CRIM I Case Digests:

#1

G.R. No. 176102

November 26, 2014
Rosal Hubilla y Carillo vs. PEOPLE

Note: The focus of the case is on the penalty imposed to the accused.

Facts:
Rosal Hubilla was only 17 year, 4 months and 2 days old when he killed Jayson Espinola with a knife. He
was charged with Homicide. The Regional Trial Court convicted him of homicide and imposed the penalty
of indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of four years and one day of prision correcional as minimum,
to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
CA – Rosal’s sentence was modified in that he was sentenced to six months and one day of prision
correctional as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. The civil aspect was
also modified
On motion for reconsideration, the CA partially granted the appeal and imposed on him the penalty of six
months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum.

Issue:
WON the CA should have suspended Rosal’s sentence in accordance with RA 9344; that he is entitled to
probation or suspension of sentence

Held:
Article 249 of the RPC prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. His minority was a
privileged mitigating circumstance that lowered the penalty to prision mayor.
In Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the penalty
next lower than the imposable penalty, which, herein, was prision correccional. So the CA imposed the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six months and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.
Petitioner insists that the maximum of his indeterminate sentence should be reduced to only six years of
prision correccional to enable him to apply for probation under PD 968.
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC - the restrictions on the personal liberty of the child shall be limited to the minimum
Sec. 38 of RA 9344 which allows the suspension of the sentence is available only until the child offender
turns 21 years of age. Since he is over 23 years of age at the time of his conviction in the RTC,
suspension was no longer feasible.
RA 9344 reveals that imprisonment of children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited.
Restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment:
(a) the detention or imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and
(b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the shortest appropriate period of time
Imprisonment was imposed on the petitioner as a last recourse after holding him to be disqualified from
probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his imprisonment was for the shortest
duration permitted by the law.
#2

GR 182941
July 3, 2009
Robert Sierra y Caneda vs. PEOPLE

Facts:
Petitioner was 15 years old when he raped a minor. He was convicted of rape and was imposed a penalty
of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and a fine. He elevated the case to CA and during the pendence of
the case, RA 9344 took effect. CA affirmed the conviction and denied the defense of minority since the
age was not established by presenting the birth certificate but only alleged in the testimonial of the
petitioner and his mother. According to them the burden of proof of age is upon the prosecution.

Issues:
Who has the burden of proof in establishing the age of the accused?
WON the petitioner can invoke paragraph 1, section 6 of RA 9344 to exempt him from criminal liability?
Whether the law be given retroactive application.

Held:
The duty to establish the age of the accused is not on the prosecution but on the accused. Age can be
established by birth certificate. Sec. 7 provides that in the absence of such document, age may be based
from the information of the child, testimonies of other persons, physical appearance and other relevant
evidence. Also in case of doubt, minority should be in favor of the child. In the case at bar, minority was
established by the testimonies of the petitioner and his mother. This was not objected by the prosecution
and did not even presented contrary evidence. Thus, minority is established.
Yes. The petitioner can invoke section 6 of RA 9344 to exempt him from criminal liability.
The law should be given retroactive application since this favors the accused as provided for in the
Revised Penal Code - penal laws favoring the accused should be given retroactive effect. Hence the
accused is considered a minor with an age of not above 15 years old.
The case is dismissed and the petitioner is referred to the appropriate local social welfare.
#3
G.R. No. 182239
March 16, 2011
PEOPLE vs. Hermie M. Jacinto

FACTS:
In the evening of January 28, 2003 at about 6 o’clock in the evening, FFF, the father of the victim AAA,
sent his 8 year old daughter CCC to buy cigarettes at the store of Rudy Hatague. AAA followed CCC.
When CCC returned without AAA, FFF was not worried as he thought AAA was watching television at her
aunt Rita Lingcay’s house. Julito Apike went to the same store at around 6:20 PM to buy a bottle of
Tanduay Rum and saw appellant place AAA on his lap. Julio, Hermie and AAA left the store at the same
time, Julito proceeded to Rita’s house while Hermie and AAA to the “lower area.” AAA was brought by
Hermie to the ricefield near the house of spouses Alejandro and Gloria Perocho, there AAA was made to
lie down on the ground, her panties removed and was boxed by the accused in the chest. Half-naked,
accused mounted AAA and made a push and pull movement causing AAA to cry. Appellant then went to
the house of the Perochos while the victim went home crying. Medico-legal exam revealed hymenal
laceration at 5 and 9 o’clock.

RTC finds accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua, a fine of
PHP 75,000 as rape indemnity and PHP 50,000 as moral damages.

CA on appeal affirmed the lower court’s decision with the following modifications: (1) accused should
suffer an indeterminate penalty from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum and fined PHP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PHP
75,000 as moral damages, and PHP 25,000 as exemplary damages.

ISSUE:
Is the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape?

RULING:
Yes, the Court considered three well-entrenched principles: (1) accusation of rape can be made with
facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove, (2) testimony
of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution, (3) evidence for prosecution must stand on
its own merit and not depend on the weakness of the defense.

The Court finds that the testimony of the victim was credible, natural and convincing as proven by victim’s
positive identification of the accused, description of what was done to her and how the accused spread
her legs, inserted his penis and made push and pull movements. This was corroborated by medico-legal
findings of hymenal lacerations. Court finds that the prosecution sufficiently established the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt but imposes a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and affirms the damages
awarded by the CA of PHP 75,000 as civil indemnity, PHP 75,000 as moral damages and increasing
exemplary damages to PHP 30,000. Furthermore, in accordance with Section 38 of RA 9344, automatic
suspension of sentence is applied and in accordance with Section 51 of RA 9344, accused is confined to
an agricultural camp or other training facility established, maintained, and controlled by BUCOR in
coordination with the DSWD.
#4
G.R. No. 213792
June 22, 2015
GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL vs. PEOPLE    

G.R. No. 213886

JAMES QUIBAC y RAFAEL vs. PEOPLE    

Facts:
At 3PM on April 11, 2004, Edward Benito, saw Elner Aro already sprawled on the ground. While in that
position, he saw Guillermo Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw
at Aro but was restrained from doing so. As Aro stood up, James Quibac punched him on the stomach,
causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital.
Aro, who fell into coma after suffering cardiac arrest during his operation, died after leaving the hospital
due to financial constraints. His cause of death was "rupture of the aorta secondary to blunt traumatic
injuries”.

Issues:
Whether or not Wacoy and Quibac are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.

Ruling:
Yes. The Court agrees with the CA’s ruling modifying the Wacoy and Quibac’s conviction from Death
Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide. There was no tumultuous affray or confusion between
groups of persons nor there unlawful aggression from the deceased. The evidence clearly established
that only 2 persons (Quibac and Wacoy) attacked the defenseless Aro. Wacoy and Quibac’s act of
mauling the Aro was the proximate cause of the latter’s death. They are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of homicide with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a
wrong under Article 13 (3) of the RPC.
#5
G.R No. 183566
May 8, 2009
PEOPLE vs. BONIFACIO BADRIAGO

Facts:
On the morning of 13th September 2002 Adrian Quinto together with his brother Oliver Quinto delivered a
letter using their tricycle. After finishing the errand they headed back to the town plaza where their mother
was waiting for them. Before they could reach their destination, they were approached by accused-
appellant Bonifacio Badriago. Accused-appelant suddenly, hacked him with a sundang (long bolo) on his
lumbar area. Accused-appellant aimed again but Adrian was able to shield himself. Adrian then, pushed
Oliver off the tricycle so he could run away and call for help. His mother later informed him that Oliver was
also attacked and did not survive. Adrian could not testify on what happened next as he lost
consciousness after the incident with the accused.
In his defense, accused-appellant said that he was accosted by Adrian and Oliver, who carried stones
with them. Adrian called out to him, "Now Boning, let us fight." He tried to go away but the two chased
him, with Adrian driving his pedicab. He said that Adrian was about to stab him so he grabbed a bolo from
his pedicab and used it to strike at Adrian, injuring his left hand and other parts of his body. After the
incident he said that Adrian run away and he on the on the other hand, headed towards the municipal
building to inform the police that he had injured someone and later denied killing Oliver.
The RTC rendered its judgment. Accused-appellant was found guilty of the crimes of frustrated murder
and murder.

Issue:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting accused-appelant of frustrated murder and murder as his
guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and the conviction on the ground that the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender, incomplete self-defense, and lack of intention to commit so grave a
wrong were not appreciated by the trial court.

HELD:
No. CA ruled that his conviction for frustrated murder was a gross violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and the cause of accusation against him. Accused-appellant’s other arguments,
however, were not given merit. Circumstantial evidence presented showed accused-appellant’s
culpability. His choice of weapon and the areas he hacked on the victim’s bodies revealed a clear
intention to kill. The CA said he was able to injure the brothers with no injury caused to himself.
Appellate court also rejected the mitigating circumstances, it ruled that there was no voluntary surrender
as he testified that he had merely reported the injury of Adrian and did not surrender. As to self-defense
claim, CA stated that accused-appellant did not established the victims’ unlawful aggression which is a
requisite in such a mitigating circumstance.
#6
G.R No. 182750
January 20, 2009
PEOPLE vs. RODEL URBANO

Issues:
Petitioner Rodel Urbano was charged with Homicide. On September 28, 1993, at around 8:00 p.m Brigido
Tomelden (victim) and petitioner who just arrived from a picnic, drank beer in a restaurant with some co-
workers. The two then had a heated altercation. Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at petitioner.
Petitioner asked why Tomelden, when drunk, is fond of insulting him It then led to an exchange of blows
petitioner delivered a "lucky punch," at Tomelden’s face, which made Tomelden topple down. Tomelden
was on the verge of hitting his head on the ground had their companions not caught him and prevented
the fall. The blow, caused Tomelden’s nose to bleed and rendered him unconscious.

September 29, 1993. Upon arriving home at around 6:00 p.m. of that day, Tomelden complained pain in
his nape, head, and ear which caused wife Rosario to immediately bring him to a Community Hospital.
After going in and out of hospital for several times, Tomelden again complained of extreme head pain,
prompting his wife to bring him back to the Community Hospital where he died due to cardio-respiratory
arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident."

The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill, asserting that hypertension, for
which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latter’s death.

RTC rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of the crime of homicide.

Issues: Whether or not CA:

1. Erred in affirming the decision of the [RTC] finding [him] guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged.
2. Erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the victim
and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in favor of the petitioner.

Held:
The petition is partly meritorious. Homicide was duly approved. Although Tomelden died only on October
10, 1993 or 12 days after the fight, during the intervening days, particularly September 29, 1993, the
deceased regularly reported for work. Moreover, petitioner states that days prior to the fateful incident of
September 28, 1993, Tomelden failed to come to work as he was suffering from malignant hypertension
and that this circumstance greatly engenders doubt as to the proximate cause of the victim’s death. CA
was not persuaded because of the medical findings that the blow caused to soften a portion of the victim’s
scalp and have shaken his brain which caused the cerebral concussion; and that the cause of the victim’s
death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage
due to mauling incident.

Mitigating Circumstances Present. CA agreed with petitioner. According to Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Art. 13,
RPC provide as follows: Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances are as follows; that the offender had no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part
of the offended party immediately preceded the act. Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner
and uttered immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not to mention other
irritating statements made by the deceased while they were having beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the
one provoked and challenged to a fist fight. CA modified and decreased the term of Rodel Urbano of two
2 years and four 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum.

#7

G.R. No.155094
January 30, 2007
MANUEL O. ORIENTE vs PEOPLE

Facts: 
Manuel Oriente w/ other persons, attacked and assaulted Romulo Cariño, hitting him with a lead pipe on
different parts of the body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death (as confirmed by the medico- legal).
CA found that the RTC erred in finding two mitigating circumstances were present, namely, lack of intent
to commit so grave a wrong and sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party, so the
court modified the penalty imposed by the RTC.

Issues: 
1. Whether or not the CA and RTC erred in not appreciating that there was an unlawful aggression on the
part of the deceased and the means employed by the appellant was reasonable and fall under the
justifying circumstances of self-defense.

2. Whether or not the appellant can be granted the opportunity of mitigating circumstance due to the
premise that there was lack of intent to commit so grace a wrong and that there was sufficient provocation
on the part of the deceased.

Ruling:
1. No. When self-defense is invoked, there should be (1) an unlawful aggression by the person injured or
killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful
aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. There can
be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression to which the appellant failed to establish. The appellant failed to prove the existence of the
gun. The threat allegedly uttered by Carino does not constitute an actual, sudden and unexpected attack
or imminent danger. The fact that the deceased was not able to use his gun to defend himself makes the
claim of self-defense unusual.

2. No. The claim of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated because the acts
employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the
victim. The brute force employed by the petitioner contradicts the claim that he had no intention to kill the
victim. Provocation in this case cannot be appreciated as well since the appellant failed to establish by
competent evidence that the deceased had a gun and used it to threaten petitioner. The fact that a heated
or intense argument preceded the incident is not by itself the sufficient provocation on the part of the
offended party as contemplated by law.

The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The
petitioner is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, as maximum. The petitioner is further ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim the amounts of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P41,500.00 as actual damages
#8

PEOPLE VS BELTRAN

Facts:

On November 3, 1999, appellant was indicted in an Information for Murder allegedly committed as
follows: That on or about October 25, 1999 at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening at Velasquez Road,
Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, while armed with a bolo, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifiying
circumstance of treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack
with the said bolo, suddenly and without warning one Norman Conception y Habla while the latter was
unarmed and completely defenseless, thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body, which directly
caused the victim’s death. When arraigned on November 9, 1999, appellant pleaded “Not Guilty” to the
charge therein. Thereafter, trial ensued.

Appellant, on his defense admitted that he hacked Norman with a bolo but insisted that he did the same in
self-defense. Furthermore, appellant also claimed that Norman is taller than him; that he was forced to
kill Norman because the latter insulted him and his mother; and that he was on his way to Bauan City to
surrender to police when he was apprehended by the barangay officers in Lipa City.

The RTC rendered its Decision finding the accused Honorato Beltran, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of murder. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC’s Decision. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the appellant Honorato Beltran, Jr. is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender?

Decision:

Appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Article 13, paragraph (7) of
the Revised Penal Code states that the offender’s criminal liability may be mitigated if he voluntarily
surrendered to a person in authority or his agents. Accordingly, the essential elements of voluntary
surrender are: (1) that the offender had not been actually arrested or apprehended; (2) that the surrender
was voluntary and spontaneous; and (3) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or
his agent.

Appellant was already apprehended for the hacking incident by the barangay officials of Lipa City just
before he was turned over to the police by a certain Tomas Dimacuha. Assuming that appellant had
indeed surrendered to the authorities, the same was not made spontaneously. Immediately after the
hacking incident, appellant, instead of proceeding to the barangay or police, went to his brother, Sherman
Beltran, in Bauan, Batangas, and the next day, to his sister in Lipa City. It took him three long days to
surrender to the police authorities. Moreover, the flight of appellant and his acts of hiding until he was
apprehended by the barangay officials are circumstances highly inconsistent with the spontaneity that
characterizes the mitigating circcumstance of voluntary surrender.
#9

G.R. No. L-32040

October 25, 1977
PEOPLE v. PEDRO PAGAL y MARCELINO and JOSE TORCELINO y TORAZO

Facts:

Pagal and Torcelino, were employees of Gau Guan. They robbed their employer in his “kaha de yero”
amounting to P1,281 and killed their boss by stabbing him with an icepick and clubbing him with an iron
pipe.

They pled guilty on the trial court on the condition that they be allowed to prove the mitigating
circumstance of sufficient provocation or threat was present. Both accused were arraigned and presented
evidence that Gau Guan had repeatedly maltreated them. Despite this, the trial court found still found
them guilty and sentenced them to death.

Issue:

Should the mitigating circumstance be appreciated?

Held:

No, sufficient provocation or threat is NOT present; the alleged provocation which caused the obfuscation
of the (accused) arose from the same incident and not during the maltreatment of Guan. This being so, it
cannot be considered as two distinct and separate circumstances, but should be treated only as one.
Further, the circumstance of (sufficient provocation or threat) cannot be mitigating in a crime which is
planned and calmly meditated beforehand. Lastly, the maltreatment had occurred much earlier than the
date of commission of the crime. Provocation must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act.

Regarding other aggravating circumstances the court considered that the crime happened during night
time. Evidence premeditation will only be considered as aggravating in a complex crime of robbery with
homicide if that plan was to rob AND kill. In this case, the original plan was to rob ONLY. They killed Guan
because he refused and fought.
#10

G.R. No. 182750

January 20, 2009
RODEL URBANO vs PEOPLE

Facts:
On September 28, 1993, at around 8:00 p.m., Brigido Tomelden and Rodel Urbano had a heated
altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled insulting remarks to Urbano. Urbano delivered a “lucky
punch” to Tomelden which rendered the latter unconscious. Days later, Tomelden died due to “cardio-
respiratory arrest secondary to cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling
incident”. Urbano, in his defense, denied having any intention to kill, asserting that hypertension, for
which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the cause of the latter's death.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Urbano is guilty of Homicide
2. Whether or not the CA erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation
on the part of the victim and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in favor of Urbano.

Rulings:
1. Yes. The direct accounts of the witness that Urbano delivered the ‘lucky punch’ that rendered
Tomelden unconscious and the finding of Dr. Arellano that the cause of death was secondary to cerebral
concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident” convinced the SC that the “lucky
punch” was the proximate cause of Tomelden’s death.
2. Yes. There were 2 mitigating circumstances present in favor of Urbano. Tomelden’s insulting remarks
and slap directed at Urbano immediately before the first fight was sufficient provocation. Also, Urbano
clearly did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed considering the fact that he avoided
the fight and he helped carry the unconscious Tomelden .
#11

G.R. No. 182551

July 27, 2011
PEOPLE V ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN

FACTS:
That on or about the 6th day of November, 2002, in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte,
Rosendo Rebucan y Lamsin, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
wound FELIPE LAGERA Y OBERO, 65 years old and RANIL TAGPIS Y LAGERA, 1 year old, with the
use of a long bolo (sundang) which the accused had provided himself for the purpose.

The Regional Trial Court found accused ROSENDO REBUCAN y LAMSIN, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of DOUBLE MURDER charged under the information and sentenced to suffer the
maximum penalty of DEATH, and to pay civil indemnity to the heirs of Felipe Lagera and Ramil Tagpis, Jr.
in the amount of Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos for each victim and moral damages in the
amount of Seventy-Five Thousand (P75,000.00) Pesos to each; and Pay the cost.

The Court of Appeals modified the judgment of the Regional Trial Court. The appellate court adopted the
position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the felonious acts of the accused-appellant
resulted in two separate crimes of murder as the evidence of the prosecution failed to prove the existence
of a complex crime of double murder.

The award of civil indemnity is reduced to P50,000.00 for each victim; the award of moral damages is
likewise reduced to P50,000.00 for each victim. Further, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
is awarded to the heirs of each victim

ISSUE:
WON Court of Appeals was correct in awarding exemplary damages in the in the instant case.

HELD:
Yes. Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following may be recovered: (1)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest, in
proper cases.

Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim without need of proof other than the
commission of the crime. Similarly, moral damages may be awarded by the court for the mental anguish
suffered by the heirs of the victim by reason of the latter’s death. The award of exemplary damages, on
the other hand, is provided under Articles 2229-2230 of the Civil Code, viz:

Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public
good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.

Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when
the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and
distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party.

In People v. Dalisay, the Court clarified that "Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore,
can be awarded, not only in the presence of an aggravating circumstance, but also where the
circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the offender. In much
the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when exemplary damages may be awarded, Article
2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award."

#12

G.R. No. 149372

September 11, 2007
RICARDO BACABAC V. PEOPLE

Facts:

Bacabac’s failure to assist the victims after the shooting reinforces this Court’s appreciation of community
of design between him and his co-accused to harm the victims. Following a heated argument in a dance
hall which resulted in a brawl, Jose Talanquines, Jr. (Jose), and Edzel Talanquines (Edzel), herein
referred to as Talanquines brothers, proceeded to confront their enemies armed with guns. They were
accompanied by Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin (Jesus). In the dancehall,
they encountered Hernani Quidato and Eduardo Selibio. After a physical confrontation, The Talanquines
brothers shot Quidato and Selibio. Quidato and Selibio later died from their wounds. The Talanquines
brothers, together with Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin was charged and
found guilty of the crime of Murder. Ricardo Bacabac (Bacabac) appealed his conviction, contending that
he cannot be deemed to be in conspiracy with the other accused because he was not the one who pulled
the trigger. He also alleged that even if he was convicted of Murder, in gratis argumenti, the correctness
of the pronouncement of guilt should have been attended by the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense, in the same manner as the other accused.

Issue:

Whether or not there is conspiracy among Jonathan Bacabac, Pat. Ricardo Bacabac, and Jesus Delfin in
the murder of the victims.

Held:

Bacabac‘s failure to assist the victims after the shooting reinforces this Court’s appreciation of community
of design between him and his co-accused to harm the victims. What is decisive in treachery is that “the
attack was executed in such a manner as to make it impossible for the victim to retaliate.” In the case at
bar, petitioner, a policeman, and his co-accused were armed with two M-16 armalites and a revolver. The
victim and his companions were not armed. The attack was sudden and unexpected, and the victim was
already kneeling in surrender when he was shot the second time. Clearly, the victim and his companion
Eduardo had no chance to defend themselves or retaliate. Conspiracy presupposes the existence of
evident premeditation does not necessarily imply that the converse ─ that evident premeditation
presupposes the existence of a conspiracy ─ is true. In any event, a link between conspiracy and evident
premeditation is presumed only where the conspiracy is directly established and not where conspiracy is
only implied, as in the present case.
#13

G.R. No. 181409

February 11, 2011
Intestate Estate of Manolita Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong
Article 38 of Void and Voidable Marriages

Facts:
Mediatrix Carungcong, in her capacity as the duly appointed administratrix of petitioner intestate estate of
her deceased mother Manolita Gonzales vda. De Carungcong, filed a complaint-affidavit for estafa
against her brother-in-law, William Sato, a Japanese national. It was alleged that the said accused
feloniously induced Manolita Gonzales, the owner of the estate and herein deceased, to sign and thumb
mark a special power of attorney (in the pretense of presenting a document pertaining to taxes) which
authorized the sale, assignment, transfer and disposition of the latter’s properties. In relation to this, the
accused moved for the dismissal of the case.
As a defense against his arrant prosecution, the accused here applies Art 332 of the Revised Penal
Code. He cites that he falls under the enumeration of those relatives who shall be exempt from criminal
prosecution. Being a relative by affinity, he cannot be held liable for the crime of estafa as stated in the
law. He further counters that the same law makes no distinction that the relationship may not be invoked
in case of death of spouse at the time the crime was allegedly committed. Thus, the death of his spouse
Zenaida Carungcong Sato though dissolved the marriage with the accused, did not on the other hand
dissolve the mother in-law and son-law relationship between Sato and his wife’s mother, Manolita. He
then cannot be removed from the protective mantle of Art 332.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the death of William’s wife and Manolita’s daughter, Zenaida, extinguished the
relationship by affinity between William and Manolita.
2. Whether or not William should be exempt from criminal liability for reason of his relationship to
Manolita.

Held:
1. No. Relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the kindred of the deceased
spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of whether the marriage
produced children or not.
2. No. The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code only applies to the
felonies of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Under the said provision, the State condones the
criminal responsibility of the offender in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. As an act of
grace, the State waives its right to prosecute the offender for the said crimes but leaves the private
offended party with the option to hold the offender civilly liable.
However, the coverage of Article 332 is strictly limited to the felonies mentioned therein. The plain,
categorical and unmistakable language of the provision shows that it applies exclusively to the simple
crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply where any of the crimes mentioned
under Article 332 is complexed with another crime, such as theft through falsification or estafa through
falsification.
Sato, the accused, could not avail of the beneficial application of ART 332 considering that the crime he
committed falls under the nature of a complex crime which is the crime estafa through falsification of
public document and does not anymore concern private relations of family members. He then can be held
criminally liable.
#14

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

VS.
MARCELINO OLOVERIO
G.R No. 211159
March 18, 2015

FACTS:

Oloverio was charged with the crime of murder for allegedly stabbing Gulane treacherously. In his
defense, Oloverio alleged that at the time and day of the incident, Gulane had been accusing him of
having an incestuous relationship with his mother and continued mocking him in a loud voice despite
repeated requests by the former for the latter to go home. Oloverio admitted that he stabbed Gulane
because he could no longer bear the insulting remarks against him.

The trial court ruled that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation was not present in this
case since it could not co-exist with the presence of treachery. The only mitigating circumstance it found
present was of voluntary surrender. The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision 15 affirming the conviction.
It found that Oloverio failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that Gulane "committed an
unlawful act which sufficiently caused him to act with passion and obfuscation."

ISSUE:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is present in this case.

HELD:

Yes. The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is present in this case.

To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the facts must be examined on a
case-to-case basis. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals narrowed its understanding of passion
and obfuscation to refer only to the emotions accused-appellant felt in the seconds before a crime is
committed. It failed to understand that passion may linger and build up over time as repressed anger
enough to obfuscate reason and self-control.
There is no uniform rule on what constitutes "a considerable length of time." The provocation and the
commission of the crime should not be so far apart that a reasonable length of time has passed during
which the accused would have calmed down and be able to reflect on the consequences of his or her
actions. What is important is that the accused has not yet "recovered his normal equanimity" when he
committed the crime.
#15
#16

GR No. 135981
January 15, 2004
People v. Genosa

Subject Matter: Applications of the provisions of Art. 11(1) and Art. 14 of the Revised Penal Code

Facts:
Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and wounded his husband which
ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did not provoke her husband when she got
home that night and it was her husband who began the provocation. The appellant said she was
frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby
safely.
The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least five times, but
that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant said that the reason why Ben
was violent and abusive towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu
Rubillos. The appellant, after being interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering from
Battered Woman Syndrome. The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband.
She was found guilty of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the
husband was attacked while asleep

Issues:
(1) Whether or not appellant acted in self-defense.
(2) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

Held:
For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of self-defense arising
from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimated partner; (b)
The final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered
person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed
to use force in order to save her life, and; (c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused based on the history of
violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.
For the second issue, the SC ruled out treachery as an aggravating circumstance because the quarrel or
argument that preceded the killing must have forewarned the victim of the assailant’s aggression.
#17
#18

G.R. No. L-3765

June 21, 1951
PEOPLE vs. MORO SABILUL

Facts:
Moro Sabilul was charged with Murder in CFI Zamboanga. Without taking any evidence and merely on
the basis of the statements and contentions made by the provincial and counsel de oficio, which were
conflicting, Presiding Judge Pablo Villalobos sentenced:

Defendant is charged and found guilty of Murder. Sentenced to Prisio Mayor.

Attended by (3) Mitigating Circumstances: (a) acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion obfuscation (b) voluntary surrender and (c) plea of guilty. No Aggravating
Circumstances. Taking also into consideration that the accused is a “Yakan” belonging to the Non-
Christian Tribes and hopelessly ignorant. Sec. 106 of the Admin Code for the Dept. of Mindanao and Sulu
was applied. Defendant thru counsel appealing and claims that the Lower Court erred in Applying Art. 248
sub section 1 of RPC instead of Art. 247 applying the penalty of destierro.

The Court however agreed with the Solicitor General’s claims that there has been a possible
misunderstanding on the part of Accused-Appellant when he entered the plea of guilty and that his
counsel believed the plea of guilty was conditioned on the penalty provided for Art. 247 of the RPC.
Counsel should have known that an accused may not enter a conditional plea of guilty in the sense that
he admits his guilt provided that a certain penalty be imposed.

Issue:
The trial court dictated its decision in open court containing facts or findings of facts which are not
supported by the evidence for the simple reason that no evidence whatsoever has been presented.

HELD:
Court SET ASIDE the decision appealed and acted on SolGen’s recommendation. Remanded to the Trial
Court for a new trial. What the trial court did was to listen to the conflicting statements and claims of the
Fiscal and Counsel de Officio, accepted some and rejected others and then dictated its sentence on what
it thought to be the facts of the case, plus the plea of guilty of the accused. The procedure is wrong.
Finding of fact of a court must have basis and support. The court should not content itself with a plea of
guilty but should receive evidence to satisfy itself.
The decision enumerates as one of the mitigating circumstances the fact that the accused acted upon an
impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. No witness, not even the
accused was put on the witness stand. So naturally this supposed mitigating circumstance could not have
been established. The same thing may be said of “Voluntary Admission” and on the circumstance that the
accused is a “Yakan” belonging to the non-Christian Tribe and hopelessly ignorant. No evidence was
taken. In cases where grave crimes are charged, it is advisable to take additional evidences as to the guilt
of the accused and the circumstances attendant upon the commission of the crime. Evidence should be
sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction or leave no room for reasonable doubt as to the possibility of
a misunderstanding on the part of the Accused-Appellant. As correlated to the Mitigating Circumstances
Par. 6 (Passion or Obfuscation) Prosecution stated that: The Victim Moro Lario and the Appellant’s wife
Mora Masilayan had been maintaining illicit relation, because of this appellant divorced her according to
Moro Custom and to avenge the dishonor caused him, surprised the victim taking a bath in a river,
attacked causing multiple wounds and killed him, with a “Pira” a Yakan bladed weapon. Defense stated
that: Wife went to the river to fetch water but the deceased saw her, attacked and succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her, she shouted for help and heard by the husband-appellant, finding the
deceased was still on top of his wife, attacked, pursued and eventually killed Lario with a bladed weapon.
#19

G.R. No. 131736-37

March 11, 2002
PEOPLE vs JOEY MANLANSING y AMBROSIO

Facts:
On December 27, 1994, brothers Joey and Mario Manlansing caused the death of spouses Magin and
Jorja Soriano. Mario confessed and claimed that he alone was responsible for the deaths. In open court,
Mario affirmed his confession and insisted that his brother had nothing to do with the deaths. He claimed
that Joey woke up only after he killed Magin and that Joey tried to unsuccessfully stop him from attacking
Jorja. He said he killed the couple out of anger after Jorja told him that he was going to be ejected as a
tenant. Mario said Joey knew nothing of his motive.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Mario and Joey Manlansing conspired to kill the Sorianos.
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing death penalty on the Manlansing brothers.

Rulings:
1. Yes. The guilt of Joey as a conspirator was proven when he admitted boxing Jorja on the face just to
protect her from Mario which was later contradicted by the autopsy report which showed that Jorja
sustained hematoma on her face and chest, an indication that she was struck several times. The nature
and type of wounds found on the victims could not be possibly inflicted by one person alone. There was
also a witness who testified seeing the brothers step out the Soriano’s house wearing bloodstained shirts.
Finally, Joey’s flight to Cabanatuan belies his innocence since flight is an indication of guilt. All the
foregoing details presented as evidence more than suffices to show that the brothers were united and had
cooperated in a conspiracy to attach the spouses. In a conspiracy, the act of one conspirator is the act of
the other co-conspirator. Thus, Joey is equally responsible as his brother, Mario for the death of the
Sorianos.

2. Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that none of the aggravating circumstances were alleged in the
informations nor in the amended informations with specificity as a qualifying circumstance elevating either
killing to murder. The SC reviewed the allegation that the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery, and nocturnity were present in the commission of the crimes. At the outset, we
shall discount nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance, since in this case, the darkness
of the night was not purposely sought by the offenders to facilitate the commission of the crime nor to
ensure its execution with impunity. The evident premeditation and treachery may only be considered as
generic aggravating circumstances. The decision of the RTC is modified to Guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of Homicide.
#20

PEOPLE V. SITCHON

Facts:

Sitchon beat up a little 2 year old boy named MarkAnthony Fernandez to death. Victim mark spread his
feces all over the floor and this enraged Sitchon. Sitchon struck him with a belt, 2x2 wood, and a hammer.
He even banged the little kid’s head on the wooden wall. This was witnessed by victim-mark’s older
brother Roberto. The next door neighbor Lilia also witnessed the beating through the open door after she
heard the cries of victimmark. Later, Sitchon brought victim-mark to the hospital but he was already dead
then. Sitchonis the live-in partner of Mark’s mom. He is also a drug addict, he was then high from Valium
10. Sitchon pleaded guilty after defense rested its case and pleaded the defense of accident. The lower
court convicted him of murder, qualified by treachery, aggravated by cruelty and alternative circumstance
of intoxication. Sitchon sentenced to death [note: 1998 RTC decision and 2002 SC decision].

Issue: What are the different aggravating and mitigating circumstances applicable in this case?

Held:

Murder, qualified by treachery, mitigated by lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. [Note: Callejo
assigned this case under Cruelty, thus this is to be discussed first]

Mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty cannot be appreciated here. It is well-settled that a plea of guilty
made after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea
considered as a mitigating circumstance. Here, Sitchon pleaded guilty only after the prosecution rested
his case.

Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong is present since his only intention was to maltreat and not to
kill mark. When he realized what he did, he immediately brought mark to the hospital but it was too late.

Voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated because he failed to prove any of the circumstances.

The trial court appreciated intoxication as an aggravating circumstance although it was clear that Sitchon
isn’t alcohol dependent but rather a drug addict. SC said that alternative circumstance of intoxication is
clear when it refers to alcohol and thus is not applicable to Sitchon’s case. Article 14 on aggravating and
article 15 on alternative do not contain an “Analogous provision” unlike Article 13 on mitigating
circumstances. Criminalstatutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused. And no person should
be brought within its terms who is not clearly covered by it.
#21
#22

G.R. Nos. L-48519-22

June 22, 1942
PEOPLE vs. Fidel Fortuno

Facts:
Defendant-appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Manila upon appeal from the
Municipal Court of four separate offenses of estafa and sentenced to undergo imprisonment in G.R. No.
49519 for two months and one day, arresto mayor, and in each of the other three cases for three months
and eleven days, arresto mayor, to indemnify the offended parties respectively in the sums of P140,
P94.50, P83.50 and P189, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

However, it appears that appellant was sentenced by this Court to undergo imprisonment in five cases.
The most severe penalty imposed upon the appellant is from four months and twenty days to one year,
eight months and twenty-one days, and the sum total of his several penalties does not exceed threefold
the length of time corresponding to the maximum limit thereof.

Issue:
WON the three-fold rule is applicable in the case of the appellant.

Ruling:
No. With respect to the most severe penalty, and the sum total of his several penalties does not exceed
threefold the length of time corresponding to the maximum limit thereof, we cannot for the present make
the pronouncement that article 70 of the RPC, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 217, is applicable.
However, in anticipation, we may state that, if in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law the
appellant should be entitled to be released on parole after service of the minimum limit of the aforesaid
indeterminate penalty (from four months and twenty days to one year, eight months and twenty-one
days), or of a greater period below the maximum limit threefold the length of which is less than the sum
total of all penalties imposed upon him, his aggregate prison term would be reduced to not more than
three times period thus served.
Judgements appealed from will be, as the same are hereby, affirmed, with costs against the appellant.
#23

G.R. No. 139879

May 8, 2003
PEOPLE v. GABRIEL ANNIBONG y INGGAO

Facts:
Appellant Gabriel Annibong, a kitchen aide serving at the camp, testified that on February 13, 1998, while
he and Artemio Tallong were in their camp at Barangay Doña Loreta, Pudtol, Apayao, the victim arrived
coming from Centro, Pudtol, Apayao. When Cpl. Fidel Obngayan went to the kitchen to get a drink, he
was irritated to discover the water container empty. Hopping mad, Obngayan rushed to appellant and
boxed him three times in the stomach and uttered: “Vulva of your mother, it is better that I will kill you.”
Obngayan proceeded to his bunker, got his M-16 rifle and aimed it at appellant, prompting the latter to
shoot the victim once. After the first shot, the victim managed to stand and aim his gun at appellant
prompting the latter to fire his M-16. But since the M-16 malfunctioned, appellant grabbed the garand rifle
of Artemio Tallong and shot the victim once more. Immediately after the shooting, appellant escaped with
Tallong and proceeded to Suan, Pudtol, Apayao. Two days later, both surrendered to Governor Batara P.
Laoat, who advised them to surrender to the police.

ARTEMIO TALLONG was presented by the defense to show unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim. Tallong narrated, still perspiring and thirsty from an operation in Centro, Pudtol, Apayao, Cpl.
Obngayan hurriedly proceeded to the camp’s kitchen for a drink. Incensed that all of the water containers
were empty, Obngayan confronted appellant whose duty it was to maintain the camp’s kitchen. He gave
appellant a jab in the abdomen, then slowly walked away towards his bunker.

Infuriated, appellant without warning, picked up his M-14 armalite rifle and strafed the former on the back.
Obngayan sprawled bloodied on the ground. Shortly after, appellant took the garand rifle of Artemio
Tallong, and unleashed another barrage of gunshots. Obngayan died instantaneously with his brain
splattered and an eye fallen on the ground.

DR. DAN REDEL EDROSO declared that on February 14, 1998, he conducted an autopsy[6] on the
victim’s remains which revealed nine gunshot wounds. From his examination of the wounds, Dr. Edroso
opined that two were inflicted from the back of the victim while five were inflicted while the victim was
already lying down with his face up.

Accused: Appellant admits shooting Cpl. Obngayan. But he claims that he did so merely to repel the
victim’s unlawful aggression.

Issues:
Whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of Cpl. Obngayan

RULING:
In cases where the accused admits committing the crime but invokes self-defense, the basic rule that the
burden of proving the guilt of the accused lies on the prosecution is reversed, and the burden of proof is
shifted to the accused to prove the elements of his defense.[16] In our view, the defense has not
discharged its burden successfully.

Granting that the initial act of aggression came from the victim when he cursed and then punched
appellant three times in the stomach, such aggression did not amount to actual or imminent threat to
appellant’s life as the victim already ceased and desisted thereafter. As defense witness Tallong testified,
the victim was already walking slowly away towards his bunker[18] at the time appellant shot him
incessantly. At that point, it was no longer necessary for appellant to shoot Obngayan in order to protect
himself

Appellant’s act of shooting the unarmed victim first with an M-16 and a garand rifle, successively, belies
his claim that he acted in self-preservation and indicates nothing more than the desire to kill.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Apayao, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 9-98, is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Gabriel Annibong y Inggao is declared guilty of murder, but
his sentence is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua. Further, he is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P1,620,000.00 for lost earnings, P10,000.00 as nominal
damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000 as exemplary damages. Costs de oficio.
#24

G.R. No. L-38635

November 17, 1980
People vs DANIEL HAYAG

Facts:
Esperanza Ranga, who was deaf and mute, signed a rape complaint against Daniel Hayag committed on
December 4, 1972. Virginia, her sister, certified under oath that she translated, interpreted and explained
the contents of the complaints through sign language to Esperanza. Since Esperanza did not attend a
deaf-mute school, Virginia, translated and interpreted for Esperanza during the cross-examination.
According to the sign language of Esperanza, as interpreted by Virginia, the alleged rape was committed
while she was on her way home from her work. Daniel Hayag, admitted that he had sexual intercourse
with Esperanza, but all of these were voluntary.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Virginia correctly and credibly interpreted and verbalized the sign language of
Esperanza

2. Whether or not Hayag is guilty of rape

Rulings:
1. No. The trustworthiness of Virginia as an interpreter was doubtful since she herself is interested in
sending the accused to prison.

2. No. The prosecution failed to establish the guilt of Hayag beyond reasonable doubt. Esperanza’s delay
in reporting the alleged rape and the absence of immediate medical examination are circumstances
creating reasonable doubt as to the commission of the rape. There was also no evidence of resistance on
the sexual assault because Esperanza did not suffer any physical injuries or her dress were not torn. As a
thirty-two year old farm girl, Esperanza is perfectly capable of defending herself and would have made the
alleged rape difficult for Hayag to consummate without the help of confederates or without the use of a
weapon. The case for the prosecution was irreparably impaired by the inconsistencies committed by
Esperanza’s mother.

The trial court's judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside. On the ground of reasonable
doubt or the insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, defendant Daniel Hayag is acquitted of the
charge of rape.
#25

G.R. No. 224886

September 4, 2017
People vs. Roger Racal

Facts:
In an Information, Racal was charged with the crime of murder when the said accused, armed with a
knife, with treachery, unexpectedly, attack and use personal violence upon the person of one Jose
Francisco by stabbing the latter, at his body, thereby inflicting a fatal wound and as a consequence of
which he died. The prosecution established that while the “trisikad” drivers were waiting for passengers,
Racal told the group of drivers not to trust Francisco because he is a traitor. Francisco asked Racal why
the latter called him a traitor. Without warning, Racal approached Francisco and stabbed him several
times with a knife, hitting him in the chest and other parts of his body.
Racal did not deny having stabbed Francisco but he raised the defense of insanity contending that he has
a predisposition to snap into an episode where he loses his reason and thereby acts outside his
conscious control.

Issue:

Whether or not the defense of insanity may be validly invoked.

Ruling:

No, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when
there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. The accused must be deprived of
reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to
discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
In the present case, the separate psychiatric evaluations of appellant were taken three and four years
after the crime was committed. An inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period
immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed. On his part, Dr. Gerong testified that
he found appellant to have “diminished capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the
commission of the crime.” “Diminished capacity” is not the same as “complete deprivation of intelligence
or discernment.”
The Court, however, appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness as would diminish the exercise of
willpower of appellant without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts, pursuant to
Article 13, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the RPC.
Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of
sound mind and that all acts are voluntary.
Gist: Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant, Roger Racal, assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed, with modification, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu City finding herein appellant guilty of the crime of murder.
#26
#27

G.R. No. 172697

September 25, 2007
PEOPLE v. Reynaldo Villanueva y Marquez

Facts:
On January 21, 2000, upon going home, appellant Reynaldo Villanueva, brought hotdogs that he cooked
since he was hungry. When his mother asked if she could have some, appellant got irked because he did
not have breakfast and lunch. His mother got scared of him and ran away. Appellant was so peeved that
he wanted to give vent to his anger. After finishing his food, he went to his mother’s room. It was this point
that the appellant committed the crimes.

Appellant killed his niece Angelica Villanueva by boxing her on the head and kicking her several times on
the different parts of her body, which cause her death. Appellant also mauled his nephews Rexie and
Enrique Villanueva.

Consequently, appellant was charged with murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder by the trial
court.

Appellant pleaded insanity.

Issue:
Whether or not the defense of insanity can exempt the accused of criminal liability.

Ruling:
No. The supreme court held that proof of existence of some abnormalities in the mental faculties will not
exempt the accused from culpability, if it was shown that he was not completely deprived of freedom and
intelligent.

Appellant’s recollection of the events prior to the crimes and his emotions afterwards indicate that he was
sane before, during and after the commission of the crimes. The report also states that appellant felt guilty
about Angelica’s death and apprehensive of being I jail for longer time. A feeling of remorse is
inconsistent with insanity, as it clear indication that he was conscious of his act.
#28

G.R. No. L-54135

November 21, 1991
PEOPLE vs. POLICARPIO RAFANAN, JR.

FACTS:
The 14 year old victim was hired by the mother of the appellant as a househelper. One evening, she was
forced by the appellant to have sexual intercourse using a bolo on her neck as a threat if she does not
cooperate. After the abuse, he also threatened to kill her if she reports what happened to anyone. After a
few days, the victim finally told her mother about what happened leading to the arrest and conviction of
the appellant of the crime of rape.
The commission of the crime was not seriously disputed by appellant. But the principal submission of
appellant was that he was suffering from a metal aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he
inflicted his violent intentions upon the victim. The trial court suspended the trial and ordered that the
appellant be confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment. In
the meantime, the case was archived. Appellant was admitted into the hospital on 29 December 1976 and
stayed there until 26 June 1978. The appellant was diagnosed to be indeed suffering from schizophrenia
by his attending physicians but was deemed fit to stand trial upon almost 1 ½ years of treatment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant should be exempted from liability for the crime on the grounds of insanity

RULING:
The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into
account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is,
that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that the acts
without the least discernment; or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will. For this reason, it
was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive
a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not
exclude imputability.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the
defendant had previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the
perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are
always reputed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order
to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will
are proved.

Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by
inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and
delusions

In the findings of the case, testimonies negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of
commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense of
insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita with death
should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of the Court, that
Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault. In any case, as already pointed out,
it is complete loss of intelligence which must be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be
found.

The law presumes every man to be sane. A person accused of a crime has the burden of proving his
affirmative allegation of insanity. Here, appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence
regarding his state of mind immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held
that inquiry into the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the
very moment the act is committed. Appellant rested his case on the testimonies of two (2) physicians
which, however, did not purport to characterize his mental condition during that critical period of time.
They did not specifically relate to circumstances occurring on or immediately before the day of the rape.
Their testimonies consisted of broad statements based on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted
with schizophrenia.
#29

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JERRY ANTONIO Y DIOLATA, accused-

appellant.
G.R. No. 144933 | July 3, 2002 (First Division)
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

Facts:

Accused-appellant was convicted of murder. The facts as presented by the prosecution show that at 1:00
in the early morning of October 11, 1998, the victim, Jomar Ephan, was engaged in a drinking session
with Reynaldo Ephan and Roselito Dacillo in front of a store in Barangay Pakna-an, Mandaue City.
Accused-appellant arrived and bought cigarettes. Then, he ordered Jomar, Reynaldo and Roselito to
count the cigarettes he bought, but the three told accused-appellant to let the storekeeper do the
counting. Rebuked, accused-appellant left the store. He returned minutes later and suddenly stabbed the
victim at the back, after which he immediately fled. The victim was rushed by his companions to the
hospital but died the following day.

On the other hand, the defense tried to prove that deceased attempted to hit accused-appellant but
because the former was very drunk, he missed and fell on his belly. It was at this point when accused-
appellant got hold of a knife he saw under the table and stabbed the deceased at the back.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in rejecting accused-appellant’s self-defense theory

Held:

No. Where an accused invokes self-defense, he thereby admits authorship of the crime. The burden of
proof is thus shifted on him to prove all the elements of self-defense, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.

In the case at bar, even if we sustain the version of accused-appellant that the initial act of aggression
came from the group of the deceased, still we cannot uphold his plea of self-defense. As testified by
accused-appellant himself, the deceased who was at that time very drunk tried to hit him but missed and
fell on the ground. At that point, unlawful aggression ceased and it was no longer necessary for him to
stab the deceased. It was accused-appellant, therefore, who became the aggressor when he, despite the
condition of the deceased, proceeded to stab the latter at the back. His act can no longer be interpreted
as an act of self-preservation but a perverse desire to kill. Hence, he cannot successfully claim the benefit
of self-defense. Furthermore, if it were true that the companions of the deceased ganged up on him, his
attack should have been directed against them and not against the deceased who was already
defenseless and lying on the ground.
#30

G.R. No. 113691

February 6, 1998
PEOPLE vs ALBERTO MEDINA y CATUD

Facts:
On May 20, 1991, while walking on his way home after coming from a party, Andres Dalisay was stabbed
by Alberto Medina, Dalisay was able to run away from Medina but was chased and stabbed once more by
Medina. While already on the ground, Medina stabbed him once more on the chest. Medina surrendered
thereafter. There were a total of 8 stab wounds, six or which were fatal. The defense testimony on the
other hand, Medina’s defense was insanity. His sister testified that Medina was confined at the National
Mental Hospital from June to October 1982 due to “schizophreniform disorder”. Showing no improvement,
he was referred to Dr. Adigue who testified that Medina has been shown to be suffering from depression
and was exhibiting homicidal tendencies thus maybe insane.
The Trial Court convicted Medina of murder & said that his defense of insanity is not meritorious since Dr.
Adigue was not qualified as an expert witness, that his sister’s testimony didn’t constitute sufficient proof
of insanity, and that he was actually mentally agile during trial.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Medina was insane therefore exempt from criminal liability.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in convicting Medina of murder
3. Whether or not the trial court erred in not appreciating Medina’s voluntary surrender

Rulings:

1. No. Dr. Adigue’s failed to establish the legal insanity of Medina as shown in the results of the tests that
she conducted which merely say that Medina has a mild depression and emotional disturbances. In
Medina’s testimony where he thought the victim was going to pull out a weapon, this statement shows
that he did not suffer any deprivation of reason or discernment. Art. 12, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
requires a complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act; i.e., that the accused be deprived of
reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or that there be complete absence of
the power to discern.

2. No. Proof of treachery was established by the fact that Medina waited behind a tree for the victim so he
can attack him and the manner of the attack which was vicious and relentless delivering 8 stab wounds,
six of which were fatal. Treachery which qualified the killing as murder was properly appreciated by the
trial court.

3. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been credited in favor of the appellant.
The evidence sufficiently established the elements of voluntary surrender, namely: (1) the offender has
not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority; and (3) his surrender was voluntary.