Gensini - Per Ponzio
Gensini - Per Ponzio
Gensini - Per Ponzio
STEFANO GENSINI
In Augusto Ponzio’s long and productive scientific career, his encounter with
Giacomo Leopardi’s linguistic ideas has played an important role, from both
the semiotic and the political viewpoint. Ponzio is significantly among the
very first scholars to have become aware of the theoretical relevance of
Leopardi’s reflections on language as formulated in his Zibaldone (his intel-
lectual diary, which counts more than 4,526 pages and on which the poet
worked from 1817 to 1832). In his essay Plurilinguismo e pluridiscorsività in
Leopardi,1 Ponzio focuses on Leopardi’s doctrine according to which lan-
guages are governed by an inner principle of differentiation: hence,
plurilingualism does not simply depend on certain social and political circum-
stances, but even more on the close relationship between language and human
knowledge, which is of course made of intellect, but also of sensitivity, mem-
ory, imagination, ever changing experience. According to Leopardi, «the
history of languages» is thus «the history of the human mind» (Zib. 2591), in
all its complicated and unexpected expressions.
Drawing attention to some passages in which Leopardi articulates his
“general linguistics”, Ponzio rightly observes that his idea that «the diversity
of languages is natural and inevitable among men» (Zib. 936, our translation)
is one of the few “praises of Babel” which can be found in Western tradition.
Indeed, some sort of phobia for variety and changeability of language accom-
panies a large part of the history of thought and of literary culture. The
theoretical background which can be briefly referred to as “Cartesian”, and
which deeply influenced cognitivism from its very beginnings (good cases in
point are Chomsky and Fodor), has systematically searched for the universal
devices underpinning knowledge and language, and has neglected the reasons
of their variety in space and time. And if one reconsiders the theoretical paths
of logic empiricism in the 1990s until the more recent developments of the
analytical tradition, one can easily see that the historical dimension of lan-
guage, its being anchored (as Malinowski argued) to a “situational context”
*
Laura Centonze has prepared the first draft of the English version of this paper. Susan
Petrilli has read the final version and suggested useful stylistic corrections. I am very
grateful to both of them.
1 Zibaldone was critically edited in 1991 by Giuseppe Pacella in three volumes,
187
188 STEFANO GENSINI
and thus resistant to any formalist account, has represented a disturbing ele-
ment and not a philosophical problem to deal with.
In his essay, Ponzio often refers to Bakhtin, a strategic thinker thanks to
his special philosophical perspective: as a matter of fact, not a few analogies
can be seen between the linguistic theory of the latter (to whom very little
attention has been paid sofar by the “mainstream” philosophy of language)
and Leopardi’s view of language and signs. I would like to suggest that the
subjectivity of the linguistic experience is the common thread between these
two thinkers who remain, under other respects, very distant from each other,
and not just chronologically. The concept of subjectivity as an inner element
(and not only an external one, in terms of performance) of the linguistic prax-
is was new and original in Leopardi’s times, when the overwhelming
rhetorical-grammatical tradition entailed an underestimation of the role played
by language in the process of knowledge. In overt opposition to the rhetorical
view of language, Leopardi suggests that «an idea with no word accompany-
ing it» is destined to wander like a ghost in our mind, without taking a definite
shape (Zib. 1054 and elsewhere); moreover, on one side, without words we
would not even be able to conceptualize quantities (Zib. 360-62), and on the
other, words act on the mind as a “resonator” of experience, affection, delicate
and personal memories. On these premises, Leopardi is able to bridge the gap
between the individual and the social dimensions of language, in a very simi-
lar way to a much more famous philosopher of language such as Wilhelm von
Humboldt; but Leopardi did so quite independently from him, having had no
access to Humboldt’s writings on language of the 1820s. I also suppose
Leopardi had no information about Humboldt’s posthumous masterpiece
Einleitung zum Kawi-Werk (1836), in which the principle of subjectivity
becomes manifest thanks to a kind of linguisticization of Kantian gnoseology
as well as to an incomparable competence in languages and grammars from all
over the world.
In another passage of his essay, Ponzio maintains that Leopardi’s
approach to the language-nation relationship is very different from the
Romantic perspective (of which Herder is a typical exemple) in the sense that
he refrains from identifying the two elements; indeed, Leopardi escapes the
dangers of linguistic nationalism characterizing the German and French
milieu, by suggesting that languages grow and develop in time according to
mechanisms that are different from those conditioning (as we would say
today) ethnicity. I should like to focus on this issue. Generally speaking, I do
agree with what Ponzio states: there are both linguistic and conceptual argu-
ments that can be used to back up such an interpretation of Leopardi’s view.
To begin with, Leopardi does not ascribe to substratum a decisive role with-
in the process of language diversification (cfr. Zib. 933 and following): this is
a crucial point in that the very idea of “ethnic reaction” of indigenous lan-
guages on languages with which they overlap for demographic, military
reasons had ended up, since the 18th century, establishing a strict correspon-
dence between linguistic and national element. The second aspect is the
ENCOUNTERING LEOPARDI 189
Waiting for a more detailed analysis, I’ll venture to suggest that Leopardi
makes use of nation as a more comprehensive term: nation does not mean
some kind of political entity, but it is rather a set of classes which make up
society (of which people is the most numerous part), seen together with their
traditions, their widespread culture, their government, and language(s). This
use of the term nation dates back to the 18th-century intellectual terminology,
where syntagms like Roman (or Neapolitan, Genoese etc.) nation, which
clearly express the peculiarities and diversification of Italian history, are nor-
mal. In such a context, Leopardy usually also talks of ancient nations, each of
which is distinct and is classified according to the identifying element repre-
sented by imagination. Hence, learning more about the history of their
languages, investigating the etymologies of Hebrew, Greek and Latin means
shedding light on ancient times, especially when no documentation can be
found: in so doing, Leopardi takes sides with the methodological principles
sketched by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz in his Brevis designatio de originibus
gentium ductis potissimum ex indicio linguarum (1710), a milestone for com-
parative linguistics. There is no evidence that Leopardi might have had access
to it, but he found similar principles in Turgot’s entry Étymologie, available
in the Éncyclopédie méthodique (which instead Leopardi consulted continual-
ly).
On the other hand, Leopardi discusses the tendential uniformity of the
international well-educated society of his times, which appears to be “one
nation” and consequently adopts a “universal” simplified language, easy and
quick to use: Modern French. To the anthropological de-nationalization of
modernity corresponds linguistic homologation, the loss of expression, the
neglect of registers and styles inherited by literary tradition. The terms based
upon rigid conventions go too far beyond their physiological space (the one
typical of arts and crafts, as well as sciences) and try to expropriate the space
of words (poetic, personal and subjective uses). It is important not to misun-
derstand what Leopardi thinks of such an issue. He firmly believes in the need
to enrich the Italian language by introducing the keywords of modern thought,
and of course he is not against the introduction of scientific terminology, since
he has no purist prejudice (the case of chemistry is something he holds very
dear). But whilst many philosophers of the Enlightenment (e.g. Condillac)
tended to generalise the principle of the semantic exactness of terms, Leopardi
maintains that a language follows a continuum of uses: it moves from seman-
tic vagueness, which feeds both poetry and common language, to precision
and formalisation tout court. (In his 1965 article, L’italiano, una lingua tra le
altre lingue, Italo Calvino must have reminisced Leopardi’s perspective).
A language is healthy (and healthy are also the cultures and the society
upon which it is based) if such a dynamic equilibrium obtains; if uniformity
and unidimensionality prevail, to the repressive damage corresponds a patho-
logical condition of social mentality. Perhaps we can explain the point made
by Leopardi by referring to very recent communication experience. Many
readers will remember Pier Paolo Pasolini’s 1964-65 contributions to the “new
ENCOUNTERING LEOPARDI 191
References