Scope of Social Accounting
Scope of Social Accounting
Scope of Social Accounting
Most economic arguments for government intervention are based on the idea that the
marketplace cannot provide public goods or handle externalities. Public health and welfare
programs, education, roads, research and development, national and domestic security, and a
clean environment all have been labeled public goods.
The fireworks example illustrates the "free-rider" problem. Even if the fireworks show is worth
ten dollars to each person, no one will pay ten dollars to the entrepreneur. Each person will seek
to "free-ride" by allowing others to pay for the show, and then watch for free from his or her
backyard. If the free-rider problem cannot be solved, valuable goods and services, ones that
people want and otherwise would be willing to pay for, will remain unproduced.
The second aspect of public goods is what economists call nonrivalrous consumption. Assume the
entrepreneur manages to exclude noncontributors from watching the show (perhaps one can see
the show only from a private field). A price will be charged for entrance to the field, and people
who are unwilling to pay this price will be excluded. If the field is large enough, however,
exclusion is inefficient because even nonpayers could watch the show without increasing the
show's cost or diminishing anyone else's enjoyment. That is nonrivalrous competition to watch
the show.
Externalities occur when one person's actions affect another person's well-being and the relevant
costs and benefits are not reflected in market prices. A positive externality arises when my
neighbors benefit from my cleaning up my yard. If I cannot charge them for these benefits, I will
not clean the yard as often as they would like. (Note that the free-rider problem and positive
externalities are two sides of the same coin.) A negative externality arises when one person's
actions harm another. When polluting, factory owners may not consider the costs that pollution
imposes on others. Policy debates usually focus on free-rider and externalities problems, which
are considered more serious problems than nonrivalrous consumption.
While most people are unaware of it, markets often solve public goods and externalities problems
in a variety of ways. Businesses frequently solve free-rider problems by developing means of
excluding nonpayers from enjoying the benefits of a good or service. Cable television services, for
instance, scramble their transmissions so that nonsubscribers cannot receive broadcasts. Both
throughout history and today, private roads have financed themselves by charging tolls to road
users. Other supposed public goods, such as protection and fire services, are frequently sold
through the private sector on a fee basis.
Public goods can also be provided by being tied to purchases of private goods. Shopping malls,
for instance, provide shoppers with a variety of services that are traditionally considered public
goods: lighting, protection services, benches, and rest-rooms, for example. Charging directly for
each of these services would be impractical. Therefore, the shopping mall finances the services
through receipts from the sale of private goods in the mall. The public and private goods are
"tied" together. Private condominiums and retirement communities also are examples of market
institutions that tie public goods to private services. Monthly membership dues are used to
provide a variety of public services.
Lighthouses are one of the most famous examples that economists give of public goods that
cannot be privately provided. Economists have argued that if private lighthouse owners
attempted to charge ship-owners for lighthouse services, a free-rider problem would result. Yet
lighthouses off the coast of nineteenth-century England were privately owned. Lighthouse owners
realized that they could not charge shipowners for their services. So they didn't try to. Instead,
they sold their service to the owners and merchants of the nearby port. Port merchants who did
not pay the lighthouse owners to turn on the lights had trouble attracting ships to their port. As it
turns out, one of the economics instructors' most commonly used examples of a public good that
cannot be privately provided is not a good example at all.
Other public goods problems can be solved by defining individual property rights in the
appropriate economic resource. Cleaning up a polluted lake, for instance, involves a free-rider
problem if no one owns the lake. The benefits of a clean lake are enjoyed by many people, and
no one can be charged for these benefits. Once there is an owner, however, that person can
charge higher prices to fishermen, boaters, recreational users, and others who benefit from the
lake. Privately owned bodies of water are common in the British Isles, where, not surprisingly,
lake owners maintain quality.
Well-defined property rights can solve public goods problems in other environmental areas, such
as land use and species preservation. The buffalo neared extinction and the cow did not because
cows could be privately owned and husbanded for profit. Today, private property rights in
elephants, whales, and other species could solve the tragedy of their near extinction. In Africa,
for instance, elephant populations are growing in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Namibia, and Botswana, all
of which allow commercial harvesting of elephants. Since 1979 Zimbabwe's elephant population
rose from 30,000 to almost 70,000 today, and Botswana's went from 20,000 to 68,000. On the
other hand, in countries that ban elephant hunting—Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, for example—
there is little incentive to breed elephants but great incentive to poach them. In those countries
elephants are disappearing. The result is that Kenya has only 16,000 elephants today versus
140,000 when its government banned hunting. Since 1970, Tanzania's elephant herd has shrunk
from 250,000 to 61,000; Uganda's from 20,000 to only 1,600.
Property rights are a less effective solution for environmental problems involving the air,
however, because rights to the air cannot be defined and enforced easily. It is hard to imagine,
for instance, how market mechanisms alone could prevent depletion of the earth's ozone layer. In
such cases economists recognize the likely necessity of a regulatory or governmental solution.
Contractual arrangements can sometimes be used to overcome other public goods and
externalities problems. If the research and development activities of one firm benefit other firms
in the same industry, these firms may pool their resources and agree to a joint project (antitrust
regulations permitting). Each firm will pay part of the cost, and the contributing firms will share
the benefits. In this context economists say that the externalities are "internalized."
Contractual arrangements sometimes fail to solve public goods and externalities problems. The
costs of bargaining and striking an agreement may be very high. Some parties to the agreement
may seek to hold out for a better deal, and the agreement may collapse. In other cases it is
simply too costly to contact and deal with all the potential beneficiaries of an agreement. A
factory, for instance, might find it impossible to negotiate directly with each affected citizen to
decrease pollution.
The imperfections of market solutions to public goods problems must be weighed against the
imperfections of government solutions. Governments rely on bureaucracy and have weak
incentives to serve consumers. Therefore, they produce inefficiently. Furthermore, politicians may
supply public "goods" in a manner to serve their own interests, rather than the interests of the
public; examples of wasteful government spending and pork-barrel projects are legion.
Government often creates a problem of "forced riders" by compelling persons to support projects
they do not desire. Private solutions to public goods problems, when possible, are usually more
efficient than governmental solutions.