Mondequillo vs Breva

Mondequillo vs Breva
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990

FACTS:

The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion

Malalag, Davao del Sur on July 1988, registered in the name of Jose
Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at Dalagbong
Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latter’s name.  A
motion to quash was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential
land is where the family home is built since 1969 prior the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities
mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment sought to be
enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated.  With
regard to the agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public
land and the transfer in his favor by the original possessor and applicant
who was a member of a cultural minority.  The residential house in the
present case became a family home by operation of law under Article
153.

ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.

HELD:

The petitioner’s contention that it should be considered a family home

from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in 1969 is not
well-taken.  Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that the
provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar
as said provisions are applicable.  It does not mean that Article 152 and
153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences
are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt
from the execution for payment of obligations incurred before the
effectivity of the Code.  The said article simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are
considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits
accorded to a family home under the FC.  The debt and liability which was
the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family
Code.  This does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided
in the FC.

As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be
made shall be on whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land. 
Petition was dismissed.

Pablito Taneo vs. Court of Appeals

G.R No. 108532

March 9, 1999

Facts:

1. That the land in question originally belonged to Lazaro Ba-a who sold the same
to the late Pablito (sic) Taneo father of the herein plaintiff on September 18, 1941,
by virtue of an Escritura de Venta identified as Reg. Not. 50; pages 53, Foleo Not.
V, Series of 1941 of the Notarial Register of Ernie Pelaez (Exh. 10);

2. That on July 19, 1951 Abdon Gilig with his wife filed a Civil Case No. 590 for
recovery of property against Pablo Taneo, et al., wherein Judgment was rendered
on June 24, 1964, in favor of Abdon Gilig and against Pablo Taneo ordering the
latter to pay damages in the amount of P5,000.00 (Exh. 2);

3. That by virtue of said decision, a writ of Execution was issued on November 22,
1965 against the properties of Pablo Taneo and on December 1, 1965, a Notice of
Levy was executed by the Clerk of Court Pedro Perez wherein the properties in
question were among the properties levied by the Sheriff (Exh. 3);

4. That the said properties were sold at public auction wherein the defendant
Abdon Gilig came out as the highest bidder and on February 12, 1965, a Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale was executed by Ex-Oficio Provincial Sheriff Pedro Perez (Exh. 1)
ceding the said properties in favor of Abdon Gilig and which Certificate of Sale was
registered with the Register of Deeds of March 2, 1966;

5. That for failure to redeem the said property within the reglementary period, a
Sheriff’s final Deed of Conveyance was executed by same Provincial Sheriff Jose V.
Yasay on February 1968, (Exhs. 4, 4-A) conveying the property definitely to Abdon
Gilig.
6. That on April 20, 1966, after his third-party claim which he filed with the Sheriff
in Civil Case No. 590 was not given due course, Rufino Arriola filed Civil Case No.
2667 entitled Arriola vs. Abdon Gilig, et al., for Recovery of Property and/or
annulment of Sale with Damages;

7. That Judgment was rendered by the Court thru Judge Bernardo Teves
dismissing the case with costs on February 21, 1969;

8. That said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision in toto on June 20, 1979; declaring the alleged Deed of Sale executed by
Abdon Gilig in favor of the plaintiff as null and void for being simulated or fictitious
and executed in fraud or (sic) creditors;

9. That on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in question erected
on the land of Plutarco Vacalares as a family home (Exh. F) but was however,
notarized only on May 2, 1965 and registered with the Register of Deeds on June
24, 1966;

10. That in the meanwhile, unknown to the defendant, Pablo Taneo applied for a
free patent on the land in question which was approved on October 13, 1973, (Exh.
B) and the Patent and Title issued on December 10, 1980 (Oct No. P-12820-Exh.
12);

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the conveyance made by way of the sheriff’s sale pursuant to
the wit of execution issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 590 is prohibited
under Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141;

(2) and whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.

Held:

The petitioner insists that the attached property is a family home, having been
occupied by him and his family since 1972, and is therefore exempt from
attachment.

The contention is not well-taken.

While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed
constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it
does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences, petitioner’s included, are deemed to have been constituted as family
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and
henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred
before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 (Modequillo vs. Breva,
185 SCRA 766). Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered
family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family
home under the Family Code (Modequillo vs. Breva, supra). Since petitioner’s debt
was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the
Family Code. His property is therefore not exempt from attachment (Annex “O,”
Plaintiff’s Position Paper and Memorandum of Authorities, p. 78).” (pp. 5-6,
Decision; pp. 64-65, Rollo) (underscoring ours)

The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code where
registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the
law provides certain instances where the family home is not exempted from
execution, forced sale or attachment.

Article 243 reads:

The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment, except:

(1) For nonpayment of taxes;

(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of
Property;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such record of
the declaration;

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, material-men and
others who have rendered service or furnished material for the construction of the
building

The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the house in
question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The
instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966.
The money judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964.
Thus, at that time when the “debt” was incurred, the family home was not yet
constituted or even registered. Clearly, petitioners’ alleged family home, as
constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article
243(2).

Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo is even doubtful
considering that such constitution did not comply with the requirements of the law.
The trial court found that the house was erected not on the land which the Taneos
owned but on the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of the law
that the “family home is the dwelling house where a person and his family resides
and the land on which it is situated,”[13] it is understood that the house should be
constructed on a land not belonging to another. Apparently, the constitution of a
family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was merely an afterthought in order
to escape execution of their property but to no avail.
Spouses Araceli Oliva De-Mesa, et. al v. Spouse Claudio D. Acero, Jr. et. al

G.R. No. 185064

January 16, 2012

Facts: On April 17, 1984 petitioner spouses Araceli and Ernesto De Mesa jointly
purchased a parcel of land situated at No. 3 Forbes Street, Mount Carmel Homes
Subdivision, Iba, Meycauyan Bulacan while they were still merely cohabiting before
their marriage. A house was constructed in the said property which the petitioners
then occupied as their family home after they got married sometime in January
1987.

In September 1988, Aracelli borrowed an amount of 100,000 pesos which was

secured by a mortgage over the subject property. As payment, Araceli issued a
check drawn against China Banking Corporation payable to Claudio. The said check
was dishonoured due to the account had already been closed. The petitioners failed
to satisfy the demand for payment.

On April 26, 1990 respondent Claudio Acero filed a complaint for violation of (B.P.
22) against the petitioners. On October 21, 1992, the RTC acquitted the petitioners
but ordered them to pay Claudio the amount of P100,000 with legal interest from
the date of demand until fully paid.

On March 15, 1993, a writ of execution was issued and Sheriff Felixberto Samonte
levied upon the subject property. On March 9, 1994, the said property was sold on
a public auction. Claudio D. Acero Jr., being the highest bidder, acquired the
ownership of a parcel of land formerly owned by petitioners Araceli Oliva-De Mesa
and Ernesto S. De Mesa (Spouses De Mesa).. Thereafter, respondents Acero and his
wife Rufina (Spouses Acero) leased the subject property to its former owners and
Juanito who then defaulted in the payment of the rent. Unable to collect the rentals
due, Spouses Acero filed a complaint for ejectment with the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) against Spouses De Mesa. The MTC ruled in Spouses Acero’s favor. The court
order to vacate the place by Juanito and De-mesas.

In their defense, Spouses De Mesa filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), seeking to nullify TCT No. T-221755 (M) on the basis that the subject
property is a family home which is exempt from execution under the Family Code,
and thus, could have not been validly levied upon for purposes of satisfying their
unpaid loan. However, the RTC dismissed their complaint. The Court of Appeals
(CA) affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the family home is exempted from execution

HELD: Petition is DENIED.

The family home’s exemption from execution must be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction.

The court agreed with CA that the petitioners should have asserted the subject
property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it
was levied or within a reasonable time. Having failed to set up and prove to the
sheriff the supposed exemption of the subject property before the sale thereof at
public auction, the petitioners now are barred from raising the same. Failure to do
so estop them from later claiming the said exemption.

For all intents and purposes, the negligence of Petitioners De Mesa or their omission
to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the presumption that
they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert it. Since the exemption under
Article 153 of the Family Code is a personal right, it is incumbent upon the De Mesa
to invoke and prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriff’s
duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a family home.

The foregoing rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption

from execution, could be summarized as follows:

First, family residences constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or
before August 3, 1988must be constituted as a family home either judicially or
extrajudicially in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be
exempt from execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt
from execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a

family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing there
after,are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively
entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.
Teofista Babiera vs Presentacion Catotal

Posted by kaye lee on 11:33 PM

G.R. No. 138493 June 15 2000

FACTS:

Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista. She

asserted that the birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth,
the signature of informant forged, and contained false entries, to wit:

 That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariñosa;

 Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is falsified;

 Teofista's correct family name is GUINTO, not Babiera;

 Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her status is an illegitimate child;

 It was clinically and medically impossible for Hermogena to bore a child at 54

years of age; her last child birth was when Presentacion was born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth void and
ineffective, and to order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the
hereditary rights of Presentacion who inherited the estate.

Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed
therein her certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card.
She also filed a motion on the grounds that:

the petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the child
of Hermogena and Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the
petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the Family Code;

and that the petition was barred from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of
the Family Code.

The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion. CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Presentacion has legal capacity to file the special proceedings
pursuant to Art. 171;

2. Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and barred by the statute of
limitation;

3. Whether or not the public record of Teofista's birth is superior to the oral
testimony of Presentacion.

RULING:

Petition is not meritorious.

1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code shows
that it applies to instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's
child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed child
of the mother. Present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give birth to
Teofista. The present action does not impugn Teofista's filiation to Eugenio and
Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. The reason
why Presentacion took interest on Teofista's status is to protect the former's
successional rights.

2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive period
for action to impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the
cancellation of Teofista's Birth Certificate, it does not impugn her legitimacy. The
action to nullify the birth certificate does not prescribe because it was allegedly
declared void ab initio.

3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence
presented during trial, sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the
issuance of birth certificate.

First, the birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the
mother's signature was different from other signatures. Second, no medical records
or doctor's prescription that provide as evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy. It was
impossible for her to have given birth at 54 years of age. Third, the disposition of
Hermogena which states that she did not give brith to Teofista and that the latter
was not hers of Eugenio.

Belen Sagad ANGELES vs Aleli “Corazon” Angeles MAGLAYA

(G.R. No. 153798; Sept 2, 2005; J. Garcia)

FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate on January 21, 1998 in the City of Manila,
leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties.
Respondent Corazon claims that as the sole legitimate child of the deceased and
Genoveva Mercado has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
required of an administrator. Petitioner Belen claims, as Francisco’s second wife and
surviving spouse, that she should be made administratix of Francisco’s estate. She
claims that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was
recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was
not signed by him. Further she said that respondent, despite her claim of being the
legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not presented the
marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable
document to prove such union. She also said that she and Francisco adopted a
child.

Respondent in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices, the
January to December 1938 records of marriages of the Civil Registrar of Bacolor,
Pampanga where the alleged 1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were
destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little consequence, owing to her
having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of
adoption entered by the RTC at Caloocan. Respondent testified having been in open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Four other witnesses
testified on her behalf, and she also offered in evidence her birth certificate which
contained an entry stating that she was born at the Mary Johnston Hospital, Tondo,
Manila, to Francisco Angeles and Genoveva Mercado and whereon the handwritten
word “Yes” appears on the space below the question “Legitimate? (Legitimo?)”.
Pictures taken during respondent’s wedding as bride to Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya;
a copy of her marriage contract, and her scholastic and government service
records, were also offered as evidence.

RTC ruled in favour of Petitoner, CA ruled in favor of respondent.

ISSUE: WoN respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles

and Genoveva Mercado?

HELD: NO. CA erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate child

is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art 146).
However, the presumption of legitimacy under Art 164 may be availed only upon
convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were
legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence
of that marriage. Respondent failed to present evidence of Francisco’s marriage to
Genoveva, thus she cannot be presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth Certificate
presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted.
Not even by Genoveva. It was only signed by the attending physician making it only
proof of the fact of the birth of a child. The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter
fixed by law itself, it cannot be made dependent on the declaration of the attending
physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. None of the
evidence respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or recognition.

Further, RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of
Francisco and Belen of their child, said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of
Francisco and Genoveva; following the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein
respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of
Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent’s
legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been
judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has
thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between
herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless
of the form of the latter.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the

estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the
deceased.
IDA LABAGALA, petitioner

VS.

NICOLASA SANTIAGO, AMANDA SANTIAGO AND HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

respondents

G.R. No. 132305

December 4, 2001

FACTS:

Jose T. Santiago is the owner of a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729, located
in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. However, his two sisters sued him for
the recovery of 2/3 portion of the land alleging that he had fraudulently registered
it only in his name. The trial court ruled in favor of his sisters and their names were
included in the certificate of title to said property. After 3 years, Jose died intestate.
His sisters then filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court for the recovery of
1/3 portion of the said land which was in the possession of the Ida C. Labagala,
who claimed to be the daughter of Jose.
Respondents alleged that Jose’s share in the property belongs to them by operation
of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and
without issue. They claimed that the sale of the property made by their brother to
Ida Lagala sometime in March 1979 was executed through petitioner’s machinations
and with malicious intent. Jose never put his thumbmark on document she
executed but always signed his name in full and he could not have sold the property
belonging to his “poor and unschooled sisters who sacrificed for his studies and
personal welfare.” Petitioner also has no means to buy the said lot.

Petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by
respondent, but Ida C. Santiago and she is daughter of Jose. She said that the
property was donated to her. Petitioner recognized respondents’ ownership of 2/3
ofthe property as decreed by the RTC. She caused the issuance of a title in her
name alone so she could avail the realty tax amnesty, because the respondents
refused to take action to prevent the property being sold by public auction due to
non-payment of realty tax.

The trial court ruled in favor of Labagala. According to the trial court, the said deed
constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were not, Labagala would still be entitled of
Jose’s share of the property for she is the daughter. The matter was then brought
to the Court of Appeals. However, it reversed the decision of the trial court. It
considered the birth certificate of Ida stating that she was born of different parents.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose Santiago’s 1/3 portion of the
property he co-owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.

(2) Whether or not respondents may impugn petitioner’s filiation in this action
for recovery of title and possession.

RULING:

(1) No. The Court ruled that there is no valid sale in this case. Jose Santiago did
not have the right to transfer the ownership of the entire property to Ida Labagala
for the 2/3 of the said property belonged to his two sisters. Moreover, one of the
essential element of a contract is consent. The petitioner is a minor at the time of
sale thus absent of the said consent will render it void. In addition, petitioner
admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property which also renders it void.
Furthermore, the deed cannot be a valid donation. Being a minor, the acceptance of
the donation should have been made by her father, mother or legal representative.

(2) Yes. Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to
assert and prove that a person is not a man’s child by his wife. However, the
present respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate
child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all. A baptismal certificate. A
baptismal certificate is not a conclusive proof of filiation. Use of a family name
certainly does not establish pedigree. Thus, she cannot inherit from him through
intestate succession.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

1)

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al. (G.R. No. 105625

January 24, 1994)
FACTS: Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian-Benitez owned various
properties in Laguna. Isabel died in 1982 while Vicente died in 1989. Vicente died
intestate.

After Vicente’s death, his sister and nephew filed a case for issuance of letters of
administration of Vicente's estate. They claim that Isable and Vicente were childless
and that one Marissa Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them since
childhood is not their child and was not legally adopted by them.

Marissa opposed the petition and alleged that she is the sole heir of deceased
Vicente and capable of administering his estate. She presented Certificate of Live
Birth, as one of her evidences to prove her claim.

The trial court decided in favor of Marissa and dismissed the petition of Vicente’s
sister and nephew. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code
on impugning the legitimacy of the child.

The appellate court reversed the trial court ad held that Articles 166 and 170 of the
Family Code are not applicable.

ISSUE: Are Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code applicable in this case?

HELD: No. Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code do not contemplate a
situation, like in the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of
nature or biological child of a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a
situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus,
under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child.

As regards the Birth Certificate which lists Marissa as the child of Isabel and
Vicente, the court said that it is highly questionable and suspicions. Under Article
410 of the New Civil Code, is states that, "the books making up the Civil Registry
and all documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall
be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." The totality of contrary
evidence presented by the sister and nephew of Vicente show that Isabel did not
become pregnant as testified to by the witnesses. Also the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Isabel Chipongian executed by Vicente
himself and by Isabel’s brother, stated that they are the sole heirs of the deceased
Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants or ascendants". In
executing this Deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of
Marissa where it appeared that Vicente was Marissa’s father.

Therefore, Marissa’s petition before the Supreme Court was dismissed.

Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals 230 SCRA 130

People vs. Tumimpad 235 SCRA 483

FACTS:

Sandra Salcedo at the time of the incident was a 15-year old Mongoloid and
daughter of Lt. Col. Teofisto Salcedo and Pastora Salcedo. She had a mind of a five-
year old child, who still needed to be fed and dressed up. Her vocabulary was
limited and most of the time she expressed herself by motions.

Col. Teofisto Salcedo was then Provincial Commander of Misamis Occidental. Four
security men were assigned to him, two of whom were accused Constable Ruel
Prieto and accused-appellant Moreno Tumimpad.

It was on August 7, 1989, when Sandra complained of constipation. Mrs. Salcedo

then brought her to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a checkup. Medication was given
to Sandra but her condition did not improve. Sandra became irritable and moody.
She felt sick and unhappy.

The following day, August 8, 1989, Sandra saw Moreno Tumimpad coming out from
the kitchen and told her mother, "Mama, patayin mo 'yan, bastos."

Sandra was brought to a doctor in Oroquieta City for a second checkup. Dr. Conol,
the examining physician, ordered a urinalysis. Jose C. Lim, a Medical Technologist,
conducted the urinalysis. The result revealed that Sandra was pregnant.

During the trial, Sandra Sandra singled out the pictures of Moreno Tumimpad and
Ruel Prieto. Her mother testified also that she requested her two-daughters-in-law,
Joy Salcedo and Celsa Salcedo, to ask Sandra the identity of the persons who
sexually molested her. The accused moved that a blood test, both "Major Blood
Grouping Test" and "Pheno Blood Typing" be conducted on the offended party, her
child Jacob and the two accused. The result of the test conducted by the Makati
Medical Center showed that Jacob Salcedo has a type "O" blood, Sandra Salcedo
type "B," accused Ruel Prieto type "A" and accused-appellant type "O."

ISSUE:

W/N his conviction was based on the medical finding that he and the victim have
the same blood type “O.”

HELD:

Accused-appellants' culpability was established mainly by testimonial evidence

given by the victim herself and her relatives. The blood test was adduced as
evidence only to show that the alleged father or any one of many others of the
same blood type may have been the father of the child. Ruel Prieto was acquitted
on reasonable doubt, stating that he “has a different type of blood with (sic) the
child Jacob Salcedo as his type of blood is “A,” while that of child Jacob Salcedo is
type “O.”

As held by this Court in Janice Marie Jao vs. Court of Appeals 19 :

Paternity ---- Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood samples of
the mother, the child, and the alleged father, it can be established conclusively that
the man is not the father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot show
only a possibility that he is. Statutes in many states, and courts in others, have
recognized the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of the decisions have
recognized the conclusive presumption of non-paternity where the results of the
test, made in the prescribed manner, show the impossibility of the alleged
paternity. This is one of the few cases in which the judgment of the Court may
scientifically be completely accurate, and intolerable results avoided, such as have
occurred where the finding is allowed to turn on oral testimony conflicting with the
results of the test. The findings of such blood tests are not admissible to prove the
fact of paternity as they show only a possibility that the alleged father or any one of
many others with the same blood type may have been the father of the child.

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant's guilt of the crime of rape having been proven

beyond reasonable doubt, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
Ilano vs. Court of Appeals 230 SCRA 2
Alberto vs. Court of Appeals 232 SCRA 745
Gono-Javier vs. Court of Appeals 239 SCRA 593

Juan Casocot, the alleged natural grandfather of petitioners, was said to have
owned during his lifetime five (5) parcels of land in Nasipit, Agusan.

On 13 February 1978, petitioners filed a case with the Regional Trial Court (“RTC”)
of Butuan City for the recovery of ownership and possession of the above five
(5)parcels which they claimed were merely held in trust for them by private
respondents. Petitioners averred that they were the children of deceased Catalino
Gono, an acknowledged natural child of Juan Casocot, who, by intestate succession,
should thus be held to be the owners of the property.

Private respondents contended that since the complaint had failed to state that
Catalino Gono had been recognized by Juan Casocot either in a record of birth or in
a will, an independent action for voluntary recognition should have first been
instituted to permit any intestate successional right to legally pass to petitioners.

Parcel covered by T.D. No. 738 had been sold by Juan Casocot to private
respondents Restituta and Fermin Casocot on 19April 1960 and a portion to private
respondent Marave.

Private respondents belied the claim that petitioner Gono-Javier purchased the
property from the Provincial Government of Agusan. private respondents assail the
defense of prescription. They have the possession of the property for 17 years.
Gaspay vs. Court of  Appeals 238 SCRA 163
Perido vs Perido, 63 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Lucio Perido married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong,
with whom he begot three children. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina
Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his
second wife died in 1943. On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the
first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a Declaration of Heirship and
Extra- judicial Partition (“Partition”).

The children belonging to the first marriage filed a complaint praying for the
annulment of the Partition. They alleged that the five children of Lucio Perido with
Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to
the estate of Lucio Perido. This is based on the theory that the children are born out
of wedlock. In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in
1905, after the first three children were born; and that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido
was still a widower, as shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in
said year.
ISSUE

Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioners are sufficient to attack
the validity of marriage between Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat

RULING:

No. The certificates of title issued to him in 1923 were not conclusive to show that
he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. It is weak and insufficient to
rebut the presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married
to each other. This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is
involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of
those who allege the illegitimacy. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony
are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to
the case, to be in fact married. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. Always presume marriage."

De la Puerta vs. CA 181 SCRA 861

Tan vs. Trocio A.C. No. 2115, 27 November
27 1990
Mangulabnan vs. Court of Appeals 185 SCRA 760
People vs. Rafanan 182 SCRA 811