EN BANC
 
REVEREND FATHER ROBERT G. R. No. 182161
P. REYES,
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
COURT OF APPEALS, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
SECRETARY RAUL M. BRION,
GONZALEZ, IN HIS PERALTA,
CAPACITY AS THE BERSAMIN,
SECRETARY OF THE DEL CASTILLO,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ABAD, and
AND COMMISSIONER VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, IN
HIS CAPACITY AS THE Promulgated:
COMMISSIONER OF THE
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, December 3, 2009
Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 
DECISION
 
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
 
For resolution is the petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the February 4, 2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. No. 00011 which dismissed the petition for the issuance of the writ
of amparo under A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, as amended. It also assails the CAs
Resolution dated March 25, 2008, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid February 4, 2008 Decision.
 
The undisputed facts as found by the CA are as follows:
 
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege
on November 30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together
with fifty (50) others, were brought toCamp Crame to await inquest
proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz
and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or
not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges
of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.
 
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold
Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of
Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the
aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.
 
On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and
36 others for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.
 
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance
asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific
participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the
determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge.
 
On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge
for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. The trial
court ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors failed to show that petitioner and the other accused-civilians
conspired and confederated with the accused-soldiers in taking arms against the
government; that petitioner and other accused-civilians were arrested because
they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to come out
from the 2nd Floor of the Hotel and submit themselves to the police authorities;
that mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing ones sentiments on
electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators absent concrete
evidence that the accused-civilians knew beforehand the intent of the accused-
soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation which the law penalizes
must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.
  
On December 18, 2007, petitioners counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez
wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.
 
On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioners letter stating that
the DOJ could not act on petitioners request until Atty. Chavezs right to represent
petitioner is settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista
representing himself as counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ.
 
On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that
despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still
subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the
NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for
the timely intervention of petitioners counsel, petitioner would not have been able
to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner
was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner
would present himself at the NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to be detained
and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion of his name
in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his
request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that
immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent
as the continued restraint on petitioners right to travel is illegal.
 
On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed the Return of the Writ raising the following
affirmative defenses: 1) that the Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Hold
Departure Orders under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of 1998 [2] and No. 18
Series of 2007[3] pursuant to his mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987
as ahead of the principal law agency of the government; 2) that HDO No. 45
dated December 1, 2007 was issued by the Sec. Gonzales in the course of the
preliminary investigation of the case against herein petitioner upon the request of
the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public
respondents pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 filed by
the respondents of the Order dated December 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing
Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO
No. 45 before the DOJ; and 5) that the constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and
18 can not be attacked collaterally in an amparo proceeding.
 
During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of
the Court of Appeals, counsels for both parties appeared. Petitioners counsel Atty.
Francisco Chavez manifested that petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every
time petitioner would leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at
the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes because of the existing
HDO; that the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis; and
 that petitioner did not file a motion to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ
because to do so would be tantamount to recognizing the power of the DOJ
Secretary to issue HDO.
 
For respondents part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG)
maintained that the Secretary of the DOJs power to issue HDO springs from its
mandate under the Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute offenders as
the principal law agency of the government; that in its ten-year existence, the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17 has not been challenged except now; and
that on January 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors had filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of Dismissal of the trial court.
 
On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a
copy of the Order dated January 31, 2008 of the trial court denying respondent
DOJs Motion for Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The trial court also
observed that the said Motion should be dismissed outright for being filed out of
time. [4]

 
The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents
violated petitioners constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ
Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject
HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been
dismissed.
 
On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the
petition and denying the privilege of the writ of amparo.
 
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[5] thereon was also denied in the
assailed Resolution[6] dated March 25, 2008.
 
Hence, the present petition which is based on the following grounds:
 
I.
 
THE DOJ SECRETARYS ARROGATION OF POWER AND
USURPATION OF AUTHORITY TO ISSUE A HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER
CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED THROUGH A RATIONALE THAT IT HAS
SUPPOSEDLY BEEN REGULARLY EXERCISED IN THE PAST OR HAS
NEVER BEEN QUESTIONED (IN THE PAST).
 
 
 II.
 
THE DOJ HAS CLAIMED A POWER TO ISSUE AN HDO
INDEPENDENT OF THAT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, HENCE,
PETITIONER CANNOT MERELY RELY ON THE RESIDUAL POWER OF
THE RTC MAKATI IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 07-3126 TO ASSAIL SUCH
CLAIMED POWER.
 
III.
 
THE UTMOST EXIGENCY OF THE PETITION IS EXEMPLIFIED BY
THE CONTINUING ACTUAL RESTRAINT ON PETITIONERS RIGHT TO
TRAVEL THROUGH THEMAINTENANCE OF HIS NAME IN THE HDO
LIST AND DOES NOT SIMPLY HINGE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER
OR NOT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL DESPITE SUCH A
RESTRAINT.
 
IV.
 
DOJ CIRCULAR 17 SERIES OF 1998 PROVIDES NO STATUTORY
BASIS FOR THE DOJ SECRETARYS CLAIMED POWER TO ISSUE AN
HDO FOR IT IS NOT A STATUTE.THE CIRCULAR ITSELF APPEARS NOT
TO BE BASED ON ANY STATUTE, HENCE, IT DOES NOT HAVE THE
FORCE OF LAW AND NEED NOT BE ATTACKED IN A DIRECT
PROCEEDING.[7]
 
Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply
to situations of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses
the whole gamut of liberties protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that
[liberty] includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal
restraint or servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his
faculties in all lawful ways. Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution is the right of a person to travel.
 
In their Comment,[8] both respondents Secretary Gonzalez and
Commissioner Libanan argue that: 1) HDO No. 45 was validly issued by the
Secretary of Justice in accordance with Department of Justice Circular No. 17,
Series of 1998,[9] and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007,[10] which were issued
pursuant to said Secretarys mandate under the Administrative Code of 1987, as
head of the principal law agency of the government, to investigate the commission
of crimes, prosecute offenders, and provide immigration regulatory services; and;
2) the issue of the constitutionality of the DOJ Secretarys authority to issue hold
departure orders under DOJ Circulars Nos. 17 and 18 is not within the ambit of a
writ of amparo.
 
The case hinges on the issue as to whether or not petitioners right to liberty
has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the subject HDO,
which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.
 
The petition must fail.
 
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
 
SECTION 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or of a private individual or entity.
 
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.
 
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[11] made a
categorical pronouncement that the Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to
these two instances of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats
thereof, thus:
 
x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form,
is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are
killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or
judicial proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by
the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a
government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the
direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to
acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.[12]
 

In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[13] the Court laid down the basic principle regarding
the rule on the writ of amparo as follows:
  
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as
a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or
threats to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and
independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as
a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns
that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on
amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo in line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable
certainty that its issuance demands requires that every petition for the issuance of
the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
 
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
 
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or
uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
 
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of
the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the
attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
 
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority or
individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation,
together with any report;
 
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity
of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
 
(f) The relief prayed for.
 
The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable
reliefs.[14]
 
The writ shall issue if the Court is preliminarily satisfied with the prima
facie existence of the ultimate facts determinable from the supporting affidavits
that detail the circumstances of how and to what extent a threat to or violation of
the rights to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party was or is being
committed. (Emphasis supplied)
 
Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for
the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection
covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual
restraint on his right to travel. The Court is thus called upon to rule whether or not
the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
 
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under
Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty;
and (3) right to security.
 
In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[15] the Court
explained the concept of right to life in this wise:
 
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially
the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality
of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is not a life lived in fear
that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful
ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the government he
established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property.
The ideal of security in life and property pervades the whole history of man. It
touches every aspect of mans existence. In a broad sense, the right to security of
person emanates in a persons legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his
limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and
the right to enjoyment of life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a
deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment
of life according to the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.
[16]

 
The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et
al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.,[17] in this manner:
 
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm
to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy
the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such
restraint as are necessary for the common welfare. x x x
 
Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.[18] thoroughly
expounded on the import of the right to security, thus:
 
 A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various
permutations of the exercise of this right.
 
First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas
clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) enunciates that a
world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of
the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars postulate that freedom
from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but essentially an individual
international human right. It is the right to security of person as the word security
itself means freedom from fear. Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of
person.
xxx
 
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
 
In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the
right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction;threat is a stimulus, a cause of
action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to well-
founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person
to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of
character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is
more correct to say that the right to security is actually thefreedom from
threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part
of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security
mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
 
Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched or
invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or
invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical disabilities, and
painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger
to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a
crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or
security of a person.
 
xxx
 
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of
ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right
is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
 Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under
Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a
corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights
under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the
chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to
life, liberty and security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not
afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to
the bar of justice. x x x (emphasis supplied) [19]
The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.
 As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,[21] xxx a persons right to travel
[20]

is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding

the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to
leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound
discretion. [22]
 
Here, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the
pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has
also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the
extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and
security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
 
In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I XIII, Inc. et al.,[23] this
Court ruled that:
 
This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court
is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is
his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or
effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the
Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by
the writ.
 
We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the
provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:
 
Section 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. When a criminal action
has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs
under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.
  
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs
available under the writ of amparo.
 
Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with
the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-
3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJs
HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was
not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, and that it is his
intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to question
before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue
an HDO.[24] We quote with approval the CAs ruling on this matter:
 
The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of
its pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul[25] that once a complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation
rests on the sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondents MR of
the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over
Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its
residual power, the court a quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the
instant case to the exclusion of even this Court.The relief petitioner seeks which is
the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the criminal case. (Sec.
22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).[26]
 
Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority
to separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated
in Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[27] thus:
 
Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly
with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we
see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the
absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or
securitythe personal concern that the writ is intended to protectis immediately
in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal
bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by
motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the
provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.
 
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to
his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.[28] Petitioners
apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear
threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The
absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion
to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998
(Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure
Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations
Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other
Purposes).
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the
CA dated February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
 Penned by Associate Justice Portia Alino-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Angelita R. Lontok and Marlene
Gonzales-Sison concurring; rollo, pp. 33-45.
[2]
 Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders.
[3]
 Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for other
purposes.
[4]
 Rollo, pp. 34-38.
[5]
 Id. at 53-68.
[6]
 Id. at 48-52.
[7]
 Id. at 10-11.
[8]
 Rollo, pp. 235-254.
[9]
 Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders.
[10]
 Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for other
purposes.
[11]
 G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008, 568 SCRA 1, 38-39.
[12]
 Citing the Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 48. This is the definition used in the Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.
[13]
 G.R. No. 182484, June 17, 2008, 554 SCRA 768, 784-785.
[14]
 Citing Section 5 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
[15]
 Supra note 11 at 52.
[16]
 Id.
[17]
 G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 308, 336.
[18]
 Supra note 11 at 52-57.
[19]
 Id. at 50-59.
[20]
 Mirasol, et al. v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 318,
353.
[21]
 G.R. Nos. 115132-34, August 9, 1995, 247 SCRA 127.
[22]
 Id. at 141-142.
[23]
 G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008, 554 SCRA 208, 211-212.
[24]
 CA Decision, rollo, pp. 9-10.
[25]
 G.R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 462.
[26]
 Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[27]
 Supra note 13 at 789.
[28]
 Rollo, p. 43.