G.R. NO. 186269 FEBRUARY 2012 (SPOUSES PASCUAL ET. AL.

V SPOUSES BALLESTEROS)

Who are the petitioners of this case?

This case is filed by the spouses Roman A. Pascual and Mercedita Pascual (Spouses Pascual),
Francisco A. Pascual, Margarita Corazon D. Mariano, Edwin D. Mariano, and Danny R. Mariano.
2
Who are the respondents of this case?
Antonio Ballesteros and Lorenza Melchor-Ballesteros (Ballesteros Spouses)
3
What was the case all about?
The instant case involves a 1,539 square meter parcel of land (subject property) situated in
Barangay Sta. Maria, Laoag Cityand covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
30375[3] of the Laoag City registry
4
Who are the owner of this parcel of land and their corresponding shares?
The subject property is owned by the following persons, with the extent of their respective
shares over the same: (1) the spouses Albino and Margarita Corazon Mariano, 330 square
meters; (2) Angela Melchor (Angela), 466.5 square meters; and (3) the spouses Melecio and
Victoria Melchor (Spouses Melchor), 796.5 square meters.
5
Who inherited the Melchor's share upon the death of the spouses Melchor?
The property was inherited by their daughter - Lorenza Melchor Ballesteros.
6
How did Lorenza and her husband Antonio acquire Angela's share?
By virtue of an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale.
7
To whom did Margarita, together with her children, sell the property when she become widow?
Spouses Pascual and Francisco
8
What was the claim of the petitioners?
They claim that there's no co-ownership over the subject property considering the shares of
the registered owners. Hence the respondents have no right to redeem the portion of the
subject property that was sold to them.
9
What was the decision of RTC?
RTC dismissed the petition.
10
What was the RTC's summary for the issues raised?
(1) whether the respondents herein and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are
co-owners of the subject property who have the right of redemption under Article 1620 of the
Civil Code; and (2) if so, whether that right was seasonably exercised by the respondents
within the 30-day redemption period under Article 1623 of the Civil Code.
11
What was the ruling of RTC on the first issue raised?
The RTC held that the respondents and the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners are
co-owners of the subject property considering that the petitioners failed to adduce any
evidence showing that the respective shares of each of the registered owners thereof were
indeed particularized, specified and subdivided.
12
What was the ruling of RTC on the second issue raised?
The RTC ruled that the respondents failed to seasonably exercise their right of redemption
within the 30-day period pursuant to Article 1623 of the Civil Code. Notwithstanding the
lack of a written notice of the sale of a portion of the subject property to Spouses Pascual
and Francisco, the RTC asserted that the respondents had actual notice of the said sale.
Failing to exercise their right of redemption within 30 days from actual notice of the said
sale, the RTC opined that the respondents can no longer seek for the redemption of the
property as against the petitioners.
13
What was the ruling of RTC?
The appeal of the respondents was GRANTED and the appealed January 31, 2007 Decision is,
accordingly, REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered approving
[respondents] legal redemption of the portion in litigation. The rest of their monetary
claims were, however, DENIED for lack of factual and/or legal bases.
14
What was the issue?
Whether or not, RTC seriously committed grave abuse of discretion.
15
What was the ruling of the court?
The petition was denied. The assailed ruling of RTC was Affirmed.
Search

[G.R. No. 118712. July 5, 1996.]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO
F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

[G.R. No. 118745. July 5, 1996.]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, represented by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Petitioner, v.

COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO L. YAP, HEIRS OF EMILIANO F. SANTIAGO, AGRICULTURAL MANAGEMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., Respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, R., J.:

Consequent to the denial of their petitions for review on certiorari by this Court on October 6, 19951 , petitioners
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), filed their respective motions for
reconsideration contending mainly that, contrary to the Court’s conclusion, the opening of trust accounts in favor of
the rejecting landowners is sufficient compliance with the mandate of Republic Act 6657. Moreover, it is argued that
there is no legal basis for allowing the withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the rejecting landowners
pending the determination of the final valuation of their properties.

Petitioner DAR, maintains that "the deposit contemplated by Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657, absent any specific
indication, may either be general or special, regular or irregular, voluntary or involuntary (necessary) or other forms
known in law, and any thereof should be, as it is the general rule, deemed complying." 2

We reject this contention. Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be
made as compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in "cash" or in "LBP bonds", to wit: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands —

x       x       x

(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds of issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. . . ."
(Emphasis)
The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would
include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit." Accordingly, we must adhere to the
well-settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or
construction, but only for application. 3 Thus, recourse to any rule which allows the opening of trust accounts as a
mode of deposit under Section 16(e) of RA 6657 goes beyond the scope of the said provision and is therefore
impermissible. As we have previously declared, the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceedings to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend or
expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. 4 Administrative regulations
must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will
always be resolved in favor of the basic law. 5

The validity of constituting trust accounts for the benefit of the rejecting landowners and withholding immediate
payment to them is further premised on the latter’s refusal to accept the offered compensation thereby making it
necessary that the amount remains in the custody of the LBP for safekeeping and in trust for eventual payment to
the landowners. 6 Additionally, it is argued that the release of the amount deposited in trust prior to the final
determination of the just compensation would be premature and expose the government to unnecessary risks and
disadvantages, citing the possibility that the government may subsequently decide to abandon or withdraw from the
coverage of the CARP certain portions of the properties that it has already acquired, through supervening
administrative determination that the subject land falls under the exempt category, or by subsequent legislation
allowing additional exemptions from the coverage, or even the total scrapping of the program itself. Force majeure is
also contemplated in view of the devastation suffered by Central Luzon de to lahar. Petitioner DAR maintains that
under these conditions, the government will be forced to institute numerous actions for the recovery of the amounts
that it has already paid in advance to the rejecting landowners. 7

We are not persuaded. As an exercise of police power, the expropriation of private property under the CARP puts the
landowner, and not the government, in a situation where the odds are already stacked against his favor. He has no
recourse but to allow it. His only consolation is that he can negotiate for the amount of compensation to be paid for
the expropriated property. As expected, the landowner will exercise this right to the hilt, but subject however to the
limitation that he can only be entitled to a "just compensation." Clearly therefore, by rejecting and disputing the
valuation of the DAR, the landowner is merely exercising his right to seek just compensation. If we are to affirm the
withholding of the release of the offered compensation despite depriving the landowner of the possession and use of
his property, we are in effect penalizing the latter for simply exercising a right afforded to him by law.

Obviously, this would render the right to seek a fair and just compensation illusory as it would discourage owners of
private lands from contesting the offered valuation of the DAR even if they find it unacceptable, for fear of the
hardships that could result from long delays in the resolution of their cases. This is contrary to the rules of fair play
because the concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to
the owners of the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of
being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the
amount necessary to cope with his loss. 8

It is significant to note that despite petitioner’s objections to the immediate release of the rejected compensation,
petitioner LBP, taking into account the plight of the rejecting landowners, has nevertheless allowed partial
withdrawal through LBP Executive Order No. 003, 9 limited to fifty (50) per cent of the net cash proceeds. This is a
clear confirmation that petitioners themselves realize the overriding need of the landowners’ immediate access to the
offered compensation despite rejecting its valuation. But the effort, though laudable, still falls short because the
release of the amount was unexplainably limited to only fifty per cent instead of the total amount of the rejected
offer, notwithstanding that the rejecting landowner’s property is taken in its entirety. The apprehension against the
total release of the rejected compensation is discounted since the government’s interest is amply protected under
the aforementioned payment scheme because among the conditions already imposed is that the landowner must
execute a Deed of Conditional Transfer for the subject property. 10

Anent the aforecited risks and disadvantages to which the government allegedly will be unnecessarily exposed if
immediate withdrawal of the rejected compensation is allowed, suffice it to say that in the absence of any substantial
evidence to support the same, the contemplated scenarios are at the moment nothing but speculations. To allow the
taking of the landowners’ properties, and in the meantime leave them empty handed by withholding payment of
compensation while the government speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse for
government to subsequently decide to abandon the property and return it to the landowner when it has already been
rendered useless by force majeure, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be
sanctioned. Legislations in pursuit of the agrarian reform program are not mere overnight creations but were the
result of long exhaustive studies and even heated debates. In implementation of the program, much is therefore
expected from the government. Unduly burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws in the
implementation of the CARP which was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation is plainly unfair and
unacceptable.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners’ motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 180462 : February 9, 2011

SOUTH PACIFIC SUGAR CORPORATION and SOUTH EAST ASIA SUGAR MILL

CORPORATION, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and SUGAR REGULATORY
ADMINISTRATION, Respondents.

CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:

In 1999, the government projected a shortage of some 500,000 metric tons of sugar due to the effects of El
Niño and La Niña phenomena. To fill the expected shortage and to ensure stable sugar prices, then President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No. 87, Series of 1999 (EO 87), facilitating sugar importation
by the private sector.

On 3 May 1999, the Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction issued the Bidding Rules providing guidelines
for sugar importation. Under the Bidding Rules, the importer pays 25% of the conversion fee within three
working days from receipt of notice of the bid award and the 75% balance upon arrival of the imported sugar.

The Bidding Rules also provide that if the importer fails to make the importation or if the imported sugar fails
to arrive on or before the set arrival date, 25% of the conversion fee is forfeited in favor of the Sugar Regulatory
Administration.

The Committee on Sugar Conversion/Auction caused the publication of the invitation to bid. Several sugar
importers submitted sealed bid tenders. Petitioners Southeast Asia Sugar Mill Corporation (Sugar Mill) and
South Pacific Sugar Corporation (Pacific Sugar) emerged as winning bidders for the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd tranches.

Pursuant to the Bidding Rules, Sugar Mill paid 25% of the conversion fee amounting to P14,340,000.00, while
Pacific Sugar paid 25% of the conversion fee amounting to P28,599,000.00.

As it turned out, Sugar Mill and Pacific Sugar (sugar corporations) delivered only 10% of their sugar import
allocation, or a total of only 3,000 metric tons of sugar. They requested the SRA to cancel the remaining
27,000 metric tons of sugar import allocation blaming sharp decline in sugar prices. The sugar corporations
sought immediate reimbursement of the corresponding 25% of the conversion fee amounting to
P38,637,000.00.

The sugar corporations filed a complaint for breach of contract and damages in the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 77) of Quezon City.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized Atty. Raul Labay of the SRA’s legal department to assist
the OSG in this case. The RTC held that paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules contemplated delay in the arrival
of imported sugar, not cancellation of sugar importation. It concluded that the forfeiture provision did not
apply to the sugar corporations which merely cancelled the sugar importation. the deputized SRA counsel,
Atty. Raul Labay, received his own copy of the Decision and filed a notice of appeal. The sugar corporations
moved to expunge the notice of appeal, which was thereafter granted, on the ground that only the OSG, as the
principal counsel, can decide whether an appeal should be made.

The Court of Appeals held that the deputized SRA counsel had authority to file a notice of appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not a deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal.

Whether or not the sugar corporations are entitled to reimbursement of P38,637,000.00 in

conversion fee.

HELD: The petition lacks merit.

CIVIL LAW: SRA

First issue: The deputized SRA counsel may file a notice of appeal.

Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the OSG to represent
the SRA, a government agency established pursuant to Executive Order No. 18, Series of 1986, in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the services of lawyers.

Assuming Atty. Labay had no authority to file a notice of appeal, such defect was cured when the OSG
subsequently filed its opposition to the motion to expunge the notice of appeal.

Second issue: The sugar corporations are not entitled to reimbursement of 25% of the conversion fee
amounting to P38,637,000.00.
Paragraph G.1 of the Bidding Rules provides that if the importer fails to make the importation, 25% of the
conversion fee shall be forfeited in favor of the SRA. In joining the bid for sugar importation, the sugar
corporations are deemed to have assented to the Bidding Rules, including the forfeiture provision under
paragraph G.1.

Petition is DENIED.

Cecilleville Realty v.
CA
G.R. No. 120363
FRANCISCO, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation owns a land in Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, in which private respondent Herminigildo Pascual occupies. Despite private
demands, petitioner refused to vacate the property and insisted that he is entitled to
occupy the land because he helping his mother Ana Pascual to cultivate the land in
question. Hence, petitioner instituted an ejectment suit before the MTC of Sta. Maria,
Bualacan. Finding no tenancy relationship between petitioner and private respondent, the
Municipal Trial Court, ordered private respondent to vacate the land. Private respondednt
appeled to the RTC. The RTC remanded the case to the DARAB for further adjudication.
A Motion for reconsidered was likewise denied. Hence, private respondent seek appeal to
the CA. The CA find the petition devoid of merit. The tenancy relationship dated back to
1976 when the defendants father, Sotero Pascual, became the tenant of Jose A.
Resurreccion, the President of the Cecilleville Realty and Service Corporation. The
defendant, although not the tenant himself, is afforded the protection provided by law as
his mother is already old and infirm and is allowed to avail of the labor of her immediate
household. He is entitled to the security of tenure accorded his mother. His having a
house of his own on the property is merely incidental to the tenancy. The CA affirmed the
decision of RTC. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON, the CA erred in not finding that while the private respondent is entitled to work on
the agricultural land of petitioner in his capacity as member of the family of tenant Ana
Pascual, nonetheless he can not occupy a substantial portion thereof and utilize the same
for residential purposes.
RULING:
Petition is impressed with merit.
Under Section 22, paragraph 3, of Rep. Act No. 1199, as amended by Rep. Act No. 2263
“The tenant shall have the right to demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling with an
area of not more than 3 per cent of the area of his landholding…” The law is
unambiguous and clear. only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right
to construct or maintain a house thereon. And here, private respondent does not dispute
that he is not petitioners tenant. . Under the law, therefore, we find private respondent not
entitled to a home lot. Neither is he entitled to construct a house of his own or to continue
maintaining the same within the very small landholding of petitioner. Compassion for the
poor, as we said in Galay, et. al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. is an imperative of every
humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved
privilege.