Compendium Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence PDF

Building Integrity
and Reducing Corruption

in Defence
A Compendium of Best Practices
The publication of this Compendium is supported by NATO
and the Swiss Ministry of Defence
Building Integrity and Reducing
Corruption in Defence:
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control
of Armed Forces
(DCAF)
www.dcaf.ch
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces is one
of the world’s leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform
(SSR) and security sector governance (SSG).
DCAF provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance
programmes, develops and promotes appropriate democratic norms at
the international and national levels, advocates good practices and
makes policy recommendations to ensure effective democratic
governance of the security sector.
DCAF’s partners include governments, parliaments, civil society,
international organisations and the range of security sector actors such
as police, judiciary, intelligence agencies, border security services and
the military.
2010
Corruption in Defence:
Geneva, 2010
The following persons participated in the production of the Compendium of Best
Practices in Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence
Editorial Board
Philipp Fluri (DCAF), Adrian Kendry (NATO), Simon Lunn (DCAF), Mark Pyman (TI-UK)
Editor and Lead Author: Todor Tagarev (Bulgaria)
Contributors
Jean-Jacques de Dardel (Switzerland) – Foreword, Francois Melese (US) – Chapters 2
and 9, Adrian Kendry and Susan Pond (NATO) – Chapter 3, James Greene (US) – Chap-
ters 5, 16 and 22, Mark Pyman (UK) – Chapter 8, Aditya Batara (Indonesia) – Chapter 11,
George Lucas (US) – Chapter 12, Alxandre Kukhianidze, Tamuna Karosanidze, Nina
Khatiskatsi and Alexander Scrivener (Georgia) – Chapter 13, Anne-Christine Wegener and
Mark Pyman (TI-UK) – Chapter 14, Leonid Polyakov (Ukraine) and James Greene (US) –
Chapter 17, Wim F. van Eekelen (The Netherlands) – Chapter 18, Valeri Ratchev (Bul-
garia) – Chapter 19, Alice Eldridge (Lockheed Martin Corporation) – Chapter 20.1, Domi-
nique Lamoureux (Thales) – Chapter 20.2, Ian Davis (UK) – Chapter 21, Nickolay Slatinski
(Bulgaria) – Chapter 24.
Some of the boxes in the text were contributed by other authors as follows: Maciej
Wnuk (Poland) – boxes 7.2, 17.4 and 17.6; Elisabeth Wrigth (US) – box 7.6; Leonid
Polyakov (Ukraine) – box 16.2; Sami Faltas (The Netherlands) – box 23.6; Velizar
Shalamanov (Bulgaria) – box 24.2; Todor Tagarev – boxes 2.4, 8.2, 9.4, 9.5, 9.9, 12.1,
12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 17.1, 19.5, 20.1, 20.2 and 24.1.
Language Editor: Ashley Thornton
Disclaimer
The views and examples presented in this Compendium are the personal responsibility
of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position of either NATO or the
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
Original version: English, Geneva, 2010
© Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010

Executive publisher: Procon Ltd., www.procon.bg
Cover design: Hristo Bliznashki
ISBN 978-92-9222-114-0
F OREWORD
One of the less heralded benefits of the watershed changes in the international secu-
rity equation—enabled twenty years ago as a result of the demise of Soviet rule—has
been the reappraisal of the notion that the end always justifies the means. The end
purpose of all defence efforts shifted from withstanding and defeating a known mighty
enemy to ensuring wider security in an unstable and multipolar world. Concomitantly,
new light was shed on the means to achieve a more comprehensive security. New no-
tions such as human security and good governance became more central in the efforts
of governments and the international community to help the transition from a Cold War
posture to better working societies confronting the challenges of globalisation.
NATO and its member states contributed to this evolution. The alliance opened it-
self up to new partnerships and memberships. As it started adapting its structures, as
member states downsized and reoriented their armed forces, more and more attention
was also devoted to the pressing reform needs of its potential future members and ac-
tive partners. The reform of the security sector was first encouraged among NATO’s
former potential foes. But as reforms progressed, a wider approach was taken to the
full range of transformations underway. These range from the parliamentary oversight
of the armed forces to the furtherance of international humanitarian law, as well as the
many necessary interactions between the military and civilians, defence institutions,
police, civil society, international organisations and NGOs.
This much wider approach to the workings of the security sector and all its actors
soon led to a better understanding of what it takes to optimise security and maximise
returns on political, economic and social investments in the stabilisation of conflicts
and tensions. Ethics were better seen as being instrumental in furthering the end goal
of lasting security. NGOs such as Transparency International (TI) rose to new levels of
acceptance and respect and a number of governments decided to focus more keenly
on the promises borne by a new spirit of openness and efficiency. A new initiative was
thus launched within the EAPC/PfP framework, whose title is self-explanatory: Building
Integrity and Reducing Corruption Risk in the Defence Establishments. This initiative
and its related Trust Fund, led by Poland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, are an
important part and extension of the Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution
Building (PAP-DIB) chapter of cooperation established some years ago after the Istan-
bul Summit. The needs in this field appear to be considerable and must be taken into
account in the new areas of operation of NATO and some of its partners.
The work undertaken under this heading by the NATO International Secretariat and
the participating countries has from the start been enabled and strengthened by exter-
nal actors such as TI, the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom and the Geneva
v
vi Foreword
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), which has produced the
present Building Integrity Compendium. Indeed, DCAF has developed expertise in
matters related to transparency building, expressed in a good number of publications,
among which are the Handbook for Parliamentarians co-published with the Inter-Par-
liamentary Union in some 50 languages, as well as the DCAF-NATO Parliamentary
Assembly handbook “Oversight and Guidance,” now under revision and slated to be
re-published in 2010 as yet another Swiss PfP contribution. More generally, DCAF’s
commitment to the PAP-DIB action plan is evidenced by manifold contributions and
inputs in a wide number of cases benefiting individual countries as well as the Euro-
Atlantic community as a whole. Together with the Geneva Centre for Security Policy
(GCSP), as well as the abovementioned partners, DCAF has organised a number of
seminars and conferences to take stock, reveal best practices and launch integrity in
defence management programmes.
Alongside its NATO partners, the Swiss government, for its part, is committed to
supporting DCAF and the GCSP and to furthering the aims of the PAP-DIB action plan
in the fields of integrity and transparency building. The task that lies ahead remains as
large and complex as the imperfections of human nature. But the results collectively
achieved so far in the fields of defence reform, stabilisation of conflict-prone regions
and the extension of international cooperation bear witness to the promise encapsu-
lated in this worthy compendium.
Ambassador Jean-Jacques de Dardel

Head of the Swiss Mission to NATO
C ONTENTS
Part I Introduction ...................................................................................................... ...........1
Chapter 1 The Corruption Curse................................................................................................3
Chapter 2 A Strategic Approach to Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence...13
Chapter 3 NATO and the Evolution of the Building Integrity Initiative......................................22
Chapter 4 National Approaches in Support of Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption
in Defence...............................................................................................................31
Part II Corruption Risks and Vulnerabilities in Defence.......................................... .........41

Chapter 5 Personnel Policies...................................................................................................43
Chapter 6 Defence Budgeting and Financial Management ....................................................57
Chapter 7 Defence Procurement .............................................................................................72
Chapter 8 Offset Arrangements...............................................................................................86
Chapter 9 Opportunities and Risks with Outsourcing, Privatization and Public-Private
Partnerships in Defence..........................................................................................99
Chapter 10 Utilisation of Surplus Equipment and Infrastructure .............................................112
Chapter 11 The Involvement of Defence Personnel and Assets in Economic Activities..........124
Chapter 12 Integrity Issues Related to Military Operations......................................................135
Chapter 13 Combating Defence-related Corruption in Countries with Unresolved
Territorial Disputes or Frozen Conflicts................................................................148
Part III Building Integrity and Reducing the Corruption Potential

in Defence Establishments ............................................................................. .......163
Chapter 14 The Importance of Integrity Building .....................................................................165
Chapter 15 Regulatory Frameworks........................................................................................172
Chapter 16 The Human in the Loop.........................................................................................193
Chapter 17 The Role of Government.......................................................................................205
Chapter 18 The Role of Parliaments and Audit Offices ...........................................................222
Chapter 19 The Role of Ombudsperson Institutions................................................................234
Chapter 20 The Defence Industry as an Ally in Reducing Corruption .....................................250
Chapter 21 The Role of Civil Society and the Media ...............................................................261
vii
viii Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence: A Compendium of Best Practices
Chapter 22 The Role of International Organisations................................................................281
Part IV Implementing Integrity Building Programmes ............................................. .......297

Chapter 23 Making Change Happen .......................................................................................299
Chapter 24 Cultural Awareness in Implementing Integrity Building Programmes....................312
Annex 1: Selected Resources ..............................................................................................323

Annex 2: TI International Defence and Security Programme ...............................................327
Annex 3: Abbreviations ........................................................................................................329
Contents ix
List of Figures
Perceived Corruption. ...................................................................................................................3
Bulgarian Defence Budget as a Percentage of GDP. ...................................................................9
Expected costs versus potential rewards from corrupt actions...................................................14
Foundations of the strategic approach to reducing defence corruption. .....................................19
Correlation between effective government and control of corruption..........................................20
Concepts and Relationships in Security and Development. .......................................................37
Personnel Management Functions (Simplified). .........................................................................44
Posters for Anonymous Whistleblowers......................................................................................84
Defence Decision Map..............................................................................................................102
Managing the Disposal of Surplus Defence Property ...............................................................121
The TNI Economic Support Structure .......................................................................................130
Trust in the Military vis-à-vis Other Sectors of Society..............................................................168
Comparisons of Levels of Trust in the Military ..........................................................................169
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs....................................................................................................195
x Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence: A Compendium of Best Practices
List of Boxes
Box 1.1. Direct Costs of Corruption ..........................................................................................7

Box 1.2. Corruption and Security Threats in Volatile Areas .....................................................8
Box 1.3. Loss of Public Trust and Resulting Cuts of the Defence Budget................................9
Box 1.4. Piracy and Its Links to Corruption ............................................................................10
Box 1.5. Corruption Impedes Stabilisation and Reconstruction Efforts. .................................11
Box 1.6. Establishing Practical Priorities in Reducing Defence Corruption Risks ..................12
Box 2.1. Emmanuel Kant and “the Moral Law within”: Lessons for Defence Officials ............16
Box 2.2. Utilitarian Theory on Rationality of Criminal Behaviour ............................................17
Box 2.3. Expected Cost of Corruption ....................................................................................17
Box 2.4. Empirical Evidence in Support of the Selected Approach ........................................20
Box 4.1. Fighting Corruption in Defence: A View from Switzerland........................................31
Box 4.2. Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States..............................39
Box 5.1. Building Integrity in Selection for Initial Officer Training ...........................................47
Box 5.2: Building Integrity in Selection for Education or Assignment Abroad.........................50
Box 5.3. Building Integrity in Promotion Selection Boards......................................................51
Box 6.1. Key Principles of Sound Budgeting of the Public Sector ..........................................58
Box 6.2. Critical Dimensions in Measuring Performance of Public Financial Management ...59
Box 6.3. Financial Management in a Strategic Defence Management Framework................61
Box 6.4. Delegation of Authority to and Accountability of Budget Holders
in the UK Ministry of Defence...................................................................................63
Box 6.5. An Example of a Regional Approach Encouraging Transparency
of Defence Budgeting...............................................................................................65
Box 7.1. Scope of Defence Acquisition ..................................................................................73
Box 7.2. Preserving the Integrity of the Defence Procurement Process
and Preventing Corruption in Poland .......................................................................75
Box 7.3. Consequences of the Lack of Transparency in Defence Procurement ....................77
Box 7.4. Parliamentarian Oversight of Defence Procurement: The Netherlands ...................79
Box 7.5. Acquisition Competencies and Stakeholders ...........................................................80
Box 7.6. Fighting Corruption in Procurement .........................................................................81
Box 7.7. US Federal Acquisition Regulation on Contractor Ethics Programs.........................83
Box 7.8. Strengthening Major Acquisitions with “Defence Integrity Pacts” .............................85
Box 8.1. Newspaper Allegations of Corruption in the Use of Offsets .....................................91
Box 8.2. Transparency in Managing Indirect Offsets..............................................................96
Box 9.1. Sourcing Options....................................................................................................100
Box 9.2. Military “Infrastructure” and Sourcing Options........................................................101
Contents xi
Box 9.3. Outsourcing Benefits from Public-Private Competitions.........................................103

Box 9.4. Selected Examples of Outsourcing, Privatization and PPPs..................................104
Box 9.5. Selected Military Value Criteria for U.S. Base Realignment & Closure (BRAC).....106
Box 9.6. Corrupt Behaviour in Share Privatizations .............................................................106
Box 9.7. Principles of a Market-Based Approach for Outsourcing, Privatization & PPPs.....108
Box 9.8. Avoiding Corruption in Privatization .......................................................................109
Box 9.9. Transparency of PPPs ...........................................................................................111
Box 10.1. Indirect Costs of Delayed Utilisation.......................................................................113
Box 10.2. The Threat from Explosive Events in Ammunition Storage Areas..........................114
Box 10.3. International Assistance in Managing Stockpiles of Conventional Weapons .........115
Box 10.4. NATO and Demilitarization of Surplus Weapons and Ammunition.........................116
Box 10.5. Excerpts from IANSA’s Recommendations for Stockpile Management .................117
Box 10.6. Corruption Charges Related to Utilisation of Surplus Weapon Systems................119
Box 11.1. Racketeering ..........................................................................................................128
Box 11.2. TNI Law No. 34/2004 .............................................................................................131
Box 11.3. Freeport’s Security Arrangement with the TNI and Human Rights Violations........134
Box 12.1. Corruption Challenges and Good Practice in Pre-deployment Activities................136
Box 12.2. Fraud, Mismanagement and Misbehaviour in UN Peacekeeping Operations........137
Box 12.3. Self-Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies through
a Code of Conduct .................................................................................................139
Box 12.4. The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies ..................144
Box 13.1. CPI and Percent of GDP for Defence in Selected Countries with Unresolved
Territorial Disputes or Frozen Conflicts ..................................................................149
Box 13.2. Main Elements of Anti-Corruption Reform..............................................................153
Box 13.3. Georgian Ratings on Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 2004-2008 ....................157
Box 14.1. Definition of Integrity...............................................................................................166
Box 14.2. Practical Reform Approaches.................................................................................170
Box 15.1. A Starting Point for Defining Corruption .................................................................173
Box 15.2. National Legal Definitions of Corruption Offences .................................................174
Box 15.3. General Principles in Criminalising Corruption.......................................................176
Box 15.4. Evading National Legal Regulations ......................................................................178
Box 15.5. Statute of a Special Investigating Unit....................................................................179
Box 15.6. Special Investigative Techniques ...........................................................................180
Box 15.7. Criminal Law does not Suffice to Counter Corruption Offences.............................182
Box 15.8. Qui tam, or “who brings the action for the king also does so for himself”...............184
Box 15.9. Defence Integrity Pacts ..........................................................................................188
Box 15.10. Educational Support to Performance Management ...............................................192
xii Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence: A Compendium of Best Practices
Box 16.1. UN Guidelines on Conflict of Interest for Public Officials........................................199

Box 16.2. Guidelines for Establishing Motivational Mechanisms............................................200
Box 16.3. Organisational Culture Change Strategy................................................................203
Box 16.4. Cultivating a Successful Community of Practice ....................................................204
Box 17.1. Organisational Solution to Consistency of Planning Disciplines and Processes....208
Box 17.2. Cleaning up Public Procurement: Publishing Misconduct & Administrative
Debarment..............................................................................................................210
Box 17.3. Ukraine’s Integrity Building Effort Post-Orange Revolution (2005-2007) ...............213
Box 17.4. Building Integrity – The Polish Story ......................................................................217
Box 17.5. Reacting to Scandal – The Peruvian Example.......................................................219
Box 17.6. Road Map for Integrity Reforms .............................................................................220
Box 18.1. The Role of the United Kingdom’s National Audit Office........................................224
Box 18.2. A Model Sequence for Oversight of Defence Procurement ...................................228
Box 18.3. Selected Major Corruption Cases in Foreign Sales ...............................................232
Box 19.1. Defining “Ombudsman” ..........................................................................................235
Box 19.2. Classical Model of an Ombudsman in Defence in Norway.....................................237
Box 19.3. The Inspector General as a Strong Institutional Ombudsman ...............................240
Box 19.4. The Model of “Weak” Institutional Ombudsman: An Example................................241
Box 19.5. Implementing the Concept of Ombudsman in Enhancing the Integrity
of Defence Acquisition............................................................................................245
Box 20.1. Self-governance Principles of the Defense Industry Initiative ................................251
Box 20.2. ASD Ethics and Anti-Corruption Activities ..............................................................260
Box 21.1. Investigative Journalism Reveals Cases of Defence Corruption............................272
Box 21.2. Civil Society Engagement and Partnerships in SSR and Defence Oversight ........276
Box 22.1. List of International Organisations and Websites ...................................................284
Box 22.2. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and National Security Interests .....................287
Box 22.3. Objectives of the PfP Action Plan for Defence Institution Building .........................290
Box 22.4. NATO-Ukraine Professional Development Program ..............................................294
Box 23.1. NATO Self-Assessment Tool .................................................................................300
Box 23.2. Vision Statement ....................................................................................................302
Box 23.3. Basic Change Management Strategies..................................................................303
Box 23.4. Example of a Planned, Systemic Change Process ................................................306
Box 23.5. NATO Building Integrity Training Course ...............................................................310
Box 23.6. Role-Play Games: A Powerful Training Tool..........................................................311
Box 24.1. On the Definition of Organisational Culture............................................................315
Box 24.2. Promoting Defence Integrity in Post-Communist Settings......................................321
Part I
Introduction
Corruption is a scourge upon the development of all countries, undermining public

confidence in the institutions of the state. It particularly impedes the progress of coun-
tries in transition, misappropriating much-needed capital away from the state. Re-
sources provided through corrupt practices are often transformed into economic and
political influence, thus weakening democratic institutions and further expanding cor-
ruption in a vicious cycle.
The defence sector often provides a fertile ground for such malign activities due to
the culture of secrecy and impunity that shields it from rigorous scrutiny. Chapter 1 out-
lines main enablers and effects of defence corruption. Chapter 2 presents the founda-
tions of a strategic approach to reduce corruption risks in defence. It combines efforts
to build integrity, increase transparency and improve accountability. Such a combina-
tion increases the moral burden of corrupt behaviour, reduces perceived rewards and
increases the expected costs, or punishment.
The introductory part of the compendium also provides examples of national and
international approaches to the reduction of corruption risks in defence – approaches
that constitute an integral part of broader efforts towards security sector reform and
defence institution building. Ultimately, the most effective means of combating corrup-
tion and building integrity in the defence sector is through a broader reform process: a
norms transfer to inculcate the sector with the highest democratic ideals and practices,
thus addressing the root causes of corruption.
Chapter 1
The Corruption Curse
Corruption hinders the development and undermines the security of modern societies
and decreases trust in public institutions. Defence is not immune to the scourge of cor-
ruption. This may come as a surprise to many, given the high regard that the public
generally has for the military around the world. Taking a global average, the military is
one of the top three most respected institutions and is almost as trusted in terms of
corruption as NGOs and religious bodies (see Figure 1.1 below).1 In many countries,
the military is perceived as less corrupt than political parties, legislatures, business
companies and the media.
This standing of the military, however, varies strongly across countries and regions.
For example, in Western Europe and the United States the military is broadly per-
ceived as being free of corruption. However, in the newly independent states of Central
70% Military
% of respondents 60%
reporting that these 50%
institutions/ser-
vices/organizations 40%
are corrupt or
30%
extremely corrupt
20%
10%
0%
Figure 1.1: Perceived Corruption.
1 Data from the 2006 Transparency International/Gallup survey “Global Corruption Barometer,”
as presented in Mark Pyman, Dominic Scott, Alan Waldron and Inese Voika, “Building
Integrity and Reducing Corruption Risk in Defense Establishments,” Connections: The
Quarterly Journal 7:2 (Summer 2008): 21–44.
3
4 Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence: A Compendium of Best Practices
and Eastern Europe, and in Africa and Latin America in particular, the military does not
fare as well.2
Notwithstanding the high esteem for the military in most societies, Transparency
International studies have rated defence among the most corrupt sectors entrusted
with the management of public resources, along with extraction of oil and gas and
construction industries.3 In the latest available study, defence falls to #13 on the list of
industrial sectors, where bribes to public officials are expected to be paid, and to #8 on
the “State Capture” list.4
The treatise in this compendium acknowledges that the high esteem for the military
and the high corruption potential of defence co-exist. This unusual co-existence and
the complex interaction of perceptions and behavioural patterns impact the design and
the implementation of counter corruption strategies and integrity building programmes.
Where the military is a highly regarded institution, the defence establishment can
inspire and lead wider institutional reform within a country. But it is also possible that,
due to the lack of transparency and informed public debate on defence, a high regard
for the military can hinder the implementation of integrity building programmes.
Needless to say, countering defence corruption in countries where the military is
seen as corrupt is imperative. Often these are countries where corruption permeates
many public and private sectors. In such cases, the example of successful reform of
defence institutions may have considerable positive impact on other public institutions.
Part I of this compendium presents national and international experience in building
democratic and effective defence institutions and countering corruption in defence.
The following chapter presents the foundations of a strategic approach to reduce cor-
ruption risks in defence. The approach combines efforts to build integrity, increase
transparency and improve accountability. Such a combination increases the moral
burden of corrupt behaviour, reduces perceived rewards and increases the expected
costs, or punishment.
The practicalities of designing and implementing integrity building programmes in
defence are discussed in part IV of the compendium. Of particular importance in this
regard is to acknowledge cultural specifics of the defence organisation in a particular
country and to strengthen those features of the organisational culture that contribute to
2 Pyman, et al., “Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption Risk,” (2008), 31.
3 Ibid., 22.
4 Transparency International website, “Bribe Payers Index 2008 Table”, www.transparency.org/
policy_research/surveys_indices/bpi/bpi_2008#bpi_table. The sectoral ranking evaluates the
likelihood of companies from the 19 sectors in the study to engage in “state capture,”
whereby parties attempt to wield undue influence on government rules, regulations and deci-
sion making through private payments to public officials.
The Corruption Curse 5
individual and organisational integrity and deter corrupt behaviour. These good prac-
tices can then be disseminated to other public organisations in the country.
Sources of Corruption in Defence
Corruption is the abuse of a position of trust for dishonest gain. Corruption within the
defence sector may take many forms: kickbacks and bribes, the awarding of non-com-
petitive contracts or the manipulation of soldier payrolls. The recent and rapid growth
of private military and security companies—performing activities previously within the
realm of the state that are outsourced in accordance with limited regulations—has fur-
ther increased opportunities for graft.
Part II of the compendium includes nine chapters that look in detail at the sources
and the reasons for corruption in defence. The majority of chapters examine corrupt
behaviour, as well as good practices in building integrity and enhancing transparency
and accountability in main defence management areas: personnel policies and man-
power management, defence budgeting and financial management, procurement, off-
set arrangements, outsourcing, privatization, public-private partnerships in defence,
utilisation of surplus equipment and infrastructure, and the involvement of defence
personnel and assets in economic activities. Chapter 12 focuses on corruption risks
and integrity issues related to contemporary military operations, while chapter 13 ex-
amines defence-related corruption in countries with unresolved territorial disputes.
Below is a list of some of the rationale that facilitates corrupt practices, namely “se-
crecy,” “urgency” and “concern for the people.” Although benign at first glance, the
regular reference to these themes strongly limits transparency of decision making and
implementation, as well as the accountability of players in the defence sector, and thus
creates a breeding ground for corruption.
Secrecy is the first and worst enemy of transparency in defence. The prolific refer-
ence to secrecy in order to “protect national security interests” severely limits the op-
portunities for parliamentarian oversight and other forms of societal control of the ex-
ecutive. In defence procurement, for example, the reference to secrecy strongly limits
the number of potential bidders or even leads to single source procurement. That not
only prevents competition but, much too often, such schemes are designed and main-
tained in order to facilitate corrupt practices.
The reference to urgency in meeting operational and other defence requirements
allows for the implementation of simplified procedures or directly defying the rules, e.g.
not holding open tenders and thus circumventing tender requirements for openness
and competitiveness. A reference to urgency is often made in the defence establish-
ments of new NATO members and partner countries that contribute to international
operations on an ad hoc basis or with “contingents” assembled for a single operational
rotation. The need to meet urgent requirements, especially when combined with refer-
ences to secrecy, creates an excellent ground for non-transparent and arbitrary deci-
sions and, hence, for corruption.
Populist slogans also often indicate corruption. One example is the call to “buy na-
tional” defence products and services, even when there are only a few or just a single
national supplier of those products or services with questionable international competi-
tiveness. Another example is the “concern for the soldiers’ well-being” that has led to
non-transparent exchanges of redundant military properties for housing for the military,
non-transparent recreation contracts, etc. A third example is the call to act in the “pub-
lic benefit,” e.g. through offset arrangements 5 that not only distort market mechanisms
but also are conducive for paybacks in variety of ways.
This is just a sample of the main “enemies” of transparency and accountability of
the defence establishment that also serve to increase the corruption potential of de-
fence with abundant negative consequences.
Effects of Corruption in Defence
Uncurbed defence corruption poses considerable challenges to the efficiency of the
defence establishment and the operational effectiveness of the armed forces, lowers
the esteem of the society and international partners for the military, endangers the se-
curity of the citizens and, in its extreme manifestation, threatens the democratic gov-
ernance mechanisms and even the foundations of modern states. These effects are
examined below in five relatively distinct groups.
Diversion of Scarce Resources
Corruption is costly. It diverts scarce resources from the generation of the defence ca-
pabilities a country needs at a proper cost and limits the opportunities to engage the
armed forces in operations that enhance the security of the country and its allies. That
means that the country is inefficient in implementing its security and defence policies
and has lower levels of defence capabilities available to address security challenges
and threats.
Box 1.1 provides an example of the cost of corruption in terms of wasted money
and lost opportunities for technological modernisation of defence. It needs to be noted
that the text in Box 1.1 accounts only for corruption cases brought to the attention of
prosecution authorities.
From a societal perspective, defence corruption also occurs at the expense of
more socially productive investments, such as education, healthcare, innovation and
competitiveness.
5 See Chapter 8 of this compendium for details.

Limited Operational Effectiveness

When a country deploys its troops in operations, corruption dramatically impacts their
operational effectiveness. Less than adequate capabilities limit the role and the useful-
ness of the military units. Equipment of lower quality puts the soldiers at higher risk
and potentially increases the casualties. By default, the morale of soldiers who had to
pay to get into an operation is low.
Corruption may be used, and in fact is used, by terrorists and organised crime to
acquire information, know-how, dangerous materials, weapon technologies and sys-
tems. Corruption may further compromise operational security, as shown in the exam-
ple presented in Box 1.2.
Lower Morale and Regard for the Defence Institution
Even occasional cases of corruption in defence put a stain on the whole defence es-
tablishment and may have a detrimental effect on public trust in the military and the
ethos of the armed forces of the country. The pride of the military and defence civilians
in their service to the country is seriously degraded when they learn of corruption
among their leadership. The lack of punishment in publicly known cases of drastic cor-
ruption among the high ranks of government further degrades the morale of the de-
fence personnel and the public’s esteem in the military. That has a negative effect on
the opportunity to attract quality people to serve either in uniform or as civilian defence
experts.
Box 1.1. Direct Costs of Corruption

In an interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta, Major General Alexander Sorochkin, deputy chair of
the Prosecutor’s Office Investigations Committee, admitted that corruption in the Russian
Armed Forces resulted in losses of 2.2 billion rubles ($78.6 million) to the state budget in the
first nine months of 2008 and the number of corruption-related crimes in the Russian Armed
Forces increased by at least 30 % compared to the same period in 2007 to a total of 1,400. The
money lost is “enough to buy at least 30 modern T-90 main battle tanks,” while general officers
have been involved in at least 18 of the corruption cases.
Russia’s chief military prosecutor, Sergei Fridinsky, has added that while the total number of
crimes had declined in the country, offences in the first nine months of 2008 soared 220 %
among the interior troops, 60 % in the Emergencies Ministry, more than 10 % in the border
guard units of the Federal Security Service and 24 % in the Defence Ministry. Among these
crimes, instances of bribe-taking and office abuse increased 50 % and over half of the offences
were related to military property and budget funds.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has made the fight against corruption one of his top pri-
orities since coming to office in May 2008, signing a decree to set up a presidential anti-corrup-
tion council just two weeks after his inauguration.
Source: “Military corruption costs Russia almost $80 million in 2008,” RIA Novosti (2 December 2008),
http://en.rian.ru/russia/20081202/118637765.html.
Box 1.2. Corruption and Security Threats in Volatile Areas

The corruption and ideological conversion of law enforcement officers by extremists in the
North Caucasus has emerged as a major security threat, as the investigations of many major
terrorist attacks have unearthed cases of corrupt or ideologically driven police officers who
have assisted the attackers. Neither the boosting of passive defence measures nor increased
preventive strikes against militant hideouts will succeed in curbing domestic terrorism if the
Russian authorities fail to take serious action to root out the corruption that plagues the coun-
try’s law enforcement community.
Source: Simon Saradzhyan, “Dynamics of Maritime Terrorist Threats to Russia and the Government’s
Response,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 8:3 (Summer 2009): 53–84.
Corruption reduces public trust in the military. Endemic corruption can have detri-
mental effects on public trust in the defence institution. Box 1.3 provides an example in
which the public regard went so low that the resulting cuts in the defence budget jeop-
ardised even the nominal functioning of the defence establishment.
Corruption-based limitations on capability and low morale, discussed in the previ-
ous section, reduce the credibility of national forces deployed on multinational peace
missions.
Overall, defence corruption has a negative impact on the prestige of the armed
forces—and the country as a whole—in the eyes of allies, partners and international
organisations such as NATO, as well as in the wider international community.
Immediate Security Threat
Furthermore, corruption-based links of security and defence organisations to organ-
ised crime pose immediate threats to the security of the country and its citizens. Cor-
rupted defence and security sectors are conducive for the creation and functioning of
organised crime and piracy groups. Box 1.2 provides one example; another example is
described in Box 1.4.
Threat to the Foundations of the State
Defence sometimes serves as a focus of corruption across government and involves
numerous actors. In lacking transparency and accountability to the public and civil so-
ciety, it is relatively easy to divert money from the defence sector and for behind-the-
scenes networks to keep corrupt officials, businesses, intermediaries, accountants and
lawyers, facilitated by spin doctors and fraudulent media, in business.
Box 1.3. Loss of Public Trust and Resulting Cuts of the Defence Budget
For years, there have been suspicions and media hints of large scale corruption in the Bulgar-
ian defence ministry and armed forces but only a few cases of petty corruption have been offi-
cially acknowledged. Only after the change in government in 2009, the Ministry of Defence and
the law enforcement agencies started to investigate the activities of the top leadership in de-
fence. Dozens of instances of corruption emerged and by December 2009 Bulgarian prosecu-
tors had charged a former defence minister with abuse of power in three cases.
The official report for the first 100 days of the new government acknowledged that the minis-
try and the armed forces are at the edge of a moral crisis and stated that “main attributes of the
people in defence such as duty, honour, integrity, confidence, and self-esteem were provoked
by bad governance and corruption.”
While important for cleaning the defence establishment from practices of mismanagement,
waste and corruption, the disclosure of the scale and methods of corruption in defence in-
creased the resentment among the people. The public trust in the defence institution further
eroded. One of the consequences was the severe cut in the defence budget, never witnessed
before in the history of the country (see Figure 1.2). It is important to note that the economic
and financial crisis had only a minor effect on this cut and, given the “morale collapse” of the
defence institution, no defence experts, think tanks or media challenged this ruthless downsiz-
ing of the defence budget.
Defence Budget, % GDP
3,5
2,5
1,5
0,5
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
19
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Figure 1.2: Bulgarian Defence Budget as a Percentage of GDP.
On the other hand, this severe cut jeopardised the sustainment of the armed forces and the
development of requisite capabilities, thus turning systemic corruption into a threat to national
security and the international stance of the country as a reliable ally.
Sources: “Former Bulgarian Defence Minister Facing Contract Fraud Charges,” Agence France-Presse
(20 November 2009), www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4386991&c=EUR; “The Defence Ministry in a
Financial and Morale Collapse,” Mediapool.bg (9 November 2009), www.mediapool.bg/show/?Storyid=
158371.
In such “grand” corruption, oligarchic circles and shady businesses criminalise the
economy and the politics of the country and impose their private interests – a phe-
nomenon known in the specialised literature as “state capture.”6
In this train of thought, countering corruption does not mean simply introduction of
regulations or “cleansing” the government; to defeat corruption means to take the
country back from the oligarchic circles of corrupt officials, firms and ways of conduct-
ing illegal business and to establish the rule of law, applied universally and in a trans-
parent manner.
In a situation when the security or the very existence of the country is under threat
either by external or internal enemies, or both, the situation is further aggravated by
endemic corruption. Box 1.5 highlights some of the ways in which corruption threatens
the stability of a country.
Box 1.4. Piracy and Its Links to Corruption

On November 15, 2008, Somali pirates hijacked the oil tanker Sirius Star carrying 25 crewmen
and 2.2 million barrels of oil. The ship was estimated to be worth approximately US$150 mil-
lion, with its cargo worth at least another US$100 million. That incident, and a series of similar
pirate attacks on smaller vessels, led to increased demands for naval presence in large areas
of the Indian Ocean.
There are many reasons for the recent increase of piracy off the Somali coast. One reason
rarely referred to is the corruption linkage between pirates and Somalia’s politico-military elites.
According to Roger Middleton, consultant researcher at Chatham House, pirates are “paying
off any significant political and military powers so they can carry on with their activities unhin-
dered.”
Source: Barney Jopson, “Somalia’s bandits broaden their horizons,” Financial Times (19 November
2008), 5.
6 See, for example, Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann, Seize the State,
Seize the Day: State Capture, Corruption and Influence in Transition, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper No. 2444 (September 2000).
Box 1.5. Corruption Impedes Stabilisation and Reconstruction Efforts.

General Stanley McChrystal repeatedly highlights corruption and weak state institutions as a
major threat to the success of ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom. He states that insuffi-
cient comprehension of the dynamics of corruption and criminality has led to a “crisis of confi-
dence among Afghans.” US General Robert Cone, commander of the force that trains the Af-
ghan army and police, has expressed similar sentiments noting, “Endemic corruption is one of
the main obstacles to the Afghan army and police being able to take over their country's secu-
rity duties.”
Corruption and chronic mismanagement have been blamed for holding back reconstruction
efforts in the country. International aid workers have said that up to one third of the funding al-
ready dispersed (about US$15 billion) has been wasted, which has deepened the resentment of
locals toward foreign troops. A day after President Hamid Karzai was sworn in for a second
term, the U.S. Defence Secretary Robert Gates said “donors should tighten control of how the
‘significant influx’ of money into the country is used.” Western leaders have put pressure on Mr.
Karzai to deal with corruption and remove former warlords from government.
Fifteen current and former Afghan ministers are under investigation over allegations of cor-
ruption that have plagued the government of President Karzai. In his inaugural address for his
second term as president, Karzai pledged to arrest those who spread corruption. International
leaders, who have threatened to hold back troops and development aid unless Karzai cleans up
corruption in his government, are watching closely to see if he keeps his promise.
Sources: “McChrystal: More forces or ‘mission failure’,” Washington Post (21 September 2009),
www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/09/20/AR2009092002920.html; Jon Hemming, “Cor-
ruption holds back Afghan army expansion,” Reuters (11 December 2008), www.reuters.com/
article/worldNews/idUSTRE4BA5S420081211?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0; “US Secretary of
Defence Robert Gates in the Pentagon,” BBC News (21 November 2009); AJ Henninger, “Corruption: 15
Afghan ministers under investigation; bribes, perks, skimming,” on the DEFENSE (November 24, 2009),
http://onthedefense.wordpress.com/2009/11/24/corruption-15-afghan-ministers-under-investigation-bribes-
perks-skimming.
Is Defence Corruption a Never-ending Story?

Defeating defence corruption is a notoriously difficult endeavour but is a pre-condition
for regaining societal confidence and provision of defence and security at an affordable
cost and with acceptable risk. And while it is far from clear whether defence corruption
can be entirely overcome, there are proven approaches and good practices that, when
implemented in the proper context, can be used to curb corruption.
In addition to the good practices in functional defence areas presented in part II of
the compendium, part III presents details on relevant regulatory frameworks and
proven practical approaches to integrity building at the level of the individual, the ex-
ecutive branch of government and the defence ministry in particular, parliaments and
audit offices, ombudsman institutions, the defence industry, civil society and the me-
dia, and international organizations.
Even a long journey starts with a few steps. While the treatment of defence corrup-
tion risks and counter-corruption strategies and measures in this compendium is com-
prehensive and detailed, the application of the approach is always context specific and
requires establishment of clear priorities and realism in matching objectives and re-
sources. Box 1.6 presents an example in defining a set of practical measures in an
ambitious programme to drastically reduce defence corruption.
Box 1.6. Establishing Practical Priorities in Reducing Defence Corruption Risks

A non-governmental study, conducted in 2008, identified several key measures that would lead
to a quick reduction of the corruption potential in the Bulgarian defence establishment:
• Creation of favourable normative and procedural conditions for eradication of corruption in
defence, with a priority on:
o Elaboration and steady application of objective-oriented budgeting, based on pro-
grammes;
o Substantial increase in transparency of the procurement process and admission of a
maximum number of bidders in tender procedures;
o Immediate discharging of the Ministry of Defence and the military from all types of eco-
nomic functions;
o Suspension of property exchanges and of similar transactions;
o Sending to operations abroad only existing units with already developed capabilities.
• Conducting additional studies on problems connected with corruption in stabilization and
reconstruction operations; formulation and realization of offset and similar programs and
projects; identification of the roots of non-efficient management; development and com-
parative analysis of methods and approaches for solving those issues.
• Monitoring the level of corruption potential in the defence sector, of the measures under-
taken by the legislative and executive power, business and non-governmental organiza-
tions to counter corruption, and of the real level of corruption.
In 2009, members of the study team were assigned to leadership positions in the Ministry of
Defence and immediately embarked on realising these recommendations.
Source: Todor Tagarev, “Defence Decision-making and Corruption Risks,” in Integrity in Defence: Effec-
tive, Transparent and Accountable Management, Avgustina Tzvetkova, ed. (Sofia: Euro-Atlantic Educa-
tion Initiative, 2009), 189–214.
Chapter 2
A Strategic Approach to Building
Integrity and Reducing Corruption
in Defence
The crippling costs of corruption, discussed in chapter 1, can be reduced significantly
through the application of proven principles, mechanisms and practices of good gov-
ernance. Governments have a wide spectrum of choices in their efforts to minimize
corruption. These can be distilled into three main categories:
• Building integrity;
• Increasing transparency; and
• Improving accountability.
A simple strategic framework offers an illustration and serves as a guide to shape
government investments to counter corruption. This framework combines a philosophi-
cal view of corruption with an economic perspective. It couples views on ethics of the
great German Enlightenment figure, Emmanuel Kant, with the utilitarian perspective
attributed to the 19th century English philosopher, John Stuart Mill.
Mill’s utilitarian perspective reappears in a contemporary economic model of crime
developed by Nobel Prize winner Gary Becker entitled Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach.1 The theory of rational crime proposed by Becker requires that
we place ourselves in the shoes of a public employee, bureaucrat or elected govern-
ment official. According to Becker, any individual with an opportunity to be corrupt
evaluates the potential (marginal) benefits of their actions against the expected (mar-
ginal) costs if detected and punished. Becker conjectures “… individuals become
criminals because of the financial and other rewards from crime compared to legal
work, taking account of the likelihood of apprehension and conviction, and the severity
of punishment.”2 His framework was later extended to include the ethical costs of
crime.3
1 Gary S. Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy 76 (1968): 169–217.
2 Ibid., 176.
3 Michael K. Block and John M. Heineke, “A Labor Theoretic Analysis of the Criminal Choice,”
The American Economic Review 63:3 (1975): 314–25.
13
According to this approach, two major factors help deter the corruption of elected
officials, civilian and military government employees, defence contractors and others in
the defence sector. The first is a culturally determined ethical or “moral burden” – if in-
dividuals recognize corrupt actions as immoral and unethical, this deters corruption.
The second major factor is the “Expected Punishment” – if individuals recognize their
actions are illegal, and that they may be discovered and imprisoned, this deters cor-
ruption. From this perspective, when evaluating whether or not to engage in corrupt
practices, individuals often implicitly consider two costs: 1) the ethical or moral burden
of committing an illegal act; and 2) the probability of being arrested and punished.
These costs are then compared to potential rewards.
Assuming diminishing marginal benefits of corrupt actions and increasing marginal
costs (see Figure 2.1) an opportunistic official would be tempted to engage in corrup-
tion as long as their perceived marginal benefits exceed their expected marginal costs,
up to the point where marginal benefits equal marginal costs. Aggregating individual
returns over all those engaged in corruption offers a lower bound on the costs of cor-
ruption. The total costs of corruption must also capture damage to the moral fabric of
society and distortions in the economy that raise the cost of public services and reduce
overall economic growth. In this framework, the two ways to decrease corruption are to
reduce perceived marginal benefits or to increase the expected marginal costs of en-
gaging in corrupt behaviour.
Figure 2.1: Expected Costs versus Potential Rewards from Corrupt Actions.
A Strategic Approach to Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence 15
Modifying the Expected Costs of Corrupt Behaviour

The expected costs for an individual considering an act of corruption include a moral
component and the likelihood of being punished. But why should anyone care about
being moral? Classical philosophers provide a range of answers:4
• Being true to one’s own rational nature (Kant);
• Because one aspires to human fulfilment (Aristotle); or
• Because keeping one’s contract with one’s fellow citizens is necessary to pre-
vent social chaos and warfare (Hobbes).
In Kant’s conception, “the moral agent must have an exemplary character, one
which recognizes the rational demands of duty upon him even when there are no ex-
ternal incentives or constraints to compel, constrain, or otherwise shape his behav-
iour.”5 Kant talks about “the Moral Law within” and “imperatives of duty.” According to
Kant, “we are to do our duty regardless of the consequences.”6 We are acting in a mor-
ally worthy fashion, and possess what Kant calls “a morally good will,” only if we are
“individuals who can be counted upon to do what we know we must and ought to do,
even when there are no external forms of incentive or accountability in place.”7 In sum,
we should not require external inducements or constraints to force us to behave mor-
ally.
In sharp contrast to Kantian ethics is the so-called “utilitarian” school of John Stuart
Mill who recognizes that “… as fallible human beings we will not always be adequately
motivated by… moral reasons for obeying the law.”8 Contemporary thinking about the
historically-conditioned, cultural grounding of morality needs to be mixed with “social
and political responsibilities to establish justice, equality, and… rule of law.”9
On the one hand, building integrity supports the Kantian ethics view. Investing in
ethics training, cultural awareness, formal and informal codes of conduct, reputation,
ideals, core values, honour, etc. increases the “Moral Burden” of corrupt actions. On
the other hand, increasing transparency and improving accountability reflect Mill’s
utilitarian perspective. For instance, utilitarians believe the guilty should be punished
only if the punishment would serve some deterrent (or preventative) purpose. They
4 George Lucas and William Rubel, eds., The Moral Foundations of Leadership (Boston, MA:
Pearson Education, 2004), 116.
5 Ibid., 184.
6 Ibid., 133.
7 Ibid., 161.
8 Ibid., 386.
9 Ibid., 159.
Box 2.1. Emmanuel Kant and “the Moral Law within”: Lessons for Defence Officials
The moral agent must have an exemplary character, one which recognizes the rational de-
mands of duty upon him even when there are no external incentives or constraints to compel,
constrain or otherwise shape his behaviour.
Defence officials and military officers are acting in a morally worthy fashion and possess a
“morally good will” only if they are individuals that can be counted upon to do what they know
they must and ought to do, even when there are no external forms of incentive or accountability
in place.
consider not the punishment but the threat of punishment as most important and set
the task “to find the right punishment that will serve as the optimum deterrent.”10
Policymakers can increase the threat of punishment in three ways:
1. By increasing the probability of detection;
2. By increasing the probability of conviction given detection; and
3. By increasing the severity of the punishment.
Each approach corresponds to a different component of law enforcement:
1. Systematic monitoring for violations of the law and identifying and arresting
offenders (here transparency increases the probability of detection);
2. An independent court system to assess guilt (accountability increases the prob-
ability of prosecution given detection); and
3. A corrections system to administer punishment (here accountability provides for
independent assessment of penalties given conviction, and the recovery of mis-
appropriated assets).
Since law enforcement is costly, the optimal level of enforcement will likely mini-
mize but not entirely eliminate corruption (see Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). Increasing
transparency—investing in building defence institutions by implementing effective and
efficient budgeting and accounting systems, systematic application of economic and
decision tools, independent financial audits, monitoring and oversight, etc.—increases
the probability that corrupt actions will be detected. Improving accountability—investing
in judicial reforms such as the promotion of an independent judiciary, enforcing laws,
rules and regulations, etc.—increases the probability an individual will be convicted if
detected and influences the assessment of penalties.
10 Ibid., 149.
Box 2.2. Utilitarian Theory on Rationality of Criminal Behaviour

Utilitarian theory predicts the likelihood an individual chooses to commit a crime will fall in re-
sponse to an increase in either the probability or severity of punishment. Empirical work by
Ehrlich (1973) demonstrates that increases in both the certainty and severity of imprisonment
consistently have negative impacts on crime rates. Trumbull (1989) finds evidence that, for
most crimes, certainty of imprisonment has a greater effect than severity of imprisonment.
Block & Gerety (1995) find that prisoners are more easily deterred by increases in the prob-
ability of punishment (certainty) than its severity.
Collectively, these studies help explain Becker’s (1968) observation that “a common gener-
alization by persons with judicial experience is that a change in the probability has a greater
effect on the number of offences than a change in the punishment.” If these results apply more
broadly, then strategic investments in defence institutions that increase transparency could
generate powerful deterrent effects that reduce corruption in the defence sector.
Sources: Isaac Ehrlich, “Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation,”
Journal of Political Economy 81:3 (May–June 1973): 52–65; William N. Trumbull, “Estimations of the Eco-
nomic Model of Crime Using Aggregate and Individual Level of Data,” Southern Economic Journal 56
(1989): 423–39; Michael K. Block and Vernon E. Gerety, “Some Experimental Evidence on Differences
between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk,” Journal of Legal Studies 22
(1995): 123–38.
Modifying the Potential Rewards of Corrupt Behaviour

The potential reward from an act of corruption depends on the amount of resources
that are under the control of the public official and the discretionary power s/he has,
and is heavily influenced by the level of transparency and accountability.
The combination of high discretionary power (high marginal benefits of corruption)
and low accountability (low expected costs) is considered among the most common
causes of corruption.11 Corruption risks increase dramatically in the absence of trans-
Box 2.3. Expected Cost of Corruption

The expected cost to a public official, military officer or defence contractor of engaging in cor-
rupt behaviour consists of two components:
EXPECTED COST = MORAL BURDEN + EXPECTED PUNISHMENT
Where: EXPECTED PUNISHMENT = (Probability of Detection) x (Probability of Conviction if

Detected) x Penalty
11 Minxin Pei, “Government by Corruption,” Forbes (January 26, 2009).

parency and when limited alternatives are available and officials are paid below market
incomes. Alternatively, the discretionary power of defence officials is limited when the
decision-making process is transparent, includes consistent and readily accessible de-
cision criteria and measurable results, and there are multiple alternatives provided by
open and fair competition (for example, in defence procurement). The potential for cor-
rupt behaviour related to discretionary power would be further reduced if defence offi-
cials are held accountable in a systematic manner to superiors, parliamentary com-
mittees and auditors, not only for legality of procedures (financial audits) but also for
objectively assessing alternative solutions (managerial audits). Efforts to reduce cor-
ruption can usefully be combined with an increased focus on the efficiency and effec-
tiveness of public expenditures.
Finally, in order to benefit from corrupt activities, officials invest effort—and possi-
bly money—to minimize detection. Increasing transparency and accountability in-
creases the cost of such efforts and therefore contributes to lower corruption. It is also
useful to recognise that individuals have different attitudes towards risk – some are risk
seekers, while others are risk-averse. Greater risk aversion in opportunistic public offi-
cials would be associated with lower perceived marginal benefits and higher expected
marginal costs of engaging in corrupt actions. Therefore, turning to Figure 2.2, highly
risk averse individuals would be expected to participate in significantly lower levels of
corrupt activity (at a point where their lower marginal benefit curve intersects their
higher marginal cost curve).
A Strategic Approach to Reduce Corruption
The strategic approach proposed in this compendium (illustrated in Figure 2.2) aims at
reducing corruption in the defence sector by:
• Reducing perceived rewards of corrupt behaviour (reducing marginal bene-
fits); and
• Increasing the expected costs (increasing marginal costs).
This is bound to lead to a change of behaviour of defence officials, resulting in
lower numbers of cases of corruption and reduced cost of corruption to the public, as
indicated in Figure 2.2.
This framework offers an approach to good governance with a special focus on in-
tegrity, transparency and accountability:
• Building integrity increases the moral burden of corrupt behaviour through
professional codes of conduct, ethics training, education, cultural exchanges,
etc. This also contributes to reducing any perceived benefits of corrupt activ-
ity.
Figure 2.2: Foundations of the strategic approach to reducing defence corruption.
• Increasing transparency increases expected punishment by raising the

probability of detection. This increases the expected costs of corrupt activity.
Moreover, transparency of defence decision making, in combination with
open and fair competition in appointments, career advancement, procurement
of goods and services, etc., limits discretionary power and, hence, reduces
the potential benefits of corruption. Defence institution building, in particular
the explicit development of defence policy and strategy, planning, budgeting
and resources management, is the main venue for increasing transparency,
effectiveness and efficiency.
• Improving accountability through legislative and judicial reforms increases the
expected punishment of corrupt behaviour by raising the probability of convic-
tion if detected and the penalty if convicted. It increases the expected costs of
corrupt behaviour and reduces the perceived net benefits of a corrupt act.
Box 2.4. Empirical Evidence in Support of the Selected Approach

Setting the strategic approach to reducing corruption in defence in a good governance frame-
work is based on solid empirical evidence. Since 1996, the Worldwide Governance Indicators
project reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 212 countries and territories
over the period 1996–2008 for six dimensions of governance: voice and accountability; political
stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law; and
control of corruption.
The analysis of the time series for two of the newer NATO members—Bulgaria and Slovakia,
which joined the alliance in 2004—reveals a strong correlation between governance and the
level of corruption. As an example, Figure 2.3 presents the percentile ranking of the two coun-
tries along the dimensions of “government effectiveness” and “control of corruption.” Other data
series also indicate dependence between corruption levels and other governance indicators:
corruption is consistently lower when a country scores highly in regard to openness, account-
ability, effective government and rule of law.
Government Effectiveness
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Bulgaria Slovakia
Control of Corruption
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008
Bulgaria Slovakia
Figure 2.3: Correlation between Effective Government and Control of Corruption.

Given a country’s limited defence resources, and the relative costs of building integrity, in-
creasing transparency and improving accountability, the objective of each nation, as well as the
NATO Alliance, should be to find an optimal mix of investments in integrity, transparency and
accountability that minimizes corruption while preserving the efficiency and effectiveness of de-
fence forces. This optimal mix will depend on a particular country’s circumstances, costs and
culture. What is considered optimal in one country may be very different in another. It must be
recognized that the effectiveness of a country’s investments in building integrity, increasing
transparency and improving accountability partly depends on its history and can change over
time.
Therefore, it is recommended that countries adopt a multi-year programmatic approach to
integrity building initiatives that reduce the perceived benefits of corrupt actions and increase
the expected costs. This approach can include regular assessments of institutional capabilities
and responses to corruption that emphasize both the prevention and treatment of corrupt be-
haviour, including clear definitions and measures of success.
Sources: Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters VIII: Aggregate and
Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008 (June 29, 2009), World Bank Policy Research Working Pa-
per No. 4978; Ilin Stanev, “Daniel Kaufmann: Radical Transparency is the Best Solution for Reducing Cor-
ruption,” Capital 29 (25 July 2009), 22–23.
Recommendations
• Approach the problem of defence-related corruption strategically, aiming to reduce poten-
tial rewards of corrupt behaviour (reduce marginal benefits), while increasing the moral
burden and the expected punishment (increase marginal costs).
• Reduce corruption through good governance, evaluating alternative approaches to deter
corruption and to respond to corrupt behaviour.
• Adopt a multi-year programmatic approach to integrity building initiatives.
• Based on a country’s costs and political realities, find the optimal mix of investments to
build integrity, increase transparency and improve accountability that minimizes corruption
risks, while preserving or increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of defence expendi-
tures.
• Conduct regular assessments of institutional capabilities and responses to corruption and
periodically review the optimality of the chosen mix of investments.
Chapter 3
NATO and the Evolution of the
Building Integrity Initiative
The Principles of NATO
NATO was founded in 1949 with an enduring vision: the indivisibility of Allied security.
More than sixty years later, NATO continues to sustain this vision and remains the
primary forum for security consultations among the allies of Europe and North Amer-
ica. These consultations take place through a transatlantic framework that underpins
the collective defence of the populations and territory of NATO states, as well as en-
suring the ability of its forces to perform a full range of missions and operations.
The common vision and shared democratic values embodied in the Washington
Treaty of 1949 are the inspiration that enables NATO to not only maintain its core pur-
pose of territorial defence but to address and respond to the emerging challenges of
the 21st century.1
NATO Partnerships
The process of Euro-Atlantic integration, together with the development of NATO’s re-
lations with many countries across the globe, has been considerably strengthened and
nurtured through the various distinctive partnerships that NATO has developed since
the 1990s, strengthening the political dimension of NATO. NATO’s policy of outreach
through partnerships, dialogue and cooperation is an essential part of the Alliance’s
purpose and tasks. The Alliance’s partnerships across the globe have an enduring
value, contributing to stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. In the
same spirit, the contributions of partners to NATO’s missions and operations are highly
valued.
The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
The largest of the formal partnerships is the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC).
Established in 1997, the EAPC superseded the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC) that was initially established in 1991. The formation of the EAPC reflected the
realisation that it was increasingly important to create a security forum better able to
promote a more enhanced and operational partnership, in line with the growing aspira-
tions of Allies and Partners for a more sophisticated partnership relationship. The 50-
1 The new NATO Strategic Concept to meet the challenges and threats of the 21st Century will
be introduced at the Lisbon Summit in the autumn of 2010.
22
NATO and the Evolution of the Building Integrity Initiative 23
nation Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (28 Allies and 22 Partners) has therefore
evolved as a multilateral forum for dialogue and consultation on political and security-
related issues among Allies and Partner countries.
NATO remains committed to substantive political discussions and effective political
cooperation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace,
based on shared values and principles. Based upon these values and principles,
NATO encourages and continues to support further defence, and other, reforms
among its partners, including within the strategically important regions of the Caucasus
and Central Asia.
NATO and the 60th Anniversary Summit
NATO’s 60th anniversary summit at Strasbourg-Kehl was an occasion to recall the Alli-
ance’s major contribution to peace and security in Europe and the wider world. It was
also a timely reminder of NATO’s willingness and commitment to reach out to Europe’s
neighbours to the East and South to promote trust, dialogue and cooperation.
NATO’s success in preserving peace and stability within the Euro-Atlantic region
has sometimes meant that these achievements can be taken for granted. However,
they are not self evident. They enshrine: the peaceful ending of the Cold War and the
transformation of former Warsaw pact countries; the ending of the division within the
European continent; the building of a permanent transatlantic community of values and
interests; the integration and coordination of US, Canadian and European military
forces and capabilities; the contribution to building a new cooperative European secu-
rity system; and support for the arms control and disarmament processes that helped
to end the conflicts in the Balkans and paved the way for Euro-Atlantic integration of
the region.
The Evolution of the Building Integrity Initiative
Following discussions between representatives of the NATO Defence and Security
Economics Directorate, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division and the defence
team of Transparency International (the pre-eminent non-governmental organisation
monitoring international public corruption), the NATO Political-Military Steering Com-
mittee and Political Committee, within the EAPC framework, prepared an initial report
on building integrity in defence establishments, outlining possible EAPC contributions
to building integrity in the security sector. This report was approved by EAPC Ambas-
sadors in November 2007.
The genesis of the Building Integrity initiative also benefited in 2007 from a major
conference addressing inter alia, the linkages between reducing corruption and the
better management of defence resources. This conference, organised by the NATO
Economic Committee in EAPC session,2 together with a workshop on Building
2 Defence Economics IX: Lessons Learned in Defence Resource Management from the NATO
Accession 2004”, Ljubljana, Slovenia, September 2007.
Transparency and Integrity in the Defence and Security Sector,3 did much to demon-
strate the importance of, and interest in, the role and measurement of integrity in the
better management of defence resources.
Within the EAPC framework, the Building Integrity initiative has been conceived
and nurtured in a 10 point Work Plan. The heart of the 10 point EAPC Building Integrity
Work plan has been the development of an education module led by the UK; a Self
Assessment Questionnaire, developed by Poland; and the development of this Best
Practices Compendium led by Switzerland.
Building Integrity and NATO Summit Declarations 2009 and 2008
NATO’s commitment to meeting the challenge of introducing reforms to combat cor-
ruption and foster good governance in the defence sector was underscored in the
communiqué from the 60th Anniversary Summit in Kehl-Strasbourg where Heads of
State and Government (paragraph 36) encouraged the EAPC “to further develop the
Building Integrity initiative which promotes transparency and accountability in the de-
fence sector, and to report back to us on this initiative at our next Summit” (in Lisbon in
autumn 2010).
This declaration followed on the seminal statement on the Building Integrity initia-
tive at the 2008 summit in Bucharest. In Bucharest, Heads of State and Government
had asserted that: “We will give priority to several new practical initiatives, which in-
clude building integrity in defence institutions…”(Paragraph 32)
Trust Funds and the Building Integrity Trust Fund
The Building Integrity Trust Fund is funded through voluntary contributions and is led
jointly by three nations: Poland, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This fund was
launched on 1 July 2008 in order to build integrity and reduce the risk of corruption in
defence establishments.
This is the first trust fund project aimed at providing practical support to defence in-
stitution building. The pilot project phase (Phase 1) was based upon three pillars: a
training module in Bulding Integrity in Defence Establishments; an Integrity Self-As-
sessment Process; and a Compendium of Best Practices in Building Integrity and Re-
ducing Corruption in Defence. In practice, these elements have implied the develop-
ment of building integrity courses for civilian and military personnel that have been of-
fered on a trial basis at the United Kingdom Defence Academy, the NATO School in
Germany and The Peace Support Operations Training Centre in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The practical training in the other two elements has led to the development of a self
assessment tool (that various nations have used in a trial) and the commissioning of
essays for this Compendium. These activities have benefited significantly from the ad-
vice, inputs and contributions of partners from civil society, including the Centre for the
3 Building Transparency and Integrity in the Defence and Security Sector, UK Defence Acad-
emy, Shrivenham, UK, July 2007.
Democratic Control of the Armed Forces and the Geneva Centre for Security Policy,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom Defence Academy, (a Partner for Peace Training and
Education Centre of Excellence) and Transparency International. Phase 2 of the ac-
tivities underpinned by the Trust Fund will consider the best ways of embedding and
deepening this cooperation.
Training and Education
In reaching out to Partners old and new, it is vital to recognise that the continual proc-
ess of managing change in the defence and security sector requires further, and
deeper, training and education of individuals and personnel. More than 50 % of
NATO’s partnership programme is devoted to training and education, incorporating
operational capabilities and good governance.
In the case of the Building Integrity initiative, this project has been developed in
close consultation with Partnership for Peace (PfP) training centres and representa-
tives of other international organizations. In addition to supporting PfP priorities, the
initiative is intended to help nations meet their obligations within the UN framework, in-
cluding the implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption.
The Financial and Democratic Challenges to Defence Reform
The budgets for training and education in the defence sector, and elsewhere, within
national economies will not escape from the potential savings that finance ministries
are seeking to effect at a time of economic hardship. The global economic crisis has
imposed, and is imposing, severe and sustained pressures on the financial resources
of the public sector of many countries. Such pressures, reflected in growing public
sector deficits and rising national debt, have created highly publicised political and so-
cial unrest in developed and less developed economies alike.
In this volatile environment afflicting many countries, the claims of the defence and
security sectors to maintain or increase their shares of public expenditure are subject
to increasing scrutiny and critical evaluation. Increasingly, the imperative is to ensure
that scarce resources allocated to the defence sector are used not only efficiently
(through strong defence resource management) but are seen to be accountable and
transparent. This is vital if taxpayers are to be convinced that their tax revenues are
being used by governments in ways that are both judicious and honest. The Building
Integrity initiative can make an important contribution to raising public awareness of
the application of prudent, ethical and transparent financial management in the de-
fence sector.
NATO Values and Building Integrity
NATO has, since its inception, emphasised that membership of the Alliance is based
on values and performance that are underpinned by various key ideals such as: de-
mocratic governance and the protection of human rights; recruitment, on the basis of
merit, of competent and credible professionals to public service; the establishing of
more effective, accountable and transparent administration at all levels of Government;

and the implementation of measurable improvements in fighting corruption, upholding
justice and the rule of law.
Following the introduction of the Partnership Action Plan in Defence Institution
Building at the NATO Summit in Istanbul in 2004, a foundation for improving the effi-
cient and accountable management of defence resources was established. The devel-
opment of a practical programme to combat corruption, strengthen governance and
build integrity in the defence sector is increasingly seen as vital to the efforts of part-
ners to build efficient and transparent defence institutions. In this regard, the efforts of
the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council to highlight the value of anti-corruption initiatives
have been, and are, of great importance.
Transformation and the Management of Change in the Defence Sector
During its six decades, NATO has sought to strengthen the Alliance and its partner-
ships through managing change and encouraging transformation in the defence sec-
tor. The ten pillars of the Partnership for Peace Framework Document on Defence In-
stitution Building 4 was, as previously noted, a major initiative that has supported de-
fence institution building and security sector reform in countries inside and outside the
Partnership for Peace.
The tools and methodologies of defence reform, exemplified by the Building Integ-
rity initiative, have supported, and are supporting, ongoing reform in NATO members,
as well as in the diverse partnerships with more than 40 countries in Eastern and Cen-
tral Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Gulf and, further a field, to countries such as
Australia, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Singapore. The Building Integrity
tools, when completed, will be made available to all interested parties through the
NATO website.
The International Effort in Reducing Risks in Corruption
Neither NATO nor the EAPC have the international lead in building integrity or reduc-
ing risks of corruption. NATO’s efforts support the wider international effort and are di-
rected at developing practical activities to help nations meet their international treaty
obligations to the UN, (the UN Convention against Corruption), the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and others. The efforts undertaken
by NATO and the EAPC are targeted at building integrity, increasing transparency and
improving accountability within the defence and security sector, specifically.
4 The Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB) aims to reinforce ef-
forts by Partner countries to reform and restructure their defence institutions to meet domes-
tic needs as well as international commitments. Effective and efficient state defence institu-
tions under civilian and democratic control are fundamental to stability in the Euro-Atlantic
area, and essential for international security cooperation.
NATO’s values, previously defined, are fundamental to the further strengthening of

governance in defence ministries. Defence ministries in Allied and Partner nations are
in no doubt as to the continuing challenges posed by corruption and recognise the
need to implement measures that will address this malaise in a serious, comprehen-
sive and transparent manner.
National Ownership and International Cooperation
Participation in, and implementation of, the Building Integrity initiative is the decision
and responsibility of nations. National ownership and commitment is the pre-requisite
and basis of involvement. As the initiative has developed, it has clearly benefited from
excellent and ongoing cooperation between nations, NATO, defence industry and
Transparency International. This cooperation is testimony to the strength that comes
from the shared values and interests of all of the relevant organisations and actors.
As previously noted, the interest in, and support for, building integrity reflects the fi-
nancial pressures increasingly imposed by finance ministries upon defence and secu-
rity budgets at a time of increasing financial stringency arising from the deep and dam-
aging international recession. Allies and Partners understand the need to spend in-
creasingly scarce resources in an effective, efficient and visible manner. In this regard,
the Building Integrity initiative can contribute to this objective in providing practical
tools to build capacity and ensure value for money.
Working in Cooperation
NATO’s experiences in Afghanistan and the Balkans have demonstrated that the secu-
rity challenges of today necessitate that the international community works coopera-
tively in combining civil and military measures and coordination. Working together ef-
fectively requires the cooperation and contribution of all major actors. It is essential for
all international actors to act in a concerted manner that takes into account respective
strengths and mandates. NATO is strengthening its ability to work effectively with part-
ner countries, international organisations, non-governmental organisations and local
authorities, enhancing synergy at all levels. Such cooperation applies equally to NATO
operations and the continuing efforts to transform in order to meet the challenges of
the 21st Century. The principal international organisations are increasingly involved in
the development and delivery of policies that will bring a more integrated approach to
defence reform, security and development.
Such an integrated approach applies not only to operations but more broadly to
many of NATO’s efforts, such as the building of integrity, the fight against terrorism
and the enhancing of energy security. For these and other reasons, NATO will con-
tinue to seek permanent, structured and cooperative relationships with partner coun-
tries and important international organisations (including the European Union, the
United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development).
The Deliberations and Findings of the Monterey Conference

February 2009
At the end of February 2009, an important international conference took place in
Monterey, California to take stock of what had been achieved in the development of
the Building Integrity initiative and to contemplate the road ahead in broadening and
deepening the implementation of the initiative.
NATO, in cooperation with the Naval Postgraduate School (the Partnership for
Peace Training and Education Centre in North America) and Transparency Interna-
tional, conducted a conference that sought to evaluate the progress made in de-
veloping practical tools and to exchange views on the further implementation of the
Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building agreed at the Istanbul Summit.
The Monterey Recommendations
The recommendations from the Monterey Conference were intended as a contribution
to the stocktaking report that was delivered to EAPC Ambassadors and as guidance in
the further development of a programme of work, including identifying practical activi-
ties to be undertaken by NATO and the EAPC in support of the UN-led effort to build
integrity, increase transparency and improve accountability in the defence sector.
Strengthening Integrity in Theatre
In cooperation with other international organisations, NATO has focused upon as-
sessing the economic footprint of the International Assistance Security Force (ISAF)
and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. In this regard, work has
been undertaken to identify mechanisms that would build integrity, increase transpar-
ency and improve accountability in order to encourage more effective and efficient
spending of resources in theatre, accelerate economic development, and promote best
practices.
In collaboration with other international organisations, NATO has developed and
supported events focused on exchange of knowledge and expertise and the promotion
of best practices for PRTs (including events organised in capitals as well as Afghani-
stan).
Strengthening Integrity through Education
It was recommended that lead nations would continue to provide support through the
Building Integrity Trust Fund to implement the Building Integrity in Defence Establish-
ments (BIDE) package. This package included 2009 trial courses in Ukraine, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Afghanistan.
Taking account of the work undertaken by the NATO School in using electronic
platforms, and the experience of others (such as the African Security Sector Reform
Network,) efforts have continued in order to develop a network of practitioners able to
promote best practices and exchange experiences and information.
The UK Defence Academy, together with other interested parties, has continued to
develop course material to be used as a “stand alone” and to support a Distance
Learning Module. Taking account of the results of 2008 self assessment process and
the 2009 trials, recommendations are being developed to strengthen the link with on-
going NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) force planning activities and other tailored
programmes of work such as Individual Partnership Action Plans.
Working with interested NATO and national education institutions, including PfP
Training and Education Centres, as well as representatives of civil society, a schedule
of BIDE activities for 2010-2012 has been developed. Such activities include the
preparation of modules to be integrated into existing training and education (such as
development of a pre-deployment training module).
Efforts have been made with others, such as the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, to
pursue potential opportunities for collaboration that draws upon the expertise of par-
liamentarians. This offers the possibility of developing modules tailored for members of
parliament and staffers.
Strengthening Integrity in Procurement
The conference took account of the initiatives and efforts of the aerospace and de-
fence industry to develop a common Trans-Atlantic industry code of conduct. Efforts
continue to be made to incorporate such developments into the further elaboration of
the Building Integrity in Defence Establishments (BIDE) initiative. On this basis, it has
been agreed to explore the feasibility of a best practices workshop on Common Indus-
try Standards on building integrity, increasing transparency and improving accountabil-
ity.
Furthermore, the intention is to continue to promote the exchange of nations’ ex-
periences on reducing corruption risks in procurement. These exchanges can include
the development of workshops and roundtables, focusing on improving financial rules
and regulations, implementing Building Integrity ethics programmes, and using e-pro-
curement to increase competition and improve accountability. A Best Practice Work-
shop on “Ethics and Procurement took place in Norway in autumn 2009.
In addition, it was recognised that offsets accompanying defence procurement can
involve additional corruption risks and contribute to a misallocation of resources. All
nations might review policies directed at offsets in order to take steps to identify the
risks and to increase transparency and improve accountability accompanying the im-
plementation of offsets. Such steps can include a review of procedures associated with
the award of offsets, ensuring that tender prices, with and without offsets, will be com-
pared in order to facilitate a quantitative assessment of the costs and benefits.
Strengthening Integrity through Research and Analysis
The importance of encouraging the NATO Defence College, the NATO School, and
relevant PfP Training and Education Centres and NATO Centres of Excellence to in-
corporate Building Integrity initiatives in their courses and research agendas has been
widely acknowledged. Such efforts might include the strengthening of integrity at the
level of PRTs and identifying best practices, with the results to be shared in NATO and
national publications and conferences.
NATO/EAPC Support to Strengthening Integrity
It is clear that nations need to reinforce existing efforts for the development and im-
plementation of the Building Integrity work programme. Drawing on voluntary national
contributions and interns, such an approach can enhance national capacity building
efforts and promote best practices.
A key element in the ongoing work of the initiative is for nations to continue to pro-
vide resources to the Building Integrity Trust Fund in Phase 2. In addition, the NATO
International Staff will continue to work with the Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development to identify contributions to the Trust Fund that are eligible as Of-
ficial Development Assistance.
Future Work and Ambitions
The Monterey Conference was a major milestone in propelling the Building Integrity
initiative. The conference took note of the proposal that a similar stocktaking confer-
ence on Building Integrity in Defence Establishments could take place in 2011 with the
Naval Postgraduate School once more acting as the host. From these recommenda-
tions, a stocktaking report has been prepared for EAPC Ambassadors, including the
proposed work programme for 2010-2012.
Building Integrity in a Turbulent World
The defence and security sectors of many countries are part of an ongoing interna-
tional financial turbulence that is imposing severe budgetary pressures. Major defence
and security reviews are taking place to assess the correct level of resources to flow
into these sectors, given the competing claims of so many other areas of public ex-
penditure such health, education and transport infrastructure.
In the three years since the Building Integrity initiative was launched, the need to
strengthen values, governance, reforms and international cooperation remains of
paramount importance. The initiative has an enduring importance in enabling nations
to implement mechanisms that will raise the standards of public administration, ac-
countability and judicial reforms. Such mechanisms will also assist in providing addi-
tional resources for defence capabilities by reducing the waste of resources from cor-
ruption.
In conclusion, The Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence Compen-
dium of Best Practices offers considerable insights and draws upon a variety of ex-
periences concerning practical approaches for tackling the corruption challenge. These
insights and experiences will help nations to implement far-reaching defence reforms
that can serve to reduce corruption risks in defence and security sectors of nations
across the world.
Chapter 4
National Approaches in Support of
Corruption in Defence
It is not only NATO as an alliance but also individual member countries and partners
that support integrity building initiatives. This chapter presents several examples of
state-of-the-art approaches to support such initiatives and recommendations derived
from best practices.
Box 4.1 presents a national view that supports the wider role of NATO and the
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in initiatives aimed to build integrity and re-
duce corruption risks in defence establishments.
Box 4.1. Fighting Corruption in Defence: A View from Switzerland

The importance of fighting corruption is taking on increasing significance in the realm of inter-
national security. This is being recognised within the NATO Alliance and by its civil society
partners. In each of the big topics in international security today—weapons of mass destruc-
tion, missile defence, civil wars, climate change—building integrity, increasing transparency
and establishing the rule of law will have a strong impact in and of themselves, and will also
thereby have a strong impact on international security.
With this recognition, Switzerland supports the EAPC Partnership Action Plan on Defence In-
stitution Building and is among the lead nations, together with Poland and the United Kingdom,
for the Building Integrity Trust Fund.
Source: HE Ambassador Jean-Jacques de Dardel, Ambassador of Switzerland to NATO,

Address to the Building Integrity and Defence Institution Building Conference, Monterey, CA
(25-27 February 2009).
31
The U.S. Approach to Integrity Building 1

Foundations
The US approach in assisting partners’ efforts to reduce defence corruption is based
on the strength of partnerships, a comprehensive approach to security sector reform
and a focus on enhancing defence institutions.
It recognises the importance of partnerships in helping nations provide for their own
security, as well as for the common security. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, dur-
ing a much-heralded lecture at Kansas State University in 2007, has said that, “argua-
bly, the most important military component in our common struggle against terrorism is
not the fighting we do ourselves, but how we enable and empower our partners to de-
fend and govern themselves.” Consistent with Secretary Gates’ remarks, the US De-
partment of Defense has substantially increased the resources devoted to enhancing
the governance capacity of partner countries.
Secondly, the Department of Defense, the Department of State and the US Agency
for International Development (USAID) have agreed on a common set of guiding prin-
ciples for a more comprehensive approach to security sector reform.2 The document
provides practitioners from the two departments and USAID with guidelines for plan-
ning and implementing security sector reform programs with foreign partner nations
and deals comprehensively with reform efforts directed at the institutions, processes
and forces that provide security and promote the rule of law.
One of these guiding principles is that operational support must be balanced with
institutional reform. Thus, the emphasis is on how the forces built with US assistance
are managed, financed, monitored and supported. It is recognised that success and
sustainability of the forces depends on the institutions and processes that support
these forces, as well as the human capacity to lead and manage them. The guidelines
further note that the principles of good governance—accountability, transparency, re-
spect for human rights and legitimacy—must be mainstreamed into the development of
security forces and institutions.
The understanding that building integrity is an integral and indispensable part of
building defence institutions forms the third foundation of the US approach. In part, the
US concern about integrity proceeds directly from the concern about corruption and its
1 The description of the US approach is based on the presentation of Honorable Joseph

Benkert, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, USA. Building Integrity
and Defence Institution Building, Conference Report (Monterey, CA: 25–27 February 2009).
2 US Agency for International Development, US Department of Defense and US Department of
State, Security Sector Reform (February 2009), www.state.gov/documents/organization/
115810.pdf.
National Approaches in Support of Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence 33
corrosive effects. Corruption is a threat to our common security. It is no less dangerous

than an external foe sabotaging the defence capacity. It gives aid and comfort to our
common enemies.
Building integrity and reducing corruption are two sides of the same coin. The con-
cern for integrity, however, has a more positive basis. Just as the responsibility for se-
curity is shared, so is our responsibility to defend it with institutions that reflect the na-
ture of the North-Atlantic Alliance, an alliance to safeguard the freedom of our people
and founded on principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. The
United States seeks to work with NATO and international and non-governmental or-
ganizations toward improving defence institutions through greater transparency and
accountability.
Key Components
Building integrity, transparency and accountability into defence institutions has internal
elements of institutional capacity, as well as some external elements. Institutional ca-
pacity is the people, processes, organization and infrastructure required to develop,
manage, sustain and employ capabilities to achieve national security goals. It is criti-
cal, therefore, to address all of these components—people, processes, organizations
and infrastructure—in integrity building programmes.
People
Success starts with people. Institutions are only shells in which talented professionals
turn ideas and resources into the tools of security. Education and training of defence
professionals, both military and civilian, is therefore at the core of fostering a culture of
integrity in defence institutions. Integrity must be a prominent feature in professional
development systems. Education must prepare the most likely targets of corruption, for
example those in the acquisition field, to recognize clear ethical boundaries and pro-
vide support systems for legal advice and counselling so that they can respond appro-
priately.
A culture of integrity is essential but defence professionals also need the tools to
act on these principles. Education of defence professionals needs to provide them with
the means of assessing their institutions’ transparency and accountability, knowledge
of best practices in these areas and a practical understanding of how to implement
these practices. Education and training that fosters ethics and integrity, and provides
the tools to build institutional integrity, is not a one-time event but a continuing re-
quirement over a professional career.
Processes and Mechanisms
A second required component of institutional capacity is building integrity into the
processes and mechanisms around which institutions function. It is well understood
that transparency mechanisms need to be integral to planning, budgeting and pro-

curement systems. Contracting and procurement systems should include multiple-key
systems that require oversight and clearly defined points of approval and review. Con-
sistent with national security, there should be systems to provide external reviews of
these processes and the decisions resulting from them. These mechanisms and proc-
esses must be informed by the host nations’ history, legal system and culture, and will
not work without host nation ownership.
Organization
The third critical element is the internal organizations that promote and provide ac-
countability and oversight. In the United States, for example, almost all government
agencies have independent monitors – the inspectors general. They provide account-
ability and support anonymous reporting by those who may fear retaliation in response
to taking courageous action.
In addition to independent monitors, there are internal organizations that help pre-
vent problems – for example, legal and ethical advisors that can guide policymakers or
officials at potential points of failure. A small amount of prevention, perhaps in the form
of periodic legal review or advice to a procurement official, may avoid the need for
more costly investigations and prosecutions.
Infrastructure
Fourth, there is the infrastructure of integrity, transparency and accountability. The
term “infrastructure” often engenders thoughts of buildings and computer systems. We
mean here the legal and policy frameworks that are essential to integrity in defence in-
stitutions – for example, the requirement to develop and publish standards of conduct
and procedures that codify the processes and mechanisms of transparency and ac-
countability. Integrity pacts—one of the “best practices” in building integrity—are ex-
cellent examples of going beyond traditional means to build the infrastructure of integ-
rity.3
External Components
There are also elements of integrity, transparency and accountability that are external
to defence institutions and yet critical to their success. Defence institution building
campaigns will not be fully successful if they are not integrated with broader security
sector reform efforts external to defence institutions.
The guidelines for US government security sector reform efforts, issued in Febru-
ary 2009, are unique in that they were jointly developed and issued by the Defense
Department, the State Department and the Agency for International Development.
3 Chapters 7, 16 and 17 provide guidelines and examples of implementation of Defense

Integrity Pacts.
They are significant in that they recognize the need for more comprehensive ap-
proaches that integrate defence, development and diplomatic tools across the range of
institutions and elements relevant to security sector reform, including components ex-
ternal to security institutions.
The first and perhaps most important external components are the parliaments and
legislatures, needed to provide a strong foundation in law for defence sector work.
These laws must be proscriptive, requiring transparency, and prohibitive, defining ille-
gal acts and demanding accountability. Parliaments should provide oversight of secu-
rity institutions and play a critical role in ensuring transparency and accountability in
defence budgeting and acquisition. Our approach to integrity in defence institutions
must include programs to support the key role of elected legislatures.
Second, the defence sector requires a strong external rule of law framework to ef-
fectively ensure transparency and accountability. It is recognised, for example, that
bolstering a defence institution’s criminal investigative capacity may prove an exercise
in futility without ensuring that the host country’s justice system is well-functioning. A
country’s security policies and practices must be founded on the rule of law and linked
to the broader justice sector. Our assistance should aim to ensure that defence institu-
tions operate within a functioning framework of domestic and international law, and
that these institutions support efforts to promote and enforce the rule of law.
NATO membership responsibilities include political as well as military elements.
The concept that defence is interconnected with the other aspects of governance is
well-grounded in the alliance. Thus, efforts to build integrity in defence institutions
need to be synchronized with security sector reform efforts in other ministries.4
Third, civil society organizations have a role to play in ensuring transparency and
accountability in defence institutions. Actors such as professional organizations, civil-
ian review boards, think tanks, advocacy organizations, non-governmental organiza-
tions, media and other groups are included here. Responsible civil society organiza-
tions should be looked upon as partners and enablers toward a common goal of insti-
tutional integrity.
In addition to monitoring security sector performance, civil society has an important
role in articulating public demand for integrity, transparency and accountability from all
levels and branches of government. Leaders are expected to address the requirement
for an institutional culture of integrity. This culture must be inherent in all components
of government and at all levels, and be bolstered by civil society. Our common work is
building the capacity of individual nations to provide for their own security and—as al-
lies and partners—to contribute to our common security. This work requires not only
building capable security forces but building the capabilities and capacity of institutions
4 NATO expects that this understanding is reflected in any “Membership Action Plan” of a
partner country.
that manage and support these forces. To be effective and to be seen as legitimate,
these institutions need to demonstrate integrity, to be transparent and accountable.
The United States can help in building such institutions.
The Canadian Approach to Security Sector Reform and its Role
in Afghanistan 5
Canada has been an important player in Afghanistan, punching above its weight, par-
ticularly if one considers the development resources it has brought to the table and the
military responsibilities it has assumed in the conflict in view of its traditional peace-
keeping role. Canada is only one actor in a broad coalition of other countries and their
peace support forces, as well as NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, private mili-
tary and security companies, and the local and international media (not to mention the
Afghan government itself, whose role is crucial).
The Canadian approach to SSR in Afghanistan is some seven years old. Canadi-
ans have attempted to take a comprehensive and integrated approach in their efforts
and have encouraged other governments—donors as well as the Afghan govern-
ment—to do likewise. A balance has been sought between governance initiatives and
those seeking to enhance the ability of the Afghan security forces to assume responsi-
bility for security delivery in the country on behalf of the population. These positive
elements form an integral part of the current Canadian government’s new approach to
Afghanistan.
Since the end of the Cold War, Canada has adopted four overarching frameworks
for conceptualizing and orienting its activities on behalf of development and, in par-
ticular, on behalf of troubled states: human security, the 3-D approach, the “whole of
government” approach and security sector reform. While these concepts have entered
the policy discourse at different intervals, they are not mutually exclusive (Figure 4.1).
Instead, they tend to enjoy a certain level of simultaneous currency and they all figure
in varying degrees as mobilizing constructs for Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan.
Canada’s objectives in Afghanistan have varied little since the initial engagements
involving Canadian troops in 2001–02 and despite the three changes of government
that have taken place in Canada during this period. Among the main objectives is to
foster stability and development in Afghanistan in keeping with Canada’s general
commitment to promoting human security in fragile states.6
5 This section is based on: David Law, “Canada in Afghanistan: Concepts, Policies, Actors,
and Prospects,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 8:3 (Summer 2009): 25–51.
6 “Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan” (known also as the Manley
Report) (2008), http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/collection_2008/dfait-maeci/FR5-20-1-2008E.pdf.
Canada’s combat mission in Afghanistan has been the defining fact that has made
it possible for the Canadian contingent to carry out a range of SSR-related activities.
The overarching framework for these activities is laid out in the Afghanistan Compact
and the more detailed Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which has
set out a five-year program of cooperation between the government of Afghanistan and
the international community in three areas: security; governance, rule of law and hu-
man rights; and economic and social development (with counter-narcotics as a cross-
cutting fourth program area). The activities of the main Canadian governmental de-
partments engaged in Afghanistan have dovetailed closely with the first three of these
program areas.
The work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan has been
vital with respect to SSR. PRTs are civil-military partnerships designed to facilitate the
development of a secure environment for reconstruction in the Afghan regions. PRTs
are structured as civil-military partnerships. Only the military elements of PRTs are in-
tegrated in the ISAF chain of command. Among the primary purposes of PRTs is to
support, as appropriate (and within their means and capabilities), security sector re-
form activities in order to facilitate the reconstruction effort.
What?
Security
Sector Reform
How? By whom?
Security
WGA Justice
3-D Approach
Approach Development
Governance
Human
Security
For whom?
Figure 4.1: Concepts and Relationships in Security and Development.

In follow-up to the Manley Report, Ottawa has published a report titled “Canada’s
Engagement in Afghanistan: Setting a Course to 2011.”7 This report offers a candid as-
sessment of the situation in Afghanistan. Regarding governance, it decries persistent
shortcomings owing to the weak capacity of Afghan government institutions and wan-
ing public trust because of continuing widespread corruption. The report lays out a
number of initiatives that have been undertaken:
• At home, Canada created a Cabinet Committee on Afghanistan and inter-de-
partmental coordination of Canadian policy has been moved to the Privy
Council of the prime minister, with a dedicated full-time staff headed by dep-
uty ministers from Foreign Affairs, Defence, Public Safety, and the Canadian
International Development Agency.
• Ottawa has committed itself to making quarterly reports to parliament and its
newly created Special Committee on Afghanistan, and to ensuring a better
flow of information to the press and the Canadian public regarding its policy in
Afghanistan. Ottawa has also promised to develop a system of benchmarks
for measuring progress on the security, governance and development fronts
in Afghanistan, and on Canadian efforts in these regards.
• Canadian efforts within Afghanistan have been recalibrated. Security and
development assistance have been focused on the Kandahar province, while
a senior-level civilian representative is to be appointed to the PRT in Kanda-
har and the overall number of Canadian civilians in the country is set to in-
crease significantly. In-country, Canadian actors are to be given more discre-
tion in making policy to address local conditions. In the country as a whole,
Canada is committed to pursuing its efforts to advance Afghanistan’s capacity
for democratic governance and effective government decision making, as well
as helping to bring about national political reconciliation.
Recommendations
• Initiatives to build integrity in defence need to be examined primarily in the
context of defence institution building.
• Defence institution building, in particular in fragile states, is to be set in wider
security sector reform efforts, closely coordinated with development assis-
tance.
7 Government of Canada, Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan: Setting a Course to 2011

(Ottawa: Government of Canada, June 2008).
Box 4.2. Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States

In 2007, the OECD Development Assistance Committee, comprising development ministers
and heads of agencies of most donor countries, endorsed a Policy Commitment and set of
Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations.
These principles reflect a growing consensus that fragile states require responses that are
different from better performing countries, and recognise that:
• Fragile states confront particularly severe development challenges such as weak gov-
ernance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crisis, persistent social
tensions, violence or the legacy of civil war;
• A durable exit from poverty and insecurity for the world’s most fragile states will need to
be driven by their own leadership and people;
• Although international engagement will not by itself put an end to state fragility, the
adoption of the shared principles can help maximize the positive impact of engagement
and minimise unintentional harm.
The long-term vision for international engagement in fragile states is to help national reform-
ers build legitimate, effective and resilient state institutions. Progress towards this goal requires
joined-up and coherent action within and among governments and organisations. The princi-
ples, therefore, emphasise the need to:
• Take context as the starting point;
• Ensure all activities do no harm;
• Focus on state-building as the central objective;
• Prioritise prevention;
• Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives;
• Promote non discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies;
• Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts;
• Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between international actors;
• Act fast but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance;
• Avoid pockets of exclusion (“aid orphans”).
By 2007, the principles were field-tested in nine countries and already started to catalyse be-
haviour change among donors. Ongoing work of the OECD DAC Fragile State Group aims to
offer more operational guidance consistent with the principles in order to sharpen donor strate-
gies and programmes in fragile states.
Source: OECD DCD-DAC, “Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States” website,
www.oecd.org/document/46/0,3343,en_2649_33693550_35233262_1_1_1_1,00.html; OECD, Whole of
Government Approaches to Fragile States (Paris: OECD, 2007), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/
37826256.pdf.
• Interagency coordination, both at home and in theatre, is key for the success
of security sector reform efforts.
• Interagency coordination that is transparent and provides mechanisms for
timely accountability to parliaments and involvement of civil society is key for
the legitimacy of security and development missions and continuous public
support.
Part II
Corruption Risks and
Vulnerabilities in Defence
The second part of the compendium includes nine chapters that examine in detail the
sources and the reasons for corruption in defence. Seven of the chapters examine cor-
rupt behaviour, as well as good practices in building integrity and enhancing transpar-
ency and accountability in main defence management areas: personnel policies and
manpower management, defence budgeting and financial management, procurement,
offset arrangements, outsourcing, privatization, public-private partnerships in defence,
utilisation of surplus equipment and infrastructure, and the involvement of defence
personnel and assets in economic activities. Chapter 12 focuses on corruption risks
and integrity issues related to contemporary military operations, while Chapter 13
examines defence-related corruption in countries with unresolved territorial disputes or
frozen conflicts.
41
Chapter 5
Personnel Policies
For the general public, corruption in personnel issues—including but not limited to the
personnel management system—are neither the most visible nor the most sensational
forms of corruption. They are, however, often the most pervasive and arguably the
most corrosive to the defence system as a whole since they undermine the effective
use of its most vital resource—its people. This chapter will examine the sources and
impact of corrupt practices in the area of personnel, and will present the principles of
successful anticorruption measures, as well as some examples of how these principles
have been successfully applied in practice.
The goal of the defence personnel management system is to ensure that the right
numbers of people with the right mix of skills and experience are in the right positions
to provide for defence outputs—current operations, future capabilities, command and
control, etc. If the personnel management system is to function effectively, it must
perform two complementary functions (see Figure 5.1):
1. Determine human resource requirements, based on current and future de-
fence requirements and force plans. These include short-term requirements
to meet the needs of the current force, mid-term (5-6 year) requirements for
the evolving force, and long-term (15+ year) requirements for meeting long-
term development goals.
2. Manage and develop people—as individuals and in aggregate—to maximize
the human resources available to meet requirements. This requires system-
atic efforts to attract, train, motivate, assign, promote and retain personnel to
ensure an available pool of personnel with needed professional competencies
(knowledge, skills and experience).
For corrupt officials, it is the second function that is the most interesting; personnel
management decisions that have a direct impact on people’s lives provide substantial
opportunities for corruption. The first function is of less (illicit) interest, as the decisions
involved are not easily translated into individual benefit. Yet from the perspective of
building integrity, the existence of an effective requirements system is essential, since
this creates a clear standard measure, linked to defence policy and plans, against
which to measure the effectiveness of personnel decisions.
43
Figure 5.1: Personnel Management Functions (Simplified).1
Forms of Corruption Related to Personnel Issues

Officials with responsibility for personnel decisions have tremendous scope for cor-
ruption, whether they be in a serviceman’s chain of command or in specialized per-
sonnel administrations. Any decision that has an impact on a serviceman can be a
vehicle: favourable assignments, financial or professional awards, or distribution of
scarce benefits (for example, housing). So are issues of a more mundane nature, such
as daily work assignment or authorization of time off. In addition, the tremendous au-
thority that superiors have over subordinates—by law or custom—also provides op-
portunities for corruption, either through bribery by subordinates to avoid difficult or
dangerous work, or though extortion by superiors or older soldiers. In general, how-
ever, corruption in the personnel area falls into three principle forms: theft/extortion,
bribery and influence networks.
Theft / Extortion
Officials charged with providing a benefit, such as serviceman’s pay or material allow-
ances like food, uniforms, or housing, divert a share of these assets to personal use.
This is sometimes done by blatantly not delivering the goods but more frequently uses
deceptive techniques like “ghost soldiers” or cash kickbacks. Another sort of corruption
is when superiors—whether officers or other soldiers—abuse their authority to steal
personal property or extort payment or personal services, based on direct threats to
1 Adapted from Jack Treddenick, “Manpower Management,” in Defence Management: An

Introduction (Geneva: DCAF, 2009), 127.
Personnel Policies 45
career or safety. Soviet-style “nomenklatura” systems, with their strong commanders’

prerogatives and embedded hazing systems, provide considerable opportunities for
such abuse of authority.
Bribery
Officials with the power to provide a positive personnel decision accept—or expect—
compensation from the individual who benefits by that decision. This can range from
minor gifts (e.g. a bottle of wine or vodka) to major cash bribes. In otherwise function-
ing systems, this is most often used to bend or break rules so that the individual gains
a benefit (i.e. favourable assignment, selection for education, extended time off) that
would not be granted through a strict application of regulations or policy. Where cor-
ruption is endemic, bribe expectations are systemic; without one, the system will not
deliver the desired results, regardless of the merits of the case. Where the benefit to
the individual of a personnel decision is monetary (for example, an assignment with
additional pay), the expected bribe is frequently proportionate to that expected benefit.
While on the surface such systemic corruption may seem merely transactional, with
prices well-known and evenly applied, it is at its core coercive – based on the denial of
rights legitimately due to servicemen by those in positions of trust or responsibility.
Influence Networks
This is a variation on bribery and frequently co-exists with it. Rather than money alone,
the currency of corruption is information, favours and influence. In authoritarian, stove-
piped bureaucracies information is at a premium and informal exchange of information
outside official channels can provide substantial benefits in terms of influence (or cor-
ruption opportunities). In addition, where formal coordination systems are cumber-
some, mutual exchange of favours can become the norm for achieving results. This
can develop into complex networks of mutual exchange of influence and favours, like
the “blat” system in Soviet times, resulting in the development of informal “clans” and
patron-client relationships. Favours inside the defence system may be linked via clan
or family relations to quid-pro-quo and patron-client relations in wider society.
Risks and Remedies in Specific Personnel Management Areas
Every phase of the personnel management cycle (see Figure 5.1) has specific corrup-
tion risks, established schemes and possible remedies. This section will identify some
risks and schemes and provide a few specific examples of best practices to limit cor-
ruption risk. However, it should not be seen as exhaustive; corruption schemes are
limited only by opportunity and imagination.
Recruitment/Conscription
Conscription. Avoiding conscription has been a major source of corruption since Na-
poleon first introduced the modern conscription system in France. Today, it is a major
industry in some countries; in Russia, where conscription is paired with brutal condi-
tions of service, a single draft deferment costs just under $7000 and conscription-re-
lated bribes nationwide are estimated at $350 million annually.2 The method for avoid-
ing conscription is usually the procurement of a document falsely showing that the
prospective conscript is medically disqualified or subject to an educational deferment.
It is also possible to obtain a forged certificate indicating that a prospective conscript
has already served. Producing these documents can involve a network of corrupt offi-
cials in conscription centres, together with doctors and educators. In addition to out-
right draft avoidance, conscription officials may provide preferential assignment to non-
combat or less demanding assignments in return for bribes. They may also use the
threat of dangerous duty to extort bribes. Conscription-avoidance schemes are usually
systemic and pyramidal, with a percentage of funds brought in at the bottom paid in
“tribute” to senior officials at the defence ministry and/or armed forces staff under
whose protection and patronage the scheme operates. Control of this lucrative op-
eration can be a key, unspoken issue in MOD restructuring efforts and can create a
secret lobby against efforts to move to a volunteer force.
Training/Education
Initial officer training
In countries where the prestige of military service is high, selection to initial officer
training programs can be highly competitive – it is not unusual for less than 10% of
applicants to be accepted.3 Social pressure on admission boards to accept candidates
from elite families can be considerable, in addition to illegal financial incentives by
those who see military service as a ticket to joining the social elite. Common methods
of corrupt influence include inflated ratings at personal interviews (often a major part of
the application process) and provision of questions ahead of time for written or oral
exams. Exceptional candidates without connections are on rare occasion given the
opportunity to gain a well-connected patron.
2 Estimate by Moscow-based NGO Indem, from: Alastair Gee, “In Russia, the Favorite
Pastime of Draft Dodging,” US News & World Report (29 December 2008).
3 For example, for the Class of 2013 at the US Naval Academy (Annapolis), only 8.1% of appli-
cants were admitted: www.usna.edu/Admissions/documents/Class%20Portrait%202013.pdf.
Higher military education (staff and war college)

Screening for acceptance into these career-enhancing educational opportunities can
offer significant potential for corruption. In some countries, candidates are expected to
visit members of the review boards on an individual basis to bring gifts and ensure
their participation in patron-client relationships. During the course of studies, teachers
Box 5.1. Building Integrity in Selection for Initial Officer Training

In the United States, coveted appointments to the four-year service academies have histori-
cally been the subject of political pressure. This has been regulated by creating a political
“nomination” process separate from the “admissions” process. All US Congressional repre-
sentatives and senators have the right to have five constituents attend each academy at any
one time. For every vacancy, they are authorized up to ten nominations. Many representatives
and senators run local competitions to select their nominees, although nominations are also
sometimes given out as political favours. In addition, the US president is allowed to appoint up
to one hundred candidates per year from those with at least one parent actively serving in the
armed forces, and the vice-president is allowed to have five candidates, open for general com-
petition. Additional nominations are available to active (enlisted) service members and children
of medal-of-honour winners.
This nomination process creates a legitimate avenue for political influence, while channelling
and limiting it. Politicians have a distinct deliverable that they can provide to a constituent. Yet
the impact of this influence is limited to the first cut, reducing the pool from some 15,000 appli-
cants (to use the example of the US Naval Academy) to an average of approximately 4,500.
The academy then uses a rigorous admissions process, which is completely separate from the
nomination process and involves external boards, to identify the 1,250 candidates that will be
offered appointments. Since candidates apply for nominations (to political figures) and appoint-
ments (to the Naval Academy) in parallel, the academy can work informally with cooperative
nominating authorities to ensure that top candidates for admission also receive a nomination. A
second benefit of the nomination process is that it ensures geographical diversity of academy
students (and thus the officer corps) across the various territorial districts and states repre-
sented by nominating representatives and senators.
In a younger democracy, Ukraine, prestige and historical traditions of military service also
make positions in initial officer training institutions highly competitive. Until recently, admissions
were largely the business of local admissions boards. This was identified as a corruption risk
by the new defence ministry leadership that arrived in early 2005. They downsized a bloated
educational system, cutting enrolment in half and approved a program to reduce entry-level of-
ficers’ training institutions from 9 to 5 (with a reduction in overall academic institutions from
over 60 to 12) by 2011. Stronger central oversight of testing and admissions were put in place,
under the supervision of a deputy defence minister. This substantially reduced corruption op-
portunities.
Sources: White Book, Defence Policy of Ukraine 2005, www.mil.gov.ua; US Naval Academy Admissions
website, www.usna.edu/Admissions/.
may also affect scores and assessments based on bribes or influence, thus affecting
assignment and career development after graduation.
Education abroad
The combination of educational, career and financial opportunities inherent in these
postings make assignment to education abroad a top corruption risk. Such opportuni-
ties are usually offered through international cooperation programs, frequently with full
external financing. As a result, frequently neither normal selection procedures (used
for national courses) nor normal internal financial oversight procedures apply, leaving
officials responsible for international cooperation, education and personnel manage-
ment with considerable discretion—and little systemic accountability—regarding se-
lection of participants. In addition to promoting the candidacies of particular individuals
based on connections or bribes, it is common for the responsible departments to try
and keep a certain number of positions to be distributed to internal candidates. Senior-
level review, often put in place as a check on corruption, can also provide a vehicle for
it when senior leaders lack integrity. Foreign partners are frequently aware of this
problem but are put in the dilemma of having to accept the candidates provided or
forcing the politically and professionally embarrassing cancellation of courses.
Assignments abroad
Coveted positions abroad include attaché postings, staff assignments to international
organizations (like the UN, EU or NATO), liaison positions at international commands
and multinational headquarters, as well as direct participation in peacekeeping opera-
tions. Like education abroad, such assignments often provide vastly increased pay and
substantial career opportunities. Many staff postings also offer a higher quality of life
for the individual and family. Yet, while there is considerable corruption risk, there are
also two limiting factors. First, many of these positions are nationally funded and
therefore selection may be under greater scrutiny. Second, many posts abroad have
high political visibility. In these cases, direct bribery to achieve a position is risky and
influence becomes the corrupt currency of choice. On the other hand, those seeking
lower level positions abroad are much more likely to be forced to make cash pay-
ments. And despite political visibility, all but the most senior personnel may still be
forced to corruptly “motivate” a substantial number of minor or mid-level officials whose
support is needed for required administrative or financials steps.
Corruption risk for participation in peacekeeping operations, however, can be con-
siderably greater. Financial benefits for participating in operations abroad can be sub-
stantial since many nations have laws setting pay for peacekeepers at levels related to
the United Nations’ reimbursements (e.g. 50 % of the UN reimbursement, coming to
about US$700/month). Unlike those in staff positions abroad, who have to cope with
higher living expenses, this money is almost entirely disposable income. The amount
of the bribe can thus be 15–20 % of the expected financial windfall (e.g. up to US$1000
for a 6-month deployment) or even higher. With dozens or even hundreds of people
required for a single operation, and applicants many times this number, corruption risk
and potential profit can be very high – particularly in countries where peacekeeping
contingents are cobbled together from disparate groups of individual soldiers.
Pay & Benefits
Ghost soldiers
Commanders, often with the acquiescence of administrative officials, keep a number of
fictitious soldiers on their roster, receiving pay, food and equipment that can be
pocketed or sold. These “ghost soldiers” sometimes account for up to 20–30 % of a
force. There are also cases of election rigging where such “ghost soldiers” vote—not
surprisingly—overwhelmingly for the government candidate.
Bonuses/prizes
Complex systems of bonuses or awards can be used by those in a position to distrib-
ute them as a tool for ensuring patron-client relationships and potentially for corruption.
Housing
In post-communist countries, housing entitlements for active and retired armed forces
personnel often significantly exceeds supply. Distribution of housing is therefore fre-
quently linked to bribery or influence peddling. One variant is to unequally distribute
funds to build apartments of grossly different sizes, pressuring junior personnel to take
sub-standard housing while senior personnel get luxury apartments.
Medical
Free medical care is a frequent benefit for servicemen, retirees and their dependents.
Nevertheless, quality care is sometimes provided only after bribing doctors or admin-
istrators.
Career Management
In systems where promotion is conditional on occupying a post designated for the ap-
propriate rank, assignment is the most crucial issue for career management. In ex-
change for money or favours, personnel managers may provide advance notice of
openings, preference candidates for assignment and seek to influence commanders to
accept these candidates. Applicants may also be requested to visit commanders for a
personal interview, at which a gift might be expected or a bribe solicited. The same
scheme works for those seeking safe, quiet assignments or postings with potential for
participating in corruption. In the latter case, substantial “advance bribes” may need to
be paid to senior officials on the assumption of future illicit income.
Box 5.2: Building Integrity in Selection for Education or Assignment Abroad

At the end of the 1990s, the Ukrainian system had difficulty making effective use of the many
training and education opportunities available through Partnership for Peace (PfP) and bilateral
military cooperation programs. Decisions were driven by supply—course availability—rather
than a clear set of requirements. Selection of personnel was cosily arranged between the De-
fence Ministry Personnel Department and International Cooperation Department, with little ef-
fective oversight. Corruption and influence peddling were rife in the selection process.
A number of factors helped improve the situation over the next several years. The creation of
the General Staff Partnership for Peace and Peacekeeping Operations Directorate (PPOD) in
1999 provided an institutional proponent for requirements-driven international cooperation, fo-
cused on building interoperability and preparing for operations. That same year, NATO opened
a liaison office, co-located with the PPOD, which added vital real-time information, resources
and political support to PPOD’s efforts. An important step in this effort was a General Staff
decision to link specific activities to specific partnership goals (objectives for reform or increas-
ing interoperability).
By 2002, these efforts had some success: participation in many training and operations-re-
lated PfP activities became more consistent and the quality of personnel attending improved.
But two problems remained. First, there was little improvement in selection for long-term edu-
cational opportunities abroad, which were largely bilateral and therefore outside the NATO and
PPOD remit. Secondly, the system for using local “military commissariats” to man special ad
hoc units for peacekeeping operations allowed considerable corruption.
The leadership that came to the Defence Ministry in February 2005, after the Orange Revo-
lution, took significant steps to address these corruption problems. The minister ordered the
development of an annual plan of all activities abroad, together with the names and positions of
personnel designated to attend, and insisted on personally signing orders for all appointments
abroad. While cumbersome, this high-level visibility helped discipline the system to clearly link
participation in specific activities to actual requirements. To help the minister’s assessments,
the MOD High Attestation Committee, chaired by the First Deputy Minister, reviewed multiple
candidates for key activities like long-term courses abroad, UN observer missions and NATO
postings on a competitive basis. The minister also issued guidance that individuals that had
previously studied abroad, served on international staffs, or participated in UN missions must
typically wait 5 years before they are eligible for similar opportunities a second time.
Regarding peacekeeping operations, the MOD, supported by advice from NATO, changed
the method for generating forces away from creating “ad hoc” units and toward deployment of
standing units. This eliminated the need for reservists to be recalled via the “commissariats,”
which considerably reduced corruption risk.
Finally, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence worked closely with NATO’s Professional Development
Program for civilian personnel in order to establish a requirements-based, competitive system
to drive appointments (see Chapter 22 for more detail on the PDP).
In some systems, candidates for assignment or promotion need to appear person-

ally for questioning before review boards, adding a considerable element of subjectivity
to the board’s decision. Where board membership is constant, candidates may also be
expected to first visit key members in order to gain their support – a process that
provides ample corruption opportunities. It also has the effect of ensuring that candi-
dates are well-embedded in patron-client relationships.
Box 5.3. Building Integrity in Promotion Selection Boards

In order to ensure that selection of officers for promotion is as objective as possible, the United
States operates a highly regulated system of selection boards. A similar process is used to
screen for major career milestones.
Convening & Guidance. Boards are convened as needed (usually annually) by the secretary
(senior political appointee) responsible for the relevant military service. Each rank and competi-
tive category (e.g. combat arms officers, engineering officers, medical officers, etc.) has a
separate board but they often meet at the same time and place. The secretary provides a
Memorandum of Instruction that sets out selection methods, factors to be considered, the
maximum numbers of officers to be selected and reports to be made.
Membership. Boards consist of at least five active duty officers, selected randomly from lists
of nominees provided by commanders as meeting the highest standards of professionalism
and integrity. They must be of a higher rank than the officers under consideration. Often, board
members are unaware of the specific board on which they will serve prior to arriving at its loca-
tion. No officer may serve on two successive selection boards for the same rank and competi-
tive category. Boards are assigned recorders for taking minutes and administrative support.
These are often personnel managers but must not be direct managers of any candidate.
Board members are prohibited from divulging their involvement in an ongoing selection
board to anyone outside their immediate chain of command. Informal office calls or social visits
in the area of the board deliberations are prohibited. No board member may divulge details of
the deliberative process to outside parties, including seniors and subordinates, nor divulge any
results before the official release of the selection list. Board members serve under oath to not
engage in or give the appearance of preferential treatment to any individual or group of officers
under consideration. Board members are obligated to report any suspected impropriety.
Integrity of Process. Information to be provided to the board is strictly regulated and comes
from the officer’s personnel record and correspondence. Boards are announced at least 30
days ahead of time, along with the names of all officers to be considered by the board, to pro-
vide candidates time to review, correct and update their official records. Officers may write a
letter to the board providing additional information or clarification. No memoranda, good or bad,
may be forwarded from third parties, except where attached to correspondence provided by
the officer. Some information, like spouse employment, is forbidden for consideration.
No board member may introduce into deliberation any information, good or bad, other than
that allowed by regulation. Board members’ personal knowledge or evaluation of a candidate’s
professional qualifications can only be considered by boards selecting for promotion to general
officer. No one has the right to represent themselves or anyone else in person in front of the
board or the secretary; efforts to communicate with board members to influence decisions are
an infraction of military regulations. The secretary has the right to appear before the board;
however, all comments made will be recorded, written and distributed to all board members.
The secretary or designee will conduct random interviews of board presidents, members, re-
corders and administrative staff to ensure that boards are conducted according to applicable
law, regulation and guidelines.
Integrity of Decisions. Recommendations are made by a majority vote of board members;
the president of the board is not permitted to use his authority to prevent a vote on any given
candidate. No official, civilian or military, may direct that a particular individual be recom-
mended or not recommended by the board. The Board Report is submitted to the secretary,
who may forward it to the US president for approval, or return it to the board with a request to
review certain matters. If the secretary requests the removal of a name, and provides the
board with additional information, this information must also be provided to the individual, who
is given a chance to respond. The secretary does not, however, have the right to change the
board report; only the US president has the right to remove the name of an officer recom-
mended for promotion prior to the report’s approval. Following approval, the report is submitted
to the US Senate, who approves all promotions to the rank of major and above.
Source: Department of the Army, Officer Promotions, Army Regulation 600–8–29 (25 February 2005),
www.army.mil/usapa/epubs/pdf/r600_8_29.pdf.
Applying the Strategic Approach: Integrity, Transparency,

Accountability
Humans are complex creatures. Assessing this complexity is difficult by logic alone
and our judgements about others are often highly intuitive. This is necessary and
good: our intuitive assessments about other people take into account an enormous
amount of information and are reasonably accurate. However, intuition is also highly
subjective, diverse between people and prone to influence by other psychological
factors. In personnel management, as in leadership, the principle challenge is not to
eliminate intuitive assessment and judgement but rather to balance it with standardi-
sation and objectivity. Any anti-corruption effort must take the limits of objectivity on
personnel matters into account if it is to succeed.
Integrity
At its most fundamental, integrity is about the decision-making process. What infor-
mation was input? What was the decision? Who made it? Why? The integrity of deci-
sion making is maximized—and standardization and objectivity supported—if functions
within the personnel system are clearly delineated. Key functions should include:
• Determining current/future personnel requirements: This creates the
independent yardstick by which other actions are measured. It is a logical
Ministry of Defence/General Staff function.
• Strategic planning for manpower use and development: This sets out policies
and approaches for developing human resources needed to meet require-
ments in the short-, mid- and long-term. It includes developing guidance (for
approval by political authority) for major actions, like selection boards, as well
as setting the framework in which daily personnel decisions will be taken by
personnel administrators and commanders. This is also logically a Ministry of
Defence/General Staff function – but separate from requirements.
• Personnel administration: This supports the real-time personnel actions
needed to recruit, train, educate, promote, qualify, assign and release specific
servicemen. In many systems, there is an autonomous, centrally-run person-
nel administration working directly for senior MOD/armed forces leadership
(within guidance determined by strategic planning). In other systems, this is a
function delegated to services. Within personnel administration, there may
also be a healthy division of function between those responsible for career
management (representing individuals) and those responsible for require-
ments (representing commanders).
• Personnel boards: These provide for consideration, with maximum objectivity
and standardisation, of a consolidated group of candidates for actions like
promotion and major career milestones. Having temporary boards that are
brought together once to act as an impartial jury, based on strict regulations
and guidance, also helps ensure impartiality and reduce corruption risk. See
Box 5.3 for a detailed example.
• Statistics/assessment: This ensures that accurate information regarding
personnel actions—and their aggregate impact—is collected, analyzed and
distributed to all relevant institutions. Ideally, this should be done with a high
degree of autonomy to ensure accurate information on the effectiveness of
personnel management is being provided to senior leaders.
• Commanders: The principle day-to-day customer of the personnel system,
who need to have the flexibility within their commands to freely apply human
resources and perform the highly intuitive skill of leadership to achieve objec-
tives. Commanders, or other superiors, are also the principle source of infor-
mation on personnel performance and frequently play a major role in lobbying
the careers of their subordinates and agreeing to incoming assignments. Yet
their authority should not be arbitrary or absolute, lest for the sake of short-
term expediency it violate the rights of subordinates or undermine the long-
term interest of the armed forces in the development of its human resources.
Each element above works to bring a particular perspective to the personnel man-
agement process. As they do so, their interaction maximizes the integrity of the system
as a whole and increases standardization and objectivity. For this to work, however, it
is important to have internal transparency – whereby accurate information is effectively
distributed to all elements of the system. Of course, the smooth interaction between
various elements is also important to ensure the system operates efficiently.
Transparency
Ensuring transparency in the area of personnel issues is complicated by several fac-
tors. Many important personnel actions are of a routine, almost daily nature, and their
application is diffused across the entire system. Collecting accurate information on
these actions is a challenge, since administrative reporting is usually done via chain-
of-command, making it unlikely that negative information will be forwarded to a higher
authority. Automated, real-time reporting systems, delegated to administrative officials
within commands, can help ensure that the central personnel management system has
complete, up-to-date information on personnel actions taken by commanders.
Another challenge is the cultural divide between units and central staffs. Local de-
viations from written laws and regulations are often socially sanctioned (and perpetra-
tors protected) by unwritten norms and traditions. These unwritten norms are fre-
quently reinforced by the belief that they are an essential part of a military culture that
is vital for success in combat – a strong imperative for those who believe they are
likely to face the test of battle. The enforcement of these cultural norms creates strong
disincentives for whistleblowers. This can only be mitigated by building trust between
the central personnel system and commanders; that is, the “operational” side of the
armed forces must believe that the personnel management system supports the goal
of victory in battle – rather than administrative perfection. Regular distribution of rele-
vant information via message, commanders’ conferences and rotation of operational
personnel into the personnel management system can help convince commanders to
be constructive stakeholders in the wider personnel system, rather than just focusing
on protecting their own prerogatives.
Two additional aspects of transparency are worth mentioning. First is the need to
ensure clarity and broad understanding of personnel requirements in order to ensure
that all elements of the personnel system share a common vision. Second is the need
for transparency to individual servicemen. Servicemen should have full access to their
record and be in a position to dispute and change parts that are in error or that they
feel do not accurately represent their performance. Likewise, commanders’ evaluations
should be fully briefed to subordinates and the latter allowed to make a written state-
ment or to appeal the evaluation. Finally, the results of administrative decisions affect-
ing large groups of servicemen should be published; for example, the results of pro-
motion boards or the list of officers awaiting apartments (and their place in the queue).
The implementation of these lists should also be publicly available.
Accountability
Three levels of accountability are of specific interest for personnel issues. First is the
accountability of commanders and supervisors to the central personnel administration
for the execution of their role in the personnel system. Second is the accountability of
the central personnel manager to the politically appointed civilian executives respon-
sible for the defence establishment. Third is the responsibility of those executives to
parliament and the public.
The individual nature of personnel issues requires a great deal of nuance and
judgement in dealing with specific situations. Best practice indicates that supervisors
that are in regular contact with the individual are in the best position to make such
subjective judgements. Thus, while it is possible to submit such decisions for review by
higher authority, this does not necessarily increase objectivity. If mechanisms are not
in place to bring new information to the review process, such review can rather act as
a further opportunity for subjective decisions – and under conditions where the re-
viewer is far removed from the practical results of the problem. It is important, there-
fore, that central personnel administrations minimize the number of commanders’ de-
cisions subject to automatic review; rather, they should require automatic reporting and
track overall trends to ensure the consistent application of regulations and judgement.
For example, commanders are rightfully the final decision authority on requests for
leave (vacation) time; review at a higher level should only be automatic in cases where
denial of leave would result in certain negative results (e.g. six months without leave,
loss of annual leave allowance, etc.) However, by tracking aggregate data, the central
personnel administration can ensure that a commander’s discretion is being applied
evenly by looking for statistical abnormalities like excessive lost leave for specific
personnel or commanders.
Likewise, senior-level executives are well advised to apply oversight mostly at the
aggregate level, rather than micromanaging specific personnel cases. A principle goal
should be directing and ensuring the integrity of the planning and personnel manage-
ment systems. Important tools include validation of requirements, issuing planning
guidance and providing instructions for selection boards. It is also important to care-
fully review results of specific personnel programs to determine if they are having the
desired impact. Of course, senior executives should review specific personnel deci-
sions with high visibility (and potentially, high corruption risk), as well as conduct spot-
checks to verify system integrity.
A key moment for influencing individual decisions is the selection of senior civil and
military cadre. Best practice will have political discretion applied in making (or validat-
ing) a specific selection out of a pool of candidates that have already been identified by
professional military or civil service boards as being qualified.
Political appointees themselves should be accountable to the government and leg-

islature. Legislative powers should include approving reports from promotion or selec-
tion boards, as well as individual approval for senior cadre. The legislature should also
ensure a clear legal framework regarding human rights and working conditions in the
armed forces. An ombudsman should be charged with ensuring that workplace rights
are respected.
Final Thoughts
Corruption in the area of personnel can substantially undermine defence output—and
national security—in favour of personal gain. Given the enormous resources and time
invested in personnel—decades in the case of senior leaders and technical experts—
the damage can be serious and lasting. Such corruption can become entrenched,
systemic and self-perpetuating as those who paid or pulled strings to rise insist that
future generations follow the same path. The result can be the creation of a “shadow
system” based on personal contacts, loyalty and corruption that is often linked through
retired officers and their families to the wider clan systems within the state. This sub-
verts the regular chain of command and undermines the military ethos of shared risks,
meritocracy and willingness to sacrifice personal profit for wider goals.
Dedicated efforts are needed to counter corruption in personnel systems and pre-
vent—or reverse—damage to defence capability and military ethos. Dedicated efforts
require the dedicated attention of senior leaders, as well as devoted staff. This staff
can be quite small if it is professional, empowered and has direct access to the re-
sponsible senior leader.
Of course, a key task for this staff will be to identify and counter specific corruption
risks and schemes within the personnel management system. But that should not dis-
tract from the principle goal: to build integrity, transparency and accountability of key
decision-making processes. This is best done through implementing a system that
balances central policy, decision making and oversight with commanders’ discretion
and initiative. Criteria for inputs and decision making should be clear. Information
should be available to all stakeholders (within the bounds of privacy) and there should
be measures in place to ensure its accuracy. There should be clarity on who is re-
sponsible for decisions and to whom they are accountable. Perhaps most importantly,
by focusing on a common set of requirements that reflect a common vision and military
ethos, corruption can be made anathema by exposing it for what it is – a key com-
ponent of possible military failure.
Chapter 6
Defence Budgeting
and Financial Management
Defence budgeting is the process of allocating financial resources to defence activities.
It is a comprehensive process encompassing budget planning, execution, reporting
and auditing. Transparent defence budgeting and accountable financial management
are key to ensuring the integrity of all defence activities and reducing the potential for
corruption in defence. Non-transparent financial management in defence combined
with the lack of accountability is a powerful enabler of corrupt practices. Even if there
are no obvious cases of corruption, poor planning, a disconnect between policymak-
ing, planning and budgeting, and poor control of expenditures severely undermine
performance in the defence sector and de-motivate both military and civilian person-
nel.
This chapter focuses on budgeting principles and process issues. Of key interest is
how to promote integrity in the budgeting process. The roles of parliament, the audit
office, society and other players in the process are examined in the respective chap-
ters in part III of this Compendium.
Principles and Requirements
Budgeting and financial management in defence reflect the budgeting procedures and
practices used in the public sector. Hence, the analysis of enablers of corruption in
defence, related to financial management, may start with an analysis of the imple-
mentation of key principles of sound budgeting in the public sector, presented in Box
6.1. Although the mandate of the World Bank does not cover security and defence,
these principles equally apply to budgeting and financial management in the defence
sector.
In the modern understanding of defence budgeting, the allocation of money—and,
respectively, people, materiel and infrastructure—to defence activities clearly supports
the attainment of security and defence objectives and the implementation of military
strategy. In the words of former US President Harry S. Truman, “strategy, programs,
and budget are all aspects of the same basic decisions.”1
1 Public Papers of Presidents of the USA, Harry Truman, 1945 (Washington, DC: US Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1961), 551.
57
Box 6.1. Key Principles of Sound Budgeting of the Public Sector

The World Bank defines the following key principles of sound budgeting and financial manage-
ment, fully applicable to defence budgeting:
• Comprehensiveness: The budget must encompass all fiscal operations;
• Discipline: Decision making must be restrained by resource realities over the medium
term; the budget should absorb only those resources necessary to implement government
policies; and budget allocations should be adhered to;
• Legitimacy: Policymakers who can change policies during implementation must take part
in the formulation and agree to the original policy;
• Flexibility: Decisions should be pushed to the point where all relevant information is avail-
able;
• Predictability: There must be stability in macro and strategic policy and in funding of
existing policy;
• Contestability: All sectors must compete on an equal footing for funding during budget
planning;
• Honesty: The budget must be derived from unbiased projections of revenue and expendi-
ture;
• Information: A medium-term aggregate expenditure baseline against which the budgetary
impact of policy changes can be measured and accurate information on costs, outputs
and outcomes should be available;
• Transparency: Decision makers should have all relevant issues and information before
them when they make decisions and these decisions and their basis should be communi-
cated to the public;
• Accountability: Decision makers are responsible for the exercise of the authority provided
to them.
Source: World Bank, Public Expenditure Management Handbook (Washington, DC: The World Bank,
1998), 1–2.
That has not always been the case. In cameralistic budgeting and accounting
systems, introduced in Europe in the late middle ages, the sovereign spends a certain
amount of money for a fiscal year and, although spending is controlled, there is no rig-
orous assessment of results. Such systems are also known as “input-oriented” budg-
eting and financial management systems and in many countries still serve to manage
defence finances. Parliaments vote on a budget proposal by the government ex-
pressed in money to be spent, for example, on military and civilian personnel, opera-
tions and maintenance, capital investments and research and development. In prac-
tice, and even with much higher level of detail, such presentation of the proposed de-
Defence Budgeting and Financial Management 59
fence budget alone does not provide for understanding the linkage between policy
objectives and budget requests.
In turn, the provision of clear and auditable linkages between objectives, strategy
and implementation is indispensable for assessing both results and performance. Box
6.2 presents the critical dimensions of performance in assessing public financial man-
agement systems and practices.
Process Integrity
In contrast to “input-oriented” budgeting, “output-” and “outcome-oriented” systems are
used to translate security and defence objectives into capability requirements and re-
spective programs, and then into budget requests. The best known system of this type
is the US DoD’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), instituted in
the early 1960s by DoD Comptroller Charles J. Hitch under the direction of the then
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. Many countries, in particular the countries
of Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics in their post-communist
transition, attempt to replicate or adapt the US PPBS as the main tool for effective and
efficient management of their defence establishments and a basis for effective democ-
ratic oversight of defence.
Box 6.2. Critical Dimensions in Measuring Performance of Public Financial Man-

agement
The Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) initiative of the World Bank has
identified six critical dimensions of performance of an open and orderly Performance Measure-
ment Framework system, as follows:
1. Credibility of the budget: The budget is realistic and is implemented as intended;
2. Comprehensiveness and transparency: The budget and the fiscal risk oversight are
comprehensive and fiscal and budget information is accessible to the public;
3. Policy-based budgeting: The budget is prepared with due regard to government policy;
4. Predictability and control in budget execution: The budget is implemented in an orderly
and predictable manner and there are arrangements for the exercise of control and stew-
ardship in the use of public funds;
5. Accounting, recording and reporting: Adequate records and information are produced,
maintained and disseminated to meet decision-making control, management and reporting
purposes;
6. External scrutiny and audit: Arrangements for scrutiny of public finances and follow up by
the executive are operating.
Source: World Bank, Public Financial Management: Performance Measurement Framework (Washington,
DC: PEFA Secretariat, June 2005), 2.
Systems like the PPBS provide for a transparent linkage between defence objec-
tives and budgets, as well as between long- and mid-term plans and programs and
current activities. Decision makers both in the executive and the legislature are able to
understand what would be the impact of a certain decision in terms of overall allocation
to defence and its distribution among defence activities, or programs, on the potential
to meet defence objectives and, respectively, on the risks for the security of the
country. Such systems also serve to provide budgeting flexibility in changing condi-
tions while preserving transparency and accountability.
However, PPBS—in itself a powerful decision support mechanism—does not
guarantee integrity of the whole defence management cycle. For that purpose it needs
to be complemented by sound arrangements for oversight of budget execution, ac-
countability, assessment and auditing mechanisms. Therefore, recently the US DoD
explicitly added the phases of Execution and Assessment to “PPB” and is currently
using the term PPBEA system. PPBEA provides for comprehensive control over inputs
and legitimacy, management efficiency and effectiveness.2
Some countries refer to the need to align defence objectives, strategy, plans and
results of implementation and keep them aligned in a changing environment as strate-
gic defence management. Box 6.3 provides a national example of how defence
budgeting and financial management are set into a strategic management framework
that guarantees policy orientation, transparency, credibility and internal and external
scrutiny in a dynamic planning and execution environment.3
It is also important to preserve the integrity of the budgeting process in changing
circumstances, in particular when countries have a longer budgetary outlook, e.g. like
the four-year outlook in the UK example presented in Box 6.4, combined with delega-
tion of authority for budget execution.
The Netherlands defence establishment, for example, has a mechanism in place
for making short-term adjustments for urgently required capabilities in the day-to-day
operational process, the so called fast-track procurement. These are normally rela-
tively small programs and fall within the authority of the budget holder. This may hap-
pen in a planning system which is sufficiently robust to produce realistic plans and
flexible enough to accommodate unforeseen circumstances. In any case, such budget
expenditures must remain subject to standing internal and external scrutiny and audit
arrangements, no matter what the level of urgency and/or secrecy of the requirement.
2 Francois Melese, “Instruments for Measuring Accountability, Transparency and Control of

Expenditures in the Security and Defence Sector,” presentation to the NATO-RACVIAC
conference on Better Management of Defence Resources, Including Building Integrity in the
Armed Forces, Zagreb, Croatia (14-16 September 2009).
3 This is an example of the process approach to enhancing defence budgeting and financial
management. For an example of supporting organisational changes see Box 17.1.
Box 6.3. Financial Management in a Strategic Defence Management Framework

To provide for credibility, transparency, policy orientation of plans, budgets and audits, the Min-
istry of Defence of Bulgaria is in the process of implementing a new, comprehensive strategic
defence management framework. It focuses on five core processes:
1. Review of defence policy;
2. Political guidance;
3. Review of capability requirements;
4. Capability delivery;
5. Assessment of performance and results.
A defence policy review is conducted at the beginning of the term of each new cabinet and
results in the publication of a Defence White Paper, presented also to parliament. The review
may be conducted within this regular cycle given considerable changes in the defence environ-
ment, e.g. in an economic and financial crisis (or, for a partner country willing to join NATO,
upon an invitation to join the alliance).
The minister of defence issues policy and planning guidance at the beginning of each annual
planning cycle, and also when assessments within the budget year point to the need to realign
objectives, plans and resource constraints.
The review of capability requirements is conducted bi-annually, in coordination with NATO
and EU defence planning processes. It results in a decision on a portfolio of future defence ca-
pabilities that is comprehensive and realistic. Sub-sets of this portfolio are assigned as capabil-
ity targets to programme managers to be met through the next core process.
The capability delivery process includes programming, short-term planning and implementa-
tion. Defence programmes specify how assigned capability targets will be achieved in future
years. Once the programme decision has been made, the first one or two years of the defence
programmes are further detailed along capability components (or types of resources), e.g. in a
defence budget, procurement plan, plans for recruitment, training, infrastructure development,
etc. All these plans are then implemented within the budget year.
The assessment process is used to check the legality of expenditures made, to measure
performance and results, and to assess the outcome of all defence activities. It is conducted
every four months and includes a review of planning assumptions. It provides feedback to the
political leadership and may also result in a recommendation to realign objectives, strategies
and constraints through a review of either plans or programmes or, if planning assumptions
have changed considerably, a review of capability requirements or even the country’s defence
policy.
This approach builds on earlier experience of the MOD and lessons learned in applying a
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting system. It continues to provide for policy-based budg-
eting and adds several essential features: (1) It institutes the understanding of defence
capabilities as the output of all defence management activities, including financial
management, and the main measure in assessing performance and results; (2) To financial
control, it adds regular assessment of efficiency and effectiveness; and (3) It allows
policymakers to balance defence objectives, plans and resources and, more importantly, to
keep these aligned under changing circumstances.

The introduction of such a strategic management approach allows for qualitative
improvement of credibility of the defence budget, enhances predictability and control in budget
execution, aids external scrutiny and audit, and facilitates continuous improvement of business
processes and planning methods.
Sources: For details on process # 4, refer to Todor Tagarev, “Introduction to Program-based Force Devel-
opment” in Defence Management: An Introduction (Geneva: DCAF, 2009), 75–92; For policies and prac-
tices of other countries in strategic defence management, the reader may refer to Stephan De
Spiegeleire, et al., Closing the Loop: Towards Strategic Defence Management (The Hague: The Hague
Centre for Strategic Studies, April 2009).
Delegation and Accountability

One of the reasons for inefficiency of many budgeting systems is the centralization not
only of budget planning but also during the execution phase. Extreme centralization of
decision-making arrangements, so typical for the Soviet command system, still impacts
management styles in the post-Soviet space. In many cases it is the minister of
defence who has to authorize even very small expenditures.
Such centralization in itself slows down the decision-making process and leaves
little time for consideration of alternatives. Even more troublesome is the loss of trans-
parency: while expenditure proposals are pushed up through hierarchical levels, al-
ways with the signature of the person in charge of each unit at the respective level of
the defence organization, it is not difficult to lose track of who really generated the
spending proposal and how it impacts other defence activities.
Organizations with efficient management deal with this problem through delegation
of authority and responsibility. Box 6.4 provides an example of delegation that goes
hand in hand with rigorous accountability, reporting and audit arrangements.
Credibility and Comprehensiveness
To be credible, the defence budget needs to be realistic and implemented as intended.
To assure credibility, the budgeting process and the defence budget need to be
comprehensive and based on reliable data and information.
Reliability here is examined from three main perspectives:
1. Preliminary costing of defence programmes and projects is based on reliable
statistical information or, when such statistics are not available, on rigorous
benchmarking studies. Regular use of independent assessments prior to a
decision to dedicate significant resources to a certain programme or project
may be a major enabler for the reliability of all budget proposals.
Box 6.4. Delegation of Authority to and Accountability of Budget Holders in the

UK Ministry of Defence
Most of the activities in the UK defence establishment are managed through eight Top Level
Budget (TLB) holders. The outcomes that TLB holders are required to deliver, as well as the
resources that are provided to them to do so, are set out in the Defence Plan.
The MoD permanent under secretary grants each TLB holder extensive delegated powers
over personnel, infrastructure and budget. Each TLB holder has a Service Delivery Agreement
with the permanent under secretary and the chief of the defence staff, which specifies:
• The outputs required of the TLB;
• The resources that are provided to deliver those outputs; and
• The financial, personnel, commercial and other authority delegated to the TLB holder.
The agreement also includes TLB performance targets, which are derived from the
objectives and targets in the Defence Plan.
TLB holders are responsible for managing the performance of their organisations, including
the performance of subordinate business units and agencies. The chief executives of these
units and agencies receive appropriate delegated authorities and are accountable to the TLB
holder for the use of their resources.
TLB holders are then held accountable to the permanent secretary and the chief of the de-
fence staff through the Defence Board for the delivery of their outcomes and the use of their re-
sources, while the permanent secretary—as the departmental accounting officer—is personally
accountable to parliament for the economic, efficient and effective use of defence resources,
prudent administration and the regularity and propriety of defence expenditure.
To combine delegation of authority and accountability, the UK Ministry of Defence applies an
approach known as Balanced Scorecard. This is a strategic planning and management system
used to align business activities at all levels to the vision and strategy of the organisation, cas-
cade objectives and metrics, improve internal and external communications and monitor organ-
isational performance against strategic goals.
Sources: UK Ministry of Defence, How Defence works. Defence Framework (London: Ministry of Defence,
2009); UK Ministry of Defence, Defence Plan 2007 (London: Ministry of Defence, 2007).
2. Proper accounting is in place. The accounting system is also comprehensive,

timely and subject to regular audits.
3. There is an understanding of the risks associated with the implementation of
all major programmes or projects and adequate risk management procedures
and instruments are in place.
The following three aspects of comprehensiveness of defence budgeting are key in
assuring credibility:
1. Budget planners encompass all fiscal operations and all activities of the de-
fence establishment. Nothing is done and no payment is made outside the
defence budget. In case the defence establishment is involved in economic
activities or is allowed to charge customers for certain services, all respective
transactions are covered by the budgeting procedures. That includes interna-
tional transactions and transfers from one budget year to another, as well as
eventual reimbursements for defence expenditures.
2. The budgeting process is examined comprehensively, as an end-to-end proc-
ess starting with formulation of policy objectives, through defence require-
ments and programmes, all the way through to budget execution, reporting
and auditing the reports. The integrity of this process is preserved at all times.
3. The planning processes, at several of its phases, include examination of
alternatives. Planners search the space of all possible solutions or, when that
is not possible due to a limited analytical capacity, they still evaluate two or
more qualitatively different alternative solutions for the requirement under ex-
amination.
Thorough auditing of implementation and results adds important lessons and fa-
cilitates the enhancement of defence budgeting and financial management. Prelimi-
nary audits of selected issues, conducted by people not directly involved in the plan-
ning process before significant resources are committed, are also seen as an impor-
tant tool for integrity building and reducing the corruption potential in defence.4
Transparency in a Multinational Framework
For the last several decades, the transparency of defence budgeting and budgets has
been seen as an important security and confidence building measure. Not surprisingly,
one of the first initiatives within the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, launched
after the end of the wars in the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, was the Budget
Transparency Initiative (BTI). It is briefly presented in Box 6.5.
One of the goals of the initiative was to exchange information on budgeting proc-
esses and rationale, as well as on defence budgets. For many years, the two year-
books, published by the secretariat of the initiative, served as the most comprehensive
and authoritative sources of military budgeting information for the countries in South
Eastern Europe, widely available to the public.5
4 Valeri Ratchev, “Effective Defence Policy through Integrated Management, Transparency,

and Accountability,” in Integrity in Defence: Effective, Transparent and Accountable Man-
agement (Sofia: Euro-Atlantic Education Initiative, 2009), 1–94.
5 Budget Transparency Initiative Secretariat, Yearbook on Defence Spending in South-Eastern
Europe – 2001 (Sofia: Budget Transparency Initiative Secretariat, 2002).
Box 6.5. An Example of a Regional Approach Encouraging Transparency of

Defence Budgeting
Throughout the 1990s, the region of South Eastern Europe (SEE) was in turmoil. SEE coun-
tries suffered from war and conflict, enduring at the same time the hardships of the transition to
market economies. With the end of hot conflicts, democratic transformations led to fundamen-
tal restructuring of armed forces, changing the role of the military in the national political sys-
tems. All SEE countries embarked on a process of establishing effective democratic control
over the armed forces, motivated to introduce the practices of transparency and accountability
throughout government, the area of defence included.
Therefore, one of the very early initiatives within the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
aimed to promote the transparency of defence budgeting; transparency being understood both
in terms of availability of information on budgets and budget execution and in terms of an open,
policy-oriented decision-making process, open to societal involvement as appropriate. Under-
standing that military budgeting is at the heart of the democratic control of armed forces and
comprehensive regional stability, the Budget Transparency Initiative (BTI) of the Stability Pact
aims to promote domestic and international transparency of defence budgets and the defence
budgeting process throughout South Eastern Europe and to encourage good practices in de-
fence decision making (policymaking, planning, programming and budgeting), with particular
reference to accountability.
The second goal was to identify good practices from within countries facing similar
challenges and to promote good governance in defence. One of the tools for identify-
ing and disseminating good practices in defence budgeting was the adoption of a
common methodology. The methodology, officially endorsed in 2003, consists of a
benchmark, questionnaire and a process to identify areas where improvement is most
needed and sources of advice. The benchmark is presented in the next section.
The implementation of this approach in a regional or other multinational setting in-
volves peer review and pressure in disseminating budget information, sharing budg-
eting experience and investing in enhancement. There is practical evidence that such
a multinational approach serves as an efficient facilitator in introducing good practices
in defence budgeting and financial management. It is also seen as a promising venue
in increasing integrity and reducing corruption potential in defence.
South East European Benchmark of a Budgeting Process
The methodology for assessing transparency of defence budgeting in South East
European countries envisioned comparison of specific prescriptions and practices
against an idealised system serving as a benchmark.6 Such a system does not neces-
sarily exist. The budgeting system described below may be considered “best” in “good
governance” terms of effectiveness, transparency and accountability and does not take
into account sometimes legitimate concerns of sensitivity of information, secrecy and
limitation on the access to information.
The benchmark is described in five major categories of criteria assessing: (1) goal
orientation of the budgeting process; (2) scope and effectiveness of the budget plan-
ning process; (3) budget execution and effective oversight; (4) transparency of defence
budgeting and budgets; and (5) assurance of integrity of defence budgeting.
1. Military Budgeting as an Integral Component of the Security and Defence
Policy
a. Objectives, vision, strategy
Military budgeting is a process well incorporated in the defence planning frame-
work, guaranteeing the implementation of a clearly stated defence policy in the
mid- and long-term. The country has clearly stated the objectives of its security and
defence policies in a small number of legislative acts with apparent interrela-
tionships among them. There is a comprehensive strategy to achieve the objec-
tives of the security and defence policy, i.e., to join an alliance. This strategy—
elaborated in a legislative act—is broadly assessed as realistic. The country has a
vision of its force structure ten or more years in the future. The vision is feasible
and sufficiently elaborated to guide R&D, technology development and acquisition
policies. Its implementation is supported by a roughly costed long-term force de-
velopment plan. The vision and the long-term plan are approved either by the gov-
ernment or by the legislature.
b. Programmatic approach
The country has an established process for development of a mid-term plan, or
defence programme,7 designed to accomplish the objectives of the stated defence
policy. The defence programme and its components are clearly designed to meet
policy objectives. It incorporates diverse requirements, e.g., of national defence
and allied planning. The defence programme further includes programmes and
projects considered of highest priority in terms of policy objectives. In a compre-
6 The methodology, including the benchmark and the questionnaire, is presented in detail in
Todor Tagarev, “A Means of Comparing Military Budgeting Processes in South East Europe,”
Information & Security: An International Journal 11 (2003): 95–135.
7 For example, the US uses the term Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). A number of
South East European countries have also accepted the term programme to denote a
resource constraint mid-term plan for development of defence and the armed forces.
hensive manner it covers all defence activities and costs, including personnel, op-
erations and maintenance, procurement, utilisation, education and training, re-
search and technology development, etc. The defence programme is constrained
by anticipated resources. It further constrains any other defence resource require-
ments posed, for example, by acquisition programmes or operational plans. It
contains alternative options to reflect thoroughly described contingencies. The de-
fence programme effectively incorporates performance indicators. The level of de-
tail for the first planning year 8 of the defence programme is sufficient to allow for its
accurate transformation into a budget plan.
c. Defence and force planning risks
There is a clear understanding of the risk level associated with the budgeted force
structure and defence posture both in the short- and mid-term.9 The country has a
methodology to assess risks associated with defence and force planning, and this
methodology is adequate to the country’s needs. It has established procedures to
develop scenarios for force implementation, to assess probability of occurrence of
each scenario under clearly stated assumptions, to simulate performance of
planned forces, to analyse simulation results and deduct risk. Furthermore, the as-
sessment of risk is supported by relevant tools, while the experts involved have the
necessary knowledge and experience. Finally, risk assessment is fully and effec-
tively incorporated within the defence and force planning cycle.
d. Objective-oriented military budgeting
The budgeting procedure is clearly oriented to reflect precise policy objectives and
programme decisions. It allows for efficient and effective translation of policy and
programme decisions into budgets.
2. Budget Planning
a. Military budget planning
Roles and responsibilities within the executive branch and among the braches of
power regarding military budgeting are very clear. These apply to the distribution of
roles and responsibilities among the executive branch, the legislature and the head
of state (the supreme commander); among the senior military authorities, the civil-
ian Ministry of Defence (MOD) officials and the Ministry of Finance; and the roles
and responsibilities of the public sector, commercial organisations and lobbying
8 Or the first two planning years, in case the respective country has a two-year budget.
9 For elaboration on planning risks, the reader may refer to Hari Bucur-Marcu, Philipp Fluri,
Todor Tagarev, eds., Defence Management: An Introduction (Geneva: DCAF, 2009), 67–71,
www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?ord279=title&q279=management&lng=en&id=105
077&nav1=5.
groups, particularly the relationships between the executives and commercial or-
ganisations owned by the MOD or other governmental agencies.
b. Flexibility
Roles and responsibilities for key aspects of military budgeting are defined through
comprehensive legislation, regulations and instructions, covered by a budget sys-
tem law. A degree of flexibility is available to the executives in spending public
funds. Programmes and the budget can be changed out of the regular planning cy-
cle. However, the discretionary powers of the executives are clearly described in
legal acts. Contingency or reserve provisions of the budget law specify clear and
stringent conditions for the use of funds. Executive reports on spending contin-
gency funds are independently audited.
c. Military budgets
In a comprehensive manner, the military budget covers all financing (subsidies and
“revenues”/ “incomes”) and spending. Comprehensively, with clearly defined
sources and elaborated purpose, the military budget accounts for the subsidy from
the state budget to the Ministry of Defence; subsidies from the state budget to
other organisations performing defence and defence-related activities, i.e., mainte-
nance of wartime reserves; funding from other national programs, i.e., for prepara-
tion for NATO membership; funding through international and bilateral programmes
(with clear regulations for using reimbursed funds); revenues from sales of excess
equipment, infrastructure, etc.; and revenues from the profits of commercial organi-
sations and organisations providing goods and services to outside organisations,
when the MOD owns or has a share in these organisations.
The country has the capacity—methodology, adequate knowledge and trained
people—to estimate accurately all future defence expenditures, including the ex-
penditures according to the UN Instrument for Standardised Reporting of Military
Expenditures, taxes, social and medical insurance costs, retirement costs and the
costs for social adaptation of prematurely released military personnel, expenditures
on utilisation of weapon systems, equipment and infrastructure, costs to cover pre-
vious contracts and loan servicing costs, as well as any contingent liabilities.
All revenues and expenditures are classified in a way that is compatible with
international standards, i.e., GFS 10 and the UN Instrument. Budget information is
presented in a way that facilitates policy analysis and promotes accountability. The
military budget is represented in the form of appropriations, giving considerable
detail. It provides detailed distribution among defence organisations, as well as
among defence programmes. In the latter case, the budget clearly presents the re-
10 GFS or Government Finance Statistics. Details on the UN classification are available on-line
at: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/class/family/family2.asp?Cl=218.
sources allotted to training, maintenance, procurement, research and development,

etc., for each programme and its elements.
3. Budget Execution and Oversight
a. Budget execution
The country has a comprehensive accounting system that provides a reliable basis
for assessing payment arrears. The accounting system is capable of generating
data on all stages of the “incomes” and payments along budget appropriations, as
well as along organisations and programmes.
Personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement and R&D regulations are
standardised and accessible to all interested parties. There are clear criteria for
discretion on employment and payment, allowing for competitive recruitment. The
regulations for open tendering for procurement, R&D and other contracting services
are clear and comprehensive and the personnel involved in their implementation is
adequately qualified. All these regulations are fully observed in practice.
b. Auditing
In the defence establishment and/or in the executive branch there is a strong ca-
pacity for internal audit. Internal audit procedures are clear and subject to effective
process review by external auditors. There is a strong audit capacity both in terms
of financial compliance and effectiveness of performance (“value-for-money” au-
dits). Additionally, there is a strong capacity for independent audits, i.e., through a
National Audit Office working for the legislature. Independent audit requirements
and procedures are clearly established in law. There is a strong independent ca-
pacity for audits in terms of financial compliance and identification of fraud/ mis-
management cases, as well as for “value-for-money” audits. Independent think
tanks (universities, academic institutes and other non-governmental organisations)
complement “value-for-money” audits in particular areas of interest, i.e., force
modernisation programmes. Non-governmental organisations have a notable ca-
pacity and track record of successful performance reports. Their reports have had
noticeable impact on decision makers and societal attitudes.
c. Reporting
The government presents regular fiscal reports to the legislature and the public. A
mid-year report on budget developments is presented to the legislature. More fre-
quent—quarterly and monthly—reports are also published. Final accounts are pre-
sented to the legislature within six months of the end of the fiscal year. They are
accompanied by a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of performance relative to

the major defence programmes.11
4. Transparency of Military Budgeting
a. Transparent decision making
All aspects of military budgeting (planning, execution and assessment of imple-
mentation) are transparent to decision makers and the public. All participants in the
budgeting process—civilian and military planners, ministers of defence and fi-
nance, governmental councils, legislature and its committees, the head of state,
audit office, lobbying groups, non-governmental profit and not-for-profit organisa-
tions, media and society at large—exercise their influence according to clear rules
and with full understanding of all aspects of the military budgeting process and ad-
here to the principles of democratic governance.
b. Availability of information
Publications of military budgets and related information—major security and de-
fence policy documents, defence programmes, implementation and audit reports—
are readily available to the public. The rules for disclosing military budgets and re-
lated information are also public. They are clearly defined in law and leave very lit-
tle room for discretion by the executive agencies. The government and the respec-
tive agencies are legally obliged to publish information on military budgets in de-
tails, allowing rigorous analysis by an informed observer. The information is pro-
vided in printed version and online, both in the native language and in another
commonly used language, i.e., in English. Furthermore, the executives, i.e. the
minister of defence, are obliged by law to respond in writing to requests for infor-
mation. If a portion of a related document is classified,12 that portion is deleted and
the rest of the document is provided to the enquiring organisation or person.
Aggregate information on the budget and the actual or expected output of the
two preceding fiscal years is readily available. Aggregate information on the budget
forecasts for five or more years following the budget year is also available.
The country complies with international treaties and agreements that require
disclosure of military budgeting information, i.e., UN and OSCE agreements and
Stability Pact initiatives, regularly providing complete and accurate information on
time.
11 In Bulgaria, for example, the prime minister is legally obliged to present to the legislature the
“Annual Report on Defence and the Armed Forces.” Although not explicitly required by law,
the expectation is that the report will analyse performance and will relate that to actual
defence expenditures.
12 Not as a general rule, but based on a specific decision for classification of a particular piece
of information.
5. Assuring Integrity
Military budgeting is based on rigorous and reliable forecasting of the budget/fiscal
constraints in a comprehensive and consistent quantitative macroeconomic frame-
work. All underlying assumptions for budget planning, i.e., major fiscal risks, un-
certain costs, specific expenditure commitments, etc., are clearly documented and
properly accounted for. Furthermore, major underlying assumptions, such as
macroeconomic forecasts and fiscal forecasts, are assessed by independent ex-
perts.
All defence programmes are costed using a comprehensive and consistent set
of cost factors that are clearly related to the findings of an independent national
statistics agency. Integrity checks are supported by an information system. Pro-
gramming and budgeting are systematically supported by an information system
with tools for automated analysis and decision-making support, allowing collabora-
tive work. The accounting basis is clearly indicated, with a full statement indicating
any changes in practices as well as current accounting policy.
Alternative programmes and budgets, corresponding to different assumptions,
are clearly identified and documented. There is a clear written procedure to transi-
tion from one alternative to another, and transition points are also clearly docu-
mented. History of both plans and implementation results and assessments is
readily available.
Fiscal reports are internally consistent and reconciled with relevant data from
other sources. Effectively and in a timely manner, accounting reports are recon-
ciled with budget appropriations and with bank accounts. Auditing of accounting
reports is also timely and effective. There is rigorous reconciliation of fiscal and
monetary data. A national statistics agency is provided with institutional independ-
ence to verify the quality of budget data. International standards for budget data
integrity and quality are fully adhered to.
Chapter 7
Defence Procurement
Defence procurement is an integral part of two fairly distinct processes:
1. The process of acquiring new defence capabilities, e.g. through introduction
of more advanced weapon systems; or
2. The process of maintaining existing capabilities through provision of spare
parts, fuel, logistics services, etc.
In lacking integrity of organisations, procedures and individuals involved, both of
these processes are prone to corruption. This chapter focuses mostly on the first
process for a number of reasons:
• It usually involves larger amounts of money;
• Linking defence needs to actual procurement is far from trivial;
• It often involves advanced technologies and, respectively, there are a handful
of potential providers;
• Procurement options are even more limited when security of supply or other
national security considerations come into play;
• The statistics on costs is limited, hard to attain or non-existent.
As a result of these and other reasons, defence acquisition involves higher corrup-
tion risks. For example, consistently more than half of the cases covered by the De-
fence Anti-Corruption Digest 1 relate to international acquisition of new weapon sys-
tems and equipment. Notwithstanding the focus of acquisition, most of the findings and
the recommendations in this chapter are applicable also to procurement within the
process of maintaining existing capabilities.
Studies on procurement-related corruption often focus on contractual issues, i.e.
this phase of the acquisition process when public officials prepare, sign and manage
contracts with suppliers of defence equipment and services. However, in order to re-
veal the mechanisms of corruption, one needs to examine the acquisition process
comprehensively and to develop corruption reduction measures respectively.
1 This digest is published regularly by Transparency International. See:

www.defenceagainstcorruption.org/news/digest-navigationmenu-111.
72
Defence Procurement 73
Integrity of the Acquisition Process

Defence acquisition is the process of adding new or enhancing existing defence ca-
pabilities, in particular when that involves insertion of new technologies. Box 7.1 pro-
vides a definition of the scope of the term and delineates three major areas of acquisi-
tion activities.
Key for reducing the potential for procurement-related corruption is the integrity of
the decision-making process. Decision making has to be regulated in a way that as-
sures procurement decisions and actual procurements clearly relate to defence policy
objectives and account for fiscal and other resource constraints. Regulations have to
provide for a clear causal link from defence objectives to procurement.
Box 7.1. Scope of Defence Acquisition

The term “defence acquisition” covers a wide range of disciplines and tasks that can essentially
be broken down into three broad areas of activity:
• Deciding what to acquire;
• Deciding how to acquire it;
• Acquiring it.
Deciding what to acquire, on the surface a simple task, is both far from trivial and key to the
overall success of an acquisition project. Defence budgets, although usually among the larger
components of public spending, are rarely sufficient to cover all defence requirements and ac-
quisition projects must be carefully prioritised in order to assemble an overall defence pro-
gramme that is as comprehensive and as balanced as possible (and, of course, individual pro-
jects must be properly managed to ensure that they represent good value for money and an
appropriate use of defence resources). Close examination of competing requirements and
creative thinking about the means to address them are thus essential for successful acquisi-
tion; investment in these activities will help to reduce project risk and increase the overall
chance of project success.
Deciding how to acquire equipment and/or services is usually achieved through the prepara-
tion of an acquisition strategy, a formal document that records and justifies the various deci-
sions taken. Once again, investment here will help to reduce risk and raise the chances of
project success. The practice of actually acquiring the equipment and/or services, supporting
them through their in-service life and eventually disposing of them is often broken down into a
series of phases to make the overall task more manageable and to introduce points at which
the project can be reviewed and decisions about its future taken. This is known as an acquisi-
tion cycle.
These three areas of activity are interrelated and will not necessarily take place sequentially
as their presentation in the form of a list suggests. There is much benefit in including activities
aimed at identifying and clarifying what is to be acquired within the acquisition cycle itself.
Source: Anthony Lawrence, “Acquisition Management,” in Defence Management: An Introduction
(Geneva: DCAF, 2009), 156–157.
First, policy makers and planners have to clearly state mission needs. This state-
ment 2 must justify in rigorous analytical terms the need to resolve a shortfall in defence
capabilities or to explore a technological opportunity for performing defence missions
more efficiently or effectively. It must be derived from rigorous mission analysis, i.e.,
analysis of current and forecasted mission capabilities in relation to projected demand
for services,3 and must contain sufficient quantitative information to establish and
justify the need. Extensive performance analysis should be completed and capability
shortfalls should be identified before preparing the statement. The statement may also
include an assessment of the impact if the mission need is not provided, as well as its
criticality, timeframe and long-range resource planning estimates.
Second is the definition of operational requirements. It elaborates qualitative and
quantitative parameters that specify the desired capabilities of a system and serve as
a basis for determining the operational effectiveness and suitability of a system prior to
deployment.
Third, and only after the first two steps are well understood and documented, one
may transition to defining technical requirements and standards and proceed to pro-
curement and the respective budget planning. The definitions of mission needs and
operational requirements serve also to define some of the main criteria for assessment
of bids and, respectively, for selection of suppliers, as well as in assessing actual de-
liveries of defence equipment, systems and services. Box 7.2 presents the experience
of the Ministry of National Defence of Poland in preventing procurement-related cor-
ruption.
The preservation of causality among the steps in the procurement process is vital
for the integrity of the decision-making process. It also provides for independent as-
sessment 4—e.g. prior to the commitment of considerable public resources—as well as
for auditing the results and the implementation of acquisition decisions, either by re-
sponsible state organisations or by independent monitors.
2 The US Department of Defense and other US federal agencies are required to produce an
official document under the title “Mission Need Statement.” See for example: Federal
Aviation Administration, “Mission Analysis. Appendix B: Mission Need Statement Template,”
http://fast.faa.gov.
3 In defence, this is usually part of a comprehensive review of defence policy, e.g. a “Strategic
Defence Review” or a “Quadrennial Defence Review.”
4 An assessment that is independent from the one made by the proponents of a particular
acquisition decision. It may be performed by a specially designated team, internally for the
defence establishment, by another state organisation or by an independent monitor. For the
latter, see the box on “Defence Integrity Pacts” below.
Box 7.2. Preserving the Integrity of the Defence Procurement Process and Pre-
venting Corruption in Poland
Defence procurement is the area of high corruption risk. There are several key points in the
process, which should be tackled with special attention to reduce this risk to a minimum. They
exist during the preparatory stage, during the tender or negotiation, as well as in the implemen-
tation of the contract. It is necessary to address specific issues, for instance by asking
particular questions, in all of the key elements. The most important of them are listed below. In
the practice of the Polish Ministry of National Defence it is the duty of the Anti-corruption
Procedures Bureau to raise these questions, prepare opinions and suggest solutions.
Preventing corruption in procurement – key points and key questions
Operational requirements Do they enable fair competition?
Technical requirements Are they accurate and objective?
Acquisition plan and budget Is the volume justified by real needs?
Unplanned purchases Justified by urgent operational needs?
Single source proc. or tender Is the single source proc. justified?
Evaluation criteria Are they accurate and objective?
Conflict of interests Do you prevent its occurrence?
Quality assurance, testing Are the proper tests expected?
The contract Is it accurate and assure MoD rights?
The contract implementation Is it proper? Changes justified only?
Preparatory stage
Operational requirements for new arms: Do they enable fair competition in the future? Are they
based on real operational needs or simply on something seen in an advertising brochure?
Technical requirements of new arms: Are they based on operational requirements or are
they simply copied from a technical specification of a specific product? Are they accurate and
objective? Do they enable fair competition? If not, is that shown clearly and justified?
Planning and budgeting: Is the acquisition plan prepared for buying capabilities and systems
or isolated items only? Is the volume of the purchase justified by real needs? Are the funds se-
cured for the whole project, for upcoming years as well? Are the unplanned purchases reliably
justified by real urgent operational needs?
Proceedings of procurement
Competitiveness: Is the procedure competitive, particularly the tender process? If not, can a
single source procedure or limited tender be justified? Is the procedure as competitive as
possible?
Evaluation criteria, documentation: Are they clear and accurate? Are they fair for all com-
petitors? Is the weight of the objective criteria (such as price or life cycle cost) bigger than the
subjective ones (such as additional capabilities)? Is the whole tender documentation clear and
objective?
Conflict of interests: Have the tender committee members, as well as the other officials par-
ticipating in the preparatory or implementation stages, identified any relationships with the po-
tential bidders that can be regarded as a conflict of interest? Did they sign a declaration con-
firming no conflicts of interest? If so, how was this verified?
Tender committee works: Has the committee worked as it was set out and agreed in the
documentation?
Contract and its implementation
Quality assurance, testing: Are the proper (objective and based on reliable methodology) tests
expected? Is the quality assurance process expected in contract implementation?
Contract draft and final contract: Is it accurate and does it assure MoD rights?
Contract implementation: Is the contract implemented as it was signed? Are changes or
amendments to the contract justified?
The integrity of the decision making process is key for assuring transparency of the
process. There have been cases when, as “a sign of transparency,” bids are open in
front of TV cameras, while at the same time tender specifications are written in a way
that strongly favours a particular supplier or even eliminates all of its competitors.
Additional measures to guarantee transparency of defence procurement include:
• Publicly available and highly visible defence policy documents that provide
clear, consistent and credible guidelines on defence modernisation;
• Advanced notification of potential suppliers, including companies in the na-
tional defence industrial base, on forthcoming acquisitions and anticipated
requirements;
• Open competitive bidding, e.g. through the use of the European Bulletin
Board (EBB) on Defence Contracts Opportunities,5 maintained by the Euro-
pean Defence Agency;
• Use of life-cycle costs, instead of just up-front costs, in acquisition planning
and in comparing the bids of competing suppliers;6 and
5 See www.eda.europa.eu/ebbweb.
• Rigorous risk assessment and transparent risk management.

Box 7.3 lists a number of negative consequences, including high corruption risks,
as a result of the lack of transparency in defence procurement.
Defence establishments and parliamentarian committees that see gaps in the
process for defence procurement and embark on enhancing its integrity should con-
sider the implementation of the international standard ISO 15288 7 and the related
NATO publication AAP-48. NATO has decided to follow ISO/IEC 15288 in dividing the
whole system life cycle into six stages:
1. Concept
2. Development
3. Production
4. Utilisation
Box 7.3. Consequences of the Lack of Transparency in Defence Procurement

Loosely defined or overly ambiguous arms procurement policies, as well as highly confidential
procurement processes regularly lead to:
• Insufficient examination of the rationale for weapons systems procurement;
• Inefficiencies in government decisions with unhealthy consequences for national and re-
gional security;
• Apprehension in neighbouring countries;
• Corruption in arms procurement and in all kinds of military-related procurement decisions;
and
• Serious damage to public confidence in the armed forces, which may be discredited and
subjected to unnecessary controversies.
Source: Hans Born, et al., Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and
Practices, 6th edition (Lausanne: Inter-Parliamentary Union and the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces, 2007), 173.
6 To guarantee comparability of life-cycle cost estimates and efficient benchmarking, it is

recommended to adhere to common cost models. See: Code of Practice for Life Cycle
Costing, RTO-TR-SAS-069 (Paris: NATO Research and Technology Agency, September
2009); Methods and Models for Life Cycle Costing, RTO-TR-SAS-054 (Paris: NATO
Research and Technology Agency, June 2007); and Cost Structure and Life Cycle Costs for
Military Systems, RTO-TR-058 (Paris: NATO Research and Technology Agency, September
2003).
7 See: ISO/IEC 12207:2008, “Systems and Software Engineering – System Life Cycle Proc-
esses,” edition 2 (International Organization for Standardization, 2008).
5. Support
6. Retirement.
Each stage represents one essential period of the life cycle of a defence system.
The partitioning of the system life cycle into stages is based on the practicality of doing
the work in small, understandable and timely steps. Stages, in addition, help address
uncertainties and risk associated with cost, schedule, general objectives and decision
making. Each stage has a distinct purpose and contribution to the whole life cycle. The
transition between stages uses decision gates and entry/exit criteria.
Thus application of ISO 15288 and AAP-48 provides a common and integrated
process framework for systems engineering and project management and allows the
integration of project management disciplines and technical processes across the full
life cycle and transparent interaction between participating organisations.
Structuring the life cycle of a defence system in this manner also provides for rig-
orous parliamentarian oversight of defence procurement. Box 7.4 presents as an ex-
ample the procurement oversight as exercised by the Dutch Parliament.8 It can be ad-
mitted that the involvement of parliament slows down the procurement process but, at
the same time, it contributes to the integrity and greatly enhances the transparency of
the decision-making process, thus strongly reducing the corruption potential of defence
procurement.
Of particular concern is the corruption potential in offset arrangements related to
defence procurement, treated in the following chapter of this compendium.
Integrity of Participating Organizations
In addition to process integrity, organisations both on the demand and the supply side
of defence procurement must have integrity in order to reduce corruption risks.
This chapter examines the demand side, i.e. the organisation of defence ministries
and agencies responsible for defence procurement, and the requirements of govern-
ments to defence contractors. Chapter 20 is dedicated to the supply side, i.e. the ef-
forts of the defence industries and their associations to establish and enforce integrity
standards on an international scale.
There are no generally valid models for organising defence acquisition. One gen-
eral rule is that the acquisition process needs to be well coordinated with other core
defence planning and management processes. Another feature of good organisational
design is the clear delineation of required competencies, decision making authority
8 For details set in an international comparative context see: Willem F. van Eekelen, The
Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Procurement: Requirements, Production, Cooperation
and Acquisition, Occasional Paper No. 5 (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Con-
trol of Armed Forces, 2005).
Box 7.4. Parliamentarian Oversight of Defence Procurement: The Netherlands

The Netherlands has a long tradition and practice of strict parliamentary oversight over defence
procurement. In principle, all procurement decisions exceeding 25 million euros have to pass
through parliament. The vehicle for this is the so-called acquisition procedure. The government
(in practice, the State Secretary for Defence who has defence materiel in his portfolio) sends a
letter chosen out of four types—A, B, C or D—depending on the phase of the acquisition. With-
out going into details, the different phases basically go from the requirement for a new weapon
system (or a successor to a present one) to a concrete proposal to buy system X from pro-
ducer Y. Parliament is in a position to influence decisions at every phase of the acquisition
process. So, when the government stipulates a need for replacement or acquisition (or sug-
gests numbers of systems to be acquired) parliament may oppose or amend this. The final
procurement decision (the “go ahead”) may also be opposed or amended, although in practice
this does not often happen. Most of the time government intentions during the entire process
are influenced by the four letters—A, B, C and D—which are discussed in parliament.
For major projects exceeding 100 million euros, a special procedure has been set up (“Big
Projects”) involving even more detailed and frequent reporting to parliament. A typical example
of this is the involvement of the Dutch government in the development phase of the Joint Strike
Fighter, an American successor to the F-16. But there are other major projects, e.g. the Air Mo-
bile Brigade. All in all, it seems that in the Netherlands the present situation is by and large
judged to be satisfactory. There are discussions about the financial threshold and the wisdom
of detailed parliamentary scrutiny of the sometimes very technical process. In this framework,
questions are raised on the quality and independence of government information and the desir-
ability of “counter-evidence,” e.g. by an independent defence institute. Finally, the role of indus-
try and lobbyists and their access to defence committee members is often discussed. However,
no major incidents have occurred in this respect.
Source: Jan Hoekema, former Member of Parliament, the Netherlands, 2002, as quoted in Hans Born, et
al., Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector (2007), 174.
and oversight responsibilities. Box 7.5 presents an understanding of acquisition

competencies and stakeholders that is common for countries with well established
defence governance and democratic control of defence. For post-totalitarian defence
establishments, however, it is often problematic to delineate the respective competen-
cies and to provide and coordinate the necessary expertise so that real decision mak-
ers are well known, and the decision-making process is transparent.
Of interest in that respect is the experience of Bulgaria. In autumn 2009, the min-
ister of defence of Bulgaria, Mr. Nicklolay Mladenov, proposed amendments to the
country’s Law on Defence and Armed Forces, which limited his own authority in de-
fence procurement. According to these amendments, the minister may decide on ac-
quisitions of up to 25 million euros. For a procurement valued between 25 and 50 mil-
Box 7.5. Acquisition Competencies and Stakeholders

There are broadly four categories of people—or stakeholders—involved in defence acquisition.
Firstly, there are those who decide upon the requirements for the equipment and/or services to
be acquired. Effective requirement setting does not take place in a single moment but over a
period of time and study during which the requirement is gradually clarified and elaborated in
greater detail. For example, an initially broad requirement for a capability to destroy a potential
enemy’s main battle tanks might, through examination of the options available, be narrowed
down to a requirement for a portable anti-tank missile system and eventually translated into a
detailed specification describing the exact performance required. The task of implementing and
managing this period of time and study—and thus defining the requirement—does not neces-
sarily belong to a single agency but can be transferred from one group to another as the study
deepens. However the task is allocated, one especially important stakeholder in this category
is the user – the representative of the armed forces who is responsible for elaborating the re-
quirement as seen by those who will eventually operate the equipment or make use of the ser-
vices acquired. Clearly, the user has the expert knowledge of how military systems are em-
ployed in practice and, therefore, what sort of capability is required to prosecute a given
military task. However, as will be seen, this does not necessarily make the user the best
person to decide on equipment solutions to meet the capability requirement, or to manage the
full acquisition process. The user community—the armed forces—will generally take the lead in
the earlier stages of requirement setting but the later stages are often better handled by
acquisition specialists. These form the second category of stakeholder.
Acquisition specialists will usually be responsible for managing the bulk of the acquisition
project: specifying the detailed requirements, contracting with suppliers, ensuring delivery of
the required equipment and/or services, managing through life support and arranging for final
disposal. Because acquisition can be very complex, many nations have found it beneficial to
establish departments or agencies specifically tasked with this role and to cultivate acquisition
management as a career specialisation. There are many advantages to this approach, which
fosters the development and sharing of acquisition expertise on both an individual and a
corporate basis, while freeing the user to concentrate on core military business. More than this,
however, managing an acquisition project requires that financial responsibility—the obligation
to spend public funds wisely—should be delegated to the acquisition manager and executed
through the proper employment of the budget allocated to the project. This raises an important
point of principle: that the user function is best separated from the financial function. This is
because the user, for understandable and perfectly justifiable reasons, tends to seek out the
best technical solution to a particular requirement, whereas the wider interest of the defence
establishment, not to mention governments, parliaments and taxpayers, is that a balance is
struck between equipping the armed forces as well as possible and the correct spending of
public funds. This in turn requires that a more neutral actor—the acquisition manager—should
be entrusted with selecting the best solution to resolve the tensions that sometimes exist
between these two demands.
The third category of stakeholder is made up of those who will oversee and scrutinise acqui-
sition projects, usually members of the defence establishment’s senior leadership. The final
category of stakeholder is the external agencies that have the means to supply the equipment
and/or services to be acquired. They will usually be private businesses but this category may
also include other government agencies or other governments.
Source: Lawrence, “Acquisition Management” (2009), 157–159.
lion euros, the Ministry of Defence needs prior authorisation by the Council of Ministers
(the Cabinet), and for cases above the threshold of 50 million euros, the Council of
Ministers must get prior parliamentarian approval.
Even when not all of these competencies are available, governments have at their
disposal instruments to increase organisational integrity and reduce procurement-re-
lated corruption risks. Box 7.6 provides an example from the experience of Sierra
Leone, which is also considered good practice.
Box 7.6. Fighting Corruption in Procurement

Abdul Tejan Cole, commissioner of the Anti Corruption Commission (ACC) in Sierra Leone,
has launched an aggressive agenda aimed at strengthening transparency and accountability
within all ministries, departments and agencies of Sierra Leone. The ACC was established to
lead the fight against corruption, recognizing that public actors and ministries are the first line
of defence. Initially, nine offences were defined as corrupt but in September 2008 the new anti-
corruption law expanded corruption offences to twenty-two. Procurement offences, including
actions within the bidding process, are now covered by the anti-corruption law. Previously,
decisions to make procurement awards often resulted in flawed procurements and the deputy
ministers responsible for procurement decisions could not be prosecuted. Corruption in
procurement is recognized worldwide as a significant issue. Conflict of interest is now an
offence against the law. And any breach of the code of conduct results in disciplinary action.
Public officials are also required to formally disclose all assets.
A preference is now in place for trials by judge rather than jury as the commissioner notes
that it is easier to successfully bribe within a group of twelve than to bribe a judge. Sierra
Leone now has two judges that specialize in corruption. Also, minimum thresholds for sen-
tencing are now in effect. This avoids previous problems with sentences sometimes resulting in
only a warning.
The UN Convention provisions have been domesticated into the national law. This strength-
ens the fight against corruption. Whistleblower protection has been dramatically improved
under the current law. Whistleblowers now have protection under the law and are entitled to
10 % of the money recovered based upon success of information, prosecution and conviction.
Free telephone access to a hotline has been established. Potential whistleblowers are
reminded that frivolous accusations will result in prosecution of the false reporter.
For more information on the efforts of the ACC, visit their website at www.anticorruption.sl.
One more instrument that governments can use to increase integrity of procure-
ment is to establish requirements towards implementation of ethics standards by de-
fence suppliers. Box 7.7 presents US defence regulations, which have been enhanced
considerably in 2009.
Integrity of Individual Behaviour
No measures to counter procurement-related corruption will be fully effective if the in-
dividuals involved lack integrity. Countries often attempt to enforce both “hard” and
“soft” measures in attempts to reduce corruption risks related to defence procurement.
Hard measures are used to criminalize conflicts of interest and actual acts of brib-
ery – directly or through intermediaries. Regulations on conflicts of interest of defence
officials cover the period of the actual procurement, as well as prior involvement of in-
dividuals with defence suppliers and potential involvement with contractors for a cer-
tain period after they stop working for the defence ministry or the procurement agency.
For example, many countries define as a conflict of interest the case, when a de-
fence official—civilian or military—starts working for or receives benefits in other ways
from a defence supplier for a period of one, two or more years after they stop working
for the government.9 This rule is usually applied not only to officials that have dealt with
contracting per se but also to civil servants and military officers that have had a role in
the whole acquisition process – from definition of requirements to assessment of the
quality of the product or service delivered.
Soft regulations on individual integrity also contribute to the reduction of corruption
risks. Codes of ethics, considered in this group of measures, are applied both by gov-
ernmental organisations and defence suppliers.
Another measure in between the hard and soft measures is the encouragement or
requirement that people who have information on corrupt behaviour in the performance
or the award of a government contract report it to the authorities. That encouragement
goes hand in hand with regulations that provide for protection of such “whistleblowers.”
Box 7.7 provides information on US regulations that make ethics programmes,
training, reporting and whistleblower protection mandatory for all defence contractors.
Similar reporting requirements also apply to state employees, with a provision that any
case of reporting—by mail, online or phone—would be anonymous and non-traceable
9 For one such highly publicized case, as well as the reaction of the contractor and the
government see www.iasa.com.au/folders/Publications/Legal_Issues/unethicalboeing.html or
www.huizenga.nova.edu/6240/cases/Boeing_AirForceEthicsScandal.htm. For the reaction in
Congress, see www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/verbatim/49262/mccain-exposes-
usaf-role-in-tanker-lease.html.
Box 7.7. US Federal Acquisition Regulation on Contractor Ethics Programs

Even before 2007, US defence regulations required that contractors adhere to the highest de-
gree of integrity and honesty. Specifically, defence regulations provided that contractors should
have: (1) a written code of ethical conduct; (2) ethics training for all employees; (3) periodic re-
views of compliance with their code of ethical conduct; (4) internal audits, external audits, or
both; (5) disciplinary action for improper conduct; (6) timely reporting to appropriate
government officials of any suspected violation of law regarding government contracts; and (7)
full cooperation with any government agencies responsible for either investigation or corrective
action. While defence regulations provided that contractors should have such elements, they
were not mandatory.
With its two amendments in 2007 and 2008, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) man-
dated and amplified contractor ethics program rules. Defence regulations now require govern-
ment contractors to have written codes of business ethics and ethics compliance training pro-
grams for contractor employees and to post “fraud hotline” posters at contractor work sites to
encourage contractor employees to report fraudulent activity in connection with performance
and award of government contracts.
In addition, the amended FAR contractor ethics rules now cover wartime contracting, e.g. in
Iraq and Afghanistan, and require contractors to disclose violations of criminal law involving
fraud, conflicts of interest, bribery or gratuity violations or violations of the civil False Claims Act
in connection with the award or performance of government contracts and subcontracts. It
should be noted that these requirements are implemented by contract clause and are
mandatory. Amended rules also subject contractors to suspension and debarment from
government contracting for knowingly failing to disclose such violations and failing to disclose
receipt of overpayments on government contracts in a timely manner.
The FAR requires that each contractor establishes internal control systems for:
• Facilitating discovery of improper conduct;
• Ensuring that corrective measures are promptly carried out;
• Otherwise promoting an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a
commitment to compliance with the law.
Since January 2009, regulations of the Department of Defense (DOD) address protections
for contractor employees who disclose information to government officials with regard to waste
or mismanagement, danger to public health or safety, or violation of law related to a DOD con-
tract or grant. Specifically, an employee may not be discharged, demoted, or otherwise dis-
criminated against as a reprisal for disclosing to the government information concerning con-
tract-related violations. Also, contractors are obliged to inform their employees in writing of
these federal whistleblower rights and protections.
Source: United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting Integrity: Opportunities
Exist to Improve DOD’s Oversight of Contractor Ethics Programs, GAO-09-591 (Washington, DC: United
States Government Accountability Office, September 2009), 6–7 and 16.
if the reporting person wishes so. Posters of the US Department of Defense that ad-
vertise such reporting lines are included in Figure 7.1 below.10
In Poland—one of the countries that joined NATO relatively recently—every senior
officer, except for military judges and prosecutors, for which general regulations for
judges and public prosecutors are valid, and junior officers serving in a finance or lo-
gistics unit is obliged to fill in an assets disclosure form. The completed forms are not
public and are controlled by the Military Police. Those who in the last three years of
their military service have participated in procurement processes—broadly understood
to include planning, preparing and implementing the tendering procedure, or imple-
menting the contract—cannot take up a job in a defence company. Defence compa-
nies are those that produce or offer defence goods, services or construction, and it
does not matter whether they have participated in MoD tenders or not.11
Integrity Pacts
The final focus in the examination of how procurement-related corruption risks can be
addressed is on the multi-agency, multinational frameworks and the use of outside
observers of procurement processes.
Government-to-industry relationships, as well as international cooperation among
defence industries, are bound to lead to international anti-corruption consortia and as-
sociated codes of conduct. Such consortia are exerting pressure for stronger anti-cor-
ruption requirements in the global regulatory framework with the goal to achieve a “no-
bribes” level playing field in the arms trade.
Figure 7.1: Posters for Anonymous Whistleblowers.
10 See www.dodig.mil.
11 Personal communication with Maciej Wnuk, 2 December 2008.
But since any long journey starts with small steps, countries embarking on the in-
tegrity building path may start with focused efforts, such as opening up a particular
defence procurement case to outside scrutiny. Box 7.8 presents the experience with
“Defence Integrity Pacts” – a tool developed by Transparency International specifically
to counter procurement-related corruption risks and applied with increasing success
throughout the world.
Box 7.8. Strengthening Major Acquisitions with “Defence Integrity Pacts”

In the 1990s, Transparency International developed the integrity pact as a tool governments
can use to combat corruption at the tendering and contract stage of procurement. Transpar-
ency International’s defence team has since developed this for application to defence pro-
curements. The Defence Integrity Pact is a contract that binds bidders and buyers to non-brib-
ery pledges on a specific procurement. Transparency International has pioneered their use in
civilian sectors for some fifteen years now and they have become well-established in countries
such as Mexico.
Defence Integrity Pacts bind all the bidders and the government together in a contract to re-
duce the possibility of corruption occurring prior to, during and after the tender. Usually they in-
clude pledges and undertakings by bidders not to offer and accept bribes, as well as pledges
and undertakings by the governments including all their consultants and advisers. Bidders
agree to withdraw from the tender if there is evidence of breach of the pledge, which may also
involve further sanctions such as exclusion from bidding for subsequent contracts. Defence
Integrity Pacts furthermore restrict government officials or their spouses from obtaining work at
bidding firms for a set period after the bid and require disclosure of details of agents or
intermediaries. What makes the tendering and contract process of Defence Integrity Pacts
particularly transparent is the appointment of an independent monitor or monitoring team. The
independent monitor is to be provided access to all meetings and unrestricted access to all
documents. To be successful and trusted, only highly regarded persons with both in-country
and external expertise should be selected as independent monitors, and their funding needs to
be sufficiently secure for a long-term commitment.
Transparency International’s defence programme has worked with the governments of Co-
lombia and Poland to apply these pacts to major defence procurements. Defence Integrity
Pacts need to be engaged at the earliest possible stage. They offer the potential for much
greater transparency and because they improve contract documentation and oversight as well
as evaluation, they can lead to better equipment specification and better value for money. Use
of tools such as Defence Integrity Pacts can also serve as a catalyst for change for other
organisations and ministries.
For more information on Defence Integrity Pacts in Colombia, see: M. Pyman, A. Waldron and L. Avelia,
“Practical Implication of Defence Integrity Pacts. Experience in Columbia” (2006); Transparencia por Co-
lombia and Transparency International UK, “An independent review of the procurement of military items”
(2006). Both publications can be downloaded from www.defenceagainstcorruption.org.
Chapter 8
Offset Arrangements
Building integrity and reducing corruption risk in defence acquisition covers many spe-
cialist areas: from the way that technical specifications are developed, to the evalua-
tion process, through to the way Defence Ministry procurement functions are organ-
ised. In most of these subject areas, there is increasingly a reasonable body of knowl-
edge on what constitutes good integrity practice. Yet in one area—offsets—there is
remarkably little scrutiny and very little discussion or development of good practice,
despite the large and rapidly growing part that offset packages play in modern defence
acquisition.
Transparency International’s (TI) assessment is that offsets are a major corruption
risk, even in the most developed nations. In TI’s experience, defence officials from
many countries also share this view, while governments are not properly managing
this risk today. There is an urgent need for a concerted effort by industry and govern-
ments internationally to set and enforce a much stronger regime of transparency and
integrity standards related to offsets.
This chapter starts with a brief discussion on current offsets usage. It then outlines
specific corruption risks and the experience to date in examining offsets contracts. The
final section presents what are currently considered minimum standards of good
practice.
Current Offsets Usage
Offsets are broadly defined as compensation practices that are required as a condition
of a purchase of equipment or services from a foreign company. They are separated
into direct offsets, which are contractual arrangements that involve defence and arti-
cles and services referenced in the sales agreements for military exports, and indirect
offsets, which are articles and services unrelated to the defence items or services in
the sales agreement.
Offsets started in Europe after 1945 as one way to help restore the European
economies after World War Two. They are used almost exclusively in defence deals.
Nowadays, most countries require offsets to a value equivalent to 100 % of the main
contract value. At the upper level are, for example, Austria at 174 % and the Nether-
lands at 118 %. At the low end are countries that seek to discourage offsets, for ex-
ample Taiwan at 20 % or Thailand at 27 %. In aerospace, countries will generally only
demand that up to 20 % of the offsets package be direct. Most offsets are indirect; the
average from 1995 to 2005 being 60 % indirect vs. 40 % direct.
86
Offset Arrangements 87
Their use has been growing substantially over the last ten years. The offset value
has gone from an average of 49 % of contract value in 1995 to 103 % in 2005. Large
defence companies have sizeable offset departments and extensive obligations.
Lockheed Martin, for example, one of the largest defence contractors, has some
US$19 billion of offset obligations across 12 countries.1
Furthermore, there are moves in a number of countries, e.g. India, Brazil, to extend
the use of offsets outside of defence purchases to other areas of government spend-
ing.
Weighting of Offset Packages in the Tender Evaluation
There is a wide range of weightings, ranging from 60 % in a country such as Turkey to
40 % in Canada, down to 10–15 % in countries where the Defence Ministry is seeking
to limit the influence of the offset package on the choice of the defence equipment.2
Overhead Costs of Offsets
There is a dearth of information on the true costs of offsets. Offsets tenders do not re-
quire the cost to be separately broken out or identified. TI has observed data ranging
from an average 5–8 % uplift over the main contract costs in one Defence Ministry,
through to figures of 15–30 % uplift on the main contract cost for specific large con-
tracts in other countries.
In addition to that are the costs of managing offset arrangements in the purchasing
country, e.g. to sustain an offset office and its personnel.
Benefits of Offsets
There is a considerable debate among defence economists concerning the actual
benefits of offsets. The dispute is rendered unanswerable by the almost total lack of
economic analysis of the impact of offset packages, together with the lack of publicly
available data on the performance of offset contracts. As Steve Schooner, dean of
procurement law at George Washington University put it recently:
There is currently broad consensus on issues such as the need for transparency, integ-
rity, and accountability in defence procurement. Yet on the offsets issue, consensus is a
long way off. There is no agreement internationally, and countries are nowhere near
reaching one. As an example of how far away agreement is, the EDA Code of Conduct
comically seeks at once to increase and decrease offsets. Similarly, the World Trade Or-
ganisation says offsets are bad and bans them in other sectors, yet it says they are ac-
1 Building Integrity and Defence Institution Building, Conference Report (Monterey, CA, 25-27
February 2009), 91.
2 Ibid., 91–92.
ceptable in defence. Nor is there agreement at national levels. The US derides offsets,
yet maintains a “buy-American” policy in defence... Therefore much of what can realisti-
cally be done is simply to try to improve the process of offset management, while slowly
moving towards consensus over whether offsets should exist at all.3
There is a growing understanding that whatever the merits of offsets, a minimum
and necessary first step is that they be transparent and contracted for in a way that
satisfies all reasonable integrity standards.
Political Dimension of Offsets
For governments, offsets can offer an opportunity to ease the politics of major defence
spending. They seem to promise technology transfers, research and development and
an enlarged industrial base, alongside investment and high-skilled employment. The
politics of the offset purchase can overshadow completely the need or the desirability
of the military acquisition. This also creates a significant tension between the two dif-
ferent parts of the government involved – usually the Finance or Economics Ministry
supervising the offset purchase and the Defence Ministry purchasing the military asset.
Offset Corruption Risks
Offset corruption risks are revealed in publicly available commentary and allegations in
official reports, academic research and interviews conducted by Transparency In-
ternational, and in newspaper articles.
EDA Report on Offsets
The European Defence Agency commissioned a team to research the phenomenon of
defence offsets, with particular reference to the effect of offsets on the development of
a European defence industrial base. The result was a major report on offsets, pub-
lished in July 2007. While corruption risk was not the main focus of the paper, the au-
thors discovered unease with the opportunities for corruption afforded by the opacity of
offsets packages. The report states:
Finally there is an aspect that did feature in some interviews. This is the issue of corrup-
tion in relation to defence contracts and its real or alleged links to offset. This is not a
property of offset per se, but it seems indisputable that opaque and un-professional off-
set implementation provides scope for corruption potentially leading to another system
being chosen than would have occurred in an open and transparent market. It was a re-
curring story in interviews how old offset practices have been found insufficient and sub-
sequently replaced. Even though in particular pMS [participating Member State] repre-
sentatives naturally claim that their current offset practices are well functioning, it is our
3 Ibid., 97.
impression that the transparency and professionalism of offset practices vary widely be-
tween pMS and that there is considerable scope for improvement.4
Academic Research
The Centre for International Cooperation and Security, in its report “The impact of arms
transfers on poverty and development,” argued that:
Another potential avenue for corrupt practices is through “offsets.” Earlier the role of off-
sets was considered in terms of the impact of arms transfers on military expenditure. But
it is important to also consider whether offset packages can help conceal large bribes or
commissions, or whether they unduly influence a country’s decision when procuring
weapons. Offset packages “have a reputation for raising the cost of a deal by around
one-fifth; being difficult to monitor; failing to bring the benefits promised at the time of
sale; and contributing to corruption.” Offsets can also help feed into domestic corruption
relationships as contracts can be channelled through local firms chosen for their political
connections. In the South African deal, subcontracts with local firms allowed further
opportunities for officials to line their pockets.5
There are various academic analyses of the economic impact of offsets, at least
one of which considers related corruption risk.6 Trevor Taylor’s aim was to consider
whether procurement officials made decisions as to the requirement for and form of
offsets packages according to economic rationale or political rationale. It is an empiri-
cal paper based on transaction-level data to estimate the models, and forms a cross-
section study across a range of countries worldwide. His results suggest that while
government procurement officials select offsets according to economic rationale, po-
litical economy variables are also very important. Some offsets agreements see eco-
nomic variables (like price, quality, transaction costs and industrial development pol-
icy) dominate political variables (such as bureaucrat maximisation, national security
considerations and interest group theory). In other circumstances, however, the attrib-
utes of the offsets package may reflect political priorities. He concludes as follows:
A recommendation to address such corruption would begin with efforts to increase the
transparency of offsets. For example, each country should employ a group of
4 E. Anders Eriksson with M. Axelson, K. Hartley, M. Mason, A.S. Stenérus and M. Trybus,
Study on the effects of offsets on the Development of a European Defence Industry and
Market (Brussels: European Defence Agency, 2007), 46, www.eda.europa.eu/Default.aspx.
5 Mike Bourne, Malcolm Chalmers, Tim Heath, Nick Hooper and Mandy Turner, The Impact of
Arms Transfers on Poverty and Development, Centre for International Cooperation and Se-
curity (University of Bradford, September 2004), 44, http://www.bradford.ac.uk/acad/cics/
publications/AVPI/transfers/AVPI_Arms_Transfers_and_Poverty.pdf.
6 Trevor K. Taylor, “Modelling Offset Policy in Government Procurement,” Journal of Policy
Modelling 25:9 (2003): 985–98.
independent, outside auditors that would assess the merits of each offsets proposal,
and then perform the detailed ex post benefit-cost accounting. This benefit-cost
accounting should be published and subjected to external scrutiny.
TI Public Interviews with Defence Experts

Frank Boland, director, Force Planning, Defence Policy and Planning Division, NATO:
Offsets have become popular, because at first glance they appear to be a good deal for
governments. If they are spending money on imports, then offsets allow governments to
try to recoup foreign exchange – so one can see the attraction… [However] it has been
the case that many offsets simply do not materialise. The real problem is that offsets
distort decision making. Militaries may want equipment for particular needs; offsets allow
for procurements to be overridden by extraneous considerations.7
Ghanim Al Najjar, senior professor of political science, Kuwait University:
Offset programmes are supposed to transform new projects in Kuwait as part of the re-
payment. Offsets are not even nearly functioning. Nobody really knows what is happen-
ing with offsets. Most of the money that was allocated has not been spent. Is there any
oversight of offset delivery? Not exactly: there isn’t much money that has been spent so
far. I don’t think there is good supervision of it. People are waiting to see how effective
the offset programme will be in terms of local projects, but often it is the case that the
procedures are complex, or the programme is not paying much. Sometimes, the money
which is supposedly allocated is there but not supervised.
Even when there is no suspicion of corruption, offset practices often raise a num-
ber of concerns, such as:
• Lack of clarity on how offset proposals will be evaluated;
• No clear national strategy as to what the offsets should achieve;
• With more than one ministry involved, because of the offsets, there is huge
scope to lose control of the procurement and its proper evaluation;
• Offsets negotiations with bidders being initiated only after the contract is
awarded;
• Inadequate offset oversight mechanisms pre and post contract award (includ-
ing life of offset programme and applicable to prime and sub-contractors);
7 Interview published in Transparency International Defence Anti-Corruption Digest, No. 17

(June 2007), www.defenceagainstcorruption.org.
Box 8.1. Newspaper Allegations of Corruption in the Use of Offsets

Portugal: The Central Department of Investigation and Penal Action (DCIAP) is investigating
the offset contract for the purchase of two submarines to the German Submarine Consortium.
With a value of 1210 million, the offset contract, whose goal is to ensure the fulfilment of that
value on investments made in Portugal, was negotiated with the Ministry of Defence by Escom,
company of the Group Espírito Santo (GES) that was targeted in Portugal’s process.
South Africa: The South African arms purchase in 1999 has been controversial both for various
allegations of corruption involving European firms and senior South African politicians. While
the South African government has repeatedly highlighted the offsets agreements attached to
their arms purchases, the media has been far more sceptical – Business Day complained in
February 2008 that the success of the offsets packages has been difficult to establish
independently as their requests for information were rejected on the grounds of commercial
sensitivity. ThyssenKrupp, who have been under investigation by South Africa’s elite serious
crime squad over allegations of corruption in the sale of the frigates, have been reported to
have fallen behind in their offsets programme. However, the clearest links between corruption
and offset have been reported in relation to the purchase of Gripen fighters from BAE and
SAAB. The South African Mail & Guardian reported on 20 March 2008 that the defence minis-
ter at the time of the purchase, Joe Modise, secretly received shares in the Conlog/Log-Tek
electronics group, which stood to benefit substantially from arms deal offset agreements.
Czech Republic: In the Czech Republic, there was another case of purchase of Gripen fighters
being investigated for bribery with questions raised over the offsets package included in the
deal. Investigations centred on payments to senior Czech officials allegedly made in 2001 and
on the structure of the tender, which competitors for the contract withdrew after complaints that
the government had intentionally drawn up a contract that would generate a victory for the
Gripen fighters. The offsets deal that accompanied the package was also criticised at the time
of purchase as being illusory, with two finance ministers at the time resigning for this reason.
UK and Saudi Arabia: The Al Yamamah contract negotiated in the 1980s between the UK gov-
ernment on behalf of BAE and Saudi Arabia is the largest export in UK history and a continuing
source of controversy. The contract contained a well-known offset clause whereby some of the
revenues generated by BAE from the contract were reinvested into the UK defence industry;
the offset has been reported to have had few discernible benefits. Amongst the US Department
of Justice’s concerns, the offsets clause was reported to be part of the investigation.
Israel: In September 2005, Defense News reported that as part of a major investigation into
allegations of fraudulent payments made overseas, the headquarters of Israel’s largest aero-
space and defence firm, Israel Aircraft Industries, was raided by police. The investigation was
focused on ten years worth of suspected graft and kickbacks and centred on the disbursement
of both export sales and offsets deals.
Romania: In the Romanian purchase of two frigates in 2003, allegations emerged as to the
payment of commissions. The crucial part of the investigation focused on irregularities in the
contract and lost funds centred on the offsets package. In June 2006, the Bucharest Daily
News reported that “the real stake appears to be the implementation of the off-set contract.”
Under this contract, BAE Systems was to use 80 % of the acquisition sum to buy products and
services from Romania in a combination of direct and indirect offsets. The offsets have contin-
ued to prove controversial, as the Jurnalul National reported in September 2003 that the Ro-
manian Ministry of Defence intended to take BAE Systems to court if the company did not fulfil
its obligations under the offset agreement. The report also stated that the deal remains under
investigation in the UK by the Serious Fraud Office.
Taiwan: In an article in Defense News on US concerns with defence procurement processes in
Taiwan, corruption and payments paid to officials were highlighted as major problems with de-
fence deals. Amongst the recommendations for improving processes, there was reported to be
broad agreement that tackling corruption would require commissions and offsets to be either
tightly controlled or ended altogether.
Sources: “Arms deal crusader is back in court,” Business Day (25 February 2008), http://www.armsdeal-
vpo.co.za/articles12/crusader.html; “Arms probe reopened,” Mail & Guardian (20 March 2008),
www.mg.co.za/article/2008-03-20-arms-probe-reopened; Jeremy Druker, “Czech-BAE corruption probe
worries Prague,” ISN Security Watch (27 February 2007); “Israel Police Raid IAI,” Defense News (30
September 2005); “Romania Will Sue BAE Systems for Breach of Contract,” Jurnalul National (03
September 2007); “U.S. Warns Taiwan: Clean Up Defense Procurement,” Defense News (11 September
2006).
• Inadequate or even non-existent penalty mechanisms for not delivering

agreed offset obligations;
• Inadequate processes for legal oversight, mediation, and litigation;
• Inadequate timeframe to allow bidders to prepare offset packages;
• Too diverse offset options, with no precise requirements and clear selection
criteria;
• Many offset option elements fall outside the expertise of potential bidders;
• Lack of experienced personnel to evaluate offset options; and
• Members of oversight committees lack the expertise to assess offsets pro-
posals and implementation.
Specific Corruption Risks of Offsets

There are three specific corruption risks related to offsets:
Improperly Influencing the Need for a Capability
The choice by government of what is needed—or even whether a capability is
needed—can be influenced by the other “goodies” that can be on offer in a defence
purchase. Defence purchases are rarely a simple economic purchase. They often
have an international political dimension in which the purchasing nation is also hoping
to deepen political relations with the supplying nation. They also often are large
enough to have an impact on the domestic political agenda. In such cases, the offer of
a raft of apparent free goods can influence local politics in favour of the purchase.
Further, an attractive range of additional benefits can make an otherwise unattractive
product seem attractive. This was alleged to be the case in the Czech Republic, where
there is ongoing questioning of the need for the fast jets in the first place, and South
African arms deals, which have been dogged with suggestions of purchasing the
wrong platforms and of illegality.
Influencing the Competitive Decision in Non-Transparent Ways
It can be unclear, sometimes deliberately so, just how the relative merits of the bidders
offset packages are balanced against the other decision criteria. Just how are offsets
merits balanced against economic, technical and other criteria? This is hard to do
given the very different nature of the criteria. There have often been allegations of this
having been improperly done, for example in the South African arms purchase.
Allowing Favours to be Repaid
Offsets arrangements are often commitments that are not centred on until sometime
after the award of the contract. They can then take years to be fully established.
Through this time delay, and the usual lessening of political and media scrutiny, there
is scope for opaque deals and the return of favours that helped ensure the award of
the contract. The offset contracts are also often poorly monitored, so that the chances
of uncovering such corruption are poor.
Reducing Offsets-related Corruption Risk
There are two broad choices in addressing these risks: 1) abandon the use of offsets
in defence contracts; or 2) greatly strengthen the controls and oversight surrounding
them. Such controls need to be in place throughout the life of the offset programme,
even if it is for 20 years or more.
There are some signs that the issue of corruption risks of offsets is being ad-
dressed, as the following examples indicate:
• The practice whereby offset negotiations happened only after awarding a
contract has changed dramatically in the past couple of years. More and more
countries are now requiring the offset agreement to be negotiated and
finalized prior to the signing of the procurement contract. Industry experts an-
ticipate that this trend will continue, where it will become the standard condi-
tion of a country’s offset policy rather than an exception.
• The formal regime of penalties for non-performance is becoming stricter. In a

large majority of countries, penalties range from 3 %–10 % of the unfulfilled
balance offset obligation at the various milestone periods, at the end of the
performance period or both, while a few apply the penalty to the sales con-
tract value. What is changing is the form of these penalties. Normally they are
in the form of liquidated damages – meaning that when you pay the penalty it
“liquidates” or satisfies your remaining obligation. More recently, according to
industry offset experts, many countries are moving toward non-liquidated
damages, which means that you must pay the penalty and still fulfil your off-
set obligation or face possible blacklisting from future government procure-
ments until the obligation has been satisfied. In addition, the defence con-
tractors are normally required to issue a performance bond upfront to cover
the potential penalties. The performance bond value is reduced in proportion
to the receipt of offset credits by the defence contractor in satisfaction of the
offset obligation.
• In May 2008 at its main annual meeting, the Global Industry Cooperation
Conference—organised by the major offsets associations—started a discus-
sion on corruption risks related to offsets and the ways to prevent corrupt
practices.
• An offset workshop during a major NATO conference on “Building Integrity
and Defence Institution Building” held in Monterey, California in February
2009, brought together senior defence officials and senior representatives
from major European and US defence companies. They made a number of
proposals to NATO that are under consideration.
These are important steps towards a more comprehensive approach to reducing
corruption risks of offsets, which would be based on:
• Raising transparency and improving reporting;
• Strengthening accountability and integrity;
• Good functional processes;
• Disclosure of conflicts of interest; and
• Proactive engagement by the key players.
The suggested improvements and proposals in each of these areas, taken to-
gether, would constitute good practice. The reader should be aware though that integ-
rity in offsets tendering is such a new subject that many of the suggestions, whilst
seemingly useful and constructive, have yet to be implemented and tested on a sus-
tained basis.
Transparency and Reporting

The bid specification should require that bids be submitted with two prices: one with
the offsets package and one without the offsets package. This proposal is in line with a
draft recommendation from the aforementioned “Building Integrity and Defence In-
stitution Building” conference:
Enhancing and increasing transparency in the process of developing, implementing, and
managing offsets programmes, with transparency understood to include consideration of
the true cost of offsets on the part of governments, governments to seek tenders which
both include and exclude proposed offsets programmes so as to allow appropriate con-
siderations of the costs and benefits of the offsets packages, and which take into ac-
count the goals and objectives of the country’s intentions for their offsets programmes.8
There should be a requirement by the government for a detailed report each year
on the performance against the contracts of all the offsets contracts that have been
entered into in relation to each major acquisition. This report should be published,
which is generally not the case today.
The government should publish the criteria for the evaluation of the main contract
and the offset package, including the detailed weightings given to each element and
the weightings achieved by each of the shortlist bidders. This is not yet common prac-
tice.
There should be a definite requirement for an independent evaluation of the costs
and expected benefits of the offsets package, to be completed some 2–3 years after
the contract award. The evaluation should be published, which almost never happens
at present.
Civil society scrutiny can be a good way of bringing non-transparent aspects of the
proposals to light. The government should actively seek to involve civil society in a
discussion of the proposed offsets packages.
Strengthening Accountability and Integrity
Defence budgets and actual defence spending are analysed by a national audit office
and presented to parliament or the supreme decision-making body in most countries.
The same level of independent scrutiny should be applied to all offset deals.
Given the risks of contracts being passed to companies to reward favours or to
benefit related individuals, there needs to be stronger conflict of interest disclosure by
all those related to the acquisitions and a requirement for wider due diligence on the
agents and offset brokers involved. The defence industry associations could help by
8 Building Integrity and Defence Institution Building, Conference Report (2009), 101.
Box 8.2. Transparency in Managing Indirect Offsets

Following the introduction of the requirement for offsets accompanying large defence procure-
ments, in 2006 the Government of Bulgaria created the “Offset Programmes” Directorate with
the Ministry of Economy and Energy (MEE). The directorate is responsible for managing
indirect offsets.
This directorate created and maintains a webpage at the MEE website (see:
www.mee.government.bg/offsetp/offsetp.html). This webpage provides detailed information on:
• Offsets related regulations;
• Priority economic sectors where the government invites offsets-related investments;
• Method for factoring an offset project (in calculating its contribution—or offset benefit—to
meeting offset obligations), depending on the economic sector and technological level;
• Registry of the companies that have expressed their interest and meet the criteria for “off-
set recipients.” As of July 2009, the registry includes 64 Bulgarian companies;
• A list of offsets proposals, approved by the Ministry of Economy and Energy. Twenty-four
investments proposals are listed as of July 2009. The potential investment value is also
available to the public. Defence contractors can pick one or more of these proposals to
meet their offset obligations;
• Ongoing offset projects, with their net value and offsets benefit (the average multiplying
factor for the projects, listed as of July 2009, is about 3);
• A list of offsets agreements with defence contractors, supplying weapon systems and
equipment to the Bulgarian armed forces, and the respective offset projects. For each
project the webpage provides the net value, the multiplying factor and the offsets benefit,
deadline and interim milestones, and a short description.
In addition, the webpage provides links to relevant reports and conference proceedings. The
full information on the webpage is available in Bulgarian. The most important part of the
information is also available in English at www.mee.government.bg/eng/offsetp/offsetp.html.
producing guidance on this (see also the recommendations below on action by indus-
try and associations).
All those involved in tendering, up to and including the tender evaluation commit-
tees and the relevant ministers, should be required to submit annual conflict of interest
statements.
Good Functional Processes
The lower the percentage weight given to the offset contract in the evaluation, the
lower the level of risk. A low weight, e.g. 10–15 %, is considered reasonable. Where
the weighting is higher, the corruption risks are correspondingly higher and more of
these other measures need to be put in place.
Government procurement departments need to recognise that offset contracts are

a major undertaking of their own. They are not a simple “add on” to the main contract.
A dedicated team should be set up to deal with offsets and ensure that the offset con-
tract preparation receives the same attention as the main contract. Additionally, the
lead ministry needs to clarify clearly and in writing before the acquisition process be-
gins the exact split of responsibilities between the ministries involved (if there is more
than one of them). The lead ministry should also insist on clear pre-award commit-
ments.
Proactive Action by Defence Companies
Individual companies should apply the full weight of their compliance programmes to
the offset programmes and the staff and consultants involved in them. This does not
seem to be the case at present.
Second, defence company standards of business conduct and business ethics
should be extended to refer explicitly to offsets and the need for controls.
Companies may well get a supportive reception if they voice their concerns over
the risks to prospective purchasers. Based on our experience, purchasing govern-
ments may well appreciate an opportunity to make specific requests and set require-
ments in respect to offset transparency, if they know they will have the support of at
least some of the bidders.
Proactive Action by Industry and Pan-Government Organisations
TI has made a surprising observation: companies with otherwise excellent anti-bribery
compliance programmes become reticent on the subject of offset programmes. The
same applies to defence industry associations. The following are constructive steps
that the industry could take to show its concern in this area:
• Defence Industry Associations should be ready to set standards for well-con-
trolled offset programmes that they expect their members to adhere to;
• They could also produce guidance on the detailed due diligence requirements
to be satisfied by offset brokers. This must include a requirement on the
companies and the brokers to satisfy themselves that the companies re-
ceiving the offset contracts do not have any improper connection to persons
in the government or political parties;
• This particularly applies to the European Defence Association (ASD) and the
US Aerospace Industry Association, AIA, given the work they are already en-
gaged in to raise anti-corruption standards in international arms sales;
• The European Defence Agency is doing excellent work in the field of opening
up defence procurement across Europe. Its approach to offsets however is
contradictory, confusing and weak. Their current code of practice in this area
is particularly poor, and, astonishingly, makes no reference at all to corruption
risks. EDA should consider reconvening an offsets task force that looks spe-
cifically at ways to raise the integrity in the tendering and implementation of
offset packages.
Proactive Action by Civil Society and Media Organisations
Offsets have remained a “hidden” topic, despite the risks outlined above. There is
clearly a need for civil society organisations that promote good governance and trans-
parency to be more active in this area. Governments that have taken measures to
open up the discussion of offsets to such debate are to be encouraged.
Given the increasing scale of offsets and their expansion outside defence into other
areas of commerce, it is strongly in the interest of good governance that the subject is
more widely discussed in countries.
Conclusions
Offsets are a major corruption risk. They have the potential to divert proper decision
making on defence needs and are an easy conduit for rewarding companies and indi-
viduals. They are remarkably unregulated and almost entirely opaque.
Industry and government readiness to address corruption risk is in the process of
changing for the better. However, corruption in offset transactions remains largely un-
touched. Governments would best eliminate this risk, and possibly gain better value, if
they decide to abandon the practice of seeking offsets. Where that is not possible,
both governments and companies can relatively easily take steps to make these
transactions more transparent and less at risk from corruption.
Chapter 9
Opportunities and Risks with Out-
sourcing, Privatization and Public-
Private Partnerships in Defence
Introduction
Many of the same lessons that apply in standard defence procurements to curb cor-
ruption also apply in less traditional contracting arrangements such as outsourcing
(“market testing” and “competitive sourcing”), privatization and public-private partner-
ships (PPPs). Two constants are the importance of sustained competition and inde-
pendent oversight. Applying these two lessons together with a country-specific mix of
integrity, transparency and accountability tools can decrease corruption by increasing
the expected costs to opportunistic officials of engaging in corrupt behaviour.1
Modern Ministries of Defence are concerned with two things:
• Effectiveness – producing the best possible defence forces to satisfy both na-
tional and collective security demands; and
• Efficiency – making the best use of limited budgets.
Given the current budget environment, this involves rethinking the way defence
does business. The challenge of streamlining government to become more efficient
and effective has been answered by looking to the private sector.
NATO members and partners find themselves increasingly relying on the private
sector in three ways:
1. To provide weapons and support services (outsourcing);
2. To raise revenues by selling excess property and facilities no longer needed
(privatization); and, particularly when budgets are tight,
3. To solicit private sector investment in defence projects and operations (pub-
lic-private partnerships).
1 Simeon Djankov and Peter Murrell, “Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A Quantitative

Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature 40:3 (September 2002): 739–92.
99
Box 9.1. Sourcing Options

Outsourcing: Organizational activities are contracted out to vendors or suppliers who specialize
in these activities (usually in a competitive fashion).
Competitive Sourcing: Current public providers and private providers compete (also known as
Public-Private Competitions or “Market Testing”).
Privatization: Current government capital equipment, facilities and workers are moved into the
private sector – either competitively or on a sole-source basis.
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs): A cooperative venture between the public and private
sectors, built on the expertise of each partner, that best meets clearly defined public needs
through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and rewards. Attempts are made to com-
bine the best of both the public and private sectors—either in a competitive or sole-source
environment. One type of public-private partnership is the private finance initiative. With private
financing, instead of having the government finance public investments, work is actually fi-
nanced by the private sector in exchange for a share of savings, or government guaranteed
purchases.
Government Entrepreneurship (“Franchising”): One government agency specializes in a given
function and provides it to other government agencies or even to the private sector – again,
either competitively or on a sole-source basis.
Sources: Jacques S. Gansler and Roger C. Lipitz, Moving Toward Market-Based Government: The
Changing Role of Government as the Provider, New Ways to Manage Series (Arlington, VA: IBM Endow-
ment for the Business of Government, 2003), 10, http://www.businessofgovernment.org/pdfs/
Gansler_Report.pdf; The Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships, www.pppcouncil.ca.
Whereas outsourcing, privatization and PPPs offer considerable opportunities to

improve the efficiency and effectiveness of defence forces, there is a dark side – cor-
ruption. To achieve desired results from outsourcing, privatization and PPPs requires a
delicate balance of enlightened and ethical leadership, strong institutions (competitive
markets, clear rules and regulations, a competent legal/judicial system) and effective
oversight (measurement and monitoring/audit capabilities) to deter corruption without
stifling efficiency or effectiveness. Combining basic integrity and good institutions guar-
antees the best possible outcomes from outsourcing, privatization and PPPs.
Ideally, the objective of each NATO member and partner country would be to find
an optimum mix of initiatives to build integrity, increase transparency and improve ac-
countability, in cooperation with other members and partners, to minimize corruption
risks in outsourcing, privatization and PPPs. Coordinated anti-corruption initiatives—
such as Transparency International’s “Defence Integrity Pacts” (see chapters 7 and 17
for examples)—encourage credible commitments on the part of key players that in-
crease the efficiency and effectiveness of national and collective security obligations.
Outsourcing, Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships 101
Corruption Risks in the “Make-or-Buy” Decision

A challenge that every Ministry of Defence (MoD) faces is whether to “make-or-buy”
defence equipment, infrastructure, supplies and support services. Should the MoD be-
come more involved in defence business (make), or should it turn more defence busi-
ness over to the private sector (buy)?
Two key steps are required to solve the “make-or-buy?” decision: the first involves
an “effectiveness” review and the second an “efficiency” review. Examples of effec-
tiveness reviews are the US “Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)” or its “Base Re-
alignment and Closure (BRAC)” process. Effectiveness reviews evaluate the appropri-
ate size and composition of defence infrastructure and support activities in the face of
existing and emerging threats, and in cooperation with alliance members and their
partners. Given a determination of the appropriate capabilities and force structure, ef-
ficiency reviews investigate opportunities to reduce costs and/or improve performance.
Effectiveness reviews result in two categories of assets and activities: “necessary”
and “unnecessary.” Unnecessary infrastructure and support activities are candidates
for divestiture or privatization. Necessary assets and activities can be further sub-di-
vided into those that are “inherently governmental” and those that are more “commer-
cial” in nature.
Box 9.2. Military “Infrastructure” and Sourcing Options

Military “infrastructure” typically includes:
• Acquisition
• Central logistics
• Central personnel
• Communications
• Force management
• Installations
• Medical functions
• Science & technology
• Education & training.
All three sourcing options discussed in this chapter are utilised by militaries around the world.
For example:
• Outsourcing is used to provide logistics services;
• Public-private partnerships for military housing (installations); and
• Privatization in providing many medical functions.
The US Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 defines an “inherently

governmental activity” as:
…an activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate perform-
ance by government personnel. These activities require the exercise of substantial
discretion in applying government authority and/or in making decisions for the govern-
ment.2
Commercial infrastructure and support activities may be discovered to be candi-
dates for outsourcing through “market testing” or “competitive sourcing.” Meanwhile,
where tight budgets restrict defence investments, public-private partnerships (PPPs)
enable government to take advantage of privately owned infrastructure, technology,
capabilities or private investment funding to improve inherently governmental or re-
tained commercial activities (see Figure 9.1). The term private finance initiative (PFI) is
used in the United Kingdom.
Figure 9.1: Defence Decision Map.
Efficiency assessments require that governments apply internal metrics that allow
them to benchmark in-house costs with the costs of commercial providers of defence
capabilities and services. This suggests a transition to some form of activity-based
costing to determine the complete costs associated with a public function. This “total
cost” must include all “indirect” costs that support the particular function being per-
formed, including many costs not currently attributed to that function – such as finance,
legal support, personnel management, etc.3 Meanwhile, in anticipating the costs of out-
sourcing and PPPs, one needs to account not only for government’s costs of obtaining
products and services in the contract but also for government’s costs of writing, moni-
2 Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., Circular A-76 Revised (Washington, DC: US Office of Management
and Budget, May 29, 2003), www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a076/a76_rev2003.pdf.
3 Gansler and Lipitz, Moving Toward Market-Based Government (2003), 11.
Box 9.3. Outsourcing Benefits from Public-Private Competitions

U.K. Ministry of Defence “Market Testing”:
• From FY87 to FY92, MoD competed for 246 activities with an average first-year sav-
ings of 24 percent.
In 1966, the US Office of Management & Budget (OMB) issued Circular A-76: Performance
of Commercial Activities, which established the policy for acquiring commercial activities. In
1979, the OMB issued procedures for A-76 cost comparison studies to determine whether
commercial activities should be performed by government, by another federal agency or by the
private sector. The objective of A-76 is to provide a “fair” public-private competitive sourcing
process, seeking to determine the most cost-effective method of obtaining services that are
available from the commercial market.
• From FY79 to FY96, the US Army completed 486 cost comparisons. In-house won
240, contractors won 228. Savings averaged 28 percent of pre-competition costs,
saving USD 4 billion over the period.
• From FY78 to FY92, the Department of Defense held 2000 competitions with an
average savings of 30 percent.
At present, an A-76 study requires an agency to develop a Performance Work Statement to
identify the work to be done; to prepare a government in-house cost estimate based upon a
Most Efficient Organization that can accomplish the work; to solicit bids to perform this work
from the private sector; and to compare this estimate with the lowest or best-value offer from
the private sector. The government converts to performance by the private sector if the offer is
lower than the in-house estimate either by 10 percent of direct personnel costs or by $10
million over the length of the specified performance period. The time period established for cost
comparisons is 24 months for a single function and 48 months for multifunction competitions.
By the end of the 1990s, the OMB estimated savings of roughly $9.2 billion in DoD operating
costs between 1997 and 2005 and $2.8 billion in annual recurring savings after 2005 resulting
from A-76 studies.
Source: Gansler and Lipitz, Moving Toward Market-based Government (2003).
toring and managing the contract, including the risk of higher costs later as the
government begins to rely more heavily on a winning contractor. Finally, corruption
risks need to be addressed early in the assessment process as this can significantly
increase transaction costs and destroy public confidence in outsourcing, privatization
and PPPs.4
4 Francois Melese, Raymond Franck, Diana Angelis and John Dillard, “Applying Insights from
Transaction Cost Economics to Improve Cost Estimates for Public Sector Purchases: The
Case of U.S. Military Acquisition,” International Public Management Journal 10:4 (October
2007): 357–85.
Box 9.4. Selected Examples of Outsourcing, Privatization and PPPs

Areas used by the Australian defence forces are centrally managed by the Defence Estate Or-
ganization (DEO). The mission of the DEO is to manage these assets according to business
principles that optimize government revenue. Armed forces are the tenants and many buildings
and much of the land has been sold and leased back. Privatizing assets and disposing of un-
used or underutilised property raises revenues.
Areas used by the Polish defence forces are centrally managed by the Military Property
Agency. The mission is to sell off all redundant military property, from hardware to former mili-
tary installations. Any profits from sales go directly to the MoD, which uses them to modernize
the Polish armed forces.
Source: Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), Conversion Survey 2001—Global
Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization (Germany: NOMOS, 2001).
Public-private competitions should always be structured to take into account the

government’s need for high-quality, reliable and sustained performance, as well as the
opportunity for cost savings and the risk of corruption. Efficiency reviews can encour-
age innovation and investment. Regardless of whether the public or the private sector
wins the cost comparison, Department of Defence officials have noted that savings of
20 percent or more are not uncommon. This is because properly conducted competi-
tions can promote efficiency, minimize corruption and improve the performance of de-
fence activities.5
Corruption Risks in Outsourcing, Privatization & PPPs
Selling (privatizing/divesting) un-needed assets allows governments to focus on core
activities, and to reduce costly subsidies and the burden on taxpayers. Auctioning un-
necessary defence assets and activities can create new business opportunities for the
private sector. It can also raise government revenues to recapitalize defence opera-
tions or to reduce budget deficits. Alternatively, voucher privatizations encourage
widespread share ownership and entrepreneurial initiative to operate assets and ac-
tivities that benefit shareholders.
The following goals apply to many outsourcing, privatization and public-private
partnership initiatives:
• Improve efficiency and reduce government borrowing (cost savings);
• Improve effectiveness (boost performance);
• Encourage share ownership;
5 Commercial Activities Panel, Improving the Sourcing Decisions of the Government

(Washington, DC: Government Accounting Office, 2002).
• Generate auction revenues for defence recapitalization or to reduce public

debt; and
• Focus on core activities.
While significant public benefits can result from a competitive and transparent
process of outsourcing, privatization and PPPs, there are also serious risks.
The first risk is that if specific assets, activities or resources (land, labour, capital,
etc.) are sufficiently valuable to the private sector, special private interests may at-
tempt to bias public results in favour of outsourcing, privatization or PPPs. The risk is
that through legal lobbying and illegal bribes or favours, those who stand to gain will
attempt to influence the political and bureaucratic process so that valuable assets are
determined to be “unnecessary” for future defence forces, leading to their transfer into
private hands through privatization. Alternatively, legal and illegal political and bu-
reaucratic influence might be used in order to “purchase” valuable outsourcing or pub-
lic-private partnership opportunities.
Another factor poses an equally significant risk. Defence ministries are often sub-
jected to intense public pressure and (legal and illegal) lobbying by states, cities, lo-
calities and special business interests to prevent base closings or property transfers
through privatization, outsourcing or PPPs that might entail the loss of current reve-
nues and jobs – even when those assets or activities are no longer necessary for na-
tional security.
In recent decades, the US has been relatively successful in addressing these con-
flicting risks. In several of its recent “effectiveness” reviews of defence infrastructure
and support activities, the US established an independent Base Realignment and Clo-
sure (BRAC) commission (see Box 9.6 for details). One key innovation minimized legal
lobbying and illegal influence peddling. The commission’s recommendations could not
be amended and were non-negotiable. Once presented to the president and Congress,
they could only be approved, or rejected, in their entirety.
Outsourcing, privatization & PPPs can take place through several methods:
1. Sole-sourcing or direct sale to, or joint ventures with, a strategic investor;
2. Competitive sealed-bid or online auctions resulting in the sale of assets (or
granting of contracts) to the highest (lowest) bidder; and
3. In the case of privatization – initial public share offerings (IPOs), voucher-
based distribution or direct sales to the public, employee share ownership
plans and/or management buyouts, or some combination.
Each of these methods is vulnerable to corruption.
Box 9.5. Selected Military Value Criteria for U.S. Base Realignment & Closure
(BRAC)
The BRAC commission used criteria that were fully transparent to all stakeholders, as well as
to the general public. For example, the commission considered:
• The current and future mission requirements and the impact on operational readiness of
the Department of Defense’s total force;
• The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace at both the
existing and potential receiving locations;
• The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization and future total force requirements
at both the existing and potential receiving locations;
• Cost and manpower implications, etc.
Box 9.6. Corrupt Behaviour in Share Privatizations

Following voucher privatization programs, in several countries managers or shareowners with
major stakes in firms attempted to gain control of firms through various means. One means
used to gain control of firms at the expense of original shareholders is called “dilution.” This in-
volves issuing new shares at levels which dilute total equity per share. Some dilution is com-
mon in most countries. For example, dilution occurs anytime firms issue options to manage-
ment to purchase future shares at rates considerably below market prices.
Advice Regarding Personnel of the Privatization Agency and of the Share/Trust Fund to Re-
duce Corruption Risk:
• Assure that the personnel of the Privatization Agency and of the Share/Trust Fund are
fully and adequately trained, both initially and thereafter in regular intervals, as well as
effectively supervised and adequately safeguarded against corruptive influences;
• Assure that all officers and staff of the Privatization Agency and of the Share/Trust Fund
publicly disclose, in regular intervals, their income, assets and any potential conflicts of in-
terest;
• Assure adequate payment structures for the officers and staff of the Privatization Agency
and the Share/Trust Fund;
• Assure clear conflict of interest rules for all staff of both institutions. To be avoided in
particular are appointments of staff based not on merit (competence and experience) but
on political connections;
• Require ethical commitments (“I will not accept or demand any bribes myself or tolerate
bribery by others and will voluntarily disclose any potential conflict of interest”) from all offi-
cers and selected staff involved in decision making in the privatization process;
• Assure that the privatization institution employs independent outside experts for decisions
on technical aspects for which it lacks the necessary expertise;
• Introduce and sustain adequate rotation rules (no officer or staff may remain in a sensitive
position long enough to develop improper connections or dependencies with potential
bribers); and
• Introduce and assure the obligation of all officers and staff in both institutions, and all
other officials involved in privatization matters, to report any suspicion or knowledge of
corrupt behaviour to the relevant authorities, irrespective of whether the briber is an official
or a private person, and provide corresponding whistleblower protection.
In cases where privatization is managed by technical ministries rather than a special privatiza-
tion agency, assure that all the safeguards recommended above for the Privatization Agency
are applied mutatis mutandis to the relevant officials and staff of the respective technical min-
istry.
Sources: Michael H. Wiehen, Avoiding Corruption in Privatization: A Practical Guide (Germany: GTZ,
2004); Excerpts from Division 42 Sector Project: Development and Testing of Strategies and Instruments
for the Prevention of Corruption, 20–25: www.u4.no/document/literature/gtzcorruptionandprivatization.pdf;
Jeffrey Miller, “Evaluation of Mass Privatization in Bulgaria,” William Davidson Institute Working Paper
#814 (March 2006).
Corruption often originates either with a bidder (offering an illegal payment to influ-
ence the outcome, i.e. bribery) or a public official (demanding a payment to influence
the outcome, i.e. extortion). As Rose-Ackerman points out, “… a firm may pay to be
included in the list of qualified bidders or to restrict their number. It may pay to obtain a
low assessment of the public property to be leased or sold off, or to be favored in the
selection process… firms that make payoffs expect not only to win the contract or…
auction, but also to obtain inefficient subsidies, monopoly benefits, and regulatory lax-
ness in the future.”6 Furthermore, the greater the risk of corruption, the more difficult it
is to attract foreign direct investment and new technology, the fewer the competitors,
and the worse the outcomes.
It may be useful to have a central independent anti-corruption institution to oversee
non-traditional procurement, including outsourcing, privatization and PPPs. With strong
support from the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government, such an
institution should be capable of investigating and prosecuting corruption, wherever it
appears.
Conclusions
Corruption risks not only depend on the competitive environment and methods chosen
for outsourcing, privatization or PPPs but also on the integrity of public officials and
6 Susan Rose-Ackerman, When is Corruption Harmful (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996).
Box 9.7. Principles of a Market-Based Approach for Outsourcing, Privatization &

PPPs
Gansler and Lipitz (2003) formulate four principles of a market-based approach for
outsourcing, privatization and PPPs:
1. The key to success is shifting from a monopoly to a competitive environment;
2. Competition must be run for “best value” rather than simply low cost;
3. Even when government contracts out work, it does not give up its management respon-
sibilities;
4. There is a critical need for key measures of performance and cost that will be continu-
ously monitored and reported.
Source: Gansler and Lipitz, Moving Toward Market-based Government (2003), 9–11.
private contractors, and the transparency and accountability of governance mecha-

nisms and institutions.
The risk of corruption can be significantly reduced through integrity pacts devel-
oped by Transparency International. Integrity pacts require that all participants engage
in transparent contracting arrangements, which include monitoring and oversight by
civil society.
Agreements on Codes of Conduct provide even more leverage, requiring that pub-
lic officials and private contractors promise to refrain from all corrupt activities and,
more importantly, that they are held accountable in case of violations. Parties agree in
advance to specific sanctions, which include loss of the contract, forfeiture of bid
bonds, liability for damages and blacklisting from future public competitions. Organi-
zations such as the OECD, OSCE, EU and the World Bank offer anti-corruption regu-
lations that can reinforce integrity pacts and include clear rules for public disclosure of
assets, income and potential conflicts of interest by politicians and public officials.
In conclusion, making the best use of defence resources often requires outsourc-
ing, privatization and PPPs. Many of the same lessons that apply in standard defence
procurements to curb corruption also apply to such “non-traditional” contracting ar-
rangements. The constants are sustained competition, transparent contracting ar-
rangements and independent oversight. Applying these lessons together with a coun-
try-specific mix of integrity, transparency and accountability tools can reduce corrup-
tion by lowering the benefits and increasing the costs of engaging in corrupt behaviour.
Box 9.8. Avoiding Corruption in Privatization

Risk Indicators for Corruption:
• Parliament/legislature subject to undue influence by the private sector, enabled also by
the absence of adequate campaign finance laws and procedures;
• Absence of transparency of public administration in general as well as non-public, non-
transparent decision making by the government;
• Inadequate access of the public at large (including civil society) to information about
government programs, processes and decisions; absence of opportunity for public discus-
sion of government programs and decision making and of opportunities for the public and
civil society to participate in the development of privatization strategy and policy, and of
the privatization law, institutions and program;
• Absence of:
o An effective control system (by the parliament, the administration and/or external,
independent institutions) for the privatization program;
o Accountability systems and controls for the politicians and officials involved in the
privatization program;
o Opportunity for the public or officials to register suspicion of corruption confiden-
tially or anonymously;
o Criminal, civil and disciplinary processes against politicians and officials who have
been implicated in previous cases or have otherwise been suspected of corrupt
behaviour;
o Effective criminal sanctions instruments and institutions, as well as ineffective
enforcement of existing sanctions instruments;
o National rules for the public disclosure of assets, income and potential conflicts of
interest by politicians and public officials involved in privatization decisions;
o Independent, courageous media;
o Corporate governance instruments and institutions; and
• Continued service of politicians and officials in critical positions, despite obvious conflicts
of interest (possibly even despite accusations and/or convictions of previous corruption of-
fences).
Audit and Control Systems to Counter Corruption:
• Install and sustain effective audit and control systems (internal and external audit,
parliamentary oversight, etc.) and functions over all decisions of the Privatization Agency
and the Share/Trust Fund, including both policy and single-enterprise decisions:
o The relevant state control and audit institutions should have and exercise authority
over all privatization decisions, whether taken in the Privatization Agency or else-
where;
o The assessments of the audit and control institutions should be fully transparent;
o Assure that any reports of violations or inadequate compliance are properly fol-
lowed up and lead to corrections and improvements;
o Give civil society involved in privatization monitoring and control access to all
relevant documentation, including normally confidential documents, under a
commitment to treat such information as confidential, except when violations are
discovered and not corrected;
• Assure and monitor the functioning of the appropriate audit and control institutions and in-
struments. Furthermore, assure the enforcement of criminal, civil and disciplinary
sanctions against politicians and officials caught in breaking laws and rules, including:
o Disciplinary measures, including removal from current functions and non-eligibility
for future public functions;
o Confiscation of illegally obtained property;
o Liability for damages; and
o Confinement and monetary fines.
Source: Michael H. Wiehen, Avoiding Corruption in Privatization: A Practical Guide (Germany: GTZ,
2004), www.u4.no/ document/literature/gtzcorruptionandprivatization.pdf.
Recommendations:
• Formulate clear and transparent defence guidance, policies, budgets and
decision processes, and performance metrics.
• Conduct regular assessments of effectiveness of delivering a defence
capability by the defence establishment, starting with support capabilities
such as infrastructure development and maintenance, medical support, etc.,
and moving towards combat support services such as air refuelling, support
to deployed forces, etc. Incorporate such assessments into strategic defence
reviews or similar processes.
• Conduct regular assessments of efficiency of delivering a defence capability
by the defence establishment and through alternative sourcing, e.g. out-
sourcing or public-private partnership, taking into account cost efficiencies as
well as the government’s need for high quality, reliable and sustained per-
formance.
• Provide clear and efficiently enforced legal and economic rules and regula-
tions for outsourcing, privatization and public-private partnerships.
Box 9.9. Transparency of PPPs

The Canadian Council for Public-Private Partnerships (http://www.pppcouncil.ca) was estab-
lished in 1993 as a member-sponsored organization with representatives from both the public
and the private sectors. As proponents of the concept of public-private partnerships (PPPs),
the council conducts research, publishes findings, facilitates forums for discussion, sponsors
an annual conference on topics related to PPPs (both domestic and international) and
celebrates successful public-private partnerships through a National Awards Program.
As a national, authoritative voice on the topic of public-private partnerships, the council sup-
ports political officials and decision makers in exploring and developing partnerships with the
private sector. Alternatively, the council strives to create opportunities for the private sector to
work with governments on public-private projects that cover the spectrum from simple con-
tracts to full privatizations.
Besides encouraging and providing information on public-private partnerships, the council
stimulates dialogue between public and private sector decision makers on the financing and
delivery of public services, educates the public, conducts objective research on key issues that
influence the effective use of partnerships and publishes research papers, case studies, guide-
lines, opinion surveys and national inventories on key public-private partnership subjects.
As a transparency measure, the council maintains an open access PPP project database,
called “PPP Project Tracker” (available at www.pppcouncil.ca/resources_project_tracker.asp).
This database covers projects in the proposal stage, recently conducted projects and cancelled
projects. For each ongoing project the public can access the following information: project title,
a brief description, the total cost of the project, model of the public-private partnership and
project duration, current and next stage of the project, website for additional information and
the point of contact.
In May 2009, the minister of defence of Canada announced that a major security infrastruc-
ture project will be procured as a public-private partnership. Although security clearances will
be required from vendors, the procurement notice is published on the council website.
For the models of public-private partnerships, see: http://www.pppcouncil.ca/
aboutPPP_definition.asp.
• Provide for effective and transparent functioning of legislative, judicial and bu-
reaucratic structures, including internal and external audits, parliamentary
oversight and public access to information (with due account for sensitivity of
some of the information).
Chapter 10
Utilisation of Surplus Equipment
and Infrastructure
In the process of adaptation to the post-Cold War security environment, the countries
on the two sides of the then dividing line reduced their armed forces significantly. A
considerable amount of weapon systems, equipment, ammunitions and military sites
became unnecessary in the process. Defence establishments to the West of the di-
viding line did have to resolve certain challenges but the combination of sound defence
management mechanisms, parliamentarian scrutiny and societal interest kept the
problem manageable. To the East of that line, however, countries had to deal with the
issue of defence surpluses in parallel with the return to free market and the principles
of democratic rule, with burning conflicts on their territories or nearby, very limited
transparency and, generally, quite weak democratic institutions.
Not surprisingly, defence establishments in Eastern, South-Eastern Europe and
elsewhere were not able to cope efficiently with this legacy and still face numerous
problems. First, maintaining surpluses costs much. Secondly, poor protection, storage
and handling of surpluses directly threatens the life of soldiers, employees, the people
working or living in nearby communities and the environment, and increases the risk of
illicit trafficking and uncontrolled spread to criminals and even terrorists. And third,
non-transparent and unaccountable management of the surpluses involves very high
corruption risks.
This chapter examines these three groups of problems and presents examples of
good practice in resolving them. The final section provides a list of recommendations,
the implementation of which lowers the corruption potential of utilisation.1
Waste of Resources
The costs of removing defence materiel that has become redundant may be signifi-
cant. On the other hand, keeping redundant weapon systems, equipment, ammunition
and infrastructure diverts valuable human and financial resources away from devel-
oping necessary defence capabilities and deploying armed forces in operations that
increase the security of the nation, its allies and partners. As the example in Box 10.1
1 Here the term “utilisation” denotes the removal of surplus defence materiel and infrastructure
from the defence establishment through sale, exchange, donation, conversion, destruction or
other legitimate ways.
112
Utilisation of Surplus Equipment and Infrastructure 113
Box 10.1. Indirect Costs of Delayed Utilisation

As a member of NATO since 2004 and of the EU since 2007, Bulgaria continues to deal with
the legacy of its large Cold War military. Twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the
defence establishment still cannot get rid of numerous weapon systems, tens of thousands of
tons of ammunition and hundreds of military sites that it does not need. On average, the speed
of utilisation of surplus defence materiel hardly exceeds the pace with which the military fills in
the stock of redundant weapons and ammunition and releases additional infrastructure.
On the other hand, the country strives to meet its alliance commitments for contribution to
international operations and development of interoperable defence capabilities. Hence, the
cost of keeping surpluses is mostly covered by limiting long-term investments. For example,
the cost of outsourcing the guarding of redundant infrastructure alone consistently exceeds the
money Bulgaria invests in defence research and technological development.
shows, inefficient utilisation also impairs the long-term development of the national de-
fence capacity.
Security and Safety Risks
Any stock of ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices creates risks for
the security of the people responsible for protecting and handling them, for nearby
communities and for the environment. But when such stocks are handled by active
military units, and in accordance with strict rules and procedures, these are routine
risks.
The situation may change dramatically when the military gets rid of the ammunition
and leaves only limited personnel to handle the surpluses. Often this task is out-
sourced and the stockpiles are guarded by private companies and may be handled by
technical personnel, possibly with lower qualifications and discipline. The risks are
even higher in the presence of abandoned or damaged ammunition and explosives in
post-conflict zones. Box 10.2 describes the threat and provides examples of the possi-
ble damages, including casualties caused by explosive events in ammunition storage
areas.
No less important than the safety risks are the security implications of poorly pro-
tected stocks of surplus weapon systems and ammunition. The European Union, for
example, has consistently expressed the view that stockpile management is an im-
portant means to block one of the most damaging channels for acquiring illicit weap-
ons and ammunition. The EU includes in “weapons management” a wide range of is-
sues, such as stockpile management, marking and record keeping of weapons and
ammunition, identification of surplus weapons, disposal of weapons and the fight
Box 10.2. The Threat from Explosive Events in Ammunition Storage Areas
News of major ammunition depot explosions makes the headlines several times in any single
year but many minor events go unreported. All of these events have a devastating impact on
local communities. Large numbers of casualties, widespread destruction of infrastructure and
the disruption of the livelihood of entire communities often result. In addition to the immediate
human suffering, such explosions can have major negative effects on the environment and, in
states with limited means to finance the technically challenging clean-up costs, local popula-
tions, especially children, are all too often exposed to the risk of injury or death due to the
unexploded ordnance that tends to litter large areas for extended periods of time after the initial
undesirable ammunition explosion.
The table below contains details of selected explosive events within ammunition storage ar-
eas from the mid-1990s onward.
Date Country Location Fatalities Injured Possible Cause

Human Error &
March 97 Albania 15 locations 56 59
Security
Fire (Human Error -
06 May 04 Ukraine Novobogdanovka 5 10
Smoking)
31 Mar 05 Cambodia Andong Chen 6 20 High Temperature
08 Dec 05 Pakistan Jhandola 12 50 Handling
08 Jul 06 Montenegro Vir 0 32 Lightning
19 Oct 06 Serbia Paracin 0 10 Not Known
02 Mar 07 Slovakia Novaky 8 45 Not Known
26 Jul 07 Syria Aleppo 15 50 Propellant Fire
09 Jul 08 Uzbekistan Kagan 3 21 Fire
04 Dec 08 India Gandhidamn 2 6 Fire
19 Mar 09 Kazakhstan Darbaza (Arys) 4 16 Fire
Source: The Threat from Explosive Events in Ammunition Storage Areas (Kent, UK: ECAO-Explosive
Capabilities Limited, 15 July 2009), www.iansa.org/un/documents/ExplosiveEvents1995-2009.pdf.
against corruption. The intensity of conflicts could be diminished significantly by inter-

rupting the influx of ammunition and by drying up the stream of its illegal delivery. Sur-
plus ammunition has been diverted from military stockpiles into zones of instability
where it has fuelled conflicts. It is also getting into the hands of criminal gangs and ter-
rorists.2
2 Debate Continues on Small Arms Conference Recommendations, UN General Assembly

DC/3008, Preparatory Committee for Review Conference on Illicit Small Arms Trade (16
January 2006), www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/dc3008.doc.htm.
Many international organisations recognise these risks and create conditions for
assistance and cooperation in eliminating stocks of surplus weapons and ammunition.
Box 10.3 describes briefly the arrangements for international assistance agreed in the
framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).
Since the beginning of the century, NATO undertook an important role in resolving
the problems with large weapons and ammunition stocks. NATO serves as a clearing-
house of donor assistance through the Partnership for Peace Trust Funds, while
NAMSA, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency, is the first choice for an execu-
tive agent. Box 10.4 provides additional information for this role of NATO.
The achievements of the arms destruction trust fund are impressive. Just during its
first five years, the fund has raised more than 16 million euros in voluntary contribu-
tions for a number of projects across the Euro-Atlantic area and provided for the de-
struction of approximately 2.5 million landmines, 325 high-altitude anti-aircraft missiles,
Box 10.3. International Assistance in Managing Stockpiles of Conventional

Weapons
The participating states in the OSCE recognize that the risks posed by surplus stockpiles of
conventional ammunitions, explosive material and detonating devices are often created by pre-
carious and unsatisfactory conditions of storage. Therefore, they agree that stockpile security
should be taken into account and that proper national security and safety control over stock-
piles of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonating devices is essential in or-
der to prevent risks of explosion and pollution, as well as loss through theft, corruption and ne-
glect.
Among the indicators in considering whether a surplus should be considered a risk, the
OSCE includes:
• The procedures to maximize the security of conventional ammunition, explosive material
and detonating devices in transport;
• The training of staff in effective stockpile management and security procedures; and
• The system for application of supervisory and auditing responsibilities.
The OSCE provides a framework for technical, financial, consultative and other assistance to
nations facing high levels of risk in storing surplus ammunition and explosives. This assistance
is provided on a voluntary basis, when the requesting nation acts in a fully transparent manner
and accepts management of the assistance effort by a joint project team.
Source: OSCE, OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Vienna: Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe, November 2003), www.osce.org/item/1538.html.
Box 10.4. NATO and Demilitarization of Surplus Weapons and Ammunition

The NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Funds originated in September 2000 and now
covers destruction of all types of weapons and conventional ammunition. Trust fund projects
originally were developed in countries of the Balkans and the Former Soviet Union, which pos-
sessed large surplus stocks of weapons and munitions that were difficult to maintain safely and
securely. There are four fundamental elements of trust fund programmes: an appeal for assis-
tance from the host country; fundraising by the lead nation; development and signing of legal
and financial agreements; and the execution of the project. The last is normally entrusted to the
NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA). Demilitarization of munitions is part of its
core business and it has the necessary contracting, project management and financial man-
agement capabilities. There are now 34 eligible countries of the PfP, Mediterranean Dialogue
and Istanbul Cooperation Initiatives. Projects have been completed or are planned in Afghani-
stan, Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Jordan, Kazakhstan,
Moldova, Montenegro, Tajikistan, Serbia and Ukraine. The NATO Trust Fund process has
been a successful vehicle for international cooperation and is likely to continue for several
years. There is scope for other international organizations to cooperate with NATO in
developing and executing projects of this type.
Source: Peter Courtney-Green, “NATO and Demilitarization of Surplus Weapons and Ammunition,” Con-
temporary Security Policy 29:1 (April 2008): 15–31.
320 tons of rocket fuel, 28,000 small arms and light weapons and 1,800 tons of
ammunition.3
Through the trust funds, NATO not just resolves an existing problem but invests in
the capability of the supported country to conduct future demilitarization activities on its
own 4 or to manage its munitions stockpiles in a safe, accountable and secure man-
ner.5
As part of stockpile management, IANSA, the International Action Network on
Small Arms, identifies some key recommendations in defining and disposing of surplus
weapon systems and ammunition (presented in Box 10.5). Some of these recom-
mendations directly address the risk of corruption related to surplus weapons and
ammunition, examined in the next section.
3 “Fifth Anniversary of Arms Destruction Trust Fund,” NATO News (16 November 2005),
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ news_21574.htm?selectedLocale=en.
4 “NATO to Help Georgia Destroy More Missiles,” NATO News (24 October 2007),
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ news_7925.htm?selectedLocale=en.
5 “NATO Assists Afghanistan to Improve Munitions Stockpile Safety,” NATO News (7 May
2008), www.nato.int/cps/en/ natolive/news_7258.htm?selectedLocale=en.
Box 10.5. Excerpts from IANSA’s Recommendations for Stockpile Management

Stockpile security:
• Maintaining stockpiles in appropriate structures, with security systems in suitable locations
identified following a risk assessment for the local population;
• Storing arms and ammunition under the appropriate temperature and climate conditions;
• Only permitting access to the stockpile by authorised, properly trained and vetted person-
nel;
• Recording and reporting the humanitarian impact if misuse does occurs, even inadver-
tently.
Surplus identification, based on the following variables:
• External and internal threat perception, as well as national security/defence strategy and
doctrine;
• Relevant policy and legislation, as well as budget and expenditure priorities;
• Size of the official security forces to be armed;
• Accurate, planned and regularly updated size of military reserves;
• Availability of appropriate safe storage facilities and capacity to maintain and secure them.
Disposal and destruction:
• Ensuring stocks are appropriately maintained, secured and transported up to the point of
destruction;
• Expediting the destruction of redundant, surplus and damaged explosives stocks without
delay;
• Earmarking a proper destruction site and assembling the necessary destruction equip-
ment or facilities;
• Adhering to the specific destruction measures outlined in the 2000 report of the UN Secre-
tary General of 15 November 2000 (paragraph 19);
• Measures to mitigate harm to people, livestock, property and the environment from the de-
struction;
• Planning, design and implementation of destruction by appropriately trained destruction
specialists.
Source: IANSA, Stockpile management & surplus disposal (2007), http://www.iansa.org/un/documents/

StockpileManagement.pdf.
Corruption Potential of the Utilisation

The parliamentarian and public attention related to defence is often focused on the
procurement of new weapon systems or construction projects, in particular in cases of
high-value contracts. Less flashy but rich with corruption potential are the cases when
the Ministry of Defence sells redundant weapon systems, equipment or infrastructure.
Box 10.6 presents one case of corruption related to the sale of surplus tanks.
Somewhat unexpectedly, the example comes from a nation that is consistently ranked
by TI among the countries with lowest level of corruption – Finland.6 In this particular
case, corruption was promptly revealed and the persons involved were released from
their positions and charged by the state prosecution.
That is rarely the case in countries with less transparent and accountable man-
agement of defence, where corruption risks relate to four main types of utilisation acts.
First is the contracting for the destruction of surplus weapon systems, equipment
and ammunition. Just like in other defence contracts, corruption risks decrease with
the implementation of open tenders and transparent, competitive procedures with
clearly formulated requirements, including requirements for environmental safety. On
the contrary, corruption potential increases when competition is limited or tender re-
quirements favour a particular company. At the extreme, the defence ministry might
use a sole source procedure, e.g. leading to a contract with a company owned by the
defence ministry. In one such case the executive director of a defence company was
later arrested and charged for giving the work to a private subcontractor.7
Second is the outsourcing of specific services, e.g. the provision of security of
weapons and ammunition storage areas. Again, transparency and open competition
are the main remedies against corruption but too often defence officials are tempted to
limit the competition or even to go to direct negotiations with a single company. The
corruption in such cases feeds back to the safety and security problems described in
the previous section – both sides have an interest to prolong the contract as much as
possible, and the destruction of surpluses is delayed respectively.
The third type of act is the selling of surplus weapon systems, equipment and in-
frastructure. While the buyer-seller relationship here is reversed, the same anti-corrup-
tion requirements apply. The requirement for transparency applies to the procedure,
pertinent regulations, items being sold and their condition. Fuzzy rules and proce-
dures, combined with a lack of transparency, increase significantly the discretionary
6 In the 2008 Corruption Perception Index, Finland ranks 5th among the countries with least
corruption.
7 “The Executive Director of the Defence Company Terem was Arrested,” DarikNews (9
September 2009), http://dariknews.bg/view_article.php?article_id=397074.
Box 10.6. Corruption Charges Related to Utilisation of Surplus Weapon Systems

The Finnish State Prosecutor Jorma Äijälä is bringing criminal charges against five individuals.
Two of the accused worked in directorial positions with the Defence Forces. The remaining
three were employed by a recycling company. The case relates to a bidding contest in which
the Defence Forces were seeking a buyer to scrap and recycle 360 obsolete armoured
vehicles from 2007–2009. According to the prosecution, the winner triumphed in the bidding
contest through illegitimate means and the opposing bidding contestant suffered EUR 350,000
in damages.
On the Defence Forces’ side, the gravest criminal charges will be filed against a then sales
manager, who is no longer employed by the military. According to the indictment, he received
bribes from representatives of the winning company and subsequently misled those deciding
on the bidding contest into thinking that its offer was superior to the one presented by the
competition. The state prosecutor calls for the sales manager to be penalised for acceptance of
bribery, aggravated fraud, aggravated misuse of his official position and infringement of official
secrets. According to Äijälä, the bribery charge relates to having been entertained.
The police suspected that the manager in question would also have received EUR 6,000 in
cash. A managerial level employee of the winning company admitted having handed this sum
of money in a brown envelope to the sales manager at the request of one of the employee’s
superiors. The state prosecutor, however, considered the evidence insufficient with regard to
the EUR 6,000 bribe.
Another Defence Forces director will be charged for negligence in duty, or, in practice, for
being careless. The director trusted the false price comparison produced by the sales
manager, based on which he then prepared a proposal briefing. The proposal briefing
advanced in the Defence Forces hierarchy upwards without anyone reviewing the sales
manager’s figures. The final decision on the scrap deal was made in accordance with the
proposal briefing by the then minister of defence.
Representatives of the contracted company will be charged for aggravated fraud, misuse of
business secrets and giving a bribe. The police also suspected the firm’s managing director
and deputy managing director of wrongdoing but the prosecutor could not file any charges.
Source: “Deal to Scrap Army Tanks Leads to Bribery Trial,” Helsingin Sanomat, International Edition (26
November 2009), http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Deal+to+scrap+army+tanks+leads+to+bribery+trial/
1135251039606.
power of the official and, respectively, the corruption potential of utilisation. The re-
quirement for competitiveness applies as in the previous two types of acts.
The way the Department of Defence of Australia deals with redundant properties
may be considered best practice. The department examines the disposal of surplus
defence property as a distinct phase, included in a streamlined process of infrastruc-
ture asset life-cycle management.8 The disposal procedure is simple, clear (see Figure
10.1) and available through the internet to all interested in the issue.9 Everyone inter-
ested can quickly figure out what are the main steps of the process, the considerations
followed, the expected outcome of the particular activity, the applicable regulations and
even to access the text of the regulations. Thus, the limited discretionary power of the
public official, in combination with a competitive procedure, strongly reduces the
corruption potential of the utilisation.
The fourth and final type of act examined here involves barter. This is possibly the
type of utilisation involving the highest corruption risk. For example, in many countries
the military is among the biggest “owners” of properties and some of these properties,
already redundant, are at very attractive locations, e.g. in the centre of a city. There
have been cases when, under the slogan of “concern for the soldiers,” defence officials
exchange attractive properties for housing, handpicking the provider of the housing.
Probably the only effective remedy against corruption here is to legally ban such ex-
changes.
Recommendations
The final section of this chapter summarises the recommendations to enhance the
governance mechanisms and reduce the utilisation-related corruption, in addition to
the contracting-related recommendations in the previous section.
Awareness
Defence ministries, parliaments and societal organisations should raise the awareness
of the problem of surplus weapon systems, equipment, ammunition and infrastructure
in all its dimensions, including the corruption potential of the utilisation.
Defence Planning and Plans
Sound defence planning is a prerequisite for the effective management of surpluses. It
puts the problem in a longer-term perspective. First, sound defence planning elimi-
nates the instances when the defence establishment invests in the development of
weapon systems and/or infrastructure that, in a follow-up update of force development
8 Australian Government, Department of Defence, Infrastructure Management,

www.defence.gov.au/IM.
9 Australian Government, Department of Defence, Guidelines for the Disposal of Surplus
Defence Property, Version 4.9 (September 2009), http://www.defence.gov.au/im/disposal/
main.htm.
plans, are declared redundant. Second, well thought-out defence plans provide reli-
able, advance information on the types and quantities of equipment and infrastructure
Figure 10.1. Managing the Disposal of Surplus Defence Property.

to be made redundant, as well as the stocks of ammunition to be destroyed. Third,

business, and the defence industry in particular, may use that information to invest in
the respective capacity and become competitive nationally and possibly internationally.
Local Ownership
The role of external actors in small arms disarmament and the destruction of surplus
stocks is often key in starting the process. Very often countries want to destroy at least
part of their surplus stocks but are unable—for financial or technological reasons—or
unwilling to make significant investments of their own. Nevertheless, these countries
will benefit from taking ownership of the problem and be proactive in the relationships
with donors. Donor countries, on their side, should encourage local governments to
take ownership,10 while at the same time seeking increased transparency and
accountability in the process of utilisation.
Adopt a Programmatic Approach in Managing Surpluses
In a short-term outlook it is always cheaper to store and guard than to destroy surplus
weapons and ammunition. But this short horizon is detrimental in the long run. There-
fore, it is recommended to adopt a programmatic approach towards utilisation, just like
in dealing with other legacy issues. That entails, inter alia:
• Setting clear objectives and performance measures;
• Estimating costs over the medium term;
• Designing and comparing alternatives;
• Making utilisation visible in the program structure of the defence institution;
• Centralising the management of the respective programme.
Seek International Assistance

International assistance is available when the problems are particularly acute. Large
scale incidents in storage houses further attract the attention of the international com-
munity. It is preferable, however, that countries with large stocks of surplus weapon
systems and ammunition and little money and/or know-how are proactive in seeking
international assistance. Increased transparency and the application of the program-
matic approach will entice donors who will see that their financial support will be effec-
tively utilised and will contribute to the development of indigenous capacity.
10 Sami Faltas, “Bulgaria and Romania: Quick Start, Ambiguous Progress,” Contemporary
Security Policy 29:1 (April 2008): 78–102.
Public-Private Partnerships
Explore the power and vigour of public-private partnerships, for example in developing
dual-use infrastructure. In doing so, guarantee a clear understanding of costs and
benefits and transparent implementation of the negotiated arrangements.
Adopt Life Cycle Management of Defence Systems
To prevent the reoccurrence of similar problems in the future, take the life cycle ap-
proach in managing the acquisition of weapon systems and developing infrastructure.
In conclusion, the implementation of the principles of good governance is the foun-

dation on which legacy problems may be resolved effectively and efficiently. The sen-
sible management of weapons and ammunition stockpiles, the transparency and ac-
countability in utilising surplus weapons and infrastructure are key enablers in resolv-
ing the overall problem of surpluses and sharply reduce the corruption risks associated
with utilisation.
Chapter 11
The Involvement of Defence
Personnel and Assets in Economic
Activities
Introduction
In transition democracies, the military remains influential in the country’s political and
economic system. The dark past of political and security situations in some transition
democracies successfully established the military as the core actor in these countries.
The military created the social and political basis for their supremacy over civilian
oversight through their domination of the effective legal control of violence. Thus, it is
not surprising if the military still has strong power within the society. Ironically, some-
times civilian politicians also took advantage from this situation by creating mutual re-
lationships with the military through the politics of violence to maintain their power and
create uncertainty in the democratization process.
One of the most significant impacts of military intervention in the political and eco-
nomic system is the transformation of the military as an economic actor. In this sense,
the military uses its resources (personnel and assets) to get involved in economic ac-
tivities. From this short explanation, it can be understood that these economic activities
cover both personal and institutional aspects of the military. Later, these economic ac-
tivities violate the essential role of the military within the state system and also threaten
human rights.
This chapter is specifically intended to analyze the involvement of defence (mili-
tary) personnel and assets in economic activities through the conceptual discussion of
the military as an economic actor and the perverse impact of military economic activity
using the case study of the Indonesian Military’s (TNI: Tentara Nasional Indonesia)
business activities.
The Transformation of the Military as an Economic Actor

Defence is the most expensive and complex feature of the state. It is widely recog-
nized that to develop an ideal defence capability the state should spend a huge
amount of funds from its national budget. On the other hand, the state should also pri-
oritize spending on other areas such as education, public welfare and health, which
124
The Involvement of Defence Personnel and Assets in Economic Activities 125
are increasingly costly. This dilemma does not automatically stipulate the transforma-
tion of the military into economic actors in order to create sustainable financing for the
defence budget. In short, the military is not trained to be profit-oriented but to be a
professional security actor even with the minimum budget. However, the trend of mili-
tary economic activity has not decreased yet. In fact, in countries such as Bangladesh,
the Philippines, Pakistan, China and Russia, the military is still actively involved in
profit-oriented activities, whether legal or illegal. Such a trend shows that there is still
growing discourse on the logic behind the transformation of the military as an eco-
nomic actor.
According to Brömmelhörster and Paes, there are several common reasons for the
involvement of the military in economic activity. First, the military has access to mate-
rial and human resources that are less accessible to civilians and that enable them to
carry out other tasks. Secondly, the military often turns to private enterprise to make
up shortfalls in defence budgets. Thirdly, weak states and poor civilian control of the
military create an added incentive for military elites to undertake commercial enter-
prises. Fourth, the roots of some military businesses can be traced back to measures
taken in order for insurgent forces to be self-sufficient. Finally, even when security
threats have subsided, downsizing of the armed forces is difficult to achieve and mili-
taries are therefore used in secondary roles.1 Based on these explanations, we could
generalize more specific situations for military involvement in economic activities.
There are two types of situations that stimulate militaries to transform into eco-
nomic actors; namely, the politico-economy nexus and the lack of state budget fulfil-
ment. Politics and economy are like two sides of a coin. Hence, it is widely accepted
that if military actors have the political power then they will also play a significant role
within the economic sphere in the state and vice versa. In this case, the economic ac-
tivity of the military substantially contributes to the political power of their civilian ally or
their military leaders. Such a relationship between the military and the politico-econ-
omy power frequently happens under oppressive governments; for example, in Indo-
nesia during General Suharto’s regime.
However, military economic activities do not always exclusively stand for their po-
litical power. In non-authoritarian countries or transition democracies, after the removal
of their political power, the military is being pushed to be professional. Unfortunately,
the pressure to professionalize the military is not backed by proper financial support
from the government. As a consequence, the military obtains the justification to per-
form economic activities as their budget is not fully supported by the government. Such
off-budget funds are claimed to finance the deficit of military budgets, even though in
reality such economic activities tend to accumulate profit for high-ranking military offi-
1 Jörn Brömmelhörster and Wolf-Christian Paes, eds., The Military as an Economic Actor: Sol-
diers in Business (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
cers. Ball and Hendrickson argue that there are several factors that may encourage
off-budget military spending: a strong executive decision-making culture; the role
played by the military in the social and economic sectors; security problems; institu-
tional fragility; and military involvement in protecting or selling natural resources.2
Both types of military involvement in economic activities are not independent. In
fact, such situations are supportive in their nature, as can be seen in the case of Indo-
nesian military business.
The Structure of Indonesian Military Business Activities

Historically, the TNI’s business activity was established under General Suharto’s op-
pressive regime from 1967–1998. During Suharto’s leadership, the TNI was given the
privilege of managing their budget and operations without any critical oversight from
the parliament or civil society organizations. Through ABRI’s (former name of the TNI)
dwifungsi doctrine, the TNI was granted extensive social and political roles. According
to the doctrine, the Indonesian Military were both defenders of the nation and a social-
political force in national development.3 As a consequence, the doctrine justified TNI
participation in the development agenda, especially regarding economic development
in the country.4
Following the expansive role of the TNI, in the 1970s the TNI built their business
empire, which was set up via the establishment of foundations and cooperatives.
Based on the Human Rights Watch Report on the Indonesian Military’s business activ-
ity in 2006, there are certain types of military personnel and assets that have been in-
volved in economic activity since the Suharto era:5
2 Dylan Hendrickson and Nicole Ball, “Off-budget Military Expenditure and Revenue: Issues
and Policy Perspectives for Donors,” Conflict Security and Development Group Occasional
Papers (2002).
3 Leonard C Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s use of Military Force (Singapore:
ISEAS, 2006), 323–325. See also: GlobalSecurity.org, “ABRI-Armed Forces of the Republic
of Indonesia,” www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/indonesia/abri.htm. In addition, ABRI
also received non-electoral seats in the parliament and plays an important role as the
gatekeeper for the Suharto government.
4 For details on TNI’s intervention in the political and economic system under Suharto, see:
Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Jakarta & Kuala Lumpur: Equinox Pub-
lishing, 2007); Sukardi Rinakit, The Indonesian Military After the New Order (Copenhagen:
NIAS Press, 2005); Leonard C. Sebastian, Realpolitik Ideology: Indonesia’s Use of Military
Force (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006).
5 See for details: Human Rights Watch, Too High a Price, The Human Rights Cost of the
Indonesian Military’s Economic Activities 18:5(C) (June 2006), www.hrw.org/en/reports/
2006/06/20/too-high-price-1.
a. Military-owned Business
• Foundations (yayasan)
The military foundations were established in the 1960s to provide social ser-
vices such as housing and education for troops and their families. In the
process, such foundations were expanded into business units presumably to
finance the soldiers’ welfare. In addition, these tax-exempt foundations super-
vise many important military business units. The army, through the Kartika
Eka Paksi Foundation (YKEP), owns a total of 26 firms and seven joint ven-
tures.6 YKEP’s business activities are managed by a holding company, PT Tri
Usaha Bhakti. The various army interests include the Sudirman Central Busi-
ness District, which owns 44 hectares in what is known as Jakarta’s “Golden
Triangle,” the Artha Graha Bank, Cigna Indonesia Assurance, Danayasa Ar-
tatama (the Hotel Borobudur), other real estate, timber, golf courses and
manufacturing.7
Meanwhile, the navy, through the Bhumyamca Foundation, controls five
firms with total assets of Rp 200 billion or $25 million. The foundation’s busi-
ness interests include Admiral Lines (shipping), resorts, an oil refinery, prop-
erty rental, import-export, cocoa plantations, maritime electronics and tele-
communications, a taxi company and diving services.
Finally, the air force and the Adi Upaya Foundation manage 17 firms, in-
cluding a bank.8 The foundation owns the Bank Angkasa, together with the
National Electricity Company Pension Fund and private investors. The foun-
dation’s other interests include golf courses, container services, hotels, log-
ging, aviation and aerial photography enterprises.9 Despite this institutional
business, the TNI personnel, from high-ranking officer to low-ranking soldier
were actively involved in businesses like forestry, mining, oil and security
guards.10
• Cooperatives (Koperasi)
The military cooperatives were established to improve the welfare of soldiers
by providing subsidized commodities, such as rice, to soldiers and families.
6 Rachel Langit, “Indonesia’s Military: Business as Usual,” Asia Times Online (16 August
2002), www.atimes.com/ atimes/Southeast_Asia/DH16Ae06.html.
7 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges,
Politics, and Power, Monograph Report (Pittsburg: RAND, 2002), 74.
8 Langit, “Indonesia’s Military” (2002).
9 Rabasa and Haseman, The Military and Democracy (2002), 76.
10 Ibid., 75.
Box 11.1. Racketeering

The practice of racketeering in the TNI took form as TNI personnel offering protection for crimi-
nal activity. For example, in Medan, North Sumatra, the military involvement in crime is well-or-
ganized. According to an interview conducted by Human Rights Watch, Medan residents said
that the protection rackets are regularized, with shop owners and trucks paying monthly fees
and showing stickers designating which military group or associated gang supported them. An-
other example is in illegal logging activity where TNI personnel, especially on the Indonesia-
Malaysia border, were offering “protection” to illegal loggers in return for payment or were
reaping the benefits of seized log cargoes, which they later sold for their own financial benefit.
Another profitable activity is allowing illegal log transporters who have been captured to go free
for a price (bribing).
Sources: Human Rights Watch, Too High a Price, The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military’s
Economic Activities 18:5(C) (June 2006), 66, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/06/20/too-high-price-1;
A.C. Casson, et al., A Multistakeholder Action Plan to Curb Illegal Logging and Improve Law Enforcement
in Indonesia, WWF Indonesia, World Bank, DFID-Multistakeholder Forestry Program (October 2006),
www.sekala.net/files/FLEGedit4Sept06.pdf.
However, like the foundations, the military cooperatives also expanded into
wide-ranging business activities such as hotels and cargo companies.
• Forestry operations
In 1967, the Suharto government granted concession rights of more than one
million hectares of forest along the Indonesia-Malaysia border to a military-
owned company PT Yamaker. The decision was based on “national security
considerations” during the preliminary border dispute between Indonesia and
Malaysia. Since then, the number of military-owned companies and military
personnel receiving this privilege has increased.11
b. Military Collaboration with Private Business
This type of military economic activity covers the military business alliance with private
companies, whether they are national or foreign companies. In this kind of relationship,
the military acts as the business broker; for example, arranging government licenses
and blocking other competitors, gaining access to goods and services, transporting on
military vehicles for a fee and leasing out land. Private companies also contribute to
11 Suripto, a senior politician from the Prosperous Justice Party and a former secretary in the
Department of Forestry once said that military members managed to get shares in approxi-
mately 550 logging concessions. Quoted from: Andreas Harsono, Indonesian Military and
Prostitution Racket, www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/INDONESIA/notebook.cfm.
the military “acquaintance funds.” For example, a developer provided land and build-
ings worth Rp. 18.5 billion ($1.95 million) to locate an army base inside a West Java
industrial zone known as Jababeka. The donation made good business sense, an offi-
cial of the industrial zone argued, since the presence of military personnel “can deter
people from carrying out crimes here.”
c. Military Involvement in Criminal Activity
Some forms of this economic activity are illegal logging and racketeering (when the
military acts as the protector of criminal activities such as gambling operations, drug
trafficking and prostitution). Racketeering is the most popular form of low-rank to mid-
dle-rank economic activity in the TNI (see Box 11.1 above).
d. Military Corruption
In the military, the biggest potential area for corruption is defence procurement. For
example, in 2004 the army planned to buy MI-17s from Russia. Accordingly, the Mem-
bers of Commission I (defence commission) of the parliament (DPR) had received re-
ports the helicopters should have been valued at only $17.6 million, a price 25 percent
lower than the $21.6 million the army had agreed to pay. Later, the helicopters were
due at the end of February but, as Tempo magazine reported, a Russian firm stopped
assembling them as it had not received the down payment of $3.2 million.12
However, the TNI’s economic activity is not only pushed by their active role in the
political sphere as the guardian of the Suharto regime but also by the fact that the
government is only able to finance 25–30 percent of the total defence budget. Hence,
the remaining 70 percent is derived from the practice of military business. The TNI’s
economic activity can be seen in a pyramid showing TNI’s economic support structure
(see Figure 11.1).13 At the top of the pyramid is the government’s official defence
budget which only covers about one-third of the total budget. At the second level are
the state enterprises in which some retired high-ranking military officers filled the
managerial positions and thus encourage the domination of military-owned enterprises
to maintain contracts with the state enterprises such as Pertamina (the state oil and
gas company). At the third level are the military cooperatives and foundations, which
have already been explained above. Finally, at the lowest level are the other re-
12 Quoted from: Munir, “Corruption threatens Indonesia’s defense system,” The Jakarta Post, 3
January 2004, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2004/03/01/corruption-threatens-
indonesia039s-defense-system.html. Further investigation by the National Team for Corrup-
tion Eradication (Timnas Tipikor) found the involvement of army officers in the procurement
corruption scandal. See: “The Corruption in DoD involves TNI,” Republika Daily (25 March
2006).
13 Rabasa and Haseman, The Military and Democracy (2002), 73.
Figure 11.1. The TNI Economic Support Structure.
sources. Examples of this type of fundraising activity are military collaboration with pri-
vate business and military involvement in criminal activities (racketeering).
In 1998, the Asian economic crisis hit the country and triggered a massive social
movement targeting the Suharto government. The reformation movement (gerakan
reformasi) led by students and activists ended with the resignation of Suharto in May
1998. Subsequently, the movement turned into a democratization process, which en-
couraged the TNI (and also the Indonesian Police) to reform its institutions and per-
sonnel. In 2004, the new TNI law (Law No.34/2004) was passed in parliament (see
Box 11.2).
The new law stipulates the government should take over all business activities that
are directly or indirectly managed by the TNI before October 2009. Subsequently, in
2005 the government established the TNI Business Supervision and Transformation
Team (TSTB) to verify the TNI businesses and provide recommendations to the gov-
ernment on the TNI’s business takeover issue. Based on the team report in 2006, the
TNI owns 23 foundations, which are supervising 53 companies, and 1,321 coopera-
tives. The TNI also owns 1,618 properties, covering more than 16,500 hectares, and
6,699 buildings. Overall, the report shows the TNI’s business assets are worth Rp 2.2
trillion (US $235.4 million).14
14 “TNI Business Takeover ‘Merely a Formality’,” The Jakarta Post (15 November 2009),
www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/10/15/tni-business-takeover-merely-a-formality039.html.
Box 11.2. TNI Law No. 34/2004

Chapter II, Article 2(d) states that:
Professional soldiers, that are well-trained, well-educated, well-equipped, do not involve in politics,
do not involve in business and his/her welfare is guaranteed by the state, and support state political
decisions that are based on democratic principle, civilian supremacy, human rights, national law and
international law and that have been ratified by the state.
In addition, Article 39 of the law also states that any TNI member is prohibited to be involved:
1. As a member of a political party;
2. In political activities;
3. In business activities;
4. In any activities intended to gain parliamentary seats in the elections and/or other politi-
cal positions.
Source: TNI Law No. 34/2004.
Even though the TNI business assets have been verified, the road to take over the
assets is still rather long. Until now, the TNI business issue remains the major road-
block for military reform in Indonesia because the government has been acting slug-
gishly on the issue. The toughest challenge comes from the budget issue of defence
personnel. The TNI budget is far from enough to finance the development of a profes-
sional cadre. From the overall budget, at least 45 percent is used for the soldier’s wel-
fare issue and around 30 percent is used for defence technology, maintenance and
development.15 In addition, the current government is only able to provide half of the
required defence budget. Hence, limited public finances impose further consideration
on the process of taking over the TNI businesses.16
15 See: Eric Hendra, “The TNI’s Business,” in Almanac on Security Sector Reform in Indonesia
2007, ed. Beni Sukadis (Jakarta: LESPERSSI & DCAF, 2007), 121.
16 As Daniel Lev, an Indonesian expert from the University of Washington once said on the is-
sue of the Indonesian military budget, “If your budget provides about one-third or one-half of
what you need, you’re going to steal the rest of it.” Quoted from: Taufik Darusman, “Putting
The Military out of Business,” The Jakarta Globe (27 September 2009),
http://thejakartaglobe.com/columns/taufik-darusman-putting-the-military-out-of-business/
332030.
The Perverse Impact of the Military as an Economic Actor

Professionalism
The direct implication of the military transformation into an economic actor is their lack
of professionalism. By involving themselves in profit-oriented activities, the military
could lose its essence as the security actor of the state. In this sense, the military be-
comes more interested in profit-oriented activities than in providing security to the state
and the citizens. The worst scenario from this lack of professionalism is that the mili-
tary detaches itself from state control. The military’s ability to finance the defence
budget (even if it’s only partially) will increase its sense of independence from the state
and thus create the risk of wider military intervention in the social, political and eco-
nomic spheres of society.
Accountability
The other negative impact of the military as an economic actor is the lack of account-
ability. If the military is able to fulfil its own budget through independent economic ac-
tivities, then the issue of accountability of the military budget and operations to the
state will potentially be diminished. The risk of this situation is high. If the state is un-
able to control the military budget and operations, then the military can perform other
duties and responsibilities that violate state regulations or even threaten state and citi-
zen security. In short, the military becomes a serious potential internal threat to the
state and citizens.
In advanced democracies, the defence budget is actively controlled by democratic
civilian oversight mechanisms such as the parliament and non-governmental organi-
zations. This situation is based on the well-established understanding that the military
is part of the state apparatus which is responsible for the provision of security and is
fully supported by the government. However, in transition democracies, there are
some difficulties in overseeing defence spending. There are several reasons for this
problem but the most common one is the issue of secrecy of the defence posture,
which is reflected in the budget. Sometimes, the military is afraid that their budget will
spill into the public area and thus expose its capabilities to civilians or even to potential
enemies.
Another reason is the lack of confidence from civilians, especially those in the par-
liament, to perform critical oversight of the military institution. The major issue here is
the military image, which affects the mindset and the rules of the game in the state
system. The image of the military as superior to civilians, exclusive, patriotic and con-
trolling legal violence sometimes creates barriers for civilians to react on the budget is-
sues. Indeed, the lack of knowledge on military budgeting and operations on the part
of members of parliament also contributes to this situation.
Human Rights Violations

The wider impact of military economic activity is human rights violations. As mentioned
above, the military represents the state apparatus, which represents the effective legal
control of violence. However, when the military’s economic activity combines profit-ori-
ented efforts with the control of violence in a situation where there are difficulties with
civilian oversight it may lead to a disaster. An example of military involvement in eco-
nomic activity that violates human rights is the case of the Freeport security agreement
with the TNI in West Papua, Indonesia (see Box 11.3).
Freeport’s security arrangement with the TNI echoes the hidden alternative for the
TNI to keep their involvement in economic activity. Under article 7 (2) of the new TNI
law, the TNI’s core function include security of vital national sites. In reality, such a
function proved to be one of the main sources of off-budget funding for the TNI.
In January 2006, the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal and Security Affairs
decided Freeport Indonesia, ExxonMobil and PT Arun LNG were vital sites for the
country. Freeport Indonesia, which operates in West Papua Province, has publicly ac-
knowledged destroying the environment less contributes to the welfare of the Papuan
people. Later, the existence of Freeport Indonesia fuelled hatred from the West Pap-
uan people and provided the impetus for the organization for the Papua’s Independ-
ence (OPM: Organisasi Papua Merdeka). Unfortunately, due to its status as a vital na-
tional site, Freeport gets full security protection from the TNI (and also the Indonesian
National Police). In this case the local people, especially the OPM, are seen by the TNI
as the most pressing threat to Freeport.
Conclusion: Pulling the Military Out of Economic Activities
The Indonesian experience has shown that the involvement of the military in economic
activities is extensive. The military’s economic activities are destructive to their profes-
sionalism, affecting their budget transparency and even violating human rights.
Overall, the main problem in military economic activities is the defence budget. Of
course, a budget scheme that supports soldiers and their families would insulate the
military from economic activities. However, it should be noted that a transparent
budget is more important than increasing the welfare of soldiers. Without any respon-
sibility for the effectiveness and efficiency of the defence budget, it is impossible to
keep the military out of economic activities.
Additionally, the military’s economic activities, specifically in the case of the Indo-
nesian Military’s business activities, are not only related to the problem of soldier wel-
fare and insufficient defence budgets. The Indonesian Military’s business activity is
very complex and deeply rooted in the society’s day-to-day life. Since its long devel-
opment and diffusion in the society, military business in Indonesia is viewed as an ac-
Box 11.3. Freeport’s Security Arrangement with the TNI and Human Rights Violations
The presence of TNI in the Freeport area is ironic. While they maintained the security of the
vital economic interests in a fashion which largely violated human rights by targeting local peo-
ple or alleged OPM members, they also received payment from the company, which is not
transparent. For example, in the mid-1990s, troops at the mine site allegedly used company
vehicles, offices and shipping containers to transport and detain people they then tortured or
killed, which were suspected security threats or members of the OPM. Unfortunately, the com-
pany said it bore no responsibility for how its equipment was used by the military. Indeed, the
Indonesian Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) has stated that the involvement of the
TNI in Freeport security measures violates human rights in West Papua.
The number of state security personnel in Freeport has risen in the recent year. As of 2005,
more than 2,400 government security personnel (military and police) were located in the gen-
eral area of Freeport’s operations. In 2005, the company’s spending for military and police se-
curity protection funds reached $66 million. Freeport said that the money was used to pay for
transportation, food and barracks for the security personnel. However, the investigative reports
published in 2005 by the NGO Global Witness and the New York Times suggested that Free-
port directed a large portion of its security payments to individuals. These reports alleged that
the company had made large, direct payments to individual Indonesian military and police offi-
cers, as well as to units in the field. The New York Times, citing company documents it ob-
tained and verified as authentic, said such payments totaled about $20 million from 1998 to
2004.
Sources: Kurniawan Tri Yunanto, “Komnas HAM: Freeport Represents Colonialism in Papua,” VHRmedia
(2 December 2009), http://www.vhrmedia.com/Komnas-HAM--Freeport-Represents-Colonialism-in-Papua-
news2775.html; Human Rights Watch, Too High a Price, The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Mili-
tary’s Economic Activities 18:5(C) (June 2006), 48–56, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/06/20/too-high-
price-1.
ceptable form of military activity by most Indonesians. Given the situation and general
attitudes, removing the military from economic activities in Indonesia could take a long
time. In this case, the government should not only restrict the military from economic
activities but also restrict or punish the Indonesians that are enjoying economic coop-
eration with military personnel or institutions. Such a strategy has never been pursued
by the Indonesian government.
To conclude, economic activity basically involves two important features: supply
and demand. In the military’s economic activity, the military acts as the supplier and
the demand comes from society. Therefore, in order to fully remove the military role in
economic activity, then we should also cut the demand and not only restrict the supply.
Chapter 12
Integrity Issues Related to Military
Operations
Corruption accompanies not only the management of the defence establishment in
peacetime but also the immediate preparation of forces for operational deployment,
the conduct of peacekeeping missions, as well as stabilization and reconstruction op-
erations. Of primary concern in the beginning of the twenty-first century is the prolific
use of contractors, in particular the involvement of private military and security compa-
nies. Hence this chapter is dedicated to the problem of corruption related primarily to
the use of contractors in operations. It also outlines good practices in increasing integ-
rity in the use of private security and military companies in theatres of operations.
Corruption not only demoralizes peacekeepers but also reduces the credibility of
national and international peace efforts. Concern about corruption in Afghanistan for
example is approaching a point where it directly threatens the success of the Govern-
ment of Afghanistan as well as the NATO-led mission.
At the present time, the military forces of NATO member nations cannot undertake
operations of any sort, for any purpose whatsoever, either individually or in coalition
exercises, without the support and active participation of “private military contractors.”
This rapidly growing dependency of NATO’s militaries on the private sector has devel-
oped over the past two decades, since the end of the Cold War. This development is
counter-intuitive as well as quite astonishing in its extent, inasmuch as the United Na-
tions Convention Against Mercenaries of 1989 1 is commonly understood as intending
to inhibit (rather than foster) the growth of private military forces and outlaw their use
by UN member nations.
The first response to this apparent paradox is that the private military contractors
(PMCs) now critically relied upon to support NATO coalition operations in war zones
are not, strictly speaking, “mercenaries” in the technical sense. The UN convention on
mercenaries itself characterizes a “mercenary” as an individual hired and employed to
bear arms and to serve as a soldier for a government other than his own. The vast
majority of PMC employees, by contrast, do not bear weapons of any sort and are also
1 United Nations General Assembly, International Convention against the Recruitment, Use,
Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 72nd plenary meeting (4 December 1989),
A/RES/44/34.
135
Box 12.1. Corruption Challenges and Good Practice in Pre-deployment

Activities
Countries are often called upon by international organizations to deploy forces in peace opera-
tions. On occasion, such decisions are made at short notice, while national forces are not
ready for such deployment and need additional weapons systems, communications, individual
and other types of equipment in order to meet the requirements of the specific theatre of op-
erations.
Procurement procedures are then implemented under much shorter deadlines, without a
proper competitive process. In addition, cost considerations are often belittled by minimal inter-
operability requirements and “noble concerns” for the safety of the soldier, sailor or airman.
Procurement processes, which may already lack integrity under normal procurement condi-
tions, are becoming extremely vulnerable to corruption.
Another vulnerability results from the lack of clear criteria and transparent procedures for
selection of the personnel to be deployed, in particular when the remuneration during deploy-
ment is several times higher than the normal salary.
Cases when some of the military pays to be deployed or hastily procured equipment is of
rather low quality may have a demoralizing effect on the deployed unit.
Most of the good practices—enhancing the integrity in procurement and personnel man-
agement as discussed in previous chapters—are applicable here too. These apply particularly
to the transparent rules and selection on merit for personnel to be deployed, as well as com-
petitive procurement and sound quality control of procured equipment.
The measure of fundamental importance, however, is to deploy not contingents, i.e. units
specially assembled and manned for the particular mission and disbanded upon their return
home, but standing organizational units. This measure is even more effective when the country
has a transparent defence policy and sound defence planning mechanisms. In such cases de-
ployable units are identified in advance, they have the capabilities required for specific mis-
sions and theatres of operations and may need only minimal additional assets and training to
be brought up to some requirements, unforeseen in advance.
directly employed by the military services or diplomatic agencies of their own nation,
deployed under their own government’s auspices to serve on foreign soil.
The critical dependence of NATO’s member-nation military and diplomatic person-
nel upon the private sector does not result from a deliberate policy by member states
to privatize their militaries. Rather, in an era characterized by voluntary, non-conscript
military services and increasingly severe economic constraints, it has proven increas-
ingly necessary, as well as more cost-effective, to outsource a number of non-combat
but mission-critical operations and services to the private sector. These outsourced or
“privatized” functions typically range from supplying and preparing food, to providing
maintenance and sanitation at military outposts and even to supervising the training of
Integrity Issues Related to Military Operations 137
Box 12.2. Fraud, Mismanagement and Misbehaviour in UN Peacekeeping

Operations
A UN task force has uncovered a pervasive pattern of corruption and mismanagement involv-
ing hundreds of millions of dollars in contracts for fuel, food, construction and other materials
and services used by UN peacekeeping operations, which are in the midst of their largest ex-
pansion in 15 years. It identified multiple instances of fraud, corruption, waste and misman-
agement at UN headquarters and peacekeeping missions, including ten significant instances of
fraud and corruption with aggregate value in excess of US$610 million.
In addition to the corruption, there are also problems with other forms of misbehaviour. By
2006, nearly 300 UN peacekeeping personnel had been investigated for sexual crimes. 170
peacekeepers, including 17 civilians and 16 police, have been sent home. As a result, in the
same year the U.S. and Japan—two of the largest contributors to UN peacekeeping opera-
tions—were threatening to withhold funds unless the UN cracks down on corruption.
Sources: “Peacekeeping: Cleaning up Corruption,” Strategy Page (2 March 2006), www.strategypage.com/

htmw/htun/articles/20060302.aspx; Colum Lynch, “U.N. Finds Fraud, Mismanagement in Peacekeeping,”
Washington Post (December 18, 2007), A06.
host country police and military forces during peacekeeping and stability operations
(as, for example, in Bosnia, Kosovo and presently Afghanistan).
At the far extreme of this range of private services, however, is the increasing use
of Armed Private Security Contractors (APSCs) to provide security for diplomatic mis-
sions and personnel, to protect vital supply convoys and even to guard military instal-
lations themselves (for which APSCs serve as sentries or police). As with the larger
phenomenon of increasing involvement of the private sector in military operations gen-
erally, this reliance on APSCs has not resulted from a deliberate, collective or even
well thought out strategic or policy decision by NATO’s member nations. Instead, the
increased reliance upon private security forces in war zones is largely the result of an
extension of conventional domestic practice within those member nations themselves.
In most NATO countries, for example, private firms have long been retained to provide
guards, sentries and traffic police for domestic or “in-country” military installations as
readily as other firms have long been retained on those same military installations to
operate the motor pool, provide routine building maintenance or grounds keeping, or to
supply, deliver, prepare and serve food for troops in the mess hall.
Thus, the rapid growth of reliance upon the private sector to support NATO military
missions abroad can be seen largely as a form of “mission creep.” That is, present re-
liance on the private sector stems from an unreflective extension of customary domes-
tic practices into the international arena, primarily out of necessity or convenience,
without much thought for the long-term implications or consequences of extending
such practices. Borrowing a phrase from the late philosopher Hannah Arendt, we might
term this the “banality” of the private sector, in marked contrast to the historically ma-
levolent or sinister moral reputation attached (for example, by Machiavelli) to any reli-
ance on mercenary military forces. Whether banal or malevolent, however, this situa-
tion is unlikely to change. How might NATO’s military forces and diplomatic missions
most adequately cope with this new feature of modern warfare?
Presumed Benefits of the Private Sector
Proponents of this dramatically increased reliance upon the private sector would assert
that this public-private partnership in the military realm is beneficial rather than sinister.
Indeed, the commercial or corporate sector’s motto of “faster, cheaper, better” seems
well suited to providing reliable, quality food and sanitation services for NATO military
personnel deployed (often with little advance warning or preparation) in peacekeeping
or stability operations, such as a humanitarian catastrophe. This tacit policy serves to
increase the number of highly-trained uniformed personnel who are available to en-
gage in the primary military mission of life-saving, peacekeeping, or nation-building,
while leaving logistical concerns in the hands of non-military support personnel. Like-
wise, proponents of the present arrangement argue, the private sector is able to mobi-
lize quickly to provide technologically complex logistical support such as weapons
systems maintenance, operational advice and technical consulting. It takes months or
even years for military units to recruit, train and deploy uniformed personnel with these
requisite technical skills. By contrast, a contract may be “let out” to a private defence
contractor to provide skilled technical support personnel during a military crisis with
very little lead time.
As an additional economic consideration, military personnel in service to their
country enlist, or are commissioned, to serve for a specified period of time. During that
assigned period of national service, they are salaried with full benefits whether or not
they are actually deployed in military operations. Upon leaving their nation’s military
service, such personnel may be entitled to a range of “veteran’s benefits,” from educa-
tion to health care, for the remainder of their lives. By contrast, employees of a private
military contractor are governed strictly by the terms of their employer’s contract. They
are usually paid quite generously, but only while deployed on assignment, and are
usually responsible for providing their own benefits (such as health care and life insur-
ance) from their salaries. Private employees can be let go or reassigned quickly when
the PMC’s primary contract (or the need for their individual services) terminates. There
is no lifetime guarantee of residual benefits at public expense.
Finally, advocates of this increasing reliance on a public-private military partnership
note that the “irregular” or unconventional military operations (or irregular warfare – IW)
in which NATO forces will likely be involved for the foreseeable future—counterinsur-
gency (COIN), humanitarian assistance, or peacekeeping in failed states—often have
an underlying economic cause. Private contractors based in NATO countries fre-

quently, upon arrival in a “failed state” or an unstable zone of conflict, offer employ-
ment to local inhabitants (to cook, clean, provide other labour, and even serve as
translators). The use of PMCs during such IW operations thus provides a reliable
source of jobs and income to the most desperately impoverished population in the tar-
get country, and serves to promote economic stability and heightened security in con-
tested regions of the world. It is for such reasons that military leaders and policy ex-
perts generally conclude that contemporary and future military operations are “unsus-
tainable” apart from reliance upon the private sector.
The Ethical and Leadership Challenges

These arguments in support of the present public-private military partnership, however,
should not be allowed to minimize a number of complex ethical challenges that this ar-
rangement inevitably has already posed and will likely continue to generate. Ideally, for
Box 12.3. Self-Regulation of Private Military and Security Companies through a

Code of Conduct
Codes of conduct (CoC) are self-imposed corporate obligations that impose normative stan-
dards that are not part of a company’s original core business. From a corporate point of view,
codes of conduct are part of PR work, risk management and a company’s socio-political contri-
butions.
While private military and security companies (PMSCs) are often aware that they are not op-
erating in a legal vacuum, there is often uncertainty as to the rules in force—particularly in con-
flict regions—and not infrequently a degree of ignorance with regard to international standards.
Hence, a code of conduct for PMSCs is a useful tool to overcome shortcomings at the level of
regulation and implementation, address third party concerns (like those of activist NGOs) and
to protect the interests of corporations.
The aim of a code of conduct for PMSCs is first of all to formulate duties based on interna-
tional standards of human rights protection and international humanitarian law that businesses
must respect. Respectively, a CoC should address the protection of the right to life and bodily
integrity, employment rights, particular gender specific duties to respect and bans on sexual
violence and exploitation, and a ban on corruption.
The second major component of a CoC is the provision for implementation of obligations, in-
cluding procedures regarding PMSC accountability and responsibility, monitoring and reporting
mechanisms.
Source: Nils Roseman, Code of Conduct: Tool for Self-Regulation for Private Military and Security Com-
panies, Occasional Paper #15 (Geneva: DCAF, 2008).
example, the contracts required for provision of specific services to military and diplo-
matic services should be negotiated transparently, through a fully open and competi-
tive bidding and procurement process designed to assure the highest quality service at
the best price. Likewise, proponents of the current system often claim that the terms of
compliance specified in the contract itself will provide sufficiently for accountability and
oversight, both of the PMC and of the behaviour of its employees. Thus, poor perform-
ance or insufficient compliance by the contractor with the terms of the contract, or im-
proper behaviour in the host or client country by a contractor’s employees, should
serve as grounds for dismissing those employees or terminating the contract with the
firm. The existence of these commercial sanctions in the “free market” are often touted
as adequate mechanisms to enforce compliance, guarantee satisfactory performance
and ensure best practices by all parties.
Regrettably, in actual practice, these “free market” ideals are seldom attained.
Transparency in bidding and contract procurement is frequently absent, and the pros-
pects for favouritism, graft, cronyism, bribery and corruption are rife. More often than
not, even absent corrupt motives and unscrupulous character, NATO member states
simply lack a sufficient number of trained and experienced procurement officers to su-
pervise these negotiations properly. Those assigned to these duties, moreover, even
given the highest level of competence and the best of civic intentions, may be rapidly
overwhelmed by the size and scope of their task, particularly in the chaotic and com-
pelling circumstances accompanying armed intervention in a failed state, or in the
midst of an unfolding humanitarian crisis. The urgent need for a wide range of diverse
services in the midst of war does not constitute (to put it mildly) an ideal situation within
which to publicize, receive, review and award large and complex contracts in a just
and orderly fashion, nor to establish effective external controls and oversight to ensure
full compliance.
Even if overworked and overwhelmed government contracting officers are not
subjected to bribery and corruption, there are ample opportunities for unscrupulous
and even incompetent PMCs, or the occasional unscrupulous employee, to take ad-
vantage of these unsettled circumstances. At present, for example, there is no ac-
cepted and generally recognized system—certainly not at the international level—for
evaluating, registering or licensing private contractors, or otherwise defining or up-
holding reasonable professional standards of performance on the part of companies
and their employees. When errors of procurement are made, or incompetence discov-
ered, there is often little recourse open to the aggrieved parties beyond termination of
the contract.
Furthermore, even the very best and most reliable private firms (just as their do-
mestic counterparts do upon occasion) may hire an incompetent or unscrupulous em-
ployee. The sanctions available for disciplining inappropriate, unprofessional, or even
criminal conduct are often woefully inadequate and hardly sufficient to serve as a de-
terrent to malevolent behaviour. It hardly seems sufficient, for example, to punish an
employee found to have engaged in criminal conspiracy, kidnapping and human traf-
ficking (as happened, for example, in Kosovo) merely with dismissal and severance of
pay and privileges. Yet, under current circumstances, there is little other recourse
available. Thus, establishing and sustaining what are sometimes termed the “inher-
ently governmental” functions of contract supervision, oversight and accountability
(particularly of individual personnel) in zones of combat constitutes, in actual practice,
a formidable challenge.
The allegedly unprovoked and indiscriminate killing of seventeen Iraqi civilian by-
standers in Monsour Square, Baghdad, on 17 September 2007 by security guards em-
ployed by the former U.S. firm Blackwater Worldwide, constituted a dramatic illustra-
tion of the range of problems associated with building integrity and ensuring best prac-
tices by private contractors in zones of conflict. That specific incident has been de-
nounced as an example of regrettable indifference and unprofessional lack of concern
of private security employees for the welfare of the local populace. Such criticisms,
however, altogether miss the most salient feature of that unfortunate incident. The
“welfare of the local populace” is, by definition, seldom if ever the principal, or even the
proper motive for a private, commercial contractor. Instead, it is concern for the welfare
and safety of the customer or paying client that constitutes the overwhelming contrac-
tual concern of the APSC and its employees.
This factor underscores sharply the underlying differences of organizational values
and intentions between public and professional organizations (such as a democratic
nation’s military forces) and private, commercial organizations. The former exist to
serve their nation and its legitimate interests. Its individual members, accordingly, in
their professional training and orientation, are routinely and extensively socialized into
that ethic of public service and sacrifice. Private commercial organizations, by contrast,
exist to serve their customers and clients. The welfare of the wider public is guaran-
teed through their activities only insofar as these commercial firms operate within a
well-defined system of legal jurisdiction and accountability – one that, for example, is
competent to detect and punish both private firms and their individual employees for
their failure to exercise due care, or for criminal negligence. In regions of armed con-
flict, let alone in failed states, it is precisely these systems of accountability and juris-
diction that have deteriorated. Absent the firm rule of law, the local population is left to
rely upon the good will of the private firm, as well as upon the character of its individual
employees. When these fail, there is little left for victims in the way of recourse.
Recognizing this dilemma, the professional military forces of NATO member states
are imbued with a sense of public service and public accountability. Character educa-
tion is a hallmark of professional military education within these nations. The goal of
character education and “professional military socialization” is to ensure that individual

members of each nation’s military may be empowered to use deadly force when nec-
essary and entrusted to use such force responsibly and economically, and only insofar
as is necessary to achieve legitimate national aims. Individual failures in exercising
this weighty responsibility—for example, engaging in criminal activities (robbery, rape,
extortion or murder), or behaving in a careless, negligent or indiscriminate manner
when using deadly force—are accountable under stern military law and discipline.
Nothing could be more different from what might be termed the private sector or
“corporate” ethic, which focuses on corporate ambition and achievement within a com-
petitive environment, with “successful performance” judged almost entirely in terms of
client and customer satisfaction. Former Blackwater CEO Erik Prince, for example,
proudly emphasizes his (former) organization’s immaculate performance record in
having never allowed a single client or “principal” to come to bodily harm during nearly
seven years of providing security services in highly volatile and extremely hazardous
war zones. This is indeed a remarkable and enviable performance record, indicative of
the highest standards of competence in providing for client security. That is precisely
the service that Blackwater Worldwide, Inc. pledged to provide.
The difficulty, however, is that this record on behalf of its own clients is not the only
standard by which to judge the performance of APSCs. Critics from the military per-
spective complain that this very record of accomplishment itself constitutes a stark
problem. The aggressive, militant and belligerent behaviour of APSC personnel,
through which such protection to clients is accorded, offends and alienates the local
population and, as in Monsour Square, often also threatens them with disproportionate
and highly inappropriate risk of harm or death. This is because the welfare of non-con-
tractual third parties, such as the local population, simply doesn’t count in terms of
compliance with the contract. Thus, the very success and proficiency of the APSC (as
judged by this corporate or contractual standard) simultaneously impedes the military’s
larger mission objectives of gaining the loyalty and trust of the local population in a
failed state by guaranteeing their safety and security and ensuring the rule of law.
Promoting PMC Best Practices and Building Integrity in NATO
Operations
The vast majority of these ethical challenges have been generated simply by the pres-
ence of APSCs in zones of combat where legal jurisdiction and accountability have
been decidedly ambiguous. APSCs, however, constitute only a tiny fraction of the
PMCs operating in conflict zones. The particular dilemma they present, moreover, has
been specifically and meticulously addressed in the deliberations of international legal
experts under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), as
summarized in the Montreux Document.2 That document carefully sets forth proposals
to amend legal statutes, clarify and extend appropriate legal jurisdiction over APSCs
operating in war zones, remove areas of ambiguity in the interests of all concerned
parties and otherwise promote best practices by host and client states. As such, this
document should be read and critically pondered by NATO member states, and its
provisions for law and best practice with regard to the use of armed private security
contractors, insofar as is feasible, should be followed.
Recommendations
C3 and the Comprehensive Approach 3 to Operations
Mid-career officers from NATO and allied military services routinely concur that the
chief challenge to effective liaison with private contractors in operations is C3, or
communication, command and control. Absent clear lines of authority or well-defined
operating procedures, commanding officers are forced to rely on proactive individual
initiative and engagement with private-sector units operating in their spheres of com-
mand. Safe and effective coordination has been found largely to depend on good will
and the ability on both sides to recognize and respect common interests.
The current unified approach to military, diplomatic, NGOs and private companies
working together in conflict zones should not blind leaders to the complexities of com-
manding disparate kinds of organizations under a single command “umbrella.” Under
that umbrella will be organizations whose underlying missions and corporate virtues
are in serious tension. This tension will be resolved only through a unified command
structure, with the NATO military commanders at the top of the command hierarchy, in
sole possession of the final authority and responsibility for the battle space, subordi-
nating all actions to their command.
Law versus Character
Conventional war, irregular war and counterinsurgency all inherently represent circum-
stances in which the normal rule of law—and mechanisms for accountability, oversight
and compliance—have deteriorated. Under such bleak circumstances, the use of
deadly force should be entrusted only to those individuals whose character and whose
2 United Nations General Assembly & International Committee of the Red Cross, Montreux
Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States
Related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies During Armed Conflict
(2008), A/63/467–S/2008/636, www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/montreux-document-
170908.
3
NATO Website, “A Comprehensive Approach” (March 2009), http://www.nato.int/issues/
comprehensiveapproach/index.html.
Box 12.4. The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies
Recent years have seen an increase in the use of PMSCs and with it the demand for a clarifi-
cation of pertinent legal obligations under international humanitarian law and human rights law.
The Montreux Document, 17 September 2008, identifies and promotes good practices relating
to PMSCs under the following themes:
• Determination of services: which services may or may not be contracted out to PMSCs,
taking into account factors such as whether a particular service could cause PMSC per-
sonnel to become involved in direct participation in hostilities.
• Procedure for the selection and contracting of PMSCs: assessing the capacity of the
PMSC to carry out its activities in conformity with relevant national and international law;
providing adequate resources and drawing on relevant expertise for selecting and con-
tracting PMSCs; ensuring transparency and supervision in the selection and contracting of
PMSCs through public disclosure of contracting regulations and of general information
about specific contracts; publication of an overview of incident reports, complaints and
sanctions; oversight by parliamentary bodies, including through annual reports or notifica-
tion of particular contracts to such bodies.
• Criteria for the selection of PMSCs: ensuring that lowest price is not the only criterion for
the selection, taking into account the past conduct of the PMSC and its personnel, finan-
cial, economic and management capacity of the PMSC, training of personnel both prior to
any deployment and on an ongoing basis on a variety of issues, including on measures
against bribery, corruption, and other crimes; the existence of monitoring, supervisory,
and internal accountability mechanisms, etc.
• Terms of contract with PMSCs: including contractual clauses and performance require-
ments that ensure respect for relevant national law, international humanitarian law and
human rights law by the contracted PMSC.
• Monitoring compliance and ensuring accountability: providing for criminal jurisdiction in na-
tional legislation over crimes under international law committed by PMSCs and their per-
sonnel; considering the establishment of corporate criminal responsibility and criminal ju-
risdiction over serious crimes committed by PMSC personnel abroad.
The same practices and requirements are applied, as appropriate, where a contracted
PMSC subcontracts with another PMSC.
While the Montreux document is addressed to states, the good practices may be of value for
other entities such as international organisations, NGOs and companies that contract PMSCs,
as well as for PMSCs themselves.
organizational “professional ethic” we can still both trust and hold accountable for fail-
ures. This is the core virtue of the military profession. The disintegration of law and or-
der, and the consequent erosion of normal oversight and accountability, pose chal-
lenges to the moral character of any individual. The military works carefully to cultivate
the kind of character that can withstand those temptations, remain steady in areas of
disequilibrium and thus help restore law and order.
The private or “corporate ethic,” by contrast, is wholly unoriented to this unique
problem. By design, corporations rely upon the external oversight of society and the
law to keep unhealthy ambitions in check. Hence, we cannot and must not deploy
armed private contractors as guards, sentries, or even prison guards inside areas be-
set by insurgency. Private security contractors should only be rearward deployed (as
they are now domestically within NATO member nations) – i.e., only in regions in which
law, security and accountability for wrong-doing are not fundamentally in question.
Eroding the Professional Military Ethic
In counterinsurgency operations and in irregular warfare generally, building trust with
the local population constitutes NATO’s best weapon. If, on the one hand, private se-
curity contractors can perform equally well all the activities that the military under-
stands as its core mission, then why bother to sustain a military force at all? We
maintain, in contrast, that there is something distinctive about a professional military
ethic that emphasizes “selfless service to the nation and its allies.”
Accordingly, the governments of individual NATO member states should not adopt
policies or practices regarding the use of private military contractors or security con-
tractors that diminish, denigrate, or erode that ethic, or otherwise undermine civil-mili-
tary relations within their respective countries. For core military missions involving ir-
regular warfare, stabilization and reconstruction, or nation-building in particular,
NATO’s core professional military virtues of sacrifice and selfless public service must
be relied upon as the only proven means of building and maintaining public trust, both
within our respective countries, as well as abroad.
Contractors and Humanitarian Interventions
The sole possible exception to the foregoing provision may be during calls for hu-
manitarian military intervention (HI). This is a special case, involving a serious equivo-
cation over the meaning of “defensive operations.” HIs are “defensive operations” in a
very different sense than, for example, sentries and prison guards (or even convoy es-
corts) are deemed “defensive.” In HI, by contrast, defence of innocent victims of geno-
cide involves offensive military action: engaging the enemy, exchanges of fire and ac-
tive pursuit of aggressors. Absent compelling national interest or even willingness
among U.N.-member nations to come to the aid of victims of genocide, the prospects
for employing private security contractors deserves consideration.
In general, the organizational “vectors” of public and commercial (private) military
organizations do not align well in war zones. HI, however, is an area in which the cor-
porate vector, aimed at protecting the contractual client or principal (in this case, the
potential victims of genocide), may prove surprisingly more effective than the public
vector of national military forces (which aim at the defence of their own nation, coun-
trymen and allies).
Inherently Governmental Functions
The widespread debate in NATO diplomatic circles over what is or is not “inherently
governmental” seems misplaced. A government’s role is accountability and oversight;
its guiding watchword is “transparency” in the public interest. Otherwise, there is no
sharply defined public-private boundary. Where the private sector mantra of “better,
cheaper and faster” holds sway (as in providing food service, mechanical and engi-
neering expertise and even local language skills), a viable continuing partnership is
desirable. The government role here is to improve procurement and contract oversight
capacities within a functioning legal framework.
Contractors and Combat Support
Use of private contractors for logistical and combat support seems appropriate, flexible
and cost-effective. The role of the government and the military in these instances is to
improve the ability to procure, manage and oversee contracts, to provide a legal
framework for jurisdiction of private contracting personnel, and to ensure full compli-
ance both with the terms of each contract and with the general rule of law in accor-
dance with the provisions for best practice outlined in the UN/ICRC Montreux Docu-
ment of 2008. Care should be taken, however, to ensure that reliance on the private
sector for these functions does not inadvertently result in a failure (e.g., during an ex-
treme crisis, or in the heat of combat) of private contractors to continue to provide es-
sential combat support (food, fuel, supplies) to military personnel dependent upon
them for survival and mission accomplishment.
Contractor Licensing
PMCs and APSCs complain that their industry is rife with unqualified and sub-par or-
ganizations and personnel. Their trade associations should work with NATO organiza-
tions to develop effective licensing and regulation of contractors, establish minimum
qualifications, experience and resources defining eligibility of private firms to engage in
competitive bidding for military, defence, or diplomatic contracts, and to dismiss or de-
clare ineligible those individuals or organizations who violate these norms.
Code of Professional Ethics
Likewise, trade associations should be required to convene their members to forge a
common code of ethics governing professional behaviour in their various contracting
activities. Adherence to this code would be an essential requirement for licensing and
contract bidding eligibility.
Prospects for “Proxy Wars”
Finally, regardless of the policy NATO and its member states adopt toward use of pri-
vate security contractors, other nations outside the alliance will likely continue to em-
ploy and deploy armed PMSCs. There is a concern by the prospects for contractors
from one NATO country working at cross purposes with contractors from allied nations,
for example, in providing maritime security. Likewise, it is not unrealistic to worry that
NATO military forces, or armed private security contractors based in NATO member
nations, might one day face a “proxy war” in Africa or Southeast Asia against armed
private military contractors from an adversary power.
Preparing Future Military Leaders
Defence colleges and academies should develop courses and resources to address
the PMSC and APSC policy issues, especially the leadership and ethics challenges
identified above. In so doing, it would be wise to make use of the experiences of both
junior and senior officers recently returned from deployment. In many cases, their ex-
periences will outrun resident instructor expertise in our respective military and de-
fence academies. It would also be wise to engage the private sector itself by inviting
leading representatives from established private military and security companies to
lecture, and to discuss their own experiences and recommendations in the classrooms
of defence academies and colleges.
Chapter 13
Combating Defence-related
Corruption in Countries with
Unresolved Territorial Disputes
or Frozen Conflicts
Unresolved territorial disputes and frozen conflicts can substantially increase corrup-
tion risks in their region. Prime examples are the unresolved territorial disputes over
secession on the territory of the former Soviet Union: Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan,
Transdnistria in Moldova and, until August 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Geor-
gia. They also include situations like the conflict between Greek and Turkish communi-
ties in Cyprus and the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir.
Generally speaking, countries with frozen conflicts have high rates of corruption.
Box 13.1 shows the ratings of some relevant countries on Transparency International’s
2008 Corruption Perceptions Index. Unsolved territorial disputes and frozen conflicts
clearly add a number of specific elements to the corruption equation yet their influence
should not be exaggerated. The level of corruption in a given country is often more
related to societal and economic factors than the existence of a frozen conflict. For
example, the high levels of defence-related corruption that existed in Georgia before
the 2003 Rose Revolution were more closely related to the state of financial ruin of
Georgia’s Ministry of Defence than the threat posed by the secessionist regions of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Especially in the former Soviet space, one of the most
corrupt regions in the world, it is hard to divorce “normal” corruption from corruption
that is causally linked to the existence of unsolved territorial conflicts.
Frozen Conflicts as Drivers of Corruption Risk
The principle factors that increase corruption risks for defence and security establish-
ments in regions with unresolved territorial disputes and frozen conflicts are: increased
military expenditures, reduced transparency, the creation of legal “grey zones” and the
existence of unregulated paramilitary formations. This is frequently compounded by an
ideology of “national survival” and high levels of public support for the military that can
lead to tacit tolerance of corrupt activities as the price to pay for national security.
148
Combating Corruption in Countries with Unresolved Territorial Disputes or Frozen Conflicts 149
Box 13.1. CPI and Percent of GDP for Defence in Selected Countries with Unre-
solved Territorial Disputes or Frozen Conflicts
CPI, 2009 % GDP for Defence

Conflict Country
(best = 10) (world average= 2.2%)
India 3.4 2.5 2007
Kashmir
Pakistan 2.4 3.1 2007
Azerbaijan 2.3 3.4 2006
Nagorno-Karabakh
Armenia 2.7 3.0 2007
Georgia 4.1 9.2 2007
S. Ossetia / Abkhasia
Russia 2.2 3.5 2007 (est.)
Transdniestria Moldova 3.3 0.5 2007
Greece 3.8 3.3 2007
Cyprus
Turkey 4.4 2.5 2007 (est.)
Darfur Sudan 1.5 4.4 2006
Sources: TI Corruption Perceptions Index: www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi;

SIPRI Military Expenditure Database: http://milexdata.sipri.org/.
Increased Spending
Frozen conflicts are characterized by competitiveness, mistrust and militarization,
which make arms races the usual practice for each of the conflicting sides. For exam-
ple, the conflict over the disputed territory of Kashmir has helped drive India to be the
second largest importer of arms in the world, Pakistan to allocate the largest portion of
its state budget to defence and both countries to develop nuclear arsenals. Territorial
disputes regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia (both supported by Russia) have
driven Georgia to increase its defence budget from 42 million Lari (20 million US dol-
lars) in 2003 to 1.4 billion Lari (830 million US dollars) in 2007, giving it one of the larg-
est proportions of state budget allocated to defence in the world (9.2% of GDP in 2007,
according to SIPRI).1 Whilst this has been presented to the international community as
necessary for the implementation of reforms related to NATO integration, to domestic
audiences Georgian officials have often cited the existence of frozen conflicts as an
argument for a high military budget. The two other South Caucasian countries—Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan—faced with the unresolved territorial dispute in Nagorno-Karabakh,
have also paid special attention to military preparations and significantly increased
defence spending. Box 13.1 shows that almost all the previously mentioned countries
1 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database: http://milexdata.sipri.org/.

with frozen conflicts spend a significantly greater proportion of GDP on defence than
the weighted world average (of 2.2% GDP).
This increased spending substantially increases the opportunity for corruption, par-
ticularly where fears of renewed conflict overshadow the case for transparency. It may
also tend to shift patterns of corruption away from low-level, need-driven corruption to
high-level, greed-driven corruption.
Reduced Transparency
In addition to driving increased budgets, the militarized situation surrounding frozen
conflicts tends to reduce transparency in defence institutions, justified in terms of the
security threat that faces the country from secessionist regions. Myriad expenses, from
combat operations to construction and procurement, can be closed to scrutiny due to
national security reasons. For example, former Georgian Defence Minister Irakli Ok-
ruashvili proudly stated that he “closed off the Ministry of Defence” because many offi-
cials “do not work for their country but for another state” in a period when “two uncon-
trolled armies” are stationed in Georgian territory.2 Over-classification, under the pre-
text of “enemies behind the ceasefire line” also reduces the effectiveness of external
oversight, like parliamentary committees and audit chambers, as well as hampering
public oversight though civil society institutions. The political climate and regulations in
countries with territorial disputes or frozen conflicts can also help corrupt elites control
media and other information resources under the pretext of preventing the enemy’s
ideological sabotage and information wars.
Legal Vacuum
Transparency and accountability are further depredated by the existence of seces-
sionist enclaves, which are black holes in the international system, without interna-
tional recognition and not bound by international law. Frequently, secessionist sides in
a frozen conflict are able to establish (usually in a “hot” phase of the conflict) and
maintain (in the “frozen” phase) de facto independent territories, often with military, fi-
nancial and information support from a large regional patron. Without formal relations,
but with the need nonetheless for meetings, discussions, negotiations and even sign-
ing agreements, the only outlet for cross-frontier relations is through unofficial con-
tacts. These are less transparent and thus more likely to be of a corrupt or criminal
nature. Likewise, secessionist entities exist in a legal vacuum, as they are bound nei-
ther by the domestic law of the state of which they are nominally part, nor by the law of
the patron state. It should not be surprising, therefore, that corrupt or criminal activities
are frequently the principle sources of income for such entities.
2 Interview with Rezonansi newspaper, 11/07/05.

Unregulated Forces
This legal vacuum is compounded by the proliferation of unregulated forces, including
separatists and paramilitaries. Separatist forces are not internationally recognized and
thus can only arm themselves with illegal military procurements. Smuggling of arma-
ments, both light and heavy, is often done through corrupt arrangements with civil and
military officials from both conflicting sides, as well as with third parties. For example,
during the war in Chechnya, Russian servicemen have been involved in illegal arms
deals with Chechen separatists, as well as embezzling the lion’s share of lucrative
military investments during post-conflict rebuilding. At the same time, Russia was ille-
gally supplying tanks, armoured personnel carriers, heavy guns, military helicopters
and light weapons to Abkhaz and Ossetian separatists, providing also military training
to their armed forces.
Paramilitary detachments, which often consist of unregulated “volunteers,” are
usually the most inclined to looting and corruption since they are less disciplined and
less institutionalized than regular military forces. Yet the weakness of law enforcement
structures combined with a culture of violence, greed and hatred create fertile ground
for broad criminality and corruption. Thus, corrupt actors can include government and
military officials, defence companies, army officers and soldiers, guerrillas, profes-
sional smugglers and even civilians. They conduct a wide variety of illegal activity: the
arms trade, human trafficking, drug smuggling and extortion of money and other valu-
ables from the peaceful population. The latter can be particularly corrosive as it leads
to the criminalization of security.
Frozen Conflicts’ Impact on Forms of Corruption
In general terms, corruption can be divided into three kinds: need driven or “petty” cor-
ruption; greed-driven or “elite” corruption; and “pyramidal” corruption that connects
high ranking government and military officials with low- and middle-level servicemen.3
Frozen conflicts have an impact on all three sorts, creating a nexus between high- and
low-level corruption, together with organized crime and smuggling. These networks
frequently work smoothly across the various sides of the conflict zone, with little regard
to loyalties.
Petty corruption involves low- and middle-level servicemen who are unable to sat-
isfy their basic social needs with their low salaries and social benefits. In normal condi-
tions, this level of corruption may look comparatively modest, even though it may in-
volve large numbers of servicemen involved in petty theft and diversion of funds. In
conflict zones, however, petty corruption can become brutal. Servicemen know the
3 Mats R. Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in
Civil Wars (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
taste of blood, with personal experience of combat and even military crimes. In post-
war or frozen situations, soldiers often feel entitled—by virtue of their participation in
combat—to a better life; yet they see no means to achieve their goals other than crimi-
nality. In this brutal environment, it becomes psychologically easy for servicemen to
terrorize the local population through extortion, assassinations, kidnappings, hostage
takings and even torture.
Elite corruption usually involves high ranking military and government officials, as
well as private companies and middlemen/agents. The usual vehicle is procurement
and arms deals on both national and international levels. Direct bribes, consultant fees
and overpaying subcontractors for low quality goods are common procurement
schemes. Construction is another high-risk area for corruption, especially in building
and restoration of destroyed military objects and infrastructure in post-war periods.
Due to their control over financial, military and law enforcement resources, high rank-
ing officials do not usually have to rely on organized crime groups. There may be,
however, a symbiotic merging of state and criminal structures, particularly in and near
separatist enclaves. Since elite corruption is less visible to the broader public than
petty corruption, it does not touch ordinary citizens’ interests directly and may escape
political notice (unless used for political purposes). Ultimately, however, it may have
the most serious negative impact on a country’s national security.
Pyramidal corruption connects together high ranking government and military offi-
cials with low- and middle-level servicemen, resulting in redistribution of illegal income
and a flow of corrupt money from the bottom up. It frequently includes a direct nexus of
corrupt officials and servicemen with organized crime groups and professional arms
smugglers, and is typical in authoritarian countries, post-Soviet states and separatist
enclaves. In some cases, professional criminal groupings capture the state or even
implement a form of “criminal totalitarianism.” The nexus between corrupt officials and
criminals can extend to the extreme criminalization of defence structures, to the point
that it becomes difficult to delineate between “mere” corrupt servicemen and profes-
sional criminals. Military and paramilitary structures (sometimes including peacekeep-
ers) can participate in criminal networks that smuggle arms, drugs, cigarettes, stolen
vehicles and people under the umbrella of corrupt government officials so that frozen
conflict becomes a profitable source of income for all conflicting sides. Driven from top
and bottom, corruption becomes systemic and penetrates to all levels of military, pa-
ramilitary and civilian structures. It also frequently penetrates into civilian society, es-
pecially into communities of socially vulnerable IDPs (internally displaced persons) and
refugees. Conflict-driven corruption becomes an integral part of public life, thus devel-
oping constituencies that may oppose conflict resolution.
Corruption in peacekeeping forces is also, unfortunately, not infrequent in conflict
zones. Peacekeepers may represent an international organization (such as the UN or
NATO), a separate country, or even separatist forces, with different levels of discipline,
responsibility, remuneration and external control on their activities. Their regular con-
tacts with local guerrillas, warlords, military, law enforcement, government representa-
tives and the population from both conflicting sides expose them to criminal and cor-
rupt networks. Their position of authority and freedom of movement can make them a
valuable asset, worth bribing.
Anti-corruption Actions
Fighting defence-related corruption in countries with unresolved territorial disputes or
frozen conflicts requires a multi-dimensional approach that extends beyond the reform
of military and law enforcement structures. In general, anti-corruption efforts are not
effective if the main methods are detainments and arrests; if systems remain un-
changed, one generation of corrupt public officials and servants will simply replace an-
other. Efficient and sustainable efforts are possible only through implementation of
well-thought out and comprehensive anti-corruption reforms.
It is important for the government that implements anti-corruption reforms to have
sufficient levels of legitimacy, and defence officials and servicemen need enough
power and freedom to make responsible decisions, for example, concerning military
procurements. This should be combined, however, with well-elaborated accountability
procedures, including audit, accounting and financial crime reporting standards. These
should cover both the open part of the defence budget and the secret one – which
should be kept as small as possible.
Box 13.2. Main Elements of Anti-Corruption Reform

The Anti-Corruption Reform includes the following main elements:
• Creation of efficient decision-making systems that allow reformist political and military
leaders to adopt and control the implementation of an anti-corruption strategy;
• Staff optimization, including professional tests to weed out incompetent (or corrupt) ser-
vicemen and the hiring of new military personnel with sufficient salaries and a high level
of discipline;
• Sufficient finance and oversight for logistical support including construction and repair-
ing of military installations, modern equipment, ammunition and infrastructure develop-
ment;
• Institutional reform to optimize the competencies of defence institutions, their internal
relations and their relations with civil institutions and international organizations;
• Legislative reform; and
• The inclusion of leading international organizations (NATO, the OECD, DCAF,
Transparency International, etc.) and democratic nation states to help facilitate reform in
the defence sector, as well as conflict resolution, through training, logistical and financial
support.
Transparency in decision making and resources is also important – first of all within
the government, where appropriate mechanisms should be set up to review decisions
related to national security secrets. Transparency to the broader public through civil
society organizations is also important, since NGOs and free media play a vital role in
raising public awareness and changing public attitudes regarding defence-related cor-
ruption. The establishment of public oversight councils and the creation of a single
database containing all types of public information on Defence Ministry activities are
two practical measures that have proven helpful. Of course, these measures are de-
pendent on the strength of democratic institutions in society and functioning civil-mili-
tary relations. This is especially difficult in conflict zones where NGOs, free media and
human rights institutions operate with difficulty.
Another tool for accountability is parliamentary investigation groups, which can ad-
dress the threat of corruption in the defence system. Such groups can include civil so-
ciety representatives and should have the mandate to monitor and control implemen-
tation of anti-corruption measures in the defence sector. The parliamentary groups can
also develop anti-corruption legislation, for example regulating tenders, incorporating
safeguards against kickbacks and improving quality control.4
A number of actions can also be taken to specifically address corruption risks as-
sociated with frozen conflicts. First is establishing discipline by eliminating non-state
paramilitaries or armed “volunteer” formations. Disarmament and demobilization of
these groups help the state to establish a monopoly on the use of force, and should be
an early step for any government with the political will to stabilize the post-conflict
situation and fight corruption.5 Further efforts can then be made to increase the good
order, discipline and professionalism of government forces, to include measures to en-
sure sufficient social conditions and salaries.
Secondly, since it is the unstable conflict situation (or threat of conflict) that drives
frozen conflict-related corruption risks, it is important to end fighting and establish
some modicum of security. This will allow a transfer of political energy from operational
issues like training and equipping programs toward improving governance. The longer
security can be maintained, the more the possibilities for cross-border communication
and cooperation, the less relevant paramilitary groups are for the security situation,
and the less political authorities are inclined to use them for political reasons.
4 Transparency International Georgia, Anti-Corruption Policy: Recommendations by Civil

Society Representatives and Experts (30 March 2009), www.transparency.ge/files/215_490_
158736_Anti-Corruption Policy Recommendations by Civil Society ENG.pdf.
5 The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), Security Sector
Reform in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding (May 2009), http://www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/
details.cfm?lng=en&id=100048&nav1=5.
Thirdly, it is important that anti-corruption measures have public support. This re-
quires, first of all, efforts to turn public opinion against corruption. Systematic and sus-
tained information support, anti-corruption TV and radio programs and publications in
print media can help the public better understand the negative consequences of cor-
ruption on real combat capability and national security more widely. This can be a
strong factor in shifting public perceptions, even when gift culture and tolerance to cor-
ruption have previously dominated in society.
The Example of Georgia
Immediately following independence, in 1992 and 1993, Georgia faced armed conflicts
in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which resulted in the creation of separatist enclaves
under Russian protection. During and just after these armed conflicts, Georgian mili-
tary structures resembled separate criminal-patriotic detachments, badly disciplined,
equipped and trained and “self-financed” through bribery, embezzlement, extortion and
looting. In 1994–1995 the government disarmed, dismissed and eliminated most of
these detachments using the newly created armed forces and law enforcement struc-
tures. But there was no political will to fight corruption and the government did so only
rhetorically. In 2002, a survey by the Georgian Opinion Research Business Interna-
tional (GORBI) indicated that 92 percent of respondents thought that corruption was
widespread among public officials.6
The logical consequence of this situation was the anti-corruption “Rose Revolution”
in November 2003. Following the revolution, the new government immediately em-
barked on reforms to combat the previously endemic levels of corruption in state insti-
tutions. Part of the rationale for this was to strengthen the Georgian state to an extent
that it would be capable of defending itself against the threat posed by the frozen con-
flicts, as well as building a Georgian state that Abkhaz and Ossetians would want to
live in. Thus, beginning in 2004, serious anti-corruption reforms were implemented in
the defence sector.
Personnel policy was one key area of effort. Generals and senior officers who
lacked professional skills or resisted reform were dismissed and a younger generation
of servicemen (part of them Western educated) was hired. Incentives for petty corrup-
tion were turned around through the combination of increased wages and strictly en-
forced regulations. For example, in 2004, when the wage of a corporal amounted to
GEL107 a month (around $50 at contemporary exchange rates), officers often sup-
plemented their wages with bribe payments (often in exchange for releasing conscripts
from duty) or through low-level embezzlement of state funds meant for food or clothes.
6 Georgian Opinion Research Business International (GORBI), Corruption Survey in Georgia –

Second Wave (2002), www.gorbi.com/store/en/20030307_055847.ppt.
As of 2008, a corporal earned GEL925 (approximately $560) a month, an increase of

864 %. Petty corruption is therefore neither necessary nor attractive.
Programming. One externally-supported measure to increase transparency with
the Georgian government was the adoption of a US-sponsored PPBS/FMS (Planning
Programming and Budgeting System/Financial Management System). This innovation,
introduced in 2006, provides for multi-year planning and transparency inside the gov-
ernment and defence establishment regarding allocation of resources toward objec-
tives. The system also clarifies and divides areas of responsibility between civil and
military personnel and theoretically liberates the military operational side of the armed
forces’ work from political objectives. However, there is little sign of such clarity either
between institutions or inside the Ministry of Defence. Anecdotal evidence from jour-
nalists, experts and NGOs suggest that the level of openness at the Ministry of De-
fence still depends largely on the attitude of the minister.
Procurement. Despite the fact that contracts over a certain value are meant to be
given out through tenders, defence procurement has often not been conducted ac-
cording to the law. Especially in the early years of Saakashvili's presidency, large pro-
jects were often carried out on the basis of “negotiations with individuals” (sole source
procurement). The most notable case was the construction of the Gori and Senaki
military bases and hospital, which was contracted out though sole source procurement
to a firm owned by Kibar Khalvashi, an ally of Defence Minister Okruashvili. This case
later ended in government accusations of embezzlement. In addition, excessive and
unaccountable defence spending has been justified in terms of internal conflicts, with
the relocation of Georgia’s main military hospital from Tbilisi to Gori and the location of
the base on the main road facing South Ossetia as examples. These high profile cases
seem to have taken place, however, against the background of a general shift since
2004 away from sole source procurement and toward tenders.
Defence restructuring and state capacity. These changes were part of the overall
restructuring of the whole defence sector, backed with dramatically increased funding
from the state budget and supported by assistance from NATO, the US, the UK,
France, Germany, Turkey, and other countries. From 2003 to 2008 the defence budget
increased from 30 million GEL (Georgian Laries) to approximately 2 billion GEL. In ad-
dition to better salaries for servicemen, this funding went toward repairing military
equipment and barracks, new procurements and training. The Ministry of Defence was
reorganized and a civilian minister of defence was appointed.
Defence restructuring was part of a wider effort to increase state capacity. An im-
portant element of that was the disarming of criminal armed guerrilla movements in
Western Georgia and a crackdown on the kanonieri kurdi 7 (Georgian criminal bosses).
7 Literally, “thieves-in-law.”
As a result, Georgian security institutions now possess a monopoly on the use of force
and paramilitary and underground organizations no longer exert the corrupting influ-
ence they once did.
Positive impact. These reforms have had tangible success at massively reducing
corruption, particularly the lower-level petty corruption that affects the broad public.
Many corrupt networks in the defence sector and other security and law enforcement
structures have been destroyed and public perception has improved dramatically.
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Indexes demonstrate Georgia’s
significant progress in implementing its anti-corruption strategy (see Box 13.3).
There has also been tremendous improvement in military professionalism: prior to
the adoption of Georgia’s NATO IPAP (Individual Partnership Action Plan) in 2004, the
Georgian armed forces barely functioned as an organization; today they are a more
modern, disciplined, well-paid, trained and better equipped army that is close to NATO
standards and free of petty corruption. This was demonstrated during the Russian-
Georgian war in August 2008, where the NATO-trained Georgian army, in which pa-
ramilitary and “volunteer” armed groups were long ago eliminated, showed more disci-
pline than Russian and their separatist allies, whom journalists video recorded in re-
peated cases of bribery, extortion and looting.
Dilemma of increased capacity. The bottom line is that Georgia’s state institutions,
including the armed forces, now possess the authority and strength to implement and
enforce anti-corruption measures. However, it is precisely this increased state capacity
that has helped create a situation where access to information has become much
more difficult and institutions meant to scrutinize the Ministry of Defence have become
weaker. Thus, while there have been very few proven cases of corruption in the Geor-
gian military since 2004, there is a perception that the reduction in petty corruption has
been accompanied by increased opportunities for high-level corruption. As one Geor-
gian military expert put it: “if a cook of a military unit used to steal two kilograms of po-
tatoes, he may no longer do so because there is control, discipline and … because he
now has a salary of 1000 lari. However, when the matter concerns tenders, construc-
tion, purchasing of cars, purchasing of military equipment and ammunition, here one
Box 13.3. Georgian Ratings on Corruption Perception Index (CPI), 2004-2008

Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
CPI Rank 133 130 99 79 67
(of 145) (of 158) (of 163) (of 179) (of 180)
Sources: TI Corruption Perceptions Index: www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi.

has to deal with such large amounts of funds that somebody may steal 42mn [the
equivalent of the 2003 annual military budget] overnight.”8
Transparency has been a significant casualty of this situation. A 2008 survey of
journalists, experts and local NGOs carried out by the Association for Justice and Lib-
erty showed that only 23 % of journalists used the Ministry of Defence’s public relations
department as a source of information; instead, they preferred to talk to military ex-
perts and insiders with knowledge of the personal politics and the behind-the-scenes
manoeuvring. More worryingly, the report quotes journalists as saying that obtaining
information from the government is “practically impossible.”9 The problem does not end
there: half the defence budget is deemed “classified” and the breakdown of the budget
is quite general. Until 2006, the Ministry of Defence was partly funded through a secret
Army Development Fund on which no information was made available. While the abo-
lition of this fund was a positive step, budgetary transparency has not improved greatly
since then. The last openly available full budget breakdown is from 2007, with large
sums categorized vaguely as “other expenditures.” This perception is supplemented by
the much publicized US intelligence report on the state of the Georgian army which
states that the selection of cadres depends on “personal relationships” and that infor-
mation is “hierarchical and tightly controlled.”10
Parliamentary & public accountability. A number of institutions have been created
to help improve parliamentary and public accountability. This includes the Civil Council
on Defence and Security, an organization established as a forum for dialogue between
the Ministry of Defence and the NGO sector that has now been reinvigorated after
having been sidelined by Okruashvili during his time in the ministry. Aside from the
Chamber of Control and the parliament (which is responsible for approving the
budget), there is also the parliamentary Trust Group of MPs who have access to clas-
sified details that are considered sensitive.
However, prominent Georgian military experts believe that all of these mechanisms
have failed to work in practice. In a 2007 survey, 80 % of experts and journalists said
that parliamentary control was “insufficient.”11 For example, the parliamentary Trust
Group is legally supposed to include at least one deputy from the parliamentary minor-
ity. In reality, the opposition’s candidate for membership of the Trust Group was re-
jected and there was no opposition representative in this group until the new parlia-
ment was convened in 2008. There are now two opposition representatives on this
8 Personal interview with Irakli Sesiashvili, director of Association “Justice and Liberty,” 13
January 2009.
9 Irakli Sesiashvili, The Transparency of the Ministry of Defense: The Problems and Prospects
(26 April 07), www.ajl.ge/pages.php?lang_id=eng&cat_id=1&news_id=3.
10 New York Times, 18 December 2008.
11 Conducted by Georgia for NATO in 2007.
group but one of them has complained that not a single meeting of the Trust Group
has taken place since the convening of the 2008 parliament,12 a year in which major
combat operations were conducted against Russia. In the case of the Chamber of
Control, reports are currently not released on the Internet and even in comparison to
the basic level of control it exerted before the Rose Revolution, this institution has not
been active in publicizing problems. Indeed, Paata Zakareishvili, an expert on defence
and conflict issues, has called the Chamber of Control “a body that has no function in
this country.... It is totally paralysed.”13 Sometimes, even officials authorized to conduct
oversight are denied access to information and the Public Ombudsman, who is
charged with monitoring the human rights situation within the Georgian armed forces,
has been prevented from visiting military detention facilities to monitor conditions.14
In short, there is widespread dissatisfaction, including from NATO and other inter-
national organisations, with the way institutions that “on paper” are supposed to be
scrutinising the Ministry of Defence are working. Some, such as Georgian military ex-
pert Irakli Sesiashvili, explain that this is due to the fact that the government controls
all these bodies, since it currently possesses a constitutional majority in parliament 15
and can appoint whomever it wishes to head such oversight institutions. Ironically,
before 2004, governments had to coexist with a far less pliant parliament and a largely
oppositional mass media. The split nature of the Georgian elite and the weakness of
the state pre-2004 also fostered a sort of pluralism, where individual officials were
relatively independent and they were better able to perform their regulatory function.
All of the above creates a fertile environment for corruption to thrive. This percep-
tion is supported by the few confirmed high-level corruption cases that have been re-
vealed in recent years. The most important was undoubtedly the allegations against
former defence minister Irakli Okruashvili, who was arrested two days after he publi-
cally accused the president of murder and corruption on live TV. The Chamber of
Control claimed to have evidence that Okruashvili had embezzled 103 million Lari (60
million US dollars), embezzling money earmarked for fuel and building contracts,
amongst other crimes. Yet the report was never released. In the other significant cor-
ruption case, key defence ministry officials closely allied to members of the govern-
ment opposed to Okruashvili were accused of corruption by Okruashvili while he was
12 Reference to Gia Tortladze – Interview with Tea Akubardia, 15 January 2009.

13 Interview with author, 13 January 2009.
14 Ombudsman’s Annual Report 2007.
15 Most of the opposition resigned their seats in protest at what they believed to be a fraudulent
election.
minister.16 It is not credible that these two cases, only revealed as a result of internal
strife in the government, mark the extent of the problem. Rather, it is likely that they
are only the tip of the iceberg.
Lessons Learned
The Georgian case provides a number of useful lessons. First is the value of specific
actions to counter corruption risks associated with frozen conflicts. This includes the
disbanding of non-state paramilitary formations, increasing salaries and discipline
within the armed forces, and focusing on building societal trust in the armed forces.
Second is the importance of state capacity in dealing with corruption. The weak-
ening of the state, partly caused by the existence of frozen conflicts, meant that cor-
ruption flourished in the 1990s in Georgia. Since 2004, however, the Georgian state
has strengthened, leading to a decline in petty corruption. However, the increase in
state capacity has also allowed for greater protection of information, which, without
effective counterbalances, has resulted in a decline in the level of transparency. The
failure to put effective democratic control mechanisms in place to oversee this in-
creased state capacity was a major oversight.
Third is the indivisibility of the defence sector from the rest of the political system in
terms of the fight against corruption and the establishment of democratically account-
able armed forces. Transparency and open discussion constitute the best mechanism
for fighting well-concealed, high level corruption. Thus, states with internal conflicts
cannot be allowed to follow their natural instincts (and perhaps cultural traditions) to
shut their defence institutions behind a wall of secrecy, keeping defence and national
security issues out of bounds for public discussion. For this to change, effort needs to
be directed at both the reinvigoration of civil society and media interest, as well as the
opening up of state institutions to public scrutiny. The inevitable negative impact of cor-
ruption on combat effectiveness can be an important tool for mobilizing public interest.
Fourth is the importance of going beyond surface level reform. Georgia has made
great progress in harmonising the workings of its defence structures with that of NATO,
increasing theoretical accountability (e.g. through the introduction of PPBS), eradicat-
ing low-level corruption, and creating a parliamentary group to monitor the armed
forces. However, this strengthened institutional and legislative base has not been
matched with a similar level of political will. Indeed, over the past several years, the
only times high-level corruption has been pursued is in the context of political conflict
within the government.
16 They were accused of embezzlement of funds meant for the reconstruction of a military
barracks near Tbilisi but were later cleared and moved to the National Security Council to the
dissatisfaction of Mr. Okruashvili who maintained that these officials were guilty and were
being protected by those who wanted to undermine him.
Finally, much of the progress that has been achieved in Georgia regarding anti-cor-
ruption and democratic control of defence institutions has been due to rigorous inter-
national assessment and pressure to meet relevant NATO or European standards.
This kind of honest and intrusive relationship should be continued with regard to both
Georgia and the other states in the region.
Part III
the Corruption Potential in
Defence Establishments
The third part of the compendium looks at the players in integrity building and their
roles. It starts with a chapter on the importance of integrity building. The following
chapters examine the role of regulatory frameworks, the individual, the executive
branch of government (with a focus on the defence ministry), parliaments and audit of-
fices, the ombuds institution, the defence industry, civil society and the media, and in-
ternational organizations. Each chapter presents principles and good practices in
building integrity and reducing corruption risks in defence establishments.
163
Chapter 14
The Importance of Integrity Building
One does not fight corruption by fighting corruption – merely prosecuting an in-
dividual, or declaring another anticorruption campaign, redrafting another anti-
corruption decree, or establishing yet another anticorruption commission. 1
Daniel Kaufmann, Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and
former Director for Global Governance at the World Bank Institute
Building integrity and fighting corruption are two sides of the same coin and both need
to be addressed in any national or sectoral plan. Corruption, or the abuse of entrusted
office for private gain, must be rendered as high risk and low reward. It is the aim of
integrity building to achieve this in a way that does not obstruct the efficiency of gov-
ernments or the private sector.2
Barriers to corruption can be erected through increasing accountability and trans-
parency. Accountability means that holders of public office are responsible to the pub-
lic for their decisions and actions. Holders of public office must submit themselves to
the level of scrutiny appropriate to their office. One means to hold public officials ac-
countable is through transparency and availability of information. Transparency and
accountability allow fewer opportunities for the abuse of public systems. One of the
frequent issues in the defence and security realm is that such transparency is often
lacking.
This chapter examines the importance of integrity building in defence by demon-
strating what integrity means in the defence and security arenas, and shows why
building integrity must be a priority for armed forces. It also gives examples of tools
that can be used to achieve this goal and present how some countries are successfully
using these tools to strengthen integrity in their defence and security ministries and
their armed forces.
1 “Anti Corruption is Signed into Treaty,” WBI Themes (7 January 2004),

http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/95071/merida/index.html.
2 Jeremy Pope, Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System, TI
Source Book 2000 (Berlin: Transparency International, 2000), www.transparency.org/
publications/sourcebook.
165
What is Meant by “Integrity”?

Integrity is a term often used in combination with national security: securing the integ-
rity of the national territory is a purpose explicitly stated in many national constitutions
for their national armed forces. In Latin America, for instance, 11 out of 16 countries
state the purpose of guaranteeing integrity in one form or another in their constitu-
tions.3
Integrity is a value that is often attributed to soldiers. The US Army, for example,
teaches integrity as one of the Seven Core Army Values taught to soldiers in the
Army’s Basic Combat Training: “As your integrity grows, so does the trust others place
in you.”4
Integrity is indeed a crucial value for armed forces around the world, both in its
technical and its moral meaning.
Establishing and maintaining integrity in public institutions encompasses a variety
of elements, which together foster an ethical environment. These elements are:
• Norms of individual and collective behaviour;
• Clearly established and respected codes of conduct;
• Leadership by example;
• Legislation and regulations;
• Effective training and regular reinforcement of that training;
• Assurance and enforcement.
Box 14.1. Definition of Integrity

In a technical sense, integrity is applied to objects to judge the quality of a system. Integrity in
this sense means that a system is fully functional and intact. A system has integrity if it works
as intended and fits seamlessly into the larger system of which it is a part. A defence system,
for example, retains its integrity as long as it is not breached.
In a moral sense, integrity refers to the consistency of actions, values, principles and out-
comes. Integrity in an individual therefore means that the person has values in which they be-
lieve and to which they stand up for. Applied to a work context, an individual has integrity if
they are doing their work honestly, competently and completely. Integrity is usually measured
through surveys and audits.
3 The countries are: Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala,

Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. See: Red de Seguridad y
Defensa de América Latina (Latin America Security and Defence Network, or RESDAL):
Comparative Atlas of Defence in Latin America, 2008 Edition (Buenos Aires, Argentina,
2008).
4 US Army, “Soldier Life,” www.goarmy.com/life/living_the_army_values.jsp.
The Importance of Integrity Building 167
Integrity in the Military

When looking at a ranking of the most trusted sectors of society, it may not seem sur-
prising that the military gets high marks. In the 2006/2007 global corruption survey by
Transparency International,5 the military ranked as the third most trusted group in soci-
ety—when expressed as a global average—only behind religious bodies and non-gov-
ernmental organisations. The military was more trusted than the media, the private
sector, parliament and political parties (see Figure 14.1 and Figure 14.2).
This survey suggests people in most countries trust their armed forces. Under-
standing this is a powerful way in which a country can go about addressing the issue
of integrity building. Surveys like this can be used to help a defence ministry diagnose
the level of confidence in the national defence establishment, and to build momentum
for reform.6
In order to live up to the level of trust placed in them, militaries must constantly
strive to build and maintain integrity. Failure to do so is costly and a waste of scarce
resources, manifested in several ways. It is widely acknowledged that corruption raises
transactions costs and uncertainty in an economy.7 Applied to armed forces this
means that money lost through corruption would have been invested either in better
military equipment, or could have been used in other non-defence expenditures in
more productive outlays. Money diverted from defence spending has an adverse im-
pact on the operational effectiveness of the military forces, and reduces public trust in
and acceptance of the armed forces, both nationally and internationally. Civilian and
military pride in their service to the country is seriously affected when corruption be-
comes apparent, stripping the military of one of its most valuable assets – public trust.8
Nevertheless, despite the favourable average perception of the military, there is
substantial variation between countries. Figure 14.2 presents a graph of the results
from the 2006 and 2007 Global Corruption Barometer as they relate to the military.9
5 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer (2007), www.transparency.org/

policyresearch/surveys _indices/gcb/2007.
6 Dominic Scott and Mark Pyman, “Public Perceptions of Corruption in the Military in Europe
and the Rest of the World,” European Security 17:4 (December 2008), 495–515.
7 See, for example, Paolo Mauro, “Corruption and Growth,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 110:3 (1995), 681–712; and Paolo Mauro, “Corruption and Composition of
Government Expenditure,” Journal of Public Economics 69:2 (1998), 263–79.
8 Mark Pyman, Dominic Scott, Alan Waldron and Inese Voika, “Building Integrity and Reducing
Corruption Risk in Defense Establishments,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal 7:2 (Sum-
mer 2008), 21–44.
9 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer (2007).
Percieved corruption for the world by sector
Religious bodies
NGOs
THE MILITARY
Registry and permit services
Utilities
Education system
Media
Medical services
Customs
Business / private sector
Tax revenue
Legal system / Judiciary
Police
Parliament / Legislature
Political parties
0 1 2 3 4 5
level
Levelof
of percieved corruption
perceived corruption
Figure 14.1. Trust in the Military vis-à-vis Other Sectors of Society.
Tools for Building Integrity

Nations must ensure that the opportunities for corrupt practices are minimised. They
can do this in several ways.
One of the first steps is to analyse the kind of corruption issues that exist in the na-
tional context; these issues will vary substantially from one nation to another. For ex-
ample, corruption around conscription is a major issue in Russia and many other East
European states but would not be relevant to many other nations. After this assess-
ment, appropriate remedial measures and systems and procedures to address those
corruption issues can be put in place. To be successful and sustainable, it is essential
for such procedures to be promoted and forcefully led by the political and military lead-
ership. If the drivers of the reforms are not regarded as having enthusiasm or integrity
themselves, this will seriously damage the commitment of defence officials and the
armed forces.
While the basic concepts and foundations of an integrity system are easily under-
stood, it is equally important that the measures being proposed to strengthen it be
grounded in reality and practicality. The international defence programme at Transpar-
Figure 14.2. Comparisons of Levels of Trust in the Military.
ency International (UK) has been working on twelve practical mechanisms for
strengthening integrity in defence establishments. These twelve mechanisms are listed
in Box 14.2.
Practical tools support nations in determining their corruption risk and in training
their personnel to enable them to tackle existing problems. These tools have been de-
veloped as crucial first steps in addressing corruption challenges in nations and in
building integrity in defence institutions. They provide states with the necessary tools
to assess their own risk, the necessary know-how to address the issue and guidance
on how to tackle the issue.
Many of these tools available to defence ministries, as well as good practice in their
implementation, are described in this compendium.
Conclusion
Strengthening good governance in defence establishments by building integrity as well
as addressing corruption risks directly is a powerful and motivating approach. In the
past, there has been a tendency to see fighting corruption as a matter of law, regula-
tions and effective prosecution. While these are necessary measures to curb corrup-
tion, they are neither sufficient nor encouraging for government officials, armed forces,
or the public. Working on building integrity is more rewarding and motivating. It is also
Box 14.2. Practical Reform Approaches

1. Raising the transparency of the defence policy and defence budgeting
2. Making a sound diagnosis of the corruption and integrity issues
3. Developing a defence integrity and corruption risk action plan
4. Making the subject discussable
5. Engaging civil society
6. Engaging defence contractors
7. Setting clear standards of business conduct for officials and officers
8. Using surveys and metrics to monitor performance
9. Establishing dedicated integrity training modules
10. Using independent monitors on public procurements
11. Raising the transparency of offsets
12. Procurement directorate reforms
Source: Detail can be found in Mark Pyman, Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption Risk in Defence
Establishments. Ten Practical Reforms (London: Transparency International – UK, 2009),
www.defenceagainstcorruption.org/index.php/publications.
more sustainable. Building integrity is also advantageous for the implementing defence
ministry: it leads to an increased level of trust in the armed forces, minimises the po-
tential for violations in procurement and other areas of defence management, and
saves money through fighting inefficiencies. Ultimately, the largest benefits for senior
officers are the positive effects that this has on the quality of military effectiveness and
in raising public trust in the armed forces.
Recommendations
The following approach is recommended to all nations that consider initiatives to build
integrity in defence establishments:
• Make your own diagnosis of corruption risks in defence and security;
• Develop support for tackling this issue across a wide range of stakeholders;
• Consider which package of measures to use – both integrity building and anti-
corruption controls;
• Assemble these in a coherent and widely discussed plan; and
• Implement the plan in a low profile way and sustain it over several years.
The following chapters examine the place and the role of a variety of players in
building integrity and reducing corruption risks in defence establishments. As can be
expected, one of the chapters looks at the defence ministry as the main player within
the executive branch of government. Other chapters examine the role of the individual
person, regulatory frameworks, parliaments and audit offices, the ombudsman institu-
tion, the defence industry, the civil society and the media, and international organiza-
tions. Each chapter presents principles of countering corruption through building integ-
rity, increasing transparency and improving accountability, and provides examples of
good practice in various settings.
Chapter 15
Regulatory Frameworks
There are a number of regulatory and legal mechanisms to tackle corruption at both
the state and international levels. Although such frameworks are not in themselves
solutions to corruption, they are nonetheless a pre-requisite to fighting it. This chapter
outlines both coercive mechanisms, including examples of enforcing such mecha-
nisms, and voluntary guidelines, such as Defence Integrity Pacts, arms control codes
of conduct, etc. “Best practice” in this regard comes from both national and interna-
tional regulations. The final section of the chapter presents examples of regulations
that facilitate transparency and accountability, and thus the enhancement of integrity in
defence.
The first type of these regulations—coercive measures based on law—are not spe-
cific to defence nor should they be: corruption is or has to be made illegal no matter in
what sector of society it takes place, while the penalty has to be commensurate to the
damages incurred from the corrupt activity. Voluntary guidelines, on the other hand,
may account for the specifics of the corporate culture of the defence establishment
and build on the esprit and the honour of military and defence civilians alike. The
regulations to provide transparency and accountability take into account the sensitivi-
ties of some of the information on security and defence, and the specific activities of
the security and defence sectors.
Coercive Measures
Corruption harms societal development, infringes on moral norms and impairs social
cohesion. There seems to be an agreement that certain political, social or commercial
practices are corrupt and in most countries in the world these are considered illegal.
But even though the phenomenon of corruption is widely spread in modern society and
has a long history, the challenge to provide a common definition, equally accepted in
every nation, seems insurmountable. In different frameworks, the international com-
munity has preferred to concentrate on the definition of certain forms of corruption, e.g.
“illicit payments” (UN), “bribery of foreign public officials in international business
transactions” (OECD), or “corruption involving officials of the European Communities
or officials of Member States of the European Union” (EU).1
1 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No.
173, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/173.htm.
172
Regulatory Frameworks 173
Transparency International defines corruption simply as “the misuse of entrusted

power for private benefit.” Although short, this definition contains three essential ele-
ments: first, a misuse of power; second, a power that is entrusted, both in the private
and in the public sectors; and third, the misuse is for private benefit, i.e. not only to the
benefit of the person misusing the power but also to the benefit of members of his or
her immediate family and friends.2
Definitions, used in the discussion in international fora, are also quite broad. Box
15.1 provides the text of the provisional definition used by the Multidisciplinary Group
on Corruption (GMC), established in the framework of the Council of Europe in Sep-
tember 1994, and the rationale for choosing such a broad definition.
Not surprisingly, national definitions of corruption also differ. Box 15.2 presents
definitions and approaches to defining corruption offenses in criminal laws of three
countries.
Box 15.1. A Starting Point for Defining Corruption

The GMC started its work on the basis of the following provisional definition: “Corruption as
dealt with by the Council of Europe's GMC is bribery and any other behaviour in relation to per-
sons entrusted with responsibilities in the public or private sector, which violates their duties
that follow from their status as a public official, private employee, independent agent or other
relationship of that kind and is aimed at obtaining undue advantages of any kind for themselves
or for others.”
The purpose of this definition was to ensure that no matter would be excluded from its work.
While such a definition would not necessarily match the legal definition of corruption in most
member states, particularly not the definition given by the criminal law, its advantage was that it
would not restrict the discussion to excessively narrow confines. As the drafting of the conven-
tion’s text progressed, that general definition translated into several common operational defi-
nitions of corruption which could be transposed into national laws, albeit, in certain cases, with
some amendment to those laws. It is worth underlining, in this respect, that the present con-
vention not only contains a commonly agreed definition of bribery, both from the passive and
active side, which serves as the basis of various forms of criminalisation, but also defines other
forms of corrupt behaviour such as private sector corruption and trading in influence, closely
linked to bribery and commonly understood as specific forms of corruption. Thus, the present
convention has, as one of its main characteristics, a wide scope, which reflects the Council of
Europe’s comprehensive approach to the fight against corruption as a threat to democratic val-
ues, the rule of law, human rights and social and economic progress.
Source: Council of Europe, Explanatory Report, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 173,
Items #24 and #25.
2 Jeremy Pope, Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System (Berlin:
Transparency International, 2000), 1, footnote 2.
Box 15.2. National Legal Definitions of Corruption Offences

France
Offences of corruption are treated by the Criminal Code of France. It distinguishes passive and
active corruption. Passive corruption is defined as “direct or indirect request or acceptance,
without right, of offers, promises, donations, gifts or advantages, when done by a person hold-
ing public authority or discharging a public service mission, or by a person holding a public
electoral mandate.” According to Article 432-11, such an offence is punished by ten years im-
prisonment and a fine of €150,000 where it is committed:
1. To carry out or abstain from carrying out an act relating to his office, duty, or man-
date, or facilitated by his office, duty or mandate; or
2. To abuse his real or alleged influence with a view to obtaining from any public body
or administration any distinction, employment, contract or any other favourable deci-
sion.
Active corruption is defined in Article 433-1 as “direct or indirect proposal, without right, at
any time, of offers, promises, donations, gifts or advantages to obtain from a person holding
public authority or discharging a public service mission or holding a public electoral mandate
that he: carry out or abstain from carrying out an act relating to his office, duty or mandate or
facilitated by his office, duty or mandate; abuse his real or alleged public influence with a view
to obtaining from a public body any distinction, contract….”
Federal Republic of Germany

German criminal law criminalises the acceptance of a benefit or a bribe, as well as the act of
granting a benefit or a bribe. It explicitly refers to military personnel, e.g. Section 333 of the
Criminal Law (Strafgesetzbuch) states that “(1) Whoever offers, promises or grants a benefit to
a public official, a person with specific public service obligations or a soldier in the Federal
Armed Forces, for that person or a third person, for the discharge of a duty.…”
The United States

It is a crime under US law to bribe both domestic and non-US government officials, and to en-
gage in private commercial bribery. Bribery, however, falls under several distinct federal and
state criminal statutes. In general, the prohibited conduct involves paying, offering, attempting
or promising to pay public officials improperly to influence their official acts, or, in the private
context, causing an employee or agent to act in a way contrary to the interests of their em-
ployer. US law also generally recognizes the concept of aiding and abetting a violation and
conspiring to engage in violative conduct as separate criminal offences.
Source: Roger Best and Patricia Barratt, Anti-Corruption Legislation – an International Perspective (Lon-
don: Clifford Chance, 2005).
Actors in Corruption
Criminal law prosecutes offenders, regardless of whether they are on the originating or
on the receiving end of corruption, or facilitate corruption and the distribution of its re-
wards. The Council of Europe’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, for example,
covers both active and passive bribery of domestic and foreign public officials, of na-
tional and foreign parliamentarians and members of international parliamentary as-
semblies, of international civil servants, as well as of domestic, foreign and interna-
tional judges and officials of international courts. In 2003, domestic and foreign arbi-
trators and jurors were added to the list of potential actors in corruption offenses.3
Trading in Influence
The Criminal Law Convention covers both the public and the private sector. In addition
to the more immediate rewards, it requires that criminal law prosecutes trading in influ-
ence. According to Article 12 of the convention, its parties “shall adopt such legislative
and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its
domestic law, when committed intentionally, the promising, giving or offering, directly
or indirectly, of any undue advantage to anyone who asserts or confirms that he or she
is able to exert an improper influence over the decision-making” of the officials defined
above “in consideration thereof, whether the undue advantage is for himself or herself
or for anyone else, as well as the request, receipt or the acceptance of the offer or the
promise of such an advantage, in consideration of that influence, whether or not the
influence is exerted or whether or not the supposed influence leads to the intended re-
sult.”4
Corporate Liability
Companies are also liable according to criminal law in cases where the briber acts for
their account or on their behalf and the bribed person is a public official, irrespective of
whether the undue advantage is actually for himself or for someone else. The corpo-
rate liability does not exclude in any manner criminal proceedings against the individ-
ual involved in corruption.
Sanctions
International conventions require that the sanctions for corruption offenses are effec-
tive, proportionate and dissuasive. That may include penalties involving deprivation of
liberty of natural persons, which can further give rise to extradition.
3 Council of Europe, The Additional Protocol to the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
(Strasbourg, 15 May 2003).
4 Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 173, Article 12.
Sanctions should be seen as fair and have a preventive effect. Box 15.3 identifies a
set of general principles in criminalising corruption.
Box 15.3. General Principles in Criminalising Corruption

The TI Source Book 2000 identifies the following eight principles that have to be followed in cri-
minalising corruption:
1. Laws against corruption should comply with international human rights standards and
afford a fair trial to those accused. It is crucial that criminal laws against corruption
respect human rights guarantees, under a Constitutional Bill of Rights or an interna-
tional code, to ensure specific procedures are not struck down by the courts as being
unconstitutional.
2. Laws should not be seen as being unduly repressive. They should enjoy popular
public support. If not, they risk a lack of enforcement.
3. There should be clear guidelines on sentencing so that sentences are consistent be-
tween one offender and another, and fair, but not outrageously punitive.
4. Combining the various criminal laws dealing with corruption and secret commissions
together in a single law has much merit. It reduces the possibility of loopholes and
can demonstrate the seriousness with which the law treats this form of behaviour by
making it plain that anti-corruption offences apply to the public and private sectors
alike. Whichever course is chosen, the offence of giving and receiving “secret com-
missions” should be provided for.
5. Regular reviews of the criminal law framework (including laws of evidence and of the
adequacy of existing penalties) are essential.… For example, the criminal law should
be able to redress corrupt corporate practices such as “bidding rings” for public con-
tracts, in which apparent competitors collude among themselves to decide who will
get a particular contract and at what price.
6. Special provisions may be necessary in corruption cases which require individuals,
once they are shown to be wealthy beyond the capacity of known sources of income,
to establish the origins of that wealth to the satisfaction of the court.
7. Special provisions will be needed to ensure that the proceeds of corruption can be
recaptured by the state as they will often be in the hands of third parties or even lo-
cated out of the country. The criminal law should provide for the tracing, seizure,
freezing and forfeiture of illicit earnings from corruption.
8. Provisions will also be needed to ensure that the crime of corruption is seen to in-
clude both the payment as well as the receipt of bribes.
Source: Pope, Confronting Corruption (2000), 270–72.

Freezing, Seizure and Confiscation

The sanctions may be monetary or include deprivation of liberty, or both. But the puni-
tive measure alone may not suffice unless the gains from the corrupt activities are re-
covered by the state. Therefore, the legislation shall provide for depriving the individual
from the rewards of the corruption offense.
Law shall enable the confiscation of proceeds of the corruption offence or property,
the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds, as well as property, equip-
ment or other instrumentalities used in or destined for use in corruption offences.5 The
UN Convention Against Corruption further stipulates that if the proceeds “have been
intermingled with property acquired from legitimate sources, such property shall, with-
out prejudice to any powers relating to freezing or seizure, be liable to confiscation up
to the assessed value of the intermingled proceeds.”6 The same applies for income or
other benefits derived from such proceeds or property.
Money Laundering of Proceeds from Corruption Offences
The success of a criminal enterprise, such as corruption, depends on its ability to sani-
tize its ill-gotten gains by moving them through lax or corrupt national financial sys-
tems, or to evade national restrictions through offshore banking, secret financial ha-
vens and the like. Box 15.4 describes the threat of allowing culprits to evade national
legal regulations. The threat of laundering multiplies when it “allows criminals and ter-
rorists to operate freely, using their financial gains to expand their criminal pursuits and
fostering illegal activities such as corruption, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, smug-
gling, and financing of terrorism.”7
Therefore, the laundering of proceeds deriving from corruption offences, including
bribery and trading in influence, shall also be criminalised. The Council of Europe’s
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption refers in that regard to the Convention on
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Products from Crime,8 also
adopted in the framework of the Council of Europe.
5 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(New York: United Nations, 2004), Article 31 (1), http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/
UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.
6 Ibid., Article 31 (5).
7 The World Bank Institute “Governance & Anti-Corruption” Learning Program: Money
Laundering.
8 Council of Europe, Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the
Products from Crime, ETS No. 141 (1990). See also: Council of Europe, Convention on
Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on the
Financing of Terrorism (Warsaw: 16 May 2005), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/
Treaties/HTML/198.htm.
Box 15.4. Evading National Legal Regulations

Offshore banking, secret financial havens, money laundering and corruption steadily corrode
the foundations of the nation-state. Offshore tax havens, spread by new computing and tele-
communications, provide an unprecedented tax shelter, enabling rich citizens and corporations
to escape the national tax system – eroding the tax base, weakening state finance and under-
mining the legitimacy of the tax system in the eyes of ordinary citizens. Offshore havens also
promote money laundering, aiding criminal antisocial activities of all kinds, beyond the detec-
tion of national authorities. Corruption of public officials flourishes under such conditions, fur-
ther eroding the capacity of the state to operate “legally” and to command the loyalty of its or-
dinary citizens.
Source: Global Policy Forum website, “State Sovereignty and Corruption,” www.globalpolicy.org/nations-
a-states/ state-sovereignty-and-corruption.html.
The same applies to accounting offences, including acts or omissions, when com-
mitted intentionally, in order to commit, conceal or disguise corruption offences. Such
account offences may involve the creation or the use of an invoice or any other ac-
counting document or record containing false or incomplete information, as well
unlawful omission to make a record of a payment.
Special Powers
There is wide international agreement that the effective prevention and prosecution of
corruption offenses may require some special powers, such as utilising specialized
authorities, the use of special investigative techniques and the admission of the evi-
dence from the application of such techniques in court proceedings.
The Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention calls for introduction of measures
as necessary to ensure that persons or entities are specialised in the fight against cor-
ruption through law enforcement (Article 20). These persons or entities shall have the
necessary independence in accordance with the fundamental principles of the coun-
try’s legal system in order to be able to carry out their functions effectively and free
from any undue pressure. It has to be assured also that the staff of such entities has
adequate training and financial resources in line with the tasks assigned.
It should be further noted that the independence of specialised authorities for the
fight against corruption cannot be absolute. Their activities should be integrated and
coordinated to the maximum extent possible with more traditional law enforcement
work. They are independent only as much as is necessary to properly perform their
functions.9
9 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 173,
item 99.
South Africa’s jurisdiction on such specialised authorities is presented in Box 15.5.
Box 15.5. Statute of a Special Investigating Unit

In conditions specified by law, the president of South Africa may establish a Special Investi-
gating Unit in order to investigate matters of corruption, to refer such matters to an existing
Special Investigating Unit for investigation, and to establish one or more Special Tribunals to
adjudicate upon justifiable civil disputes emanating from any investigation of any particular
Special Investigating Unit (SIU).
The SIU jurisdiction is to investigate alleged cases of:
a) Serious maladministration in connection with the affairs of any state institution;
b) Improper or unlawful conduct by employees of any state institution;
c) Unlawful appropriation or expenditure of public money or property;
d) Unlawful, irregular or unapproved acquisitive act, transaction, measure or practice
having a bearing upon state property;
e) Intentional or negligent loss of public money or damage to public property;
f) Corruption offences committed in connection with the affairs of any state institution;
or
g) Unlawful or improper conduct by any person which has caused or may cause serious
harm to the interests of the public or any category thereof.
The functions of a Special Investigating Unit are:
a) To investigate all allegations regarding the matter concerned;
b) To collect evidence regarding acts or omissions which are relevant to its investigation
and, if applicable, to institute proceedings in a Special Tribunal against the parties
concerned;
c) To present evidence in proceedings brought before a Special Tribunal;
d) To refer evidence regarding or which points to the commission of an offence to the
relevant prosecuting authority;
e) To perform such functions which are not in conflict with the provisions of this act, as
the president may from time to time request;
f) From time-to-time, as directed by the president, to report on the progress made in
the investigation and matters brought before the Special Tribunal concerned;
g) Upon the conclusion of the investigation, to submit a final report to the president; and
h) To at least twice a year submit a report to parliament on the investigations by and the
activities, composition and expenditure of such a unit.
Source: Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act No. 74 of 1996, Government Gazette 26311
(South Africa: 28 April 2004), www.siu.org.za/legislation/act2005.pdf.
Article 50 of the UN Convention Against Corruption calls for authorising the use of
special investigative techniques, as well as to admit the evidence from the application
of such techniques in court proceedings (see Box 15.6 for details). The area of de-
fence is not excluded from the use of special powers and techniques.
Box 15.6. Special Investigative Techniques

In order to combat corruption effectively, a country—to the extent permitted by the basic princi-
ples of its legal system and in accordance with the conditions prescribed by law—shall take
such measures as may be necessary to allow for the appropriate use by its competent authori-
ties of controlled delivery and, where appropriate, other special investigative techniques, such
as electronic or other forms of surveillance and undercover operations, within its territory, and
to allow for the admissibility in court of evidence derived therefrom.
States Parties to the Convention are encouraged to conclude, when necessary, appropriate
bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements for using such special investigative tech-
niques in the context of cooperation at the international level.
In the absence of such an agreement or arrangement, decisions to use such special investi-
gative techniques at the international level shall be made on a case-by-case basis and may,
when necessary, take into consideration financial arrangements and understandings with re-
spect to the exercise of jurisdiction by the States Parties concerned.
Decisions to use controlled delivery at the international level may, with the consent of the
States Parties concerned, include methods such as intercepting and allowing the goods or
funds to continue intact or be removed or replaced in whole or in part.
Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention Against Corruption (New
York: United Nations, 2004), Article 50, 41.
Protection of Witnesses, Experts, Victims and Reporting Persons

In order to fight corruption effectively, countries need to introduce an appropriate sys-
tem of protection for witnesses and other persons cooperating with the judicial authori-
ties. That includes appropriate legal frameworks, as well as financial resources. More-
over, “provisions should be made for the granting of immunity or the adequate reduc-
tion of penalties in respect of persons charged with corruption offences who contribute
to the investigation, disclosure or prevention of crime.”10
The level of protection should be “effective” and “appropriate” vis-à-vis the risks
that exist for collaborators of justice, witnesses or whistleblowers. In some cases it
10 Conclusions and Recommendations of the 2nd European Conference of Specialised Ser-

vices in the Fight Against Corruption (Tallinn, October 1997), as quoted in Council of Europe,
Explanatory Report, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 173, item 108.
could be sufficient, for instance, to maintain their name undisclosed during the pro-
ceedings, in other cases they would need bodyguards, in extreme cases more far-
reaching witness protection measures such as change of identity, work, domicile, etc.
might be necessary.11
Countries are expected to incorporate into their domestic legal systems appropriate
measures to provide protection against any unjustified treatment for any person who
reports in good faith and on reasonable grounds to the competent authorities any facts
concerning corruption offences.12
The US extends that concept to persons involved in the corruption offence, en-
couraging them to come forward and offer evidence. The first person “involved in a
Securities And Exchange Commission offence who ‘blows the whistle’ is granted
automatic immunity.”13 A simple measure like this can break the silence over an other-
wise seen as mutually beneficial and highly secretive act.
International Cooperation in Enforcing Anti-corruption Legislation
The international community has invested considerable efforts in devising and imple-
menting a body of legal regulations and requirements aimed to curb corruption. The
enforcement of the respective body of legislation, which is predominantly national, re-
quires extensive international cooperation. Towards this purpose, the UN Convention
Against Corruption, for example, thoroughly treats the issues of extradition, transfer of
sentenced persons, mutual legal assistance, transfer of criminal proceedings, law en-
forcement cooperation and the conduct of joint investigations.
Other conventions, such as the Criminal Law Convention of the Council of Europe,
elaborate the further organizational and information exchange aspects of international
cooperation in the fight against corruption. The intention is to provide means and
channels of international cooperation, where procedural and sometimes political ob-
stacles delay or prevent the prosecution of the offenders in cross-border cases of cor-
ruption.
International conventions also introduce monitoring mechanisms and usually envi-
sion programmes for assisting individual countries in combating corruption.
International criminal anti-corruption regulations often include provisions aimed to
facilitate both the preventive and the punitive effects, such as provisions for access to
information. These aspects will be treated later in the chapter, following the examina-
tion of civil law and administrative measures against corruption.
11 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No.
173, item 113.
12 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(New York: United Nations, 2004), Article 33.
13 Pope, Confronting Corruption (2000), 273.
Finally, Article 61 of the UN Convention Against Corruption envisions international

exchange of information and best practice. It requires participating to “consider devel-
oping and sharing with each other and through international and regional organizations
statistics, analytical expertise concerning corruption and information with a view to de-
veloping, insofar as possible, common definitions, standards and methodologies, as
well as information on best practices to prevent and combat corruption.”
Civil Law
Civil law enables persons who have suffered damage as a result of corruption to de-
fend their rights and interests or may empower citizens to enforce anti-corruption laws
where public authorities fail to do so. The reasons to go beyond criminal law in perse-
cuting corruption offences are summarised in Box 15.7.
The Civil Law Convention on Corruption of the Council of Europe in Article 2 de-
fines corruption as “requesting, offering, giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a
bribe or any other undue advantage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper
performance of any duty or behaviour required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue
advantage or the prospect thereof.”
Box 15.7. Criminal Law does not Suffice to Counter Corruption Offences
The first line of attack in combating corruption is the criminal justice system and a successful
prosecution is certainly first prize. It not only leaves society with a sense of vindication but is
also a strong deterrent against would-be perpetrators. Practice has shown, however, that the
criminal justice system alone does not contain sufficient weaponry to ensure victory over the
perpetrators of corruption. Corruption is normally committed in a clandestine manner to ensure
that it is as difficult as possible to discover. Even if it is discovered, complex schemes are used
to unsure that it is difficult to prove.
The result is that it is often extremely difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to secure a con-
viction. This problem is compounded by the scarcity of eyewitnesses, the need to rely on ad-
missible documentary evidence, the shortage of skilled prosecutors in this field and the burden
of having to prove your case beyond a reasonable doubt. The confidence of society is often
decreased further because courts often do not impose very serious sentences for economic
crime, despite legislation that prescribes a 15 year sentence for economic crime involving more
than R500 000. Finally, perpetrators are often released from prison long before they have
served the sentences imposed by the courts. The result is that the public is left with the per-
ception that the bad guys outgun the authorities and that crime pays. Thus it became clear that
society needs more weapons in its arsenal to fight corruption.
Source: Willie Hofmeyr, The Use of Civil Law in Combating Corruption, Head of Special Investigating Unit,
South Africa, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/Hofmeyr.pdf.
International conventions treat comprehensively the use of civil law remedies

against any form of corruption, addressing topics such as:
• Determination of the main potential victims of corrupt behaviours;
• Problems of evidence and of proof of the causal link between acts and dam-
age;
• The fiscal aspects of illicit payments and their relation to the distortion of
competition;
• Validity of contracts;
• Role of auditors;
• Protection of employees;
• Procedures, including litigation costs, and international cooperation.14
A key difference with the application of civil law comes with the reversal of the bur-
den of proof and requesting the provision of “credible evidence.” For example, when a
person in a position of trust has accumulated considerable wealth that could not have
come from his or her official salary, the investigating agency makes a formal request
and then it is up to the person to provide an explanation. When the individual fails to
give a likely explanation, the matter may go to a court hearing.15
The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, for instance, expresses this
concept in the following terms:
Subject to its Constitution and the fundamental principles of its legal system, each State
Party that has not yet done so shall take the necessary measures to establish under its
laws as an offense a significant increase in the assets of a government official that he
cannot reasonably explain in relation to his lawful earnings during the performance of
his functions.16
One potentially powerful approach, known as “Qui tam,” is ingrained in US legisla-

tion and may be worthy of consideration by others. It is briefly presented in Box 15.8.
14 For details, the reader may refer to Council of Europe, Explanatory Report, Civil Law
Convention on Corruption, ETS No. 174, http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/
174.htm.
16 Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, adopted by the Organization of American
States (March 1996), Article IX, www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html.
Box 15.8. Qui tam, or “who brings the action for the king also does so for himself”
The roots of this approach lie in mediaeval England as early as 1424, where someone who un-
covered evidence of illegal conduct was rewarded with a share of the penalties paid by the
wrongdoer. Early in its own life, the US Congress imported the notion into almost all of the first
14 American statutes which imposed penalties. The present-day US False Claims Act had its
origins in the American Civil War, where the large-scale fraud of government contractors
cheated the Union out of resources it could ill afford to lose. Congress and the president
sought to enlist the support of private individuals in the struggle to root out fraud and swell the
state’s coffers.
Quite simply, the government had neither the time nor the resources to address the issue
effectively and by empowering members of the public to act in its name (and share in the pro-
ceeds recovered), they increased the risk factor, unlocked private enthusiasm and, ultimately,
recovered billions of dollars which would otherwise have been lost to the state. This would
seem to be an attractive position for governments who find themselves in the same position to-
day.
The approach has been strengthened over the years and in 1986 Congress described it as
the government’s “primary litigative tool for combating fraud.” Similar provisions also apply in
other federal statutes, such as the area of patent infringement.
The US False Claims Act creates a civil liability where false transactions have taken place
(which capture deliberate ignorance and reckless disregard of truth or falsity as well as actual
knowledge), and there is no requirement of a specific intent to defraud. As the court actions are
civil in nature—not criminal—the facts do not have to be established “beyond reasonable
doubt” but to the slightly lower standard applicable in civil cases.
Defendants face a minimum penalty of $5000 for every separate false claim, plus three
times the amount of damage caused to the government by the defendant’s acts.
“Qui tam” actions can be started by individuals (they do not have to wait for the government
to take action) and there are protections for whistleblowers to safeguard them against reprisals.
The government is served with copies of the proceedings and has 60 days in which to decide
whether the Department of Justice will intervene and take over primary responsibility for con-
ducting the action. Even where it does, the original claimant has a right to remain as a party to
the action, so it cannot be settled without the originator being heard on the issue. At the end of
the day, a successful private claimant receives either 10 percent of the sum recovered (where
the government takes the action over), or 25 percent (where it has not).
There are safeguards against frivolous claims. The government can intervene and settle the
claim, or else can ask the court to strike it out. The court can also restrict the originator’s part in
the litigation where unrestricted participation would be for the purposes of harassment. And
where the claim fails because the claim was frivolous or vexatious, the court may award rea-
sonable legal fees and expenses against the claimant. Some claimants have received million
dollar awards and the resulting publicity may encourage others to come forward.
Source: Pope, Confronting Corruption (2000), 280–81.

Voluntary Guidelines
Codes of Conduct for Public Officials
Voluntary guidelines have an impact on individual and corporate behaviour that com-
plements the preventive power of potential coercive measures against corruption of-
fences established by law. In the area of defence, such guidelines, most often in the
form of “codes of ethics” or “codes of conduct,” build on the specific corporate culture
of the military and other defence personnel. The overwhelming majority of people in
defence take pride in serving the nation and its people and strongly resent any act that
puts a stain on the establishment. In such an environment, voluntary regulations of
both individual and organisational behaviour can make a real change.
The main requirements to the conduct of individuals in public service are outlined in
Article 8 of the UN Convention Against Corruption. Furthermore, both the United Na-
tions and the Council of Europe have adopted model codes of conduct for public offi-
cials. These codes identify general principles of integrity for public officials and ad-
dress specific issues such as conflicts of interest, the misuse of confidential informa-
tion and the acceptance of gifts and hospitality.
The International Code of Conduct for Public Officials assumes a public office is a
position of trust and hence the ultimate loyalty of public officials shall be to the public
interests of their country as expressed through its democratic institutions.17 It further
stipulates that public officials shall perform their duties and functions efficiently, effec-
tively and with integrity, and shall at all times seek to ensure that public resources for
which they are responsible are administered in the most effective and efficient manner.
Conflict of Interest. A public official should not allow his or her private interest to
conflict with his or her public position. The public official’s private interest includes any
advantage to himself or herself, to his or her family, close relatives, friends and per-
sons or organisations with whom he or she has or has had business or political rela-
tions. It is his or her responsibility to avoid such conflicts of interest, whether real, po-
tential or apparent. The public official should never take undue advantage of his or her
position for his or her private interest both during office and after leaving their official
positions.18
Disclosure of Assets. According to their position and as permitted or required by
law and administrative policies, public officials shall comply with requirements to de-
17 International Code of Conduct for Public Officials, adopted by the UN General Assembly in
resolution 51/59 (12 December 1996), www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r059.htm.
18 Ibid. See also: Council of Europe, Codes of Conduct for Public Officials, Recommendation
Rec(2000)10 and explanatory memorandum (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing,
January 2001).
clare or to disclose personal assets and liabilities, as well as those of their spouses
and/or dependants, if possible.
Acceptance of Gifts or Other Favours. Public officials should not solicit or receive
directly or indirectly any gift or other favour that may influence the exercise of their
functions, the performance of their duties or their judgement. Usually, officials are al-
lowed to receive some symbolic gifts, when the monetary value of such token gifts
combined, per year, is under a certain threshold.
Confidential Information. The public official has a duty to treat appropriately, with all
necessary confidentiality, all information and documents acquired by him or her in the
course of, or as a result of, his or her employment. Such restrictions also apply after
leaving public office. Confidentiality can be broken only when national legislation, the
performance of duty or the needs of justice strictly require otherwise.
In addition, codes of conduct of public officials often include, inter alia, clauses de-
fining:
• Conditions under which they need to report to the competent authorities ac-
tual, intended, or requested breaches of the code, the law and administrative
procedures;
• Requirements for regular declaration of interests;
• Requirements not to engage in any activity or transaction or acquire any posi-
tion or function, whether paid or unpaid, that is incompatible with or detracts
from the proper performance of his or her duties;
• Rules on how to react to improper offers; and/or
• A requirement not to give preferential treatment or privileged access to the
public service to former public officials.19
Observance of the code. Such codes of conduct are issued under the authority of
the respective minister or the head of the public service. The public official has a duty
to conduct himself or herself in accordance with this code and therefore to keep him-
self or herself informed of its provisions and any amendments. He or she should seek
advice from an appropriate source when unsure of how to proceed. The provisions of
the code form part of the terms of employment of the public official. Breach of them
may result in disciplinary action. The public official who negotiates terms of employ-
ment should include in them a provision to the effect that this code is to be observed
and forms part of the employment contract. Subsequently, the official who supervises
or manages other public officials has the responsibility to see that they observe the
code and to take or propose appropriate disciplinary action for breaches of it.
19 For details on these and other clauses see Codes of Conduct for Public Officials.
And finally, the public administration regularly reviews the provisions of the code of
conduct and amends it as appropriate.20
Codes of Conduct in the Private Sector
Just like in the public sector, companies also have codes of conducts that treat corrupt
behaviour of their employees among other unacceptable conduct. Chapter 20 provides
examples of codes of conduct of major defence suppliers.
On the international stage, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment gave momentum to the inclusion of corruption and its cross-border manifesta-
tions with the 1999 Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions.21 The stipulations of the convention are fully applicable
to arms trade.
Bribery and conflict of interest are among the most commonly addressed behav-
iours in codes of conduct. Academic analysis even concludes that the presence or ab-
sence of a bribery policy is a key indicator of the overall ethicalness of a company.22
On the other hand, empirical research leads to the conclusion that various types of
corporate behaviour are generally unaffected by international codes and more closely
affected by other factors. Nevertheless, research establishes that codes of conduct
may have a positive impact. For example, corruption is not directly decreased by
codes but codes open a more formal and constructive dialogue and thus contrast posi-
tively.23
In combination with government regulation and codes of conduct of professional
associations, corporate codes of conduct are suggested as effective ways of imple-
menting industry wide change in conflict of interest and bribery policy.24
There are a number of defence-related professional associations with codes of
ethics. In the US, for example, most of the major defence contractors belong to the
Defense Industry Initiative (see Box 20.1). In Europe, similar activities are conducted in
the framework of the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD),
20 Ibid., 14, Article 28.

21 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating Brib-
ery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions (February 1999), www.oecd.org/
document/21/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2017813 _1_1_1_1,00.html.
22 Bert Scholtens and Lammertjan Dam, “Cultural Values and International Differences in
Business Ethics,” Journal of Business Ethics 75:3 (2007): 273–84, as quoted in A. Scott
Carson, Mark Baetz, Shelley McGill, Codes of Conduct in the Private Sector (Toronto:
EthicsCentre CA, April 2008), 16, www.ethicscentre.ca/EN/resources/ethicscentre_codes_
april08.pdf.
23 Carson, Baetz and McGill, Codes of Conduct (2008), 13.
24 Ibid., 19.
and they resulted in “Common Industry Standards for European Aerospace and De-
fence.” Box 20.2 provides a brief description of the ASD ethics and anti-corruption ac-
tivities.
Integrity Pacts
Transparency International came forward with an innovative form of integrity building
and promoting proper conduct on the side of both public officials and defence suppli-
ers. The so-called “Defence Integrity Pacts” are designated to curb corruption in de-
fence contracting. The idea, briefly presented in Box 15.9, has been implemented in
Poland. Other NATO and partner countries are making the first steps in introducing
Defence Integrity Pacts. The Ministry of Defence of Bulgaria, for one, considers mak-
ing such pacts obligatory for high value defence procurements.
As in the examination of corruption risks and codes of conduct of public officials
and defence suppliers, such voluntary frameworks are strengthened by governmental
regulations. Box 7.7 provides an example of US federal regulations, requiring that
defence contractors have ethics programmes and subjecting contractors to suspension
Box 15.9. Defence Integrity Pacts

Integrity Pacts are tools developed by Transparency International to tackle corruption in public
contracting. These have since been developed for application to defence procurement.
A Defence Integrity Pact usually contains three main features:
• A short contract in which all bidders and the procuring organisation agree to certain
specified no-bribery pledges and the bidders agree to enhanced disclosure rules. Bid-
ders also agree to sanctions, including withdrawal from the tender, in the event they are
found in violation of the agreed pledges.
• An Independent Monitor who ensures that all the parties abide by their commitments un-
der the pact. This usually includes the use of an independent technical expert who re-
views the tender documents for undue or corrupt influence and who is available to bid-
ders in case of concern or complaint.
• More public transparency of documents and processes. This also allows greater scope
for input from the public and civil society, and enhances confidence in the process
through increased transparency.
A sample Defence Integrity Pact is available on Transparency International’s Defence Against
Corruption website, at: www.defenceagainstcorruption.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=
doc_download&gid=37.
Source: Mark Pyman, Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption Risk in Defence Establishments: Ten Prac-
tical Reforms (London: Transparency International – UK, April 2009), 36.
and debarment from government contracting for failing to abide by such program-
mes.25
The cross-border application of this principle, i.e. introducing internationally valid
debarment 26 for corruption offenses, might turn into an even more powerful instrument
in curbing corruption related to the procurement of defence products and services.
Access to Information, Transparency and Governance
Most of the regulations discussed so far could not be effectively enforced unless the
activities of public officials are transparent and the government is accountable to the
people. The UN Convention Against Corruption sets explicit requirements for transpar-
ency and accountability (Article 10). It requests that countries take such measures as
may be necessary to enhance transparency in their public administration. Among the
measures prescribed by the UN convention in order to enhance transparency and ac-
countability are:
• Adopting procedures or regulations allowing members of the general public to
obtain, where appropriate, information on the organization, functioning and
decision-making processes of its public administration and, with due regard
for the protection of privacy and personal data, on decisions and legal acts
that concern members of the public;
• Simplifying administrative procedures, where appropriate, in order to facilitate
public access to the competent decision-making authorities; and
• Publishing information, which may include periodic reports on the risks of cor-
ruption in its public administration.
A relatively simple measure with a solid preventive effect is to make publically
available the information on the assets of public officials once they come into office
and to update that information on a regular basis.
Transparency may be considerably enhanced by introduction of a law on the free-
dom of information. Thus, by law, members of society will have guaranteed access to
information. National experience in that regard differs. Some laws limit access by ap-
plying only to information related to public functions or information of public impor-
tance, or by requiring requesters to give reasons why he or she needs the information.
As a rule, however, access to information should apply to “all information held, re-
25 In this particular case, for knowingly failing to disclose violations of the False Claims Act in
connection with the award or performance of government contracts and subcontracts and
failing to disclose receipt of overpayments on government contracts in a timely manner.
26 Just like debarment of a company by one US department bars it from getting contracts from
any federal department.
gardless of form, source, date of creation, official status, whether it was created by the
body that holds it, and whether it is classified.”27
In terms of ways of facilitating access, a freedom of information law should meet
several international standards providing for:
• The right to make oral requests;
• An obligation for public bodies to appoint information officers to assist re-
questers;
• An obligation to provide information as soon as possible and, in any case,
within a set time limit;
• The right to specify the form of access preferred, such as inspection of the
document requested, an electronic copy, or a photocopy; and
• The right to written notice, with reasons, for any refusal of access.28
Recent work by the World Bank calls for promoting the access to information and
transparency in the judicial branch, making it more democratic and open to citizens.
That issue has two dimensions – providing access to information and transparency re-
garding the administrative functioning of the judiciary, as well as its jurisdictional func-
tions. The first dimension covers budget issues, assets and income disclosure state-
ments, and court statistics, transparency and citizen participation in the process to ap-
point judges, while the second treats the publication of court sentences, access to
case files in corruption cases and disciplinary procedures of judicial officials.29
Good governance is the basis of the strategic approach to reducing defence cor-
ruption risks, adopted in this compendium. Much in that regard can be accomplished
administratively and without any need to reform the law at all. That includes measures
to abolish unnecessary licences, streamline procedures, limit areas of discretion (and
defining criteria where they are necessary), creating avenues for citizens to complain
effectively, and many others.30
Both part II and part III of the compendium provide examples in enhancing good
governance in defence, and the impact respective practices have on curbing defence
corruption.
27 Toby Mendel, “Legislation on Freedom of Information: Trends and Standards,” PREMNotes,

No. 93 (World Bank, October 2004), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/
premnote93.pdf.
28 Ibid., 2.
29 Alvaro Herrero and Gaspar Lopez, Access to Information and Transparency in the Judiciary,
WBI Working Paper (Buenos Aires, Asociación por los Derechos Civiles, April 2009),
http://go.worldbank.org/IIB514XG10.
In that respect, the 1993 US Government Performance and Results Act provides
an example of a comprehensive framework for limiting waste and inefficiency of gov-
ernment, addressing adequately vital public needs and maintaining public confidence.
The act is intended to:
1) Improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the Fed-
eral Government by systematically holding federal agencies accountable for
achieving program results;
2) Initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot projects in setting
program goals, measuring program performance against those goals and re-
porting publicly on their progress;
3) Improve federal program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting
a new focus on results, service quality and customer satisfaction;
4) Help federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that they plan
for meeting program objectives and by providing them with information about
program results and service quality;
5) Improve congressional decision making by providing more objective informa-
tion on achieving statutory objectives, and on the relative effectiveness and
efficiency of federal programs and spending; and
6) Improve internal management of the federal government.31
In sum, the act requires introduction in all governmental agencies of strategic plan-
ning, annual performance plans and reports, and performance budgeting, while pro-
viding for managerial accountability and flexibility. Box 15.10 presents an example of
educational support to the implementation of the US Government Performance and
Results Act throughout the defence establishment.
Conclusion: On the Importance of Legal Regulations
It is beyond doubt that the efforts to curb corruption in defence, as in most sectors
of public activity, have to be based on an adequate legal framework. That framework
should provide for prevention of corruption, prosecution of offenders and confiscation
of the rewards from corruption offences, while protecting victims, witnesses and whis-
tleblowers. The enforcement of such coercive mechanisms requires a level of access
to information and international cooperation, adequate to the realities of the globalised
world.
31 The White House, Office of Management and Budget, Government Performance Results Act
of 1993, www.whitehouse.gov/omb/mgmt-gpra_gplaw2m.
Box 15.10. Educational Support to Performance Management

The Information Resource Management College—part of the US National Defense University in
Washington—provides education to mid-career and senior defence officials, both military and ci-
vilian, in performance management and related disciplines.
The Advanced Management Program is a 14-week resident graduate program. Three of its
core courses directly support the increase of performance in defence:
• The course “Policy Foundations of Information Resources Management” presents public
sector resource management concepts, policies and policy constituencies, focusing on
the application of these concepts and policies as mechanisms of modern governance. It
focuses on the application and interaction of financial, information and human resources
to achieve legislative and policy goals and accomplish agency missions.
• The course “Measuring Results of Organizational Performance” provides strategies and
techniques for assessing an organization’s performance results as part of strategic
planning or budgeting processes. It leverages lessons learned from inter-agency ex-
perience concerning approaches and resources required to establish and validate per-
formance measurement instrumentation, collect and organize performance data, and
analyze and report results.
• The course “Strategies for Process Improvement” focuses on strategies, methods and
resources for improving, managing and controlling processes within and across federal
agencies.
Source: National Defense University, Information Resources Management College website, “Advanced Man-
agement Program (AMP),” www.ndu.edu/irmc/pcs/pcs_amp.html.
In the review of criminal and civil anti-corruption legislation we need to recognise

the interconnections between different strategies. For example, removing the controls
on press freedom will be of little consequence if reporters do not have adequate ac-
cess to government data. Likewise, efforts to enhance anti-corruption laws would not
bring expected results if law enforcement is weak and corrupt.
When legislation is enforced effectively, regular reviews and updates will allow for
changing corrupt practices and evolving technological means to exchange benefits
and launder money. On the other hand, when legislation is fairly good but the en-
forcement is weak, we should not concentrate excessively on the legal framework but
focus instead on improving the institutional mechanisms and drawing civil society and
the private sector into the integrity building reform.
Voluntary guidelines, streamlined administrative procedures, increase of transpar-
ency and enhancement of management mechanisms, parliamentarian oversight and
societal involvement—treated in the remaining chapters of this compendium—contrib-
ute to the institutional capacity to counter defence corruption.
Chapter 16
The Human in the Loop
Whatever the legislative and organisational framework, it is people who make up the
defence establishment. The fundamental objective, therefore, of anti-corruption efforts
in defence is to influence human behaviour: to promote professional and ethical be-
haviour and discourage the use of public office for private gain. Chapter two set out
two approaches to doing that. The first dissuades corrupt action by increasing the
moral cost or “moral burden” of corruption. The second aims to deter corruption by in-
creasing the perceived risks, through a combination of increasing the probability of
detection and increasing the probability of punishment. Three specific tools were intro-
duced to help achieve these goals: building integrity, increasing transparency and im-
proving accountability.
This chapter will expand on these approaches and tools. In considering how best to
understand and influence the actions of particular individuals, it will consider the driv-
ers of behaviour as well as the broader organisational contexts in which those drivers
exert their influence. It will also consider how organisations can best reinforce positive
ethical and professional behaviours, as well as discourage unethical behaviour. Fi-
nally, it will consider how to help shape the organisational environment in which indi-
viduals make ethical decisions.
Drivers of Human Behaviour
Behaviour encompasses all human actions or, in scientific terms “the combination of
observable and describable responses of an agent to internal and external stimuli.”
Ethical actions are a subset of overall behaviour. Behaviour can be conscious or sub-
conscious, overt or covert, voluntary or involuntary, and include any externally visible
action that a person can take like talking, moving and expressing emotion. Behaviour
is conditioned both by internal drivers (within the person) and by the environment. In-
ternal drivers include heredity, knowledge, personality, attitude, values, abilities and
needs. Environmental drivers include social drivers (derived from other people), physi-
cal drivers (climate, topography, infrastructure, objects) and events.
Specific behaviours are humans’ effort to influence our environment to meet our
needs. These needs are manifested in our consciousness as desires but described
scientifically in both their conscious and unconscious forms as “drivers.” The conse-
quences, both intentional and unintentional, of behaviours create feedback, either di-
rectly, through our perception that a need was (or was not) met, or through social cues
– the messages we receive from other people. That feedback then becomes an exter-
nal driver influencing subsequent behaviour. Feedback is reinforced through consis-
tency and can be internalized, for example through the adoption of societal norms.
193
Behaviours often have unintended positive or negative consequences, which can

be in relation to the need targeted, as well as tangential or completely separate areas.
Perceiving feedback in these latter circumstances may be difficult, since the logical
connection between the behaviour and the feedback may not be so obvious. For ex-
ample, on receiving a prestigious award, a person may accurately perceive that it was
the result of many hours of voluntary after-hours work. Yet the same person may not
perceive that co-workers resent the award and fear the expectation that they, too,
should put in unpaid overtime.
All needs are not created equal. In the mid-twentieth century, psychologist Abra-
ham Maslow noted that certain needs, when unmet, are more powerful drivers of be-
haviour than others. When humans are thirsty, we look for water before we search for
food; when hungry, the search for food overshadows concerns about job satisfaction;
when feeling insecure (physically, emotionally, financially) we find it difficult to focus on
realizing our full human potential through “self-actualisation.” Maslow suggested a five-
layer “hierarchy of needs” in which it was essential to meet the needs of each lower
layer before proceeding to higher ones.1 Once lower order needs are met, however,
they lose relevance as drivers of behaviour and the person increasingly looks to meet
higher order needs. Maslow’s hierarchy is still widely used today and is worth a closer
look (see Figure 16.1 for a graphical representation). The hierarchy includes the
following elements:
Physiological
The need for oxygen, food, water and a relatively constant body temperature are the
most compelling. This layer also includes the need to be active, to rest, to sleep, to
eliminate wastes, to avoid pain and to have sex. If deprived of these needs, they take
first place in a person’s search for satisfaction.
Safety/Security
When immediate physiological needs are satisfied and no longer drive behaviour, the
need for safety and security awakens. This includes protection of our physical bodies
and our health, as well as the resources that we rely on to meet our physical needs
into the future. These can include material resources like money and property, social
resources like family and employment, or even a more general desire for structure, or-
der and limits.
Love/Belonging
When the need for physiological well-being and safety/security are satisfied, people
become more aware of feelings of loneliness and alienation. These are manifestations
1 First set out in Maslow’s paper “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50:4
(July 1943): 370–396.
The Human in the Loop 195
Figure 16.1: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.2
of a need for love, affection and belongingness (in the same way that hunger is a
manifestation of the need for food) and are met by friendship, sweethearts, affection-
ate relationships and the sense of community. It involves expressing feelings for oth-
ers, receiving their feelings for us and having a sense of belonging.
Esteem
When needs identified in the first three layers are satisfied, people focus on their de-
sire to feel respected and valuable. Maslow identified two forms of this need. The first
form is satisfied by expressions of respect from others, leading to feeling of status,
recognition, appreciation, attention, reputation, dignity and even dominance (validated
by others’ submission). Maslow considered this to be a lower form of meeting the need
for esteem because it is dependent on the actions of others. The second form is self-
respect, including feelings like confidence, competence, achievement and self-reli-
ance. Maslow considered this the higher form because it is less dependent on actions
by other people.
Self-Actualisation
When all lower needs are satisfied, people focus on their need for “self-actualisation” –
that is, the desire to express their unique abilities and role as an individual: “A musi-
2
Janet A. Simons, Donald B. Irwin and Beverly A. Drinnien, Psychology – The Search for Un-
derstanding (New York: West Publishing Company, 1987).
cian must make music, an artist must paint, and a poet must write.” The responses
needed to meet these needs include creativity, self-awareness, ethics and seeking
knowledge. In practice, the application of these responses is highly individualistic, in
contrast to the clear and fairly universal responses needed to meet needs in the lower
four levels.
Understanding the basic dynamics of human behaviour—drivers, behaviour, con-
sequences and feedback—is important to effective management and leadership.
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs provides a valuable additional tool to differentiate be-
tween and understand the various needs that drive workplace behaviour. It can also
help in the design and targeting of anti-corruption efforts. For example, traditional de-
terrence efforts act at the level of security by threatening loss of pay, position, or free-
dom for those caught in corrupt activity. But these risks may have a reduced deterrent
value for those individuals who today feel secure; with their attention focused on higher
levels of needs—like relationships or esteem—they may be poorly attuned to risks at
the level of security (until they become immanent). For such individuals, deterrents that
put at risk relationships or reputation might prove more effective. The same can be
said about efforts to build integrity, which in its pure “Kantian” form is most relevant to
only that small portion of the population that is focused on moral self-actualisation. In
sum, both deterrents and rewards should be designed to appeal to a wide cross-sec-
tion of needs.
The Organisational Context
Before looking in more detail at promoting ethical behaviour, we will consider the or-
ganisational context in which that behaviour takes place. Traditionally, discussions of
organisations begin with a structural diagram, move on to responsibilities and interre-
lationships, and then address key processes. The human element is often underrepre-
sented. More useful for the purposes of countering corruption is an organisational be-
haviour approach, which focuses on systemic analysis of the interrelationship between
individuals, groups, the organisation itself and the social system inside and around it.
Some selected aspects of such an analysis are addressed below.
Individual behaviour, seen from the perspective of the relationship to the organisa-
tion, falls into three dimensions. A first dimension is task performance: the sets of ac-
tivities and results that must be performed to produce the desired outputs. In most or-
ganisations, this dimension receives the most managerial attention, with the principle
issue being the motivation of individuals and teams to increase efficiency and effec-
tiveness. A second dimension is ethical performance: ensuring that activities are per-
formed in a way that meets standards of ethics. At a minimum, this should be the
standard of legality; ideally, it also includes efforts to live according to societal values
of right and wrong. This dimension is the central focus of anti-corruption efforts, as well
as compliance efforts more widely. The third dimension is contextual performance: ac-
tivities that fall outside strict task performance but contribute to the effectiveness of co-
workers, groups, or the organisation – that is, the broader context in which an individ-
ual works. This dimension is often somewhat neglected yet it represents an important
long-term investment in shaping the organisational and cultural environment in which
tasks are done and ethical choices made.
It is useful to note that anti-corruption efforts are but a piece of a wider ethical envi-
ronment. Ethical issues are a part of daily business, even where there is little corrup-
tion. Common unethical behaviour includes cutting corners on quality control, covering
up incidents, abusing or lying about sick days, deceiving customers and putting inap-
propriate pressure on co-workers. Surveys indicate that those who engage in unethical
behaviour most often cite causes linked to management: pressure to meet budgets
and quotas, weak leadership, insufficient resources, workload and lack of recognition.
Personal financial problems come near the bottom of the list.
Personality consists of stable patterns of behaviour expressed over time. Personal-
ity is multi-faceted and varied; yet in terms of the way people accommodate to work,
there are only three principle organisational personality orientations. These are:
• Organisationalist. Strong identification with the organisation for which they
work; seek organisational rewards and advancement as important measures
of success.
• Professional. Strong identification with the substance of work, rather than the
organisation for which they do it.
• Indifferent. Identification is more focused on things outside of work.
For any given person, these factors coexist in a state of balance, with one usually
dominant. They are a key driver of commitment. Other organisational commitment
factors include continuance (the job is better than what else is out there), identity
(strong belief in common goals and values) and normative (social pressures).
These personality-related factors have direct relevance to anti-corruption pro-
grams. Firstly, efforts to build integrity can gain important “psychological allies” if they
are focused on positive changes that are aligned with organisational personality ori-
entation. By focusing on a positive agenda of improving the organisation or task per-
formance, rather than simply increasing the “moral burden” of corrupt action, a greater
number of individuals can be mobilized to achieve positive systemic results – with the
positive “secondary” side affect of reducing corruption. Such efforts will be most effec-
tive if they address a variety of the drivers of commitment—organisational loyalty,
dedication to task performance, job security, ideology or social pressures—thus ap-
pealing to the widest possible group of officials.
Organisational issues can have a significant impact on individuals’ susceptibility or
resistance to corruption, as well as the success of integrity building efforts. These in-
clude issues such as structure and responsibilities, coordination and the decision-
making processes. They also touch on motivational efforts and organisational culture,
which will be addressed in later sections.
Structure is one of the characteristics of an organisation most visible from the out-
side and is—probably not coincidentally—one of the favourite targets for change in the
name of reform. Without addressing the merits of any particular structure, several hu-
man factors are worth mentioning. First, whatever the structure, it is important that re-
sponsibilities are clearly delineated, without overlap or gaps. This helps avoid unnec-
essary confusion and conflict, particular at the level of managers – a group of individu-
als that are often naturally competitive and protective of perceived prerogatives. Effec-
tive division of responsibilities can also help build integrity by ensuring that multiple
stakeholders, each with a distinct institutional perspective and mandate, are involved
in decision making. For example, in the area of personnel management, separate staff
elements should be responsible for determining personnel requirements for strategic
planning to develop human resources, for real-time career management for individual
personnel and for program assessment. Similarly, in the area of procurement, sepa-
rate staff elements should be responsible for requirements, planning, contracting and
audit. This creates a system of natural checks and balances.
Effective mechanisms for horizontal coordination are vital for ensuring integrity and
transparency. The coordination system should allow all stakeholders to share common
information, make assessments based on their various institutional perspectives and
openly discuss these with their peers in order to build bottom-up solutions. Information
should flow freely, ideally using a system that “pushes” it to all relevant stakeholders.
Regular inter-departmental meetings help ensure transparency; in their absence, co-
ordination is done through more opaque informal mechanisms. It can help coordination
and increase transparency if staff elements with closely related functions have a com-
mon senior sponsor (e.g. deputy minister). On the other hand, elements conducting
oversight (e.g. audit departments, inspector generals) should not have a common
senior sponsor with elements for which they are responsible.
Human factors also play an important role in ensuring integrity of decision making.
Participants in decision-making processes should be clearly identified and they should
have clear direction regarding legitimate inputs, desired outputs and decision criteria.
Decision makers should disclose conflicts of interest, recusing themselves when ap-
propriate, and provide transparency on their finances. Box 16.1 shows UN guidelines
on conflict of interest for public officials.
Motivating Ethical Behaviour
Motivating sustained performance is a key managerial task in any organisation. The
principle challenge in doing this is aligning organisational interests—task, ethical and
contextual performance—with the needs of individuals for physiological satisfaction,
security, belonging, esteem and self-actualisation. Motivation is best done through a
combination of positive feedback mechanisms, such as:
• Praise, recognition and respect (which meet the need for esteem);
• Team-building, loyalty and good communication (which help build a sense of
belonging);
Box 16.1. UN Guidelines on Conflict of Interest for Public Officials

II. Conflict of Interest and Disqualification
Public officials shall not use their official authority for the improper advancement of their own or
their family’s personal or financial interest. They shall not engage in any transaction, acquire
any position or function or have any financial, commercial or other comparable interest that is
incompatible with their office, functions and duties or the discharge thereof.
Public officials, to the extent required by their position, shall, in accordance with laws or ad-
ministrative policies, declare business, commercial and financial interests or activities under-
taken for financial gain that may raise a possible conflict of interest. In situations of possible or
perceived conflict of interest between the duties and private interests of public officials, they
shall comply with the measures established to reduce or eliminate such conflict of interest.
Public officials shall at no time improperly use public moneys, property, services or informa-
tion that is acquired in the performance of, or as a result of, their official duties for activities not
related to their official work.
Public officials shall comply with measures established by law or by administrative policies in
order that after leaving their official positions they will not take improper advantage of their pre-
vious office.
Source: United Nations, UN International Code of Conduct for Public Officials, Annex, A/RES/51/59, 82nd
plenary meeting (12 December 1996).
• Financial incentives (which meet the need for security and provide resources
relevant to activities that meet higher level needs); and
• Advancement (which contributes to a sense of esteem and self-actualisation).
Motivation is increased when feedback is regularly repeated in response to good
performance. Significantly, all of the motivators listed above are positive. Used rarely,
negative reinforcement can discourage negative behaviours but it loses effectiveness if
used too frequently. Negative reinforcement also has serious side affects in terms of
morale and motivation, and only very limited usefulness in motivating positive perform-
ance. This underlines again the importance of a positive approach to countering cor-
ruption, using constructive feedback to link integrity, transparency and accountability to
positive organisational and personal agendas.
Systemic corruption is an indication that an organisation’s motivation mechanisms
have failed and no longer provide sufficient prospects for individuals in the organisa-
tion to meet their needs. If the organisation is unable to provide a warm work environ-
ment or a wage sufficient to put food on the table then workers will call in absent rather
than freeze and steal rather than starve. If the chain of command is unable to prevent
threats and bullying from senior soldiers, servicemen will seek security by accommo-
dating with these groups, even if the price of accommodation includes participation in
corrupt or other criminal behaviour. If the system is unpredictable and disorderly, indi-
viduals will trust their career development to patrons and friends, rather than the per-
sonnel department. If there is weak corporate identity, individuals will develop their
sense of belonging in informal groups within the organisation. If the public esteem for
the armed forces is low, then the value of “honest service” as a vehicle for esteem is
diminished and the value of economic success “at any cost” comes to the fore. Finally,
if the system is sufficiently dysfunctional, even dedicated professionals might see no
alternative to illegal (but in their view ethical) action in order to get the job done.
The challenge, therefore, for building integrity in systems with entrenched corrup-
tion is not just motivating ethical behaviour; rather, it is helping re-establish functioning
motivation mechanisms in a way that will re-align individual and organisational incen-
tives (see Box 16.2 for suggested guidelines). This requires particular attention to the
issue of organisational culture.
Organisational Culture
In addition to structures, regulations and processes, each institution has its own or-
ganisational culture. This is “the way business is done here” – a pattern of shared ba-
sic assumptions and approaches that the group considers valid for meeting internal
tasks and relating to external actors. It is actively taught to new members of the group
as the correct way to perceive and act on those issues. It consists of three layers:
Box 16.2. Guidelines for Establishing Motivational Mechanisms

1. Establish clear expectations for performance in all areas: task, ethical, contextual. Publish
clear policies and standards; establish a code of conduct for civil and military officials.
2. Establish procedures that are clear, accurate and work smoothly. Assessment, promotion
and assignment procedures are seen as fairness issues and should be high on the agenda.
Introduce incentives targeted to individuals at various levels on Maslow’s hierarchy.
3. Train managers in the new policies and procedures. Make it clear that the goal is improving
quality and performance by doing business in new, more effective ways.
4. Build ownership in efforts to create a new, functioning system through personal commitment
by leadership, including frank (closed-door) discussions with civil and military managers and
unit visits.
5. Use information efforts to reach out to servicemen, defence officials and the public. Out-
reach to families can be an important tool in acceptance of the new standards (and any resul-
tant loss of income).
6. Have clear, proportional sanctions for violations. Conserve resources by focusing on admin-
istrative punishment for procedural violations, rather than criminal proceedings. Nevertheless,
a few well-publicized (and well-deserved) cases of punishment early will raise awareness of
the new expectations.
7. Regularly review progress with all major stakeholders.
• Those visible to the outside world, including the way the organisation pre-
sents itself in facilities, furnishings and dress codes, as well as how it con-
ducts its external interactions;
• The professed internal culture, including mission statements, slogans, codes
of conduct and personal values widely expressed throughout the organisa-
tion;
• Tacit assumptions, which are unseen and assumed, not generally identified in
everyday interactions inside the organisation; some “unspoken rules” may
exist subconsciously, and others may be taboo (or discussed only during
smoke breaks).
While the first level can be observed, and the second identified through surveys
and interviews, it is difficult for outsiders (including new leadership) to understand cul-
ture at the third level. This is one of the reasons why organisational culture is the most
difficult organisational attribute to change, outlasting organisation, processes, leader-
ship and all other physical attributes of the organisation. Another reason for its resil-
ience is that organisational culture is driven by the personality of the managers in what
is known as the dominant coalition – the group of effective and essential managers
and leadership that collectively control the organisation’s resources and set its goals.
Organisational culture is found not only in the formal organisation but also in the
informal organisation – the unofficial working and social relationships that exist in par-
allel with every formal organisation. The informal organisation has several important
functions:
• Perpetuate the group’s cultural and social values;
• Provide social status and satisfaction through close personal interaction;
• Promote communication among members about management actions;
• Provide social control by influencing and regulating behaviour inside and out-
side the group.
Informal organisations exhibit high resistance to change; they seek to perpetuate
the values and lifestyle that they hold in common and have effective social control
tools to maintain conformity inside the group and coordinate the group’s external influ-
ence. Where the informal organisation intersects with the dominant coalition, resis-
tance to change can become powerfully entrenched.
Organisational Culture and Motivation: Friend or Foe?
Organisational culture is nested in an iron triangle of formal organisation, informal or-
ganisation and the dominant coalition, giving it a powerful effect on influencing behav-
iour. When an employee meets the same assumptions and approaches in daily busi-
ness, in social interactions and in contact with senior managers, these are quickly as-
similated as social norms and become an internal driver of behaviour.
Where this culture remains predominantly ethical and professional, it can be har-
nessed by leadership as a powerful driver for positive behaviour. Positive social tools
to reinforce behaviour that builds integrity can include peer awards, publication of arti-
cles or mention at senior level meetings. Negative tools can include peer review
boards, naming and shaming, social shunning and dismissal/suspension. In order to
be effective, however, the group must perceive ownership of these tools, and that they
are being wielded in the interest of the group and its social norms.
In situations where corruption has become the norm, the role of organisational
culture may not be so positive. Corruption networks form their own informal organisa-
tion(s). In cases of extreme systemic dysfunction, defence professionals many have
turned to these informal networks to achieve results that the official organisation could
not – even in professional matters. Indeed, through corruption and influence peddling,
the informal organisation may have been able to consistently provide stronger and
more consistent behaviour incentives than the formal system. The result can be a de
facto shift in the “dominant coalition” to the informal organisation; in effect, institutional
capture by a shadow elite.
In this case, reform-minded leadership will be faced with an organisational culture,
propagated through powerful informal networks, that actively encourages corrupt be-
haviour. If not addressed, it risks undermining all other changes; structures and proc-
esses will change, but not “the way business is done here.” A number of strategies
have been developed to overcome this resistance (Box 16.3 provides an example).
Efforts to change organisational culture can consume enormous resources in terms
of leadership time and significantly disrupt the organisation’s daily operations. In coun-
tries where corruption is endemic in society, defence leadership will face additional
challenges in creating a culture with norms that differ from society at large. In deter-
mining their level of ambition for cultural change, a key question for leadership is
whether a critical mass of senior managers (who form much of the dominant coalition)
will support the effort. Without their clear support, or the ability to find supportive and
competent replacements, other scarce resources like leadership time and political
capital will likely prove insufficient to push through broad cultural transformation
throughout the entire defence establishment.
A two-level approach can help moderate the level of ambition without abandoning
the goal of cultural change. On one level, an extensive information campaign ensures
that new standards of behaviour and new deterrents are understood throughout the
entire defence structure. Paired with modest enforcement efforts, the goal of this effort
is to have a real (but likely modest) quantitative reduction in corruption. At the same
time, working with a small group of professionals, a more intensive effort has the goal
of qualitatively transforming “the way things are done” in one area of the defence es-
tablishment. Success in this area can become a model for others and can also provide
a supply of committed personnel with relevant experience who can act as internal
change agents in other parts of the defence system.
Box 16.3. Organisational Culture Change Strategy

Changing organisational culture is a long-term project. At a minimum, employees need time to
get used to new ways of doing business. In companies with a very strong and specific culture,
there will likely be strong resistance. The following guidelines for cultural change can serve as
a basis on which to develop an implementation strategy:
Formulate a clear strategic vision
A clear vision of the firm’s new strategy, shared values and behaviours is needed to provide
the impulse and direction for implementing cultural change.
Display top-management commitment
Cultural change must be led from the top, since the willingness of senior management to
change is a prerequisite for success and an important indicator for the rest of the organisation.
Model cultural change at the highest level
Senior management’s commitment to change must be noticeable in new values and behav-
iours that model those to be introduced in the rest of the company. It is also useful for man-
agement to show continuity of current culture in a way that calms fears about radical change.
Modify the organisation to support organisational change
This could be a minor adjustment to accommodate a new element of culture or a shift to a dif-
ferent model (e.g. autocratic to collegial) to help drive change.
Select and socialize newcomers and terminate deviants
Modifying organisational membership can help implement cultural change; people can be se-
lected and terminated based on their fit with the new culture.
Develop ethical and legal sensitivity
Change in people’s rights, roles and responsibilities may have ethical and legal implications.
Source (adapted from): Thomas G. Cummings and Christopher G. Worley, Organisation Development
and Change, 8th Ed. (Thomson South-Western, 2005).
Within the civilian defence ministry, logical areas for such a targeted effort include
policy departments, audit departments or a selected cadre of reform-minded mid-level
and senior managers. Within the armed forces, operational officers with international
experience may have the right attitude and position to link ethical behaviour to a mili-
tary ethos that considers integrity to be an important component of operational
success.
A useful concept to support such an intensive effort is the idea of a community of
practice. This is a group of people who share a profession and actively interact to ex-
change relevant knowledge. By sharing knowledge and social interaction, they natu-
rally develop a sense of joint enterprise—the thing that binds them together—and cre-
ate their own informal organisation. This can help counterbalance the influence of cor-
rupt informal organisations and provide a mechanism for introducing cultural change
even if there is insufficient support by mid-level managers. The group’s informal inter-
actions also help its members build social capital that is useful for task fulfilment and
career advancement. Box 16.4 provides some guidelines on developing a successful
community of practice.
Box 16.4. Cultivating a Successful Community of Practice

A community of practice succeeds depending on its purpose and objective, as well as the in-
terests and resources of its members. These seven actions can help a community of practice
be successful:
• Welcome and cultivate members with different levels of participation, forming a core
(leadership) group, an active group and a peripheral group;
• Find and nurture a regular rhythm for the community; members should regularly
meet, reflect and evolve;
• Combine familiarity and excitement; offer both expected and innovative learning op-
portunities;
• Develop both public and private community spaces;
• Create opportunities for open dialogue within as well as with outside perspectives;
• Focus on the value of the community and provide explicit opportunities to discuss it;
• Design the community to evolve naturally.
Source: Etienne Wenger, Richard McDermott and William M. Snyder, Cultivating Communities of Practice
(Boston, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2002).
Summary
Even in systems with high levels of corruption, most people face the question “to be or
not to be corrupt” relatively rarely. On the other hand, they make a myriad of daily de-
cisions that influence the corruption climate by impacting integrity, transparency or ac-
countability. Motivating those constructive decisions should be the principle objective
of anti-corruption efforts. This will be most successful when individual, organisational
and social interests align and receive positive reinforcement. Individual needs should
be targeted with full understanding of their diversity and the hierarchy in which they
operate. Organisational needs can be supported by ensuring clear institutional respon-
sibilities, effective horizontal coordination and decision-making integrity. If an organi-
sation’s culture is ethical, it can serve as a powerful motivator, mobilizing social feed-
back across formal processes, the informal organisation and the managerial group. If
organisational culture is not ethical, then its transformation becomes a top priority for
defence leadership; unchanged, it will undermine all other reforms. This is a long-term
effort but can be achievable with political will, ingenuity in developing allies inside the
system and patience.
Chapter 17
The Role of Government
The legitimacy of all governments ultimately depends upon public confidence in their
ability to effectively and efficiently deliver public goods—in this case, defence capabil-
ity—and uphold the public trust. By diverting public goods to private interests, corrup-
tion undermines that ability. It is in governments’ self-interest, therefore, to lead in the
fight against corruption. To be effective, anti-corruption efforts should complement
broader reform strategies, like the development of a coherent policy, planning, pro-
gramming and budgeting system (PPBS), with an eye to building the integrity of deci-
sion making. There must be a readiness to conform to best practices in transparency
and accountability, such as providing timely information to defence leadership, parlia-
ment and the public. Effective internal control mechanisms should be in place, sup-
ported by easily applied administrative sanctions to correct malpractice in cases where
criminal prosecution would be doubtful or disproportionate. Since modern defence
management methods require considerable delegation of responsibility and authority,
it is essential to invest in building the professional abilities and public service ethos of
the relevant civilian and military cadre. Experience shows that with sufficient leader-
ship and attention, the Defence Ministry and armed forces can set a positive example
for the rest of government and society.
Corruption Risks
The main areas endangered by corruption are well-known. These include areas of
major direct budget distribution: procurement of weapons, equipment, fuel, food and
other supplies, infrastructure construction and maintenance, and research/technology
projects. Another area with high corruption risk is disposal of surplus property and
equipment, which can be knowingly transferred to the civilian sector at a cost far less
than its worth. The areas of distributions and admissions offer substantial possibilities
for corruption: housing allocation, selection for education (especially abroad) and as-
signment (especially to well-paid missions abroad). In conscript systems, a particular
high risk area is exemptions from service or assignment to less difficult or dangerous
occupations. Finally, the abuse of power and privileges provides opportunities for ex-
tortion from subordinates. Areas that deserve particular attention are those with limited
oversight: flexible operational funds, restricted or “black” projects and projects re-
sourced by foreign military missions (where the interaction of two countries’ oversight
systems might leave gaps).
Corruption occurs even in developed democracies, although it is for the most part
an individual rather than systemic phenomena. In the MODs of young democracies,
however, corruption is more often present on a systemic level. This can involve a
205
broad circle of perpetrators, both civilian and military, and may be linked more widely
to corruption within society and ruling elites. Particularly vulnerable are areas where
effective civilian management is not yet in place due to the absence of civilian experts
(and thus are still under control of the military), a shortage of skilled and reliable civil-
ian experts, or lack of good traditions and practices. Post-totalitarian regimes can face
especially high risks due to large a number of defence-owned enterprises, huge vol-
umes of redundant equipment and ill-conceived efforts to close budget gaps. Particu-
larly damaging is the creation of non-budget “special” funds, which require the military
to earn its own revenue to meet defence needs. These provide broad prospects and
logical justification for corruption by openly promoting commercialization of the defence
establishment.
Economic and social depravation can also play a major role in fostering corruption.
In the severe economic crisis that many post-Warsaw Pact states experienced during
the 1990s, officers’ pay plummeted below subsistence to as little as $30–50 per
month. At the same time, there was a severe housing shortage and a meltdown of the
once generous social support system. Servicemen faced stark choices: retire and try
their luck in private business, moonlight at one or more additional jobs, or engage in
corruption. Economic depravation was accompanied by a drastic drop in social status,
fed by a backlash against the ills of the communist militaries. As the social status and
self-esteem of officers and professional non-commissioned officers degraded, so did
their incentive for self-control. In some countries, this “survival period” lasted for a dec-
ade, during which corruption became deeply entrenched in defence institutions and the
military culture.
Building Integrity in Defence Management
The goal of defence management is to efficiently and effectively deliver the defence
capability needed to adequately protect society – the “public good” of the defence
system. In democracies, this is closely linked to civil democratic control and public ac-
countability. In other words, governmental structures and individual functionaries use
public resources (taxpayers’ money) in a legal framework and under parliamentary,
media and societal control.1 Strengthening mechanisms for effective management, ac-
countability and transparency naturally reduces opportunities for corruption.
Several basic principles can be applied to ensure integrity of decision-making
processes, be they selection boards, tender committees or leadership decisions. To
the maximum extent possible, these processes should be governed by written regula-
tion. Such regulation should identify participants and their responsibilities (all major
stakeholders should be included). It should define legitimate inputs (both in terms of
appropriateness for consideration and ensuring accuracy) and decision-making crite-
1 As compared with authoritarian or totalitarian regimes where the defence minister is often a
uniformed general responding directly and solely to the head of state, who may also have a
military background.
The Role of Government 207
ria. It should also define legitimate outputs of the process, in terms of public good.
Goals and objectives should be documented, approved by the official responsible for
guidance and oversight of the process and transparent to all stakeholders. Decisions
and their rationale should be set out in writing. Information should, in all but extreme
cases, be equally available to all participants. To the maximum extent possible, out-
puts should be measurable and actions taken to assess performance and provide ac-
countability. Vague, opaque procedures and blurry assessment and accountability are
tell-tale signs of embedded corruption. The following paragraphs apply these principles
to various areas of defence management.
Policy, Planning, Programming and Budgeting
Effective defence management links resource allocation as clearly as possible with the
intended result, be it current operations, improved capabilities for the future or in-
creased social protection for servicemen. This requires, in the first place, clarity and
transparency on defence objectives—for example, the roles, missions and tasks of the
armed forces—and on the measures that will be taken to meet them. These should be
clearly set out in strategic guidance documents that have the greatest possible visibil-
ity within the defence system (in the UK, for example, through annual Defence Strate-
gic Guidance approved by the minister) and transparency to the parliament and public
(in Ukraine, for example, by an annual public “White Book” report on the status of the
armed forces).
The development of plans and decisions on resource allocation (often referred to
as “programming”) should be closely linked with the defence outputs defined by policy.
Written planning and programming guidance should be drawn directly from strategic
guidance documents, reviewed by MOD policy staff, and approved by the minister.
Operational plans (current, contingency) and force development plans (organization,
equipping, manning, training/education and infrastructure) should also be closely
linked to resource allocation. In order to better make these links, many new democra-
cies have implemented variations on the US-developed Planning, Programming and
Budgeting System (PPBS).
The core element of PPBS is programming, which links resource allocation with
planning over the mid-term (usually five years) and gives visibility on all inputs required
to achieve specific outputs. Programming decisions then drive, rather mechanistically,
budget development and implementation. Moving the centre of gravity for resource al-
location to programming instead of budgeting significantly improves system integrity.
Programming brings a far greater number of players to discussions on resource allo-
cation and improves internal transparency. The five-year programming window allows
better assessment of the impact of resource allocations than a one- or two-year
budget. Responsibility for allocating resources and accountability for achieving outputs
is unified under program managers, who submit proposals to a senior-level Program
Review Board that includes a broad group of officials responsible for policy and im-
plementation (as well as finance). This dilutes the monopoly that finance departments
often have in budget-driven systems, where they often lead in both shaping budgets
and distributing allocated funds in a less than transparent manner.
Normative and organisational arrangements should support the smooth transition
from defence policy objectives and long-term plans to defence programmes, and then
from programmes to budgets and implementation. Box 17.1 provides an example of an
organisational solution intended to guarantee that short-term plans, including the de-
fence budget, and implementation activities clearly correspond to defence pro-
grammes, thus preserving the integrity of the resource management process.
Box 17.1. Organisational Solution to Consistency of Planning Disciplines and

Processes
Defence ministries in many post-totalitarian countries, inspired by the US experience, attempt
to enhance their resource management systems through introduction of Planning, Program-
ming, and Budgeting Systems (PPBS). PPBS, when properly implemented, are a powerful
management tool with the potential to provide for substantial increase in the transparency of
the decision-making process and the accountability of “line managers.” The Ministry of Defence
of Bulgaria, for example, has applied a program-based resource management system since
2000.
On the other hand, organisational resistance to the introduction of such new management
tools is not rare. Combined with limited knowledge and weak leadership, it often leads to over-
whelming challenges: how to provide for effective interaction among planning disciplines, how
to guarantee that programmes lead to the achievement of defence goals and objectives, and
that financial and procurement management is clearly in line with approved defence pro-
grammes, etc. In particular, when defence ministries have to deal with growing operational
demands or are under financial duress, budgeting and procurement decisions follow a logic
that often differs from the rationale of the defence programmes. That inevitably leads to a loss
of transparency and blurs accountability.
In August 2009—in its first month in office after parliamentary elections—the leadership of
the Ministry of Defence of Bulgaria made one organizational change: it created a “Planning,
Programming, and Budget” Directorate. Thus, it allocated to a single organisation the functions
of long-term defence planning, programming and short-term planning for financial and material
resources. This is seen primarily as an organisational solution to the problem of providing con-
sistency between budgets, procurement and construction plans, on one hand, and defence
programmes, on the other. Furthermore, this consistency is maintained even when circum-
stances change, thus preserving the transparency and accountability of defence resource
management and lowering the corruption risks.
Personnel Management
People are the most valuable resource of the defence system, yet personnel man-
agement is often highly subjective. This subjectivity is magnified in systems where
commanders are key players in every major personnel decision. Moving to a more
centralised personnel management system can significantly improve the integrity and
accountability of the process. This requires effort to standardize performance assess-
ment by objective characteristics and the use of well-regulated personnel boards to
assess candidates for promotion or selection for major assignments (e.g. command or
professional education). Appointments to senior or highly sought after positions, like
major command, long-term education abroad and positions of special trust and re-
sponsibility, should be subject to ministerial oversight. A top-level review board, in-
cluding senior military and civil servants, can help ensure transparent and objective
decision making. A more centralised system can also improve oversight and reduce
corruption risk in processes like testing for initial officer’s education, recruitment and
exemptions from conscript service.
Equipment, Logistics and Infrastructure
This is perhaps the area of highest corruption risk due to the large amounts of money
involved in acquisition, maintenance and service contracts. To ensure that procure-
ment supports real operational needs, it is important to have close oversight and re-
view of the entire requirements process, from designation of an operational need
through technical specifications, tendering and quality testing of the delivered product.
To ensure the efficiency and fairness of the system it is important to safeguard the in-
tegrity of the competitive system, including level tender conditions, bid evaluation pro-
cedures and contract drafts. Placing information on upcoming and ongoing procure-
ments on the internet is a good way to improve transparency and promote increased
competition. It also allows vendors to file a complaint if they feel unfairly excluded from
a competition. “Single sourcing” or non-competitive purchases should be strictly lim-
ited.
Requirements and tendering committees can play an important role in building in-
tegrity by ensuring internal transparency to major stakeholders. Special regulations
should require that members of tender committees disclose conflicts of interests and
recuse themselves from participating in relevant deliberations and decisions. To en-
sure better application of safeguards, it can also be useful to limit the number of pro-
curement officials and bidding committees. Information on previous misconduct by
tender participants and their possible blacklisting can also help ensure the integrity of
the process (see Box 17.2).
Box 17.2. Cleaning up Public Procurement: Publishing Misconduct & Adminis-

trative Debarment
Publishing contractor misconduct can play an important role in helping to maintain the integrity
of public procurement. In the United States, since 2002 the non-governmental Project On Gov-
ernment Oversight (POGO) has maintained a Federal Contractor Misconduct Database
(FCMD) that includes over 750 instances of misconduct including fraud, antitrust, environ-
mental, securities and labour law violations since 1995. It also matches that list against the top
100 federal contractors. The US National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 has a
provision to establish a database of information regarding the integrity and performance of fed-
eral contractors and grantees, modelled after the POGO database, although not accessible to
the public.
It is useful to note that 25 of the top 100 contractors in the FCMD have no known instances
of misconduct and 14 of the contractors only have one instance. Thus, 39 of the top 100 gov-
ernment contractors do not show a pattern of misconduct, belying the myth that any company
big enough to do business with the government will inevitably have multiple instances of
wrongdoing.
The government of the Czech Republic has recently gone one step further, introducing in its
latest anti-corruption program the instrument of barring certain companies convicted of corrupt
activities from participating in public contracts (i.e. blacklisting). This measure has long been
championed by the Czech branch of Transparency International, which considers that it would
provide an important administrative measure to purify the market of those companies that cor-
rupt it, pending the completion of investigations and prosecutions. It would also create a credi-
ble deterrent for other potential wrongdoers. A 2007 report lists recommendations for the suc-
cess of the debarment program, including: public availably of rules; the binding nature of the
blacklist for all procurement; a fair process with equal conditions applied to all; and strictly ad-
ministrative penalties, with the goal of encouraging reform rather than inducing bankruptcy.
The report also recommends that blacklisting should be a part of a more complex strategy of
anti-corruption measures in public procurement: observation of the codes of ethics of public
contracts, integrity pacts, whistleblower protection, leniency programs and other measures.
Sources: “Project on Government Oversight Releases New Federal Contractor Misconduct Database,”
Ethics World (15 October 2008), www.ethicsworld.org/publicsectorgovernance/publicprocurement.php
#pogo; “TI Czech Supports Blacklisting to Clean Up Public Procurement. Report provides key conditions
for blacklisting to be successful,” Ethics World (11 December 2007), www.ethicsworld.org/
publicsectorgovernance/ publicprocurement.php#blacklisting.
Disposal of surplus equipment and infrastructure introduces additional challenges

to integrity. Here the challenge is to effectively assess whether an item is actually sur-
plus and, if so, its worth. Open auctions with good transparency on items to be sold
can help ensure that MOD extracts the maximum possible value from surplus items.
Countries with significant surplus may wish to establish specialized departments to
manage the process of transfer or disposal, thus removing MOD from the role of auc-
tioneer.
Inspection and Audit
Effective inspection and audit systems play a major role in deterring potential corrup-
tion by providing a real chance of detection and punishment. Even in the absence of
corruption they are important tools to ensure effective and efficient use of scarce re-
sources and the integrity of the defence management and decision-making systems.
These can include both inspections for legality, such as those usually performed by in-
spector generals, or checks by audit bodies on the efficiency, effectiveness and integ-
rity of processes. Measures to strengthen inspection and audit can include increasing
the number and professional preparation of inspectors, refining procedures and in-
creasing powers, and better use of information technology.
Transparency and Accountability
Transparency of information and accountability to higher authority are significant in-
struments to build integrity and deter corruption. Traditional methods of external trans-
parency include public white papers and reports to parliament (see chapters 18 and
21). These are important tools to limit officials’ frequently all-too-convenient use of se-
crecy to avoid accountability. Secret categories or projects should be used in only the
most urgent circumstances and with appropriate (classified) oversight. Transparency
and public accountability can also be developed through innovative relations with civil
society, like establishing civil advisory boards and including board members in ministry
business. Such direct contacts between the defence establishment and civil society
can also help ensure that the political elite stay accountable to the public for its de-
fence policy.
Equally important is transparency inside the ministry. Internally, horizontal trans-
parency promotes inclusive, effective decision making. It also has a deterrent effect on
corruption by distributing information within a peer community that is most likely to de-
tect and potentially act against wrongdoing. Proper application of management princi-
ples will also promote vertical transparency, with accurate information passed up the
chain of command in sufficient detail to provide a clear picture without overwhelming
leaders’ ability to adsorb it. Such practical transparency has the added benefit of mak-
ing accountability more relevant.
Professional Cadre
Equally important to building integrity of decision-making processes is building integrity
within the professional cadres—civil servants and professional military—that are the
implementers of those processes. In the context of democratic civilian control it is ci-
vilian (rather than military) authorities within MOD who take responsibility for the state
of national defence and lead in major policy development, administrative control, legal
support, procurement and budgetary functions. This allows the uniformed military to
focus on their indigenous business of training troops, operational planning and conduct
of operations. Notwithstanding their public trust, senior civilian officials present a
significant corruption risk, particularly in transition countries where they may be inter-
twined with corrupt political and societal elites.
A key element to effective civilian control is the development of a cadre of civilian
experts in the MOD who can serve as professional intermediaries between the military
and the government and society. The fostering of a public service ethos within this
cadre is a powerful tool in building integrity, albeit one that takes time, particularly for
post-totalitarian states where corruption has become deeply entrenched in society.
The observations made by the German political scholar and sociologist Max Weber
over 90 years ago are still valid today: “Modern bureaucracy in the interest of integrity
has developed a high sense of status honour; without this sense the danger of an aw-
ful corruption and a vulgar Philistinism threatens fatally. And without such integrity,
even the purely technical functions of the state apparatus would be endangered.”2 On
the other hand, fostering “honour sense” within the professional civil service will pro-
vide a degree of inoculation even against senior-level misdeeds.
Professional training in defence management can be an important tool in building
this public service ethos. It is particularly effective in the context of international coop-
eration, which helps build a sense of belonging to an international community with its
own norms and practices. Programs like NATO’s Defence Institution Building and the
NATO-Ukraine Professional Development Program provide good examples of suc-
cessful efforts. Recruiting personnel from outside the current defence establishment
can also help to build a public service culture. Experience shows the importance of
steps by senior leadership to establish new norms and standards – and to implement
these standards by personal example.
Constructive tension between the military and civil service, with different roles but a
common civil service ethos, can be of particular value in ensuring defence integrity. In
many countries, the military is considered to be one of the least corrupt institutions.
According to Transparency International, “The 2007 Global Corruption Barometer
(GCB) shows that the military is held on average in higher regard than all other sectors
of society – except religious groups and civil society organizations (CSOs).”3 If the
armed forces is provided with sufficient compensation to eliminate “corruption by need”
and is removed from economic areas where “corruption by greed” is most tempting,
then it has the potential to maintain an independent culture of integrity. If allowed to
exert their professional voice within the decision-making system, the military can play
an important role in promoting integrity throughout the defence system and govern-
ment more widely.
2 Max Weber, H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1958), 88.
3 Transparency International, “Addressing Corruption and Building Integrity in Defense
Establishments,” TI Working Paper #2 (2007), 2.
It goes without saying, however, that no defence system is immune from the ills of
society, including corruption. Effective sanctions for misdeeds, particularly administra-
tive measures that can be applied quickly to restore system integrity (rather than
strictly to punish) are an important tool for the MOD to enforce a stricter standard than
that observed by society at large.
Box 17.3 provides an example of how the principles discussed above have been
applied in the particular case of Ukraine’s post-Orange Revolution reformist govern-
ment.
Box 17.3. Ukraine’s Integrity Building Effort Post-Orange Revolution (2005-2007)

Before the end of 2004, Ukraine was a transitional, quasi-democratic state suffering from wide-
spread corruption that permeated the government, including the Defence Ministry. Corruption
was especially bad in departments related to the appropriation of scarce budgetary funding: lo-
gistics, acquisition, medical support, disposal of redundant ammunition and equipment, de-
militarizing of surplus land and infrastructure, R&D orders, communication, maintenance and
construction, etc. Corruption was also felt in the distribution and selection processes: educa-
tion, career promotion (for “good” positions or “good” places of service), distribution of hous-
ing – even in training and selection for peacekeeping missions and in education abroad.
The Orange Revolution of November–December 2004 did not immediately repair the coun-
try’s ills but it did allow more democracy. Two aspects in particular had a healthy effect on
countering systemic corruption in the Defence Ministry. First was true freedom of expression,
greater transparency and higher expectations, which improved public oversight. Second was
the arrival of many honest, responsible professionals, untainted by corruption, to positions of
responsibility in the Defence Ministry (and the government more widely).
A new team of civilian leadership arrived at the Defence Ministry in February 2005. Much of
this team was retired military with experience in the think tank community or the commercial
sector. There they found a number of officials with high potential but who had lost motivation in
what was an unexpectedly poor professional environment. The new team, under the leadership
of Minister Anatoliy Grytsenko, took a number of quick steps to unlock this potential by estab-
lishing new norms and standards. The strategy that he implemented included the following
elements:
Strongly discourage corrupt behaviour. Officials implicated in corruption were immediately
suspended from executing their duties, pending investigation. External agencies were brought
in to help with investigations, in particular military counterintelligence (in the Security Service)
and Interior Ministry anticorruption bodies. When investigations proved wrongdoing, the MOD
took quick action, using its own authority where possible to force resignation, dishonourably
discharge, reduce military rank, etc. Over a dozen general officers and many more senior offi-
cers were thus removed during the first few months of 2005. In many cases, files were then
transferred to the Prosecutor General’s Office for criminal procedures. The principle of immedi-
ate responsibility, regardless of status or rank, continued through Minister Grytsenko’s tenure
(until Dec 2007), with the dismissal of officials as senior as a deputy defence minister and a
service commander.
Streamline defence management processes. Streamlining procedures improved manage-

ment and reduced risks of corruption and misappropriation. In some cases, optimizing prac-
tices eliminated opportunities for corruption; for example, the decision to assign complete, pre-
exiting units to peacekeeping operations removed local mobilization departments’ lucrative role
in selecting servicemen for well-paying peacekeeping assignments abroad. Planning and
budgeting improvements included steps toward implementing a PPBS system, better proce-
dures for developing strategic guidance documents and the creation of a special “ad hoc”
budgetary commission. That commission brought senior MOD and General Staff officials re-
sponsible for policy, planning, operations and finance together under the chairmanship of the
first deputy minister to provide timely strategic input for drafting and implementing the budget.
A similar top-level board helped to increase transparency and accountability for critical person-
nel selections, in support of a transition from a nomenklatura to a more centralized personnel
management system. The selection process for military educational institutions was also cen-
tralized, allowing for better supervision over candidates’ testing and other entrance selection
processes. Similarly, acquisition procedures were consolidated, with three bidding committees
taking over responsibilities that had previously been executed by several dozen. Finally, a spe-
cial department, with the head appointed by the government, was established to manage the
transfer or disposal of surplus equipment. The MOD supported legislation that would relinquish
its rights to sell surplus directly to buyers and pass the responsibility for auctions and other
forms of transfers to authorized governmental agents. A key element of these reforms was to
minimize the involvement of military personnel in economic activity.
Strengthen the system of inspecting and auditing. The authority and manpower of the in-
spection and auditing system was increased, with the key elements being the MOD Main Mili-
tary Inspection, the MOD Main Control-Auditing Directorate and the General Staff Control-Au-
diting Directorate. Structural and procedural reforms to this system helped improve its effec-
tiveness, as did efforts to attract the best personnel, increase their professionalism and safe-
guard their integrity. Finally, the ministry began to introduce modern computer-based admini-
stration and management systems that would allow for precise accounting and supervision of
all financial, material and personnel flows.
Promote democratization and public transparency. For the new MOD leadership it was im-
mediately clear that the struggle against corruption would require the strengthening of democ-
ratic institutions and increasing transparency in defence. A Civil Council (Gromads’ka Rada)
was created, with over 70 representatives from different NGOs and think tanks, in order to pro-
vide for direct communication with civil society. This advisory body also had important supervi-
sory functions; for instance, a member of the council was always present at the minister’s
regular reception hours, when citizens could address requests and complaints to the minister
personally. Another example of transparency and accountability was the annual “White Book,”
which gave a detailed report to the Ukrainian public on major defence activity during the year.
Finally, the ministry created officers’ councils in brigades and in higher headquarters. These
councils performed certain advisory and supervisory functions, as well as helping to build offi-
cers’ sense of honour, dignity and intolerance to corruption.
The example of Ukraine’s Defence Ministry in 2005–2007 demonstrates that energetic, con-
centrated and consistent efforts to fight corruption can produce significant results, even in an
environment of widespread corruption in other government departments and society. The key
factors behind these results can be formulated in words like democratization and transparency,
streamlining and concentration, leadership and teamwork, effective inspection and auditing,
and quick and proportional punishment. It is noteworthy that NATO officials, while sometimes
having reservations about the readiness of Ukraine as a whole to join the alliance, frequently
admitted the success of Ukraine’s Defence Ministry in reaching NATO standards.
The Defence Ministry’s success at countering corruption, against a continuing high level of
corruption in the country overall, came at a price. This price was the level of high-level supervi-
sion needed to ensure integrity. Too many decision-making responsibilities were placed at the
level of deputy ministers and the minister himself, slowing processes and leading to near ex-
haustion of the MOD leadership and their support staff. This produced a big difference but to
be sustainable in the long run, systemic changes in society and the creation of self-sustaining
dynamics within professional cadre are needed.
Preventing Conflict of Interest

In order to ensure the integrity of government decision making, it is important to iden-
tify and eliminate conflicts of interest. This is important first of all for senior leaders and
members of committees and boards (e.g. for tendering or assessing promotions) for
whom disclosure and recusal requirements apply. This is also important for all uni-
formed and civilian officials – any one of which may have the opportunity to inappropri-
ately influence decision making. Codes of conduct are a useful tool for preventing con-
flicts of interest in the broader sense. These may regulate such issues as (examples
are drawn from the Polish code of conduct for relations with industry):
• Acceptance of gifts and other benefits (general rule: no gifts);
• Participation in industry sponsored events (limited to common events directly
linked to signing or implementation of a contract);
• Presentation of defence goods and services by industry (direct presentations,
no agents); and
• Renting of military property for external events (defence industrial lobbying
prohibited).
Other regulations may define obligations relating to professional military service, for
example:
• Prohibition on taking up additional work for the defence industry during mili-
tary service;
• Obligations for all officers to submit asset disclosures; and
• Moratorium on defence industry employment (three years after the end of the
service for military personnel involved in procurements or implementing con-
tracts).
One of the aims of the Polish code was to eliminate “intermediaries” from the rela-
tionship between the Ministry and defence industry, often presenting themselves as
“independent” experts, journalists and publishers but whose activities were non-trans-
parent, unregistered industrial lobbying. Governments should demand that suppliers
fully disclose the use of agents and intermediaries, their identities and payments, and
the terms of their contracts. This is particularly important in identifying the possible im-
proper role of current or former senior officials or family members in influencing gov-
ernment decisions.
Anti-Corruption Bodies
In addition to efforts aimed at promoting good governance, defence ministries have
also found it useful to create dedicated anti-corruption bodies and strategies. Two
principle approaches can be taken for establishing anti-corruption bodies in the minis-
try: enforcement and prevention.
An enforcement approach calls for the establishment of dedicated investigative
bodies. These institutions have essentially law enforcement functions and carry out in-
dependent investigations into major fraud plots and organised crime. The MOD can
also gain support from external agencies to more effectively investigate corruption.
The prevention approach calls for establishing a bureau for anti-corruption proce-
dures and policy. This bureau may serve as a watchdog for general legislative proc-
esses in the ministry, analyzing proposed new regulations and procedures from the
point of view of their legality, transparency, prevention of conflicts of interest and good
governance. It may also provide independent expert advice to the minister or other of-
ficials, particularly in cases where the minister has been asked to approve actions be-
yond existing procedures, such as acquiring armaments based on urgent operational
need. The bureau may analyse whether such proposals are legal, economical and
well-justified, as well as recommend the correct and legal way to address them. The
bureau can also advise officers and officials to help them stay compliant with regula-
tions and codes of conduct. Dedicated anti-corruption bureaus also usually play a key
role in developing and implementing anti-corruption strategies. Such bureaus can also
help supervise key elements of the procurement process. Information on the Polish
example is in Box 17.4.
Concluding Thoughts: Strategy & Sequencing
All too frequently, efforts to build integrity are reactive, implemented in response to
scandals that exceed society’s patience. While immediate action is called for to restore
public confidence, the short timelines involved often result in a patchwork of actions
and mixed results that may alienate the defence institutions. Box 17.5 gives one such
example.
Box 17.4. Building Integrity – The Polish Story

According to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, in 2005 Poland was
the most corrupt country within the European Union. At that time, the anti-corruption efforts of
the Ministry of National Defence were quite inefficient, as they were in the whole of the Polish
administration. On the positive side, many institutions were involved in counteracting corruption
in defence; on the negative side, the anti-corruption activities of these institutions were com-
pletely uncoordinated. Many corrupt schemes were uncovered, a few officers and civilians
were charged and a special report on corruption in defence was prepared for the minister. But
despite the report, knowledge of corruption schemes was not used to carry out systematic
changes. There was no focus within the ministry on preventing corruption, no anti-corruption
policy was introduced and there was no integrity building program. In this environment, anti-
corruption measures were ineffective.
Not surprisingly, corruption was a major issue in the presidential and parliamentary election
campaigns in 2005. Following that election, the Polish Ministry of National Defence introduced
an anti-corruption plan. This was driven by support from the minister at the top level, who ap-
pointed an experienced anti-corruption expert inside the organisation to develop and imple-
ment the plan. The Anti-Corruption Procedures Bureau, reporting directly to the minister, was
founded early in 2006 as a new body with the mission of improving procedures for integrity and
creating anti-corruption policy. Four civilians were employed, all from outside the defence sec-
tor and industry, in order to preclude any possible conflicts of interest. Most of them had an
anti-corruption background from NGOs, local administration or the judiciary. The primary idea
of its foundation was to anchor the anticorruption duties more firmly in the structure of the min-
istry.
Starting with practical reforms, the bureau decided to tackle corruption from the top, from the
point where potential losses for the society were highest. The aim was to show the reforms as
serious and reliable. To define our priorities we provided a short risk assessment to determine
the highest corruption risk area with the emphasis on heavy potential financial losses and sen-
ior officials’ engagement. As a result, we assessed public procurement of military equipment as
the most important issue to tackle. It was less transparent than normal public procurement,
consumed a significant part of the budget (c. 20%, more than €1M/year) and engaged top
management of the ministry and armed forces.
Reform of the procurement system comprised several elements, including:
• Increasing transparency by putting information on planned, ongoing and finished pro-
curements on the web;
• Extending the use of electronic auctions;
• Enhancing quality assurance, including additional tests of the Rosomak armoured
vehicle, for which ballistic resistance had not been properly tested previously during
the procurement process;
• Preventing conflicts of interest of the tender committee members through additional
regulations;
• Promoting more competition through the limitation of single source procedures to the
well-justifiable cases; and
• Preliminary auditing by the bureau of key procurement documents, such as technical
requirements, tender conditions, bid evaluation procedures and contract drafts.
In addition, a new code of conduct for military and civilian personnel in relations with the de-
fence industry was developed, containing general commonsense principles and detailed regu-
lations such as a “no gifts” policy and a policy of no cooperation or participation in events spon-
sored by industry.
The bureau also started cooperation with Transparency International (UK), introducing some
elements of Defence Integrity Pacts—which introduces oversight together with the independent
review of equipment specifications and contracts—into a tender for the acquisition of VIP jet
aircraft.
As a result of these reforms, today the Polish Ministry of Defence buys equipment of better
quality for less money. Procurements are better prepared overall and more focused on buying
capabilities and not just goods. Poland’s lessons learned are applicable to other countries and
we found that even small changes in key points can have a major impact. Building integrity and
reducing corruption risk is not an insurmountable task if tackled coherently.
On the other hand, a well-targeted, proactive strategy can help prevent scandals—
and mitigate the need for ad hoc responses. Box 17.6 sets out an example of a road
map for developing such a strategy.
Officials tasked with developing and implementing such a strategy should take into
account the real conditions of society and institutions not to dilute efforts but to target
them realistically. Even the term “anti-corruption” should be applied cautiously, par-
ticularly in situations where officials may perceive corruption as essential for their live-
lihood or even for their legitimate professional activity; for example, supply officers are
legendary for using barter and informal agreements (often encouraged by command-
ers) when the formal supply system is unable to provide crucial parts in a timely man-
ner. Attacking such barter arrangements without improving the system that makes it
necessary will be considered by many officials as counterproductive at best and hostile
at worst.
This suggests a three-tiered approach. The first tier addresses what British scholar
James Sherr has called (in the case of Ukraine) the “realistic and urgent goal: creating
a state of affairs where corruption is a matter of choice rather than a necessity of life.”4
This should be combined with measures that protect junior personnel from being pres-
sured into joining “corruption pyramids” where they are forced into corrupt schemes
and a portion of their gains passed to senior officials. The second tier looks to stream-
line procedures and improve management and governance. Focusing on improving
4
James Sherr, “Ukraine and NATO: Today Realism, Tomorrow Membership?” Dzerkalo
Tyzhnia # 42 (570), (29 October–4 November 2005).
Box 17.5. Reacting to Scandal – The Peruvian Example

In response to domestic insurgency, Peru’s Intelligence Service was greatly increased during
the 1990s. Yet the service was also used to keep tight control of political opposition to the gov-
ernment of President Alberto Fujimori. Officially a presidential advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos
was the real chief of the Intelligence Service and de facto controlled the national defence insti-
tutions, reporting only to the president. Under his direction, the Intelligence Service bribed and
blackmailed important public figures, provided weapons to Colombian guerrillas and even ac-
cepted large sums of money from drug traffickers. In 2000, Montesinos was caught bribing an
official on tape, leading to his dismissal and, in November 2000, to President Fujimori’s resig-
nation.
An interim government was established and, in the few months before a new elected gov-
ernment took office, it initiated a number of steps aimed to regain civil control over the security
establishment. The Intelligence Service and Defence Ministry were reorganized, their budgets
reduced, and Congress given stronger oversight of both of them. Top security officials were
prosecuted for corruption and human rights abuses during the internal war, as well as corrup-
tion in weapons acquisitions during the 1995 border war with Ecuador. Some retired military
officers and security experts helped in this reform process, which was deepened by the ad-
ministration elected in July 2001. The National Intelligence Service was reformed several times
in the following years, reducing its activities quite significantly, and Congressional control was
strengthened through the Defence Commission and the Intelligence Commission. To improve
confidentiality, beginning in 2006 membership in the Intelligence Commission was set at a full
five-year Congressional term, rather than being renewed yearly, as with other Congressional
commissions.
Overall, these actions were well-received by the public, and helped restore confidence.
Within the security institutions, however, it was perceived as “collective punishment” for the im-
proper behaviour of former leaders. Thus, national security institutions have become more
transparent but with a significant loss of effectiveness. This has been one factor in the resur-
gence of terrorist activity and a general perception of vulnerability to a better armed Chile.
Source: Dr. Jorge Ortiz, Instituto Peruano de Economica y Politica
capability rather than countering corruption can help build bridges to professional con-
stituencies within the defence establishment. When defence officials are able to live
and work effectively without corruption, they will willingly support the third tier: a dedi-
cated anti-corruption campaign.
The fact that corruption exists virtually everywhere does doom defence ministries
to the same level of corruption as the rest of society. Even in countries with endemic
corruption, factors like rising public expectations and increasing public oversight can
combine with the mission-oriented ethos of the defence establishment to create an is-
land of integrity. Paradoxically, most societies, even if corrupt, consider integrity in the
armed forces and defence civil service as a matter of national pride and respect. Ironi-
cally, authoritarian regimes may find this situation uncomfortable, since corruption is
frequently a means to tie defence and security sector leadership to the regime and
thus ensure their support against the public, should it be necessary. Thus, democratic
governance helps build defence integrity and defence integrity helps promote democ-
racy. A wise government will work with, and benefit from, this positive and mutually
reinforcing dynamic.
Box 17.6. Road Map for Integrity Reforms

The following road map on integrity reforms in defence is based on the Polish experience.
First, carry out a self-assessment of corruption risks to identify the issues in need of reform.
NATO offers a tool, the Integrity Self-Assessment Questionnaire, and can also provide subject
matter expertise. After assessing the areas of corruption, determine priorities for addressing
them. Reliable reforms should start from the top, where high corruption risk intersects with
heavy potential losses and senior officials. Then prepare the strategy, which should set priori-
ties, identify key points for change and set out an action plan, needed budget and staff.
The action plan should be implemented by full-time staff designated for this job. This means
officials for whom prevention of corruption and building integrity are the main tasks of their job
description. Engaging new people from outside the defence establishment and defence indus-
try can protect against conflicts of interest.
In preparing reforms, concentrate on substantive changes. This means change the law and
procedures first and make personnel changes afterwards. Substantive changes are more du-
rable.
Cooperate with anti-corruption institutions in and outside of defence. Law enforcement
agencies can share knowledge of new corruption schemes and civil society organisations can
be an excellent source of advice. Train staff and educate defence personnel. NATO offers a
tool, namely the education module on integrity building in defence. In searching for solutions,
learn from the best practices of other countries and institutions.
When starting your effort, there will be many requests to deal with specific issues. Limited
resources will not allow you to deal with all of them effectively. Concentrate on priorities. And
be consistent in your activities: supervise implementation of newly introduced rules compre-
hensively and over a protracted period of time.
Finally, use moments of high political will to introduce substantial reforms. These can be im-
plemented in periods of lower political will. And even when there is no political will, some of the
reforms will be continued.
Integrity reforms – How to start and continue?
Carry out a self assessment of corruption risks NATO offers a tool
Find priority areas: high corruption risk + heavy losses + high ranks
T
Prepare the strategy: define priorities + find key points for change H
E
Base activities on fully-paid staff, designated for this job
R
Engage new people from outside the defence establishment
O
Change the procedures first, make personal changes second A
D
Cooperate with a-c institutions, in and outside defence, e.g. DIP
M
Train your staff, educate defence personnel NATO offers a tool A
P
Learn from the best practices You are reading the NATO tool
Concentrate on priorities Be consistent in activities
Use momentum of high political will to introduce substantial reforms

Chapter 18
The Role of Parliaments and Audit
Offices
As the direct representatives of the public, parliaments are the principle source of de-
mocratic legitimacy. They are responsible for establishing the legislative framework in
which government and society operate, and play the central role in overseeing the ac-
tivities of the executive (in particular, defence ministries and the military), as well as
defence industry and private security contractors. Parliamentary committees should be
sufficiently empowered to scrutinise budget, procurement and personnel decisions in
the context of national security policies and priorities. To exercise their powers effec-
tively, they need to have sufficient access to information and the staff capacity to ef-
fectively analyse it. In many countries, parliaments have audit offices attached to them.
These have an important role in carrying out detailed investigations of government ex-
penditure and highlighting malpractice
This chapter will look at the various mechanisms and issues of parliament’s role in
light of the anti-corruption agenda of building integrity, increasing transparency and
improving accountability.
Parliamentary Committees
Committees are parliaments’ work horses. While major political issues or scandals
may be played out in front of cameras in plenary, it is in committee format that parlia-
mentarians most often hear testimony from defence officials, debate issues, conduct
investigations, or commission reports. Most parliaments have a committee that bears
principal responsibility for defence issues, frequently combined with national security
issues more broadly. Nevertheless, various aspects of complicated issues like defence
invariably cut across a number of committees – for example, finance, foreign policy,
human rights and intelligence oversight.
Areas of activity for the security and defence committee include:
• Developing legislation for the defence and security sector;
• Advising on budgets and monitoring expenditures;
• Reviewing government defence policy and security strategy;
• Consulting on international commitments and treaties to be ratified by parlia-
ment;
• Advising parliament on the use of force and the deployment of troops abroad;
• Monitoring defence procurement;
222
The Role of Parliaments and Audit Offices 223
• Reviewing senior appointments; and

• Monitoring personnel policy and human rights.
For committees to be effective in exerting their oversight role, three requirements
must be met. Firstly, they must have the necessary authority, clearly delineated in
legislation. This usually includes the power to:
• Hold hearings or inquiries, at which ministers, others senior executive offi-
cials, military or civilian officials and experts can be summoned to answer
questions or testify;
• Request documents from the executive;
• Scrutinize the transparency and efficiency of public spending and request
competent authorities to perform audits as necessary;
• Examine petitions and complaints from military personnel and civilians
concerning the defence and security sector; and
• Visit and inspect bases and other premises, including troops deployed
abroad.
Secondly, the committee must have the capacity to adequately carry out their re-
sponsibilities, in terms of qualified staff, adequate budget, access to information and
the ability to arrange (and pay for) external expertise. The professional abilities of
committee members are also important; they should have the appropriate education,
experience and knowledge, periodically supplemented with additional training and
education.
Last but not least is committee members’ attitude toward holding government ac-
countable and seeking the common good in a non-partisan way. Holding closed
meetings, without media or the public, can be one way to help avoid partisan pres-
sures. Off-the-record informal meetings or seminars are also an excellent tool for
building common vision and moving beyond partisan politics. The most influential ele-
ment, however, is the attitude and leadership of the committee chairman.
A strong, pro-active attitude can also help ensure that the committee practises pre-
ventative oversight. Such an investment of time in regularly scheduled and surprise
unit visits, hearings and audits will save considerable time and energy that would oth-
erwise be used reactively to address problems after they have come up.
Audit Offices
In addition to professional staff within the committee, parliaments frequently have ac-
cess to information and analysis from independent audit offices. These are often at-
tached to the legislature, either directly, like the US Congressional Budget Office, or
through specific statutory responsibilities and interrelationships, like the UK National
Audit Office. When working effectively, these offices provide parliament with a means
to assess the executive’s past and current performance. Specific actions by the audit
offices may include:
• Auditing financial statements of all central government departments and

executive agencies;
• Supporting budget deliberations by developing budget outlooks, analyzing
budget proposals by the executive, independently validating cost estimates,
and presenting alternative budget options and scenarios;
• Analyzing specific policy and program issues related to budget and finance;
• Providing a means for whistleblowers and the public to make complaints and
investigating such accusations; and
• Assisting departments to improve the value for money they deliver, using au-
dits and dissemination of best practices.
All of these efforts are dependent on the ability to accurately cost units and tasks.
In addition to an accountancy or legalistic approach, a focus on “policy accountability”
is also useful, as it helps link resources, performance and desired outcomes. This is
made easier—and the value of auditing offices’ outputs increased—when their work is
linked to a Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System (PPBES). In this
case, the auditing office should pay particular attention to programming, which governs
decisions on mid-term resource allocation and program evaluation. In many countries
evaluation remains an underdeveloped function; not surprising, given its labour inten-
siveness and political sensitivity.
Box 18.1. The Role of the United Kingdom’s National Audit Office
The National Audit Office (NAO), led by the Comptroller and Auditor General, focuses its ef-
forts in three areas: ensuring value for money; supporting parliament; and providing guidance
on good practice.
Value for Money
Under the National Audit Act 1983, the NAO can examine and report on the economy of public
spending. Its value for money work looks at how government departments and other public
bodies have spent their resources effectively and efficiently to achieve intended outcomes. The
scope of this work covers a wide range of issues, from the operation of the criminal justice
system to major Defence Ministry procurement projects, from improving commercial skills for
government projects to improving contracting for highway maintenance. The NAO presents
about 60 reports a year. All are evidence-based and draw on rigorous analysis as well as
strong statutory powers that give access to relevant documents.
Support to Parliament
The head of the NAO is a statutory officer of the House of Commons and the results of its work
are presented to parliament by order of the House of Commons. It works on behalf of parlia-
ment and the taxpayer to hold government to account for the use of public money and to help
public services improve performance. Since 2000 it has regularly examined the key assump-
tions underpinning the government’s projections of public finances to check their reasonable-
ness, reporting the findings alongside the government’s reports. In 2007/08, it published 60
major reports to parliament and audited over 460 accounts. Beginning with the 2008–2009 cy-
cle, audits will be made using International Financial Reporting Standards.
The NAO supports the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), other select committees from
both Houses and individual members in their scrutiny of public expenditure and service deliv-
ery. The NAO has provided 17 Select Committees with a wide range of support and has re-
cently begun producing performance briefings to assist Select Committees’ annual oversight of
departments’ performance. It also deals with a complex and wide range of enquiries from
members of parliament, which on occasion may lead to a full value for money report.
Good Practice
NAO produces technical information, guidance and good practice material that can be used by
others, particularly those in public sector organizations.
Defence Issues
NAO work in this area includes financial audit of this complex department, which holds ap-
proximately £90 billion in fixed assets and manages an annual budget of nearly £34 billion. The
NAO also undertakes reports assessing the value for money of Defence Ministry spending.
This covers the department’s ability to support current operations, as well as maintenance and
development of military capabilities to meet future requirements. The NAO focuses on aspects
of operational effectiveness, support for armed forces’ personnel, major equipment acquisitions
and underpinning infrastructure such as the Defence Estate and business change programs.
Recent reports have looked at the Chinook helicopter fleet, Hercules C-130s, logistics ar-
rangements for fast jets, recruitment and retention, the use of reserve forces and the defence
information infrastructure.
Source (adapted from): National Audit Office, www.nao.org.uk.
Start at the Top: Corruption Risks and Remedies for Parliamen-

tarians
In reducing corruption parliamentarians should be gamekeepers, establishing norms
and standards for transparency, holding the government accountable for proper deci-
sion-making processes and scrutinising its audits. Yet, as in any area where there are
large outlays, they are tempted to influence those decisions and sometimes do so for
personal gain or for their party’s coffers. In this respect, corruption in defence contracts
is increasingly in the limelight. Yet there is no indication that the defence field is more
prone to corruption than, say, building and infrastructure contracts. Indeed, in the wider
security sector corruption plagues police and customs services far more than defence,
although this is frequently petty, grassroots corruption that occurs far below the level of
parliament.
Nevertheless, the defence sector does have its unique corruption risks. The circle
of decision makers and interested parties usually is smaller and operates in secrecy,
expertise is less widespread, and—above all—the market is monopsonistic, i.e. the

defence department is the only buyer and the number of qualified suppliers limited.
Complex defence contracts with numerous sub-contractors make proper accounting
difficult and procurement departments prefer to deal with a handful of trusted suppliers.
Against this background, parliamentarians lobby for the economic interests of their
constituency and might lend a hand in obtaining deferrals from conscription or plum
jobs for their protégées. In this, there is a thin line between legitimate help to constitu-
ents and the exertion of undue influence.
There is no limit to human inventiveness and brinkmanship in finding ways to influ-
ence acquisition processes without being in outright conflict with the law. Corruption
can take the form of kickbacks on (unjustifiably high) contractual payments, so-called
commissions for services rendered, favours outside the contract like holiday trips for
members of the family or other services, or outright payments under the table. Large
scale corruption to sway the decision of influential individuals usually takes place
through agents or other intermediaries, thus avoiding direct contact between supplier
and buyer and making it difficult to trace payments through the banking system.1 This
underlines the importance of clear legislation on what is allowed, what is not permitted
and where officials should draw the line in their contacts with suppliers. Limits should
be put on the value of gifts officials and parliamentarians are allowed to accept. Par-
liamentarians should see to it that these rules or codes of conduct are firmly estab-
lished and observed, and also apply them to themselves. They should avoid any sem-
blance of inappropriate behaviour and, for example, not enter into contact with com-
mercial agents or visit factories on their own, but only do so in combination with their
colleagues in the defence committee.
In 2007 the democratic senator from Montana, Jon Tester, even took the innovative
step of posting his daily schedule on the web. This action highlights the remedy to the
risks: maximum transparency in the way parliamentarians do their work and declare
their interests. Individual parliamentarians should declare their assets and interests
before taking public office and do the same some years after relinquishing it. There
should be a prohibition on anonymous contributions to them and to their party’s fi-
nances. These measures are also in their personal interest, protecting them from in-
correct accusations of fraud and enhancing public confidence in their work. In this re-
gard, the UN International Code of Conduct for Public Officials provides a useful basis
for crafting rules – in particular section II on conflict of interest and disqualification, and
section III on disclosure of assets. Such disclosure is of particular importance in legis-
latures that are not considered a full time occupation and where members are there-
fore allowed to take other paid jobs. For example, in the British House of Lords 139 out
of the 743 members have paid advisory functions and figure on the salary sheets of
corporations.
1 “The Etiquette of Bribery: How to Grease a Palm,” The Economist, 23 December 2006.
Parliament’s Role in Ensuring Defence Transparency

Parliaments play a strong role in ensuring the transparency of the Defence Department
and have a number of instruments at their disposal to do so. Their members can ask
written or oral questions and follow them up when the answers are unsatisfactory. A
powerful tool for achieving transparency is the organisation of hearings with competing
suppliers, if necessary behind closed doors to protect commercial secrets. More dra-
matic, but also time consuming, is a parliamentary inquiry, which aims at fact-finding
and the attribution of responsibilities. Few ministers or state secretaries survive such
an ordeal, for the political battle continues in the inquiry and members of the opposition
have their knives out for proving the incompetence of the government. At the same
time, parliamentary inquiries are often weakened by the inexperience of its members in
legal questioning. They are elected for their political acumen, not for their investigative
abilities.
Investigative tools are important but the best remedies to corruption are regular
procedures and sticking to them: careful, line-by-line examination of the defence
budget, looking for the life-cycle cost of new acquisitions, and combining the review
with reports from the audit office to determine whether financial outlays are spent for
the purposes indicated. Obviously, however, such procedures only work well if parlia-
ment possesses sufficient qualified staff for in-depth analysis. Provided an independ-
ent Audit Office exists, it also serves as a deterrent to malpractice, since misappro-
priations are likely to come to light in their reports.
In the area of procurement, the Defence Ministry should be required to provide par-
liament with information about military requirements, the alternatives for meeting them,
the list of potential suppliers and the arguments for final procurement decisions. For
example, in Belgium and the Netherlands the Minister of Defence has to follow a pre-
scribed procedure of first including the requirement for a weapon system in a 10-year
programme and subsequently explaining it, then analysing the alternatives, reporting
on the negotiations and the co-production and compensation aspects (handled by the
ministry of economic affairs), and finally making the decision. To support such delib-
erations, in 1996 Belgium established an ad hoc committee for military purchases of
the House of Representatives. In the Netherlands, the Defence Ministry must follow a
convention that parliament has sufficient time to consider contracts above Euro 50 mil-
lion before the contract is signed (see Box 18.2). This normally results in a green light
from the Defence Committee but members have the right to put the item on the
agenda of the Second Chamber for plenary discussion and vote. In Germany, a similar
procedure of enhanced scrutiny begins at the Euro 25 million level.
Box 18.2. A Model Sequence for Oversight of Defence Procurement

The following model sequence of procurement oversight is based on parliamentary practice in
the Netherlands.
Requirement
The Defence Ministry informs parliament of the general operational requirement. This includes
the type of equipment, an estimate of the numbers needed and the volume of funding reserved
for the procurement. Parliamentarians usually focus their attention on the share of the overall
budget the new plans will adsorb and pose questions concerning compatibility with other prior-
ity needs. The procurement can only move forward if the parliamentary defence commission
approves the requirement, or at minimum signals acquiescence with the formula “the commis-
sion takes note of the document presented.”
Preparatory Studies
Operational requirements are translated into technical specifications. The market is explored
and an exhaustive list of all possible suppliers drawn up. If the product is not available now or
in the immediate future, plans are drawn up for a development phase in cooperation with in-
dustry and other interested countries. A procurement strategy is established, as well as a
timetable for production and delivery.
Assessment
This is a thorough study of the information provided by interested suppliers. Are they able to
fulfil all specifications or do they suggest alternative ways of meeting the requirements? Is the
equipment in use by other forces and what are their experiences regarding performance? What
are the possibilities for co-production and compensation [offsets]? This study should lead to a
short list of alternative products. The information should be subject to discussion in the com-
petent parliamentary committee and preferably made public.
Acquisition
This involves a final recommendation and preparations for the acquisition, based on negotiated
offers, possibly complemented by field trials. The armaments directorate applies a range of
criteria in arriving at its final recommendation. Assuming that several alternatives meet the
military requirements, other factors may come to bear: for example, life-cycle costs, gradations
in military effectiveness and safety. Offset or co-production arrangements are also frequently
an issue – parliamentarians want to be sure that domestic industry will be adequately involved
and usually demand one hundred percent compensation for every defence dollar or euro spent
abroad.
The role of parliament in each of these phases will differ, depending on the monetary value. In
the Netherlands, contracts below 5 million Euros are left to the service concerned. Projects up
to Euro 25 million must be included by the chief of the Defence Staff in the overall defence and
communicated to parliament. Between Euro 25 and 100 million the requirement has to be ap-
proved by the parliamentary committee at the beginning of the cycle, but further execution is
mandated to the service concerned, unless the project has been qualified as politically sensi-
tive. Projects of higher value need parliamentary approval before signature. Decisions regard-
ing their implementation can only be taken by the State Secretary (deputy minister) in charge
of equipment. Contracts above Euro 250 million require approval by the full cabinet and par-
liamentary approval.
Source: Willem F. van Eekelen, The Parliamentary Dimension of Defence Procurement: Requirements,
Production, Cooperation and Acquisition, Occasional Paper No. 5 (Geneva: DCAF, 2005).
Allies: Media, NGOs, International Organizations, Defence

Professionals
One of the challenges for parliaments is to effectively target the often tremendous re-
sources at their disposal, in light of real limits on parliamentarians’ time. Media is one
source of inspiration; many question hours in Western parliaments rely on stories
about scandals or ineffective government action in the morning papers. An active and
inquisitive press is a requirement for effective democracy yet relying too heavily on
news percolating through the media has the drawbacks of promoting reactive re-
sponses to scandals and politicisation. Sometimes parliamentarians would better use
their resources if they would take some distance from short-lived media excitement
and focus on longer-term policy objectives. Likewise, international institutions, like
UNDP, should consider the need for balance in their funding of investigative journal-
ism. While a good thing overall, investigative journalism can contribute to an unhelpful
accusatory climate. The media should observe a code of conduct of their own.
Parliaments also have allies in the non-governmental community. Most countries
have a plethora of civic organizations focused on combating corruption at the national
or local levels. The challenge is to bring them into constructive relationships with par-
liament, rather than just accusatory ones. On the international level, a key ally in
countering corruption is Transparency International, which was formed fifteen years
ago and annually publishes a Bribe Payers Index, Global Corruption Barometer and
Corruption Perception Index. Such “naming and shaming” of culprits—individuals,
companies or entire nations—has had some impact, particularly in Western parlia-
ments. Transparency International, through its network of national chapters, can also
help mobilize national non-governmental organizations to participate constructively in
parliamentary efforts to counter corruption.
A major player in assisting parliaments to build oversight capacity is the Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), an international founda-
tion formed by the Swiss government in 2000. DCAF identifies and promotes best
practices in security sector governance at the national and international levels. It works
closely with other international institutions to provide in-country advisory support and
practical assistance programmes that build integrity, transparency and accountability.
This is frequently done in combination with various parliamentary assemblies, like the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the NATO Parliamentary As-
sembly, as well as other international institutions that seek to promote best practice in
security sector governance.
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has been particularly active
in supporting defence and security sector oversight. In 2005, in response to actions
taken in combating terrorism, it developed a set of detailed recommendations regard-
ing oversight in the areas of intelligence, police, border control, defence and “national
security and democracy.” These underlined the need for:
• Clear and appropriate legislation to govern the activities of the security and
defence sector, with clear distinctions between security and intelligence ser-
vices on the one hand and law enforcement agencies on the other;
• The armed forces to remain focused on national security, without dilution by
auxiliary tasks, except in exceptional circumstances;
• Functioning specialized parliamentary committees, with supervision of intelli-
gence services and budgets as a minimum prerequisite;
• Parliamentary supervision of exceptional measures, which must not seriously
hamper the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights.
The resolution also acknowledged the increasing importance of international coop-
eration and peacekeeping missions and emphasized that this “must not be allowed to
have an adverse effect on the role of parliament in the decision-making process.” It
also noted that deferred transparency (declassifying confidential material after a period
of time prescribed by law) could help manage the balance between confidentiality and
accountability.2
A major anti-corruption ally among intergovernmental organizations is the Organi-
sation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Composed of thirty in-
dustrialised nations, the OECD drafted a Treaty against Corruption in 1977 that as of
today has been adopted by 38 countries. It also has a Working Group on Bribery,
which is chaired by the Swiss professor Mark Pieth. A number of OECD nations have
implemented anti-corruption laws based on this treaty, with substantial results. For ex-
ample, Germany adopted an anti-corruption law in 1999 and has followed it up force-
fully. The electronics company Siemens was prosecuted for paying €1.3 billion in
bribes in more than fifty countries, including a personal payment to Nigerian President
Sani Abacha. In December 2008 the inquiry into Siemens’ “Schwarze Kassen” [black
accounts] ended with a fine of €395 million. The OECD treaty also facilitated comple-
mentary actions in other countries. A similar inquiry in the US led to a fine of $800 mil-
lion and in 2004 Italy banned Siemens from doing business with public entities for a
year.
Lastly, defence professionals can form a powerful domestic ally to support effective
parliamentary oversight. Defence personnel will not easily cheat on the quality and du-
2 Democratic Oversight of the Security Sector in Member States, Recommendation 1713

(Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2005), http://assembly.coe.int/.
rability of equipment they are procuring because this might become a matter of life or
death for their operational colleagues. Moreover, authorisation and accounting proce-
dures have been regulated carefully, often in excruciating detail and requiring signa-
tures at every level of the procurement process. Most defence departments have a
special office to scrutinise this process on possible fraud. Such offices need an inde-
pendent position outside the line of command and linked with staff of the inspector
general. The inspector general should have a strong link with parliament, which should
be consulted on his appointment.
Oversight of the Defence Industry and Arms Exports
Parliaments are frequently far stricter in oversight of national procurement than they
are of foreign sales. On the one hand, this is logical since national procurement in-
volves the parliament that appropriated taxpayers’ money as a direct stakeholder. On
the other hand, economic incentives focus more on industrial development than on
oversight where experts are concerned. Parliamentarians are legitimately concerned
about maintaining jobs in such an innovative branch of industry, focusing on state of
the art technology and skilled labour. Except for the US, no country possesses a home
market that is large enough to sustain a viable defence industry, making export mar-
kets or multinational production arrangements necessary for companies to remain in
business. Yet for over a decade, reduced defence budgets in most Western countries
have led to increased competition in third country markets. The current economic crisis
makes this even more urgent. As large defence contracts are few and far between—
but once obtained provide years of work for industry and guaranteed employment for
constituents—some in authority are willing to close an eye when attractive contracts
could be impeded by full transparency and clean practices. A number of recent cases,
however, have begun to reverse this trend (see Box 18.3).
One positive note is that industry itself has begun to address the issue of corrup-
tion. In July 2006, the European aerospace and defence industry announced the crea-
tion of an international industry working group dedicated to combating corruption. It is
initially intended to cover all European defence companies and their national defence
associations, and then to be open to defence companies from other countries. On the
same day, the formation of the UK Defence Industries Anti-Corruption Forum was an-
nounced. Will they work? That remains to be seen. The World Development Report of
1997 noted that 15 percent of all companies in industrialised countries have to pay
bribes to retain their business. This figure was 40 % in Asia and 60 % in the Russian
Federation. Reduction of corruption will depend on the perseverance of governments
and parliaments, particularly in view of the fact that outside Europe and the US many
people in high positions expect bribes for their participation in commercial deals. Con-
sequently, corruption will only diminish if the risks to suppliers and buyers are high. It
can be helped if the competing firms close ranks in observing a code of conduct. Par-
liaments can certainly play a constructive role in supporting this trend.
Box 18.3. Selected Major Corruption Cases in Foreign Sales

The most visible recent case of allowing bribery has been the dealings of British Aerospace
Systems (BAE), the fourth largest defence firm in the world, with Saudi Arabia. In 2003, the
Guardian newspaper revealed that BAE, with the connivance of successive British cabinets,
had paid millions of bribes over the past two decades to senior Saudi officials and members of
their families in return for lucrative defence contracts. The British Serious Fraud Office started
an investigation and discovered the existence of a £60 million slush fund at BAE for “support
services” and evidence that one billion pounds had been transferred to the Swiss bank ac-
counts of two middlemen linked with the Saudi royal family. However, the attorney general
stopped the inquiry, indicating to parliament in December 2006 that Saudi Arabia had hinted at
retaliating by stopping information concerning possible terrorist attacks in the UK. Prime Min-
ister Tony Blair supported the decision.
Such cases have also occurred in sales to NATO countries. In the mid-1970s, the Nether-
lands experienced an effort by Lockheed to buy influence in the acquisition of new military air-
craft. At his request, Lockheed paid $1.1 million to Prince Bernhard, husband of Queen Juliana.
An independent commission of inquiry concluded that his behaviour had been “reprehensible,”
but with the threat of a possible constitutional crisis (possible abdication by the queen) the
government, in consultation with parliamentary leaders, only terminated the prince’s functions
as Inspector General of the Armed Forces. In roughly the same period, when the Netherlands
was in the process of buying F-16 aircraft from the US, an agent linked to Dassault was
suspected of attempting to bribe a parliamentarian but the case was not brought to trial.
India is a good example of a country that has suffered greatly from corruption yet it has also
taken important legislative action. The purchase of Jaguar aircraft from the UK in 1978 and
major contracts in the 1980s for the purchase of Bofors artillery guns, Mirage 2000 aircraft and
HDW submarines were all surrounded by a stench of corruption, although nominally backed by
defence requirements.
In response, in 2001 a person of impeccable integrity was appointed to introduce a measure
of transparency and public accountability into the functioning of the Defence Ministry. The gov-
ernment issued instructions for the open declaration by foreign suppliers of the services to be
rendered by their representatives and the remuneration payable to them by ways of fees,
commissions or any other method. The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) enunciated in
2006 created registration requirements and penalties that removed the attractiveness of hiring
middlemen—Indian or foreign—for promoting defence contracts. (However, by April 2008 no
authorised Indian representative had been registered under this instruction.) The DPP also
contains three critical elements: an offset clause, no single-vendor purchases and compulsory
transfer of technology in all major contracts. In 2008, Defence Minister Antony also informed
parliament of other steps to prevent corruption and to ensure transparency, including: an “In-
tegrity Pact” between the government in all contracts above 3 billion Rupees; major decisions
in the acquisition process would be taken in a collegiate manner; enhanced transparency in the
conduct of field trials; and regulations on pre-bid meetings with vendors.
Sources: G. Parthasaraty, The Era of Corruption (28 March 2001), www.rediff.com; Defence minister A.K.
Antony in a written reply in the Rajya Sabha. See www.thaindian.com (22 April 2008).
Final Thoughts
A review of contemporary recent corruption cases underlines the continuing need for
transparency, as well as the important role—and limitations—of parliamentary over-
sight. In several cases, the executive successfully (if perhaps only temporarily) argued
that the higher interests of the state overrule the inclination of parliaments to take
stronger action. Nevertheless, parliamentary action has had an impact. Industrial en-
terprises are increasingly reluctant to even consider bribery. And overall, governments
and parliaments have come together to address the issue. The Lockheed scandal (see
Box 18.3) and a case with General Electric led to the adoption by the US of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977 – and subsequent US pressure on other govern-
ments to do the same in order to get a level playing field. Parliamentarians have also
frequently led national efforts to implement the OECD Convention into national law.
And inter-parliamentary assemblies like the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly continue to play a leading role in
pushing international cooperation and standards for combating corruption.
Parliaments and parliamentarians have a sacred trust from their citizens to lead in
countering corruption. And while much has been done in recent years, many more
challenges remain. Parliamentarians can help meet them by ensuring that defence
committees and audit offices have sufficient authority to provide effective oversight.
They can work to build the needed capacity to implement these mandates, in terms of
staff, budget, access to information and contracting for external expertise. Defence
Committee members can demonstrate leadership in developing their professional
knowledge and in showing a public-spirited, non-partisan attitude toward issues of na-
tional security – which fundamentally touch on the survival of the state. In doing so
they can courageously act to ensure defence transparency, while protecting legitimate
state secrets. And in all of this they can improve their effectiveness by cultivating a
network of allies, domestically and internationally, that share a common interest in
countering corruption and helping their countries develop as prosperous, secure de-
mocracies.
Chapter 19
The Role of Ombudsperson
Institutions
In the 200 years of its history,1 the ombudsman institution has demonstrated its value
for both developing and mature democracies. The ombudsperson institution is not the
primary instrument to fight corruption as a criminal activity. However, if properly de-
signed, supported by strong political will and equipped with experienced and motivated
staff, the ombuds office can be an effective instrument within a strategy of preventing,
neutralising and eradicating corruption in defence.
The Ombudsman Function in Defence
In its modern interpretation, the primary function of the ombudsman is “to protect the
people against violation of rights, abuse of powers, error, negligence, unfair decisions
and maladministration in order to improve public administration and make the govern-
ment’s actions more open and the government and its servants more accountable to
members of the public.”2 The essence of this explanation, as embraced by mature de-
mocracies, is that the ombudsperson is independent from the organisation subject to
peoples’ complaints. Hence, the ombuds institution is created by law; the ombudsper-
son is appointed by the legislature and serves as its agent. One of the supporting ar-
guments is that such an arrangement helps guarantee the independence of the om-
budsman, who might otherwise be reluctant to criticize the actions of agencies that are
responsible to the executive. As part of the legislative branch of government, the om-
budsman is not only providing a direct service to citizens, but also performs a role in
the legislative oversight of the agencies under the ombudsman’s jurisdiction. Since the
ombudsman may only make recommendations, and may not compel the executive and
judicial agencies to take substantive actions, his or her role is consistent with the con-
cept of separation of powers.3
1 Frank Orton, former human rights ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina and former
Swedish ombudsman, argues that in October 1713 the king of Sweden signed an ordinance
by which he established the institution of the King’s Highest Ombudsman to ensure that the
judges, military officers and civil servants in Sweden were observing the laws of the country
and the rules laid down for them.
2 International Ombudsman Institute, as quoted at: www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/ioi/.
3 Comment from the Model Ombudsman Act for the State Governments, developed by the
U.S. Ombudsman Association, www.abanet.org/adminlaw/ombuds/usoamodel1.html.
234
The Role of Ombudsperson Institutions 235
Box 19.1. Defining “Ombudsman”

Loosely translated, “ombudsman” means “the citizen’s defender” or “representative of the peo-
ple.” Ombudsman is a gender-neutral term, used throughout the world by women and men who
hold the office. However, some prefer the terms ombuds or ombudsperson (see
www.usombudsman.org). Many other names are used to represent the ombudsman office. For
example, in English speaking countries the names vary from parliamentary commissioner for
administration (Sri Lanka, United Kingdom), public protector (South Africa), to investigator-
general (Zambia). In a number of countries, the protection of human rights is one of the major
purposes of the ombudsman office and this is often reflected in the name of the office, e.g.
Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights, the Civil Rights Protector of Poland, the Hu-
man Rights Ombudsman of Slovenia and the Parliamentary Commissioner for Human Rights
in Hungary.
Source: Petter Bolme, International Overview of the Ombudsman Concept (Stockholm: Global Reporting
Sweden AB, 2008), 4.
This is the core of the original concept that, applied to defence, looks at the public
protector or military ombudsman who safeguards the rights of military personnel and
emphasises democratic constitutionalism within the defence forces. It is important to
underline that interpretations such as “internal ombudsperson” or “inspector general”
with ombuds functions, appointed by the head of the institution, deviate from the origi-
nal concept. They may have positive impact in keeping the institution healthy but can-
not be examined as alternatives. Bureaucracies characterized by diverse organisa-
tional cultures have introduced modified versions of the original ombuds concept with
varying degrees of success. The knowledge of the basic concepts and their specific
implementation mechanisms facilitates the establishment of an ombudsperson institu-
tion adequate to the strategy of building national and institutional integrity.
The establishment of a defence ombudsman institution aims to cope with two prin-
cipal problems of defence in a liberal (or liberalising) democracy: to keep the relations
between civil society and its military institutions under proper civil control and, simulta-
neously, to protect the human and social rights of the people in defence. Thus, the
classical question in civil-military relations “who will guard the guardians?” is combined
with another one – “how to guard the rights of guardians as citizens in uniform?” The
issues, embraced by both questions, are interrelated not only conceptually but as a
strategy and policy of societal and defence institutional development.
The internationally accepted role of the ombuds office is merely to investigate and
recommend solutions. The establishment of such an office, therefore, does not have to
be seen as a threat to any existing authority.4 The scope of activity of a military
ombudsman will be dependent, to a large extent, on the intent, influence and nature of
4 In many cases such activities are viewed as contrary to military subordination and are
explained—rightly or wrongly—as eroding military or political authority and leadership.
the evolving defence environment. It is unlikely that it will get “out of hand.”5 Corrup-
tion, in its multiple forms and manifestations, is plausible throughout the entire spec-
trum of civil-military relations. Therefore, a “full-scale ombudsman” should have the re-
sponsibility and capacity to cope with all serious civil-military problems. It is worth not-
ing that the establishment of this office in a number of countries has resulted in some
remarkable developments in the conduct and behaviour of military personnel in exe-
cuting their duties and responsibilities.
Models of Ombudsman Institutions
Generally, ombuds institutions are divided into two groups – “classical” and “organisa-
tional.” There is constant evolution within each group and the demarcation lines among
them change rapidly.6 But defence is different both as a governmental policy and a so-
cietal detachment. For that reason there are numerous types of ombudsman institu-
tions in defence, with widely varying tasks and authorities. Three main models may be
distinguished from a practical point of view – the classical ombudsperson, the powerful
institutional ombudsperson in defence, and the weak organizational ombudsperson of
the armed forces.
Recalling the basic premise in management that “what is measured is what gets
done,” the power of the ombudsperson is examined herein as a component of the
processes of monitoring and evaluation of defence governance, in particular in the
formulation and implementation of defence policy.
The Classical Model of Ombudsman in Defence
This model is based on the presumption that in any parliamentary democracy the par-
liament is the supreme national authority. The parliament alone makes all final deci-
sions on defence matters, including decisions on resource allocation and institutionali-
zation of control mechanisms such as budget control, hearing of petitions, the raising
of problems through parliamentary hearings, etc. These mechanisms could also in-
clude a public protector or military ombudsman who safeguards, on one hand, the par-
liamentarian and societal ownership of the national defence policy and emphasises
democratic constitutionalism within the defence force and, on the other hand, the rights
of military personnel as humans, citizens and members of the military organisation.
Box 19.2 provides an example of the classical ombudsman in defence in Norway.
5 Phasoane Mokgobu, “Determining a Role for a Military Ombudsman in the South African
National Defence Force,” African Security Review 8:1 (1999), www.iss.co.za/ASR/8NO1/
Determining.html.
6
According to materials published by The Ombudsmen’s Association (TOA), a U.S.-based
umbrella body. See also the website of the Canadian Armed Forces ombudsman,
www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca.
Box 19.2. Classical Model of an Ombudsman in Defence in Norway

An example of a classical ombudsperson in defence is the Parliamentary Ombudsman for the
Armed Forces of Norway – the world’s first parliamentary military ombudsman established in
1952. The ombudsman and the Ombudsman’s Committee are bodies of the Norwegian Par-
liament and part of its oversight and supervisory activities. The ombudsman shall safeguard
the rights of all members (and former members) of the armed forces. Anyone who feels that he
or she has been wrongly, unjustly or unreasonably treated can bring his or her case before the
ombudsman. The Ombudsman’s Committee is required to submit annual reports to parliament
but may address a matter to parliament at any time. The ombudsman acts as an advisor to the
parliament and the Ministry of Defence on matters within his sphere of competence. In its role
as independent military oversight mechanism the Ombudsman’s Committee inspects military
units stationed at home and abroad. The ombudsman submits inspection reports with proper
recommendations to the minister of defence and the chief of defence.
The ombudsman may address or take actions of his own initiative in any matter which
comes to his attention. He is empowered to deal with cases involving all authorities, has ac-
cess to all documents and information and may hear witnesses and experts. The ombudsman
is impartial and independent of the minister of defence, the Ministry of Defence and the military
authorities.
Source: Website of the Norwegian ombudsman for AF, www.ombudsmann.no/mil/english.asp.
Despite some variations in name, classical ombuds institutions for defence share
some essential characteristics:
• To protect people’s rights, the ombudsman function is created by law and the
ombudsperson is appointed by the legislative body that provides strong legal
safeguards for their independence and confidentiality of records.
• The ombudsperson has the power to investigate whether the government, in-
cluding the Ministry of Defence (MoD) performs its functions contrary to the
law or against public moral norms.
• The ombudsperson makes proposals and issues recommendations to the
government for changing or initiating actions (including legal actions) to elimi-
nate unfair and improper institutional performance.
• He or she makes the results of its activities public possession and initiates
non-governmental and media pressure for administrative or legislative correc-
tive action.
In all cases, the ombudsman institution must be impartial, non-partisan and non-
political. But inevitably the ombudsperson is an actor in the political arena.7 He/she is
7 In this case, the political arena consists of political parties, political institutions like parlia-
ment, the government, the presidential office, non-governmental organisations and the for-
mal and informal, legal and illegal procedures they use to interact within the arena.
in a position to initiate political responses, including through introduction of new laws or

amendments, recommend dismissal of political appointees, illuminate illegal political or
administrative practices and initiate sectoral or structural institutional reforms. The
criticism of a ministry or other public authority represents a criticism against the gov-
erning option (party or coalition) and can be (mis)used by the opposition.8
The power of the classical ombudsperson in building national military identity and
integrity is not just in investigating personal cases of violation of different rights. The
ombudsperson’s role in integrity building could be considerable if he or she succeeds
to influence the political process at the stage of policy formulation, to strengthen the
legitimacy in its implementation and to provide the society with information on
achieved results. The ombudsperson would have a key role for the society and the
military if he or she contributes to establishing an environment of mutual confidence
and support.
The Institutional (Organisational) Model
The original concept of ombudsman is based on the independence of the ombudsman
from the executive powers. Historically, during the past two centuries, most govern-
ment agencies in democracies have matched the authentic ombudsman model and
role by establishing internal procedures for handling complaints from employees. The
classical concept has been modified by extending it to embrace so-called ombudsmen
appointed by the heads of the departments or agencies being complained against. On
occasion, this is seen as an alternative to the classic ombuds institution, created for
the purpose of guaranteeing the liability of complex organisations such as defence.
Such alternatives are established in order to meet specific needs of the organisation
and their terms of reference and powers are tailored to that end. Such alternatives
share some common characteristics, which clearly illustrate their specifics and limita-
tions:
• They are set up via regulations issued by the minister of defence; as a result
they do not have strong legal safeguards and autonomy guaranteed by spe-
cial legislation. In some cases such ombudspersons are only mentioned as
an element of the ministerial architecture.
• They are appointed by the minister of defence and report directly and only to
him/her, without having direct access to the legislature.
• As MoD employees, they are part of the ministerial chain of command with all
benefits and limitations stemming from that fact.
• Their reports, findings and recommendations are usually “for official use only”
or even of higher level of classification.
8 Ivan Bizjak, “The Ombudsman between Legislator, Administration and Citizen – Political An-
gle” (Copenhagen, April 2005).
• They attempt to resolve issues informally, when possible, and have the
capacity to investigate and make recommendations if necessary, but following
the established military order.
Analysts and practitioners have opposing opinions on how valuable this modified
concept is. One point of view is that by introducing the institutional ombudsperson the
idea has been distorted and distanced from the original idea and desired objectives.
Clearly, in comparison with the classical model, any institutional ombudsperson has
limited status, power and capabilities to perform his or her duties. The opposing view is
that the existence of many classical and institutional persons and offices with ombuds
functions has created an additional layer of scrutiny and transparency to what normally
occurs in the executive organisations.
In addition, the experience of different countries, being at different stages of de-
mocratic maturity and/or defence institution building, provides arguments to delineate
“strong” or “weak” versions of the institutional ombudsperson model.
Strong Institutional Ombudsman
Within the “strong” formula the ultimate goal is to create an effective and credible om-
budsman office, with a focus on the office. The principal qualities of the “strong” om-
buds office are independence and impartiality, confidentiality and capabilities (norma-
tive, resources, personnel) of performing credible review and investigations. Within this
model the initiative and responsibilities are for the ombudsman, who should not wait
for “the client” (soldier, officer, civilian employee or family member) to approach the of-
fice but monitors, studies, analyses and investigates on his or her own initiative, as
well as upon special request or order.
A strong institutional ombudsman for defence exists when it has been established
by law with the presumption to exercise control and provide feedback over: 1) defence
policy, taken as a whole; 2) defence resource management; 3) performance of the
armed forces; and 4) personnel ethos, rights and freedoms. Box 19.3 presents an
example based on the experience of the Netherlands. This should be a large and
functionally powerful office, usually led by an inspector general, placed outside the
military command system and reporting directly to the minister of defence. All military
and civilian personnel, as well as all functions performed by the MoD and the armed
forces, should be under his or her oversight. The inspector general could make inves-
tigations and produce recommendations following orders, pursuing signals or on their
own initiative. They are vested with considerable power and authority and there is a
clear correlation between their ability to ascertain the facts and their credibility within
their fields.
Within the concept of the so called Integrated Ministry of Defence, where the ad-
ministrative and defence staff are organisationally and functionally integrated under the
shared leadership and control of a senior civilian administrator and a chief of defence,
the role and responsibilities of the inspector general’s office are much larger than
those of the ombudsman, who is focused mainly on people’s complains. Such design
Box 19.3. The Inspector General as a Strong Institutional Ombudsman

An example of a strong institutional ombudsman is the inspector general of the Netherlands
Armed Forces. He works outside the chain of command and reports directly to the minister of
defence. He has a mandate to: inform and make recommendations to the minister on request
or on his own initiative on matters relating to the armed forces, in addition to instituting investi-
gations into, or fulfilling the role of mediator and adjudicator, matters relating to individual
armed forces personnel or former personnel, these being submitted to him in writing by, or on
behalf of, the person in question or his next of kin. His functions include giving advice, mediat-
ing at later stages in proceedings, networking and bringing any problems to the attention of
those who can solve them. The two fundamentals of his office are independence and confiden-
tiality. The inspector general has wide ranging investigative powers, including the right to ac-
cess any place or document belonging to the armed forces, as well as the power to summon
any armed forces personnel to a hearing.
Source: National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman, The Way Forward: Ombudsmen Models.
of a defence agency is based on clear conceptual distinction between political, man-

agement and command functions and maximum integration of civilian and military ex-
pertise. To work properly, such a system vitally needs internal checks and balances
designed to guarantee both the quality of advice and the quality of the relationship
between civilians and military. In order to cope with such a challenge, the inspector
general, in addition to his or her principal functions to ensure that no one suffers injus-
tice while serving in the armed forces or working for the MoD, has the role of serving
as “an internal independent audit” office. Such expansion of the ombudsman model
has extremely great value for preventing and fighting corruption especially in sensitive
areas such as defence acquisition and procurement, resource allocation and man-
agement. Organisationally and in terms of resources, it has to be a large and very ca-
pable office, placed outside the military chain of command and directly subordinated to
the minister of defence.
Weak Institutional Ombudsman
In its “weak” version, the institutional ombudsman assists the client to develop, and
then pursue, his or her own options to resolve problems. The onus is on the “client”
(soldier, officer, civilian employee, business entity, citizen, etc.). This is a much dis-
torted concept of the ombudsman – it looks more like an administrative “office of griev-
ances” than an institution for defending democracy and human rights. It has some
value for the people in defence and could be used to counter corruption but has rather
limited value for the development of defence as an effective and democratic, transpar-
ent and accountable institution, for the society of free and active citizens, and for the
parliament as a centre for democratic development and control of the executive “on
behalf of the people.” Typical functions of this model often include only “check-up,”
Box 19.4. The Model of “Weak” Institutional Ombudsman: An Example

An example of an “ombudsman-like” institution is The Inspectorate of the Minister of Defence
of the Czech Republic (which is also the case in other countries—former members of the War-
saw Pact). This is the supreme internal inspection body of the Ministry of Defence responsible
for the performance of inspection operations within the Czech military, excluding the inspection
of financial operations. The inspectorate cooperates with national-level inspection authorities,
such as the Supreme Audit Office of the Czech Republic, the Public Defender of Rights – Om-
budsman, with Czech authorities with jurisdiction over criminal prosecution and the National
Security Authority. The inspectorate coordinates the anti-corruption strategy within the military
and provides coordination in the implementation of anti-corruption measures. It is also respon-
sible for investigations into the causes of air crashes. The inspectorate is headed by a director,
who reports to the minister of defence.
Source: Website of the Czech Republic Ministry of Defence, www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=7152.
listening, providing information, reframing issues, referring, advice, looking into a

problem, formal mediation, proposing changes in certain practices, and monitoring and
upward referral of trends.9
There are differences in the specific application of this model but one single feature
is common to each: the ombudsman’s duty is to ensure that the public authorities meet
the requirement of lawful administration and respect for the individual rights of citi-
zens.10
The Ombudsman Role for Building Integrity and Reducing
Corruption Risks in Defence
Corruption is the antithesis of good governance, which is widely recognised to be es-
sential to economic development.11 The old and enduring view, with deep roots in
some defence establishments, is that corruption is “just another business expense,
normal for the market economy and those who want to make business with defence
should pay it. Everybody does it!” In fact, corruption leads to poor performance with
long-term implications not only for the character of the armed forces but for the nation
as a whole. Corruption in defence is one of today’s most serious moral challenges.
9 These are the “ten points” as quoted in The Ombudsmen Association literature.
10
Michael Lunn, The Ombudsman between Legislator, Administration and Citizen –
Developing the Ombudsman Concept, speech on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the
Danish ombudsman’s institution, 1.
11 As the prominent analyst of the Bulgarian transition towards democracy, Dr. Ivan Krastev
once said in a TV interview, “Public officials take bribes because they do not have a reason
not to take bribes. Private companies give bribes because they do not have an option not to
give.”
Despite the specifics of individual countries, corruption could be named a common

reason for some spectacular failures in defence acquisition, sales of real estate and
property management, drafting into and dismissal from military service and even in
some aspects of structural reforms.
The defence decision-making process is based on and passes through the
political, administrative and military sectors where: (1) military experts determine
operational doctrines and required capabilities; (2) civilian managers and politicians
make decisions on resource allocation, material acquisition, arms trade and
organisational development; and (3) civilian defence agencies organise the acquisition
of public tenders and provide services. Every sector along this process is susceptible
to corruption.
Moreover, from a socio-political point of view, every potentially corrupt decision of a
civilian minister runs up against the social “cost of politics,” confuses the image of the
politicians transferring them from a symbol of democracy into “business politicians,”
creates a gap in military confidence and the political leadership (notwithstanding sus-
picions that their military colleagues are also engaged), and forms the impression that
every political party is surrounded by its own “ring of companies.” At the same time,
every engagement of the military in corrupt activities damages the internal ethos and
morale of the people in uniform, public prestige and the national value of the defence
institution. In one sentence, corruption destroys the cohesion of the national integrity
system, including its military pillar.
John McMillan, the commonwealth and defence force ombudsman of Australia,
based on his comprehensive experience argues, “Fighting corruption is not the main or
even a major function of Ombudsman offices. They do not have the intrusive powers
that are needed for that purpose, such as the power to conduct covert surveillance,
intercept telephone calls, and arrest suspects for questioning. Those functions are also
resource intensive and beyond the capacity of most Ombudsman offices. Rather, the
core function of Ombudsman offices is twofold: to handle complaints from members of
the public about shortcomings in government decision-making and service delivery;
and to conduct occasional own-motion investigations into systemic problems occurring
either across government or in specific agencies.”12
Nevertheless, the role of the ombudsman institution within a holistic approach
against corrupt practices has the following values and capabilities:
• The very existence of an ombudsman office and the fact that every man and
woman in the defence establishment has the right to communicate to him or
her any problem created by decisions or their performance is a strong argu-
ment for those in political, administrative or command power to act lawfully
and with integrity.
12 John McMillan’s speaking notes for the U.N. Conference on Anti-Corruption Measures, Good
Governance and Human Rights, Poland, 8-9 November 2006.
• The establishment of an office within a defence institution, independent from

the command hierarchy, creates a sense of alternativeness in case someone
thinks that corruption is possible or it is a fact. People in defence have an op-
tion and know that the requirements to follow strict organisational procedures
do not oblige them to keep quiet when witnessing corrupt behaviour.
• The easy accessibility of the ombudsperson provides opportunities to deal
with “minor” cases of corruption that usually are left outside judiciary, admin-
istrative or military sanctions. However, such minor cases are often the vi-
ruses that after not so long make even solid systems like defence rotten.
• The potential of the ombuds office to examine all defence decision-making
processes, which in practice means most of the government, systematically
and unpredictably, having a potentially large number of sources of informa-
tion, is a permanent reminder to those engaged that their work is monitored
from inside and outside and every indication of corruption, or potential corrup-
tion, could trigger alarm at any stage of the decision-making or implementa-
tion processes.
• The access of the ombudsperson to classified documents and facilities is a
strong deterrence factor against falsifying documents, evidence and proce-
dures in attempts to facilitate corruption.
• The capacity of the ombudsperson to make his work public and announce all
names of political, military and civilian personnel engaged in corrupt or other
illegal practices, with no exemption, is a warning to every servant to stay
away from corruption unless they are willing to risk their career and honour.
• The fact that every citizen, not only defence personnel, has the right to attract
the attention of the office of the ombudsperson for defence creates an impor-
tant sense of integrity between society (consumers of security and stake-
holders of national defence) and the military, which is one of the pillars of
consolidated national integrity.
Thus, the ombudsman for defence plays an important role in keeping the institution
healthy, improving its governance and performance and systematically developing the
ethos and morale of the people in defence in accordance with the highest professional
standards and the maturity of the social and national integrity. As John McMillan has
underlined, “Many ombudsman offices see themselves as a champion of complaint
handling principles, freedom of information, and whistleblower protection. Those are
part of the fabric of democratic values that can strengthen a system of government and
act as a barrier and disincentive to corrupt and damaging practices.”13
One noteworthy lesson from worldwide experience in fighting corruption is that a
multifaceted strategy combining political, social and economic reforms with strength-
ening the national integrity system is likely to be more successful than piecemeal anti-
13 Ibid.
corruption measures, despite how decisive and crucial they are.14 Hence, the
establishment of an ombuds institution for defence is an important component of any
anti-corruption strategy. Worldwide, no two models are identical (see Box 19.5 for an
example of a very specific implementation of the ombudsman concept). An ombuds-
man model will only be successful in its implementation if it is tailored to meet the de-
mand leading to its creation. Nevertheless, some principal considerations drawn from
positive experience of defence ombudsmen from different countries and of various
models could be considered when a country or a defence institution designs its om-
budsman institution:
• Vision: The introduction of a defence (or military) ombudsman should per-
suade the society and the defence establishment that the national authorities
(parliament, government, the head of state and the judicial system) operate in
a fair, effective, accountable and transparent manner strictly within the con-
stitutional framework and in accordance with democratic and national moral
values. Achieving and sustaining mutual confidence is vital for the civil-mili-
tary relations in the country and for the national security sector. Confidence
as perception is the faith in the system and its ability to successfully manage
national security, the defence establishment and any type of crisis.
• Role: The role of defence ombudsman should be to contribute to the strength-
ening of the identity and character of the military, defence civilians and the
political leadership of national defence. In that respect, the ombudsperson
has the role of a consensus-builder through dialog, mutual respect and inten-
sive and inclusive communion of broadly shared goals and purpose.
• Mission: The principal mission of the ombudsperson is to contribute to
enhancing the credibility and performance of defence political leadership,
administration and command, since strengthening identity and integrity re-
quires a proven record of accomplishments. The ombudsman office safe-
guards the society in its relations with the Ministry of Defence and the armed
forces. It contributes to correcting administrative deficiencies through inde-
pendent review of complaints about the ministry’s administrative actions, fos-
tering good public administration that is accountable, lawful, fair, transparent
and responsive, assisting people to resolve complaints about government
administrative action, developing policies and principles for accountability, re-
viewing statutory compliance by agencies, etc. But the mission of the om-
budsman is not to replace or oppose decision making by the government,
Ministry of Defence or the armed forces. Rather, the ombudsman institution
exists to encourage those agencies, and civilian and military leaders within its
jurisdiction, to be aware of their responsibilities to society, military and civilian
personnel, to act reasonably, and to ensure that they comply with the law and
14 Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr John Kpundeh, Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for Building
National Integrity (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999).
best practices in administration, and respect the traditional military ethos. The
ombudsman for defence shall work to develop the country’s defence organi-
sation into an organisation that is shared and beneficial for all members of the
community.
Box 19.5. Implementing the Concept of Ombudsman in Enhancing the Integrity

of Defence Acquisition
Since 2006, Korea has operated the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration (DAPA). It
was established following extensive problems with integrity and corruption in defence acquisi-
tions in the past, and under pressure from civil society on the need for fundamental reform to
introduce transparency.
In 2003, a special committee was launched to prepare the fundamental reform to defence
procurement. DAPA was launched in January 2006 with the backing of a new law. It was
tasked to deal with defence acquisition and procurement, with a vision to enhancing transpar-
ency, efficiency, expertise and accountability in the process. DAPA was established with a 50
percent civilian staff, which was important as the first movement into a previously untouchable
or even “divine” area of government. Inviting civil society to participate in this was also a further
achievement in Korea.
The tools available to DAPA included a programme execution committee, Integrity Pacts,
ombudsman programmes, and “real name” policies. Three civilian ombudsmen were appointed
under recommendations by Transparency International Korea, PSPD, and the Board of Audit
and Inspection. The principles of activity for the ombudsman are independence, continuity,
participatory process, transparency and neutrality. The ombudsman group holds weekly meet-
ings, makes recommendations and corrections and publishes results.
The DAPA ombudsman system was the first in Korea to be based on law and the first case
of participation of civil society in monitoring defence procurement. Changes are beginning to be
made to old practices for the first time, with the possibility of cooperation raised.
The lessons from this process have been the following:
1. Civil society participation is possible and important in each step
2. External, participatory monitoring is crucial for enhancing integrity
3. Engagement of experts is also very important to build confidence in investigation re-
sults
4. A non-confrontational and cooperative attitude is a key factor to draw voluntary
change
5. Sustaining change is as important and as difficult as achieving it.
Source: Based on the presentation of Sung-Goo Kang, Secretary-General of Transparency International

Korea and Representative Ombudsman at the Defence Acquisition Programme Administration in Korea to
the NATO Building Integrity conference in Monterey, California, 25-27 February 2009.
• Functions and powers: Despite the selected model, the main function of the
defence ombudsman shall be to investigate any and every kind of complaint
made against the civil service. The primary outcome from this function is not
exclusively to identify a violation of law or rights but to contribute to estab-
lishing cohesion within the defence organization and throughout society. Co-
hesion means unity of purpose in achieving common goals.
If the country’s expectations are high, the model chosen should be close to
the classical model where the defence ombudsman is empowered to investi-
gate all spheres of government and the public sector, including those related
to the provision and use of materiel and services. Military service, foreign re-
lations issues, military courts, state wartime reserves, military health and rec-
reation services, among others, fall within the scope of the ombudsman’s re-
sponsibility. The ombudsman’s principal duty shall be to oversee and ensure
the observance of constitutional rights and legal requirements within all sec-
tors of the defence organisation, whether they originate from within the MoD
or the armed forces, defence industries or civil society. The defence om-
budsman can investigate complaints about administrative actions and force
employment matters but usually cannot investigate actions related to discipli-
nary proceedings or the grant or refusal of an honour or award to an individ-
ual. Unless under exceptional circumstances, he or she investigates com-
plaints from serving members only after they have exhausted internal griev-
ance mechanisms.
If the country’s ambitions are to have a strong institutional ombudsman, in
order to be effective, he or she should be provided with legally determined in-
dependence and impartiality, confidentiality and a credible review and investi-
gative process. Given this intent, the defence ombudsman should be able to
initiate investigations, should also be required to investigate complaints and
shall be bound to investigate any case where persons pursue unlawful ends
within the scope of their jurisdiction, make arbitrary or unreasonable deci-
sions, or otherwise commit mistakes or acts of negligence in the discharge of
their duties.
The functions of the weak institutional ombudsman shall be determined in
a way that provides for work more with people until their problems are solved,
thus closing the gap between “the office and the client.”
A common denominator of different models of ombudsman’s powers in-
cludes, but is not limited to the following powers:15 to investigate, on complaint
or on the ombudsman’s own initiative, any administrative act of the MoD with-
out regard to the finality of the administrative act; to undertake, participate in
or cooperate with persons and agencies in such conferences, inquiries,
meetings, or studies which might improve the functioning of the MoD and the
15 Adopted from United States Ombudsman Association, Model Ombudsman Act for State
Governments (Dayton, Ohio, February 1997).
armed forces or lessen the risks that objectionable administrative acts will in-
cur; to make such inquiries and obtain such assistance and information from
any person or defence unit; to enter and inspect without prior notice the
premises of any unit; to subpoena any person to appear, to give sworn testi-
mony or to produce documentary or other evidence that is reasonably rele-
vant to the matters under investigation; to maintain the confidentiality of any
matter related to complaints and investigations; and to prepare and adminis-
ter a budget for the office of the ombudsman.
• Values:16 Independence and impartiality are the hallmarks of the ombudsman
institution – they are the foundation upon which this office must be built. Inde-
pendence is needed to ensure actual and perceived impartiality and to estab-
lish a close relationship between the ombudsman and the minister. The integ-
rity of the ombudsman is in his or her steadfast adherence to a strict moral or
ethical code of conduct – his or her behaviour should convince the people in
defence that their loyalty should be towards the state and its democratic po-
litical system, which will protect their rights and their earned privileges, thus
enabling them to apply their efforts in a positive and responsible manner. The
ombudsman shall be easily accessible to the military and civil servants, as
well as to citizens and business people. He or she must have access to any
military camp, division, unit and other work environment, to call for and have
access to any and all documents pertinent to a case being investigated, with
a guarantee that no documents may be withheld. Confidentiality should help
the ombudsperson win people’s reliance on the institution. The role of the
ombuds office requires utmost professionalism by everyone on staff; their
professional work strengthens the professionalism in defence institutions and
generally in the government. The ombudsperson should be politically neutral;
furthermore, he or she cannot be aligned with any formal or informal associa-
tion within the organisation in a way that might create actual or perceived
conflict of interest or compromise the neutrality of the ombuds office.
• Appointment: Despite which model is implemented, the ombudsperson should
be appointed through consultations involving at least the minister of defence
and the relevant committee of the parliament. One of the powers of this com-
mittee is to ask not only the minister but the senior leadership and every sin-
gle service man and woman to testify on particular issues.
• Staffing: Different ombudsman offices have adopted various models of staff-
ing, particularly when dealing with the issue of balancing the need for inde-
pendent civilian personnel against the need for military knowledge and ex-
perience. The German parliamentary commissioner for the armed forces has
16 Values could also be explained as “standards.” See: International Ombudsman Association,

International Ombudsman Association Best Practices (A Supplement to IOA’s Standards of
Practice), Version 2 (March 31, 2008).
the authority to select staff members. The office has a staff of approximately
60 persons and roughly half are higher-intermediate and higher service per-
sonnel, directly concerned with the review of matters brought to the attention
of the commissioner.17 The Australian Defence Force ombudsman is staffed
by members of the Australian Public Service. There are no military personnel
involved in reviews by the ombuds office. In the Netherlands, the inspector
general’s office employs 16 military personnel and 13 civilians, while the posi-
tions of inspector general and chief of staff rotate among the three services.18
• Transparency and accountability: There should be an obligation to inform the
appointing authority and the public of the activities of the ombudsman. The
ombudsman, at least annually, should report generally on the activities of the
office to the ombudsman’s appointing authority, other policymakers and the
public.19 The list could also include a range of brochures and information
sheets available to the public, better practice guides to orient people and
agencies on how to deal with the ombudsman’s office, inspection reports of
duty service in the MoD and the armed forces, investigation reports of ad-
ministrative actions of the MoD and the armed forces, an ombudsman’s web-
site and e-bulletins that describe recent case studies of finalised complaints
where lessons of interest to a wider audience can be drawn, posters explain-
ing the ombudsman’s role and services, ombudsman’s submissions to a par-
liamentary committee, and others.20
Conclusion
Ombudsman institutions are one of the key components of “horizontal” accountability
of the state political, executive and security systems. The appointment of an ombuds-
person for defence should serve to safeguard against any improper actions by the de-
fence political, administrative or commanding body, the government or the public ad-
ministration, while at the same time ensuring that the rights and duties of military per-
sonnel, civilian employees and civil society comply with democratic norms and values.
The flexibility of the ombudsman model means that integrity in defence can be
promoted in numerous ways – through investigations, reports, public speeches, par-
17 Karl Gleumes, The Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces: Her Role in
Exercising Parliamentary Control over the Federal Armed Forces and Processing Petitions
from Service Personnel, 17.
18 See the website (www.ombudsman.forces.gc.ca) of the ombudsman of the Canadian De-
fence Forces.
19 Most offices issue a report annually that describes the work of the previous year: the number
of inquiries, the number of cases resolved informally, cases investigated and investigations
pending, recommendations made and whether or not they were followed.
20 The list is based on the experience of Australian, Canadian, German, Norwegian and US
ombudsman offices.
liamentary submissions and meetings with senior government managers. In any case,
this shall be an office that independently receives and investigates allegations of
maladministration.
In order to be effective for strengthening national and defence integrity, the om-
budsman institution and its function should be established by law, protected from arbi-
trary removal or censure, provided with adequate budget and non-partisan staffing and
should be easily accessible to every defence person and citizen. Thus, it will compel
executives to respect and act on recommendations, including those addressing integ-
rity building in defence.
Chapter 20
The Defence Industry as an Ally in
Reducing Corruption
For an anti-corruption regime to function effectively, the defence industry must be as-
sociated with it. Defence suppliers increasingly recognise the importance of corporate
social responsibility and legitimisation, associated with greater transparency. This
chapter presents the integrity policies of two major defence contractors and outlines
further measures that can be taken by the defence industry and governments to en-
hance the integrity of the defence sector.
1. Defence Industry as Part of the Solution to Reducing

Corruption: An American Perspective
Some argue that corruption in certain marketplaces is simply a cost of doing business
within that market. The implication of this premise is that efforts to fight corruption are
futile and unnecessary. One should simply accept this tax on doing business and
move on. This view ignores the very real evils of corruption. It destroys public trust in
governments and corporations, lessens the quality of products and services procured
using public funds and undermines the efficient functioning of the free marketplace.
Fortunately, this view is becoming less credible in today’s interconnected world where
large scale corruption—which in the end is almost always discovered—is publicized
and criticized to the detriment of all parties involved.
In recent years, the defence industry has been buffeted by allegations of corrupt
behaviour around the globe. This has significantly weakened confidence in an industry
that largely depends on public funds. It may seem incongruous therefore to say that a
partnership between industry and government represents the only effective means to
fight corruption. If one steps back, however, it seems logical that the problem of cor-
ruption must be attacked from both the supply side—typically the defence industry—
and the demand side—typically government agencies or personnel.
This section examines the supply side of corruption, focusing on best practices un-
dertaken by major defence corporations within the United States, Lockheed Martin in
particular, to ensure that business is conducted in accordance with high ethical stan-
dards.
The Defense Industry Initiative (DII)
Most of the major defence contractors within the United States belong to the DII. The
initiative was established in 1986 in response to an erosion of public confidence in the
250
The Defence Industry as an Ally in Reducing Corruption 251
industry caused by widely reported instances of fraud, waste and abuse both within in-
dustry and the Department of Defense. All DII signatories agree to adopt and adhere to
six self-governance principles, presented in Box 20.1.
Each DII signatory agrees to complete a detailed annual questionnaire relating to
their ethics programs and practices. The results of this questionnaire are compiled and
reported upon in the annual DII Public Accountability Report.1
While all members of the DII adopt their own approach to compliance with these six
principles, over time and through the sharing of best practices, the ethics programs of
major US defence contractors have come to share certain common elements.
Elements of an Effective Ethics Program
a. Codes of Ethics or Conduct
Every DII signatory has adopted a code of ethics, also referred to as a code of con-
duct. A code of conduct sets forth the values and standards that the company and its
employees are expected to uphold. To be effective, a code should reflect the com-
pany’s culture and commitment to integrity. Many codes adopted by US companies set
forth compliance standards, in addition to expressing the company’s values. DII
member codes typically include standards that address issues ranging from discrimi-
nation and harassment to business courtesies, anti-corruption and anti-kickbacks.
Lockheed Martin’s code, “Setting the Standard, Code of Ethics and Business Con-
duct,”2 has been in existence since the corporation’s beginning. The code emphasizes
Box 20.1. Self-governance Principles of the Defense Industry Initiative

1. Each signatory shall have and adhere to a written code of business conduct. The code es-
tablishes the high ethical values expected for all within the signatory’s organization.
2. Each signatory shall train all within the organization as to their personal responsibilities un-
der the code.
3. Signatories shall encourage internal reporting of violations of the code, with the promise of
no retaliation for such reporting.
4. Signatories have the obligation to self-govern by implementing controls to monitor compli-
ance with federal procurement laws and by adopting procedures for voluntary disclosure of
violations of federal procurement laws to appropriate authorities.
5. Each signatory shall have responsibility to each other to share their best practices in imple-
menting the DII principles; each signatory shall participate in an annual Best Practices Forum.
6. Each signatory shall be accountable to the public.
Source: Charter of the Defense Industry Initiative, Article III: www.dii.org.
1 The annual reports since 2003 are available on the DII website: www.dii.org.
2 Available for download at www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/corporate/documents/ethics/
setting-the-standard.pdf.
Lockheed Martin’s commitment to the highest standard of integrity and the important
role that each employee has in maintaining that commitment. It informs employees of
the values that are important to Lockheed Martin and their role in upholding those val-
ues. Every employee must certify that they have received the code, read and under-
stood it and agreed to abide by it.
Thus, for example, one section of the code entitled “Do Business Ethically Outside
the United States,” states that Lockheed Martin’s commitment to the highest standards
of ethical conduct extends globally. The code also states:
Bribery, violations of export and import laws, and participating in illegal boycotts, erode
confidence in the marketplace, undermine democracy, distort economic and social de-
velopment, and hurt everyone who depends on trust and transparency in the transaction
of business.3
This reflects Lockheed Martin’s value, “Do What’s Right.” The section goes on to
require employees to comply with the national and local laws of the countries in which
Lockheed Martin operates. The section expressly directs employees to pay particular
attention to compliance with anti-corruption laws, including those adopted under the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials and the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
among other international anti-bribery conventions.4
b. Formal Ethics Organizations
Most large US defence contractors have formal ethics organizations that manage and
implement the company’s ethics program. Formal ethics programs help ensure that a
company’s code of conduct is meaningful. Typically, such a program serves at least
two critically important functions: (1) communication, training and outreach with re-
spect to the company’s values, commitment to the code, and compliance; and (2) en-
forcement of the code.
When fulfilling its communications and outreach efforts, the organization basically
is seeking to ensure that a commitment to integrity is embedded in the company’s
culture. In many ways, this is the most important function that a formal ethics program
can fulfil. The most effective means to prevent misconduct or corruption is to ensure
that you create a culture where all employees understand that they will be held ac-
countable for their improper actions.
A culture of integrity will not take root, however, if employees believe that the or-
ganization’s values and code are mere words on paper and do not represent how the
company really operates. Therefore, it is very important to balance the need to protect
the privacy of employees with the need to inform them about the consequences for
those who choose to ignore the company’s code.
3 Lockheed Martin, Setting the Standard: Code of Ethics and Business Conduct (Bethesda,
MD: Lockheed Martin Corporation, October 2008), 12.
4 Ibid., 12.
The placement of the organization within the company’s governance structure is

also important. It must be high enough within the organization to reinforce the impor-
tance of ethics and integrity to the organization and to ensure its independence. In the
US, the majority of ethics programs report to the company’s General Counsel, or di-
rectly to the CEO. Most also have established lines of reporting and/or communication
with the Board of Directors.
Finally, the most effective ethics organizations have full or part time ethics officers
embedded within their major lines or business. Ethics officers represent the human
face of the ethics organization and are available for consultation and guidance, as well
as to investigate instances of alleged misconduct. By being embedded within the busi-
ness, ethics officers can also proactively offer guidance while business is being con-
ducted.
At Lockheed Martin, the ethics organization reports to the chairman, CEO and
president of Lockheed Martin, as well as to the Board of Directors. The organization
has more than sixty-five full and part-time ethics officers who are embedded within the
lines of business.
c. Hotlines, Helplines or Reporting Channels
An essential element of most US ethics programs is a means by which an employee
can report their concerns to, or ask for guidance from, the ethics organization. Most
US ethics programs have established many different avenues for employees to report
their concerns, or seek guidance on ethical issues. These include in-person visits to
ethics officers, sending e-mails directly to a particular ethics officer or to a corporate
ethics e-mail box, posting on a designated website, or sending faxes or letters. The
most important reporting channel, however, is a hotline or helpline. Typically, this is a
toll-free phone number, which connects employees directly to the ethics organization.
Such hotlines generally allow employees to report their concerns anonymously if they
do not want to identify themselves. They also have an established means by which an
employee who leaves an anonymous report can call the same hotline and receive an
update on the ethics organization’s investigation into their concerns.
Effective reporting channels ensure that employees who observe misconduct or
feel pressure to participate in corruption have an avenue to ensure that their concerns
are heard and resolved. To be effective, the company must strongly reinforce the fact
that it will not permit retaliation against employees who avail themselves of these re-
porting channels in good faith. Fear of retaliation is one of the primary reasons that
employees do not report their concerns to the company.
d. Training and Outreach
Most US ethics programs also include compliance training and training on the com-
pany’s code of conduct. Compliance training is focused training that addresses par-
ticular areas of regulatory or legal risk a particular company faces in its industry. Code
of conduct training, called “awareness training” at Lockheed Martin, may include com-
pliance issues, but focuses more on a company’s values, culture and ethical decision
making. Neither compliance training nor code of conduct training attempts to turn em-
ployees into experts on particular laws or regulations. They are designed to raise
awareness and help employees understand when they should seek guidance before
acting.
At Lockheed Martin, employees are assigned computer-based compliance training
based on the function they perform within the organization. For example, we do not re-
quire a mechanic who works on an airplane to take export/import training because
their day-to-day responsibilities do not require them to know about this topic. All em-
ployees, on the other hand, are required to take the labour course because, as a US
government contractor, this is an area about which all employees must be knowledge-
able. In addition, each required compliance course must be repeated periodically –
every one or two years. Finally, provision is made for those employees who do not
have access to a computer or have special needs.
Awareness training is provided annually. Unlike the computer-based compliance
training, the majority of Lockheed Martin’s awareness training is delivered in person by
the employee’s leader. This is accomplished using a cascading process whereby Bob
Stevens, Lockheed Martin’s chairman, CEO and president, trains his staff, they train
their staff, and on down through the organization until all employees are trained. The
training generally takes an hour and is based on video scenarios and participative
dialogue around the issues presented.
e. Communication
Effective ethics programs also expend significant effort on innovative communications
vehicles to ensure all employees remember the importance of upholding the com-
pany’s ethical standards. Companies use newsletters, e-mail messages, posters,
postcards and websites to deliver target messages throughout the year relating to
ethics and integrity. Creative communication vehicles engage employee’s attention
often better than required training. Many companies in the US increasingly are using
technology to develop new means to deliver ethics messages to their employees. For
example, companies are posting video vignettes of ethical dilemmas on YouTube and
blogging about ethical dilemmas or current events involving ethical successes or fail-
ures.
At Lockheed Martin, Integrity Minute is the most popular communication vehicle
that the ethics organization employs. The Lockheed Martin Integrity Minute is a short
series of videos that are e-mailed to Lockheed Martin employees to complement an-
nual awareness training by reinforcing ethics, diversity and Full Spectrum Leadership
messages throughout the year. Lockheed Martin releases three Integrity Minute series
each year. They are specifically targeted to trends that are observed in the workplace.
Each series highlights important topics such as the proper conduct of international
business, harassment, conflicts of interest, discrimination and other instances of em-
ployee misconduct. The scenarios are presented in two minute segments over the
course of three weeks. The first two segments end with a cliff hanger and invite em-
ployees to tune in for the next week’s segment to learn what happens.
Specific Techniques to Fight Corruption

Backed by a strong ethics program which ensures that integrity is part of the fabric of
our company’s culture, the following is a summary of certain targeted techniques that
Lockheed Martin has found effective in combating corruption:
• Code of Conduct sections dealing with anti-corruption, the giving and receiv-
ing of business courtesies and conflicts of interest.
• Detailed company policies that address kickbacks, business courtesies and
conflicts of interest.
• Country-specific hospitality guidelines that establish appropriate limits for
business courtesies in the countries where we operate. This guidance is eas-
ily available to our employees.
• Regular reports are required of any business courtesies that exceed the
hospitality guidelines and for any facilitation payments made.
• Compliance and code of conduct training specifically addressing the com-
pany’s anti-corruption policies.
• Audits of all aspects of our anti-corruption efforts.
• Rigorous due diligence is performed on all third-party agents and consultants
in advance of engaging such individuals. Due diligence includes, at a mini-
mum, a review of public source information, reference checks, inquiry with in-
country embassies and a face-to-face interview.
• Third-party agents and consultants are required to abide by Setting the Stan-
dard, Lockheed Martin’s Code of Conduct and, more specifically, Lockheed
Martin’s anti-corruption standards.
• Agreements with third-party agents and consultants are subject to periodic re-
view, including repeated due diligence.
2. Policy of Integrity: The Example of a European Defence

Contractor
Over recent years, major international companies have come to recognise that strict
ethical standards and compliance with international laws and regulations have to be an
integral part of their strategic vision. Responding to major changes in the global eco-
nomic and geopolitical context and the increasingly global scope of their operations,
companies have taken a long, hard look at the way they conduct aspects of their busi-
ness ranging from human resource management to marketing and sales, industrial
operations and stakeholder relations. Adopting its corporate responsibility policy in
2001, Thales was one of the first European companies to formally embrace these
changes.
A Complex, Changing Environment

Throughout its history, Thales has successfully adapted to changes in its environment.
Ongoing transformations in the institutional framework governing the “sovereignty in-
dustry” in the early 21st century are at least as significant as any of these other
changes.
Thales and the businesses it has acquired in other countries (the United Kingdom,
Netherlands, Australia, etc.) operated for decades in a strictly national framework and
under close state control. As the main customer and sometimes even a shareholder,
the state was also involved in setting corporate strategy, funding research and devel-
opment, granting export clearances and other aspects of the business.
Now that Thales is a “multidomestic” company, it no longer operates within a sin-
gle, clearly defined and consistent national framework but rather in a strategic space
with global dimensions. In this new context, tasks such as managing human resources
or international business transactions are becoming ever more complex.
As global as they have become, the company’s businesses still rely on technolo-
gies that are sensitive, strategic and central to the national sovereignty of each state.
This structural contradiction presents many challenges both to transnational compa-
nies and their regulators, and calls for a different set of management methods based
on innovative concepts of corporate governance.
More Transparency and Traceability
Adding to the complexity of this international economic environment, international or-
ganisations and national lawmakers continue to make new regulations and pass new
laws, not always consistently, while stakeholders from civil society, including non-gov-
ernmental organisations, continue to demand new and higher standards from the busi-
ness community.
In the absence of a global model of governance, the sheer number and complexity
of these different rules and requirements make the business environment even more
incoherent – particularly considering that certain “soft law” codes and standards, many
of them British or American in origin, are at odds with the legal systems of other coun-
tries. With increasingly globalised business and a complex legislative and normative
context set by multiple bodies, demand for transparency is constantly growing, forcing
companies to bring a much greater degree of openness and traceability to their busi-
ness processes.
Ethical Management
As pressure on governance practices mounts around the world, the sphere of influ-
ence of public bodies—the only bodies with the power to enact “hard law”—is gradually
diminishing because no hard law is perfectly aligned with economic realities for very
long. Frequent revisions and amendments are needed to make laws more specific but
the more they are revised, the more obscure they tend to become. As a result, there is
a growing tendency for lawmakers to lay down little more than basic legislative princi-
ples, leaving it up to companies to define their own codes, baselines and standards of
ethical conduct. The concept of ethics and corporate responsibility starts where the law
ends.
This shift in the governance framework places greater responsibility on companies,
directly impacting their management processes and business models. Several years
ago, Thales established a comprehensive policy on ethics and corporate responsibility
as part of its efforts to adapt to these new conditions. In a restrictive legal and norma-
tive framework, managers are constantly required to make choices about the applica-
bility of different standards. They have to strike a balance between minimum effort and
optimum effort, weighing up their options to determine the best way to ensure sustain-
able growth and profitability over the long term. These choices are a key part of the
manager’s responsibility and they become more difficult as the number of stakeholders
increases and as their demands become more specific.
Management also has to embrace and reconcile the moral expectations of all com-
pany employees, whose cultural backgrounds and traditions clearly become more di-
verse as the company expands its international footprint. To manage companies effec-
tively in this globalised context, it is important to move from the implicit to the explicit,
from oral tradition to written requirements, from discretionary decision making to be-
haviours governed by accepted best practices. A new management paradigm has
emerged.
Risk Management
Any business undertaking involves a degree of risk. However, worldwide flows of sen-
sitive technologies, growing legal complexity, new societal demands and ever more
intense competition make it more important than ever before to identify and manage
risks. In addition, the civil and criminal liability of companies and their leadership teams
is being called into question more frequently as the business world becomes more liti-
gious.
As a result, and in light of its sectors of activity, Thales’s corporate responsibility
policy is based not only on in-depth analysis of the risks of non-compliance but on
rules of ethical conduct and integrity that are upheld by the company’s most senior
management bodies and communicated systematically to all employees. This ap-
proach boosts management awareness of the issues involved and provides a com-
pany-wide framework of continuous improvement that configures the development of
the policy measures already in place.
Tailored Processes
Thales believes that doing business responsibly means, first and foremost, complying
with international trade regulations and, in particular, taking measures to avoid exports
of sensitive technologies and defence equipment to countries classified as risks,
thereby helping address the challenges posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and global terrorism. Internal control procedures are being reinforced
throughout the company to combat corruption as effectively as possible, in a sector
where transactions represent considerable sums of money and may involve countries
with little concern for ethical practices.
Rigorous Procedures to Prevent Corruption
A coherent set of directives and strict procedures for delegating responsibilities is in
place to ensure compliance with national and international anti-bribery laws. In par-
ticular, measures have been taken to ensure that operating units do not independently
enter into contractual relationships with agents or external service providers to facili-
tate international business transactions. All resources supporting export sales and
marketing efforts of operating units are managed by dedicated organisations, particu-
larly by Thales International. These are the only organisations accredited by the com-
pany to handle these complex issues in their strict regulatory framework. This policy
improves the efficiency of Thales’s sales and marketing efforts and assures strict
monitoring of the compliance of its international commercial transactions.
The procedures and directives apply to all external service providers, including in-
dividuals, consultancy firms and companies, that support Thales in marketing and
sales operations involving public as well as private customers. Eligible consultants
must be recognised as experts in their fields at the regional or international level.
Stringent selection procedures are applied: a detailed application questionnaire must
be completed, copies of company registrations and all other official documents, par-
ticularly annual reports, must be provided, and senior management must undertake to
apply all legislation relating to ethical conduct in international trade. All this information
is analysed and validated by an outside body. Risk factors are flagged when informa-
tion provides grounds for closer investigation and referral to a higher level of manage-
ment for a decision. Certain types of information are classified as “show stoppers” and
bring the selection process to an immediate halt. Payments for these services are also
subject to stringent procedures. For example, transfers may not be made to a financial
establishment located in a tax haven, and all payments must correspond to an actual
service and reflect the exact type of service provided.
All these procedures are laid down in the Best Practices Handbook developed and
approved by Thales corporate management. A continuous improvement process is in
place to increase both the exhaustiveness of the procedures and the measures taken
to enforce them.
Development of Best Practices
A company is at risk if its competitors are able to meet minimum legal requirements by
making less ethical choices. A sector-wide approach is therefore needed so that com-
mon standards can be developed and adopted as best practice by all companies,
thereby restoring a level playing field. Thales was involved in launching just such an
initiative within the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD).
Ethics and Corporate Responsibility at Thales

Thales corporate management recognises that an effective compliance policy needs to
extend beyond international marketing and sales transactions to include all of the
company’s operations. The Thales ethics and corporate responsibility policy is an-
chored in a Code of Ethics issued to each employee, and in a number of company-
wide sets of processes and procedures dealing with commercial, environmental, la-
bour and societal issues. A dedicated organisation has also been established, with an
Ethics and Corporate Responsibility Committee setting Thales policy and a dedicated
corporate department in charge of implementing that policy. Local implementation—at
the divisional and country level—is supported by a network of ethics officers.
At the same time, large-scale awareness, information and training campaigns, in-
cluding an e-learning programme, have been developed to support employee en-
gagement across the organisation and ensure that all employees share the company’s
ethical values.
3. Further Measures to Enhance the Integrity of the Defence

Industry
Recently, major defence contractors in Western Europe and North America have made
visible progress in adopting and enforcing codes of ethics and standards of zero-toler-
ance to corruption in all its forms. Associations of these industries have embarked on
deriving lessons learned and enhancing industry standards. Box 20.2 provides an
example of activities in the framework of the Aerospace and Defence Industries Asso-
ciation of Europe (ASD).
Addressing the supply side of corruption, major contractors and defence industry
associations will continue to assess and attempt to increase the effectiveness of integ-
rity codes and standards, to engage defence suppliers, including small and medium
enterprises, and widen the geographical coverage of application. A level playing field
and fair competition can be guaranteed only through application of consistent and
harmonised standards among all exporting companies.
Prime defence contractors should also make sure that the sub-contractors, defence
consultants, lobbyists and all other sorts of intermediaries they involve adhere to the
same code of ethics, as they do. Only through full coverage of the “supply chain” may
they convincingly claim that the supply they offer is free of corruption.
Governments are advised to shortlist only those participants in tenders that have
endorsed common defence industry standards on integrity and corruption. Further-
more, they should debar defence suppliers that have used corruption in getting con-
tracts and share that information with other governments. Defence industry associa-
tions would then be expected to strip such a company of its membership status.
Box 20.2. ASD Ethics and Anti-Corruption Activities

In 2006, the CEO’s representing the companies that make up the ASD Council confirmed their
continued dedication to contribute to a marketplace free of corruptive practices, allowing all
participants in the international market to compete on an equal and fair basis.
The industry expressed its commitment to observe and apply the rules embedded in national
legislation implementing the 1997 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, as well as in other applicable law. ASD formed
an “Ethics & Anti-Corruption Working Group.” This group has conducted a benchmarking exer-
cise in order to assess present practices among participating companies. The internal codes of
ethics of the companies have been analysed by an independent lawyer, who also chairs the
Commission on Anti-Corruption of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).
These activities resulted in “Common Industry Standards for European Aerospace and De-
fence,” approved by the council in April 2007. ASD National Associations members were asked
to endorse the standards, and participating companies to sign a Company Statement of Ad-
herence. Endorsement has been requested since October 2008 and a structured process with
progress indicators to encourage and convince companies to sign up to the standards is un-
derway.
ASD, with the support of the International Chamber of Commerce, contributes to initiatives to
extend the geographical scope of its ethics and anti-corruption activities also to non-OECD
countries.
Sources: Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe, Annual Report 2007 (Brussels: ASD,
2008), 20, www.asd-europe.org; The “Common Industry Standards for European Aerospace and Defence”
is available at: www.asd-europe.org/Objects/2/Files/WEB Common Industry Standards.pdf.
International organisations such as NATO may facilitate the development of an ef-

fective, balanced and comprehensive strategy to enhance the integrity of the defence
supplier base. They may also encourage transparency in the defence industry, includ-
ing transparency of ownership, and to support defence suppliers in meeting integrity
requirements.
Only cooperation among governments and suppliers, intergovernmental organisa-
tions and industry associations can turn defence companies into reliable allies in the
common fight against the corruption potential of the defence sector.
Chapter 21
The Role of Civil Society
and the Media
Introduction
This chapter looks at the indispensable role of civil society and the media in building
integrity and reducing corruption in the defence and security sector. It considers the is-
sue of “building integrity” mainly through the lens of security sector reform (SSR), a
concept that emerged in the 1990s in response to the recognition that development
and security are two sides of the same coin and that efforts to improve security should
be carried out within a framework of strengthening democratic or good governance. In
its core, “good” governance is people-centred, equitable, accountable, and transpar-
ent. It engenders participation and consultation in planning and decision-making, ef-
fective and efficient public sector management, and actively seeks and facilitates the
involvement of civil society. In other words, good governance is legitimised by partici-
patory processes, anti-corruption efforts, and bureaucratic accountability. It empha-
sises efficient and effective use of resources and promotes the active involvement of
the private sector and the civil society to counteract vested interests.1
In 2004, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) produced, and the membership endorsed,
a policy paper that urged stakeholders to “redefine security and move the debate from
the realist version to a more comprehensive and co-operative approach.”2 The OECD
DAC describes SSR as the “transformation of the ‘security system’—which includes all
the actors, their roles, responsibilities and actions—working together to manage and
operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and
sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning secu-
rity framework.”3 In seeking to build an “institutional culture of integrity” (Chapter 24)
there would seem to be no need to reinvent the conceptual wheel: the objectives and
1 Hans Born, Philipp H. Fluri and Simon Lunn, eds.,Oversight and Guidance: The Relevance
of Parliamentary Oversight for the Security Sector and its Reform, A collection of articles on
foundational aspects of parliamentary oversight of the security sector (DCAF/NATO Parlia-
mentary Assembly, January 2003), Glossary, 240–241.
2 OECD Development Assistance Committee, Security System Reform and Governance: Pol-
icy and Good Practice (Paris: OECD, 2004).
3 OECD, Security System Reform and Governance: A DAC Reference Document (Paris:
OECD, 2005), www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf.
261
standards set out in the DAC SSR framework already largely fit the bill. What is mainly
lacking is effective implementation of existing standards by many governments, espe-
cially in relation to transparency and accountability,4 and in fully embracing the poten-
tial contribution of key stakeholders, especially civil society.
As the SSR agenda has evolved in recent years, civil society has played an im-
portant role in building the integrity of this approach and there is growing acknowl-
edgement among many states and within the United Nations that non-government ac-
tors, the media and parliamentarians can perform crucial civilian oversight and moni-
toring functions. Parliamentarians alone cannot guarantee effective oversight and hold
the government accountable for all activities and policies within the security sector
since they do not have the time, resources or expertise to do so. As the DAC de-
scribes, “the involvement of civil society in SSR programs is a precondition for wider
and more inclusive local ownership and, ultimately, sustainability.”5 As a number of
earlier chapters have indicated,6 independent oversight by civil society organisations
(CSOs) and the media is a necessary element of building integrity and is crucial to ef-
fective implementation of SSR initiatives to strengthen good governance in defence
establishments as well as address corruption risks.
Overall, however, the practical role of CSOs and the media in SSR and integrity
capacity building has been rather limited, not only in fragile or transition states (often
due to the nature of authoritarian regimes and the weakness of civil society) but also in
more advanced democratic societies and especially within the NATO alliance (where
entry points for independent civil society engagement remain restricted, as discussed
further below). This chapter aims to stimulate discussion about why this has been the
case and what needs to be done to strengthen civil society and the media’s role in
monitoring and reforming defence establishments.
It begins by separately reviewing the roles of civil society and the media and then
looks at the difficulties of applying these roles within three particular scenarios: fragile
states, transition countries and the NATO Alliance. The chapter concludes by propos-
ing some options and recommendations for protecting and enhancing the ability of civil
society and the media to build integrity and reduce the corruption potential in defence
establishments.
4 In this discussion “accountability” basically means “answerability” – the obligations to answer

questions on what has been and will be done and why. It is the definition used by William
Byrd and Stéphane Guimbert in The World Bank, “Public Finance, Security, and Develop-
ment: A Framework and an Application to Afghanistan,” Policy Research Working Paper
4806 (The World Bank South Asia Region Poverty Reduction, Economic Management, Fi-
nance and Private Sector Development Department, January 2009), footnote 11.
5 OECD, OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice
(2007).
6 See, for example, chapters 5 and 8 on national approaches and offset arrangements,
respectively. Both authors argue that civil society organisations have a role to play in ensur-
ing transparency and accountability.
The Role of Civil Society and the Media 263
The Role of Civil Society

A vibrant civil society is a basic requirement for democracy. It has the potential to
counterbalance the power of the state, resist authoritarianism and, due to its pluralism,
ensure that the state is not controlled by vested interests. In recent decades the politi-
cal space in many parts of the world, and not just within established democracies, has
been opened up by an evolving and ever-widening array of civil society groups. There
is no single agreed definition of civil society. The DAC defines “civil society” as “the
political space between the individual and the government, expressed by membership
of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), social groups, associations and other or-
ganisations and networks. Civil society organisations include NGOs at the national
level, community-based organisations, faith groups, professional and interest groups
such as trade unions, the media, private business companies, bar associations, hu-
man rights groups, independent consultants, universities and independent policy think
tanks.”7
The UN Secretary-General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil So-
ciety Relations draws a narrower description of civil society as encompassing associa-
tions of citizens (outside families, friends, government and businesses) entered into
voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas and ideologies.8 This chapter, however,
takes the three sector model, which looks at the state as consisting of the government,
the market and the citizenry, as a useful starting point to define civil society. In this
perspective, civil society constitutes the third sector, existing alongside and interacting
with the state and profit-seeking firms (including the media) in the form of social
movements, NGOs, religious bodies, women and youth groups, indigenous peoples’
organisations, professional associations, academic centres, unions, etc., that operate
in individual countries or transnationally.
This definition of civil society excludes profit-making businesses (including most of
the mainstream media) and organisations within the governmental sector. However, as
will become clear, the boundaries between the three sectors are becoming increas-
ingly blurred. Some overlap exists, for example, between functions of CSOs and pri-
vate businesses and the media, especially in the increasing use by NGOs of “new me-
dia”9 to perform advocacy and monitoring roles. The following paragraphs look at why
civil society should play a role in building integrity and reducing corruption in defence,
7 OECD, OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform.

8 United Nations General Assembly, We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and
Global Governance: Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society
Relations, A/58/817 (New York, 11 June 2004), 13.
9 New media is a term meant to encompass the emergence of digital, computerised or net-
worked information and communication technologies in the later part of the 20th century,
such as the Internet and websites. By implication, “old media” is television programmes,
feature films, magazines, books or paper-based publications.
what this role includes, the experiences in SSR to date and the contemporary backlash
against NGOs.
Civil Society and the “New Diplomacy”
Civil society includes a mixed bag of organisations and movements that mobilise so-
cial energies to voice deeply felt values and visions.10 NGOs are a core element of civil
society. They may or may not be membership-based or formally registered but are
usually independent of governments and political parties and often independently
funded. They engage in service delivery (security is also an essential service that
needs to be delivered),11 policy advocacy and development, public education and
other forms of non-profit activity and range from huge international bodies like Am-
nesty International, which has over 2.2 million members and subscribers in more than
150 countries and regions, to small local grassroots organisations. As for research in-
stitutes, these may either be NGOs or academic centres independent of government
or, on the contrary, have links with government, for example, through state funding or
the involvement of former government ministers and officials (either as members or
employees).
In the past, many of the relationships between NGOs and governments were tense
or indeed hostile. In many parts of the world they still are (or are becoming so again –
as discussed below). Over the last two decades, however, on a number of issues and
in a growing number of locations (including most of Europe and the Americas, large
parts of South Asia and Africa and within isolated pockets within the Middle East), this
relationship has changed from conflict to growing cooperation. Some have dubbed the
constructive relationship between NGOs and governments as “the new diplomacy.”12
This has been partly a result of the growing recognition by many governments that an
important element of national security and stability is achieved by promoting human
security.13
10 L. David Brown, Creating Credibility: Legitimacy and Accountability for Transnational Civil
Society (Sterling, VA: Kumarian Press, 2008), 1.
11 Security as a public service has some distinctive characteristics that affect the way it is deliv-
ered and the options for accountability and financing arrangements. Monitoring the perform-
ance of security service providers can be difficult, as security forces are armed and poten-
tially can threaten civilian monitors, while preparedness during peace time is often difficult to
evaluate and may involve contested performance measures and outcomes. See the discus-
sion by William Byrd and Stéphane Guimbert in The World Bank, “Public Finance” (January
2009).
12 David Davenport, “The New Diplomacy,” Policy Review 116 (December 2002 & January
2003).
13 The traditional goal of “national security” has been the defence of the state from external
threats. The focus of human security, by contrast, is the protection of individuals. Human Se-
curity Brief 2006 (University of British Columbia, Human Security Centre).
Civil Society Oversight of Defence

In terms of the specific agenda of this book, civil society actors—mainly a narrow
range of NGOs and research institutes—could (and in some limited cases already do)
engage with governments, parliaments and the public in five main ways:
• Public education and awareness raising: Alerting the public to the crippling
costs of corruption, as discussed in chapter 1, and consequently mobilising
support for national government and international initiatives to build integrity,
increase transparency and improve accountability is a crucial NGO (and me-
dia) activity. A primary aim of this awareness-raising work is ensuring that the
implementation of domestic SSR initiatives is seen as an ongoing long-term
process and that the public recognises the relevance of this issue to them-
selves and their communities. NGOs have successfully utilised shareholder
activism and “name and shame” strategies as means of affecting direct action
on specific issues or violations.
• Acting as catalysts and intermediaries: NGOs and other CSOs, such as think
tanks, universities and research institutes, can play intermediary or bridge-
building roles. In this respect, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control
of Armed Forces (DCAF) and Transparency International have been two of
the leading lights for over a decade and have contributed enormously to par-
liamentary competence and capacity building through analysis, reports and
by providing training courses and seminars. Many civil society groups in Latin
America and Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and 1990s also
played an important dialogue role as newly elected civilian governments be-
gan to restructure their armed forces. These dialogues initially helped to
break down the isolation of the armed forces and opened up professional ex-
changes between civil society, elected officials and the military command
structures. Overall, however, more civil society players need to be brought to
the table, especially in fragile and transition states, to mediate between gov-
ernments (especially their defence establishments) and certain sectors of so-
ciety indifferent or potentially antagonistic to the government itself.
• Providing a pool of expertise and knowledge: A multitude of diverse grass-
roots NGOs and CSOs have built up a huge store of institutional and individ-
ual staff and activist expertise and skill on successful methodologies required
to tackle SSR and good governance reforms. For example, NGOs have
worked with the military on increasing stockpile security measures, advised
on developing weapons marking and tracing programmes and have played
crucial roles in post-conflict disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
programmes. While this pool of expertise and human resources may be
shallower in terms of the specific defence-related concerns set out in part II of
this book, it nonetheless remains potentially available to governments or in-
tergovernmental organisations (IGOs) to strengthen initiatives to combat the
corruption risks and vulnerabilities in defence. The deeper SSR pool of ex-
pertise may also offer important good governance “crossover” contributions
and lessons that are applicable to the specialist defence management sector.
But while some limited use is being made of this experience and technical
expertise, for example, in parliamentary hearings, it largely remains an un-
tapped resource. The lack of trust on both sides and competing priorities on
the limited resources of humanitarian, human rights and development NGOs
are contributory factors.
• Provision of primary research and development of policy: One of the major
contributions provided by CSOs is in the research and documentation of the
reality of the “corruption curse” (chapter 1), from exposing flaws or contradic-
tions in decision making on the use of military force—in terms of both the de-
cision to intervene in a conflict and military operations on the ground—to in-
appropriate, ineffective and sometimes illegal defence management, pro-
curement and export practices. By extending public and governmental under-
standing of these issues, civil society and the media play a vital role in ena-
bling the development of appropriate responses. Closely linked with this re-
search has been the work of analytical and policy orientated NGOs and re-
search institutes that have sought to provide new approaches and strategy
options for building integrity and reducing corruption in defence. Such work
includes comparing best practices in different regions of the world, developing
policy initiatives and making practical proposals for policy change.
• Monitoring practice: Once policies aimed at tackling the “corruption curse”
have been adopted by governments, NGOs also have an important role to
play as “watch dogs” – monitoring the implementation of policy and calling
governments to account for any shortcomings and failures that may occur.
NGOs, especially national and international human rights organisations, such
as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have an important role in
monitoring the activities of the security forces and the military to ensure that
they do not commit human rights violations or breaches of international hu-
manitarian law.
As discussed further below, there are also many difficulties and barriers to civil so-
ciety undertaking these roles. At a minimum, effective governments and parliaments
need to ensure access to all relevant policy documents and stimulate the existence
and functioning of an independent third sector, including defence oversight. One way
of achieving the latter, for example, is by commissioning independent think tanks, re-
search institutes, universities and NGOs to carry out research and audits in specific
fields of the defence and security sector (e.g. crime, procurement issues and person-
nel policies). However, if civil society is to play an active part in this integrity building
agenda, and especially in facilitating alternative debates in the public domain, inde-
pendent NGOs need to be able to recruit and retain the necessary expertise that can
provide well-informed perspectives on government security policy, defence budgets,
procurement and resource options. At present, such expertise within NGOs is thin on
the ground even in mature democracies and requires greater capacity building and a
stronger commitment from donors to fund it.
Civil society groups have been particularly active over the decades in furthering the
principles of international law, as embodied in the UN Charter and other multilateral
agreements and institutions. They are often seen by many states as assistance pro-
viders and reliable partners. Citizen movements and NGOs have become major public
advocates in many fields, including human rights, the environment, development, de-
mocratic governance and conflict prevention. They have helped to progress interna-
tional norms and treaties, and have articulated groundbreaking moral and political
standards that have later become policy and law.
Examples of significant civil society movements include the Jubilee 2000 debt
campaign that persuaded G7 governments to cancel $100bn of debt owned by poor
countries, the Ottawa campaign to ban landmines,14 and the opposition to the US-led
invasion of Iraq in 2003. NGOs also played a critical role in the establishment of an
International Criminal Court, the decision to add an optional protocol to the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (outlawing military conscription of children less than 18 years
of age) and in advancing measures to combat the proliferation and misuse of small
arms and light weapons (SALW).
Civil Society and SSR
Following a process led by the UK Department for International Development (DFID)
and the OECD Directorate for Development Co-operation, a handbook was produced
in 2007 to provide “guidance to operationalise the OECD DAC guidelines on SSR and
close the gap between policy and practice.”15 On civil society involvement in SSR, the
handbook asserts that, “CSOs can serve as beneficiary, informal overseer, partner and
advocate of reforms as well as service provider. Support to SSR can also be provided
by international civil society actors that can play a role in building capacity and de-
signing, advocating, implementing, monitoring and evaluating reforms.”16
NGOs offer bottom-up approaches that are often more appropriate and effective
than top-down measures, for example, by providing lines of communication to commu-
nities with which states have little contact or influence. The handbook also says that:
SSR programs should include a firm analysis of the context, role and position of civil so-
ciety organizations, since their capacity, effectiveness and space to engage vary greatly
from country to country. Civil society assessments must take into account the range of
local actors beyond those ‘approved’ by the state, and identify those that genuinely fo-
14 See, for example: Kenneth Anderson, “The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines: the Role
of International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society,”
European Journal of International Affairs 2:1 (2000).
15 OECD DAC Handbook on Security System Reform (OECD, 2007).
16 Ibid., 226.
cus on improving the security of the poor, of women, of children and youth, and of other
groups often excluded from the security debate.17
The handbook also discusses points of entry for civil society, such as peace proc-
esses, national budget processes and security and defence reviews. In theory, civil
society can perform many important functions, such as: monitoring defence and secu-
rity-related measures; scrutinizing counter-terrorism efforts and legislation and ascer-
taining whether they respect human rights and the rule of law; overseeing the actions
of the military, law enforcement, and other security services and publicising violations
of the law or policies or negative consequences of inappropriate laws or policies; con-
ducting investigations into alleged corruption and other abuses; and recommending
guidelines for improved SSR practice. In practice, however, civil society organisations
are often relegated to consultative roles 18 and the lofty principles contained in the
handbook are invariably ignored.
Even the presence of an active civil society is no magic wand or guarantor of suc-
cess. Prior to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, for example, the country had one of Af-
rica’s most highly developed NGO sectors but the ethnically divided society still quickly
descended into violence and chaos.19
A Backlash Against NGOs?
The enthusiasm for civil society that emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s with the
collapse of the Berlin Wall and the spread of democratic regimes has, according to
some analysts, been replaced in recent years by a backlash on many levels and
fronts. This ranges from the renewed, systematic repression of civil society in authori-
tarian states at one end of the spectrum, to a more general querying of the probity of
CSOs, especially NGOs, at the other.20
Domestic publics, academics, grassroots activists, intergovernmental organisations
(IGOs), the media, corporations and governments increasingly question by what au-
thority NGOs purport to speak for others and aspire to influence domestic and interna-
17 Ibid.
18 Daniel Bendix and Ruth Stanley, “Deconstructing Local Ownership of Security Sector Re-
form: A Review of the Literature,” African Security Review 17:2 (June 2008): 93–104.
19 Most of the NGOs in Rwanda in 1994 were recent creations, almost wholly dependent on
external donors and the state, and there were few programmes to challenge racism and eth-
nic hatred. See: Peter Uvin, Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Uganda (West
Hartford, CT: Kumarian Press, 1998),164–176.
20 Jude Howell, et al., “The Backlash against Civil Society in the Wake of the Long War on Ter-
ror,” Development in Practice 18:1 (2008): 82–93. As regards the latter, note, for example,
this seemingly innocuous sentence in chapter 4 of this Compendium: “Responsible civil soci-
ety organisations should be looked upon as partners and enablers toward a common goal of
institutional integrity” [emphasis added]. However, no similar caveat is used to preface or
qualify the other stakeholders.
tional polities. (This is a valid enough question but one that lies beyond the scope of
this chapter.21 Suffice it to say that integrity and accountability within CSOs and the
media are crucial prerequisites for public and government acceptance of their over-
sight roles and as agents for change). It is a backlash that has only intensified since
the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing global “war on terror.” The discourse of non-state
actors as threats to national security has led to restrictive legislative and regulatory
measures that have made it more difficult for many NGOs to operate freely and effec-
tively.22 NGOs, organisations and movements that challenge repressive regimes
inevitably arouse the anger of those in power but in recent years, democratic states,
IGOs, and transnational corporations (TNCs) have appropriated the language of
counter-terrorism to intensify their attacks against civil society critics. Negative impacts
have been especially noticeable in conflict zones and among groups that challenge
government policies through their work in peace building, democratisation and human
rights.23
And if the water was not already muddy enough, governments (and increasingly
the private sector) sometimes create “front” NGOs that serve to reinforce establish-
ment positions and confuse the genuine voice of civil society.24 In a few exceptional
cases, corporations and governments have also planted “spies” within NGOs.25 This,
then, is the challenging contemporary context in which civil society is expected to con-
tribute to building integrity and reducing corruption in defence. Instead of freely under-
taking their watchdog role, many NGOs find themselves under suspicion and subject
to increased state and private sector monitoring of their own activities.
21 For a full treatment of this issue, see: Lisa Jordan and Peter van Tuijl, eds., NGO Account-
ability: Politics, Principles and Innovations (Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2006); and Jem Bendell,
Debating NGO Accountability, UN-NGLS Development Dossier (United Nations, 2006).
22 In the US, for example, where hostility toward NGO involvement in global governance issues
has been a defining feature of neoconservative thinking, such restrictive policies include Ex-
ecutive Order 13224, the Patriot Act and voluntary Anti-Terrorist Financing guidelines for
charities issued by the US Treasury. However, similar regulatory approaches to widen the
authority of police, intelligence and security forces to investigate and detain suspects, with
little regard for judicial oversight or the protection of individual rights, has occurred in many
other states around the world.
23
For extensive examples, see: Alistair Millar with David Cortright, Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf
and George A. Lopez, Oversight or Overlooked? Civil Society’s Role in Monitoring and Re-
forming Security Systems and the Practice of Counterterrorism, A report to Cordaid from the
Fourth Freedom Forum and Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of
Notre Dame (March 2009).
24 Moisés Naím, “What Is a Gongo? How Government-Sponsored Groups Masquerade as Civil
Society,” Foreign Policy (May/June 2007): 96.
25
Saeed Shah, “BAE Ordered to Identify ‘Mole’ Who Passed Details on Arms Protesters,” The
Independent (27 February 2007); George Monbiot, “A Parallel State,” The Guardian (13 Feb-
ruary 2007).
The Role of the Media

The principal watchdog function of journalists is to expose wrongdoing or misconduct.
Beyond this accountability mechanism, an independent media can also function as an
instrument of good governance by presenting accurate, balanced and timely informa-
tion on issues of interest to society. This enables citizens to make informed decisions
concerning who governs them and how they are governed. In other words, good jour-
nalism “plays a vital role in identifying what is at stake in a particular policy or decision,
in framing issues for the public, analysing the issues and identifying possible solutions
and alternatives.”26 Close media scrutiny is widely recognised as an important element
in democratic control of armed forces. However, the interaction between the “fourth
estate” and security policy is a complex subject with many nuances and this section
only touches on a few of the key trends and issues.
Many of the traditional means of delivering information are being slowly super-
seded by the increasing pace of modern technological advances. Almost every con-
ventional mode of media and information dissemination has a modern counterpart: ter-
restrial television versus satellite television; web-based publishing versus traditional
publishing; and voice over internet protocol versus conventional telephony. The expo-
nential growth of electronic news media (in both production and consumption) has
been a particularly significant trend. During the 1990s, for example, satellite and cable
households grew from 85 million to well over 300 million, and a dozen or more multi-
regional all-news channels emerged for the first time.
Combined with the internet, which now reaches almost 1.8 billion people (over
25 % of the population) worldwide, it is now possible for many citizens to regularly ac-
cess “foreign media” as an alternative source of reporting on world events. Many of
these technological advances also offer journalists significant potential advantages in
seeking to maintain and enhance their “freedom of speech,” although some govern-
ments are responding to the challenges posed by new media technologies by deploy-
ing increasingly sophisticated technology of their own (a notable example being
China’s attempts to impose control through a state run internet service provider that
controls access to the Internet).
Journalists encounter numerous obstacles and challenges in performing their gen-
eral watchdog function, and these challenges are often exacerbated or are more acute
in reporting on defence-related issues. In particular, the watchdog role of the media
with regard to security and intelligence agencies is often weak, especially in peace-
time.27 This is partly due to the comparatively few journalists who specialise in the
26 For a detailed survey of the media’s relationship with security and its governance, see Ma-
rina Caparini, ed., Media in Security and Governance: The Role of the News Media in Secu-
rity (Geneva: DCAF, 2004), chapter 1.
27 In contrast to peacetime reporting of military affairs, war correspondence tends to attract
higher numbers of journalists. For example, about 5,000 journalists covered the 1999 Kos-
ovo War.
field—most of whom are to be found either within the large media organisations (such
as the BBC, the major US networks and other major national papers and networks) or
the specialist defence media (such as the Jane’s Group)—but also a decline in serious
public affairs journalism and a general “dumbing-down” of news in the last decade or
so. However, there are also numerous other factors that can potentially undermine the
effectiveness of the media in its defence oversight role. The “public information battle-
space” after 9/11 underscores many of these obstacles and challenges, just as it has
done for CSOs as described earlier.28
A key general principle is that the media should maintain a healthy degree of inde-
pendence, especially from the state and ruling government, but also from other vested
interests. But since 9/11 the mainstream Western media has been criticised for being
patriotic and subservient. The increasing concentration of ownership (which is only
partly offset by increased diversity within the “new media”) exacerbates such concerns.
This close relationship between corporate interests, certain political elites and media
monopolies tends to constrain independent and critical journalism. It may also reduce
the spectrum of perspectives that are aired, especially on vital public issues. So, just
as anti-European tabloid newspapers in the UK play an important role in sustaining a
broad but uninformed euroscepticism in public debate, similar controls are exercised
on the parameters of national security discourse. As one critic of the US media’s
“cheerleading” of interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan has put it, “many mainstream
American journalists and columnists continue to resemble court scriveners of the kind
the Mughal emperors employed.”29
This tendency for co-option (reproducing official statements and perspectives
rather than subjecting them to critical examination) is perhaps most common in the se-
curity field – as is the risk of “internalising” the official line or being manipulated by in-
siders (including officials, whistleblowers and “spin doctors”). In most NATO countries,
for example, the armed forces’ approach to the media is now essentially the same as
that of any other large organisation, with communications directorates and public rela-
tions specialists. It is also now almost common in military operations for interested
parties to hire the services of lobby firms to present their case; a practice popularised
by the Kuwaiti government in 1990 and carried on throughout the disintegration of
Yugoslavia and most recently by the Georgian and Afghan governments.30
Journalists also need some measure of protection so that they are not unjustly ac-
cused of libel, sued, imprisoned or even killed for “pointing the finger” at leading offi-
cials when they report on corruption. However, more than a third of the world’s people
live in countries where there is no press freedom and new kinds of conflicts between
28 Carl Conetta, “Disappearing the Dead: Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Idea of a ‘New Warfare’,”
Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph, No. 9 (18 February 2004).
29 Pankaj Mishra, “Kissinger’s Fantasy is Obama’s Reality,” The Guardian (11 December 2009).
30 Jaimy Lee, “National Security Council of Georgia hires Public Strategies,” PR Week (19
November 2009).
Box 21.1. Investigative Journalism Reveals Cases of Defence Corruption

The Contracting Black Hole in Iraq
A combination of investigative journalism, whistleblowers, government auditors and concerned
legislators have gradually stripped away US contracting practices in Iraq. A BBC Panorama in-
vestigation in 2008 claimed that as much as $23bn may have been lost, stolen or not properly
accounted for in Iraq. Allegations of mismanagement, fraud and waste are legion: contractors
chosen for their US government connections without a competitive bidding process; contrac-
tors inflating their costs and double counting to increase their profits and billions supposed to
be used to rebuild the Iraqi military allegedly ending up in the pockets of some Iraqi govern-
ment officials.
Sources: Ed Harriman, “Where Has all the Money Gone?,” London Review of Books 27:13 (7 July 2005):
3-7; Daylight Robbery: BBC Panorama (10 June 2008), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/
7438372.stm.
Funding the Taliban in Afghanistan

In 2009, investigative journalist Aram Roston traced how the Pentagon’s civilian contractors in
Afghanistan ended up paying insurgent groups to protect American supply routes from attack.
US military officials in Kabul told Roston that a minimum of ten percent of the Pentagon’s logis-
tics contracts consists of payments to the Taliban.
Source: Aram Roston, “How the US Funds the Taliban,” The Nation, 30 November 2009.
The Aitken Affair – UK

In April 1995, former UK defence procurement minister Jonathan Aitken promised to use the
“sword of truth” against The Guardian and sued the newspaper for libel in a row over his deal-
ings with Saudi arms traders. In 1999 he went to prison for seven months for perjury after he
was revealed to have lied repeatedly.
Source: “The Aitken Affair,” Special Reports, The Guardian, www.guardian.co.uk/aitken.
The BAE Files – UK

In February 2010, the British arms firm BAE Systems accepted guilt and agreed to pay penal-
ties in the US and the UK totalling several hundred million dollars to settle all the long-running
corruption allegations against it, first disclosed in The Guardian in 2003.
Source: “The BAE Files,” The Guardian, www.guardian.co.uk/world/bae.
Operation “West End,” India

Operation “West End” was a sting operation aimed at the corruption underlying India’s large
defence contracts. The original investigative piece by Tehelka, India’s Independent Weekly
News Magazine, in 2001 targeted several members of the then ruling coalition government. It
showed several political figures, as well as senior army officials, colluding to take bribes in or-
der to approve defence contracts. The Defence Minister resigned after the tapes were made
public, but he was reinstated later. Initially the government, instead of acting on the evidence,
accused Tehelka of fabricating allegations. However, five years later, in October 2006, the In-
dian Central Bureau of Investigation filed charges against leading figures in the Barak missile
case, claiming that there was reasonable basis to suspect corruption and criminal conspiracy.
Sources: Tarun J. Tejpal, “The Tehelka Exposé,” www.taruntejpal.com/TheTehelkaExpose.htm; V.
Venkatesan, “Dubious Deal,” Frontline 23:21 (2006), http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2321/stories/
20061103001804100.htm.
ethnic, ideological, religious or simply criminal interests have made investigative re-
porting increasingly dangerous.
Another key trend is the increased capacity of the global media to inflame “casualty
sensitivity” either in support of or opposition to foreign intervention. This so-called
“CNN effect” has been a subject of broad concern in the defence community since the
early 1990s.31 The initiation and the termination of US operations in Somalia and the
rapid conclusion of the 1990-91 Gulf War (following circulation of images depicting the
so-called “Highway of Death” incident) were both partially attributed to this effect. This
in turn led to greater governmental efforts to manage the media, control the flow of in-
formation and shape the coverage of military operations post 9/11, through, for exam-
ple, “embedding” in the 2003 War in Iraq and coordinated message development and
dissemination. Despite a continuation of this restrictive policy in Afghanistan—includ-
ing the weeding-out of “negative” embedded journalists 32—the strategic literature has
been filled with ruminations on the capacity of the Taliban and Al Qaeda to exploit both
the “CNN effect” and casualty sensitivity in seeking an asymmetric advantage over the
United States and its NATO allies.33
A final and long-standing issue of contention is secrecy. While governments may
legitimately suppress information if they believe its release would harm the public or
national interest, they also use “national security” as grounds for withholding informa-
31 Sometimes used to mean any media involvement, this expression more accurately reflects
the belief that real-time television reporting in particular exercises an undue influence on cri-
sis management and overseas military deployments by democratic countries. Margaret H.
Belknap, “The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk?” Parameters (Autumn
2002): 100–114.
32 Charlie Reed, “Pentagon Hires PR firm to Weed out ‘Negative’ Embedded Journalists,” Stars
and Stripes (25 August 2009), www.reclaimthemedia.org/propaganda_and_war/pentagon_
hires_pr_firm_weed_ou2535.
33 See, for example: Peter Singer, “Winning the War of Words: Information Warfare in
Afghanistan” (The Brookings Institution, 23 October 2001); Thomas Elkjer Nissen, “The Tali-
ban’s Information Warfare – A Comparative Analysis of NATO Information Operations (Info
Ops) and Taliban Information Activities,” Brief (Royal Danish Defence College, December
2007); Tim Foxley, “Winning the Information War,” Blog entry, SIPRI website (12 May 2009),
www.sipri.org/ blogs/Afghanistan/winning-the-information-war.
tion that would cause embarrassment or scandal due to corruption or mismanagement.

The climate of “securitisation” that followed 9/11 has also resulted in a renewed em-
phasis on government secrecy and a partial reversal of a post-Cold War trend towards
greater transparency, public accountability and accessibility of official information.
Civil Society and the Media in Fragile States, Transition States
and NATO
In many “fragile states”34 abusive security operations make it very difficult and even
dangerous for civil society and the media to even attempt to monitor and advocate in-
tegrity building within domestic defence establishments. The creation of special secu-
rity forces and intensified operations against insurgents and alleged criminals and ter-
rorists have led to a sharp rise in the number of unsolved cases of extrajudicial killings
and abductions of human rights workers and political activists in many fragile states,
including (but certainly not limited to) Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Kenya, Pakistan, Uganda
and Zimbabwe. While in Colombia, Nepal, the Palestinian Territories, Somalia, Sri
Lanka and other conflict zones, NGOs are sometimes seen by governments and
armed rebels alike as political adversaries. In some conflict areas NGOs are denied
access, while in others—such as Mogadishu and parts of Iraq and Afghanistan—CSO
operations have at times become untenable because of extreme dangers.35
Similarly, in many “transition states,”36 bureaucratic barriers to the legal recognition
of NGOs, the poor record of political freedom and generally weak civil societies sug-
gest that, with respect to military and security sector reform, non-state actors tend to
play only a minimal role in shaping policy.37 And as noted earlier, repressive legislation
and pressures against civil society have increased post 9/11. Counter-terrorism legis-
lation and measures against “extremism” have been used to crack down on NGOs and
political activists who criticise government policies in many transition states, including
(and again not limited to) China, Egypt, El Salvador, Indonesia, Jordan, the Philip-
pines, Russia, Sudan, Tunisia, Uzbekistan and Yemen.38 While the 1990s saw a
considerable amount of bold reporting on SSR subjects in Russia, for example, in re-
34 Fragile states (also sometimes referred to as “failed” or “weak” states) are those that gener-
ally cannot provide security for their citizens, or their territory, and that are corrupt and ille-
gitimate in the eyes of their citizens.
35 For example, see: Millar, Cortright, Gerber-Stellingwerf and Lopez, Oversight or Overlooked?
(2009).
36 A term usually attributed to the Soviet successor states but also sometimes applied to any
state transitioning from authoritarian or military rule to democratic governance.
37 On civil society and SSR in post-communist countries, see: Marina Caparini, Philipp Fluri and
Ferenc Molnar, eds., Civil Society and the Security Sector: Concepts and Practices in New
Democracies (Berlin: LIT, 2006).
38 For examples, see: Millar, Cortright, Gerber-Stellingwerf and Lopez, Oversight or Over-
looked? (2009).
cent years Russian civil society and the media appears to have been very much
weakened.
Nonetheless, civil society engagement and oversight of the security sector is still
sometimes possible in transition states especially with external IGO support. In the
former Soviet space, for example, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) has done much to counter such negative trends by promoting stability
through the strengthening of good governance, civil society and press freedom. Simi-
larly, the EU has, to varying degrees, shown a good understanding of the role of non-
state actors as alternative entry points in fragile and transition states. The European
Initiative on Human Rights (EIDHR) and Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) are unique
in that they fund civil society, democracy, human rights and conflict prevention projects
without requiring approval from their governments.
There are also examples of important SSR related work being done by civil society
actors on the ground in transition states. For example, the Southern African Defence
and Security Management (SADSEM) Network is a donor supported activity within the
security sector that aims to increase the professionalism and accountability of a broad
range of security sector actors (including civil society) and of the interaction between
them. But while there are a few limited examples of local stakeholder CSOs playing a
valuable oversight and monitoring function at the “softer” end of SSR (such as policing
and judicial reform), at the harder end (the defence-related missions and institutions
that feature in this book), CSO activities remain almost totally unobserved.39
One multi-case review concluded: “in all of the countries studied, civil society is
rarely a full partner and the programs remain more focused on supply of security and
justice than demand for them.”40 Another review of integrated missions in Burundi, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Kosovo found that in each case “negligible
attention was granted to the development of parliamentary or civil society oversight
mechanisms for the security sector. Support to strengthening the capacity of legisla-
tures or civil society actors such as media and NGOs is generally provided by UNDP,
albeit rarely with specific focus on the security sector.”41
Another weakness of the SSR/good governance agenda is that it is invariably seen
as something that other states should implement. Thus, for example, while one of the
39 Edward Rees, “Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Peace Operations: ‘Improvisation and
Confusion’ from the Field,” External Study for the UN Department of Peacekeeping Opera-
tions (March 2006).
40 Christopher Stone, Joel Miller, Monica Thornton and Jennifer Trone, “Supporting Security,
Justice, and Development: Lessons for a New Era” (Vera Institute of Justice, June 2005), 9,
www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/security-justice-development.pdf.
41 Heiner Hänggi and Vincenza Scherrer, “Recent Experience of UN Integrated Missions in
Security Sector Reform (SSR): Review and Recommendations” (Geneva: DCAF, November
2007), www.dcaf.ch/un_ssr_pcpb/recent-experience-un-integrated-missions-071203.pdf.
Box 21.2. Civil Society Engagement and Partnerships in SSR and Defence
Oversight
A number of civil society organisations and networks provide examples of successful engage-
ment engagement in security sector reform and defence oversight. Among them are:
The African Security Sector Network (ASSN), www.africansecuritynetwork.org

Southern African Defense and Security Management Network (SADSEM), www.sadsem.org
ASSN was established in Ghana in 2003 with the aim of supporting and facilitating security
sector governance in Africa through efforts including research, advocacy, capacity building,
and providing points of contact for interaction and sharing information with partners and other
actors. The ASSN includes the full range of actors relevant to SSR (i.e., policy makers, practi-
tioners, donors and civil society) and has developed courses on security sector governance
which are being offered, for example, by the Southern African Defense and Security Manage-
ment Network (SADSEM). SADSEM is a donor supported activity within the security sector that
aims to increase the professionalism and accountability of a broad range of security sector ac-
tors (including civil society) and of the interaction between them. The value of both networks is
that they offer space for security officials to interact with academics and civil society and thus
play an important sensitization, as well as capacity-building, role.
Saferworld – UK, www.saferworld.org.uk

Academy for Peace and Development, Somalia, www.apd-somaliland.org
Puntland Development Research Centre - Somalia, www.pdrcsomalia.org
Centre for Research and Dialogue – Somalia, www.crdsomalia.org
Saferworld began over 15 years ago to work for a regional agreement on arms transfers in the
EU, a move which over time has culminated in the EU concluding a legally binding agreement
on the control of arms exports. In the UK, at the turn of this century, legislation governing irre-
sponsible arms transfers was changed for the first time since the Second World War, making it
harder for arms producers and their agents to channel weapons to the places where they do
most damage.
In Somalia, which has lacked effective governance for more than 18 years, Saferworld has
been working with community-based organisations, the business sector and other civil society
groups to bring their ideas for the security and development of the country to the attention of
international policy makers, including the UN Security Council in Djibouti. Local Somali partners
include the Academy for Peace and Development, Puntland Development Research Centre
and the Centre for Research and Dialogue. While considerable challenges remain, the building
blocks are in place to enable CSOs to input into peace and development processes and help
build consensus on how to bring peace to Somalia.
leading exponents, the UK Department for International Development (DFID),42 has

done much to promote SSR and the involvement of NGOs in transition and fragile
states, Britain’s own recent domestic record is considerd mixed: the country’s leading
defence manufacturer has faced a string of corruption charges involving arms con-
tracts in Africa, the Middle East and Eastern Europe;43 the National Audit Office has
described Britain’s defence procurement programme as “unaffordable,” following
revelations of a £6bn to £36bn “black hole” in the MoD’s spending plans.44 The key les-
son from recent British experience, therefore, is that building integrity and reducing
corruption in defence begins at home. Of course, relative to the situation in most fragile
and transition states, Britain’s situation is far less critical.
For NATO to live up the reason for which it was created—to safeguard the free-
dom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law (North Atlantic Treaty, 1949)—it can
be expected to be open, transparent and accountable to the public. NATO’s system of
collective decision making might be properly accountable if members of parliament
were kept fully informed of NATO decisions and if they had financial control. Neither is
currently the case. Scrutiny certainly exists in national legislatures and parliamentary
committees, and some very effective investigation has occurred of NATO action (on
Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, for instance). This, however, has often been ham-
pered by difficulties of accessing relevant information. Further, the role of national par-
liaments in their arguably most important function of assenting to policy is particularly
underdeveloped. Many parliaments simply lack the power of prior authorisation of
military operations or of determining the length of time a mission is deployed.
Similarly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly is not designed to have formal influ-
ence or oversight over decision making in the alliance. Defence decisions should cer-
tainly not be the exclusive preserve of the executive branch of government or powerful
inter-governmental bureaucracies. This applies, for example, to procurement decisions
made in the framework of the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD),
the senior NATO body responsible for collaboration between member states on equip-
ment and research projects.
Citizens (and parliamentarians) in NATO member states are bound by secrecy
rules that were drafted in a very different era – when the public had different expecta-
42 See, for example: UK Department for International Development, “Understanding and

Supporting Security Sector Reform,” www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/supportingsecurity.pdf.
43 “BAE Faces Corruption Charges,” New York Times (1 October 2009). For further back-
ground, see: “The BAE Files,” The Guardian, www.guardian.co.uk/world/bae. Interestingly, it
was a coordinated civil society action between Corner House and the Campaign Against
Arms Trade that brought a judicial review of the Serious Fraud Office’s termination of the in-
vestigation into BAE’s contracts with Saudi Arabia.
44
Nicholas Timmins, “Warning of ‘Black Hole’ in Defence Budget,” Financial Times (15 Decem-
ber 2009); Jeremy Lemer, Alex Barker and James Blitz, “Damning UK Defence Equipment
Review,” Financial Times (15 October 2009).
tions about participation in defence and foreign policy, when few of its member states
had adopted a national right-to-information law, and when the threat posed to the
Western alliance was more profound and immediate. All of these circumstances have
changed but the regime that governs the handling of shared information remains un-
changed in important respects. As a consequence, it is rather difficult for legislators
and citizens to participate in the formulation of policies that have a profound effect on
their liberty and security.
To address these weaknesses a new civil society policy network, NATO Watch,
was established in April 2009. NATO Watch aims to: encourage NATO to adopt an in-
formation openness policy consistent with the access to information laws already in
place in the alliance’s 28 member countries; contribute to independent monitoring and
analysis of policy-making and operational activities within NATO; and increase trans-
parency, stimulate parliamentary engagement and broaden public awareness and par-
ticipation in NATO policy-making. NATO Watch associates across member states,
partnership and contact countries will be encouraged to pursue these project goals
through their own parliamentary representatives and national networks of decision
makers and opinion-shapers.45 Civil society groups meeting at a Shadow NATO Sum-
mit in Brussels also called on NATO to “reconnect with citizens,” stating that to
“deepen and extend the shared values-base within the Alliance … means an updated,
more open, transparent and accountable Alliance, appropriate to 21st century expecta-
tions”.46 In addition, “Five Principles for an Open and Accountable NATO” drawn up by
Access Info, call on NATO to establish guidelines for proactive publication of core in-
formation, a mechanism by which the public can file requests for information and an
independent review body for hearing appeals against refusals or failures to make in-
formation public within a short time-frame.47
Conclusions: Increasing NGO and Governmental Integrity-
building Partnerships
Civil society has a fundamental role to play in building integrity and reducing corruption
in defence. Many governments already recognise the legitimate contribution of NGOs,
45 For further details, see: www.natowatch.org.

46 “Citizens Declaration of Alliance Security,” developed at the NATO Shadow Summit held in
Brussels 31 March to 1 April 2009, www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2009_artrel_308_natoshadow_
execsum_v5.pdf; see also: “The Shadow NATO Summit Report,” www.isis-europe.org/pdf/
2009_artrel_309_natoshadow_v11.pdf.
47 NATO Shadow Summit Report, “Five Principles for an Open and Accountable NATO,”
Appendix 4. Access Info (www.access-info.org) is a human rights organisation based in Ma-
drid, which works to promote and defend the right of access to information by promoting the
transparency of national and supranational public bodies. NATO Watch and Access Info
have proposed a joint civil society-NATO expert group to review the alliance’s information
disclosure policy.
other sections of civil society and an independent media. CSOs and the media can
maintain an effective watchdog role by continuing to expose and challenge abuses
within the defence sector and by building public support for more accountable govern-
ance based on the rule of law. However, in those countries where such mutually bene-
ficial partnerships are insufficient or absent, governments should allocate space and
take steps to expand or create them.
The formation of a public climate in which more than lip service is paid to this
agenda may demand alterations of mindsets and the promotion of routines of open-
ness, consultation, cooperation and trust from both governments and those nascent
NGOs and civil society structures. Engagement must also take place with a wider
range of those active in civil society, such as the media, NGOs, academics, trade un-
ions and women’s organizations – and not just the “establishment-friendly” defence
think tanks. All too often these wider voices and roles of civil society are curtailed or
disregarded. Such changes are unlikely to be achieved overnight. But the benefits for
society and for governments (see chapter 14) make it a worthwhile process to embark
upon.
Since the 9/11 attacks, the United States and a few of its allies have considered
themselves to be at war and it is well understood that when at war the media-civil so-
ciety and government-armed forces relationships are governed by different rules. In
most democratic societies, the majority of people understand perfectly well that in war
a government will use both secrecy and deception. But while there is little dispute that
restrictions on the media and civil society should apply in wars of national survival, the
invocation of these rules for “wars of choice” (which arguably includes the operation in
Iraq and other security operations under the “War on Terror”) has received less public
support.
In response to the pressures and restrictions that have been imposed on civil soci-
ety groups since 9/11, some NGOs have sought to assert their own right to operate
freely without government interference and harassment. The US-based International
Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), for example, has set out a series of principles of
civil society protection that are based on universal human rights conventions and dec-
larations to which virtually all governments already subscribe.48 States must not only
avoid meddling with human rights and basic freedoms, they must defend those rights
and guarantee their orderly expression. It is vital that states create an enabling envi-
ronment in which civil society actors can function without restraint.
In turn, civil society groups and especially the development, human rights and civil
liberties communities need to engage more fully in the public debate over security
strategies and the proper approach to overcoming the corruption risk in defence.
These civil society actors may form an international network to express a coherent
voice and engage in a common set of activities to address the challenges set out in
this book. CSOs can help to craft and encourage support for that elusive optimal bal-
48 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law and World Movement for Democracy, “Defending
Civil Society,” The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law 10:2 (April 2008): 31-33.
ance between investments in integrity, transparency and accountability, on the one

hand, and the preservation of efficiencies and effectiveness of defence forces, on the
other (see chapter 2). NGOs with SSR experience are well-suited to these challenges.
Many have extensive field experience in zones of conflict and their general missions,
for example, in overcoming social exclusion, may provide valuable insight into what is
needed to ameliorate conditions conducive to corruption in defence.
The case study on South Korea in chapter 19 shows just what can be achieved.
Following extensive problems with integrity and corruption in defence acquisitions, the
South Korean government initiated a process of reform in 2003. Three years later, an
ombudsman system was introduced, the first in Korea to be based on law and the first
case of participation of civil society in monitoring defence procurement.
CSOs need to be more proactive in communicating their experience and wisdom
more widely to policymakers and the public, and should seek to take a stronger lead in
reframing the political discourse on building integrity at all levels of the defence and
security debate. Civil society groups should help craft a new narrative and shape the
terms of the debate through an innovative policy framework that is practical, empiri-
cally based and ethically grounded. CSOs should use established mass media outlets
and new communication tools (such as the internet and social networking) to commu-
nicate this perspective and to counter false claims and misinformation. To ensure that
the potential role of civil society is fully utilised, the donor community is well advised to
transfer resources towards enhancing the capacity of NGOs to play the roles high-
lighted here.
NGOs should not shun the requirement for greater transparency and accountability
in their own financial affairs and operations. Legitimacy and public integrity are vital to
CSOs and are essential to the effectiveness of their mission. As transparency and ac-
countability are demanded of NGOs, however, the same transparency and account-
ability are needed from governments and their agencies, as well as within NATO.
Throughout NATO’s history, MPs in national parliaments, when asking questions about
NATO decisions, have invariably been told that such decisions are confidential. When
the same questions were put to the Secretary-General, he invariably replied that NATO
was but an alliance of sovereign states. This catch-22 situation may have served a
purpose during the Cold War but is no longer appropriate today. Adequate mecha-
nisms for transparency and accountability within NATO are urgently required.
Chapter 22
The Role of International
Organisations
International organisations have played a central role in driving the tremendous shift in
worldwide attitudes about corruption that have taken place in the past twenty years.
They have also played a major role in practical efforts to counter corruption through
international conventions and standards, promoting good governance, monitoring and
advocacy. While most of this work has focused on the areas of international business
and development, there is now growing attention to the issue of corruption in the de-
fence and security sectors. This is a natural extension of an increasing focus on de-
fence governance over the past decade, itself being driven by the growing under-
standing in institutions like NATO that effective stewardship of resources is vital to en-
suring successful operations.
International organisations—for the purposes of this chapter include inter-govern-
mental organisations and global non-governmental organisations—have tremendous
resources and know-how that can be valuable to officials or citizens who wish to make
a contribution to combating corruption in their own institutions or society. This chapter
aims to help such readers better understand the resources available, access them and
use them effectively. It will first look at the various roles and approaches to combating
corruption taken by international organisations, both overall and more specifically in
the area of defence. It will then examine several prominent institutions more closely
before considering how to best leverage the capabilities provided by these institutions
to catalyse change in the national context.
Role of International Organisations: The Broad Context
Until the early 1990s, corruption was viewed by most of the international business and
development community as a regular (if not “normal”) transaction cost. In some West-
ern countries, it was not unusual for corruption payments to be listed as legitimate
business expenses for tax purposes. Nevertheless, for several decades there had
been a growing understanding of the tremendous burden that corruption puts on devel-
opment programs as well as its distortive economic effects. Debate surrounding the
US Corrupt Foreign Practices Act of 1977, for example, noted that more than 400 US
corporations had admitted to paying out in excess of $300 million in corporate funds to
foreign government officials – a reality that was not only unethical but also bad busi-
ness, eroding confidence in the corporations in question and, by favouring private ar-
rangements over efficiency, undermining the integrity of the free market system more
281
generally.1 The tremendous corrosive effects of corruption were also brought home by
the troubled “free-market” transition in Russia and other post-Soviet states, where pri-
vatisation programs recommended by well-meaning (but naïve) Western experts de-
generated into wholesale theft of state assets. The creation in 1993 of Transparency
International, whose founders were officials with direct experience in the damage that
corruption causes to development, gave a voice to this growing awareness. Since that
time, a growing network of national and international institutions have used education,
lobbying and focused research to place the corruption problem—and the need to com-
bat it—firmly on the world’s political agenda.
Today, dozens of major international organisations, inter-governmental organisa-
tions and global non-governmental organisations are now actively involved in efforts to
counter corruption. They fill a number of important niches in the anti-corruption eco-
system (please note that due to space limitations the organisations mentioned for each
niche are representative, not exhaustive):
Developing and implementing anti-corruption agreements and standards at the
global and regional levels. Over a dozen of such agreements exist today, most notably
the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which came into force in December
2005, and the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, signed in December 1997. Monitoring imple-
mentation of conventions is frequently an important role for institutions like the OECD,
as is identifying and spreading good practice. Work is often supported through a net-
work of organisations – for example, in Europe: the Council of Europe, GRECO (Group
of States against Corruption), the European Commission and the OSCE Coordinator
on Economic and Environmental Activities. In the Americas, the Organisation of
American States works in support of the Inter-American Convention against Corrup-
tion. There are also niche roles: the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) leads in com-
bating money laundering through development and implementation of international
standards; the World Trade Organisation incorporates an anti-corruption role in its
Working Group on Transparency in Government Procurement.
Parliamentary assemblies can help develop international agreements and ap-
proaches to countering corruption, lobby national adoption and monitor implementa-
tion. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) is a prime example
for its work regarding the Council of Europe Criminal & Civil Law Conventions on Cor-
ruption. Another prominent organisation, the Canadian-based Global Organisation of
Parliamentarians against Corruption (GOPAC), supports national parliamentarians in
protecting their own integrity by adherence to a code of conduct, as well as in effec-
tively understanding and exerting their oversight role. Usefully, this includes perform-
ance indicators for parliamentary oversight. Other regional parliamentary assemblies,
like the Asian Parliamentary Assembly, also address corruption issues.
1 Unlawful Corporate Payments Act of 1977, Legislative History – House Report,

http://10.173.2.10/criminal/fraud/fcpa/history/ 1977/houseprt.html.
The Role of International Organisations 283
Development banks have become major players in anti-corruption efforts, both in

order to maintain integrity of their own programs and, more broadly, to remove what is
widely acknowledged as a serious impediment to economic and social development;
corruption distorts the rule of law, weakens the institutions necessary for economic
growth and undermines public services on which the poor are particularly reliant. De-
velopment bank programs often take a multi-faceted approach to countering corrup-
tion, building corporate governance and management in institutions receiving loans,
increasing political accountability for spending of resources, and strengthening civil
society’s ability to demand action and monitor compliance. The World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund are the two largest global players. In addition, regional
development banks such as the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development,
the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank also have
anti-corruption programs.
Major non-bank international (and national) development organisations have also
increasingly targeted corruption as a part of the growing emphasis on good govern-
ance as essential to human development. Corruption is increasingly being targeted di-
rectly as its corrosive effects on governance have become better known. Institutions
working to identify and spread good practice include the United Nations Development
Program, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the
Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform (GFN-SSR). In this sense,
NATO also works as a “development” organisation, linking its anti-corruption programs
to its interest in good security sector governance and democratic civil control.
Coordinating law enforcement actions. Global institutions like Interpol and the
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) play a significant role in coordi-
nating and complementing national anti-corruption efforts. In addressing what is one of
its six priority areas for fighting crime, Interpol has developed codes of ethics and con-
duct for law enforcement officers, standards for police forces and a Police Integrity
Survey to benchmark capabilities, collated a Library of Best Practice to assist corrup-
tion investigators, and established a group of national contact points on corruption. It
also operates the Interpol Group of Experts on Corruption (IGEC) to facilitate, in con-
junction with other international stakeholders, coordination and harmonisation of na-
tional and regional approaches to combating corruption. The UNODC and Interpol
have agreed to open the world’s first Anti-Corruption Academy, to be located near Vi-
enna, Austria. The European Commission also has strong anti-corruption programs, as
do some regional institutions, like law enforcement task forces in the Baltic Sea and
Balkans areas.
International professional organisations often have programs to maintain integrity
and fight corruption in their areas of responsibility. Examples of global organisations
include the International Association of Judges, the International Commission of Ju-
rists, the International Bar Association and the International Association of Prosecu-
tors. There are also a number of regional organisations addressing audits; for exam-
ple, the Asian Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions.
Box 22.1. List of International Organisations and Websites

Asian Development Bank http://www.adb.org/Anticorruption/unit.asp
Asian Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions http://www.asosai.org
Asian Parliamentary Assembly http://www.asianparliament.org
Council of Europe http://www.consilium.europa.eu
European Bank of Reconstruction and
http://www.ebrd.com
Development
European Commission http://ec.europa.eu
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) http://www.fatf-gafi.org
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
http://www.dcaf.ch
Armed Forces
Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector
http://www.ssrnetwork.net
Reform (GFN-SSR)
Global Organisation of Parliamentarians Against
http://www.gopacnetwork.org
Corruption (GOPAC)
Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/
Inter-American Development Bank http://www.iadb.org
International Association of Judges http://www.iaj-uim.org
International Association of Prosecutors http://www.iap-association.org
International Bar Association http://www.ibanet.org
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Anti-
http://www.iccwbo.org/policy/anticorruption
Corruption Commission
International Commission of Jurists http://www.icj.org
International Monetary Fund http://www.imf.org
Interpol http://www.interpol.int
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) http://www.nato.int
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
http://www.oecd.org
Development (OECD)
Organisation of American States http://www.oas.org
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in
Europe (OSCE) Coordinator on Economic and http://www.osce.org/eea
Environmental Activities
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
http://assembly.coe.int
(PACE)
Transparency International http://www.transparency.org
United Nations http://www.un.org
UNICORN http://www.againstcorruption.org
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
http://www.unodc.org
(UNODC)
United Nations Development Program http://www.undp.org
World Bank http://www.worldbank.org
World Trade Organisation http://www.wto.org
WTO Working Group on Transparency in http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpr
Government Procurement oc_e.htm#plurilateral
Advocacy and monitoring. A number of international non-governmental organisa-

tions work to raise awareness and promote anti-corruption action, using both political
and social pressure. With an international network and over 90 national chapters,
Transparency International leads in this field. Its efforts are complemented by other in-
stitutions, such as the trade union organisation UNICORN and the International Cham-
ber of Commerce (ICC), a business association supporting an efficiently functioning
global economy characterised by free and fair competition. The ICC has an Anti-Cor-
ruption Commission whose main objective is to encourage self-regulation by business
in confronting issues of extortion and bribery, and to provide business input into inter-
national initiatives to fight corruption.
The Link to Defence
The defence community’s awakening to the importance of governance—and the direct
threat that corruption makes to it—parallels that of the development community. The
case of Partnership for Peace in Central and Eastern Europe illustrates this situation
well. The 1990s saw hope for a rapid democratic, free-market transformation of post-
communist states. Military-to-military engagement complemented that process by
bringing military professionals together in common tasks of peacekeeping and hu-
manitarian relief. The number one task for cooperation and assistance programs at
that time was therefore interoperability – the ability for military forces to have common
(or at least compatible) understanding, procedures and technical capabilities needed
to work side-by-side in joint operations. Democratic control of the armed forces as an
issue was considered largely in terms of operational control.
The ensuing decade saw considerable progress in developing operational interop-
erability. However, as the 90s progressed it became clear that interoperability alone
was only half of the equation: the other half was defence transformation – the devel-
opment of new capabilities and methods that would match the requirements of modern
operations. This drive toward transformation further accelerated when counter-terror-
ism missions became increasingly important following 9/11. Unlike interoperability,
transformation could not be isolated as a “military-to-military” effort. On the contrary, it
needed to be driven by new visions of policy, innovative planning and increased
budget support. Yet while civilian democratic control was effectively in place in opera-
tional terms (i.e. the president as “commander-in-chief”), defence institutions responsi-
ble for policy, planning, resource allocation, etc. were weak in many countries. Without
an effective civilian defence ministry to provide direction or lobby its interests, the
military fell victim to its own inertia and the political class’ apathy towards national se-
curity issues (and defence budgets).
This put the issue of security sector governance squarely on the defence coopera-
tion agenda – a trend that was confirmed with the creation in 2004 of NATO’s Partner-
ship for Peace Defence Institution Building program. With good governance now firmly
on the defence cooperation agenda, it was only a matter of time before countering cor-
ruption received due attention, in the form of NATO’s program for Building Integrity and
Reducing Corruption (the sponsor of this compendium). This program sees countering
corruption as an essential part of the reform process but retains its focus on develop-
ing positive dynamics of integrity, transparency and accountability as keys to effective
defence management.
Selected Institutions and Programs
The role of the United Nations in corruption is centred around implementation of the
United Nations Convention on Corruption, which came into force in December 2005.
The convention seeks to develop a common global language about corruption and an
effective set of benchmarks for coherent implementation strategies. It sets out a four-
point approach to combating corruption, including preventative measures, criminalisa-
tion, international cooperation and asset recovery.
The UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) runs a Global Program against Cor-
ruption as a catalyst and a resource to help states effectively implement the provisions
of the convention. It assists states with vulnerable developing or transitional econo-
mies by promoting anti-corruption measures in the public and private sector, including
in high-level financial and political circles. Areas of work include the codification of
good practice and policy, technical assistance to spread such good practices in the
public and private sector and public awareness. Specific tools include a Judicial Integ-
rity Group, a self-assessment checklist and a legislative guide for signatories to the
convention.
Over the last few years, under pressure from media and member governments, the
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations has also increased its anti-
corruption efforts, making a number of investigations and, on occasion, turning down
troop contributions from countries that had a history of problems.
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is an inter-
national organisation of 31 countries committed to values of pluralist democracy based
on the rule of law and the respect of human rights, adherence to open and transparent
market economy principles and a shared goal of sustainable development.2 The OECD
has become a major hub for dialogue on globally significant issues and contributes to
efforts for a stronger, cleaner and fairer world economy. Using one of the world’s larg-
est and most reliable sources of comparable statistics, it monitors trends, analyses and
forecasts economic developments and researches social changes or evolving patterns
in trade, environment, agriculture, technology, taxation and public governance.
One of the important areas of the organisation’s work is combating corruption. The
latter threatens good governance, democratic process, sustainable development and
2 The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile (joined in
January 2010), the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
fair business practices. By employing a multidisciplinary approach the OECD ad-

dresses corruption in business, taxation, development aid and governance in member
countries and beyond. This includes combating the “supply side” of bribery, preventing
bribery through export credits, denying tax deductibility of bribes, promoting responsi-
ble business conduct, preventing corruption in the public sector by building a robust
integrity framework and improving governance through development assistance.3
The OECD helps countries prevent conflicts of interest and corruption in public ser-
vice. It focuses on vulnerable areas like public procurement and contract management,
lobbying and political-administrative interface. Based on review and analysis of good
country practices, the OECD has developed policy instruments, implementation guide-
lines and practical tools to help policymakers and managers promote integrity and
foster resistance to corruption in the public sector.
The centrepiece of the OECD anti-corruption efforts is the 1997 Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions
(Anti-Bribery Convention) and related instruments that address issues of taxes, export
credits, bilateral aid, multinational enterprises and public procurement.4 The conven-
tion is a legally binding international treaty that addresses “active bribery” – the indi-
viduals or companies who promise, offer or give bribes to foreign public officials in or-
der to gain or retain business advantages. All OECD member countries plus 7 non-
member economies are parties to the Anti-Bribery Convention, pledging to make brib-
ery of foreign public officials in international business a criminal offence under their na-
tional law and implement effective policies to prevent, detect, investigate and sanction
foreign bribery.
By fighting to eliminate bribery of foreign public officials from competition for con-
tracts and investment, the OECD is making a major contribution to levelling the playing
field for transnational business, including the defence industry. A unique strength of
the OECD anti-bribery instruments is their rigorous, peer-driven review carried out by
the OECD Working Group on Bribery. Detailed monitoring reports evaluate countries’
Box 22.2. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and National Security Interests
According to Article 5 of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, investigation and prosecution of
the bribery of a foreign public official shall not be influenced by considerations of national eco-
nomic interest, the potential effect upon relations with another state or the identity of the natural
or legal persons involved. Article 5 acknowledges the possibility of prosecutorial discretion but
limits such discretion to professional motives (e.g. the weight of evidence), excluding improper
influence by concerns of a political nature. Applicability of Article 5 of the OECD Convention
was tested in the UK when a major case involving the alleged bribery of a foreign public official
was terminated, reportedly due to the need to safeguard national and international security.
3 For more information, see: www.oecd.org/corruption.

4 OECD, “Key OECD Anti-Corruption Documents,” www.oecd.org/document/42/0,3343,en_
2649_37447_41799402_1_1 _1_1,00.html.
Facts. Between July 2004 and December 2006 the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) investi-
gated allegations of bribery by BAE Systems in relation to the Al-Yamamah military aircraft
contracts with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In October 2005, BAE sought to persuade the
attorney general and the SFO to stop the investigation on the grounds that its continuation
would adversely affect relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia and prevent
the United Kingdom securing what it described as the largest export contract in the last dec-
ade. In July 2006, when the SFO was about to obtain access to Swiss bank accounts, what
were discreetly described as “Saudi representatives” made a specific threat to the prime min-
ister’s chief of staff, Jonathan Powell: if the investigation was not stopped, there would be no
contract for the export of Typhoon aircraft and the previous close intelligence and diplomatic
relationship would cease. Ministers advised that those threats would likely be carried out, with
grave consequences for the arms trade and for the safety of British citizens and service per-
sonnel. In light of what he regarded as a grave risk to life if the threat were carried out, in De-
cember 2006 the SFO director decided to stop the investigation. In April 2008, following a re-
quest for judicial review by two NGOs, the U.K. High Court found that the Al Yamamah investi-
gation had been unlawfully terminated in what Lord Justice Moses and Mr. Justice Sullivan de-
scribed as “a successful attempt by a foreign government to pervert the course of Justice in the
United Kingdom.” In July 2008, the House of Lords, the highest appellate court of law in the
country, upheld the SFO’s appeal and overturned the High Court decision, agreeing that the
SFO director acted within the limits of allowed discretion and holding that the interpretation of
applicability of Article 5 to national security considerations should be left to the OECD Working
Group on Bribery.
OECD Report. In its examination report on the UK, the OECD Working Group on Bribery felt it
inappropriate to interpret Article 5 in the context of a country report. The report focused instead
on procedures related to Article 5 and reached the following conclusions: i) where the termina-
tion of a case could appear to be based on considerations prohibited under Article 5, prosecu-
tors must apply a “strict scrutiny” test to ensure that permissible considerations are the real ba-
sis for the decision; ii) a case must not be terminated on national security grounds unless alter-
native solutions have been thoroughly explored as appropriate by the whole of government.
The case of discontinued investigation in the Al-Yamamah case uncovered a number of defi-
ciencies in the UK system of investigation and prosecution of sensitive cases involving national
interests, in particular in the conditions for applying prosecutorial discretion. It underlined the
need for comprehensive reform of the UK outdated anti-bribery legislation. It also pointed to the
need for further academic research and an authoritative interpretation of Article 5 of the OECD
Convention with a view to clarifying the scope of exceptions to enforcement of the foreign brib-
ery offence.
Sources: OECD Working Group on Bribery, Phase 2bis Report on the UK, www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/20/
41515077.pdf; The UK High Court judgment, www.bailii.org/ew/cases/ EWHC/Admin/2008/714.html; The
UK House of Lords judgment, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldjudgmt/jd080730/
corner.pdf; TI 2009 Progress Report on the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, http://www.transparency.org/
news_room/in_focus/2009/oecd_pr_2009.
implementation and enforcement of anti-bribery laws and policies. A mutual evaluation

process creates peer pressure within the Working Group and motivates countries to
ensure the highest level of compliance with the convention.
The Council of Europe (CoE)/GRECO exist to uphold and further pluralist democ-
racy, human rights and the rule of law. The council’s efforts to fight corruption are due
to the threat corruption presents to the very foundations of these core values. CoE’s
approach consists of three interrelated elements: (1) setting European norms and
standards; (2) monitoring compliance with the standards; and (3) capacity building of-
fered to individual countries and regions, through technical cooperation programs.
The Council of Europe has developed a number of legal instruments addressing is-
sues like criminalisation of corruption in the public and private sectors, liability and
compensation for damage caused by corruption, conduct of public officials and the fi-
nancing of political parties. These instruments are aimed at improving the capacity of
states to fight corruption domestically as well as at the international level.
The monitoring of compliance with these standards is entrusted to the Group of
States against Corruption (GRECO). GRECO was established in 1999 by the Council
of Europe to monitor States’ compliance with the organisation’s anti-corruption stan-
dards. Currently it has 46 members, 45 European States and the United States of
America. GRECO’s objective is to improve the ability of its members to fight corruption.
It does this through a dynamic process of mutual evaluation and peer pressure based
on monitoring missions to test their compliance with Council of Europe anti-corruption
standards, identify deficiencies in national anti-corruption policies, and then prompt the
necessary legislative, institutional and practical reforms. GRECO also provides a plat-
form for sharing best practice in the prevention and detection of corruption.
In July 2008, NATO launched a Trust Fund to build integrity and reduce corruption
in defence establishments. The program seeks to increase national capacity using three
principle tools:
• A self assessment tool designed to measure the current state of integrity and
anti-corruption programs in defence establishments;
• Building integrity courses for civilian and military personnel;
• Development of a compendium to promote best practices (the one you are
currently reading).
The Building Integrity Trust Fund is being implemented together with a number of
partners, including the UK Defence Academy, the Geneva Centre for the Democratic
Control of Armed Forces, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and Transparency In-
ternational.
The Trust Fund is a natural extension of NATO’s Partnership Action Plan for De-
fence Institution Building (PAP/DIB), which was launched in July 2004 to help partners
develop and sustain efficient defence institutions that operate under democratic civilian
control. The PAP/DIB established ten objectives (see Box 22.3) for nations building de-
fence institutions and took three major steps toward helping them achieve these ob-
jectives:
• Integrating defence institution building into the defence planning process for
Partnership (PfP Planning and Review Process, or PARP);
• Developing activities to facilitate exchange of experience; for example a
Reference Curricula that provides in-depth learning objectives and curriculum
development support;
• Helping tailor and focus bilateral defence and security assistance programs.
The Trust Fund also helps nations to meet their international obligations, including
implementation of the UN Convention against Corruption, the OECD Anti-Bribery Con-
vention, the World Bank strategy on corruption, and anti-corruption instruments of
other international and regional organisations.
Box 22.3. Objectives of the PfP Action Plan for Defence Institution Building
The Action Plan’s objectives include:
• Effective and transparent arrangements for the democratic control of defence activi-
ties;
• Civilian participation in developing defence and security policy;
• Effective and transparent legislative and judicial oversight of the defence sector;
• Enhanced assessment of security risks and national defence requirements, matched
with developing and maintaining affordable and interoperable capabilities;
• Optimizing the management of defence ministries and other agencies which have
associated force structures;
• Compliance with international norms and practices in the defence sector, including
export controls;
• Effective and transparent financial, planning and resource allocation procedures in
the defence area;
• Effective management of defence spending as well as of the socio-economic conse-
quences of defence restructuring;
• Effective and transparent personnel structures and practices in the defence forces;
and
• Effective international cooperation and good neighbourly relations in defence and
security matters.
Source: Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building, www.nato.int.
NATO’s intensive security and defence cooperation with Ukraine has served as an
incubator for innovative projects, under the framework of the Distinctive NATO-Ukraine
Partnership. These may provide useful lessons that can be applied more widely.
One of the most successful innovations has been the creation in 1998 of the
NATO-Ukraine Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR). For over a decade,
the JWGDR has helped Ukraine draw on NATO countries’ experience in defence and
security sector reform in formats from expert workshops to annual ministerial-level
consultations. This has proven particularly valuable in helping Ukraine develop its re-
form agenda in ways that reflect international good practice and working together with
NATO countries to manage international support for that agenda – including the devel-
opment of a number of innovative programs tailored to Ukraine’s requirements. This
joint management has also included regular progress assessments.
A number of specific initiatives coming out of the JWGDR are worth noting:
• Expert support on key national security documents that form a road map for
reform, including Defence Reviews in 2003 and 2009 and the National Secu-
rity Strategy in 2006;
• Expert assistance on the development of “White Books” providing public
transparency on policy and implementation for defence and the intelli-
gence/security sector;
• Engagement of numerous allied technical advisors with Ukraine’s Ministry of
Defence, along with the creation of a Joint Coordinating Committee to man-
age efforts;
• Engagement with parliament on democratic control issues, including semi-
nars, workshops, expertise on legislation and publication of the legislative co-
dex on security and defence;
• The NATO-Ukraine Working Group on Civil and Democratic Control of the
Intelligence Sector, which brought together dozens of intelligence officials and
experts from NATO countries and Ukraine to discuss the functioning of intelli-
gence agencies in democracies;
• A Professional Development Program that has trained hundreds of civilians
working in Ukraine’s defence and security institutions;
• A Partnership Network for Civil Society Expertise Development to promote the
role of civil society in defence and security affairs by linking experts from
Ukraine and NATO countries.
Many of these efforts were implemented in close coordination with the Geneva
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) is one of
the world’s leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform (SSR) and secu-
rity sector governance (SSG). Established by the Swiss government in 2000, it oper-
ates as an international foundation with 53 member states. DCAF develops and pro-
motes appropriate democratic norms at the international and national levels, advo-
cates good practices and conducts policy-related research on SSR issues, and pro-
vides in-country advisory support and practical assistance programs. It runs the follow-
ing programs:
• Security Governance Program
• Government Advisory Program
• Parliamentary Assistance Program
• Civil Society Program
• Defence Reform Program
• Police Reform Program
• Border Security Program
• Intelligence Accountability Program
• Gender, Children and Security Program.
DCAF’s priority geographical focus is on the Western Balkans and the Newly Inde-
pendent States; however, it has been increasingly reaching out to the Middle East and
parts of Africa, Latin America and Asia.
Transparency International (TI) is a non-partisan global network that brings to-
gether the international presence of a global NGO with the local capacities of its more
than 90 national chapters. These chapters work to bring together relevant players from
government, civil society, business and the media to promote transparency in elec-
tions, public administration, procurement and business. They also use advocacy cam-
paigns to lobby governments to implement anti-corruption reforms.
TI helps these chapters with developing the skills, tools, experience, expertise and
broad participation to fight corruption on the ground, as well as through global and re-
gional initiatives.
The global priorities for TI are combating corruption in politics, public contracting
and the private sector. They also support implementation of international anti-corrup-
tion conventions and work to alleviate poverty and support development. TI does not
undertake investigations of alleged corruption or expose individual cases but at times
will work in coalition with organisations that do.
Beginning in 2000, the UK chapter of TI began working to address corruption in the
defence arena. The initial focus of this effort was in the area of arms exports, and TI
brought together arms exporting governments and defence companies to consider
what constructive measures might be taken to reduce corruption in this area. These
ideas include the possibility of a defence consortium against corruption, strengthening
the implementation of the OECD Convention, integrity pacts for procurement and
closer work with other international organisations.
TI has recently begun working on a Trust Fund Project with NATO to explicitly ad-
dress corruption and corruption risk in the defence sphere. It has also begun an initia-
tive to better measure the effectiveness of effort of defence integrity programs.
Leveraging International Organisations to Catalyze Change

A tremendous number of international organisations, inter-governmental organisations
and global civil society institutions are involved in combating corruption. The challenge
for the reform-minded defence official or citizen is how to use that know-how to cata-
lyze positive change. The following three approaches have proven successful:
1. International Standards: The national institution seeking reform engages with
an international institution that is a repository of an international standard.
This could be an anti-corruption standard like the OECD, or it could be a
standard of ethics like the UN Guidelines on Conflict of Interest for Public Of-
ficials, or a standard for the integrity of a process, like auditing. The goal is to
publicly meet the standard using any feedback mechanisms to gain the pres-
tige, workplace pride and improved effectiveness that meeting an interna-
tional standard can bring. By working closely with the assessment team, in-
spections become an excellent opportunity not only for feedback but also to
place difficult reforms on the agenda of senior officials.
2. Joint Projects: The national institution seeks assistance from the international
organisation to address a specific issue that is important to the institution’s
leadership but beyond local means to implement unaided. The result is a joint
program with joint management mechanisms – that is, implementation teams,
steering boards to provide direction, joint assessments and joint reporting to a
body where senior officials of both sides regularly attend. This can help lock
domestic institutions into frameworks where they work according to interna-
tional standards of integrity, transparency and accountability. Joint projects
can also be an effective mechanism for transfer of norms, values and working
methods. Transparency is improved as the free flow of information up the
“Western” portion of the reporting chain forces local counterparts to match
that accuracy and honesty of reporting (see the example in Box 22.4).
3. Bridge-building: Often there are actors within a national institution, or out in
society, who are potential allies in building integrity with motivation and re-
sources (at least human resources). However, the opportunity to meet may be
limited due to the nature of bureaucracy or society – for example, mutual sus-
picion or bureaucratic regulation. International organisations can help these
natural allies to meet, share knowledge and experience, gain confidence with
each other and work together in a network. In this case, it is useful if the host
government encourages international organisations to make broad links
within society and the state apparatus in order to have the best information
and contacts available to play “matchmaker.” International organisations are
also usually well-placed to link domestic officials and non-governmental
experts or activists to international counterparts. The development of this
network can have a strong impact in at least two directions: 1) the creation of
a professional and well-integrated expert class; and 2) increased expertise in

civil society, allowing for more effective independent monitoring.
Box 22.4. NATO-Ukraine Professional Development Program

In 2005, NATO and Ukraine identified a gap in training for defence officials. Military officers
were regularly receiving training opportunities, abroad or in-country, but their civilian counter-
parts were not. This was leading to imbalances in the system.
Ukraine requested support to address the problem and in 2006 NATO and Ukraine created
the NATO-Ukraine Professional Development Program, which was targeted at defence civil-
ians. National sponsors were found and a program team was put in place at the NATO Liaison
Office in Kyiv. A Ukrainian officer from the MOD Personnel Department was seconded to the
implementation team, reporting to the NATO-national program manager. In addition, a local
management board was made that included representation from all major stakeholders: the
MOD leadership (assistant to the minister), the MOD Personnel Department, the National Se-
curity and Defence Council, the UK special defence advisor (UK being lead nation on the pro-
ject), the head of the NATO Liaison Office and the program manager. On behalf of the Man-
agement Board, the program manager presented 3–4 times a year to a steering committee of
major donors in Brussels.
Training and education abroad are important parts of the program and to date over 1000
Ukrainian officials have attended courses – some in-country, some abroad. As these courses
are in high demand, they come with significant corruption risk (which was already endemic in
national selection procedures). In order to ensure the integrity of the process, the program in-
stituted the following procedures:
1. Requirements for training are developed a year ahead of time based on MOD
transformation objectives. This helped ensure that managers were motivated to send
the right people to get the job done.
2. Training requirements are matched to courses and potential students (or at least
postings) and presented in an annual plan to be approved by senior MOD leadership.
3. The program staff, working with the MOD, identifies a pool of possible candidates
with the right prerequisites, the right position and the supervisor’s permission. These
candidates are subject to:
a) Competitive selection, including language testing and interviews, with the
interview board made up of different stakeholders, and always at least one
Ukrainian and one NATO official.
4. Joint management and ownership of the results, with regular assessment being pro-
vided to senior stakeholders.
On this latter point, the support of the defence leadership was crucial for maintaining the in-
tegrity of these decisions and in several cases resulted in significant punishment for those who
tried to circumvent the regulations.
In all these cases, the key enabling factor is people – dedication, trustworthiness
and a good rapport between partners is crucial for success. For international organisa-
tions, the number one prerequisite for success is an in-country counterpart who can
work patiently with all stakeholders, help smooth over differences, take a stand when
necessary and—in the end—take ownership of the process, jointly at first, and then
ideally gradually accepting increased responsibility for project implementation. There is
a good chance that the reader, having made it this far in the compendium, may be just
such a person.
Part IV
Implementing Integrity
Building Programmes
The final part of the compendium examines the practical aspects of designing and im-
plementing integrity building programmes in defence. Of particular importance in this
regard is to acknowledge the cultural specifics of the defence organisation in a par-
ticular country and to strengthen those features of the organisational culture that con-
tribute to individual and organisational integrity and deter corrupt behaviour. These
good practices can then be disseminated to other public organisations in the country.
297
Chapter 23
Making Change Happen
No two defence organizations face the same problems of integrity and corruption. Re-
spectively, integrity building initiatives may require different levels and types of effort,
from minor adjustments in a particular process, perhaps focused on increasing the
transparency and integrity of the procurement procedure, to comprehensive endeav-
ours aimed at enhancing the integrity of all core defence business processes and
changing the general attitudes and behaviours of the people in the organisation.
This chapter is focused on the latter case. It provides the reader with an under-
standing of tried change management strategies and processes, with their respective
strengths and weaknesses. It also informs the reader of likely pitfalls and suggestions
of how to approach the challenges of creating and implementing integrity building pro-
grammes.
The design of such a programme is based on a solid understanding of the current
status and trends in defence integrity and corruption risks, commitment, vision and
strategy.
Assessment of Current Status
Frequently, leaders of the defence organisation initiate change under the pressure of
parliamentary hearings or public opinion, related to a particular instance of corrupt be-
haviour. Much too often they want to demonstrate quick results, while the initiated
change has only a temporary impact and yields meagre positive results, if any.
Therefore, it is strongly recommended to assess the status of integrity before em-
barking on the design of an integrity building programme. Such an assessment should
lead to:
• Identification of the areas and defence activities involving corruption risks;
• Understanding of the reasons for actual or potential corrupt behaviour;
• Insight into perceptions and attitudes of the military, other MoD personnel and
society regarding corrupt behaviour; and
• Estimation of the readiness to accept integrity measures and change.
In addition, a comprehensive and well structured assessment of defence integrity,
involving the widest community of stakeholders, will contribute to:
• Understanding of causality and interdependencies among integrity enhance-
ment measures and a variety of practices;
299
• Insight into who might be the likely allies and opponents of integrity building
measures; and
• Identification of potential agents of change.
Studies of internal and public sources, focused discussions with people from inside
and outside the defence establishment, structured questionnaires and interviews are
used to assess the current status. The NATO self-assessment tool and question-
naire—one of the early results within the NATO integrity building initiative—can be
particularly useful in this initial assessment. Box 23.1 provides initial information and
references on this tool, available to any country and defence establishment, for adopt-
ing an anti-corruption agenda.
Box 23.1. NATO Self-Assessment Tool

A collaboration between NATO nations and Transparency International, led by Poland, resulted
in an Integrity Self-Assessment Process for defence and security. It is available to any country
wishing to use it and has already been implemented by several NATO and partner countries.
The Integrity Self-Assessment Process provides nations with a template to assess the
strength of their own integrity systems. It focuses on answers provided by the Ministry of De-
fence and others to a detailed questionnaire that is then reviewed by an external expert review
team. The questionnaire addresses the main pillars of the integrity system in the defence es-
tablishment and corruption risk across each of these. It contains guidance as to how to com-
plete the questionnaire and how to initiate follow-up processes, comprising reform and imple-
mentation plans for building integrity and reducing corruption. The expert team assesses the
responses and conducts an on-site visit to determine key strengths and weaknesses of the
process, and makes a set of recommendations and observations for follow-up. The process
can be conducted on a one-off basis or as part of a repeated cycle.
The Integrity Self-Assessment Process covers the following topics:
1. Democratic control and engagement;
2. National anti-corruption laws and policy;
3. Anti-corruption policy in defence and security;
4. Personnel – behaviour, policy, training, discipline;
5. Planning and budgeting;
6. Operations;
7. Procurement;
8. Engaging with defence companies and other suppliers;
9. Nation-specific questions.
Source: Mark Pyman, Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption Risk in Defence Establishments: Ten
Practical Reforms, with foreword by Lord George Robertson of Port Ellen (UK: Transparency Interna-
tional, April 2009); The full description and the questionnaire are available at: Transparency International,
“Integrity Self-Assessment Process,” http://www.defenceagainstcorruption.org/tools-and-techniques/self-
assessment-tool.
Making Change Happen 301
Form a Strong Coalition

Among the most useful results of the assessment of defence corruption risks is the
creation of a sense of urgency.1 Focused interviews and studies often bring forward
convincing narratives and qualitative data that may agitate people who may otherwise
be oblivious to the problem of corruption or its wider and long-term impact on organ-
isational performance and ethos.
That also provides a background against which to ensure the commitment of the
senior leadership, both military and civilian, across the defence organization and not
just of the heads of those organisational units considered most susceptible to corrup-
tion.
It is important already at this stage to consider who would act as agents of change,
as well as to start seeking support of representatives of parliament and civil society, in
particular of defence think-tanks, activist groups and media. Representatives of suppli-
ers of defence technologies, products and services may also be considered among
potential allies in initiatives to counter defence corruption.
Any successful attempt at building integrity and reducing corruption in defence
would build on a strong coalition of the political leadership of the Ministry of Defence,
the senior military leadership, parliamentarians and lead civil society representatives,
supported by major defence suppliers and benefiting from the close monitoring of an
independent, critical media.
Develop and Communicate a Vision and a Strategy
Complex endeavours such as building integrity and reducing corruption in defence re-
quire visionaries, who can also approach the problem strategically and communicate
their vision and strategy effectively.
First, the leadership of the defence organisation needs to properly frame the prob-
lem of integrity building and the approach to considerably reducing the potential for
corruption in defence. Framing the problem too narrowly is not likely to have a long-
term and systemic impact on defence corruption. On the other hand, framing the
problem too broadly, e.g., as “promoting democratic and accountable defence institu-
tions,” would lead to loss of focus and may not generate the support necessary for a
successful initiative. Chapter two of this compendium provides an example of how the
problem and the approach to its resolution may be feasibly framed.
Next comes the formulation of a vision. The vision statement should be specific to
each country and defence establishment and relevant to the status of integrity and the
threat of corruption. Some may want to see corrupt defence officials land in prison,
while others may call for a “corruption-free” defence establishment. There is no gener-
ally valid recipe of how to formulate a vision but it needs to be constructive and draw a
1 This and several of the steps below are based on John P. Kotter, Leading Change (Boston:
Harvard Business School Press, 1996).
future that is both challenging and achievable. Box 23.2 provides guidance on how to
create a vision statement.
Box 23.2. Vision Statement

Bert Nanus defines a vision as a “realistic, credible, attractive future for [an] organization.” This
short definition underlines the following key features of a vision statement:
• Realistic: A vision must be based in reality to be meaningful for an organization.
• Credible: A vision must be believable to be relevant. To whom must a vision be credi-
ble? Most importantly, to the members of the organization. If the members of the or-
ganization do not find the vision credible, it will not be meaningful or serve a useful
purpose. One of the purposes of a vision is to inspire those in the organization to
achieve a level of excellence, and to provide purpose and direction for the work of
those employees. A vision which is not credible will accomplish neither of these ends.
• Attractive: If a vision is going to inspire and motivate those in the organization, it must
be attractive. People must want to be part of this future that is envisioned for the or-
ganization.
• Future: A vision is not in the present, it is in the future. A vision is not where you are
now; it is where you want to be in the future.
Such a vision statement can accomplish a number of things for the organization:
• It attracts commitment and energizes people. One of the primary reasons for having
a vision for an organization is its motivational effect. When people can see that the
organization is committed to a vision—and that entails more than just having a vision
statement—it generates enthusiasm about the course the organization intends to
follow and increases the commitment of people to work toward achieving that vision.
• It creates meaning in the lives of members of the organization. A vision allows people
to feel like they are part of a greater whole and hence provides meaning for their
work. The right vision will mean something to everyone in the organization if they can
see how what they do contributes to that vision.
• It establishes a standard of excellence. A vision serves a very important function in
establishing a standard of excellence. In fact, a good vision is all about excellence. A
vision so characterized by lack of a striving for excellence would not motivate or ex-
cite anyone about that organization. The standard of excellence also can serve as a
continuing goal and stimulate integrity building improvement programmes, as well as
providing a measure of the worth of the organization.
• It bridges the present and the future. The right vision takes the organization out of
the present and focuses it on the future. It is easy to get caught up in the crises of the
day and to lose sight of where you were heading. A good vision can orient you to the
future and provide positive direction.
Sources: Bert Nanus, Visionary Leadership: Creating a Compelling Sense of Direction for Your Organiza-
tion (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1992); “Strategic Vision,” in Strategic Leadership and Decision Making
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1997).
Collins and Porras elaborate another view on defining a vision. Conceptually, they
see it as having two major components: a Guiding Philosophy and a Tangible Image,
where the guiding philosophy is defined as “a system of fundamental motivating as-
sumptions, principles, values and tenets” and stems from the organization’s core be-
liefs, values and purpose, and the image is provided by a vivid description of the or-
ganization’s mission.2
A vision alone is not sufficient to move the organisation from the present to the de-
sired future. This transition from the present to the future requires a strategy that is
adequate to the organisational culture and feasible. Box 23.3 provides an overview of
basic change management strategies and the factors that condition the choice of one
or another integrity building strategy.
Both the vision and the strategy to promote integrity and reduce corruption risks
have to be clearly communicated to all members of the defence organization. Since
strong anti-corruption coalitions involve stakeholders external to the defence organisa-
tion, the vision and the strategic approach also have to be communicated to the wider
defence and security sector, as well as to society.
The vital importance of communications in change management has been repeat-
edly stressed since the issue was first formulated and developed. Clarity, continuity
and constancy of communication are most effective in achieving success. Communi-
cation must also be reciprocal, e.g. leaders and change agents have to listen as well
as talk. Advocacy and sponsorship are also vital in communications.3
The role of the minister of defence as lead communicator is a clear sign of personal
commitment and, in itself, sends a strong message to all members of the defence or-
ganisation and to society, in particular when the minister regularly communicates his or
her own priorities and the achievements in enhancing integrity in defence.
Box 23.3. Basic Change Management Strategies

Experienced practitioners in the management of organisational change identify four basic
change management strategies, with their underlying rationale as follows:
1. Empirical-Rational: People are rational and will follow their self-interest, once it is re-
vealed to them. Change is based on the communication of information and the prof-
fering of incentives.
2. Normative-Reeducative: People are social beings and will adhere to cultural norms
and values. Change is based on redefining and reinterpreting existing norms and
values, and developing commitments to new ones.
2 James C. Collins and Jerry I. Porras, “Organizational Vision and Visionary Organizations,”
California Management Review 34:1 (Fall 1991), 30–52.
3 Gregory R. Guy and Karen V. Beaman, Effecting Change in Business Enterprises: Current
Trends in Change Management, Research Repot R-1371-05-RR (NY: The Conference
Board, 2005).
3. Power-Coercive: People are basically compliant and will generally do what they are
told or can be made to do. Change is based on the exercise of authority and the im-
position of sanctions.
4. Environmental-Adaptive: People oppose loss and disruption but they adapt readily to
new circumstances. Change is based on building a new organization and gradually
transferring people from the old one to the new one.
There is no single best change strategy; leaders of change are best served by some mix of
strategies. The selection of one or more of these strategies hangs on a number of factors, in-
cluding:
• Scope and Scale. This can vary from the minor, e.g. adjusting of a process within a
unit, to the complete transformation of the entire organisation. The larger the scope
and scale, the more likely a broad mix of strategies will be required with the Power-
Coercive strategy playing a central role.
• Degree of Resistance. Strong resistance argues for a coupling of Power-Coercive
and Environmental-Adaptive strategies. Weak resistance or concurrence argues for a
combination of Empirical-Rational and Normative-Reeducative strategies.
• Target Population. Large populations argue for a mix of all four strategies, “some-
thing for everyone” so to speak.
• The Stakes. High stakes argue for a mix of all four strategies. When the stakes are
high, nothing can be left to chance.
• The Time Frame. Short time frames argue for a Power-Coercive strategy. Longer
time frames argue for a mix of Empirical-Rational, Normative-Reeducative and Envi-
ronmental-Adaptive strategies.
• Available Expertise. Having available adequate expertise in change management ar-
gues for some mix of the strategies outlined above. Not having it available argues for
reliance on the Power-Coercive strategy.
• Dependency. This is a classic double-edged sword. If the organization is dependent
on its people, management’s ability to command or demand is limited. Conversely, if
people are dependent upon the organization, their ability to oppose or resist is lim-
ited. Mutual dependency almost always signals a requirement for some level of ne-
gotiation.
In sum, people manage organisational change pretty much the same way they would man-
age anything else of a turbulent, messy and chaotic nature – they do not really manage it, they
grapple with change. It is as much a matter of leadership ability as it is of management skills.
Sources: Fred Nickols, Change Management 101: A Primer (Distance Consulting, 2007),
www.managementhelp.org/misc/reqs-for-successful-change.pdf; The strategies are adapted from: Warren
G. Bennis, Kenneth D. Benne and Robert Chin, eds., The Planning of Change, 2nd Edition (NY: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1969).
To implement the integrity building strategy, change agents may consider a more
or less formal plan or programme. Practice in that respect differs widely. Attempts
have been made to use formal programmes with clearly set objectives, creation of a
particular organisation with an explicit mandate, e.g. the anti-corruption bureaus in the
Ministries of Defence of Poland and Ukraine, and the allocation of the requisite re-
sources. Whether this is an effective approach or not remains to be seen.
Whatever the level of formalisation, these and other features of programmatic
management, such as personal and organisational commitment, regular delivery of
progress accounts with agreed measures of progress and results are common to most
integrity building efforts.
Other features of a well planned, systemic process of organisational change are
presented in Box 23.4.
Notwithstanding the particular approach, experienced change management profes-
sionals identify the following common features of successful change management ini-
tiatives:
• Attention to eliminating obstacles to change;
• Early demonstration of success;
• Building on initial wins to accelerate change; and
• Embedding new practices into the organisational culture.4
Eliminate Obstacles to Change

There is hardly ever open resistance to integrity building initiatives. On occasion, there
is an opposition that is more subtle, as well as obstacles of various natures. Change
agents are advised to eliminate such obstacles to change, with a particular focus on
the following ones:5
1. Complacency driven by arrogance;
2. Self-protective immobilization driven by fear;
3. Defiance driven by anger; and
4. Hesitancy driven by pessimism.
A good communication strategy with the involvement of the most senior defence
leadership is a powerful tool to reduce roadblocks to change. More specific ap-
proaches may be applied to deal with particular target groups.
4 Kotter, Leading Change.

5 Jeanne Dininni, “Guide to Management Theory of John Kotter,” Work.com How-to Guides to
Your Business (2009).
Box 23.4. Example of a Planned, Systemic Change Process

A typical planned, systemic (and systematic) organizational development process often follows
an overall approach as described below. There are many variations, e.g. combining various
phases and/or splitting some into more phases. In this example it is assumed—and this is usu-
ally the case—that the leadership of the organisation tasks a change agent—either internal or
external to the organisation—to manage the change process.
Phase 1: Clarifying Expectations and Roles for Change Process
This phase is sometimes called the “Contracting” and/or “Entry” phase. This phase is usually
where the relationship between you (the initial change agent) and your client starts, whether
you are an external or internal consultant. Experts assert that this phase is one of the most—if
not the most—important phases in the organizational change process. Activities during this
stage form the foundation for successful organizational change. The quality of how this phase
is carried out usually is a strong indicator of how the initiative will go. This phase provides an-
swers to a number of questions, including the following:
• Who is the current client?
• How is “success” defined?
• What is the client’s readiness for change?
Phase 2: Joint Discovery to Identify Priorities for Change
The more collaborative the change agent is working with members of the client’s organization,
the more likely that the change effort will be successful. The change agent and the client work
together during this phase to understand more about the overall priority of the change effort
and how it can be addressed effectively. It might be a major problem in the organization or an
exciting vision to achieve. Together, you will collect information, analyze it to identify findings
and conclusions and then make recommendations from that information. Sometimes the data-
collection effort is very quick, for example, facilitating a large planning meeting. Other times,
the effort is more extensive, for example, evaluating an entire organization and developing a
complete plan for change, conducting interviews, etc.
Sometimes people minimize the importance or skip this critical discovery phase altogether
and start change management by articulating an ambitious and comprehensive vision for
change. Many would argue that it is unethical to initiate a project for organizational change
without fully examining (or discovering) the current situation in the client’s organization. Fo-
cusing most of the change efforts on achieving a robust vision, without at least some careful
discovery, often can be harmful and you can end up dealing with symptoms of current issues,
rather than the root causes. Also, the project could end up pushing an exciting vision that,
while initially inspiring and motivating to many, could be completely unrealistic to achieve, es-
pecially if the organization already has many current, major issues to address.
This phase also involves:
• Establishing a project team;
• Joint planning and conducting data collection;
• Joint analysis of research results;

• Joint generation of findings and conclusions;
• Joint sharing of findings and recommendations in client’s organization.
Phase 3: Joint Planning of Organizational Development Activities to Address Priorities
This phase is focused on further clarifying the recommendations on how to address priorities,
along with developing them into various action plans. The various plans are sometimes inte-
grated into an overall change management plan. Thus, the early activities in this phase often
overlap with, and are a continuation of, the activities near the end of the previous discovery
phase. Action plans together can now provide a clear and realistic vision for change. They pro-
vide the “roadmap” for managing the transition from the present state to the desired future
state.
This phase also involves:
• Selecting organizational development activities to address the findings from discov-
ery;
• Joint development of action plans;
• Joint development of evaluation plans;
• Joint development of learning plans.
Phase 4: Change Management and Joint Evaluation
During this phase, emphasis is placed on sustaining and evaluating the change effort, including
by addressing resistance that arises from members of the organization and sometimes in the
change agent as well. This phase involves:
• Client’s ongoing communication of action plans;
• Client’s implementation of action plans;
• Client and change agent maintain momentum during change;
• Joint evaluation of project activities and desired results;
Source: Carter McNamara, “Organizational Change and Development,” Free Management Library,
www.managementhelp.org/org_chng/org_chng.htm#anchor556912.
The empowerment of the members of the organization is another instrument to cir-

cumvent or eliminate obstacles. It spans a whole range of techniques – from encour-
aging people to report on conflict of interest and other corruption risks, through dele-
gating responsibilities and resources to achieve concrete integrity objectives, to as-
signing members of the organization to function as leaders of teams tasked to oversee
processes and practice in whole areas with significant corruption risk, e.g. defence
procurement, offsets, etc.
Empowerment may be particularly effective when the senior leadership of the de-
fence establishment widely acknowledges the achievements of individuals and teams
and demonstrates continuous commitment to integrity building.
And finally, it is not necessary to eliminate all barriers as a condition for taking ac-
tion. Leaders and change agents may choose to eliminate some of the potential barri-
ers, reduce the impact of others, and even ignore some obstacles with the belief that
the positive reasons for change are more important than the obstructions that may be
set up.
Demonstrate Quick Wins
Of particular importance is to create a momentum of change and to convince sceptics
of the seriousness of intent and the feasibility of the integrity building strategy. There-
fore, change agents are under pressure to start implementing the integrity building
strategy or programme as soon as it has been announced and are expected to dem-
onstrate that it is working.
Seasoned practitioners provide advice to change agents—and to leaders of the
defence establishment as well—not to engage in destructive behaviours, such as fo-
cusing heavily on detail, reacting negatively to criticism, jumping to conclusions or
micromanaging employees, since all such behaviours undermine their chances of suc-
cess.
“Quick wins” are not necessarily related to major change in the ways the organisa-
tion is functioning. They may not have a great impact on corruption risks in quantitative
terms either. What is really important is to demonstrate commitment in practice, to
show resolve in the face of resistance, and to prove the feasibility of the counter-cor-
ruption strategy that is based on building integrity, increasing transparency and im-
proving accountability.
For example, when the use of independent monitors of defence procurement cases
is part of the building integrity strategy (see, for example, chapter 7 of the compen-
dium), it is not necessary to wait for large procurement cases, e.g. for procurement of
airplanes or ships. The feasibility of the approach may be tested in smaller procure-
ments—maybe just for a few hundred thousand Euros—that still get on the radar of
specialized media and non-governmental organizations. The success of such a novel
approach will contribute to the initiative gaining momentum and, on the other hand, will
help the change agents to foresee future obstacles and refine the integrity building
strategy respectively.
Build on Initial Wins to Accelerate Change
Initial gains in building integrity and reducing corruption risks, however small at the
start, have to be consolidated and then expanded to produce more of the desired
changes.
The desired end state, however, may also shift. The implementation of integrity
building programmes is a dynamic process, undergoing frequent revision to accom-
modate lessons learned from the experience gained. It may turn out that the scope of
the initiative is overly ambitious or that it does not reach far enough.
In addition, change management, just like any form of management, must allow for
revising plans or altering the process in the light of experience. In full accordance with
the famous military aphorism, “No battle plan survives contact with the enemy,”6 no
change management plan survives contact with the real world of implementation.7
But there are also some constants in successful implementation, such as the need
to:
• Recognise and reward performance in line with the objectives of the integrity
building programme;
• Continue to clarify and communicate the scope and rationale for change;
• Provide for feedback by defence employees and external stakeholders;
• Continue with the efforts to identify potential resistance and the rationale be-
hind it; and
• Identify and invest in competencies necessary to accelerate and institutional-
ize integrity.
Embed New Practices into the Organisational Culture

The final stage according to Kotter’s change management treatise is to make the de-
sired change, in this case in integrity and corruption risks in defence, irreversible.
That may be achieved when new standards and, more importantly, new behaviour
characterised by integrity and zero tolerance to corruption become part of the shared
attitudes, beliefs and customs of the defence organisation and its external stake-
holders, including those in parliament, the defence industry, the media and so on.
Training the future leaders of the defence sector has an important role to play in
the institutionalisation of such organisational culture. Box 23.5 describes the training
course provided within the NATO Integrity Building Initiative to future leaders of de-
fence in both NATO and partner countries. Box 23.6 provides an example of using
role-play, which has been used successfully in the training of the next generation of
leaders of the defence and security sectors in numerous partner countries.
In summary, the compendium provides many examples in dealing with particular
corruption issues and practical approaches to enhancing integrity. This particular
chapter examined notional processes of change management. But there is no off-the-
shelf solution for each defence establishment. The application of the ideas and good
practices herein to a particular setting requires imagination and strategic thinking,
leadership qualities and perseverance, combined with application of good governance
principles to defence.
6 Attributed to Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891). The phrase is translated from
German in the following way: “No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first
encounter with the enemy’s main strength.”
7 Guy and Beaman, Effecting Change in Business Enterprises.
Box 23.5. NATO Building Integrity Training Course

This UK-led initiative to train future leaders of defence establishments resulted in a five day in-
tegrity building training course, endorsed within the NATO Integrity Building Initiative.
The training course is designed for Defence Ministries, armed forces personnel and is aimed
at colonel level staff. Lectures are conducted by the staff of the Defence Academy of the UK,
the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, NATO, the Swedish Defence College and Transparency
International, as well as external speakers from a range of government and international insti-
tutions.
The content of the lectures includes the types of corruption and vulnerabilities in the defence
sector, corruption issues in military operations and peacekeeping and the role of media and
managerial aspects in tackling defence corruption. It focuses on practical issues, different na-
tional experiences and the role of officers and civilians in the middle of the hierarchy in effect-
ing change.
The main goals of the training module are to help participants to:
1. Understand what corruption is;
2. Understand corruption in defence;
3. Understand ways to build integrity and tackle corruption at the political level, at the
functional level and through personal behaviour;
4. Gain confidence that the topic can be addressed.
Course participants also examine the concepts of transparency and good governance and
ways to engage appropriately with defence suppliers, the public and civil society. They ex-
change personal experiences and learn from each other. The highlight of the course for the
trainees is their individual presentations of the topic “How I will tackle integrity.”
The first pilot course was conducted at the UK Defence Academy in July 2008. It was deliv-
ered to a group of eighteen international participants from Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Arme-
nia, Romania, Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro, Poland, the UK, Norway and Swit-
zerland.
To date, the course has been delivered to participants from more than 20 nations at the
NATO School Oberammergau, the Peace Support Operations Training Centre in Sarajevo and
the National Defence Academy of Ukraine in Kyiv. It has had a highly enthusiastic reception
from some 30 high ranking military officers and civil servants and up to 15 additional lecturers
and international experts in anti-corruption participating in each of the courses.
Source: NATO Building Integrity Training Course: http://www.defenceagainstcorruption.org/tools-and-

techniques/training-module.
Box 23.6. Role-Play Games: A Powerful Training Tool

As a tool for political reform, training must have the full backing of the authorities, reach the
right people and enhance their knowledge and skills, as well as their attitude. However, it is
never easy to influence people’s attitudes because these are often deep-seated and uncon-
scious. If we want to invite trainees to change their attitudes, we must first lead them to recog-
nise these attitudes. Then we need to help them figure out what gives rise to the attitudes in
question. Finally we must encourage them to try out and practise different attitudes. None of
this can be achieved by conventional teaching. To think it can be done in a PowerPoint pres-
entation is folly.
But imagine a role-play game in which an opposition parliamentarian is criticising a plan to
buy jet fighters and a minister of defence who is arguing why the air force needs the aircraft. In
real life, one of the players is indeed involved in opposition politics, while the other works for
the defence establishment, but in the game, each is playing the other’s role. So they are put-
ting themselves in the shoes of the other and they now see their own role portrayed by some-
one else. Besides, the players experience the issues of weapons procurement in a dramatic,
direct, almost tangible way. This can serve to complement what they previously learned in a
more conventional training session.
At the end of day one, a trainee commented on the introductory sessions on democratic
governance, saying: “I know this stuff. We had it at university.” On day two, he played a leading
role in a role-play game. Later, he said, “Yesterday I thought I understood what you were say-
ing, but I didn’t. NOW I understand it.”
During a role-play exercise, a trainee who was playing a member of a parliamentary com-
mittee of inquiry told the game controller he was going home. The controller, taken aback,
asked why. “I can’t stand that arrogant minister of defence,” the trainee said. The game con-
troller pointed out that the acting was realistic, and the trainee agreed. The controller pointed
out that this arrogant behaviour was serving an educational purpose, and the trainee agreed to
that as well. “It’s so realistic that I can’t stand it, even if we are learning a lot,” he said, and went
home.
At the post-mortem after a role-play game, a trainee who had played a corrupt minister said:
“I am disgusted at my own character. I never thought I could play such a crook.” And another
player, when asked whether his realistic acting was a gift or inspired by the circumstances of
the game answered: “I’m a terrible actor. It was the game.”
Another benefit of role-play is that it helps in group-building, which greatly benefits the sub-
sequent class work. Finally, the excitement makes a durable impact. Long after the trainees
have forgotten the instructors and the course, they will remember the game. The instructor can
only provide circumstantial evidence, but we firmly believe role-play is an essential part of “best
practice” in training programmes that aim to do more than convey knowledge and improve skills.
Sources: Sami Faltas, Centre for European Security Studies, www.cess.org; Sami Faltas and Merijn
Hartog, “The Starlink Program: Training for Security Sector Reform in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Moldova, and Ukraine,” Connections: The Quarterly Journal, 7:2 (Summer 2008), 81–91.
Chapter 24
Cultural Awareness in Implementing
Integrity Building Programmes
The design and implementation of effective integrity building strategies and pro-
grammes depends on the ability to capture the specific influence of given organisa-
tional cultures and, in return, to strengthen those features of the organisational culture
that contribute to individual and organisational integrity and deter corrupt behaviour.
Why Culture Matters?
In many post-communist, transition and developing states, corruption has reached
such a scale and caused such damage to politics, the economy, society and ordinary
citizens that it may be defined as a securitised problem.1 Successive governments
have been incapable of finding the right solution to the securitized problem of corrup-
tion and often come to power promising to “break the back” of corruption. Yet at the
end of their term, both objective criteria and perceptions indicate that not only has cor-
ruption not been reduced but its tentacles have spread more widely and deeply in so-
ciety. This erodes people’s faith in democracy, weakens the social fabric, deepens so-
cial stratification and provides additional channels for direct and hidden influence of
oligarchic and criminal structures on the country’s governance. Therefore, curbing cor-
ruption becomes a top priority of national security policy.
This applies to a great extent and with increasing urgency to the defence sector.
On one hand, the military is one of the top three least corrupt sectors in all recent TI
perception studies, which in itself generates legitimacy and popular support for de-
fence organisations. On the other hand, defence traditionally has been an area closed
to public and even parliamentarian scrutiny. Thus, unless there are proper mecha-
nisms for democratic control in place or a culture of zero tolerance to corruption, de-
fence easily turns into a quagmire of foul interests and an experimental field where
new corruption scams are invented and “validated.”
Previous chapters in this compendium provide examples of good practice in en-
hancing the integrity of defence organisations, processes and individuals and reducing
corruption risks in the defence sector. However, attempts to apply such good practices
in other countries frequently do not have the same effect and, no matter how good the
1 There are problems that concern security and those that are of core importance for security,
hence they become securitized.
312
Cultural Awareness in Implementing Integrity Building Programmes 313
intentions, are seen as imitations of initiatives that are just not suitable for the local
setting.
Fundamental cultural differences are among the reasons for failure in attempts to
transfer good practice. In many instances, the application of a model that is success-
fully imitated at the start terminates with a fiasco or brings unsatisfactory outcomes.
This is due to a neglect of local specificities, traditions, experience, organization and
human culture.
In other words, culture matters. In implementing external models and practices
there should be translation and interpretation, enabling the taking into account of local
particularities, dispositions and stereotypes. It should be ensured as well that models
and practices, recommended from outside, have been correctly understood and are
not distorted by local attitudes and perceptions.
What Makes People and Organisations Different?
Cultural differences manifest themselves on no less than seven levels:
1. Between the West and the East, i.e. between the Western individualistic
societies and the Eastern collectivistic ones. Besides, some Slavic and/or
Orthodox countries come under the so-called “in-between” societies.
2. Between the two shores of the Northern Atlantic. These are not radically
different communities and yet after the end of the Cold War, their strategic
perceptions and priorities often diverge.
3. Between Western and Eastern Europe, separated earlier by the real Berlin
Wall and later by a virtual Iron Curtain. Notwithstanding the genuine and in
many cases colossal efforts of the former socialist countries to return to the
European democratic mainstream, the legacy of the previous type of political
and social arrangements has permeated into societies and individuals, in
worldviews and perceptions. Since 1989, Eastern Europe has been attempt-
ing to adopt, most often uncritically, Western European norms and practices,
while Western Europeans tend not to notice patterns of communication and
self-organisation of communities at the local level, of social contacts, parental
and neighbourhood relationships, compassion and solidarity among genera-
tions, models of domestic and friendly mutual assistance and models of ad-
vancing with small steps in the pursuit of common objectives. There are be-
havioural patterns of informal communities that locate themselves between
the individual—whose social and functional importance in totalitarian societies
was insignificant—and the state, which attempted to regulate and penetrate
all spheres of life.
4. Between the institutions of power and the common citizens within the country.
In Eastern European societies there is a dual attitude of ordinary people to-
wards power. On one hand, there are expectations that “power” must resolve
all their problems, or at least the main ones. Power is the active subject of
governance, whereas ordinary people are passive objects. On the other hand,
people see that those in power have their own goals and ambitions, such as
higher living standards and privileges.
5. Between the institutions of the security sector (i.e., the institutions authorised
to apply force) and other state institutions. The force structures continue to
view themselves as structures of higher order, in the name of which the soci-
ety ought to suffer privations and restrictions because “who does not feed
their own army will feed a foreign one,” i.e. the resources for these structures
are considered guaranteed no matter how effective or efficient is their use.
Militarised thinking sustains the idea that national security is sacred, that the
protection of sovereignty and independence, no matter whether relevant
threats exist, is the hard mission and top priority of the country and its armed
forces, which has to be resourced even if that means poor public health ser-
vices, education, science and environment. Box 24.1 provides two of the
widely used definitions of organisational culture and its elements.
6. Between the defence sector and the other institutions of the national security
sector. Too many people in the defence sector keep considering that—unlike
for instance police and civil protection services—the defence establishment is
not bound to report on the outputs and the outcomes of its activity.
7. Between the military and the civilians in defence. Countries in central and
Eastern Europe have achieved remarkable progress in establishing democ-
ratic civil-military relations. Nevertheless, the military and civilians rarely see
themselves as a team fighting against corruption; instead, they often blame
the other side for lacking integrity.
All seven levels of manifestation of national and organisational cultural peculiarities

deserve due attention and effort to enhance integrity, educate translators and commu-
nicators and establish built-in prevention and early warning systems. Depending on
criteria and indicators chosen, a concrete weight may be assigned to each of these
seven levels and then focus efforts to minimise the damages introduced by “distor-
tions” in transferring good practices to maximise benefits.
Cultural Layers and Corruption Attitudes

In the consideration of integrity building initiatives, change agents need to consider
four main layers of acquired dispositions and stereotypes towards corruption. This is
particularly important when they want to trace behaviour back to the cultural peculiari-
ties that influence perceptions of corruption, to adopt working strategies to counter cor-
ruption and to change the attitude towards it.
Box 24.1. On the Definition of Organisational Culture

One generally accepted definition of organizational culture describes it as:
The set of beliefs, values, and norms, together with symbols like dramatized events and personali-
ties, that represent the unique character of an organization, and provides the context for action in it
and by it.
Other respected theorists dealing with organizational culture prefer a general definition that
does not eliminate factors that actually are part of corporate culture:
A pattern of shared basic assumptions that the group learned as it solved its problems of external
adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore,
to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those
problems.
These two definitions are nearly the same in terms of content. In other words, as groups
evolve over time, they face two basic challenges: integrating individuals into an effective whole
and adapting effectively to the external environment in order to survive. As groups find solu-
tions to these problems over time, they engage in a kind of collective learning that creates the
set of shared assumptions and beliefs called “culture.”
Elements of organizational culture may include:
• Stated and unstated values;
• Overt and implicit expectations for member behaviour;
• Customs and rituals;
• Stories and myths about the history of the group;
• Shop talk – typical language used in and about the group;
• Climate – the feelings evoked by the way members interact with each other, with out-
siders and with their environment, including the physical space they occupy; and
• Metaphors and symbols, which may be unconscious but can be found embodied in
other cultural elements.
Sources: Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1997); Edgar
Schein, “Organizational Culture and Leadership” in Classics of Organization Theory, Jay Shafritz and J.
Steven Ott, eds. (Fort Worth: Harcourt College Publishers, 2001); “Organizational Culture,”
www.soi.org/reading/change/culture.shtml.
• The historical layer is a result of influences generated by very long historical

and cultural experience. In long periods of their history, people in central and
Eastern Europe have been subjugated to empires run from afar. People were
in permanent contact with traditions and rules that coerced them to adopt cor-
rupt behaviour as the main or even unique condition for communication with
the local representatives of the empire. For example, different behaviour un-
der Ottoman rule was impossible; at that time, corruption was the other name
of power and a form of its functioning. Such centuries-long experience inevi-

tably has a durable, persistent impact on individual and societal stereotypes
and dispositions, which in turn influenced the choice of living strategies.
Patience and perseverance is required to deal with such “distortion” that
promotes tolerance to and acceptance of corruption. Key is the so-called soft
measures, such as leadership, education, ethical codes and personal exam-
ple. Respectively, more promising is the use of incentives, rewarding achieve-
ments in integrity. The responsibility of the political leadership is huge, since
each case of corruption reinforces the general belief that corruption is natural.
• The communist layer consists of impacts and influences generated by the So-
viet type of totalitarian government with a one-party system, state ownership
of all major assets, command-administrative economy and limited human
rights. The communist system has grown its own corruption, related to per-
manent deficiency of goods, services and opportunities (requiring alternative
ways of their provision and generating corrupt behaviour). Different forms of
monopoly multiplied themselves time and again and, as a natural result of the
mentality and abnormal monopoly of the single party, were always in power.
Corruption stereotypes related to the impact of empires may be seen as
imposed from outside and one of the symbols of foreign dominance. In con-
trast, corruption in a totalitarian society is internal, indigenous practice, exer-
cised deliberately and as a personal choice made in order to achieve some
aims not necessarily related to survival. For that reason, totalitarian corruption
is to some extent more damaging to the society and the individual. This is
manifested in reflections such as: “I am against corruption by others, but if I
have the opportunity, I would take it.” Pro-corruption layers of the totalitarian
period must be counteracted not by sporadic work but systematically, over
time. Incentives seem to be working better here: control, police measures,
dismissal and other types of punishment.
• The transitional layer consists of impacts and influences generated by the pe-
riod of transition towards democracy in a rather brief and very dynamic his-
torical period. Seen as a transition from a totalitarian society towards a soci-
ety functioning in accordance with democratic principles and the rules of the
liberal market economy, it also meant brutal redistribution of ownership,
where ethics and morality, concepts such as honesty, equity and legality were
pushed into the background by the hyperactive strive for the enrichment of a
relatively limited number of persons. Nearly everyone has benefited by liberty
and democracy but the losers from the process of redistribution of ownership
are many more than the winners. This does not increase the legitimacy of the
transition period and undermines support for the process of democratisation.
A related effect is the widely spread attitude towards power and politics,
viewed mainly as a means of increasing individual influence and enrichment.
Thus, corruption is viewed as an effective, pragmatic and rational behav-
iour, corresponding to the meaning and the nature of the transition period. So,
if the “historical” and the “communist” heritage led to attitudes towards cor-
ruption that may be defined as reactive, as a way of accepting “the rules of
the game,” here we witnessed a qualitatively different, proactive attitude. In
such an attitude, corruption is self-reproducing and is increasingly innovative,
with a self-indulging rationale that “everyone does the same” and that it is
only “natural” to do so.
Tackling this layer requires a systemic multi-dimensional effort encom-
passing political, normative, institutional and disciplinary measures. This re-
quires clear political vision, dedication, political will, modern legislation, insti-
tutional networking and strong sanctions, including sentencing and jailing cul-
prits.
• The “implanted” layer consists of impacts and influences generated by the
transfer and implementation of models and practices from outside, projecting
on the consciousness of the people and changing values, norms and human
relations. The liberal economic model is spreading globally, advocating the
dominance of the market and private ownership. But the global economy also
experiences problems with manageability and global corporations tend not to
take into account the interests of host nations and societies. The excessive
emphasis on private and corporate interests may have a negative impact on
societal and personal ethics and may facilitate corruption and other abuses of
power. There are cases when international corporations use corruption chan-
nels to enter new markets, including in selling armaments. And when Western
companies are involved, the negative effects on local political and business
elites, as well as on the state administration, are particularly strong. Witness-
ing that “Westerners behave in the same manner” often removes remaining
ethical barriers to corruption.
Strategies to Address Cultural Specifics

Accounting for the cultural specifics of the respective society, we can identify four main
types of strategies to be implemented to address corruption.
(1) At the International Level
At this level the strategies include primarily:
• Elaboration of international standards of integrity and the use of benchmark-
ing to define “best” regulations and practices to be transferred. Here a bal-
ance is needed between the general validity of standards and best practices
and the need to adjust them to the particular cultural environment;
• Denying the use of double standards towards administrations and companies
of the host and Western countries; introduction of ratings of firms with a “repu-
tation of integrity” and, correspondingly, refusal to get into contractual rela-
tionships with companies that do not figure into such lists or have a low
“integrity rating”;
• Defence Integrity Pacts and Alliances;
• Extension of the World Bank’s Public Expenditure and Financial Accountabil-
ity (PEFA) process to defence;
• Strict requirements for clean procurement;
• Budget transparency and anti-corruption strategies in the defence sector;
• Allocation of considerably more funds for training; education and research in
the field of integrity building and good governance.
In addition, in the majority of the new NATO and EU member countries, as well as
in other states on the way to modernization, the concept of “integrity” is not clearly
conceived as the opposite of corruption. Therefore, along with the efforts to build integ-
rity, the strategic priority of the fight against corruption has to be continuously empha-
sized so that it does not remain hidden behind talks of integrity.
(2) At the National Level
Strategies at this level should take into account national peculiarities to the maximum
extent possible. Strategies should be based on precise diagnostics of the disease and
not just on its symptoms.
In many nations, the need for survival under dramatic circumstances has been
conducive to imitations of adaptation and mimicry: on the surface, there is apparent
adoption of the norms of the external actor, whereas national specificity remains un-
derneath. Institutions and politicians are capable of saying and demonstrating to
Europe what they think Europe wants to see. To some extent, this is the case with the
fight against corruption. There is often an abundance of strategies, laws and institu-
tions for countering corruption and the reporting to European institutions is “perfect,”
no matter how poor the practical results are. Thus, long-existing practices of nepotism,
clientelism and favouritism easily reproduce themselves.
On the other hand, the so called “high context” often prevails in local cultures, i.e.
whatever is said and done should be interpreted in the concrete cultural context and
according to the circumstances. Status, respect and “saving face” are what matters
most. Behaviour styles are adaptive, preferring adaptation to the environment, avoid-
ance of direct confrontation and concealment of discrepancies.
At this level outside institutions, European or Euroatlantic institutions should adopt
a type of “name and shame” strategy of explicit and dosed pressure, with continuous
external oversight, frequent checks and monitoring reports, accompanied with sanc-
tions and signs of limited trust. At the same time, in order not to make local elites lose
faith nor to alienate society, there should also be periodic praising and acknowledge-
ment of good practices that have been successfully implemented.
Such strategies include measures to:
• Incorporate systemic early warning and prevention mechanisms;

• Create barriers to corruption of a systemic nature;
• Enforce disciplinary sanctions for corrupt behaviour, including for return of
misappropriated assets;
• Provide for advanced auditing of all public sector activities;
• Create a new, synchronized political and economic culture.
(3) At the Security Sector Level
The strategies at this level are bound by cultural specifics of national security sectors,
particularly those related to a traditional and sometimes quite powerful secretive cul-
ture.
Even in the most transparent form of government—democracy—there are areas
where transparency is limited, for example on matters of national security. Neverthe-
less, transitional states should acknowledge the need to open up their security system
to parliamentarian scrutiny and audit. The secretive culture must be replaced by a
culture of transparency and accountability, which gradually should transform into a
culture of transparency and reporting in order to deter practices of corruption, as well
as ineffective and inefficient governance.
Strategies at this level should serve three goals in enhancing governance and in-
tegrity:
• The first goal is to promote the understanding that the national security sys-
tem no longer enjoys the exclusive, “untouchable” status it enjoyed in the to-
talitarian society. At the beginning of the 21st century and under the principles
of democracy, the security sector must struggle for legal, personnel and re-
source provisions on an equal footing with other public sectors such as edu-
cation, healthcare and social protection, etc.
• The second goal is to promote the understanding that the national security
sector is not “subscribed” for resources and that the expenditures for it are not
inevitable. Instead, they have to be seen as investments that should provide
good returns and serve the society well, and not just be a burden.
• The third goal is to promote the understanding that national security and the
security sector are not a topic for a restricted group of experts, isolated from
common citizens. Rather, it is a sphere of activity that belongs to and repre-
sents the legitimate interests of every citizen.
Strategies at this level aim to strengthen the transparency of security sector institu-
tions and establish legal norms so that the information created by or in the interest of
state organizations should become public to the maximum extent possible. Long ex-
isting fears of the people of institutions of force add another dimension. Hence, good
practices such as open phone lines, mailboxes, reception-rooms and others, guaran-
teeing anonymity, may also be applied in support of a transparency strategy.
(4) At the Level of Defence

Strategies at this level take into account the specifics of the defence sector, estab-
lished patterns of civil-military relations, the status enjoyed by the nation’s military and
the role of the defence industry.
Under communism, the military organisation was like “a state within the state” be-
cause of its unique position in the security system. In the years of transition, society is
often reminded of that status. The military much too frequently explains loss of prestige
and resources with pressures from abroad and “betrayal” by politicians. This automati-
cally makes them politicized; in subtle ways, the military attempt either to oppose
elected officials or try to directly influence politics, seeing civilian control as infringing
on their interests.
Also under communism, defence was a priority of paramount importance. Years
afterwards, defence and the armed forces kept being favoured in financing, consuming
the lion’s share of public resources, often to the detriment of other security sector in-
stitutions. That in itself was a factor for attracting corruption scams and bad govern-
ance practices.
Many socialist countries also supported certain regimes with armaments—through
sales or “brotherly assistance”—that were later placed under restrictions by the inter-
national community. This then enhanced a culture of covert and illegal operations, of-
ten supported by the intelligence services. That heritage is not yet overcome; it hinders
control over the military, their budget and activities.
In addition, frequent changes of government led to cycles of tension within the de-
fence administration. On more than one occasion, as ministers of defence were ap-
pointed persons without adequate competencies, they fed on opportunities offered by
the Ministry of Defence to derive benefits for themselves and their political associates.
Ministers and their political cabinets were often busy not with the formulation and im-
plementation of policy but serving as hotbeds of corruption.
The strategies at this level should be multidirectional and address a wide spectrum
of problems, deficits and challenges. Regardless of attempts by the Ministry of De-
fence to introduce Planning, Programming, and Budgeting Systems (PPBS), capability
planning methods, advanced defence acquisition management principles and so on,
implementation is often superficial, whereas Soviet attitudes and procedure remain.
Problems are most acute in financial and materiel planning, implementation and re-
porting where the emphasis is kept on the input and too often decisions are made not
according to policy objectives and sound planning but based on expedience.
Over-centralization of resource allocation decision making, combined with a lack of
transparency, contributes to arbitrary rules and corruption. The situation is aggravated
further when the parliament does not oversee major defence procurements, the proc-
ess of utilisation of surplus equipment and infrastructure, and there is no open discus-
sion on the real needs and budget levels for the security and defence sector, nor an
adequate control and audit. It is very hard to find examples in post-communist coun-
tries of objective assessments and whether and to what extent the allocated resources
have generated security.
There are, nevertheless, some promising developments. For example, in a 2007
audit of the Ministry of Defence, the Audit Office of Bulgaria assessed not only whether
the budget was spent in compliance with the law but also whether this was done in an
effective manner. The report underlined the lack of sufficient political documents with
clearly defined, measurable and achievable goals and the fact that required capabili-
ties have not been defined. It also stated that the MoD uses a large and complex hier-
archy with five levels of management and the administration employs an excessive
number of people with responsibilities for planning, programming, executing and ac-
counting of programmes and budgets.
It may seem like a trivial comment if made in a country with well-established gov-
ernance mechanisms in defence but in particular cultural settings some observers de-
fined it as a “revolutionary” undertaking. Box 24.2 provides other examples of integrity
at different levels.
Box 24.2. Promoting Defence Integrity in Post-Communist Settings

The experience of Bulgaria provides a few examples of integrity-based change processes on
the political, international, doctrine implementation and institution building levels.
Military Doctrine of 1999: An Example of Political Integrity
After the elections in 1997, the Bulgarian government made a clear commitment to bring the
country into NATO and the EU. In line with that commitment, the parliament ratified a new na-
tional security concept and, a year later, a new Military Doctrine that stipulated Bulgaria as a de
facto member of NATO and the EU and provided a vision, strategy and base for implementa-
tion planning in this direction. That happened after more than a year of effort to jump-start real
defence reform, which was stymied by attempts by the conservative military leadership to re-
place it with camouflaged adaptation, and the replacement of several senior political and mili-
tary officials. Expert consultations, political-military cooperation and a public discussion then
facilitated defence reform. During open discussions on draft texts of the Military Doctrine it be-
came clear that the arguments used by some conservative members of the military did not sur-
vive in real debate.
The Kosovo Crisis of 1999: Integrity on the International Level
The Kosovo crisis illustrates the importance and value of integrity as a key principle for suc-
cess. First of all, the NATO operation in Kosovo was a clear example of integrity in action and
provided a good lesson for the Bulgarian people of what political integrity means on the inter-
national level. Second, the same principle of integrity was the key criterion for the decision-
making process in the government regarding the conflict, especially its support for the Kosovo
intervention. The policy was in full compliance with Bulgaria’s Security Concept and Military
Doctrine, and provided a test case for the key ideas underlying the defence reform plan that
was under development in this period. The coherence of policy and action provided a solid
foundation for gaining public support and maintaining all the consultations with NATO and indi-
vidual states, including for denying Russia’s request to permit military flights over Bulgarian ter-
ritory.
Plan 2004: Integrity in the Implementation of the Doctrine
The development of the defence reform plan known as “Plan 2004” was quite different from
any other similar undertaking in Bulgaria till 1999. First, it was based on the National Security
Concept and the Military Doctrine, under clear leadership of the prime minister and with sup-
port from the president and parliament. Second, it was based on a solid operational analysis of
many options for the structure, strength, equipment and training, and possible courses of ac-
tion for the armed forces. Third, force development was coordinated with plans for education
and training, intelligence and counterintelligence, medical support, logistics support, social
support, acquisition and research, transition of functions and structures outside the MoD,
transforming military formations outside MoD into civilian organizations, etc., all supported by a
clear implementation mechanism and institutions and sound budget projections until 2004. The
plan not only provided for downsizing and restructuring but also for institution building and
process improvement through introduction of a Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
(PPBS), incorporation of mechanisms of transparency, accountability and measurement of re-
sults, along with the use of operational analysis in defence decision making.
Defence Management, Integrity and Institution Building
The Implementation of the Military Doctrine and Plan 2004 was supported by the introduction
of PPBS and a special study on defence governance and management. There was a study on
civil-military relations and parliamentary control starting in 1998 and after the approval of Plan
2004 a new study was initiated with the UK MoD Department for Consultancy and Manage-
ment Services (DCMS) to further institutionalize the practices of good governance and defence
management, including changes in the organic statute of the MoD and Bulgaria’s Defence
Law. In order to increase transparency, accountability and the measurability of management
processes, the minister of defence established the Programming, Integration, and Moderniza-
tion Councils, supported by the newly established Defence Planning, Euroatlantic Integration,
and Armaments Policy directorates, as well as a newly organized J5 in the General Staff and
similar division in the services’ headquarters.
In conclusion, since culture is so deeply rooted in an organization’s history and

collective experience, working to change it requires a major investment of time and re-
sources. Help from a change agent outside the system is often advisable. Without
such help, it may be difficult for insiders to view the realities of defence as something
they have constructed and to see meaning in things they normally take for granted. On
the other hand, a change agent coming from outside defence or outside the country
needs to be aware of the specific culture of the defence organisation. The NATO Integ-
rity Building initiative, supported by the established trust fund, may be used to take on
the challenge of culture change in defence in order to make defence establishments
more transparent, effective and efficient.
Annex 1: Selected Resources
Official Documents
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2004)
www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf.
Official translations of the Convention are available also in Arabic, Chinese, French,
Russian, and Spanish
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption
Council of Europe, ETS No. 173 (1999)
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/173.htm
Civil Law Convention on Corruption
Council of Europe, ETS No. 174 (1999)
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/174.htm
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from
Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism
Council of Europe (2005)
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/HTML/198.htm
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
Organization of American States (1996)
www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html
International Code of Conduct for Public Officials
UN General Assembly Resolution 51/59 (1996)
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r059.htm
Guides and Handbooks
UN Anti-Corruption Toolkit
The Global Programme Against Corruption
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (3rd edition, 2004)
www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/toolkit/corruption_un_anti_corruption_toolkit_sep04.pdf
Best Practices in Combating Corruption
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (2004)
Original in English; available also in Armenian, Azerbaijani, Macedonian, Russian, and
Serbian
www.osce.org/item/13568.html
323
Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Principles, Mechanisms and Practices

IPU-DCAF Handbook for Parliamentarians (2003)
Orginal in English; available in more than 35 languages
www.dcaf.ch/publications/kms/details.cfm?lng=en&id=25289&nav1=4
Security System Reform and Governance
OECD DAC Guidelines and Reference Series
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005)
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/39/31785288.pdf
Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting Security and Justice
DAC Guidelines and Reference Series
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2007)
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/25/38406485.pdf
Anti-Corruption Handbook: National Integrity System in Practice
Transparency International, project ACH
www.transparency.org/policy_research/ach
The Anti-Corruption Plain Language Guide
Transparency International (2009)
www.transparency.org/content/download/45306/725785/file/TI_Plain_Language_Guide
_280709.pdf.
A Handbook on Fighting Corruption
USAID Center for Democracy and Governance, February 1999
www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnace070.pdf
Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption Risk in Defence Establishments: Ten
Practical Reforms
Mark Pyman, Transparency International (2009)
www.defenceagainstcorruption.org/publications
Methodologies
World Bank Governance & Anti-Corruption Tools
The World Bank Institute, in collaboration with other units in the World Bank Group,
supports countries in improving governance and controlling corruption. On the basis of
a multidisciplinary approach, it applies action-learning methods to link empirical diag-
nostic surveys, their practical application, collective action, and prevention. It periodi-
cally releases the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) and country diagnostics.
This integrated approach is supported by operational research and a comprehensive
governance databank.
www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
Annexes 325
A Users’ Guide to Measuring Corruption

UNDP and Global Integrity, www.globalintegrity.org, provide government, civil society
and development practitioners with good practices in measuring corruption. Available
in English, Spanish and French.
www.undp.org/oslocentre/flagship/users_guide_measuring_corruption.html
Public Financial Management: Performance Measurement Framework
PEFA Secretariat, World Bank (2005)
Available in English, French, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, Arabic, Mandarin,
Ukrainian, Turkish, Armenian, Serbian, and Vietnamese.
www.pefa.org/pfm_performance_frameworkmn.php
Anticorruption Assessment Handbook
USAID, prepared by Bertram I. Spector, Michael Johnston and Svetlana Winbourne (Feb-
ruary 2009)
www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/technical_areas/anticorruption_
handbook/index.html
Assessing the Transparency of Defence Budgets and Budgeting
Todor Tagarev, “A Means of Comparing Military Budgeting Processes in South East
Europe,” Information & Security. An International Journal 11 (2003): 95-135.
Databases Accessible Online
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index
Since 1995, Transparency International (TI) assesses Corruption Perceptions Index
(CPI). By 2008, TI provides CPI data for 180 countries. The data can be retrieved in
the form of an Excel sheet from http://www.icgg.org/corruption.cpi_2008.html or
www.transparency.org/content/download/38703/612764.
Global Corruption Barometer
A survey, conducted since 2003, assesses general public attitudes toward and experi-
ence of corruption in dozens of countries around the world. The 2009 survey covered
69 countries. Reports are published by Transparency International in English, French,
and Spanish.
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb
Bribe Payers Index
The TI Bribe Payers Index evaluates the supply side of corruption – the likelihood of
firms from the world’s industrialised countries to bribe abroad. Full reports from 1999,
2002, 2006, and 2008 are available at www.transparency.org/policy_research/
surveys_indices/bpi.
Worldwide Governance Indicators
World Bank
As of 2009, the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project reports aggregate and
individual governance indicators for 212 countries and territories over the period 1996-
2008, for six dimensions of governance, including “control of corruption.”
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp
Open Budget Index
Open Budget Initiative conducts surveys bi-annually. The open Budget 2008 rankings
are available for free download in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Portuguese,
and Spanish. The English version of the full report is available at
http://openbudgetindex.org/files/FinalFullReportEnglish1.pdf.
www.openbudgetindex.org
Public Expenditure & Financial Acountability (PEFA)
www.pefa.org
PEFA assesses public financial management by country. Reports are available at
www.pefa.org/assesment_reportmn.php.
Selected Monographs and Reports
Building Integrity and Defence Institution Building, Conference Report (Monterey, CA:
25–27 February 2009).
Mark Pyman, Peter Foot and Philipp Fluri, eds., Building Transparency and Reducing
Corruption in Defence, Workshop Proceedings (Geneva & Lugansk: May 2008),
www.nps.edu/GovIndustry/Conferences/NATO/Documents/Transparency International
Geneva workshop on building integrity May 2008.pdf.
Nils Roseman, Code of Conduct: Tool for Self-Regulation for Private Military and Secu-
rity Companies, Occasional Paper #15 (Geneva: DCAF, 2008).
Rasma Karklins, The System Made Me Do It. Corruption in Post-Communist Societies

(New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).
The World Bank, “Measuring Corruption: Myths and Realites,” Findings 273 (April
2007).
United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Contracting Integrity (Wash-

ington, D.C.: GAO, 2009).
Annex 2: TI International Defence
and Security Programme
Corruption in Defence
Transparency International (TI) is the civil society organisation leading the global fight
against corruption. Through more than 90 chapters worldwide and an international se-
cretariat in Berlin, Germany, Transparency International raises awareness of the dam-
aging effects of corruption, and works with partners in government, business and civil
society to develop and implement effective measures to tackle it. For more information
on the Transparency International movement go to: www.transparency.org.
Transparency International’s global defence and security programme “Defence
Against Corruption” (DAC) aims to reduce corruption and transform attitudes to corrup-
tion in defence and security sectors to benefit citizens. The international defence pro-
gramme is led by Transparency International-UK on behalf of the TI movement.
Transparency International’s defence programme began six years ago, bringing to-
gether governments, defence companies, academics and civil society to determine the
best ways to approach the problem of defence corruption. The DAC Programme is
now well-known to defence ministries, security ministries, defence companies and or-
ganisations across the globe. The work is currently funded by the UK Department for
International Development (DFID) and NATO.
DAC works with reform-minded nations ranging from Colombia to Poland to Af-
ghanistan and with multilateral organizations to reduce corruption risk in defence and
security. With governments, multilateral organisations, civil society and the defence in-
dustry DAC collaborates constructively to raise the integrity of international arms
transfers. To achieve sustainable change across the world, the team supports experts
and campaigners in counter-corruption reform, delivers workshops and nurtures
knowledge transfer on counter-corruption.
Out of an active collaboration with NATO, two counter-corruption tools have been
developed:
i. The “Integrity Self-Assessment Questionnaire and evaluation process” for na-
tions was developed in 2008 and 2009 in collaboration with Poland and a
working group of ten nations. Successful trials took place in Norway, Ukraine
and Bosnia Herzegovina. It is now widely available for nations to use.
ii. An innovative “Building integrity and reducing corruption risk” training course
has been developed. This five-day course is aimed at experienced ministry of
defence and interior ministry officials and armed forces officers at the OF5
327
level and above. This course has been given six times, with participation from
some twenty nations, and is being extended.
Both the self-assessment and the training course are aimed at supporting nations
in building knowledge and expertise on counter-corruption in defence.
The DAC programme is furthermore actively engaged with African nations on de-
fence and security corruption issues, and supports the negotiation of the UN Arms
Trade Treaty.
Also key in the fight against corruption in the defence and security sector is the re-
search conducted and published by the DAC Team. This is disseminated to interested
parties to promote best practice and encourage the implementation of up-to-date anti-
corruption methods. DAC also publishes a bi-monthly news digest on defence corrup-
tion cases.
Information on Transparency International’s work in the defence and security
sector to date, including background, overviews of current and past projects, and
publications, is available at the Defence Against Corruption website:
www.defenceagainstcorruption.org.
Contacts:
Transparency International-UK
Defence Against Corruption programme
London
Director
Mark Pyman
Tel.: +44 207 785 6359
E-mail: [email protected]
Programme Manager
Anne Christine Wegener
Tel.: +44 207 785 6358
E-mail: [email protected]
Annex 3: Abbreviations
AIA [US] Aerospace Industries Association
ANDS Afghanistan National Development Strategy
APSC Armed Private Security Contractor
ASD Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe
C3 Command, Control, and Communications
CAC [UN] Convention Against Corruption
CoC Code of Conduct
CoE Council of Europe
COIN COunterINsurgency [operation]
CPI Corruption Perceptions Index
DAC [OECD] Development Assistance Committee
DCAF [Geneva Centre for the] Democratic Control of Armed Forces
DoD [U.S.] Department of Defense
EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EBB [EDA’s] Electronic Bulletin Board
EDA European Defence Agency
EU European Union
FY Fiscal Year
GCSP Geneva Centre for Security Policy
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFS Government Finance Statistics
GMC [CoE] Multidisciplinary Group on Corruption
HI Humanitarian Intervention
IANSA International Action Network on Small Arms
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
329
IDP Internally Displaced Person

IGO Intergovernmental organisation
IPAP Individual Partnership Action Plan
ISAF International Security Assistance Force (in Afghanistan)
IW Irregular Warfare
MoD Ministry of Defence
NAMSA NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NGO Non-governmental organisation
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OMB [US] Office of Management & Budget
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAP-DIB Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building
PEFA Public Expenditure & Financial Accountability
PFI Private Finance Initiative
PFM Public Financial Management
PMC Private Military Company
PMSC Private Military and Security Companies
PPBEA Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution, and Assessment
[system]
PPBS Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PPP Public-Private Partnership
PR Public Relations
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
SIU Special Investigating Unit
TI Transparency International
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian Military)
UN United Nations
USAID US Agency for International Development
331
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system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-
copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Geneva Centre for
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces.
This publication is circulated subject to the condition that it shall not by way of trade or
otherwise, be lent, sold, hired out or otherwise circulated without the publisher’s prior
consent in any form of binding or cover other than in which it is published and without
a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent publisher.
Todor Tagarev, ed., Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defence: A

Compendium of Best Practices (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of
Armed Forces, 2010). – 344 pp., 14 figures, 1 table, 101 boxes.
Original version: English, Geneva, 2010
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

< www.dcaf.ch>
P.O.Box 1360, CH-1211 Geneva 1, Switzerland
Cover Design: Hristo Bliznashki

Language Editor: Ashley Thornton
Printed in 1 000 copies
Format: 6.25 x 9
ISBN 978-92-9222-114-0
Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
(DCAF)
DCAF was established in 2000 by the Swiss government. DCAF is an international

foundation with 53 member states and the Canton of Geneva. DCAF’s main divisions
are Research, Operations and Special Programmes. The staff numbers over 70 em-
ployees from more than 30 countries. DCAF’s head office is located in Geneva, Swit-
zerland. The Centre also has permanent offices in Brussels, Ljubljana, Ramallah and
Beirut.
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces is one of the
world’s leading institutions in the areas of security sector reform and security sector
governance. DCAF provides in-country advisory support and practical assistance pro-
grammes, develops and promotes appropriate democratic norms at the international
and national levels, advocates good practices and conducts policy-related research to
make recommendations to ensure effective democratic governance of the security
sector.
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Building Integrity

and Reducing Corruption

Editor and Lead Author: Todor Tagarev (Bulgaria)

Language Editor: Ashley Thornton

Original version: English, Geneva, 2010

© Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010

Ambassador Jean-Jacques de Dardel

Part II Corruption Risks and Vulnerabilities in Defence.......................................... .........41

Part III Building Integrity and Reducing the Corruption Potential

Chapter 22 The Role of International Organisations................................................................281

Part IV Implementing Integrity Building Programmes ............................................. .......297

Annex 1: Selected Resources ..............................................................................................323

Box 1.1. Direct Costs of Corruption ..........................................................................................7

Box 9.3. Outsourcing Benefits from Public-Private Competitions.........................................103

Box 16.1. UN Guidelines on Conflict of Interest for Public Officials........................................199

Corruption is a scourge upon the development of all countries, undermining public

Figure 1.1: Perceived Corruption.

5 See Chapter 8 of this compendium for details.

Limited Operational Effectiveness

Box 1.1. Direct Costs of Corruption

Box 1.2. Corruption and Security Threats in Volatile Areas

Defence Budget, % GDP

Figure 1.2: Bulgarian Defence Budget as a Percentage of GDP.

security and the international stance of the country as a reliable ally.

Box 1.4. Piracy and Its Links to Corruption

Box 1.5. Corruption Impedes Stabilisation and Reconstruction Efforts.

Is Defence Corruption a Never-ending Story?

Box 1.6. Establishing Practical Priorities in Reducing Defence Corruption Risks

Modifying the Expected Costs of Corrupt Behaviour

Box 2.2. Utilitarian Theory on Rationality of Criminal Behaviour

Modifying the Potential Rewards of Corrupt Behaviour

Box 2.3. Expected Cost of Corruption

EXPECTED COST = MORAL BURDEN + EXPECTED PUNISHMENT

Where: EXPECTED PUNISHMENT = (Probability of Detection) x (Probability of Conviction if

11 Minxin Pei, “Government by Corruption,” Forbes (January 26, 2009).

Figure 2.2: Foundations of the strategic approach to reducing defence corruption.

• Increasing transparency increases expected punishment by raising the

Box 2.4. Empirical Evidence in Support of the Selected Approach

Figure 2.3: Correlation between Effective Government and Control of Corruption.

more effective, accountable and transparent administration at all levels of Government;

NATO’s values, previously defined, are fundamental to the further strengthening of

The Deliberations and Findings of the Monterey Conference

Box 4.1. Fighting Corruption in Defence: A View from Switzerland

Source: HE Ambassador Jean-Jacques de Dardel, Ambassador of Switzerland to NATO,

The U.S. Approach to Integrity Building 1

1 The description of the US approach is based on the presentation of Honorable Joseph

corrosive effects. Corruption is a threat to our common security. It is no less dangerous

that transparency mechanisms need to be integral to planning, budgeting and pro-

3 Chapters 7, 16 and 17 provide guidelines and examples of implementation of Defense

Figure 4.1: Concepts and Relationships in Security and Development.

7 Government of Canada, Canada’s Engagement in Afghanistan: Setting a Course to 2011

Box 4.2. Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States

Figure 5.1: Personnel Management Functions (Simplified).1

Forms of Corruption Related to Personnel Issues

1 Adapted from Jack Treddenick, “Manpower Management,” in Defence Management: An

career or safety. Soviet-style “nomenklatura” systems, with their strong commanders’

Higher military education (staff and war college)

Box 5.1. Building Integrity in Selection for Initial Officer Training

Box 5.2: Building Integrity in Selection for Education or Assignment Abroad