l\epublic of tbe ~Uilippines

i,upreme lourt
;§lRnniln

FIRST DIVISION

JORGE E. AURO, represented G.R. No. 246674

by his heirs, JOMAR 0. AURO
Present:
and MARJORIE 0. AURO-
GONZALES, PERALTA, CJ., Chairperson,
Petitioners, CAGUIOA,
REYES, J. JR.,
LAZARO-JAVIER, and
- versus - LOPEZ, JJ.

JOHANNA A. YASIS,
represented by ACHILLES A. Promulgated:
YASIS,
Respondent. JUN 3 0 2020
x --------------------------------------------- -------------------------- --------- --------x

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari' under Rule 45 of

the Rules of Court are the Decision2 dated September 27, 2018 and the
Resolution3 dated March 15, 2019, both promulgated by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 155932 entitled, "Jorge E. Auro v.
Honorable Presiding Judge of Branch 41, RTC Daet, Johanna A. Yasis
represented by Achilles A. Yasis, and People ofthe Philippines."

The facts, as established by the evidence presented by the paiiies, are

as follows :

Rollo, pp. 3- 15.

Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate Justices Myra V. Garcia-
Fernandez and Ronaldo Roberto 8. Martin, concurring; id. at 19-26.
ld. at 28-29.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 246674

Petitioner Jorge E. Auro (Jorge) was charged with the crime of

falsification of public document, as defined and penalized under Article
172,4 in relation to Article 171 5 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Mercedes, Camarines Norte. The
accusatory portion of the Information reads as follows:

That on or about January 7, 2005 at Brgy. Del Rosario,

[M]unicipality of Mercedes, [P]rovince of Carnarines Norte, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to
attain a common purpose, being then private individuals, did, then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale, a public document, by making it appear that private
complainant JOHANNA A. YASIS, participated in the said Deed of
Absolute Sale as vendor and by affixing her signature as such, that is,
accused made it appear that complainant sold her 2.5000 hectares fishpond
situated in Brgy. Del Rosario, Mercedes, Camarines Norte, where in truth
and in fact said complainant never participated in the preparation,
execution or signing thereof, as she was actually residing in the United
States of America and has never returned to the Philippines on that
particular year (2005), and as a direct consequence thereof, the tax
declaration of the complainant was cancelled and in lieu thereof a new
declaration was issued in favor of the accused Jorge E. Auro, to the great
damage and prejudice of the private complainant.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 6

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use offalsified documents. - The penalty of
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than [PS,000.00]
shall be imposed upon:
I. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next
preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of
commercial document; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall
in any private document comm it any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding
article.
Art. 171. Falsification ofpublic officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty
of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed [PS ,000.00] shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by
committing any of the following acts:
I. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not
in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than
those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated fonn a document purporting to be a copy of an original document
when no such original exists, or including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different
from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Jntercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official book.
Rollo, p. 20.
Decision 3 G.R. No. 246674

Ruling of the MTC

In its Decision dated June 21, 2017, the MTC found Jorge guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Falsification of Public Document
and imposed the penalty of imprisonment of four months and one day of
arresto mayor as minimum to three years, six months and 21 days of prision
correccional as maximum, and to pay a fine of Pl,000.00. Co-accused Fred
C01nelio was acquitted by the lower court for failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. With his motion for reconsideration
denied by the lower court, Jorge filed his appeal before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC).

Ruling of the RTC

Finding that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to

prove the genuineness or falsity of the questioned signature on the subject
Deed of Sale, the RTC, on January 31, 2018, rendered a Decision, the
dispositive portimJ of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing considerations, judgment is

hereby rendered by:

a) setting aside the Judgment appealed from and a new one is

entered acquitting the accused-appellant of the crime; and

b) ordering the cancellation of the tax declaration issued in favor of

the accused-appellant by virtue of the subject deed (Exhibit "D").
7
SO ORDERED.

The RTC acquitted Jorge, but ordered the cancellation of the tax
declaration issued in his name by virtue of the alleged Deed of Sale. It ruled
that the while it was established that the notary public who notarized the said
Deed of Sale had no
existing n0tarial commission, the prosecution failed to
present a handwriting expert to prove the genuineness or falsity of the
questioned signature of respondent Johanna A. Yasis (Johanna) in the said
Deed of Sale. The RTC opined that an individual could have several ways of
affixing his/her signature. Applying the equipoise rule, the trial court ruled
that the acquittal of Jorge is warranted.

However, the lower court t1:eated the Deed of Sale as a mere private
document that is not registrqblc, thus. the cancellation of the tax declaration
is justified.

ld. at 19-20.
Decision 4 G.R. No. 246674

Not contented with the ruling of the trial court, Jorge seasonably filed
his appeal with the CA .. During the pendency of his appeal, he died and was
substituted by herein petitioners as his lawful heirs.

Ruling of the CA

On September 27, 2018, the CA issued the now appealed Decision

denying petitioners' appeal, and affinning the ruling of the trial court.

The CA notes that Jorge was not acquitted because there was no
evidence against him, but by reason that the evidence for the prosecution and
the defense were so evenly balanced as to call for the tilting of the scales in
favor of Jorge. It does not necessarily mean that he did not commit the
felony charged.

The appellate comi pointed out that the cancellation of the tax
declaration was related to the felony charged against him because the said
tax declaration would not have been issued in Jorge's name without the
alleged Deed of Sale executed in his favor. Since the Deed of Sale was
defective, it cannot possibly give rise to a change of ownership in the tax
declaration in favor of Jorge. ·

The CA agreed with the findings of the RTC that while there is doubt
on whether or not the signature of respondent Johanna A. Yasis (Johanna) in
the alleged Deed of Sale was falsified, it is already established that Atty.
David S. Efiano, Jr. (~tty. Efiano), who signed the notarial part, was not a
commissioned notary officer in Quezon City or anywhere else in the
Philippines in 2005. Furthermore, while the said Deed of Sale was allegedly
notarized on January 7, 2005," the purported proof of identification from
Johanna in the form of a Community Tax Certificate was issued only on
January 27, 2005. Further still, Johanna had claimed that she was residing in
the United States of America at the time the alleged Deed of Sale was
executed, thus, making it impossible that she was present during the time
that the same was notarized before Atty. Efiano. Given that the alleged Deed
of Sale was not validly notarized, it shall be treated as a mere private
document that cannot be registered and give rise to a transfer of ownership,
and, moreover, it cannot be a cause for the issuance of a corresponding tax
declaration in favor of Jorge.

Therefore, on the basis of Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code

(RPC), and as a consequence of the finding that the enabling document
which gave rise to the erroneous issuance of the tax declaration in favor of
Jorge was defective, the appellate court deemed it just that the said tax
Decision 5 G .R. No. 246674

declaration be cancelled as a form of restitution and Johanna be placed in the

condition as she was before she had been defrauded.

Hence, this Petition.

The Issue

Petitioners posit the sole assignment of error: "[t]hat the lower court
and the CA committed serious error of law in ordering the cancellation of
the tax decla1~ation of the petitioner over the subject property as part of its
adjudication in the civil aspect of a criminal case for falsification of a public
document, such cancellation being a totally different issue should be
8
threshed out in a separate proceeding."

The Courfs Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

The civil action for the recovery of

civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action

As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error

proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a
criminal case; The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final
and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the
9
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. Section 21 ,
Article III of the Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar
to another prosecution for the same act."

Be as it may, either party may appeal the civil aspect of the decision,
10
separate from the judgment of acquittal of the defendant. This is because
our jurisdiction recognizes that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense is
11
deemed instituted as well.

Rollo, p. 8.
9
Peopie v. Cou/'f ofAppi al~·. 75'-i Phil. 80, 97(2015).
10
Id. at 98
II
REVISED R:JLES ON CRJMIN/'.L PROCr.:DURE, Rule 111 , Sec. !(a).
Decision 6 G.R. No. 246674

In this case, it is Jorge himself, who appealed the civil liability

imposed upon him arising from the same act or omission that is the subject
of the instant criminal case. Petitioners cannot now, in its appeal, raise into
issue the alleged error of the trial court regarding Jorge's civil liability in the
criminal case instituted against him and at the same time, deny that the said
civil action was ever deemed to be instituted with the criminal action.

In any case, the reservation of the right to institute separately the civil
action should have been made before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation. 12 Failing to do so, the civil action ex
delicto shall automatically be deemed to be instituted with the present
criminal action.

Civil liability of an accused may

consist of more than an award of
damages in favor of the offended
party

Petitioners begrudge the RTC's order, which cancelled the tax

declaration issued in the name of Jorge by reason that the alleged Deed of
Sale was a mere private document that is not registrable. They argue that
there is no basis for the award of civil indemnity in favor of Johanna since
the act of falsification was not proven by the prosecution. Even assuming
arguendo that Jorge had been convicted, the civil aspect would merely
pertain to the actual,· moral, exemplary damages and/or loss of earning
capacity that may be due to the offended party.

We disagree.

Under Article 104 of the RPC, civil liability includes: 1) restitution;

2) reparation of the. damage caused; and 3) indemnification• of the
consequential damages. Restitution means the return or the restoration of a
thing or condition back to its original status, wherever or whatever it may be.
Unlike indemnification, as when the court orders the offender to pay for
damages for the loss incurred by the offended party, in restitution, the
offender is forced to give up the thing or condition that he/she had gained
back to the situation before he/she became the owner/possessor of the thing
or benefited frorn the condition that had already occuned or happened.

Restitutioi-i c,f the thing or the subject matter of the action ·instituted
must be made whenever possible, with allowance for any deterioration, or

12
Id.
 Decision 7 G.R. No. 246674

diminution of value, as determined by the comi. 13 F~rth~rmore, even though

the thing may be found in the possession of third parties, who acquired it by
lawful means, it may be recovered and its possession may be restored to its
original owner or possessor, as the case may be. 14

Acquittal of accused in a criminal

case for failure of the prosecution to
prove his/her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt does not automatically preclude .
a judgment against him/her on the
civil aspect ofthe case

Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to
be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended
parties, including the State, which have been wronged, must be equally
considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial of
justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for, to the
society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean injustice. Justice
then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one hand, and
the State and the offended party, on the other. 15

This Comt had the occasion to rule that if the acquittal of the accused
of the felony or crime charged against him/her is based on reasonable doubt,
he/she is not automatically exempt from civil liability, which may be proved
by preponderance of evidence only. In this regard, preponderance of
evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater
weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
Preponderance of ev1dence is evidence which is more convincing to the
comt as worthy o·f belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. 16

This distinction between civil and criminal proceedings is in accord

with the essential principle in law that while a crim.inal liability carries with
it a corresponding civil liability, they are neve1iheless separate and distinct.
In other words, these two liabilities may co-exist, but their existence is not
1-
dependent on each other. '

This is supp01ied by the Rules of Court, which provides that the

extinction 0f the crimina.1 action does not result in the extinction of the

13
REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. l 0:.
14
Id.
15
Macapagal-Arroyo ''· People, 808 r,hil. I IJ42, 1079- I 080 (20 17).
16
Castillo v. Salvador, 740 Phil. 11.5, 12? (2014), citing Encinas i'.. National Books!ore,· lnc., 485
Phil. .68] , 695 (2004).
17
Dy V. reople. 792 Phil. 672,682 (2016).
Decision 8 G.R. No. 246674

corresponding civil _action. 18 Consistent with this, the Rules require that in
judgments of acquittal, the court must state whether "the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely
19
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The latter may only be
extinguished when there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
• 20
not exist.

In this case, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC regarding the
existence of Jorge's civil liability in the criminal case charged against him,
despite the fact that he was acquitted to the same, to wit:

At the outset, the Court notes that [Jorge] was acquitted not
because there was no evidence against [Jorge], but because the evidence of
the prosecution and the defense were so evenly balanced as to call for the
tilting of the scales in
favor of [Jorge]. Hence, while the R TC did acquit
[Jorge] , it did not necessarily mean that he did not commit the felony
charged. The RTC only granted him the benefit of doubt under the
equipoise doctrine. In other words, the evidence that [Jorge] committed
falsification failed to hurdle the test or standard of proof beyond
21
reasonable doubt.

Thus, while the trial court had ruled that the prosecution had failed to
prove Jorge's guilt beyond reasonable doubt to the felony of falsification, it
(prosecution) had nevertheless presented sufficient preponderance of
evidence to establish the invalidity of the tax declaration issued in his name.

It is undisputed that the Deed of Sale was not validly notarized by an

existing notary public in Quezon City or anywhere in the Philippines in
2005. Well-settled is the rule that deeds, conveyances, encumbrances,
discharges, and other voluntary instruments, whether affecting registered or
22
unregistered lands, should be notarized in order to be registrable. Since the
enabling document, i.e., the Deed of Sale was not validly notarized, it
remains to be a private· document that could not affect or cause the transfer
of ownership of the tax declaration to the name of Jorge. Contrary to
petitioners' contention, the cancellation of the tax declaration is a necessary
and direct consequence of the finding that the unnotarized Deed of Sale
cannot give rise to any transfer of ownership to Jorge. Petitioners cannot
have its cake and eat it too.

18
REVISED RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Rule l 11 , Sec. 2.
19
Id., Rule 120, Sec._2.
20
Dy v. People. supra note 17, at 683.
21
Rollo, p. 24 .
22
Presidential Decree No. I 529, Sec. I 12.
I \ I <

Decision 9 G.R. No. 246674

Finally, petitioners bewail that they were not afforded due process and
were not presented an opportunity to present their evidence to the contrary.
Case law states that the touchstone of due process is the opportunity to be
heard. 23 "To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in comi; one
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of
24
procedural due process.

In conclusion, while the evidence presented does not establish the fact
of the crime with moral certainty, the civil action still prevails for as long as
the greater weight of evidence tilts in favor of a finding of liability. This
means that while the mind of the comi cannot rest easy in penalizing the
accused for the commission of the crime, it nevertheless finds that he/she
committed or omitted to perform acts which serve as a separate source of
. · 25
o bl1gatton.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is

DENIED due to lack of merit. The Decision dated September 27, 2018 and
the Resolution dated March 15, 2019 issued by the Comi of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 155932 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

L41/
SE C. MYES, JR.
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO . PERALTA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ZJ Cam be v. Office of Lhe Ombudsman, 802 Phil. J 90, 230(2016).

24 Vivo v. Philippine Amusemenl and Gaming Corporal ion, 721 Phil. 34, 43 (2013).
25
Dyv. People, supra note 17, at 685.
Decision 10 G.R. No. 246674

U/_·
AM ~~0-JAVIER
'Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.

.PERALTA