Title: Role of China in Rohingya Crisis

M. Phil Program

Fall Semester 2019

Course # PH 1201: Regional and International Affairs

Submitted by:

Mushfek-Ul-Alam Chowdhury

ID: M190008

Submitted to:

Dr. A.S.M. Ali Ashraf

Adjunct Faculty, BUP

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 Contents
Title: Role of China in Rohingya Crisis.........................................................................................1

Summary..........................................................................................................................................4

1.0 Introduction:..............................................................................................................................5

2.0 Research Questions....................................................................................................................7

3.0 Hypothesis:................................................................................................................................7

A. Conventional Wisdom:...........................................................................................................7

B. Alternative Wisdom................................................................................................................7

4.0 Literature Review:.....................................................................................................................8

4.1 Research Framework:..........................................................................................................14

5.0 Methodology:...........................................................................................................................15

5.1 Descriptive study.................................................................................................................15

5.2 Exploratory design...............................................................................................................15

5.3 Data type..............................................................................................................................15

5.4 Data source: Primary documents.........................................................................................15

5.5 Secondary documents..........................................................................................................15

6.0 Data Findings:..........................................................................................................................16

A. Primary documents...............................................................................................................16

A1. Qualitative findings:.......................................................................................................16

A2. Quantitative findings:.....................................................................................................22

B. Secondary documents:..........................................................................................................23

B1. Qualitative findings:........................................................................................................23

B2. Quantitative findings:......................................................................................................29

7.0 Data Analysis and Interpretation:............................................................................................38

7.1 Quantitative analysis:...........................................................................................................38

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 7.2 Qualitative analysis:.............................................................................................................41

8.0 Answers to the Research Question:.........................................................................................47

9.0 Lessons learned........................................................................................................................48

Bibliography..................................................................................................................................49

APPENDIX...............................................................................................................................83

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 Summary

The research paper focuses on ‘Role of China in Rohingya crisis. It mainly investigates the geo-
political moves from the Chinese perspective to check on whether there is a possibility for China
to succeed in their negotiating acts between Bangladesh and Myanmar, The paper
chronologically provides: a background to find the origin of the problem, clarifies reasons on
Why China is so important as a negotiator in this issue, the possible outcomes of the negotiation
process and how it may affect China’s political standing with a series of research questions and
problem statement. The researcher primarily denounces the conventional ideas that China only
prefers to look after Myanmar’s interest or Sino-Myanmar relationship will continue on a
positive note in the long run. Methodology section briefly analyzes the nature of the research and
the type of data which are used to justify researcher’s alternative views. In the data collection
section, the researcher demonstrates a comparative picture between Bangladesh and Myanmar in
terms of their economic, political and military relationship with Chine to find whether China
prioritizes both nations equally from their geo-political standing. Finally, in the analysis section
the researcher describes many different dimensions based on the data which was found in order
to predict the possible outcomes of the current negotiation process such as the limited Chinese
involvement in Humanitarian aspects, the current steps which are taken by the Myanmar Military
regime in repatriating the Rohingyas, Why does the democratic reform process within Myanmar
is so necessary for China to succeed as a negotiator, What Myanmar must do to regain the trust
of it’s Rohingya citizens and how the current situation is endangering the Chinese diplomacy or
why a worsening scenario between China and Myanmar may arise in the near future. All the
findings and analysis inherently support the author’s alternative view on the issue and duly
answer the research questions. Finally, the researcher discussed about the common lessons which
are learned so far from international relations perspective.

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1.0 Introduction:

In order to understand the role of China that may or may not resolve the Rohingya crisis it is
essential to look at the background of the Rohingya history. It is needless to say that both China
and Bangladesh are deeply involved in a crisis which is completely Myanmar’s domestic
problem from the outer perspective. Based on the information captured by Rahman, Anusara,
Chanthamith, Hossain and Al-amin (2018) Rohingyas are the ancient settlers of the Arakan state
– a state which was lately known as Rakhine where the early dynasties were originated as
followers of Hindus and Mahayana Buddhists. This literature further suggests that the Arab
traders used Arakan for naval routes, who eventually settled down in Arakan, married members
of the local community – as a result the Muslim population grew formidably in the region (Ibid,
2018). Ibid (2018) also prescribed a series of events from which it seems clear that these Muslim
communities in Arakan who gradually came to be known as Rohingyas, went through many
racial conflicts since the Mughal administration that continued up to the Post-British colonial
period. Finally, it was evident from the above documents that at some point the Rohingya
population was recognized as indigenous citizens of Myanmar but lost their citizenship rights
when the military took over. The above document also provides the researcher a strong
indication that the struggle of the Rohingya population in regard to their ethnic identity is clearly
a case of racial discrimination. Majumder, Chopra and Chakraborty (2015) supported this view
by describing the Rohingyas as stateless people that existed in Myanmar without being granted a
right to citizenship – who are being victimized largely in the Northern part of Myanmar. Even
though Islam (2009) defined Rohingyas as Arab traders who guarded around the coastal line of
Bay of Bengal and mentioned a common connection between the language of Rohigyas with that
of the local community in Chittagong – this notion can also be backed by evidences which are
provided by other authors such as Leider (2013) who clearly suggested a crucial link between the
rohingyas and the ancient Bengali Muslims. However, none of these evidences justified the
deceitful refusal of the Myanmar military administration who conducted a violent campaign

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against this minor population, even through almost all of the above documents provided strong
reasons to believe that there had been ethnic extortions, brutal murders and rape crimes –
committed by the Myanmar authority against the Rohingyas in order to prevent their political
ideologies.

The next phase of investigation that was carried by the researcher in fact examined the role of the
regional leadership in regard to this conflict – specially, China - a nation that was identified as
the most influential in this conflict for the following reasons: First of all, China is not only the
dominating leader in South-East Asian trade context but also a very well recognized candidate
for the future global hegemony with a political state - seemingly different to that in US or in
other Western countries. Second, this above major influence laid down China’s foundation as a
chief mediator in the Rohingya conflict that involved both Bangladesh and Myanmar. The Initial
investigation which is conducted by the author convincingly suggests that because of the late
incidences which are arising between the Myanmar military and the Arakan Rohingya Salvation
Army caused almost 13, 00,000 Rohingyas fleeing from Myanmar to Bangladesh, who refused to
go back to their original homeland as they fear a possible extermination (Rahman, Anusara,
Chanthamith, Hossain and Al-amin, 2018). Additionally, circumstantial evidences proved that
this above event is imposing a huge economic/environmental/infrastructural burden upon the
host community as well as causing numerous number of global and domestic political headaches
for the current Bangladeshi government (Imran and Mian, 2014; UNDP, 2018) Third, there are
strong evidences to believe that China’s path to regional hegemony exerts a maximum effort on
not pushing Myanmar or other South-East Asian countries closer to a US or Western dominance
in terms of a trade or political rivalries in the region, specially when one considers the persistent
US threat to erode the Chinese leadership containment (Yhome, 2019; Joy, 2018; Womack 2004
& Cheng 2013). Besides, China has many sensitive geo-political issues which linked them to
both Bangladesh and Myanmar (Joy, 2018, Yhome, 2018, Ramchandran, 2017 & Bhattacharjee,
2018). Based on these facts and considering the political, economic as well as military aspects
the author predicts that China is bound to simultaneously protect the interests of both Bangladesh
and Myanmar despite their so called preferences in protecting their internal ties with the
Myanmar military administration.

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In the current study, the author finally aims to prove the following fact:

‘If Myanmar fails to resolve their internal political conflicts with the ethnic groups, it will
bitterly affect the Sino-Myanmar relationship in the long-run, therefore, will not only pose
challenges for the Chinese political standing in South-East Asia but will also change their
current role as a negotiator in the Rohingya issues’

2.0 Research Questions

‘Will China’s mediation role in Rohingya issues be successful? – Will Myanmar’s internal
political uncertainties will affect China’s diplomatic standing in the long run?’

3.0 Hypothesis:

A. Conventional Wisdom: ‘China prefers Myanmar over Bangladesh considering their greater
geo-political interests which will affect their role as a mediator in resolving the Rohingya crises
in a negative manner’

B. Alternative Wisdom: ‘China has an equal geo-political interest in both Bangladesh and
Myanmar ; China’s relationship with Myanmar will certainly experience a diplomatic
breakdown, which will affect their role in Rohingya issues given Myanmar fails to resolve their
internal political uncertainties in the long run’

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4.0 Literature Review:

According to Macza (2010) geo-politics is an integrated framework which has both traditional as
well as critical components, however it is about geo-political identity. Geopolitical role can also
be defined in terms of the ‘Social constructivism’ related ideas of Wendt (1999) who believed
international politics can be fixed by specific role and perception, which identifies a particular
group and their perception comes from the roles based on their ideas inherent in social life. From
the above information one can make this comment while considering geo-politics - Ideas,
perception, social roles of a nation are crucial in international politics. Macza (2010) finally
derives this conclusion that geo-politics can be used as an analytical tool to explore an
international event where the expectations are based on geo-political role and perception,
influencing the actor’s identity and activities. On the other hand, Gray and Solan (2008) believe
geo-politics can be used as an alternative tool by the politicians in order to represent their
alternative views against a traditional ideology. From the above evidence it can be suggested that
geo-political interest is crucial to understand in order to analyze a specific state role during the
time of a conflict. Giblin (2013) believes it is very rational to associate ‘economics’ with geo-
political interest. Ibid (2013) further suggests economic interest and activity are also the key
principles to analyze the roles of geo-political state actor. Evidence from Kurecic (2012)
supports the above claim that suggests resource conflicts are one of the major sources which
arise among the geo-political rivalries. Based on the findings of Agnew and Corbridge (1995) a
state or an individual organization or a non-state actor is always incomplete without considering
its economic relationship with others in the global political context. Ibid (1995) additionally
suggests that this economic attribute can be ‘territorial in nature’. Considering all of the above
evidences the researcher found it significant to bring in the economic perspectives which link
China, Myanmar and Bangladesh in order to analyze the Chinese role in ‘Rohingya crisis’,
specially China’s deep economic involvement in Rakhine state that might reshape it’s political
role. Again, Toncea (2006) and Okur believe that geopolitics always applies political influence
in order to increase the dominance over territories and to create diplomacy. Other findings
indicate that the economic weapons are used to fight the political context which is increasing in
nature due to globalization (Luttwak, 1990 cited at. Mattlin and Wigell, 2016)

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Marphy, Bassin, Newman, Reuber and Agnew (2004) describes vision of a political institution
that includes global governance is always complex in nature because of it’s basic relationship
between politics and geography in regard to the roles they carry out in international relations
(Higgot, Payne, Soyaze and Ossenbruege, 2000 el at Murphy, Bassin, Newman Reuber and
Agnew,2004) . Murphy (2004) confirms that politics represents geopolitics where as geopolitics
is viewed from different dimensions by the politicians and the geographers. However, going
though all of the above literary evidences it is very clear to the researcher that the political
interest of China is strongly linked to her geopolitical features in the current event and it includes
economic aspects too. Rech, Bos, Jenkings, Williams and Woodward (2014) used the term
‘militarization’ in explaining human geography where evidence suggests militarism is
prioritizing military power in order to solve a conflict that may arise due to multi-dimensional
factors such as differences among social, cultural, economic interests or political ideologies. Ibid
(2014) also described militarization as principle practice to gain a popular acceptance that is used
by the elite actors to solve any social or political problem (Fusty, 2008; Gilbert, Kuus, 2008 el at.
Rech, Bos, Jenkings and Williams, 2014). Tishin (1994) explains how interest of each country in
the world can coincide or contradict with those of others that again conveys the importance of
military aspects from the researcher’s perspective. Based on the above findings the researcher is
willing to instigate a relationship among the role of China in resolving the Rohingya conflict and
their military interests in Rakhine/Myanmar and in Bangladesh. So it will also help the
researcher to figure out the overall Chinese geopolitical movement in the region.

Ryseiw (2000) describes conventional wisdom as a regularity of a thought or an action or a

belief. Ibid (2000) also added, there is an intention among the actors or the philosophers to
confirm their beliefs or action on the basis of regularity that ensures further regularity of the
same intended behavior or belief and it also conveys conventional principles of wisdom where as
from the contradictory point of view Ryan, Hernandez-Maskivker and Velverde (2018) proposes
for re-examining any conventional wisdom through the nature of waiting or building
anticipation. Ibid (2018) also suggests challenging established propositions is like a positive
waiting that increases perceived value of a concept along with additional information. Even

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though these authors added role of exploration as well as further research to challenge
conventional wisdom but they didn’t use the exact word ‘alternative wisdom’ (Ibid, 2018).

According to Joy (2018) as the crisis immediately began and many refugees fled from Rakhine
to Bangladesh due to the violence - the situation was escalated as a result of the military
clearance operation by the Myanmar Military against the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army,
China didn’t condemn at Burmese military like their other international partners. Based on the
opinion of Ibid (2018) it was also found that China, being the largest trading partner of Myanmar
initially denied to mediate on the issues that influenced the contents of UN Security Council
resolution. Ibid (2018) further claimed evidences which suggest China played a crucial role in
making few important changes of the negotiation context such as removal of the fact-finding
mission and delaying the process of sending UN advisors to Burma. Finally Ibid (218) described
China as a major facilitator of Myanmar’s peace process with the ethnic groups who always gave
a strong support towards the military affairs in Rakhine and according to these authors they did
so as part of their deeply inherent economic interests. This notion is a very commonly accepted
ground among many International Relation theorists. Even though the contradictory views
indicate that China was largely successful to establish a negotiation channel between Naypyitaw
and Dhaka but most of the researchers defined this revolutionary phase from Beijing’s
perspective to solve the Rohingya conflict – as based on selfish motives (Ramachandran, 2017).
Claims which are made by Savic (2017) support these findings, who believe offers from Beijing
as a mediator was simply a strategic move to promote their belt and road initiatives and China
was well exploiting both Myanmar and Bangladesh to rip all the diplomatic as well as economic
benefits. Joy (2018) directly claimed that Chinese response to Rohingya conflict is strongly
favorable for the government of Myanmar. Although, Ibid (2018) also generates the idea that
China’s confirmation recognizes Myanmar government’s move against organized terrorism by
the ethnic armed groups. On the basis of same logic, he further reassured on the military
cooperation between the two states (Joy, 2018). Based on all of the above claims one could
undoubtedly make the following remark that the conventional wisdom of most of the
international theorists treated China’s role as a mediator largely favorable on behalf of the
Myanmar Government and predicted a negative outcome. Among the other evidences, Yhome

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(2018) mentioned that China may have significant political and economic influences in
Bangladesh and Myanmar but it clearly exclude any other qualities that a mediator must possess
in re-settling the Rohingyas. Ibid (2018) notably suggests that many Bangladeshis also believe
that China is showing an unfair and biased judgment towards Myanmar, and Beijing's interests in
Rakhine will be fuelling to fail them as a mediator (Yhome, 2018)

The researcher, however, wants to re-examine the same issue – “Chinese link with the Myanmar
military administration” slightly from a different perspective in his current study. Even though
the researcher has no doubt that China is currently a strong partner of Myanmar but one must
reconsider their role as a mediator in the long run by anticipating and adding other possibilities.
Strategic game theory and hegemonic stability theory suggests that China will find itself in a
challenging position if it fails to prevail as a mediator on the current issue. It might seriously
affect them, specially the Chinese investors in the long run, where, the researcher thought about
two instances. In the first instance, the author treated the ethnic minority groups as allies
challenging the intervening role of China and it’s affairs with the Myanmar military (Alt, Calvert
and Hume, 1998). Based on the same notion, the researcher added a further dimension that the
current domestic uncertainties in Myanmar may turn out as seriously damaging for the overall
relationship between Myanmar and China. For example, some journalists believe while the 3
step plan proposed by China to solve the problem addresses natures of the conflict but it fails to
target the root causes such as flawed citizenship laws and systemic discrimination that pervade
Myanmar (Zalewski, 2017) but one can’t possibly overlook the comments which are made by the
Chinese president in his UN speech which clearly show that China advocates the establishment
of a new type of international relations based on mutual respect, fairness, justice and win–win
cooperation, and the building of a community of shared future for mankind (Song, 2018).

So the researcher further elaborates his alternative view against the conventional thoughts of
“China’s failure as a mediator”. In doing so, one might add the second instance, where, China as
a rising global superpower not only assumes the responsibilities to protect it’s own economic,
political and military interest but also has a significant role to play on how it relates itself to the

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other small states in South-East Asian region. Due to the increasing awareness of global politics,
building reputation is mandatory for them. Precisely, according to the researcher, it is heavily
important for China to emphasize on ‘building a positive image’ of regional public good, interest
gain, socialization, manipulation of incentives where exceptionalism in it’s state role can be
treated as ways to gain regional level of acceptance with necessity and weakness based on
expectations and demands from the other small states (Alt, Calvert and Humes, 1998).

Considering of both of these above instances, the researcher firmly believes that China as a
hegemony might choose to either accept or to challenge it’s current allies in Rohingya issues,
given the ally either obeys or reject her decision. Given the allies obeys it’s decision and the
current situation doesn’t change, which is - no one is blaming China for it’s current defensive
role against Myanmar on the issue, China might gain a positive payoff but it will not be
sustainable. Or, things may be happening in a different direction , where, allies might decide to
challenge the current decision making process of China in regard to Rohingya issues So China
will be left with two options – It can either punish the ally by not doing anything about the
Myanmar citizenship law on Rohingyas and keep supporting the current Myanmar military
position or may decide to negotiate with the challenges imposed by the allies, that is to deal with
the current action of Myanmar military regime in real terms and to force them in reconsidering
the citizenship law on Rohingya civilians.

Finally, the notion that is conceived from the above theory, it tells the researcher that if the
hegemony stays affirm with it’s own self-motivating decision by ignoring the humanitarian
appeal despite the dissatisfied allies against Myanmar military junta - there is a negative pay off
for both China and Myanmar in the longer-term (Ibid, 2018). Accordingly, the researcher firmly
believes that if China fails to arrive at a positive diplomatic outcome in resolving the ‘Rohingya’
issues which may leave either Myanmar or Bangladesh dissatisfied in the long run, it will
definitely affect their political dominance in South-East Asia and so, the researcher additionally
confirms – if Myanmar fails to resolve their domestic political uncertainties, it will bring a huge
negative impact upon the relationship between Naypyitaw military regime and the Chinese

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administration, which in turn will re-enforce their role as a mediator specially, given the case that
as a major influential leader - China has always a wider scope to push Myanmar for reviewing
the citizenship law of Rohingya civilians and stopping the military interventions against them.
The researcher finally believes that a transition in China’s role may also arise from the given
political uncertainties which currently exist within Myanmar politics and it will definitely make
China to rethink about how it should approach towards the Rohingya refugee repatriation issue.

McCarthy, Metcalfe-Hough and Willitis-king (2016) propose that state is always the key or
principle actor to drive the humanitarian aspects in a global conflict. Ibid (2016) also suggests
that for protecting the benefits of common people this kind of role is played by the states even
though that role may vary depending upon the nature and types of a crisis. The same authors also
found an unambiguous relationship between a state’s foreign policy and the humanitarian role it
plays during the time of a conflict. Khakee (2018) on the other hand believes humanitarian role
might be resulted as a failure of action to resolve a crisis situation because of the unequal
structure and nature of the international system with repeated occurrences. Ibid (2018) also
identifies both internationals as well as local levels might be simultaneously involved in a
humanitarian action where as liberals find humanitarian process as more successful feature
compared to other political wings. However, after going through these series of evidences the
researcher decided to add the following issue: whether China is playing a humanitarian role at
the moment in resolving the ‘Rohingya crisis’ and if that includes any positive aspects for the
situation under consideration because if not, China is bound to reconsider their humanitarian
ground in order to work out for a sustainable solution.

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4.1 Research Framework:

Chinese Geo-political interest Chinese Geopolitical interest in

in political, economic and political, economic and
military terms in Myanmar military terms in Bangladesh

Determining priorities as a mediator to solve

the Rohingya crisis – Humanitarian ground or
national interest

Long run behavior of

China/Myanmar/Bangladesh
and effect on the international
relations

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5.0 Methodology:

5.1 Descriptive study: Describing systematically and accurately the facts and the characteristics
of a given population or an area of interest, individual group or situations in order to find a new
meaning, also describe or observe the document aspects, answer questions based on ongoing
events (Dulock, 1993)

5.2 Exploratory design: Any research may include exploratory research that helps in developing
hypothesis, exploring the existing literature, provides suitability of the research instruments to
discover a new relationship (Zukauskas, Vveinhardt & Kaiteine, 2018)

5.3 Data type: Both quantitative as well as qualitative

5.4 Data source: Primary documents -  A list of at least five original documents such
--Foreign Policy statements made by the President/Prime Minister/Foreign Minister/Defense
Minister/Permanent Representative to the United Nations or any official policy paper on
Rohingya Issue 

5.5 Secondary documents:  A list of at least 15 journal articles/book chapters/study

reports/newspaper commentaries etc. that clearly address the research/term paper topic.

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6.0 Data Findings:

A. Primary documents

A1. Qualitative findings:

Looking at the primary document which was collected from the Chinese Foreign ministry the
researcher found the following political interests as well as initiatives – which are taken by China
in order to resolve the ‘Rohingya crisis’: China proposed a three step plan as a mediator to sort
out the relationship between Myanmar and Bangladesh – (I) Ceasefire to restore peace for
homeless refugees, (II) Building stronger communication channel between the two countries in
order to build a friendly relationship (III) Achieving a sustainable solution to the problem on the
basis of mutual agreement and finally revealing the root causes of the problem so that it can
increase the development and economic investment in Rakhine ((Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2017). So it clearly contradicts to those earlier suggested that China is not ready to track the root
causes of the problem.

Although to find the answer to the question ‘Will it be easy for China to succeed as a mediator?’

The researcher explored some further qualitative primary documents:

In an interview with DW (Deutsche Welle) it seems pretty clear that the Rohingya refugees are
adamant to abandon their homeland on a permanent basis due to the fear factors of a possible
extermination where the interviewee Foreign Minister AK Abdul Momen clearly mentioned
about relocating these refugees in Bhasan Char. (DW, 2019). This ensures the researcher that the
mediation task won’t be easy for China.

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Next, the researcher tried to locate all the relevant information on Chinese political, economic
and military interests which link them to both Bangladesh and Myanmar in order clarify the
Chinese preferences:

Statements which are made by the foreign ministry of People’s Republic of China indicate the
following:

“Wang Yi expressed that China was pleased to see the progress made in the process of peaceful
reconciliation in Myanmar. China hopes that all parties concerned in Myanmar should conduct
friendly consultation while upholding the "Panglong Spirit", and finally reach consensus
featuring ethnic unity and high degree of autonomy within the framework of the Constitution of
the Republic of the Union of Myanmar as well as achieve long-lasting peace and stability at an
early date. China regards Myanmar as an important partner in the joint construction of the "Belt
and Road" with distinct complementary advantages. In order to further consolidate China-
Myanmar comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and deepen practical cooperation,
China is willing to, according to the development plan and actual needs of Myanmar, discuss on
building a Y-shaped China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, thus establishing a wide triangle
cooperation pattern and pushing forward the balanced development across Myanmar” (Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of People’s republic of China, 2017, p.1). Further, evidences collected from
an interview with the former French ambassador in Myanmar shows how deeply China is
connected to Myanmar in terms of their economic interests (Lacombe, 2017). Documents from
Financial Time in an online video also support these above evidences (Financial Time, 2013).

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But is China solely interested in Myanmar? Because the joint statement of Chinese and
Bangladeshi ambassadors published information that shows not only a China-Bangladesh
bilateral relations based on peaceful Coexistence, respecting and supporting each other in
choosing the paths of development strongly exist in the current Chinese book but also China
identifies Bangladesh as one of their crucial partners of the Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI). The
statement also provides further evidences on Bangladesh and China’s joint affiliation with BCIM
economic corridor where Myanmar and India are also involved, numerous number of
infrastructural projects that tied up the Chinese investors, huge amount of Chinese investment in
both financial and non-financial sectors and most importantly a large amount of Chinese debt
flowing into the power and energy sector of Bangladesh. This was in fact a significant document
to prove that China has a huge economic and political interest in Bangladesh. (Joint Statement of
the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 2019).

Additionally, document provided by the Chinese Embassy in Bangladesh clearly supports the
above data where H.E. Zhang Zuo – the Chinese ambassador repeatedly mentioned in his speech
about the 16 billion dollars of bilateral trade, the size and the amount of Chinese engineering
contracts in Bangladesh compared to the other countries in South-East Asia and the growing size
of the e-commerce and financial market linkages between the two nations. He also reminded
about Chinese ideologies on: peaceful Coexistence, to resolutely abandon the Cold War
mentality and power politics, to respect the social systems and development paths chosen
independently by every nation, and to respect each other's core interests and major concerns, and
to take the new road of dialogue without confrontation, partnership instead of alliances
(Chinese Embassy in Bangladesh, 2012)

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Finally the researcher tried get some collective evidences on Chain’s current foreign policy by
exploring one of the recent UN speeches given by the Chinese president because the researcher
thinks this new Chinese guideline might add a whole new dimension to it’s current relationship
with the Myanmar military regime in resolving the Rohingya crisis:

“We should be committed to multilateralism and reject unilateralism. We should adopt a new
vision of seeking win-win outcomes for all, and reject the outdated mindset that one's gain means
the other's loss or that the winner shall take all. Consultation is an important form of democracy,
and it should also become an important means of exercising contemporary international
governance. We should resolve disputes and differences through dialogue and consultation” (UN
Speech, 2015)

Additional primary documents were collected which may help in identifying the negative aspects
for China in regard to Myanmar’s foreign policy on the problem considering the positive
ideology of the Chinese president:

In an interview with BBC (British Broadcasting Channel) Myanmar leader Aung San Suu Kyi
had shown a strong denial of any type of ethnic cleansing (Kyi, 2017) and same was found from
the speech of the Myanmar representative at UN speech which indicates Myanmar was not
happy about the UN fact finding mission at all, who rather strongly opposed the idea of setting
up an ICC (International Criminal Court) panel for the investigation against a possible violation
of Humanitarian law (Swe, 2019). Even though the author found strong evidences, contrary to
the above notions from Myanmar’s major political personalities – Findings from an open letter of
a Rohingya refugee that was written by addressing the Aljazeera channel, Human Right council
(UN) report and additionally, a speech from UN secretary general simultaneously suggest that a
serious problem of violation of human right and ethnic cleansing are currently going on in
Myanmar - (Rohingya blogger, 2019; Human Right Council, 2018 & & Secretary-General, UN,
2017). Primary data collected from Turkish State International News Channel strongly supports

19
the above evidences and strong intention by UN to take action against Myanmar military for
violating human rights (TRT world, 2017).

Next, the researcher was willing to instigate a possibility of whether China will be under any
kind of circumstantial pressure from the international community due to the predicted failure in
it’s mediation role and will that be a challenging issue from Chinese diplomatic perspective?

As a part of that investigation, it was revealed that China faces a tremendous pressure from US
and it’s Western allies in regard to their present views on Rohingya crisis and dealings with
Myanmar. So there is a strong reason to believe that the above circumstance may ultimately
produce a negative impact on their political standing in South-East Asia. First of all, China was
severely criticized for it’s current political attitude towards US. (Pence, 2018, p.1).

Besides, based on further evidences, US clearly want a rethink of Myanmar policy who already
imposed sanction on the Myanmar authority to push for justice against human genocide. (USIP,
2018). Data from Dhaka Tribune (2019) also suggest the same. The researcher also conducted
additional investigations to find out more about US views on China’s urgency to be successful in
the mediation process. The researcher identified a clear divide of opinions between US and
Chinese lawmakers because US claimed the present situation as ‘a clear case of ethnic cleansing’
(Voice of America News, 2017) where as Chinese foreign minister sought a sound environment
and to encourage both Bangladesh and Myanmar to resolve the crisis within a mutual framework
of understanding who labeled Myanmar’s current military operation in Rakhine as a positive
contribution towards continuous achievement of peace, development and political stability
(CGTN, 2017). In addition to the above, primary documents collected from AP Archive (2018)
provides strong evidence that China is clearly not concerned about the increasing strength of
Myanmar military or their barbarian acts against the minor population in Rakhine. Perspectives
of European Union countries also look quite similar to those of US which clearly contradict the
Chinese defensiveness against the Myanmar military regime (Aljazeera, 2019).

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Finally, from the series of above documents the researcher had some clear indications about the
ongoing Chinese manipulation on the issue and a strong dissatisfaction about it from the US and
Western allies - as expert panels from USIP evidently suggested that Beijing should be more
transparent in building it’s negotiation strategy on Myanmar in regard to various ethnic groups,
who could benefit neither from a hot war nor from a complete peace process (Ibid, 2018).
Nonetheless, these evidences nowhere suggest that China will fail in it’s mediation rather they
find China’s current position as dubious and conflicting due to promoting the Chinese national
interest (Ibid, 2018). At the same time these sources also evaluated a limited US perspective on
the Myanmar peace context which according to these experts was never due to the explicit
opposition from China against a US engagement. Ibid (2018) makes a slight bit of indication that
though China may not gain from a complete peace process and recently strengthened it’s ties
with Myanmar military yet the ongoing domestic political factors will hinder Sino-Myanmar
relationship at some point which supports the alternative prediction of the researcher.

Even though the panels predicted that this sort of breakdown in Sino-Myanmar relationship
could happen because Myanmar always tried to avoid the dominance of any single country over
it’s internal issues but China on the other hand remains worried about the borderland crisis and
it’s investment ties with Myanmar (Ibid, 2018). As a result, according to these experts, the
dissimilarities which are existing between the two side’s political notions, sooner or later could
face a revolutionary transition towards a negative direction (Ibid, 2018).

However, considering the fact that China’s present role is based upon only it’s own national
interest, the panel recommended that to be successful in their negotiation China must not
overlook the welfare concerns of the local Rakhine community (Ibid, 2018).

21
A2. Quantitative findings: No ‘primary quantitative’ evidence on the above issues could be
collected by the researcher due to the shorter span of time.

22
B. Secondary documents:

B1. Qualitative findings:

B1 (a) Chinese economic interest in Myanmar:

Finding from Dhaka Tribune (2018) clearly suggests that China heavily invested in Rakhine
state. Ibid (2018) mentioned about Kaukphyyu sea port in the West of Rakhine which is owned
by the Chinese and where the worst fighting between Rakhine military and the Rohingya rebels
were taking place. The same source (2018) also ensured about the existence of a major gas and
oil pipeline in which China was primarily interested - called ‘Thelong Myanmar-China gas and
oil pipeline project’ (Ibid, 2018). According to this source, this pipeline extends up to 771 km.
from the coastal line of Rakhine to Yunnan province in South-western China that helps in
supplying gas and oil from Bay of Bengal to China (Ibid, 2018). Ibid (2018) additionally
mentioned that almost $2.45 US billion dollar was invested in this particular project where China
holds a 51% of the ownership stake through the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation -
involving 22 million tons of oil and 12 million cubic meter of natural gas.

Finally, the author revealed a major Chinese economic significance in Rakhine as the same
sources added - the latest strategic addition in Kyaukphyu port will be a part of China’s ‘Belt and
Road initiative; that will provide an overland route for cargo shipment through all the major
cities in South East Asia (Ibid, 2018). Kudo (2008) on the other hand, believes that China grew
very rapidly as a major exporter from a top importer in their recent trading with Myanmar. Even
though the study identified a very weak impact from Myanmar’s perspective on Chinese
economic development yet the author openly agreed with the fact that China, indeed, became the
largest trade supplier of Myanmar over the last decade (Ibid, 2008). The same author also argued
that border trade has always been a very important component of their bilateral trade relationship
(Ibid, 2008).

23
Another finding from Joy (2018) indicates that all the large scale investments produced
somewhat a negative reaction among the local Rakhine community due to an increased social
side-effects (Prostitution and violence against women). The author also confirmed about negative
feelings of the local Rakhine Muslim community towards the investors that ultimately resulted in
less representation from them in the state political institutions and increased an external
influences from the Chinese business counterparts (ibid, 2018). Ibid (2018) also discovered the
possibility that these investors willingly wanted to remove all possible objections from the local
community unlike the Myanmar government.

Considering all of the above findings, the researcher has firm reasons to believe that China has
potential economic interest in state of Rakhine – that has a greater role to play for its
involvement with Myanmar in protecting it’s investment by delivering their unconditional
supports to the Myanmar military.

B1 (b) Chinese political interest in Myanmar:

From the findings of Yhome (2018) it seems China’s political interests in Myanmar arises from
the background of the ethnic conflicts in Myanmar - which is strongly linked to its borderland
security. The finding also confirmed that “border stability” is very crucial for China as the
process includes border inhabitants with multi-cultural identities leading to conflict of ethnic
races near the Chinese border (Ibid, 2018). Ibid (2018) also suggest that China is exploiting
Myanmar on this issue in order to gain a trustworthy relationship with the Myanmar government
so it can, on one hand refrain Myanmar from getting closer to US allies, on the other hand -
create a smooth pathways for it’s investment projects. Additionally, it was also found by the
researcher that Beijing in fact has taken the role of a chief negotiator to facilitate dialogues
between the Myanmar government and the armed ethnic groups in order to maximize their
border stability (Ibid, 2018). Findings from Joy (2018) and Patrick (2012) confirms - China is
not only acting as a mediator between the Myanmar military and the armed ethnic groups but
also represented it’s strong political interest on behalf of few ethnic rebel groups like ‘WA’ army

24
because they include a vast majority from Chinese background - leading to the birth of WA self-
administered division in Shan state, that was, in fact originated from the broken wings of
Myanmar communist party.

Screening through the above documents, one could clearly arrive at this conclusion that China
serves a greater political influence in Myanmar which they could always use to their advantage,
specially, while it comes to playing role as a negotiator in resolving a conflict between the ethnic
minorities and the central government of Myanmar but the only issue that concerns the
researcher in the current study is whether this role will favor or disfavor the Rohingya Muslim
refugees.

B1 (c) Chinese Military interest in Myanmar:

Based on the opinion of Bayman and Cliff (1999) Myanmar though was a mere purchaser of
arms from China but at the recent times it turned into one of China’s largest military consumer.
The same findings also indicate that the major military aspects which tied up these two countries
are as follows:

(I) To obstacle the defense planning of India

(ii) To facilitate the access to Myanmar naval bases so that it can increase Chinese influences
over Indian Ocean,

(iii) To look after the Chinese commercial interest in South-China Sea (Ibid, 1999).

25
The same source also claimed that despite the counter strategies which were taken by the Indian
defense leadership, China succeeded in mending several important military installments
including a radar station in Coco Island adjoining Andaman in strengthening Myanmar’s naval
base at the Indian Ocean that also provides a great technical assistance to Myanmar navy (Ibid,
1999) – perhaps faced no political objection due to the security factors as a primary reason
against any possible terrorist campaign as it also involves the Indian trade relationship with
Myanmar. From another finding of Perwita (2018) the researcher identified significant evidences
on greater Chinese military prospect that lies Myanmar. Ibid (2018) suggests that the Chinese
defense policy is largely interested in protecting the Sino-Myanmar co-operation to hold a strong
position in the Indian ocean, to increase it’s influence over South-China sea, to stabilize the
borderland between China and Myanmar and also to stop all illegal cross-border activities
through a joint security and military training programs which they define as a total commitment
against all kind of terrorism by the ethnic armed groups.

After going through these evidences the researcher thinks, there is a strong reason to believe that
China will continue it’s military ties with Myanmar irrespective of the Rohingya issues and
international condemnation at Myanmar military’s because of their recent action in Rakhine.

26
B1 (d) Chinese political, economic and military interest in Bangladesh:

On the contrary, the researcher gathered additional data that shows China is not wholly interested
in Myanmar or only prioritizes their position against a possible terrorist attack by the armed
ethnic groups at the borderland.

In supporting the reflections from the primary documents like ‘The joint statement issued by the
Chinese-Bangladesh joint ambassadors’, the researcher found many other similar secondary,
qualitative evidences which show China have an equal political, economic and military interest
in Bangladesh – that is no less significant than Myanmar. Bhattacharjee (2018) clearly suggests
China has not only a military role to play on behalf of Bangladesh so it can provide the Chinese a
required support at the time of it’s border dispute with India by using the strategic locations like
Siliguri corridor but they also possess a huge economic interest in the vast consumer market of
160 million Bangladeshis. Besides the above facts, the author also mentioned about the
consistency of Chinese policies for joint development initiatives with Bangladesh and China’s
gaining through its supreme political advantage – in the most convincing manner that influenced
Dhaka to join the Belt and road initiative as China simply remained an observer at the South-
Asian Association of Regional Co-operation (SAARC) summits (Ibid, 2018).

These data also suggest on the potential Chinese political interest in Bangladesh since the time of
it’s independence (Ibid, 2018).

27
Holding the ‘Economic, Political and Military’ interests as constant factors which seem rather
equivalent to the researcher from Chinese geo-political perspective, one must be curious to
reveal the true factors which is motivating the Chinese silence about the Rohingya crisis even
though it might bring a strong negative impact on Bangladesh as evidences justified the view
from most of the conventional theorists about the Chinese preference when the researcher
discovered that China publically praised the Myanmar government's crackdowns in Rakhine
(Ramchandran, 2017).

Ibid (2017) suggests that the Chinese interest in Rakhine has not only been for it’s extensive
extraction of natural resources in the area but also regards the coastline that gives Beijing an
access to Bay of Bengal and Indian ocean to use the naval route for its trade purpose which are
basically a part of their BRI (Belt and Road initiative) plan. Rakhine is also a major source of gas
reserves and oil resources which China is transporting to use for its own economic development
(Ibid, 2017). So the researcher firmly believes that it is not the extent of the Chinese interests
which they posses either in Bangladesh or Myanmar - can neutrally justify their current position
in Rakhine, rather one should consider a more holistic approach to analyze the current Chinese
policy. According to the researcher, China is more focused in establishing a regional hegemony
that is seeking a far greater stability in whole Asia in terms of their economic, political or
military dominance - it equally involves almost all South-East Asian and ASEAN countries with
whom China would always want to avoid a direct military clash. The researcher further believes
that any possible clash between China and the Myanmar military may disrupt the Chinese BRI
plan and China never wants that. However, the researcher purely intents to prove in his current
study that this Chinese defensiveness which they presently pursue to ensure a sound Sino-
Myanmar relationship to might also cause a true downfall of the relationship in the near future
between these two.

28
B2. Quantitative findings:

B2 (I) China’s economic interest in Myanmar:

The lion-share of the China’s investments in Myanmar are in the power sector (57%), while oil,
gas and other mining make up 18% of Chinese investment. A typical feature of Chinese
companies investing in Myanmar is that they are usually state-owned (Lwin, 2019).

6 major projects to monitor by the Chinese in Myanmar in 2019

Table I
(Etimati
ons In
US
dollars
–
billions
for
    2019)

Kayupkhyu Deep Sea

1 Port 1.3

Muse-Mandalay Railway
2 Project 9

New Yangoon
3 Development Project 1.5

4 3 border economic zones 5.8

(Muse and Chin Shwe
Haw in Shan State, and
Kan Pite Tee in Kachin

29
 State)

Myitsone Hydro-power
5 project 3.6

Kayupkhyu-Kunming
6 railway project 20

   Total 41.2

Chart 1

1.3

Kayupkhyu Deep Sea Port

Muse-Mandalay Railway Project
New Yangoon Development Project
3 border economic zones (Muse
20 and Chin Shwe Haw in Shan State,
1.5 and Kan Pite Tee in Kachin State)
Myitsone Hydro-power project
Kayupkhyu-Kunming railway
project

5.8

3.6

(Lwin, 2019)

30
 Map I

(Lwin, 2019)

31
B2 (II) Chinese Economic Investment in Bangladesh:

Table II
Chinese Investment In (Estimated in US dollars -
Bangladesh Billions)
   
FDI 3.6
Power and Infrastructure related 21.6
BRI related 38
Total 63.2

(Source: Prothom Alo, 2019)

Chart II

(Estimated in US dollars - Billions)

60
40
20
0
I
FD ed ed (Estimated in US tdollars
al -
lat le at Billions) To
re I r
re BR
uctu
str
nfa
I
d
r an
we
Po

(Source: Prothom Alo, 2019)

32
B2 (III) Chinese military interest in Myanmar:

Exchange of high-level visits between Tatmadaw and PLA (People Liberation Army) had
significant aspects on military relations through joint training programs where China involved
Myanmar officers at the PLA's Staff College and Defense College. China co-operated Burmese
army by deploying troops along the border and conducted military exercises in a full scale. China
conducted its joint naval exercise with Myanmar since 2017.

Table III

Activities Chinese initiative Myanmar Chinese activity Myanmar’s

response participation

Joint Drills 3 warships 2 frigates Biggest Phase Biggest purchase

(Recent one) of Arms supply

(2014-2016)

$US 440
million dollar

Guided missile
destroyer

Replenishment ships China Provides Myanmar security

training force and police
organizations jointly
participate in defense
training for:

33
 Border policing, drug
trafficking control and
other monitoring other
illegal cross-border
activities

Chinese Borderland Stability Controlling the Common Training Myanmar

Interest armed ethnic Interest police and security
groups force; Anti-terrorism
movement

Arms supply China sold arms Myanmar Recent Export Recent Import
amounted up to $ US turned into a by China
By Myanmar:
4 Billion major customer
from a minor
arms purchaser
Air craft: 120

Naval Vessels: 21

Missiles: 1029

Artillery: 125

Armed Vehicles: 696

34
 (From 1989- China sold: Myanmar sold Common Strengthening
now) nothing to Interest Myanmar Military
Warships
China yet.

Small arms

Anti-craft guns Overall Chinese To protect border

Interest Investment

Combat aircraft China’s effort to

bolster its sphere of
influence in the Indian
Ocean

Main battle tanks

Personal armed
carriers

Chinese Strengthening To protect its

Interest Myanmar Military civilians from
ethnic terror
groups

(Source: Perwita, 2018)

B2 (IV) Chinese military interest in Bangladesh:

35
China was the biggest supplier of arms to Bangladesh from 2009 to 2013, with the country
accounting for 82% of the total arms imported by Bangladesh during the period. China is helping
Bangladesh to strengthen its national defense mechanism in accordance with Bangladesh’s
defense strategy. According to IHS Jane’s, Bangladesh was the second biggest importer of
Chinese arms, spending over $350 million in 2012 (Zaman, 2014)

SIPRI data shows Bangladesh procured anti-ship missiles, tanks, fighter aircrafts and other arms
from China between 2008 and 2012 (Dhaka Tribune, 2014; Shao; 2019)

Chart III

(Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2018)

B2 (V) Chinese humanitarian role:

36
Researcher has found very limited significant evidences on ongoing Chinese humanitarian
ground on the Rohingya issues that suggest China needs to play a much broader role in this
aspect. China pledged aid for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh with projects on building and
financing House for displaced Rohingyas in Rakhine (Daily Star, 2019). It was further revealed
that a Chinese govt. delegation Offered $6000 cash to each Rohingya if they return to Rakhine
state while meeting them (Ibid, 2019). Additionally, China donated 150 tons of aid for
Rohingyas (Gao, 2017). Based on the same data, On September 28, China delivered 2,000 relief
tents and 3,000 blankets, to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh (Gao, 2017). According to the
latest source of information, China will provide 2,500 tons of rice for Rohingyas living in
Bangladesh after being forcibly displaced from Myanmar (Times of India, 2019)

B2 (VI) Chinese political interest in Bangladesh and Myanmar: Not much quantitative
data were found in regard to this issue due to the narrative style of the aspect.

37
7.0 Data Analysis and Interpretation:

7.1 Quantitative analysis:

Table 7.1 A. Economic interest - A Comparative picture of the major Chinese

priorities

1 Current Chinese investment in major projects that concerns Rakhine 41.2

2 Chinese investment in Bangladesh to boost their Belt and Road initiative 63.2

Chart IV

41.2

63.2

(Source: DW, 2019 & Lwin, 2019)

38
As the above data clearly suggests (from Table 7.1.A and Chart IV) that China possesses a
greater investment interest based on the recent progression of it’s trade relationship with
Bangladesh compared to that with Myanmar. So the researcher has no reason to believe that the
economic interest might influence as a single variable in the current research framework - to
manipulate the outcome in the long run: “Chinese role in resolving the Rohingya crisis”.

Additionally,

I. Myanmar imports from China was US$6.22 Billion during 2018, according to the
United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade where as

II. Bangladesh Imports from China was US$10.35 Billion during 2015, according to the
United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade.

Chart V

(In Billions)
12

10 10.35

8
(In Billions)
6 6.22

Source: (COMTRADE, 2019)

39
This above data in Chart V strongly supports the earlier claim of the researcher that Bangladesh
is currently a more important trade partner with China who recently imported more than
Myanmar, therefore, plays a more significant value in terms of the Chinese foreign trade balance.

Table 7.1 B. Military Interest - A comparative picture:

Arms export and import from 2014 to 2016

1 Bangladesh export of arms and weaponries from China 890

2 Myanmar export of arms and weaponries from China 440

Chart VI: China’s Arms and weaponry investment in both countries – Bangladesh vs.
Myanmar
12

10

0
0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Source: (Dhaka Tribune, 2014; Shao, 2019 & Perwita, 2018)

Table 7.1.B and Chart VI clearly suggest that despite the huge arms supply of China to Myanmar
(especially at the crunching time 2014-2016 of the recent Rohingya Crisis), Based on the above

40
data China posses an equal military interest in Bangladesh. So according to the researcher, if
anything that is encouraging China to keep it’s stronger ties with Myanmar military that is the
borderland instability as it might put the Chinese investors in a damaging position in the long run
– and it might, in fact adversely affect the Sino-Myanmar relationship.

7.2 Qualitative analysis:

A. From ‘Table I’ and ‘Chart I” - the data simultaneously indicate that China has a potential
interest in Rakhine. So, it is not very difficult to figure out why the Chinese authorities are so
desperate to stabilize the region with military interventions from Myanmar despite the
contradictory recommendations from United States Institute of Peace – study panels.
Additionally, screening through the Interview script from France24 with the ex-French
ambassador in Myanmar it is very clearly understood why China is vaporized in between the
pressure that is created by the international community and the worried Chinese investors in
Rakhine (France24, 2017)

B. Map I is a solid evidence of huge existing Chinese potentials in Myanmar.

C. On the other hand, Table II and Chart II clearly represent the fact that China is strongly
interested in protecting their trade interest with Bangladesh; therefore, it clearly denounces the

41
conventional view from numerous number of theorists that China is only set to protect their
interest with Myanmar as a major preference.

These above findings can be strongly supported with the fact that during the last visit of
Bangladeshi prime-minister to China both countries agreed on a power-sector deal of $1.7 billion
loans (DW, 2019). China also involved Bangladesh in an economic commitment of Bangladesh-
China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM EC) project that tied up nearly three billion
consumers of all these countries (Bhattacharjee, 2018).

D. Table III further, represents the Chinese interest in building their dominance over South-
China Sea which doesn’t completely justify the view that China is only interested in addressing
the ‘Islamic militancy factors’ – a problem that is arising due to the armed ethnic wings’ in
Myanmar. Even though the conventional wisdom conveys their mass awareness against possible
terrorist movement along the border.

E. On the contrary, Chart III strongly suggests that Bangladesh largely depends on China for
their defense capability just as Myanmar or even more. It is good news from Chinese
perspective. On the other hand, from Bangladeshi perspective, Bangladesh can possibly look for
alternative military suppliers such as India, Australia or Japan to denounce a single Chinese
market of military goods. Although the BRI factor, here, can be considered as a crucial variable.
At the same time, it is fair to say that both countries represent an equal interest against all kind of
terrorist movement – a motive that draws these nations together.

42
F. Going through the primary document on Zuo – the Chinese ambassador’s statement during his
visit in Bangladesh, it is very much evident that China views Bangladesh as equally important as
Myanmar to build it’s common market in South-East Asia from economic perspective as he
further proposed to form a Free-trade area with Bangladesh excluding all kind of tariffs and other
trade barriers. This again narrows down the crucial finding about a strong Chinese willingness to
signify the future economic ties with Bangladesh.

G. The above document also describes information that provides a similarity of the nature of
Chinese investment which was made in Rakhine state – purely infrastructural such as Chinese
contribution for building highways, airports, sea ports, and bridges –Padma Bridge, for instance.

After analyzing all these documents there is a strong reason to believe that Chinese motivation is
well known and quite familiar – an attempt to build a strong economic region in South Asia that
parallelly involves both Myanmar and Bangladesh. In the same document the Chinese
ambassador repeatedly emphasized on a positive adjoined military role from Bangladesh and
China about the friendly exchanges of military goods like tanks, medical personals as well young
military officials (Chinese Embassy in Bangladesh, 2018). It also strongly reminds the researcher
about the Chinese political motive to prevent it’s South-east Asian allies from getting closer to
the West. However, the analysis shows a strong ignorance from China to push the Myanmar
authorities in revisiting their citizenship law and it never mentions anything on re-enforcing their
leadership role against the Myanmar military intervention to destroy the Rohingya population or
to facilitate the ICC panel (International Criminal Court of Justice) to investigate the possible
war crimes against innocent civilians. On the other hand, it is further understood by the
researcher that as a mediator China is more willing in establishing a common ground between
Bangladesh and Myanmar by offering the Rohingyas a mutual repatriation opportunity without
isolating the fact that the current actions of Myanmar military evoked a negative psychological
fear among the Rohingya refugees but the repatriation process can’t be delayed considering the
pressure upon the host community in terms of socio-economic barriers such as job and labor
market, infrastructure, market price and combined effect of wage and price on poverty. There

43
have been plenty of other evidences collected by the researcher to support this above view
(UNDP, 2018) Again, findings of Rahman, Anusara, Chanthamith, Hossain and Al-amin, (2018)
can be positively collaborated with these views. The possible links between ARSA and Rohingya
Muslims – a major security threat, is another concern for the host community. The same view
can be further supported from the findings of Bashar (2017). Overall, China must succeed as a
mediator to continue their ties with both Myanmar and Bangladesh by figuring out all the ins and
out which may favor or disfavor either of these two countries and to do that the Chinese
authority must prioritize the humanitarian factors over their national interest. Finally, Is China
desperate to protect their regional dominance as a negotiator? To find the answer, following
evidence can be used as supporting document:

“If the West enters, there will be more problems. Hence, given this fear of Western countries,
China’s desire to control the Myanmar is greater than that of other countries” (Yhome, 2018)

H. Myanmar is busy remodeling the Northern Rakhine. All projects which are relevant to
Rakhine state are currently infrastructure based. Mostly the Buddhists inhabitants moved to up
to the areas where previously Muslim Rohingyas used to live. With Rohingyas are gone
Myanmar military administration began some major reconstruction works in the area instead of
rebuilding the destroyed Rohingya residences (Hindustan Times, 2018) The current satellite
images show a negative picture that might bring a tremendous political pressure upon the
Chinese negotiators and global investors - which is only a matter of time. A research conducted
by Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2019) suggests Myanmar government took no or
minimum preparation to rebuild a sustainable area for Rohingya repatriation as a result both
Bangladesh and Myanmar are going to be locked in a dead end despite all negotiation efforts
from China which strongly support the earlier views expressed by Savic (2018), Joy (2018) as
well as Yhome (2018). On the other hand, according to some journalists China because of its
larger economic interest and political aim to control the borderland stability failed so far to
identify the root cause of the problem that must be concerned with the citizenship law of the
Rohingya Muslims instead and China didn’t specify any guideline on moderating or revising the

44
law which was made by the Myanmar military regime earlier – an origin of the conflict
(Zalewski, 2017).

I. Data from AP Archives on US reactions as well as UN Security Council meeting in Myanmar

clearly reinforces the idea that if Chinese leadership fails on negotiating the Rohingya issue their
diplomatic position will be in far greater trouble (AP Archive, 2018 & U.S. Department of State,
2018). Even though US already imposed sanctions on Myanmar, anything which is
compromising or less than a situation that results in bringing down the Myanmar military leaders
before justice for committing the heinous crimes of killing innocent civilians might seem quite
dissatisfactory for the international observers (Dhaka Tribune, 2019)

J. Finally, It is also important to remember how China’s own human rights violations might play
a role in its deliberations. Specifically, China’s treatment of its own Muslim minority is
significant. In the Xinjiang province, China’s Uighur Muslim population has been subject to
long-term repression by Beijing and, as the Uighurs has grown militant in recent years, the police
response has been brutal. Something similar is going on in Hong Kong (Castets, 2003). These
problems can seriously affect them with a future failure to build proper reputation; therefore, one
may define it as a clear negative impact upon their position as a rising challenger for regional or
global hegemony.

K. Lantengine and Marc (2015) proposes that China has recently implemented a more multi-
dimensional political culture which breeds a strong willingness of maintain a positive approach
that might hugely disfavor the Myanmar’s current policies about its ongoing attitude towards the
domestic problem. These authors also argue that a same situation may continue as Myanmar
needs to reform their path to political peace and stability. Additionally, Li, Chenyang and Char
(2015) believe that Beijing’s interest in Myanmar national politics and economic development
has many prospects but in the near future this bi-lateral nature of the relationship may not
provide China a convenient return. These same authors further suggest that it is a huge challenge

45
for Myanmar to cop up with the Chinese evolution while one may consider their domestic
political transformation which has a definite long-run implication even though things may not
change very rapidly in the short to medium term. And finally, Han and Enze (2017) proposed
that the future relationship between these two nations will be under a close observation that
involves rather too many complexities on how they figure out, specially, Myanmar to adjust
themselves with the quick changing faces of the geo-political scenarios in South-East Asia.

L. it was further evident to the researcher that despite the repeated Chinese diplomatic
intervention, neither the invasion of the Myanmar military on ground has stopped nor Myanmar
military was being able in succeeding to regain their full control over the armed ethnic groups.
Besides, current advocates of democracy in Myanmar such as Suu Kyi failed to regain the trust
so far among the ethnic minorities. So a continuing Chinese defensiveness on the basis of only
addressing the problem of Islamic militancy won’t get them very far.

M., Bhaumik (2017) supports the view that despite the repeated Chinese attempts as a complete
ceasefire is not within sight – it is a strong indication that there could be a negative twist in the
tale with the added concern among the military personalities to recoup the current Myanmar
leader – a very similar finding to the one that was revealed earlier by the researcher - from Suu
Kyi’s interview with BBC (BBC, 2017). Precisely, by looking at these evidences the researcher
intuitively believes that there is strong possibility of a forceful transition in Sino-Myanmar
relationship due to the mere success of the democratic and peace process within Myanmar. The
researcher, however, agrees with the argument that in order to determine it’s success as a
mediator, China must focus in pressurizing Myanmar to review it’s citizenship law. China must
re-consider it’s humanitarian appeal instead of thriving for regional dominance that solely
reflects it’s the national geo-political interests – which has been very limited so far. As long as
the refugees remain psychologically devastated: a cash offer or assistance in housing supplies
may not seem to be a very fruitful idea.

N. Finally, the researcher strongly proposes that Chinese economic, political or military interest
in Myanmar are briefly equivalent to those with Bangladesh.

46
8.0 Answers to the Research Question:

There is a strong possibility that China might fail as a mediator in repatriating the Rohingyas
because of prioritizing their own national interest but achieving a sustainable solution to the
problem on their part is not impossible if they are willing to push Myanmar in revisiting the
citizenship law on Rohingya refugees and re-enforce their leadership roles to force Myanmar in
seizing all kind of military actions in Rakhine against the minor civilians. Given, Myanmar fails
in terms of their democratic reform; the outcome will certainly affect China’s diplomatic
standing, therefore, raises a future possibility of a China disfavoring Myanmar at the UN. That
may include: surrendering before the UN pressure “to set up an ICC panel against the Myanmar
military regime” - at the Security Council.

47
9.0 Lessons learned

A. China and Myanmar may turn out to be the best friends or the worst foes in the near future
due to Myanmar’s hardliner approach towards the Rohingya minorities and other internal
conflicts.

B. Given China fails to arrive at a positive diplomatic situation - It will create a huge political
pressure upon China from the perspective of the International communities like different state or
non-state actors: UN, US and other Western allies.

C. China might have to pay a heavy price by loosing it’s ties either with Myanmar or Bangladesh
in economic, political or military terms but at the same time continuing its support towards the
Myanmar military will not bring a positive result for Chinese policy makers specially in
reforming the democratic process of Myanmar even though some experts suggest that China is
neither interested in complete peace nor in ethnic conflicts.

D. China must prioritize the humanitarian ground over it’s national interest. This concluding
comment of the researcher can be strongly supported by drawing evidences from Song (2018)
who believes if China wants to be a in a proper leadership role of global refugee governance it
must prioritize principles like refugee protection, protect refugees inside their own land and
avoidance of coercion which are undoubtedly not happening in case of Rohingya refugees.

48
 Bibliography

 Alt, E, J; Calvert, L, R & Hums, D, B (2013); Reputation and Hegemonic Stability: A

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APPENDIX
Section
64
Video transcripts:

Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi exclusive interview - BBC News as follows:

65
66
67
68
69
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MFEEmdKbqBE

70
🇲🇲 Myanmar - Union Minister for Office of State Counsellor Addresses General Debate, 73rd
Session

United Nations

Kyaw Tint Swe, Union Minister for the Office of the State Counsellor of the Republic of the
Union of Myanmar, addresses the general debate of the 73rd Session of the General Assembly of
the UN (New York, 25 September - 01 October 2018). Myanmar’s Union Minister Kyaw Tint
Swe said international attention has been focused on the outflow of Rohingya refugees to
Bangladesh and “overlooked the broader picture of the various reasons, immediate as well as
longstanding, that brought about the displacement of these people.” The Rohingya are a stateless
Muslim minority in Myanmar. Addressing the UN General Assembly today (28 Sep), Tint Swe
said the attacks carried out by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) in August 2017
“opened a chapter of fear and instability and led to a large outflow of refugees to Bangladesh.”
He stressed that his Government has persisted in its efforts to address the need for stability,
reconciliation, and development in Rakhine State. The Union Minister said Myanmar signed
three bilateral agreements with Bangladesh for the repatriation of Rohingyas, made necessary
preparations in line with these bilateral agreements and have been ready to receive “verified
returnees” since January 2018. He said “we call on Bangladesh to fulfil its commitments in
accordance with the bilateral agreements, to allow, without delay the return of verified persons
under voluntary, safe and dignified conditions.” Tint Swe opened his statement by informing the
Assembly that Mynamar is conducting negotiations with various armed groups - the eight-ethnic
armed groups that have signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) but also with those
that have yet to sign, and he said “we are convinced that ethnic strife and armed conflicts in
Myanmar can only be ended through political means. Lasting peace will become a reality only
when the democratic federal union, to which our people aspired, is established.” The Minister
also said his government is concerned over the report published on 27 August 2018 by the
Human Rights Council's Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar which called for the investigation
and prosecution of Myanmar’s top military leaders for genocide, crimes against humanity and
war crimes in Rohingya’s native Rakhine State. Tint Swe said “at a time when we are working

71
hard to build harmony on the ground, we are concerned that the release of this report based on
narratives and not on hard evidence – and I repeat based on narratives and not on hard evidence -
will only serve to inflame tensions further and potentially hinder our efforts to create a much
needed social cohesion in Rakhine State.” He also said “the Government of Myanmar has
resolutely rejected the ICC’s ruling of 6 September 2018 in connection with Rakhine State. Our
position here is clear: Myanmar is not a party to the Rome Statute, and the Court has no
jurisdiction over Myanmar whatsoever. The ICC decision was made on dubious legal grounds
and applied to a situation here domestic remedies have not yet been exhausted.” In its ruling on 6
September 2018, the International Criminal Court said that it has jurisdiction to probe the forced
expulsion of Rohingya as a possible crime against humanity and thus opened the door to criminal
prosecution of Myanmar military leaders for their crackdown on Rohingyas. According to the
UN refugee agency UNHCR, since 25th August 2017, over 723 000 Rohingya refugees have fled
the violence in Myanmar and are now sheltering in Bangladesh. The vast majority are women
and children, and more than 40 per cent are under age 12.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=fGW1QeGvNTU

72
Discussion: China-Myanmar ties

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has wrapped up a visit to Myanmar in which he met his
counterpart and de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi. It was the first visit by a foreign official since
the new government took office. What statement is intended with this visit, and what can be
expected from the China-Myanmar relationship going forward? Suu Kyi will likely be appointed
to a role similar to prime minister, although the bill was opposed by the country's remaining
military powers. What should her priorities be? And will a strong relationship with China help
her in the formidable tasks of stabilizing the country and boosting economic growth? Join us for
a discussion with Mr. Victor Gao, one of the directors of the China-Myanmar Friendship
Association; Mr. Alistair Cook, research fellow with the Center for Non-Traditional Security
Studies (NTS) at Nanyang Technological University; and Mr. Murray Hiebert, deputy director
and senior fellow, Chair for Southeast Asia Studies at CSIS

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=voOBEV4mOB4

73
China says it won't block UN action on Rohingya refugees

AP Archive

(28 Aug 2018) China said Tuesday it isn't blocking action by the United Nations on the issue of
Muslim Rohingya refugees, but that it doesn't believe sanctions or criticism of Myanmar's
government will help resolve the crisis. Foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying's
comments came a day after investigators working for the UN's top human rights body said
Myanmar military leaders should be prosecuted for genocide against the Rohingya. China is a
permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto power over whether the issue will be
brought before the International Criminal Court. It has been reticent about condemning
Myanmar's government during the crisis. Hua said China believes the Rohingya issue has a
complex historical, religious and ethnic background and China wishes to play a "constructive
role" in finding a proper solution. More than 700,000 Rohingya have fled into neighboring
Bangladesh over the past year to escape a Myanmar government crackdown that followed rebel
attacks on security and police posts. Hua also criticized comments made by President Donald
Trump accusing Beijing of not being supportive in efforts to denuclearize North Korea. She also
called Japan's latest defense white paper "groundless" and "irresponsible" after it issued concerns
over China's military budget increases, its modernization and buildup of forces and weaponry,
and its continuing assertive moves in the region's airspace and seas

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tW5nucN5-w

74
Rohingya Crisis: China is very worried -- they have a lot to lose

FRANCE 24 English

Jean Michel LACOMBE

Former French ambassador to Burma, and Bangladesh. Professor at Science Po Paris

A textbook case of ethnic cleansing says the UN''s top human rights official. Nearly 400,000
Rohingyas have fled Burma in the past fortnight for neighboring Bangladesh after skirmishes
between local militants and authorities triggered a fierce backlash. The plight of the Rohingyas
has stirred indignation across the Muslim world in places like Indonesia and Turkey''s First Lady
dispatched to Bangladesh to support relief efforts. So what should the wider international
community do?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bXfhDYlp-Vg

75
China proposes three-phase solution to Rakhine problem: FM

CGTN

China has proposed a three-phase approach to solving the Rohingya refugee crisis involving
Myanmar and Bangladesh. Visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi outlined China's position
at a news conference with Myanmar's State Counselor and Foreign Minister Aung San Suu Kyi
on Sunday.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-hKCTD1JHqI

Myanmar Violence: UN unlikely to act against Myanmar military

TRT World

The United Nations says more than 480 thousand Rohingya refugees entered Bangladesh in the
past month, after fleeing violence in Myanmar. UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres is to
address the Security Council on Thursday. But that's unlikely to lead to a resolution being
adopted, as China and Russia have already said they support Myanmar's actions. Shamim
Chowdhury reports.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a8UnNvKK3Ew

76
With Rohingya gone, Myanmar remodels Rakhine stat

Hindustan Times

With the Rohingya purged from their villages, the Myanmar government, military and local
ethnic Rakhine Buddhists are methodically reshaping the scarred Myanmar state in their absence
with any hope of significant numbers of refugee repatriation looking increasingly unlikely

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5-1czF0sTFs

Chinese Interest in Myanmar's Resources Continues | FT World New

Financial Times

As Beijing offers to broker a peace agreement between Myanmar and the Kachin rebels, the
recent fighting is threatening to destabilise China's rich and volatile border with Myanmar. The
FT's Ben Marino reports on the challenges Beijing faces as it tries to continue to extend its
influence in Myanmar amid political reform and a recent wave anti-Chinese protests

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YSJl_MurnQ8

77
China's Role in Myanmar's Internal Conflicts

United States Institute of Peace

As China becomes more assertive internationally, it has begun to encounter conflict and
instability in fragile states worldwide. Nowhere is this truer than in Myanmar, where China is a
key actor in the peace process and has come to the defense of the government over the Rohingya
crisis in Rakhine State. Assessing China’s role in and perspectives toward Myanmar’s internal
conflicts can offer important insights into conflict dynamics inside the country and help inform
potential U.S. peace support policies

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nwgw1xCeP-Q

Secretary-General Antonio Guterres Speaks at UN Briefing on Myanmar

VOA News

U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said the U.N. report deserved serious consideration
and that accountability was necessary for genuine reconciliation between ethnic groups in
Myanmar. Guterres added that the report by the independent experts found "patterns of gross
human rights violations and abuses" committed by the security forces, which it said
"undoubtedly amount to the gravest crimes under international law". International cooperation
would be "critical" to ensuring accountability, he added. Guterres said the U.N. Security Council
needed to continue to press for the release of journalists arrested for reporting on the Rohingya
crisis, a reference to two Reuters reporters on trial in Myanmar.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oLg7EfezqdA

78
 Other Documents

79
 JOINT STATEMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF BANGLADESH
2019/07/07

(6 July, 2019, Beijing)

1. At the invitation of Mr. Li Keqiang, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China,
Sheikh Hasina, Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Bangladesh paid an official visit to China
from 1-6 July 2019. She also participated at the 13th Summer Davos Forum in Dalian.

2. During the visit, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina called on Xi Jinping, President of the People's
Republic of China, held talks with Premier Li Keqiang, and met Li Zhanshu, Chairman of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China. The two
sides had in-depth exchanges of views on China-Bangladesh relations, international and regional
issues of common interest, and reached broad consensus.

3. Bangladesh congratulated China on the 70th anniversary of its founding of the People's Republic
of China and expressed its sincere wishes that under the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought on
Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, the Chinese people will realize the Two
Centenary Goals and build China a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong,
democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.

4. China appreciated the rapid socio-economic development in Bangladesh in recent years and is
confident that under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, Bangladesh will become a
middle-income country by 2021, which will lay a solid foundation for Bangladesh to becoming a
developed country by 2041 and building a Sonar Bangla (Golden Bangladesh) at the earliest time.

5. The two sides expressed their satisfaction with the strong momentum gained by China-
Bangladesh relations, since the establishment of China-Bangladesh Strategic Partnership of
Cooperation in 2016. The two sides agreed to take necessary measures for speedy implementation
of the projects of bilateral cooperation agreed at leaders' summits. The two sides reiterated their
adherence to the important principles for developing China-Bangladesh relations, including
developing bilateral relations on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, respecting
and supporting each other in choosing the paths of development according to the national

80
6. The two sides agreed to enhance high-level exchanges, maintain frequent contacts between
leaders of the two countries on the sidelines of multilateral fora, and strengthen exchanges and
cooperation at various levels between the two governments, legislative bodies, political parties, and
peoples. The two sides expressed satisfaction with the outcome of regular Foreign Secretary/Vice
Minister level consultations and other existing mechanisms to implement the consensus of the
leaders of the two countries and exchange views on the bilateral relations as well as global and
regional issues.

7. The two sides shared the view that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers a model of
international cooperation for all the participants and provides new opportunities for regional
connectivity and economic integration. The two sides agreed to fully tap the potentials of cooperation
in various areas and promote BRI development, so as to realize sustainable development and
common prosperity of the two countries.

8. The two sides agreed to expand and deepen trade, investment and industrial capacity cooperation
so as to expand mutual benefit. China attaches importance to reduce the trade imbalance between
the two countries and China will support to enhance Bangladesh's export to China esp. jute,
seafood, leather, pharmaceuticals and so on. Both sides appreciated the step to establish China
Economic and Industrial Zone in Chattogram of Bangladesh and encourage investment on Chinese
companies in EZs of Bangladesh. The two sides shall continue joint feasibility study on China-
Bangladesh Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

The two sides expressed their satisfaction with the positive progress made in a number of projects
such as the 8th China-Bangladesh Friendship Bridge, China-Bangladesh Friendship Exhibition
Center, Padma Bridge Rail Link Project, Multi-lane road tunnel under the river Karnaphuli,
Installation of Single Point Mooring(SPM) with Double Pipe Line Project in Chattogram area. China
will encourage more Chinese enterprises among others to explore cooperation in Power, Railway,
Road, Port, ICT, iron and steel. Bangladesh will provide more favourable policy environment to
facilitate the investment of Chinese enterprises and ensure the security of Chinese projects and
people in Bangladesh.

9. The two sides agreed to enhance cooperation on agriculture, marine, science, technology,
Climate Change and establishing Climate Adaptation Center in Bangladesh. China will help
Bangladesh on promoting high productive crop through demonstration. The two sides agreed to hold
Dialogue on Maritime Cooperation on a regular basis, and explore the ways and means to cooperate

81
on Blue Economy, maritime management, marine spatial planning, joint ocean observation, among
others. The two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation on science and technology innovation,
promote the fulfillment of the Belt and Road Science, Technology and Innovation Cooperation Action
Plan, and try to enhance personnel exchanges, establish joint laboratories and technology transfer.
The two sides agreed to strengthen exchanges and cooperation on Climate Change. China is willing
to help Bangladesh on capacity building in addressing Climate Change.

10. The two sides agreed that defense cooperation is an important part of China-Bangladesh
friendship and will maintain and enhance exchanges at various levels between the two armed
forces. The two sides will deepen cooperation on defense industry and trade, training, equipment
and technology, mutual visits of navy ships, and the United Nations peacekeeping operations.

11. The two sides condemned and opposed terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. The
Chinese side conveyed its support for Bangladesh's efforts in combating terrorism and maintaining
national security and stability and expressed its readiness to cooperate through sharing of
information, capacity building and training with Bangladeshi side. The law enforcement departments
will further cooperate on combating transnational crimes, drug suppression, protection to projects
and their staff.

12. The two sides agreed that training opportunities of human resources and skills development
shall continuously be provided for the Bangladeshi side. The Bangladeshi side expressed its
gratitude for the education, training and scholarship programs for its students and officials to study in
China. The Chinese side will continue to provide training courses to Bangladeshi professionals in
fields such as public administration, science and technology, agriculture, health care, arts, and help
the Bangladeshi side to develop vocational training in Bangladesh. The Chinese side will continue to
provide government scholarships for Bangladeshi students to study in China, and fund the
outstanding young Bangladeshi scientists to work in China.

13. The two sides agreed to strengthen cultural and people-to-people exchanges and promote
interactions between the media, think tank, youth, women organizations, non-governmental
organizations and local authorities of the two countries. The two sides agreed to promote facilitation
on personnel exchanges based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit. The aeronautical
authorities of two countries will maintain consultation on expanding air traffic rights to facilitate
people-to-people exchanges.

14. The two sides value the important role of BCIM Economic Corridor in promoting practical
cooperation among Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar and the overall development of the

82
region. The two sides are ready to enhance communication and coordination in pushing forward the
construction of BCIM Economic Corridor. The two sides also agreed to push for early
accomplishment of the Joint Study Report and good progress in the BCIM Economic Corridor
development.

15. The two sides emphasized that they will abide by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter,
and stay committed to realizing democratization of international relations. The two sides agreed to
maintain the status and critical role of the UN in international affairs, support necessary reform of the
UN and the UN Security Council, and increased representation of developing countries in the
Security Council. The two sides maintain that the reform should be achieved by formulating agenda
of comprehensive reform through democratic consultation and on the foundation of the broadest
consensus.

16. The two sides agreed to enhance their cooperation in the UN and other international
organizations, including enhancing coordination and cooperation in global issues such as
development, energy, food security and other issues related to challenges and appeals of
developing countries, and will work together to promote peace, security, development and prosperity
of the region and the world. The two sides agreed to strengthen coordination in international trade,
economic and financial organizations and support the efforts of building of a more just and
reasonable international economic order and consolidating South-South cooperation.

17. Both sides expressed their opposition to any kind of trade protectionism and stay committed to
maintain the rules-based multilateral trading system with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the
core, and work for a more open, inclusive, balanced and win-win economic globalization so that its
benefits are shared by all.

18. The two sides agreed that the development of South Asia is full of vitality and potential. The two
sides reiterated to making efforts towards a peaceful, stable, open, inclusive, developing and
prosperous South Asia. The two sides agreed to enhance coordination and cooperation in regional
cooperation mechanisms.

19. Both sides agreed that properly resolving the issue involving Rakhine State will contribute to the
peace and stability of the region. Both sides agreed that solution to this issue lies in the early, safe
and dignified return to Myanmar of the displaced people who have entered Bangladesh from
Rakhine State. The Chinese side encourages Myanmar and Bangladesh to realize the early
repatriation of the displaced people to Myanmar through consultation. China will continue to host
trilateral meetings among China, Bangladesh and Myanmar to provide a platform for dialogue to

83
promote the early return of the displaced people. China will offer its support in creating secure and
conducive conditions for the return to Myanmar of the displaced people currently taking shelter in
Bangladesh.

20. The two sides signed documents of cooperation in areas such as power, economic and
technology, investment, hydrology, and cultural contacts during the visit.

21. The two sides expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the visit. Both sides believe that
this visit is of great significance to the in-depth development of Strategic Partnership of Cooperation
between China and Bangladesh. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina appreciated the warm hospitality
accorded by the Chinese government and people, and extended invitation to the Chinese leaders to
visit Bangladesh. Both sides agreed to maintain the momentum of high-level exchanges.

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1679204.shtml

(1)

Wang Yi Holds Talks with State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Aung
San Suu Kyi of Myanmar
2017/11/20

On November 19, 2017, local time, Foreign Minister Wang Yi held talks in Nay Pyi Taw with State
Counsellor and Foreign Minister Aung San Suu Kyi of Myanmar.

Wang Yi firstly conveyed greetings from President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang to Aung San
Suu Kyi. Wang Yi expressed that Myanmar sent an instant congratulatory message to China during
the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, fully demonstrating the "Paukphaw"
friendship and the great importance attached by Myanmar to China-Myanmar relations. China and
Myanmar are friendly neighbors linked by mountains and rivers. China firmly supports State
Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi's successful administration based on the will of the people and
Myanmar's efforts in safeguarding its sovereignty, independence, security and dignity. China also
firmly supports the Myanmar government's commitment to actively advancing the process of
domestic peaceful reconciliation, improving people's livelihood and boosting the development and

84
revitalization of economy. China firmly supports Myanmar to well host the upcoming Asia-Europe
Meeting, so as to improve Myanmar's international status and influence.

Wang Yi expressed that China is pleased to see the progress made in the process of peaceful
reconciliation in Myanmar. China hopes that all parties concerned in Myanmar should conduct
friendly consultation while upholding the "Panglong Spirit", and finally reach consensus featuring
ethnic unity and high degree of autonomy within the framework of the Constitution of the Republic of
the Union of Myanmar as well as achieve long-lasting peace and stability at an early date. Wang Yi
said that China regards Myanmar as an important partner in the joint construction of the "Belt and
Road" with distinct complementary advantages. In order to further consolidate China-Myanmar
comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and deepen practical cooperation, China is willing
to, according to the development plan and actual needs of Myanmar, discuss on building a Y-shaped
China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, thus establishing a wide triangle cooperation pattern and
pushing forward the balanced development across Myanmar.

Aung San Suu Kyi asked Wang Yi to convey her warm greetings and sound wishes to President Xi
Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, and noted that despite the difference in size, Myanmar and China
have always treated each other with mutual respect and understanding. The two countries with
traditional friendship are now a community of shared future. At present, what Myanmar and its
people need most is peace, stability and development. While cooperating with China is of great
significance and indispensable to realize such goals. Myanmar appreciates China's initiative of
building the Myanmar-China Economic Corridor, which fits well with Myanmar's development plan.
Myanmar is now in urgent need of addressing its undeveloped traffic and electricity, and hopes to
cooperate with China in the aforementioned areas with priority by building the Myanmar-China
Economic Corridor. Myanmar is willing to dock with China in terms of this initiative at an early date.
Myanmar actively facilitates the process of domestic peaceful reconciliation and hopes to
continuously receive understanding and support from China.

In regard to the Rakhine State issue, Wang Yi noted that considering its complicated background,
the issue can be properly resolved only through friendly consultation between Myanmar and
Bangladesh, and the international community should create necessary conditions and sound
environment to this end. China proposes to address the Rakhine State issue in three phases. The
first phase is to secure a ceasefire and restore order. In the second phase, the two sides work out
feasible ways to solve the issue through friendly consultation, and sign and implement the
repatriation agreement as soon as possible. In the third phase, the international community should
increase support and inputs to the poverty alleviation in Rakhine State, so as to drive the
development by poverty reduction and achieve stability through development.

85
Aung San Suu Kyi expressed that Myanmar cherishes China's understanding of the Rakhine State
issue and agrees with the three-phase plan proposed by China. Myanmar is willing to restore the
rule of law and order in the region and carry out repatriation work soon through dialogue and
consultation with Bangladesh, so as to properly address the issue as soon as possible. Myanmar
agrees with China on the idea of dealing with the root cause of the Rakhine State issue and wishes
to achieve peace and stability in the Rakhine State and even the whole Myanmar through
development. Myanmar hopes that China continues playing its important role in promoting an early
resolution of the Rakhine State issue.

After the talks, Wang Yi and Aung San Suu Kyi attended the exchange ceremony of the relevant
agreement documents and the inauguration of the China Cultural Center, and met with the press
together.

https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1512574.shtml

86
By Al Jazeera
September 11, 2017

A resident of Myanmar's Rakhine State discusses daily life and the abuses and attacks Rohingya endure.

Maungdaw, Rakhine State, Myanmar - For all my life, all 24 years of it, I've been a prisoner in this open air jail
you know as Rakhine State.

I was born in Myanmar, as were my parents, but my citizenship was snatched away before I was even conceived.

My movement, education, access to healthcare and career have been heavily restricted because of my ethnicity.

I'm banned from working in the government, denied the right to pursue higher education, barred from visiting the
capital, Yangon, and even stopped from leaving northern Rakhine State.

I'm subjected to the worst form of discrimination, all because I'm a Rohingya - a Rohingya Muslim.

For years, my people, who have been denied their most basic rights, are killed on a near daily basis. Shot dead in
plain sight, forcibly and systematically made homeless, our homes razed in front of our very eyes; we're the victims
of a brutal state.

For you to fully appreciate what our conditions are like, I'm going to use an analogy: imagine a mouse stuck in a
cage with a hungry cat. That's what it's like for the Rohingya.

Our only method of survival is to run, or hope someone helps us get out.

For those of us that have remained, there's a systematic campaign to separate us from the wider Rakhine community.

We're called "Kalar" [a slur often used against Muslims] by Buddhists to our faces. Whether you're a child or an old
man, no one escapes the abuse.

We face discrimination at schools and at hospitals, and there's been a boycott campaign by Buddhists to avoid us at
all costs.

"Only buy from Buddhists," they say. "If you give a penny to a Buddhist, they'll help build a Pagoda (temple), but if
you give a penny to a Muslim, they'll build a mosque."

These kinds of comments, they've become the norm and helped encourage Buddhist extremists to attack us.

When Aung San Suu Kyi, a Noble Peace Prize winner, won parliamentary elections in 2015 and ended half a
century of dominance by the military, we had high hopes change was coming.

We were confident that this woman, hailed as a beacon of democracy, would end our abuse and oppression.

Sadly, it soon became clear that not only would she not be our voice, she would ignore our suffering.

Her silence showed she was complicit in the violence.

In the end, she failed us; our last hope, failed us.

In 2012, a huge number of the Rohingya were slaughtered in one of the worst bouts of communal violence. Around
140,000 were internally displaced, an event that would repeat itself in 2016.

Shot, slaughtered, and burned alive in front of their families, the violence last October would give rise to the Arakan
Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a small group of men who decided to defend themselves and fight back.

87
Armed with just sticks and stones, they knew they couldn't fend off the well-equipped Myanmar army but they tried
nonetheless.

Still, now our sisters and mothers are forced to give birth in paddy fields as we run for our lives in this violence that
you say is between two equal sides. It is not.

Children being shot at as they flee and women's bodies floating in rivers is not an equal fight.

We're facing extinction, and unless the international community stands with us, one of the most persecuted people in
the world, we will face genocide and you, you will all be a witness to it.

The author of this letter has requested anonymity due to fear of attacks from the government. 

http://www.rohingyablogger.com/2017/09/letter-from-rohingya-we-are-facing.html

28 September 2017

Secretary-General's remarks at open debate of the Security Council on Myanmar [as delivered]

I welcome this opportunity to brief you on the crisis in Myanmar.

 
On September 2nd, I wrote to this Council urging concerted efforts to prevent further escalation
of the crisis in northern Rakhine state. 
 
I am encouraged that the Council has discussed the situation four times in less than a month. 
 

88
The reality on the ground demands action -- swift action -- to protect people, alleviate suffering,
prevent further instability, address the root causes of the situation and forge, at long last, a
durable solution.
 
The following briefing is based on our reporting from the ground, and is our best sense of what
has happened, what is still happening, and what needs to be done.
 
The current crisis has steadily deteriorated since the August 25 attacks by the Arakan Rohingya
Salvation Army on the Myanmar security forces.  I repeat my condemnation of those attacks
today.
 
Since then, the situation has spiralled into the world’s fastest developing refugee emergency and
a humanitarian and human rights nightmare.
 
I continue to call on the Myanmar authorities to take three immediate steps:
 
First, to end the military operations;
 
Second, to allow unfettered access for humanitarian support;
 
And third, to ensure the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of the refugees to their
areas of origin.
 
Let me now review what we know about the military operations that have taken place since
August 25th.
While there have been competing narratives in a highly complex environment, certain elements
are clear.
 
At least 500,000 civilians have fled their homes and sought safety in Bangladesh. 
 
Although the total number of those displaced is unknown, it is estimated that 94 per cent of them

89
are Rohingya.
 
The devastating humanitarian situation is not only a breeding ground for radicalization, it also
puts vulnerable people – including young children –
at risk of criminal elements including trafficking. 
 
We have received bone-chilling accounts from those who fled -- mainly women, children and the
elderly. 
 
These testimonies point to excessive violence and serious violations of human rights, including
indiscriminate firing of weapons, the presence of landmines and sexual violence. 
 
This is unacceptable and must end immediately. 
 
International human rights law and standards are clear:  any use of force by the authorities must
respect Myanmar's human rights obligations under international law and comply with well-
established human rights standards.  Above all, these actions must fully respect the human rights
of those affected, regardless of ethnicity or religion.
 
The use of lethal force, even in situations of emergency, must be commensurate with the threat to
the public order and utmost care must be taken to minimize loss of life and injury, especially for
unarmed people and communities.
 
The authorities have claimed that security operations ended on September 5th, following major
displacements in northern Rakhine, where Rohingya were the majority. 
 
However, displacement appears to have continued, with reports of the burning of Muslim
villages, as well as looting and acts of intimidation. 
 
Myanmar authorities themselves have indicated that at least 176 of 471 Muslim villages in
northern Rakhine have been totally abandoned. 

90
 
In Rathedaung Township, three quarters of the Rohingya population has fled.  Most villages and
all three of the former internally displaced persons camps have been burnt to the ground.  Just
five isolated Muslim communities remain in Rathedaung. 
 
Elsewhere too, a majority of the abandoned villages were majority Muslim. 
 
There seems to be a deeply disturbing pattern to the violence and ensuing large movements of an
ethnic group from their homes.
 
The failure to address this systematic violence could result in a spill-over into central Rakhine,
where an additional 250,000 Muslims could potentially face displacement.  They are
outnumbered by Rakhine communities, some of whom have engaged in violent acts of
vigilantism against their Muslim neighbors. 
 
The violence in Rakhine – whether by the military or radical elements within communities –
must end. 
 
The Myanmar authorities must fulfill their fundamental obligation of ensuring the safety and
security of all communities and upholding the rule of law without discrimination.
 
Let me now turn to the question of humanitarian access.
 
It is imperative that UN agencies and our non-governmental partners be granted immediate and
safe access to all affected communities. 
 
I am deeply concerned by the current climate of antagonism towards the United Nations and
non-governmental organizations.  Indeed, this can lead to unacceptable violence, such as the
recent attacks against the ICRC by Rakhine villagers in Sittwe.   
 
The Myanmar authorities have said repeatedly in the past few days that “it was not the time”

91
for unhindered access to resume.
 
Given the enormous needs, this position is deeply regrettable.  The United Nations and its
partners should be allowed to reach the affected areas without delay.
 
I would also like to address the issue of safe return of refugees to their places of origin.
 
I ask members of the Security Council to join me in urging that all those who have fled to
Bangladesh be able to exercise their right to a safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return to
their homes. 
 
Myanmar authorities have committed to use the framework established in the 1993 Joint
Statement of the Foreign Ministers of Bangladesh and Myanmar to facilitate these returns. 
 
While that may be a useful starting point, it is not sufficient in the present circumstances. 
Notably, the framework does not refer to resolving the root cause of displacement.  Moreover, it
requires documents that the fleeing Rohingya may not be able to provide.
 
The United Nations is committed to a plan for voluntary return and calls upon the international
community to support such an effort.  This should include development assistance to the villages
of those who return home, and the implementation of the Rakhine Advisory Commission
recommendations regarding verification and citizenship.
 
Voluntary repatriation also requires, as a critical first step, the registration of refugees in
Bangladesh using internationally accepted standards.
 
The United Nations is ready to support Myanmar and Bangladesh in all stages of this important
process.
 
Ensuring the safe, voluntary and dignified return of refugees to Rakhine – in line with
international refugee law – will require the restoration of mutual trust among the communities.

92
 
Improving inter-communal relations is a critical part of a sustainable resolution to the crisis and
one of the essential recommendations of the Rakhine Advisory Commission, led by Kofi Annan.
 
In this highly complex environment, the Myanmar authorities must work to defuse tensions and
uphold and protect the rights of all communities, including respect for property rights.
 
Those who fled should be able to return to their homes in peace – not to yet another cycle of
violence. 
 
It will be especially important to avoid re-locating those displaced yet again to camp-like
conditions.   
 
In Bangladesh, the United Nations continues to step up our humanitarian response.
 
The High Commissioner for Refugees visited just days ago.
 
In the next two weeks, the World Food Programme, the Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, the International Organization for Migration and UNICEF will visit the
Bangladesh border area. 
 
On October 9th, UNHCR, OCHA and IOM will convene a donor’s conference. 
 
In my meeting last week with Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, I expressed great
appreciation for the care being provided to refugees.  I commend those countries that are
supporting Bangladesh in its response.    
 
Let me also stress the need for strengthened cooperation between Myanmar and Bangladesh and
I welcome the upcoming high-level visit of Myanmar officials to Bangladesh.
 
The crisis has generated multiple implications for neighbouring States and the larger region,

93
including the risk of inter-communal strife. 
 
We should not be surprised if decades of discrimination and double standards in treatment of the
Rohingya create openings for radicalization.  
In moving forward, we need an effective partnership with the Myanmar authorities, especially
the military.  All involved should refrain from any actions that could exacerbate the precarious
situation on the ground.
I welcome the participation here today of National Security Adviser U Thaung Tun – as well as
the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, Masud Bin Momen. 
 
I appreciate the National Security Adviser’s efforts to engage in dialogue with various
stakeholders during the high-level week of the General Assembly. 
 
In addition to discussions with the United Nations Secretariat on future cooperation, the
Myanmar delegation has reached out to Bangladesh to revive dialogue. 
 
Myanmar has also engaged the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for desperately needed
humanitarian assistance. 
 
I look forward to effective and credible follow-up to the authorities’ stated commitment to
greater access, including for the international community, the media and humanitarian actors.
 
The regional cooperation with Myanmar will also be essential, and the United Nations fully
stands behind this.
 
I welcome the important role played by Foreign Minister Retno [Marsudi] of Indonesia in this
respect. She has been advocating for an approach that echoes the three steps I have been
emphasizing and is also what many countries have been seeking.
 
The crisis has underlined an urgent need for a political solution to the root causes of the violence.
 

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The core of the problem is protracted statelessness and its associated discrimination. 
 
The recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine provide a blueprint for the
longer-term future.
 
The Muslims of Rakhine State should be granted nationality.  The present Myanmar citizenship
legislation only allows it partially.  We encourage Myanmar to revise it in line with international
standards. (What China is doing in this concern?) 
 
In the interim, an effective verification exercise as previously foreseen should allow those
entitled to be granted citizenship according to the present laws. 
 
All others must be able to obtain a legal status that allows them to lead a normal life, including
freedom of movement and access to labour markets, education and health services.
 
I appeal to the leaders of Myanmar, including military leaders, to condemn incitement to racial
hatred and violence, and take all measures to defuse tensions between communities. 
 
We have taken good note of declarations by Myanmar authorities that no one is above the law. 
There is a clear need to ensure accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations, to curb
the current violence and to prevent future abuses.
 
The United Nations will remain a close partner to Myanmar to address these urgent issues. 
 
We have no agenda other than to help Myanmar advance the well-being of all the country’s
people. 
 
We have no interest other than to see all communities enjoying peace, security, prosperity and
mutual respect.
 
And we are committed to nothing less than easing the heart-breaking suffering of so many

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vulnerable people while forging a lasting solution that affirms shared values, promotes mutual
respect and upholds human dignity. 
 
I call on the Security Council to stand united and to support efforts to urgently end this tragedy.
 
Thank you very much, Mr. President.

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2017-09-28/secretary-generals-remarks-open-
debate-security-council-myanmar

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