latter almost as deep as the achievements of the ' Emathian Conqueror ' on which the modem Greek nationalists
insist so strongly. "
The same logic applies here. Here also arguments are taken from conditions which once existed but which are no
longer real and which omit to take into consideration later facts which history has to record during practically one
thousand years—after the return of Hsuan Tsang.
It is true that when Hsuan Tsang came, not only the Punjab but what is now Afghanistan was part of India and
further, the people of the Punjab and Afghanistan were either Vedic or Buddhist by religion. But what has happened
since Hsuan Tsang left India ?

The most important thing that has happened is the invasion of India by the Muslim hordes from the north-west. The
first Muslim invasion of India was by the Arabs who were led by Mahommad Bin Qasim. It took place in 711 A. D.
and resulted in the conquest of Sind. This first Muslim invasion did not result in a permanent occupation of the
country because the Caliphate of Baghdad, by whose order and command the invasion had taken place, was obliged
by the middle of the 9th century A. D. to withdraw 2[f.2] its direct control from this distant province of Sind. Soon
after this withdrawal, there began a series of terrible invasions by Muhammad of Ghazni in 1001 A. D. Muhammad
died in 1030 A. D., but within the short span of 30 years, he invaded India 17 times. He was followed by
Mahommad Ghori who began his career as an invader in 1173. He was killed in 1206. For thirty years had
Muhammad of Ghazni ravaged India and for thirty years Mahommad Ghori harried the same country in the same
way. Then followed the incursions of the Moghul hordes of Chenghiz Khan. They first came in 1221. They then
only wintered on the border of India but did not enter it. Twenty years after, they marched on Lahore and sacked it.
Of their inroads, the most terrible was under Taimur in 1398. Then comes on the scene a new invader in the person
of Babar who invaded India in 1526. The invasions of India did not stop with that of Babar. There occurred two
more invasions. In 1738 Nadirshah's invading host swept over the Punjab like a flooded river " furious as the ocean
". He was followed by Ahmadshah Abdalli who invaded India in 1761, smashed the forces of the Mahrattas at
Panipat and crushed for ever the attempt of the Hindus to gain the ground which they had lost to their Muslim
invaders.
These Muslim invasions were not undertaken merely out of lust for loot or conquest. There was another object
behind them. The expedition against Sind by Mahommad bin Qasim was of a punitive character and was
undertaken to punish Raja Dahir of Sind who had refused to make restitution for the seizure of an Arab ship at
Debul, one of the sea-port towns of Sind. But, there is no doubt that striking a blow at the idolatry and polytheism
of Hindus and establishing Islam in India was also one of the aims of this expedition. In one of his dispatches to
Hajjaj, Mahommad bin Qasim is quoted to have said :
" The nephew of Raja Dahir, his warriors and principal officers have been dispatched, and the infidels converted to
Islam or destroyed. Instead of idol-temples, mosques and other places of worship have been created, the Kulbah it
read, the call to prayers is raised, so that devotions are performed at staled hours. The Takbir and praise to the
Almighty God are offered every morning and evening. " 3[f.3]

After receiving the above dispatch, which had been forwarded with the head of the Raja, Hajjaj sent the following
reply to his general:
" Except that you give protection to all, great and small alike, make no difference between enemy and friend. God,
says, ' Give no quarter to infidels but cut their throats '. Then know that this is the command of the great God. You
shall not be too ready to grant protection, because it will prolong your work. After this give no quarter to any
enemy except those who are of rank." 4[f.4]

Muhammad of Ghazni also looked upon his numerous invasions of India as the waging of a holy war. Al' Utbi, the
historian of Muhammad, describing his raids writes :
" He demolished idol temples and established Islam. He captured ...... cities, killed the polluted wretches, destroying
the idolaters, and gratifying Muslims. ' He then returned home and promulgated accounts of the victories obtained
for Islam. ....... and vowed that every year he would undertake a holy war against Hind 5[f.5] . " Mahommed Ghori
was actuated by the same holy zeal in his invasions of India. Hasan Nizami, the historian, describes his work in the
following terms :
" He purged by his sword the land of Hind from the filth of infidelity and vice, and freed the whole of that country
from the thorn of God-plurality and the impurity of idol-worship, and by his royal vigour and intrepidity left not
one temple standing 6[f.6]

Taimur has in his Memoir explained what led him to invade India. He says:
" My object in the invasions of Hindustan is to lead a campaign against the infidels, to convert them to the true faith
according to the command of Muhammad (on whom and his family be the blessing and peace of God), to purify the
land from the defilement of misbelief and polytheism, and overthrow the temples and idols, whereby we shall be
Ghazis and Mujahids, companions and soldiers of the faith before God. " 7[f.7]

These invasions of India by Muslims were as much invasions of India as they were wars among the Muslims
themselves. This fact has remained hidden because the invaders are all lumped together as Muslims without
distinction. But as a matter of fact, they were Tartars, Afghans and Mongols. Muhammad of Ghazni was a Tartar,
Mahommed of Ghori was an Afghan, Taimur was a Mongol, Babar was a Tartar, while Nadirshah and Ahmadshah
Abdalli were Afghans. In invading India, the Afghan was out to destroy the Tartar and the Mongol was out to
destroy the Tartar as well as the Afghan. They were not a loving family cemented by the feeling of Islamic
brotherhood. They were deadly rivals of one another and their wars were often wars of mutual extermination. What
is, however, important to bear in mind is that with all their internecine conflicts they were all united by one
common objective and that was to destroy the Hindu faith.
The methods adopted by the Muslim invaders of India are not less significant for the subsequent history of India
than the object of their invasions.
Mahommad bin Qasim's first act of religious zeal was forcibly to circumcise the Brahmins of the captured city of
Debul ; but on discovering that they objected to this sort of conversion, he proceeded to put all above the age of 17
to death, and to order all others, with women and children, to be led into slavery. The temple of the Hindus was
looted, and the rich booty was divided equally among the soldiers, after one-fifth, the legal portion for the
government, had been set aside.
Muhammad of Ghazni from the first adopted those plans that would strike terror into the hearts of the Hindus. After
the defeat of Raja JaipalinA.D. 1001, Muhammad ordered that Jaipal " be paraded about in the streets so that his
sons and chieftains might see him in that condition of shame, bonds and disgrace; and that fear of Islam might fly
abroad through the country of the infidels. "
"The slaughtering of ' infidels' seemed to be one thing that gave Muhammad particular pleasure. In one attack on
Chand Rai, in A. D. 1019, many infidels were slain or taken prisoners, and the Muslims paid no regard to booty
until they had satiated themselves with the slaughter of the infidels and worshippers of the sun and fire. The
historian naively adds that the elephants of the Hindu armies came to Muhammad of their own accord, leaving
idols, preferring the service of the religion of Islam. " 8[f.8]

Not infrequently, the slaughter of the Hindus gave a great setback to the indigenous culture of the Hindus, as in the
conquest of Bihar by Muhammad Bakhtyar Khilji. When he took Nuddea (Bihar) the Tabaquat-i-Nasiri informs us
that:
" great plunder fell into the hands of the victors. Most of the inhabitants were Brahmins with shaven heads. They
were put to death. Large number of books were found......... but none could explain their contents as all the men had
been killed, the whole fort and city being a place of study. " 9[f.9]
Summing up the evidence on the point. Dr. Titus concludes :
" Of the destruction of temples and the desecration of idols we have an abundance of evidence. Mahommad bin
Qasim carried out his plan of destruction systematically in Sind, we have seen, but he made an exception of the
famous temple at Multan for purposes of revenue, as this temple was a place of resort for pilgrims, who made large
gifts to the idol. Nevertheless, while he thus satisfied his avarice by letting the temple stand, he gave vent to his
malignity by having a piece of cow's flesh tied around the neck of the idol.
" Minhaj-as-Siraj further tells how Mahommad became widely known for having destroyed as many as a thousand
temples, and of his great feat in destroying the temple of Somnath and carrying off its idol, which he asserts was
broken into four parts. One part he deposited in the Jami Masjid of Ghazni, one he placed at the entrance of the
royal palace, the third he sent to Mecca, and the fourth to Medina. 10[f.10] "

It is said by Lane Poole that Muhammad of Ghazni " who had vowed that every year should see him wage a holy
war against the infidels of Hindustan " could not rest from his idol-breaking campaign so long as the temple of
Somnath remained inviolate. It was for this specific purpose that he, at the very close of his career, undertook his
arduous march across the desert from Multan to Anhalwara on the coast, fighting as he went, until he saw at last the
famous temple:
" There a hundred thousand pilgrims were wont to assemble, a thousand Brahmins served the temple and guarded
its treasures, and hundreds of dancers and singers played before its gates. Within stood the famous linga, a rude
pillar stone adorned with gems and lighted by jewelled candelebra which were reflected in rich hangings,
embroidered with precious stones like stars, that decked the shrine..... Its ramparts were swarmed with incredulous
Brahmins, mocking the vain arrogance of foreign infidels whom the God of Somnath would assuredly consume.
The foreigners, nothing daunted, scaled the walls; the God remained dumb to the urgent appeals of his servants;
fifty thousand Hindus suffered for their faith and the sacred shrine was sacked to the joy of the true believers. The
great stone was cast down and its fragments were carried off to grace the conqueror's palace. The temple gates were
setup at Ghazni and a million pounds worth of treasure rewarded the iconoclast " 11[f.11]

The work done by Muhammad of Ghazni became a pious tradition and was faithfully followed by those who came
after him. In the words of Dr. Titus 12[f.12]

"Mahommad Ghori, one of the enthusiastic successors of Muhammad of Ghazni, in his conquest of Ajmir
destroyed pillars and foundations of the idol-temples, and built in their stead mosques and colleges, and the
precepts of Islam and the customs of the law were divulged and established. At Delhi, the city and its vicinity were
freed from idols and idol worship, and in the sanctuaries of the images of the Gods mosques were raised by the
worshippers of the one God.
" Qutb-ud-Din Aybak also is said to have destroyed nearly a thousand temples, and then raised mosques on their
foundations. The same author states that he built the Jami Masjid, Delhi, and adorned it with the stones and gold
obtained from the temples which had been demolished by elephants, and covered it with inscriptions (from the
Quran) containing the divine commands. We have further evidence of this harrowing process having been
systematically employed from the inscription extant over the eastern gateway of this same mosque at Delhi, which
relates that the materials of 27 idol temples were used in its construction.
" Ala-ud-Din, in his zeal to build a second Minar to the Jami Masjid, to rival the one built by Qulb-ud-Din, is said
by Amir Khusru not only to have dug stones out of the hills, but to have demolished temples of the infidels to
furnish a supply. In his conquests of South India the destruction of temples was carried out by Ala-ud-Din as it had
been in the north by his predecessors.
" The Sultan Firoz Shah, in his Futuhat, graphically relates how he treated Hindus who had dared to build new
temples. ' When they did this in the city (Delhi) and the environs, in opposition to the law of the Prophet, which
declares that such are not to be tolerated, under Divine guidance I destroyed these edifices. I killed these leaders of
infidelity and punished others with stripes, until this abuse was entirely abolished and where infidels and idolaters
worshipped idols, Musalmans now by God's mercy perform their devotions to the true God."
Even in the reign of Shah Jahan, we read of the destruction of the temples that the Hindus had started to rebuild,
and the account of this direct attack on the piety of the Hindus is thus solemnly recorded in the Badshah-namah :

" It had been brought to the notice of His Majesty, says the historian, that during the late reign (of Akbar) many
idol-temples had been begun but remained unfinished at Benares, the great stronghold of infidelity. The infidels
were now desirous of completing them. His Majesty, the defender of the faith, gave orders that at Benares and
throughout all his dominions in every place all temples that had been begun should be cast down. It was reported
from the Province of Allahabad that 76 temples had been destroyed in the district of Benares. " 13[f.13]
It was left to Aurangzeb to make a final attempt to overthrow idolatry. The author of ' Ma ' athir-i-Alamgiri dilates
upon his efforts to put down Hindu teaching, and his destruction of temples in the following terms :
" In April, A. D. 1669, Aurangzib learned that in the provinces of Thatta, Multan and Benares, but especially in the
latter, foolish Brahmins were in the habit of expounding frivolous books in their schools, and that learners, Muslims
as well as Hindus, went there from long distances.... The ' Director of the Faith ' consequently issued orders to all
the governors of provinces to destroy with a willing hand the schools and temples of the infidels; and they were
enjoined to put an entire stop to the teaching and practising of idolatrous worship.. ...Later it was reported to his
religious Majesty that the Government officers had destroyed the temple of Bishnath at Benares. " 14[f.14]

As Dr. Titus observes 15 [f.15] —

" Such invaders as Muhammad and Timur seem to have been more concerned with iconoclasm, the collection of
booty, the enslaving of captives, and the sending of infidels to hell with the' proselytizing sword ' than they were
with the conversion of them even by force. But when rulers were permanently established the winning of converts
became a matter of supreme urgency. It was a part of the stale policy to establish Islam as the religion of the whole
land.
"Qutb-ud-Din, whose reputation for destroying temples was almost as great as that of Muhammad, in the latter part
of the twelfth century and early years of the thirteenth, must have frequently resorted to force as an incentive to
conversion. One instance may be noted: when he approached Koil (Aligarh) in A. D. 1194, ' those of the garrison
who were wise and acute were converted to Islam, but the others were slain with the sword '.
" Further examples of extreme measures employed to effect a change of faith are all too numerous. One pathetic
case is mentioned in the lime of the reign of Firoz Shah (A. D. 1351—1388). An old Brahmin of Delhi had been
accused of worshipping idols in his house, and of even leading Muslim women to become infidels. He was sent for
and his case placed before the judges, doctors, elders and lawyers. Their reply was that the provisions of the law
were clear. The Brahmin must either become a Muslim or be burned. The true faith was declared to him and the
right course pointed out, but he refused to accept it. Consequently he was burned by the order of the Sultan, and the
commentator adds, ' Behold the Sultan's strict adherence to law and rectitude, how he would not deviate in the least
from its decrees '. "

Muhammad not only destroyed temples but made it a policy to make slaves of the Hindus he conquered. In the
words of Dr. Titus:
" Not only was slaughter of the infidels and the destruction of their temples resorted to in earlier period of Islam's
contact with India, but as we have seen, many of the vanquished were led into slavery. The dividing up of booty
was one of the special attractions, to the leaders as well as to the common soldiers in these expeditions. Muhammad
seems to have made the slaughter of infidels, the destruction of their temples, the capturing of slaves, and the
plundering of the wealth of the people, particularly of the temples and the priests, the main object of his raids. On
the occasion of his first raid he is said to have taken much booty ; and half a million Hindus, ' beautiful men and
women ', were reduced to slavery and taken back to Ghazni. " 16[f.16]

When Muhammad later took Kanauj, in A. D. 1017, he took so much booty and so many prisoners that * the fingers
of those who counted them would have tired '. Describing how common Indian slaves had become in Ghazni and
Central Asia after the campaign of A. D. 1019, the historian of the times says 17[f.17] :

"The number of prisoners may be conceived from the fact that each was sold for from two to ten dirhams. These
were afterwards taken to Ghazni, and merchants came from far distant cities to purchase them ;. . ....and the fair and
the dark, the rich and the poor were commingled in one common slavery.

" In the year A.D. 1202, when Qulb-ud-Din captured Kalinjar, after the temples had been convened into mosques,
and the very name of idolatry was annihilated, fifty thousand men came under the collar of slavery and the plain
became black as pitch with Hindus. "
Slavery was the fate of those Hindus who were captured in the holy war. But, when there was no war the systematic
abasement of the Hindus played no unimportant part in the methods adopted by the Muslim invaders. In the days of
Ala-ud-Din, at the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Hindus had in certain parts given the Sultan much
trouble. So, he determined to impose such taxes on them that they would be prevented from rising in rebellion.
" The Hindu was to be left unable to keep a horse to ride on, to carry arms, to wear fine clothes, or to enjoy any of
the luxuries of life. " 18[f.18]
Speaking of the levy of Jizyah Dr. Titus says 19[f.19] ''

" The payment of the Jizyah by the Hindus continued throughout the dominions of the sultans, emperors, and kings
in various parts of India with more or less regularity, though often, the law was in force in theory only ; since it
depended entirely on the ability of the sovereign to enforce his demands. But, finally, it was abolished throughout
the Moghul Empire in the ninth year of the enlightened Akbar's reign (A. D. 1665), after it had been accepted as a
fundamental part of Muslim government policy in India for a period of more than eight centuries. "
Lane Poole says that
" the Hindu was taxed to the extent of half the produce of his land, and had to pay duties on all his buffaloes, goats,
and other milk-cattle. The taxes were to be levied equally on rich and poor, at so much per acre, so much per
animal. Any collectors or officers taking bribes were summarily dismissed and heavily punished with sticks,
pincers, the rack, imprisonment and chains. The new rules were strictly carried out, so that one revenue officer
would string together 20 Hindu notables and enforce payment by blows. No gold or silver, not even the betelnut, so
cheering and stimulative to pleasure, was to be seen in a Hindu house, and the wives of the impoverished native
officials were reduced to taking service in Muslim families. Revenue officers came to be regarded as more deadly
than the plague; and to be a government clerk was disgrace worse than death, in so much that no Hindu would
marry his daughter to such a man. " 20[f.20]

These edicts, says the historian of the period,

" were so strictly carried out that the chaukidars and khuts and muqad-dims were not able to ride on horseback, to
find weapon, to wear fine clothes, or to indulge in betel. . .... No Hindu could hold up his head. ..... Blows,
confinement in the stocks, imprisonment and chains were all employed to enforce payment. "

All this was not the result of mere caprice or moral perversion. On the other hand, what was done was in
accordance with the ruling ideas of the leaders of Islam in the broadest aspects. These ideas were well expressed by
the Kazi in reply to a question put by Sultan Ala-ud-Din wanting to know the legal position of the Hindus under
Muslim law. The Kazi said :—

" They are called payers of tribute, and when the revenue officer demands silver from them they should without
question, and with all humility and respect, tender gold. If the officer throws dirt in their mouths, they must without
reluctance open their mouths wide to receive it..... The due subordination of the Dhimmi is exhibited in this humble
payment, and by this throwing of dirt into their mouths. The glorification of Islam is a duty, and contempt for
religion is vain. God holds them in contempt, for he says, ' Keep them in subjection '. To keep the Hindus in
abasement is especially a religious duty, because they are the most inveterate enemies of the Prophet, and because
the Prophet has commanded us to slay them, plunder them, and make them captive, saying, ' Convert them to Islam
or kill them, and make them slaves, and spoil their wealth and properly '. No doctor but the great doctor (Hani-fah),
to whose school we belong, has assented to the imposition of jizya on Hindus ; doctors of other schools allow no
other alternative but ' Death or Islam '. " 21[f.21]

Such is the story of this period of 762 years which elapsed between the advent of Muhammad of Ghazni and the
return of Ahmadshah Abdalli.
How far is it open to the Hindus to say that Northern India is part of Aryavarta ? How far is it open to the Hindus to
say because once it belonged to them, therefore, it must remain for ever an integral part of India ? Those who
oppose separation and hold to the ' historic sentiment ' arising out of an ancient fact that Northern India including
Afghanistan was once part of India and that the people of that area were either Buddhist or Hindus, must be asked
whether the events of these 762 years of incessant Muslim invasions, the object with which they were launched and
the methods adopted by these invaders to give effect to their object are to be treated as though they were matters of
no account ?
Apart from other consequences which have flowed from them these invasions have, in my opinion, so profoundly
altered the ' culture and character of the northern areas, which it is now proposed to be included in a Pakistan, that
there is not only no unity between that area and the rest of India but that there is as a matter of fact a real antipathy
between the two.
The first consequence of these invasions was the breaking up of the unity of Northern India with the rest of India.
After his conquest of Northern India, Muhammad of Ghazni detached it from India and ruled it from Ghazni. When
Mahommed Ghori came in the field as a conqueror, he again attached it to India and ruled it from Lahore and then
from Delhi. Hakim, the brother of Akbar, detached Kabul and Kandahar from Northern India. Akbar again attached
it to Northern India. They were again detached by Nadirshah in 1738 and the whole of Northern India would have
been severed from India had it not been for the check provided by the rise of the Sikhs. Northern India, therefore,
has been like a wagon in a train, which can be coupled or uncoupled according to the circumstances of the moment.
If analogy is wanted, the case of Alsace-Lorraine could be cited. Alsace-Lorraine was originally part of Germany,
like the rest of Switzerland and the Low Countries. It continued to be so till 1680, when it was taken by France and
incorporated into French territory. It belonged to France till 1871, when it was detached by Germany and made part
of her territory. In 1918, it was again detached from Germany and made part of France. In 1940, it was detached
from France and made part of Germany.
The methods adopted by the invaders have left behind them their aftermath. One aftermath is the bitterness between
the Hindus and the Muslims which they have caused. This bitterness, between the two, is so deep-seated that a
century of political life has neither succeeded in assuaging it, nor in making people forget it. As the invasions were
accompanied with. destruction of temples and forced conversions, with spoliation of property, with slaughter,,
enslavement and abasement of men, women and children, what wonder if the memory of these invasions has ever
remained green, as a source of pride to the Muslims and as a source of shame to the Hindus ? But these things apart,
this north-west corner of India has been a theatre in which a stern drama has been played. Muslim hordes, in wave
after wave, have surged down into this area and from thence scattered themselves in spray over the rest of India.
These reached the rest of India in thin currents. In time, they also receded from their farthest limits ; while they
lasted, they left a deep deposit of Islamic culture over the original Aryan culture in this north-west corner of India
which has given it a totally different colour, both in religious and political outlook. The Muslim invaders, no doubt,
came to India singing a hymn of hate against the Hindus. But, they did not merely sing their hymn of hate and go
back burning a few temples on the way. That would have been a blessing. They were not content with so negative a
result. They did a positive act, namely, to plant the seed of Islam. The growth of this plant is remarkable. It is not a
summer sapling. It is as great and as strong as an oke. Its growth is the thickest in Northern India. The successive
invasions have deposited their ' silt ' more there than anywhere else, and have served as watering exercises of
devoted gardeners. Its growth is so thick in Northern India that the remnants of Hindu and Buddhist culture are just
shrubs. Even the Sikh axe could not fell this oak. Sikhs, no doubt , became the political masters of Northern India,
but they did not gain back Northern India to that spiritual and cultural unity by which it was bound to the rest of
India before HsuanTsang. The Sikhs coupled it back to India. Still, it remains like Alsace-Lorraine politically
detachable and spiritually alien so far as the rest of India is concerned. It is only an unimaginative person who could
fail to take notice of these facts or insist in the face of them that Pakistan means breaking up into two what is one
whole.
What is the unity the Hindu sees between Pakistan and Hindustan ? If it is geographical unity, then that is no unity.
Geographical unity is unity intended by nature. In building up a nationality on geographical unity, it must be
remembered that it is a case where Nature proposes and Man disposes. If it is unity in external things, such as ways
and habits of life, that is no unity. Such unity is the result of exposure to a common environment. If it is
administrative unity, that again is no unity. The instance of Burma is in point. Arakan and Tenas-serim were
annexed in 1826 by the treaty of Yendabu. Pegu and Martaban were annexed in 1852. Upper Burma was annexed
in 1886. The administrative unity between India and Burma was forged in 1826. For over 110 years that
administrative unity continued to exist. In 1937, the knot that tied the two together was cut asunder and nobody
shed a tear over it. The unity between India and Burma was not less fundamental. If unity is to be of an abiding
character, it must be founded on a sense of kinship, in the feeling of being kindred. In short, it must be spiritual.
Judged in the light of these considerations, the unity between Pakistan and Hindustan is a myth. Indeed, there is
more spiritual unity between Hindustan and Burma than there is between Pakistan and Hindustan. And if the
Hindus did not object to the severance of Burma from India, it is difficult to understand how the Hindus can object
to the severance of an area like Pakistan, which, to repeat, is politically detachable from, socially hostile and
spiritually alien to, the rest of India.
CHAPTER V

WEAKENING OF THE DEFENCES

How will the creation of Pakistan affect the question of the Defence of Hindustan ? The question is not a very
urgent one. For, there is no reason to suppose that Pakistan will be at war with Hindustan immediately it is brought
into being. Nevertheless, as the question is sure to be raised, it is better to deal with it.
The question may be considered under three heads: (1) Question of Frontiers, (2) Question of Resources and (3)
Question of Armed Forces.
I

QUESTION OF FRONTIERS
It is sure to be urged by the Hindus that Pakistan leaves Hindustan without a scientific frontier. The obvious reply,
of course, is that the Musalmans cannot be asked to give up their right to Pakistan, because it adversely affects the
Hindus in the matter of their boundaries. But banter apart, there are really two considerations, which, if taken into
account, will show that the apprehensions of the Hindus in this matter are quite uncalled for.
In the first place, can any country hope to have a frontier which may be called scientific? As Mr. Davies, the author
of North-West Frontier, observes:
" It would be impossible to demarcate on the North-West of our Indian Empire a frontier which would satisfy
ethnological, political and military requirements. To seek for a zone which traverses easily definable geographical
features; which does not violate ethnic considerations by cutting through the territories of closely related tribes; and
which at the same time serves as a political boundary, is Utopian."

As a matter of history, there has been no one scientific boundary for India and different persons have advocated
different boundaries for India. The question of boundaries has given rise to two policies, the " Forward " Policy and
the " Back to the Indus " Policy. The " Forward " Policy had a greater and a lesser intent, to use the language of Sir
George Macmunn. In its greater intent, it meant active control in the affairs of Afghanistan as an Etat Tampion to
India and the extension of Indian influence up to the Oxus. In its lesser intent, it was confined to the absorption of
the tribal hills between the administered territory (i.e. the Province of N.-W.F.) and Afghanistan as defined by the
Durand Line and the exercise of British control right up to that line. The greater intent of the Forward Policy, as a
basis for a safe boundary for India, has long been abandoned. Consequently, there remain three possible boundary
lines to choose from: (1) the Indus River, (2) the present administrative boundary of the N.-W. F. P. and (3) the
Durand Line. Pakistan will no doubt bring the boundary of Hindustan Back to the Indus, indeed behind the Indus, to
the Sutlej. But this " Back to the Indus " policy was not without its advocates. The greatest exponent, of the Indus
boundary was Lord Lawrence, who was strongly opposed to any forward move beyond the trans-indus foot-hills.
He advocated meeting any invader in the valley of the Indus. In his opinion, it would be an act of folly and
weakness to give battle at any great distance from the Indus base ; and the longer the distance an invading army has
to march through Afghanistan and the tribal country, the more harassed it would be. Others, no doubt, have pointed
out that a river is a weak line of defence. But the principal reason for not retiring to the Indus boundary seems to lie
elsewhere. Mr. Davies gives the real reason when he says that the

" ' Back to Indus ' cry becomes absurd when it is examined from the point of view of the inhabitants of the modern
North-West Frontier Province. Not only would withdrawal mean loss of prestige, but it would also be a gross
betrayal of those peoples to whom we have extended our beneficent rule."
In fact, it is no use insisting that any particular boundary is the safest, for the simple reason that geographical
conditions are not decisive in the world today and modern technique has robbed natural frontiers of much of their
former importance, even where they are mighty mountains, the broadest streams, widest seas or far stretching
deserts.
In the second place, it is always possible for nations with no natural boundaries to make good this defect. Countries
are not wanting which have no natural boundaries. Yet, all have made good the deficiencies of nature, by creating
artificial fortifications as barriers, which can be far more impregnable than natural barriers. There is no reason to
suppose that the Hindus will not be able to accomplish what other countries similarly situated have done. Given the
resources, Hindus need have no fear for want of a naturally safe frontier.

II

QUESTION OF RESOURCES
More important than the question of a scientific frontier, is the question of resources. If resources are ample for the
necessary equipment, then it is always possible to overcome the difficulties created by an unscientific or a weak
frontier. We must, therefore, consider the comparative resources of Pakistan and Hindustan. The following figures
are intended to convey an idea of their comparative resources:—
Resources of Pakistan
Provinces Area Population Revenues 22[f.22]
Rs.
N.-W. F. P. 13,518 2,425,003 1,90,11,842
Punjab 91,919 23,551,210 12,53,87,730
Sind 46,378 3,887,070 9,56,76,269
Baluchistan .. 54,228 420,648
Bengal 82,955 50,000,000 36,55,62,485
Total .. 288,998 80,283,931 60,56,38,326

Resources of Hindustan
Provinces Area Population Revenues 23[f.23]
Rs.
Ajmer-Mcrwara 2,711 560,292 21,00,000
Assam 55,014 8,622,251 4,46,04,441
Bihar 69,348 32,371,434 6,78,21,588
Bombay 77,271 18,000,000 34,98,03,800
C. P. & Berar 99957 15,507,723 4,58,83,962
Coorg 1,593 163,327 11,00,000
Delhi 573 636,246 70,00,000
Madras 142,277 46,000,000 25,66,71,265
Orissa 32,695 8,043,681 87,67,269
U.P. 206,248 48,408,763 16,85,52,881
Total 607,657 178,513,919 96,24,05,206

These are gross figures. They are subject to certain additions and deductions. Revenues derived by the Central
Government from Railways, Currency and Post and Telegraphs are not included in these figures, as it is not
possible to ascertain how much is raised from each Province. When it is done, certain additions will have to be
made to the figures under revenue. There can be no doubt that the share from these heads of revenue that will come
to Hindustan, will be much larger than the share that will go to Pakistan. Just as additions will have to be made to
these figures, so also deductions will have to be made from them. Most of these deductions will, of course, fall to
the lot of Pakistan. As will be shown later, some portion of the Punjab will have to be excluded from the scheme of
Western Pakistan. Similarly, some portion of Bengal will have to be excluded from the proposed Eastern Pakistan,
although a district from Assam will have to be added to it. According to me, fifteen districts will have to be
excluded from Bengal and thirteen districts shall have to be excluded from the Punjab. Sufficient data are not
available to enable any one to give an exact idea of what would be the reduction in the area, population and
revenue, that would result from the exclusion of these districts. One may, however, hazard the guess that so far as
the Punjab and Bengal are concerned, their revenues would be halved. What is lost by Pakistan by this exclusion,
will of course be gained by Hindustan. To put it in concrete terms, while the revenues of Western and Eastern
Pakistan will be 60 crores minus 24crores, i.e., 36 crores, the revenues of Hindustan will be about 96 crores plus 24
crores, i.e., 120 crores.
The study of these figures, in the light of the observations I have made, will show that the resources of Hindustan
are far greater than the resources of Pakistan, whether one considers the question in terms of area, population or
revenue. There need, therefore, be no apprehension on the score of resources. For, the creation of Pakistan will not
leave Hindustan in a weakened condition.
Ill
QUESTION OF ARMED FORCES

The defence of a country does not depend so much upon its scientific frontier as it does upon its resources. But
more than resources does it depend upon the fighting forces available to it.
What are the fighting forces available to Pakistan and to Hindustan ?

The Simon Commission pointed out, as a special feature of the Indian Defence Problem, that there were special
areas which alone offered recruits to the Indian Army and that there were other areas which offered none or if at all,
very few. The facts revealed in the following table, taken from the Report of the Commission, undoubtedly will
come as a most disagreeable surprise to many Indians, who think and care about the defence of India :
 Areas of Recruitment Number of Recruits drawn
1 N.-W. Frontier Province 5,600
2 Kashmir 6,500
3 Punjab 86,000
4 Baluchistan 300
5 Nepal 19,000
6 United Provinces 16,500
7 Rajputana 7,000
8 Central India 200
9 Bombay 7,000
10 Central Provinces 100
11 Bihar & Orissa 300
12 Bengal Nil
13 Assam Nil
14 Burma 3,000
15 Hyderabad 700
16 Mysore 100
17 Madras 4,000
18 Miscellaneous 1,900
TOTAL 158,200

The Simon Commission found that this state of affairs was natural to India, and in support of it, cited the following
figures of recruitment from the different Provinces of India during the Great War especially because " it cannot be
suggested that any discouragement was offered to recruitment in any area ":
Province Combatants Recruits Non-combatants Total
Enlisted Recruits Enlisted

Madras Bombay 51,223 41,117 92,340

Bengal 41,272 30,211 71,483
United Provinces 7,117 51,935 59,052
Punjab 163,578 117,565 281,148
North-West 349,688 97,288 446,976
Frontier 32,181 13,050 45,231
Baluchistan 1,761 327 2,088
Burma 14,094 4,579 18,673
Bihar and Orissa 8,576 32,976 41,552
Central Provinces 5,376 9,631 15,007
Assam 942 14,182 15,124
Ajmer-Marwar 7,341 1,632 8,973
Nepal 58,904 - 58,904
Total 742,053 414,493 1,156,546
 These data reveal in a striking manner that the fighting forces available for the defence of India mostly come
from areas which are to be included in Pakistan. From this it may be argued, that without Pakistan, Hindustan
cannot defend itself.

The facts brought out by the Simon Commission are, of course, beyond question. But they cannot be made the basis
of a conclusion, such as is suggested by the Simon Commission, namely, that only Pakistan can produce soldiers
and that Hindustan cannot. That such a conclusion is quite untenable will be seen from the following
considerations.

In the first place, what is regarded by the Simon Commission as something peculiar to India is not quite so peculiar.
What appears to be peculiar is not due to any inherent defect in the people. The peculiarity arises because of the
policy of recruitment followed by the British Government for years past. The official explanation of this
predominance in the Indian Army of the men of the North-West is that they belong to the Martial Classes. But Mr.
Chaudhari 24 [f.24] has demonstrated, by unimpeachable data, that this explanation is far from being true. He has
shown that the predominance in the Army of the men of the North-West took place as early as the Mutiny of 1857,
some 20 years before the theory of Martial and Non-martial Classes was projected in an indistinct form for the first
time in 1879 by the Special Army Committee 25[f.25] appointed in that year, and that their predominance had
nothing to do with their alleged fighting qualities but was due to the fact, that they helped the British to suppress the
Mutiny in which the Bengal Army was so completely involved. To quote Mr. Chaudhari :
" The pre-Mutiny army of Bengal was essentially a Brahmin and Kshalriya army of the Ganges basin. All the three
Presidency Armies of those days, as we have slated in the first part of this article, were in a sense quite
representative of the military potentialities of the areas to which they belonged, though none of them could, strictly
speaking, be correctly described as national armies of the provinces concerned, as there was no attempt to draw
upon any but the traditional martial elements of the population. But they all got their recruits mainly from their
natural areas of recruitment, viz., the Madras Army from the Tamil and Telugu countries, the Bombay Army from
Western India, and the Bengal Army from Bihar and U. P. and to a very limited extent from Bengal. There was no
official restriction on the enrolment of men of any particular tribe or caste or region, provided they were otherwise
eligible. Leaving aside for the moment the practice of the Bombay and the Madras Armies, the only exception to
this general rule in the Bengal Army was that which applied to the Punjabis and Sikhs, who, inspite of their
magnificent military traditions, were not given a fair representation in the Army of Northern India. Their
recruitment, on the contrary, was placed under severe restrictions by an order of the Government, which laid down
that ' the number of Punjabis in a regiment is never to exceed 200, nor are more than 100 of them lobe Sikhs'. It was
only the revolt of the Hindustani regiments of the Bengal Army that gave an opportunity to the Punjabis to
rehabilitate themselves in the eyes of the British authorities. Till then, they remained suspect and under a ban, and
the Bengal Army on the eve of the Mutiny was mainly recruited from Oudh, North and South Bihar, especially the
latter, principally Shahabad and Bhojpur, the Doab of the Ganges and Jumna and Rohilkhund. The soldiers
recruited from these areas were mostly high-caste men. Brahmins of all denominations, Kshatriyas, Rajputs and
Ahirs. The average proportion in which these classes were enrolled in a regiment was: (1) Brahmin 7/24, (2)
Rajputs 1/4, (3) Inferior Hindus 1/6, (4) Musalmans 1/6, (5) Punjabis 1/8.
"To this army, the area which now-a-days furnishes the greatest number of soldiers—the Punjab, Nepal, N.-W. F.
Province, the hill tracts of Kumaon and Garhwal, Rajpulana,—furnished very few recruits or none at all. There was
practical exclusion in it of all the famous fighting castes of India,—Sikhs, Gurkhas, Punjabi Musalmans, Dogras,
Jats, Pathans, Garhwalis, Rajpulana Rajpuls, Kumaonis, Gujars, all the tribes and seels, in fact, which are looked
upon today as atower of strength of the Indian Army. A single year and a single rebellion was, however, to change
all this. The Mutiny, which broke out in 1857, blew up the old Bengal Army and brought into existence a
Punjabized and barbarized army, resembling the Indian Army of today in broad lines and general proportions of its
composition.
" The gaps created by the revolt of the Hindustani regiments (of the Bengal Army) were at once filled up by Sikhs
and other Punjabis, and hillmen eager for revenge and for the loot of the cities of Hindustan. They had all been
conquered and subjugated by the British with the help of the Hindustani soldiers, and in their ignorance, they
regarded the Hindustanis, rather the handful of British, as their real enemies. This enmity was magnificently
exploited by the British authorities in suppressing the Mutiny. When the news of the enlistment of Gurkhas reached
Lord Dalhousie in England he expressed great satisfaction and wrote to a friend: ' Against the Oudh Sepoys they
may confidently be expected to fight like devils'. And after the Mutiny, General Mansfield, the Chief of the Staff of
the Indian Army, wrote about the Sikhs: ' It was not because they loved us, but because they hated Hindustan and
haled the Bengal Army that the Sikhs had flocked to our standard instead of seeking the opportunity to strike again
for their freedom. They wanted to revenge themselves and to gain riches by the plunder of Hindustani cities. They
were not attracted by mere daily pay, it was rather the prospect of wholesale plunder and stamping on the heads of
their enemies. In short, we turned to profit the esprit de corps of the old Khalsa Army of Ranjit Singh, in the
manner which for a time would most effectually bind the Sikhs to us as long as the active service against their old
enemies may last ".
" The relations thus established were in fact to last much longer. The services rendered by the Sikhs and Gurkhas
during the Mutiny were not forgotten and henceforward the Punjab and Nepal had the place of honour in the Indian
Army."

That Mr. Chaudhari is right when he says that it was the Mutiny of 1857 which was the real cause of the
preponderance in the Indian Army of the men of the North-West is beyond the possibility of doubt. Equally
incontrovertible is the view of Mr. Chaudhari that this preponderance of the men of the North-West is not due to
their native superiority in fighting qualities, as the same is amply borne out by the figures which he has collected,
showing the changes in the composition of the Indian Infantry before and after the Mutiny.

CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE INDIAN INFANTRY

Percentage of men from different Paris

Year North-West India North-East India South India Burma

U. P, Bihar
Punjab, N.-W. F., Nepal, Garhwal,
Kashmir Kumaon
1856 Less than 10 Negligible Not less Nil
than 90
1858 47 6 47
1883 48 17 35
1893 53 24 23
1905 47 15 22 16
1919 46 14.8 25.5 12 1.7
1930 58.5 22 11.0 5.5 3

These figures show that in 1856, one year before the Mutiny, the men from the North-West were a negligible factor
in the Indian Army. But in 1858, one year after the Mutiny, they had acquired a dominant position which has never
received a setback.

It will thus be seen that the distinction between Martial and Non-martial Classes, which was put forth for the first
time in 1879, as a matter of principle, which was later on insisted upon as a matter of serious consideration by Lord
Roberts 26 [f.26] and which was subsequently recognised by Lord Kitchener as a principle governing recruitment to
the Indian Army, had nothing to do with the origin of this preponderance of the men of the North-West in the
Indian Army. No doubt, the accident that the people from North-West India had the good luck of being declared by
the Government as belonging to the Martial Class, while most of the classes coming from the rest of India had the
ill-luck of being declared Non-martial Classes had important consequences. Being regularly employed in the Army,
the people of North-West India came to look upon service in the Army as an occupation with a security and a career
which was denied to men from the rest of India. The large number of recruits drawn from North-West India,
therefore, indicates nothing more than this—namely, owing to the policy of the British Government, service in the
Army has become their occupation and if people in other parts of India do not readily come forth to enlist in the
Army, the reason is that Government did not employ them in the Army. People follow their ancestral occupations
whether they like it or not. When a people do not take to a new occupation it does not necessarily mean that they
are not fit for it. It only means that it is not their ancestral occupation.

This division between Martial and Non-martial Classes is, of course, a purely arbitrary and artificial distinction. It is
as foolish as the Hindu theory of caste, making birth instead of worth, the basis for recognition. At one time, the
Government insisted that the distinction they had adopted was a real distinction and that in terms of fighting
qualities, it meant so much fighting value. In fact, this was their justification for recruiting more men from the
North-West of India. That this distinction has nothing to do with any difference in fighting qualities has now been
admitted. Sir Phillip Chetwode, 27[f27] late Commander-in-Chief of India, broadcasting from London on the
constitution of the Indian Army, took pains to explain that the recruitment of a larger proportion of it from the
Punjab, did not mean that the people of the Peninsula were without martial qualities. Sir Phillip Chetwode
explained that the reason why men of the North were largely recruited for the Indian Army was chiefly climatic, as
the men from the South cannot stand the extremes of heat and cold of North India. No race can be permanently
without martial spirit. Martial spirit is not a matter of native instinct. It is a matter of training and anybody can be
trained to it.
But apart from this, there is enough fighting material in Hindustan, besides what might be produced by special
training. There are the Sikhs, about whose fighting equalities nothing need be said. There are the Rajputs who are
even now included in the category of Martial Classes. In addition to these, there are the Mahrattas who proved their
calibre as a fighting race during the last European War. Even the people of the Madras Presidency can be depended
upon for military purposes. Speaking of the Madrasis as soldiers, General Sir Frederick P. Haines, at one time
Commander-in-Chief in India, observed :
" It has been customary to declare that the Madras Army is composed of men physically inferior to those of the
Bengal Army, and if stature alone be taken into consideration, this is true. It is also said that by the force of
circumstances the martial feeling and the characteristics necessary to the real soldier are no longer to be found in its
ranks. I feel bound to reject the above assertions and others which ascribe comparative inefficiency to Madras
troops. It is true that in recent years they have seen but little service; for, with the exception of the sappers, they
have been specially excluded from all participation in work in the field. I cannot admit for one moment that
anything has occurred to disclose the fact that the Madras Sepoy is inferior as a fighting man. The facts of history
warrant us in assuming the contrary. In drill training and discipline, the Madras Sepoy is inferior to none; while in
point of health, as exhibited by returns, he compares favourably with his neighbours. This has been manifested by
the sappers and their followers in the Khyber; and the sappers are of the same race as the Sepoys."
Hindustan need, therefore, have no apprehension regarding the supply of an adequate fighting force from among its
own people. The separation of Pakistan cannot weaken her in that respect.
The Simon Commission drew attention to three features of the Indian Army, which struck them as being special
and peculiar to India. It pointed out that the duty of the Army in India was two-fold; firstly, to prevent the
independent tribes on the Indian side of the Afghan frontier from raiding the peaceful inhabitants of the plains
below. Secondly, to protect India against invasion by countries lying behind and beyond this belt of unorganized
territories. The Commission took note of the fact that from 1850 to 1922, there were 72 expeditions against the
independent tribes, an average of one a year, and also of the fact that in the countries behind and beyond this belt of
unorganized territory, lies the direction from which, throughout the ages, the danger to India's territorial integrity
has come. This quarter is occupied by " States which according to the Commission are not members of the League
of Nations " and is, therefore, a greater danger to India now than before. The Commission insisted on emphasizing
that these two facts constituted a peculiar feature of the problem of military defence in India and so far as the
urgency and extent of the problem is concerned, they are " without parallel elsewhere in the Empire, and constituted
a difficulty in developing self-government which never arose in any comparable degree in the case of the
self-governing Dominions ".
As a second unique feature of the Indian Army, the Commission observed:
" The Army in India is not only provided and organized to ensure against external dangers of a wholly exceptional
character: it is also distributed and habitually used throughout India for the purpose of maintaining or restoring
internal peace. In all countries . . . . the military is not normally employed in this way, and certainly is not organized
for this purpose. But the case of India is entirely different. Troops are employed many times a year to prevent
internal disorder and, if necessary, to quell it. Police forces, admirably organized as they are, cannot be expected in
all cases to cope with the sudden and violent outburst of a mob driven frantic by religious frenzy. It is, therefore,
well understood in India both by the police and by the military—and, what is even more to the point, by the public
at large—that the soldiers may have to be sent for.. . This Use of the Army for the purpose of maintaining or
restoring internal order was increasing rather than diminishing, and that on these occasions the practically universal
request was for British troops. The proportion of the British to Indian troops allotted to this duty has in fact risen in
the last quarter of a century. The reason, of course, is that the British soldier is a neutral, and is under no suspicion
of favouring Hindus against Mahomedans or Mahomedans against Hindus ..... Inasmuch as the vast majority of the
disturbances which call for the intervention of the military have a communal or religious complexion, it is natural
and inevitable that the intervention which is most likely to be authoritative should be that which has no bias, real or
suspected, to either side. It is a striking fact in this connection that, while in regular units of the Army in India as a
whole British soldiers are in a minority of about 1 to 21/2, in the troops allotted for internal security the
preponderance is reversed, and for this purpose a majority of British troops is employed—in the troops car-marked
(or internal security the proportion is about eight British to seven Indian soldiers."
Commenting upon this feature of the Indian Army the Commission said:

" When, therefore, one contemplates a future for India in which, in place of the existing Army organization, the
country is defended and pacified by exclusively Indian units, just as Canada relics on Canadian troops and Ireland
on Irish troops, it is essential to realize and bear in mind the dimensions and character of the Indian problem of
internal order and the part which the British soldier at present plays (to the general satisfaction of the country-side)
in supporting peaceful government."

The third unique feature of the Indian Army, which was pointed out by the Simon Commission, is the
preponderance in it of the men from the North-West. The origin of this preponderance and the reasons underlying
the official explanation given therefor have already been examined.
But, there is one more special feature of the Indian Army to which the Commission made no reference at all. The
commission either ignored it or was not aware of it. It is such an important feature that it overshadows all the three
features to which the Commission refers, in its importance and in its social and political consequences.
It is a feature which, if widely known, will set many people to think furiously. It is sure to raise questions which
may prove insoluble and which may easily block the path of India's political progress—questions of far greater
importance and complexity than those relating to Indianization of the Army.
This neglected feature relates to the communal composition of the Indian Army. Mr. Chaudhari has collected the
relevant data in his articles, already referred to, which throws a flood of light on this aspect of the Indian Army. The
following table shows the proportion of soldiers serving in the Indian Infantry, according to the area and the
community from which they are drawn:
Changes in the Communal
Composition of the Indian Army
Area and Communities Percentage in Percentage in 1918 Percentage in 1919 Percentage in
1914 1930
I. The Punjab, 47 46.5 46 58.5
N.-W. F. P. and Kashmir
(1) Sikhs 19.2 17.4 15.4 13.58
(2) Punjabi Musalmans 11.1 11.3 12.4 22.6
(3) Pathans 6.2 5.42 4.54 6.35
II. Nepal, Kumaon, Garhwal 15 18.9 14.9 22.0
(1) Gurkhas 13.1 16.6 12.2 16.4
22 22.7 25.5 11.0
III. Upper
India
(1) U.P.Rajputs 6.4 6.8 7.7 2.55
(2) Hindustani Musalmans 4.1 3.42 4.45 Nil
(3) Brahmins 1.8 1.86 2.5 Nil
16 11.9 12 5.5
IV. South
India
(1) Mahrattas 4.9 3.85 3.7 5.33
(2) Madras! Musalmans 3.5 2.71 2.13 Nil
(3) Tamils 2.5 2.0 1.67 Nil

V. Burma
(1) Burmans Nil Negligible 1.7 3.0

This table brings out in an unmistakable manner the profound changes which have been going on in the communal
composition of the Indian Army particularly after 1919. They are (1) a phenomenal rise in the strength of the
Punjabi Musalman and the Pathan, (2) a substantial reduction in the position of Sikhs from first to third, ( 3) the
degradation of the Rajputs to the fourth place, and (4 ) the shutting out of the U. P. Brahmins, the Madrasi
Musalmans, and the Tamilians, both Brahmins and Non-Brahmins.
A further analysis of the figures for 1930, which discloses the communal composition of the Indian Infantry and
Indian Cavalry, has been made by Mr. Chaudhari in the following table. 28[f.28]

Communal Composition of the Indian Army in 1930

Class Areas Percentage in Infantry Percentage in Cavalry

Excluding Including Gurkhas
Gurkhas
1. Punjabi Musalman Punjab 27 22.6 14.28
2. Gurkhas Nepal 16.4
3. Sikhs Punjab 16.24 13.58 23.81
4. Dogras North Punjab and 11.4 9.54 9.53
 Kashmir
5. Jats Rajputana, U. P., 9.5 7.94 19.06
Punjab
6. Pathans N.-W. F. Province 7.57 6.35 4.76
7. Mahrattas Konkan 6.34 5.33
8. Garhwalis Garhwal 4.53 3.63
9. U. P. Rajputs U. P. 3.04 2.54
10. Rajputana Rajputs Rajputana 2.8 2.35
11. Kumaonis Kumaon 2.44 2.05
12. Gujars N. E. Rajputana 1.52 1.28
13. Punjabi Hindus Punjab 1.52 1.28
14. Ahirs Do. 1.22 1.024
15. Musalmans, Rajputs, Neighbourhood of 1.22 1.024 7.14
Ranghars. Delhi
16. Kaimkhanis Rajputana 4.76
17. Kachins Burma 1.22 1.024
18. Chins Do. 1.22 1.024
19. Karens Do. 1.22 1.024
20. Dekhani Musalmans Deccan 4.76
21. Hindustani U. P. 2.38
Musalmans

Reducing these figures in terms of communities, we get the following percentage as it stood in 1930 :—

Communities Percentage in Infantry Percentage -in Cavalry

Including Gurkhas Excluding Gurkhas
1. Hindus and Sikhs 60.55 50.554 61.92
2. Gurkhas 16.4
3. Muhammadans 35.79 29.974 30.08
4. Burmans 3.66 3.072

These figures show the communal composition of the Indian Army. The Musalmans according to Mr. Chaudhari
formed 36% of the Indian Infantry and 30% of the Indian Cavalry.
These figures relate to the year 1930. We must now find out what changes have taken place since then in this
proportion.
It is one of the most intriguing things in the Military history of India that no information is available on this point
after 1930. It is impossible to know what the proportion of the Muslims in the Indian Army at present is. There is
no Government publication from which such information can be gathered. In the past, there was no dearth of
publications giving this information. It is very surprising that they should have now disappeared, or if they do
appear, that they should cease to contain this information. Not only is there no Government publication containing
information on this point, but Government has refused to give any information on the point when asked by
members of the Central Legislative Assembly. The following questions and answers taken from the proceedings of
the Central Legislative Assembly show how Government has been strenuously combating every attempt to obtain
information on the point :
There was an interpellation on 15th September 1938, when the following questions were asked and replies as stated
below were given:—

Arrangements for the Defence of India. 29[f.29]

Q. 1360: Mr.Badri Dull Pande (on behalf of Mr. Amarendra Nath Chattopadhya).
(a) x x x x

(b) x x x x
(c) x x x x

(d) How many Indians have been recruited during 1937 and 1938 as soldiers and officers during 1937-38 for the
Infantry and Cavalry respectively? Amongst the soldiers and officers recruited, how many are Punjabi Sikhs,
Pathans, Garhwalis, Mahrattas, Madrasis, Biharis, Bengalis and Hindustanis of the United Provinces and Gurkhas ?

(e) If none but the Punjabi Sikhs, Pathans and Garhwalis have been recruited, is it in contemplation of the
Honourable Member to recruit from all the Provinces for the defense of India and give them proper military training
?
(f) Will the Defence Secretary be pleased to state if Provincial Governments will be asked to raise Provincial
Regiments, trained and fully mechanised, for the defence of India? If not, what is his plan of raising an efficient
army for the defence of India ?
Mr. C.M.G.Oglvie:

(a) The Honourable Member will appreciate that it is not in the public interest to disclose the details of such
arrangements.

(b) 5 cadets and 33 Indian apprentices were recruited for the Indian Air Force during 1937-38.
(c) During 1937-38, 5 Indians have already been recruited to commissioned ranks in the Royal Indian Navy, 4 will
be taken by competitive examination in October 1938, and 3 more by special examination of " Dufferin " cadets
only. During the same period, 314 Indians were recruited to different non-commissioned categories in the Royal
Indian Navy.

(d) During the year ending the 31st March 1938, 54 Indians were commissioned as Indian Commissioned Officers.
They are now attached to British units for training, and it is not yet possible to say what proportion will be posted to
infantry and cavalry, respectively. During the same period, 961 Indian soldiers were recruited for cavalry, and
7,970 for infantry. Their details by classes are not available at Army Headquarters and to call for them from the
recruiting officers all over India would not justify the expenditure of time and labour involved.
(e) No.

(f) The reply to the first portion is in the negative. The reply to the second portion is that India already possesses
an efficient army and so far as finances permit, every effort is made to keep it up-to-date in all respects. Mr. S.
Satyamurti: With reference to the answers to clauses (d) and (e) of the question taken together, may I know whether
the attention of Government has been drawn to statements made by many public men that the bulk of the army is
from the Punjab and from one community ? Have Government considered those facts and will Government also
consider the desirability of making the army truly national by extending recruitment to all provinces and
communities, so as to avoid the danger present in all countries of a military dictatorship seizing political power ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I am not sure how that arises from this question, but I am prepared to say that provincial
boundaries do not enter into Government's calculations at all. The best soldiers are chosen to provide the best army
for India and not for any province, and in this matter national considerations must come above provincial
considerations. Where the bulk of best military material is found, there we will go to get it, and not elsewhere.

Mr. S. Saty'amurti : May I know whether the bulk of the army is from the Punjab and whether the Government
have forgotten the experience of the brave exploits of men from my province not very long ago in the Indian Army,
and may I know if Madrasis are practically kept out and many other provinces are kept out of the army altogether ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Madras is not practically kept out of the army. Government gladly acknowledge the gallant
services of the Madrasis in the army and they are now recruited to those Units where experience has proved them to
be best. There are some 4,500 serving chiefly in the Sappers and Miners and Artillery.
Mr. S. Sayamurti : Out of a total of 120,000 ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : About that.
Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I take it, that, that is a proper proportion, considering the population of Madras, the
revenue that Madras pays to the Central exchequer, and the necessity of having a national army recruited from all
the provinces ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : The only necessity we recognise is to obtain the best possible army.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I know by what tests Government have come to the conclusion that provinces other than
the Punjab cannot supply the best elements in the Indian Army ?
Mr. Ogilvie : By experience.

Dr. Sir Ziauddin Ahmed: May I ask if it is not a fact that all branches of Accounts Department are monopolised by
the Madrasis and will Government immediately reduce the number in proportion to their numerical strength in
India?
Mr. Ogilvie : I do not see how that arises from this question either, but the Government are again not prepared to
sacrifice efficiency for any provincial cause.

Indian Regiment consisting of Indians belonging to Different Castes 30[f.30]

Q. 1078 : Mr.M.Anantasayanam Ayyangar (on behalf of Mr. Manu Subedar):

(a) Will the Defence Secretary state whether any experiment has ever been made under British rule of having an
Indian regiment consisting of Indians recruited from different provinces and belonging to the different castes and
sections, such as Sikhs, Mahrattas, Rajputs, Brahmins and Muslims ?

(b) If the reply to part (a) be in the negative, can a statement of Government's policy in this regard be made giving
reasons why it has not been considered proper to take such action ?
(c) Is His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief prepared to take up this matter with His Majesty's Government ?

(d) Are Government aware that in the University Corps and in the Bombay Scout Movement, and in the Police
Forces of the country, there is no separation by caste or creed ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :
(a) No.
(b) Government regard it as a fundamental principle of organization that Military Sub-Units, such as companies
and squadrons, must be homogeneous.
(c) No, for the reason just mentioned.

(d) Yes.
Mr. S. Satyamurti: May I know the meaning which Government attach to the word " homogeneous " ? Does it mean
from the same province or the same community ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : It means that they must belong to the same class of persons.
Mr. S. Satyamurti : May I ask for some elucidation of this point ? Do they make distinction between one class and
another ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Certainly.

Mr. S. Satyamurti: On what basis ? Is it religious class or racial class or provincial class ? .
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Neither. It is largely racial class.

.Mr. S. Satyamurti: Which races are preferred and which are not preferred ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: I refer the Honourable Member to the Army List. Recruitment to the Indian Army 31[f.31]

Q. 1162: Mr.Brojendra Narayan Chaudhary: Will the Defence Secretary please state :—
(a) Whether the attention of Government has been drawn to the address of the Punjab's Premier, the Hon'ble Sir
Sikander Hyat Khan to his brother soldiers, in these words : " No patriotic Punjabi would wish to impair Punjab's
position of supremacy in the Army," as reported by the Associated Press of India in the Hindustan Times of the 5th
September 1938; and
(b) Whether it is the policy of Government to maintain the supremacy of Punjabis in the army by continuing to
recruit the major portion from the Punjab ; or to attempt recruitment of the Army from all the provinces without
racial or provincial considerations ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :

(a) Yes.
(b) I refer the Honourable Member to replies I gave to the supplementary questions arising from starred question
No. 1060 asked by Mr. Amarendra Nath Chattopadhyaya on 15th September 1938.

Mr. S. Satyamurti : With reference to the answer to part (a) of the question, my Honourable friend referred to
previous answers. As far as I remember, they were not given after this statement was brought before this House.
May I know if the Government of India have examined this statement of the Punjab Premier, " No patriotic Punjabi
would wish to impair Punjab's position of supremacy in the Army" ? May I know whether Government have
considered the dangerous implications of this statement and will they take steps to prevent a responsible Minister
going about and claiming provincial or communal supremacy in the Indian Army, which ought to remain Indian
first and Indian last ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I can only answer in exactly the same words as I answered to a precisely similar question of
the Hon'ble Member on the 15th September last. The policy of Government with regard to the recruitment has been
repeatedly stated and is perfectly clear.
Mr. S. Satyamurti: That policy is to get the best material and I am specifically asking my Honourable friend—1
hope he realises the implications of that statement of the Punjab Premier. I want to know whether the Government
have examined the dangerous implications of any provincial Premier claiming provincial supremacy in the Indian
Army and whether they propose to take any steps to correct this dangerous misapprehension ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government consider that there are no dangerous implications whatever but rather the
reverse.

Mr. Satyamurti : Do Government accept the supremacy of any province or any community as desirable
consideration, even if it is a fact, to be uttered by responsible public men and do not the Government consider that
this will give rise to communal and provincial quarrels and jealousies inside the army and possibly a military
dictatorship in this country ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government consider that none of these foreboding have any justification at all.

Mr. M. S. Aney : Do the Government subscribe to the policy implied in the statement of Sir Sikander Hyat Khan ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : Government's policy has been repeatedly stated and made clear.
Mr. M. S. Aney : Is it the policy that the Punjab should have its supremacy in the Army ?

Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : The policy is that the best material should be recruited for the Army.
Mr. M. S .Aney : I again repeat the question. Is it the policy of Government that Punjab should have supremacy in
the Army ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie : I have repeatedly answered that question. The policy is that the Army should get the best
material from all provinces and Government are quite satisfied that it has the best material at present.
Mr. M. S. Aney : Is it not, therefore, necessary that Government should make a statement modifying the policy
suggested by Sir Sikander Hyat Khan ?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie: Government have no intention whatever of changing their policy in particular.
Another interpolation took place on 23rd November 1938 when the question stated below was asked :—

Recruitment to the Indian Army from the Central Provinces and Berar 32[f.32]
Q. 1402 : Mr. Govind V. Deshmukh : Will the Defence Secretary please state :—
(a) The centres in the Central Provinces and Berar for recruiting men for the Indian Army ;

(b) The classes from which such men are recruited;

(c) The proportion of the men from the C. P. & Berar in the Army to the total strength of the Army, as well as to the
population of these provinces ; and

(d) The present policy of recruitment, and if it is going to be revised; if not, why not?
Mr. C. M. G. Ogilvie :
(a) There are no recruiting centres in the C. P. or Berar. Men residing in the C. P. are in the area of the Recruiting
Officer, Delhi, and those of Berar in the area of the Recruiting Officer, Poona.
(b) Mahrattas of Berar are recruited as a separate class. Other Hindus and Mussalmans who are recruited from the
C. P. and Berar are classified as " Hindus " or " Musalmans ", and are not entered under any class denomination.

(c) The proportion to the total strength of the Army is .03 per cent. and the proportion to the total male population
of these provinces is .0004 per cent.
(d) There is at present no intention of revising the present policy, the reasons for which were stated in my reply to a
supplementary question arising out of Mr. Satyamurti's starred question No. 1060, on the 15th September 1938, and
in answer to part (a) of starred question No. 1086 asked by Mian Ghulam Kadir Muhammad Shahban on the same
date, and in the reply of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief to the debates in the Council of State on the
Honourable Mr. Sushil Kumar Roy Chaudhary's Resolution regarding military training for Indians on the 21st
February 1938 and on the Honourable Mr. P. N. Sapru's Resolution on the recruitment of all classes to the Indian
Army in April 1935.

This was followed by an interpellation on 6th February 1939, when the below mentioned question was asked :—

Recruitment to the Indian Army 33[f.33]

Q. 729; Mr. S. Satyamurti: Will the Defence Secretary be pleased to state:

(a) Whether Government have since the last answer on this question reconsidered the question of recruiting to
the Indian Army from all provinces and from all castes and communities;
(b) Whether they have come to any conclusion ;

(c) Whether Government will categorically state the reasons as to why other provinces and communities are not
allowed to serve in the army ; and
(d) What are the tests by which they have come to the conclusion that other provinces and other communities
than those from whom recruitment is made to the Indian Army to-day cannot come up to the standard of efficiency
required of the Indian Army ?

Mr. C.M.G.Ogilvie:
(a) No.
(b) Does not arise.

(c) and
(d) The reasons have been categorically stated in my replies to starred questions Nos. 1060 and 1086of 15th
September 1938, No. 1162 of 20th September 1938 and No. 1402 of 23rd November 1938 and also in the replies of
His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in the Council of State to the debates on the Honourable Mr. P. N. Sapru's
Resolution regarding recruitment of all classes to the Indian Army and the Honourable Mr. Sushil Kumar Roy
Chaudhary's Resolution regarding Military training for Indians, on the 13th March 1935 and 21st February 1938
respectively.
This conspiracy of silence on the part of the Government of India, was quite recently broken by the Secretary of
State for India, who came forward to give the fullest information on this most vital and most exciting subject, in
answer to a question in the House of Commons. From his answer given on 8th July 1943 we know the existing
communal and provincial composition of the Indian Army to be as follows :—

1. Provincial Composition of the Indian Army

Province Percentage Province Percentage

1. Punjab 50 7. Bengal Presidency 2
2. U. P. 15 8. C. P. & Berar
3. Madras Presidency 10 9. Assam 5
4. Bombay Presidency 10 10. Bihar
5. N. W. F. Province 5 11. Orissa
6. Ajmere & Merwara 3 12. Nepal 8

II. Communal Composition of the Indian Army

1. Muslims 34 p.c.
2. Hindus & Gurkhas 50 p.c.

3. Sikhs 10 p.c.

4. Christians & The Rest 6 p.c.

The information given by the Secretary of State is indeed very welcome. But, this is the war-time composition of
the Indian Army. The peace-time composition must be very different. It rested on the well-known distinction
between the Martial and Non-Martial Races. That distinction was abolished during the War. There is, however, no
certainty that it will not be revived now that peace has returned. What we want to know is the peacetime communal
composition of the Indian Army. That still remains an unknown fact and a subject of speculation.
Some say that the normal pre-war proportion of Muslims was between 60 and 70 p.c. Others say that it is
somewhere in the neighbourhood of 50 p.c. In the absence of exact information, one could well adopt the latter
figure as disclosing the true situation especially, when on inquiry, it happens to be confirmed by those who are in a
position to form some idea on the matter. Even if the proportion be 50% it is high enough to cause alarm to the
Hindus. If this is true, it is a flagrant violation of well established principles of British Army policy in India,
adopted after the Mutiny.

After the Mutiny, the British Government ordered two investigations into the organization of the Indian Army. The
first investigation was carried out by the Peel Commission which was appointed in 1859. The second investigation
was undertaken by a body, called the Special Army Committee, appointed in 1879 to which reference has already
been made.

The principal question considered by the Peel Commission was to find out the weaknesses in the Bengal Army,
which led to the Mutiny of 1857. The Peel Commission was told by witness after witness that the principal
weakness in the Bengal Army which mutinied was that
" In the ranks of the regular Army men stood mixed up as chance might befall. There was no separating by class
and clan into companies........ In the lines, Hindu and Mahomedan, Sikh and Poorbeah were mixed up, so that each
and all lost to some extent their racial prejudice and became inspired with one common sentiment." 34[f.34]

It was, therefore, proposed by Sir John Lawrence that in organizing the Indian Army care should be taken " to
preserve that distinctiveness which is so valuable, and while it lasts, makes the Mahomedan of one country despise,
fear or dislike the Mahomedan of another; Corps should in future be provincial, and adhere to the geographical
limits within which differences and rivalries are strongly marked. Let all races, Hindu or Mahomedan of one
province be enlisted in one regiment and no others, and having created distinctive regiments, let us keep them so,
against the hour of need. .. .. By the system thus indicated two great evils are avoided : firstly, that community of
feeling throughout the native army and that mischievous political activity and intrigue which results from
association with other races and travel in other Indian provinces." 35[f.35]

This proposal was supported by many military men before the Peel Commission and was recommended by it as a
principle of Indian Army Policy. This principle was known as the principle of Class Composition.
The Special Army Committee of 1879 was concerned with quite a different problem. What the problem was,
becomes manifest from the questionnaire issued by the Committee. The questionnaire included the following
question :—
"If the efficient and available reserve of the Indian Army is considered necessary for the safety of the Empire,
should it not be recruited and maintained from those parts of the country which give us best soldiers, rather than
among the weakest and least warlike races of India, due regard, of course, being had to the necessity of not giving
too great strength or prominence to any particular race or religious group and with due regard to the safety of the
Empire ? "
The principal part of the question is obviously the necessity or otherwise of" not giving too great strength or
prominence to any particular race or religious group ". On this question official opinion expressed before the
Committee was unanimous.

Lt.-General H. J. Warres, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, stated:—

" I consider it is not possible to recruit the reserve of the Indian Army altogether from those parts of India which are
said to produce best soldiers, without giving undue strength and prominence to the races and religions of these
countries."
The Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick P. Haines, said:—

" Distinct in race, language and interests from the more numerous Army of Bengal, it is, in my opinion, eminently
politic and wise to maintain these armies (the Madras and Bombay Armies) as a counterpoise to it, and I would in
no way diminish their strength in order that a reserve composed of what is called ' the most efficient fighting men
whom it is possible to procure ' may be established. If by this it is meant to replace Sepoys of Madras and Bombay
by a reserve of men passed through the ranks of the Bengal Army and composed of the same classes of which it is
formed, I would say, that anything more unwise or more impolitic could hardly be conceived."

The Lt-Governor of the Punjab also shared this view. He too declared that he was " opposed to having one
recruiting field for the whole armies " in India. " It will be necessary," he added, " for political reasons, to prevent
preponderance of one nationality."
The Special Committee accepted this view and recommended that the composition of the Indian Army should be so
regulated that there should be no predominance of any one community or nationality in the Army.

These two principles have the governing principles of Indian Army policy. Having regard to the principle laid down
by the Special Army Committee of 1879, the changes that have taken place in the communal composition of the
Indian Army amount to a complete revolution. How this revolution was allowed to take place is beyond
comprehension. It is a revolution which has taken place in the teeth of a well-established principle. The principle
was really suggested by the tear of the growing predominance of the men of the North-West in the Indian Army and
was invoked with the special object of curbing that tendency. The principle was not only enunciated as a rule of
guidance but was taken to be rigorously applied. Lord Roberts, who was opposed to this principle because it set a
limit upon the recruitment of his pet men of the North-West, had to bow to this principle during his regime as the
Commander-in-Chief of India. So well was the principle respected that when in 1903, Lord Kitchener entered upon
the project of converting fifteen regiments of Madrasis into Punjab regiments, he immediately setup a counterpoise
to the Sikhs and the Punjabi Musalmans by raising the proportion of
the Gurkhas and the Pathans. As Sir George Arthur, his biographer, says:—

" The Government, mindful of the lesson taught by the Mutiny, was alive to the danger of allowing any one element
in the Indian Army to preponderate unduly. An increase in the Punjabee infantry had as its necessary sequel a
further recruitment of the valuable Gurkha material and the enlistment of more trans-border Pathans in the Frontier
Militia."
That a principle, so unanimously upheld and so rigorously applied upto the period of the Great War, should have
been thrown to the wind after the Great War, without ceremony and without compunction and in a clandestine
manner, is really beyond comprehension. What is the reason which has led the British to allow so great a
preponderance of the Muslims in the Indian Army ? Two explanations are possible. One is that the Musalmans
really proved, in the Great War, that they were better soldiers than the Hindus. The second explanation is that the
British have broken the rule and have given the Musalmans such a dominating position in the Army because they
wanted to counteract the forces of the Hindu agitation for wresting political power from the hands of the British.
Whatever be the explanation, two glaring facts stand out from the above survey. One is that the Indian Army today
is predominantly Muslim in its composition. The other is that the Musalmans who predominate are the Musalmans
from the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. Such a composition of the Indian Army means that the Musalmans of the
Punjab and the N. W. F. P. are made the sole defenders of India from foreign invasion. So patent has this fact
become that the Musalmans of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P. are quite conscious of this proud position which has
been assigned to them by the British, for reasons best known to them. For, one often hears them say that they are
the ' gatekeepers ' of India. The Hindus must consider the problem of the defence of India in the light of this crucial
fact.

How far can the Hindus depend upon these ' gate-keepers' to hold the gate and protect the liberty and freedom of
India ? The answer to this question must depend upon who comes to force the gate open. It is obvious that there are
only two foreign countries which are likely to force this gate from the North-West side of India, Russia or
Afghanistan, the borders of both of which touch the border of India. Which of them will invade India and when, no
one can say definitely. If the invasion came from Russia, it may be hoped that these gate-keepers of India will be
staunch and loyal enough to hold the gate and stop the invader. But suppose the Afghans singly or in
combination with other Muslim States march on India, will these gate-keepers stop the invaders or will they open
the gates and let them in ? This is a question which no Hindu can afford to ignore. This is a question on which
every Hindu must feel assured, because it is the most crucial question.
It is possible to say that Afghanistan will never think of invading India. But a theory is best tested by examining its
capacity to meet the worst case. The loyalty and dependability of this Army of the Punjabi and N. W. F. P. Muslims
can only be tested by considering how it will be have in the event of an invasion by the Afghans. Will they respond
to the call of the land of their birth or will they be swayed by the call of their religion, is the question which must be
faced if ultimate security is to be obtained. It is not safe to seek to escape from these annoying and discomforting
questions by believing that we need not worry about a foreign invasion so long as India is under the protection of
the British. Such a complacent attitude is unforgivable to say the least. In the first place, the last war has shown that
a situation may arise when Great Britain may not be able to protect India, although, that is the time when India
needs her protection most. Secondly, the efficiency of an institution must be tested under natural conditions and not
under artificial conditions. The behaviour of the Indian soldier under British control is artificial. His behaviour
when he is under Indian control is his natural behaviour. British control does not allow much play to the natural
instincts and natural sympathies of the men in the Army. That is why the men in the Army behave so well. But that
is an artificial and not a natural condition. That the Indian Army behaves well under British control is no guarantee
of its good behaviour under Indian control. A Hindu must be satisfied that it will behave as well when British
control is withdrawn.
The question how this army of the Punjabi and the N. W. F. P. Muslims will behave if Afghanistan invades India, is
a very pertinent and crucial question and must be faced, however unpleasant it may be.
Some may say—why assume that the large proportion of Muslims in the Army is a settled fact and that it cannot be
unsettled ? Those who can unsettle it are welcome to make what efforts they can. But, so far as one can see, it is not
going to be unsettled. On the contrary, I should not be surprised if it was entered in the constitution, when revised,
as a safeguard for the Muslim Minority. The Musalmans are sure to make this demand and as against the Hindus,
the Muslims somehow always succeed. We must, therefore, proceed on the assumption that the composition of the
Indian Army will remain what it is at present. The basis remaining the same, the question to be pursued remains
what it was : Can the Hindus depend upon such an Army to defend the country against the invasion of Afghanistan
? Only the so-called Indian Nationalists will say * yes * to it. The boldest among the realists must stop to think
before he can give an answer to the question. The realist must take note of the fact that the Musalmans look upon
the Hindus as Kaffirs, who deserve more to be exterminated than protected. The realist must take note of the fact
that while the Musalman accepts the European as his superior, he looks upon the Hindu as his inferior. It is doubtful
how far a regiment of Musalmans will accept the authority of their Hindu officers if they be placed under them. The
realist must take note that of all the Musalmans, the Musalman of the North-West is the most disaffected Musalman
in his relation with the Hindus. The realist must take note that the Punjabi Musalman is fully susceptible to the
propaganda in favour of Pan-lslamism. Taking note of all these considerations, there can be very little doubt that he
would be a bold Hindu who would say that in any invasion by Muslim countries, the Muslims in the Indian Army
would be loyal and that there is no danger of their going over to the invader. Even Theodore Morrison 36[f.36]
writing in 1899, was of the opinion that—
" The views held by the Mahomedans (certainly the most aggressive and truculent of the peoples of India) are alone
sufficient to prevent the establishment of an independent Indian Government Were the Afghan to descend from the
north upon an autonomous India, the Mahomedans, instead of uniting with the Sikhs and the Hindus to repel him,
would be drawn by all the ties of kinship and religion to join his flag."
And when it is recalled that in 1919 the Indian Musalmans who were carrying on the Khilafat movement actually
went to the length of inviting the Amir of Afghanistan to invade India, the view expressed by Sir Theodore
Morrison acquires added strength and ceases to be a matter of mere speculation.

How this Army composed of the Muslims of the Punjab and N. W. F. P. will behave in the case of an invasion by
Afghanistan is not the only question which the Hindus are called upon to consider. There is another and equally
important question on which the Hindus must ponder. That question is: Will the Indian Government be free to use
this Army, whatever its loyalties, against the invading Afghans ? In this connection, attention must be drawn to the
stand taken by the Muslim League. It is to the effect that the Indian Army shall not be used against Muslim powers.
There is nothing new in this. This principle was enunciated by the Khilafat Committee long before the League.
Apart from this, the question remains how far the Indian Muslims will, in future, make it their article of faith. That
the League has not succeeded in this behalf against the British Government does not mean that it will not succeed
against an Indian Government. The chances are that it will, because, however unpatriotic the principle may be from
the standpoint of the Hindus, it is most agreeable to the Muslim sentiment and the League may find a sanction for it
in the general support of the Muslim community in India. If the Muslim League succeeds in enforcing this
limitation upon Indians right to use her fighting forces, what is going to be the position of the Hindus ? This is
another question which the Hindus have to consider.
If India remains politically one whole and the two-nation mentality created by Pakistan continues to be fostered, the
Hindus will find themselves between the devil and the deep sea, so far as the defence of India is concerned. Having
an Army, they will not be free to use it because the League objects. Using it, it will not be possible to depend upon
it because its loyalty is doubtful. This is a position which is as pathetic as it is precarious. If the Army continues to
be dominated by the Muslims of the Punjab and the N. W. F. P., the Hindus will have to pay it but will not be able
to use it and even if they were free to use it against a Muslim invader, they will find it hazardous to depend upon it.
If the Hague view prevails and India does not remain free to use her Army against Muslim countries, then, even if
the Muslims lose their predominance in the Army, India on account of these military limitations, will have to
remain on terms of subordinate co-operation with the Muslim countries on her bolder, as do the Indian States under
British paramountcy.

The Hindus have a difficult choice to make: to have a safe Army or a safe border. In this difficulty, what is the
wisest course for the Hindus to pursue ? Is it in their interest to insist that the Muslim India should remain part of
India so that they may have a safe border, or is it in their interest to welcome its separation from India so that they
may have a sale Army ? The Musalmans of this area are hostile to the Hindus. As to this, there can be no doubt.
Which is then better for the Hindus : Should these Musalmans be without and against or should they be within and
against ? If the question is asked to any prudent man, there will be only one answer, namely, that if the Musalmans
are to be against the Hindus, it is better that they should be without and against, rather than within and against.
Indeed, it is a consummation devoutly to be wished that the Muslims should be without. That is the only way of
getting rid of the Muslim preponderance in the Indian Army.
How can it be brought about ? Here again, there is only one way. to bring it about and that is to support the scheme
of Pakistan. Once Pakistan is created, Hindustan, having ample resources in men and money, can have an Army
which it can call its own and there will be nobody to dictate as to how it should be used and against whom it should
be used. The defence of Hindustan, far from being weakened by the creation of Pakistan, will be infinitely
improved by it.
The Hindus do not seem to realize at what disadvantage they are placed from the point of view of their defence, by
their exclusion from the Army. Much less do they know that, strange as it may appear, they are in fact purchasing
this disadvantage at a very heavy price.
The Pakistan area which is the main recruiting ground of the present Indian Army, contributes very little to the
Central Exchequer as will be seen from the following figures :—
Contribution to the Central Exchequer
Rs.
Punjab 1,18,01,385
North-West Frontier 9,28,294
Sind 5,86,46,915
Baluchistan Nil
Total 7,13,76,594

As against this the provinces of Hindustan contribute as follows:—

Rs.
Madras 9,53,26,745
Bombay 22,53,44,247
Bengal 37[f.37] 12,00,00,000
U.P. 4,05,53,000
Bihar 1,54,37,742
C.P. & Berar 31,42,682
Assam 1,87,55,967
Orissa 5,67,346
Total 51,91,27,729

The Pakistan Provinces, it will be seen, contribute very little. The main contribution comes from the Provinces of
Hindustan. In fact, it is the money contributed by the Provinces of Hindustan which enables the Government of
India to carry out its activities in the Pakistan Provinces. The Pakistan Provinces are a drain on the Provinces of
Hindustan. Not only do they contribute very little to the Central Government but they receive a great deal from the
Central Government. The revenue of the Central Government amounts to Rs.121 crores. Of this, about Rs. 52
crores are annually spent on the Army. In what area is this amount spent ? Who pays the bulk of this amount of Rs.
52 crores ? The bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores which is spent on the Army is spent over the Muslim Army
drawn from the Pakistan area. Now the bulk of this amount of Rs. 52 crores is contributed by the Hindu Provinces
and is spent on an Army which for the most part consists of non-Hindus ! ! How many Hindus are aware of this
tragedy ? How many know at whose cost this tragedy is being enacted ? Today the Hindus are not responsible for it
because they cannot prevent it. The question is whether they will allow this tragedy to continue. If they mean to
stop it, the surest way of putting an end to it is to allow the scheme of Pakistan to take effect. To oppose it, is to buy
a sure weapon of their own destruction. A safe Army is better than a safe border.
CHAPTER VI
PAKISTAN AND COMMUNAL PEACE

Does Pakistan solve the Communal Question is a natural question which every Hindu is sure to ask. A correct
answer to this question calls for a close analysis of what is involved in it. One must have a clear idea as to what is
exactly meant, when the Hindus and Muslims speak of the Communal Question. Without it, it will not be possible
to say whether Pakistan does or does not solve the Communal Question.

It is not generally known that the Communal Question like the " Forward Policy " for the Frontier has a " greater "
and a " lesser intent, " and that in its lesser intent it means one thing, and in its greater intent it means quite a
different thing.
I

To begin with the Communal Question in its " lesser intent ". In its lesser intent, the Communal Question relates to
the representation of the Hindus and the Muslims in the Legislatures. Used in this sense, the question involves the
settlement of two distinct problems :—
(1) The number of seats to be allotted to the Hindus and the Muslims in the different legislatures, and
(2) The nature of the electorates through which these seats are to be filled in.

The Muslims at the Round Table Conference claimed :—

(1) That their representatives in all the Provincial as well as in the Central Legislatures should be elected by
separate electorates ;

(2) That they should be allowed to retain the weightage in representation given to Muslim minorities in those
Provinces in which they were a minority in the population, and that in addition, they should be given in those
Provinces where they were a majority such as the Punjab, Sind, North-West Frontier Province and Bengal, a
guaranteed statutory majority of seats.

The Hindus from the beginning objected to both these Muslim demands. They insisted on joint electorates for
Hindus and Muslims in all elections to all the Legislatures, Central and Provincial, and on population ratio of
representation, for both minorities, Hindus and Muslims, wherever they may be, and raised the strongest objections
to a majority of seats being guaranteed to any community by statute.

The Communal Award of His Majesty's Government settled this dispute by the simple, rough and ready method of
giving the Muslims all that they wanted, without caring for the Hindu opposition. "The Award allowed the Muslims
to retain weight-age and separate electorates, and in addition, gave them the statutory majority of seats in those
provinces where they were a majority in the population.

What is it in the Award that can be said to constitute a problem ? Is there any force in the objections of the Hindus
to the Communal Award of His Majesty's Government ? This question must be considered carefully to find out
whether there is substance in the objections of the Hindus to the Award.
Firstly, as to their objection to the weightage to Muslim minorities in the matter of representation. Whatever may be
the correct measure of allotting representation to minorities, the Hindus cannot very well object to the weightage
given to Muslim minorities, because similar weightage has been given to the Hindus in those Provinces in which
they are a minority and where there is sufficient margin for weightage to be allowed. The treatment of the Hindu
minorities in Sind and the North-West Frontier Province is a case in point.

Secondly, as to their objection to a statutory majority. That again does not appear to be well founded. A system of
guaranteed representation may be wrong and vicious and quite unjustifiable on theoretical and philosophical
grounds. But considered in the light of circumstances, such as those obtaining in India, the system of statutory
majority appears to be inevitable. Once it is granted that the representation to be given to a minority must not
reduce the majority to minority, that very provision creates, as a mere counterpart, a system of statutory majority to
the majority community. For, fixing the seats of the minority involves the fixation of the seats of the majority.
There is, therefore, no escape from the system of statutory majority, once it is conceded that the minority is not
entitled to representation which would convert a majority into a minority. There is, therefore, no great force in the
objections of the Hindus to a statutory majority of the Muslims in the Punjab, the North-West Frontier Province,
Sind and Bengal. For, even in the Provinces where the Hindus are in a majority and the Muslims are in minority,
the Hindus have got a statutory majority over the Muslims. At any rate, there is a parity of position and to that
extent there can be said to be no ground for complaint.
This does not mean that because the objections set forth by the Hindus have no substance, there are no real grounds
for opposing the Communal Award. There does exist a substantial ground of objection to the Communal Award,
although, it does not appear to have been made the basis of attack by the Hindus.
This objection may be formulated in order to bring out its point in the following manner. The Muslim minorities in
the Hindu Provinces insisted on separate electorates. The Communal Award gives them the right to determine that
issue. This is really what it comes to when one remembers the usual position taken, viz., that the Muslim minorities
could not be deprived of their separate electorates without their consent, and the majority community of the Hindus
has been made to abide by their determination. The Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces insisted that there should
be joint electorates. Instead of conceding their claim, the Communal Award forced upon them the system of
separate electorates to which they objected. If in the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minorities are allowed the right
of self-determination in the matter of electorates, the question arises : Why are not the Hindu minorities in the
Muslim Provinces given the right of self-determination in the matter of their electorates ? What is the answer to this
question ? And, if there is no answer, there is undoubtedly a deep seated inequity in the Communal Award of His
Majesty's Government, which calls for redress.

It is no answer that the Hindus also have a statutory majority based on separate electorates 38[f.38] in those
Provinces where the Musalmans are in a minority. A little scrutiny will show that there is no parity of position in
these two cases. The separate electorates for the Hindu majorities in the Hindu Provinces are not a matter of their
choice. It is a consequence resulting from the determination of the Muslim minorities who claimed to have separate
electorates for themselves. A minority in one set of circumstances may think that separate electorates would be a
better method of self-protection and may have no fear of creating against itself and by its own action a statutory
majority based on separate electorates for the opposing community. Another minority or, for the matter of that, the
same minority in a different set of circumstances would not like to create by its own action and against itself a
statutory majority based upon separate electorates and may, therefore, prefer joint electorates to separate electorates
as a better method of self-protection. Obviously the guiding principle, which would influence a minority, would be :
Is the majority likely to use its majority in a communal manner and purely for communal purposes ? If it felt certain
that the majority community is likely to use its communal majority for communal ends, it may well choose joint
electorates, because it would be the only method by which it would hope to take away the communal cement of the
statutory majority by influencing the elections of the representatives of the majority community in the Legislatures.
On the other hand, a majority community may not have the necessary communal cement, which alone would enable
it to use its communal majority for communal ends, in which case a minority, having no fear from the resulting
statutory majority and separate electorates for the majority community, may well choose separate electorates for
itself. To put it concretely, the Muslim minorities in choosing separate electorates are not afraid of the separate
electorates and the statutory majority of the Hindus, because they feel sure that by reason of their deep-seated
differences of caste and race the Hindus will never be able to use their majorities against the Muslims. On the other
hand, the Hindu minorities in the Muslim Provinces have no doubt that, by reason of their social solidarity, the
Muslims will use their statutory majority to set into operation a "Resolute Muslim Government", after the plan
proposed by Lord Salisbury for Ireland as a substitute for Home Rule; with this difference, that Salisbury's Resolute
Government was to last for twenty years only, while the Muslim Resolute Government was to last as long as the
Communal Award stood. "The situations, therefore, are not alike. The statutory majority of the Hindus based on
separate electorates is the result of the choice made by the Muslim minority. The statutory majority of the Muslims
based on separate electorates is something which is not the result of the choice of the Hindu minority. In one case,
the Government of the Muslim minority by a Hindu communal majority is the result of the consent of the Muslim
minority, In the other case, the Government of the Hindu minority by the Muslim majority is not the result of the
consent of the Hindu minority, but is imposed upon it by the might of the British Government.
To sum up this discussion of the Communal Award, it may be said that, as a solution of the Communal Question in
its " lesser intent ", there is no inequity in the Award on the ground that it gives weightage to the Muslim minorities
in the Hindu Provinces. For, it gives weightage also to Hindu minorities in Muslim Provinces. Similarly, it may be
said that there is no inequity in the Award, on the ground that it gives a statutory majority to the Muslims in Muslim
Provinces in which they are a majority. If there is any, the statutory limitation put upon the Muslim number of
seats, also gives to the Hindus in Hindu Provinces a statutory majority. But the same cannot be said of the Award in
the matter of the electorates. The Communal Award is iniquitous inasmuch as it accords unequal treatment to the
Hindu and Muslim minorities in the matter of electorates. It grants the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces
the right of self-determination in the matter of electorates, but it does not grant the same right to the Hindu
minorities in the Muslim Provinces. In the Hindu Provinces, the Muslim minority is allowed to choose the kind of
electorates it wants and the Hindu majority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. But in the Muslim
Provinces, it is the Muslim majority which is allowed to choose the kind of electorates it prefers and the Hindu
minority is not permitted to have any say in the matter. Thus , the Muslims in the Muslim Provinces having been
given both statutory majority and separate electorates, the Communal Award must be said to impose upon the
Hindu minorities Muslim rule, which they can neither alter nor influence.
This is what constitutes the fundamental wrong in the Communal Award. That this is a grave wrong must be
admitted. For, it offends against certain political principles, which have now become axiomatic. First is, not to trust
any one with unlimited political power. As has been well said,
" If in any state there is a body of men who possess unlimited political power, those over whom they rule can never
be free. For, the one assured result of historical investigation is the lesson that uncontrolled power is invariably
poisonous to those who possess it. They are always tempted to impose their canon of good upon others, and in the
end, they assume that the good of the community depends upon the continuance of their power. Liberty always
demands a limitation of political authority......"
The second principle is that, as a King has no Divine Right to rule, so also a majority has no Divine Right to rule.
Majority Rule is tolerated only because it is for a limited period and subject to the right to have it changed, and
secondly because it is a rule of a political majority, i.e., majority which has submitted itself to the suffrage of a
minority and not a communal majority. If such is the limited scope of authority permissible to a political majority
over a political minority, how can a minority of one community be placed under the perpetual subjection of a
majority of another community ? To allow a majority of one community to rule a minority of another community
without requiring the majority to submit itself to the suffrage of the minority, especially when the minority demands
it, is to enact a perversion of democratic principles and to show a callous disregard for the safety and security of the
Hindu minorities.
II
To turn to the Communal Question in its " greater intent ". What is it, that the Hindus say is a problem ? In its
greater intent the Communal Question relates to the deliberate creation of Muslim Provinces. At the time of the
Lucknow Pact, the Muslims only raised the Communal Question in its lesser intent. At the Round Table
Conference, the Muslims put forth, for the first time, the plan covered by the Communal Question in its greater
intent. Before the Act of 1935, there were a majority of Provinces in which the Hindus were in a majority and the
Muslims in a minority. There were only three Provinces in which the Muslims were in a majority and the Hindus in
a minority. They were the Punjab, Bengal and the North-West Frontier Province. Of these, the Muslim majority in
the North-West Frontier Province was not effective, because there was no responsible government in that province,
the Montagu-Chemsford Scheme of Political Reforms not being extended to it. So, for all practical purposes, there
were only two provinces—the Punjab and Bengal—wherein the Muslims were in majority and the Hindus in
minority. The Muslims desired that the number of Muslim Provinces should be increased. With this object in view,
they demanded that Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency and created into a new self-governing
Province, and that the North-West Frontier Province, which was already a separate Province, should be raised to the
status of a self-governing Province. Apart from other considerations, from a purely financial point of view, it was
not possible to concede this demand. Neither Sind nor the North-West Frontier Province were financially
self-supporting. But in order to satisfy the Muslim demand, the British Government went to the length of accepting
the responsibility of giving an annual subvention to Sind 39[f.39] and North-West Frontier Province 40[f.40] from
the Central Revenues, so as to bring about a budgetary equilibrium in their finances and make them financially
self-supporting.

These four Provinces with Muslims in majority and Hindus in minority, now functioning as autonomous and
self-governing Provinces, were certainly not created for administrative convenience, nor for purposes of
architectural symmetry—the Hindu Provinces poised against the Muslim Provinces. It is also true that the scheme
of Muslim Provinces was not a matter of satisfying Muslim pride which demanded Hindu minorities under Muslim
majorities to compensate the humiliation of having Muslim minorities under Hindu majorities. What was then, the
motive underlying this scheme of Muslim Provinces ? The Hindus say that the motive for the Muslim insistence,
both on statutory majority and separate electorates, was to enable the Muslims in the Muslim Provinces to mobilize
and make effective Muslim power in its exclusive form and to the fullest extent possible. Asked what could be the
purpose of having the Muslim political power mobilized in this fashion, the Hindus answer that it was done to place
in the hands of the Muslims of the Muslim Provinces an effective weapon to tyrannize their Hindu minorities, in
case the Muslim minorities in the Hindu Provinces were tyrannized by their Hindu majorities. The scheme thus
became a system of protection, in which blast was to be met by counter-blast, terror by terror and tyranny by
tyranny. The plan is undoubtedly, a dreadful one, involving the maintenance of justice and peace by retaliation, and
providing an opportunity for the punishment of an innocent minority, Hindus in Muslim Provinces and Muslims in
Hindu Provinces, for the sins of their co-religionists in other Provinces. It is a scheme of communal peace through a
system of communal hostages.
That the Muslims were aware from the very start, that the system of communal Provinces was capable of being
worked in this manner, is clear from the speech made by Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as President of the Muslim
League Session held in Calcutta in 1927. In that speech the Maulana declared:—
" That by the Lucknow Pact they had sold away their interests. The Delhi proposals of March last opened the door
for the first time to the recognition of the real rights of Musalmans in India. The separate electorates granted by the
Pact of 1916 only ensured Muslim representation, but what was vital for the existence of the community was the
recognition of its numerical strength. Delhi opened the way to the creation of such a state of at fairs as would
guarantee to them in the future of India a proper share. Their existing small majority in Bengal and the Punjab was
only a census figure, but the Delhi proposals gave them for the first time five provinces of which no less than three
(Sind, the Frontier Province and Baluchistan) contained a real overwhelming Muslim majority. If the Muslims did
not recognise this great step they were not fit to live. There would now be nine Hindu provinces against five
Muslim provinces, and whatever treatment Hindus accorded in the nine provinces, Muslims would accord the same
treatment to Hindus in the five Provinces. Was not this a great gain ? Was not a new weapon gained for the
assertion of Muslim rights ? "
That those in charge of these Muslim provinces know the advantage of the scheme, and do not hesitate to put it to
the use for which it was intended, is clear from the speeches made not long ago by Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, as Prime
Minister of Bengal.

That this scheme of Communal Provinces, which constitutes the Communal Question in its larger intent, can be
used as an engine of communal tyranny, there can be no doubt. The system of hostages, which is the essence of the
scheme of communal provinces, supported by separate electorates, is indeed insupportable on any ground. If this is
the underlying motive of the demand for the creation of more Muslim Provinces, the system resulting from it is
undoubtedly a vicious system.
This analysis leaves no doubt that the communal statutory majority based on separate communal electorates and the
communal provinces, especially constituted to enable the statutory majority to tyrannize the minority, are the two
evils which compose what is called, ' the Communal Problem '.
For the existence of this problem the Hindus hold the Muslims responsible and the Muslims hold the Hindus
responsible. The Hindus accuse the Muslims of contumacy. The Muslims accuse Hindus of meanness. Both,
however, forget that the communal problem exists not because the Muslims are extravagant and insolent in their
demands and the Hindus are mean and grudging in their concessions. It exists and will exist wherever a hostile
majority is brought face to face against a hostile minority. Controversies relating to separate vs. joint electorates,
controversies relating to population ratio vs. weightage are all inherent in a situation where a minority is pitted
against a majority. The best solution of the communal problem is not to have two communities facing each other,
one a majority and the other a minority, welded in the steel-frame of a single government.
How far does Pakistan approximate to the solution of the Communal Question?
The answer to this question is quite obvious. If the scheme of Pakistan is to follow the present boundaries of the
Provinces in the North-West and in Bengal, certainly it does not eradicate the evils which lie at the heart of the
Communal Question. It retains the very elements which give rise to it, namely, the pitting of a minority against a
majority. The rule of the Hindu minorities by the Muslim majorities and the rule of the Muslim Minorities by the
Hindu majorities are the crying evils of the present situation. This very evil will reproduce itself in Pakistan, if the
provinces marked out for it are incorporated into it as they are, i.e., with boundaries drawn as at present. Besides
this, the evil which gives rise to the Communal Question in its larger intent, will not only remain as it is but will
assume a new malignity. Under the existing system, the power centered in the Communal Provinces to do mischief
to their hostages is limited by the power which the Central Government has over the Provincial Governments. At
present, the hostages are at least within the pale of a Central Government which is Hindu in its composition and
which has power to interfere for their protection. But, when Pakistan becomes Muslim State with full sovereignty
over internal and external affairs, it would be free from the control of the Central Government. The Hindu
minorities will have no recourse to an outside authority with overriding powers, to interfere on their behalf and curb
this power of mischief, as under the scheme, no such overriding authority is permitted to exist. So, the position of
the Hindus in Pakistan may easily become similar to the position of the Armenians under the Turks or of the Jews
in Tsarist Russia or in Nazi Germany. Such a scheme would be intolerable and the Hindus may well say that they
cannot agree to Pakistan and leave their co-religionist as a helpless prey to the fanaticism of a Muslim National
State.
Ill

This, of course, is a very frank statement of the consequences which will flow from giving effect to the scheme of
Pakistan. But care must be taken to locate the source of these consequences. Do they flow from the scheme of
Pakistan itself or do they flow from particular boundaries that may be fixed for it. If the evils flow from the scheme
itself, i.e., if they are inherent in it, it is unnecessary for any Hindu to waste his time in considering it. He will be
justified in summarily dismissing it. On the other hand, if the evils are the result of the boundaries, the question of
Pakistan reduces itself to a mere question of changing the boundaries.
A study of the question amply supports the view that the evils of Pakistan are not inherent in it. If any evil results
follow from it they will have to be attributed to its boundaries. This becomes clear if one studies the distribution of
population. The reasons why these evils will be reproduced within Western and Eastern Pakistan is because, with
the present boundaries, they do not become single ethnic states. They remain mixed states, composed of a Muslim
majority and a Hindu minority as before. The evils are the evils which are inseparable from a mixed state. If
Pakistan is made a single unified ethnic state, the evils will automatically vanish. There will be no question of
separate electorates within Pakistan, because in such a homogeneous Pakistan, there will be no majorities to rule
and no minorities to be protected. Similarly, there will be no majority of one community to hold, in its possession, a
minority of an opposing community.
The question, therefore, is one of demarcation of boundaries and reduces itself to this : Is it possible for the
boundaries of Pakistan to be so fixed, that instead of producing a mixed state composed of majorities and
minorities, with all the evils attendant upon it, Pakistan will be an ethnic state composed of one homogeneous
community, namely Muslims ? The answer is that in a large part of the area affected by the project of the League, a
homogeneous state can be created by shifting merely the boundaries, and in the rest, homogeneity can be produced
by shifting only the population.
In this connection, I invite the reader to study carefully the figures given in the Appendices V, X, XI showing the
distribution of the population in the areas affected, and also the maps showing how new boundaries can create
homogeneous Muslim States. Taking the Punjab, two things will be noted :—
(i) There are certain districts in which the Musalmans predominate. There are certain districts in which the
Hindus predominate. There are very few in which the two are, more or less, evenly distributed; and
(ii) The districts in which Muslims predominate and the districts in which the Hindus predominate are not
interspersed. The two sets of districts form two separate areas.
For the formation of the Eastern Pakistan, one has to take into consideration the distribution of population in both
the Provinces of Bengal and Assam. A scrutiny of the population figures shows—
(i) In Bengal, there are some districts in which the Muslims predominate. In others, the Hindus
predominate.
(ii) In Assam also, there are some districts in which the Muslims predominate. In others, the Hindus
predominate.

(iii) Districts in which the Muslims predominate and those in which the Hindus predominate are not
interspersed. They form separate areas.
(iv) The districts of Bengal and Assam in which the Muslims predominate are contiguous.
Given these facts, it is perfectly possible to create homogeneous Muslim States out of the Punjab, Bengal and
Assam by drawing their boundaries in such a way that the areas which are predominantly Hindu shall be excluded.
That this is possible is shown by the maps given in the appendix.
In the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, the situation is rather hard. How the matter stands in the North-West
Frontier Province and Sind may be seen by an examination of the figures given in the appendices VI to IX. As may
be seen from the appendices, there are no districts in which the Hindus in the North-West Frontier Province and
Sind are concentrated. They are scattered and are to be found in almost every ^strict of the two provinces in small,
insignificant numbers. These appendices show quite unmistakably that the Hindus in Sind and the North-West
Frontier Province are mostly congregated in urban areas of the districts. In Sind, the Hindus outnumber the
Muslims in most of the towns, while the Muslims outnumber the Hindus in villages. In the North-West Frontier
Province, the Muslims outnumber the Hindus in towns as well as in villages.

The case of the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, therefore, differs totally from the case of the Punjab and
Bengal. In the Punjab and Bengal, owing to the natural segregation of the Hindus and Muslims in different areas, it
is possible to create a homogeneous State by merely altering their boundaries, involving the shifting of the
population in a very small degree. But in the North-West Frontier Province and Sind, owing to the scattered state of
the Hindu population, alteration of boundaries cannot suffice for creating a homogeneous State. There is only one
remedy and that is to shift the population.

Some scoff at the idea of the shifting and exchange of population. But those who scoff can hardly be aware of the
complications, which a minority problem gives rise to and the failures attendant upon almost all the efforts made to
protect them. The constitutions of the post-war states, as well as of the older states in Europe which had a minority
problem, proceeded on the assumption that constitutional safeguards for minorities should suffice for their
protection and so the constitutions of most of the new states with majorities and minorities were studded with long
lists of fundamental rights and safeguards to see that they were not violated by the majorities. What was the
experience ? Experience showed that safeguards did not save the minorities. Experience showed that even a ruthless
war on the minorities did not solve the problem. The states then agreed that the best way to solve it was for each to
exchange its alien minorities within its border, for its own which was without its border, with a view to bring about
homogeneous States. This is what happened in Turky, Greece and Bulgaria. Those, who scoff at the idea of transfer
of population, will do well to study the history of the minority problem, as it arose between Turky, Greece and
Bulgaria. If they do, they will find that these countries found that the only effective way of solving the minorities
problem lay in exchange of population. The task undertaken by the three countries was by no means a minor
operation. It involved the transfer of some 20 million people from one habitat to another. But undaunted, the three
shouldered the task and carried it to a successful end because they felt that the considerations of communal peace
must outweigh every other consideration.

That the transfer of minorities is the only lasting remedy for communal peace is beyond doubt. If that is so, there is
no reason why the Hindus and the Muslims should keep on trading in safeguards which have proved so unsafe. If
small countries, with limited resources like Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria, were capable of such an undertaking,
there is no reason to suppose that what they did cannot be accomplished by Indians. After all, the population
involved is inconsiderable and because some obstacles require to be removed, it would be the height of folly to give
up so sure a way to communal peace.
There is one point of criticism to which no reference has been made so far. As it is likely to be urged, I propose to
deal with it here. It is sure to be asked, how will Pakistan affect the position of the Muslims that will be left in
Hindustan ? The question is natural because the scheme of Pakistan does seem to concern itself with the Muslim
majorities who do not need protection arid abandons the Muslim minorities who do. But the point is : who can raise
it ? Surely not the Hindus. Only the Muslims of Pakistan or the Muslims of Hindustan can raise it. The question
was put to Mr. Rehmat Ali, the protagonist of Pakistan and this is the answer given by him :—
"How will it affect the position of the forty five million Muslims in Hindustan proper ?
" The truth is that in this struggle their thought has been more than a wrench to me. They are the flesh of our flesh
and the soul of our soul. We can never forget them ; nor they, us. Their present position and future security is, and
shall ever be, a mailer of great importance to us. As things are at present, Pakistan will not adversely affect their
position in Hindustan. On the basis of population (one Muslim to four Hindus), they will still be entitled to the same
representation in legislative as well as administrative fields which they possess now. As to the future, the only
effective guarantee we can offer is that of reciprocity, and, therefore, we solemnly undertake to give all those
safeguards to non-Muslim minorities in Pakistan which will be conceded to our Muslim minority in Hindustan.
" But what sustains us most is the fact that they know we are proclaiming Pakistan in the highest interest of the'
Millet'. It is as much theirs as it is ours. While for us it is a national citadel, for them it will ever be a moral anchor.
So long as the anchor holds, everything is or can be made safe. But once it gives way, all will be lost ".

The answer given by the Muslims of Hindustan is equally clear. They say, " We are not weakened by the separation
of Muslims into Pakistan and Hindustan. We are better protected by the existence of separate Islamic States on the
Eastern and Western borders of Hindustan than we are by their submersion in Hindustan. " Who can say that they
are wrong ? Has it not been shown that Germany as an outside state was better able to protect the Sudeten Germans
in Czechoslovakia than the Sudetens were able to do themselves ? 41[f.41]

Be that as it may, the question does not concern the Hindus. The question that concerns the Hindus is : How far
does the creation of Pakistan remove the communal question from Hindustan ? That is a very legitimate question
and must be considered. It must be admitted that by the creation of Pakistan, Hindustan is not freed of the
communal question. While Pakistan can be made a homogeneous state by redrawing its boundaries, Hindustan must
remain a composite state. The Musalmans are scattered all over Hindustan—though they are mostly congregated in
towns—and no ingenuity in the matter of redrawing of boundaries can make it homogeneous. The only way to
make Hindustan homogeneous is to arrange for exchange of population. Until that is done, it must be admitted that
even with the creation of Pakistan, the problem of majority vs. minority will remain in Hindustan as before and will
continue to produce disharmony in the body politic of Hindustan.

Admitting that Pakistan is not capable of providing a complete solution of the Communal Problem within
Hindustan, does it follow that the Hindus on that account should reject Pakistan ? Before the Hindus draw any such
hasty conclusion, they should consider the following effects of Pakistan.
First, consider the effect of Pakistan on the magnitude of the communal Problem. That can be best gauged by
reference to the Muslim population as it will be grouped within Pakistan and Hindustan.

Muslim Population in Pakistan. Muslim Population in India

1. Punjab 13.332,460 1. Total Muslim Population in 66,442,766
British India (Excluding Burma and
2. N.W.F.P. 2,227,303 Aden).
3. Sind 2,830,800
4. Baluchistan 405,309 2. Muslim Population grouped in 47,897,301
Pakistan and Eastern Bengal State.
5. Eastern Bengal 27,497,624

Muslim States 3. Balance of Muslims in British 18,545,465

(i) Eastern Bengal 27,497,624 Hindustan
(ii) Sylhet 1,603,805
Total 47,897,301
What do these figures indicate ? What they indicate is that the Muslims who will be left in British Hindustan will be
only 18,545,465 and the rest 47,897,301, forming a vast majority of the total Muslim population, will be out of it
and will be the subjects of Pakistan States. This distribution of the Muslim population, in terms of the communal
problem, means that while without Pakistan the communal problem in India involves 6 1/2 crores of Muslims, with
the creation of Pakistan it will involve only 2 crores of Muslims. Is this to be no consideration for Hindus who want
communal peace ? To me, it seems that if Pakistan does not solve the communal problem within Hindustan, it
substantially reduces its proportion and makes it of minor significance and much easier of peaceful solution.
In the second place, let the Hindus consider the effect of Pakistan on the communal representation in the Central
Legislature. The following table gives the distribution of seats in the Central Legislature, as prescribed under the
Government of India Act, 1935 and as it would be, if Pakistan came into being.

Name of the Distribution of seats. Distribution of seats.

Chamber
I—As at present. II.—After Pakistan.
Non- Non-
Total Muslim Muslim Total Muslim (Hindu) Muslim Territorial
seats. (Hindu) Territorial seals. Territorial Seats. Seats.
Territorial Seats.
Scats.
Council of State. 150 75 49 126 75 25
Federal Assembly. 250 105 82 211 105 43

To bring out clearly the quantitative change in the communal distribution of seats, which must follow the
establishment of Pakistan, the above figures are reduced to percentage in the table that follows:—

Name of the Distribution of seats. Distribution of seats.

Chamber.
1.—As at present. II.—After Pakistan
Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of Muslim Percentage of Muslim
Muslim seats to Muslim scats to total seats to Hindu seats. seats to total seals.
Hindu seals. seats.
Council of State 33 66 25 33 1/3,
Federal Assembly

33 80 21 40

From this table one can see what vast changes must follow the establishment of Pakistan. Under the Government of
India Act, the ratio of Muslim seats to the total is 33% in both the Chambers, but to the Hindu seats, the ratio is
66% in the Council of State and 80% in the Assembly—almost a position of equality with the Hindus. After
Pakistan, the ratio of Muslim seats to the total seats falls from 33 1/3 % to 25% in the Council and to 21% in the
Assembly, while the ratio to Hindu seats falls from 66% to 33 1/3 % in the Council and from 80% to 40% in the
Assembly. The figures assume that the weightage given to the Muslims will remain the same, even after Hindustan
is separated from Pakistan. If the present weightage to Muslims is cancelled or reduced, there would be further
improvement in the representation of the Hindus. But assuming that no change in weightage is made, is this a small
gain to the Hindus in the matter of representation at the Centre ? To me, it appears that it is a great improvement in
the position of the Hindus at the Centre, which would never come to them, if they oppose Pakistan.
These are the material advantages of Pakistan. There is another which is psychological. The Muslims, in Southern
and Central India, draw their inspiration from the Muslims of the North and the East. If after Pakistan there is
communal peace in the North and the East, as there should be, there being no majorities and minorities therein, the
Hindus may reasonably expect communal peace in Hindustan. This severance of the bond between the Muslims of
the North and the East and the Muslims of Hindustan is another gain to the Hindus of Hindustan.
Taking into consideration these effects of Pakistan, it cannot be disputed that if Pakistan does not wholly solve the
communal problem within Hindustan, it frees the Hindus from the turbulence of the Muslims as predominant
partners. It is for the Hindus to say whether they will reject such a proposal, simply because it does not offer a
complete solution. Some gain is better than much harm.
IV
One last question and this discussion of Pakistan in relation to communal peace may be brought to a close. Will the
Hindus and the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal agree to redraw the boundaries of their provinces to make the
scheme of Pakistan as flawless as it can be made ?
As for the Muslims, they ought to have no objection to redrawing the boundaries. If they do object, it must be said
that they do not understand the nature of their own demand. This is quite possible, since the talk that is going on
among Muslim protagonists of Pakistan, is of a very loose character. Some speak of Pakistan as a Muslim National
State, others speak of it as a Muslim National Home. Neither care to know whether there is any difference between
a National State and a National Home. But there can be no doubt that there is a vital difference between the two.
What that difference is was discussed at great length at the time of constituting in Palestine a Jewish National
Home. It seems that a clear conception of what this difference is, is necessary, if the likely Muslim opposition to the
redrawing of the boundaries is to be overcome.
According to a leading authority :—

" A National Home connotes a territory in which a people, without receiving the rights of political sovereignty, has
nevertheless a recognised legal position and receives the opportunity of developing its moral, social and intellectual
ideals. "
The British Government itself, in its statement on Palestine policy issued in 1922, defined its conception of the
National Home in the following terms :—
" When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered
that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further
development of the existing Jewish Community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that
it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest
and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full
opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should be known that it is in
Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. This is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish
National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognized to rest
upon ancient historic connection. "
From this, it will be clear that there is an essential difference between a National Home and a National State. The
difference consists in this : in the case of a National Home, the people who constitute it do not receive the right of
Political sovereignty over the territory and the right of imposing their nationality on others also living in that
territory. All that they get, is a recognized legal position guaranteeing them the right to live as citizens and freedom
to maintain their culture. In the case of a National State, people constituting it, receive the rights of political
sovereignty with the right of imposing their nationality upon the rest.
This difference is very important and it is in the light of this that one must examine their demand for Pakistan. What
do the Muslim want Pakistan for ? If they want Pakistan to create a National Home for Muslims, there is no
necessity for Pakistan. In the Pakistan Provinces, they already have their National Home with the legal right to live
and advance their culture. If they want Pakistan to be a National Muslim State, they are claiming the right of
political sovereignty over the territory included in it. This they are entitled to do. But the question is : Should they
be allowed to retain, within the boundaries of these Muslim States, Non-Muslim minorities as their subjects, with a
right to impose upon them the nationality of these Muslim States ? No doubt, such a right is accepted to be an
accompaniment of political sovereignty. But it is equally true that in all mixed States, this right has become a
source of mischief in modern times. To ignore the possibilities of such mischief in the creation of Pakistan will be
to omit to read the bloody pages of recent history on which have been recorded the atrocities, murders, plunders and
arsons committed by the Turks, Greeks, Bulgars and the Czechs against their minorities. It is possible to take away
from a state this right of imposing its nationality upon its subjects, because it is incidental to political sovereignty.
But it is possible not to provide any opportunity for the exercise of such a right. This can be done by allowing the
Muslims to have such National Muslim States as are strictly homogeneous, strictly ethnic states. Under no
circumstances can they be allowed to carve out mixed states composed of Muslims opposed to Hindus, with the
former superior in number to the latter.

This is probably not contemplated by the Muslims who are the authors of Pakistan. It was certainly not
contemplated by Sir M. Iqbal, the originator of the scheme. In his Presidential address to the Muslim League in
1930, he expressed his willingness to agree to " the exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some other
districts where non-Muslims predominate " on the ground that such exclusion " will make it less extensive and
more Muslim in population ". On the other hand, it may be that those who are putting forth the Scheme of Pakistan,
do contemplate that it will include the Punjab and Bengal with their present boundaries. To them it must become
clear, that to insist upon the present boundaries is sure to antagonise even those Hindus who have an open mind on
the question. The Hindus can never be expected to consent to the inclusion of the Hindus in a Muslim State
deliberately created for the preservation and propagation of Muslim faith and Muslim culture. The Hindus will no
doubt oppose. Muslims must not suppose that it will take long to find them out. Muslims, if they insist upon the
retention of the present boundaries, will open themselves to the accusation that behind their demand for Pakistan
there is something more sinister than a mere desire to create a National Home or a National State. They will be
accused of a design to perfect the scheme of Hindu hostages in Muslim hands by increasing the balance of Muslim
majorities against Hindu minorities in the Muslim areas.
So much, for considerations which ought to weigh with the Muslims in the matter of changing the provincial
boundaries to make Pakistan.

Now, as to the considerations which ought to weigh with the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal. The Hindus are the
more difficult of the two parties to the question. In this connection it is enough to consider the reaction of the high
caste Hindus only. For, it is they who guide the Hindu masses and form Hindu opinion. Unfortunately, the high
caste Hindus are bad as leaders. They have a trait of character which often leads the Hindus to disaster. This trait is
formed by their acquisitive instinct and aversion to share with others the good things of life. They have a monopoly
of education and wealth, and with wealth and education they have captured the State. To keep this monopoly to
themselves has been the ambition and goal of their life. Charged with this selfish idea of class domination, they take
every move to exclude the lower classes of Hindus from wealth, education and power, the surest and the most
effective being the preparation of scriptures, inculcating upon the minds of the lower classes of Hindus the teaching
that their duty in life is only to serve the higher classes. In keeping this monopoly in their own hands and excluding
the lower classes from any share in it, the high caste Hindus have succeeded for a long time and beyond measure, it
is only recently that the lower class Hindus rose in revolt against this monopoly by starting the Non-Brahmin
Parties in the Madras and the Bombay Presidencies and the C. P. Still the high caste Hindus have successfully
maintained their privileged position. This attitude of. keeping education, wealth and power as a close preserve for
themselves and refusing to share it, which the high caste Hindus have developed in their relation with the lower
classes of Hindus, is sought to be extended by them to the Muslims. They want to exclude the Muslims from place
and power, as they have done to the lower class Hindus. This trait of the high caste Hindus is the key to the
understanding of their politics.

Two illustrations reveal this trait of theirs. The Hindus in 1929 opposed the separation of Sind from the Bombay
Presidency before the Simon Commission, strenuously and vehemently. But in 1915, the Hindus of Sind put forth
the opposite plea and wanted Sind to be separated from Bombay. The reason in both the cases was the same. In
1915, there was no representative Government in Sind, which, if there was one would have undoubtedly been a
Muslim Government. The Hindus advocated separation because in the absence of a Muslim Government, they
could obtain jobs in Government in a greater degree. In 1929, they objected to the separation of Sind because they
knew that a separate Sind would be under a Muslim Government, and a Muslim Government was sure to disturb
their monopoly and displace them to make room for Muslim candidates. The opposition of the Bengali Hindus to
the Partition of Bengal is another illustration of this trait of the high caste Hindus. The Bengali Hindu had the whole
of Bengal, Bihar, Orissa, Assam and even U. P. for his pasture. He had captured the civil service in all these
Provinces. The partition of Bengal meant a diminution in the area of this pasture. It means that the Bengali Hindu
was to be ousted from Eastern Bengal to make room for the Bengali Musalman who had so far no place in the civil
service of Bengal. The opposition to the partition of Bengal on the part of the Bengali Hindus, was due principally
to their desire not to allow the Bengal Musalmans to take their place in Eastern Bengal. Little did the Bengali
Hindus dream that by opposing partition and at the same time demanding Swaraj they were preparing the way for
making the Musalmans the rulers of both Eastern as well as Western Bengal.
These thoughts occur to one's mind because one fears that the high caste Hindus, blinded by their hereditary trait,
might oppose Pakistan for no other reason except that it limits the field for their self-seeking careers. Among the
many reasons that might come in the way of Pakistan, one need not be surprised, if one of them happens to be the
selfishness of the high caste Hindus.
There are two alternatives for the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal and they may be asked to face them fairly and
squarely. The Muslims in the Punjab number 13,332,460 and the Hindus, with Sikhs and the rest, number
11,392,732. The difference is only 1,939,728. This means that the Muslim majority in the Punjab is only a majority
of 8 p.c. Given these facts, which is better: To retain the unity of the Punjab and allow the Muslim majority of 54
p.c. to rule the Hindu minority of 46 p.c. or to redraw the boundaries, to allow the Muslims and the Hindus to be
under separate national states, and thus rescue the whole body of Hindus from the terrors of the Muslim rule ?
The Muslims in Bengal number 27,497,624 and the Hindus number 21,570,407. The difference is only of
5,927,217. This means that the Muslim majority in Bengal is only a majority of 12 p.c. Given these facts, which is
better : To oppose the creation of a National Muslim State out of Eastern Bengal and Sylhet by refusing to redraw
the boundaries and allow the Muslim majority of only 12 p.c. to rule the Hindu minority of 44 p.c.; or to consent to
redraw the boundaries, to have Muslims and Hindus placed under separate National States, and thus rescue the 44
p.c. of the Hindus from the horrors of the Muslim rule ?

Let the Hindus of Bengal and the Punjab consider which alternative they should prefer. It seems to me that the
moment has come when the high caste Hindus of Bengal and the Punjab should be told that if they propose to resist
Pakistan, because it cuts off a field for gainful employment, they are committing the greatest blunder. The time for
successfully maintaining in their own hands a monopoly of place and power is gone. They may cheat the lower
orders of the Hindus in the name of nationalism, but they cannot cheat the Muslim majorities in the Muslim
Provinces and keep their monopoly of place and power. The resolution of the Hindus—if their cry against Pakistan
can be regarded as such— to live under a Muslim majority and oppose self-determination may be a very
courageous thing. But it will not be a very wise thing if the Hindus believe that they will be able to maintain their
place and power by fooling the Musalmans. As Lincoln said, it is not possible to fool all people for all times. If the
Hindus choose to live under a Muslim majority the chances are that they may loose all. On the other hand, if the
Hindus of Bengal and the

Punjab agree to separate, true, they will not get more, but they will certainly not lose all.

Contents PART III

[f.1]Cunnigham's Ancient Geography of India (Ed. Majumdar), pp. 13-14. The writers of the Puranas divided India
into nine divisions.

[f.2]Sind was reoccupied by Mahommed Ghori.

[f.3]Indian Islam by Dr. Titus, p. 10.

[f.4]Quoted by Dr. Tilus—Ibid., p. 10.

[f.5]lbid.,p.11

[f.6]lbid.,p.11.

[f.7]Quoted by Lane Poole in Medieval India, p. 155.

[f.8]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam, p. 22

[f.9]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam,

[f.10]p. 22. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

[f.11]Lane Poole: Medieval India, p. 26

[f.12]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam, pp. 23-24.

[f.13]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam, p. 24.

[f.14]lbid.,p.22

[f.15]Ibid.. pp. 31-32.

[f.16]Quoted by Dr. Titus—Indian Islam, p. 24.

[f.17]lbid.,p.26 [f.17]

[f.18]Dr. Titus : Indian Islam, p. 29

[f.19]Ibid., p. 30.

[f.20]Lane Poole : Medieval India, p. 104.

[f.21]Quoted by Dr. Titus—Indian Islam, p. 29.

[f.22]Revenues include revenue raised both by Provincial Government in the Provinces from provincial sources
and by the Central Government from Central revenues.
[f.23]Revenues include revenue raised both by Provincial Government in the Provinces from provincial sources
and by the Central Government from Central revenues.
[f.24]See his series of articles on " The Martial Races of India " published in the Modern Review for July 1930,
September 1930, January 1931 and February 1931.
[f.25]The Questionnaire circulated by the Committee included the following question:— " If an efficient and
available reserve of the Indian Army be considered necessary for the safely of the Empire, should it not be recruited
and maintained from those parts of the country which give us best soldiers, rather than amongst the weakest and
least warlike races of India ?".......

[f.26]In his Forty-One Years he wrote: " Each cold season, I made long lours in order to acquaint myself with the
needs and capabilities of the men of the Madras Army. I tried hard to discover in them those fighting qualities
which had distinguished their forefathers during the wars of the last and the beginning of the present century. . .
And I was forced to the conclusion that the ancient military spirit had died in them, as it had died in the ordinary
Hindustani of Bengal and the Mahratta of Bombay, and that they could no longer with safely be pitted against
warlike races, or employed outside the limit of Southern India."

[f27]Indian Social Reformer, January 27lh, 1940.

[f.28]This table shows the percentage of men of each eligible class in the Indian Infantry (82 active and 18 training
battations), the Indian Cavalry (21 regiments), and the 20 battalions of the Gurkha infantry. This table does not
include the Indian personnel of (a) the 19 ballerics of Indian Mountain Artillery, and (b) 3 regiments of Sappers and
Miners, (c) the Indian Signal Corps, and (d) the Corps of Indian Pioneers, all of which are composed of different
proportions of the Punjabi Musalmans, Sikhs, Pathans, Hindustani Ilindus and Musalmans, Madrasis of all classes
and Hazra Afghans, either in class units or class companies. Except that some units in these arms of the service are
composed of the Madrasis and Hazras, now enrolled in other units of the Indian Army, the class composition of
these units docs not materially alter the proportion of the classes as given in the table. This table does not also
include the Indian personnel attached to the British Infantry and Artillery units.

[f.29]Legislative Assembly Debales, 1938 Vol. VI, page 2462.

[f.30]Legislative Assembly Debates, 193S, Vol. VI, page 2478.

[f.31]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol. VI, page 2754.

[f.32]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938, Vol.VII, page 3313.

[f.33]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1939, Vol. I, page 253.

[f.34]MacMunn and Lovett, The Armies of India, pp. 84-85, quoted by Chaudhari

[f.35]As quoted by Chaudhari

[f.36]Imperial Rule in India, page 5.

[f.37]Only 1/2 revenue is shown because nearly 1/2 population is Hindu.

[f.38]It is perhaps not quite correct to speak of a Hindu Electorate. The Electorate is a General Electorate
consisting of all those who are not included in any separate electorate. But as the majority in the General Electorate
consists of Hindus, it is called a Hindu Electorate

[f.39]Sind gets an annual subvention of Rs. 1.05,00,000.

[f.40]North-West Frontier Province gets an annual subvention of Rs. 1,00,00,000

[f.41]The leaders of the Muslim League seem to have studied deeply Hitler's bulling tactics against Czechoslovakia
in the interest of the Sudeten Germans and also learned the lessons which those tactics teach. See their threatening
speeches in the Karachi Session of the League held in 1937.
PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
_______________________________________________________________

Contents

Part III - WHAT IF NOT PAKISTAN ?

Chapter VII : Hindu alternative to Pakistan

Chapter VIII : Muslim alternative to Pakistan

Chapter IX : Lessons from abroad

Part III

WHAT IF NOT PAKISTAN ?

Having stated the Muslim case for Pakistan and the Hindu case against it, it is necessary to turn to
the alternatives to Pakistan, if there be any. In forming one's judgement on Pakistan, one must take
into account the alternatives to it. Either there is no alternative to Pakistan : or there is an
alternative to Pakistan, but it is worse than Pakistan. Thirdly, one must also take into consideration
what would be the consequences, if neither Pakistan nor its alternative is found acceptable to the
parties concerned. The relevant data, having a bearing on these points, are presented in this part
under the following heads :—

1 Hindu alternative to Pakistan.

2 Muslim alternative to Pakistan.

3 Lessons from abroad.

CHAPTER VII

HINDU ALTERNATIVE TO PAKISTAN

I

Thinking of the Hindu alternative to Pakistan, the scheme that at once comes to one's mind is the
one put forth by the late Lala Hardayal in 1925. It was published in the form of a statement which
appeared in the Pratap of Lahore. In this statement, which he called his political testament, Lala
Hardayal said:—

" I declare that the future of the Hindu race, of Hindustan and of the Punjab, rests on these four
pillars: (1) Hindu Sangalhan, (2) Hindu Raj, (3) Shuddhi of Moslems, and (4) Conquest and
Shuddhi of Afghanistan and the Frontiers. So long as the Hindu nation does not accomplish these
four things, the safely of our children and great-grandchildren will be ever in danger, and the safety
of the Hindu race will be impossible. The Hindu race has but one history, and its institutions are
homogeneous. But the Musalmans and Christians are far removed from the confines of Hindustan,
for their religions are alien and they love Persian, Arab and European institutions. Thus, just as one
removes foreign matter from the eye, Shuddhi must be made of these two religions. Afghanistan
and the hilly regions of the frontier were formerly part of India, but are at present under the
domination of Islam..... Just as there is Hindu religion in Nepal, so there must be Hindu institutions
in Afghanistan and the frontier territory; otherwise it is useless to win Swaraj. For mountain tribes
are always warlike and hungry. If they become our enemies, the age of Nadirshah and Zamanshah
will begin anew. At present English officers are protecting the frontiers; but it cannot always
be....... If Hindus want to protect themselves, they must conquer Afghanistan and the frontiers and
convert all the mountain tribes."

I do not know how many Hindus would come forward to give their support to this scheme of Lala
Hardayal as an alternative to Pakistan. 1[f.1]

In the first place, Hindu religion is not a proselytising religion. Maulana Mahomed Ali was quite
right when, in the course of his address as President of the Congress, he said:

" Now, this has been my complaint for a long lime against Hinduism, and on one occasion,
lecturing at Allahabad in 1907,I had pointed out the contrast between Musalmans and Hindus, by
saying that the worst that can be said of a Muslim was that he had a tasteless mess which he called
a dish fit for kings, and wanted all to share it with him, thrusting it down the throats of such as did
not relish it and would rather not have it, while his Hindu brother, who prided himself on his
cookery, retired into the privacy of his kitchen and greedily devoured all that he had cooked,
without permitting even the shadow of his brother to fall on his food, or sparing even a crumb for
him. This was said not altogether in levity; and in fact, I once asked Mahatma Gandhi to justify this
feature of his faith to me. "

What answer the Mahatma gave to his question, Mr. Mahmed Ali did not disclose. The fact is that
however much the Hindus may wish, Hindu religion cannot become a missionary religion like
Islam or Christianity. It is not that the Hindu religion was never a missionary religion. On the
contrary, it was once a missionary religion—indeed could not but have been a missionary religion,
otherwise it is difficult to explain how, it could have spread over an area so vast as the Indian
continent. 2[f.2] But once a missionary religion, Hinduism perforce ceased to be a missionary
religion after the time when the Hindu society developed its system of castes. For, caste is
incompatible with conversion. To be able to convert a stranger to its religion, it is not enough for a
community to offer its creed. It must be in a position to admit the convert to its social life and to
absorb and assimilate him among its kindred. It is not possible for the Hindu society to satisfy this
prerequisite of effective conversion. There is nothing to prevent a Hindu, with a missionary zeal, to
proceed to convert an alien to the Hindu faith. But before he converts the alien, he is bound to be
confronted with the question: What is to be the caste of the convert ? According to the Hindus, for a
person to belong to a caste he must be born in it. A convert is not born in a caste, therefore he
belongs to no caste. This is also an important question. More than political or religious, man is a
social animal. He may not have, need not have, religion ; he may not have, need not have, politics.
He must have society; he cannot do without society. For a Hindu to be without caste is to be
without society. Where there is no society for the convert, how can there be any conversion ? So
long as Hindu society is fragmented in autonomous and autogenic castes, Hindu religion cannot be
a missionary religion. The conversion of the Afghans and the frontier tribes to Hinduism is,
therefore, an idle dream.

In the second place, Lala Hardayal's scheme must call for financial resources the immensity of
which it is hardly possible to compute. , Who can furnish the funds necessary for the conversion
of the Afghans and the Frontier Tribesmen to Hinduism ? The Hindus, having ceased to convert
others to their faith for a long time, have also lost the. zeal for conversion. Want of zeal is bound to
affect the question of finances. Further, Hindu society being moulded in the cast of the
Chaturvarna, wealth has, from very ancient times, been most unevenly distributed. It is only the
Baniya who is the heir to wealth and property among the Hindus. There are, of course, the
landlords who are the creation of foreign invaders or native rebels, but they are not as numerous as
the Baniya. The Baniya is money-made and his pursuits are solely for private gain. He knows no
other use of money except to hold it and to transmit it to his descendants. Spread of religion or
acquisition and promotion of culture do not interest him. Even decent living has no place in his
budget. This has been his tradition for ages. If money is expected, he is not much above the brute in
the conception and manner of life. Only one new service, on the expenditure side, has found a place
in his budget. That service is politics. This happened since the entry of Mr. Gandhi as a political
leader. That new service is the support of Gandhian politics. Here again, the reason is not love of
politics. The reason is to make private gain out of public affairs. What hope is there that such men
will spend money on such a bootless cause as the spread of Hindu religion among the Afghans and
Frontier Tribes ?

Thirdly, there is the question of facilities for conversion that may be available in Afghanistan. Lala
Hardayal evidently thought that it is possible to say in Afghanistan, with the same impunity as in
Turkey, that the Koran is wrong or out of date. Only one year before the publication of his political
testament by Lala Hardayal, i.e., in 1924; one Niamatulla—a follower of Mirza Ghulam Ahamed of
Quadiyan—who claimed to be the messiah and Mahdi and a prophet of a sort—was stoned to death
3[f.3] at Kabul by the order of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of Afghanistan. The crime of this
man was, as reported by a Khilafat paper, that he was professing and preaching ideas and beliefs,
inconsistent with Islam and Shariat. This man, says the same paper, was stoned to death according
to the agreeing judgements of the first Shariat (canon) Court, the Central Appellate Court and the
Ulema and Divines of the final Appellate Committee of the Ministry of Justice. In the light of these
difficulties, the scheme must be said to be wild in its conception and is sure to prove ruinous in its
execution. It is adventurous in character and is too fantastic to appeal to any reasonable man except
perhaps some fanatical Arya Samajists of the Punjab.

II

The stand taken by Hindu Mahasabha has been defined by Mr. V. D. Savarkar, the President of the
Sabha, in his presidential addresses at the annual sessions of the Sabha. As defined by him, the
Hindu Maha Sabha is against Pakistan and proposes to resist it by all means. What these means are
we do not know. If they are force, coercion and resistance, they are only negative alternatives and
Mr. Savarkar and the Hindu Maha Sabha alone can say how far these means will succeed.

It would, however, not be fair to Mr. Savarkar to say that he has only a negative attitude towards
the claim put forth by the Muslims of India. He has put forth his positive proposals in reply to
them.
To understand his positive proposals, one must grasp some of his basic conceptions. Mr. Savarkar
lays great stress on a proper understanding of the terms, Hinduism, Hindutva and Hindudom. He
says : 4[f.4]

" In expounding the ideology of the Hindu movement, it is absolutely necessary to have a correct
grasp of the meaning attached to these three terms. From the word " Hindu" has been coined the
word "Hinduism " in English. It means the schools or system of Religion the Hindus follow. The
second word " Hindutva " is far more comprehensive and refers not only to the religious aspects of
the Hindu people as the word " Hinduism " does but comprehend even their cultural, linguistic,
social and political aspects as well. It is more or less akin to " Hindu Polity " and its nearly exact
translation would be " Hinduness ". The third word " Hindudom " means the Hindu people spoken
of collectively. It is a collective name for the Hindu World, just as Islam denotes the Moslem
World."

Mr. Savarkar takes it as a gross misrepresentation to say that the Hindu Maha Sabha is a religious
body. In refutation of this misrepresentation, Mr. Savarkar says : 5[f.5]

" It has come to my notice that a very large section of the English educated Hindus hold back from
joining the Hindu Maha Sabha.... under the erroneous idea that it is an exclusively Religious
organization— something like a Christian Mission. Nothing could be far from truth. The Hindu
Maha Sabha is not a Hindu Mission. It leaves Religious questions regarding theism, monotheism.
Pantheism or even atheism to be discussed and determined by the different Hindu schools of
religious persuasions. It is not a Hindu Dharma Maha Sabha, but a Hindu National Maha Sabha.
Consequently by its very constitution it is debarred to associate itself exclusively as a partisan with
any particular religious school or sect even within the Hindu fold. As a national Hindu body it will
of course propagate and defend the National Hindu Church comprising each and all religions of
Hindusthani origin against any non-Hindu attack or encroachment. But the sphere of its activity is
far more comprehensive than that of an exclusively religious body. The Hindu Maha Sabha
identifies itself with the National life of Hindudom in all its entirety, in all its social, economical,
cultural and above all political aspects and is pledged to protect and promote all that contributes to
the freedom, strength and glory of the Hindu Nation; and as an indispensable means to that end to
attain Puma Swarajya, absolute political Independence of Hindusthan by all legitimate and proper
means. "

Mr. Savarkar does not admit that the Hindu Maha Sabha is started to counteract the Muslim League
and that as soon as the problems arising out of the Communal Award are solved to the satisfaction
of both Hindus and Musalmans, the Hindu Maha Sabha will vanish. Mr. Savarkar insists that the
Hindu Maha Sabha must continue to function even after India becomes politically free. He says :
6[f.6]

"...... Many a superficial critic seems to fancy that the Maha Sabha was only contrived to serve as a
make-weight, as a reaction checkmating the Moslem League or the anti-Hindu policy of the present
leaders of the Congress and will be out of court or cease automatically 10 function as soon as it is
shorne of this spurious excuse to exist. But if the aims and object of the Maha Sabha mean anything
it is clear that it was not the outcome of any frothy effusion, any fussy agitation to remove a
grievance here or oppose a seasonal party there. The fact is that every organism whether, individual
or social which is living and deserves to survive throws out offensive and defensive organs as soon
as it is brought to face adversely changing environments. The Hindu Nation too as soon as it
recovered and freed itself from the suffocating grip of the pseudo-nationalistic ideology of the
Congress brand developed a new organ to battle in the struggle for existence under the changed
conditions of modem age. This was the Hindu Maha Sabha. It grew up of a fundamental necessity
of the National life and not of any ephemeral incident. The constructive side of its aims and objects
make it amply clear that its mission is as abiding as the life of the Nation itself. But that apart, even
the day to day necessity of adapting its policy to the ever changing political currents makes it
incumbent on Hindudom to have an exclusively Hindu organization independent of any moral or
intellectual servility or subservience to any non-Hindu or jointly representative institution, to guard
Hindu interests and save them from being jeopardised. It is not so, only under the present political
subjection of Hindustan but it will be all the more necessary to have some such exclusively Hindu
organization, some such Hindu Maha Sabha in substance whether it is identical with this present
organization or otherwise to -serve as a watchtower at the gates of Hindudom for at least a couple
of centuries to come, even after Hindustan is partially or wholly free and a National Parliament
controls its political destiny.

" Because, unless something altogether cataclysmic in nature upsets the whole political order of
things in the world which practical politics cannot envisage today, all that can be reasonably
expected in immediate future is that we Hindus may prevail over England and compel her to
recognise India as a self-governing unit with the status contemplated in the Westminster Statute.
Now a National Parliament in such a self-governing India can only reflect the electorate as it is, the
Hindus and the Moslems as we find them, their relations a bit bettered, perhaps a bit worsened. No
realist can be blind to the probability that the extraterritorial designs and the secret urge goading on
the Moslems to transform India into a Moslem stale may at any time confront the Hindustani state
even under self-government either with a Civil War or treacherous overtures to alien invaders by
the Moslems. Then again there is every likelihood that there will ever continue at least for a century
to come a danger of fanatical riots, the scramble for services, legislative seats, weightages out of
proportion to their population on the part of the Moslem minority and consequently a constant
danger threatening internal peace. To checkmate this probability which if we are wise we must
always keep in view even after Hindustan attains the status of a self-governing country, a powerful
and exclusive organization of Hindudom like the Hindu MahaSabha will always prove a sure and
devoted source of strength, a reserve force for the Hindus to fall back upon to voice their
grievances more effectively than the joint Parliament can do, to scent danger ahead, to warn the
Hindus in lime against it and to fight out if need be any treacherous design to which the joint state
itself may unwittingly fall a victim.

"The History of Canada, of Palesline,of the movement of the Young Turks will show you that in
every slate where two or more such conflicting elements as the Hindus and Moslems in India
happen to exist as constituents, the wiser of them has to keep its exclusive organization intact,
strong and watchful to defeat any attempt at betrayal or capture of the National State by the
opposite party; especially so if that party has extra-territorial affinities, religious or cultural, with
alien bordering states."

Having stated what is Hindustan, and what is Hindu Maha Sabha, Mr. Savarkar next proceeds to
define his conception of Swaraj. According to Mr. Savarkar : 7[f.7]

" Swaraj to the Hindus must mean only that in which their" Swaraj ", their " Hindutva " can assert
itself without being overlorded by any non-Hindu people, whether they be Indian Territorials or
extra-Territorials—-some Englishmen are and may continue to be territorially born Indians. Can,
therefore, the overlordships of these Anglo-indians be a " Swarajya " to the Hindus ? Aurangzeb or
Tipu were hereditary Indians, nay, were the sons of converted Hindu mothers. Did that mean that
the rule of Aurangzeb or Tipu was a "Swarajya" to the Hindus ? No ! Although they were
territorially Indians they proved to be the worst enemies of Hindudom and therefore, a Shivaji, a
Gobindsingh, a Pratap or the Peshwas had to fight against the Moslem domination and establish
real Hindu Swarajya. "

As part of his Swaraj Mr. Savarkar insists upon two things.

Firstly, the retention of the name Hindustan as the proper name for lndia 8[f.8] " The name "
Hindustan " must continue to be the appellation of our country. Such other names as India, Hind,
etc., being derived from the same original word Sindhu may be used but only to signify the same
sense—die land of the Hindus, a country which is the abode of the Hindu Nation. Aryavarta,
Bharat-Bhumi and such other names are of course the ancient and the most cherished epithets of
our Mother Land and will continue to appeal to the cultured elite. In this insistence that the Mother
Land of the Hindus must be called but " Hindustan ", no encroachment or humiliation is implied in
connection with any of our non-Hindu countrymen. Our Parsee and Christian countrymen are
already too akin to us culturally and .arc too patriotic and the Anglo-indians too sensible to refuse
to fall in line with us Hindus on so legitimate a ground. So far as our Moslem countrymen are
concerned it is useless to conceal the fact that some of them are already inclined to look upon this
molehill also as an insuperable mountain in their way to Hindu-Moslem unity. But they should
remember that the Moslems do not dwell only in India nor are the Indian Moslems the only heroic
remnants of the Faithful in Islam. China has crores of Moslems. Greece, Palestine and even
Hungary and Poland have thousands of Moslems amongst their nationals. But being there a
minority, only a community, their existence in these countries has never been advanced as a ground
to change the ancient names of these countries which indicate the abodes of those races whose
overwhelming majority owns the land. The country of the Poles continues to be Poland and of the
Grecians as Greece. The Moslems there did not or dared not to distort them but are quite content to
distinguish themselves as Polish Moslems or Grecian Moslems or Chinese Moslems when occasion
arises, so also our Moslem countrymen may distinguish themselves nationally or territorially
whenever they want, as" Hindustance Moslems "without compromising in the least their
separateness as Religious or Cultural entity. Nay, the Moslems have been calling themselves as "
Hindustanis " ever since their advent in India, of their own accord.
" But if inspite of it all some irascible Moslem sections amongst our countrymen object even to this
name of our Country, that is no reason why we should play cowards to our own conscience. We
Hindus must not betray or break up the continuity of our Nation from the Sindhus. in Rigvedic days
to the Hindus of our own generation which is implied in " Hindustan ", the accepted appellation of
our Mother Land. Just as the land of the Germans is Germany, of the English England, of the Turks
Turkistan, of the Afghans Afghanistan—even so we must have it indelibly impressed on the map of
the earth for all times to come a " Hindustan "—the land of the " Hindus ".

The second is the retention of Sanskrit as sacred language, Hindi as national language and Nagari
as the script of Hindudom. 9[f.9]

"The Sanskrit shall be our " Deva Bhasha)" 10[f.10] our sacred language and the "Sanskrit
Nishtha" 11[f.11] Hindi, the Hindi which is derived from Sanskrit and draws its nourishment from
the latter, is our ' 'mr' ' (Rashtra Bhasha) 12[f.12] our current national language—-besides being
the richest and the most cultured of the ancient languages of the world, to us Hindus the Sanskrit is
the holiest tongue of tongues. Our scriptures, history, philosophy and culture have their roots so
deeply imbedded in the Sanskrit literature that it forms veritably the brain of our Race. Mother of
the majority of our mother tongues, she has suckled the rest of them at her breast. All Hindu
languages current today whether derived from Sanskrit or grafted on to it can only grow and
flourish on the sap of life they imbibe from Sanskrit. The Sanskrit language therefore must ever be
an indispensable constituent of the classical course for Hindu youths.

" In adopting the Hindi as the National tongue of Hindudom no humiliation or any invidious
distinction is implied as regards other provincial tongues. We are all as attached to our provincial
tongues as to Hindi and they will all grow and flourish in their respective spheres. In fact some of
them are today more progressive and richer in literature. But nevertheless, taken all in all the Hindi
can serve the purpose of a National Pan-Hindu language best. It must also be remembered that the
Hindi is not made a National Language to order. The fact is that long before either the English or
even the Moslems stepped in India the Hindi in its general form had already come to occupy the
position of a National tongue throughout Hindustan. The Hindu pilgrim, the tradesman, the tourist,
the soldier, the Pandit travelled up and down from Bengal to Sind and Kashmere to Rameshwar by
making himself understood from locality to locality through Hindi. Just as the Sanskrit was the
National Language of the Hindu intellectual world even so Hindi has been for at least a thousand
years in the past the National Indian Tongue of the Hindu community.....

"By Hindi we of course mean the pure "Sanskrit Nistha" Hindi, as we find it for example in the "
Satyartha Prakash " written by Maharsi Dayananda Saraswati. How simple and untainted with a
single unnecessary foreign word is that Hindi and how expressive withal ! It may be mentioned in
passing that Swami Dayanandaji was about the first Hindu leader who gave conscious and definite
expression to the view that Hindi should be the Pan-Hindu National language of India. " This
Sanskrit Nistha " Hindi has nothing to do with that hybrid, the so-called Hindusthani which is being
hatched up by the Wardha scheme. It is nothing short of a linguistic monstrosity and must be
ruthlessly suppressed. Not only that but it is our bounden duty to oust as ruthlessly all unnecessary
alien words whether Arabian or English, from every Hindu tongue—whether provincial or
dialectical. . . . . . .

"....... Our Sanskrit alphabetical order is phonetically about the most perfect which the world has
yet devised and almost all our current Indian scripts already follow it. The Nagari Script too
follows this order. Like the Hindi language the Nagari Script too has already been current for
centuries all over India amongst the Hindu literary circles for some two thousand years at any rate
in the past and was even popularly nick-named as the " Shastri Lipi " the script of our Hindu
Scriptures. ....It is a matter of common knowledge that if Bengali or Gujarathi is printed in Nagari it
is more or less understood by readers in several other provinces. To have only one common
language throughout Hindustan at a stroke is impracticable and unwise. But to have the Nagari
script as the only common script throughout Hindudom is much more feasible. Nevertheless, it
should be borne in mind that the different Hindu scripts current in our different provinces have a
future of their own and may flourish side by side with the Nagari. All that is immediately
indispensable in the common interest of Hindudom as a whole is that the Nagari Script must be
made a compulsory subject along with the Hindi language in every school in the case of Hindu
students. "

What is to be the position of the Non-Hindu minorities under the Swaraj as contemplated by Mr.
Savarkar ? On this question, this is what Mr. Savarkar has to say : 13[f.13]

"When once the Hindu Maha Sabha not only accepts but maintains the principles of" one man one
vote " and the public services to go by merit alone added to the fundamental rights and obligations
to be shared by all citizens alike irrespective of any distinction of Race or Religion . . .. any further
mention of minority rights is on the principle not only unnecessary but self-contradictory. Because
it again introduces a consciousness of majority and minority on Communal basis. But as practical
politics requires it and as the Hindu Sanghatanists want to relieve our non-Hindu countrymen of
even a ghost of suspicion, we are prepared to emphasise that the legitimate rights of minorities with
regard to their Religion, Culture, and Language will be expressly guaranteed: on one condition only
that the equal rights of the majority also must not in any case be encroached upon or abrogated.
Every minority may have separate schools to train up their children in their own tongue, their own
religious or cultural institutions and can receive Government help also for these,—but always in
proportion to the taxes they pay into the common exchequer. The same principle must of course
hold good in case of the majority too.

"Over and above this, in case the constitution is not based on joint electorates and on the unalloyed
National principle of one man one vote, but is based on the communal basis then those minorities
who wish to have separate electorate or reserve seats will be allowed to have them,—but always in
proportion to their population and provided that it does not deprive the majority also of an equal
right in proportion of its population too."

That being the position assigned to the minorities, Mr. Savarkar concludes 14 [f.14] that under his
scheme of Swaraj :

"The Moslem minority in India will have the right to be treated as equal citizens, enjoying equal
protection and civic rights in proportion to their population. The Hindu majority will not encroach
on the legitimate rights of any non-Hindu minority. But in no case can the Hindu majority resign its
right which as a majority it is entitled to exercise under any democratic and legitimate constitution.
The Moslem minority in particular has not obliged the Hindus by remaining in minority and
therefore, they must remain satisfied with the status they occupy and with the legitimate share of
civic and political rights that is their proportionate due. It would be simply preposterous t endow
the Moslem minority with the right of exercising a practical veto on the legitimate rights and
privileges of the majority and call it a " Swarajya ". The Hindus do not want a change of masters,
are not going to struggle and fight and die only to replace an Edward by an Aurangazeb simply
because the latter happens to be born within Indian borders, but they want henceforth to be masters
themselves in their own house, in their own Land. " And it is because he wants his Swaraj to bear
the stamp of being a Hindu Raj that Mr. Savarkar wants that India should have the appellation of
Hindustan.

This structure has been reared by Mr. Savarkar on two propositions which he regards as
fundamental.

The first is that the Hindu are a nation by themselves. He enunciates this proposition with great
elaboration and vehemence. Says 15[f.15] Mr. Savarkar :

" In my Presidential speech at Nagpur I had, for the first time in the history of our recent politics
pointed out in bold relief that the whole Congress ideology was vitiated ab initio by its unwitted
assumption that the territorial unity, a common habitat, was the only factor that constituted and
ought to and must constitute a Nation. This conception of a Territorial Nationality has since then
received a rude shock in Europe itself from which it was imported wholesale to India and the
present War has justified my assertion by exploding the myth altogether. All Nations carved out to
order on the Territorial design without any other common bond to mould each of them into a
national being have gone to rack and ruin, tumbled down like a house of cards. Poland and
Czechoslovakia will ever serve as a stem warning against any such efforts to frame heterogeneous
peoples into such hotch-potch Nation, based only on the shifting sands of the conception of
Territorial Nationality, not cemented by any cultural, racial or historical affinities and consequently
having no common will to incorporate themselves into a Nation. These treaty-Nations broke up at
the first opportunity they got: The German part of them went over to Germany, the Russian to
Russia, Czechs to Czechs and Poles to Poles. The cultural, linguistic, historical and such other
organic affinities proved sponger than the Territorial one. Only those Nations have persisted in
maintaining their National unity and identity during the last three to four centuries in Europe which
had developed racial, linguistic cultural and such other organic affinities in addition to their
Territorial unity or even at times in spite of it and consequently willed to be homogeneous National
units—such as England, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, etc.

" Judged by any and all of these tests which go severally and collectively to form such a
homogeneous and organic Nation, in India we Hindus are marked out as an abiding Nation by
ourselves. Not only do we own a common Fatherland, a Territorial unity, but what is scarcely
found anywhere else in the world, we have a common Holy Land which is identified with our
common Fatherland. This Bharat Bhumi, this Hindustan, India is both our 1^^ and gi^. Our
patriotism therefore is doubly sure. Then, we have common affinities, cultural, religious, historical,
linguistic, and racial which through the process of countless centuries of association and
assimilation moulded us into a homogeneous and organic nation and above all induced a will to
lead a corporate and common national life. The Hindus are no treaty Nation—but an organic
National Being.

" One more pertinent point must be met as it often misleads our Congressite Hindu brethren in
particular. The homogeneity that wields a people into a National Being does not only imply the
total absence of all internal differences, religious, racial or linguistic, of sects and sections amongst
themselves. It only means that they differ more from other people as a national unit than they differ
amongst themselves. Even the most unitarian nations of today—say the British or the French—
cannot be free from any religious, linguistic, cultural, racial or other differences, sects or sections or
even some antipathies existing amongst themselves. National homogeneity connotes oneness of a
people in relation to the contrast they present to any other people as a whole.

" We Hindus, in spite of thousand and one differences within our fold, are bound by such religious,
cultural, historical, racial, linguistic and other affinities in common as to stand out as a definitely
homogeneous people as soon as we are placed in contrast with any other non-Hindu people— say
the English or Japanese or even the Indian Moslems. That is the reason why today we the Hindus
from Cashmere to Madras and Sindh to Assam will have to be a Nation by ourselves ". . .

The second proposition on which Mr. Savarkar has built up his scheme relates to the definition of
the term Hindu. According to Mr. Savarkar a Hindu is a person:

" ...... who regards-and owns this Bharat Bhumi, this land from the Indus to the Seas, as his
Fatherland as well as his Holy Land;—i.e., the land of the origin of his religion, the cradle of his
faith.

The followers therefore of Vaidicism, SanaUmism, Jainism, Buddhism, Lingaitism, Sikhism, the
Arya Samaj, the Brahmosamaj, the Devasamaj, the Prarlhana
Samajandsucholherreligionsofindianorigin are Hindus and constitute Hindudom, i.e., Hindu people
as a whole.
Consequently the so-called aboriginal or hill-tribes also are Hindus : because India is their
Fatherland as well as their Holy Land whatever form of religion or worship they follow. The
definition rendered in Sanskrit stands thus:

ASINDHU SINDH PANYANTA YSMA BHARAT BHUMIKA I

PRITIBHU H PUNDYABHOOSHRAIV SA VAI HINDURITISMRITAH II

This definition , therefore, should be recognized by the Government and made the test of '
Hindutva * in enumerating the population of Hindus in the Government census to come. "

This definition of the term Hindu has been framed with great care and caution. It is designed to
serve two purposes which Mr. Savarkar has in view. First, to exclude from it Muslims, Christians,
Parsis and Jews by prescribing the recognition of India as a Holy Land as a qualification for being a
Hindu. Secondly, to include Buddhists, Jains, Sikhs, etc., by not insisting upon belief in the sanctity
of the Vedas as an element in the qualifications.

Such is the scheme of Mr. Savarkar and the Hindu Maha Sabha. As must have been noticed, the
scheme has some disturbing features.

One is the categorical assertion that the Hindus are a nation by themselves. This, of course, means
that the Muslims are a separate nation by themselves. That this is his view, Mr. Savarkar does not
leave to be inferred. He insists upon it in no uncertain terms and with the most absolute emphasis
he is capable of. Speaking at the Hindu Maha Sabha Session held at Ahmedabad in 1937, Mr.
Savarkar said :—

" Several infantile politicians commit the serious mistake in supposing that India is already welded
into a harmonious nation, or that it could be welded thus for the mere wish to do so. These our
well-meaning but unthinking friends take their dreams for realities. That is why they are impatient
of communal tangles and attribute them to communal organizations. But the solid fact is that the
so-called communal questions are but a legacy handed down to us by centuries of a cultural,
religious and national antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims. When the time is ripe you
can solve them; but you cannot suppress them by merely refusing recognition of them. It is safer to
diagnose and treat deep-seated disease than to ignore it. Let us bravely face unpleasant facts as they
are. India cannot be assumed today to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary
these are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims in India. "

Strange as it may appear, Mr. Savarkar and Mr. Jinnah instead of being opposed to each other on
the one nation versus two nations issue are in complete agreement about it. Both agree, not only
agree but insist that there are two nations in India—one the Muslim nation and the other the Hindu
nation. They differ only as regards the terms and conditions on which the two nations should live.
Mr. Jinnah says India should be cut up into two, Pakistan and Hindustan, the Muslim nation to
occupy Pakistan and the Hindu nation to occupy Hindustan. Mr. Savarkar on the other hand insists
that, although there are two nations in India, India shall not be divided into two parts, one for
Muslims and the other for the Hindus ; that the two nations shall dwell in one country and shall live
under the mantle of one single constitution; that the constitution shall be such that the Hindu nation
will be enabled to occupy a predominant position that is due to it and the Muslim nation made to
live in the position of subordinate co-operation with the Hindu nation. In the struggle for political
power between the two nations the rule of the game, which Mr. Savarkar prescribes, is to be one
man one vote, be the man Hindu or Muslim. In his scheme a Muslim is to have no advantage which
a Hindu does not have. Minority is to be no justification for privilege and majority is to be no
ground for penalty. The State will guarantee the Muslims any defined measure of political power in
the form of Muslim religion and Muslim culture. But the State will not guarantee secured seats in
the Legislature or in the Administration and, if such guarantee is insisted upon by the Muslims,
16[f.16] such guaranteed quota is not to exceed their proportion to the general population. Thus by
confiscating its weightages, Mr. Savarkar would even strip the Muslim nation of all the political
privileges it has secured so far.

This alternative of Mr. Savarkar to Pakistan has about it a frankness, boldness and definiteness
which distinguishes it from the irregularity, vagueness and indefiniteness which characterizes the
Congress declarations about minority rights. Mr. Savarkar's scheme has at least the merit of telling
the Muslims, thus far and no further. The Muslims know where they are with regard to the Hindu
Maha Sabha. On the other hand, with the Congress the Musalmans find themselves nowhere
because the Congress has been treating the Muslims and the minority question as a game in
diplomacy, if not in duplicity.

At the same time, it must be said that Mr. Savarkar's attitude is illogical, if not queer. Mr. Savarkar
admits that the Muslims are a separate nation. He concedes that they have a right to cultural
autonomy. He allows them to have a national flag. Yet he opposes the demand of the Muslim
nation for a separate national home. If he claims a national home for the Hindu nation, how can he
refuse the claim of the Muslim nation for a national home ?

It would not have been a matter of much concern if inconsistency was the only fault of Mr.
Savarkar. But Mr. Savarkar in advocating his scheme is really creating a most dangerous situation
for the safety and security of India. History records two ways as being open to a major nation to
deal with a minor nation when they are citizens of the same country and are subject to the same
constitution. One way is to destroy the nationality of the minor nation and to assimilate and absorb
it into the major nation, so as to make one nation out of two. This is done by denying to the minor
nation any right to language, religion or culture and by seeking to enforce upon it the language,
religion and culture of the major nation. The other way is to divide the country and to allow the
minor nation a separate, autonomous and sovereign existence, independent of the major nation.
Both these ways were tried in Austria and Turkey, the second after the failure of the first.

Mr. Savarkar adopts neither of these two ways. He does not propose to suppress the Muslim nation.
On the contrary he is nursing and feeding it by allowing it to retain its religion, language and
culture, elements which go to sustain the soul of a nation. At the same time he does not consent to
divide the country so as to allow the two nations to become separate, autonomous states, each
sovereign in its own territory. He wants the Hindus and the Muslims to live as two separate nations
in one country, each maintaining its own religion, language and culture. One can understand and
even appreciate the wisdom of the theory of suppression of the minor nation by the major nation
because the ultimate aim is to bring into being one nation. But one cannot follow what advantage a
theory has which says that there must ever be two nations but that there shall be no divorce between
them. One can justify this attitude only if the two nations were to live as partners in friendly
intercourse with mutual respect and accord. But that is not to be, because Mr. Savarkar will not
allow the Muslim nation to be co-equal in authority with the Hindu nation. He wants the Hindu
nation to be the dominant nation and the Muslim nation to be the servient nation. Why Mr.
Savarkar, after sowing this seed of enmity between the Hindu nation and the Muslim nation should
want that they should live under one constitution and occupy one country, is difficult to explain.

One cannot give Mr. Savarkar credit for having found a new formula. What is difficult to
understand is that he should believe that his formula is the right formula. Mr. Savarkar has taken
old Austria and old Turkey as his model and pattern for his scheme of Swaraj. He sees that in
Austria and Turkey there lived one major nation juxtaposed to other minor nations bound by one
constitution with the major nation dominating the minor nations and argues that if this was possible
in Austria and Turkey, why should it not be possible for the Hindus to do the same in India.

That Mr. Savarkar should have taken old Austria and old Turkey as his model to build upon is
really very strange. Mr. Savarkar does not seem to be aware of the fact that old Austria and old
Turkey are no more. Much less does he seem to know the forces which have blown up old Austria
and old Turkey to bits. If Mr. Savarkar instead of studying the past—of which he is very
fond—were to devote more attention to the present, he would have learnt that old Austria and old
Turkey came to ruination for insisting upon maintaining the very scheme of things which Mr.
Savarkar has been advising his " Hindudom " to adopt, namely, to establish a Swaraj in which there
will be two nations under the mantle of one single constitution in which the major nation will be
allowed to hold the minor nation in subordination to itself.

The history of the disruption of Austria, Czechoslovakia and Turkey is of the utmost importance to
India and the members of the Hindu Maha Sabha will do well to peruse the same. I need say
nothing here about it because I have drawn attention to lessons from their fateful history in another
chapter. Suffice it to say that the scheme of Swaraj formulated by Mr. Savarkar will give the
Hindus an empire over the Muslims and thereby satisfy their vanity. and their pride in being an
imperial race. But it can never ensure a stable and peaceful future for the Hindus, for the simple
reason that the Muslims will never yield willing obedience to so dreadful an alternative.

III

Mr. Savarkar is quite unconcerned about the Muslim reaction to his scheme. He formulates his
scheme and throws it in the face of the Muslims with the covering letter ' take it or leave it '. He is
not perturbed by the Muslim refusal to join in the struggle for Swaraj. He is quite conscious of the
strength of the Hindus and the Hindu Maha Sabha and proposes to carry on the struggle in the
confident hope that, alone and unaided, the Hindus will be able to wrest Swaraj from the British.
Mr. Savarkar is quite prepared to say to the Musalmans :

"If you come, with you, if you don't, without you; and if you oppose, in spite of you—the Hindus
will continue to fight for their national freedom as best as they can. "

Not so Mr. Gandhi. At the very commencement of his career as a political leader of India when Mr.
Gandhi startled the people of India by his promise to win Swaraj within six months, Mr. Gandhi
said that he could perform the miracle only if certain conditions were fulfilled. One of these
conditions was the achievement of Hindu-Muslim unity. Mr. Gandhi is never tired of saying that
there is no Swaraj without Hindu-Muslim unity. Mr. Gandhi did not merely make this slogan the
currency of Indian politics but he has strenuously worked to bring it about. Mr. Gandhi, it may be
said, began his carrier as a political leader of India with the manifesto dated 2nd March 1919
declaring his intention to launch Satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act and asking those who desired
to join him to sign the Satyagraha pledge. That campaign of Satyagraha was a short-lived campaign
and was suspended by Mr. Gandhi on 18th April 1919. As a part of his programme Mr. Gandhi had
fixed 17[f.17] the 6th March 1919 to be observed all over India as a day of protest against the
Rowlatt Act. Mass meetings were to be held on that day and Mr. Gandhi had prescribed that the
masses attending the meetings should take a vow in the following terms :

" With God as witness, we Hindus, and Mahomedans declare that we shall behave towards one
another as children of the same parents, that we shall have no differences, that the sorrows of each
shall be the sorrows of the other and that each shall help the other in removing them. We shall
respect each other's religion and religious feelings and shall not stand in the way of our respective
religious practices. We shall always refrain from violence to each other in the name of religion. "
There was nothing in the campaign of Satyagraha against the Rowlatt Act which could have led to
any clash between the Hindus and Muslims. Yet Mr. Gandhi asked his followers to take the vow.
This shows how insistent he was from the very beginning upon Hindu-Muslim unity.

The Mahomedans started the Khilafat movement in 1919. The objective of the movement was
two-fold; to preserve the Khilafat and to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Both these
objectives were unsupportable. The Khilafat could not be saved simply because the Turks, in whose
interest this agitation was carried on, did not want the Sultan. They wanted a republic and it was
quite unjustifiable to compel the Turks to keep Turkey a monarchy when they wanted to convert it
into a republic. It was not open to insist upon the integrity of the Turkish Empire because it meant
the perpetual subjection of the different nationalities to the Turkish rule and particularly of the
Arabs, especially when it was agreed on all hands that the doctrine of self-determination should be
made the basis of the peace settlement.

The movement was started by the Mahomedans. It was taken up by Mr. Gandhi with a tenacity and
faith which must have surprised many Mahomedans themselves. There were many people who
doubted the ethical basis of the Khilafat movement and tried to dissuade Mr. Gandhi from taking
any part in a movement the ethical basis of which was so questionable. But Mr. Gandhi had so
completely persuaded himself of the justice of the Khilafat agitation that he refused to yield to their
advice. Time and again he argued that the cause was just and it was his duty to join it. The position
taken up by him may be summed up in his own words. 18[f18]

" (1) In my opinion, the Turkish claim is not only not immoral and unjust, but it is highly equitable,
only because Turkey wants to retain what is her own. And the Mahomedan manifesto has definitely
declared that whatever guarantee may be necessary to be taken for the protection of the
non-Muslim and non-Turkish races, should be taken so as to give the Christians theirs and the
Arabs their self-government under the Turkish suzerainty;

(2) I do not believe the Turk to be weak, incapable or cruel. He is certainly disorganised and
probably without good generalship. The argument of weakness, incapacity and cruelly one often
hears quoted in connection with those from whom power is sought to be taken away. About the
alleged massacres a proper commission has been asked for, but never granted. And in any case
security can be taken against oppression;

(3) I have already stated that, if I were not interested in the Indian Mahomedans, I would not
interest myself in the welfare of the Turks any more than I am in that of the Austrians or the Poles.
But I am bound as an Indian to share the sufferings and trials of fellow-Indians. If I deem the
Mahomedan to be my brother, it is my duty to help him in his hour of peril to the best of my ability,
if his cause commends itself to me as just;

(4) The fourth refers to the extent Hindus should join hands with the Mahomedans. It is, therefore,
a matter of feeling and opinion. It is expedient to suffer for my Mahomedan brother to the utmost in
a just cause and I should, therefore, travel with him along the whole road so long as the means
employed by him are as honourable as his end. I cannot regulate the Mahomedan feeling. I must
accept his statement that the Khilafat is with him a religious question in the sense that it binds him
to reach the goal even at the cost of his own life. "'

Mr. Gandhi not only agreed with the Muslims in the Khilafat cause but acted as their guide and
their friend. The part played by Mr. Gandhi in the Khilafat agitation and the connection between
the Khilafat agitation and the Non-co-operation Movement has become obscure by the reason of
the fact that most people believed that it was the Congress which initiated the Non co-operation
Movement and it was done as a means for winning Swaraj. That such a view should prevail is quite
understandable because most people content themselves with noting the connection between the
Non-co-operation Movement and the special session of the Congress held at Calcutta on 7th and
8th September 1920. But anyone, who cares to go behind September 1920 and examine the
situation as it then stood, will find that this view is not true. The truth is that the non-co-operation
has its origin in the Khilafat agitation and not in the Congress Movement for Swaraj : that it was
started by the Khilafatists to help Turkey and adopted by the Congress only to help the Khilafatists
: that Swaraj was not its primary object, but its primary object was Khilafat and that Swaraj was
added as a secondary object to induce the Hindus to join it will be evident from the following facts.

The Khilafat movement may be said to have begun on 27th October 1919 when the day was
observed as the Khilafat Day all over India. On 23rd November 1919 the first Khilafat Conference
met at Delhi. It was at this session that the Muslims considered the feasibility of non-co-operation
as a means of compelling the British Government to redress the Khilafat wrong. On 10th March
1920 the Khilafat Conference met at Calcutta and decided upon non-co-operation as the best
weapon to further the object of their agitation.

On 9th June 1920 the Khilafat Conference met at Allahabad and unanimously reaffirmed their
resolve to resort to non-co-operation and appointed an Executive Committee to enforce and lay
down a^ detailed programme. On 22nd June 1920 the Muslims sent a message to the Viceroy
stating that they would start non-co-operation if the Turkish grievances were not redressed before
1st August 1920. On 30th June 1920 the Khilafat Committee meeting held at Allahabad resolved to
start non-co-operation, after a month's notice to the Viceroy. Notice was given on 1st July 1920 and
non-co-operation commenced on 1st August 1920. This short resume shows that the
non-co-operation was started by the Khilafat Committee and all that the Congress special session at
Calcutta did was to adopt what the Khilafat Conference had already done and that too not in the
interest of Swaraj but in the interest of helping the Musalmans in furthering the cause of Khilafat.
This is clear from the perusal of the Congress Resolution 19 [f.19] passed at the special session
held at Calcutta.

Although the Non-co-operation Movement was launched by the Khilafat Committee and merely
adopted by the Congress primarily to help the Khilafat cause, the person who suggested it to the
Khilafat Committee and who identified himself with the Committee and took the responsibility of
giving effect to it and who brought about its adoption by the Congress was Mr. Gandhi. At the first
Khilafat Conference held at Delhi on 23rd November

1919 Mr. Gandhi was present. Not only was Mr. Gandhi present but also it was he who advised the
Muslims to adopt non-co-operation as a method for forcing the British to yield to their demands
regarding the Khilafat. The joining of Mr. Gandhi in the Khilafat movement is full of significance.
The Muslims were anxious to secure the support of the Hindus in the cause of Khilafat. At the
Conference held on 23rd November 1919 the Muslims had invited the Hindus. Again on 3rd June
1920 a joint meeting of the Hindus and the Khilafatist Muslims was held at Allahabad. This
meeting was attended among others by Sapru, Motilal Nehru and Annie Besant. But the Hindus
were hesitant in joining the Muslims. Mr. Gandhi was the only Hindu who joined the Muslims. Not
only did he show courage to join them, but also he kept step with them, nay, led them. On 9th June

1920 when the Khilafat Conference met at Allahabad and formed an Executive Committee to
prepare a detailed programme of non co-operation and give effect to it, Mr. Gandhi was the only
Hindu on that Executive Committee. On 22nd June 1920 the Muslims sent a message to the
Viceroy that they would start non-co-operation if the Turkish grievances were not redressed before
1st August 1920. On the same day Mr. Gandhi also sent a letter to the Viceroy explaining the
justice of the Khilafat cause, the reasons why he has taken up the cause and the necessity of
satisfying the hands of the Khilafatists. For instance the notice given to the Viceroy on 1st July
1920 that non-co-operation will be started on 1st August was given by Mr. Gandhi and not by the
Khilafatists. Again when non-co-operation was started by the Khilafatist on 31st August 1920 Mr.
Gandhi was the first to give a concrete shape to it by returning his medal. After inaugurating the
Non-co-operation Movement as an active member of the Khilafat Committee Mr. Gandhi next
directed his energy to the cause of persuading the Congress to adopt non-co-operation and
strengthen the Khilafat movement. With that object in view Mr. Gandhi toured the country between
1st August and 1st September 1920 in the company of the Ali Brothers who were the founders of
the Khilafat movement impressing upon the people the necessity of non-co-operation. People could
notice the disharmony in the tune of Mr. Gandhi and the Ali Brothers. As the Modern Review
pointed out: " Reading between the lines of their speeches, it is not difficult to see that with one of
them the sad plight of the Khilafat in distant Turkey is the central fact, while with the other
attainment of Swaraj here in India is the object in view ". This dichotomy 20[f.20] of interest did
not augur well for the success of the ultimate purpose. Nonetheless Mr. Gandhi succeeded in
carrying the Congress with him in support of the Khilafat cause. 21[f.21]

For a long time the Hindus had been engaged in wooing the Muslims to their side. The Congress
was very anxious to bridge the gulf between itself and the Muslim League. The ways and means
adopted in 1916 for bringing about this consummation and which resulted in the Lucknow Pact
signed between the Congress and the Muslim League have been graphically told by Swami
Shradhanand in his impressions of the Congress Session held in that year at Lucknow. Says the
Swami 22[f.22] :

" On sitting on the dias (Lucknow Congress platform) the first thing that I noticed was that the
number of Moslem delegates was proportionately fourfold of what it was at Lahore in 1893. The
majority of Moslem delegates Bad donned gold, silver and silk embroidered chogas (flowing robes)
over their ordinary coarse suits of wearing apparel. It was rumoured that these ' chogas ' had been
put by Hindu moneyed men for Congress Tamasha. Of some 433 Moslem delegates only some 30
had come from outside, the rest belonging to Lucknow City. And of these majority was admitted
free to delegate seals, board and lodging. Sir Syed Ahmad's anti-Congress League had tried in a
public meeting to dissuade Moslems from joining the Congress as delegates. As a countermove the
Congress people lighted the whole Congress camp some four nights before the session began and
advertised that that night would be free. The result was that all the " Chandul Khanas " of Lucknow
were emptied and a huge audience of some thirty thousand Hindus and Moslems was addressed
from half a dozen platforms. It was then that the Moslem delegates were elected or selected. All
this was admitted by the Lucknow Congress organisers to me in private.

" A show was being made of the Moslem delegates. Moslem delegate gets up to second a resolution
in Urdu. He begins : ' Hozarat, I am a Mahomedan delegate '. Some Hindu delegate gels up and
calls for three cheers for Mahomedan delegates and the response is so enthusiastic as to be beyond
description. "

In taking up the cause of Khilafat Mr. Gandhi achieved a double purpose. He carried the Congress
Plan of winning over the Muslims to its culmination. Secondly he made the Congress a power in
the country, which it would not have been, if the Muslims had not joined it. The cause of the
Khilafat appealed to the Musalmans far more than political safeguards, with the result that the
Musalmans who were outside it trooped into the Congress. The Hindus welcomed them. For, they
saw in this a common front against the British, which was their main aim. The credit for this must
of course go to Mr. Gandhi. For there can be no doubt that this was an act of great daring.

When the Musalmans in 1919 approached the Hindus for participation in the Non-co-operation
Movement which the Muslims desired to start for helping Turkey and the Khilafat, the Hindus were
found to be divided in three camps. One was a camp of those who were opposed to
non-co-operation in principle. A second camp consisted of those Hindus who were prepared to join
the Muslims in their campaign of non-co-operation provided the Musalmans agreed to give up Cow
Slaughter. A third group consisted of the Hindus who feared that the Mahomedans might extend
their non-co-operation to inviting the Afghans to invade India, in which case the movement instead
of resulting in Swaraj might result in the subjection of India to Muslim Raj.

Mr. Gandhi did not care for those Hindus who were opposed to joining the Muslims in the
Non-co-operation Movement. But with regard to the others he told them that their attitude was
unfortunate.

To those Hindus who wanted to give their support on the condition that the Muslims give up cow
killing, Mr. Gandhi said 23[f.23] :

" I submit that the Hindus may not open the Goraksha (cow protection) question here. The test of
friendship is assistance in adversity, and that too, unconditional assistance. Co-operation that needs
consideration is a commercial contract and not friendship. Conditional co-operation is like
adulterated cement which does not bind. It is the duty of the Hindus, if they see the justice of the
Mahomedan cause to render co-operation. If the Mahomedans feel themselves bound in honour to
spare the Hindu's feelings and to slop cow killing, they may do so, no matter whether the Hindus
co-operate with them or not. Though therefore, I yield to no Hindu in my worship of the cow, I do
not want to make the slopping of cow killing a condition precedent to co-operation. Unconditional
co-operation means the protection of the cow."

To those Hindus who feared to join the Non-co-operation Movement for the reasons that Muslims
may invite the Afghans to invade India, Mr. Gandhi said 24[f.24] :

" It is easy enough to understand and justify the Hindu caution. It is difficult to resist the
Mahomedan position. In my opinion, the best way to prevent India from becoming the battle
ground between the forces of Islam and those of the English is for Hindus to make
non-co-operation a complete and immediate success, and I have little doubt that, if the
Mahomedans remain true to their declared intention and are able to exercise self-restraint and make
sacrifices, the Hindus will ' play the game ' and join them in the campaign of non-co-operation. I
feel equally certain that Hindus will not assist Mahomedans in promoting or bringing about an
armed conflict between the British Government and their allies, and Afghanistan. British forces are
too well organised to admit of any successful invasion of the Indian frontier. The only way,
therefore, the Mahomedans can carry on an effective struggle on behalf of the honour of Islam is to
take up non-co-operation in real earnest. It will not only be completely effective if it is adopted by
the people on an extensive scale, but it will also provide full scope for individual conscience. If I
cannot bear an injustice done by an individual or a corporation, and, I am directly or indirectly
instrumental in upholding that individual or corporation, I must answer for it before my Maker; but
I have done all that is humanly possible for me to do consistently with the moral code that refuses
to injure even the wrong-doers, if I cease to support the injustice in the manner described above. In
applying, therefore, such a great force, there should be no haste, there should be no temper shown.
Non-co-operation must be and remain absolutely a voluntary effort. The whole thing, then, depends
upon Mahomedans themselves. If they will but help themselves, Hindu help will come and the
Government, great and mighty though it is, will have to bend before the bloodless opposition of a
whole nation. "

Unfortunately, the hope of Mr.Gandhi that ' no Government can possibly withstand the bloodless
opposition of a whole nation ' did not come true. Within a year of the starting of the
Non-co-operation Movement, Mr. Gandhi had to admit that the. Musalmans had grown impatient
and that :

" In their impatient anger, the Musalmans ask for more energetic and more prompt action by the
Congress and Khilafat organisations. To the Musalmans, Swaraj means, as it must mean, India's
ability to deal effectively with the Khilafat question. The Musalmans, therefore, decline to wait if
the attainment of Swaraj means indefinite delay of a programme that may require the Musalmans of
India to become impotent witnesses of the extinction of Turkey in European waters.

" It is impossible not to sympathise with this attitude. I would gladly recommend immediate action
if I could think of any effective course. I would gladly ask for postponement of Swaraj activity if
thereby we could advance the interest of Khilafat. I could gladly take up measures outside
non-co-operation, if I could think of any, in order to assuage the pain caused to the millions of the
Musalmans.

" But, in my humble opinion, attainment of Swaraj is the quickest method of righting the Khilafat
wrong. Hence it is, that for me the solution of the Khilafat question is attainment of Swaraj and vice
versa. The only way to help the affiliated Turks is for India to generate sufficient power to be able
to assert herself. If she cannot develop that power in time, there is no way out for India and she
must resign herself to the inevitable. What can a paralytic do to stretch forth a helping hand to a
neighbour but to try to cure himself of his paralysis ? Mere ignorant, thoughtless and angry outburst
of violence may give vent to pent-up rage but can bring no relief to Turkey. "

The Musalmans were not in a mood to listen to the advice of Mr. Gandhi. They refused to worship
the principle of non-violence. They were not prepared to wait for Swaraj. They were in a hurry to
find the most expeditious means of helping Turkey and saving the Khilafat. And' the Muslims in
their impatience did exactly what the Hindus feared they would do, namely, invite the Afghans to
invade India. How far the Khilafatists had proceeded in their negotiations with the Amir of
Afghanistan it is not possible to know. But that such a project was entertained by them is beyond
question. It needs no saying that the project of an invasion of India was the most dangerous project
and every sane Indian would dissociate himself from so mad a project. What part Mr. Gandhi
played in this project it is not possible to discover. Certainly he did not dissociate himself from it.
On the contrary his misguided zeal for Swaraj and his obsession on Hindu-Moslem unity as the
only means of achieving it, led him to support the project. Not only did he advise 25[f.25] the
Amir not to enter into any treaty with the British Government but declared:

" I would, in a sense, certainly assist the Amir of Afghanistan if he waged war against the British
Government. That is to say, I would openly tell my countrymen that it would be a crime to help a
government which had lost the confidence of the nation to remain in power ".

Can any sane man go so far, for the sake of Hindu-Moslem unity ? But, Mr. Gandhi was so
attached to Hindu-Moslem unity that he did not stop to enquire what he was really doing in this
mad endeavour. So anxious was Mr. Gandhi in laying the foundation of Hindu-Moslem unity well
and truly, that he did not forget to advise his followers regarding the national crisis. In an Article in
Young India of 8th September 1920 Mr. Gandhi said :
" During the Madras tour, at Bezwada I had occasion to remark upon the national crisis and
suggested that it would be better to have cries about ideals than men. I asked the audience t replace
Mahatma Gandhi-ki-jai and Mahomed Ali Shoukat Ali-ki-jai by Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai. Brother
Shoukat Ali, who followed, positively laid down the law. In spite of the Hindu-Muslim unity, he
had observed that, if Hindus shouted Bande Mataram, the Muslims rang out with AllahoAkbar and
vice ersa. This, he rightly said jarred on the ear and still showed that the people did not act with one
mind. There should be therefore only three cries recognised. Allaho Akbar to be joyously sung out
by Hindus and Muslims, showing that God alone was great and no other. The second should be
Bande Malaram (Hail Motherland) or Bharat Mata-ki-jai (Victory to Mother Hind). The third
should be Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai without which there was no victory for India, and no true
demonstration of the greatness of God.. I do wish that the newspapers and public men would take
up the Maulana's suggestion and lead the people only to use the three cries. They are full of
meaning. The first is a prayer and confession of our littleness and therefore a sign of humility. It is
a cry in which all Hindus and Muslims should join in reverence and prayfulness. Hindus may not
fight shy of Arabic words, when their meaning is not only totally inoffensive but even ennobling.
God is no respecter of any particular tongue. Bande Mataram, apart from its wonderful
associations, expresses the one national wish—the rise of India to her full height. And I should
prefer Bande Mataram to Bharat Mata-ki-jai, as it would be a graceful recognition of the
intellectual and emotional superiority of Bengal. Since India can be nothing without the union of
the Hindu and the Muslim heart, Hindu-Musalman-ki-jai is a cry which we may never forget.

" There should be no discordance in these cries. Immediately some one has taken up any of the
three cries, the rest should take it up and not attempt to yell out their favourite. Those, who do not
wish to join, may refrain, but should consider it a breach of etiquette to interpolate their own when
a cry has already been raised. It would be better too, always to follow out the three cries in the
order given above. "

These are not the only things Mr. Gandhi has done to build up Hindu-Moslem unity. He has never
called the Muslims to account even when they have been guilty of gross crimes against Hindus.

It is a notorious fact that many prominent Hindus who had offended the religious susceptibilities of
the Muslims either by their writings or by their part in the Shudhi movement have been murdered
by some fanatic Musalmans. First to suffer was Swami Shradhanand, who was shot by Abdul
Rashid on 23rd December 1926 when he was lying in his sick bed. This was followed by the
murder of Lala Nanakchand, a prominent Arya Samajist of Delhi. Rajpal, the author of the Rangila
Rasool, was stabbed by llamdin on 6th April 1929 while he was sitting in his shop. Nathuramal
Sharma was murdered by Abdul Qayum in September 1934. It was an act of great daring. For
Sharma was stabbed to death in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner of Sind where he was
seated awaiting the hearing of his appeal against his conviction under Section 195, 1. P. C., for the
publication of a pamphlet on the history of Islam. Khanna, the Secretary of the Hindu Sabha, was
severely assaulted in 1938 by the Mahomedans after the Session of the Hindu Maha Sabha held in
Ahmedabad and very narrowly escaped death.

This is, of course, a very short list and could be easily expanded. But whether the number of
prominent Hindus killed by fanatic Muslims is large or small matters little. What matters is the
attitude of those who count, towards these murderers. The murderers paid the penalty of law where
law is enforced. The leading Moslems, however, never condemned these criminals. On the
contrary, they were hailed as religious martyrs and agitation was carried on for clemency being
shown to them. As anillustration of this attitude, one may refer to Mr. Barkat Alli, a Barrister of
Lahore, who argued the appeal of Abdul Qayum. He went to the length of saying that Qayum was
not guilty of murder of Nathuramal because his act was justifiable by the law of the Koran. This
attitude of the Moslems is quite understandable. What is not understandable is the attitude of Mr.
Gandhi.

Mr. Gandhi has been very punctilious in the matter of condemning any and every act of violence
and has forced the Congress, much against its will to condemn it. But Mr. Gandhi has never
protested against such murders. Not only have the Musalmans not condemned 26[f.26] these
outrages but even Mr. Gandhi has never called upon the leading Muslims to condemn them. He has
kept silent over them. Such an attitude can be explained only on the ground that Mr. Gandhi was
anxious to preserve Hindu-Moslem unity and did not mind the murders of a few Hindus, if it could
be achieved by sacrificing their lives.

This attitude to excuse the Muslims any wrong, lest it should injure the cause of unity, is well
illustrated by what Mr. Gandhi had to say in the matter of the Mopla riots.

The blood-curdling atrocities committed by the Moplas in Malabar against the Hindus were
indescribable. All over Southern India, a wave of horrified feeling had spread among the Hindus of
every shade of opinion, which was intensified when certain Khilafat leaders were so misguided as
to pass resolutions of " congratulations to the Moplas on the brave fight they were conducting for
the sake of religion". Any person could have said that this was too heavy a price for Hindu-Moslem
unity. But Mr. Gandhi was so much obsessed by the necessity of establishing Hindu-Moslem unity
that he was prepared to make light of the doings of the Moplas and the Khilafats who were
congratulating them. He spoke of the Moplas as the " brave God-fearing Moplas who were fighting
for what they consider as religion and in a manner which they consider as religious ". Speaking of
the Muslim silence over the Mopla atrocities Mr. Gandhi told the Hindus:

" The Hindus must have the courage and the faith to feel that they can protect their religion in spite
of such fanatical eruptions. A verbal disapproval by the Mussalmans of Mopla madness is no test of
Mussalman friendship. The Mussalmans must naturally feel the shame and humiliation of the
Mopla conduct about forcible conversions and looting, and they must work away so silently and
effectively that such a thing might become impossible even on the part of the most fanatical among
them. My belief is that the Hindus as a body have received the Mopla madness with equanimity and
that the cultured Mussalmans are sincerely sorry of the Mopla's perversion of the teaching of the
Prophet"

The Resolution 27[f.27] passed by the Working Committee of the Congress on the Mopla
atrocities shows how careful the Congress was not to hurt the feelings of the Musalmans.

" The Working Committee places on record its sense of deep regret over the deeds of violence done
by Moplas in certain areas of Malbar, these deeds being evidence of the fact that there are still
people in India who have not understood the message of the Congress and the Central Khilafat
Committee, and calls upon every Congress and Khilafat worker to spread the said message of
non-violence even under the gravest provocation throughout the length and breadth of India.
" Whilst, however, condemning violence on the part of the Moplas, the working Committee desires
it to be known that the evidence in its possession shows that provocation beyond endurance was
given to the Moplas and that the reports published by and on behalf of the Government have given
a one-sided and highly exaggerated account of the wrongs done by the Moplas and an
understatement of the needless destruction of life resorted to by the Government in the name of
peace and order.

" The Working Committee regrets to find that there have been instances of so-called forcible
conversion by some fanatics among Moplas, but warms the public against believing in the
Government and inspired versions. The Report before the Committee says:
" The families, which have been reported to have been forcibly converted into Mahomedanism,
lived in the neighbourhood of Manjeri. It is clear that conversions were forced upon Hindus by a
fanatic gang which was always opposed to the Khilafat and Non-co-operation Movement and there
were only three cases so far as our information goes. ' "

The following instances of Muslim intransigence, over which Mr. Gandhi kept mum are recorded
by Swami Shradhanand in his weekly journal called the Liberator. Writing in the issue of 30th
September 1926 the Swamiji says :

" As regards the removal of untouchability it has been authoritatively ruled several times that it is
the duty of Hindus to expiate for their past sins and non-Hindus should have nothing to do with it
But the Mahomedan and the Christian Congressmen have openly revolted against the dictum of Mr.
Gandhi at Vaikorn and other places. Even such an unbiased leader as Mr. Yakub Hassan, presiding
over a meeting called to present an address to me at Madras, openly enjoined upon Musalmans the
duty of converting all the untouchables in India to Islam. "

But Mr. Gandhi said nothing by way of remonstrance either to the Muslims or to the Christians.

In his issue of July 1926 the Swami writes :

" There was another prominent fact to which I drew the attention of Mahatma Gandhi. Both of us
went together one night to the Khilafat Conference at Nagpur. The Ayats (verses) of the Quran
recited by the Maulanas on that occasion, contained frequent references to Jihad and killing of the
Kaffirs.But when I drew his attention to this phase of the Khilafat movement, Mahatmaji smiled
and said, ' They are alluding to the British Bureaucracy '. In reply I said that it was all subversive of
the idea of non-violence and when the reversion of feeling came the Mahomedan Maulanas would
not refrain from using these verses against the Hindus. "

The Swami 's third instance relates to the Mopla riots. Writing in the Liberator of 26th August
1926 the Swami says :
"The first warning was sounded when the question of condemning the Moplas for their atrocities on
Hindus came up in the Subjects Committee. The original resolution condemned the Moplas
wholesale for the killing of Hindus and burning of Hindu homes and the forcible conversion to
Islam. The Hindu members themselves proposed amendments till it was reduced to condemning
only certain individuals who had been guilty of the above crimes. But some of the Moslem leaders
could not bear this even. Maulana Fakir and other Maulanas, of course, opposed the resolution and
there was no wonder. But I was surprised, an out-and-out Nationalist like Maulana Hasrat Mohani
opposed the resolution on the ground that the Mopla country no longer remained Dar-ul-Aman but
became Dar-ul-Harab and they suspected the Hindus of collusion with the British enemies of the
Moplas. Therefore, the Moplas were right in presenting the Quran or sword to the Hindus. And if
the Hindus became Mussalmans to save themselves from death, it was a voluntary change of faith
and not forcible conversion—Well, even the harmless resolution condemning some of the Moplas
was not unanimously passed but had to be accepted by a majority of votes only. There were other
indications also, showing that the Mussalmans considered the Congress to be existing on their
sufferance and if there was the least attempt to ignore their idiosyncracies the superficial unity
would be scrapped asunder. "

The last one refers to the burning of the foreign cloth started by Mr. Gandhi. Writing in the
Liberator of 31st August 1926 the Swamiji says:

" While people came to the conclusion, that the burning of foreign cloth was a religious duty of
Indians and Messrs. Das, Nehru and other topmost leaders made bon-fire of cloth worth thousands,
the Khilafat Musalmans got permission from Mahatmaji to send all foreign cloth for the use of the
Turkish brethren. This again was a great shock to me. While Mahatmaji stood adamant and did not
have the least regard for Hindu feelings when a question of principle was involved, for the Moslem
dereliction of duty, there was always a soft corner in his heart "

In the history of his efforts to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity mention must be made of two
incidents. One is the Fast, which Mr. Gandhi underwent in the year 1924. It was a fast of 21 days.
Before undertaking the fast Mr. Gandhi explained the reasons for it in a statement from which the
following extracts are taken:

" The fact that Hindus and Musalmans, who were only two years ago apparently working together
as friends, are now fighting like cats and dogs in some places, shows conclusively that the
non-co-operation they offered was not non-violent. I saw the symptoms in Bombay, Chauri Chaura
and in a host of minor cases. I did penance then. It had its effects protanto. But this Hindu-Muslim
tension was unthinkable. It became unbearable on hearing of the Kohat tragedy. On the eve of my
departure from Sabarmati for Delhi, Sarojinj Devi wrote to me that speeches and homilies on peace
would not do. I must find out an effective remedy. She was right in saddling the responsibility on
me. Had I not been instrumental in bringing into being the vast energy of the people? I must find
the remedy if the energy proved self-destructive.

* * *

" I was violently shaken by Amethi, Sambhal and Gulbarga. I had read the reports about Amelhi
and Sambhal prepared by Hindu and Musalman friends. I had learnt the joint finding of Hindu and
Musalman friends who went to Gulbarga. I was writhing in deep pain and yet I had no remedy. The
news of Kohal set the smouldering mass aflame. Something had got to be done. I passed two nights
in restlessness and pain. On Wednesday I knew the remedy. I must do penance.

"It is a warning to the Hindus and Musalmans who have professed to love me. If they have loved
me truly and if I have been deserving of their love, they will do penance with me for the grave sin
of denying God in their hearts.

" The penance of Hindus and Mussalmans is not falling but retracting their steps. It is true penance
for a Mussalman to harbour no ill-will for his Hindu brother and an equally true penance for a
Hindu to harbour none for his Mussalman brother.

" I did not consult friends—noteven Hakim Saheb who was close with me for a long lime on
Wednesday—not Maulana Mahomed Ali under whose roof I am enjoying the privilege of
hospitality.

"But was it right for me to go through the last under a Mussalman roof? (Gandhi was at that time
the guest of Mr. Mahomed Ali at Delhi). Yes, it was. The fast is not born out of ill-will against a
single soul. My being under a Mussalman roof ensures it against any such interpretation. It is in the
fitness of things that this fast should be taken up and completed in a Mussalman house.

" And who is Mahomed Ali ? Only two days before the fast we had a discussion about a private
matter in which I had told him what was mine was his and what was his was mine. Let me
gratefully tell the public that I have never received warmer or teller treatment than under Mahomed
Ali's roof. Every want of mine is anticipated. The dominant thought of every one of his household
is to make me and mine happy and comfortable. Doctors Ansari and Abdur Rehman have
constituted themselves my medical advisers. They examine me daily. I have had many a happy
occasion in my life. This is no less happy than the previous ones. Bread is not everything. I am
experiencing here the richest love. It is more than bread [or me.

" It has been whispered that by going so much with Mussalman friends, I make myself unfit to
know the Hindu mind. The Hindu mind is myself. Surely I do not live amidst Hindus to know the
Hindu mind when every fibre of my being is Hindu. My Hinduism must be a very poor thing if it
cannot flourish under influences the most adverse. I know instinctively what is necessary for
Hinduism. But I must labour to discover the Mussalman mind. The closer I come to the best of
Mussalmans,the juster I am likely to be in my estimate of the Mussalmans and their doings. I am
striving to become the best cement between the two communities. My longing is to be able to
cement the two with my blood, if necessary. But, before I can do so, I must prove to the
Mussalmans that I love them as well as I love the Hindus. My religion teaches me to love all
equally. May God help me to do so I My fast among other things is meant to qualify me for
achieving that equal and selfless love. "

The fast produced Unity Conferences. But the Unity Conferences produced nothing except pious
resolutions which were broken as soon as they were announced.

This short historical sketch of the part Mr. Gandhi played in bringing about Hindu-Moslem unity
may be concluded by a reference to the attitude of Mr. Gandhi in the negotiations about the
Communal Settlement. He offered the Muslims a blank cheque. The blank cheque only served to
exasperate the Muslims as they interpreted it as an act of evasion. He opposed the separate
electorates at the Round Table Conference. When they were given to the Muslims by the
Communal Award, Mr. Gandhi and the Congress did not approve of them. But when it came to
voting upon it, they took the strange attitude of neither approving it nor opposing it.

Such is the history of Mr. Gandhi's efforts to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity. What fruits did
these efforts bear? To be able to answer this question it is necessary to examine the relationship
between the two communities during 1920-40, the years during which Mr. Gandhi laboured so hard
to bring about Hindu-Moslem unity. The relationship is well described in the Annual Reports on
the affairs of India submitted year by year to Parliament by the Government of India under the old
Government of India Act. It is on these reports 28[f.28] that I have drawn for the facts recorded
below.

Beginning with the year 1920 there occurred in that year in Malabar what is known as the Mopla
Rebellion. It was the result of the agitation carried out by two Muslim organizations, the
Khuddam-i-Kaba (servants of the Mecca Shrine) and the Central Khilafat Committee. Agitators
actually preached the doctrine that India under the British Government was Dar-ul-Harab and that
the Muslims must fight against it and if they could not, they must carry out the alternative principle
of Hijrat. The Moplas were suddenly carried off their feet by this agitation. The outbreak was
essentially a rebellion against the British Government The aim was to establish the kingdom of
Islam by overthrowing the British Government. Knives, swords and spears were secretly
manufactured, bands of desperadoes collected for an attack on British authority. On 20th August a
severe encounter took place between the Moplas and the British forces at Pinmangdi Roads were
blocked, telegraph lines cut, and the railway destroyed in a number of places. As soon as the
administration had been paralysed, the Moplas declared that Swaraj had been established. A certain
Ali Mudaliar was proclaimed Raja, Khilafat flags were flown, and Ernad and Wallurana were
declared Khilafat Kingdoms. As a rebellion against the British Government it was quite
understandable. But what baffled most was the treatment accorded by the Moplas to the Hindus of
Malabar. The Hindus were visited by a dire fate at the hands of the Moplas. Massacres, forcible
conversions, desecration of temples, foul outrages upon women, such as ripping open pregnant
women, pillage, arson and destruction— in short, all the accompaniments of brutal and unrestrained
barbarism, were perpetrated freely by the Moplas upon the Hindus until such time as troops could
be hurried to the task of restoring order through a difficult and extensive tract of the country. This
was not a Hindu-Moslem riot. This was just a Bartholomew. The number of Hindus who were
killed, wounded or converted, is not known. But the number must have been enormous.

In the year 1921-22 communal jealously did not subside. The Muharram Celebrations had been
attended by serious riots both in Bengal and in the Punjab. In the latter province in particular,
communal feeling at Multan reached very serious heights, and although the casualty list was
comparatively small, a great deal of damage to property was done.

Though the year 1922-23 was a peaceful year the relations between the two communities were
strained throughout 1923-24. But in no locality did this tension produce such tragic consequences
as in the city of Kohat. The immediate cause of the trouble was the publication and circulation of a
pamphlet containing a virulently anti-Islamic poem. Terrible riots broke out on the 9th and 10th of
September 1924, the total casualties being about 155 killed and wounded. House property to the
estimated value of Rs. 9 lakhs was destroyed, and a large quantity of goods were looted. As a result
of this reign of terror the whole Hindu population evacuated the city of Kohat. After protracted
negotiations an agreement of reconciliation was concluded between the two communities.
Government giving an assurance that, subject to certain reservations, the prosecution pending
against persons concerned in rioting should be dropped. With the object of enabling the sufferers to
restart their businesses and rebuild their houses. Government sanctioned advances, free of interest
in certain instances, amounting to Rs. 5 lakhs. But even after the settlement had been reached and
evacuees had returned to Kohat there was no peace and throughout 1924-25 the tension between
the Hindu and Musalman masses in various parts of the country increased to a lamentable extent. In
the summer months, there was a distressing number of riots. In July, severe fighting broke out
between Hindus and Musalmans in Delhi, which was accompanied by serious casualties. In the
same month, there was a bad outbreak at Nagpur. August was even worse. There were riots at
Lahore, at Lucknow, at Moradabad, at Bhagalpur and Nagpur in British India ; while a severe
affray took place at Gulbarga in the Nizam's Dominions. September-October saw severe fighting at
Lucknow, Shahajahanpur, Kankinarah and at Allahabad. The most terrible outbreak of the year
being the one that took place at. Kohat which was accompanied by murder, arson and loot.

In 1925-26 the antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims became widespread. Very
significant features of the Hindu-Muslim rioting, which took place during this year were its wide
distribution and its occurrence, in some cases, in small villages. Calcutta, the United Provinces, the
Central Provinces and the Bombay Presidency were all scenes of riots, some of which led to
regrettable losses of life. Certain minor and local Hindu festivals which occurred at the end of
August, gave rise to communal trouble in Calcutta, in Berar, in Gujarat in the Bombay Presidency,
and in the United Provinces. In some of these places there were actual clashes between the two
communities, but elsewhere, notably at Kankinarah—one of the most thickly populated jute mill
centres of Calcutta—serious rioting was prevented by the activity of the police. In Gujarat,
Hindu-Muslim feeling was running high in these days and was marked by at least one case of
temple desecration. The important Hindu festival of Ramlila, at the end of September, gave rise to
acute anxiety in many places, and at Aligarh, an important place in the United Provinces, its
celebration was marked by one of the worst riots of the year. The riot assumed such dangerous
proportions that the police were compelled to fire in order to restore order, and five persons were
killed, either by the police or by riots. At Lucknow, the same festival gave rise at one time to a
threatening situation, but the local authorities prevented actual rioting. October saw another serious
riot at Sholapur in the Bombay Presidency. There, the local Hindus were taking a car with Hindu
idols through the city, and when they came near a mosque, a dispute arose between them and
certain Muslims, which developed into a riot.

A deplorable rioting started in Calcutta in the beginning of April as an affray outside a mosque
between Muslims and some Arya Samajists and continued to spread until 5th April, though there
was only one occasion on which the police or military were faced by a crowd which showed
determined resistance, namely, on the evening of the 5th April, when fire had to be opened. There
was also a great deal of incendiarism and in the first three days of this incendiarism, the Fire
Brigade had to deal with 110 fires. An unprecedented feature of the riots was the attacks on temples
by Muslims and on mosques by Hindus which naturally led to intense bitterness. There were 44
deaths and 584 injured. There was a certain amount of looting and business was suspended, with
great economic loss to Calcutta. Shops began to reopen soon after the 5th, but the period of tension
was prolonged by the approach of a Hindu festival on the 13th of April, and of the Id on the 14th.
The Sikhs were to have taken out a procession on the 13th, but Government were unable to give
them the necessary license. The apprehensions with regard to the 13th and 14th of April,
fortunately, did not materialise and outward peace prevailed until 22nd April when it was abruptly
broken as a result of a petty quarrel in a street, which restarted the rioting. Fighting between the
mobs of the two communities, generally on a small scale, accompanied by isolated assaults and
murders continued for six days. During this period there were no attacks on the temples and
mosques and there was little arson or looting. But there were more numerous occasions, on which
the hostile mobs did not immediately disperse on the appearance of the police and on 12 occasions
it was necessary to open fire. The total number of casualties during this second phase of the rioting
was 66 deaths and 391 injured. The dislocation of business was much more serious during the first
riots and the closing of Marwari business houses was not without an effect on European business
firms. Panic caused many of the markets to be wholly or partially closed and for two days the meat
supply was practically stopped. So great was the panic that the removal of refuse in the disturbed
area was stopped. Arrangements were, however, made to protect supplies, and the difficulty with
the Municipal scavengers was overcome, as soon as the Municipality had applied to the police for
protection. There was slight extension of the area of rioting, but no disturbances occurred in the
mill area around Calcutta. Systematic raiding of the portions of the disturbed area, the arrest of
hooligans, the seizure of weapons and the re-inforcement of the police by the posting of British
soldiers to act as special police officers had the desired effect, and the last three days of April, in
spite of the continuance of isolated assaults and murders, witnessed a steady improvement in the
situation. Isolated murders were largely attributable to hooligans of both communities and their
persistence during the first as well as the second outbreak induced a general belief that these
hooligans were hired assassins. Another equally persistent feature of the riots, namely, the
distribution of inflammatory printed leaflets by both sides, together with the employment of hired
roughs, strengthened the belief that money had been spent to keep the riots going.

The year 1926-27 was one continuous period of communal riots. Since April 1926, every month
witnessed affrays more or less serious between partizans of the two communities and only two
months passed without actual rioting in the legal sense of the word. The examination of the
circumstances of these numerous riots and affrays shows that they originated either in utterly petty
and trivial disputes between individuals, as, for example, between a Hindu shopkeeper and a
Mahomedan customer, or else, the immediate cause of trouble was the celebration of some
religious festival or the playing of music by Hindu processionists in the neighbourhood of
Mahomedan places of worship. One or two of the riots, indeed, were due to nothing more than
strained nerves and general excitement. Of these, the most striking example occurred in Delhi on
24th June, when the bolting of a pony in a crowded street gave the impression that a riot had
started, upon which both sides immediately attacked each other with brickbats and staves.

Including the two outbursts of rioting in Calcutta during April and May 1926,40 riots took place
during the twelve months ending with April 1st 1927, resulting in the death of 197 and injuries,
more or less severe, to 1,598 persons. These disorders were widespread, but Bengal, the Punjab,
and the United Provinces were the parts of India most seriously affected. Bengal suffered most
from rioting, but on many occasions during the year, tension between Hindus and Mahomedans
was high in the Bombay Presidency and also in Sind. Calcutta remained uneasy throughout the
whole of the summer. On 1st June a petty dispute developed into a riot in which forty persons were
hurt. After this, there was a lull in overt violence until July 15th on which day fell an important
Hindu religious festival. During its celebration the passage of a procession, with bands playing in
the neighbourhood of certain mosques, resulted in a conflict, in which 14 persons were killed and
116 injured. The next day saw the beginning of the important Mahomedan festival of Muharram.
Rioting broke out on that day and, after a lull, was renewed on the 19th, 20th, 21st and 22nd.
Isolated assaults and cases of stabbing occurred on the 23rd, 24th and 25th. The total ascertained
casualties during this period of rioting were 28 deaths and 226 injured. There were further riots in
Calcutta on the 15th September and 16th October and on the latter day there was also rioting in the
adjoining city of Howrah, during which one or two persons were killed and over 30 injured. The
April and May riots had been greatly aggravated by incendiarism, but, happily, this feature was
almost entirely absent from the later disorders and during the July riots, for example, the Fire
Brigade was called upon to deal with only four incendiary fires.

Coming to the year 1927-28 the following facts stare us in the face. Between the beginning of April
and the end of September 1927, no fewer than 25 riots were reported. Of these 10 occurred in the
United Provinces, six in the Bombay Presidency, 2 each in the Punjab, the Central Provinces,
Bengal, and Bihar and Orissa, and one in Delhi. The majority of these riots occurred during the
celebration of a religious festival by one or other of the two communities, whilst some arose out of
the playing of music by Hindus in the neighbourhood of mosques or out of the slaughter of cows by
the Muslims. The total casualties resulting from the above disorders were approximately 103
persons killed and 1,084 wounded.

By far the most serious riot reported during the year was that which took place in Lahore between
the 4th and 7th of May 1927. Tension between the two communities had been acute for some time
before the outbreak, and the trouble when it came was precipitated by a chance collision between a
Mahomedan and two Sikhs. The disorder spread with lightning speed and the heavy casualty
list—27 killed 272 injured—was largely swollen by unorganised attacks on individuals. Police and
troops were rushed to the scene of rioting quickly and it was impossible for clashes on a big scale
to take place between hostile groups. Casual assassinations and assaults were however, reported,
for two or three days longer before the streets and lanes of Lahore became safe for the solitary
passerby.

After the Lahore riot in May, there was a lull for two months in inter-communal rioting, if we
except a minor incident, which happened about the middle of June in Bihar and Orissa ; but July
witnessed no fewer than eight riots of which the most serious occurred in Multan in the Punjab, on
the occasion of the annual Muharram celebrations. Thirteen killed and twenty-four wounded was
the toll taken by this riot. But August was to see worse rioting still. In that month, nine riots
occurred, two of them resulting in heavy loss of life. In a riot in Bettiah, a town in Bihar and Orissa,
arising out of a dispute over a religious procession, eleven persons were killed and over a hundred
injured, whilst the passage of a procession in front of a mosque in Bareilly in the United Provinces
was the occasion of rioting in which fourteen persons were killed and 165 were injured.
Fortunately, this proved to be the turning point in inter-communal trouble during the year, and
September witnessed only 4 riots. One of these, however, the riot in Nagpur in the Central
Provinces on September 4th was second only to Lahore riot in seriousness and in the damage which
it caused. The spark, which started the fire, was the trouble in connection with a Muslim
procession, but the materials for the combustion had been collected for some time. Nineteen
persons were killed and 123 injured were admitted to hospitals as a result of this riot, during the
course of which many members of the Muslim community abandoned their homes in Nagpur.

A feature of Hindu-Muslim relations during the year which was hardly less serious than the riots
was the number of murderous outrages committed by members of one community against persons
belonging to the other. Some of the most serious of these outrages were perpetrated in connection
with the agitation relating to Rangila Rasul and Risala Vartman, two publications containing most
scurrilous attack on the Prophet Muhammed and as a result of them, a number of innocent persons
lost their lives, sometimes in circumstances of great barbarity. In Lahore a series of outrages
against individuals led to a state of great excitement and insecurity during the summer of 1927.
The excitement over the Rangila Rasul 29[f.29] case had by now travelled far from its original
centre and by July had begun to produce unpleasant repercussions on and across the North-West
Frontier. The first signs of trouble in this region became apparent early in June, and by the latter
part of July the excitement had reached its height. On the British side of the border, firm and tactful
handling of the situation by the local authorities averted, what would have been a serious breach of
the peace. Economic boycott of Hindus was freely advocated in the British Frontier Districts,
especially in Peshawar, but this movement met with little success, and although the Hindus were
maltreated in one or two villages, the arrest of the culprits, together with appropriate action under
the Criminal Law, quickly restored order. Across the border however, the indignation, aroused by
these attacks on the Prophet, gave rise to more serious consequences. The Frontier tribesmen are
acutely sensitive to the appeal of religion and when a well-known Mullah started to preach against
the Hindus among the Afridis and Shinwaris in the neighbourhood of the Khyber Pass, his words
fell on fruitful ground. He called upon the Afridis and Shinwaris to expel all the Hindus living in
their midst unless they declared in writing that they dissociated themselves from the doings of their
co-religionists down country. The first to expel their Hindu neighbours were two clans of the
Khyber Afridis, namely the Kuikhel and Zakkakhel, on the 22nd July. From these, the excitement
spread among their Shinwari neighbours, who gave their Hindu neighbours notice to quit a few
days later. However, after the departure of some of the Hindus, the Shinwaris agreed to allow the
remainder to stay on. Some of the Hindus on leaving the Khyber were roughly handled. In two
cases, stones were thrown, though happily without any damage resulting. In a third case, a Hindu
was wounded and a large amount of property carried off, but this was recovered by Afridi
Khassadars in full, and the culprits were fined for the offence. Thereafter, arrangements were made
for the picketing of the road for the passage of any Hindu evacuating tribal territory. Under
pressure from the Political Agent an Afridi jirga decided towards the end of July to suspend the
Hindu boycott pending a decision in the Risala Vartman case. In the following week, however,
several Hindu families, who had been living at Landi Kotal at the head of the Khyber Pass moved
to Peshawar refusing to accept assurances of the tribal chiefs but leaving one person from each
family behind to watch over their interests. All told, between four hundred and fifty Hindus, men,
women and children, had come into Peshawar by the Middle of August, when the trouble was
definitely on the wane. Some of the Hindus were definitely expelled, some were induced to leave
their homes by threats, some left from fear, some no doubt from sympathy with their neighbours.
This expulsion and voluntary exodus from tribal territory were without parallel. Hindus had lived
there for more generations than most of them could record as valued and respected, and, indeed, as
essential members of the tribal system, for whose protection the tribesmen had been jealous, and
whose blood feuds they commonly made their own. In all, about 450 Hindus left the Khyber during
the excitement ; of these, about 330 had returned to their homes in tribal territory by the close of the
year 1927. Most of the remainder had decided to settle, at any rate for the present, amid the more
secure conditions of British India.

The year 1928-29 was comparatively more peaceful than the year 1927-28. His Excellency Lord
Irwin, by his speeches to the Central Legislature and outside, had given a strong impetus to the
attempts to find some basis for agreement between the two communities, on those questions of
political importance, which were responsible for the strained relations between them. Fortunately
the issues arising out of the inquiry by the Simon Commission which was appointed in 1929,
absorbed a large part of the energy and attention of the different communities, with the result that
less importance came to be attached to local causes of conflict, and more importance to the broad
question of constitutional policy. Moreover, the legislation passed during the autumn session of the
Indian Legislature in 1927 penalising the instigation of inter-communal hostility by the press, had
some effect in improving the inter-communal disturbances. The number of riots during the twelve
months ending with March 31st, 1929, was 22. Though the number of riots was comparatively
small, the casualties,—swelled heavily by the Bombay riots,—were very serious, no fewer than 204
persons having been killed and nearly a thousand injured. Of these, the fortnight's rioting in
Bombay accounts for 149 killed and 739 injured. Seven of these 22 riots, or roughly one-third of
them, occurred on the day of the celebration of the annual Muslim festival of Bakr-i-Id at the end of
May. The celebration of this festival is always a dangerous time in Hindu-Muslim relations. The
Muslim regard it as a day of animal sacrifice, and as the animal chosen is almost always a cow the
slightest tension between the two communities is apt to produce an explosion. Of the Bakr-i-Id riots
only two were serious and both of them took place in the Punjab. The first took place in a village in
the Ambala District in which ten people were killed and nine injured. The other riot which took
place in Softa village in the Gurgaon District in the Southern Punjab, attained considerable
notoriety because of its sensational features. The village of Softa is about 27 miles south of Delhi
and is inhabited by Muslims. This village is surrounded by villages occupied by Hindu cultivators
who, on hearing that the muslims of Softa intended to sacrifice a cow on the ' Id Day ', objected to
the sacrifice of the particular cow selected on the ground that it had been accustomed to graze in
fields belonging to the Hindu cultivators. The dispute over the matter assumed a threatening aspect
and the Superintendent of Police of the district accordingly went with a small force of police, about
25 men in all, to try to keep peace. He took charge of the disputed cow and locked it up, but his
presence did not deter the Hindu cultivators of a few neighbouring villages from collecting about a
thousand people armed with pitchforks, spears and staves, and going to Softa. The Superintendent
of Police and an Indian Revenue official, who were present in the village, assured the crowd that
the cow, in connection with which the dispute had arisen would not be sacrificed, but this did not
satisfy the mob which threatened to burn the whole village if any cow was sacrificed, and also
demanded that the cow should be handed over to them. The Superintendent of Police refused to
agree to this demand, whereupon the crowd became violent and began to throw stones at the police
and to try to get round the latter into the village. The Superintendent of Police warned the crowd to
disperse, but to no effect. He, therefore, fired one shot from his revolver as a further warning.
Notwithstanding the crowd still continued to advance and the Superintendent had to order his party
of police to fire. Only one volley was fired at first, but as this did not cause the retreat of the mob,
two more volleys had to be fired before the crowd slowly dispersed, driving off some cattle
belonging to the village.

While the police were engaged in this affair a few Hindu cultivators got into Softa at another place
and tried to set fire to the village. They were, however, driven away by the police after they had
inflicted injuries on three or four men. In all 14 persons were killed and 33 were injured. The
Punjab Government deputed a judicial officer to enquire into this affair. His report, which was
published on 6th July, justified the action of the police in firing on the mob and recorded the
opinion that there was no reason to suppose that the firing was excessive or was continued after the
mob had desisted from its unlawful aggression. Had the police not opened fire, the report proceeds,
their own lives would have been in immediate danger, as also the lives of the people of Softa.
Lastly, in the opinion of the officer writing the report, had Softa village been sacked, there would
certainly have broken up, within 24 hours, a terrible communal conflagration in the whole of the
surrounding country-side.
The riots of Kharagpur, an important railway centre not far from Calcutta, also resulted in serious
loss of life. Two riots took place at Kharagpur, the first on the occasion of the Muharram
celebration at the end of June and the second on the 1st September 1928, when the killing of a cow
served as a cause. In the first riot 15 were killed and 21 injured, while in the second riot, the
casualties were 9 killed and 35 wounded. But none of these riots is to be compared with those that
raged in Bombay from the beginning to the middle of February, when, as we have seen, 149
persons were killed and well over 700 injured.

During the year 1929-30 communal riots, which had been so conspicuous and deplorable a feature
of public life during the preceding years, were very much less frequent. Only 12 were of sufficient
importance to be reported to Government of India, and of these only the disturbances in the City of
Bombay were really serious. Starting on the 23rd of April they continued sporadically until the
middle of May, and were responsible for 35 deaths and about 200 other casualties. An event which
caused considerable tension in April was the murder at Lahore of Rajpal, whose pamphlet Rangila
Rasul, containing a scurrilous attack on the Prophet of Islam, was responsible for much of the
communal trouble in previous years, and also for a variety of legal and political complications.
Fortunately, both communities showed commendable restraint at the time of the murder, and again
on the occasion of the execution and funeral of the convicted man ; and although feelings ran high
no serious trouble occurred.

The year 1930-31 saw the eruption of the Civil Disobedience Movement It gave rise to riots and
disturbances all over the country. They were mostly of a political character and the parties involved
in them were the police and the Congress volunteers. But, as it always happens in India, the
political disturbances took a communal twist. This was due to the fact that the Muslims refused to
submit to the coercive methods used by Congress volunteers to compel them to join in Civil
Disobedience. The result was that although the year began with political riots it ended in numerous
and quite serious communal riots. The worst of these communal riots took place in and around
Sukkur in Sind between the 4th and 11th of August and affected over a hundred villages. The
outbreak in the Kishoreganj subdivision of Mymensingh District (Bengal) on the 12th/15th of July
was also on a large scale. In addition, there were communal disturbances on the 3rd of August in
Ballia (United Provinces) ; on the 6th of September in Nagpur, and on the 6th/7th September in
Bombay ; and a Hindu-Christian riot broke out near Tiruchendur (Madras) on the 31st of October.
On the 12th of February, in Amritsar, an attempt was made to murder a Hindu cloth merchant who
had defied the picketers, and a similar outrage which was perpetrated the day before in Benares had
very serious consequences. On this occasion, the victim was a Muslim trader, and the attack proved
fatal; as a result, since Hindu-Muslim relations throughout most of Northern India were by this time
very strained, a serious communal riot broke out and continued for five days, causing great
destruction of property and numerous casualties. Among the other communal clashes during this
period were the riots at Nilphamari (Bengal) on the 25th of January and at Rawalpindi on the 31st.
Throughout Northern India communal relations had markedly deteriorated during the first two
months of 1931, and already, in February, there had been serious communal rioting in Benares,
This state of affairs was due chiefly to the increasing exasperation created among Muslims by the
paralysis of trade and the general atmosphere of unrest and confusion that resulted from Congress
activities. The increased importance which the Congress seemed to be acquiring as a result of the
negotiations with the Government aroused in the Muslims serious apprehensions and had the effect
of worsening the tension between the two communities. During March, this tension, in the United
Provinces at any rate, became greatly increased. Between the 14th and 16th there was serious
rioting in the Mirzapur District, and on the 17th, trouble broke out in Agra and continued till the
20th. There was also a communal riot in Dhanbad (Bengal) on the 28th, and in Amritsar District on
the 30th ; and in many other parts of the country, the relations between members of the two
communities had become extremely strained.

In Assam, the communal riot which occurred at Digboi in Lakhimpur District, resulted in deaths of
one Hindu and three Muslims. In Bengal, a communal riot took place in the Asansol division
during the Muharram festival. In Bihar and Orissa there was a certain amount of communal tension
during the year, particularly in Saran. Altogether there were 16 cases of communal rioting and
unlawful assembly. During the Bakr-i-Id festival a clash occurred in the Bhabua sub-division of
Shahabad. Some 300 Hindus collected in the mistaken belief that a cow had been sacrificed. The
local officers had succeeded in pacifying them when a mob of about 200 Muhammedans armed
with lathis, spears and swords, attacked the Hindus, one of whom subsequently died. The prompt
action of the police and the appointment of a conciliation committee prevented the spread of the
trouble. The Muharram festival was marked by two small riots in Monghyr, the Hindus being the
aggressors on one occasion and the Muslims on the other. In the Madras Presidency there were also
several riots of a communal nature during the year and the relations between the communities were
in places distinctly strained. The most serious disturbance of the year occurred at Vellore on the 8th
of June, as a result of the passage of a Muslim procession with Tazias near a Hindu temple ; so
violent was the conflict between members of the two communities that the police were compelled
to open fire in order to restore order ; and sporadic fighting continued in the town during the next
two or three days. In Salem town, owing to Hindu-Muslim tension a dispute arose on the 13th of
July, as to who had been the victor at a largely attended Hindu-Muslim wrestling match at
Shevapet. Another riot occurred in October at Kitchipalaiyam near Salem town ; the trouble arose
from a few Muslims disturbing a street game played by some young Hindus. Hindu-Muslim
disturbances also arose in Polikal village, Kurnool District, on the 15th of March, owing to a
dispute about the route of a Hindu procession, but the rioters were easily dispersed by a small force
of police. In the Punjab there were 907 cases of rioting during the year as compared with 813 in
1929. Many of them were of a communal character, and the tension between the two principal
communities remained acute in many parts of the Province. In the United Provinces, although
communal tension during 1930 was not nearly so acute as during the first 3 months of 1931, and
was for a while overshadowed by the excitement engendered by the Civil Disobedience Movement,
indications of it were fairly numerous, and the causes of disagreement remained as potent as ever.
In Dehra Dun and Bulandshahr there were communal riots of the usual type, and a very serious riot
occurred in Ballia city as a result of a dispute concerning the route taken by a Hindu procession,
which necessitated firing by the police. Riots also occurred in Muttra, Azamgarh, Mainpuri and
several other places.

Passing on to the events of the year 1931-32, the progress of constitutional discussions at the R. T.
C. had a definite reaction in that it bred a certain nervousness among the Muslim and other minority
communities as to their position under a constitution functioning on the majority principle. The first
session of the Round Table Conference afforded the first " close-up " of the constitutional future.
Until then the ideal of Dominion Status had progressed little beyond a vague and general
conception, but the declaration of the Princes at the opening of the Conference had brought
responsibility at the Centre, in the form of a federal government, within definite view. The
Muslims, therefore, felt that it was high time for them to take stock of their position. This
uneasiness was intensified by the Irwin-Gandhi settlement, which accorded what appeared to be a
privileged position to the Congress, and Congress elation and pose of victory over the Government
did not tend to ease Muslim misgivings. Within three weeks of the " pact " occurred the savage
communal riots at Cawnpore, which significantly enough began with the attempts of Congress
adherents to force Mahomedan shopkeepers to observe a hartal in memory of Bhagat Singh who
was executed on 23rd March. On 24th March began the plunder of Hindu shops. On the 25th there
was a blaze. Shops and temples were set fire to and burnt to cinders. Disorder, arson, loot, murder,
spread like wild fire. Five hundred families abandoned their houses and took shelter in villages. Dr.
Ramchandra was one of the worst sufferers. All members of his family, including his wife and aged
parents, were killed and their bodies thrown into gutters. In the same slaughter Mr. Ganesh Shankar
Vidyarthi lost his life. The Cawnpore Riots Inquiry Committee in its report states that the riot was
of unprecedented violence and peculiar atrocity, which spread with unexpected rapidity through the
whole city and even beyond it. Murders, arson and looting were widespread for three days, before
the rioting was definitely brought under control. Afterwards it subsided gradually. The loss of life
and property was great. The number of verified deaths was 300; but the death roll is known to have
been larger and was probably between four and five hundred. A large number of temples and
mosques were desecrated or burnt or destroyed and a very large number of houses were burnt and
pillaged.

This communal riot, which need never have occurred but for the provocative conduct of the
adherents of the Congress, was the worst which India has experienced for many years. The trouble,
moreover, spread from the city to the neighbouring villages, where there were sporadic communal
disturbances for several days afterwards.

The year 1932-33 was relatively free from communal agitations and disturbances. This welcome
improvement was doubtless in some measure due to the suppression of lawlessness generally and
the removal of uncertainty in regard to the position of the Muslims under the new constitution.

But in 1933-34 throughout the country communal tension had been increasing and disorders which
occurred not only on the occasion of such festivals as Holi, Id and Muharram, but also many
resulting from ordinary incidents of every-day life indicated, that there had been a deterioration in
communal relations since the year began. Communal riots during Holi occurred at Benares and
Cawnpore in the United Provinces, at Lahore in the Punjab, and at Peshawar. Bakr-i-ld was marked
by serious rioting at Ayodhya, in the United Provinces over cow sacrifice, also at Bhagalpore in
Bihar and Orissa and at Cannanore in Madras. A serious riot in the Ghazipur District of the United
Provinces also resulted in several deaths. During April and May there were Hindu-Muslim riots at
several places in Bihar and Orissa, in Bengal, in Sind and Delhi, some of them provoked by very
trifling incidents, as for instance, the unintentional spitting by a Muslim shopkeeper of Delhi upon
a Hindu passer-by. The increase in communal disputes in British India was also reflected in some
of the States where similar incidents occurred.

The position with regard to communal unrest during the months from June to October was
indicative of the normal, deep-seated antagonism between the two major communities. June and
July months, in which no Hindu or Muhammedan festival of importance took place, were
comparatively free from riots, though the situation in certain areas of Bihar necessitated the
quartering of additional police. A long-drawn-out dispute started in Agra. The Muslims of this city
objected to the noise of religious ceremonies in certain Hindu private houses which they said
disturbed worshippers at prayers in a neighbouring mosque. Before the dispute was settled, riots
occurred on the 20th July and again on the 2nd September, in the course of which 4 persons were
killed and over 80 injured. In Madras a riot, on the 3rd September resulting in one death and
injuries to 13 persons was occasioned by a book published by Hindus containing alleged reflections
on the Prophet. During the same month minor riots occurred in several places in the Punjab and the
United Provinces.
In 1934-35 serious trouble arose in Lahore on the 29th June as a result of a dispute between
Muslims and Sikhs about a mosque situated within the precincts of a Sikh temple known as the
Shahidganj Gurudwara. Trouble had been brewing for some time. Ill-feeling became intensified
when the Sikhs started to demolish the Mosque despite Muslim protests. The building had been the
subject of prolonged litigation, which has confirmed the Sikh right of possession.

On the night of the 29th June a crowd of 3 or 4 thousand Muslims assembled in front of the
Gurudwara. A struggle between this crowd and the Sikhs inside the Gurudwara was only averted by
the prompt action of the local authorities. They subsequently obtained an undertaking from the
Sikhs to refrain from further demolition. But during the following week, while strenuous efforts
were being made to persuade the leaders to reach an amicable settlement, the Sikhs under pressure
of extremist influence again set about demolishing the mosque. This placed the authorities in a
most difficult position. The Sikhs were acting within their legal rights. Moreover the only effective
method of stopping demolition would have been to resort to firing. As the building was full of
Sikhs and was within the precincts of a Sikh place of worship, this would not only have caused
much bloodshed but, for religious reasons, would have had serious reactions on the Sikh population
throughout the Province. On the other hand, inaction by Government was bound to cause great
indignation among the Muslims, for religious reasons : and it was expected that this would show
itself in sporadic attacks on the Sikhs and perhaps on the forces of Government.

It was hoped that discussions between leaders of the two communities would effect some
rapprochement, but mischief-makers inflamed the minds of their co-religionists. Despite the arrest
of the chief offenders, the excitement increased. The Government's gesture in offering to restore to
the Muslims another mosque which they had purchased years ago proved unavailing.
The situation took a further turn for the worse on the 19th July and during the following two days
the situation was acutely dangerous. The Central Police station was practically besieged by the
huge crowds, which assumed a most menacing attitude. Repeated attempts to disperse them without
the use of firearms failed and the troops had to fire twice on the 20th July and eight times on the
21st. In all 23 rounds were fired and 12 persons killed. Casualties, mostly of a minor nature, were
numerous amongst the military and police.

As a result of the firing, the crowds dispersed and did not reassemble. Extra police were brought in
from other Provinces and the military garrisons were strengthened. Administrative control was
re-established rapidly, but the religious leaders continued to fan the embers of the agitation. Civil
litigation was renewed and certain Muslim organisations framed some extravagant demands.

The situation in Lahore continued to cause anxiety up to the close of the year. On the 6th
November, a Sikh was mortally wounded by a Muslim. Three days later a huge Sikh-Hindu
procession was taken out. The organisers appeared anxious to avoid conflict but nonetheless one
serious clash occurred. This was followed by further rioting on the next day. But for the good work
of the police and the troops, in breaking up the fights quickly, the casualties might have been very
large.

On the 19th March 1935 a serious incident occurred in Karachi after the execution of Abdul
Quayum, the Muslim who had murdered Nathuramal, a Hindu, already referred to as the writer of a
scurrilous pamphlet about the Prophet. Abdul Quayum's body was taken by the District Magistrate,
accompanied by a police party, to be handed over to the deceased's family for burial outside the
city. A huge crowd, estimated to be about 25,000 strong, collected at the place of burial. Though
the relatives of Abdul Quayum wished to complete the burial at the cemetery, the most violent
members of the mob determined to take the body in procession through the city. The local
authorities decided to prevent the mob entering, since this would have led to communal rioting. All
attempts of the police to stop the procession failed, so a platoon of the Royal Sussex Regiment was
brought in to keep peace. It was forced to open fire at short range to stop the advance of the
frenzied mob and to prevent itself from being overwhelmed. Forty-seven rounds were fired by
which 47 people were killed and 134 injured. The arrival of reinforcements prevented further
attempts to advance. The wounded were taken to the Civil Hospital and the body of Abdul Quayum
was then interred without further trouble.

On the 25th August 1935 there was a communal riot at Secunderabad.

In the year 1936 there were four communal riots. On the 14th April there occurred a most terrible
riot at Firozabad in the Agra District. A Muslim procession was proceeding along the main bazar
and it is alleged that bricks were thrown from the roofs of Hindu houses. This enraged the Muslims
in the procession who set fire to the house of a Hindu, Dr. Jivaram, and the adjacent temple of
Radha Krishna. The inmates of Dr. Jivaram's house in addition to 11 Hindus including 3 children
were burnt to death. A second Hindu-Muslim riot broke out in Poona in the Bombay Presidency on
24th April 1936. On the 27th April there occurred a Hindu-Muslim riot in Jamalpur in the Monghyr
District. The fourth Hindu-Muslim riot of the year took place in Bombay on the 15th October 1936.

The year 1937 was full of communal disturbances. On the 27th March 1937 there was a
Hindu-Muslim riot at Panipat over the Holi procession and 14 persons were killed. On the 1st May
1937 there occurred a communal riot in Madras in which 50 persons were injured. The month of
May was full of communal riots which took place mostly in the C. P. and the Punjab. One that took
place in Shikarpur in Sind caused great panic. On 18th June there was a Sikh-Muslim riot in
Amritsar. It assumed such proportions that British troops had to be called out to maintain order.

The year 1938 was marked by two communal riots—one in Allahabad on 26th March and. another
in Bombay in April.

There were 6 Hindu-Muslim riots in 1939. On the 21st January there was a riot at Asansol in which
one was killed and 18 injured. It was followed by a riot in Cawnpore on the 11th February in which
42 were killed, 200 injured and 800 arrested. On the 4th March there was a riot at Benares followed
by a riot at Cassipore near Calcutta on the 5th March. On 19th June there was again a riot at
Cawnpore over the Rathajatra procession.

A serious riot occurred on 20th November 1939 in Sukkur in Sind. The riot was the culmination of
the agitation by the Muslims to take possession, even by force, of a building called Manzilgah
which was in the possession of Government as Government property and to the transfer of which
the Hindus had raised objections. Mr. E. Weston—now a judge of the Bombay High Court—who
was appointed to investigate into the disturbances gives 30[f.30] the following figures of the
murdered and the wounded :
 Taluka. Murders committed. Persons Persons

injured. Subsequently

died from injuries.

Hindus. Mdns. Ilindus. Mdns. Ilindus. Mdns.
Sukkur Town 20 12 11 11 1
Sukkur Taluka 2 2 23 5
Shikarpur Taluka 5 11 2
Garhi Yasin Taluka 24 4
Rohri Taluka 10 3
Pano Akil Taluka 6 1
Ghorki Taluka 1 1
Mirpur Mathelo Taluka 1
Ubauro Taluka 4 3 1 1
142 14 58 12 9

Of the many gruesome incidents recorded by him the following may be quoted:

" The most terrible of all the disturbances occurred on the night of the 20th at Gosarji village which
is eight miles from Sukkur and sixteen from Shikarpur. According to an early statement sent by the
District Magistrate to Government, admittedly incomplete, 27 Hindus were murdered there that
night. According to the witnesses examined the number was 37.

" Pamanmal, a contractor of Gosarji states that at the time of satyagraha the leading Hindus of
Gosarji came in deputation to the leading zemindar of the locality Khan Sahib Amirbux who was
then at Sukkur. He reassured them and said he was responsible for their safely. On the 20th Khan
Sahib Amirbux was at Gosarji, and that morning Mukhi Mahrumal was murdered there. The
Hindus went to Khan Sahib Amirbux for protection and were again reassured, but that night
wholesale murder and looting took place. Of the 37 murdered, seven were women. Pamanmal
states that the following morning he went to the Sub-Inspector of Bagerji, which is one mile from
Gosarji, but he was abused and driven from the thana. He then went to Shikarpur and complained
to the panchayat, but did not complain to any officer there. I may mention that the Sub-Inspector of
Bagerji was afterwards prosecuted under section 211, Indian Penal Code, and has been convicted
for failure to make arrests in connection with murders at Gosarji.

" As Khan Sahib Amirbux, the zemindar, who was said to have given assurance of protection to the
Hindus of Bagerji, was reported to be attending the Court, he was called and examined as a Court
witness. He states that he lives half a mile from Gosarji village. The Sub-Inspector of Bagerji came
to Gosarji on the 20th after the murder of Mehrumal, and he acted as a mashir. He says that the
Hindus did not ask for help and there was no apprehension of trouble. On the night of the 20th he
was not well, and he heard nothing of the murders. He admits that he had heard of the Manzilgah
evacuation. Later in his evidence he admits that he told the villagers of Gosarji to be on the alert as
there was trouble in Sukkur, and he says he had called the panchayat on the evening of the 19th. He
went to Gosarji at sunrise on the 21st after the murders. He admits that he is regarded as the
protector of Gosarji. "

Mr. Weston adds 31[f.31] :—

" I find it impossible to believe the evidence of this witness. I have no doubt that he was fully aware
that there was trouble in Gosarji on the night of 20th and preferred to remain in his house. "
Who can deny that this record of rioting presents a picture which is grim in its results and sombre
in its tone ? But being chronological in order, the record might fail to give an idea of the havoc
these riots have caused in any given Province and the paralysis it has brought about in its social and
economic life. To give an idea of the paralysis caused by the recurrence of riots in a Province I
have recast the record of riots for the Province of Bombay. When recast the general picture appears
as follows :

Leaving aside the Presidency and confining oneself to the City of Bombay, there can be no doubt
that the record of the city is the blackest. The first Hindu-Muslim riot took place in 1893. This was
followed by a long period of communal peace which lasted upto 1929. But the years that have
followed have an appalling story to tell. From February 1929 to April 1938—a period of nine
years—there were no less than 10 communal riots. In 1929 there were two communal riots. In the
first, 149 were killed and 739 were injured and it lasted for 36 days. In the second riot 35 were
killed, 109 were injured and it continued for 22 days. In 1930 there were two riots. Details as to
loss of life and its duration are not available. In 1932 there were again two riots. The first was a
small one. In the second 217 were killed, 2,713 were injured and it went on for 49 days. In 1933
there was one riot, details about which are not available. In 1936 there was one riot in which 94
were killed, 632 were injured and it continued to rage for 65 days. In the riot of 1937, 11 were
killed, 85 were injured and it occupied 21 days. The riot of 1938 lasted for 2 1/2 hours only but
within that time 12 were killed and a little over 100 were injured. Taking the total period of 9 years
and 2 months from February 1929 to April 1938 the Hindus and Muslims of the City of Bombay
alone were engaged in a sanguinary warfare for 210 days during which period 550 were killed and
4,500 were wounded. This does not of course take into consideration the loss of property which
took place through arson and loot.

Such is the record of Hindu-Muslim relationship from 1920 to 1940. Placed side by side with the
frantic efforts made by Mr. Gandhi to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity, the record makes most
painful and heart-rending reading. It would not be much exaggeration to say that it is a record of
twenty years of civil war between the Hindus and the Muslims in India, interrupted by brief
intervals of armed peace.

In this civil war men were, of course, the principal victims. But women did not altogether escape
molestation. It is perhaps not sufficiently known how much women have suffered in communal
hostilities. Data relating to the whole of India are not available. But some data relating to Bengal
exist.

On the 6th September 1932 questions were asked in the old Bengal Legislative Council regarding
the abduction of women in the Province of Bengal. In reply, the Government of the day stated that
between 1922 to 1927, the total number of women abducted was 568. Of these, 101 were
unmarried and 467 were married. Asked to state the community to which the abducted women
belonged, it was disclosed that out of 101 unmarried women 64 were Hindus, 29 Muslims, 4
Christians, and 4 non-descript : and that out of 467 married women 331 were Hindus, 122 Muslims,
2 Christians and 12 non-descript. These figures relate to cases which were reported or if reported
were not detected. Usually, about 10 p.c. of the cases are reported or detected and 90 p.c. go
undetected. Applying this proportion to the facts disclosed by the Bengal Government, it may be
said that about 35,000 women were abducted in Bengal during the short period of five years
between 1922-27.

The attitude towards women-folk is a good index of the friendly or unfriendly attitude between the
two communities. As such, the case which happened on 27th June 1936 in the village of Govindpur
in Bengal makes very instructive reading. The following account of it is taken from the opening
speech 32[f.32] of the Crown counsel when the trial of 40 Mahomedan accused began on the 10th
August 1936. According to the prosecution :
" There lived in Govindpur a Hindu by name Radha Vallabh. He had a son Harendra. There lived
also in Govindpur a Muslim woman whose occupation was to sell milk. The local Musalmans of
the village suspected that Harendra had illicit relationship with this Muslim milk woman. They
resented that a Muslim woman should be in the keeping of a Hindu and they decided to wreak their
vengeance on the family of Radha Vallabh for this insult. A meeting of the Musalmans of
Govindpur was convened and Harendra was summoned to allend this meeting. Soon after Harendra
went to the meeting, cries of Harendra were heard. It was found that Harendra was assaulted and
was lying senseless in the field where the meeting was held. The Musalmans of Govindpur were
not satisfied with this assault. They informed Radha Vallabh that unless he, his wife and his
children embraced Islam the Musalmans did not feel satisfied for the wrong his son had done to
them. Radha Vallabh was planning to send away to another place his wife and children. The
Musalmans came to know this plan. Next day when Kusum, the wife of Radha Vallabh, was
sweeping the courtyard of her house, some Mahomedans came, held down Radha Vallabh and
some spirited away Kusum, After having taken her to some distance two Mahomedans by name
Laker and Mahaxar raped her and removed her ornaments. After some time, she came to her senses
and ran towards her home. Her assailants again pursued her. She succeeded in reaching her home
and locking herself in. Her Muslim assailants broke open the door, caught hold of her and again
carried her away on the road. It was suggested by her assailants that she should be again raped on
the street. But with the help of another woman by name Rajani, Kusum escappd and look shelter in
the house of Rajani. While she was in the house of Rajani the Musalmans of Govindpur paraded
her husband Radha Vallabh in the streets in complete disgrace. Next day the Musalmans kept watch
on the roads to and from Govindpur to the Police Station to prevent Radha Vallabh and Kusum
from giving information of the outrage to the Police. "

These acts of barbarism against women, committed without remorse, without shame and without
condemnation by their fellow brethren show the depth of the antagonism which divided the two
communities. The tempers on each side were the tempers of two warring nations. There was
carnage, pillage, sacrilege and outrage of every species, perpetrated by Hindus against Musalmans
and by Musalmans against Hindus—more perhaps by Musalmans against Hindus than by Hindus
against Musalmans. Cases of arson have occurred in which Musalmans have set fire to the houses
of Hindus, in which whole families of Hindus, men, women and children were roasted alive and
consumed in the fire, to the great satisfaction of the Muslim spectators. What is astonishing is that
these cold and deliberate acts of rank cruelty were not regarded as atrocities to be condemned but
were treated as legitimate acts of warfare for which no apology was necessary. Enraged by these
hostilities, the editor of the Hindustan—a Congress paper—writing in 1926 used the following
language to express the painful truth of the utter failure of Mr. Gandhi's efforts to bring about
Hindu-Muslim unity. In words of utter despair the editor said 33[f.33] :

" There is an immense distance between the India of to-day and India a nation, between an uncouth
reality which expresses itself in murder and arson and that fond fiction which is in the imagination
of patriotic if self-deceiving men. To talk about Hindu-Muslim unity from a thousand platforms or
to give it blazoning headlines is to perpetrate an illusion whose cloudly structure dissolves itself at
the exchange of brick-bats and the desecration of tombs and temples. To sing a few pious hymns
of peace and goodwill a la Naidu. . . . .. will not benefit the country. The President of the Congress
has been improvising on the theme of Hindu- Muslim unity, so dear to her heart, with brilliant
variations, which does credit to her genius but leaves the problem untouched. The millions in India
can only respond when the unity song is not only on the tongues of the leaders but in the hearts of
the millions of their countrymen. "

Nothing I could say can so well show the futility of any hope of Hindu-Muslim unity.
Hindu-Muslim unity upto now was at least in sight although it was like a mirage. Today it is out of
sight and also out of mind. Even Mr. Gandhi has given up what, he perhaps now realizes, is an
impossible task.

But there are others who notwithstanding the history of the past twenty years, believe in the
possibility of Hindu-Muslim unity. This belief of theirs seems to rest on two grounds. Firstly/they
believe in the efficacy of a Central Government to mould diverse set of people into one nation.
Secondly, they feel that the satisfaction of Muslim demands will be a sure means of achieving
Hindu-Muslim unity.

It is true that Government is a unifying force and that there are many instances where diverse
people have become unified into one homogeneous people by reason of their being subjected to a
single Government. But the Hindus, who are depending upon Government as a unifying force seem
to forget that there are obvious limits to Government acting as a unifying force. The limits to
Government working as a unifying force are set by the possibilities of fusion among the people. In
a country where race, language and religion do not stand in the way of fusion. Government is most
effective as a unifying force. On the other hand, in a country where race, language and religion put
an effective bar against fusion, Government can have no effect as a unifying force. If the diverse
people in France, England, Italy and Germany became unified nations by reason of a common
Government, it was because neither race, language nor religion obstructed the unifying process of
Government. On the other hand, if the people in Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Turkey
failed to be unified, although under a common Government, it was because race, language and
religion were strong enough to counter and nullify the unifying power of Government. No one can
deny that race, language and religion have been too dominant in India to permit the people of India
to be welded into a nation by the unifying force of a common Government. It is an illusion to say
that the Central Government in India has moulded the Indian people into a nation. What the Central
Government has done, is to tie them together by one law and to house them together in one place,
as the owner of unruly animals does, by tying them with one rope and keeping them in one stable.
All that the Central Government has done is to produce a kind of peace among Indians. It has not
made them one nation.

It cannot be said that time has been too short for unification to take place. If one hundred and fifty
years of life under a Central Government does not suffice, eternity will not suffice. For this failure
the genius of the Indians alone is responsible. There is among Indians no passion for unity, no
desire for fusion. There is no desire to have a common dress. There is no desire to have a common
language. There is no will to give up what is local and particular for something which is common
and national. A Gujarati takes pride in being a Gujarati, a Maharashtrian in being a Maharashtrian,
a Punjabi in being a Punjabi, a Madrasi in being a Madrasi and a Bengali in being a Bengali. Such
is the mentality of Hindus, who accuse the Musalman of want of national feeling when he says "I
am a Musalman first and Indian afterwards ". Can any one suggest that there exists anywhere in
India even among the Hindus an instinct or a passion that would put any semblance of emotion
behind their declaration " Civis Indianus sum ", or the smallest consciousness of a moral and social
unity, which desires to give expression by sacrificing whatever is particular and local in favour of
what is common and unifying ? There is no such consciousness and no such desire. Without such
consciousness and no such desire, to depend upon Government to bring about unification is to
deceive oneself.

Regarding the second, it was no doubt the opinion of the Simon Commission:

"That the communal riots were a manifestation of the anxieties and ambitions aroused in both the
communities by the prospects of India's political Future. So long as authority was firmly
established in British hands and self-government was not thought of, Hindu-Muslim rivalry was
confined within a narrower field. This was not merely because the presence of a neutral
bureaucracy discouraged strife. A further reason was that there was little for members of one
community to fear from the predominance of the other. The comparative absence of communal
strife in the Indian States today may be similarly explained. Many, who are well acquainted with
conditions in British India a generation ago, would testify that at that epoch so much good feeling
had been engendered between the two sides that communal tension as a threat to civil peace was at
a minimum. But the coming of the Reforms and the anticipation of what may follow them have
given new point to Hindu-Muslim competition. The one community naturally lays claim to the
rights of a majority and relics upon its qualifications of better education and greater wealth ; the
other is all the more determined on those accounts to secure effective protection for its members,
and does not forget that it represents the previous conquerors of the country. It wishes to be assured
of adequate representation and of a full share of official posts. "

Assuming that to be a true diagnosis, assuming that Muslim demands are reasonable, assuming that
the Hindus were prepared to grant them—and these are all very big assumptions—it is a question
whether a true union between Hindus and Muslims can take place through political unity, resulting
from the satisfaction of Muslim political demands. Some people seem to think that it is enough if
there is a political unity between Hindus and Muslims. I think this is the greatest delusion. Those
who take this view seem to be thinking only of how to bring the Muslims to join the Hindus in their
demands on the British for Dominion Status or Independence as the mood of the moment be. This,
to say the least, is a very shortsighted view. How to make the Muslims join the Hindus in the
latter's demands on the British is comparatively a very small question. In what spirit will they work
the constitution ? Will they work it only as aliens by an unwanted tie or will they work it as true
kindreds, is the more important question. For working it as true kindreds, what is wanted is not
merely political unity but a true union of heart and soul, in other words, social unity. Political unity
is worth nothing, if it is not the expression of real union. It is as precarious as the unity between
persons, who without being friends become allies of each other. How very precarious it always is,
is best illustrated by what has happened between Germany and Russia. Personally, I do not think
that a permanent union can be made to depend upon the satisfaction of mere material interests.
Pacts may produce unity. But that unity can never ripen into union. A pact as a basis for a union is
worse than useless. As its very nature indicates, a pact is separative in character. A pact cannot
produce the desire to accommodate, it cannot instil the spirit of sacrifice, nor can it bind the parties
to the main objective. Instead of accommodating each other, parties to a pact strive to get, as much
as possible, out of each other. Instead of sacrificing for the common cause, parties to the pact are
constantly occupied in seeing that the sacrifice made by one is not used for the good of the other.
Instead of fighting for the main objective, parties to the pact are for ever engaged in seeing that in
the struggle for reaching the goal the balance of power between the parties is not disturbed. Renan
spoke the most profound truth when he said :

"Community of interests is assuredly a powerful bond between men. But nevertheless can interests
suffice to make a nation ? I do not believe it. Community of interests make commercial treaties.
There is a sentimental side to nationality; it is at once body and soul ; a Zollverein is not a
fatherland. "

Equally striking is the view of James Bryce, another well-known student of history. According to
Bryce,

" The permanence of an institution depends not merely on the material interests that support it, but
on its conformity to the deep-rooted sentiment of the men for whom it has been made. When it
draws to itself and provides a fitting expression for that sentiment, the sentiment becomes thereby
not only more vocal but actually stronger, and in its turn imparts a fuller vitality to the institution. "

These observations of Bryce were made in connection with the foundation of the German Empire
by Bismarck who, according to Bryce, succeeded in creating a durable empire because it was based
on a sentiment and that this sentiment was fostered

" .... most of all by what we call the instinct or passion for nationality, the desire of a people already
conscious of a moral and social unity, to see such unity expressed and realize under a single
government, which shall give it a place and name among civilized suites ".

What is it that produces this moral and social unity which gives permanence and what is it that
drives people to see such unity expressed and realized under a single government, which shall give
it a place and a name among civilized states ?

No one is more competent to answer this question than James Bryce. It was just such a question he
had to consider in discussing the vitality of the Holy Roman Empire as contrasted with the Roman
Empire. If any Empire can be said to have succeeded in bringing about political unity among its
diverse subjects it was the Roman Empire. Paraphrasing for the sake of brevity the language of
Bryce :—The gradual extension of Roman citizenship through the founding of colonies, first
throughout Italy and then in the provinces, the working of the equalized and equalizing Roman
Law, the even pressure of the government on all subjects, the movements of population, caused by
commerce and the slave traffic, were steadily assimilating the various peoples. Emperors, who were
for the most part natives of the provinces, cared little to cherish Italy or even after the days of the
Antonines, to conciliate Rome. It was their policy to keep open for every subject a career by whose
freedom they had themselves risen to greatness. Annihilating distinctions of legal status among
freemen, it completed the work, which trade and literature and toleration to all beliefs but one were
already performing. No quarrel of race or religions disturbed that calm, for all national distinctions
were becoming merged in the idea of a common Empire.

This unity produced by the Roman Empire was only a political unity. How long did this political
unity last ? In the words of Bryce:

"Scarcely had these slowly working influences brought about this unity, when other influences
began to threaten it. New foes assailed the frontiers ; while the loosening of the structure within
was shown by the long struggles for power which followed the death or deposition of each
successive emperor. In the period of anarchy after the fall of Valerian, generals were raised by their
armies in every part of the Empire, and ruled great provinces as monarchs apart, owning no
allegiance to the possessor of the capital. The breaking-up of the western half of the Empire into
separate kingdoms might have been anticipated by two hundred years, had there not arisen in
Diocletian a prince active and skilful enough to bind up the fragments before they had lost all
cohesion, meeting altered conditions by new remedies. The policy he adopted by dividing and
localizing authority recognized the fact that the weakened heart could no longer make its pulsations
fell to the body's extremities. He parcelled out the supreme power among four monarchs, ruling as
joint emperors in four capitals, and then sought to give it a fictitious strength by surrounding it with
an oriental pomp which his earlier predecessors would have scorned. . . . The prerogative of Rome
was menaced by the -rivalry of Nicomedia, and the nearer greatness of Milan. "

It is, therefore, evident that political unity was not enough to give permanence and stability to the
Roman Empire and as Bryce points out that " the breaking-up of the western half (of the Roman
Empire) into separate kingdoms might have been anticipated by two hundred years, had the
barbarian tribes on the border been bolder, or had there not arisen in Diocletian a prince active and
skilful enough to bind up the fragments before they had lost all cohesion, meeting altered
conditions by new remedies ". But the fact is that the Roman Empire which was tottering and
breaking into bits and whose political unity was not enough to bind it together did last for several
hundred years as one cohesive unit after it became the Holy Roman Empire. As Prof. Marvin points
out 34[f.34] :

" The unity of the Roman Empire was mainly political and military. It lasted for between four and
Five hundred years. The unity which supervened in the Catholic Church was religious and moral
and endured for a thousand years. "

The question is what made the Holy Roman Empire more stable than the Roman Empire could ever
hope to be ? According to Bryce it was a common religion in the shape of Christianity and a
common religious organization in the shape of the Christian Church which supplied the cement to
the Holy Roman Empire and which was wanting in the Roman Empire. It was this cement which
gave to the people of the Empire a moral and social unity and made them see such unity expressed
and realized under a single government.

Speaking of the unifying effect of Christianity as a common religion Bryce says:

" It is on religion that the in most and deepest life of a nation rests. Because Divinity was divided,
humanity had been divided, likewise ; the doctrine of the unity of God now enforced the unity of
man, who had been created in His image. The first lesson of Christianity was love, a love that was
to join in one body those whom suspicion and prejudice and pride of race had hitherto kept apart.
There was thus formed by the new religion a community of the faithful, a Holy Empire, designed to
gather all men into its bosom, and standing opposed to the manifold polytheisms of the older world,
exactly as the universal sway of the Caesars was contrasted with the innumerable kingdoms and
city republics that had gone before it . . . . " 35[f.35]

If what Bryce has said regarding the instability of the Roman Empire and the comparatively greater
stability of its successor, the Holy Roman Empire, has any lesson for India and if the reasoning of
Bryce that the Roman Empire was unstable because it had nothing more than political unity to rely
on, and that the Holy Roman Empire was more stable, because it rested on the secure foundation of
moral and social unity, produced by the possession of a common faith, is valid reasoning and
embodies human experience, then it is obvious that there can be no possibility of a union between
Hindus and Muslims. The cementing force of a common religion is wanting. From a spiritual point
of view, Hindus and Musalmans are not merely two classes or two sects such as Protestants and
Catholics or Shaivas and Vaishnavas. They are two distinct species. In this view, neither the Hindu
nor .the Muslim can be expected to recognize that humanity is an essential quality present in them
both, and that they are not many but one and that the differences between them are no more than
accidents. For them Divinity is divided and with the division of Divinity their humanity is divided
and with the division of humanity they must remain divided. There is nothing to bring them in one
bosom.

Without social union, political unity is difficult to be achieved. If achieved, it would be as

precarious as a summer sapling, liable to be uprooted by the gust of a hostile wind. With mere
political unity, India may be a State. But to be a State is not to be a nation and a State, which is not
a nation, has small prospects of survival in the struggle for existence. This is especially true where
nationalism—the most dynamic force of modern times—is seeking everywhere to free itself by the
destruction and disruption of all mixed states. The danger to a mixed and composite state, therefore,
lies not so much in external aggression as in the internal resurgence of nationalities which are
fragmented, entrapped, suppressed and held against their will. Those who oppose Pakistan should
not only bear this danger in mind but should also realize that this attempt on the part of suppressed
nationalities to disrupt a mixed state and to found a separate home for themselves, instead of being
condemned, finds ethical justification from the principle of self-determination.

CHAPTER VII

MUSLIM ALTERNATIVE TO PAKISTAN

The Hindus say they have an alternative to Pakistan. Have the Muslims also an alternative to
Pakistan? The Hindus say yes, the Muslims say no. The Hindus believe that the Muslim proposal
for Pakistan is only a bargaining manoeuvre put forth with the object of making additions to the
communal gains already secured under the Communal Award. The Muslims repudiate the
suggestion. They say there is no equivalent to Pakistan and, therefore, they will have Pakistan and
nothing but Pakistan. It does seem that the Musalmans are devoted-to Pakistan and are determined
to have nothing else and that the Hindus in hoping for an alternative are merely indulging in
wishful thinking. But assuming that the Hindus are shrewd enough in divining what the Muslim
game is, will the Hindus be ready to welcome the Muslim alternative to Pakistan? The answer to
the question must, of course, depend upon what the Muslim alternative is.

What is the Muslim alternative to Pakistan? No one knows. The Muslims, if they have any, have
not disclosed it and perhaps will not disclose it till the day when the rival parties meet to revise and
settle the terms on which the Hindus and the Muslims are to associate with each other in the future.
To be forewarned is to be forearmed. It is, therefore, necessary for the Hindus to have some idea of
the possible Muslim alternative to enable them to meet the shock of it; for the alternative cannot be
better than the Communal Award and is sure to be many degrees worse.

In the absence of the exact alternative proposal one can only make a guess. Now one man's guess is
as good as that of another, and the party concerned has to choose on which of these he will rely.
Among the likely guesses, my guess is that the Muslims will put forth as their alternative some
such proposal as the following :—

"That the future constitution of India shall provide:

(i) That the Muslims shall have 50% representation in the Legislature, Central as well as Provincial,
through separate electorates.

(ii) That 50% of the Executive in the Centre as well as in the Provinces shall consist of Muslims.

(iii) That in the Civil Service 50% of the posts shall be assigned for the Muslims.

(iv) That in the Fighting Forces the Muslim proportion shall be one half, both in the ranks and in
the higher grades.

(v) That Muslims shall have 50% representation in all public bodies, such as councils and
commissions, created for public purposes.

(vi) That Muslims shall have 50% representation in all international organizations in which India
will participate.

(vii) That if the Prime Minister be a Hindu, the Deputy Prime Minister shall be a Muslim.

(viii) That if the Commander-in-Chief be a Hindu, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief shall be a

Muslim.

(ix) That no changes in the Provincial boundaries shall be made except with the consent of 66% of
the Muslim members of the Legislature.

(x) That no action or treaty against a Muslim country shall be valid unless the consent of 66% of
the Muslim members of the Legislature is obtained.

(xi) That no law affecting the culture or religion or religious usage of Muslims shall be made
except with the consent of 66% of the Muslim members of the Legislature.

(xii) That the national language for India shall be Urdu. (xiii) That no law prohibiting or restricting
the slaughter of cows or the propagation of and conversion to Islam shall be valid unless it is passed
with the consent of 66% of the Muslim members of the Legislature.

(viv) That no change in the constitution shall be valid unless the majority required for effecting
such changes also includes a 66% majority of the Muslim members of the Legislature.

This guess of mine is not the result of imagination let loose. It is not the result of a desire to
frighten the Hindus into an unwilling and hasty acceptance of Pakistan, If I may say so, it is really
an intelligent anticipation based upon available data coming from Muslim quarters.

An indication of what the Muslim alternative is likely to be, is obtainable from the nature of the
Constitutional Reforms which are contemplated for the Dominions of His Exalted Highness the
Nizam of Hyderabad.

The Hyderabad scheme of Reforms is a novel scheme. It rejects the scheme of communal
representation obtaining in British India. In its place is substituted what is called Functional
Representation, i.e. representation by classes and by professions. The composition of the
Legislature which is to consist of 70 members is to be as follows :—

Elected Nominated
Agricluture 12 Illakas 8
Patidars 8 Sarf-i-Khas 2
Tenants 4 Paigahs 3
Women 1
Graduates 1 Peshkari 1
University 1
Jagirdars 2 Salar Jung 1
Maashdars 1
Legal 2 Samasthans 1
Medical 2
Western 1 Officials 18
Rural Arts and Crafts 1
Oriental 1 Backward Classes 1
Teaching 1 Minor Unrepresented 3
Commerce 1 Classes.
Industries 2 Others 6
Banking 2
Indigenous 1 1
Co-operative and
Joint Stock 1 1
Organized Labour 1
Harijan 1
District Municipalities 1
City Municipality 1
Rural Boards 1
Total 33 Total . 37

Whether the scheme of functional representation will promote better harmony between the various
classes and sections than communal representation does is more than doubtful. In addition to
perpetuating existing social and religious divisions, it may quite easily intensify class struggle by
emphasizing class consciousness. The scheme appears innocuous but its real character will come
out when every class will demand representation in proportion to its numbers. Be that as it may,
functional representation is not the most significant feature of the Hyderabad scheme of Reforms.
The most significant feature of the scheme is the proposed division of seats between Hindus and
Musalmansn in the new Hyderabad Legislature. Under the scheme as approved by H. E. H. the
Nizam, communal representation is not al together banished. It is retained along with functional
representation. It is to operate through joint electorates. But there is to be equal representation for
"the two majority communities" on every 36[f.36] elective body including the legislature and no
candidate can succeed unless, he secures 40 percent, of the votes polled by-members of his
community. This principle of equal representation to Hindus and Muslims irrespective of their
numbers 37[f.37] is not only to apply to every elective body but it is to apply to both elected as
well as nominated members of the body.
In justification of this theory of equal representation it is stated that:

" The importance of the Muslim community in the state, by virtue of its historical position and its
status in the body politic, is so obvious that it cannot be reduced to the status of a minority in the
Assembly."

Quite recently there have appeared in the press 38[f.38] the proposals formulated by one Mr. Mir
Akbar Ali Khan calling himself the leader of the Nationalist Party as a means of settling the
Hindu-Muslim problem in British India. They are as follows :—

(1) The future Constitution of India must rest upon the broad foundation of adequate military
defence of the country and upon making the people reasonable military minded. The Hindus must
have the same military mindedness as the Muslims.

(2) The present moment offers a supreme opportunity for the two communities to ask for the
defence of India bang made over to them. The Indian Army must consist of an equal number of
Hindus and Muslims and no regiment should be cm a communal, as distinguished from regional
basis.
(3) The Governments in the Provinces and at the Centre should be wholly National Governments
composed of men who are reasonable military minded. Hindu and Muslim Ministers should be
equal in number in the Central as well as all Provincial cabinets; other important minorities might
wherever necessary be given special representation. This scheme will function most satisfactorily
with joint electorates, but in the present temper of the country separate electorates might be
continued. The Hindu Ministers must be elected by the Hindu members of the legislature and the
Muslim Ministers by the Muslim members.

(4) The Cabinet is to be removable only on an express vote of no-confidence, against the Cabinet
as a whole, passed by a majority of 2/3rd of the whole house which majority must be of Hindus and
Muslims taken separately.

(5) The religion, language, script and personal law of each community should be safeguarded by a
paramount constitutional check enabling the majority of members, representing that community in
the legislature to place a veto on any legislative or other measure affecting it. A similar veto must
be provided against any measure designed or calculated to affect adversely the economic
well-being of any community.

(6) An adequate communal representation in the services must be agreed to as a practical measure
of justice in administration and in the distribution patronage.

If the proposals put forth by a Muslim leader of the Nationalist Party in Hyderabad State is an
indication of the direction in which the mind of the Muslims in British India is running, then, the
guess I have made as to what is likely to be the alternative to Pakistan derives additional support.

II

It is true that in the month of April 1940 a Conference of Muslims was held in Delhi under the
grandiloquent name of " The Azad Muslim Conference." The Muslims who met in the Azad
Conference were those who were opposed to the Muslim League as well as to the Nationalist
Muslims. They were opposed to the Muslim League firstly, because of their hostility to Pakistan
and secondly because they did not want to depend upon the British Government for the protection
of their rights 39[f.39] They were also opposed to the Nationalist Musalmans (i. e. Congressites out
and out) because they were accused of indifference to the cultural and religious rights of the
Muslims. 40[f.40]
With all this the Azad Muslim Conference was hailed by the Hindus as a Conference of friends.
But the resolutions passed by the Conference leave very little to choose between it and the League.
Among the resolutions passed by the Azad Muslim Conference the following three bear directly
upon the issue in question.

The first of these runs as follows :—

" This conference, representative of Indian Muslims who desire to secure the fullest freedom of the
country, consisting of delegates and representatives of every province, after having given its fullest
and most careful consideration to all the vital questions affecting the interest of the Muslim
community and the country as a whole declares the following:—

" India will have geographical and political boundaries of an individual whole and as such is the
common homeland of all the citizens irrespective of race or religion who are joint owners of its
resources. All nooks and comers of the country are hearths and homes of Muslims who cherish the
historic eminence of their religion and culture which are dearer to them than their lives. From the
national point of view every Muslim is an Indian. The common rights of all residents of the country
and their responsibilities, in every walk of life and in every sphere of human activity are the same.
The Indian Muslim by virtue of these rights and responsibilities, is unquestionable an Indian
national and in every part of the country is entitled to equal privileges with that of every Indian
national in every sphere of governmental, economic and other national activities and in public
services. For that very reason Muslims own equal responsibilities with other Indians for striving
and making sacrifices to achieve the country's independence. This is a self-evident proposition, the
truth of which no right thinking Muslim will question. This Conference declares unequivocally and
with all emphasis at its command that the goal of Indian Muslims is complete independence along
with protection of their religion and communal rights, and that they are anxious to attain this goal
as early as possible. Inspired by this aim they have in the past made great sacrifices and are ever
ready to make greater sacrifices.

"The Conference unreservedly and strongly repudiates the baseless charge levelled against Indian
Muslims by the agents of British Imperialism and others that they are an obstacle in the path of
Indian freedom and emphatically declares that the Muslims are fully alive to their responsibilities
and consider it inconsistent with their traditions and derogatory to their honour to lag behind others
in the struggle for independence."

By this Resolution they repudiated the scheme of Pakistan. Their second Resolution was in the
following terms:—

"This is the considered view of this Conference that only that constitution for the future
Government of India would be acceptable to the people of India which is framed by the Indians
themselves elected by means of adult franchise. The constitution should fully safeguard all the
legitimate interests of the Muslims in accordance with the recommendations of the Muslim
members of the Constituent Assembly. The representatives of other communities or of an outside
power would have no right to interfere in the determination of these safeguards."

By this Resolution the Conference asserted that the safeguards for the Muslims must be determined
by the Muslims alone. Their third Resolution was as under:—

" Whereas in the future constitution of India it would be essential, in order to ensure stability of
government and preservation of security, that every citizen and community should feel satisfied,
this Conference considers it necessary that a scheme of safeguards as regards vital manors
mentioned below should be prepared to the satisfaction of the Muslims.

" This Conference appoints a board consisting of 27 persons. This board, after the fullest
investigation, consultation and consideration, shall make its recommendations for submission to the
next session of this Conference, so that the Conference may utilise the recommendations as a
means of securing a permanent national settlement of the communal question. This
recommendation should be submitted within two months. The matters referred to the board are the
following:

"1. The protection of Muslim culture, personal law and religious rights.

" 2. Political rights of Muslims and their protection.

" 3. The formation of future constitution of India to be non-unitary and federal, with absolutely
essential and unavoidable powers for the Federal Government.

"The provision of safeguards for the economic, social and cultural rights of Muslims and for their
share in public services

" The board will be empowered to fill up any vacancy in a suitable manner. The board will have the
right to co-opt other members. It will be empowered also to consult other Muslim bodies and if it
considers necessary, any responsible organisation in the country. The 27 members of the board will
be nominated by the president.

"The quorum for the meeting will be nine.

" Since the safeguards of the communal rights of different communities will be determined in the
constituent assembly referred to in the resolution which this Conference has passed, this
Conference considers it necessary to declare that Muslim members of this constituent will be
elected by Muslims themselves."

We must await the report 41[f.41] of this board to know what safeguards the Azad Muslim
Conference will devise for the safety and protection of Muslims. But there appears no reason to
hope that they will not be in favour of what I have guessed to be the likely alternative for Pakistan.
It cannot be overlooked that the Azad Muslim Conference was a body of Muslims who were not
only opposed to the Muslim League but were equally opposed to the Nationalist Muslims. There is,
therefore, no ground to trust that they will be more merciful to the Hindus than the League has been
or will be.

Supposing my guess turns out to be correct, it would be interesting to know what the Hindus will
have to say in reply. Should they prefer such an alternative to Pakistan ? Or should they rather
prefer Pakistan to such an alternative ? Those are questions which I must leave the Hindus and their
leaders to answer. All I would like to say in this connection is that the Hindus before determining
their attitude towards this question should note certain important considerations.

In particular they should note that there is a difference between Macht Politic 42 [f.42] and
Gravamin Politic 43[f.43] ; that there is a difference between Communitas Communitatum and a
nation of nations; that there is a difference between safeguards to allay apprehensions of the weak
and contrivances to satisfy the ambition for power of the strong: that there is a difference between
providing safeguards and handing over the country. Further, they should also note that what may
with safety be conceded to Gravamin Politic may not be conceded to Macht Politic. What may be
conceded with safety to a community may not be conceded to a nation and what may be conceded
with safety to the weak to be used by it as a weapon of defence may not be conceded to the strong
who may

use it as a weapon of attack.

These are important considerations and, if the Hindus overlook them, they will do so at their peril.
For the Muslim alternative is really a frightful and dangerous alternative.

CHAPTER IX
 LESSONS FROM ABROAD

Hindus who will not yield to the demand of the Muslims for the division of India into Pakistan and
Hindustan and would insist upon maintaining the geographical unity of India without counting the
cost will do well to study the fate that has befallen other countries which, like India, harboured
many nations and sought to harmonise them.

It is not necessary to review the history of all such countries. It is enough to recount here the story
of two, Turkey and Czechoslovakia.

To begin with Turkey. The emergence of the Turks in history was due to the fact that they were
driven away by the Mongols from their home in Central Asia, somewhere between 1230-40 A.D.,
which led them to settle in north-west Anatolia. Their career as the builders of the Turkish Empire
began in 1326 with the conquest of Brusa. In 1360-61, they conquered Thrace from the Aegean to
the Black Sea; in 1361-62, the Byzantine Government of Constantinople accepted their supremacy.
In 1369 Bulgaria followed suit. In 1371-72 Macedonia was conquered. In 1373 Constantinople
definitely accepted Ottoman sovereignty. In 1389 Servia was conquered, in 1430Salonica, in 1453
Constantinople, in 1461 Trebizond, in 1465Quraman, and in 1475KaffaandTana were annexed.
After a short lull, they conquered Mosul in 1514, Syria, Egypt, the Hiaz and the Yaman in 1516-17
and Belgrade in 1521. This was followed in 1526 by victory over the Hungarians at Mohacz. In
1554 took place the first conquest of Baghdad and in 1639 the second Conquest of Baghdad. Twice
they laid siege to Vienna, first in 1529 and again in 1683 with a view to extend their conquest
beyond. But on both occasions they were repulsed with the result that their expansion in Europe
was completely checked forever.

Still the countries they conquered between 1326 and 1683 formed a vast empire. A few of these
territories the Turks had lost to their enemies thereafter, but taking the extent of the Turkish Empire
as it stood in 1789 on the eve of the French Revolution, it comprised (1) the Balkans, south of the
Danube, (2) Asia Minor, the Levant and the neighbouring islands (i.e., Cyprus), (3)Syria and
Palestine, (4) Egypt, and (5) North Africa from Egypt to Morocco.

The tale of the disruption of the Turkish Empire is easily told. The first to break away de facto, if
not de jure, was Egypt in 1769. The next were the Christians in the Balkans. Bessarabia was taken
by Russia in 1812 after a war with Turkey. In 1812 Serbia rebelled with the aid of Russia and the
Turks were obliged to place Serbia under a separate government. In 1829 similar concessions were
granted to two other Danubian provinces, Moldavia and Wallachia. As a result of the Greek war of
independence which lasted between 1822-29, Greece was completely freed from the Turkish rule
and the Greek independence was recognised by the Powers in 1832. Between 1875-77 there was
turmoil amongst the Balkans. There was a revolt in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bulgarians
resorted to atrocities against the Turks, to which the Turks replied with atrocities in equal measure.
As a result, Serbia and Montenegro declared war on Turkey and so did Russia. By the Treaty of
Berlin, Bulgaria .was given self-government under Turkey and Eastern Rumania was to be ruled by
Turkey under a Christian Governor. Russia gained Kars and Batourn. Dobrudja was given to
Rumania. Bosnia and Herzegovina were assigned to Austria for administration and England
occupied Cyprus.In 1881 Greece gained Thessaly and France occupied Tunis. In 1885 Bulgaria and
Eastern Rumania were united into one state.

The story of the growth and decline of the Turkish Empire upto 1906 has been very graphically
described by Mr. Lane Poole in the following words 44[f.44] :—

"In its old extent, when the Porte ruled not merely the narrow territory now called Turkey in
Europe, but Greece, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumania, Rumania, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
with the Crimea and a portion of Southern Russia, Egypt, Syria, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers and
numerous islands in the Mediterranean, not counting the vast but mainly desert tract of Arabia, the
total population (at the present time) would be over fifty millions, or nearly twice that of Europe
without Russia. One by one her provinces have been taken away. Algiers and Tunis have been
incorporated with France, and this 175,000 square miles and five million inhabitants have
transferred their allegiance. Egypt is practically independent, and this means a loss of 500,000
miles and over six millions of inhabitants. Asiatic Turkey alone has suffered comparatively little
diminution. This forms the bulk of tier present dominions, and comprises about 680,000 square
miles, and over sixteen millions of population. In Europe her losses have been almost as severe as
in Africa where Tripoli alone remains to her. Serbia and Bosnia are administered by Austria and
thereby nearly 40,000 miles and three and a half millions of peoples have become Austrian
subjects. Wallachia and Moldavia are united in the independent kingdom of Rumania, diminishing
the extent of Turkey by 46,000 miles and over five millions of inhabitants. Bulgaria is a dependent
stale over which the Ports has no real control and Eastern Rumania has lately de facto become part
of Bulgaria and the two contain nearly 40,000 square miles, and three millions of inhabitants. The
kingdom of Greece with its 25,000 miles and two million population has long been separated from
its parent In Europe where the Turkish territory once extended to 230,000 miles, with a population
of nearly 20 millions, it now reaches only the total of 66 thousand miles and a population of four
and a half millions. It has lost nearly three-fourths of its land, and about the same proportion of its
people."

Such was the condition of Turkey in 1907. What has befallen her since then is unfortunately the
worst part of her story. In 1908 taking advantage of the revolution brought about by the Young
Turks, Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria declared her independence. In 1911
Italy took possession of Tripoli and in 1912 France occupied Morocco. Encouraged by the
successful attack of Italy in 1912, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro formed themselves into
a Balkan League and declared war on Turkey. In this war, known as the first Balkan War, Turkey
was completely defeated. By the Treaty of London(1913) the Turkish territory in Europe was
reduced to a narrow strip round Constantinople. But the treaty could not take effect because the
victors could not agree on the distribution of the spoils of victory. In 1913 Bulgaria declared war on
the rest of the Balkan League and Rumania declared war on Bulgaria in the hope of extending her
territory. Turkey also did the same. By the Treaty of Bukharest (1913), which ended the second
Balkan War, Turkey recovered Adrianople and got Thrace from Bulgaria. Serbia obtained Northern
Macedonia and Greece obtained Southern Macedonia (including Salonika), while Montenegro
enlarged her territory at the expense of Turkey. By 1914 when the Great European War came on,
the Balkans had won their independence from Turkey and the area in Europe that remained under
the Turkish Empire was indeed a very small area round about Constantinople and her possessions
in Asia. So far as the African continent is concerned, the Sultanas power over Egypt and the rest of
North Africa was only nominal, for the European Powers had established real control therein. In the
Great War of 1914 the overthrow of Turkey was complete. All the provinces from the
Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf were overrun, and the great cities of Baghdad, Jerusalem,
Damascus and Alleppo were captured. In Europe the allied troops occupied Constantinople. The
Treaty of Sevres, which brought the war with Turkey to a close, sought to deprive her of all
her outlying provinces and even of the fertile plains of Asia Minor. Greek claim for territory was
generously allowed at the expense of Turkey in Macedonia, Thrace and Asia Minor and Italy was
to receive Adalia and a large tract in the South. Turkey was to be deprived of all her Arab provinces
in Asia, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Hedjaz and Nejd. There was left to Turkey only the capital,
Constantinople, and separated from this city, by a " neutral zone of the straits," part of the barren
plateau of Anatolia. The treaty though accepted by the Sultan was fiercely attacked by the
Nationalist Party under Kemal Pasha. When the Greeks advanced to occupy their new territory,
they were attacked and decisively beaten. At the end of the war with Greece, which went on from
1920 to 1922, the Turks had reoccupied Smyrna. As the allies were not prepared to send armies to
help the Greeks, they were forced to come to terms with the Nationalist Turks. At the conference at
Mudiania the Greeks agreed to revise the terms of the Treaty of Sevres, which was done by the
Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 which granted the demands of Turkey except in Western Thrace. The
rest of the Treaty of Sevres was accepted by the Turks which meant the loss of her Arab provinces
in Asia. Before the War of 1914, Turkey had lost all her provinces in Europe. After the War, she
lost her provinces in Asia. As a result of the dismemberment of the old Turkish Empire, what now
remains of it is the small state called the Republic of Turkey with an area which is a minute fraction
of the old Empire 45[f.45] .

II

Take the case of Czechoslovakia. It is the creation of the Treaty of Trianon which followed the
European War of 1914. None of the peace treaties was more drastic in its terms than the Treaty of
Trianon. Says Prof. Macartney, " By it Hungary was not so much mutilated as dismembered. Even
if we exclude Croatia, Slavonia, which had stood only in a federal relationship to the other lands of
the Holy Crown—although one of eight hundred years' standing—Hungary proper was reduced to
less than one-third (32.6 per cent.) of her pre-war area, and a little over two-fifths (41.6 per cent.)
of her population. Territories and peoples formerly Hungarian were distributed among no less than
seven states." Of these states, there was one which did not exist before. It was a new creation. That
was the state of Czechoslovakia.

The area of the Republic of Czechoslovakia was 54,244 square miles and the population was about
13,613,172. It included the territories formerly known as Bohemia, Moravia, Slovakia and
Ruthenia. It was a composite state which included in its bosom three principal nationalities, (i)
Czechs occupying Bohemia and Moravia, (ii) Slovaks occupying Slovakiaand(iii) Ruthenians in
occupation of Ruthenia.

Czechoslovakia proved to be a very short-lived state. It lived exactly for two decades. On the 15th
March 1939 it perished or rather was destroyed as an independent state. It became a protectorate of
Germany. The circumstances attending its expiry were of a very bewildering nature. Her death was
brought about by the very Powers which had given it birth. By signing the Munich Pact on 30th
September 1938—of which the protectorate was an inevitable consequence. Great Britain, France
and Italy assisted Germany, their former enemy of the Great War, to conquer Czechoslovakia, their
former ally. All the work of the Czechs of the past century to gain freedom was wiped off. They
were once more to be the slaves of their former German overlords.

Ill

What are the reasons for the disruption of Turkey ?

Lord Eversley in his Turkish Empire 46[f.46] has attempted to give reasons for the decay of
Turkey, some internal, some external. Among the internal causes there were two. First the
degeneracy of the Ottoman dynasty. The supreme power fell into the hands either of the Vazirs of
the Sultans or more often in the hands of women of the harem of the Sultan. The harem was always
in antagonism to the official administration of the Porte, which ostensibly carried on the
administration of the state under the direction of the Sultan. The officials of every degree from the
highest to the lowest were interested in the sale of all offices, civil and military, to the highest
bidders. For securing their object, they found it expedient to bribe the inmates of the harem and
thereby win the assent of the Sultans. The harem thus became the centre from which corruption
spread throughout the Turkish Empire and which was one of the main causes of its decay. The
second main cause of the decadence of the Turkish Empire was the deterioration of its armies due
to two causes. During the last 300 years the army had lost the elan and the daring by which the
Ottomans won their many victories in the early period of their career. The loss of this elan and
daring by the Turkish army was due to the composition of the army, recruitment to which was
restricted to Turks and Arabs, and also to the diminution of opportunities of plunder and the hope
of acquiring lands for distribution among the soldiers as an incentive to victory and valour in the
latter period when the Empire was on the defensive and when it was no longer a question of making
fresh conquests, but of retaining what had already been won,
Among the external causes of the disruption of Turkey, the chief one is said to be the rapacity of
the European nations. But this view omits to take note of the true cause. The true and the principal
cause of the disruption of Turkey was the growth of the spirit of nationalism among its subject
peoples. The Greek revolt, the revolts of the Serbs, Bulgarians and other Balkans against the
Turkish authority were no doubt represented as a conflict between Christianity and Islam. That is
one way of looking at it, but only a superficial way. These revolts were simply the manifestations
of the spirit of nationalism by which they were generated. These revolts no doubt had for their
immediate causes Turkish misrule, Christian antipathy to Islam and the machinations of European
nations. But this does not explain the real force which motivated them. The real motive force was
the spirit of nationalism and their revolts were only a manifestation of this inner urge brought on by
it. That it was nationalism which had brought about the disruption of Turkey is proved by the revolt
of the Arabs in the last war and their will to be independent. Here there was no conflict between
Islam and Christianity, nor was the relationship between the two that of the oppressor and the
oppressed. Yet, the Arab claimed to be freed from the Turkish Empire. Why ? Because he was
moved by Arab nationalism and preferred to be an Arab nationalist to being a Turkish subject.
What is the cause of the destruction of Czechoslovakia ?

The general impression is that it was the result of German aggression. To some extent that is true.
But it is not the whole truth. If Germany was the only enemy of Czechoslovakia, all that she would
have lost was the fringe of her borderland which was inhabited by the Sudeten Germans. German
aggression need have cost her nothing more. Really speaking the destruction of Czechoslovakia
was brought about by an enemy within her own borders. That enemy was the intransigent
nationalism of the Slovaks who were out to break up the unity of the state and secure the
independence of Slovakia.

The union of the Slovaks with the Czechs, as units of a single state, was based upon certain
assumptions. First, the two were believed to be so closely akin as to be one people, and that the
Slovaks were only a branch of Czechoslovaks. Second, the two spoke a single * Czechoslovak *
language. Third, there was no separate Slovak national consciousness. Nobody examined these
assumptions at the time, because the Slovaks themselves desired this union, expressing their wish
in 1918 by formal declaration of their representatives at the Peace Conference. This was a
superficial and hasty view of the matter. As Prof. Macartney 47[f.47] points out.

". . . . ' the central political fact which emerges from the consideration of this history (of the
relations between the Czechs and Slovaks) for the purposes of the present age is the final
crystallization of a Slovak national consciousness , . . .' The genuine and uncompromising
believers in a single indivisible Czechoslovak language and people were certainly never so large, at
least in Slovakia, as they were made to appear. Today they have dwindled to a mere handful, under
the influence of actual experience of the considerable differences which exist between the Czechs
and the Slovaks. At present Slovak is in practice recognized by the Czechs themselves as the
official language of Solvakia. The political and national resistance has been no less tenacious, and
to-day the name of ' Czechoslovakia' is practically confined to official documents and to literature
issued for the benefit of foreigners. During many weeks in the country I only remember hearing
one person use the term for herself; this was a half German, half-Hungarian girl, who used it in a
purely political sense, meaning that she thought irridentism futile. No Czech and no Slovak feels or
calls himself, when speaking naturally, anything but a Czech or a Slovak as the case may be."
This national consciousness of the Slovaks, which was always alive, began to burst forth on seeing
that the Sudeten Germans had made certain demands on Czechoslovakia for autonomy. The
Germans sought to achieve their objective by the application of gangster morality to international
politics, saying " Give us what we ask or we shall burst up your shop." The Slovaks followed suit
by making their demands for autonomy but with a different face. They did not resort to gangster
methods but modulated their demands to autonomy only. They had eschwed all idea of
independence, and, in the proclamation issued on October 8 by Dr. Tiso, the leading man in the
autonomist movement in Slovakia, it was said " We shall proceed in the spirit of our motto, for God
and the Nation, in a Christian and national spirit." Believing in their bona fides and desiring to give
no room to the Gravamin Politic of which the Slovaks were making full use to disturb the friendly
relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks, the National Assembly in Prague passed an Act in
November 1938—immediately after the Munich Pact—called the " Constitutional Act on the
Autonomy of Slovakia." Its provisions were of a far-reaching character. There was to be a separate
parliament for Slovakia and this parliament was to decide the constitution of Slovakia within the
framework of the legal system of the Czechoslovak Republic. An alteration in the territory of
Slovakia was to be with the consent of the two-third majority in the Slovak parliament. The consent
of the Slovak parliament was made necessary for international treaties which exclusively concerned
Slovakia. Officials of the central state administration in Slovakia were to be primarily Slovaks.
Proportional representation of Slovakia was guaranteed in all central institutions, councils,
commissions and other organizations. Similarly, Slovakia was to be proportionally represented on
all international organizations in which the Czechoslovak Republic was called upon to participate.
Slovak soldiers, in peace time, were to be stationed in Slovakia as far as possible. As far as
legislative authority was concerned all subjects which were strictly of common concern were
assigned to the parliament of Czechoslovakia. By way of guaranteeing these rights to the Slovaks,
the Constitution Act provided that the decision of the National Assembly to make constitutional
changes shall be valid only if the majority constitutionally required for such changes includes also a
proportionate majority of the members of the National Assembly elected in Slovakia. Similarly, the
election of the President of the Republic required the consent not merely of the constitutionally
determined majority of the members of the parliament, but also of a proportionate majority of the
Slovak members. Further to emphasize that the central government must enjoy the confidence of
the Slovaks it was provided by the constitution that one-third of the Slovak members of parliament
may propose a motion of ' No Confidence. '

These constitutional changes introduced, much against the will of the Czechs, a hyphen between
the Czechs and the Slovaks which did not exist before. But it was done in the hope that, once the
relatively minor quarrels between the two were got out of the way, the very nationalism of the
Slovaks was more likely to bring them closer to the Czechs than otherwise. With the constitutional
changes guaranteeing an independent status to Slovakia and the fact that the status so guaranteed
could not be Changed without the consent of the Slovaks themselves, there was no question of the
Slovaks ever losing their national identity through submergence by the Czechs. The autonomy
introduced by the hyphen separated the cultural waters and saved the Slovaks from losing their
colour.

The first Slovak parliament elected under the new constitution was opened on January 18, 1939,
and Dr. Martin Sokol, the President of the parliament, declared, " The period of the Slovak's
struggle for freedom is ended. Now begins the period of national rebirth." Other speeches made on
the occasion indicated that now that Slovakia had its autonomy the Slovaks would never feel
animosity towards the Czechs and that both would loyally abide by the Czecho-Slovak State.

Not even a month elapsed since the inauguration of the Slovak parliament before the Slovak
politicians began their battle against the hyphen and for complete separation. They made excited
speeches in which they attacked the Czechs, talked about Czech oppression and demanded a
completely independent Slovakia. By the beginning of March, the various forms of separatism in
Slovakia were seriously threatening the integrity of the Czechoslovak State. On March 9 it was
learnt that Tiso, the Slovak Premier, had decided to proclaim the independence of Slovakia. On the
10th, in anticipation of such an act, troops were moved in Slovakia and Tiso, the Prime Minister,
was dismissed along with other Slovak ministers by the President of the Republic, Dr. Hacha. On
the next day Tiso, supposed to be under police supervision, telephoned to Berlin and asked for help.
On Monday Tiso and Hitler met and had an hour and a half talk in Berlin. Immediately after the
talk with Hitler, Tiso got on the phone to Prague and passed on the German orders.

They were:—

(i) All Czech troops to be withdrawn from Slovakia;

(ii) Slovakia to be an independent state under German protection;

(iii) The Slovak parliament to be summoned by President Hacha to hear the proclamation of
independence.

There was nothing that President Hacha and the Prague Government could do except say ' yes ' for
they knew very well that dozens of divisions of German troops were massed round the defenceless
frontiers of Czechoslovakia ready to march in at any moment if the demands made by Germany in
the interest of and at the instance of Slovakia were refused. Thus ended the new state of
Czechoslovakia.

IV

What is the lesson to be drawn from the story of these two countries ?

There is some difference as to how the matters should be put. Mr. Sydney Brooks would say that
the cause of these wars of disruption is nationalism, which according to him is the enemy of the
universal peace. Mr. Norman Angell, on the other hand, would say it is not nationalism but the
threat to nationalism which is the cause. To Mr. Robertson nationalism is an irrational instinct, if
not a positive hallucination, and the sooner humanity got rid of it the better for all.

In whatever way the matter is put and howsoever ardently one may wish for the elimination of
nationalism, the lesson to be drawn is quite clear: that nationalism is a fact which can neither be
eluded nor denied. Whether one calls it an irrational instinct or positive hallucination, the fact
remains that it is a potent force which has a dynamic power to disrupt empires. Whether
nationalism is the cause or the threat to nationalism is the cause, is a difference of emphasis only.
The real thing is to recognize, as does Mr. Toynbee, that " nationalism is strong enough to produce
war in spite of us. It has terribly proved itself to be no outworn creed, but a vital force to be
reckoned with." As was pointed out by him, " the right reading of nationalism has become an affair
of life and death." It was not only so for Europe. It was so for Turkey. It was so for
Czechoslovakia. And what was a question of life and death to them could not but be one of life and
death to India. Prof. Toynbee pleaded, as was done before him by Guizot, for the recognition of
nationality as the necessary foundation of European peace. Could India ignore to recognize this
plea ? If she does, she will be acting at her peril. That nationalism is a disruptive force is not the
only lesson to be learnt from the history of these two countries. Their experience embodies much
else of equal if not of greater significance. What that is, will be evident if certain facts are recalled
to memory.

The Turks were by no means as illiberal as they are painted. They allowed their minorities a large
measure of autonomy. The Turks had gone far towards solving the problem of how people of
different communities with different social heritages are to live together in harmony when they are
geographically intermingled. The Ottoman Empire had accorded, as a matter of course, to the
non-Muslim and non-Turkish communities within its frontiers a degree of territorial as well as
cultural autonomy which had never been dreamt of in the political philosophy of the West. Ought
not the Christian subjects to have been satisfied with this ? Say what one may, the nationalism of
Christian minorities was not satisfied with this local autonomy. It fought for complete freedom and
in that fight Turkey was slit open.

The Turks were bound to the Arabs by the tie of religion. The religious tie of Islam is the strongest
known to humanity. No social confederacy can claim to rival the Islamic brotherhood in point of
solidarity-. Add to this the fact that while the Turk treated his Christian subjects as his inferior, he
acknowledged the Arab as his equal. All non-Muslims were excluded from the Ottoman army. But
the Arab soldiers and officers served side by side with Turks and Kurds. The Arab officer class,
educated in Turkish school, served in military and civil capacities on the same terms as the Turks.
There was no derogating distinction between the Turk and the Arab, and there was nothing to
prevent the Arab from rising to the highest rank in the Ottoman services. Not only politically but
even socially the Arab was treated as his equal by the Turk and Arabs married Turkish wives and
Turks married Arab wives. Ought not the Arabs to have been satisfied with this Islamic
brotherhood of Arabs and Turks based on fraternity, liberty and equality ? Say what one may, the
Arabs were not satisfied. Arab nationalism broke the bonds of Islam and fought against his fellow
Muslim, the Turk, for its independence. It won, but Turkey was completely dismantled.

As to Czechoslovakia, she began with the recognition that both the Czechs and the Slovaks were
one people. Within a few years, the Slovaks claimed to be a separate nation. They would not even
admit that they were a branch of the same stock as the Czechs. Their nationalism compelled the
Czechs to recognize the fact that they were a distinct people. The Czechs sought to pacify the
nationalism of the Slovaks by drawing a hyphen as a mark indicating distinctness. In place of
Czechoslovakia they agreed to have Czecho-Slovakia. But even with the hyphen the Slovak
nationalism remained discontented. The act of autonomy was both, a hyphen separating them from
the Czechs as well as a link joining them with the Czechs. The hyphen as making separation was
welcome to the Slovaks but as making a link with the Czechs was very irksome to them. The
Slovaks accepted the autonomy with its hyphen with great relief and promised to be content and
loyal to the state. But evidently this was only a matter of strategy. They did not accept it as an
ultimate end. They accepted it because they thought that they could use it as a vantage ground for
destroying the hyphen which was their main aim and convert autonomy into independence. The
nationalism of the Slovaks was not content with a hyphen. It wanted a bar in place of the hyphen.
Immediately the hyphen was introduced, they began their battle to replace the hyphen between the
Czechs and the Slovaks by a bar. They did not care what means they should employ. Their
nationalism was so wrong-headed and so intense that when they failed they did not hesitate to call
the aid of the Germans.

Thus a deeper study of the disruption of Turkey and Czechoslovakia shows that neither local
autonomy nor the bond of religion is sufficient to withstand the force of nationalism, once it is set
on the go.

This is a lesson which the Hindus will do well to grasp. They should ask themselves : if the Greek,
Balkan and Arab nationalism has blown up the Turkish State and if Slovak nationalism has caused
the dismantling of Czechoslovakia, what is thereto prevent Muslim nationalism from disrupting the
Indian State ? If experience of other countries teaches that this is the inevitable consequence of
pent-up nationalism, why not profit by their experience and avoid the catastrophe by agreeing to
divide India into Pakistan and Hindustan ? Let the Hindus take the warning that if they refuse to
divide India into two before they launch on their career as a free people, they will be sailing in
those shoal waters in which Turkey, Czechoslovakia and many others have foundered. If they wish
to avoid shipwreck in mid-ocean, they must lighten the draught by throwing overboard all
superfluous cargo. They will ease the course of their voyage considerably if they—to use the
language of Prof. Toynbee—reconcile themselves to making jetsam of less cherished and more
combustible cargo.

Will the Hindus really lose if they agree to divide India into two, Pakistan and Hindus'?

With regard to Czechoslovakia it is instructive to note the real feelings of its government on the
loss of their territory caused by the Munich Pact. They were well expressed by the Prime Minister
of Czechoslovakia in his message to the people of Czechoslovakia. In it he said 48[f.48] :—

" Citizens and soldiers.... I am living through the hardest hour of my life; I am carrying out the most
painful task, in comparison with which death would be easy. But precisely because I have flight
and because I know under what conditions a war is won, must tell you frankly... that the forces
opposed to us at this moment compel us to recognize their superior strength and to act
accordingly....
"In Munich four European Great Powers met and decided to demand of us the acceptance of new
frontiers, according to which the German areas of our State would be taken away. We had the
choice between desperate and hopeless defence, which would have meant the sacrifice not only of
the adult generation but also of women and children, and the acceptance of conditions which in
their ruthlessness, and because they were imposed by pressure without war, have no parallel in
history. We desired to make a contribution to peace; we would gladly have made it But not by any
means in the way it has been fenced upon us.

" But we were abandoned, and were alone.... Deeply moved, all your leaders considered, together
with the army and the President of the Republic, all the possibilities which remained. They
recognized that in choosing between narrower frontiers and the death of the nation it was their
sacred duty to save the life of our people, so that we may not emerge weakened from these terrible
limes, and so that we may remain certain that our nation will gather itself together again, as it has
done so often in the past. Let us alt see that our State re-establishes itself soundly within its new
frontiers, and that its population is assured of a new life of peace and fruitful labour. With your
help we shall succeed. We rely upon you, and you have confidence in us."

It is evident that the Czechs refused to be led by the force of historic sentiment. They were ready to
have narrower frontiers and a smaller Czechoslovakia to the ultimate destruction of their people.

With regard to Turkey the prevalent view was the one that was expressed in 1853 by the Czar
Nicholas I, during a conversation with British Ambassador in St. Petersburg in which he said " We
have on our hand a sick man—a very sick man . . . . He may suddenly die upon our hands." From
that day the imminent decease of Turkey, the sick man of Europe was awaited by all his
neighbours. The shedding of the territories was considered as the convulsions of a dying man who
is alleged to have breathed his last by affixing his signature to the Treaty of Severs.

Is this really a correct view to take of Turkey in the process of dissolution? It is instructive to note
the comments of Arnold Toynbee on this view. Referring to the Czar's description of Turkey as the
sick man who may suddenly die, he says 49[f.49] :

" In this second and more sensational part of his diagnosis Czar Nicholas went astray because he
did not understand the nature of the symptoms. If a person totally ignorant of natural history
stumbled upon a snake in course of shedding its skin, he would pronounce dogmatically that the
creature could not possible recover. He could point out that when a man (or other mammal) has the
misfortune to lose his skin, he is never known to survive. Yet while it is perfectly true that the
leopard cannot change his spots nor the Ethiopian his skin, a wider study would have informed our
amateur naturalist that a snake can do both and does both habitually. Doubtless, even for the snake,
the process is awkward and uncomfortable. He becomes temporarily torpid, and in this condition he
is dangerously at the mercy of his enemies. Yet, if he escapes the kites and crows until his
metamorphosis is complete, he not only recovers his health but renews his youth with the
replacement of his mortal coils. This is the recent experience of the Turk, and ' moulting snake ' is
better simile than sick man for a description of his distemper."

In this view, the loss of her possessions by Turkey is the removal of an anomalous excrescence and
the gain of a new skin. Turkey is certainly homogeneous and has no fear of any disruption from
within.

The Muslim areas are an anomalous excrescence on Hindustan and Hindustan is an anomalous
excrescence on them. Tied together they will make India the sick man of Asia. Welded together
they will make India a heterogeneous unit. If Pakistan has the demerit of cutting away parts of
India, it has also the merit of introducing harmony in place of conflict.

Severed into two, each becomes a more homogeneous unit. The homogeneity of the two areas is
obvious enough. Each has a cultural unity. Each has a religious unity. Pakistan has a linguistic
unity. If there is no such unity in Hindustan, it is possible to have it without any controversy as to
whether the common language should be Hindustani, Hindi or Urdu. Separated, each can become a
strong and well-knit state. India needs a strong Central Government. But it cannot have it so long as
Pakistan remains a part of India. Compare the structure of the Federal Government as embodied in
the Government of India Act, 1935, and it will be found, that the Central Government as
constituted under it is an effete ramshackle thing with very little life in it. 50[f.50] As has already
been pointed out, this weakening of the Central Government is brought about by the desire to
placate the Muslim Provinces who wish to be independent of the authority of the Central
Government on the ground that the Central Government is bound to be predominantly Hindu in
character and composition. When Pakistan comes into being these considerations can have no
force. Hindustan can then have a strong Central Government and a homogeneous population, which
are necessary elements for the stability of the state and neither of which will be secured unless there
is severance of Pakistan from Hindustan.

Contents PART IV

[f.1]See Times of India dated 25-7-1925, " Through Indian Eyes ".

[f.2]On the question whether the Hindu Religion was a missionary Religion and if it was, why it
ceased to be so, see my essay on Carte and Conversion in the Annual Number of the Telugu
Samachar for 1926.

[f.3]See Report in Times of India 27-11-24, "Through Indian Eyes

[f.4]Speech at the Calcutta Session of the Hindu Maha Sabha held in December 1939, p. 14.

[f.5]Speech Ibid., p. 25.

[f.6]Ibid..pp.24—27

[f.7]Speech 1939, Ibid.. p. 18.

[f.8]Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[f.9]Speech 1939, pp. 21,22,23.

[f.10]Language of Gods

[f.11]Basically Sanskrit

[f.12]National Language

[f.13]Ibid., p. 4.

[f.14]Ibid., p. 16.

[f.15]Ibid.. pp. 14-17

[f.16]It should be noted that Mr. Savarkar is not opposed to separate electorates for the Muslims. It
is not clear whether he is in favour of separate electorates for Muslims even where they are in a
majority

[f.17]See his Manifesto dated 23rd March 1919

[f18]Young India, 2nd June 1920.

[f.19]" In view of the fact that on the Khilafat question both the Indian and Imperial Governments
have signally failed in their duty towards the Muslims of India and the Prime Minister has
deliberately broken his pledged word given to them, and that it is the duty of every non-Muslim
Indian if every legitimate manner to assist his Muslim brother in his attempt to remove the religious
calamity that has overtaken him;

" And in view of the fact that, in the matter of the events of the April of 1919, both the said
Governments have grossly neglected or failed to protect the innocent people of the Punjab and
punish officers guilty of unsoldierly and barbarous behaviour towards them, and have exonerated
Sir Michael O'Dwyer who proved himself directly responsible for most of the official crimes and
callous to the sufferings of the people placed under his administration, and that the debate in the
House of Lords betrayed a woeful lack of sympathy with the people of India, and systematic
terrorism and frightfulness adopted in the Punjab, and that the latest Viceregal pronouncement is
proof of entire absence of repentance in the matters of the Khilafat and the Punjab ;

" This Congress is of opinion that there can be no contentment in India without redress of the two
aforementioned wrongs, and that the only effectual means to vindicate national honour and to
prevent a repetition of similar wrongs in future is the establishment of Swarajya.

" This Congress is further of opinion that there is no course left open for the people of India but to
approve of and adopt the policy of progressive non-violent non-co-operation inaugurated by
Mahatma Gandhi, until the said wrongs are righted and Swarajya is established. "

Mrs. Annie Besant says : " It will be remembered that Mr. Gandhi, in March 1920, had forbidden
the mixing up of non-co-operation in defence of the Khilafat with other questions ; but it was found
that the Khilafat was not sufficiently attractive to Hindus ", so at the meeting of the All-India
Congress Committee held at Benares on May 30 and 31, the Punjab atrocities and the deficiencies
of the Reforms Act were added to the list of provocative causes.—The Future of Indian Politics, p.
250.

[f.20]Mr. Gandhi repudiated the suggestion of the Modern Review and regarded it as " crudest cut
". Dealing with the criticism of the Modern Review in his Article in Young India for 20th October
1921 Mr. Gandhi said " I claim that with us both the Khilafat is the central fact, with Maulana
Mahomed Ali because it is his religion, with me because, in laying down my life for the Khilafal, I
ensure safely of the cow, that is my religion, from the Musalman knife. "

[f.21]The Resolution of non-co-operation was carried by 1886 voles against 884. The late Mr.
Tairsee once told me that a large majority of the delegates were no others than the taxi drivers of
Calcutta who were paid to vote for the non-co-operation resolution

[f.22]Liberator 22nd April 1926.

[f.23]Young India, 10th December 1919.

[f.24]Young India. 9th June 1920

[f.25]Young India dated 4th May 1921

[f.26]It is reported that for earning merit for the soul of Abdul Rashid, the murderer of Swami
Shradhanand, in the next world, the students and professors of the famous theological college at
Deoband finished five complete recitations of the Koran and had planned to finish daily a lakh and
a quarter recitations of Koranic verses. Their prayer was " God Almighty may give the marhoom
(Le.. Rashid) a place in the ' a ' ala-e-illeeyeen (the summit of the seventh heaven) "— Times of
India. 30-11-27 Through Indian Eyes columns.

[f.27]The resolution says that then were only three cases of forcible conversion ! ! In reply to a
question in the Central Legislature (Debates 16thJanuary 1922)Sir William Vincent replied: - The
Madras Government report that the number of forcible conversions probably runs to thousands but
that for obvious reasons it will never be possible to obtain anything like an accurate estimate ".

[f.28]The series is known as " India in 1920 " & so on.

[f.29]Rangila Rasul was written in reply to Sitaka Chinala—a pamphlet written by a Muslim
alleging that Sita, wife of Rama, the hero of Ramayana, was a prostitute.

[f.30]Report of the Court of Inquiry appointed under section 3 of the Sind Public Inquiries Act to
inquire into the riots which occurred at Sukkur in 1939, p. 65. The total of 142 Hindus under '
murdered ' seems to be a mistake. It ought to be 72.

[f.31]Ibid., pp. 66-67.

[f.32]This is an English version of the report which appeared in the Savadhan, a Marathi weekly of
Nagpur, in its issue of 25th August 1936

[f.33]Quoted in " Through Indian Eyes "columns of the Times of India, dated 16-8-26.

[f.34]The Unity of Western Civiliazation (4th Ed.,) p. 27.

[f.35]The Christian Church did not play a passive pan in the process of unification of the Holy
Roman Umpire, It took a very active part in bringing it about. " Seeing one institution after another
falling to pieces around her, seeing how countries and cities were being severed from each other by
thr eruption of strange tribes and the increasing difficulty of communication the Christain Church, "
says Bryce, " strove to save religious fellowship by strengthening the ecclesiastical organization, by
drawing lighter every bond of outward union. Necessities of faith were still more powerful. Truth,
it was said, is one, and as it must bind into one body all who hold it, so it is only by continuing in
that body that they can preserve it. There is one Flock and one Shepherd. "

[f.36]Beside the Central Legislature there are to be constituted under the scheme of Reforms other
popular bodies such as Panchayats, Rural Boards, Municipalities and Town Committees.

[f.37]The distribution of population of Hyderabad State (excluding Berar) is according to the

census of 1931 as follows;—

"Hindus Untouchables Muslims Christians Others Total

96,99,615 24.73.230 15.34,666 1.51,382 5,77.255 1.44.36.148

[f.38]See Bombay Sentinal, June 22nd, 1940. Mr. Mir Akbar Ali Khan says that he discussed his
proposals with Mr. Srinivas Iyengar, ex-president of the Congress and the proposals published by
him are really proposals as approved by Mr. lyengar.

[f.39]Mufti Kifay at Ullah, a prominent member of the conference, in the course of his speech is
reported to have said : "They had to demonstrate that they were not behind any other community in
the fight for freedom, He wished to declare in clear terms that they did not rely on the British
Government for the protection of their rights. They would themselves chalk out the safeguards
necessary for the protection of their religious rights and would fight oat any party, however
powerful, that would refuse to accept those safeguards as they would fight the Government for
freedom " (Prolonged cheers.) Hindustan times. april 30, 1940.
[f.40]See the speeches of Maulana Hafizul Rehman and Dr. K. M. Ashraf in the same issue of the
Hindustan Times.

[f.41]This report has not appeared even now

[f.42]Macht Politic means Power Politics.

[f.43]Gravamin Politic mews in which the main strategy is to gain power by manufacturing
grievances.

[f.44]Turkey, pp. 363-64.

[f.45]The area of Turkey is 294,492 square miles exclusive of 3,708 square miles of lakes and
swamps. The area of Turkey in Europe is only 9,257 square miles.

[f.46]See abridgement by Sheikh Abdur Rashid.

[f.47]C. A. Macartney—Hungary and Her Successors (Oxford), 1937, p. 136.

[f.48]Alexander Henderson—-Eye-witness in Czechoslovakia (Harrap. 1939). pp. 229-30.

[f.49]Amold Toynbee—Turkey, p. 141

[f.50]For further light on this topic, mx my tract on Federation vs. Freedom

PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
________________________________________________________________

Contents

PART IV : PAKISTAN AND THE MALAISE

Chapter X : Social stagnation

Chapter XI : Communal aggression

PART IV
PAKISTAN AND THE MALAISE

The Hindu-Muslim problem has tow aspects to it. In its first aspect, the problem that presents itself is the problem of
two separate communities facing each other and seeking adjustment of their respective right and privileges. In its
other aspect, the problem is the problem of the reflex influences which this separation and conflict produces upon each
of them. In the course of the foregoing discussion we have looked at the project of Pakistan in relation to the first of
the aspects of the Hindu-Muslim problem. We have not examined the project of Pakistan in relation to the second
aspect of that problem. Yet, such an examination is necessary because that aspect of the Hindu-Muslim problem is not
unimportant. It is a very superficial if not an incomplete view to stop with the problem of the adjustment of their
claims. It cannot be overlooked that their lot is cast together as such they have to participate in a course of common
activity whether they like it or not. And if in this common activity they face each other as two combatants do, then their
actions and reactions are worth study, for they affect both and produce a state of affairs from which if it is a deceased
state, the question of escape must be faced. A study of the situation shows that the actions and reactions have produced
a malaise which exhibits itself in three ways :(l) Social Stagnation, (2) Communal Aggression, and (3) National
Frustration of Political 'Destiny. This malaise is a grave one. Will Pakistan he a remedy for the malaise ? Or, will it
aggravate the malaise ? The following chapters are devoted to the consideration of these questions.

CHAPTER X

SOCIAL STAGNATION

I
The social evils which characterize the Hindu Society, have been well known. The publication of Mother India by
Miss Mayo gave these evils the widest publicity. But while Mother India served the purpose of exposing the evils and
calling their authors at the bar of the world to answer for their sins, it created the unfortunate impression throughout
the world that while the Hindus were grovelling in the mud of these social evils and were conservative, the Muslims in
India were free from them, and as compared to the Hindus, were a progressive people. That, such an impression should
prevail, is surprising to those who know the Muslim Society in India at close quarters.

One may well ask if there is any social evil which is found among the Hindus and is not found among the Muslims ?
Take child-marriage. The Secretary of the Anti-Child-marriage Committee, constituted by the All-India Women's
Conference, published a bulletin which gives the extent of the evil of child-marriage in the different communities in
the country. The figures which were taken from the Census Report of 1931 areas follows :—
TABLE
MARRIED FEMALES AGED 0-15 PER 1000 FEMALES OF THAT AGE

Hindus Muslims Jains Sikhs Christians

1881 208 153 189 170 33
1891 193 141 172 143 37
1901 186 131 164 101 38
1911 184 123 130 88 39
1921 170 III 117 72 32
2931 199 186 125 80 43

Can the position among the Musalmans so far as child-marriage goes, be considered better than the position among the
Hindus ?

Take the position of women. It is insisted by Muslims that the legal rights given to Muslim women, ensure them a
greater measure of independence than allowed to other Eastern women, for example, Hindu women, and are in excess
of the rights given to women in some Western countries. Reliance is placed on some of the provisions of the Muslim
Law.

Firstly, it is said the Muslim Law does not fix any age for marriage, and recognizes the right of a girl to marry any
time. Further, except where the marriage is celebrated by the father or the grandfather, a Muslim girl, if given in
marriage in childhood, has the power to repudiate her marriage on attaining puberty.
Secondly, it is held out that marriage among the Musalmans is a contract. Being a contract, the husband has a right to
divorce his wife and the Muslim Law has provided ample safeguards for the wife which, if availed of, would place the
Muslim wife on the same footing as the husband in the matter of divorce. For, it is claimed that the wife under the
Muslim Law can, at the time of the marriage,' or even thereafter in some cases, enter into a contract by which she may
under certain circumstances obtain a divorce.

Thirdly, the Mahomedan Law requires that a wife can claim from her husband, by way of consideration for the
surrender of her person, a sum of money or other property—known as her " dower ". The dower may be fixed even
after marriage and if no amount is fixed, the wife is entitled to proper dower. The amount of dower is usually split into
two parts, one is called " prompt " which is payable on demand, and the other " deferred " which is payable on
dissolution of marriage by death or divorce. Her claim for dower will be treated as a debt against the husband's estate.
She has complete dominion over her dower which is intended to give her economic independence. She can remit it or
she can appropriate the income of it as she pleases.

Granting all these provisions of law in her favour, the Muslim woman is the most helpless person in the world. To
quote an Egyptian Muslim leader :—

" Islam has set its seal of inferiority upon her, and given the sanction of religion to social customs which have deprived
her of the full opportunity for self-expression and development of personality."

No Muslim girl has the courage to repudiate her marriage, although it may be open to her on the ground that she was a
child and that it was brought about by persons other than her parents. No Muslim wife will think it proper to have a
clause entered into her marriage contract reserving her the right to divorce. In that event, her fate is " once married,
always married." She cannot escape the marriage tie, however irksome it may be. While she cannot repudiate the
marriage, the husband can always do it without having to show any cause. Utter the word " Tallak "' and observe
continence for three weeks and the woman is cast away. The only restraint on his caprice is the obligation to pay
dower. If the dower has already been remitted, his right to divorce is a matter of his sweet will.

This latitude in the matter of divorce destroys that sense of security which is so fundamental for a full, free and happy
life for a woman. This insecurity of life, to which a Muslim woman is exposed, is greatly augmented by the right of
polygamy and concubinage, which the Muslim Law gives to the husband.

Mahomedam Law allows a Muslim to marry four wives at a time. It is not unoften said that this is an improvement
over the Hindu Law which places no restriction on the number of wives a Hindu can have at any given time. But it is
forgotten that in addition to the four legal wives, the Muslim Law permits a Mahomedan to cohabit with his female
slaves. In the case of female slaves nothing is said as to the number. They are allowed to him without any restriction
whatever and without any obligation to marry them.

No words can adequately express the great and many evils of polygamy and concubinage and especially as a source of
misery to a Muslim woman. It is true that because polygamy and concubinage are sanctioned, one must not suppose
they are indulged in by the generality of Muslims; still the fact remains that they are privileges which are easy for a
Muslim to abuse to the misery and unhappiness of his wife. Mr. John J. Pool, no enemy of Islam, observes [f1] 1:—

"This latitude in the mailer of divorce is very greatly taken advantage of by some Mohamedans. Slohart, commenting
on this subject in his book, Islam, and its Founder, says: ' Some Mohamodans make a habit of continually changing
their wives. We read of young men who have had twenty and thirty wives, a new one every three months: and thus it
comes about that women are liable to be indefinitely transferred from one man to another, obliged to accept a husband
and a home whenever they can find one, or in case of destitution, to which divorce may have driven them, to resort to
other more degrading means of living. Thus while keeping the strict letter of the law, and possessing only one or
certainly not more than four wives, unscrupulous characters may yet by divorce obtain in a lifetime as many wives as
they please.
" In another way also a Mohammedan may really have more than four wives, and yet keep within the law. This is by
means of living with concubines, which the Koran expressly permits. In that sura which allows four wives, the words
are added, ' of the slaves which ye shall have acquired.' Then in the 70th suru. it is revealed that it is no sin to live with
slaves. The very words are: ' The slaves which their right hands possess, as to them they shall be blameless.' At the
present day, as in days past, in multitudes of Mohamedan homes, slaves are found; as Muir says, in his Life of
Mahomet ' so long as this unlimited permission of living with their female slaves continues, it cannot be expected that
there will be any hearty attempt to put a stop to slavery in Mohamedan countries.' Thus the Koran, in this matter of
slavery, is the enemy of the mankind. And women, as usual, are the greater sufferers.'

Take the caste system. Islam speaks of brotherhood. Everybody infers that Islam must be free from slavery and caste.
Regarding slavery nothing needs to be said. It stands abolished now by law. But while it existed much of its support
was derived from Islam and Islamic countries.[f2] 2 While the prescriptions by the Prophet regarding the just and
humane treatment of slaves contained in the Koran are praiseworthy, there is nothing whatever in Islam that lends
support to the abolition of this curse. As Sir W. Muir has well said 3[f.3] :—

"...rather, while lightening, lie riveted the fetter.... There is no obligation on a Muslim to release his slaves. ... "
But if slavery has gone, caste among Musalmans has remained. As an illustration one may take the conditions
prevalent among the Bengal Muslims. The Superintendent of the

Census for 1901 for the Province of Bengal records the following interesting facts regarding the Muslims of Bengal
:—

" The conventional division of the Mahomedans into four tribes— Sheikh, Saiad, Moghul and Pathan—has very little
application to this Province (Bengal). The Mahomedans themselves recognize two main social divisions, (1) Ashraf or
Sharaf and (2) Ajlaf Ashraf means ' noble ' and includes all undoubted descendants of foreigners and converts from
high caste Hindus. All other Mahomedans including the occupational groups and all converts of lower ranks, are
known by the contemptuous terms, ' Ajlaf , ' wretches ' or ' mean people ': they are also called Kamina or Itar, ' base '
or Rasil, a corruption of Rizal, ' worthless '. In some places a third class, called Arzal or ' lowest of all ', is added. With
them no other Mahomedan would associate, and they are forbidden to enter the mosque to use the public burial
ground.

"Within these groups there are castes with social precedence of exactly the same nature as one finds among the
Hindus.

' 1. Ashraf or better class Mahomedans.

(1) Saiads.

(2) Sheikhs.
(3) Pathans.

(4) Moghul.

(5) Mallik.
(6) Mirza.
II. Ajlaf or lower class Mahomedans.

(1) Cultivating Sheikhs, and others who were originally Hindus but who do not belong to any functional group, and
have not gained admittance to the Ashraf Community, e.g. Pirali and Thakrai.

(2) Darzi, Jolaha, Fakir, and Rangrez.

(3) Barhi, Bhalhiara, Chik, Churihar, Dai, Dhawa, Dhunia, Gaddi, Kalal, Kasai, Kula Kunjara, Laheri, Mahifarosh,
Mallah, Naliya, Nikari.
(4) Abdal, Bako, Bediya, Bhal, Chamba, Dafali, Dhobi, Hajjam, Mucho, Nagarchi, Nal,Panwaria, Madaria,Tunlia.
III. Arzal or degraded class. Bhanar, Halalkhor, Hijra, Kasbi, Lalbegi, Maugia, Mchlar."
The Census Superintendent mentions another feature of the Muslim social system, namely, the prevalence of the "
panchayat system." He states :—
" The authority of the panchayat extends to social as well as trade matters and... marriage with people of' other
communities is one of offences of which the governing body lakes cognizance. The result is that these groups are often
as strictly endogamous as Hindu castes. The prohibition on inter-marriage extends to higher as well as to lower castes,
and a Dhuina, for example, may marry no one but a Dhuina. If this rule is transgressed, the offender is at once hauled
up before the panchayat and ejected ignominiously from his community. A member of one such group cannot
ordinarily gain admission to another, and he retains the designation of the community in which he was born even if he
abandons its distinctive occupation and takes to other means of livelihood.... thousands of Jolahas are butchers, yet
they are still known as Jolahas."

Similar facts from other Provinces of India could be gathered from their respective Census Reports and those who are
curious may refer to them. But the facts for Bengal are enough to show that the Mahomedans observe not only caste
but also untouchability.
There can thus be no manner of doubt that the Muslim Society in India is afflicted by the same social evils as afflict
the Hindu Society. Indeed, the Muslims have all the social evils of the Hindus and something more. That something
more is the compulsory system of purdah for Muslim women.
As a consequence of the purdah system a segregation of the Muslim women is brought about. The ladies are not
expected to visit the outer rooms, verandahs or gardens, their quarters are in the back-yard. All of them, young and old,
are confined in the same room. No male servant can work in their presence. A woman is allowed to see only her sons,
brothers, father, uncles and husband, or any other near relation who may be admitted to a position of trust. She cannot
go even to the mosque to pray and must wear burka (veil) whenever she has to go out. These burka women walking in
the streets is one of the most hideous sights one can witness in India. Such seclusion cannot but have its deteriorating
effects upon the physical constitution of Muslim women. They are usually victims to anaemia, tuberculosis and
pyorrhoea. Their bodies are deformed, with their backs bent, bones protruded, hands and feet crooked. Ribs, joints and
nearly all their bones ache. Heart palpitation is very often present in them. The result of this pelvic deformity is
untimely death at the time of delivery. Purdah deprives Muslim women of mental and moral nourishment. Being
deprived of healthy social life, the process of moral degeneration must and does set in. Being completely secluded
from the outer world, they engage their minds in petty family quarrels with the result that they become narrow and
restricted in their outlook.

They lag behind their sisters from other communities, cannot take part in any outdoor activity and are weighed down
by a slavish mentality and an inferiority complex. They have no desire for knowledge, because they are taught not to
be interested in anything outside the four walls of the house. Purdah women in particular become helpless, timid, and
unfit for any fight in life. Considering the large number of purdah women among Muslims in India, one can easily
understand the vastness and seriousness of the problem of purdah 4[f.4]

The physical and intellectual effects of purdah are nothing as compared with its effects on morals. The origin of
purdah lies of course in the deep-rooted suspicion of sexual appetites in both sexes and the purpose is to check them
by segregating the sexes. But far from achieving the purpose, purdah has adversely affected the morals of Muslim
men. Owing to purdah a Muslim has no contact with any woman outside those who belong to his own household.
Even with them his contact extends only to occasional conversation. For a male there is no company of and no
commingling with the females except those who are children or aged. This isolation of the males from females is sure
to produce bad effects on the morals of men. It requires no psychoanalyst to say that a social system which cuts off all
contact between, the two sexes produces an unhealthy tendency towards sexual excesses and unnatural and other
morbid habits and ways.

The evil consequences of purdah are not confined to the Muslim community only. It is responsible for the social
segregation of Hindus from Muslims which is the bane of public life in India. This argument may appear far fetched
and one is inclined to attribute this segregation to the unsociability of the Hindus rather than to purdah among the
Muslims. But the Hindus are right when they say that it is not possible to establish social contact between Hindus and
Muslims because such contact can only mean contact between women from one side and men from the other 5 [f.5]

Not that purdah and the evils consequent thereon are not to be found among certain sections of the Hindus in certain
parts of the country. But the point of distinction is that among the Muslims, purdah has a religious sanctity which it
has not with the Hindus. Purdah has deeper roots among the Muslims than it has among the Hindus and can only be
removed by facing the inevitable conflict between religious injunctions and social needs. The problem of purdah is a
real problem with the Muslims—apart from its origin—which it is not with the Hindus. Of any attempt by the Muslims
to do away with it, there is no evidence.

There is thus a stagnation not only in the social life but also in the political life of the Muslim community of India. The
Muslims have no interest in politics as such. Their predominant interest is religion. This can be easily seen by the
terms and conditions that a Muslim constituency makes for its support to a candidate fighting for a seat. The Muslim
constituency does not care to examine the programme of the candidate. All that the constituency wants from the
candidate is that he should agree to replace the old lamps of the masjid by supplying new ones at his cost, to provide a
new carpet for the masjid because the old one is torn, or to repair the masjid because it has become dilapidated. In
some places a Muslim constituency is quite satisfied if the candidate agrees to give a sumptuous feast and in other if he
agrees to buy votes for so much a piece. With the Muslims, election is a mere matter of money and is very seldom a
matter of social programme of general improvement. Muslim politics takes no note of purely secular categories of life,
namely, the differences between rich and poor, capital and labour, landlord and tenant, priest and layman, reason and
superstition. Muslim politics is essentially clerical and recognizes only one difference, namely, that existing between
Hindus and Muslims. None of the secular categories of life have any place in the politics of the Muslim community
and if they do find a place—and they must because they are irrepressible—they are subordinated to one and the only
governing principle of the Muslim political universe, namely, religion.

II
The existence of these evils among the Muslims is distressing enough. But far more distressing is the fact that there is
no organized movement of social reform among the Musalmans of India on a scale sufficient to bring about their
eradication. The Hindus have their social evils. But there is this relieving feature about them—namely, that some of
them are conscious of their existence and a few of them are actively agitating for their removal. The Muslims, on the
other hand, do not realize that they are evils and consequently do not agitate for their removal. Indeed, they oppose any
change in their existing practices. It is noteworthy that the "Muslims opposed the Child-Marriage Bill brought in the
Central Assembly in 1930, whereby the age for marriage of a girl was raised to 14 and of a boy to 18 on the ground
that it was opposed to the Muslim canon law. Not only did they oppose the bill at every stage but that when it became
law they started a campaign of Civil Disobedience against that Act. Fortunately the Civil Disobedience campaign of
the Muslims against the Act did not swell and was submerged in the Congress Civil Disobedience campaign which
synchronized with it. But the campaign only proves how strongly the Muslims are opposed to social reform.

The question may be asked why are the Muslims opposed to social reform ?

The usual answer given is that the Muslims all over the world are an unprogressive people. This view no doubt accords
with the facts of history. After the first spurts of their activity the scale of which was undoubtedly stupendous leading
to the foundations of vast empires—the Muslims suddenly fell into a strange condition of torpor, from which they
never seem to have become awake. The cause assigned for this torpor by those, who have made a study of their
condition, is said to be the fundamental assumption made by all Muslims that Islam is a world religion, suitable for all
people, for all times and for all conditions. It has been contended that :—

"The Musalman, remaining faithful to his religion, has not progressed; he has remained stationary in a world of swiftly
moving modern forces. It is, indeed, one of the salient features of Islam that it immobilizes in their native barbarism,
the races whom it enslaves. It is fixed in a crystallization, inert and impenetrable. It is unchangeable; and political,
social or economic changes have no repercussion upon it.

" Having been taught that outside Islam there can be no safety; outside its law no truth and outside its spiritual message
there is no happiness, the Muslim has become incapable of conceiving any other condition than his own, any other
mode of thought than the Islamic thought. He firmly believes that he has arrived at an unequalled pitch of perfection;
that he is the sole possessor of true faith, of the true doctrine, the true wisdom ; that he alone is in possession of the
truth—no relative truth subject to revision, but absolute truth.
" The religious law of the Muslims has had the effect of imparting to the very diverse individuals of whom the world is
composed, a unity of thought, of feeling, of ideas, of judgement."

It is urged that this uniformity is deadening and is not merely imparted to the Muslims, but is imposed upon them by a
spirit of intolerance which is unknown anywhere outside the Muslim world for its severity and its violence and which
is directed towards the suppression of all rational thinking which is in conflict with the teachings of Islam. As Renan
observes 6[f.6] :—

" Islam is a close union of the spiritual and the temporal; it is the reign of a dogma, it is the heaviest chain that
humanity has ever borne.... Islam has its beauties as a religion;.... But to the human reason Islamism has only been
injurious. The minds that it has shut from the light were, no doubt, already closed in their own internal limits; but it has
persecuted free thought, I shall not say more violently than other religions, but more effectually. It has made of the
countries that it has conquered 9 closed field to the rational culture of the mind. What is, in fact -essentially distinctive
of the Musalman is his hatred of science, his persuasion that research is useless, frivolous, almost impious—the natural
sciences, because they are attempts at rivalry with God; the historical sciences, because they apply to times anterior to
Islam, they may revive ancient heresies. Renan concludes by saying:—
"Islam, in treating science as an enemy, is only consistent, but it is a dangerous thing to be consistent. To its own
misfortune Islam has been successful. By slaying science it has slain itself; and is condemned in the world to a
complete inferiority."
This answer though obvious, cannot be the true answer. If it were the true answer, how are we to account for the stir
and ferment that is going on in all Muslim countries outside India, where the spirit of inquiry, the spirit of change and
the desire to reform are noticeable in every walk of life. Indeed, the social reforms which have taken place in Turkey
have been of the most revolutionary character. If Islam has not come in the way of the Muslims of these countries, why
should it come in the way of the Muslims of India ? There must be some special reason for the social and political
stagnation of the Muslim community in India.

What can that special reason be ? It seems to me that the reason for the absence of the spirit of change in the Indian
Musalman is to be sought in the' peculiar position he occupies in India. He is placed in a social environment which is
predominantly Hindu. That Hindu environment is always silently but surely encroaching upon him. He feels that it is
de-musalmanazing him. As a protection against this gradual weaning away he is led to insist on preserving everything
that is Islamic without caring to examine whether it is helpful or harmful to his society. Secondly, the Muslims in India
are placed in a political environment which is also predominantly Hindu. He feels that he will be suppressed and that
political suppression will make the Muslims a depressed class. It is this consciousness that he has to save himself from
being submerged by the Hindus socially and-politically, which to my mind is the primary cause why the Indian
Muslims as compared with their fellows outside are backward in the matter of social reform. Their energies are
directed to maintaining a constant struggle against the Hindus for seats and posts in which there is no time, no thought
and no room for questions relating to social reform. And if there is any, it is all overweighed and suppressed by the
desire, generated by pressure of communal tension, to close the ranks and offer a united front to the menace of the
Hindus and Hinduism by maintaining their socio-religious unity at any cost.
The same is the explanation of the political stagnation in the Muslim community of India. Muslim politicians do not
recognize secular categories of life as the basis of their politics because to them it means the weakening of the
community in its fight against the Hindus. The poor Muslims will not join the poor Hindus to get justice from the rich.
Muslim tenants will not join Hindu tenants to prevent the tyranny of the landlord. Muslim labourers will not join
Hindu labourers in the fight of labour against capital. Why ? The answer is simple. The poor Muslim sees that if he
joins in the fight of the poor against the rich, he may be fighting against a rich Muslim. The Muslim tenant feels that if
he joins in the campaign against the landlord, he may have to fight against a Muslim landlord. A Muslim labourer feels
that if he joins in the onslaught of labour against capital, he will be injuring a Muslim mill-owner. He is conscious that
any injury to a rich Muslim, to a Muslim landlord or to a Muslim mill-owner, is a disservice to the Muslim
community, for it is thereby weakened in its struggle against the Hindu community.

How Muslim politics has become perverted is shown by the attitude of the Muslim leaders to the political reforms in
the Indian States. The Muslims and their leaders carried on a great agitation for the introduction of representative
government in the Hindu State of Kashmir. The same Muslims and their leaders are deadly opposed to the introduction
of representative governments in other Muslim States. The reason for this strange attitude is quite simple. In all
matters, the determining question with the Muslims is how it will affect the Muslims vis-a-vis the Hindus. If
representative government can help the Muslims, they will demand it, and fight for it. In the State of Kashmir the ruler
is a Hindu, but the majority of the subjects are Muslims. The Muslims fought for representative government in
Kashmir, because representative government in Kashmir meant the transfer of power from a Hindu king to the Muslim
masses. In other Muslim States, the ruler is a Muslim but the majority of his subjects are Hindus. In such States
representative government means the transfer of power from a Muslim ruler to the Hindu masses, and that is why the
Muslims support the introduction of representative government in one case and oppose it in the other. The dominating
consideration with the Muslims is not democracy. The dominating consideration is how democracy with majority rule
will affect the Muslims in their struggle against the Hindus. Will it strengthen them or will it weaken them ? If
democracy weakens them, they will not have democracy. They will prefer the rotten state to continue in the Muslim
States rather than weaken the Muslim ruler in his hold upon his Hindu subjects.

The political and social stagnation in the Muslim community can be explained by one and only one reason. The
Muslims think that the Hindus and Muslims must perpetually struggle; the Hindus to establish their dominance over
the Muslims and the Muslims to establish their historical position as the ruling community—that in this struggle the
strong will win, and to ensure strength they must suppress or put in cold storage everything which causes dissension in
their ranks.

If the Muslims in other countries have undertaken the task of reforming their society and the Muslims of India have
refused to do so, it is because the former are free from communal and political clashes with rival communities, while
the latter are not.

III

It is not that this blind spirit of conservatism which dose not recognize the need of repair to the social structure has
taken hold of the Muslims only. It has taken hold of the Hindus also. The Hindus atone time did recognize that without
social efficiency no permanent progress in other fields of activity was possible, that, owing to the mischief wrought by
evil customs Hindu Society was not in a state of efficiency and that ceaseless efforts must be made to eradicate these
evils. It was due to the recognition of this fact that the birth of the National Congress was accompanied by the
foundation of the Social Conference. While the Congress was concerned with defining the weak points in the political
organisation of the country, the Social Conference was engaged in removing the weak points in the social organisation
of the Hindu Society. For some time, the Congress and the Conference worked as two wings of one common body and
held their annual sessions in the same pandal. But soon the two wings developed into two parties, a Political Reform
Party and a Social Reform Party, between whom raged fierce controversy. The Political Reform Party supported the
National Congress and the Social Reform Party supported the Social Conference. The two bodies became two hostile
camps. The point at issue was whether social reform should precede political reform. For a decade the forces were
evenly balanced and the battle was fought without victory to either side. It was, however, evident that the fortunes of
the Social Conference were ebbing fast. The gentlemen who presided over the sessions of the Social Conference
lamented that the majority of the educated Hindus were for political advancement and indifferent to social reform and
that while the number of those who attended the Congress was very large and the number who did not attend but who
sympathized with it even larger, the number of those who attended the Social Conference was very much smaller. This
indifference, this thinning of its ranks was soon followed by active hostility from the politicians, like the late Mr.
Tilak. In course of time, the party in favour of political reform won and the Social Conference vanished and was
forgotten,7 [f7] With it also vanished from the Hindu Society the urge for social reform. Under the leadership of Mr.
Gandhi, the Hindu Society, if it did not become a political mad-house, certainly became mad after politics.
Non-co-operation, Civil Disobedience, and the cry for Swaraj took the place which social reform once had in the
minds of the Hindus. In the din and dust of political agitation, the Hindus do not even know that there are any evils to
be remedied. Those who are conscious of it, do not believe that social reform is as important as political reform, and
when forced to admit its importance argue that there can be no social reform unless political power is first achieved.
They are so eager to possess political power that they are impatient even of propaganda in favour of social reform, as it
means so much time and energy deducted from political propaganda. A correspondent of Mr. Gandhi put the point of
view of the Nationalists very appropriately, if bluntly, when he wrote 8[f.8] to Mr. Gandhi, saying:—

" Don't 'you think that it is impossible to achieve any great reform without winning political power ? The present
economic structure has got to be tackled? No reconstruction is possible without political reconstruction and I am afraid
all this talk of polished and unpolished rice, balanced diet and so on and so forth is mere moonshine."

The Social Reform Party, led by Ranade, died leaving the field to the Congress. There has grown up among the Hindus
another party which is also a rival to the Congress. It is the Hindu Maha Sabha. One would expect from its name that it
was a body for bringing about the reform of Hindu Society. But it is not. Its rivalry with the Congress has nothing to
do with the issue of social reform vs. political reform. Its quarrel with the Congress has its origin in the pro-Muslim
policy of the Congress. It is organized for the protection of Hindu rights against Muslim encroachment. Its plan is to
organize the Hindus for offering a united front to the Muslims. As a body organized to protect Hindu rights it is all the
time engaged in keeping an eye on political movements, on seats and posts. It cannot spare any thought for social
reform. As a body keen on bringing about a united front of all Hindus, it cannot afford to create dissensions among its
elements which would be the case if it undertook to bring about social reforms. For the sake of the consolidation of the
Hindu rank and file, the Hindu Maha Sabha is ready to suffer all social evils to remain as they are. For the sake of
consolidation of the Hindus, it is prepared to welcome the Federation as devised by the Act of 1935 in spite of

its many iniquities and defects. For the same purpose, the Hindu Maha Sabha favours the retention of the Indian States,
with their administration as it is. ' Hands off the Hindu States ' has been the battle-cry of its President. This attitude is
stranger than that of the Muslims. Representative government in Hindu States cannot do harm to the Hindus. Why then
should the President of the Hindu Maha Sabha oppose it ? Probably because it helps the Muslims, whom he cannot
tolerate.
IV

To what length this concern for the conservation of their forces can lead the Hindus and the Musalmans cannot be
better illustrated than by the debates on the Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act VIII of 1939 in the Central Assembly.
Before 1939, the law was that apostasy of a male or a female married under the Muslim law ipso facto dissolved the
marriage with the result that if a married Muslim woman changed her religion, she was free to marry a person
professing her new religion. This was the rule of law enforced by the courts, throughout India at any rate, for the last
60 years.[f9] 9

This law was annulled by Act VIII of 1939, section 4 of which reads as follows:—

" The renunciation of Islam by a married Muslim woman or her conversion to a faith other than Islam shall not by
itself operate to dissolve her marriage:

Provided that after such renunciation or conversion the woman shall be entitled to obtain a decree for the dissolution of
marriage on any of the grounds mentioned in section 2:
Provided further that the provision of' this section shall not apply to a woman converted to Islam from some other faith
who re-embraces her former faith."
According to this Act, the marriage of a married Muslim woman is not dissolved by reason of her conversion to
another religion. All that she gets is a right of divorce. It is very intriguing to find that section 2 does not refer to
conversion or apostasy as a ground for divorce. The effect of the law is that a married Muslim woman has no liberty of
conscience and is tied for ever to her husband whose religious faith may be quite abhorrent to her.
The grounds urged in support of this change are well worth attention. The mover of the Bill, Quazi Kazmi, M.L.A.
adopted a very ingenious line of argument in support of the change. In his speech 10[f.10] on the motion to refer the
Bill he said:—
" Apostasy was considered by Islam, as by any other religion, as a great crime, almost amounting to a crime against the
State. It is not novel for the religion of' Islam to have that provision. If we look up the older Acts of any nation, we
will find that similar provision also exists in other Codes as well. Fur the male a severer punishment was awarded, that
of death, and for females, only the punishment of imprisonment was awarded. This main provision was that because it
was a sin, it was a crime, it was to be punished, and the woman was to be deprived of her status as wife. It was not
only this status that she lost, but she lost all her suit us in society; she was deprived of her properly and civil rights as
well. But we find that as early as 1850 an Act was passed here, called the Caste Disabilities Removal Act of 1850, Act
XXI of 1850.....

" .... by this Act, the forfeiture of civil rights that could be imposed on a woman on her apostasy has been taken away.
She can no longer be subjected to any forfeiture of properly or her right of inheritance or anything of the kind. The
only question is that the Legislature has come to her help, it has given her a certain amount of liberty of thought, some
kind of liberty of religion to adopt any faith she likes, and has removed the forfeiture clause from which she could
suffer, and which was a restraint upon her changing the faith. The question is how far we are entitled after that to
continue placing the restriction on her status as a wile. Her status as a wife is of some importance in society. She
belongs to some family, she has got children, she has got other connections too. If she has got a liberal mind, she may
not like to continue the same old religion. If she changes her religion, why should we, according to our modern ideas,
inflict upon her a further penalty that she will cease to be the wife of her husband. I submit, in these days when we are
advocating freedom of thought and freedom of religion, when we are advocating inter-marriages between different
communities, it would be inconsistent for us t support a provision that a mere change of faith or change of religion
would email forfeiture of her rights as the wife of her husband. So, from a modern point of view, I have got no
hesitation in saying that we cannot, in any way, support the contrary proposition that apostasy must be allowed to
finish her relationship with her husband. But that is only one part of the argument.

"Section 32 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936, is to the effect that a married woman may sue for divorce on
the grounds 'that the defendant has ceased to be a Parsi ....'

" There are two things apparent from this. the first is, that it is a ground for dissolution, not from any religious idea or
religious sentiment, because, if two years have passed after the conversion and if plaintiff does not object, then either
the male or female has no right to sue for dissolution of marriage. The second thing is, that it is the plaintiff who has
got the complaint that the other party has changed the religion, who has got the right of getting the marriage
dissolved....... In addition to this Act, as regards other communities we can have an idea of the effect of conversion on
marriage tie from the Native Converts ' Marriage Dissolution Act, Act XXI of 1886 ........ It applies to all the
communities of India, and this legislation recognises the fact that mere conversion of an Indian to Christianity would
not dissolve the marriage but he will have the right of going to a law court and saying that the other party., who is not
converted, must perform the marital duties in respect of him...... then they are given a year's time and the judge directs
that they shall have an interview with each other in the presence of certain other persons to induce them to resume their
conjugal relationship, and if they do not agree, then on the ground of desecration the marriage is dissolved. The
marriage is dissolved no doubt, but not on the ground of change of faith. . . .. .So, every community in India has got
this accepted principle that conversion to another religion cannot amount to a dissolution of marriage."

Syed Gulam Bikh Nairang, another Muslim member of the Assembly and a protagonist of the Bill, was brutally frank.
In support of the principle of the Bill he said 11[f.11] :—

" For a very long lime the courts in British India have held without reservation and qualification that under all
circumstances apostasy automatically and immediately puts an end to the married slate without any judicial
proceedings, any decree of court, or any other ceremony. That has been the position which was taken up by the Courts.
Now, there are three distinct views of Hanafi jurists on the point. One view which is attributed to the Bokhara jurists
was adopted and even that not in its entirely but in what I may call a mutilated and maimed condition. What that
Bokhara view is has been already stated by Mr. Kazmi and some other speakers. The Bokhara jurists say that marriage
is dissolved by apostasy. In fact, I should be more accurate in saying—1 have got authority for that—that it is,
according to the Bokhara view, not dissolved but suspended. The marriage is suspended but the wife is then kept in
custody or confinement till she repents and embraces Islam again, and then she is induced to marry the husband, whose
marriage was only suspended and not put an end to or cancelled. The second view is that on apostasy a married
Muslim woman ceases to be the wife other husband but becomes his bond woman. One view, which is a sort of
corollary to this view, is that she is not necessarily the bond woman of her ex-husband but she becomes the bond
woman of the entire Muslim community and anybody can employ her as a bond woman. The third view, that of the
Ulema of Samarkand and Baikh, is that the marriage lie is not affected by such apostasy and that the woman still
continues to be the wife of the husband. These are the three views. A portion of the first view, the Bokhara view, was
taken hold of by the Courts and rulings after rulings were based on that portion.
" This House is well aware that it is not only in this solitary instance that judicial error is sought to be corrected by
legislation, but in many other cases, too, there have been judicial errors or conflicts of judicial opinion or uncertainties
and vagueness of law. Errors of judicial view are being constantly corrected by legislation. In this particular mailer
there has been an error after error and a tragedy of errors. To show me those rulings is begging the question. Surely, it
should be realized that it is no answer to my Bill that because the High Courts have decided against me, I have no
business to come to this House and ask it to legislate this way or that way."
Having regard to the profundity of the change, the arguments urged in support of it were indeed very insubstantial. Mr.
Kazmi failed to realize that if there was a difference between the divorce law relating to Parsis, Christians and
Muslims, once it is established that the conversion is genuine, the Muslim law was in advance of the Parsi and the
Christian law and instead of making the Muslim law retrograde, the proper thing ought to have been to make the Parsi
and the Christian law progress. Mr. Nairang did not stop to inquire that, if there were different schools of thought
among the Muslim jurists, whether it was not more in consonance with justice to adopt the more enlightened view
which recognized the freedom of the Muslim woman and not to replace it by the barbaric one which made her a
bonds-woman.

Be that as it may, the legal arguments had nothing to do with the real motive underlying the change. The real motive
was to put a stop to the illicit conversion of women to alien faiths, followed by immediate and hurried marriages with
some one professing the faith she happened to have joined, with a view to locking her in the new community and
preventing her from going back to the community to which she originally belonged. The conversion of Muslim woman
to Hinduism and of Hindu woman to Islam looked at from a social and political point of view cannot but be fraught
with tremendous consequences. It means a disturbance in the numerical balance between the two communities. As the
disturbance was being brought about by the abduction of women, it could not be overlooked. For woman is at once the
seed-bed of and the hothouse for nationalism in a degree that man can never be.12 [f12] These conversions of women
and their subsequent marriages were there-fore regarded, and rightly, as a series of depredations practised by Hindus
against Muslims and by Muslims against Hindus with a view to bringing about a change in their relative numerical
strength. This abominable practice of woman-lifting had become as common as cattle-lifting and, with its obvious
danger to communal balance, efforts had to be made to stop it. That this was the real reason behind this legislation can
be seen from the two provisions to section 4 of the Act. In proviso I the Hindus concede to the Musalmans that if they
convert a woman who was originally a Muslim she will remain bound to her former Muslim husband notwithstanding
her conversion. By proviso 2 the Muslims concede to the Hindus that if they convert a Hindu married woman and she
is married to a Musalman, her marriage will be deemed to be dissolved if she renounces Islam and she will be free to
return to her Hindu fold. Thus what underlies the change in law is the desire to keep the numerical balance and it is for
this purpose that the rights of women were sacrificed.

There are two other features of this malaise which have not been sufficiently noted.
One such feature is the jealousy with which one of them looks upon any reform by the other in its social system. If the
effect of such reform is to give it increase of strength for resistance, it at once creates hostility.
Swami Shradhanand relates a very curious incident which well illustrates this attitude. Writing in the Liberator
13[f.13] his recollections, he refers to this incident. He says :—

" Mr. Ranade was there. . . . to guide the Social Conference to which the title of ' National ' was for the first and last
lime given. It was from the beginning a Hindu Conference in all walks of life. The only Mahomedan delegate who
joined the National Social Conference was a Mufti Saheb of Barreily. Well! The conference began when the resolution
in favour of remarriage of child-widows was moved by a Hindu delegate and by me. Sanalanist Pandits opposed it.
Then the Mufti asked permission to speak. The laic Baijnalh told Mufti Saheb that as the resolution concerned the
Hindus only, he need not speak. At this the Mufti flared up.

" There was no loophole left for the President and Mufti Saheb was allowed to have his say. Mufti Saheb's argument
was that as Hindu Shastras did not allow remarriage, it was a sin to press for it. Again, when the resolution about the
reconversion of those who had become Christians and Musalmans came up. Mufti Saheb urged that when a man
abandoned the Hindu religion he ought not to be allowed to come back."

Another illustration would be the attitued of the Muslims towards the problem of the Untouchables. The Muslims have
always been looking at the Depressed Classes with a sense of longing and much of the jealousy between Hindus and
Muslims arises out of the fear of the latter that the former might become stronger by assimilating the Depressed
Classes. In 1909 the Muslims took the bold step of suggesting that the Depressed Classes should not be enrolled in the
census as Hindus. In 1923 Mr. Mahomed Ali in his address as the President of the Congress went much beyond the
position taken by the Muslims in 1909. He said:—
"The quarrels about ALAMS and PIPAL trees and musical processions are truly childish ; but there is one question
which can easily furnish a ground for complaint of unfriendly action if communal activities are not amicably adjusted.
It is the question of the conversion of the Suppressed Classes, if Hindu society does not speedily absorb them. The
Christian missionary is already busy and no one quarrels with him. But the moment some Muslim Missionary Society
is organized for the same purpose there is every likelihood of an outcry in the Hindu press. It has been suggested to me
by an influential and wealthy gentleman who is able to organize a Missionary Society on a large scale for the
conversion of the Suppressed Classes, that it should be possible to reach a settlement with leading Hindu gentlemen
and divide the country into separate areas where Hindu and Muslim missionaries could respectively work, each
community preparing for each year, or longer unit of lime if necessary, an estimate of the numbers it is prepared to
absorb or convert. These estimates would, of course, be based on the number of workers and funds each had to spare,
and tested by the actual figures of the previous period. In this way each community would be free to do the work of
absorption and conversion, or rather, of reform without chances of collision with one another. I cannot say in what
light my Hindu brethren will lake it and I place this suggestion tentatively in all frankness and sincerity before them.
All that I say for myself is that I have seen the condition of the ' Kali Praja ' in the Baroda Slate and of the Gonds in the
Central Provinces and I frankly confess it is a reproach to us all. If the Hindus will not absorb them into their own
society, others will and must, and then the orthodox Hindu loo will cease to treat them as untouchables. Conversion
seems to transmute them by a strong alchemy. But does this not place a premium upon conversion ?"

The other feature is the " preparations " which the Muslims and Hindus are making against each other without
abatement. It is like a race in armaments between two hostile nations. If the Hindus have the Benares University, the
Musalmans must have the Aligarh University. If the Hindus start Shudhi movement, the Muslims must launch the
Tablig movement. If the Hindus start Sangathan, the Muslims must meet it by Tanjim. If the Hindus have the R. S. S.
S.,14[f.14] the Muslims must reply by organizing the Khaksars.t This race in social armament and equipment is run
with the determination and apprehension characteristic of nations which are on the war path. The Muslims fear that the
Hindus are subjugating them. The Hindus feel that the Muslims are engaged in reconquering them. Both appear to be
preparing for war and each is watching the " preparations " of the other.

Such a state of things cannot but be ominous. It is a vicious circle. If the Hindus make themselves stronger, the
Musalmans feel menaced. The Muslims endeavour to increase their forces to meet the menace and the Hindus then do
the same to equalize the position. As the preparations proceed, so does the suspicion, the secrecy, and the plotting. The
possibilities of peaceful adjustment are poisoned at the source and precisely because everyone is fearing and preparing
for it that " war " between the two tends to become inevitable. But in the situation in which they find themselves, for
the Hindus and the Muslims not to attend to anything, except to prepare themselves to meet the challenge of each
other, is quite natural. It is a struggle for existence and the issue, that counts, is survival and not the quality or the plane
of survival.

Two things must be said to have emerged from this discussion. One is that the Hindus and the Muslims regard each
other as a menace. The second is that to meet this menace, both have suspended the cause of removing the social evils
with which they are infested. Is this a desirable state of things ? If it is not how then can it be ended ?

No one can say that to have the problems of social reform put aside is a desirable state of things. Wherever there are
social evils, the health of the body politic requires that they shall be removed before they become the symbols of
suffering and injustice. For it is the social and economic evils which everywhere are the parent of revolution or decay.
Whether social reform should precede political reform or political reform should precede social reform may be a
matter of controversy. But there can be no two opinions on the question that the sole object of political power is the
use to which it can be put in the cause of social and economic reform. The whole struggle for political power would be
a barren and bootless effort if it was not justified by the feeling that, because of the want of political power, urgent and
crying social evils are eating into the vitals of society and are destroying it. But suppose the Hindus and the Muslims
somehow come into possession of political power, what hope is there that they will use it for purposes of social reform
? There is hardly any hope in that behalf. So long as the Hindus and the Muslims regard each other as a menace, their
attention will be engrossed in preparations for meeting the menace. The exigencies of a common front by Musalmans
against Hindus and by Hindus against Musalmans generate—and is bound to generate—a conspiracy of silence over
social evils. Neither the Muslims nor the Hindus will attend to them even though the evils may be running sores and
requiring immediate attention, for the simple reason that they regard every measure of social reform as bound to create
dissension and division and thereby weaken the ranks when they ought to be closed to meet the menace of the other
community. It is obvious that so long as one community looks upon the other as a menace there will be no social
progress and the spirit of conservatism will continue to dominate the thoughts and actions of both.
How long will this menace last ? It is sure to last as long as the Hindus and Muslims are required to live as members of
one country under the mantle of a single constitution. For, it is the fear of the single constitution with the possibility of
the shifting of the balance—for nothing can keep the balance at the point originally fixed by the constitution—which
makes the Hindus a menace to the Muslims and the Muslims a menace to the Hindus. If this is so, Pakistan is the
obvious remedy. It certainly removes the chief condition which makes for the menace. Pakistan liberates both the
Hindus and the Muslims from the fear of enslavement of and encroachment against each other. It removes, by
providing a separate constitution for each, Pakistan and Hindustan, the very basis which leads to this perpetual struggle
for keeping a balance of power in the day-to-day life and frees them to take in hand those vital matters of urgent social
importance which they are now forced to put aside in cold storage, and improve the lives of their people, which after
all is the main object of this fight for Swaraj.

Without some such arrangement, the Hindus and the Muslims will act and react as though they were two nations, one
fearing to be conquered by the other. Preparations for aggression will 'always have precedence over social reform, so
that the social stagnation which has set in must continue. This is quite natural and no one need be surprised at it. For,
as Bernard Shaw pointed out:—

" A conquered nation is like a man with cancer ; he can think of nothing else . . . . A healthy nation is as unconscious
of' its nationality as a healthy man of his bones. But if you break a nation's nationality it will think of nothing else but
getting it set again. It will listen to no reformer, to no philosopher, to no preacher until the demand of the nationalist is
granted. It will attend to no business, however vital, except the business of unification and liberation."
Unless there is unification of the Muslims who wish to separate from the Hindus and unless there is liberation of each
from the fear of domination by the other, there can be no doubt that this malaise of social stagnation will not be set
right.
CHAPTER XI

COMMUNAL AGGRESSION

Even a superficial observer cannot fail to notice that a spirit of aggression underlies the Hindu attitude towards the
Muslim and the Muslim attitude towards the Hindu. The Hindu's spirit of aggression is a new phase which he has just
begun to cultivate. The Muslim's spirit of aggression is his native endowment and is ancient as compared with that of
the Hindu. It is not that the Hindu, if given time, will not pick up and overtake the Muslim. But as matters stand
to-day, the Muslim in this exhibition of the spirit of aggression leaves the Hindu far behind.

Enough has been said about the social aggression of the Muslims in the chapter dealing with communal riots. It is
necessary to speak briefly of the political aggression of the Muslims. For this political aggression has created a malaise
which cannot be overlooked.

Three things are noticeable about this political aggression of the Muslims.

First is the ever-growing catalogue of the Muslim's political demands. Their origin goes back to the year 1892.

In 1885 the Indian National Congress was founded. It began with a demand for good government as distinguished
from self-government. In response to this demand the British Government felt the necessity of altering the nature of
the Legislative Councils, Provincial and Central, established under the Act of 1861. In that nascent stage of Congress
agitation, the British Government did not feel called upon to make them fully popular. It thought it enough to give
them a popular colouring. Accordingly the British Parliament passed in 1892 what is called the Indian Councils Act.
This Act is memorable for two things. It was in this Act of 1892 that the British Government for the first time accepted
the semblance of the principle of popular representation as the basis for the constitution of the Legislatures in India. It
was not a principle of election. It was a principle of nomination, only it was qualified by the requirement that before
nomination a person must be selected by important public bodies such as municipalities, district boards, universities
and the associations of merchants, etc. Secondly, it was in the legislatures that were constituted under this Act that the
principle of separate representation for Musalmans was for the first time introduced in the political constitution of
India.

The introduction of this principle is shrouded in mystery. It is a mystery because it was introduced so silently and so
stealthily. The principle of separate representation does not find a place in the Act. The Act says nothing about it. It
was in the directions—but not in the Act—issued to those charged with the duty of framing regulations as to the
classes and interests to whom representation was to be given that the Muslims were named as a class to be provided
for.
It is a mystery as to who was responsible for its introduction. This scheme of separate representation was not the result
of any demand put forth by any organized Muslim association. In whom did it then originate ? It is suggested 1[f.15] 5
that it originated with the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, who, as far back as the year 1888, when dealing with the question of
representation in the Legislative Councils, emphasized the necessity that in India representation will have to be, not in
the way representation is secured in England, but representation by interests. Curiosity leads to a further question,
namely, what could have led Lord Dufferin to propose such a plan ? It is suggested 16[f.16] that the idea was to wean
17[f.17] away the Musalmans from the Congress which had already been started three years before. Be that as it may,
it is certain that it is by this Act that separate representation for Muslims became, for the first time, a feature of the
Indian Constitution. It should, however, be noted that neither the Act nor the Regulations conferred any right of
selection upon the Muslim community, nor did the Act give the Muslim community a right to claim a fixed number of
seats. All that it did was to give the Muslims the right to separate representation.
Though, to start with, the suggestion of separate representation came from the British, the Muslims did not fail to
appreciate the social value of separate political rights with the result that when in 1909 the Muslims came to know that
the next step in the reform of the Legislative Councils was contemplated, they waited of their own accord in deputation
18[f.18] upon the Viceroy, Lord Minto, and placed before him the following demands :—

(i) Communal representation in accordance with their numerical strength, social position and local influence,
on district and municipal boards.

(ii) An assurance of Muhammadan representation on the governing bodies of Universities.

(iii) Communal representation on provincial councils, election being by special electoral colleges composed of
Muhammadan landlords, lawyers, merchants, and representatives of other important interests, University graduates of
a certain standing and members of district and municipal boards.

(iv) The number of Muhammadan representatives in the Imperial Legislative Council should not depend on their
numerical strength, and Muhammadans should never be in an ineffective minority. They should be elected as far as
possible (as opposed to being nominated), election being by special Muhammadan colleges composed of landowners,
lawyers, merchants, members of provincial councils, Fellows of Universities, etc.

These demands were granted and given effect to in the Act of 1909. Under this Act the Muhammadans were given (1)
the right to elect their representatives, (2) the right to elect their representatives by separate electorates, (3) the right to
vote in the general electorates as well, and (4) the right to weightage in representation. The following table shows the
proportion of representation- secured to the Muslims in the Legislatures by the Act of 1909 and the Regulations made
thereunder :—

Composition of Legislative Councils under the act

of 1999 showing Communal Proportion between
Hindus ad Muslims

Province Maximum Maximum Ex-officio Strength of the Councils under the Regulations Total
number of number of Members Elected Members Nominated Members strength
additional Additional Total Non-Muslims Muslims Officials Non Experts Total columns
Members Members 4, 5, 12
Law Others officials
prescribed allowed by
Officials
by the Act Regulatory 19
of 1909 columns 5 [f.19]
and 12

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
India 60 60 8 27 22 5 -- 28 5 -- 33 63
Madras 50 45 4 21 19 2 -- 16 5 2 24 49
Bombay 50 45 4 21 17 4 1 14 7 2 24 49
Bengal 50 50 4 28 23 5 1 16 4 2 22 54
Bihar 50 41 4 21 17 4 -- 15 4 1 20 45
U.P. 50 49 1 21 17 4 -- 20 6 2 28 50
Punjab 30 26 1 8 8 none -- 10 6 2 18 27
Burma 30 17 1 1 1 none -- 6 8 2 16 18
Assam 30 25 1 11 9 2 -- 9 4 1 14 25
The provisions were applied to all Provinces except the Punjab and the C. P. It was not applied to the Punjab because
such special protection was considered unnecessary for the Musalmans of the Punjab and it was not applied to the C. P.
because it had no Legislative Council at the time. 20[f.20]

In October 1916, 19 members of the Imperial Legislative Council presented the Viceroy (Lord Cheirnsford) a
memorandum demanding a reform of the Constitution. Immediately the Muslims came forward with a number of
demands on behalf of the Muslim community. These were :—
(i) The extension of the principle of separate representation to the Punjab and the C. P.

(ii) Fixing the numerical strength of the Muslim representatives in the Provincial and Imperial Legislative
Councils.

(iii) Safeguards against legislation affecting Muslims, their religion and religious usages.
The negotiations following upon these demands resulted in agreement between the Hindus and the Muslims which is
known as the Lucknow Pact. It may be said to contain two clauses. One related to legislation, under which it was
agreed that :—

" No Bill, nor any clause thereof, nor a resolution introduced by a nonofficial affecting one or other community (which
question is to be determined by the members of that community in the Legislative Council concerned) shall be'
proceeded with, if three-fourths of the members of that community in the particular Council, Imperial and Provincial,
oppose the Bill or any clause thereof or the resolution."

The other clause related to the proportion of Muslim representation. With regard to the Imperial Legislative Council
the Pact provided :—

"That one-third of the Indian elected members should be Muhammadans, elected by separate electorates in the several
Provinces, in the proportion, as nearly as might be, in which they were represented on the provincial legislative
councils by separate Muhammadan electorates."

In the matter of Muslim representation in the Provincial Legislative Councils it was agreed that the proportion of
Muslim representation should be as follows 21 [f.21] :—

Percentage of elected Indian

Members to the Provincial

Legislature

Punjab 50
United Provinces 30

Bengal 40
Bihar and Orissa 25
Central Province 15
Madras 15
Bombay 33

While allowing this proportion of seats to the Muslims, the right to second vote in the general electorates which they
had under the arrangement of 1909 was taken away.

The Lucknow Pact was adversely criticized by the Montagu Chelmsford Report. But being an agreement between the
parties Government did not like to reject it and to substitute in its place its own decision. Both clauses of the agreement
were accepted by Government and embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919. The clause relating to
legislation was given effect to but in a different form. Instead of leaving it to the members of the Legislature to oppose
it, it was provided' 22[f.22] ' that legislation affecting the religion or religious rites and usages of any class of British
subjects in India shall not be introduced at any meeting of either Chamber of the Indian Legislature without the
previous sanction of the Governor-General.
The clause relating to representation was accepted by the Government, though in the opinion of the Government the
Punjab and Bengal Muslims were not fairly treated.
The effect of these concessions can be seen by reference to the composition of the Legislatures constituted under the
Government of India Act, 1919, which was as follows :—
Composition of the Legislatures

Statu- Elected Members Nominated Members Actu-

tory al
Mini- Total
mum
Total Muslims Non-Muslims Officials Non-officials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Legislative Assembly 145 104 52 52 26 15 145
Council of State 60 33 11 22 17 10 60
Madras Provincial 118 98 13 85 11 23 132
Council
Bombay Provincial III 86 27 59 19 9 114
Council
Bengal Provincial 125 114 39 75 16 10 140
Council
U. P. Provincial Council 118 110 29 71 17 6 123
Punjab Provincial 83 71 32 39 15 8 94
Council
Bihar Provincial Council 98 76 18 58 15 12 103
C. P. Provincial Council 70 55 7 48 10 8 73
Assam Provincial Council 53 39 12 27 7 7 53

The extent of representation secured by the Muslims by the Lucknow Pact can be seen from the following table
23[f.23] :—

Percentage

of
Percentage Percentage Muslim
o{ Muslims Percentage of elected. ' Members
to total of Muslim Muslim to total
population Members Members Members Lucknow
Legislative Body. of the to total to total in seats filled Pact
electoral No. ol No. of by election Percentage
area (1921 Members elected from Indian
Census) Indian general
Members' (communal)
24[f.24] consti-
tuencies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Punjab 55.2 40 48.5 50 50
United Provinces 14.3 25 30 32.5 30
Bengal 54.6 30 40.5 46 40
Bihar and Orissa 10.9 18.5 25 27 25
Central Provinces 4.4 9.5 13 14.5 15
Madras 6.7 10.5 14 16.5 15
Bombay 19.8 25.5 35 37 33.3
Assam 32.2 30 35.5 37.5 No. provision
Legislative Assembly 24.0 26 34 38 33.3

This table does not show quite clearly the weightage obtained by the Muslims under the Lucknow Pact. It was worked
out by the Government of India in their despatch 25 [f25] on the Report of Franchise Committee of which Lord
Southborough was the Chairman. The following table is taken from that despatch which shows that the Muslims got a
weightage under the Lucknow Pact far in excess of what Government gave them in 1909.

Muslim Percentage of Muslim Percentage

percentage of seats Proposed (2) of (1)

Population
(1) (2) (3)
Bengal 52.6 40 76
Bihar and Orissa 10.5 25 238
Bombay 20.4 33.3 163
Central Provinces 4.3 15 349
Madras 6.5 15 231
Punjab 54.8 50 91
United Provinces 14.0 30 214

In 1927 the British Government announced the appointment of the Simon Commission to examine the working of the
Indian Constitution and to suggest further reforms. Immediately the Muslims came forward with further political
demands. These demands were put forth from various Muslim platforms such as the Muslim League, All-India Muslim
Conference, All-Parties Muslim Conference, Jamiat-ul-Ulema and the Khilafat Conference. The demands were
substantially the same. It would suffice to state those that were formulated by Mr. Jinnah 26[f.26] on behalf of the
Muslim League.

They were in the following terms :—

1. The form of the future Constitution should be federal with residuary powers vested in the provinces.

2. A uniform measure of autonomy should be granted to all provinces.

3. All legislatures in the country and other elected bodies should be reconstituted on the definite principle of
adequate and effective representation of minorities in every province without reducing the majority of any province to
a minority or even equality.
4. In the Central Legislature, Muslim representation should not be less than one-third.

5. The representation of communal groups should continue to be by means of separate electorates as at present,
provided that it should be open to any community at any time to abandon its separate electorate in favour of joint
electorates.

6. Any territorial redistribution that might at any lime be necessary should not in any way affect the Muslim
majority in the Punjab, Bengal and North-West Province.
7. Full religious liberty, that is, liberty of belief, worship, observances, propaganda, association and education
should be guaranteed to all communities.

8. No bill or resolution, or any part thereof, should be passed in any legislature or any other elected body if
three-fourths of the members of any community in that particular body oppose such bill or resolution or part thereof on
the ground that it would be injurious to the interests of that community or, in the alternative, such other method as may
be devised or as may be found feasible and practicable to deal with such cases.

9. Sind should be separated from the Bombay Presidency.

10. Reforms should be introduced in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan on the same fooling as in other
provinces.
11. II. Provision should be made in the Constitution giving the Muslims an adequate share along with other Indians in
all the Services of the Slate and in self-governing bodies, having due regard to the requirements of efficiency.
12. The constitution should embody adequate safeguards for the protection of Muslim religion, culture and personal
law, and the promotion of Muslim education, language, religion, personal laws, Muslim charitable institutions, and for
their due share in grants-in-aid given by the Stale and by self-governing bodies.

13. No Cabinet, either Central or Provincial, should be formed without there being a proportion of Muslim Ministers of
at least one-third.
14. No change to be made in the Constitution by the Central Legislature except with the concurrence of the States
constituting the Indian Federation.
15. That in the present circumstances the representation of Musalmans in the different legislatures of the country and
of the other elected bodies through separate electorates is inevitable, and, further, Government being pledged not to
deprive the Musalmans of this right, it cannot be taken away without their consent, and so long as the Musalmans are
not satisfied that their rights and interests are safeguarded in the manner specified above (or herein) they would in no
way consent to the establishment of joint electorates with or without conditions.

Note:—The question of excess representation of Musalmans over and above their population in the provinces where
they are in minority to be considered hereafter.

This is a consolidated statement of Muslim demands. In it there are some which are old, and some which are new. The
old ones are included because the aim is to retain the advantages accruing therefrom. The new ones are added in order
to remove the weaknesses in the Muslim position. The new ones are five in number: (1) Representation in proportion
to population to Muslim majorities in the Punjab and Bengal, (2) One-third representation to Muslims in the cabinets
both Central and Provincial, (3) Adequate representation of Muslims in the Services, (4) Separation of Sind from the
Bombay Presidency and the raising of N.-W. F. P. and Baluchistan to the status of self-governing provinces, and (5)
Vesting of residuary powers in the provinces instead of in the Central Government.

These new demands are self-explanatory except perhaps I, 4 and 5. The object of demands I and 4 was to place, in four
provinces, the Muslim community in a statutory majority where it had only communal majority, as a force
counteracting the six provinces in which the Hindu community happened to be in a majority. This was insisted upon as
a guarantee of good treatment by both the communities of its minorities. The object of demand No. 5 was to guarantee
Muslim rule in Sind, N.-W. F. P., the Punjab and Bengal. But a Muslim majority rule in these Muslim Provinces, it
was feared, would not be effective if they remained under the control of the Central Government which could not but
be in the hand of the Hindus. To free the Muslim Provinces from the control of the Hindu Government at the Centre
was the object for which demand No. 5 was put forth.

These demands were opposed by the Hindus. There may not be much in this. But what is significant is that they were
also rejected by the Simon Commission. The Simon Commission, which was by no means unfriendly to the Muslims,
gave some very cogent reasons for rejecting the Muslim demands. It said 27[f.27] :—

" This claim goes to the length of seeking to preserve the full security for representation now provided for Muslims in
these six provinces and at the same time to enlarge in Bengal and the Punjab the present proportion of seats secured to
the community by separate electorates to figures proportionate to their ratio of population. This would give
Muhammadans a fixed and unalterable majority of the general constituency seats in both provinces. We cannot go so
far. The continuance of the present scale of weightage in the six provinces could not—in the absence of a new general
agreement between the communities—equitably be combined with so great a departure from the existing allocation in
Bengal and the Punjab.
" It would be unfair that Muhammadans should retain the very considerable weightage they enjoy in the six provinces,
and that there should at the same lime be imposed, in face of Hindu and Sikh opposition, a definite Muslim majority in
the Punjab and Bengal unalterable by any appeal to the electorate........ "
'Notwithstanding the opposition of the Hindus and the Sikhs and the rejection by the Simon Commission, the British
Government when called upon to act as an arbiter granted the Muslims all their demands old and new.

By a Notification 28[f.28] in the Gazette of India 25th January 1932 the Government of India, in exercise of the
powers conferred by sub-section (2) of section 52 A of the Government of India Act, 1916, declared that the N.-W. F.
Province shall be treated as a Governor's Province. 29[f.29] By an Order in Council, issued under the provisions
contained in sub-section (1) of section 289 of the Government of India Act of 1935, Sind was separated from Bombay
as from 1st April 1936 and declared to be a Governor's Province to be known as the province of Sind. By the
Resolution issued by the Secretary of State for India and published on 7th July 1934 the Muslim share in the public
services was fixed at 25 per cent. of all appointments Imperial and Provincial. With regard to residuary powers, it is
true that the Muslim demand that they should be vested in the Provinces was not accepted. But in another sense the
Muslim demand in this respect may be deemed to have been granted. The essence of the Muslim demand was that the
residuary powers should not be vested in the Centre, which, put in different language, meant that they should not be in
the hands of the Hindus. This is precisely what is done by section 104 of the Government of India Act, 1935, which
vests the residuary powers in the Governor-General to be exercised in his discretion. The demand for 33 1/3 per cent.
representation in the Cabinets, Central and Provincial, was not given effect to by a legal provision in the Act. The right
of Muslims to representation in the Cabinets was however accepted by the British Government and provision for
giving effect to it was made in the Instruments of Instructions issued to the Governors and Governor-General. As to the
remaining demand which related to a statutory majority in the Punjab and Bengal, the demand was given effect to by
the Communal Award. True, a statutory majority in the whole House has not been given to the Muslims and could not
be given having regard to the necessity for providing representation to other interests. But a statutory majority as
against Hindus has been given to the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal without touching the weightages obtained by
the Muslim minorities under the Lucknow Pact.
These political grants to the Muslim community by the British Government lacked security and it was feared by the
Muslims that pressure might be brought upon them or upon His Majesty's Government by the Hindus to alter the terms
of the grants to the prejudice of the Muslims. This fear was due to two reasons. One was the success of Mr. Gandhi in
getting that part of the Award which related to the Depressed Classes revised by means of the pressure of a fast unto
death. 30[f.30] Some people encouraged by this success actually agitated for revision of that part of the Award which
related to the Muslims and some Muslims were even found to be in favour of entering into such negotiations 31[f.31] .
This alarmed the Muslim community. The other reason for the fear of are vision of the terms of the grants arose out of
certain amendments in the clauses in the Government of India Bill which were made in the House of Commons
permitting such revision under certain conditions. To remove these fears and to give complete security to the Muslims
against hasty and hurried revision of the grants, His Majesty's Government authorized he Government of India to issue
the following communiqué 32[f.32] :—

" It has come to the notice of His Majesty's Government that the impression is prevalent that what is now Clause 304
of the Government of India Bill (numbered 285 in the Bill as first introduced and 299 in the Bill as amended by the
Commons in Committee) has been amended during the passage of the Bill through the Commons in such a way as to
give His Majesty's Government unfettered power to alter at any lime they may think fit the constitutional provisions
based upon what is commonly known as Government's Communal Award.

" His Majesty's Government think it desirable to give the following brief explanation both of what they consider is the
practical effect of Clause 304 in relation to any change in the Communal Award and of their own policy in relation to
any such change.

- "Under this Clause there is conferred on the Governments and Legislatures in India, after the expiry of ten years, the
right of initiating a proposal to modify the provisions and regulating various matters relating to the constitution of the
Legislature, including such questions as were covered by the Communal Award.
"The Clause also imposes on the Secretary of State the duty of laying before Parliament from the Governor-General or
the Governor as the case may be his opinion as to the proposed amendment and in particular as to the effect which it
would have on the interests of any minority and of informing Parliament of any action which he proposed to take.
"Any change in the constitutional provisions resulting from this procedure can be effected by an Order in Council, but
this is subject to the proviso that the draft of the proposed Order has been affirmatively approved by both Houses of
Parliament by a resolution. The condition is secured by Clause 305 of-the Bill.
" Before the expiry of ten years there is no similar constitutional initiative residing in the Governments and the
Legislatures of India. Power is, however, conferred by the Clause to make such a change by an Order in Council
(always with the approval of both Houses of Parliament) even before the end of ten years, but within the first ten years
(and indeed subsequently, if the initiative has not come from the Legislatures of India) it is incumbent upon the
Secretary of Slate to consult the Governments and the Legislatures of India who will be affected (unless the change is
of a minor character) before any Order in Council is laid before Parliament for its approval.

" The necessity for the powers referred to in the preceding paragraph is due to such reasons as the following :—

" (a) It is impossible to foresee when the necessity may arise for amending minor details connected with the franchise
and the constitution of legislatures, and for such amendment it will be clearly disadvantageous to have no method
available short of a fresh amending Act of Parliament, nor is it practicable statutorily to separate such details from the
more important matter such as the terms of the Communal Award;
" (b) It might also become desirable, in the event of a unanimous agreement between the communities in India, to
make a modification in the provisions based on the Communal Award ; and for such an agreed change it would also be
disadvantageous to have no other method available than an amending Act of Parliament.

" Within the range of the Communal Award His Majesty's Government would not propose, in the exercise of any
power conferred by this Clause, to recommend to Parliament any change unless such changes had been agreed to
between the communities concerned.
" In conclusion. His Majesty's Government would again emphasise the fact that none of the powers in Clause 304 can,
in view of the provisions in Clause 305, be exercised unless both Houses of Parliament agreed by an affirmative
resolution."

.After taking into account what the Muslims demanded at the R. T. C. and what was conceded to them, any one could
have thought that the limit of Muslim demands was reached and that the 1932 settlement was a final settlement. But, it
appears that even with this the Musalmans are not satisfied. A further list of new demands for safeguarding the Muslim
position seems to be ready. In the controversy that went on between Mr. Jinnah and the Congress in the year 1938, Mr.
Jinnah was asked to disclose his demands which he refused to do. But these demands have come to the surface in the
correspondence that passed between Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah in the course of the controversy and they have been
tabulated by Pandit Nehru in one of his letters to Mr. Jinnah. His tabulation gives the following items as being matters
of disputes and requiring settlement 33 [f.33] :—

( 1 ) The fourteen points formulated by the Muslim League in 1929.

(2) The Congress should withdraw all opposition to the Communal Award and should not describe it as a negation of
nationalism.

(3) The share of the Muslims in the state services should be definitely fixed in the constitution by statutory enactment.

(4) Muslim personal law and culture should be guaranteed by statute.

(5) The Congress should take in hand the agitation in connection with the Sahidganj Mosque and should use its moral
pressure to enable the Muslims to gain possession of the Mosque.

(6) The Muslims' right to call Azan and perform their religious ceremonies should not be fettered in any way.

(7) Muslims should have freedom to perform cow-slaughter.

(8) Muslim majorities in the Provinces, where such majorities exist at present, must not be affected by any territorial
re-distribution or adjustments.
(9) The ' Bande Mataram' song should be given up.

(10) Muslims want Urdu to be the national language of India and they desire to have statutory guarantees that the use
of Urdu shall not be curtailed or damaged.

(11) Muslim representation in the local bodies should be governed by the principles underlying the Communal
Award, that is, separate electorates and population strength.

(12) The tricolour flag should be changed or alternately the flag of the Muslim League should be given equal
importance.
(13) Recognition of the Muslim League as the one authoritative and representative organization of Indian Muslims.

(14) Coalition Ministries should be formed.

With this new list, there is no knowing where the Muslims are going to stop in their demands. Within one year, that is,
between 1938 and 1939, one more demand and that too of a substantial character, namely 50 per cent. share in every
thing, has been added to it. In this catalogue of new demands there are some which on the face of them are extravagant
and impossible, if not irresponsible. As an instance, one may refer to the demand for fifty-fifty and the demand for the
recognition of Urdu as the national language of India. In 1929, the Muslims insisted that in allotting seats in
Legislatures, a majority shall not be reduced to a minority or equality. 34 [f34] This principle, enunciated by
themselves, it is now demanded, shall be abandoned and a majority shall be reduced to equality. The Muslims in 1929
admitted that the other minorities required protection and that they must have it in the same manner as the Muslims.
The only distinction made between the Muslims and other minorities was as to the extent of the protection. The
Muslims claimed a higher degree of protection than was conceded to the other minorities on the ground of their
political importance. The necessity and adequacy of protection for the other minorities the Muslims never denied. But
with this new demand of 50 per cent. the Muslims are not only seeking to reduce the Hindu majority to a minority but
they are also cutting into the political rights of the other minorities. The Muslims are now speaking the language of
Hitler and claiming a place in the sun as Hitler has been doing for Germany. For their demand for 50 per cent. is
nothing but a counterpart of the German claims for Deutschland Uber Alles and Lebenuraum for Tthemselves,
irrespective of what happens to other minorities.
Their claim for the recognition of Urdu as the national language of India is equally extravagant. Urdu is not only not
spoken all, over India but is not even the language of all the Musalmans of India. Of the 68 millions of Muslims
35[f.35] only 28 millions speak Urdu. The proposal of making Urdu the national language means that the language of
28 millions of Muslims is to be imposed particularly upon 40 millions of Musalmans or generally upon 322 millions of
Indians.

It will thus be seen that every time a proposal for the reform of the constitution comes forth, the Muslims are there,
ready with some new political demand or demands. The only check upon such indefinite expansion of Muslim
demands is the power of the British Government, which must be the final arbiter in any dispute between the Hindus
and the Muslims. Who can confidently say that the decision of the British will not be in favour of the Muslims if the
dispute relating to these new demands was referred to them for arbitration ? The more the Muslims demand the more
accommodating the British seem to become. At any rate, past experience shows that the British have been inclined to
give the Muslims more than what the Muslims had themselves asked. Two such instances can be cited.

One of these relates to the Lucknow Pact. The question was whether the British Government should accept the Pact.
The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report were disinclined to accept it for reasons which were very weighty.
Speaking of the weightages granted to the Muslims by the Lucknow Pact, the authors' of the Joint Report observed 36
[f36] :—

" Now a privileged position of this kind is open to the objection, that if any other community here after makes good a
claim to separate representation, it can be satisfied only by deducting the non-Muslim seats, or by a rateable deduction
from both Muslim and non-Muslim ; and Hindu and Muslim opinion are not likely to agree which process should be
adopted. While, therefore, for reasons that we explain subsequently we assent to the maintenance of separate
representation for Muhammadans, we are bound to reserve our approval of the particular proposals set before us, until
we have ascertained what the effect upon other interests will be, .. and have made fair provision for them."

Notwithstanding this grave flaw in the Lucknow Pact, the Government of India, in its despatch referred to above,
recommended that the terms of the Pact should be improved in so far as it related to the Muslims of Bengal. Its reasons
make a strange reading. It argued that :—

" The Muhammadan representation which they the authors of the Pact] propose for Bengal is manifestly insufficient It
is questionable whether the claims of the Muhammadan population of Eastern Bengal were adequately pressed when
the Congress-League compact was in the making. They are conspicuously a backward and impoverished community.
The repartition of the presidency in 1912 came as a severe disappointment to them, and we should be very loath to fail
in seeing that their interests are now generously secured. In order to give the Bengal Muslims a representation
proportionate to their numbers, and no more, we should allot them 44 instead of 34 seats [due to them under the Pact]."
This enthusiasm for the Bengal Muslims shown by the Government of India was not shared by the British Government
It felt that as the number of seats given to the Bengal Muslims was the result of an agreement, any interference to
improve the bargain when there was no dispute about the genuineness of the agreement, could not but create the
impression that the British Government was in some special sense and for some special reason the friend of the
Muslims. In suggesting this augmentation in the seats, the Government of India forgot to take note of the reason why
the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal were not given by the Pact seats in proportion to their population. The Lucknow
Pact was based upon the principle, now thrown to the winds, that a community as such was not entitled to political
protection. A community was entitled to protection when it was in a minority. That was the principle underlying the
Lucknow Pact. The Muslim community in the Punjab and Bengal was not in a minority and, therefore, was not entitled
to the same protection which it got in other Provinces where it was in a minority. Notwithstanding their being in a
majority, the Muslims of the Punjab and Bengal felt the necessity of separate electorates. According to the principle
underlying the Pact they could qualify themselves for this only by becoming a minority which they did by agreeing to
a minority of seats. This is the reason why the Muslims of Bengal and the Punjab did not get the majority of seats they
were entitled to on the population basis. 37[f.37]

The proposal of the Government of India to give to the Bengal Muslims more than what they had asked for did not go
through. But the fact that they wanted to do so remains as evidence of their inclinations.

The second occasion when the British Government as an arbiter gave the Muslims more than they asked for was when
the Communal Decision was given in 1932. Sir Muhammad Shafi made two different proposals in the Minorities
Sub-Committee of the R. T. C. In his speech on 6th January 1931, Sir Muhammad Shafi put forth the following
proposal as a basis for communal settlement 38[f.38] :—
" We are prepared to accept joint electorates on the conditions named by me : Firstly, that the rights at present enjoyed
by the Musalmans in the minority Provinces should be continued to them; that in the Punjab and in Bengal they should
have two joint electorates and representation on a population basis; that there should be the principle of reservation of
seats coupled with Maulana Mahomed Ali's condition. 39[f.39]

In his speech on 14th January 1931 before the same Committee he made a different offer. He said 40[f.40] :—

" To-day I am authorized to make this offer : that in the Punjab the Musalmans should have through communal
electorates 49 per cent. of the entire number of seats in the whole House, and should have liberty to contest the special
constituencies which it is proposed to create in that Province : so far as Bengal is concerned that Musalmans should
have through communal electorates 46 percent, representation in the whole House, and should have the liberty to
contest the special constituencies which it is proposed to create in that Province; in so far as the minority Provinces are
concerned, the Musalmans should continue to enjoy the weightage which they have at present through separate
electorates, similar weightage to be given to our Hindu brethren in Sind, and to our Hindu and Sikh brethren in the
North-West Frontier Province. If at any time hereafter two-thirds of the representatives of any community in any
Provincial Legislative Council or in the Central Legislative Council desire to give up communal electorates and to
accept joint electorates then there after the system of joint electorates should come into being."
The difference between the two proposals is clear. "Joint electorates, if accompanied by statutory majority. If statutory
majority was refused, then a minority of seats with separate electorates." The British Government took statutory
majority from the first demand and separate electorates from the second demand and gave the Muslims both when they
had not asked for both.

The second thing that is noticeable among the Muslims is the spirit of exploiting the weaknesses of the Hindus. If the
Hindus object to anything, the Muslim policy seems to be to insist upon it and give it up only when the Hindus show
themselves ready to offer a price for it by giving the Muslims some other concessions. As an illustration of this, one
can refer to the. question of separate and joint electorates. The Hindus have been to my mind utterly foolish in fighting
over joint electorates especially in Provinces in which the Muslims are in a minority. Joint electorates can never suffice
for a basis for nationalism. Nationalism is not a matter of political nexus or cash nexus, for the simple reason that
union cannot be the result of calculation of mere externals. Where two communities live a life which is exclusive and
self-enclosed for five years, they will not be one, because, they are made to come together on one day in five years for
the purposes of voting in an election. Joint electorates may produce the enslavement of the minor community by the
major community : but by themselves they cannot produce nationalism. Be that as it may, because the Hindus have
been insisting upon joint electorates the Muslims have been insisting upon separate electorates. That this insistence is a
-matter of bargain only can be seen from Mr. Jinnah's 14 points 41[f.41] and the solution 42 [f42] passed in the
Calcutta session of the All-India Muslim League held cm 30th December 1927. Therein it was stipulated that only
when the Hindus agreed to the separation of Sind and to the raising of the N.-W. F. P. to the status of a self-governing
Province the Musalmans would consent to give up separate electorates. 43[f.43] The Musalmans evidently did not
regard separate electorates as vital. They regarded them as a good quid pro quo for obtaining their other claims.

Another illustration of this spirit of exploitation is furnished by the Muslim insistence upon cow-slaughter and the
stoppage of music before mosques. Islamic law does not insist upon the slaughter of the cow for sacrificial purposes
and no Musalman, when he goes to Haj, sacrifices the cow in Mecca or Medina. But in India they will not be content
with the sacrifice of any other animal. Music may be played before a mosque in all Muslim countries without any
objection. Even in Afghanistan, which is not a secularized country, no objection is taken to music before a mosque.
But in India the Musalmans must insist upon its stoppage for no other reason except that the Hindus claim a right to it.
The third thing that is noticeable is the adoption by the Muslims of the gangster's method in politics. The riots are a
sufficient indication that gangsterism has become a settled part of their strategy in politics. They seem to be
consciously and deliberately imitating the Sudeten Germans in the means employed by them against the Czechs.
44[f.44] So long as the Muslims were the aggressors, the Hindus were passive, and in the conflict they suffered more
than the Muslims did. But this is no longer true. The Hindus have learned to retaliate and no longer feel any
compunction in knifing a Musalman. This spirit of retaliation bids fair to produce the ugly spectacle of gangsterism
against gangsterism.

How to meet this problem must exercise the minds of all concerned. There are the simple-minded Hindu Maha Sabha
patriots who believe that the Hindus have only to make up their minds to wipe the Musalmans and they will be brought
to their senses. On the other hand, there are the Congress Hindu Nationalists whose policy is to tolerate and appease
the Musalmans by political and other concessions, because they believe that they cannot reach their cherished goal of
independence unless the Musalmans back their demand. The Hindu Maha Sabha plan is no way to unity. On the
contrary, it is a sure block to progress. The slogan of the Hindu Maha Sabha President— Hindustan for Hindus— is
not merely arrogant but is arrant nonsense. The question, however, is : is the Congress way the right way ? It seems to
me that the Congress has failed to realize two things. The first thing which the Congress has failed to realize is that
there is a difference between appeasement and settlement, and that the difference is an essential one. Appeasement
means buying off the aggressor by conniving at his acts of murder, rape, arson and loot against innocent persons who
happen for the moment to be the victims of his displeasure. On the other hand, settlement means laying down the
bounds which neither party to it can transgress. Appeasement sets no limits to the demands and aspirations of the
aggressor. Settlement does. The second thing the Congress has failed to realize is that the policy of concession has
increased Muslim aggressiveness, and what is worse, Muslims interpret these concessions as a sign of defeatism on the
part of the Hindus and the absence of the will to resist. This policy of appeasement will involve the Hindus in the same
fearful situation in which the Allies found themselves as a result of the policy of appeasement which they adopted
towards Hitler. This is another malaise, no less acute than the malaise of social stagnation. Appeasement will surely
aggravate it. The only remedy for it is a settlement. If Pakistan is a settlement, it is a proposition worth consideration.
As a settlement it will do away with this constant need of appeasement and ought to be welcomed by all those who
prefer the peace and tranquillity of a settlement to the insecurity due to the growing political appetite shown by the
Muslims in their dealings with the Hindus.

Contents Continued…

[f1]Studies in Mahetnedamsm, pp. 34-35

[f2]Ibid., Chapter XXXIX.

[f.3]The Koran, its Composition and Teaching . p. 58.

[f.4]For the position of Muslim women, see Our Cause, edited by Shyam Kumar Nehru.

[f.5]It is interesting to note the argument which the Europeans who are accused by Indians for not admitting them to
their clubs use to defend themselves. They say, " We bring our women to the clubs. If you agree to bring your women t
the club, you can be admitted. We can't expose our women to your company if you deny us the company of your
women. Be ready to go fifty-fifty. them ask for entry in our clubs."

[f.6]Nationality and other Essays.

[f7] For a more detailed statement, sec my tract on Annihilation of caste.

[f.8]Harijan—11th January 1936.

[f9]The earliest retried decision was that given by the high Court of the North-West Province in 1870 in the case of
Zabaroast Kluin vs. His wife
[f.10]Legislative Assembly Debates. 1938, Vol. V. pp. 1980 -1101.

[f.11]Legislative Assembly Debates, 1938. Vol. V. pp. 1953-55.

[f12]The part played by woman in sustaining nationalism has not been sufficiently noticed. See the observations of
Renan on this point in his Essay on Nationality.
[f.13]26lh April 1926.

[f.14]Short for the Rashtriya Swayam Sevaka Sangh which is a Hindu volunteer corps. Khaksar is a Muslim
volunteer corps.
[f.15]See the speech of Sir Mahomad Shaif in the Minorities Sub-committee of the first R.T.C. (Indian Edition). p. 57.

[f.16]See the speech of Raja Narendranath, lbid„ p. 65.

[f.17]The Musalinans had already been told by Sir Sayad Ahmad not to join the Congress in the two speeches, one
delivered at Lucknow on 28th December 1887, and the other at Meerut on 16th March 1988. Mr. Mahomed Ali in his
presidential address speaks of them as historic speeches.

[f.18]Mr' Mahomed Ali in his speech as the President of the Congress said that this deputation was a " command
performance."
[f.19]The number in column 9 represents the maximum of Official members permitted under the Regulations.
[f.20]The C.P. Legislative Council was established in 1914.

[f.21]For some reason the pact did not settle the proportion of Muslim representation in Assam.

[f.22]Government of India Act, 1919, section 67(2) (h).

[f.23]Statutory Commission, 1929, Report, Vol. I, p. 189.

[f.24]Column 3 includes Indians elected by special constituencies, e.g. Commerce, whose communal proportions may
of course vary slightly from time to time. Similarly column 2, including also officials and nominated non-officials, will
show slightly different results at different periods.

[f25]* Fifth despatch on Indian Constitutional Reforms (Franchises) dated 23rd April 1919, para 21.

[f.26]The demands are known as Mr. Jinnah's 14 points. As a mailer of fact they are 15 in number and were
formulated at a meeting of .Muslim leaders of' all shades of opinion held at Delhi in March 1927 and were known as
the Delhi Proposals, for Mr. Jinnah's explanation of the origin of his 14 points, see All-India Register, 1929, Vol. 1., p.
367.

[f.27]Report, Vol. II, p. 71.

[f.28]Notification No. F. 173/31-R in the Gazette of India Extraordinary, dated 25th January 1932.

[f.29]The Simon Commission had rejected the claim saying: " We entirely share the view of the Bray Committee that
provision ought now to be made for the constitutional advance of the N.-W. F. P. .............. But we also agree that the
situation of the Province and its intimate relation with the problem of Indian defence are such that special
arrangements are required. . It is not possible, therefore, to apply to it automatically proposals which may be suited for
provincial areas in other parts of India. " They justified it by saying: " The inherent right of a man to smoke a cigarette
must necessarily be curtailed if he lives in a powder magazine."—Report, Vol. H. paras 120-121.

[f.30]This resulted in the Poona Pact which was .signed on 24lh September 1932.

[f.31]For the efforts to gel the Muslim part of the Award revised, see All-India Register. 1932 Vol. II, pp. 281-315.

[f.32]The communique is dated Simla July 2,1935.

[f.33]Indian Annual Register. 1938. Vol. I, p. 369.

[f34]* See points no 3 in mr . jinnah’s 14 points

[f.35]These figures relate to the Census of 1921.

[f36]* Montagu-Chelmsford Report, 1918, para 163.

The Government of India fell that injustice was done to the Punjab as well. But as there was no such special reason as
there was in the case of Bengal, namely, the unsettling of the partition, they did not propose any augmentation in its
representation as settled by the Pact.

[f.37]There is no doubt that this was well understood by the Muslims who were parties to the Pact. This is what Mr.
Jinnah said as a witness appearing before the Joint Select Committee appointed by Parliament on the Government of
India Bill, 1919, in reply to question No. 3808: " The position of Bengal was this: In Bengal the Muslims are in a
majority, and the argument was advanced that any section or any community which is in the majority cannot claim a
separate electorate: separate electorate is to protect the minority. But the counter-argument was perfectly true that
numerically we are in a majority but as voters we are in the minority in Bengal, because of poverty and backwardness
and so on. It was said: Very well, then fix 40 per cent., because if you are really put to test you will not get 40 per cent.
because you will not be qualified as voters. Then we had the advantage in other Provinces."

[f.38]Report of the Minorities Sub-Committee of the first R.T.C. (Indian Edition), p. 96

[f.39] Mr. Mahomed Ali's formula was for Joint Electorates and Reserved Seats with this proviso that no candidate
shall be declared elected unless he had secured at least 40 per cent. of the votes of his own community and at least 5 or
10 per cent. of the votes of the other community.

[f.40]Ibid., p. 123.
[f.41]See point No. 15 m Mr. Jimuh's points.

[f42]+ For the resolution and the speech of Mr. Baikal Ali thereon, see the Indian Quarterly Register. 1927. Vol. II.
pp. 447-48.
[f.43]The unfortunate thing for the Hindus is that they did not get joint electorates although the Musalmans got the
concessions.
[f.44]ln the Karachi session of the All-India Muslim League both Mr. Jinnah and Sir AbduUah Haroon compared the
Muslims of India to the " Sudeten " of the Muslim world and capable of doing what the Sudelen Germans did to
C'echoslovakia.
PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
________________________________________________________________

Contents

PART V :

Chapter XIII : Must there be Pakistan

Chapter XIV : The problems of Pakistan

Chapter XV : Who can decide ?

EPILOGUE

PART V

Different people have thought differently of what has been said in the foregoing pages on the
question of 'Pakistan. One set of people have alleged that I have only stated the two sides of the
issue and the problems arising out of it but have not expressed my personal views on either of them.
This is not correct. Anyone who has read the preceding parts will have to admit that I have
expressed my views in quite positive terms, if not on all, certainly on many questions. In particular
I may refer to two of the most important ones in the controversy, namely, Are the Muslims a Nation,
and Have they a case for Pakistan. There are others whose line of criticism is of a different sort.
They do not complain that I have failed to express my personal views. What they complain is that in
coming to my conclusions I have relied on propositions as though they were absolute in their
application and have admitted no exception. I am told, " Have you not stated your conclusions in
too general terms ? Is not a general proposition subject to conditions and limitations ? Have you
not disposed of certain complicated problems in a brief and cavalier fashion ? Have you shown
how Pakistan can be brought into existence in a just and peaceful manner ?" Even this criticism is
not altogether correct. It is not right to say that I have omitted to deal with these points. It may be
that my treatment of them is brief, and scattered. However, I am prepared to admit that there is
much force in this criticism and I am in duty bound to make good the default. This part is therefore
intended and is devoted to the consideration of the following subjects :—

1. What ate the limiting considerations which affect the Muslim case for Pakistan ?

2. What are the problems of Pakistan ? and what is their solution ?

3. Who has the authority to decide the issue of Pakistan ?

CHAPTER XIII
MUST THERE BE PAKISTAN ?

With all that has gone before, the sceptic, the nationalist, the conservative and the old-world Indian
will not fail to ask " Must there be Pakistan ?" No one can make light of such an attitude. For the
problem of Pakistan is indeed very grave and it must be admitted that the question is not only a
relevant and fair one to be put to the Muslims and to their protagonists but it is also important. Its
importance lies in the fact that the limitations on the case for Pakistan are so considerable in their
force that they can never be easily brushed aside. A mere statement of these limitations should be
enough to make one feel the force they have. It is writ large on the very face of them. That being
so, the burden of proof on the Muslims for establishing an imperative need in favour of Pakistan is
very heavy. Indeed the issue of Pakistan or to put it plainly of partitioning India, is of such a grave
character that the Muslims will not only have to discharge this burden of proof but they will have to
adduce evidence of such a character as to satisfy the conscience of an international tribunal before
they can win their case. Let us see how the case for Pakistan stands in the light of these limitations.
II

Must there be Pakistan because a good part of the Muslim population of India happens to be
concentrated in certain defined areas which can be easily severed from the rest of India ? Muslim
population is admittedly concentrated in certain well defined areas and it may be that these areas
are severable. But what of that ? In considering this question one must never lose sight of the
fundamental fact that nature has made India one single geographical unit. Indians are of course
quarrelling and no one can prophesy when they will stop quarrelling. But granting the fact, what
does it establish ? Only that Indians are a quarrelsome people. It does not destroy the fact that India
is a single geographical unit. Her unity is as ancient as Nature. Within this geographic unit and
covering the whole of it there has been a cultural unity from time immemorial. This cultural unity
has defied political and racial divisions. And at any rate for the last hundred and fifty years all
institutions—cultural, political, economic, legal and administrative—have been working on a
single, uniform spring of action. In any discussion of Pakistan the fact cannot be lost sight of,
namely, that the starting point, if not the governing factor, is the fundamental unity of India. For it
is necessary to grasp the fact that there are really two cases of partition which must be clearly
distinguished. There is a case in which the starting point is a pre existing state of separation so that
partition is. only a dissolution of parts which were once separate and which were subsequently
joined together. This case is quite different from another in which the starting point at all times is a
state of unity. Consequently partition in such a case is the severance of a territory which has been
one single whole into separate parts. Where the starting point is not unity of territory, i.e., where
there was disunity before there was unity, partition—which is only a return to the original—may
not give a mental shock. But in India the starting point is unity. Why destroy its unity now, simply
because some Muslims are dissatisfied ? Why tear it when the unit is one single whole from
historical times ?

III

Must there be Pakistan because there is communal antagonism between the Hindus and the
Muslims ? That the communal antagonism exists nobody can deny. The question however is, is the
antagonism such that there is no will to live together in one country and under one constitution ?
Surely that will to live together was not absent till 1937. During the formulation of the provisions
of the Government of India Act, 1935, both Hindus and Musalmans accepted the view that they
must live together under one constitution and in one country and participated in the discussions that
preceded the passing of the Act. And what was the state of communal feeling in India
between—say 1920 and 1935 ? As has been recorded in the preceding pages, the history of India
from 1920 up to 1935 has been one long tale of communal conflict in which the loss of life and loss
of property had reached a most shameful limit. Never was the communal situation so acute as it
was between this period of 15 years preceding the passing of the Government of India Act, 1935,
and yet this long tale of antagonism did not prevent the Hindus and the Musalmans from agreeing
to live in a single country and under a single constitution. Why make so much of communal
antagonism now ?

Is India the only country where there is communal antagonism ? What about Canada ? Consider
what Mr. Alexander Brady 1[f.1] has to say on the relations between the English and the French in
Canada :—

" Of the four original provinces, three. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Ontario had populations
substantially of the same Anglo-Saxon stock and traditions. Originally a by-product of the
American Revolution, these colonies were established by the 50,000 United Empire Loyalists who
trekked north from persecution and cut their settlements out of the wilderness. Previous to the
American Revolution, Nova Scotia had received a goodly number of Scotch and American settlers,
and in all the colonies after the Revolution the Loyalist settlements were reinforced by immigrants
from Great Britain and Ireland."

* * * *

" Very different was the province of Quebec. French Canada in 1867 was a cultural unit by itself,
divorced from the British communities, by the barriers of race, language and religion. Its life ran in
a different mould. Stirred by a Catholic faith mediaeval in its intensity, it viewed with scant
sympathy the mingled Puritanism and other-worldliness of a Protestantism largely Calvinistic. The
religious faiths of the two peoples were indeed poles apart. In social, if not always in religious,
outlook, English Protestantism tended towards democracy, realism and modernism: the Catholicism
of the French leaned to paternalism, idealism and a reverence for the past."

* * * *

" What French Canada was in 1867 it remains substantially today. It still cherishes beliefs, customs,
and institutions which have little hold on the English provinces. It has distinctive thought and
enthusiasm, and its own important values. Its attitude, for example, on marriage and divorce is in
conflict with the dominant view, not merely of the rest of Canada, but of the remainder of
Anglo-Saxon-North-America."

* * * *

" The infrequency of intercourse between the two peoples is illustrated in Canada's largest city,
Montreal. About 63 per cent. of the population is French and 24 per cent British. Here, if anywhere,
is ample scope for association, but in fact they remain apart and distinct except where business and
politics force them together. They have their own residential sections; their own shopping centres,
and if either is more notable for racial reserve, it is the English."

* * * *

" The English-speaking residents of Montreal, as a whole, have made no effort to know their
French-speaking fellow citizens, to learn their language, to understand their traditions and their
aspirations, to observe with a keen eye and a sympathetic mind their qualities and their defects. The
separation of the two peoples is encouraged by the barrier of language. There is a wealth of
significance in the fact revealed by the census of 1921 ; viz., that about 50 per cent. of the
Canadians of French origin were unable to speak English and 95 per cent. of those of British origin
were unable to speak French. Even in Montreal, 70 per cent. of the British could not speak French
and 34 per cent. of the French could not speak English. The absence of a common language
maintains a chasm between the two nationalities and prevents fusion.

" The significance of Confederation is that it provided an instrument of government which enabled
the French, while retaining their distinct national life, to become happy partners with the British
and attain a Canadian super-nationality, embracing a loyally extending beyond their own group to
that of the Dominion as a whole."

* * * *

" While the federal system successfully opened the path for a wider nationality in Canada, the
co-operation which it sponsored has at times been subjected to severe strain by the violent clash of
opinion between the French and the British. The super-nationality has indeed often been reduced to
a shadow."

What about South Africa ? Let those who do not know the relationship between the Boers and the
British ponder over what ,Mr. E. H. Brooks 2 [f2] has to say :—

" How far is South African nationalism common to both the white races of South Africa ? There is,
of course, a very real and intense Afrikander nationalism ; but it is, generally speaking, a sentiment
confined to one of the white races, and characterised, significantly enough, by a love of the
Afrikans language, the tongue of the early settlers from Holland, as modified slightly by Huguenot
and German influence, and greatly by the passage of time. Afrikander nationalism has a tendency
to be exclusive, and has little place for the man who, while in every way a devoted son of South
Africa, is wholly or mainly English-speaking."

* * * *

" Is there a South African nation today ?

" There are certain factors in South African life which militate against an affirmative answer."

* * * *

" Among English-speaking South Africans there are found many tendencies inclined to hinder the
cause of national unity. With all the great virtues of the race they have its one cardinal defect—a
lack of imagination, a difficulty in putting one's self in the other man's place. Nowhere does this
come out more clearly than in the language question. Until recently comparatively few
English-speaking South Africans have studied Africans except as a business proposition or (as in
the Civil Service) more or less under compulsion; and fewer still have used it conversationally.
Many have treated it with open contempt—a contempt in inverse proportion to their knowledge of
it—and the majority with mere tolerance, exasperated or amused according to temperament."

Another witness on the same point may be heard. He is Mr. Manfred Nathan. 3 [f3] This is what he
has to say on the relations between the Boers and the British in South Africa :—
" They are also, in the main, both of them Protestant peoples—although this is not of too great
importance nowadays, when differences of religion do not count for much. They engage freely in
commercial transactions with each other."

* * * *

" Nevertheless it cannot with truth be said that hitherto there has been absolutely free social
intercourse between these two great sections of the white population. It has been suggested that this
is partly due to the fact that in the large urban centres the population is predominantly English, and
that the townsfolk know little of the people in the country and their ways of life. But even in the
country towns, though there is, as a rule, much greater friendliness, and much hospitality shown by
Boers to visitors, there is not much social intercourse between the two sections apart from
necessary business or professional relationship, and such social functions, charitable or public, as
require co-operation."

Obviously India is not the only place where there is communal antagonism. If communal
antagonism does not come in the way of the French in Canada living in political unity with the
English, if it does not come in the way of the English in South Africa living in political unity with
the Dutch, if it does not come in the way of the French and the Italians in Switzerland living in
political unity with the Germans why then should it be impossible for the Hindus and the Muslims
to agree to live together under one constitution in India?

IV

Must there be Pakistan because the Muslims have lost faith in the Congress majority ? As reasons
for the loss of faith Muslims cite some instances of tyranny and oppression practised by the Hindus
and connived at by the Congress Ministries during the two years and three months the Congress
was in office. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah did not persist in his demand for a Royal Commission to
inquire into these grievances. If he had done it we could have known what truth there was in these
complaints. A perusal of these instances, as given in the reports 4[f.4] of the Muslim League
Committees, leaves upon the reader the impression that although there may be some truth in the
allegations there is a great deal which is pure exaggeration. The Congress Ministries concerned
have issued statements repudiating the charges. It may be that the Congress during the two years
and three months that it was in office did not show statesmanship, did not inspire confidence in the
minorities, nay tried to suppress them. But can it be a reason for partitioning India ? Is it not
possible to hope that the voters who supported the Congress last time will grow wiser and not
support the Congress ? Or may it not be that if the Congress returns to office it will profit by the
mistakes it has made, revise its mischievous policy and thereby allay the fear created by its past
conduct ?

Must there be Pakistan because the Musalmans are a nation ? It is a pity that Mr. Jinnah should
have become a votary and champion of Muslim Nationalism at a time when the whole world is
decrying against the evils of nationalism and is seeking refuge in some kind of international
organization. Mr. Jinnah is so obsessed with his new-found faith in Muslim Nationalism that he is
not prepared to see that there is a distinction between a society, parts of which are disintegrated,
and a society parts of which have become only loose, which no sane man can ignore. When a
society is disintegrating—and the two nation theory is a positive disintegration of society and
country—it is evidence of the fact that there do not exist what Carlyle calls " organic filaments
"—i.e., the vital forces which work to bind together the parts that are cut asunder. In such cases
disintegration can only be regretted. It cannot be prevented. Where, however, such organic
filaments do exist, it is a crime to overlook them and deliberately force the disintegration of society
and country as the Muslims seem to be doing. If the Musalmans want to be a different nation it is
not because they have been but because they want to be. There is much in the Musalmans which, if
they wish, can roll them into a nation. But isn't there enough that is common to both Hindus and
Musalmans, which if developed, is capable of moulding them into one people ? Nobody can deny
that there are many modes, manners, rites and customs which are common to both. Nobody can
deny that there are rites, customs and usages based on religion which do divide Hindus and
Musalmans. The question is, which of these should be emphasized. If the emphasis is laid on things
that are common, there need be no two nations in India. If the emphasis is laid on points of
difference, it will no doubt give rise to two nations. The view that seems to guide Mr. Jinnah is that
Indians are only a people and that they can never be a nation. This follows the line of British
writers who make it a point of speaking of Indians as the people of India and avoid speaking of the
Indian nation. Granted Indians are not a nation, that they are only a people. What of that ? History
records that before the rise of nations as great corporate personalities, there were only peoples.
There is nothing to be ashamed if Indians are no more than a people. Nor is there any cause for
despair that the people of India—if they wish—will not become one nation. For, as Disraeli said, a
nation is a work of art and a work of time. If the Hindus and Musalmans agree to emphasize the
things that bind them and forget those that separate them there is no reason why in course of time
they should not grow into a nation. It may be that their nationalism may not be quite so integrated
as that of the French or the Germans. But they can easily produce a common state of mind on
common questions which is the sum total which the spirit of nationalism helps to produce and for
which it is so much prized. Is it right for the Muslim League to emphasize only differences and
ignore altogether the forces that bind ? Let it not be forgotten that if two nations come into being it
will not be because it is predestined. It will be the result of deliberate design.

The Musalmans of India as I have said are not as yet a nation in the de jure or de facto sense of the
term and all that can be said is that they have in them the elements necessary to make them a
nation. But granting that the Musalmans of India are a nation, is India the only country where there
are going to be two nations ? What about Canada ? Everybody knows that there are in Canada two
nations, the English and the French. Are there not two nations in South Africa, the English and the
Dutch ? What about Switzerland ? Who does not know that there are three nations living in
Switzerland, the Germans, the French and the Italians ? Have the French in Canada demanded
partition because they are a separate nation ? Do the English claim partition of South Africa
because they are a distinct nation from the Boers ? Has anybody ever heard that the Germans, the
French and the Italians have ever agitated for the fragmentation of Switzerland because they are all
different nations ? Have the Germans, the French and the Italians ever felt that they would lose
their distinctive cultures if they lived as citizens of one country and under one constitution ? On the
contrary, all these distinct nations have been content to live together in one country under one
constitution without fear of losing their nationality and their distinctive cultures. Neither have the
French in Canada ceased to be French by living with the English, nor have the English ceased to be
English by living with the Boers in South Africa. The Germans, the French and the Italians have
remained distinct nations notwithstanding their common allegiance to a common country and a
common constitution. The case of Switzerland is worthy of note. It is surrounded by countries, the
nationalities of which have a close religious and racial affinity with the nationalities of Switzerland.
Notwithstanding these affinities the nationalities in Switzerland have been Swiss first and Germans,
Italians and French afterwards.

Given the experience of the French in Canada, the English in South Africa and the French and the
Italians in Switzerland, the questions that arise are, why should it be otherwise in India ? Assuming
that the Hindus and the Muslims split into two nations, why cannot they live in one country and
under one constitution ? Why should the emergence of the two-nation theory make partition
necessary ? Why should the Musalmans be afraid of losing their nationality and national culture by
living with the Hindus ? If the Muslims insist on separation, the cynic may well conclude that there
is so much that is common between the Hindus and the Musalmans that the Muslim leaders are
afraid that unless there is partition whatever little distinctive Islamic culture is left with the
Musalmans will eventually vanish by continued social contact with the Hindus with the result that
in the end instead of two nations there will grow up in India one nation. If the Muslim nationalism
is so thin then the motive for partition is artificial and the case for Pakistan loses its very basis.

VI

Must there be Pakistan because otherwise Swaraj will be a Hindu Raj ? The Musalmans are so
easily carried away by this cry that it is necessary to expose the fallacies underlying it.

In the first place, is the Muslim objection to Hindu Raj a conscientious objection or is it a political
objection If it is a conscientious objection all one can say is that it is a very strange sort of
conscience. There are really millions of Musalmans in India who are living under unbridled and
uncontrolled Hindu Raj of Hindu Princes and no objection to it has been raised by the Muslims or
the Muslim League. The Muslims had once a conscientious objection to the British Raj. Today not
only have they no objection to it but they are the greatest supporters of it. That there should be no
objection to British Raj or to undiluted Hindu Raj of a Hindu Prince but that there should be
objection to Swaraj for British India on the ground that it is Hindu Raj as though it was not
subjected to checks and balances is an attitude the logic of which it is difficult to follow.

The political objections to Hindu Raj rest on various grounds. The first ground is that Hindu society
is not a democratic society. True, it is not It may not be right to ask whether the Muslims have
taken any part in the various movements for reforming Hindu society as distinguished from
proselytising. But it is right to ask if the Musalmans are the only sufferers from the evils that
admittedly result from the undemocratic character of Hindu society. Are not the millions of
Shudras and non-Brahmins or millions of the Untouchables, suffering the worst consequences of
the undemocratic character of Hindu society ? Who benefits from education, from public service
and from political reforms except the Hindu governing class—composed of the higher castes of the
Hindus—which form not even 10 per cent. of the total Hindu population ? Has not the governing
class of the Hindus, which controls Hindu politics, shown more regard for safeguarding the rights
and interests of the Musalmans than they have for safeguarding the rights and interests of the
Shudras and the Untouchables ? Is not Mr. Gandhi, who is determined to oppose any political
concession to the Untouchables, ready to sign a blank cheque in favour of the Muslims ? Indeed,
the Hindu governing class seems to be far more ready to share power with the Muslims than it is to
share power with the Shudras and the Untouchables. Surely, the Muslims have the least ground to
complain of the undemocratic character of Hindu society.

Another ground on which the Muslim objection to Hindu Raj rests is that the Hindus are a majority
community and the Musalmans are a minority community. True. But is India the only country
where such a situation exists ? Let us compare the conditions in India with the conditions in
Canada, South Africa and Switzerland. First, take the distribution of population. In Canada 5[f.5]
out of a total population of 10,376,786 only 2,927,990 are French. In South Africa 6 [f6] the Dutch
number 1,120,770 and the English are only 783,071. In Switzerland 7[f.7] out of the total
population of 4,066,400 the Germans are 2,924,313, the French 831,097 and the Italians 242,034.

This shows that the smaller nationalities have no fear of being placed under the Raj of a major
community. Such a notion seems to be quite foreign to them. Why is this so? Is it because there is
no possibility of the major nationality establishing its supremacy in those centres of power and
authority, namely the Legislature and in the Executive ? Quite the contrary. Unfortunately no
figures are available to show the actual extent of representation which the different major and
minor nationalities have in Switzerland, Canada and South Africa. That is because there is no
communal reservation of seats such as is found in India. Each community is left to win in a general
contest what number of seats it can. But it is quite easy to work out the probable number of seats
which each nationality can obtain on the basis of the ratio of its population to the total seats in the
Legislature Proceeding on this basis what do we find? In Switzerland the total representatives in the
Lower House is 187. Out of them the German population has a possibility of winning 138, French
42 and Italians only 7 seats. In South Africa out of the total of 153, there is a possibility of the
English gaining 62, and the Dutch 94 seats. In Canada the total is 245. Of these the French 8 [f.8]
have only 65. On this basis it is quite clear that in all these countries there is a possibility of the
major nationality establishing its supremacy over the minor nationalities. Indeed, one may go so far
as to say that speaking de jure and as a mere matter of form in Canada the French are living under
the British Raj, the English in South Africa under the Dutch Raj, and the Italians and French in
Switzerland under the German Raj. But what is the position de facto ? Have Frenchmen in Canada
raised a cry that they will not live under British Raj ? Have Englishmen in South Africa raised a cry
that they will not live under Dutch Raj ? Have the French and Italians in Switzerland any objection
to living under the German Raj ? Why should then the Muslims raise this cry of Hindu Raj ?

Is it proposed that the Hindu Raj should be the rule of a naked communal majority ? Are not the
Musalmans granted safeguards against the possible tyranny of the Hindu majority ? Are not the
safeguards given to the Musalmans of India wider and better than the safeguards which have been
given to the French in Canada, to the English in South Africa and to the French and the Italians in
Switzerland? To take only one item from the list of safeguards. Haven't the Musalmans got an
enormous degree of weightage in representation in the Legislature ? Is weightage known in
Canada, South Africa or Switzerland ? And what is the effect of this weightage to Muslims ? Is it
not to reduce the Hindu majority in the Legislature? What is the degree of reduction? Confining
ourselves to British India and taking account only of the representation granted to the territorial
constituencies, Hindu and Muslim, in the Lower House in the Central Legislature under the
Government of India Act, 1935, it is clear that out of a total of 187, the Hindus have 105 seats and
the Muslims have 82 seats. Given these figures one is forced to ask where is the fear of the Hindu
Raj ?

If Hindu Raj does become a fact, it will, no doubt, be the greatest calamity for this country. No
matter what the Hindus say, Hinduism is a menace to liberty, equality and fraternity. On that
account it is incompatible with democracy. Hindu Raj must be prevented at any cost. But is
Pakistan the true remedy against it ? What makes communal Raj possible is a marked disproportion
in the relative strength of the various communities living in a country. As pointed out above, this
disproportion is not more marked in India than it is in Canada, South Africa and Switzerland.
Nonetheless there is no British Raj in Canada, no Dutch Raj in South Africa, and no German Raj in
Switzerland. How have the French, the English and the Italians succeeded in preventing the Raj of
the majority community being established in their country ? Surely not by partition : What is their
method ? Their method is to put a ban on communal parties in politics. No community in Canada,
South Africa or Switzerland ever thinks of starting a separate communal party. What is important to
note is that it is the minority nations which have taken the lead in opposing the formation of a
communal party. For they know that if they form a communal political party the major community
will also form a communal party and the majority community will thereby find it easy to establish
its communal Raj. It is a vicious method of self-protection. It is because the minority nations are
fully aware how they will be hoisted on their own petard that they have opposed the formation of
communal political parties.

Have the Muslims thought of this method of avoiding Hindu Raj. Have they considered how easy it
is to avoid it ? Have they considered how futile and harmful the present policy of the League is ?
The Muslims are howling against the Hindu Maha Sabha and its slogan of Hindudom and Hindu
Raj. But who is responsible for this ? Hindu Maha Sabha and Hindu Raj are the inescapable
nemesis which the Musalmans have brought upon themselves by having a Muslim League. It is
action and counter-action. One gives rise to the other. Not partition, but the abolition, of the
Muslim League and the formation of a mixed party of Hindus and Muslims is the only effective
way of burying the ghost of Hindu Raj. It is, of course, not possible for Muslims and other minority
parties to join the Congress or the Hindu Maha Sabha so long as the disagreement on the question
of constitutional safeguards continues. But this question will be settled, is bound to be settled and
there is every hope that the settlement will result in securing to the Muslims and other minorities
the safeguards they need. Once this consummation, which we so devoutly wish, takes place nothing
can stand in the way of a party re-alignment, of the Congress and the Maha Sabha breaking up and
of Hindus and Musalmans forming mixed political parties based on an agreed programme of social
and economic regeneration, and thereby avoid the danger of both Hindu Raj or Muslim Raj
becoming a fact. Nor should the formation of a mixed party of Hindus and Muslims be difficult in
India. There are many lower orders in the Hindu society whose economic, political and social needs
are the same as those of the majority of the Muslims and they would be far more ready to make a
common cause with the Muslims for achieving common ends than they would with the high caste
of Hindus who have denied and deprived them of ordinary human rights for centuries. To pursue
such a course cannot be called an adventure. The path along that line is a well trodden path. Is it not
a fact that under the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms in most Provinces, if not in all, the Muslims,
the Non-Brahmins and the Depressed Classes united together and worked the reforms as members
of one team from 1920 to 1937 ? Herein lay the most fruitful method of achieving communal
harmony among Hindus and Muslims and of destroying the danger of a Hindu Raj. Mr. Jinnah
could have easily pursued this line. Nor was it difficult for Mr. Jinnah to succeed in it. Indeed Mr.
Jinnah is the one person who had all the chances of success on his side if he had tried to form such
a united non-communal party. He has the ability to organize. He had the reputation of a nationalist.
Even many Hindus who were opposed to the Congress would have flocked to him if he had only
sent out a call for a united party of like-minded Hindus and Muslims. What did Mr. Jinnah do ? In
1937 Mr. Jinnah made his entry into Muslim politics and strangely enough he regenerated the
Muslim League which was dying and decaying and of which only a few years ago he would have
been glad to witness the funeral. However regrettable the starting of such a communal political
party may have been, there was in it one relieving feature. That was the leadership of Mr. Jinnah.
Everybody felt that with the leadership of Mr. Jinnah the League could never become a merely
communal party. The resolutions passed by the League during the first two years of its new career
indicated that it would develop into a mixed political party of Hindus and Muslims. At the annual
session of the Muslim League held at Lucknow in October 1937 altogether 15 resolutions were
passed. The following two are of special interest in this connection.

Resolution 9[f.9] No. 7:

" This meeting of the All India Muslim League deprecates and protests against the formation of
Ministries in certain Provinces by the Congress parties in flagrant violation of the letter and the
spirit of the Government of India Act, 1935, and Instrument of Instructions and condemns the
Governors for their failure to enforce the special powers entrusted to them for the safeguards of the
interest of the Musalmans and other important minorities"

Resolution* No. 8:

" Resolved that the object of the All India Muslim League shall be the establishment in India of
Full Independence in the form of federation of free democratic states in which the rights and
interests of the Musalmans and other minorities are adequately and effectively safeguarded in the
constitution."

Equal number of resolutions were passed at the next annual session of the League held at Patna in
December 1938. Resolution* No. 10 is noteworthy. It reads as follows :—

"The All India Muslim League reiterates its view that the scheme of Federation embodied in the
Government of India Act, 1935, is not acceptable, but in view of the further developments that have
taken place or may take place from time to time it hereby authorises the President of the All India
Muslim League to adopt such course as may be necessary with a view to explore the possibility of a
suitable alternative which will safeguard the interests of the Musalmans and other minorities in
India." By these resolutions Mr. Jinnah showed that he was for a common front between the
Muslims and other non-Muslim minorities. Unfortunately the catholicity and statesmanship that
underlies these resolutions did not last long. In 1939 Mr. Jinnah took a somersault and outlined the
dangerous and disastrous policy of isolation of the Musalmans by passing that notorious resolution
in favour of Pakistan. What is the reason for this isolation ? Nothing but the change of view that the
Musalmans were a nation and not a community ! ! One need not quarrel over the question whether
the Muslims are a nation or a community. But one finds it extremely difficult to understand how the
mere fact that the Muslims are a nation makes political isolation a safe and sound policy ?
Unfortunately Muslims do not realize what disservice Mr. Jinnah has done to them by this policy.
But let Muslims consider what Mr. Jinnah has achieved by making the Muslim League the only
organization for the Musalmans. It may be that it has helped him to avoid the possibility of having
to play the second fiddle. For inside the Muslim camp he can always be sure of the first place for
himself. But how does the League hope to save by this plan of isolation the Muslims from Hindu
Raj ? Will Pakistan obviate the establishment of Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Musalmans
are in a minority ? Obviously it cannot. This is what would happen in the Muslim minority
Provinces if Pakistan came. Take an all-India view. Can Pakistan prevent the establishment of
Hindu Raj at the centre over Muslim minorities that will remain Hindustan? It is plain that it
cannot. What good is Pakistan then ? Only to prevent Hindu Raj in Provinces in which the Muslims
are in a majority and in which there could never be Hindu Raj ! ! To put it differently Pakistan is
unnecessary to Muslims where they are in a majority because there, there is no fear of Hindu Raj. It
is worse than useless to Muslims where they are in a minority, because Pakistan or no Pakistan they
will have to face a Hindu Raj. Can politics be more futile than the politics of the Muslim League ?
The Muslim League started to help minority Muslims and has ended by espousing the cause of
majority Muslims. What a perversion in the original aim of the Muslim League ! What a fall from
the sublime to the ridiculous ! Partition as a remedy against Hindu Raj is worse than useless.

VI

These are some of the weaknesses in the Muslim case for Pakistan which have occurred to me.
There might be others which have not struck me. But the list as it is, is quite a formidable one. How
do the Muslims propose to meet them ? That is a question for the Muslims and not for me. My duty
as a student of the subject extends to setting forth these weaknesses. That I have done. I have
nothing more to answer for.

There are, however, two other questions of such importance that this discussion cannot be closed
with any sense of completeness without reference to them. The purpose of these questions is to
clear the ground between myself and my critics. Of these questions, one I am entitled to ask the
critics, the other the critics are entitled to ask me.

Beginning with the first question, what I feel like asking the critics is, what good do they expect
from a statement of these weaknesses ? Do they expect the Musalmans to give up Pakistan if they
are defeated in a controversy over the virtues of Pakistan ? That of course depends upon what
method is adopted to resolve this controversy. The Hindus and the Musalmans may follow the
procedure which Christian missionaries had set up in early times in order to secure converts from
amongst the Hindus. According to this procedure a day was appointed for a disputation, which was
open to public, between a Christian missionary and a Brahmin, the former representing the
Christian religion and the latter holding himself out as the protagonist of the Hindu religion with
the condition that whoever failed to meet the case against his religion was bound to accept the
religion of the other. If such a method of resolving the dispute between the Hindus and the Muslims
over the issue of Pakistan was agreed upon there may be some use in setting out this string of
weaknesses. But let it not be forgotten that there is another method of disposing of a controversy
which maybe called Johnsonian after the manner which Dr. Johnson employed in dealing with
arguments of Bishop Berkeley. It is recorded by Boswell that when he told Dr. Johnson that the
doctrine of Bishop Berkeley that matter was non-existent and that everything in the universe was
merely ideal, was only an ingenious sophistry but that it was impossible to refute it. Dr. Johnson
with great alacrity answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he
rebounded from it saying, " I refute it thus." It may be that the Musalmans will agree, as most
rational people do, to have their case for Pakistan decided by the tests of reason and argument. But
I should not be surprised if the Muslims decided to adopt the method of Dr. Johnson and say "
Damn your arguments ! We want Pakistan." In that event the critic must realize that any reliance
placed upon the limitations for destroying the case for Pakistan will be of no avail. It is therefore no
use being jubilant over the logic of these objections to Pakistan.

Let me now turn to the other question which I said the critic is entitled to put to me. What is my
position regarding the issue of Pakistan in the light of the objections, which I have set out ? I have
no doubts as to my position. I hold firmly that, subject to certain conditions, detailed in the chapters
that follow, if the Musalmans are bent on having Pakistan then it must be conceded to them. I know
my critics will at once accuse me of inconsistency and will demand reasons for so extraordinary a
conclusion— extraordinary because of the view expressed by me in the earlier part of this chapter
that the Muslim case for Pakistan has nothing in it which can be said to carry the compelling force
which the decree of an inexorable fate may be said to have. I withdraw nothing from what I have
said as to the weaknesses in the Muslim case for Pakistan. Yet I hold that if the Muslims must have
Pakistan there is no escape from conceding it to them. As to the reasons which have led me to that
conclusion I shall not hesitate to say that the strength or weakness of the logic of Pakistan is not
one of them. In my judgement there are two governing factors which must determine the issue.
First is the defence of India and second is the sentiment of the Muslims. I will state why I regard
them as decisive and how in my opinion they tell in favour of Pakistan.

To begin with the first. One cannot ignore that what is important is not the winning of
independence but the having of the sure means of maintaining it. The ultimate guarantee of the
independence of a country is a safe army—an army on which you can rely to fight for the country
at all time and in any eventuality. The army in India must necessarily be a mixed army composed
of Hindus and Muslims. If India is invaded by a foreign power, can the Muslims in the army be
trusted to defend India ? Suppose invaders are their co-religionists. Will the Muslims side with the
invaders or will they stand against them and save India ? This is a very crucial question. Obviously,
the answer to this question must depend upon to what extent the Muslims in the army have caught
the infection of the two-nation theory, which is the foundation of Pakistan. If they are infected, then
the army in India cannot be safe. Instead of being the guardian of the independence of India, it will
continue to be a menace and a potential danger to its independence. I confess I feel aghast when I
hear some Britishers argue that it is for the defence of India that they must reject Pakistan. Some
Hindus also sing the same tune. I feel certain that either they are unaware as to what the
determining factor in the independence of India is or that they are talking of the defence of India
not as an independent country responsible for its own defence but as a British possession to be
defended by them against an intruder. This is a hopelessly wrong angle of vision. The question is
not whether the British will be able to defend India better if there was no partition of India. The
question is whether Indians will be able to defend a free India. To that, I repeat, the only answer is
that Indians will be able to defend a free India on one and one condition alone—namely, if the
army in India remains non-political, unaffected by the poison of Pakistan. I want to warn Indians
against the most stupid habit that has grown up in this country of discussing the question of Swaraj
without reference to the question of the army. Nothing can be more fatal than the failure to realize
that a political army is the greatest danger to the liberty of India. It is worse than having no army.

Equally important is the fact that the army is the ultimate sanction which sustains Government in
the exercise of its authority inside the country, when it is challenged by a rebellious or recalcitrant
element. Suppose the Government of the day enunciates a policy which is vehemently opposed by a
section of the Muslims. Suppose the Government of the day is required to use its army to enforce
its policy. Can the Government of the day depend upon the Muslims in the army to obey its orders
and shoot down the Muslim rebels ? This again depends upon to what extent the Muslims in the
army have caught the infection of the two-nation theory. If they have caught it, India cannot have a
safe and secure Government.

Turning to the second governing factor the Hindus do not seem to attach any value to sentiment as
a force in politics. The Hindus seem to rely upon two grounds to win against the Muslims. The first
is that even if the Hindus and the Muslims are two nations, they can live under one state. The other
is that the Muslim case for Pakistan is founded on strong sentiment rather than upon clear
argument. I don't know how long the Hindus are going to fool themselves with such arguments. It
is true that the first argument is not without precedent. At the same time it does not call for much
intelligence to see that its value is extremely limited. two nations and one state is a pretty plea. It
has the same attraction which a sermon has and may result in the conversion of Muslim leaders.
But instead of being uttered as a sermon if it is intended to issue it as an ordinance for the Muslims
to obey it will be a mad project to which no sane man will agree. It will, I am sure, defeat the very
purpose of Swaraj. The second argument is equally silly. That the Muslim case for Pakistan is
founded on sentiment is far from being a matter of weakness; it is really its strong point. It does not
need deep understanding of politics to know that the workability of a constitution is not a matter of
theory. It is a matter of sentiment. A constitution like clothes must suit as well as please. If a
constitution does not please, then, however perfect it may be, it will not work. To have a
constitution which runs counter to the strong sentiments of a determined section is to court disaster
if not to invite rebellion.

It is not realized by the Hindus that, assuming there is a safe army, rule by armed forces is not the
normal method of governing a people. Force, it cannot be denied, is the medicine of the body
politic and must be administered when the body politic becomes sick. But just because force is the
medicine of the body politic it cannot be allowed to become its daily bread. A body politic must
work as a matter of course by springs of action which are natural. This can happen only when the
different elements constituting the body politic have the will to work together and to obey the laws
and orders passed by a duly constituted authority. Suppose the new constitution for a United India
contained in it all the provisions necessary to safeguard the interests of the Muslims. But suppose
the Muslims said " Thank you for your safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you " ; and
suppose they boycott the Legislatures, refuse to obey laws, oppose the payment of taxes ; what is to
happen ? Are the Hindus prepared to extract obedience from Muslims by the use of Hindu bayonets
? Is Swaraj to be an opportunity to serve the people or is it to be an opportunity for Hindus to
conquer the Musalmans and for the Musalmans to conquer the Hindus ? Swaraj must be a
Government of the people by the people and for the people. This is the raison d'etre of Swaraj and
the only justification for Swaraj. If Swaraj is to usher in an era in which the Hindus and the
Muslims will be engaged in scheming against each other, the one planning to conquer its rival, why
should we have Swaraj and why should the democratic nations allow such a Swaraj to come into
existence ? It will be a snare, a delusion and a perversion.

The non-Muslims do not seem to be aware that they are presented with a situation in which they are
forced to choose between various alternatives. Let me state them. In the first place they have to
choose between Freedom of India and the Unity of India. If the non-Muslims will insist on the
Unity of India they put the quick realization of India's freedom into jeopardy. The second choice
relates to the surest method of defending India, whether they can depend upon Muslims in a free
and united India to develop and sustain along with the non-Muslims the necessary will to defend
the common liberties of both: or whether it is better to partition India and thereby ensure the safety
of Muslim India by leaving its defence to the Muslims and of non-Muslim India by leaving its
defence to non-Muslims.

As to the first, I prefer Freedom of India to the Unity of India. The Sinn Feinners who were the
staunchest of nationalists to be found anywhere in the world and who like the Indians were
presented with similar alternatives chose the freedom of Ireland to the unity of Ireland. The
non-Muslims who are opposed to partition may well profit by the advice tendered by the Rev.
Michael O'Flanagan, at one time Vice-President of the Feinns to the Irish Nationalists on the issue
of the partition of Ireland. 10[f.10] Said the Rev. Father :—

" If we reject Home Rule rather than agree to the exclusion of the Unionist parts of Ulster, what
case have we to put before the world ? We can point out that Ireland is an island with a definite
geographical boundary. That argument might be all right if we were appealing to a number of
Island nationalities that had themselves definite geographical boundaries. Appealing, as we are, to
continental nations with shifting boundaries, that argument will have no force whatever. National
and geographical boundaries scarcely ever coincide. Geography would make one nation of Spain
and Portugal; history has made two of them. Geography did its best to make one nation of Norway
and Sweden ; history has succeeded in making two of them. Geography has scarcely anything to
say to the number of nations upon the North American continent; history has done the whole thing.
If a man were to try to construct a political map of Europe out of its physical map, he would find
himself groping in the dark. Geography has worked hard to make one nation out of Ireland; history
has. worked against it. The island of Ireland and the national unit of Ireland simply do not coincide.
In the last analysis the test of nationality is the wish of the people."

These words have emanated from a profound sense of realism which we in India so lamentably
lack.
On the second issue I prefer the partitioning of India into Muslim India and non-Muslim India as
the surest and safest method of providing for the defence of both. It is certainly the safer of the two
alternatives. I know it will be contended that my fears about the loyalty of the Muslims in the army
to a Free and United India arising from the infection of the two nation theory is only an imaginary
fear. That is no doubt true. That does not militate against the soundness of the choice I have made. I
may be wrong. But I certainly can say without any fear of contradiction that, to use the words of
Burke, it is better to be ridiculed for too great a credulity than to be ruined by too confident a sense
of security. I don't want to leave things to chance. To leave so important an issue, as the defence of
India, to. chance is to be guilty of the grossest crime.

Nobody will consent to the Muslim demand for Pakistan unless he is forced to do so. At the same
time, it would be a folly not to face what is inevitable and face it with courage and common sense.
Equally would it be a folly to lose the. Part one can retain in the vain attempt of preserving the
whole.

These are the reasons why I hold that if the Musalman will not yield on the issue of Pakistan then
Pakistan must come. So far as I am concerned the only important question is : Are the Musalmans
determined to have Pakistan ? Or is Pakistan a mere cry ? Is it only a passing mood ? Or does it
represent their permanent aspiration ? On this there may be difference of opinion. Once it becomes
certain that the Muslims want Pakistan there can be no doubt that the wise course would be to
concede the principle of it.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PROBLEMS OF PAKISTAN

I
Among the many problems to which the partition of India into Pakistan and Hindustan must give
rise will be the following three problems:—

(1) The problem of the allocation of the financial assets and liabilities of the present Government
of India,

(2) The problem of the delimitation of the areas, and

(3) The problem of the transfer of population from Pakistan to Hindustan and vice versa.

Of these problems the first is consequential, in the sense, that it would be worth while to consider it
only when the partition of India has been agreed to by the parties concerned. The two other
problems stand on a different footing. They are conditions precedent to Pakistan in the sense that
there are many people who will not make up their mind on Pakistan unless they are satisfied that
some reasonable and just solution of them is possible. I will, therefore, confine myself to the
consideration only of the last two problems of Pakistan.
 II

On the question of the boundaries of Pakistan we have had so far no clear and authoritative
statement from the Muslim League. In fact it is one of the complaints made by the Hindus that
while Mr. Jinnah has been carrying on a whirlwind campaign in favour of Pakistan, which has
resulted in fouling the political atmosphere in the country, Mr. Jinnah has not thought fit to inform
his critics of the details regarding the boundaries of his proposed Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah's argument
has all along been that any discussion regarding the boundaries of Pakistan is premature and that
the boundaries of Pakistan will be a matter for discussion when the principle of Pakistan has been
admitted. It may be a good rhetorical answer, but it certainly does not help those who wish to apply
their mind without taking sides to offer whatever help they can to bring about a peaceful solution of
this problem. Mr. Jinnah seems to be under the impression that if a person is committed to the
principle of Pakistan he will be bound to accept Mr. Jinnah's plan of Pakistan. There cannot be a
greater mistake than this. A person may accept the principle of Pakistan, which only means the
partition of India. But it is difficult to understand how the acceptance of this principle can commit
him to Mr. Jinnah's plan of Pakistan. Indeed if no plan of Pakistan is satisfactory to him he will be
quite free to oppose any form of Pakistan although he may be in favour of the principle of Pakistan.
The plan of Pakistan and the principle of Pakistan are therefore two quite distinct propositions.
There is nothing wrong in this view. By way of illustration it may be said that the principle of
self-determination is like an explosive substance. One may agree in principle to its use when the
necessity and urgency of the occasion is proved. But no one can consent to the use of the dynamite
without first knowing the area that is intended to be blown up. If the dynamite is going to blow up
the whole structure or if it is not possible to localize its application to a particular part he may well
refuse to apply the dynamite and prefer to use some other means of solving the problem.
Specifications of boundary lines seem therefore to be an essential preliminary for working out in
concrete shape the principle of Pakistan. Equally essential it is for a bona fide protagonist of
Pakistan not to hide from the public the necessary particulars of the scheme of Pakistan. Such
contumacy and obstinacy as shown by Mr. Jinnah in refusing to declare the boundaries of his
Pakistan is unforgivable in a statesman. Nevertheless those who are interested in solving the
question of Pakistan need not wait to resolve the problems of Pakistan until Mr. Jinnah
condescends to give full details. Only one has to carry on the argument on the basis of certain
assumptions. In this discussion I will assume that what the Muslim League desires is that the
boundaries of the Western Pakistan should be the present boundaries of the Provinces of the
North-West Frontier, the Punjab, Sind and Baluchistan, and that the boundaries of Eastern Pakistan
should be the boundaries of the present Province of Bengal with a few districts of Assam thrown in.

Ill

The question for consideration therefore is : Is this a just claim ? The claim is said to be founded on
the principle of self-determination. To be able to assess the justice of this claim it is necessary to
have a clear understanding of the scope and limitations of the principle of self-determination.
Unfortunately, there seems to be a complete lack of such an understanding. It is therefore necessary
to begin with the question : What is the de facto and de jure' connotation of this principle of
self-determination ? The term self-determination has become current since the last few years. But it
describes something which is much older. The idea underlying self-determination has developed
along two different lines. During the 19th century self-determination meant the right to establish a
form of government in accordance with the wishes of the people. Secondly, self-determination has
meant the right to obtain national independence from an alien race irrespective of the form of
government. The agitation for Pakistan has reference to self-determination in its second aspect.

Confining the discussion to this aspect of Pakistan it seems to me essential that the following points
regarding the issue of self-determination should be borne in mind.

In the first place, self-determination must be by the people. This point is too simple even to need
mention. But it has become necessary to emphasize it. Both the Muslim League and the Hindu
Maha Sabha seem to be playing fast and loose with the idea of self-determination. An area is
claimed by the Muslim League for inclusion in Pakistan because the people of the area are
Muslims. An area is also claimed for being included in Pakistan because the ruler of the area is a
Muslim though the majority of the people of that area are non-Muslims. The Muslim League is
claiming the benefit of self-determination in India. At the same time the League is opposed to
self-determination being applied to Palestine. The League claims Kashmir as a Muslim State
because the majority of people are Muslims and also Hyderabad because the ruler is Muslim. In
like manner the Hindu Maha Sabha claims an area to be included in Hindustan because the people
of the area are non-Muslims. It also comes forward to claim an area to be a part of Hindustan
because the ruler is a Hindu though the majority of the people are Muslims. Such strange and
conflicting claims are entirely due to the fact that either the parties to Pakistan, namely, the Hindus
and the Muslims do not understand what self-determination means or are busy in perverting the
principle of self-determination to enable them to justify themselves in carrying out the organized
territorial loot in which they now seem to be engaged. India will be thrown into a state of utter
confusion whenever the question of reorganization of its territories comes up for consideration if
people have no exact notions as to what self-determination involves and have not the honesty to
stand by the principle and take the consequences whatever they be. It is, therefore, well to
emphasize what might be regarded as too simple to require mention, namely, that
self-determination is a determination by the people and by nobody else.

The second point to note is the degree of imperative character with which the principle of
self-determination can be said to be invested. As has been said by Mr. O' Connor 11[f.11] :

" The doctrine of self-determination is not a universal principle at all. The most that can be said
about it is that generally speaking, it is a sound working rule, founded upon justice, making for
harmony and peace and for the development of people in their own fashion, which, again generally
speaking, is the best fashion. But it must yield to circumstances, of which size and geographical
situation are some of the most important. Whether the rule should prevail against the circumstances
or the circumstances against the rule can be determined only by the application of one's common
sense or sense of justice, or, as a Benthamite would prefer to put it, by reference to the greatest
good of the greatest number— all these three, if properly understood, are really different methods
of expressing the same thing. In solving a particular case very great difficulties may arise. There are
facts one way and facts another way. Facts of one kind may make a special appeal to some minds,
little or none to others. The problem may be of the kind that is called imponderable, that is to say,
no definite conclusion that will be accepted by the generality of the mankind may be possible.
There are cases in which it is no more possible to say that a nation is right in its claim to interfere
with the self-determination of another nation than that it is to say that it is wrong. It is a matter of
opinion, upon which honest and impartial minds may differ."

There are two reasons why this must be so. Firstly, nationality is not such a sacrosanct and absolute
principle as to give it the character of a categorical imperative, over-riding every other
consideration. Secondly, separation is not quite so essential for the maintenance and preservation of
a distinct nationality.

There is a third point to be borne in mind in connection with the issue of self-determination.
Self-determination for a nationality may take the form of cultural independence or may take the
form of territorial independence. Which form it can take must depend upon the territorial layout of
the population. If a nationality lives in easily severable and contiguous areas, other things being
equal, a case can be made out for territorial independence. But where owing to an inextricable
intermingling the nationalities are so mixed up that the areas they occupy are not easily severable,
then all that they can be entitled to is cultural independence. Territorial separation in a case like this
is an impossibility. They are doomed to live together. The only other alternative they have is to
migrate.

IV
Having defined the scope and limitations of the idea of self-determination we can now proceed to
deal with the question of boundaries of Pakistan. How does the claim of the Muslim League for the
present boundary to remain the boundaries of Pakistan stand in the light of these considerations ?
The answer to this question seems to me quite clear. The geographical layout seems to decide the
issue. No special pleading of any kind is required. In the case of the North-West Frontier Province,
Baluchistan and Sind, the Hindus and the Muslims are intermixed. In these Provinces a case for
territorial separation for the Hindus seems to be impossible. They must remain content with cultural
independence and such political safeguards as may be devised for their safety. The case of the
Punjab and Bengal stands on a different footing. A glance at the map shows that the layout of the
population of the Hindus and the Muslims in these two Provinces is totally different from what one
finds in the other three Provinces. The non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal are not found living
in small islands in the midst of and surrounded by a vast Muslim population spread over the entire
surface as is the case with the North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and Sind. In Bengal and
the Punjab the Hindus occupy two different areas contiguous and severable. In these circumstances,
there is no reason for conceding what the Muslim League seems to demand, namely, that the
present boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal shall continue to be the boundaries of Western
Pakistan and Eastern Pakistan.

Two conclusions necessarily follow from the foregoing discussion. One is that the non-Muslims of
the Punjab and Bengal have a case for exclusion from Pakistan by territorial severance of the areas
they occupy. The other is that the non-Muslims of North-West Frontier Province, Baluchistan and
Sind have no case for exclusion and are only entitled to cultural independence and political
safeguards. To put the same thing in a different way it may be said that the Muslim League claim
for demanding that the boundaries of Sind, North-West Frontier and Baluchistan shall remain as
they are cannot be opposed. But that in the case of the Punjab and Bengal such a claim is untenable
and that the non-Muslims of these Provinces, if they desire, can claim that the territory they occupy
should be excluded by a redrawing of the boundaries of these two Provinces.

One should have thought that such a claim by the non-Muslim minorities of the Punjab and Bengal
for the redrawing of the boundaries would be regarded by the Muslim League as a just and
reasonable claim. The possibility of the redrawing of boundaries was admitted in the Lahore
Resolution of the Muslim League passed in March 1940. The Resolution 12[f.12] said :—

" The establishment of completely independent States formed by demarcating geographically

contiguous units into regions which shall be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as
may be necessary, that the areas in which the Musalmans are numerically in a majority, as in the
north-western and eastern zones of India, shall be grouped together to constitute independent States
as Muslim free national homelands in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and
sovereign."

That this continued to be the position of the Muslim League is clear from the resolution passed by
the Muslim League on the Cripps Proposals as anyone who cares to read it will know. But there are
indications that Mr. Jinnah has changed his view. At a public meeting held on 16th November
1942in Jullunder Mr. Jinnah is reported to have expressed himself in the following terms:—

" The latest trick—1 call it nothing but a trick—to puzzle and to mislead the ignorant masses
purposely, and those playing the game understand it, is, why should the right of self-determination
be confined to Muslims only and why not extend it to other communities ? Having said that all
have the right of self-determination, they say the Punjab must be divided into so many bits ;
likewise the North-West Frontier Province and Sind. Thus there will be hundreds of Pakistans.

SUB-NATIONAL GROUPS 13[f.13]

" Who is the author of this new formula that every community has the right of self-determination
all over India ? Either it is colossal ignorance or mischief and trick. Let me give them a reply, that
the Musalmans claim the right of self-determination because they are a national group on a given
territory which is their homeland and in the zones where they are in a majority. Have you known
anywhere in history that national groups scattered all over have been given a State ? Where are you
going to get a State for them ? In that case you have got 14 per cent. Muslims in the United
Provinces. Why not have a State for them ? Muslims in the United Provinces are not a national
group; they are scattered. Therefore in constitutional language they are characterized as a
sub-national group who cannot expect anything more than what is due from any civilized
Government to a minority. I hope I have made the position clear. The Muslims are not a
sub-national group; it is their birthright to claim and exercise the right of self-determination."

Mr. Jinnah has completely missed the point. The point raised by his critics was not with regard to
the non-Muslim minorities in general. It had reference to the non-Muslim minorities in the Punjab
and Bengal. Does Mr. Jinnah propose to dispose of the case of non-Muslim minorities who occupy
a compact and an easily severable territory by his theory of a sub-nation ? If that is so, then one is
bound to say that a proposition cruder than his it would be difficult to find in any political
literature. The concept of a sub-nation is unheard of. It is not only an ingenious concept but it is
also a preposterous concept. What does the theory of a subnation connote ? If I understand its
implications correctly, it means a sub-nation must not be severed from the nation to which it
belongs even when severance is possible: it means that the relations between a nation and a
sub-nation are no higher than the relations which subsist between a man and his chattels, or
between property and its incidents. Chattels go with the owner, incidents go with property, so a
sub-nation goes with a nation. Such is the chain of reasoning in Mr. Jinnah's argument. But does
Mr. Jinnah seriously wish to argue that the Hindus of the Punjab and Bengal are only chattels so
that they must always go wherever the Muslims of the Punjab and the Muslims of Bengal choose to
drive them ? Such an argument will be too absurd to be entertained by any reasonable man. It is
also the most illogical argument and certainly it should not be difficult for so mature a lawyer as
Mr. Jinnah, to see the illogicality of it. If a numerically smaller nation is only a sub-nation in
relation to a numerically larger nation and has no right to territorial separation, why can it not be
said that taking India as a whole the Hindus are a nation and the Muslims a sub-nation and as a
sub-nation they have no right to self-determination or territorial separation ?

Already there exists a certain amount of suspicion with regard to the banafides of Pakistan. Rightly
or wrongly, most people suspect that Pakistan is pregnant with mischief. They think that it has two
motives, one immediate, the other ultimate. The immediate motive, it is said, is to join with the
neighbouring Muslim countries and form a Muslim Federation. The ultimate motive is for the
Muslim Federation to invade Hindustan and conquer or rather reconquer the Hindu and re-establish
Muslim Empire in India. Others think that Pakistan is the culmination of the scheme of hostages
which lay behind the demand, put forth by Mr. Jinnah in his fourteen points, for the creation of
separate Muslim Provinces. Nobody can fathom the mind of the Muslims and reach the real
motives that lie behind their demand for Pakistan. The Hindu opponents of Pakistan if they suspect
that the real motives of the Muslims are different from the apparent ones, may take note of them
and plan accordingly. They cannot oppose Pakistan because the motives behind it are bad. But they
are entitled to ask Mr. Jinnah, Why does he want to have a communal problem within Pakistan ?
However vicious may be the motives behind Pakistan it should possess at least one virtue. The
ideal of Pakistan should be not to have a communal problem inside it. This is the least of virtues
one can expect from Pakistan. If Pakistan is to be plagued by a communal problem in the same way
as India has been, why have Pakistan at all ? It can be welcomed only if it provides an escape from
the communal problem. The way to avoid it is to arrange the boundaries in such a way that it will
be an ethnic State without a minority and a majority pitched against each other. Fortunately it can
be made into an ethnic State if only Mr. Jinnah will allow it. Unfortunately Mr. Jinnah objects to it.
Therein lies the chief cause for suspicion and Mr. Jinnah, instead of removing it, is deepening it by
such absurd, illogical and artificial distinctions as nations and sub-nations.
Rather than resort to such absurd and illogical propositions and defend what is indefensible and
oppose what is just, would it not be better for Mr. Jinnah to do what Sir Edward Carson did in the
matter of the delimitation of the boundaries of Ulster ? As all those who know the vicissitudes
through which the Irish Home Rule question passed know that it was at the Craigavon meeting held
on 23rd September 1911 that Sir Edward Carson formulated his policy that in Ulster there will be a
government of Imperial Parliament or a Government of Ulster but never a Home Rule Government.
As the Imperial Parliament was proposing to withdraw its government, this policy meant the
establishment of a provisional government for Ulster. This policy was embodied in a resolution
passed at a joint meeting of delegates representing the Ulster Unionist Council, the County Grand
Orange Lodges and Unionist Clubs held in Belfast on 25th September 1911. The Provisional
Government of Ulster was to come into force on the day of the passing of the Home Rule Bill. An
important feature of this policy was to invest the Provisional Government with a jurisdiction over
all " those districts which they (Ulsterites) could control."

The phrase " those districts which they could control " was no doubt meant to include the whole of
the administrative division of Ulster. Now this administrative division of Ulster included nine
counties. Of these three were overwhelmingly Catholic. This meant the compulsory retention of the
three Catholic counties under Ulster against their wishes. But what did Sir Edward Carson do in the
end ? It did not take long for Sir Edward Carson to discover that Ulster with three overwhelmingly
Catholic districts would be a liability, and with all the courage of a true leader he came out with a
declaration that he proposed to cut down his losses and make Ulster safe. In his speech in the
House of Commons on the 18th of May 1920 he announced that he was content with six counties
only. The speech that he made on that occasion giving his reasons why he was content only with
six counties is worth quoting. This is what he said 14[f.14] :—

" The truth is that we came to the conclusion after many anxious hours and anxious days of going
into the whole matter, almost parish by parish and townland by townland, that we would have no
chance of successfully starting a Parliament in Belfast which would be responsible for the
government of Donegal, Caven and Monaghan. It would be perfectly idle for us to come here and
pretend that we should be in a position to do so. We should like to have the very largest areas
possible, naturally. That is a system of land grabbing that prevails in all countries for widening the
jurisdiction of the various governments that are set up ; but there is no use in our undertaking a
government which we know would be a failure if we were saddled with these three counties."

These are wise, sagacious and most courageous words. The situation in which they were uttered has
a close parallel with the situation that is likely to be created in the Punjab and Bengal by the
application of the principle of Pakistan. The Muslim League and Mr. Jinnah if they want a peaceful
Pakistan should not forget to take note of them. It is no use asking the non-Muslim minorities in the
Punjab and Bengal to be satisfied with safeguards. If the Musalmans are not prepared to be content
with safeguards against the tyranny of Hindu majority why should the Hindu minorities be asked to
be satisfied with the safeguards against the tyranny of the Muslim majority ? If the Musalmans can
say to the Hindus " Damn your safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you "—an argument which
Carson used against Redmond—the same argument can be returned by the Hindus of the Punjab
and Bengal against the Muslim offer to be content with safeguards.

The point is that this attitude is not calculated to lead to a peaceful solution of the problem of
Pakistan. Sabre-rattling or show of force will not do. In the first place, this is a game which two can
play. In the second place, arms may be an element of strength. But to have arms is not enough. As
Rousseau said : " The strongest is never strong enough to be always master, unless he transforms
his might into right, and obedience into duty." Only ethics can convert might into right and
obedience into duty. The League must see that its claim for Pakistan is founded on ethics.

VI

So much for the problem of boundaries. I will now turn to the problem of the minorities which
must remain within Pakistan even after boundaries are redrawn. There are two methods of
protecting their interests.

First is to provide safeguards in the constitution for the protection of the political and cultural rights
of the minorities. To Indians this is a familiar matter and it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it.

Second is to provide for their transfer from Pakistan to Hindustan. Many people prefer this solution
and would be ready and willing to consent to Pakistan if it can be shown that an exchange of
population is possible. But they regard this as a staggering and a baffling problem. This no doubt is
the sign of a panic-stricken mind. If the matter is considered in a cool and calm temper it will be
found that the problem is neither staggering nor baffling.

To begin with consider the dimensions of the problem. On what scale is this transfer going to be ?
In determining the scale one is bound to take into account three considerations. In the first place, if
the boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal are redrawn there will be no question of transfer of
population so far as these two Provinces are concerned. In the second place, the Musalmans
residing in Hindustan do not propose to migrate to Pakistan nor does the League want their
transfer. In the third place, the Hindus in the North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan
do not want to migrate. If these assumptions are correct, the problem of transfer of population is far
from being a staggering problem. Indeed it is so small that there is no need to regard it as a problem
at all.

Assuming it does become a problem, will it be a baffling problem ? Experience shows that it is not
a problem which it is impossible to solve. To devise a solution for such a problem it might be well
to begin by asking what are the possible difficulties that are likely to arise in the way of a person
migrating from one area to another on account of political changes. The following are obvious
enough : (1) The machinery for effecting and facilitating the transfer of population. (2) Prohibition
by Government against migration. (3) Levy by Government of heavy taxation on the transfer of
goods by the migrating family. (4) The impossibility for a migrating family to carry with it to its
new home its immovable property. (5) The difficulty of obviating a resort to unfair practices with a
view to depress unduly the value of the property of the migrating family. (6) The fear of having to
make good the loss by not being able to realize the full value of the property by sale in the market.
(7) The difficulty of realizing pensionary and other charges due to the migrating family from the
country of departure. (8) The difficulty of fixing the currency in which payment is to be made. If
these difficulties are removed the way to the transfer of population becomes clear.

The first three difficulties can be easily removed by the two States of Pakistan and Hindustan
agreeing to a treaty embodying an article in some such terms as follows :—

" The Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan agree to appoint a Commission consisting of equal
number of representatives and presided over by a person who is approved by both and who is not a
national of either.

" The expense of the Commission and of its Committees both on account of its maintenance and its
operation shall be borne by the two Governments in equal proportion.

" The Government of Pakistan and the Government of Hindustan hereby agree to grant to all their
nationals within their territories who belong to ethnic minorities the right to express their desire to
emigrate.

" The Governments of the States above mentioned undertake to facilitate in every way the exercise
of this right and to interpose no obstacles, directly or indirectly, to freedom of emigration. All laws
and regulations whatsoever which conflict with freedom of emigration shall be considered as null
and void."

The fourth and the fifth difficulties which relate to transfer of property can be effectually met by
including in the treaty articles the following terms:
" Those who, in pursuance of these articles, determine to take advantage of the right to migrate
shall have the right to carry with them or to have transported their movable property of any kind
without any duty being imposed upon them on this account.

"So far as immovable property is concerned it shall be liquidated by the Commission in accordance
with the following provisions:

(1) The Commission shall appoint a Committee of Experts to estimate the value of the immovable
property of the emigrant The emigrant interested shall have a representative chosen by him on the
Committee.

(2) The Commission shall take necessary measures with a view to the sale of immovable property
of the emigrant"

As for the rest of the difficulties relating to reimbursement for loss, for payment of pensionary and
charges for specifying the currency in which payments are to be made the following articles in the
treaty should be sufficient to meet them :

" (1) The difference in the estimated value and the sale price of the immovable property of the
emigrant shall be paid in to the Commission by the Government of the country of departure as soon
as the former has notified it of the resulting deficiency. One-fourth of this payment may be made in
the money of the country of departure and three-fourths in gold or short term gold bonds.

" (2) The Commission shall advance to the emigrants the value of their immovable property
determined as above.

" (3) All civil or military pensions acquired by an emigrant at the dale of the signature of the
present treaty shall be capitalized at the charge of the debtor Government, which must pay the
amount to the Commission for the account of its owners.

" (4) The funds necessary to facilitate emigration shall be advanced by the States interested in the
Commission."

Are not these provisions sufficient to overcome the difficulties regarding transfer of population ?
There are of course other difficulties. But even those are not insuperable. They involve questions of
policy. The first question is : is the transfer of population to be compulsory or is it to be voluntary ?
The second is : is this right to State-aided transfer to be open to all or is it to be restricted to any
particular class of persons ? The third is : how long is Government going to remain liable to be
bound by these provisions, particularly the provision for making good the loss on the sale of
immovable property ? Should the provisions be made subject to a time limit or should the liability
be continued indefinitely ?

With regard to the first point, both are possible and there are instances of both having been put into
effect. The transfer of population between Greece and Bulgaria was on a voluntary basis while that
between Greece and Turkey was on a compulsory basis. Compulsory transfer strikes one as being
prima facie wrong. It would not be fair to compel a man to change his ancestral habitat if he does
not wish to, unless the peace and tranquility of the State is likely to be put in jeopardy by his
continuing to live where he is or such transfer becomes necessary in his own interest. What is
required is that those who want to transfer should be able to do so without impediment and without
loss. I am therefore of opinion that transfer should not be forced but should be left open for those
who declare their intention to transfer.

As to the second point, it is obvious that only members of a minority can be allowed to take
advantage of the scheme of State-aided transfer. But even this restriction may not be sufficient to
exclude all those who ought not to get the benefit of this scheme. It must be confined to certain well
defined minorities who on account of ethnic or religious differences are sure to be subjected to
discrimination or victimization.
The third point is important and is likely to give rise to serious difference of opinion. On a fair view
of the matter it can be said that it is quite unreasonable to compel a Government to keep open for an
indefinite period the option to migrate at Government cost .There is nothing unfair in telling a
person that if he wants to take advantage of the provisions of the scheme of State-aided migration
contained in the forgoing articles, he must exercise his option to migrate within a stated period and
that if he decides to migrate after the period has elapsed he will be free to migrate but it will have to
be at his own cost and without the aid of the State There is no inequity in thus limiting the right to
State aid. State-aid becomes a necessary part of the scheme because the migration is a resultant
consequence of political changes over which individual citizens have no control. But migration
may not be the result of political change. lt may be for other causes, and when it is for other causes,
aid to the emigrant cannot bean obligation on the State. The only way to determine whether
migration is for political reasons or for private reasons is to relate it to a definite point of time.
When it takes place with in a defined period from the happening of a political change it may be
presumed open for an indefinite period the option to migrate at Government cost. There is nothing
unfair in telling a person that if he wants to take advantage of the provisions of the scheme of
State-aided migration contained in the foregoing articles, he must exercise his option to migrate
within a stated period and that if he decides to migrate after the period has elapsed he will be free to
migrate but it will have to be at his own cost and without the aid of the State. There is no inequity
in thus limiting the right to State-aid. State-aid becomes a necessary part of the scheme because the
migration is a resultant consequence of political changes over which individual citizens have no
control. But migration may not be the result of political change. It may be for other causes, and
when it is for other causes, aid to the emigrant cannot be an obligation on the State. The only way
to determine whether migration is for political reasons or for private reasons is to relate it to a
definite point of time. When it takes place within a defined period from the happening of a political
change it may be presumed to be political. When it occurs after the period it may be presumed to be
for private reasons. There is nothing unjust in this. The same rule of presumption governs the cases
of civil servants who, when a political change takes place, are allowed to retire on proportionate
pensions if they retire within a given period but not if they retire after it has lapsed.

If the policy in these matters is as I suggest it should be, it may be given effect to by the inclusion
of the following articles in the treaty:

" The right to voluntary emigration may be exercised under this treaty by any person belonging to
an ethnic minority who is over 18 years of age.

" A declaration made before the Commission shall be sufficient evidence of intention to exercise
the right.

" The choice of the husband shall carry with it that of the wife, the option of parents or guardians
that of their children or wards aged less than 18 years.

" The right to the benefit provided by this treaty shall lapse if the option to migrate is not exercised
within a period of 5 years from the date of signing the treaty.

" The duties of the Commission shall be terminated within six months after the expiration of the
period of five years from the date when the Commission starts to function."

What about the cost ? The question of cost will be important only if the transfer is to be
compulsory. A scheme of voluntary transfer cannot place a very heavy financial burden on the
State. Men love property more than liberty. Many will prefer to endure tyranny at the hands of their
political masters than change the habitat in which they are rooted. As Adam Smith said, of all the
things man is the most difficult cargo to transport. Cost therefore need not frighten anybody.

What about its workability ? The scheme is not new. It has been tried and found workable. It was
put into effect after the last European War, to bring about a transfer 15 [f.15] of population between
Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece. Nobody can deny that it has worked, has been tried
and found workable. The scheme I have outlined is a copy of the same scheme. It had the effect of
bringing about a transfer* of population between Greece and Bulgaria and Turkey and Greece.
Nobody can deny that it was worked with signal success. What succeeded elsewhere may well be
expected to succeed in India.

The issue of Pakistan is far from simple. But it is not so difficult as it is made out to be provided the
principle and the ethics of it are agreed upon. If it is difficult it is only because it is heart-rending
and nobody wishes to think of its problems and their solutions as the very idea of it is so painful.
But once sentiment is banished and it is decided that there shall be Pakistan, the problems arising
out of it are neither staggering nor baffling.

CHAPTER XV

WHO CAN DECIDE ?

There are two sides to the question of Pakistan, the Hindu side and the Muslim side. This cannot be
avoided. Unfortunately however the attitude of both is far from rational. Both are deeply embedded
in sentiment. The layers of this sentiment are so thick that reason at present finds it extremely
difficult to penetrate. Whether these opposing sentiments will wither away or they will thicken,
time and circumstances alone can tell. How long Indians will have to wait for the melting of the
snow no one can prophesy. But one thing is certain that 'until this snow melts freedom will have to
be put in cold storage. I am sure there must be many millions of thinking Indians who are dead
opposed to this indefinite postponement of Indian freedom till an ideal and a permanent solution of
Pakistan is found. I am one of them. I am one of those who hold that if Pakistan is a problem and
not a pose there is no escape and a solution must be found for it. I am one of those who believe that
what is inevitable must be faced. There is no use burying one's head in the sand and refusing to take
notice of what is happening round about because the sound of it hurts one's sentiments. I am also
one of those who believe that one must, if one can, be ready with a solution long before the hour of
decision arrives. It is wise to build a bridge if one knows that one will be forced to cross the river.

The principal problem of Pakistan is : who can decide whether there shall or shall not be Pakistan ?
I have thought over the subject for the last three years, and I have come to some conclusions as to
the proper answer to this question. These conclusions I would like to share with others interested in
the solution of the problem so that they may be further explored. To give clarity to my conclusions,
I have thought that it would serve the purpose better if I were to put them, in the form of an Act of
Parliament. The following is the draft of the Act which embodies my conclusions:—

Government of India (Preliminary Provisions) Act

Be it enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the
Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the
authority of the same as follows :—

I.—(1) If within six months from the date appointed in this behalf a majority of the Muslim
members of the Legislatures of the Provinces of the North-West Frontier, the Punjab, Sind and
Bengal pass a resolution that the predominantly Muslim areas be separated from British India, His
Majesty shall cause a poll to be taken on that question of the Muslim and the non-Muslim electors
of these Provinces and of Baluchistan in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

(2) The question shall be submitted to the electors in these Provinces in the following form :— (i)
Are you in favour of separation from British India ? (U) Are you against separation ?

(3) The poll of Muslim and non-Muslim electors shall be taken separately.
II.—(1) If on a result of the poll, a majority of Muslim electors are found to be in favour of
separation and a majority of non-Muslim electors against separation, His Majesty shall by
proclamation appoint a Boundary Commission for the purpose of preparing a list of such districts
and areas in these Provinces in which a majority of inhabitants are Muslims. Such districts and
areas shall be called Scheduled Districts.

(2) The Scheduled Districts shall be collectively designated as Pakistan and the rest of British India
as Hindustan. The Scheduled Districts lying in the North-west shall be called the State of Western
Pakistan and those lying in the North-east shall be called Eastern Pakistan.

///.—(1) After the findings of the Boundary Commission have become final either by agreement or
the award of an Arbitrator, His Majesty shall cause another poll to be taken of the electors of the
Scheduled Districts.

(2) The following shall be the form of the questions submitted to the electors :— (i) Are you in
favour of separation forthwith ? (U) Are you against separation forthwith ?

IV.—(I ) If the majority is in favour of separation forthwith it shall be lawful for His Majesty to
make arrangements for the framing of two separate constitutions, one for Pakistan and the other for
Hindustan.

(2) The New States of Pakistan and Hindustan shall commence to function as separate States on the
day appointed by His Majesty by proclamation issued in that behalf.

(3) If the majority are against separation forthwith it shall be lawful for His Majesty to make
arrangements for the framing of a single constitution for British India as a whole.

V.— No motion for the separation of Pakistan. lf the poll under the last preceding section has been
against separation forthwith and no motion for incorporation of Pakistan into Hindustan if the poll
under the last preceding section has been in favour of separation forthwith shall be entertained until
ten years have elapsed from the date appointed by His Majesty for putting into effect the new
constitution for British India or the two separate constitutions for Pakistan and Hindustan.

VI.—(1) In the event of two separate constitutions coming into existence under Section Four it
shall be lawful for His Majesty to establish as soon as may be after the appointed day, a Council of
India with a view to the eventual establishment of a constitution for the whole of British India, and
to bringing about harmonious action between the Legislatures and Governments of Pakistan and
Hindustan, and to the promotion of mutual intercourse and uniformity in relation to matters
affecting the whole of British India, and to providing for the administration of services which the
two parliaments mutually agree should be administered uniformly throughout the whole of British
India, or which by virtue of this Act are to be so administered.
(2) Subject as hereinafter provided, the Council of India shall consist of a President nominated in
accordance with instructions from His Majesty and forty other persons, of whom twenty shall be
members representing Pakistan and twenty shall be members representing Hindustan.

(3) The members of the Council of India shall be elected in each case by the members of the Lower
Houses of the Parliament of Pakistan or Hindustan.

(4) The election of members of the Council of India shall be the first business of the Legislatures of
Pakistan and Hindustan.

(5) A member of the Council shall, on ceasing to be a member of that House of the Legislature of
Pakistan or Hindustan by which he was elected a member of the Council, cease to be a member of
the Council : Provided that, on the dissolution of the Legislature of Pakistan or Hindustan, the
persons who are members of the Council shall continue to hold office as members of the Council
until a new election has taken place and shall then retire unless re-elected.
(6) The President of the Council shall preside at each meeting of the Council at which he is present
and shall be entitled to vote in case of an equality of votes, but not otherwise.

(7) The first meeting of the Council shall be held at such time and place as may be appointed by the
President.

(8) The Council may act notwithstanding a deficiency in their number, and the quorum of the
Council shall be fifteen.

(9) Subject as aforesaid, the Council may regulate their own procedure, including the delegation of
powers to committees.

(10) The constitution of the Council of India may from time to time be varied by identical Acts
passed by the Legislature of Pakistan and the Legislature of Hindustan, and the Acts may provide
for all or any of the members of the Council of India being elected by parliamentary electors, and
determine the constituencies by which the several elective members are to be returned and the
number of the members to be returned by the several constituencies and the method of election.

VII.—(1) The Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan may, by identical Acts, delegate to the
Council of India any of the powers of the Legislatures and Government of Pakistan and Hindustan,
and such Acts may determine the manner in which the powers so delegated are to be exercisable by
the Council.

(2) The powers of making laws with respect to railways and waterways shall, as from the day
appointed for the operation of the new constitution, become the powers of the Council of India and
not of Pakistan or Hindustan : Provided that nothing in this subsection shall prevent the Legislature
of Pakistan or Hindustan making laws authorising the construction, extension, or improvement of
railways and waterways where the works to be constructed are situate wholly in Pakistan or
Hindustan as the case may be.

(3) The Council may consider any questions which may appear in any way to bear on the welfare of
both Pakistan and Hindustan, and may, by resolution, make suggestions in relation thereto as they
may think proper, but suggestions so made shall have no legislative effect.

(4) It shall be lawful for the Council of India to make recommendations to the Legislatures of
Pakistan and Hindustan as to the advisability of passing identical Acts delegating to the Council of
India the administration of any all-India subject, with a view to avoiding the necessity of
administering them separately in Pakistan or Hindustan.

(5) It shall be lawful for either Legislature at any time by Act to deprive the delegation to the
Council of India of any powers which are in pursuance of such identical Acts as aforesaid for the
time being delegated to the Council and thereupon the powers in question shall cease to be
exercisable by the Council of India and shall become exercisable in parts of British India within
their respective jurisdictions by the Legislatures and Governments of Pakistan and Hindustan and
the Council shall take such steps as may be necessary to carry out the transfer, including
adjustments of any funds in their hands or at their disposal.

VIII.—(1) If at the end of ten years after coming into operation of a constitution for British India as
prescribed by Section IV—(3) a petition is presented to His Majesty by a majority of the Muslim
members representing the Scheduled Districts in the Provincial and Central Legislatures demanding
a poll to be taken with regard to the separation of Pakistan from Hindustan, His Majesty shall cause
a poll to be taken. (2) The following shall be the form of the questions submitted to the electors :—
d) Are you in favour of separation of Pakistan from Hindustan ?

(ii) Are you against the separation of Pakistan from Hindustan ?

IX.— If the result of the poll is in favour of separation it shall be lawful for His Majesty to declare
by an Order-in-Council that from a day appointed in that behalf Pakistan shall cease to be a part of
British India, and dissolve the Council of India.

X.—(1) Where two constitutions have come into existence under circumstances mentioned in
Section IV it shall be lawful for His Majesty to declare by an Order-in-Council that Pakistan shall
cease to be a separate State and shall form part of Hindustan. Provided that no such order shall be
made until ten years have elapsed from the commencement of the separate constitution for
Pakistan. Provided also that no such declaration shall be made unless the Popular Legislatures of
Pakistan and Hindustan have passed Constituent Acts as are provided for in Section X—(2).
(2) The popular Legislatures of Pakistan and Hindustan may, by identical Acts agreed to by an
absolute majority of members at the third reading (hereinafter referred to as Constituent Acts),
establish, in lieu of the Council of India, a Legislature for United India, and may determine the
number of members thereof and the manner in which the members are to be appointed or elected
and the constituencies for which the several elective members are to be returned, and the number of
members to be returned by the several constituencies, and the method of appointment or election,
and the relations of the two Houses if provided for to one another.
XI.—(1) On the date of the union of Pakistan and Hindustan the Council of India shall cease to
exist and there shall be transferred to the Legislature and Government of India all powers then
exercisable by the Council of India.

(2) There shall also be transferred to the Legislature and Government of British India all the powers
and duties of the Legislatures and Government of Pakistan and Hindustan, including all powers as
to taxation, and those Legislatures and Government shall cease to exist.

XII.—(1) A poll under this Act shall be taken by ballot in the same manner so far as possible as a
poll of electors for the election of a member to serve in a Legislature and His Majesty may make
rules adopting the election laws for the purpose of the taking of the poll.
(2) An elector shall not vote more than once at the poll, although registered in more than one place.

(3) Elector means every adult male and female residing in the Provinces of North-West Frontier,
the Punjab, Sind, and Bengal and in Baluchistan.

XIII.— This Act may be called the Indian Constitution

(Preliminary Provisions) Act, I94 .

I do not think .that any detailed explanation is necessary for the reader to follow and grasp the
conclusions I have endeavoured to embody in this skeleton Act. Perhaps it might be advantageous
if I bring out some of the salient features of the proposals to which the projected statute of
Parliament is intended to give effect by comparing them with the Cripps proposals.

In my opinion it is no use for Indians to ask and the British Parliament to agree to proceed
forthwith to pass an Act conferring Dominion Status or Independence without first disposing of the
issue of Pakistan. The Pakistan issue must be treated as a preliminary issue and must be disposed of
one way or the other. This is why I have called the proposed Act " The Government of India
(Preliminary Provisions) Act." The issue of Pakistan being one of self-determination must be
decided by the wishes of the people. It is for this that I propose to take a poll of the Muslims and
non-Muslims in the predominantly Muslim Provinces. If the Majority of the Muslims are in favour
of separation and a majority of non-Muslims are against separation, steps must be taken to delimit
the areas wherever it is possible by redrawing provincial boundaries on ethnic and cultural lines by
separating the Muslim majority districts from the districts in which the majority consists of
non-Muslims. A Boundary Commission is necessary for this purpose. So a Boundary Commission
is provided for in the Act. It would be better if the Boundary Commission could be international in
its composition.

The scheme of separate referenda of Muslims and non-Muslims is based on two principles which I
regard as fundamental. The first is that a minority can demand safeguards for its protection against
the tyranny of the majority. It can demand them as a condition precedent. But a minority has no
right to put a veto on the right of the majority .to decide on questions of ultimate destiny. This is the
reason why I have confined the referendum on the establishment of Pakistan to Muslims only. The
second is that a communal majority cannot claim a communal minority to submit itself to its
dictates. Only a political majority may be permitted to rule a political minority. This principle has
been modified in India where a communal minority is placed under a communal majority subject to
certain safeguards. But this is as regards the ordinary question of social, economic and political
importance. It has never been conceded and can never be conceded that a communal majority has a
right to dictate to a communal minority on an issue which is of a constitutional character. That is
the reason why I have provided a separate referendum of non-Muslims only, to decide whether they
prefer to go in Pakistan or come into Hindustan.

After the Boundary Commission has done its work of delimiting the areas, various possibilities can
arise. The Musalmans may stop with the delimitation of the boundaries of Pakistan. They may be
satisfied that after all the principle of Pakistan has been accepted—which is what delimitation
means. Assuming that the Musalmans are not satisfied with mere delimitation but want to move in
the direction of establishing Pakistan there are two courses open to them. They may want to
establish Pakistan forthwith or they may agree to live under a common Central Government for a
period of say ten years and put the Hindus on their trial. Hindus will have an opportunity to show
that the minorities can trust them. The Muslims will learn from experience how far their fears of
Hindu Raj are justified. There is another possibility also. The Musalmans of Pakistan having
decided to separate forthwith may after a period become so disgusted with Pakistan that they might
desire to come back and be incorporated in Hindustan and be one people subject to one single
constitution.

These are some of the possibilities I see. These possibilities should in my judgement be kept open
for time and circumstances to have their effect. It seems to me to be wrong to say to the Musalmans
if you want to remain as part of India then you can never go out or if you want to go then you can
never come back. I have in my scheme kept the door open and have provided for both the
possibilities in the Act (1) for union after a separation of ten years, (2) for separation for ten years
and union there after. I personally prefer the second alternative although I have no strong views
either way. It would be much better that the Musalmans should have the experience of Pakistan. A
union after an experience of Pakistan is bound to be stable and lasting. In case Pakistan comes into
existence forthwith, it seems to me necessary that the separation should not altogether be a
severance, sharp and complete. It is necessary to maintain live contact between Pakistan and
Hindustan so as to prevent any estrangement growing up and preventing the chances of reunion. A
Council of India is accordingly provided for in the Act. It cannot be mistaken for a federation. It is
not even a confederation. Its purpose is to do nothing more than to serve as a coupling to link
Pakistan to Hindustan until they are united under a single constitution.

Such is my scheme. It is based on a community-wise plebiscite. The scheme is flexible. It takes

account of the fact that the Hindu sentiment is against it. It also recognizes the fact that the Muslim
demand for Pakistan may only be a passing mood. The scheme is not a divorce. It is only a judicial
separation. It gives to the Hindus a term. They can use it to show that they can be trusted with
authority to rule justly. It gives the Musalmans a term to try out Pakistan.

It might be desirable to compare my proposals with those of Sir Stafford Cripps. The proposals
were given out as a serial story in parts. The draft Declaration issued on 29th March 1943 contained
only the following :—

" His Majesty's Government therefore make the following terms:—

(a) Immediately upon cessation of hostilities steps shall be taken to set up in India in manner
described hereafter an elected body charged with the task of framing a new constitution for India.

(b) Provision shall be made, as set out below, for participation of Indian States in the
constitution-making body.

(c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the constitution so
framed subject only to:

(i) The right of any province of British India that is not prepared to accept the new constitution to
retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so
decides.

With such non-acceding provinces should they so desire. His Majesty's Government will be
prepared to agree upon a new constitution giving them the same full status as the Indian Union and
arrived at by a procedure analogous to that here laid down."

Particulars of accession and secession were given in his broadcast. They were in the following
terms :—

" That constitution-making body will have as its object the framing of a single constitution for the
whole of India—that is, of British India, together with such of the Indian States as may decide to
join in.

" But we realize this very simple fact. If you want to persuade a number of people who are inclined
to be antagonistic to enter the same room, it is unwise to tell them that once they go in there is no
way out, they are to be forever locked in together.

" It is much wiser to tell them they can go in and if they find they can't come to a common decision,
then there is nothing to prevent those who wish, from leaving again by another door. They are
much more likely all to go in if they have knowledge that they can by their free will go out again if
they cannot agree.

" Well, that is what we say to the provinces of India. Come together to frame a common
constitution—if you find after all your discussion and all the give and take of a constitution-making
assembly that you cannot overcome your differences and that some provinces are still not satisfied
with the constitution, then such provinces can go out and remain out if they wish and just the same
degree of self-government and freedom will be available for them as for the Union itself, that is to
say complete self-government."

To complete the picture further details were added at the Press Conference. Explaining the plan for
accession or secession of provinces Sir Stafford Cripps said :—

" If at the end of the Constituent Assembly proceedings, any province or provinces did not wish to
accept the new constitution and join the Union, it was free to keep out—provided the Provincial
Assembly of that province, by a substantial vote say not less than 60 per cent., decided against
accession. If it was less than 60 per cent, the minority could claim a plebiscite of the whole
province for ascertaining the will of the people. In the case of the plebiscite, a bare majority would
be enough. Sir Stafford explained that for completing accession there would have to be a positive
vote from the Provincial Assembly concerned. The non-acceding province could, if they wanted,
combine into a separate union through a separate Constituent Assembly, but in order to make such
a Union practicable they should be geographically contiguous."

The main difference between my plan and that of Sir Stafford Cripps is quite obvious. For deciding
the issue of accession or secession which is only another way of saying, will there be or will there
not be Pakistan, Sir Stafford Cripps took the Province as a deciding unit. I have taken community
as the deciding unit. I have no doubt that Sir Stafford adopted a wrong basis. The Province can be a
proper unit if the points of dispute were interprovincial. For instance, if the points of dispute related
to questions such as distribution of taxation, of water, etc., one could understand the Province as a
whole or a particular majority in that Province having the right to decide. But the dispute regarding
Pakistan is an inter-communal problem which has involved two communities in the same Province.
Further the issue in the dispute is not on what terms the two communities will agree to associate in
a common political life. The dispute goes deeper and raises the question whether the communities
are prepared at all to associate in a common political life. It is a communal difference in its essence
and can only be decided by a community-wise plebiscite.

IV

I do not claim any originality for the solution I have proposed. The ideas which underlie it are
drawn from three sources, from the Irish Unity Conference at which Horace Plunket presided, from
the Home Rule Amending Bill of Mr. Asquith and from the Government of Ireland Act of 1920. It
will be seen that my solution of the Pakistan problem is the result of pooled wisdom. Will it be
accepted ? There are four ways of resolving the conflict which is raging round the question of
Pakistan. First is that the British Government should act as the deciding authority. Second is that
the Hindus and the Muslims should agree. Third is to submit the issue to an International Board of
Arbitration and the fourth is to fight it out by a Civil War.

Although India today is a political mad-house there are I hope enough sane people in the country
who would not allow matters to reach the stage of Civil War. There is no prospect of an agreement
between political leaders in the near future. The A.I.C.C. of the Indian National Congress at a
meeting in Allahabad held in April 1942 on the motion of Mr. Jagat Narayan Lal resolved 16
[f16] not to entertain the proposal for Pakistan. Two other ways are left to have the problem solved.
One is by the people concerned ; the other is by international arbitration. This is the way I have
suggested. I prefer the former. For various reasons this seems to me the only right course. The
leaders having failed to resolve the dispute it is time it was taken to the people for decision. Indeed,
it is inconceivable how an issue like that of partition of territory and transference of peoples'
allegiance from one government to another can be decided by political leaders. Such things are no
doubt done by conquerors to whom victory in war is sufficient authority to do what they like with
the conquered people. But we are not working under such a lawless condition. In normal times
when constitutional procedure is not in abeyance the views of political leaders cannot have the
effect which the fiats of dictators have. That would be contrary to the rule of democracy. The
highest value that can be put upon the views of leaders is to regard them as worthy to be placed on
the agenda. They cannot replace or obviate the necessity of having the matter decided by the
people. This is the position which was taken by Sir Stafford Cripps. The stand taken by the Muslim
League was, let there be Pakistan because the Muslim League has decided to have it. That position
has been negatived by the Cripps proposals and quite rightly. The Muslim League is recognized by
the Cripps proposals only to the extent of having a right to propose that Pakistan as a proposition be
considered. It has not been given the right to decide. Again it does not seem to have been realized
that the decision of an All-India body like the Congress which does not carry with it the active
consent of the majority of the people, immediately affected by the issue of Pakistan, cannot carry
the matter to solution. What good can it do if Mr. Gandhi or Mr. Rajagopalachariar agreeing or the
All-India Congress Committee resolving to concede Pakistan, if it was opposed by the Hindus of
the Punjab, or Bengal. Really speaking it is not the business of the people of Bombay or Madras to
say, ' let there be Pakistan ' It must be left to be decided by the people who are living in those areas
and who will have to bear the consequences of so violent, so revolutionary and so fundamental a
change in the political and economic system with which their lives and fortunes have been closely
bound up for so many years. A referendum by people in the Pakistan Provinces seems to me the
safest and the most constitutional method of solving the problem of Pakistan.

But I fear that solving the question of Pakistan by a referendum of the people howsoever attractive
may not find much favour with those who count. Even the Muslim League may not be very
enthusiastic about it. This is not because the proposal is unsound. Quite the contrary. The fact is
that there is another solution which has its own attractions. It calls upon the British Government to
establish Pakistan by the exercise of its sovereign authority. The reason why this solution may be
preferred to that which rests on the consent of the people is that it is simple and involves no such
elaborate procedure as that of a referendum to the people and has none of the uncertainties involved
in a referendum. But there is another ground why it is preferred, namely, that there is a precedent
for it. The precedent is the Irish precedent and the argument is that if the British Government by
virtue of its sovereign authority divided Ireland and created Ulster why cannot the British
Government divide India and create Pakistan ?

The British Parliament is the most sovereign legislative body in the world. De L'home, a French
writer on English Constitution, observed that there is nothing the British Parliament cannot do
except make man a woman and woman a man. And although the sovereignty of the British
Parliament over the affairs of the Dominions is limited by the Statute of Westminster it is still
unlimited so far as India is concerned. There is nothing in law to prevent the British Parliament
from proceeding to divide India as it did in the case of Ireland. It can do it, but will it do it? The
question is not one of power but of will.
Those who urge the British Government to follow the precedent in Ireland should ask what led the
British Government to partition Ireland. Was it the conscience of the British Government which led
them to sanction the course they took or was it forced upon them by circumstances to which they
had to yield ? A student of the history of Irish Home Rule will have to admit that the partition of
Ireland was not sanctioned by conscience but by the force of circumstances. It is not often clearly
realized that no party to the Irish dispute wanted partition of Ireland. Not even Carson, the Leader
of Ulster. Carson was opposed to Home Rule but he was not in favour of partition. His primary
position was to oppose Home Rule and maintain the integrity of Ireland. It was only as a second
line of defence against the imposition of Home Rule that he insisted on partition. This will be quite
clear from his speeches both inside and outside the House of Commons. Asquith's Government on
the other side was equally opposed to partition. This may be seen from the proceedings in the
House of Commons over the Irish Home Rule Bill of 1912. Twice amendments were moved for the
exclusion of Ulster from the provisions of the Bill, once in the Committee stage by Mr.
Agar-Roberts and again on the third reading by Carson himself. Both the times the Government
opposed and the amendments were lost.

Permanent partition of Ireland was effected in 1920 by Mr. Lloyd George in his Government of
Ireland Act. Many people think that this was the first time that partition of Ireland was thought of
and that it was due to the dictation of the Conservative—Unionists in the Coalition Government of
which Mr. Lloyd George was the nominal head. It may be true that Mr. Lloyd George succumbed
to the influence of the predominant party in his coalition. But it is not true that partition was
thought of in 1920 for the first time. Nor is it true that the Liberal Party had not undergone a change
and shown its readiness to favour partition as a possible solution. As a matter of fact partition as a
solution came in 1914 six years before Mr. Lloyd George's Act when the Asquith Government, a
purely Liberal Government, was in office. The real cause which led to the partition of Ireland can
be understood only by examining the factors which made the Liberal Government of Mr. Asquith
change its mind. I feel certain that the factor which brought about this change in the viewpoint of
the Liberal Government was the Military crisis which took place in March 1914 and which is
generally referred to as the " Curragh Incident". A few facts will be sufficient to explain what the "
Curragh Incident " was and how decisive it was in bringing about a change in the policy of the
Asquith Government.

To begin at a convenient point the Irish Home Rule Bill had gone through all its stages by the end
of 1913. Mr. Asquith who had been challenged that he was proceeding without a mandate from the
electorate had however given an undertaking that the Act would not be given effect to until another
general election had been held. In the ordinary course there would have been a general election in
1915 if the War had not supervened. But the Ulstermen were not prepared to take their chance in a
general election and started taking active steps to oppose Home Rule. They were not always very
scrupulous in choosing their means and their methods and under the seductive pose that they were
fighting against the Government which was preventing them from remaining loyal subjects of the
King they resorted to means which nobody would hesitate to call shameless and nefarious. There
was one Maginot Line on which the Ulstermen always depended for defeating Home Rule. That
was the House of Lords. But by the Parliament Act of 1911 the House of Lords had become a
Wailing Wall neither strong nor high. It had ceased to be a line of defence to rely upon. Knowing
that the Bill might pass notwithstanding its rejection by the House of Lords, feeling that in the next
election Asquith might win, the Ulstermen had become desperate and were searching for another
line of defence. They found it in the Army. The plan was twofold. It included the project of getting
the House of Lords to hold up the Annual Army Act so as to ensure that there would be no Army in
existence to be used against Ulster. The second project was to spread their propaganda—That
Home Rule will be Home Rule—in the Army with a view to preparing the Army to disobey the
Government in case Government decided to use the Army for forcing Home Rule on Ireland. The
first became unnecessary as they succeeded easily in bringing about the second. This became clear
in March 1914 when there occurred the Curragh Incident. The Government had reasons to suspect
that certain Army depots in Ireland were likely to be raided by the Unionist Volunteers. On March
20th, order-were sent to Sir Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief of the Forces in Ireland, to take
steps to safeguard these depols. His reply was a telegram to the effect that officers were not
prepared to obey and were resigning their commissions and it was feared that men would refuse to
move. General Sir Hubert Gough had refused to serve against the Ulster Unionists and his example
had been followed by others. The Government realized that the Army had become political,
17[f.17] nay, partisan. It took fright and decided in favour of partition acting on the well-known
maxim that wisdom is the better part of valour. What made Asquith change his position was not
conscience but the fright of the Army rebelling. The fright was so great that no one thereafter felt
bold enough to challenge the Army and enforce Home Rule without partition.

Can His Majesty's Government be depended upon to repeat in India what it did in Ireland ? I am
unable to answer the question. But two things I will say. The first thing is that His Majesty's
Government knows full well what have been the consequences of this partition of Ireland. The Irish
Free State has become the most irreconcilable enemy of Great Britain. The enmity knows no limits.
The wound caused by partition will never be healed so long as partition remains a settled fact. The
Partition of Ireland cannot but be said to be morally indefensible inasmuch as it was the result not
of the consent of the people but of superior force. It was as bad as the murder of Duncan by
Macbeth. The blood stains left on His Majesty's Government are as deep as those on Lady Macbeth
and of which Lady Macbeth said that " All the perfumes of Arabia " had failed to remove the stink.
That His Majesty's Government does not like to be responsible for the execution of another deed of
partition is quite clear from its policy with the Jew-Arab problem in Palestine. It appointed the Peel
Commission to investigate. The Commission recommended partition of Palestine. The Government
accepted 18[f.18] it in principle as the most hopeful line of solving the deadlock. Suddenly the
Government realized the gravity of forcing such a solution on the Arabs and appointed another
Royal Commission called the Woodhead Commission which condemned partition and opened an
easy way to a Government which was anxious to extricate itself from a terrible position. The
partition of Ireland is not a precedent worthy to be followed. It is an ugly incident which requires to
be avoided. It is a warning and not an example. I doubt very much if His Majesty's Government
will partition India on its own authority at the behest of the Muslim League.

And why should His Majesty's Government oblige the Muslim League ? In the case of Ulster there
was the tie of blood which made a powerful section of the British politicians take the side of Ulster.
It was this tie of blood which made Lord Curzon say " You are compelling Ulster to divorce her
present husband, to whom she is not unfaithful and you are compelling her to marry someone else
who she cordially dislikes, with whom she does not want to live." There is no such kinship between
His Majesty's Government and the Muslim League and it would be a vain hope for the League to
expect His Majesty's Government to take her side.
The other thing I would like to say is that it would not be in the interests of the Muslim League to
achieve its object by invoking the authority of His Majesty's Government to bring about the
partition of India. In my judgement more important than getting Pakistan is the procedure to be
adopted in bringing about Pakistan if the object is that after partition Pakistan and Hindustan should
continue as two friendly States with goodwill and no malice towards each other.

What is the procedure which is best suited for the realization of this end ? Everyone will agree that
the procedure must be such that it must not involve victory to one community and humiliation to
the other. The method must be of peace with honour to both sides. I do not know if there is another
solution better calculated to achieve this end than the decision by a referendum of the people. I
have made my suggestion as to which is the best course. Others also will come forth with theirs. I
cannot say that mine is the best. But whatever the suggestion be unless good sense as well as a
sense of responsibility is brought to bear upon the solution of this question it will remain a festering
sore.

EPILOGUE

Here I propose to stop. For I feel that I have said all that I can say about the subject. To use legal
language I have drawn the pleadings. This I may claim to have done at sufficient length. In doing
so, I have adopted that prolix style so dear to the Victorian lawyers, under which the two sides plied
one another with plea and replication, rejoinder and rebutter, surrejoinder and surrebutter and so on.
I have done this deliberately with the object that a full statement of the case for and against
Pakistan may be made. The foregoing pages contain the pleadings. The facts contained therein are
true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I have also given my findings. It is now for Hindus and
Muslims to give theirs.

To help them in their task it might be well to set out the issues. On the pleadings the following
issues seem to be necessary issues:

(1) Is Hindu-Muslim unity necessary for India's political advancement ? If necessary, is it still
possible of realization notwithstanding the new ideology of the Hindus and the Muslims being two
different nations?

(2) If Hindu-Muslim unity is possible, should it be reached by appeasement or by settlement ?

(3) If it is to be achieved by appeasement, what are the new concessions that can be offered to the
Muslims to obtain their willing co-operation, without prejudice to other interests ?

(4) (4) If it is to be achieved by a settlement, what are the terms of that - settlement ? If there are
only two alternatives, (i) Division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan, or (ii) Fifty-fifty share in
Legislature, Executive and the Services, which alternative is preferable ?

(5) Whether India, if she remained one integral whole, can rely upon both Hindus and Musalmans
to defend her independence, assuming it is won from the British?

(6) Having regard to the prevailing antagonism between Hindus and Musalmans and having regard
to the new ideology demarcating them as two distinct nations and postulating an opposition in their
ultimate destinies, whether a single constitution for these two nations can be built in the hope that
they will show an intention to work it and not to stop it ?

(7) On the assumption that the two-nation theory has come to stay, will not India as one single unit
become an incoherent body without organic unity, incapable of developing into a strong united
nation bound by a common faith in a common destiny and therefore likely to remain a feebler and
sickly country, easy to be kept in perpetual subjection either of the British or-of any other foreign
power ?

(8) If India cannot be one united country, is it not better that Indians should help India in the
peaceful dissolution of this incoherent whole into its natural parts, namely, Pakistan and Hindustan
?

(9) Whether it is not better to provide for the growth of two independent and separate nations, a
Muslim nation inhabiting Pakistan and a Hindu nation inhabiting Hindustan, than pursue the vain
attempt to keep India as one undivided country in the false hope that Hindus and Muslims will
some day be one and occupy it as the members of one nation and sons of one motherland ?

Nothing can come in the way of an Indian getting to grips with these issues and reaching his own
conclusions with the help of the material contained in the foregoing pages except three things :
(1)A false sentiment of historical patriotism, (2) a false conception of the exclusive ownership of
territory and (3) absence of willingness to think for oneself. Of these obstacles, the last is the most
difficult to get over. Unfortunately thought in India is rare and free thought is rarer still. This is
particularly true of Hindus. That is why a large part of the argument of this book has been
addressed to them. The reasons for this are obvious. The Hindus are in a majority. Being in a
majority, their view point must count! There is not much possibility of peaceful solution if no
attempt is made to meet their objections rational or sentimental. But there are special reasons which
have led me to address so large a part of the argument to them and which may not be quite so
obvious to others. I feel that those Hindus who are guiding the destinies of their fellows have lost
what Carlyle calls " the Seeing Eye " and are walking in the glamour of certain vain illusions, the
consequences of which must, I fear, be terrible for the Hindus. The Hindus are in the grip of the
Congress and the Congress is in the grip of Mr. Gandhi. It cannot be said that Mr. Gandhi has given
the Congress the right lead. Mr. Gandhi first sought to avoid facing the issue by taking refuge in
two things. He started by saying that to partition India is a moral wrong and a sin to which he will
never be a party. This is a strange argument. India is not the only country faced with the issue of
partition or shifting of frontiers based on natural and historical factors to those based on the
national factors. Poland has been partitioned three times and no one can be sure that there will be
no more partition of Poland. There are very few countries in Europe which have not undergone
partition during the last 150 years. This shows that the partition of a country is neither moral nor
immoral. It is unmoral. It is a social, political or military question. Sin has no place in it.

As a second refuge Mr. Gandhi started by protesting that the Muslim League did not represent the
Muslims and that Pakistan was only a fancy of Mr. Jinnah. It is difficult to understand how Mr.
Gandhi could be so blind as not to see how Mr. Jinnah's influence over the Muslim masses has been
growing day by day and how he has engaged himself in mobilizing all his forces for battle. Never
before was Mr. Jinnah a man for the masses. He distrusted them. 19[f.19] To exclude them from
political power he was always for a high franchise. Mr. Jinnah was never known to be a very
devout, pious or a professing Muslim. Besides kissing the Holy Koran as and when he was sworn
in as an M.L.A., he does not appear to have bothered much about its contents or its special tenets. It
is doubtful if he frequented any mosque either out of curiosity or religious fervour. Mr. Jinnah was
never found in the midst of Muslim mass congregations, religious or political.

Today one finds a complete change in Mr. Jinnah. He has become a man of the masses. He is no
longer above them. He is among them. Now they have raised him above themselves and call him
their Qaid-e-Azam. He has not only become a believer in Islam, but is prepared to die for Islam.
Today, he knows more of Islam than mere Kalama. Today, he goes to the mosque to hear Khutba
and takes delight in joining the Id congregational prayers. Dongri and Null Bazaar once knew Mr.
Jinnah by name. Today they know him by his presence. No Muslim meeting in Bombay begins or
ends without Allah-ho-Akbar and Long Live Qaid-e-Azam. In this Mr. Jinnah has merely followed
King Henry IV of France—the unhappy father-in-law of the English King Charles I. Henry IV was
a Huguenot by faith. But he did not hesitate to attend mass in a Catholic Church in Paris. He
believed that to change his Huguenot faith and go to mass was an easy price to pay for the powerful
support of Paris. As Paris became worth a mass to Henry IV, so have Dongri and Null Bazaar
become worth a mass to Mr. Jinnah and for similar reason. It is strategy ; it is mobilization. But
even if it is viewed as the sinking of Mr. Jinnah from reason to superstition, he is sinking with his
ideology which by his very sinking is spreading into all the different strata of Muslim society and is
becoming part and parcel of its mental make-up. This is as clear as anything could be. The only
basis for Mr. Gandhi's extraordinary view is the existence of what are called Nationalist
Musalmans. It is difficult to see any real difference between the communal Muslims who form the
Muslim League and the Nationalist Muslims. It is extremely doubtful whether the Nationalist
Musalmans have any real community of sentiment, aim and policy with the Congress which marks
them off from the Muslim League. Indeed many Congressmen are alleged to hold the view that
there is no different between the two and that the Nationalist Muslim inside the Congress are only
an outpost of the communal Muslims. This view does not seem to be quite devoid of truth when
one recalls that the late Dr. Ansari, the leader of the Nationalist Musalmans, refused to oppose the
Communal Award although it gave the Muslims separate electorates in teeth of the resolution
passed by the Congress and the Nationalist Musalmans. Nay, so great has been the increase in the
influence of the League among the Musalmans that many Musalmans who were opposed to the
League have been compelled to seek for a place in the League or make peace with it. Anyone who
takes account of the turns and twists of the late Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan and Mr. Faziul Huq, the
late Premier of Bengal, must admit the truth of this fact. Both Sir Sikandar and Mr. Fazlul Huq
were opposed to the formation of branches of the Muslim League in their Provinces when Mr.
Jinnah tried to revive it in 1937. Notwithstanding their opposition, when the branches of the League
were formed in the Punjab and in Bengal within one year both were compelled to join them. It is a
case of those coming to scoff remaining to pray. No more cogent proof seems to be necessary to
prove the victory of the League.

Notwithstanding this Mr. Gandhi instead of negotiating with Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim League
with a view to a settlement, took a different turn. He got the Congress to pass the famous Quit India
Resolution on the 8th August 1942. This Quit India Resolution was primarily a challenge to the
British Government. But it was also an attempt to do away with the intervention of the British
Government in the discussion of the Minority question and thereby securing for the Congress a free
hand to settle it on its own terms and according to its own lights. It was in effect, if not in intention,
an attempt to win independence by bypassing the Muslims and the other minorities. The Quit India
Campaign turned out to be a complete failure.

It was a mad venture and took the most diabolical form. It was a scorch-earth campaign in which
the victims of looting, arson and murder were Indians and the perpetrators were Congressmen.
Beaten, he started a fast for twenty-one days in March 1943 while he was in gaol with the object of
getting out of it. He failed. Thereafter he fell ill. As he was reported to be sinking the British
Government released him for fear that he might die on their hand and bring them ignominy. On
coming out of gaol, he found that he and the Congress had not only missed the bus but had also lost
the road. To retrieve the position and win for the Congress the respect of the British Government as
a premier party in the country which it had lost by reason of the failure of the campaign that
followed up the Quit India Resolution, and the violence which accompanied it, he started
negotiating with the Viceroy. Thwarted in that attempt, Mr. Gandhi turned to Mr. Jinnah. On the
17th July 1944 Mr. Gandhi wrote to Mr. Jinnah expressing his desire to meet him and discuss with
him the communal question. Mr. Jinnah agreed to receive Mr. Gandhi in his house in Bombay.
They met on the 9th September 1944. It was good that at long last wisdom dawned on Mr. Gandhi
and he agreed to see the light which was staring him in the face and which he had so far refused to
see.
The basis of their talks was the offer made by Mr. Rajagopalachariar to Mr. Jinnah in April 1944
which, according to the somewhat incredible 20[f.20] story told by Mr. Rajagopalachariar, was
discussed by him with Mr. Gandhi in March 1943 when he (Mr. Gandhi) was fasting in gaol and to
which Mr. Gandhi had given his full approval. The following is the text of Mr. Rajagopalachariar's
formula popularly spoken of as the C. R. Formula:—

(1) Subject to the terms set out below as regards the constitution for Free India, the Muslim
League endorses the Indian demand for Independence and will co-operate with the Congress in the
formation of a provisional interim government for the transitional period.

(2) After the termination of the war, a commission shall be appointed for demarcating contiguous
districts in the north-west and east of India, wherein the Muslim population is in absolute majority.
In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of all the inhabitants held on the basis of adult suffrage
or other practicable franchise shall ultimately decide the issue of separation from Hindustan. If the
majority decide in favour of forming a sovereign State separate from Hindustan, such decision
shall be given effect to, without prejudice to the right of districts on the border to choose to join
either State.

(3) It will be open to all parties to advocate their points of view before the plebiscite is held.

(4) In the event of separation, mutual agreements shall be entered into for safeguarding defence,
and commerce and communications and for other essential purposes.

(5) Any transfer of population shall only be on an absolutely voluntary basis.

(6) These terms shall be binding only in case of transfer by Britain of full power and responsibility
for the governance of India.

The talks which began on the 9th September were carried on over a period of 18 days till 27th
September when it was announced that the talks had failed. The failure of the talks produced
different reactions in the minds of different people. Some were glad, others were sorry. But as both
had been, just previous to the talks, worsted by their opponents in their struggle for supremacy,
Gandhi by the British and Jinnah by the Unionist Party in the Punjab, and had lost a good deal of
their credit the majority of people expected that they would put forth some constructive effort to
bring about a solution. The failure may have been due to the defects of personalities. But it must
however be said that failure was inevitable having regard to certain fundamental faults in the C. R.
Formula. In the first place, it tied up the communal question with the political question in an
indissoluble knot. No political settlement, no communal settlement, is the strategy on which the
formula proceeds. The formula did not offer a solution. It invited Mr. Jinnah to enter into a deal. It
was a bargain—" If you help us in getting independence, we shall be glad to consider your proposal
for Pakistan. " I don't know from where Mr. Rajagopalachariar got the idea that this was the best
means of getting independence. It is possible that he borrowed it from the old Hindu kings of India
who built up alliance for protecting their independence against foreign enemies by giving their
daughters to neighbouring princes. Mr. Rajagopalachariar forgot that such alliances brought neither
a good husband nor a permanent ally. To make communal settlement depend upon help rendered in
winning freedom is a very unwise way of proceeding in a matter of this kind. It is a way of one
party drawing another party into its net by offering communal privileges as a bait. The C. R.
Formula made communal settlement an article for sale.

The second fault in the C. R. Formula relates to the machinery for giving effect to any agreement
that may be arrived at. The agency suggested in the C. R. Formula is the Provisional Government.
In suggesting this Mr. Rajagopalachariar obviously overlooked two difficulties. The first thing he
overlooked is that once the Provisional Government was established, the promises of the
contracting parties, to use legal phraseology, did not remain concurrent promises. The case became
one of the executed promise against an executory promise. By consenting to the establishment of a
Provisional Government, the League would have executed its promise to help the Congress to win
independence. But the promise of the Congress to bring about Pakistan would remain executory.
Mr. Jinnah who insists, and quite rightly, that the promises should be concurrent could never be
expected to agree to place himself in such a position. The second difficulty which Mr.
Rajagopalachariar has overlooked is what would happen if the Provisional Government failed to
give effect to the Congress part of the agreement. Who is to enforce it ? The Provisional
Government is to be a sovereign government, not subject to superior authority. If it was unwilling
to give effect to the agreement, the only sanction open to the Muslims would be rebellion. To make
the Provisional Government the agency for forging a new Constitution, for bringing about Pakistan,
nobody will accept. It is a snare and not a solution.

The only way of bringing about the constitutional changes will be through an Act of Parliament
embodying provisions agreed upon by the important elements in the national life of British India.
There is no other way.

There is a third fault in the C. R. Formula. It relates to the provision for a treaty between Pakistan
and Hindustan to safeguard what are called matters of common interests such as Defence, Foreign
Affairs, Customs, etc. Here again Mr. Rajagopalachariar does not seem to be aware of obvious
difficulties. How are matters of common interest to be safeguarded? I see only two ways. One is to
have a Central Government vested with Executive and Legislative authority in respect of these
matters. This means Pakistan and Hindustan will not be sovereign States. Will Mr. Jinnah agree to
this ? Obviously he does not. The other way is to make Pakistan and Hindustan sovereign States
and to bind them by a treaty relating to matters of common interests. But what is there to ensure
that the terms of the treaty will be observed ? As a sovereign State Pakistan can always repudiate it
even if it was a Dominion. Mr. Rajagopalachariar obviously drew his inspiration in drafting this
clause from the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1922. But he forgot the fact that the treaty lasted so long as
Ireland was not a Dominion and that as soon as it became a Dominion it repudiated the treaty and
the British Parliament stood silent and grinned, for it knew that it could do nothing.

One does not mind very much that the talks failed. What one feels sorry for is that the talks failed
giving us a clear idea of some of the questions about which Mr. Jinnah has been observing discreet
silence in his public utterances, though he has been quite outspoken about them in his private talks.
These questions are— (1) Is Pakistan to be conceded because of the Resolution of the Muslim
League ? (2) Are the Muslims, as distinguished from the Muslim League, to have no say in the
matter ? (3) What will be the boundaries of Pakistan ? Whether the boundaries will be the present
administrative boundaries of the Punjab and Bengal or whether the boundaries of Pakistan will be
ethnological boundaries ? (4) What do the words " subject to such territorial adjustments as may be
necessary " which occur in the Lahore Resolution mean ? What were the territorial adjustments the
League had in mind ? (5) What does the word " finally " which occurs in the last part of the Lahore
Resolution mean ? Did the League contemplate a transition period in which Pakistan will not be an
independent and sovereign State ? (6) If Mr. Jinnah's proposal that the boundaries of Eastern and
Western Pakistan are to be the present administrative boundaries, will he allow the Scheduled
Castes, or, if I may say so, the non-Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal to determine by a plebiscite
whether they wish to be included in Mr. Jinnah's Pakistan and whether Mr. Jinnah would be
prepared to abide by the results of the plebiscite of the non-Muslim elements in the Punjab and
Bengal ?

(7) Does Mr. Jinnah want a corridor running through U. P. and Bihar to connect up Eastern
Pakistan to Western Pakistan ? It would have been a great gain if straight questions had been put to
Mr. Jinnah and unequivocal answers obtained. But instead of coming to grips with Mr. Jinnah on
these questions, Mr. Gandhi spent his whole time proving that the C. R. Formula is substantially the
same as the League's Lahore Resolution—which was ingenious if not nonsensical and thereby lost
the best opportunity he had of having these questions clarified.

After these talks Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah have retired to their pavilions as players in a cricket
match do after their game is over, as though there is nothing further to be done. There is no
indication whether they will meet again and if so when. What next ? is not a question which seems
to worry them. Yet it is difficult to see how India can make any political advance without a solution
of the question which one may refuse to discuss. It does not belong to that class of questions about
which people can agree to differ. It is a question for which solution will have to be found. How ? It
must be by agreement or by arbitration. If it is to be by agreement, it must be the result of
negotiations—of give and take and not of surrender by one side to the other. That is not agreement.
It is dictation. Good sense may in the end prevail and parties may come to an agreement. But
agreement may turn out to be a very dilatory way. It may take long before good sense prevails.
How long one cannot say. The political freedom of India is a most urgent necessity. It cannot be
postponed and yet without a solution of the communal problem it cannot be hastened. To make it
dependent on agreement is to postpone its solution indefinitely. Another expeditious method must
be found. It seems to me that arbitration by an International Board is the best way out. The disputed
points in the minorities problem including that of Pakistan should be remitted to such a Board. The
Board should be constituted of persons drawn from countries outside the British Empire. Each
statutory minority in India—Muslims, Scheduled Castes, Sikhs, Indian Christians—should be
asked to select its nominee to this Board of Arbitration. These minorities as also the Hindus should
appear before the Board in support of their demands and should agree to abide by the decision
given by the Board. The British should give the following undertakings :—

(1) That they will have nothing to do with the communal settlement. It will be left to agreement or
to a Board of Arbitration.

(2) They will implement the decision of the Board of Arbitration on the communal question by
embodying it in the Government of India Act.

(3) That the award of the International Board of Arbitration would be regarded by them as a
sufficient discharge of their obligations to the minorities in India and would agree to give India
Dominion Status.

The procedure has many advantages. It eliminates the fear of British interference in the communal
settlement which has been offered by the Congress as an excuse for its not being able to settle the
communal problem. It is alleged that, as there is always the possibility of the minorities getting
from the British something more than what the Congress thinks it proper to give, the minorities do
not wish to come to terms with the Congress. The proposal has a second advantage. It removes the
objection of the Congress that by making the constitution subject to the consent of the minorities,
the British Government has placed a veto in the hands, of the minorities over the constitutional
progress of India. It is complained that the minorities can unreasonably withhold their consent or
they can be prevailed upon by the British Government to withhold their consent as the minorities
are suspected by the Congress to be mere tools in the hands of the British Government.
International arbitration removes completely every ground of complaint on this account. There
should be no objection on the part of the minorities. If their demands are fair and just no minority
need have any fear from a Board of International Arbitration. There is nothing unfair in the
requirement of a submission to arbitration. It follows the well known rule of law, namely, that no
man should be allowed to be a judge in his own case. There is no reason to make any exception in
the case of a minority. Like an individual it cannot claim to sit in judgement over its own case.
What about the British Government ? I cannot see any reason why the British Government should
object to any part of this scheme. The Communal Award has brought great odium on the British. It
has been a thankless task and the British should be glad to be relieved of it. On the question of the
discharge of their responsibilities for making adequate provision for the safety and security of
certain communities in respect of which they have regarded themselves as trustees before they
relinquish their sovereignty what more can such communities ask than the implantation in the
constitution of safeguards in terms of the award of an International Board of Arbitration ? There is
only one contingency which may appear to create some difficulty for the British Government in the
matter of enforcing the award of the Board of Arbitration. Such a contingency can arise if any one
of the parties to the dispute is not prepared to submit its case to arbitration.
 In that case the question will be: will the British Government be justified in enforcing the award
against such a party ? I see no difficulty in saying that the British Government can with perfect
justice proceed to enforce the award against such a party. After all what is the status of a party
which refuses to submit its case to arbitration ? The answer is that such a party is an aggressor.
How is an aggressor dealt with ? By subjecting him to sanctions. Implementing the award of the
Board of Arbitration in a constitution against a party which refuses to go to arbitration is simply
another name for the process of applying sanctions against an aggressor. The British Government
need not feel embarrassed in following this process if the contingency should arise. For it is a well
recognized process of dealing with such cases and has the imprimatur of the League of Nations
which evolved this formula when Mussolini refused to submit to arbitration his dispute with
Abyssinia. What I have proposed may not be the answer to the question : What next ? I don't know
what else can be. All I know is that there will be no freedom for India without an answer. It must be
decisive, it must be prompt and it must be satisfactory to the parties concerned.

Contents Appendices

[f.1]Canada—Chapter 1.

[f2]The Political Future of South Africa, 1927.

[f3]The South African Commonwealth, p. 365.

[f.4]On this point, see Report of the Inquiry Committee appointed by the All-India Muslim League
to inquire into Muslim grievances in Congress Provinces popularly known as Pirpur Report. Also
Report of the Bihar Provincial Muslim League to inquire into some grievances of Muslims in Bihar
and the Press Note issued by the Information Officer, Government of Bihar, replying to some of the
allegations contained in these reports published in Amrita Bazar Patrika of 13-3-39.

[f.5]Canada Year Book, 1936.

[f6]South Africa Year Book. 1941.

[f.7]Statesman's Year Book, 1941.

[f.8]That is for the Province of Quebec.

[f.9]Italics not in the original.

[f.10]Quoted by Sir James O'Connor—-History of Ireland, Vol. II, p. 257.

[f.11]History of Ireland, vol. II

[f.12]Italics are mine.

[f.13]Eastern Times (Lahore) of 17th November 1942.

[f.14]Hansard (House of Commons), 1920, Vol. 129, p. 1315. Italics are mine.

[f.15]Those who want more information on the question of transfer of population may consult with
great advantage The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey by Stephen P. Ladas
(Mac), 1932, where the scheme for the transfer of population between Greece and Bulgaria and
Greece and Turkey has been fully set out.
[f16]The text of the resolution is as follows :—

" The A. I. C. C. is of opinion that any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any
component Slate or territorial unit to secede from the Indian Union or Federation will be highly
detrimental to the best interests of the people of the States and Provinces and the country as a whole
and the Congress, therefore, cannot agree to any such proposal."

[f.17]On this point see Life of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson by Major General Sir C.
E.Callwell, Vol. 1., Chapter IX ; also Parliamentary Debates (House of Lords), 1914, Vol. 15, pp.
998-1017, on Ulster and the Army. This shows that the Army had been won over by the Ulsterites
long before the Curragh Incident. It is possible that Mr. Asquith decided in 1913 to bring in an
Amending Bill to exclude Ulster from Home Rule for six years because he had become aware that
the Army had gone over to Ulster and that it could not be used for enforcing Home Rule.

[f.18]See Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 1938-39, Vol. 341, pp. 1987-2107 ; also (Lords)
1936-37, Vol. 106, pp. 599-674.

[f.19]Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in his autobiography says that Mr. Jinnah wanted the Congress to
restrict its membership to matriculates

[f.20]The formula was discussed with Mr. Gandhi in March 1943 but was not communicated to
Mr. Jinnah till April 1944.
PAKISTAN OR THE PARTITION OF INDIA
________________________________________________________________

Contents

APPENDICES

Appendix I : Population of India by Communities

Appendix II : Communal distribution of population by Minorities in the Provinces of British India

Appendix III : Communal distribution of population by Minorities in the States

Appendix IV : Communal distribution of population in the Punjab by Districts

Appendix V : Communal distribution of population in Bengal by Districts

Appendix VI : Communal distribution of population in Assam by Districts

Appendix VII : Proportion of Muslim population in N.-W. F. Province by Districts

APPENDIX I

POPULATION OF INDIA BY COMMUNITIES

Communities British India Indian States and Total

Agencies
1. Hindus 150,890,146 55,227,180 206,117,326
2. Muslims 79,398,503 12,659,593 92.058.096
3. Scheduled Castes 21[f.1] 39,920,807 8.892,373 48,813,180
4. Tribal 16,713,256 8.728,233 25,441,489
5. Sikhs 4,165,097 1,526,350 5,691,447
6. Christians
(i) Indian Christians 1,655,982 1,413,808 3,069,790
(ii) Anglo-Indians 113,936 26,486 140,422
(iii) Others 75,751 7,708 83,459
7. Jains 578,372 870,914 1.449.286
8. Buddhists 167,413 64,590 232,003
9. Parsees 101,968 12,922 114,890
10. Jews 19.327 3,153 22,480
11. Others 371,403 38,474 409,877
Total 294,171,961 89,471,784 383,643,745

NOTE.—The figures for the Scheduled Castes both for British India and Indian States do not give the
correct totals. The figures for Ajmer-Merwara in British India and for Gwalior State are not included in the
totals. The Census Reports for 1940 fail to give these figures.
 APPENDIX II
COMMUNAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY MINORITIES IN THE PROVINCES OF
BRITISH INDIA

Total Muslims Scheduled Castes Indian Sikhs

Christians
Provinces
Population Population % Population % Population % Population %
1. 583,693 89,899 15.4 Nil 3,895 .8 867 .15
Ajmere-Merwara
2. Andaman 33,768 8,005 23.7 Nil 779 2.3 744 2.2
Nicobar
3. Assam 10,204,733 3,442,479 33.7 676,291 6.6 37,750 .4 3,464 .03
4. British 501,631 438,930 87.5 5,102 1.0 2,633 .5 11,918 2.3
Baluchistan
5. Bengal 60,306,525 33,005,434 54.7 7,878,970 13.0 110,923 .2 16,281 .03
6. Bihar* 36,340,151 4,716,314 12.9 4,840,379 13.3 24,693 .07 13,213 .04
7. Bombay 20,849,840 1,920,368 9.2 1,855,148 8.9 338,812 1.6 8,011 .04
8. Central 16,813,584 783,697 4.7 3,051,413 18.1 48,260 .3 14,996 .09
Provinces &
Berar*
9. Coorg 168,726 14,780 8.8 25,740 15.3 3,309 2.0 Nil
10. Delhi 917,939 304,971 33.2 121,693 13.3 10,494 1.1 16,157 1.8
11. Madras 49,341,810 3,896,452 7.9 8,068,492 16.4 2,001,082 4.06 418 .001
12. N.-W.F.P. 3,038,067 2,788,797 91.8 Nil 5,426 .2 57,989 1.9
13. Orissa 8,728,544 146,301 1.7 1,238,171 14.2 26,584 .3 232 .003
14. Punjab 28,418,819 16,217,242 57 1,248,635 4.4 486,038 1.7 3,757,401 13.2
15. Panth Piploda 5,267 251 4.8 918 17.4 216 4.1 Nil
16. Sind 4,229,221 3,054,635 72.2 191,634 4.5 13,232 .3 31,011 .7
17. United 55,020,617 8,416,308 15.3 11,717,158 21.3 131,327 .2 232,445 .4
Provinces @
Total 295,502.935 79,344,863 26.9 40,919,744 13.9 3,245,453 1.0 4,155,147 1.0
* Bihar 28,823,802 4,168,470 14.4 3,919,619 13.6 12,651 .04 3,204 .01
Chota Nagpur 7,516,349 547,844 7.3 420,760 5.6 12,042 .2 10,009 .1
* C.P. 13,208,718 448,528 3.4 2,359,836 17.9 42,135 .3 12,766 .1
Berar 3.604,866 335,169 93 691.577 19.2 6,125 .2 2,230 .05
@ Agra 40,903,147 6,231,062 15-2 8,018,803 19.6 120,549 .3 226,096 .5
Oudh 14,114,470 2,185,246 15.5 3,698,355 26.2 10,778 .08 6,349 .05

APPENDIX III

COMMUNAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION BY MINORITIES

IN INDIAN STATES

States and Total Muslims Scheduled Castes Indian Sikhs

Agencies Population Christians
Population % Population % Population % Population %
1. Assam 725,655 31,662 4.4 265 .04 25913 3.6 381 .05
2. Baluchistan 356,204 346,251 97.2 65 .02 40 .01 126 .04
3. Baroda 2,855,010 223,610 7.8 230,794 8.1 9182 .3 566 .02
4. Bengal 2,144,829 372,113 17.3 269,729 12.6 564 .03 28 .001
5. Central India 7,506,427 439,850 5.9 1,027,009 13.7 7,582 .1 2731 .04
6. Chattisgarh 4,050,000 28,773 0.7 483,132 11.9 11,820 .3 507 .01
7. Cochin 1,422,875 109,188 7.7 141,154 9.9 399,394 28.1 9
8. Deccan 2,785,428 182,036 6.5 306,898 11.0 17,236 .6 22 .001
(and Kolhapur)
9. Gujarat 1,458,702 58,000 3.9 55,204 3-8 4,215 .3 182 .01
10. Gwalior 4,006,159 240,903 6.0 1,352 .03 2,342 .06
11. Hyderabad 16,338,534 2,097,475 12.8 2,928,048 17.9 215,989 1.3 5,330 .03
12. Kashmir and 4,021.616 3,073,540 76.4 113,464 2.8 3,079 .08 65,903 1.6
Feudatories
13. Madras 498,754 30,263 6.0 83,734 16.8 20,806 4.2 5
14. Mysore 7,329,140 485,230 66 1,405,067 19.2 98,580 1.3 269 004
15. N.-W.F.P. 46,267 22,068 47.7 Nil 571 1.2 4,472 9.1
16. Orissa 3,023,731 14,355 0.47 352,088 11.6 2,249 .07 151 .005
17. Punjab 5,503,554 2,251,459 40.9 349,962 6.4 6,952 .1 1,342,685 24.4
18. Punjab Hill 1,090,644 46,678 4.3 238,774 21.9 188 .02 17,739 1-6
19. Rajputana 13,670,208 1,297,841 9.5 4,349 .03 81,896 .6
20. Sikkim 121,520 83 0.07 76 06 34 .03 1
21. Travancore 6.070,018 434,150 7.2 395,952 6.5 1,958,491 32.3 31
22. U.P. 928,470 273,625 29.5 152,927 16-5 1,281 .1 731 .08
23. Western India 4,904,156 600,440 12.2 358,038 7.3 3,105 .06 239 .005
Total 91,810,571 15,733,133 16.59 8,892,373 9.7 2,794,959 3.1 1,526,350 1.7

APPENDIX IV

COMMUNAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN THE PUNJAB BY DISTRICTS

Muslims Scheduled Indian Sikhs Hindus

Castes Christians
Districts Total Population % Population % Population % Population % Population %
Population
1. Hissar 1,006,709 285,208 28.3 128,240 12.7 1,235 .1 60,731 6.0 524,602 52.1
2. Rohtak 956,399 166,569 17.4 135,103 14.1 1,026 .1 1,466 .2 645,371 57.5
3. Gurgaon 851,458 285,992 33.6 119,250 14.0 1,457 .2 637 .07 441,287 51.8
4. Karnal 994,575 304,346 30.6 136,713 13.7 1,223 .1 19,887 2.0 529,588 53.2
5. Ambala 847,745 268,999 31.7 124,006 14.6 4,892 .6 153,543 18.1 288,652 34.0
6. Simla 38,576 7,022 18.2 7,092 18.4 508 1.3 1,032 2.7 22,374 58.-0
7. Kangra 899,377 43,249 4.8 121,622 13.5 590 .07 4,809 .5 725,909 80.7
8. Hoshiyarpur 1,170,323 380,759 32.5 170,855 14.6 6,060 .5 198,194 16.9 413,837 35.4
9. Jullundar 1.127,190 509,804 45.2 154,431 13.7 5,971 .5 298,744 26.5 156,579 13.9
10. Ludhiana . 818,615 302,482 36.9 68,469 8.4 1,632 .2 341,175 41.7 106,246 12.9
11. Ferozpore . 1.423,076 641,448 45.1 73,504 5.1 11,031 .8 479,486 33.7 216,229 15.2
12. Lahore 1,695,375 1,027,772 60.6 32,735 1.9 67,686 4.0 310,648 18.3 252,004 14.9
13. Amritsar 1,413,876 657,695 46.5 22,750 1.6 25,330 1.8 510,845 36.1 194,727 13.8
14. Gurdaspur . 1,153,511 589,923 51.1 45,839 4.0 40,262 4.4 221,251 19.2 244,935 21.2
15. Sialkot 1,190,497 739,218 62.1 65,354 5.5 73,846 6.2 139,409 11.7 165,965 13.9
16. Gujranwalla 912,235 642,706 70.5 7,485 .8 60,380 6.6 99,139 10.9 100,630 11.0
17. Shakhupura 852,508 542,344 63.6 22,438 2.6 59,985 7.0 160,706 18.9 66,744 7.8
18. Gujarat 1,104, 52 945,609 85.6 4,621 .4 4,391 .4 70.233 6.3 80,022 7.2
19. Shahapur 998,921 835,918 83.7 9,693 1.0 12,690 1.3 48.046 4.8 92,479 9.2
20. Jhealam . 629,658 563,033 89.4 771 .1 730 .1 24,680 3.9 40,117 6.4
21. Rawalpindi 785,231 628,193 80.0 4.233 .5 4,212 .5 64,127 8.2 78,245 10.0
22. Attock 675,875 611,128 90.4 1,015 .1 504 .09 20,102 30 42,194 6.2
23. Mianwali . 506,321 436,260 86.2 1,008 .2 324 .06 6,865 1.3 61,806 12.2
24. 1,329,103 918,564 69.1 43,456 3.2 24,101 1.9 175.064 13.2 167,510 12.6
Montgomery
25. Lyallpore 1,396,305 877,518 62.8 68,222 4.9 51,694 3.7 262,737 18.8 135,637 9.7
26. Jhang. 821,631 678,736 82.6 1,943 .2 744 .1 12,238 1.-5 127,946 15.6
27. Multan 1,484,333 1,157,911 78.0 24.530 1.7 13,270 .9 61,628 4.1 225,342 15.2
28. 712,849 616,074 86.4 2,691 .4 218 .03 5.882 .8 87,952 12.3
Muzaffargarh
29.DeraGazi 581,350 512,678 88.1 1,059 .2 46 .01 1.072 .2 66,348 114
Khan
30.Transfrontier 40,246 40,084 99.6 Nil Nil 2 160 .4
Tract
Total . 28.418,820 16,217,242 57.1 1,592,320 5.6 486,038 1.7 3,757,401 13.2 6,301,737 22.2

APPENDIX V

COMMUNAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN BENGAL BY DISTRICTS

Muslims Scheduled Castes Hindus Indian

Christians
Districts Total Population % Population % Population % Population %
Population
1. Burdwan 1,890,732 336,665 17.8 430,300 22.8 963,520 51.0 3,280 .2
2. Birbhum 1,048,317 287,310 27.4 280,254. 26.7 406,182 38.8 344 .03
3. Banknra 1,289,640 55,564 4.3 355,290 97.5 723,269 56.1 1,216 .1
4.Midnapore 3,190,647 246,559 7.7 339,066 10.6 2.342,897 73.4 3,834 .1
5.Hooghly 1,377,729 207,077 15.0 245,810 17.8 853.734 61.9 543 .04
6. Howrah 1490,304 296,325 19.9 184,318 12.4 1,000,548 67.1 994 .06
7. 24-Parganas 3,536,386 1,148,180 32.5 743,397 21.0 1.566,599 44.3 20,823 .6
8. Calcutta 2,108,891 497,535 23.6 55,228 2.6 1,476,284 70.0 16,431 .8
9. Nadia 1,759,846 1,078,007 61.3 143,682 8.2 514,268 29.2 10,749 .6
10. Murshidabad 1,640,530 927,747 56.6 167,184 10.2 517,803 31.6 394 .02
11. Khulna 1,943,218 959,172 49.4 470,550 24.2 507,143 26.1 3,538 .2
12. Rajashahi 1,571,750 1,173.285 74.6 75,650 4.8 253,580 16.1 1,166 .07
13. Dinajpur 1,926,833 967,246 50.2 399,410 20.7 375,212 19.5 1,448 .07
14. Jalpaiguri 1,089,513 251,460 23.4 325,504 29.9 226,143 20.8 2,589 .2
376,369 9,125 28,922 149,574 39.7
15. Darjeeling 2,877,847 2,055,186 2.4 495,462 7.7 307,387 10.7 2,599 .7
1,260.463 1,057,902 61,303 126,229 10.0
16. Rangpur 71.4 17.2 389 .01
83.9
17. Bogra 4.9 286 .02
18. Pabna 1705,072 1,313,968 77.1 114,738 6.7 269,017 15.8 285 .02
19. Malda . 1,232,618 699,945 56.7 75,535 6.1 390,143 31.6 466 .04
20. Dacca 4,222,143 2,841,261 67.3 409,905 9.7 950,227 22.5 15,846 .4
21. Myrnensiagh 6,023,758 4,664.548 77.4 340,676 5.7 955,962 15.9 2,322 .04
2,888,803 1,871,336 64.4 527,496 478,742 16.6
22. Faridpur 3,549,010 2,567,027 72.3 427,667 18.3 480,962 13.6 9,549 .3
3,860,139 2,975,901 77.1 227,643 12.1 652,318 16.9
23. Bakargunj 2,217,402 1,803,937 81.3 81,817 330.494 14.9 9,357 .2
5.9
24. Tippera 428 .01
3.7
25. Naokhali 535 .02
26, Chittagong 2,153,296 1,605,183 74.5 57,024 2.6 401,050 18.6 395 .02
247,053 7,270
27. Chittagong 2.9 283 .1 4,598 1.9 60 .02
Hill Tracts .

28. Jessore 1,828,216 1,100,713 60.2 314,856 17.2 406,223 22.2 1057 .06
Total 60,306,525 33,005,434 54.7 7,378,.970 12.2 17,630,054 29.3 110,923 .2

APPENDIX VI

COMMUNAL DISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION IN ASSAM BY DISTRICTS

Muslims Scheduled Indian Sikhs Hindus

Castes Christians
Districts Total Population % Population % Population % Population % Population %
Population
Surma
Valley
1. 641,181 232,950 36.3 51,961 8.1 3,744 .6 --- --- 173,855 27.1
Kachahar
2. Sylhet 3,116,602 1,892,117 60.7 364,510 11.7 2,590 .08 --- --- 785,004 25.2
3. Khasi 118,665 1,555 1.3 63 .05 120 .1 --- --- 12,676 10.7
and Jantia
Hills
4. Naga 189,641 531 .2 45 .02 9 --- --- 4,153 2.2
Hills
5. Lushai 152,786 101 .06 22 .01 Nil --- --- 2,425 1.6
Hills
Assam --- ---
Valley
6. Goalpara 1,014,285 468,924 46.2 23,434 2.3 269 .03 --- --- 282,789 27.9
7. Kamrup 1,264,200 361,522 391 59,092 4.7 1,038 .08 --- --- 637,457 50.4
8. Darang 736,791 120,995 16.4 19.475 2.6 6,367 .8 --- --- 328,283 44.6
9. 710,800 250,113 35.2 59,214 8.3 4,049 .6 --- --- 229,137 32.2
Nowgong
10. 1.074.741 51.769 4.8 50,184 4.7 15,268 1.4 --- --- 593,007 55.2
Sibsagar
11. 894,842 44.579 5.0 43,527 4.9 .3,786 .4 --- --- 457,509 51.1
Lakmipur
12. Garo 233,569 10,398 4.5 789 .3 1 --- --- 13,518 5.8
Hills
13. Sadiya 60,118 864 1.4 3,991 6.6 486 .8 --- --- 14.605 24.3
Frontier
Tract
14. 6,512 61 .9 74 1.1 23 .4 --- --- 2.514 38.6
Balipara
Frontier
Tract
Total 10.204,733 3,442,479 33.7 676,291 6.6 37,750 .4 3,464 .03 3,536,932 34.6

APPENDIX VII

N.-W. F. PROVINCE PROPORTION OF MUSLIM POPULATION BY DISTRICTS

Districts Total Total Muslim P. C. of Muslim Total P. C. of

Population Population Population to Non-Muslim Non-Muslim to
Total Population Total
Hazara 796,230 756,004 94.9 40,226 5.1
Mardan 506,539 483,575 965 22,964 4.5
Peshawar . 851,833 769,589 90.4 82,244 9.6
Kohat 289,404 266,224 92.0 23,180 8.0
Bannu 295,930 257,648 871 38,282 12.9
D.I. Khan. 298,131 255,757 85.8 42,374 14.2

Contents Continued…

[f.1]This is a statutory designation given to the untouchables by the Government of India Act, 1935.