Islamic Theology

Traditionalism and Rationalism

Binyamin Abrahamov

Edinburgh University Press

 To Michael Schwarz

O Binyamin Abrahamov, 1998

Edinburgh University Press

22 George Square, Edinburgh

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 CONTENTS

Introduction vii
I T h e Foundations of Traditionalism 1

2 The Place of Reason in Traditionalism 12

3 Traditionalism against Rationalism '9

T h e Traditionalists' Criticism of the Use of Rational
Methods
The Attitude towards the Kalám and the Mutakallimün
4 T h e Foundations of Rationalism
5 T h e Rationalists' Criticism of Traditionalism
6 Compromise between Rationalism and Traditionalism
7 Summary
Appendix 1 The Creed of Abü Zur'a 'Ubaydalláh ibn
'Abd al-Karim al-Razi (d. 264'878) and
Abú Hatim Muhammad ibn Idris
al-Razi (d. 277/890)
Appendix 11 Al-Mukhtasar fi usü1 aldin
Appendix 111 Two Passages on Reason and Tradition
Appendix IV Kitáb usül al-'adl wa'l-tawhid wa-nafy
al-jabr wa'l-tashbih
Notes
References and Abbreviations
Primary Sources
Secondary Sources
Index
 INTRODUCTION

It is a common human phenomenon that tradition and reason

may oppose each other, mainly because tradition causes continuity,
and hence stability, while reason causes change, and hence insta-
bility. Tradition is usually uaced back to a great authority such as
the teachings of great ancestors, while reason is based on personal
efforts and does not submit to externa1 authority. In the domain of
religion, the debate between tradition and reason is sharper than
in other domains, for tradition has the authority of divine revela-
tion. However, tradition and reason may be harmonised and may
complete each other. The Greek philosophers had set forth
rational proofs for the existence of God' and arguments against
popular religion,' and the history of the great monotheistic reli-
gions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, attests to the dispute
between reason and tradition and to the attempts to make them
compatible. Muslim philosophers have dealt extensively with the
relationship between philosophy and revelation, generally coming
to the conclusion, whose source is neeplatonic, that the notions
contained in the Scriptures are symbols of the philosophic truth.3
The strife between Muslim philosophers and traditional theologians
gave birth to works dealing with a variety of issues, for example al-
Ghazáli's (d. ~ O ~ / I I I Tahajut
I ) alfalasifa ( The Incoherente o/ the Phi-
losophers)' and to books and chapters which treat specific issues
such as the etemity of the world, God's ignorante of the particulars,
the Resurrection and logic.5 The relatively narrow scope of this
debate seems to be due to the fact that philosophy has not pen-
etrated into wide circles of Muslims, who, as a result, have not felt
threatened by the philosophers' teachings. The philosophers for
their part felt sometimes that there was no common ground to
debate with the theologians. The Christian philosopher Yahya ibn
'Adi (d. 363/974) accused the Mutakallimhn of not fully under-
standing Aristotle's Kitab al-jadal ( Topica) .6
 ...
Vlll ISLAMIC THEOLOCY: TRADITIONALISM A N D KATlONALISM

T h e principal theological struggle in Islam, for which we have

relatively numerous pieces of evidence, has taken place between
traditionalist theologians and rationalist ones. The latter are repre-
sented by the Mutakallimün, the speculative theologians, whether
Mu'tazilites, Ash'arites, Matüridites or other groups. We should
immediately note that the boundaries between these two groups of
theologians, the traditionalists and the rationalists, are not always
definitely marked. This will be elucidated later. Whereas in the
dispute between philosophy and tradition, the traditionalists
themselves are almost absent and it is carried out between tlieolo-
gians and philosophers, in the dispute between speculative theology
and tradition, the traditionalists participated fully and brought
forward arguments which refute the rationalists' notions. Con-
cerning the issue of reason versus tradition, modern scholars seem
to have devoted more attention to the thought of the philoso-
phers, the Mutakallimün and the sectarians than to the thought of
the scholars who belong to the central trend of Islam, namely, the
theologians of 'the people of the Sunna and the Consensus' (ahl
al-sunna wa'L-jarmira), those who usually have not used Kaláni
speculation in their works, o r have limited their use of speculative
arguments to a minimum. A major part of the arguments of this
trend demonstrates intellectual consistency and sophistication.
The centrality of this struggle in Islamic thought, and the fact that
modern scholars have paid little attention to it,' justify treating this
subject again. Thus, the present work aims at examining the foun-
dations of both traditionalism and rationalism in classical Islamic
thought, the criticism levelled by each system of thought against
the other and the attempts which have been carried out to recon-
cile reason and tradition. It is not a historical study, in the sense of
retracing the development of arguments and systems of thought,
although sometimes we shall show such developments (see below,
Chapter 2 , n. q n ) , partly because the foundations of traditionalism
have not changed to a great extent over the a g e ~rather,
;~ it identi-
fies trends and directions. T h e materials studied are from the
third/ninth century until the tenth/sixteenth c e n t ~ r y1. ~
have not
tried to be exhaustive - it is impossible in such a work - but 1 have
tried to give examples for each trend o r notion, assuming that
such trends and notions which will be discussed below occur also
in materials which have not been dealt with here.
O n e of these issues is the conclusion arrived at in the present
study that pure or extreme traditionalism does not belong exclu-
sively to the Hanbalites, but also to the Sháfi'ite, the Malikite and
 INTRODUCTION ix

Hanafite scholars. Another issue is the question of the attitude

towards a sinner o r an innovator in religion. As is well known, the
orthodox (ahl al-sunna) neither considered the sinner and the
innovator an unbeliever nor prevented prayer behind hirn. This
attitude is confirrned by Ibn Taymiyya's staternent, which consti-
tutes the title of a chapter, to the effect that the traditionalists
neither declare Muslirns to be unbelievers on account of a sin or
an innovation, nor prevent prayer behind thern.'" However, as we
shall see, sorne Shafi'ite scholars adopted a severe attitude towards
sinners and innovators, iricluding considering thern unbelievers
and the prohibition of praying behind them. Thus the Hanbalites
were not always those who adopted extreme stands. The fact that
Muslim scholars have not always been cornrnitted to the teachings
of their schools as expressed by sorne eminent rnembers of those
schools has been already stated by G. Makdisi."
1 would like now to clarify the basic terrns which are used in the
present work. The word 'tradition' means literally handing over,
but it also includes the object of handing o ~ e r ,which,
'~ in o u r case,
is practices o r beliefs. The words or deeds of Muharnrnad and his
earlier followers, the Companions (a&ahüba) and their Followers
(tübi'ún), were handed down to posterity in a kirid of communica-
tion which is called tladith (a tradition, literally a tale or a report).
The hadith tells the Muslirns Muharnmad's norrns and beliefs
(sunna, pl. sunan) which they rnust carry out and in which they
rnust b e l i e ~ e .The
' ~ people who have dealt with the hadith, that is,
those who have transrnitted, criticised and compiled traditions, are
called in this work 'traditionists' (ahl al-hadith or rnuhadithth,~~).
This terrn should be differentiated from 'traditionalists', namely,
those who have regarded religious knowledge as deriving frorn the
Revelation (the Qur'an), the Tradition (the Sunna) and the Con-
sensus (ijm')and preferred these sources to reason in treating
religious matters. The tradi tiorialists are rnostly narned ahl al-sunna
wa'l-jamüra (The people of the Tradition and the Consensus).'l It
seems to m e that the rnost common expression omits the Qur'an,
for it was evident that al1 Muslim sects believed in the Qur'án, but
some groups did not adhere to the Sunna.'j Consequently, this
designation has polemic overtones.
In the present study, the terrn 'rationalisrn', with which 1 arn not
completely satisfied, nieans the tendency to consider reason the
principal device or one of the principal devices to reach the truth
in religion, and the preference of reason to revelation and tradi-
tion in dealing with sonie theological rnatters, rnainly when a
X l S L A M l C T H E O L O G Y : T R A D I T I O N A L I S M A N D RATIONALISM

conflict arises between them. In Islamic thought, those who held

that reason is man's sob authority in attaining the truth were
regarded as unbelievers, and as such they fa11 outside the scope of
this study.I6When we speak of rationalists in our context, we mean
those who attacked the traditionalists and their doctrines on the
basis of reason, claiming that much, but not all, of religious knowl-
edge can be known through reason. The term 'rationalism' must
be distinguished from 'rationality' which means treating any issue
by using reason, but without giving reason priority. Rationality
turns to rationalism when reason is prior to revelation. If a thinker
proves God's existence and unity through rational proofs without
having recourse to the Qur'an and the Sunna as primary sources,
he beconies a rationalist in these suúject matters. A traditionalist may
be rational in dealing with a theological issue - this phenomenon
will also be discussed - but he may not ascribe to reason any advan-
tage over the Qur'an o r the Sunna. His point of departure is the
sacred texts.I7Figures like Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taymiyya have used
reason in treating theological matters; Ibn Taymiyya claimed that
the notion of using reason occurs in the Qur'án, and hence there
is no contradiction between revelation and reason.18Within Islam
there is no pure rationalism, in the sense that al1 religious issues
derive from reason. There are different degrees of rationalism; the
most rationalist group is the Mu'tazila who used reason as a source
of knowledge in many theological issues, whereas the Ash'arites
are less rationalist than the Mu'tazilites. But there is pure tradi-
tionalism. Traditionalists who have not used reason in deriving the
principles of religion can be called pure traditionalists. Those
among the traditionalists who have used reason in proving some of
the principles of religion were sometimes called mutakallimü ahl al-
hadith (the speculative theologians of the people af Tradition) .Ig

Al-Ash'ari represents a Mutakallim of ahl al-hadith; when he proves

the existence of God o n the basis of the doctrine of atoms and
accidents,'" he is a rationalist, for he does not rely on the Qur'an to
prove this idea. The Qur'an serves him only as corroboration. The
same term applies to any theologian who has recourse to reason
instead of tradition in proving a theological notion. Thus the term
'rationalist' applies to a Muslim theologian only in a certain o r in
some issues; it cannot be used without reservations." It seems to
me that ahl al-hadith represenis the highest degree of traditional-
ism, whereas other traditionalists allowed a certain measure of
reason in dealing with theological problems. Ibn Taymiyya repre-
sents the rational trend of traditionalism. In spite of his adherence
to tlie Qur'an, the Sunna and the Consensus of the Salaf, he does
not regard the Qur'an as only a report (khabar) but as a device
which teaches man rational argumenis. However, he does not
become a rationalist, because even when he uses rational proofs,
he ascribes them to the Qur'an. Thus Ibn Taymiyya remains in the
framework of rationality and not of rationalism. Sometimes, for
the same theological issue, there are two solutions, one traditional
and the other rational. When speaking of Paradise, al-Baghdadi
states that there is a rational possibility of the passing away of Para-
dise, but according to the Tradition Paradise will exist forever." It
is worth noting that a diversity of opinions concerning the source
of theological doctrine has existed even among the Mu'tazilites,
the most rationalist group of the Mutakallimün. 'The command or
the urge to d o what is approved and the prohibition against doing
what is reprehensible' (al-amr bi'l-marriif wa'l-nahy 'un al-munkar),
which is one of the five principies of the Mu'ta~ila,~3 is learned by
some Mu'tazilites both from reason and revelation and by others
from revelation only.'4
This study focuses on the foundations of both traditionalism
and rationalism, the arguments which the two tendencies used
against each other and the compromise made by some thinkers
between them. In the following, we shall discuss the foundations
of traditionalism (Chapter I ) , the place of reason in traditionalism
(Chapter 2), Traditionalism against rationalism (Chapter 3), includ-
ing the traditionalists' criticism of the use of rational methods and
the attitude towards the Kalam and the Mutakallimün, the founda-
tions of rationalism (Chapter 4), the rationalists' criticism of tradi-
tionalism (Chapter 5 ) and the compromise between traditionalism
and rationalism (Chapter 6). The appendices include a creed and
texts which clarify some of the problems discussed.
 THE FOUNDATIONS OF
TRADITIONALISM

We have learned the foundations of traditionalism from the tradi-

tionalists' creeds, counsels to their followers and statements. The
hierarchy of these foundations is established by us according to
the texts, although they do not al1 make mention of al1 these foun-
dations.
The first foundation of traditionalism in medieval Islam is the
strict adherence to the teachings of the Qur'án, the Sunna of the
Prophet and the Consensus (zjmür)mainly of the first generations
of scholars.' This foundation is characteristic not only of the
Hanbalites, who have been described in the scholarly literature as
the main proponents of traditionalism, but also of members of
other schools of law, for example the Shafi'ites. The Shafi'ite theo-
logian al-Tayrni (d. 535/1140) emphasises the role of the Qur'an
and the Sunna:
The people of truth make the Qur'an and the Sunna their
model (imüm) and they search for religion through both of
them. What they have attained through their intellect and
mínd, they subject to the examination of the Book and the
Sunna. If they find it compatible with both of them, they
accept it, and they thank God for showing them this and for
His guidance. If they find it opposing the Qur'an and the
Sunna, they leave what they have attained and turn to both
of them and blame themselves (for finding such a notion).
That is because the Book and the Sunna guide the people
only to the truth, while man's opinion may be true o r false.'
Thus the Book and the Sunna serve not only as the source of truth
but also as the criterion for examining what man obtains through
his intellect. One should note that some of the ideas of traditional-
ism were developed by Sh~fi'itetheologians and appeared later in
Hanbalite works.3
2 ISLAMIC T H E O L O G Y : T R A D I T I O N A L I S M A N D RATIONALISM

Let us examine an example of adherence to the Qur'an, the

Sunna and the Consensus in dealing with a specific theological
issue. In the Shafi'ite scholar al-lalaka'i (d. 418/1027), the discus-
sion of predestination begins with interpretation of Qur'án verses
through the device of al-tafsir bi'l-ma'thür (interpretation through
putting forth traditions). Qur'an 37.96 'God has created you and
your action' (allah khalaqakum wa-mü ta'malüna) is interpreted,
according to a tradition traced back to Hudhayfa ibn al-Yaman (d.
36/656), to mean that God creates people and their actions.+Like-
wise, the verse 'We have created everything through a decree'
(Qur'an 54.49) is interpreted by 'Abdallah ibn 'Abbas (d. 68/687)
to mean that God has created al1 people through a decree and also
that He has created good and evil.5 In the same manner, al-lalaka'i
interprets dozens of verses and then cites traditions independent
of the Qur'an verses6The third phase in al-Lalaka'i's discussion of
God's predetermination sets forth the consensus of Muhammad's
Companions and their Followers through citations of their state-
ments which advocate God's predetermination.7 He neither uses
speculative reasons nor compares verses o r traditions in order to
draw theological conclusions. Thus al-Lalaka'i follows the dictum
adopted by some traditionalists, to the effect that there is n o anal-
ogy in the Sunna (laysafi'l-sunna qiyüs). By analogy, they mean any
speculative argument which may answer the theological questions
of how and ~ h yThe. ~ prohibition against dealing with God's essence
(la tafakkaa fi dhüt al1üh)"hrough using rational proofs is a part of
this rule. The Qur'an and the Sunna contain what man should
know and beheve,'" and therefore any discussion involving exter-
nal devices such as rational arguments is rejected. It is in this
framework that o n e should place the prohibition stated in severa1
traditions of dealing with the problem of God's predetermina-
tion." Thus extreme (or pure) traditionalists consider speculative
reasoning concerning theological issues as something to be avoided.
They sometimes go so far in their adherence to the Qur'an and the
Sunna as to say that whoever refutes one verse of the Qur'an re-
futes the whole Qur'an, and the same with regard to the Sunna."
When these three elements of traditionalism, the Qur'an, the
Sunna and the Consensus, are joined together, they lead to certain
and true perceptions which n o interpretation can oppose. Con-
cerning the issue of man's seeing God in the world to come, al-
Darimi (d. 280/893) says: 'If the Qurá'n, the Messenger's saying
and the Consensus of the community join, there is n o other
interpretation'.'3
 T H E FOUNDATIONS OF TRADITlONALlSM 3

Here it is appropriate to treat the authoritativeness of the three

principles of traditionalism, for the discussion of this subject is rel-
evant to the adherence to them. Basing the authoritativeness of
these three principles justifies and strengthens their acceptance,
and rejects the rationalists' claim to use reason as proof of theo-
logical tenets. However, there is a difference between the Qur'an
o n the one hand and the Sunna and the Consensus on the other.
While the authoritativeness of the Qur'an derives from its being
divine and eterna1 speechl+- although in Arabic literature there
have been a few attempts to criticise its contents and style'5- the
proofs of the authoritativeness of the Sunna and the Consensus
were discussed at length by Muslim scholars. One of the ways taken
to establish the authoritativeness of the Sunna, certainly - as the
context proves - with the airn of refuting those who have attacked
the Tradition (see below, pp. qff.), naniely the rationalists, was to
equal it to the Qur'án. In a tradition quoted by al-lalaka'i, Jibril is
said to have sent down (küna yunrilu) the Sunna on Muhammad
and to have taught him its contents just as he did,with regard to
the Q ~ r ' a n .In
' ~Sharh al-Sunna, a work by the Shafi'ite scholar al-
Husayn ibn Mas'üd al-Baghawi (d. 516/1122), Muhammad is
quoted as saying that he was given the Book with what resembles it.
According to al-Baghawi, Muhammad received the unrecited texts,
the Sunan, just as he received the recited text, the Qur'an. As a
corroboration, he cites Qur'an 3.164 'Truly God was gracious to
the believers when He raised up among them a Messenger from
themselves, to recite to them His signs and to purify them, and to
teach them the Book and the Wisdom, though before they were in
manifest error' (tr. Arberry). The Book is the Qur'an and the
Wisdom (hikma) is the Sunna." The adherence to the Qur'an and
the Sunna is a title which occurs in the Hadith literature. Here the
Hadith is legitimised through the Hadith itself.IR
Four centuries after al-Baghawi, the farnous Shafi'ite scholar
Jalál al-Din al-Suyüti (d. g11/1505)tried to vindicate the use of the
Sunna as a tool equal to the Qur'an in religious matters. His work
entitled Miftüh al-jannafi-7-i'tisüm h'l-sunna (The Key to Paradise is
the Adherence to the Sunna) begins with a statement made by a
Shi'ite (rüjidt) to the effect that traditions should not be employed
as arguments and that only in the Qur'an should one find one's
arguments. Paradoxically, in support of his contention, this Shi'ite
brings as evidence a tradition according to which the Prophet says
that 'You should subject any tradition coming from me to the
judgement of the Qur'an, then, if you find its root in the Qur'an
4 ISLAMIC THEOLOGY: TRADITIONALISM AND RATIONALISM

you should accept it, othenvise, you should reject it'.'g Thus the
Qur'an judges the Sunna, which has n o independent status, and
the Qur'án contains the criteria of what man must know. However,
according to al-Suyüti, whoever denies that a prophetic tradition
may be used as an argument is an unbeliever.'" Basing himself o n
great authorities such as al-Shafi'i (d. 205/820) and Abu Bakr
Ahmad ibn al-Husayn al-Bayhaqi (d. 458/1065), he states that the
Qur'an (4.171,24.62 and 3.164 cited above) connects the belief in
Muhammad with the belief in God and that God orders the Mus-
l i m ~to follow His revelation as well as the Prophet's traditions
Varada Allah 'ala al-nüs ittiba' wahyihi wa-sunan rasulihi)." The
Sunna is compared to the Qur'an in traditions which state that if
the believers adhere to the Qur'an and the Sunna they will never
err." The equalisation of the Sunna to the Qur'an is expressed
also from three other points of view: ( 1 ) the S u m a was sent down
like the Qur'an;'3 (2) the Sunna should be studied as the Qur'an is
studied;'+ (3) the sanctity (or inviolability, hunna) of the Messen-
ger's traditions is like that of the Qur'an.l5 This last notion is also
expressed in a slightly different manner in another tradition cited
by the Málikite scholar Abü 'Umar Yüsuf ibn 'Abd al-Barr (d. 463/
1070). It reads: 'What God's Messenger prohibited (ma harrama
rasül allah) is like what God prohibited (mithl mü harrama allah)'.'"
Again, in the context of refuting the rationalists, there appears the
view that the Sunna contains what the believer should know. Al-
Suyüti, basing himself on Abü Bakr al-Khatib al-Baghdadi's (d.
463/1070) Sharaf ashab al-hadith, says that whoever is content with
the Tradition does not need anything else, for it contains the prin-
ciples of religion, such as God's unity, His attributes, the prophets'
stories, history, the biography of the Prophet, Qur'án interpreta-
tion, laws and so on."
In sum, the authoritativeness of the Sunna is proved not only
because it is the summa of the Prophet's sayings and actions which
were trarismitted through chains of reliable Muslims, but also
through the idea that the Sunna is equal to the Qur'án in rank
and, hence, should be regarded as such. Thus the Qur'an is not
the sole Islamic revelation.
The authoritativeness of the Consensus (hujjiyyat al-ijma') has
been thoroughly discussed by H o u r a n i . 2 ~ m üis' sometimes based
o n the Qur'an, for example, Qur'an 4.115, from which o n e can
learn that man must follow the 'way of the believers' which
amounts to c ~ n s e n s u s . ~ ~ o m e t i m
it eissbased on prophetic tradi-
tions such as 'what the believers regard as good is good in God's
eyes and what they regard as evil is evil in God's eyes'3' o r 'my com-
munity does not agree on an error',3' and the trustworthiness of
the tradition itself is based on t~watur.3~
The attitude towards reason
as a means to prove the authoritativeness of the Consensus is not
definite. Although most of the usulis (those who treat the subject
of the principies of law - usul al-fiqh) did not consider reason a
source for proving the authoritativeness of consensus, some of
them did attempt to d o so.33 According to Hourani, generally in
the discussions of the basis of ijmarthe kind of group which consti-
tutes the zj'müris not specified.34 1 have the impression, however,
that many traditionalists regard the consensus of the first genera-
tions of Muslim community, especially the Companions of the
Prophet and their Followers, as the best consensus. Contrary to
Hourani,35 not only the Hanbalites regard the zj'ma'of the ancient
scholars as obligatory, but, as we shall see, so do scholars of other
schools of t h o ~ g h t . 3 ~
In this context, it is worth noting the meaning of the word
jamara (literally 'group'), which occurs in the term ahl al-sunna
wa'l-jamaa. According to al-Shatibi in his al-l'tisámj7 as quoted by
al-Lalaka'i,J8Muslimscholars have five definitions of jamü'a: ( 1 ) the
majority of the Muslims; ( 2 ) the leading scholars of the Muslim
community; (3) Muhammad's Companions; (4) al1 Muslims when
they agree on a certain matter; (5) al1 Muslims when they agree on
a certain leader. Generally, the extreme traditionalists adopt the
second o r the third definition o r both of them,Jg while the moder-
ate wing of traditionalism speaks of the consensus of the commu-
nity. In al-Lálaka'i, many traditions enjoin Muslims to adhere to
the community (aljamá'a). Arnong them is a tradition traced back
to 'Umar which tells that the best people are the Sahüba; those who
canie after them are inferior and so forth until lies will diffuse. In
this case, one should have recourse to the community, since the
Devil exists with the individual. The jamüra, theri, is presented as a
device which prevents people from believing in lies.4" Although
the best consensus remains that of the &haba, that of the commu-
nity is not rejected.
The need to adhere to the public ('jamüra) is stated by the
Hanbalite scholar Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 5g7/1200) by means of a tradi-
tion uaced back to 'Umar ibn al-Khatgib, which reads: 'Whoever
wants the pleasure of Paradise must join the community (al-
jamüra), for the Devil exists with the individual and he is remotest
from the two'."' According to other traditions, God protects the
community, and whoever leaves the community may be liable to
6 ISLAMlC T H E O L O G Y : T R A D l T l O N A L l S M A N D R A T l O N A L l S M

the Devil's attack, like a sheep which may be liable to the wolf S
attack when it leaves the flock. God unites the people for the purpose
of their keeping the right ~ay.~'Jamü'ais the opposite of iftiraq
(division), and division causes perdition. The adherence to the
community, meaning the consensus, serves as a guarantee to the
preservation of the Muslims. Uniformity protects any group of
people from being led astray. Hence, dispute (jadal) should be
rejected.43 As we shall immediately see, the holding of different
opinions, which endangers the community, also appears in
polemical context when dealing with the principle of homogeneity.
The second foundation of traditionalism is the idea that the
principles of religion, which derive from the above-mentioned
roots, namely, the Qur'an, the Sunna and the Consensus, are h o m e
geneous. Hence, any disagreement concerning these principles is
reprehensible. Referring to Qur'an 3.105, 'Be not as those who
scattered (tafawaqü) and fell into variance ( i k h t a w ) after the
clear signs (bayyinat) came to them' (tr. Arberry), the Shafi'ite
scholar al-Bayhaqi (d. 458/1065) states that the Qur'án, the Sunna
and the Consensus of Muhammad's Companions have affirmed
God's attributes (sifat),M the believers' seeing of God in the World
to Come ( mjat allah)+5and the Intercession (shafa'a).4%oever
denies these principles and contradicts them does so after the
coming of the clear signs, meaning the Qur'an, the Sunna and the
Consensus. Al-Bayhaqi adds that the Prophet's Companions have
agreed on the principles of religion, and as for the branches (furil,
the laws), which stem from these principles, and matters for which
there is n o text either in the Qur'an o r in the Sunna, they have
agreed on some of them and disagreed on others.47 T h e Law-giver
(sühib al-shar) has allowed his Companions this kind of disagree-
ment which originates from the system of deriving conclusions
(istinbat) and the system of formulating independent judgements
( ijtihad) .t8
Apart from introdiicing traditions which defame dispute (jadal)
in theological issues, such as 'They [meaning the ancient scholars]
hated diversity in religion (aldin) ' or 'Beware of debates in religion',49
the traditionalists tried to prove the principle of homogeneity by
referring to real experiences of scholars. The famous traditionist
Muhammad ibn Isma'il al-Bukhári (d. 257/870) says that over forty-
six years h e has met more than 1,000 scholars from different dis-
tricts - some of the most prominent of them are indicated - al1 of
whom were agreed upon the tenets of Islam.5" A similar notion
appears in a creed related by two scholars of Rayy, Abü Zur'a 'Ubayd
 THE FOUNDATIONS OF TRADITIONALISM 7

Allah ibn 'Abd al-Karirn (d. 264/878) and Abü Hatim Muharnmad
ibn Idris ibn al-Mundhir (d. 277/890), who were critics of Hadith.5'
Both of thern stated that the scholars frorn al1 the cities in Hgáz, al-
'Iraq, al-Sham and al-Yaman had agreed on the sarne articles of
faith.5' According to Ibn Qutayba, the traditionists (ahl al-hadith)
are characterised by agreernent and homogeneity.53 It seems that
the underlying assurnption of the traditionalists, who sought
hornogeneity, was the idea that adhering to the same sources, the
Qur'án, the Sunna and the Consensus, would bring about identi-
cal results."Also the tendency to stress the prophetic tradition was
the result of the aspiration to hornogeneity.55
A part of the notion of homogeneity is the polemical statement
that while the Mutakallirnün move from one notion to another,
the traditionalists are stable and d o not change their minds even if
they are subjected to severe trials. Stability in one's opinions is a
sign of certain belief and truth. In Ibn Tayrniyya, agreement in
views, absence of divergencies and, hence, stability serve as criteria
for rneasuring one's proximity to truth. Thus, for exarnple, the dif-
ferences in the philosophers' notions testify to their remoteness
from truth." Uniformity, which is the outcome of following the
Qur'an and the Sunna, causes stability, and also serves the aim of
preserving the cornmunity from destruction. Nations have per-
ished because of heresies.57
As a result of the above-mentioned notion, one should not
accept without reservation Goldziher's statement that 'indeed, the
conception of diversity as a divine favour was not limited to the
ikhtihf alfuqaha (dissent among legal experts), but was extended even
to doctrinal difference' ('Catholic Tendencies and Particularism in
Islam', p. 130). Goldziher rightly points out that orthodox Islam
never produced formal institutions for the establishing of dogmas
(ibid.), but ignores the fact that uniforrnity in rnatters of theology
rnay be achieved, as indeed happened, through informal dyna-
mism rnotivated by the strict adherence to the Qur'an, the Sunna
and the Consensus.
A logical consequence of following the Sunna of the Prophet is
the adherence to those who are responsible for the collection and
transmission of traditions, which is the third foundation of tradi-
tionalisrn. In the first rank stand Muhammad's Companions
($haba)" and their Followers (Tabirun).In the second rank stand
ahl al-hadith or ashüb al-hadith, rneaning the people who deal with
traditions, or, as we have stated, the traditionists. The Sahaba are
the best, the purest and the rnost just people whom God has
8 I S L A M I C THEOLOGY: TRADITIONALISM A N D R A T I O N A L I S M

chosen. This is proved through Qur'án verses and traditions.59 Praises

of Muhammad's Companions and apologia for them in exknsiue
fonn occur not only in Hanbalite literature, but also in writings of
scholars who affiliated with other schools of la^.^ Abü Bakr ibn al-
Arabi al-Mu'afiri (d. 543/1148), an eminent scholar of the Málikite
school, wrote a book entitled al-'Awüsim min al-qawüsim, fi tahqiq
mawüqij al-sahaba barda wafüt al-nabi salla allüh 'alayhi wa-sallama
('The Defence against Attack, o n the Verification of the Compan-
ions' Stands after Muhammad's Death'). A general survey of the
traditions dealing with the Sahaba in al-Lálaka'i's sha. usül shows
the importance ascribed to the adherence to them. These tradi-
tions occupy the seventh and eighth parts of al-Lalaká'i's work. It is
stated there that the love for the Sahaba stems from the Sunna,
and people are urged to love them. People are forbidden to abuse
the Sahaba, and God will curse and punish severely whoever abuses
them. Many traditions are devoted to the praises of the first four
caliphs and other eminent &habis such as Talha, al-Zubayr and
Abú 'Ubayda. That the idealisation of the pious ancestors is an
important part of traditionalism is also demonstrated through the
creeds of al1 the schools of Law. The creed of the Malikite jurist
Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawáni (d. 386/996) states:
The best of generations is the generation who saw the Mes-
senger of God and believed in him. Next are those who
followed them, and next are those who followed these. The
most excellent of the Companions (of Muhammad) are the
rightly and truly guided caliphs, Abu Bakr, then 'Umar, then
'Uthman, then 'Ali. Let not any of the Companions of the
Messenger be mentioned except most honourably and with-
out reference to what was disputed among them. They,
above other people, deserve to have the best construction
put upon (their conduct) and to have the best views attrib-
uted to them.='
However, in al-Lalaka'i's view the term ahl al-hadith includes not
only those who transmit traditions but also those who transmit and
recite the Qur'an, becaiise one of the Qur'án's names is hndith
(Qur'an 39.23 'God has sent down the fairest discourse', a&an al-
hadith . ..), and because people learn the Qur'an from them." The
traditionists are highly praised, for they are the bearers of God's
knowledge and religion and are the mediators between. God and
His community. Their influence on the community is great in
their life, because of their pietistic conduct, and after their death
 THE FOUNDATIONS OF TRADITIONALISM 9

they are also venerated through the visiting of their t0mbs.~3Ibn

Tayrniyya gives Ibn Hanbal's funeral, in which thousands of people
participated, as an example of adoration for those who follow the
Sunna. Likewise, al-Shafi'i and other scholars were glorified by
many people, for they adhered to the S ~ n n a . ~Some
4 scholars, like
Ibn Hazm, were honoured only when they adhered to the Sunna,
but criticised whenever they deviated from k 6 5
Until now we have dealt with the positive elements of tradition-
alism, namely, the adherence to the Qur'an, the Sunna and the
Consensus, homogeneity of ideas and the following of the
traditionists. However, traditionalism also has negative founda-
tions which are n o less extensively dealt with in the religious litera-
ture. Contrary to adherence to the Qur'án, the Sunna and the
Consensus stands the opposition to any innovation (&dra)which is
regarded as going astray (dalala).66 Just as the source of the truth is
adherence to unchanged and definite principies, so the source of
deviation and innovation is adherence to different, changeable
prin~iples.~7 And contrary to the following of the traditionists,
there is a clear opposition to the innovators which takes various
forms.
One of these forms is the prohibition against disputing with
(munazara) the innovators (ahl al-&dar), speaking with them and
listening to their innovative views.@The estimation of the innova-
tors' religious stand is obviously expressed in the notion that they
are regarded as those who cannot repent of their innovation,
whereas sinners can repent of their sins.@This means that innova-
tion is even graver than polytheism, for a polytheist may change
his status and become a Muslim, whereas an innovator remains in
his status. According to the Hanbalite scholar Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 597/
IZJOO), not only the innovators but also those who sit with them are
dangerous to Islam.7" The reason for this is the following tradition:
'Whoever helps (in another version "honours") an innovator helps
to destroy Islam'." The innovator is so abominable a person that
even if he walked on water (a reference to Jesus' miracle) or on
air, he would not be accepted by the pious people. A certain Bishr
ibn al-Hárith is reported to have said: 'While 1 was walking in the
market 1 heard about the death of al-Maris1.7~If the market had
been a place of prostration, 1 would have prostrated myself, thank-
ing God and praising Him for killing him.'73
As we have seen, a part of the rejection of any innovation is the
prohibition against dealing with metaphysical issues,74 such as
God's attributes and essence, or predetermination. One of the
1O ISLAMIC T H E O L O G Y : TRADITIONALISM A N D RATIONALISM

traditions which expreses this prohibition is: 'Think of (tafakkaw)

God's creation and not of Him' (in another version 'His essence'
( d h ~ t ) .This
' ~ prohibition is one of the foundations of the bi-lü
kayfa doctrine with which 1 have dealt in my 'The bi-lü kayfa Doc-
trine and Its Foundations in Islamic Theology'. Al-Lálaka'i devotes
a chapter (vol. 2, pp. 627ff.) to the prohibition against treating the
problem of predestination (qadar). He quotes the renowned tradi-
tion which reads: 'Do not speak of anything relating to qadar, for i t
is God's secret, so d o not disclose God's secret1.7Wneis forbidden
to deal with predestination because it leads to heresy (zandaqa).77
The ban on associating with the people of q ~ d a r 7arises ~ logically
out of the ban on treating the qadar problem.79 The Qadarites are
regarded as God's adversaries, as the Zoroastrians of this commu-
nity (majüs hadhihi al-umma) and as those who will bring destruc-
tion to their community. The Children of Israel are brought forward
as an example of a community which caused itself destruction on
account of their controversy over this question." The Qadarites
are also considered unbelievers and, hence, their punishment is
death.82The traditionalists' attitude towards the Qadarites is best
exemplified by the prohibitions against praying behind them,
marrying them, eating animals slaughtered by them, and accept-
ing their testimonies." They also accuse those who adhere to
heretical views84of unbelief.
Contrary to the explicit prohibition against disputing with the
innovators, one can find a trend which allows such a dispute and
even recommends how it should be carried out. According to a
tradition traced back to 'Umar ibn a l - K h a t ~ band quoted by sev-
eral authorities,@ there will come a time in which people will
dispute ahl al-sunna wa'l-jamiira through using the ambiguous
verses of the Qur'án (shuhhüt al-qur'ün). The tradition advises the
scholars to employ traditions in this dispute, for those who are
experts in traditions know the Qur'an b e ~ t . ~ W also
e learn here
the value of traditions in disputes concerning the Qur'án. Al-
Suyúti, stating that the Qur'án, contrary to the Sunna, has many
aspects ( d h ü wujüh) ,87 justifies the use of traditions in polemics on
the Qur'án. It is related that 'Ali ibn Abi Tálib sent Ibri 'Abbás to
dispute with the Khárijites; he was ordered to dispute on the basis
of traditions, not the Qur'an, because the Qur'an has many
aspects, otherwise the dispute would take the shape of 'we say' and
'they say' (naqülu wayaqülüna), in other words, a dispute without
victory for either side. Ibn 'Abbas did as he was ordered and the
Kliárijites were unable to argue against him.08It is also charactenstic
 T H E F O U N D A T I O N S OF TRADITIONALISM 11

of the traditionalists to resort to arguments which, according to

thern, are definitive by virtue of their nature and, hence, cannot
be refuted.
A further elaboration of the attitude of the traditionalists
towards the rationalists will be set forth in Chapter 3, which deals
specifically with the traditionalists' attitude towards the Kalám and
the Mutakallirnün. The present issue belongs to this chapter and
the next.
 THE PLACE OF REASON IN
TRADITIONALISM

Both the traditionalists and the rationalists use reason, but there is
generally a clear difference between the two parties with respect to
the status of reason within their systems. This difference is per-
spicuously stated by al-Taymi. According to him,' the innovators
base their doctrines on reason ('aql), while stating that traditions
are subject to reason. The traditionalists, on the other hand, say
that the basis of religion is following the traditions, and reason
comes after traditions. They argue that if religion were based on
reason, people would not need revelation arid prophets,' the orders
and the prohibitions would be cancelled and people would follow
their wills. Moreover, it would be posible for the believers not to
accept anything unless it appears reasonable to them. In al-
Taymi's view, there are many issues in religion, such as God's
attributes, Paradise and Hell, the Punishment in the Tomb ('adhab
al-qabr), the Balance (al-mizün) and so o n , whose true meariings
believers cannot perceive through reason, notwithstanding that
they are obliged to believe in and to accept them. If people under-
stand anything of religion, they must thank God, for He causes
their understanding.3 The right method of dealing with religious
issues, which cannot be understood through reason, is not to
make a decision (tawqzf) concerning such issues, and to delegate
their knowledge to God ( t a f i i d ).+
A similar notion is put forth by al-Lalaka'i. He states that the
necessity (wujub) of man's knowledge of God and His attributes
derives from the sam' (here the meaning is the Qur'án and the
Sunna, but sometimes the term includes also the Consensus) and
not from reason. To prove his statement, the author cites some
verses, for example Qur'an 47.19 'Know therefore that there is no
god but God'; 6.106 'Follow what has been revealed to you from
your Lord; there is no god but He; and turn away from the
idolators'; 21.25 'And We sent never a Messenger before you except
 T H E PLACE O F REASON IN TRADITIONALISM '3

that we revealed to him, saying: "There is no god but 1; so serve

Me"'. Other verses show that the necessity of one's knowledge of
the messengers also derives from the sacred texts, for example
Qur'án 7.158 'Believe in God and His Messenger ...'; 17.15 'We
never chastise, until We send forth a Messenger'.s Traditions are
put forth to show that God sent Muhammad.'
The traditionalists, however, d o not altogether annul the func-
tion of reason in religion, but assign to it a secondary function,
namely, to prove what has been revealed or transmitted, o r to
know how to perform the precepts.7 The attitude towards the notion
of taqlid may show the difference between the traditionalist and
the rationalist positions. Taqlid means following blindly someone
else's teaching without bringing proofs or criticising.' Al-Taymi
defines taqlid as accepting someone else's view without a proof
(qabül qawl al-ghayr min ghayri hujja).g In his view, there is a clear
difference between adherence to a doctrine (ittibá') accompanied
by proofs, and taqlid.'" T h e Qur'an and the Sunna order man to
adhere to their teachings but not to follow them blindly. Muslims
have tiaditional proofs (dalá'il samriyya)which attest to Muhammad's
prophecy and which were transmitted to them by transmitters
(ruruüt). After accepting the authenticity of Muhammad's proph-
ecy, Muslims are obliged to believe in the contents of his prophecy
which comprises God's unity, His attributes and so on. As far as it
is put forth by the Qur'an and the Sunna, reflection (nazar) in
order to attain more certainty and tranquillity of the soul is not
rejected." Al-Tayrni opposes the Mutakallimún's stand according
to which the first obligation on man is reflection (nazar) which
brings about knowledge of the Creator (awwal ma yajibu 'ala al-
insan al-nazar al-mu'addi ilá marrifat al-bañ)." The arguments which
he uses against this stand are based on tradition and reason. He
asks, for example, 'How can it be that man's first obligation was
hidden from the Sahaba who were the first leaders of this commu-
nity and the mediators between Muhammad and the Muslims?"
And traditions, which were transmitted through the process of
t a w a t u ~ ,relate
'~ that Muhammad called the unbelievers to Islam,
and called upon them to express the two testimonies of the profes-
sion of faith (shahüdatayn) and not to speculate.'s
The traditionalists demonstrate their notions not only through
traditional proofs but also through various rational proofs. Even
traditionalists who are not primarily identified as Mutakallimün
used to employ rational arguments, sometimes even Kalam argu-
ments, to prove traditional dogmas. Combining traditional and
'4 ISLAMIC THEOLOGY: TKADITIONALISM AND KATIONALISM

rational proofs is characteristic of many traditionalists. This phe-

nomenon may be explained mainly by their polemics with the
rationalists which frequently forced the traditionalists to use
rational arguments. T o illustrate the use of rational proofs, let us
bring some examples. It is very fitting to begin with Ibn Hanbal,
who has become down the ages a symbol of traditionalism. Ibn
Hanbal refutes the Jahmites,'s who argue that God is everywhere.16
After quoting Qur'an verses to the effect that God sat Himself
upon the Throne (istawa 'ala al-ársh, Qur'an 7.54, 20.5)~he states
that there are places, such as man's body, which are not appropri-
ate for God's greatness ( 'izam).Thus it is impossible for God to be
there." This is a simple rational argument which is based on the
contradiction between the Jahmites' contention and o n e of God's
most beautiful names, namely, God's being the greatest ('azim) .18

This argument appears later in al-Ash'ari and in the writings of his

successors.'"
However, Ibn Hanbal also uses arguments characteristic of the
Kalám. O n e of these is the argument from disjunction (qisma or
taqsim) Concerning the issue just discussed, he asks the Jahmite
.'O

whether God was without anything before creation. The Jahmite

answers in the affirmative. Then Ibn Hanbal raises the following
question: 'When God created a thing, did He create it inside Himself
or outside Himself?' The answer to this question can be divided
into three parts, only one of which is right. If the Jahmite argues
that God created the creation inside Himself, h e will be consid-
ered an unbeliever, for he argues that Jinn (demons), people and
Devil are inside God. If he argues that God created the material
world outside Himself then entered into them, this also will be
unbelief, for he argues that God entered into dirty places. Finally,
if he argues that God created His creation outside Himself then
did not enter into them, he will withdraw his contention. This last
possibility is the view of ahl al-sunna."
Al-Lalaka'í uses a way of proving known as istinbüt, which means
to produce a logical argument based on a Qur'an verse." As an
example, let us take the issue of the uncreatedness of the Qur'an
advanced by ahl al-sunna. The foundation of the argument is
Qur'ari 36.82 'His command, when He desires a thing, is to say to it
"Be" ( k u n ) , and it is'. This verse shows us that God creates every-
thing by saying to it kun. Now, if kun, which is God's speech consid-
ered by the Mu'tazilites to be created, is also created, then a created
thing created another created thing which leads to an iininter-
rupted chain of creations, which is an absurdity.'3 It is to be noted
 T H E PLACE O F REASON I N T R A D I T I O N A L I S M '5

that the framework of the argument is a tradition. Another istinbat

is based on Qur'án 7.54 'Verily, His are the creation (khalq) and
the command (amr)'. God differentiates between the two words
khalg and amr. Khalg means the created things (mkhluqat), whereas
amr is the Qur'an, that is, God's uncreated speech.'4
Al-Lalaká'i reports a conversation between a certain person and
Abü al-Hudhayl al-'Alláf (d. 235/850), the head of the Mu'tazilite
school of Basra. Abü al-Hudhayl was asked about the Qur'an and
answered that it was created. T h e conversation continues as fol-
lows: Q Does a created thing die o r will it live forever? A: It will
die. Q: When will the Qur'án die? A: When those who recite the
Qur'an die, the Qur'an will die. Q: [Suppose] those who recite the
Qur'an died and the world passed away, and then God would say:
'Whose is the Kingdom today?' (Qur'an 40.16). This is [Cod's
speech, namely] the Qur'án. Although people already died [the
Qur'an still speaks, which means that it is eternal]. Abü al-Hudhayl
answered to this: '1 d o not know', and he was perplexed.?5Without
paying attention to the authenticity of this story, which does not
matter here, this passage shows that the traditionalists, in this case
al-Lalaka'i, tried to refute their opponents through using reason
and systems of Kalam.
Sometimes the traditionalists employ the technical terms of
their opponents to prove that the latter contradict their own
thesis, or cannot act according to it. Abü Ishaq al-Shirazi, a
Shafi'ite scholar (d. 476/1083), tells us about a dispute between
one of the people of unity (ahl al-tawhid) and a Mu'tazilite, who is
called here a qadañ."jThey were both near a tree. The qadañ took
a leaf from the tree and said: 'Did [not] 1 make o r create [this
action]?' (He thus referred to the Mu'tazilite doctrine that man
makes o r creates his a c t i o n ~ . ~T' )h e traditionalist answered: 'If you
are right, then return the leaf to its first condition, for whoever is
capable of doing something is also capable of doing its opposite
(man qadara 'ala shay'qadara 'ala diddihi')." This is one of the com-
ponents of the Mu'tazilite doctrine of man's creation of his acts.'"
As 1 have pointed out elsewhere,3" simple rational arguments
are adduced to refute the figurative interpretations of anthropo-
morphic verses o r traditions. O n e of these traditions tells about
God's descent to the lowest heaven at the end of every night. In
this event, God states: 'Whoever calls Me, 1 will answer him, who-
ever asks something, 1 will give him, and whoever asks forgiveness,
1 will forgive h i m ' . ~According
' to the figurative interpretation, it is
not God who descends every night, but His command and mercy,
I6 I S L A M I C T H E O L O G Y : T R A D IT I O N A L I S M A N D R A T I O N A L I S M

for God is everywhere and His position does not change. The tra-
ditionalist scornfully attacks this argument saying that it belongs to
the kind of arguments used by women and children. However, he
does not content himself with ad hominem argument. In his view,
their argument does not hold water, for God's command and
mercy descends to the earth every minute, thus there is n o need to
particularise a part of the night for this descent. Moreover, does
God cal1 people to ask forgiveness through His command and
mercy? Or does He make His command and mercy speak in His
name? An affirmative answer to the last question obliges the oppo-
nent to ask the command and the mercy forgiveness, which is an
absurdity. The traditionalist regards the opponent's stand as rejec-
tion of the truth even if the latter knows it (mukabara)."
Another argument used by al-Darimi against al-Marisi can be
named as the a forlion' argument. Al-Darimi states that 'we do not
allow independent reasoning (ijtihad al-ra y) in many juristic issues
which we see and hear, the more so concerning God's attributes
which we d o not see and on which we cannot conjecture'.33
According to al-Marisi, one must not intei-pret the word 'finger'
which occurs in the famous tradition 'the people's hearts are
between two of God's fingers734as God's power (qudra). From the
point of view of the Arabic language, says al-Dárimi, this interpre-
tation is untenable, because the identification of 'finger' with
'power' is not found in any of the Arabic dialects. Moreover, people
always speak of God's powerand not of His powers.35
Linguistic considerations are also put forth when dealing with
the problem of God's attributes. The Mu'tazilites distinguish
between two kinds of attributes: essential attributes (sifat al-dhat)
and factual attributes (s@t al$?) .36 God is entitled to factual atttibutes
only when He acts, whereas essential attributes are regarded as al-
ways inhering in Him. Consequently, the attributes Creator, Bene-
factor, Provider, and so on refer to God only after He creates, gives
support, provides and so on. Thus they are not eterna1 and inher-
ent attributes of Him. Al-Tayrni refutes the notion of factual
attributes through putting forth linguistic examples taken from
the ordinary use of language. We say a cutting knife, a satiating
bread and quenching water, for we know that cutting, satiating
and quenching will come into effect through these three objects,
even if now these acts d o not exist. In like manner, God is the
Creator, the Benefactor, the Provider and so on before He created,
gave support and provided, for these acts will come into effect in
the future on behalf of God.37 It is worth noting that the Sháfi'ite
 T H E PLACE OF REASON I N T R A D I T l O N A L I S M '7

traditionalist scholar al-Bayhaqi (d. 4581'1065) accepted the Kalam

distinction between essential attributes and factual attributes,
emphasising that God always deserves the factual ones but not
from eternity.3'
Very important to our inquiry is al-Taymi's distinction between
in tellect ( 'aql) and knowledge ( 'ilm). First, quoting an anonymous
scholar, he states definitely that religion is not perceived by the
intellect (al-din Ia yudraku bi'l-'aql). Then he states what he means
by the intellect. The intellect is divided into two parts: inborn
intellect ( 'aql ghañzi) and acquired intellect ( 'aql iktisübz). By the
inborn intellect, one can abstain from damage and bring benefits
to oneself. The inborn intellect grows in the course of a man's life
until he reaches the age of forty (Qur'an 46.15) whereupon his
intellect is perfect. This growth is called acquired intellect. How-
ever, after the age of forty the intellect decreases as man becomes
old and feeble-minded. Contrary to the decrease of the intellect
after the age of forty, man's knowledge increases every day. Al-
Taymi seems to understand knowledge as the accumulation of
information in the mind, a process which does not stop. It must be
admitted that the difference between these two kinds of intellect is
not so clear, because what he calls acquired intellect seems to grow
due to experience, which continues throughout life. Al-Taymi
does not attempt to explain this obscurity. However, since the
intellect stops its growth and attains its perfection at forty, whereas
man never stops attaining knowledge, the intellect is weaker than
knowledge. Consequently, owing to its weakness, religious issues
cannot be perceived by the intellect, but, owing to the strength
and multiplicity of knowledge, they can be perceived by knowl-
edge.39
The judgement of the intellect, says al-Taymi, is different from
the judgement of knowledge. Knowledge regards issues in religion
as appropriate, whereas the intellect regards the same issues as
inappropriate. For instance, sexual intercourse is rejected by the
intellect, whereas knowledge and religious law deem it right.
Furthermore, if the intellect had perceived religion, the rational
persons ('uqalá') among the unbelievers, especially the Qurayshites
who were renowned for their intellectual ability, would not have
insisted on unbelief. The chapter ends with the notion that knowl-
edge is stronger than the intellect, because God is described as
knowing ('alim) and not as having intellect ('üqil) .4"
The Qur'an is sometimes described as containing the rational
proofs which the believer needs. For example, concerning the
r8 I S L A M I C T HE O L O G Y : T R A D I T I O N A L I S M A N D R A T I O N A L I S M

Resurrection, the Qur'an states that if God was able to create the
world and man, it will be easier for Him to revive the dead (Qur'an
17.50). Likewise, the Resurrection is compared to God's causing
the earth to give birth to plants. Whoever can revive the earth can
revive the dead (Qur'an 35.9). And the existence of one Creator is
proved through the argument that many gods would destroy the
heaven and the earth. Qur'an 21.22 reads: 'Were there gods in
earth and heaven other than God, they would surely go to ruin'
(tr. A r b e r ~ y ) .According
~' to Ibn Taymiyya, one should consider
the Qur'an not only as a basis of information in religious matters
but also as a source of rational proofs concerning God's existence,
His unity, prophecy and the world to come." This notion can be
traced back to al-Ash'ari's Risálat istiban al-khawd fi 'ilm al-Kalam,43
and from him it might have reached al-Ghazali who developed the
idea in his al-Qistas al-mustaqzm. Al-Ghazali's work might have influ-
enced the traditionalist Malikite scholar Abü Bakr Muhammad ibn
'Abdallah ibn al-'Arabi (d. 543/1148), who met al-Ghazali and
learned from h i m . Answering
~ the question relating to the excuse
of scholars who deviate from the teachings of the Qur'an and deal
extensively and profoundly with rational proofs concerning the
knowledge of God, Ibn aLfArabi states that the Qur'an includes
rational proofs in a concise manner and in allusions. The Qur'an
sets forth the roots of rational proofs and not their branches and
related topics. The function of extending and explaining these
proofs and supplying their branches in a complete form is to be
carried out by the scholars. The second excuse of the author is
connected with polemics; the scholars wish to show to the unbe-
lievers (mulhida) and to the innovators (mubtadiá) that the use of
reason does not belong to them exclusively. The unbelievers and
innovators are thus aware that they are refuted by means of every
kind of argument.45 Thus, according to the traditionalists, rational
arguments constitute an integral part of the Qur'an.
In sum, we have seen that reason plays an important role for the
traditionalists, whether as a device for proving their tenets, or as a
polemical tool. However, since reason was not the basis of uadi-
tionalism and because it served as the core of the teachings of
their adversaries the rationalists, the traditionalists have criticised
the use of rational arguments. How they have treated this issue is
the subject matter of the next chapter.
 TRADITIONALISM AGAINST
RATIONALISM

THE TRADITIONALISTS' CRITICISM O F T H E USE OF

RATIONAL METHODS
Since our work treats Islamic thought as it appears mainly in theo-
logical treatises, works of usul and creeds, it is not our specific aim
to refer to other kinds of Islamic religious literature. However, we
must bear in mind that some Muslim scholars have criticised the
use of rational arguments in the interpretation of the Qur'án.'
They have prohibited the use of independent rational interpreta-
tion of the Qur'an (al-tafsir bi'l-ra y).' A criticism of rational methods
in the sphere of Islamic law is illustrated in the teachings of the
Zahirite school of law which rebuked the use of analogical reason-
ing (qiyüs) in deriving law from the Qur'án or the Sunna.3 In both
cases, the criticism was directed against the very use of rational
arguments, not against their place in argumentation or interpreta-
tion.
As we have seen, the traditionalists' attitude towards rational
arguments in theology is two-sided. On the one hand, rational
proofs of the principles of religion, such as God's existence, His
unity and attributes, are rejected by extreme traditionalists, but on
the other, the traditionalists use rational argurnents to prove prin-
ciples derived from the Qur'án and the Sunna and to refute their
adversaries. They oppose the tenets of the rationalists derived from
speculative considerations, and also the inevitable consequence of
using reason, namely, the diversity of the rationalists' theological
solutions, as against the uniformity of the traditionalists' teachings.
The foremost target of the traditionalists was the Mutakallirnün,4
the main body of Muslim scholars (except for the philosophers
who are not treated in this work), who used speculative ways of rea-
soning to formulate their theological tenets and also to attack the
traditionalists' approaches. An early example of a traditionalist's
20 ISLAMIC T H E O L O G Y : T R A D l T l O N A L I S M A N D RATIONALISM

criticism of rationalism is Ibn Qutayba's work Ta'wil mukhtalif al-

hadith, which constitutes his response to the Mutakallimün's criticism
of the traditionists ( a h l al-hadith) .5 The core of the Mutakallimün's
criticism of the traditionists is the latter's transmission of contra-
dictory traditions which brought about controversy in the Muslim
community which in turn caused it to split into sects each clairning
truth on the basis of traditions. Such sects are the Kharijites and
their opponents the M ~ r j i ' i t e sthe
, ~ Qadarites and their opponents
the Jabrites,' the Rafidites and their o p p ~ n e n t s . ~
Ibn Qutayba levels the same accusation, but from another point
of view; he blames the Mutakallimün for introducing contradictory
doctrines which are based on analogical reasoning and speculation.
Abü al-Hudhayl al-'Allaf,g for example, opposes al-Nazzam's'" doc-
trines, and al-Najjar" opposes both of them. They would have had
an excuse, says Ibn Qutayba, if they had differed on juristic matters,
but they differed on matters such as God's unity, His attributes
and power and so on, which are known to a prophet only through
revelation. Whereas, concerning the principies of religion, the
traditionalists are in agreement - the only exception being the
question of the reciting of the Qur'an, whether it is created or
uncreated - the Mutakallimün are in disagreement.lz Moreover,
they sometimes ascribe contradictory statements to the Qur'an,
and state that it attests to these contradictions. 'Ubayd Allah ibn al-
Hasan, a governor of the district of al-Basra, said that whoever
adhered to the doctrine of predestination was right, and whoever
adhered to the doctrine of free will was also right, because both
doctrines have their basis in the Qur'an.'3 There are also extremely
illogical teachings of the Mutakallimün. Al-Bakr, the eponym of
the Bakriyya sect, which is mentioned by al-Ash'ari as one of the
ten kinds of Muslims,'4 says that whoever steals a grain of mustard
then dies without expressing repentance will suffer in Hell forever
like Jews and Christians.'5
The notion that reason is multi-faceted and that it leads to
different directions also occurs in Ibn Qutayba's contemporary al-
Darimi (d. 280/893 or 282/895). According to al-Darimi , the intel-
ligible (ma'qül) is not homogeneous. Each sect considers its ideas
as intelligible and its opponents' ideas as unintelligible. Even in
one and the same sect, says al-Darirni directing his words to the
Jahmiyya, there are many groups, each clairning that its thought is
intelligible.16This phenornenon reminds one of the term taküfu'
al-adilla (equality of [contradictory] proofs), which means that al1
speculation is futile.'' Ibn Tayrniyya explains this term in reference
 TRADITIONALISM A C A I N S T RATIONALISM 21

to the Mutakallimün; what characterises them is arguments, contra-

dictions and doubts which are directed against other M~takallimün.'~
Ibn Taymiyya further develops the notion of the weakness of
speculation by saying that rational arguments vary and are some-
times self-contradictory.
The preference of rational arguments over traditional ones is
impossible and unsound. As for the preference of the tradi-
tional proofs, it is possible and sound . .. that is o n account of
the fact that being known through reason or not is not an
inherent attribute (sifa lüzima) of a thing but rather a relative
one (min al-umür al-nisbiyya al-idajiyya), for Zayd may know
through his reason what Bakr does not know, and a man may
know at a certain time through his reason what he will not
know at another time.'g
Thus reason is an unstable device, while tradition is stable and
does not change. According to Ibn Taymiyya, scholars dispute with
one another even concerning necessary knowledge which is
supposed to be h o m o g e n e o u ~There
. ~ ~ are many examples of the
phenomenon that reason leads to a variety of opinions. Thus, the
Mu'tazila and some of the Shi'a who followed them have disputed
with ahl al-ithbat (those who affirm God's attributes and predeter-
mination), each claiming that their respective tenets (the
Mu'tazilite denial of attributes and predetermination counters the
affirmation of attributes and predetermination by ahl al-ithbat) are
known through rational and decisive proofs (adilla 'aqliyya qat'iyya) ."
Moreover, the more remote a school is from Tradition the
greater the dispute among them. Thus the Mu'tazilites have
more debates among themselves than do the Mutakallimün
of ahl al-ithbat. The Shi'a exceeds the Mu'tazila in its interna1
disputes and the philosophers have the highest number of
divergent opinions."
'Ibn Tayrniyya does not ignore the question which one would
immediately raise, to the effect that the ancient scholars of Tradi-
tion (the Sahaba and the Tabirün) also engaged in debates relating
to religious issues so that they are not different from the
Mutakallimün of the Mu'tazila and of ahl al-ithbát and so that Tra-
dition, t o ~contains
, contradictory notions.'3 He says, however, that
when these debates were taking place, the ancient scholars turned
to God and to the Messenger in order to receive the right decision.
Some of them were right, and as a result God made their reward
22 ISLAMIC THEOL.OGY: TRADITIONALISM AND RATIONALISM

greater, and others were mistaken in their striving for truth, and
God forgave them. Answering, elsewhere, the question of how
'A'isha opposed two traditions of the Prophet through using
Qur'an verses, Ibn Taymiyya says: 'We d o not deny that they con-
tradicted one text by another. We only deny that they contradicted
the texts through their reason. T h e texts themselves d o not contra-
dict each other except for command and prohibition where one
text is abrogative (násikh) and the other is abrogated (mansükh).
As for pieces of information (akhbür), it is inconceivable that they
should contradict one another" (Dar', vol. 5, p. 23of.). By akhbür,
Ibn Taymiyya means non-practica1 doctrines like the question of
attributes and predestination. In h e , Tradition contains the solu-
tion to the problem of self-contradiction; n o externa1 device
should be used to solve it."+
In addition to his preceding conten tion, Ibn Taymiyya states
that traditional matters such as the affirmation of God's attributes
and His predetermination, whose truth the rationalists contest, are
known through necessary knowledge which ensues from the process
of tawütur.'s As a result of using tawatur, this knowledge cannot be
false; moreover it is certain, contrary to the opponents' rational
arguments which convey doubts and hence ~ n c e r t a i n t y .It
' ~is to be
noted that there are some other issues concerning which controver-
sies arose, such as the traditional docuine that the spirit was created
before the body while, according to the Kalám, ari accident, in this
case the spirit, cannot exist without a substrate, namely, the body.'7
Dealing with rational proofs leads not only to doubts and confu-
sion, but also to a mixture of truth and fal~eness.~'
'Those who oppose
the Qur'an and the Sunna through what they cal1 rational proofs
('aqliyyüt), such as speculative proofs (kalümiyyüt) and philosophi-
cal proofs (falsafyyat) and the like, base their doctrines only on
general and ambiguous opinions which bear many nieanings, and
their ambiguity in form and sense requires them to also include
truth and falseness.""bn Taymiyya regards the mixture of truth
and falseness as the origin of innovations (mamha'al-bzda'),for if
an innovation were totally false, this would be manifest and hence
it would be rejected; and if, on the other hand, it were totally true,
it would agree with Tradition, because Tradition does not contra-
dict pure truth. An innovation combines both truth and falseness,
and hence misleads people. Ibn Taymiyya explains that the
ancient sages applied rieither afirmation nor negation to the
innovations, for these two devices would have applied to both truth
and falseness.Jo
 TRADITIONALISM AGAINST RATIONALISM 23

Ibn Taymiyya also rejects the technical terms used by the theo-
logians and the philosophers. In their doctrines, they employ
terms which d o not belong to the pure Arabic of the Qur'an, the
Sunna arid ordinary linguistic usage.3' This is a part of the general
contention according to which the Qur'an and the Sunna did not or-
der people to engage in Kalam and the ancients did not deal with it.3'
O n e of the ways to fight against rationalism is to show the dan-
gerous consequences of the preference of reason over revelation.
This preference means that nothing can be learned from the
Qur'án and the Sunna, a notion which may cause unbelief and
heresy.33 Very probably following the Hanbalite scholar al-
Barbahári (d. 33o/g4r), Ibn Taymiyya goes even further, saying
that a deviation from revelation in one issue leads to total devia-
tion.34 Possibly, he alludes here to Mutakallimün who preferred
reason as a source of knowledge concerriing some theological
subjects such as God's attributes and predetermination, whereas
on other issues tliey remained loyal to the doctrines of traditional-
ism. Two more evil results are indicated: speculation, as experience
attests, does not bring about piety and indeed, those who engage
in it are usually immoral;35 and the preference of reason leads to
considering the comrnon people, who coristitute the majority of
the Muslims, unbelievers (takjir al-'awümm), for they know religion
only through adhering to the teachings of the Qur'án, the Sunna
and their ancest0rs.3~
Another main traditionalist target is the rationalists' figurative
interpretation (ta Wil) of the Qur'an and the Sunna. The rational-
ists justify their use of this device by stating that without it the
Qur'an and the Sunna are full of anthropomorphisms37 whicli
debase the true perception of God as eterna1 being unlike any
other being. It is not our aim here to elaborate on anthr-oponior-
phisrn, but rather to shed light on the reaction of the traditional-
ists to the method of ta'wil. However, an example is needed to
illustrate the problem. Let us put forth the famous verse in Qur'an
20.5 to which books and chapters were dedicated." It reads: 'The
All-Compassionate sat himself upon the Throne'. This verse was
interpreted by the likeners (mushabbihun) to rnean that God's
place is o n the Throne. Following the Jahmites, the Mu'tazilites
hold that God is everywhere, for if He were in a certain place, He
would be limited as a body.jWost of the Mu'tazilites think that
'God is everywhere' means that He directs and rules (istnrua, which
literally mearis 'he sat', is figuratively interpreted by using the verb
istawlü, meaning 'he ruled') every place.+"
24 ISLAMIC T I I E O L O G Y : T R A D I T I O N A L I S M A N D RATIONALISM

This kind of interpretation is vehemently attacked by the

Hanbalite scholar Ibn Qudáma al-Maqdisi (d. 620/1223) on the
strength of several arguments. The first argument is based ori the
famous verse (Qur'án 3.7) which reads:
It is He who brought down the Book; in it there are self-
evident verses (muhkamat) that are the basis of the Book
(umm al-kitüb) and others that are ambiguous (mutashabihat).
Those who deviate from the right way follow the ambiguous
verses for the purpose of [bringing about] dissension and of
interpreting them (ta'wilahu, interpreting the ambiguous
ories). Only God knows the interpretation of these verses
(wa-ma yarlamu ta'wilahu illa alkih). And the rnost erudite
persons (al-rasikhün Ji'l-'ilm) say we believe in them (the
ambiguous verses), each one (every ambiguous os self-evident
verse) is from God, and only the clever people pay attention
to [it] .4'
Accordirig to Ibn Qudáma, God rebukes both those who follow
the tahzl, which for him is obviously a wrong interpretation, and
those who strive for dissension. The two parties are accused of
deviation, which proves that striving for such an interpretation is
forbidden. Moreover, stating that 'only God knows the interpreta-
tion of these verses' means that God prevents them from attairiing
their aim. The following verse (3.8) 'Our God! Do not make our
hearts deviate after You have guided us' shows that believers do
not want to be like deviators who use the method of tafwiL.+
According to the second argument, which is also known from
other sources,+?if ta'wil had been obligatory on the Muslims,
Muhammad would have explained it, for a prophetic niessage
should not come late. And also, the Prophet is not above the
believers as far as carrying out laws (al-ahküm) is concerned, so if
ta Wzl had been obligatory on him, he would not have violated it.
Muhamniad was ordered in Qur'an 5.67 ( ' O Messenger, deliver
what has been sent down to you from your Lord') to deliver every
divine message to his community, hence it is inconceivable that he
should have not done so.X
Thirdly, the method of the ancient scholars and the religious
leaders who followed them (a'zmma;he may mean by this term the
heads of the juristic schools) with regard to anthropomorphisms
was to affirm (iqrar) and accept them without interpretation os
cancellation (ta'til). One rnust not oppose their way or deviate
from it.
 TRADITIONALISM AGAINST RATIONALISM 25

Fourthly, whoever uses figurative interpretation judges God

through criteria which cannot be known by the interpreter. H e
interprets God's intention without knowing what God intends.
According to Ibn Qudama, the best argument the interpreter can
put forth is that a certain word may be interpreted in a certain way.
However, one cannot deduce from the mere fact that there is a
possible interpretation that this is God's intention, for there are
other possible interpretations some of which the interpreter, who
is incapable of knowing al1 the meanings of a word, does not know.
As a corroboration for this notion, Ibn Qudáma cites Qur'an 7.33:
'God has forbidden . . . to speak of Him what one does not know'.
The fifth argument shows that tu Wil is an innovation in religion
against which the Prophet has warned the Muslims. Al-muta'aruzuil
(whoever interprets figuratively) renounces the Sunna of the
Prophet and that of the Righteous Caliphs.
In the sixth argument, Ibn Qudama states that there is n o need
to exert efforts for the purpose of establishing this kind of inter-
pretation, because n o action is required by religion as a result of
this interpretation. The believer must believe in the anthropomor-
phic words without knowing their meaning, just as he believes in
God's angels without knowing their essence.45 A similar argument
was already adduced by al-Taymi, who states that the discussion of
God's attributes is a branch of the discussion of God's essence.
The affirmation of God's essence is an affirmation of existence
(ithbüt wujüd), not modality (ithbüt kayfzyya). Likewise, the affirma-
tion of God's attributes is also an affirmation of existence and not
modality. On the question of how belief is vaiid when one does not
know the real meaning of the object of one's belief, al-Taymi an-
swers that belief is valid due to God's obligation on man to believe
which man absolutely knows. God orders man to believe in His
angels, Books, Messengers, the Last Day, Paradise and Hell, even if
man does not know al1 the aspects of these objects.4%ccording to
al:Taymi, there is a prohibition to deal with the modality of God's
attributes. This prohibition is expressed in the statement: 'God's
unity should not be dealt with through analogy (laysa al-tawhid bi'l-
qiyüs)'. Al-Taymi buttresses this statement by referring to the fact
that when God describes Himself in the Qur'an, He does not set
forth the causes of His attributes; God does not say, '1 know because
of such and such a cause'.47 Therefore, analogy should not be used
in this issue.4"
In the seventh argument, Ibn Qudma uses the method of
qisma.'"t us suppose, he says, that the tu Wil is obligatory. In such
26 ISLAMIC THEOLOGY: T K A D I T I O N A L I S M AND RATIONALISM

a case, there must be two possibilities; it is obligatory either on al1

the people (al-abün) or on whoever has a proof for it. The first
possibility, namely, the obligation to use tu Wilwithout knowing i t s
proof, means that God requires man to believe in ignorance (taklzf
al-qawl bi'l-jahl), which is forbidden by consensus. If it is not obliga-
tory on whoever does not know its proof, how do h o s e who adhere
to it order the masses (al-'amma) and those who d o not know its
proofs to use it?
Ibn Qudama regards ta'wil as a part of the niethod of individual
interpretation (al-raj). Since this method is forbidden, tu Wil is
also forbidden. In its kind, this argument (the eighth) is like the
fifth, which considers tu Wi1 a part of the general group of innova-
tions.
The ninth argument is as follows. Whoever uses tu Wil (al-
muta h w l ) combines two procedures: (1) he describes God through
an attribute which God does not use to describe Himself; and ( 2 )
he denies an attribute of God which God ascribes to Himself. For
example, if he says that the meaning of istawü (sat Himself on the
Throne: Qur'an 20.5) is 'He ruled', he describes God through an
attribute which God does not use to describe Himself, and he
denies of Him an attribute (istiruü') which occurs seven times in
the Qur'an. Could not God, Ibn Qudama asks ironically, say
istarulü (if He really wanted to say this word)?sn
Ibn Qudama also criticises the Mutakallimün for using the
method of al-istidlül bi'l-shahid 'ala al-gha'ib (literally 'inferring what
is absent from what is p r e ~ e n t ' ) .He
~ ' introduces the Kalam device
as follows: 'What is absent (al-ghü'ib) is Iike what is proved (thabata)
with regard to us (fi haqqina)',"' meaning that which is true con-
cerning man is also true concerning God. For the refutation of
this method, Ibn Qudama set forth three arguments: ( 1 ) the
Mutakallimün name God absent, whereas His names and attributes
appear in the Qur'an. Did the Mutakallimün, asks Ibn Qudama
sarcastically, not find a name for God out of His ninety-nine
names, so that they had to use another name?sj Moreover, God has
denied this name of Himself, saying: 'We were not absent' (Qur'an
7.7) .%
(2) The Mutakallimün are accused of tashbih, for their method
of istidlül likens God's names and attributes to man's names and
attributes, and this is the essence of tashúih.
(3) This argument is an elaboration of the second one. The
Mutakallimün affirm God's other attributes, such as hearing, see-
ing, knowledge and life. Now, using the method of istidlül means
 TRADITIONALISM AGAINST RATIONALISM 27

that God hears, sees, knows and lives through instruments, just as
man carries out these actions through instruments (organs, and
body in the case of life). Consequently, God is likened to His crea-
tion, a notion rejected by the Mutakallimün. Ibn Qudama employs
here the Kalam method of ilzüm w h i ~ hmeans forcing the imagi-
nary opponent to admit views which are absurd or heretical, or
contrary to the opponent's own views. It is carried out through
inferring conclusions from the opponent's opinions.55 In the
present argument, the basis is the opponent's method of istidlal
which is exploited to refute the Mutakallimün's rejection of
tashbih this procedure finally leads to the conclusion that the
Mutakallimun hold tashbih. Ibn Qudama, who vehemently attacks
the Mutakallimün, uses their method in order to render their
thesis untenable.

T H E ATTITUDE TOWARDS T H E KALAM AND T H E

MUTAKALLIMON
The attitude of the traditionalists towards the rationalists, mainly
the Mutakallimün, follows two principles: prohibition against
engaging in Kalam, including breaking off relations with and
excommunication of the Mutakallimun; and refutation of their
tenets. These principles are expressed in different ways. Al-Suyüti
banned discussion of Kalam issues, for debate causes controversies
and innovations in religion. He compared his prohibition to the
prohibition against dealing with the ambiguous verses of the
Qur'an.sGBasing himself on 'Abdallah ibn Muhammad al-Harawi's
(d. 481/108g) Dhamm al-kakim wa-ahlihi, al-Suyüti points out that
the hostile attitude towards the Kalam and the Mutakallimün is
not characteristic only of one generation. Indeed, it has accompa-
nied al1 the generations beginning with the Sahaba and ending
with scholars of the fifth/eleventh century, including (it could not
be othenvise) the imams of the great schools of law.57 As we have
seen elsewhere, it is typical of the traditionalists to strengthen their
views through relying on the ovenvhelming majority of the Muslims.
In a work entitled Akhbür 'Amr ibn 'Libayd5"tten by the Sháfi'ite
traditionist and lexicographer 'Ali ibn 'Umar al-Daraqumi (d. 385/
995), it is related that the son of the famous Basran traditionist
Yünus ibn 'Ubayd (d. 13g/756 or 140/757; see the German text, p.
25) violated his father's prohibition against visiting the Mu'tazilite
Mutakallim 'Arnr ibn 'Ubayd (d. 144/761). Yuniis ibn 'Ubayd's
reaction to his son's visit was that it is better to meet God (that is,
28 I S L A M I C T H EO LO GY: T R A D I T I O N A L I S MA N D R A T I O N A L I S M

on the Day ofJudgement) with grave sins such as fornication, theft

and drinking wine than to meet Him with the views of 'Amr ibn
'Ubayd and his followers.jg This anecdote demonstrates the bitter
hostility of the traditionalists towards the rationalists. Yünus ibn
'Ubayd seems to have regarded 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd as a great threat
to religion, because of his attitude towards the hadith (he lied con-
cerning traditions) and his belief in free wilLQ
Sometimes the breaking-off of relations with the rationalists has
taken the form of prohibitions against praying behind them (a
Jahmite, for example, should not serve as an imam in a prayer) or
marrying them.'jl
In his al-l'tiqüd wa 7-hidüya ilü sabil al-rashüd 'ala madhhab al-salaf
wa-ashüb al-hadith, the Shafi'ite scholar al-Bayhaqi (d. 458/1065)
devotes a chapter to the prohibition against sitting in the company
of the people of innovations (al-nafj 'un mujülasat ahl al-&dar). The
bitterest attack in this chapter is reserved for those people who
believe in free will (al-qadariyya)." H e seems to refer to the
Mu'tazilites and not to the early believers in free will, who are also
called qadariyya. Probably, beginning from the ninth century,
qadariyya had become a pejorative name for the Mu'ta~ila.~? Let us
cite, for exarnple, three traditions: (1) 'Do not sit with the people
of qadar and d o not open conversation with them';" ( 2 ) 'The
~ 5this community - when
qadari,yya are the Zoroastrians ( m ~ j ü s ) of
they are ill, d o not visit them, and when they die, d o not attend
their funeral'; (3) 'Two groups of my community have no connec-
tion to Islam: the murji'a" and the qadariyya'. T h e last two madi-
tions point out a tendency to excommunicate the rationalists, or
those who d o not adhere to the Qur'an and the Sunna, from the
legitimate community. This phenomenon of excommunication or
declaring the ideological opponent to be an unbeliever (takfir) is a
common method. Thus the Sháfi'ite scholar al-Shirazi (d. 476/
1083) declares whoever denies the Ash'arite doctrines to be an un-
b e l i e ~ e r . When
~? the Mu'tazilite scholar Hafs al-Fard (fl. the first
half of the third/eighth century)@' said that the Qur'an was
created, al-Shafi'i said to him: 'You have disbelieved in the Mighty
God'." According to the Hanafite scholar Abii Yiisiif al-Ansari (d.
182/798), who was the most distinguished of Abii Hanifa's disciples,
knowledge through speculative theology (kalüm) is ignorance, and
ignorance of Kalam is knowledge. Whoever becomes a master of
.Kalám is accused of heresy (zandaqa) .7" Al-Shafi'i's attitude towards
the Mutakallimün was no less severe. His judgement of them is
that they should be smitten with palm branches and shoes in the
 TRADITIONALISM A G A I N S T RATIONALISM 29

presence of many people and then it will be said: this is the punish-
ment of those who abandoned the Qur'án and the Sunna and
turned to the Kal~m.7~ However, as attested in the Shafi'ite scholar
al-Husayn ibn Mas'üd al-Baghawi (d. 516/1122),7' the attitude
towards the sectarians (ahl al-ahwa )' depends sometimes o n their
doctrines. The traditionist Abü Sulayman Ahmad ibn Muhammad
al-Busti al-KhatGbi (d. 388/998)73 did not cal1 the sectarians who
interpreted the Qur'an and made mistakes unbelievers, and he
also allowed their testimony to be accepted74 as long as they did
not cal1 Muhammad's Companions unbelievers. 'Abd Allah ibn
Ahmad ibn Hanbal related in the name of his father that o n e
should not pray behind whoever held the createdness of the
Qur'an.75 Again, it should be noted that when speaking of the
people of innovations (ahl al-bida') o r of the sectarians (ahl al-
ahwü'), the scholars d o not always mean to speak of those who
hold rational doctrines, for these appellations also refer to the
possessors of mystical o r political notions and to performers of
unusual practices. The different kinds of attitude seem to refer to
al1 kinds of heretics, the rationalists occupying a central place
among them.
Another important note is the fact that the Qur'an contains
many verses in which the word hawan (literally 'passion') occurs.
These verses are exploited for the purpose of refuting the
sectarians (ahl al-ahwa'), for example Qur'án 18.28 'DO not obey
o n e whose heart We have made neglectful of O u r remembrance
so that he follows his passion' (or his sectarian doctrine, hawahu) .76
T h e rationalists are described, along with despotic kings (mulük
ja 'ira) and ignorant ascetics (juhhal al-mutasawwifa), as those who
corrupt religion. They are evil scholars (ahbar su'), who deviate
from religion through their views a n d untrue analogies which per-
mit what God forbids and forbid what God permits.77
In al-Taymi there exists even the notion, which 1 have not seen
elsewhere, that the Mutakallimün are not religious scholars
( %lama') . Basing himself o n the ancient scholars ( 'ulamá 'al-salaf) ,
al-Taymi states that, in order to justify his position, a religious
leader (imüm 3'1-din) must have the following characteristics: he
must know the language of the Arabs with al1 its divergencies,7' the
different views of the religious scholars, the rules of grammar, the
Qur'án, its interpretations, its different recitations and several
issues relating to the Qur'an, such as the selfevident and ambigu-
ous verses, and he must know the Traditions a n d their kinds.
Moreover, h e must be a pious man. Whoever has these properties
3O ISLAMIC T H E O L O G Y : T R A D I T I O N A L I S M A N D R A T I O N A L I S M

may be the originator of a religious system (madhhab). Taking into

account these conditions, al-Taymi draws the conclusion that tiiose
who built their methods o n their intellect, such as the Mu'tazilites
Abü 'Mi al-fubba'i (d. 303/g15), his son Abü Háshim al-Jubba'i (d.
321/g33), Abü al-Qasim al-Ka'bi (d. 31g/g31), al-Nazzam (d. 221/836
o r 231/845), the Murji'ite Mutakallim al-Husayn ibn Muhammad
al-Najar (d. 221/836?), and the Mutakallim Ibn Kullab (d. 241/855),
are not learned men like Muhammad's Companions and their Fol-
lowers. Furthermore, one cannot place them in the rank of either
juristic scholars like al-Shafi'i (d. 205/820) o r scholars of language
like al-&mafi (d. 215/830), or grammarians like al-Khalil ibn
Ahmad (d. c . 170/786), o r those who are well versed in the sciences
of the Qur'an like Nafi' ibn 'Abd al-Rahman (d. 170/786), or
traditionists like Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. q1/855), o r ascetics like
al-Hasan al-Basri (d. 110/728). Al-Taymi concludes this section by
saying that the worst method, adopted by people who believe in
reason (ahl al-qawl bi'Lraql), is to abandon the Qur'an and the
Sunna and the statements of the Companions and the scholars
who followed them.79
In spite of al-Tayrni's severe attitude towards the rationalists,
whom he does not consider real scholars, he presents a response
of Abü Sulaymán Ahmad ibn Muhammad al-KhatGbi to a certain
scholar, who apparently asked how one should deal with the
Mutakallimün. Through this response, we understand that the
scholar vacillated between quitting the Mutakallimün and sitting
with them. Either alternative presented a dilemma. O n the one
hand, the scholar might have succumbed to their claims, and on
the other, he might have disputed with them and rejected their
stands. Again, both possibilities seemed to him difficult; if he
wanted to accept their views, religion would prevent him from
doing so, and if he wanted to refute them, he would have to use
rational arguments, for they were not persuaded by the plain texts.
Therefore, this unknown scholar asked al-Khattabi to supply him
with proofs and arguments which could not rationally be refuted
by the Mutakallimün. He made his decision to refute the
Mutakallimün, and not just to break off relations with them as
some other authorities had r e ~ o m m e n d e d . ~ "
Al-Khattabi says that this dissension, meaning the Kalam, has
spread al1 over the country, and only one whoni God protected
from it would be safe. He asks himself the reason for the success of
the Kalám. And he answers that it is the seduction of the Devil
which made people deviate from the path of the Qur'an a n d the
 TRADlTlONALISM AGAINST RATIONALISM 3'

Sunna. The Devil caused the clever people to think that if they
were content with the teachings of the Qur'an and the Sunna and
accepted their plain meanings, they would be like the masses (al-
'ümma), which means, naturally, degradation. As a result, they
began to deal with speculative theology in order to distinguish
thernselves from the mas se^.^' Another reason for the strengthen-
ing of the Kalám was the weakness of the belief in finding the truth
in the Qur'an and the Sunna, which in turn caused the unbelievers
to attack Islam on the basis of unsound arguments. The Muslirns
thought that only a reaction through speculative means would
overcorne their opponents, a thought which proved to be a grave
error.HiAl-KhatGbi accuses the Mutakallimün of taking their doc-
trines from the philosophers, who were obliged to turn to these
doctrines, because they did not affirm the prophecies83 Whoever
accepts Muhammad's prophecy needs n o speculative methods, for
prophecy contains what man must know concerning r e l i g i ~ n . ~ +
In sum, there are divergent attitudes towards the rationalists in
Islarnic theological literature. These attitudes range from total
rejection and excommunication to permission to debate with
thern. The Hanbalites d o not appear as the sole extremists in this
issue; traditionalism in its different forrns again exists in al1 Islamic
schools of law. When al-Suyüti defarnes the Kalam in his Sawn, he
uses the writings of scholars frorn various schools, Hanbalites (al-
Harawi), Shafi'ites (al-Muhasibi), Malikites (Abü Talib al-Makki)
and Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, who established his own school of law.
 THE FOUNDATIONS OF
RATIONALISM

As pointed out in the Introduction, pure rationalism does not exist

in Islamic theology. Concerning this field, we can speak only of
rationalist tendencies, and the terms 'rationalist' and 'rationalism'
are rightly used only with reference to some theological issues.
However, since there are ingredients of rationalism in Islamic
theology, 1 prefer to use this term. The Mu'tazilites were very close
to such rationalism in some of their tenets, but their religiosity
cannot be denied, because revelation was a central issue for them.
Scholars like Ibn al-Rawandi (see below) who took the Mu'tazilite
notions to their extremes, that is, the consideration of the intellect
as the source of al1 knowledge, became unbelievers.
T h e basis of rationalism is the notion that Cod and the world
can be perceived through the intellect which God creates in man.
Concerning God, this perception means that God's existence, His
unity and His attributes can be known through reason. Concern-
ing the world, i t means that the creation of the world and its struc-
ture, man and his actions can be logically understood. From this
foundation, it follows that the world is directed according to
rational rules and that, hence, even God is subject to these rules.
We shall immediately see that according to some Mu'tazilites, God
is logically obliged to act in a certain manner. It is n o wonder,
thus, that God's first obligation on man is to speculate (or reflect)
in order to attain the knowledge of Cod (al-nazar al-mu'addi iki
ma'nyat alliih) .' Contrary to the view of the traditionalists, one can
know God without the support of the Scripture, and even without
a teacher.' However, the motive which causes man to reflect is a
warning (khatir) made by God to the effect that if he does not
reflect, he will be punished.3 In Sharh al-usül al-khamsa,4 Manakdim
states that 'the knowledge of God is attained only through rational
proofs' (mar7ifatalliih ta'alii lii tuniilu illa bi-hujat al-¿lql).He mentions
four kinds of proofs: ( 1 ) the rational proof; ( 2 ) the Book, that is,
 T H E F O U N D A T I O N S OF RATIONALISM 33

the Qur'an; (3) the Sunna; and (4) the Consensus (al-zj'ma'). Now,
the knowledge of God cannot be obtained through the last three
proofs, since they are the branches Vuru') of the knowledge of
God, and it is inconceivable to use the branches in order to affirm
the existence of the root (asl). T h e Qur'án, says Mánakdim, is
approved as a proof only when one proves that it is a just and wise
speech, and this derives from the knowledge of God, His unity and
justice.5
Another foundation of Islamic rationalism is the ovenvhelming
power of reason over revelation. Since reason is the goveming prin-
ciple of the world, the contradiction between revelation and reason
must be solved according to reason. For example, anthropomorph-
isms in the Qur'an and the Sunna should be interpreted in a figu-
rative way, otherwise God loses His atuibutes of being the Creator
and the Everlasting; if God is like the created things, He can be
neither the Creator nor the Everlasting.
I t is not o u r airn in this treatise to deal with the rationalists'
proofs of creation and God's existence, o r to consider their advan-
tages and disadvantages from the point of view of reason," but
some examples are needed to illustrate their activity. Early on, two
Mu'tazilite theologians, al-Iskafi (d. 240/854) and al-Nazzam (d.
221/836 o r 231/845), used the proof for creation from the impossi-
bility of an infinite number: 'The world must have a beginning
since an infinite past time could not have been traversed'.'
The proof from accidents is the standard Kalam proof for the
creation of the world. Its basis is the structure of the world as seen
by the Mutakallimün. According to them, there are two elements
which compose each body: (1) atom (jawhar, pl. jawahir o r aljuz'
allazi lü yatajatz'u, an indivisible particle), an unchanging particle
devoid of properties; and ( 2 ) accident ('arad, pl. arrüd), the
changeable element of each body, which comes into existence and
disappears, like motion and rest in a body. Each existent body is
composed of atoms and accidents. Since accidents come into exist-
ente and are necessarily parts of the body, the body also comes
into existence. The universe is a body, hence i t also came into
existence. Abü al-Hudhayl al-'Allaf (d. 235/849) is said to have
been the first Mu'tazilite Mutakallim who put forth tliis argu~nerit."
Other arguments for creation arid God's existence are h e argu-
ment from c o m p o s i t i o n , ~ t h eargument from particulari~atiori'~
and the argument from dcsign."
Basically, there is no difference between the Mu'tazilite and the
Ash'arite Mutakallimün in introducing rational proofs for creation
34 ISI.AMIC TtlEOLOGY: TRADITIONALISM A N D RATIONALISM

and Sor God's existence. As a rule, Ash'arite Kalarn rnanuals begin

with a chapter o n the sources of knowledge, then comes a ctiapter
on proving the creation of the world and God's existerice." The
difference lies in their treatment of the obligation to rationally
know God's existence and the creation of the world. Al-Ash'ari
holds that this obligation derives from revelation,'j whereas the
Mu'tazilites and even sorne of the Ash'arites, such as al-Qalanisi (d.
359/970) and his Sollowers, regard this obligation as steniniing
frorn reason.'4
The Mu'tazilites derive God's attribute of His being powerful
(qüdir) directly frorn His being tlie Creator OS the world (al-
muhdith li7-'alam), for the possibility OSone's being an agent (liter-
ally, o n e for whorn an act is possible - sahha minhu al-)?) proves
one's ability.'S Likewise, His being knowing ('alim) sterns froni the
possibility of His carrying out perfect actions.16 The cornbination
OS the two previous attributes brings about the third attribute,
narnely, His being the living (hayy). Whoever is powerful arid
knowirig rnust be living.'7 Here the author uses the rational
rnetliod nientioned above of proving what is abserit from what is
present (al-istidlal bi'l-shahid ala al-gha'ib; see above, p. 26). The
sarne method is used by the Ash'arite Mutakallirn~n'~ but is rejected
by the traditionalists, who learn God's attributes frorn the Qur'an
and the Sunna.'y
A point of dispute between the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites
was the relatioriship of God's attribiites to His esserice. The
Mu'tazilites argued ttiat whatever is eterna1 rnust be God and that
God's unity denies rnultiplicity of attributes in Hirn, even though
these attributes are eterrially united in God and not separated in
Hirn.'" Thus they denied the real existence OSattributes as separate
spiritual entities in God. God is knowing ('alim), powerful (qüdir)
and living (lzayy) not by virtue OSknowledge, power and life inher-
ing in Hirn, as tlie Ash'arites thought, but by virtue of His essence.
The Mu'tazilites represent here a clear rational consideration in
deriying the attributes as separate entities inhering in God." O n
the other hand, the Ash'arites, owing to their cornmitrnent to tlie
traditional tenets," claimed that God is knowing by virtue OS
knowledge, but having been aware of C ~ d ' sunity a n d eterriity,
they also claimed that these attributes are rieither identical witli
rior other than God. By stating that the attributes are riot identical
with God they, besides stressing the attributes' indeperident status
as opposed to the Mu'tazilite stand, did not infringe on God's
iinity and eternity, and by stating that His attributes are not other
 THE FOUNDATlONS OF RATIONALISM 35

than Him, they claimed that they inhered in Him. Thus the
Ash'arites used reason in order to defend traditional views.
The discussion on free will and predestination supplies us with
another example of rationalism in Islamic theology. In the range
of our work it is impossible to set forth even a limited exposition of
the history of the debate and its various arguments, therefore we
shall only give the principles. According to the Mu'tazilites, man is
free to choose his acts and he is capable of carrying them out due
to the power that God grants him before he acts. They hold that
'ought implies can'; if God had predetermined a man to be an
unbeliever and then ordered him to be a believer and punished
hirn on account of liis unbelief, He would have been unjust and
irrational, because after having been predetermined to unbelief a
man cannot be a believer. Here again, we see that the Mu'tazilites
judge God in keeping with their rational understanding. The prin-
ciple which applies to man applies also to
In contrast, the Ash'arite point of departure is different; it is
God's ornnipotence. Since God creates al1 things, He also creates
rnan's acts. T o safeguard both nian's responsibility and God's
omnipotence, al-Ash'ari developed the theory of kasb (literally
'acquisition'), whereby God creates rnan's actions arid as man
appropriates them, he becomes responsible for them. How nian
can be responsible for an action for which God creates the power
and also the power of appropriation is a question which al-Ash'ari
and his followers tried to answer.'4 The theory of kasb was a
rational attempt to harmonise the rational requisite of free will
and the traditional dogma of predestinatiori whether this dogma
derives from the sacred texts or from the people's nientality. For
other attempts at harmonisation, see Chapter 6. What is important
in this context is that the Kalam theory of kasb penetrated into
traditionalist circles. In his interpretation of al-'aqida al-ta?~üwiyya,
whose author the Hanafite Abü Ja'far Ahrnad ibn Muhammad al-
Taháwi (d. 322/g33) says that 'man's actions are God's creation
and rnan's appropriation' (afal al-'ibüd khalq allah zua-kasb min al-
Z'bad), the Hanafite scholar Ibn Abi al-'Izz (d. 792/1389), who is ari
example of traditionalism in Hanafism, adopted this theory.'5
Elsewhere, we see that although this scholar criticises the Kalam,2G
he uses a Kalam argument - the argument from hypothetical
mutual prevention (da12 al-tamanu') - to demonstrate God's
unity." The core of this argument is the liypothcsis that two
producen cannot act harmoniously, and that inability or weakriess
is necessarily attached to orie or to both of theni. The argument
 has its basis in the Qur'an ( 2 3 . 9 1 , 2 1 . 2 2 ) , but owes its elaboration to
the Mutakallim~n.'~
The Mu'tazilites hold that rnan understands what is good and
what is evil through his own intelligence, which can intuit these
values. Good and evil actions have intrinsic properties which can
necessarily be known through man's reason. God reveals to rnan
what h e generally knows and also supplies him with the details of
his obligations.'q Contrary to this view, the Ash'arites hold divine
subjectivism: to wit, what God forbids is evil and what He orders is
good. Thus rnan cannot know by his reason before revelation the
ethical values. And also, God is not subject to the reasonable rules
which rnan understands.jo That God, in the rationalists' view, is
subject to such rules is exemplified once more in the issue of
God's assistance ( l u f ) . The Mu'tazilites think that rnan knows that
God created him purposefully, that is, to benefit him.3' If God had
created rnan purposelessly, His creation would not have been wise.
A purposeless act ( 'abath) is considered an act performed unwisely,
and it is inconceivable to speak of God as unwise. The best benefit
that God can give rnan is a reward obtained only through carrying
out duties which God imposes on him. Two conditions are required
for man to perform his duties in order to obtain reward: he must
have the power to d o them; and he must freely choose his acts, and
his choice requires different motivations or rational alternatives.
God must give rnan the power to act (tamkin) and the motivation
to d o good deeds. This last assistance is called lutJ If He did not d o
this, H e would be unjust, which according to 'Abd al-Jabbár corre-
sponds to his being irrational.9 The pains caused by God raise
doubts about God's justice. The Mu'tazilites solve this problem by
stating that pains caused by God benefit man. When God inflicts
pains on rnan for the latter's benefit, He must @ve him compensa-
tion ( 'iwarl) which exceeds the measure of the pains.33 Again, we
see that, according to the Mu'tazilites, God does not act arbitrarily,
but rather in keeping with reasonable rules which rnan can under-
stand.34 In contrast, the Ash'arite doctrine does not impose any
rules on God. According to them, God can inflict pains on rnan as
He without be~towingbenefit o r c o m p e n s a t i ~ nWe . ~ ~see
thus that the Mu'tazilitec are more rationalist than the Ash'arites.
The discussion of the proofs for the trustworthiness o f pi-ophet-
hOOdcan also be carried out according to either the traditional or
[he rationai íine. This can be best
5hown lhrough examining a
passage in a treatise of the Ashfarite scholar Fakhr al-Din aH&i
(d. 606/1210) entitled al-nubuwwat wa-ma yataizllagu bi-ha (Prophecies
 THE FOUNDATIONS OF RATIONALISM 37

and Pertinent Issues). The believers in prophethood, says al-Razi,

are divided into two parties. The first are those who state that the
miracles prove the prophet's tru~tworthiness.3~ After they know
that the prophet is trustworthy, they know, through the prophet's
sayings, truth and falsehood. This is the traditional method which
was adopted by most religious people. The second party are those
who first know the true dogmas and the right actions to which
man must adhere. Then, when they see a man who calls people to
these ideas and actions, and his cal1 exercises a strong influence
over the people leading them from falsehood to truth, they know
that he is a true prophet who must be followed. According to al-
Razi, this method of identifymg the true prophet is logical and has
very few doubts. It is based on several premises: (1) Man's perfec-
tion (kamül) Iies in knowing the truth in itself and goodness in
order to carry out good actions. In other words, al-Razi speaks
here of theoretical and practical perfections which are, of course,
reminiscent of the philosophers' view concerning the rank of the
philosopher. ( 2 ) People are divided into three groups concerning
perfection and imperfection in theoretical and practical powers.
Most people are imperfect in their theoretical and practical
powers. There are some individuals whom al-Razi calls 'saints'
(awliya'), who are perfect in both domains, but they cannot cure
the imperfect, namely, they cannot render them perfect. The last
party are both perfect and capable of making the imperfect per-
fect - those are the prophets. (3) It is necessarily known that the
degrees of perfection, from the point of view of number and force,
are infinite. (4) Although imperfection is a general phenomenon
among people, there must be among them a perfect person. This
premise is proved through examining the different kinds of ani-
mals and people. (5) The perfect man occupies the highest rank
of humanity which has a connection to the last rank of the angels.37
In sum, in al-Rázi's view, the knowledge of the theoretical and
practical perfections precedes the knowledge of the true pr0phet.3~
Thus al-Razi comes very close to the philosophers' view.39 However,
he devotes a chaptertoto proving that this method, by which while
the branch is prophethood the root is metaphysics, is clearly at-
tested in the Qur'an. The course of Qur'an 87 (súrat al-a rla), which
begins with the mention of God and His actions in the world and
continues with the characteristics of the Prophet and his mission,
serves al-Razi as proof of his view. However, it is evident that the
Qur'an here is a corroboration for al-Razi's thesis which occurs
first, and not the basis of his theory. Thus, he proves to be a
38 ISLAMIC T H E O L O C Y : TRADITIONALISM A N D RATIONALISM

rationalist coricerning this issue. Al-Razi prefers this way of proving

prophethood to proofs according to miracles, and regards it as the
best way.4' This view is characteristic of a l - m i ' s later works (al-
Matülib al-'üliya min al-Z'lmal-ikihi, Maúlim usül al-din and al-Tafsir al-
kabir (known also as Mafütih al-ghayb)), but in his Muhassal a@ar
al-mutaqaddimin wa'l-muta'akhkhiñn he still considers this proof as
equivalent to the traditional proofs.4' We see thus that in this
issue an Ash'arite theologian accepts the notion that o n e should
deal with metaphysics before entering into religious matters. Al-
Rázi is an excellent example of a theologian who o n a specific
issue becomes a rationalist after being a traditionalist on the
same issue. This proves again that in Islamic theology the term
'rationalist' should be used only with regard to specific issues and
relatively.
It is common knowledge that the philosophers, since they deem
resurrection of the body to be impossible,+jconsider the phenom-
ena of the world to come syrnbols which aim at the education of
the ordinary people. It is relevant to our inquiry to examine how
rational considerations formulate the rationalists' attitude towards
such phenomena.
ildhab al-qabr (the Punishment of the Grave) may serve as an
example of the rationalists' attitude towards a dogma, the belief in
which is obligatory according to the traditiona1ists.H According to
this dogma, two angels called munkar and nakir (literally 'the
unknown angels' o r 'the detestable angels')45 ask a man who died
about his beliefs and deeds in this world. If it is evident after the
angels' interrogation that a man did not believe o r that he com-
mitted grave sins, he will be punished in the grave. Some
Mu'tazilites ('Amr ibn Ubayd (d. 200/815) was among them)46denied
'adhab al-qabron the grounds that if it really took place, o n e would
see the signs of torrnent in the dead persori o r hear his voice. That
we d o not see such signs proves that this dogma has n o basis.47
Rationalism here takes the form of necessary knowledge, that is,
experience attested by one's seeing does not prove this phenom-
enon. Although Manakdim affirms 'adhab al-qabr on the basis of
the Qur'an and the Sunna,Q he introduces modifications into the
modality (kayfiyya) of its occurrence so as to render it reasonable.
'Know that if God wills to torment them, H e must make them live,
since tormenting an inanimate being (jamüd) is absurd (muhül). ' 4 g
Manakdim continues his thread of thought and states thatjust as i t
is incumbent on God to create life in order to torment man, so it is
incumbent on Him to create intelligence in rnan so that the torment
 T H E FOUNDATIONS OF RATIONALISM 39

becomes positive, otherwise the tormented person will think that

h e is wronged (mazlüm). It is to be noted that one needs intelli-
gence also to know that one is being ill-treated. This is the reason
why the people who are in Hell must also have intelligence.joAgain
we see that rational procedure as understood by man obliges God.
God is restricted in His actions to a natural (= rational) sequence
of actions. It is very probable that Manakdim also refutes the
voluntaristic occasionalism held by some Mutakallimün who assert
that power, knowledge, hearing and seeing may inhere in a dead
body.5'
Rational considerations are not absent from the discussion of
the Balance (al-mizün).The Balance which will weigh man's deeds
in the Day of Resurrection is plainly mentioned in the Qur'an (see,
for example, Qur'án 21.47: 'And We shall set u p the just balances
[al-mawazin al-qist] for the Resurrection'y). First, Mánakdim states
that the Qur'an speaks here and elsewhere of a real balance.
Then, asked how man's deeds can be weighed while they are acci-
dents which cannot be weighed, he answers that i t is possible that
light represents obedience and darkness is a sign of transgression,
and God puts both of them o n the scales and weighs thern.53 It is
also possible that God puts man's deeds in leaves and weighs the
leaves.%This solution is mentioned in al-Baghdadi's u1. (p. 246)
as a rational way which is stated in traditions. Such possibilities
seem very odd to the modern reader, but seem to have been
reasonable in the eyes of the rationalist Muslim of the eleventh
cen tiiry.
Another example of the Resurrection phenomena is the Path
(sirat) which leads to Paradise. The Path occurs many times in the
Qiir'an (for example Qur'an 37.23: 'Guide them to the Path of
Hell'). According to the Sunna, the Path is finer than a hair and
sharper than a sword. Whoever was righteous would cross the Path
and enter Paradise, but whoever was wicked would stumble and
fa11 into He1L55 Manakdini rejects this description of the Path,
which he ascribes to the hmhwiyya,j%n the grounds that the Here-
after is not a place of imposition of duties. Therefore God will not
inflict the crossing of the Path o n man. Moreover, the Path is a
way, while the above-mentioned description has n o connection to
a way. Mánakdim says that 'Abd al-Jabbar relates in his book ( p r o b
ably Manakdim means 'Abd al-Jabbarls Sharh al-usül al-khama)
that many Mu'tazilite scholars hold that the Path consists of the
signs which show the acts of obedience and the acts of transgres-
sion; whoever adheres to the former is brought to Paradise and
4" ISLAMlC T H E O L O G Y : T R A D I T I O N A L I S M A N D RATIONALISM

whoever adheres to the latter is brought to Hell. Mánakdim does

not accept this interpretation either. According to him, there is no
compelling reason to cancel the plain meaning (zühir) of the Path
and to interpret it figuratively. Thus, surprisingly enough and con-
trary to 'Abd al-Jabbar, Mánakdim accepts the notion of bi-la kayfa;
he accepts that this is a path, but denies the literal meaning of the
Path and does not put forth any positive interpretation.5'It is very
interesting that a Mu'tazilite thinker adopts an Ash'arite solution
to the problem of anthropomorphism. Thus, just as rationalist
notions penetrated traditional circles, traditional theories found
their way into the rationalist circles. The ideological boundaries of
the schools of thought have not always remained closed.
 T H E RATIONALISTS' CRITICISM OF
TRADITIONALISM

Apart from rationalist opposition to some traditionalist theological

tenets, there exists criticism of the fundamentals of the traditional-
ists' theology and their practices. This criticism can be divided into
five parts: ( 1 ) criticism of the Qur'an; ( 2 ) criticism of the hadith;
(3) criticism of the ancient scholars (al-salaf);(4) criticism of the
Consensus; and (5) criticism of rituals and commandments. The
criticism of religion and prophecy in general does not concern us
here - although it is an interesting phenomenon which has been
dealt with by Muslim theologians - since the holders of such views
were fe; They were considered to be unbelievers and had little
influence on the debate between rationalism and traditionalism
within Islam. The marginal contribution of those unbelievers to
our topic was only the extension and refinement of the arguments
in favour of prophecy.' As a rule, theological manuals refute the
denial of prophecy through setting forth different rational argu-
ments. For example, answering the claim that it is impossible for
God to choose one person to be a prophet among others who
equal him, al-Baqillani uses the method of al-istidlül bi'l-sháhid 'ala
al-gha'ib, saying that it is possible for God to do this, just as a man
may choose one of his friends over others who equal him.?
As for the Qur'an, owing to its divine source, the rationalists,
generally, have not criticised the text itself, but only such interpre-
tations which d o not agree with reason, for example the literal
interpretation of anthropomorphic expressions, the statement
that God knows by virtue of knowledge inhering in Him. However,
in Ibn Hanbal's a l - h d d 'ala al-zanüdiqa wa'l-jahmiyya there occurs a
criticism of the Qur'an levelled by the zanüdiqa.3 If we understand
by the term zanüdiqa the Mu'tazilites, then we have here a rational-
ist criticism of the Qur'an within Islam; this seems probable with
the qualification that it derives from a bitter opponent of the
Mu'tazila such as Ibn Hanbal. The main argument which occurs
q2 ISLAMIC T H E O L O G Y : TKADITIONALISM A N D KATIONALISM

here is the self-contradictory nature of the Qur'án. In many issues,

the Qur'an teaches contradictory ideas; for exaniple, on the one
hand it teaclies that people will see God (Qur'an 75.22-3) and on
the other it teaches that man cannot see God (Qur'án 6.103). We
have found elsewhere other corroboration for a similar Mu'tazilite
criticism (see above, Chapter 3, n. 13). However, it is also possible
to regard the zanadiqa occurring in this text as people outside
Islam who attacked the Qur'án, o r as Mu'tazilite theologians who
became infidels, such as Ibn al-Ráwandi who censures the Qur'an
in his Kitab al-dÜmigh.4 As a rule, the Qur'an was accepted by al1
parties, incliiding the sectarians, as God's revelation. The case is
different with regard to traditions. The rationalists did not and
could not reject the Prophet's sayings, but had doubts concerning
the authenticity of most of the traditions.5
T h e rationalists' criticism of the hadith can be best drawn from
Ibn Qutayba's ta Wil mukhtaliJ al-hadith. As we have seen, this is a
treatise written in response to a letter directed to Ibn Qutayba
according to which the Mutakallimün accused the people of tradi-
tion (ahl al-haúith) of lying and expressing contradictory statements
so that divisions arose and the Muslim community was split into
sects each claiming the truth o n the basis of traditions.' Ibn
Qutayba states that, according to the critics, traditions served
opposing groups such as the Khárijites (who considered the grave
sinner as an unbeliever) and the Murji'ites (who pointed out that
sins d o not impair belief), the Qadarites (who held man's free
choice) and the Jabrites (who held predestination), the Rafidites
(who rejected the khihfa of Abü Bakr and 'Umar) and their adver-
saries (who preferred both of them to 'Ali), those who prefer
wealth and those who prefer poverty (the ascetics, zuhhüd), the
different groups of jurists (al-fuqahü') and the holders of bada'
(those who believe that God changes His decisions). Believers in
anthropomorphic traditions ('God created Adam in His image' or
'the believer's heart is between two of God's fingers') are set forth
as examples of those who tell lies concerning God.' Moreover, the
traditionists relate follies which cause people to disparage Islam,
the unbelievers (al-mulhidün) to laugh at the faith, those who wish
to embrace Islam to abstain frorn it, and which increase the doubts
of the sceptics."bn Qutayba regards these traditions as forgeries
made by the zanüdiqa.Y In addition to the contents of traditions
which bothered the Mutakallimün, the traditionists' personalities
also annoyed them; they are ignorant and ill-natured.'"
Now let us investigate the claims against traditions as detailed by
 THE R A T I O N A L I S T S ' CRITICISM OF TRADITIONALISM 43

Ibn Qutayba. There are traditions which oppose speculation and

rational arguments, such as the Prophet's statement that he is
more entitled to be sceptical than Ibrahím concerning God's
actions." The assumption which lies at the basis of the argument is
Muhammad's perfection, which could not be impaired by doubts.
Furthermore, some traditions d o not coincide with man's experi-
ence. According to a tradition, the Prophet said that no human
being would remain on earth in the year AH 100.Now, the opponent
maintains that we are in AH 300 and the world is more populated
than before."
Most of the examples can be subsumed under the title of con-
tradictory traditions. Such contradictions exist in different domains.
It may be in the sphere of leadership; according to orie tradition,
the leader of the community must be the best person. However,
another tradition tells the people that they can pray behind any
person whether he be a righteous or a wicked ruler.'3 And in the
sphere ofjurisprudence, one tradition inflicts cutting off the hand
for stealing an egg or a rope, while another states that such a pun-
ishment is only for stealing a quarter of a dinar.'+In the sphere of
theology, the relationship between grave sin and belief is also dealt
with. There is a contradiction between one tradition which teaches
that grave sin does not coincide with belief, while a second tradi-
tion states that even a grave sinner will come to Paradise, meaning
that he is a believer.'5 Concerning the position of the Prophet, we
learn the famous tradition: 'There will be no prophet after me, arid
no community after my community. The permitted things (}laúd) are
those which God permitted through me [says Muhammad] until
the Resurrection, and the forbidden things are those which God
forbade through me until the Resurrection.' Against it stands a
tradition no less noteworthy, which reads: 'Jesus Christ will descend
[this is one of the signs which precedes the Resurrection], kill the
pig, break the cross and increase the number of the permitted
things'.I6 Thus Muhammad is not the last prophet and there will
be a change ir1 the number of permitted things.
The rationalists also use the Qur'an in order to show the illegiti-
macy of the Tradition. According to Qur'an 2.180 ('Prescribed for
you, when any of you dies, and he leaves behind some goods, is to
make testament in favour of his parents and kinsmen . . .'), a man
must write a testament in favour of his heirs, contrary to a tradition
which states that there should not be a testament in favour of an
heir (La ruasiyata li-ruarith). Ibn Qutayba answers that this verse was
abrogated." Also, in the question of aja1 (the appointed time of
44 ISLAMIC T H E O L O G Y : T R A D I T I O N A L I S M A N D RATIONALISM

death), there is a contradiction between the Qur'an and the Tradi-

tion. Qur'an 7.34 reads: 'When their ajal comes, they shall neither
postpone it nor make it come earlier by an hour'. The ajal is thus
fixed. However, there is a tradition which tells us that man can
lengthen his lifetime by doing good for his relatives (silat al-rahim
tazidu fi '1-Úmr).'*
It is not only the Qur'an which refutes the traditionalists' doc-
trines, but also the Consensus (al-ijma'). We are told in a tradition
that C a d descends every night to the lowest heaven, which means
that in this time H e is in a specific place. This contradicts what is
known through Qur'an verses (58.7, 43.84) and through the Con-
sensus that God is everywhere.'g
In sum, the hadith, a very important source of knowledge which,
as we have seen, equals, according to some theologians, the Qur'an,
and on which the traditionalists rely, is, according to the rational-
ists, a device which cannot be relied on, because reason and man's
experience contradict its teachings, its nature is selfcontradictory,
and it is refuted by both the Qur'an and the Consensus.
In al-Darimi's K al-radd 'alii al-Mari~i,~"a different element of
criticism is added to the discussion on the absurdities of the hadith."
This concerns the contention over the sources of traditions.
Surprisingly enough, the opponent, who represents al-Marisi's
arguments, cites in the first instance a tradition that states that pro-
phetic traditions will be widely circulated (su-yafshü al-hadith 'anni)
and the criterion of their authenticity is their accordance with the
Qur'an Va-ma wafaqa minha al-qur'ün fa-huwa 'anni wa-ma khalafahu
fa-laysa 'anni) ." Thus, in the adversary's view, traditionalism itself
admits the forgery of some traditions. Al-Darirni's opponent is not
content with this general accusation, and he also adds specific
ones. The caliph Mu'awiyya ibn Abi Sufyán (d. 60/680) is said to
have collected unapproved traditions from people and then as-
cribed them LO the Prophet.'3 T h e same charge is levelled against
'Abdallah ibn 'Arnr ibn al-'&, who is renowned for transmittirig
many traditions from Muhammad. H e fourid during the battle of
Yarmük (15/636) two pack-animals loaded with books of the
people of the Book (ahl al-kitab, meaning Jewish and Christian
books). He related the contents of these books to his people as tra-
ditions traced back to the Prophet. Here, the exact source of the
prophetic traditions is indicated.'+ Elsewhere, al-Darimi set forth
the opponent's contention that 12,000 traditions were invented by
unbelievers (zanüdiqa) and put into circulation among negligent
transmitters of traditions.'' The opponent even exploits statements
of important traditionists such as Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 161/778),
Shu'ba ibn al-Hajaj (d. 160/776) and 'Abdallah Ibn al-Mubarak (d.
181/797) to reprove dealing with the hadith. For example, Shu'ba
says that 'this hadith diverts you from the remembrance of God
and from prayer . . .'G
The Mu'tazilites, who are in many theological issues rationalists,
express a subtle attitude towards the hadith. Their stand stems from
the search for certainty. As an example, 1 choose to survey 'Abd al-
Jabbar's view. Answering their opponents' claim that the Mu'tazila
cannot be named ahl al-suma wa'l-jamara, since they d o not adhere
to the Sunna and the Consensus, 'Abd al-jabbar first defines the
Sunna. In his view, Sunna is the Prophet's order which must be
carried out perpetiially, o r his act which must be followed continu-
ously. This definition applies to what is proved as the Prophet's
statement or act. Now, a tradition which is based on the authority
of a single transmitter (khabar al-wáhid) or single transmitters
(khabar al-ahad) and which meets the conditions of trustworthiness
is called Sunna according to ordinary usage ('ala wajh al-tarar@ .27
'Abd al-Jabbár opposes the consideration of these traditions as
true Sunna, because 'we are not safe from being liars concerning
this'. Such traditions d o not convey certainty, therefore it is forbid-
den from the point of view of reason to say definitely: 'The
Prophet has said it', but o n e may say: 'It has been related from the
Prophet'." Thus, for 'Abd al-Jabbar the majority of traditions are
of an uncertain source, d u e to rational considerations. To defend
his attitude towards traditions, he cites statements (mainly of
Shu'ba ibn al-Hajaj, whom he names 'Commander of the faithful
concerning the Tradition', amir al-mu'minin J al-hadith) which
espouse the danger of dealing with traditions and the notion that
a great many are not genuine. Moreover, he states that if there
were no proof of the obligation to carry out acts according to this
type of traditions, there would be n o benefit in transmitting them.
According to the Prophet, the criterion for judging the authentic-
ity o f traditions is their agreement with the contents of the Qur'an
and the Sunna, which are known. This criterion is relevant to tra-
ditions which deal with practice (mü triquhu al-'amal), but there is
n o obligation to accept khabar al-wühid, which deals with theological
issues ( m a tarzquhu al-din). 'Abd al-jabbar censures the tradi tionists
not because of the essence of the Tradition, but rather because of
their wrong method and their limited understanding. If reciting
the Qur'an without understanding is detestable in the eyes of the
Prophet, the more so with regard to the reading of traditions. In
sum, 'Abd al-Jabbar does not oppose khabar al-ahad by virtue of it-
self, but because many traditions of this kind are spurious and
because their transmitters cannot be relied upon d u e to their neg-
ligence and lack of understanding.'g
We have seen that one of the principles of traditionalism is
adherence to and adoration for the teachings of the ancient schol-
ars (al-salan and for their personalities. From the era in which the
criticism against the salaf began to flourish, we learn that this prin-
ciple of traditionalism became firmly rooted in the traditionalists'
view beginning with the third/ninth century. The rationalists tried
to undermine the firm stand of the salaf by discrediting their per-
sonalities. T h e Mu'tazilite al-Nazzam refers to the caliph 'Umar
ibn al-Khattáb as being inconsistent in using analogy (qiyüs) and in
his judgements.3" The same accusations apply to Abii Bakr.3' The
caliph 'Ali does not remain free from blame. 'Ali said: 'Whenever
one transmitted to me a tradition of the Prophet (hadaththani bi-
hadith), 1 made him swear by God that h e had heard it from God's
Messenger. If h e swore, 1 believed him.' Al-Nazzam reacts to 'Ali's
statement, saying: 'The transmitter must be in 'Ali's view either a
trustworthy person (thiqa) or an untrustworthy o n e (muttaham) .
Now, if he is trustworthy, making him swear has n o meaning, and
if he is untrustworthy, how will the saying of the untrustworthy
person prove true through his oath? If it is possible for him to
transmit false tradition, it is possible for him to swear falsely.'3' Two
conclusions, which attack two principles of traditionalism, can be
drawn from this passage: 'Ali's reputation as a wise scholar is
impaired, for h e established an unreasonable procedure for
accepting traditions; and al1 the traditions in which 'Ali is a trans-
mitter may be suspected as unreliable.
Other members of the Sahaba, who are the bulk of the salaf; are
also condemned by al-Nazzam. 'Abdalláh ibn Mas'üd (d. 3216' 52)
has uttered contradictory statements. O n the one hand h e said:
'The permitted thing (halal) is evident (bapin) and the forbidden
thing (haram) is evident'; but on the other hand he said concern-
ing juridical judgements: '1 speak of them on the basis of my per-
sonal judgement (ra j). If 1 am right, it is from God, and if 1 am
wrong, it is from me.' Consequently, o n e who follows the juridical
judgements of 'Abdallah ibn Mas'iid may err and carry out wrong
acts, contrary to Ibn Mas'iid's first s t í ~ t e m e n t .'Abdallah
~~ ibn
Mas'üd is also accused of lying. He claimed, says al-Nazzám, that
h e saw the moon being split (cf. Qur'an 54.1) for Muhammad. Al-
Nazzam responds that this is a lie, for God did not split the moon
 only for Muhammad, but He split it as sign for al1 the people and
as proof for the prophecy of Muhammad.34 Another criticism of
Ibn Mas'üd is his having been inconsistent and influenced by
others in juridical opinions. Al-Nazzam relates that Ibn Mas'üd was
asked by the caliph 'Umar about exchange of money and said to
the caliph: 'There is n o objection to it'. However, after the caliph
had said: '1 d o not like it', Ibn Mas'üd said: '1 d o not like it, for you
d o not Iike it'. Ibn Mas'ud withdrew his first statement without
speculation. Al-Nazzam says that if this is the behaviour of the best
scholar ofjurisprudence, what should o n e think about the behav-
iour of scholars of lesser rank? How can such scholars be proof
against us and how can we obey them?35
Al-Nazzám cites statements of the Sahába which show that they
admitted that their juridical judgements were made on the basis of
assumption ( z a n n ) ,whereas God has forbidden judgements on the
basis of assumption and ordered that judgements should be made
in keeping with knowledge and certainty. If this is the case con-
cerning the ancient scholars (salaf), the more so concerning those
who followed them.36 In sum, al-Nazzam discredits the salaf and
hence traditionalism.
The hadith literature as the sum total of Muhammad's teaching
is discredited by the Zaydite Mutakallim al-Q~simibn Ibrahim (d.
246/860), who speaks of the possibility that not al1 the Prophet's
sayings were recorded by the Sahába. H e seems to have deduced
from this statement that traditions cannot serve as an independent
source of information without using the Book.37
Al-Nazzam is also said to have censured the principle of Consen-
sus (ijmá'). As we have seen, the ijma' is leptimised, inter alia,
through the hadith: 'My community does not agree o n an error' (La
tajtami'u ummati 'ala dalala).3* Contrary to this tradition, al-Nazzam
states that it is posible for Muslims to agree on an error (khata').jg'
In K. al-nakth (p. I I ~ ) there
, is a different version of al-Nazzam's
statement according to which the community may agree on a s u b
jective error (dalala),meaning an error based on personal opinion
( r a j ) o r analogy (giyas), but not on an objective fault (khata'),
which derives from transmission of knowledge through the senses.
Al-Khayyat ( K al-intzyar, p. qq) denies the ascription of this state-
nient to al-Nazzám, saying that it is known only through the
medium of al-Jahiz. Al-Nazzám also states that the community
agreed that only Muhammad had been sent to al1 the people on
earth, whereas the truth is that every prophet was sent to al1 the
people, for God's miracles reach every place on earth.4" According
48 ISLAMIC THEOLOGY: TRADITIONALISM AND RATIONALISM

to him, the ijmürof the %haba was wrong on account of their con-
tradictor~ statements in matters of Iaw.+['Abd al-Jabbar, who
accepts the Consensus as proof (al-Mughni, vol. 17, pp. 16off.),
states that the Consensus is not necessarily the consensus of the
majority. In his view, the jamü'a, a term which is equal, as we have
seen, to the zjmü: is the agreement with (mujümara) the people of
truth (ahl al-haqq) even if they are few. He accepts the notion of al-
Nazzám that many people may err, and cites Qur'an verses, such as
11.40, 'Only a few people believed with him (Nüh),' which praise
the few.4' Other verses are cited to show that the Qur'an recom-
mends asking and obeying the wise people and not the jam'a.
'Ask the people of remembrance if you d o not know' (Qur'an 21.7)
and 'Obey God and obey the Messenger and those who are wise,
(literally 'those in authority', ülü al-amr).43 Also, the beginning of
Muhammad's career proves that the truth may be with the few,
Muhammad and his first followers, and not with the many, the
pagans in Makka. The experiences of other prophets prove the
same notion.44
The criticism of rituals and commandments which occupies a
central place in the works of heretics such as Ibn al-Rawandi (see
notes I and 4 above) is almost absent from the writings of the
rationalists. 1found only a few examples in Ibn Qutayba's treatise.
He relates that the Baghdadi Mu'tazilite Thumama ibn Ashras
(d. 213/828), when seeing people run on Friday to the mosque for
fear of missing the prayer> said: 'Look at the cattle, look at the
donkeys . .. What this Arabian [meaning the Prophet] has done to
the pe0ple.'4~According to Ibn Qutayba, the Mutakallimün even
regard some of God's prohibitions as essentially unbinding. For
example, wine is not forbidden in itself, but only for the purpose
of education.47 Other Mutakallimun, says Ibn Qutayba, consider
the fat and the skin of swine permitted for use, for God only for-
bade the flesh of swine (Qur'an 5.3 'Forbidden to you are carrion,
blood, the flesh of swine . . .'@).Here, the literal meaning of a verse
serves as a weapon of libertinism against traditionalism. However,
this criticism remained marginal; the main target of the rational-
ists' attacks was the hadith and its transmitters.
 COMPROMISE BETWEEN
RATIONALISM AND
TRADITIONALISM

In Islamic theology, the compromise between rationalism and

traditionalism (using both terms as defined in the introduction)
can be shown on the basis of two versions. In the first, reason and
Tradition constitute separate tools, each responsible for the knowl-
edge of certain religious principles. Here there is n o contradiction
between reason and revelation, for either these devices d o not
meet in one and the same issue, o r if they do, they teach from two
points of view. Al-Báqillani and Abü al-Husayn al-Basri speak of
issues which can be known through the intellect and others
through Tradition.' Using both methods is legitimate from the
point of view of religion. It is also possihle that a theologian would
use both Tradition and reason concerning the same issue, either
to prove its existence o r to prove a certain aspect of it. According
to al-Ghazáli, Tradition and reason appear in the treatment of the
Resurrection, the first as a means of knowing its reality and truth
and the second being what is incumbent on man. 'Resurrection is
mentioned by Revelation, it is true (or: it is really exists) and one
must believe in it, for it is possible according to the i n t e l l e ~ t . ' ~
However, it should be noted that al-Ghazáli's attitude towards reason
and Tradition is not homogeneous. Sometimes he distinguishes
between reason in general and speculative theology (kalam) in
particular. Whereas reason, or philosophical reasoning, occupies
an important place in his theology and in certain issues the para-
mount place,3 the systems of the Kalam do not receive similar
treatment; on the contrary, in Zhya'the aim of the Kalám is to safe-
guard the belief of the common people (al-'awamm) from the
confusion introduced by the innovators. The common people are
easily aroused by the disputation fiadal) of the innovators, even if
it is false. And to reject this false disputation one must use a false
device, meaning the Kalám. Speculative arguments should be con-
sidered a dangerous medicine; it must be given in the place in
5O ISLAMIC THEOLOGY: TRADITIONALISM AND RATIONALISM

which it is needed, in the appropriate time, and in a measure

according to necessity.4 However, in his al-Mustasfa, the Kalam is
the highest science.5 There is a difference between al-Ghazali's
early work al-Iqtisüd and his later works, al-Mustasfü and al-Qistac.
In the early work, what the intellect regards as inconceivable, for
example anthropomorphic expressions, should be interpreted
fig~ratively,~ for it is inadmisible that Revelation should contain
texts which contradict reason.7 Thus al-Ghazali raises reason above
Tradition, a stand which he shares with Ibn Rushd. Although al-
Ghazali condemns the Kalam, he states that if the intellect is used
in an appropriate manner, which means not as used by some
Mutakallimün, man can obtain the truth concerning metaphysical
issues. And this truth is consistent with what can be found in rev-
elation.' As we have ~ e e nal-Ghazali
,~ also holds that rational argu-
ments are an integral part of Revelation, and hence he concludes
that there can be no contradiction between reason and Revela-
tion. This conclusion was later drawn by Ibn Tayrniyya in his Dar'
tu 'arud al-'aql wa 7-naql.
The second form of compromise between reason and Tradition,
the notion that rational arguments d o not contradict traditional
ones, was already advanced by the Zaydite imam al-Hadi ila al-
Haqq Yahya ibn al-Husayn ibn al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim (d. 298/910)
in his a l - h d d 'ala ahl al-zaygh min al-mushabbihin. In Yahya's view,
which was very probably based on the teaching of the Mu'tazila,
arguments, be they rational or traditional, cannot contradict each
other, for they are God's. God provides man with two kinds of rev-
elations, the Qur'an and the proofs of the intellect, therefore
there can be n o contradiction between reason and Tradition.
Moreover, the intellect proves what the Qur'án and the Sunna
affirm, and vice versa. The rejection of anthropomorphism is
adduced as an example of the absence of contradiction between
reason and Revelation. Qur'an 42.11and 112.1-4are brought as
proof that God is unlike anything. Likewise, the intellect affirms
the unlikeness of God to the creation.'" It must be emphasised that
this notion must be differentiated from the notion according to
which the Messenger urges the people to deliberate. In the latter,
the intellect is not a form of revelation but man's predisposition
for using rational arguments to attain truth. The function of the
prophet is to activate this ability. In his commentary to Qur'an
17.15, 'We never chastise, until We send forth a Messenger' (tr.
Arberry), the Mu'tazilite exegete al-Zamakhshari (538/1143) states
that if God did not send forth messengers to the people, the latter
could say that they were inattentive." Ibn Taymiyya adopts a notion
which in certain aspects resembles that of the Mu'tazila, and he
may have been influenced by their teachings. Like the Mu'tazila,
he considers the proofs of the intellect to be God's, but whereas in
the Mu'tazila the rational proofs are produced in man, in Ibn
Taymiyya the rational proofs are an integral part of the Qur'an.
The Qur'án's indication (dalala)" of things is divided into
two kinds: ( 1 ) God's trustworthy message ... and ( 2 ) the
Qur'án's parables and its explanation of rational proofs
which indicate what is sought for. This last indication is both
revelational and rational (dalala sharriyya 'aqliyya). It is
revelational, because the Qur'án (or revelation, al-shar') in-
dicates it and guides man to it, and it is rational, because its
veracity is known through the intellect.'3
Moreover, in many places h e states that what man obtains through
pure intellect is consistent with what the Messenger affirmed. The
information gained through man's pure intellect does not contra-
dict the information gained through pure tradition (laysa bayna al-
rnarqül a k a r i h wa'l-manyül a k a r i h tanaqud aslan) This statement
.14

proves that Ibn Taymiyya thinks that apart from the rational argu-
ments located in the Revelation, there are arguments which man
gains by means of his intellectual efforts. If these arguments are
built in an appropriate way, they do not contradict the contents of
the Revelation. Contradiction between the Revelation and reason
occurs only when either the intellect produces false arguments, or
a tradition is weak or apocryphal.'s It seems to me, contrary to what
1 have stated e l ~ e w h e r e ,that
' ~ in addition to Qur'ánic arguments,
there are arguments which man produces. Thus Ibn Taymiyya also
maintains the independent status of rational proofs.
Apart from general systems of harmonisation of reason and
Tradition, there have also been efforts aimed at specific theologi-
cal issues. Thus the theory of kasb may be viewed as an attempt at
harmonising the rational requisite of free will and the traditional
dogma of predestination.17
 7
SUMMARY

The following are the main conclusions arrived at in this book.

The basic difference between Muslim traditionalists and rational-
ists is the latter's use of rational proofs as a source of reiigious
knowledge a n d as a point of departure to attack the traditionalists.
As we have seen, pure rationalism is absent from Islamic theology,
and the denomination 'rationalist' applies to those who use rational
proofs as their primary source for producing certain theological
theses. This enables us to differentiate between degrees of ration-
alism which are established according to the measure of rational
proofs used. The Mu'tazilites are thus best entitled to this name,
whereas other Mutakallimün such as Ash'arites o r Maturidites
occupy the second place in such a theoretical hierarchy. The ration-
alists have been more inclined than the traditionalists to employ
rational arguments to support theological tenets which derive
from Tradition. Whereas pure rationalism is absent from Islamic
theology, there is pure (or extreme) traditionalism, although this
phenomenon has been limited to a small number of scholars. By a
pure traditionalist we mean a theologian who does not use rational
proofs at all, neither as a source of religious knowledge nor as cor-
roboration for doctrines derived from the sam', namely, the
Qur'an, the Sunna and the Consensus, nor as a weapon against his
adversaries. T h e second type of traditionalist is one who bases his
doctrines o n sam: but uses rational arguments either to support
his doctrines o r to refute his adversaries (for example Ibn Hanbal).
Among the traditionalists, extremism is not the privilege of the
Hanbalites alone, but can be found in scholars of other schools.
There is diffusion of ideas in al1 the schools of law and theology; a
theologian is not always committed to the teachings of his school.
Thus scholars, such as Ibn Tayrniyya, who introduce themselves as
bitter opponents of Kalam, nevertheless use the systems of the
Kalam. Rational solutions to theological problems, such as the use
 SUMMARY 53

of figurative speech as a remedy for anthropomorphism, penetrate

circles of Mutakallimün who are known as followers of Ash'arisim.
Usually the Ash'arites apply the theory of bi-la kayfa, and this last
theory appears in a Mu'tazilite scholar. As we have seen in Fakhr
al-Din al-Razi's theory of prophethood, a scholar may be a tradi-
tionalist then a rationalist.
The foundations of traditionalism and rationalism stand in
sharp contrast. At o n e end of the spectrum are the interna1 roots
of Islam - the Qur'an, the Sunna and the Consensus, al1 of which
produce homogeneous doctrines (however, this statement is not
always right), and the ancient scholars and their true and legiti-
mate doctrines. And at the other e n d of the spectrum is an exter-
nal device - reason (though not always considered as an externa1
device; sometimes it constitutes a kind of revelation and sometimes
it is included in revelation), which produces various solutions to
theological issues and at times defames the ancient scholars on
account of rational considerations. Each trend reacts to the foun-
dations and to the doctrines which are drawn from the opposing
trend; a n d the more extreme the rationalist is, the more offensive
he is to the traditionalists and vice versa. The traditionalists use
reason in order to refute the rationalists, while the rationalists d o
not refrain from using Qur'ánic interpretation and traditions to
refute the traditionalists. Sometimes rationalists and traditionalists
use similar arguments which derive from different premises, such
as the argument that reason o r Tradition leads to contradictory
tenets. The battlefield is not always clear, for the traditionalists
sometimes wear the clothes of the rationalists.' Therefore, it is
better to speak of rationalist tendencies than to speak of rational-
ism.
 APPENDIX 1
T H E CREED OF ABÜ ZUR'A
'UBAYDALLAH IBN 'ABD AL-KARIM
AL-RAZI (D. 2 6 4 / 8 7 8 ) AND ABÜ
HATIM MUHAMMAD IBN IDRIS
AL-RAZI (D. 2 7 7 / 8 9 0 ) '

(p. '76)
I. Belief is action and saying (qawl wa-'amal), it increases and
decreases (yazidu zua-yanqusu).'
2. T h e Qur'án is God's uncreated speech (kalüm Allüh ghayr
makhlüq) in al1 its aspects."
3. Predestination (qadar),whether good o r evil, derives from God.4
4. The best persons of this commilnity after its Prophet are Abü
Bakr al-Siddiq, then 'Umar ibn al-Khattáb, then 'Uthmán ibn
'Affan, then 'Ali. (p. 177) They are the rightly giiided caliphs.5
5. There are ten persons whom God's Messenger called the peo-
ple of Paradise and testified that they would be there. It is his
true statemerit. O n e must have mercy upon al1 Muhammad's
Companions and abstain from [dealing with controversies]
which took place among them.6
6. God is on His Throne ('arshihi) a n d is separated from His
creation as He described Himself in His Book and through
His Messenger 'without modality' (bi-la kayfa) . 7 God knows
everything thoroughly: 'There is none like Him and He is the
All-Hearing and the All-Seeing' (Qur'án 42.11 ) .
7. God will be seen in the world to come.' The people of Para-
dise will see Hini with their eyes (literally 'glances') and will
hear His speech in the manner He wills and as He wills.
8. Both Paradise and Hell really exist. Both of them are created
eritities which will never perish.q Paradise is reward for God's
friends (aruliya'ihi) and Hell is punishment for sinners (liter-
ally 'those who disobey God', ahl maSiyatihi), unless God will
have mercy upon them.'"
9. T h e Way (akirüt) is true."
10. Tlie Balance (al-miran) is true. It has two scales in which rnari's
good and evil deeds are weighed. [All this is] true."
I 1. The Basin (al-hawd), through which our Prophet is honoured,
is true.I3
12. The Intercessiori (al-shafa'a) is true."
13. The Resurrection (al-ba2h) after death is true.I5
14. People who commit grave sins are subject to God's ~ i l l . ' ~
15. We d o not declare the Muslims (literally 'the people who direct
their prayer toward the Ka'ba', ahl al-qibla) to be unbelievers
on account of their sins, and we entrust their secrets to God.I7
16. We carry out the precepts of the Holy War (jihad) and Pilgrim-
age (ha~j]with the leaders of the Muslims in every period."
I 7. We d o not consider rebellion against the leaders of the com-
munity and strife in civil war appropriate. We listen to and
obey those whom God appoints as o u r leaders and we shall not
stop obeying [them]. We follow the Sunna and the Consensus
(jama'a) and abstain from deviations (shudhüdh), controversy
(khikllf) and disunion Vurqa) . ' g

18. The Holy War continues from the time of Muhammad until
the Resurrection with the powerful leaders of the Muslims,
nothirig will cancel it.
19. Likewise the Pilgrimage and giving obligatory offerings in the
form of cattle to powerful leaders of the Muslims [continue].
20. People must be treated as believers (literally 'people are
believers') in accordance with the rules of believers and their
inheritarice. We d o not know what they are in the eyes of
God.'"
21. Whoever says that he is truly a believer is an innovator. Who-
ever says that he is a believer in the eyes of God is a liar." And
whoever says that he is truly a believer in God is right.
22. The Murji'ites and the innovators are deviators (dulál).
23. The innovative Qadarites are deviators. Whoever, among
them, denies that God knows what happens before it happens
is an unbeliever."
24. The Jahmites are unbelievers.'"
25. The Rafidites re~ected(rafadü) Islam.'4
26. The Kharijites are apostates (muraq) .li
27. Whoever claims that the Qur'an was created (makhlüq) does
not believe in the Mighty God. His unbelief removes him from
the community. Whoever doubts his unbelief, among those
who understand, is an unbeliever.
28. Whoever has doiibts concerning God's speech hesitating and
 saying: 1 d o not know whether it was created or not, is a
Jahmite.'6
29. Whoever hesitates concerning the Qur'an without knowing is
an innovator and n o t a n unbeliever.'7

30. Whoever says: My uttering of the Qur'án is created, or the Qur'an

in my uttering is created is a Jahmite.
31. Abü Muhammad ('Abd al-Rahman ibn A b i ~Hátim) said: 1heard
my father saying: The sign of the innovators (ahl al-bida') is
their defaming of the traditionists (ahl al-athar), and the sign
of the heretics (zanadiqa) is their naming ahl al-sunna as
hashwiyya wishing through this the cancellation of traditions.
The sign of the Jahmites is their naming of ahl al-sunna as
likeners (mushabbiha).The sign of the Qadarites is their nam-
ing of the traditionists as mujbira (those who adhere to predes-
tination). The sign of the Murji'ites is their naming of ahl al-
sunna as opposers (mukhalifa) and as nuqsaniyya (those who
state that belief increases and decreases [naqasa]).The sign of
the Ráfibites is their naming of ahl al-sunna as nasiba.
Only one name is attached to ahl al-sunmz, and it is impossible
that al1 these names should apply to them.
1 would like to point out some other dogmas which 1have found in
the creeds of other scholars mentioned by al-Lalaka'i and which
are not set out in the present creed. Despite al-Lalaka'i's statement
on the homogeneity of the teachings of ahl al-sunna wa'l-jam¿ira
(see Chapter 1, n. 50), the following list proves that even among
the traditionalists there was n o general consensus concerning
articles of faith. 1 d o not mean to say that a scholar who did not
introduce one of the following articles did not believe in it, but the
absence of a certain article shows at least that he did not ascribe
irnportance to it. Out of the ten creeds which occur in al-Lalaka'i,
eight seem to be complete creeds. These are the creeds of Sufyan
al-Thawri, Sufyán ibn 'Uyayna, Ibn Hanbal, ' N i ibn al-Madini, al-
Bukhári, Sahl al-Tustari, Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, and Abü Hátim and
Abü Zur'a. What appears as the irtiqad of al-Awza'i and of Abü
Thawr al-Kalbi is n o more than several statements on belief.
1. Wiping off the shoes (admash 'ala al-khuJayn).'"
2. Lowering of the voice when uttering the formula 'In the name
of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate' (h-smi allah al-rahmün
al-rahim) in the prayer.'g
 3. Following the ancient scholars (al-salaf).30
4. Belief in and acceptance of traditions as they are without ques-
tions of 'why' a n d ' h ~ w ' . ~ '
5. T h e Punishment of the Tomb ( 'adhüb al-qabr).3'
6. T h e Prophet saw God.33
7. T h e Antichrist will appear and Jesus will kill him.34
8. Whoever does not pray is unbeliever, and God permits his kill-
ing.35
9. Whoever commits a sin, for which there is the punishment of
Hell, and then repents, God will forgive him.3"
10. T h e adulterer must be stoned.37
11. There are traditions which must not be interpreted.3"
12. Discussion of predestination and other issues of the Sunna is
reprehensible (al-kalüm fi al-qadar wa-ghaynhi min al-sunna
makruh) .39
13. Whoever defames o r hates one of the Companions is an inno-
vator
.4O

14. Hypocrisy (nzfaq) amounts to unbelief (kufr).+'

15. It is forbidden to fight against this com1nunity.4~
16. O n e has to forsake the Mutakallimün's views and their com-
pany and the company of whoever composes books according
to personal opinions and not according to traditions.43
17. T h e discussion of what 'name' (ism) and what 'the object
named' (al-musammü) are is stupidity.44
 APPENDIX 11
AL-MUKHTASAR Ff U S Ü L AL-DfN'

(P. '97)
Q: What must the person obliged know concerning the principles
of religion (usül aldin)?'
A: He must know four issues: (1) God's unity (tawhid);3 ( 2 ) God's
justice ('ad1);4 (3) Prophecies (nuhruwüt); and (4) Laws
(sharü 'ir).

(P. '99)
What is the first obligation incumbent o n man?
It is speculation and reflection which leads to the knowledge
of God.
First, what is the source of our knowledge that speculation and
reflection are obligatory, whereas some people, such as the
traditionists (ahl al-hadith), oppose this notion and state that
knowledge is gained through uncritical acceptance of ideas
(al-'ilm bi'l-taqlid)?5 Moreover, some learned people state that
knowledge is obtained necessarily and there is no need to
reflect and speculate.
The learned man knows that there are people who are wrong
in their speculation (yukhti'u) and others who are right
(yusibu), however each of them claims that he is right. Why,
then, is the taqlid of one of them better than the taqlid of the
other? Why is the taqlid of the believer in God's unity better
than the taqlid of the unbeliever? Why is the taqlid of whoever
believes in the seeing of God better than the taqlid of whoever
denies this seeing?

This explains the incorrectness of the taqlid and proves that

the truth cannot be known through people ...
 A P P E N D I X 11 59

The proof that the knowledge of God and His Messenger

can be obtained through reflection is that if it were obtained
through necessary knowledge the learned people would hold
the same notions and would not differ concerning them ...
What proves our idea, from the point of view of tradition (al-
samr),is that God enjoins speculation and urges people to it;
He praises those who speculate and denounces those who
deviate from it and says: 'Speculate about what is in the heavens
and in the earth' (Qur'an 10.101) and 'Do they not speculate
about how the carnels were created?' (Qur'an 88.17) and '[In
the earth there are signs ... ] and in yourselves, d o you not
see'? (Qur'an 51.21)and 'How many a sign there is in the heavens
and in the earth that they pass by, turning away from it'
(Qur'an 12.105).The Qur'ánic arguments to which God calls
man's attention prove the obligation to speculate and the
incorrectness of the ~ a q l i d . ~

Q What is the proof that the learned man must speculate in or-
der to obtain the knowledge of God?
A: That is because if he hears the people's controversies concern-
ing these systems of thought, the charge of unbelief through
which they accuse each other (takjir) and each of them fright-
ening his colleague as a result of the controversy, and if he
knows that it is impossible that al1 these systems of thought
should be right, for each contradicts the other, for example
the notion that the world is eternal vis-54s the notion that the
world was created, the notion that God can be seen vis-54s the
notion that H e cannot be seen, and [if he knows] that it is also
impossible that al1 these systems can be wrong, for the truth
lies within one of them, that is, it is inconceivable that the
world should not be eternal and should not have been created,
[he will necessarily know that] there are systems which are
right and others which are wrong.
 APPENDIX 111
TWO PASSAGES O N REASON AND
TRADITION

A CHAPTER WHICH DETAILS WHAT CAN BE KNOWN

THROUGH REASON AND N O T THROUGH
TRADITION, WHAT CAN BE KNOWN ONLY
THROUGH TRADITION AND N O T THROUGH
REASON AND WHAT CAN BE KNOWN THROUGH
BOTH REASON AND TRADITION'

Know, may God have mercy upon you, that al1 the known princi-
pies of religion (ahküvf al-din al-ma'lüma) must be divided into
three kinds: ( 1 ) what may be known only through reason (al-'aql)
and not through Tradition (or Revelation - al-sam'); ( 2 ) what rnay
not be known through reason, but may be known only through
Tradition; and (3) what may be known both through reason and
Tradi tion.
As for what may be known only through reason and not
through Tradition, these are the creation of the world (hudüth al-
'ülam), the proof of the existerice of its creator (muhdith),j His
being one (wahdñniyatihi), His attributes, the prophecy of His
messengers and al1 that which is connected to these matters,
namely, the knowledge of God's unity and prophecy which may
oniy be obtained through reason.
The proof of this is that Tradition (al-sam') is only God's speech
(kalüm allah, meatiing the Qur'an) and the statements (qarul,
meaning the hadith) of him who is known as God's Messenger and
the Consensus (ijmü') of those who are reported not to have erred
in their opinions. It is impossible to know that the speech is God's,
that the statenients are 1-Iis Messenger's and the trustworthiness
arid rightness of those whom the Messenger declared to be trust-
worthy and right, unless one knows God's existence beforehand.
That is because the knowledge that the speech is God's and that
 A P P E N D I X III 61

the Messenger is His Messenger constitutes a branch of the knowl-

edge of God's existence, for God is known through His speech,
His sending (of messengers) and His attributes. And it is impossi-
ble for o n e to know God's attributes, unless one knows God's exist-
ente, just as it is impossible for o n e who does not know Zayd's ex-
istence to know his speech and his messenger. Therefore, the
knowledge of God and of the prophecy of His messengers must be
known through reason before the knowledge of the rightness of
tradi tion.4

As for what is known through Tradition - things in which reason

plays n o role - it is the knowledge that the actions of the person
obliged ífirl al-mukallaf) are either good or evil, permitted or for-
bidden . . . obligatory or recommended . . . 5
As for what may be known sometimes through reason and
sometimes through Tradition, these include al1 rules or rational
issues, the ignorance of which does not infringe the knowledge of
God's unity and prophecy, for example the knowledge of the pos-
sibility of seeing God, the knowledge of the possibility of forgive-
ness for the sinner, the knowledge that it is appropriate to act
according to tradition based on o n e transmitter (khabar al-wühid),
the knowledge of using analogy in laws, and so on. If the person
obliged does not know such issues, his ignorance does not prevent
him from knowing God and the prophecy of His messengers."

A CHAPTER O N WHAT IS KNOWN T H R O U G H

RATIONAL PROOFS AND WHAT IS KNOWN
THROUGH TRADITIONAL PROOFS7
Know that things known through proof can be possibly known
either through reason ('aql) alone, or through Tradition (shar')
alone, o r through both Tradition and reason. The things known
through reason alone are those for which there is a rational proof
and the knowledge of the soundness of Tradition is based on the
knowledge of it (this rational proof), such as the knowledge of
God('s existence) and His attributes and that He is All-sufficient
and does not d o evil. We say: 'The knowledge of the soundness of
Tradition is hased on the knowledge of rational proof, for we
know the soundness of Tradition only if we know the trustworthi-
ness of the prophets, and we know their trustworthiness through
miracles only if we know that i t is impossible for God to show
62 ISLAMIC T H E O L O G Y : T R A D I T I O N A L I S M A N D RATIONALISM

miracles by the mediuni of a liar. And this last knowledge is

obtained only if we know that showing miracles through a liar is
evil arid God does not d o evil. We know that God does not d o evil
only if we know that He knows the evilness of evil and does not
need the evil thirigs. This knowledge is a branch of the knowledge
of God. Therefore these pieces of knowledge must precede the
knowledge of Tradition.
As for what it is posible to know through both Tradition and
reason, these are al1 the things for which there are rational proofs
and the knowledge of the soundness of Tradition is not based on
the knowledge of these proofs, such as the knowledge that God is
one and that there is n o other god whose wisdom equals that of
God. That is because if His wisdom is proved, and if there were
another as wise as He, it would be inconceivable for both of them,
or o n e of them, to send one who would he.' Therefore, if the mes-
senger informs that God is one and that there is n o other eterna1
entity with Him, we will know his trustworthiness. Likewise, the ob-
ligation to return deposit (wujüb radd al-wadira) and the benefit
which is gained without damaging anyone (are known through
both tradition and reason).
As for what is known through Tradition (al-sharr) alone, it is
that for which Tradition (al-sam'), and not reason, has proof such
as traditional benefits and damages (al-masalih wa'l-mafaid al-
shar?yya) and what is connected with theni. The traditional ben-
efits and damages are the actions through which Tradition calls
upon us to worship God either through carrying out or omitting
these actions, such as the obligation to pray and the prohibition
against drinking wine and the like.
 APPENDIX IV
KITAB USÜL AL-'ADL WA'L-TAWHf D
WA-NAFY AL-JABR WA'L-TASHB f H '

The worship of God is divided into three parts: ( 1 ) knowledge of

God; ( 2 ) knowledge of what pleases Hirn and what displeases Hirn;
and (3) practising what pleases Him and abstaining frorn what dis-
pleases Hirn .. .
These three kinds of worship derive frorn three proofs which
God introduces to rnan: reason ( 'aql), the Qur'án and the Messenger.
The proof of reason produces the knowledge of God, the proof
of the Book produces the knowledge of worship (a&tarabbud)and
the proof of the Messenger produces the knowledge of the practi-
cal ways of worship ( Z'bada). Reason is the basis of the Qur'án and
the Messenger, (p. 1 2 5 ) for they both are known through reason,
whereas reason is not known through thern.
The Consensus (ijma') is the fourth proof which incliides al1
three proofs and derives frorn thern.'
Know that each of these proofs has a root (asl) and a branch.
The branch must be returned to the root, for the roots judge the
branches.
The root of reason is what the learned people agree on and d o
not differ on, and its branch is what they differ on and do not
agree on ...
The root of the Qur'án is the selfevident (muhkam) [part of it]
on which there is an agreernent and whose interpretation (taiuil)
does not contradict its plain rneaning (tanzil).3The branch of the
Qur'an is the arnbiguous (mutashübih) [part of it] which rnust be
returned to its root on which there is no disagreernent among the
interpreten (ahl al-ta'wil) .4
The root of the Sunna of the Prophet is what Muslirns agree on,
and its branch is what they differ on concerning what carne frorn
the Prophet. Every tradition on which there is disagreernent rnust
be returned to the roots of reason, the Book and the Consensus.
64 ISLAMIC THEOLOGY: T R A D l T l O N A L l S M AND RATIONALISM

The knowledge of God is rational. It is divided into two aspects:

affirmation and negation. Affirmation means certain knowledge of
God (al-yaqin bi-allüh) and acknowledgment of Him, and negation
means negation of His anthropomorphism (tashhh),which in turn
is a declaration of His unity (tawhid).
 NOTES

INTRODUCTION
1. Arberry, Reuelation and Reason, p. 9.
2. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 111.
3. Al-Fürübi on the Perfect State. AW Nasr al-Farübi's Mabadi' Arü' Ahl al-
Madina al-Füdila, ed. trans. a n d comm. R. Walzer, Oxford 1985, PP.
474-81. D. Gutas, Auicana and the Aristotelian Tradition, Introduction to
Reading Auicenna's Philosophical Works, Leiden 1988, pp. 299-307- Ibn
Rushd tries a kind of compromise between reiigion a n d revelation,
according to which since the Qur'an itself urges people to speculate
in order to attain the truth, there can be n o contradiction between
the demonstrative inquiry a n d revelation; both of thern are true
devices. Fwl al-magül wa-tagñr mii bayna al-shañ'a wa 'lhikmu min al-ittisül,
ed. G. F. Hourani, Leiden 1959, p. 5f. Ed. Muhammad 'Imára, p. 31f.
4. Tr. by S. van d e n Bergh, London 1954. This work includes the transla-
tion of both al-Ghazali's Tahüfut alfalasifa a n d Ibn Rushd's Tahüfut al-
tahüfut.
5. T h e Zaydite theologian al-Qasim ibn Ibrahim (d. 246/860), who was
prone to Mu'tazilism, wrote a treatise against a philosopher o r a s c e p
tic entitled K. al-radd úlü al-mulhid, MS Berlin (W.Ahlwardt, Vena'chnis
der arabischen Handschriften der Koniglicha Bibliothek zu Berlin, Berlin
1887-9, vol. 4, p. 290, no. 4876, Glaser I O I )fols
, 58b-63b, ed. Muhamrnad
Yahya 'Azzan, San'a' 1992. In this epistle, the main issue is the refuta-
tion of the eternity of the world. In his al-Mabühith al-Mashnqiyya,
Fakhr al-Din al-Razi sometimes criticises Ibn Sina's views but also
accepts sorne notions of the philosopher. Ibn Taymiyya seerns to have
been the most prolific theologian in refuting philosophy. See, for
example, Kitüb bughyat al-mufiüdfi'l-radd 'ala al-mutafalsifa rua'l-qaramita
wa'l-bütiniyya, Cairo AH 1329. In his N q d al-mantiq (p. 44), Ibn
Taymiyya points out that the Ash'arite theologian al-Baqillani (d. 404/
1013)wrote a work entitled K. aldaqü'iq in which he refuted the views
of the philosophers concerning the spheres, the stars, the intellects,
the souls, logic and so on. Al-Suyüti's refutation of the Aristotelian
logic Vahd al-qarihaf2 tajrid al-nasi/~a[The Exertion of Effort in Divest-
ing the Nasiha], which constitutes the second volurne of his Sawn) is
an abridgement of Ibn Tayrniyya's Nasihat ahl al-iman JZ al-radd 'ala
mantiq al-yunün (the alternative title is al-Radd 'ala al-mantiqiyyin - T h e
66 NOTES

Refutation of the Logicians). For a discussion and translation of Jahd

al-qañha, see W . B. Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logzcians,
Oxford 1993. Several Muslim theologians before Ibn Tayrniyya have
criticised the Aristotelian logic. Ibid. pp. 42-7. For passages of refuta-
tion of philosophical views in theological works, see for exarnple Ibn
al-Jawzi, T a l h s Zblts, pp. 45-50 Ibn Hazm, al-Fisal, vol. I , pp. 9-14.
6. Kraerner, Humanism, p. 181.
7. In his h e l a t i o n and Reason i n Islam, Arberry devotes most of his work
to philosophy, and the scanty discussion of theological issues is not
satisfactory. The state of research in this field is best exemplified
through the absenc.e of any study which examines the doctrine of bi-la
kayfa, one of the rnost irnportant doctrines of the traditionalists. For
discussion of this issue, see my 'The bi-la kayfa Doctrine and its Foun-
dations in Islarnic Theology', Arabica 42:s (1995). PP. 365-79. Tritton's
article ('Reason and Revelation', Arabic and Zslamic Studies i n Honor of
Hamilton A. R. Gibb, ed. G. Makdisi, Leiden 1965, PP. 619-30) deals
briefly with speculative theologians and philosophers but ignores the
theology of the traditionalists.
8. An excellent exarnple of such a phenornenon is a treatise entitled Qatf
al-thamarfi bayan ' q i d a t ahl al-athar ('Picking the fruits concerning the
explanation of the creed of the people of Tradition') written by an
Indian Muslim scholar Muhamrnad Siddiq Hasan Khán al-Qinnawji
(d. 1307/188g) and edited by '&¡m ibn Abdallah al-Qaryüti, Beirut
1984. Apart frorn al-Qinnawji's adherence to the Qur'án, the Sunna
and the views of the Sahaba and the Tábi'ün (ibid., p. qz), he states
that one should keep away from the innovators ( a h l al-bida') and a b
stain frorn controversy in religious rnatters. As exarnples of innovators,
he points out the ancient sects, the Rafidites, the Kharijites, the
Jahrnites and so on without applying to thern rnodern rneanings.
9. It is to be noted that the third/ninth century is established as a point
of departure, for in this era the notion of traditionalisrn has begun to
be crystallised. In the second/eighth century, Muharnrnad's Tradition
has not yet occupied i:s central position regarding practice and creed.
Most of the texts studied belong to the period between the third/
ninth and the eighth/fourteenth centuries.
10. j? a n n a ahl al-sunna Ia yukaffirüna musliman bidhanbin wa-bid'atzn wa-la
yamna rüna al-salata khalJahu. Rasü'il wa-fatawü shaykh al-islüm fi'l-tafsir
rua'l-hadith wa 'l-usü1 wa 'l-'aqü'id rua'l-üdab wa'l-ahküm, ed. Muharnrnad
Rashid Rida, Cairo 1992 (repr.), vol. 2, part 5 , p. 241.
11. 'Hanbalite Islam', p. 240. Cf. Reinhart, Before Rmelation, PP. 24, 27, 34,
195, n. 13 (quoting Makdisi, 'Hanbalite Islam', p. 239). Ibn Tayrniyya
hirnself tried to protect the Hanbalites from their reputation as the
only extrernists in religion. Referring to the issue of the affirrnation of
God's attributes or their negation, Ibn Tayrniyya states that 'the affir-
rnation of attributes does not particularise the Hanbalites, and ex-
trernisrn (ghuluww) [in this issue] which occurs in thern occurs also in
others. Moreover, whoever investigates the people's systerns will find
in each group extrernists (ghulüt)-concerning negation and affirrna-
tion which he will not find in the Hanbalites.' Naqd al-mantiq, p. 139.
Frorn Abü al-Hasan Muharnmad ibn 'Abd al-Malik al-Karji's (d. 532/
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 67

1137) condemnation of those who adhere to a certain school in

matters of law (e.g. Hanbalism) and to another school in matters of
theology (e.g. Mu'tazilism), we learn that the boundaries which mark
out the schools were not closed. Ibid., p. 144 (quoting al-Karji's al-
FusÜl/t'l-usu1 'un al-a'imma al-fuhul). It is also impossible to state that a
certain school of law has always been committed to a certain theologi-
cal school. Baghdad of the fourth/tenth century attests to leading
Hanafite scholars who were Mu'tazilites and other Hanafites who
opposed Mu'tazilism. Madelung, 'The Spread of Máturidism', p. r 12.
12. The Enqclopedia of Religzon, ed. M. Eliade, New York and London 1987,
vol. 15, p. 1.
13. For the distinction between hadith and sunna, see 1. Goldziher, Muslim
Studies, vol. 2, ch. I , pp. 24-5.
14. Other appellations which are not in common use are: ahl al-kitüb wa'l-
sunna, ahl al-haqq wa'l-sunna, ahl al-haqq. Ibn Batta, Sharh, p. 11, n. 1.
T h e term which combines the Qur'án, the Sunna and the Consensus
is al-sam' (literally 'hearing'). See below, al-Baqillani, Appendix 111.
For the distinction between 'traditionist' and 'traditionalist', see
Melchert, 'The Adversaries', p. 235, n. 4.
15. Al-Suyüti, Miftüh al-janna, p. 16, para. 7. Some traditionalists identify
religion with tradition; according to al-Taymi (al-Hzyja, vol. 1 , p. 206),
religion means traditions, and in al-Dárimi's view whoever defames
traditions defames Islam. Al-Radd 'ala al-Marisi, p. 495.
16. Their attitude towards religion resernbles, in some respects, the
rationalism of the Enlightenment. See below, p. 41.
17. Cf. Arberry, Reuelation and Reason, p. 24.
18. Abrahamov, 'Ibn Taymiyya', p. 267. See below, p. 51.
19. Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat al-aúilla , vol. 1, p. 453. Cf. Ibn 'Asákir, Tabyin, p.
rogf.
20. For al-Ash'ari's proofs of God's existence in his various writings, see D.
Gimaret, La doctrine d'al-Ash'ari, Paris 1990, PP. 219-34.
21. See below (pp. 3 6 8 ) , Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's proof of prophecy. Abü
Hanifa is said to have thought that one can attain the knowledge of
God without revelation. Reinhart, Before Reuelation, p. I 1.
22. USÚL P. 230, 11. 7-9.
23. T h e other four are: (1) God's unity (tawhid); (2) God's justice ('aúl);
(3) the promise (ruard) and the threat (warid); (4) the intermediate
state of the grave sinner (manzila bayna al-manzilatayn). Abrahamov, al-
Qüsim pp. 15-55. D. Gimaret, 'Mu'tazila', EI2, vol. 7, pp. 783-93. Watt,
The F o m t i v e Period, pp. 228-49.
24. Mánakdim, Sharh, pp. 142, 742.

CHAPTER 1: T H E FOUNDATIONS O F
TRADITIONALISM
1. Al-Lálaká'i, Sharh usül, vol. I, p. 9. Through these sources of knowledge
o r proofs, man knows what h e should know concerning the principles
of religion, namely, God's iinity, His attributes and the belief in His
messengers. Tine belief in these principles is not characteristic only of
68 NOTES

the traditionalists but also of the rationalists. However, the difference

lies in the systerns used to study them a n d in their contents. Following
the Q u r ' a n a n d the Sunna is a theme recorded in niany traditions.
See, for example, Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah al-Khatib al-Tabrizi (fl.
the eighth/fourteenth centiiry), Mishkat al-Masábih, ed. Muharnrnad
Nasir al-Din al-Albani, Beirut 1961, pp. 51-69 T h e Qur'an is sometimes
called sunnat aUüh. Al-Qurtubi, al-Bida: p. 176.
2. Al-Hujja, vol. 2, p. 224. In the introduction to his book, al-Taymi points
out that his aim in composing this book was to explain the beliefs of
the ancient scholars (or-the $oiis Ancestors, al-su&) and the people
of the Sunna (ahl al-sunna) in o r d e r to refute the innovators a n d to
strerigthen adherence to the Sunna. Ibid., p. 83f. As a nile, the empha-
sis is o n adherence to the Qur'an a n d the Sunna o r t o the Sunna
alone. See, for example, Daiber, 'Ibn Qudama', p. 109;Ibn Tayrniyya,
Naqd, p. 48. It is worth noting that t h e motive of strengthening the
Qur'an and the Sunna was not always the challenge of reason o r other
kinds of innovations but also the adherence to jurisprudent literature
and as a result neglecting studying the Qur'an a n d the Sunna. Al-
Baghawi, Sharh al-súnna, vÓl. 1, p. 4.-
3. Ibn Taymiyya speaks of the divergence of opinions in the rationalist
tliinkers as a point of weakness in rationalism. Abrahamov, 'Ibn
Taymiyya', pp. 259-61. This notion has already been advanced by al-
Tayrni, who says: 'If you consider the people of the sects a n d the inno-
vators, you will see that they are scattered and have differerit views ...
You will hardly ever find two of them holding the sarne view concern-
ing dogma. Some of them accuse others of thern of being irinovators,
moreover they arrive a t accusirig each other of unbelief; a son accuses
his father of being an unbeliever ... You always see them in contest
and hatred ...' Al-Taymi, al-Hujja, vol. 2 , p. 225.
4. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh U S Ü I , vol. 2, p. 5 3 8 T h e pronoun mü here is under-
stood as ma masdanyya a n d the verb 'amila as ' h e acted'. T h e pronoun
rnü can be othenvise understood as ma mauts~ila,hence the verse would
read: 'God has created you and that which you make'. T h e meaning
of the verb ámila is either 'he acted' o r 'he made'. Abrahamov, al-
Qüsirn, p. 46f.
5. Al-Lalaka'i, ibid., vol. 2, p. 541.
6. Ibid., pp. 58off.
7. Ibid., pp. 655ff.
8. Al-Barbahari ( a Hanbalite scholar d. 32g/g40), Sharh al-sunna, p. 24.
Abü Ya%, Tabaqat, vol. 2, p. 241: 'The Sunna interprets the Qur'an
and serves as its proofs, and there is neither analogy in the Sunna, nor
parables apply to it. It is neither perceived by the intellect nor by per-
sonal inclinations' (kitudraku bz'l-'uqül wa-lü bi'l-ahwü').
9. Al-Taymi, al-Huja, vol. 1, p. 98f. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh u s d , vol. 2, pp. 524-
27. Al-Suytiti, Surun, vol. 1, p. 82f. T h e verb tafakkara means to prove
something o n the basis of premises. Al-Jurjani defines fikr (literally
'thought') as 'the arrangement of things known in order to obtain the
thing unknown' (tartib umur rna'lüma li-tata'addü ilü majhül). Kitüb al-
ta'rifüt, ed. G. Flügel, Leipzig 1845, p. 176. In Kitüb al-tafakkur (The Rook
of Reflection) in Ihyü' (vol. 4, p. 425), al-Ghazali states: 'Know that the
 NOTES TO C H A P T E R I 69

meaning of discursive knowledge (literally 'reflection' - tafakkur) is to

bring two pieces of knowledge into the heart in order to derive from
both a third piece of knowledge'. Abrahamov, 'Al-Ghazali's Supreme
Way,' p. i61f. See below, p. gf.
lo. Ibn Taymiyya, Ma'ürij al-wusÜ[, p. 175:'God's Messenger has explained
the whole of religion, its roots and branches, its plain meaning and its
hidden one, its knowledge and its practice'. This notion was already
introduced in Islamic theology by al-Khattabi as quoted in al-Suyüti's
&wn, vol. 1, p. 141.The Qur'ánic basis ofthis iiotion is sum 5, v. 3: 'Today
1 have completed your religion for you'. Cf. Al-Razi, Tafiir, part XI, p.
139, the fifth issue. This notion is more extreme than the notion
expressed by al-Taymi, for al-Taymi allows the use of reasori on the
condition of its compliance with the Qur'ari and the Sunna.
11. Al-Lalak'ai, Sharh usül, vol. 2, pp. 627-33. Abü Ya'la, Tabaqüt, vol. 2 , p.
25. See below, p. 10.
12. Abü Ya'la, Tabaqüt, vol. 2, p. 30 (quoting the al-Barbahári's creed).
13. Al-Darimi, al-Raúd 'ala aljahmi'ya, p. 306. This notion also appears in
juristic literature; in his al-Risala, al-Shafi'i states that revelation
(meaning the Qur'an and the Surina; cf. Wansbrough, Quranic Studies,
p. 174.) is a necessary, an exclusive and a sufficient source of know-
ledge. Calder, 'Ikhtilaf and Ijma", p. 72.
14. The traditionalists believe in the uncreatedness of the Qur'an, for
they regard the Qur'an as God's speech, which means .a divine
attribute, and God's attributes are eternal. See below, p. 54. Traditions
play an important role in the elevation of the Qur'an. Rubin, The Eye
of the Beholdm, p. 10.T h e trustworthiness of the Qur'an as God's revela-
tion to the Prophet is proved through miracles God did for him, and
for later generations it is proved throiigh khabar mutaruatir.
15. Al-Qasim ibn Ibrahirn, K al-radd 'ala al-zindiq al-laln Ibn al-Muqaffa: in
M. Guidi, La lotta tra l'islam et il manicheismo, Rome 1927. But while Ibn
al-Muqaffa' (d. 142/759) was considered as a heretic, like the arch-
heretic of the third/ninth century Ibn al-awandi (see below, p. 89),
the famous poet Abü al-'Ala' al-Ma'arri (d. qqg/ro57) reniained in the
eyes of his Muslim contemporaries a Muslim notwithstanding his criti-
cism of iljüz al-qur'ün and other principies of religion. H e even went so
far as to make a clear distinction between religion and intellect.
According to him, people are divided iiito two groups: those who have
intellect without religion, and those who have religion without intel-
lect. Luzümivyüt, Beirut 1983, vol. 2, p. 231. (For al-Ma'arri, see P. Smoor,
EZ2, vol. 5, pp. 927ff.). It is worth noting that in the writings of the
Mutakallimün, chapters dealing with the proofs of Muhanimad's
prophecy and with iljüz al-qur'an were mainly directed against other
religions. See, for example, al-Baqillani, K al-tamhid, chs 10, 1 1 . For a
cautious and delicate estimation of Ibn al-MuqaffaHsattitude towards
the Qur'an, see J. van Ess, 'Some Fragments of the Muaradal al-qur'ün
Attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffa", Studia Arabica et Islamica, Festschrift
Ihsan 'Abbas, ed. Wadad Al-Qadi, Beirut 1981,pp. 151-63.
16. Sharh usül, vol. 1, p. 83f. Cf. al-Suyüti, Saron, vol. I , p. 77: 'We have to
learri what has come frorn God's Messenger, for it has the status of the
Qur'ari'. Cf. Goldziher, Muslim Studies, vol. 2 , ch. 1, p. 31f.
7O NOTES

17. Sharh al-sunna, vol. 1, p. 201f. Cf. al-Tabari, TafsIr, part N , p. 108. Other
verses such as ' 0 b e y ~ G o darid the ~ e s s e i i ~ (e ~r u r ' a nj.32, 4.59), in
which God represents the Qur'an and the Messeriger the Sunna, and
'Those who denied the Book and that which we have sent with o u r
messengers' (Qur'an 40.70; 'That which we have sent ...' stands for
the Sunna) are cited for ttie same purpose. It is worth noting that the
term kitüb a l h h (the Book of God) in alShafiri's al-Risála refers to al1
forms of divine revelation. Calder, 'Ikhtilaf and Ijma", p. 55.
18. U. Rubin, The Eye of the Behoidm, p. 6.
19. Mijtüh al-janna, p. 15. In p. qg, alSuyüti clearly rejects tlie authenticity
of this tradition. For a similar tradition, see Chapter 5, p. M .
20. Ibid., p. 16.
21. Ibid., pp. 17f.. 26.
22. Ibid., pI28: '1 have left among you something that if you adhere to it
you will never err, it is God's Book and my (Muhammad's) Sunna'.
23. Ibid., p. 38.
24. Ibid., p. 105.
25. Ibid., p. 107.
26. Ibid., p. 28. Ibn 'Abd alBarr, Jümi, vol. 2, p. 1,187. Al-Shafi'i states that
'Muhamrnad's rulings are God's rulings'. Quoted by Burton (Introduc-
- ~

tion, p. 85) from K al-umm. It is thus n o wonder that when one of tlie
four imams of jurisprudence (Abü Hanifa, Malik, al-Shafi'i and Ibn
Hanbal) expresses a notion whicti is contradicted by a tradition, he, in
Ibri Taymiyya's view, must make excuses for his deviation. These excuses
are divided into three kinds: (1) the imam's thought that Muharnmad
did not say this tradition; (2) the imam's assurnption that the tradition
is riot relevant to the question discussed; (3) the imam's thought that
the judgement of the tradition was cancelled. Ibn Taymiyya, Raf al-
malam, p. I 8f.
27. Al-Suyüti, Sawn, vol. r , p. 194.
28. G. F. Hourani, 'The Basis of Authority of Consensus in Siinnite Islam',
i r i his Reason and Tradition i n Islamic Ethics, Cambridge 1985, PP. 190-
226.
29. Ibid., pp. 197, 200-3. Cf. Talmud ofJerusalem, Pe'ah, ch. 7, 2oc: 'Go out
and see what the action of the people is and act likewise'. Tr. Calder,
'Ikhtilaf and Ijma", p. 75.
30. Ibid., p. 195.
31. Ibid., pp. 198, 203. In al-Shafi'i's view, the common people coiild not
unite ori a notion wliicli contradicts the Prophet's statements. Calder,
Ibid. This is a slightly different versiori of the tradition rneritioned
above.
32. Hourani, ibid., p. 205f. For more verses and traditioris in favour of tlie
ijmü: see al-Jassas, al-ljma', pp. 137-51.
33. Al-Jassas, al-ljma: p. 66f. Al-Jassas bririgs as an example the proof of tlie
Hanafite scholar 'Ala' al-Din 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn A l ~ m a dibii Muhammad
al-Bukhári (d. 730/1330). Accordirig to him, it is logically proved that
the Prophet is the seal of the prophets (khatam al-anbiyü'),and that his
Law will eridure until the Resurrection. Now when ttiere occurred
events to which n o decisive text of the Qur'an and the Sunna can
apply, tlie commuriity agreed upon the laws concerning these everits.
72 NOTES

which is subject to disagreement is not true. 'Mi ibn Muhammad ibn

al-Walid (d. 612/1215),Dümigh al-batil wa-hatfal-munadil, ed. Mustafa
Ghalib, Beimt 1982, vol. ir, p. 150.
44. T h e traditionalists, including Mutakallimün, such as the Ash'arites,
who adhere to traditional ideas, hold that God's attributes exist in
Him as eternal separate spiritual entities, while the Mu'tazilites think
that 'God is one' means that n o entity exists in His essence and that
there is a kind of identity between God and His attributes. Hence, the
Mu'tazilites are called by the traditionalists mu'attila, those who cancel
God's attributes. For the problem of God's attributes in Islamic theol-
ogy, see Wolfson, kálclm, ch. 2; R. M. Frank, The Teaching of the Basrian
School of the Mu'tazilu in the Clussical Period, Albany 1978. Here we see an
example of the complexity of the problem of rationalism versus tradi-
tiorialism in Islarnic theology. In this subject matter, only the
Mu'tazilites remain rationalists in that they conclude their position
from rational proofs, whereas other Mutakallimün, who can be named
rationalists in other issues, here adopt the traditionalist stand, that is,
their point of departure is traditionalist, and they try to prove it
through rational arguments.
45. In the traditionalists' view, the believer's highest reward in the world
to come is seeing God. This doctrine is based on Qur'an verses (e.g.
75.22-3) and o n rational arguments (e.g. every existing thing can be
seen: since God exists, H e can be seen). T h e opposite view of the
rationalists is also based on Qur'án verses (e.g. 6.103) and o n rational
arguments (e.g. one can see only corporeal Gtity; seeing God means
that H e is a body, for o n e can see only bodies, a n d a body is created
and the Creator cannot be created). For this issue, see my Anthropo-
mmphism, pp. 15-18. Some Mutakallimün, such as the Ash'arite Sayf al-
Din al-Amidi (631/1233) and al-Ghazali, accepted the Mu'tazilite view
of God's visibility which is understood as one's knowledge of God
which exists in orie's heart. Ibid., p. 7. Abrahamov, 'Al-Ghazáli
Supreme Way', pp. 155-7. In this issue, the main stimulus for the dis-
cussion is clearly Qur'an verses for and against the vision of God.
46. Shafü'a means that Muhammad, o r any other prophet, o r an angel o r
a saint can plead for a sinner so that the latter's punishment will be
reduced o r cancelled. T h e Mu'tazilites did not accept this doctrine in
this form, claiming that a sinner who does not repent is doorned to
eternal punishment in Hell. They held that the shafa'a applies only to
those who have already repented. A. J. Wensirick and D. Gimaret,
'Shafa'a', EI2, vol. g , pp. 177-9.
47. Al-Bayhaqi, Al-l'tiqad wa'l-hidüya, p. 187f. T h e legitimacy of dissent ir1
juridical rriatters was established, inter alia, through the famous tradi-
tion 'Diversity in my community is a mercy from God'. Goldziher,
'Catholic Tendencies and Particularism in Islam', p. 126f.
48. For the last term, see N. J. Coulson, A Histoly ofIslumic Law, Edinburgh
1964, index.
49. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Jami', vol. 2, p. 931f. By aldin this author means the
belief in God, His angels, His books, His messengers and the Resur-
rection. Cf. Ibn Taymiyya, Iqtida', p. 142.
50. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh usül, vol. 1, pp. 173-6. 'What proves that the
 NOTES T O C H A P T E R 1 73

traditionists ( a h l abhadith) follow the true way ('ala al-hqq) is the fact
that if you examine al1 their works from first to last, their ancient
works and modern ones, notwithstanding their different cities and
epochs and the distance between their abodes ... you will find them
agreeing on the creeds without deviation ... their view is o n e and their
transmission (naql) is one. You will not see among them divergency ...
If you joined al1 that which they said and transmitted from their ances-
tors, you would find it as if it came from one heart ... 1s there any
clearer proof for the truth than this?' Al-Taymi, al-Hujja, vol. 2, p. 224.
However, the examination of the creeds which appear in al-Lalaka'i
shows that there are some differences among these creeds and that
not al1 the creeds point out the same theological dogmas. See Appen-
dix 1.
51. Dickinson, p. q f .
52. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh usüi, vol. I , pp. 176-82. For the creed of Abü Zur'a
and Abü Hátim, see Appendix 1.
53. Ta'wil, p. 16. Al-Suyüti, Sawn, vol. I , p. 219.
54. Cf. Dickinson, p. 4.
55. Ibid., p. 6.
56. Ibn Taymiyya, Naqd, pp. 42-4.
57. Al-Suyü~,&wn, vol. 1, pp. 69-72.
58. A Companion (sahübi) is whoever associated with the Prophet for a
period of a year, o r a month, o r a day, o r an hour, o r saw him. The
measure of companionship is established in accordance with the dura-
tion of association. In any case, the inferior companion is better than
o n e who did not see the Prophet, even if the latter carried out al1 the
good acts. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh usüi, vol. r , p. 160.
59. Ibn Rajab, Fadl 'ilm al-sala. p. 29f. Ibn Hajar aL'Asqaláni, al-Isüba fi
tamyiz al-sahüba, Beirut n.d. (repr. of Cairo AH 1328), vol. 1, pp. 9-12.
Cf. Y. Friedmann, 'Finality of Prophethood in Sunni Islam', J e r u s a h
Studies i n Arabic and Islam 7 (1986), p. 208f. Muslim scholars have
devoted whole chapters to the praises of the Cornpanions (fadü'il al-
sahüba). See, for example, al-Taymi, al-Hujja, vol. 2, pp. 319-78. Ibn
Rajab says quoting al-Awa'i (d. r57/774) that knowledge is what the
Sahüba have brought, a n d everything else is not knowledge. Fadl 'ilm
al-sakJ p. 33. And Ibn Taymiyya tries to prove logically that the
traditionists are the most learned ~ e o ~ lIn
I I
e .short. this ~ r o o runs
f as
follows: Since Muhammad is the most erudite person, those who know
him best, that is, the &haba and their followers, must be the most
learned people. Naqd, p. r16f.
According to G. H. A. Juynboll (Muslim Tradition: Studies in Chrono-
logy, Prouenance and Authurship of Early Hadith, Cambridge 1983, PP.
171-6), Ibn Abi Hatim al-Rázi (d. 327/938) was the first scholar who
expressed the dogma of the collective reliability of the first genera-
tions of Muslims. Cf. Dickinson, p. 118.
A typical statement concerning the attitude towards the Sahüba is
the following: 'If you see a man who loves Abü Hurayra, prays to God
for him and asks God to have mercy on him, hope for him good and
know that h e is free from innovations'. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh usül, p. 170.
'The principies of the Sunna in our view (usül al-sunna 'indana) are to
 NOTES

adhere to the Sahaba' says Ibn Taymiyya (Naqd, p. 128) quoting Ibn
Hanbal. T h e adoration for the traditionists seerns to have n o limit;
sometimes traditions raise the rank of the traditionists above the rank
of the angels, the prophets a n d the martyrs. Al-Suyü., Sawn, vol. 1 , p.
196 (quoting al-Khatib al-Baghdadi's Sharaf ashüb al-hadith).
A Mutakallim who repents of his way also serves as a means to praise
the traditionists. Al-Walid al-Karabisi is said to have bequeathed his
sons before his death to follow the traditionists, for truth is with them.
Ibid., p. 197.
60. Cf. ~ a k d i s i'Hanbalite
, Islam', p. 263.
61. Tr. by W. M. Watt in his Islamic Creeds: A Seiection, Edinburgh 1994,p.
72. Ibn Hanbal stopped relating traditions from the traditionist al-
Husayn ibn al-Hasan al-Ashqar (d. 208/823-4) when h e heard that the
latter defarned Abü Bakr and 'Urnar. Melchert, 'The Adversaries', p.
237.
62. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh usül, vol. 1 , p. 24.
63. Ibid., pp. 23, 25.
64. Naqd, p. 9. Ibn Tayrniyya notes here (p. 16), without proving it, that
there is a consensus on praising those who adhere to the teachings of
the Sunna.
65. Ibid., pp. i r , 17.
66. 1. Goldziher, Muslim Studies, vol. 2, pp. 33-7. Al-Qurtubi, al-Bida: p.
r7rf. According to Ibn Taymiyya, a notion concerning religion which
has n o religious proof (meaning Qur'án, Sunna and Ijrná') is an inno-
vation. Dar', vol. r , p. 224. Many traditions, such as 'beware of innova-
tions' (iyyükum wa'l-bida? are recorded in the traditionalists' literature.
See, for exarnple, al-Qurtubi, al-Bida', p. 173.Cf. Abü Shama, al-Bü'ith,
pp. 24-8. For innovations concerning practices see Abú Shama, ibid.,
and Ibn Abi Randaqa, Abü Bakr Muharnmad ibn al-Walid al-Turtüshi,
Kitüb al-hawüdith wa'l-bida: ed. Bashir Muharnmad 'Uyün, Damascus
and Beirut 1991.
67. Al-Suyúti, Sawn, vol. 1 , p. 78f.
68. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh usül, vol. 1 , pp. 114-50. 'DO not sit with those who
adhere to the doctrine of free will ( a h l alqadar) and d o not dispute
with thern', ibid., p. 118. 'Do not dispute with the people of contro-
versy' (ashab al-khusümat), ibid., p. 129. Cf. Ibn aljawzi, Talbis iblis, p.
12f.
69. al-maSiya yutabu minhü wa'l-bid'a Lü yutübu minha. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh
usül, p. 132. Al-Qurtubi, al-Bida: p. 198. 'God does not permit the
innovator to repent'. Ibn Batm, Sharh, p. 40 of the Arabic text.
70. 'Beware of whoever sits with an innovator', Talbis Iblis, p. 14.T h e for-
mula 'do not sit' (Ia tujülisü) appears frequently in collections of
hadith. Wensinck, Concwdance, vol. 1 , p. 358. Al-Qurtubi, al-Bida: pp.
rgzff., 313, n. 2. It is important to note that most of the traditions cited
in al-Qurtubi's chapter 'The prohibition to sit and to associate with
the innovators' refers to innovations pertaining to dogma, such as ' d o
not sit with him, for h e is a Mu'tazilite'. Ibid., p. 196.
71. Talbis iblis, p. 14. Cf. Abü Shama, al-Bü'ith, p. 27.
72. Bishr ibn Ghiyath (d. 218/833 o r 228/842), a Murji'ite theologian
known for his dispute with the Mutakallim 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Makki (d.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 2 75

240/85~)on the nature of the Qur'an. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Makki, Kitüb al-
Hayda, ed. Janiil Saliba, Beirut 1992.EIz, vol. 1, p. 1242. For this issue,
see below, p. 54.
73. Talbis iblis, p. 14f The Hadith literature is replete with notes on the
innovations and their degrees in the Muslim sects. See, for example,
Abü 'Ubayd al-Qasim ibn Salam, K al-iman, ed. Muhammad Násir al-
Din al-Albáni, Kuwait 1985, p. 82. The severe attitude towards the inno-
vations is exemplified through traditions which compare the & d a to
other calamities. 'It is preferable to me', says the traditionist, 'to see in
the mosque fire which 1 cannot extinguish than to see in it an ii-inova-
tor whom 1 cannot change.' Al-Qurtubi, al-Bida', p. 181.
74. See above, p. 2.
75. Al-Lálaka'i, Sharh usiil, vol. 2, p. 524. Cf. Plato, Laws, 8zra. See above, p. 2.
76. Ibid., p. 629.
77. Ibid., p. 633. For the term zandaqa, see below, pp. 28, 41.
78. Those who affirm man's capability of producing his acts. This term
refers mainly to the Mu'tazilites.
79. This can be proven also through the succession of traditions in al-
Lalaka'i, ibid., p. 62gf.
80. Ibid., pp. 639-46. For this term, see Chapter 3, n. 65.
81. Ibid., p. 633. 1 do not know whether this tradition has any historical
basis.
82. Ibid., p. 712.
83. Ibid., pp. 730-6.
84. Such as likening God to man (tashhh: ibid., pp. 528-33). not making a
decision concerning the question whether the Qur'an is created or
uncreated (Ibid., vol. 1, p. p 3 ) , and the belief that the act of reciting
the Qur'an is created. Ibid., p. 349.
85. Al-Suyüu, Miftüh al-janna, p. 127, n. 5.
86. Al-Lalaka'i, Sha. usül, vol. 1, p. 123.
87. For this term, see al-Tabari, part 1, p. 25f. Wansbrough, Quranic Studies,
pp. 208-11. A. Rippin, 'Lexicographical Texts and the Qur'an', in
Appfoaches to the Histmy ofthe Interfwetation of the Qur'ün, ed. A. Rippin,
Oxford 1988, pp. 167-71.
88. Al-Suyüti, Miftüh al-janna, p. 128.

CHAPTER 2: T H E PLACE O F REASON I N

TRADITIONALISM
I. On this issue he bases himself on Abü al-Muzaffar Mansür ibn
Muhammad al-Sam'ani (d. 489/1og5), a Hanafite then a Shafi'ite
scholar. (On the historical back&ound of his conversion see Madelung,
Religious Trends, p. 35.) Al-Huja, vol. 1, p. 31qf.In doing this he was not
alone; al-Suyüti also quotes the same passage and others from al-
Sam'áni. r.un, vol. 1, p. 231. Ibid., p. 234 corresponds to al-Taymi's p.
320.
2. This reminds one of Ibn al-Rawandi's contention which appears i r i the
disguise of the Barahima's staten-ient. B. Abrahamov, 'The Barahinia's
Enigma, A Search for a New Solution', Die Welt des Onents 18 (1987),
76 NOTES

pp. 72-91. It seems very probable that al-Taymi had some knowledge of
the Baráhima's views as occur in the writings of some theologians, for
example al-Bliáqillani, K. al-tamhid, ch. g. See below. p. 42.
3. Al-Taymi, al-Hujja, vol. I, pp. 320-2. Al-Taymi (ibid., quoting o n e of ahl
al-sunna) regards the intellect ('aql) as divided into three kinds: (1)
inborn intellect ('aql mawlüd mal&') through which God distin-
guishes man frorn animals. God's imposition of precepts on man is
turned to this intellect. It has the function of distinction between
things (tamyiz) and direction of things (tadóir). (The understanding of
áql as natural disposition was already advanced by al-Harith al-
Muhásibi (d. 243/857), who regarded this intellect as a means to know
God and what benefits man and what harms him. In his view, knowl-
edge is the outcome of the activity of the intellect. K mü'iyat al-%l,
pp. 2oif., 205. Ibn Taymiyya pointed out later that through necessary
natural knowledge man knows that God is above and distinct from his
creation. This is general knowledge which revelation details and
explains. Naqd, pp. 38f, 52. Even in a traditionalist there is a place for
necessary knowledge as proof. Cf. Abrahamov, 'Necessary Knowl-
edge'. Moreover, the notion that one can attain general knowledge
through the intellect and that details of this knowledge are supplied
by revelation (al-fitra ta'lamu al-amr mujmalan wa'l-shanra tuJassiluhu
wa-tubayyinuhu) reminds one of the Mu'tazila's attitude towards moral
values. See below, p. 36. Thus Ibn Taymiya seems to have learned
from his bitter adversaries. This shows again that sometimes the
boundaries between traditionalists and rationalists carinot be defi-
nitely fixed.) (2) Revelational intellect ( ' q l al-ta )id) which God gives
to the prophets and to pious people. (3)-Intellect which is attained
through experience and contacts among people. For a distinction
between intellect and knowledge, see below, p. 17.
4. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 66.
5. This verse might have served the Hanbalite scholar and Ibn
Taymiyya's eminent disciple Ibn al-Qayyirn aljawjiyya (d. 751/1350),
who stated that actions are good o r evil by virtue of themselves, but
reward o r punishment are deserved only through God's orders o r pro-
hibitions. Madünj al-Sülikin, Beimt 1983, vol. I , p. 127. Al-Tayrni, al-
Hujja, vol. I , p. 315. n. 2. In expressing such a view, h e partly accepts
the doctrine of the Mu'tazila concernirig the intrinsic value of man's
actions. See below, p. 36.
In the Ash'arite Mutakallim Fakhr al-Din al-Kizi's view, the messen-
ger mentioned in this verse is the intellect through which one affirms
the existence of revelation. Had intellect not been sent to man, n o
prophetic revelation would have existed. Mafátih al-ghayb, part XX, p.
rpf. Al-Suyüti ascribes this notion, as a logical possibility, to al1 the
Mutakallimún, saying: 'If one said 'There is n o god but God and my
intellect is God's messenger", h e would not b e considered an unbe-
liever in the eyes of the Mutakallimun'. Sarun, vol. i , p. 232.
However, we should stress again that al1 the pure traditionalists
share the notion that theological dogmas must be deduced from rev-
elation and not from reason. This is clearly stated by the Malikite
scholar Ibn 'Abd al-Barr (d. 463/107o): 'There is n o controversy
 NOTES .ro C H A P T E K 2 77

among the jurisprudents in al1 the countries and al1 the people of the
Sunna, ¡.e., the people ofjurisprudence and tradition (ahl al-fiqh wa'l-
hadith) o n the denial of analogy (qiyüs) i r i the matter of God's unity
(tawhid, which means theological issues; sometimes theology is called
'the knowledge of God's unity' - 'ilm al-tawhid) and o n the affirmation
of it in the matter of law (ahküm)'.Jümi', vol. 2, p. 887.
6. Al-Lalaká'i, Sharh, vol. 1, pp. 193-203. Cf. al-Taymi, al-Huj'ja, vol. 1 ,
p 3'4f.
7. In al-Suyüti's wording: 'We have given people the intellect only to
establish worship and riot to perceive Godship (li-iqümat al-'ubudiyya lü
li-idrük al-mbúbiyya). Whoever uses what h e has been given ir1 order to
establish worship for the purpose of perceiving Godship, misses worship
arid does not perceive Godship ... The iritellect is a device of distin-
guishing between good and evil, tradition and innovation, hypocrisy
arid sincerity. Without the intellect there woiild not b e imposition of
precepts (taklzf).' Sawn, vol. 1, p. 233.
8. Cf. H. Lazarus-Yafeh, 'Some Notes o n the Term Taqlid in the Writings
of al-Ghazzali', Israel Oriental Studies 1 ( r g j ~ ) pp.
, 249-56. Frank, 'Al-
Ghazali o n Taqlid'. For taqlid in Ibn Tayrniyya, see Laoust, Essai, pp.
226-30.
9. Al-Hujja, vol. 2, p. 116.
10. Cf. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr Vami', vol. 2, p. 787). who adds to the uriderstand-
ing of this phenornenon saying that sometimes the muqallid kriows the
mistaken view but is afraid to oppose it.
r 1. Al-Taymi, al-Huja, vol. 2, p. 116f. T h e intellect is a condition of under-
standing but not its cause, which is God. Al-Suyüti, Sawn, vol. 1 , p. 2 p f .
12. Ibid., p. 117. Cf. Manakdim, Sharh, pp. . . 39, 69. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh usÜ1,
vol. 1, p. 193, n. I . See Chapter 5.
~ ~

13. See Chapter 3, n. 23.

14. 'There is no deity but God' ( hilüha illü alúihu) and 'Muhammad is
the Messenger of God' (rua-muhammad rasül allüh). See D. Gimaret,
'Shahada', EI2, vol. g, p. 201.
15. A group of theologians whose eponym was J a h m ibn Safwan (d. 128/
745). Jahm is said to have deriied God's attributes, interpreted anthro-
pomorphic phrases of the Qur'an figiiratively and held strict predesti-
nation. Abrahamov, ~nthropomorphish,pp. 73-5, n. 42.
16. Since if H e were in a certain place, for example o n the Throne, H e
would be limited by the Throne and hence be like created beings.
Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism, p. gf.
17. Al-Radd 'ala al-zanüdiqa wa'l-jahmiyya, p. 92f. Cf. al-Dárimi, al-Radd 'ala
al-Marisi, p. 453f.
18. For this nanie see Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, Sharh asma' allah al-husnü, ed.
Taha 'Abd al-Ra'üf Sa'd, Beirut 1990, PP. 258-60.
19. Al-Ash'ari, al-Ibüna, p. 32. Al-Baqillani, K al-tamhíd, p. 260.
20. For this argument see J. van Ess, 'The Logical Structure of Islamic
Theology', Logc in Classical Islamic Culture, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum,
Wiesbaden 1970, pp. 40-2.
21. Ibn Manbal, al-Radd 'ala al-zanüdiqa, p. ggf.
22. Al-Jurjáni, K al-ta'ñfüt, p. 22. T h e source of this term is Qur'an 4.83.
See al-Razi, Mafütih aLghayb, vol. 8, p. rg8ff.
78 NOTES

23. Al-Lálaka'í, Sharh, vol. 1, p. z17f. Cf. al-Tavmi, al-Huja, vol. r , p. 227f.
'Abd al-Qadir aljilaní ( a Hanbalite Sufí d . 56r/rr65), K al-ghunya li-
tülib? tañq al-haqq, Cairo 1956, p. 60.
24. Al-Lalaka'i, ibid., p. 2r8f. Khalg is an infinitive (masdar) of klrakzqa and
as such iridicates both the action and the objects of this action. T h e
traditionalists exploit this linguistic phenornenon to support their
thesis of the uncreatedness of the Qur'an.
25. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh usüi, vol. 1, p. 221.
26. A qadañ is a pejorative name used by the predestinarians against those
who believe in free will, for whoever believes in free will ascribes to
hiniself the power to decree (qadara) his actions. Al-Ash'ari, al-Ibana,
p. 54. Watt, TheFormative Pa'od, p. 116f.By ahl al-tawhid the author may
rriean traditionalists, or traditional Mutakallimün, for exarnple
Ash'arites who oppose the Mu'tazila concerning the issue of God's
decree. If the second possibility is right, it is n o worider tliat a
Mutakallim uses reason to refute a Mu'tazilite.
27. Manakdím, Sharh, pp. 323ff.
28. Al-Shirazi, K. al-ishüra, p. 24.
29. Manakdíni, Sha-, p. 396.
30. 'The bi-la ka-fa Doctrine', p. 371,
31. For ari exhaustive discussion of this traditiori, see Ibn Taymiyya, Sharh
hadith al-nuzül, ed. Muharnmad ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kharnis,
Rivadh 1993.
32. For this term, see aljurjání, K al-tanifát, p. 245. T h e argument appears
in al-Darirrii, al-Radd a l a al-Marisi, p. 377f:
33. Al-Dárirni, ibid., p. 380.
34. Abrahamov, 'The &-la kalfa Doctrine', p. 371.
35. Al-Dárimi, ibid., p. 417.
36. Madeliing, Der Imatn, pp. r 12-14. Peters, God's Created Speech, p. 248f.
37. Al-Tayrni, al-Hujja, vol. 1, p. goof.
38. Al-I'tiqüd wa'l-hidüya, p. 52.
39. Al-Hujja, vol. 2, p. 502f. For another definition of 'aql, see above,
p. 76, ri. 3.
40. Ibid., pp. 504-6.
41. See below, Chapter 3, n. 32.
42. Maarij al-ruu~ül,p. 179.
43. Ed. R. J. McCartliy in his The Theolog~of al-Ash'an, Beirut 1953. Cf. al-
Subkí, Tabaqat, vol. 3, p. 421: 'One wonders at whoever says that the
science of the Kalarn does not occur in the Qur'an'.
44 Ibn aLCArabi,Qanün al-ta'uizl, pp. 111-14. Ibii al-'Arabi called al-Ghazali
dánishrnand which rneans in Persian 'the sage'.
45. Ibid., pp. 176-8.

CHAPTER 3: TRADITIONALISM AGAINST

RATIONALISM
1. Qiir'án exegesis naturally contains referenccs to Muslim dogmas, but
siiice this genre as a whole is riot dedicated only to theology, 1 have
riot iiicliided it in this inquiry. Notwithstanding, 1 have referred froni
 N O T E S TO C H A P T E R 3 79

time to time to Qur'ánic interpretation when it has a direct bearirig

on a certain issue o r a certain thinker.
2. Al-Tabari, Tafsir, part 1, p. 27. Ibn Kathir, Tafsir, vol. 1, p. 10. 1.
Goldziher, Die Richtunga der Islarnischen Kwanauslegung, repr. Leiden
1952, 61f.. tr. into Arabic by 'Abd al-Halim al-Najar, Madhahib al-tafsir
al-islami, Cairo 1955, p. 80.
3. 1. Goldziher, The 7Ahiris. Qiyas, says the Shafi'ite scholar Abu Hamid
Muhammad al-Maqdisi (d. 888/1483), was first used by the Devil
(iblis),who was also the first to create contradiction between the plain
meaning of the text (al-nas~) and that which is intelligible (al-rna'qd).
The Devil refused to obey God's order to bow himself to Adarn, argu-
ing that he is better than Adani, for Adarn was created of clay, whereas
h e was created of fire. Qur'ari 17.61,7.12.T h e author adds some others
logical questions of the Devil. Al-Risülafz al-radd 'ala al-rüjida, ed. 'Abd
al-Walihab Khalil al-Rahrnan, Bombay 1983, PP. 124-7. Cf. al-Tabari,
Tafsir, part rq, p. 22.
4. See above, p. x.
5. See below, Chapter 6.
6. The main controversy between the two parties concerris the questioti
of belief. Extreme Kharijitcs claimed that whoever cornmits a grave sin
(kabira) is ari unbeliever and doorned to eterna1 punishrnerit in Hell,
which means that one's actions are relevant to one's belief, while
extreme Murji'ites clainied that belief is man's knowledge of God,
which rneans that one's actrons have no corinectiori to orie's belief. Al-
Ash'ari, Maqalát, pp. 86, 132.
7. Those who believe in free will as opposcd to those who helieve in pre-
destination.
8. Those who give precederice to 'Ali as against those who prefer Abü
Bakr and 'Umar. Tailiil, pp. 3-6.
9. See, o n hirrr, H. S. Nybei-g, EI2, vol. I, pp. 127-9.
10. See, o n him, J. van Ess, EI2, vol. 7, pp. ro57f. Al-Nazzam composed a
book on his controversy with Abü al-Hudhayl. Watt, The F m a t i u e
Period, p. 220. O n e of their controversies revolved round the doctrine
of atoms, which Abü al-Hudhayl affirnicd while al-Nazzam denied. Al-
Ash'ari, Magakit, pp. 314, 318.
11. See, on hirii, H . S. Nyberg and Khalil At.liamina, EI2, vol. 7, pp. 866-8.
Watt, ibid., pp. 199-201. Probably Ibn Qutayba had i r i mind thc theory
of kasb whose originators were Dirár ibn 'Amr (d. 200/815) and al-
Husayn ibn Muhamniad al-Najar (d. 221/836?). This theory opposes
the theory of man's choosing his acts adopted by the Mu'tazilites.
12. Ta'wil, pp. 14-16
13. Ibid., pp. 44-6.
14. M q Ü h t , p. 5, 1. 5.
15. For the refutation of this view, see ibid., p. 46f.
16. Al-Radd 'ala al-jahmiyya, p. 308f.
17. J. van Ess, 'Skepticisrn in Islamic Religious Thought', Al-Abhath 21
(1968)~ p. 7.
18. Naqd, p. 25. T h e contention that rhe process of reasoriirig leads to
doubts and hence sliakes one's belief in God was already rnentionrd
in al-Maturidi's K al-tariihzd. (For al-Matuñdi, see Chapter 5.) He answers
80 NOTES

this claim by stating that the intellect's activity is natural a n d cannot

be stopped. Indeed, it is dangerous, but such are man's other activi-
ties; o n e should abstain froni its disadvantages and atternpt to gain its
benefits. Pessagno, 'Intellect', p. 21.
19. Dar', vol. 1 , p. 193, quoted in my 'Ibn Taymiyya o n the Agreemerit',
p. 259. Cf. Naqd, pp. 22-44.
20. Abrahamov, ibid., p. 259f.
21. Ibid., p. 260.
22. Ibid. Cf. al-Suyüti, Sauin, vol. 1, p. 220. It is worth noting that o n e of
Ibn 'Asakir's argurnents in his apologia for al-Ash'ari is the notion that
al-Ash'ari inherited the knowledge of Kalam from his ancestors who
are reported to have asked Muhamrnad theological questions. Takyin,
p. 105. Thus practising Kalam is justified o n account of its having been
a tool used by the Prophet himself. Moreover, Ibri 'Asakir wonders at
those who state that 'zlm al-kalüm does not occur in the Qur'an. In his
view, whoever denies this knowledge is either a n ignorant person who
inclines to taqlid o r a person who adheres to wrong and innovative
opinions. Ibid., p. 359. Cf. al-Subki, T a b q ü t , vol. 3, p. q21f. Al-Ghazali
denies the possibility that the Prophet has dealt with Kalam proofs,
arguing that there is n o transrnission of such inforrnation. Faysal al-
tafnqa, p. 20.
23. See Chapter 6.
24. Abrahamov, 'Ibri Taymiyya o n the Agreernent', p. 260f.
25. A hadith mutawütir is a tradition with rnany chains of transrnitters, al1
known to be reliable, so that a lie cannot penetrate it. EI2, vol. 2, p. 25.
ALJurjani, K. al-ta'nfat, p. 74.
26. ~ b r a h a m o v ,'Ibn ~ a y m i y y ao n the Agreement', p. 261. Most of the
Muslim theologiaris consider khabar mutawütir as a device which
provides necessary and certain knowledge. Abraharnov, 'Necessary
Knowledge', p. 22. However, the Isma'ili Da'i 'Aii ibn Muhamrnad ibn
al-Walid (d. 612/1215) opposes this view, saying that a great number of
people may agree o n a lie a n d their lie will be transrnitted afterwards
by means of taruütur. Furthermore, each Muslim sect bases the trust-
worthiness of its creeds and argunients o n the process of tawütur.
Now, if tazt~üturcausescertain knowledge, whereas the sects have con-
t r a d i c t o r ~ideas, o n e cannot know where the truth exists. Abraharnov,
'An Isma'ili Episternology: T h e Case of Al-Da'i al-Mutlaq 'Ali B.
Muharnrnad B. al-Walid', Jounzal ojSmitic Studies, 412 (rgyG), pp. 27-2.
27. Al-Suyüti, Sawn, vol. 1, p. 227.
28. Ibn Taymiyya, Naqd, p. 62.
29.. Dar', vol. 1, p. 208f. Q i o t e d in Abrahamov, 'Ibn Taymiyya o n the
Agreement', p. 261. A similar accusation of rnixiiig truth with error is
levelled by Abu Hatim al-Razi, an Isma'ili Da'í, against some of the
philosophers whom he called mutafalsifa (those who affect to be phi-
losophers). H. Daiber, 'Abü Hátirn al-Razi (10th century AD) ori the
Unity and Diversity of Religions', Dialogue and Syncretism, A n Interdisci-
plinaly Approach, ed. J . Gort, H. Vroom, R. Fernhout and A. Wessels,
h s t e r d a m 1989, p. 98. Abrahamov, ibid., p. 262, n. 36.
30. Abrahamov, ibid., p. 262.
31. Abrahamov, ibid., p. 262f. Ari answer to this contention was already
 NOTES TO C H A P T E R 3 81

given by al-Ghazáli (Ihyü', vol. 1, p. 95f.) a n d Ibn 'Asakir in his defence

of al-Ash'ari. T h e terms 'atom' (jaruhar) ,or 'accident' ('arad), says Ibn
'Asakir, are not used Sor the sake of using foreign terms, but rather for
the sake of attaining the knowledge of God; the use of them brings
people closer to comprehension. T h e r e are also other terms which
have been used in other fields of Islam, such as 'cause' ('illa), 'effect'
(ma'lül) a n d 'analogy' (qiyüs) in .jurisprudence.
. O n e cannot say that
the use of them by ;he j&ts is an innovation, just as one cannot say
that the fact that the ancients have not used them is considered defi-
ciency o n the part of them. Tabyin, p. 357s. This argument was later
adopted by al-Subki in his Tabaqüt, vol. 3, p. 420. A comparison
between jurisprudence (fiqh) and theology (kalüm) was made by 'Abd
al-Jabb$fro& another i o i n t of view. H e says thatjust as the science of
jurisprudence takes general rules which occur in the Qur'án, elabo-
rates o n them and details them, so the science of theology treats
general theological ideas in the Qur'án. Fadl al-i'tizül, p. 182.
32. Al-Suyüti, Sawn, vol. 1, p. 64. Al-Ash'arí's rejoinder to this contention is
divided into three parts. First, in a typical Kalam system which turns
the adversary's argument agairist him, h e states that 'It is also t m e that
the Prophet never said: "If anyone should inquire into that a n d dis-
cuss it (¡.e. the Kalam), regard him as a deviaiing innovator n . So you
are constrained to regard yourselves as deviating innovators, since you
have discussed something which the Prophet did not discuss ...' (tr.
McCarthy in Al-Ash'ari's al-Luma, p. izif.). Secondly, even if the
Prophet did not speciEy certain terms, nevertheless, the Qur'an
mentions them in a general way. For example, the principies of the
proof of God's unity from mutual hypothetical prevention (dalil al-
tamünu; for this proof see Abrahamov, Al-Qüsim, pp. 19-2, n. 89, and
below, Chapter 4, n. 28) occur in the Qrir'an. Al-Ash'ari, ibid., p. 89 of
the Arabic text. Thirdly, the Prophet did not discuss some theological
and,juridical issues, because they did not occur in his time, but h e did
know them. If questions o n the doctrine of atoms, for example, had
arisen in his time, h e would have discussed it in detail. Ibid., p. gqf. of
the Arabic text.
33. Abrahamov, 'Ibn Taymiyya o n the Agreement', p. 270. Al-Suyüti, Sarun,
vol. 1, p. 226.
34. Abrahamov, ibid., p. 271.
35. Al-Sup-tti, Sawn, vol. 1, p. 227.
36. Ibid., p. 230s.
37. Anthropomorphism (tashbih) means likening God to man. Most of the
Muslim theologians were not likeners (mushabbihün). Abrahamov,
Anthropomwphism, introduction.
38. For example, alQ%im ibn Ibrahim, Sifat al-'arsh wa'l-kursi wa-tafsin~huma
and a chapter in Kitab al-mustarshid. Ibn Khuzayma, R al-tauihid, pp.
~orff.Al-Bayhaqi, al-Irtiqüd, pp. 8gff.
39. Frank, 'The Neoplatonism', p. 403. In K. al-majmü, vol. r , p. rgg, 11. 15-
16, 'Abd aLJabbar states that whatsoever is possible with regard to bod-
ies must be denied of God. Cf. Ibn Hazm, K. al-fisal, vol. 2, p. 122.
Abrahamov, Anthrqbomorphism, p. 9, n. 52.
40. Al-Ash'ari, M q a h t , p. 157, 11. 2-4.
82 NO TES

41. For further details concerning this verse, see Abrahamov, Anthropomm-
phism, ch. 2. Idem, '&la Kajifa', p. 374.
42. Ibn Qudama, Tahrirn al-nazar, p. 29. For a survey of Ibn Qudama's ar-
guments, see J. Pavlin, 'Sunni Kalam and Theological Controversies',
H i s t q of Islamic Philosophy, ed. S. H. Nasr and O . Leaman, London
and New York, vol. r, pp. 113-15.
43. Al-Taymi, al-Hujja, vol. 2, p. 384.
44. Ibn Qudama, Tahñm al-nazar, p. 30. An opponent would have said that
also analogy (qiyas) was not ordered by the Prophet, notwithstandirig
the fact that thejurists employed it. See above, n. 31.
6.
45. Tahrim al-nazar, 32.
46. Al-Huja, vol. I, pp. 175, 288f. Abrahamov, '6-la Kayfa', p. 375. For affir-
mation of the existence of God's attributes, see also Daiber, 'Ibn
Qudama', p. r 10.
47. Al-Taymi seems to refer to the method used by some Mutakallimun
who state that just as man knows by virtue of his knowledge so God
knows by virtue of His knowledge. Al-Baqillani, al-Tamhid, p. r97f.
48. Ai-Tayrni, al-Hujja, vol. 1, p. 111.
49. O n this method, see above, p. 14. Although the author attacks the
Kalam, he, like Ibn Taymiyya, does not refrain from using its methods.
50. Ibn Qudama, Tahnm al-nazar, pp. 30-4, 47.
51. It is also called: qiyñs al-ghü'ib 'ala al-shahid íjudging what is absent by
analogy with what is present). This is a Kalam way of proving God's
existence and attributes from His actions observed on earth. Sháhid
means the present world which is perceived by the senses, whereas
ghü'ib means the hidden world, namely, things which are not per-
ceived by the senses, mainly God and His attributes. God has created
manifest things whose aim is to serve as an indication (dalil) of the
hidden ones.-One must find the connection (ta'alluq) between the
manifest a n d the hidden things, and that is the act of istidlal o r qiyas.
B. Abrahamov, 'Ai-Qasirn ibn Ibráhim's Argument from Design',
Onens 29-30 ( 1 9 8 6 )p.~ 279, n. 103.
52. Tahrim al-nazar, p. 50.
53. H e refers here to asma' allüh al-husnü (God's most beautiful names,
most of which occur in the Qur'an). There is a controversy among the
theologians concerning the origin of God's names. Some of them
allow namirig God according to rational considerations, wliether rev-
elation affirms this o r not (al-Baqillani's stand), whereas some others
(e.g. al-Ghazali, Faklir al-Din al-Razi) state that God's names derive
from the Revelation, but His attributes can be learned by means of
reason. Fakhr al-Din al-Rázi, Laruami' al-bayyinát, p. 40. For a list and
disciissions of these names see al-Ghazali, al-Maqsad al-asna, sha. asma
allah al-husnü, ed. Muhammad Mustafa Abü al-'Ala', Cairo n.d.; Al-
Razi, ibid.; D. Gimaret, Les n o m divins en islam, exégise lexicographique et
theologique, Paris 1988.
54. It is to be noted that this argument is a part of the general argument
against the use of reason in religious matters, for religion means fol-
lowirig what is stated ir1 the Qur'an, Sunna and the statements of the
ancient scholars without comment (taqlid). Cf. al-Barbahari, Sharh al-
sunna, p. 42, para. 75. In his Risülat al-istihsan (p. 95, para. 23), al-
 NOTES T O CHAPTER 3 83

Ash'ari rejoins to this argument turning it against the opponent and

saying that the Prophet did not state that the Qur'an was not created,
although there are some traditionalists who believe in the
uncreatedness of the Qur'an.
55. Abrahamov, Al-(Zásim, p. 36, n. 226. Van Ess, 'The Logical Structure',
p. 25f.
56. Sarun, vol. 1, p. 52.
57. Ibid., pp. 86-124. Malik, for example, warns the people against innova-
tions whorn h e identifies with the b l a r n . Ibid., p. 96. Abü Hanifa
regards the Mutakallimün's statements as the views of the philoso-
phers. Ibid., p. ggf. (Cf. the statement made by the Christian theologian
of the third century, Tertullian: 'Heresies are themselves instigated by
philosophy. T h e s&e subject matter is discussed over and over again
by the heretics and the philosophers ... Unhappy Aristotle! who invented
for these men dialectics ...' Tertullian, On Presctiption against Heretics,
ch. 7, quoted by Arberry, Reuelation and Reason, p. 10.) Similar state-
ments are related o n the authority of al-Shafi'i (ibid., pp. 103-8) and
Ibn Hanbal (ibid., p. 108).
58. Traditionistische P o h i k Gegen 'Amr ibn 'Ubaid, ed. J. van Ess, Beirut 1967.
59.
-- Ibid., p. 12 of the Arabic text. A similar tradition is traced back to al-
shafi'í: 'It is better for man to meet God with any sin, except polythe-
ism [shirk] than to meet God with something heretical [shay' min al-
hawa]'. Al-Bayhaqi, I'tiqad, p. 193.Cf. al-Baghawi, Sharh al-sunna, vol. I,
p. 217. Cf. Ibn Abi al-'Izz, Sharh al-'aqida, vol. 1, 247. Al-Barbahari, Sharh
al-sunna, p. 54, para. 116, p. 55, para. 117, p. 60, para. 130.
60. Akhbár 'Amr ibn 'Ubayd, p. 13 of the Arabic text.
61. Al-Bukhari, Khalq afal al-'ibad, p. 130. Al-Barbahari, Sharh al-sunna, p.
49, par. 97. God does not accept the innovator's acts of worship, for
example prayer, fast, almsgiving and so on. Al-Qurtubi, al-Bida', p. 158.
This Malikite scholar also states that whoever turns to an innovator
turns to destroy Islam. Ibid., p. 159.
62. Al-Bayhaqi, I'tiqüd, p. Igr
63. Watt, The Fonnatiue Pa'od, pp. I 16-18.
64. Cf. a tradition traced back to al-Hasan al-Basri which reads: 'Do not sit
in the company of the people of the sects (ahl al-ahrua'), d o not dis-
pute with thern and d o not hear frorn thern'. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Jümi',
vol. 2, p. 944.
65. Because they admit two owners of power, God and the Devil o r God
and man. Al-Ash'ari, al-lbüna, p. 54. However, the Mu'tazilites applied
this deprecatory narne to the believers in predestination (al-mujhm),
since they shared with the Zoroastrians the belief in God's decree.
Manakdim, Sharh, pp. 773ff. T h e author of Sharh brings other reasons
to this appellation. Cf. al-Zarnakhshari, al-Minhüj, p. 61 of the Arabic
text.
66. The Murji'a are the theologians who are mainly associated with the
notions of suspension of the grave sinner's judgement and of the defi-
nition of belief as knowledge. Watt, The FormativePa'od, pp. 119-48.
67. K. al-ishüra, p. 45.
68. See, o n him, EI2, vol. 3, p. 63.
69. N-Baghawi, Sharh al-sunna, vol. 1, p. 227.
84 NOTES

70. For the developrnent of this terrn in Muslim religious literature, see
Abrahamov, al-Qüsim, p. 18of., n. 1. Ibn Abi al-'Izz, Sharh al-'aqida, vol.
1, p. 17.According to a staternent traced back to Malik ibn Anas and to
Abü Yüsuf al-Ansan, whoever seeks religion through the Kalam becornes
an infidel ( m a n talaba al-din bi'l-kaiüm tazandaqa). However, in Ibn
'Asakir's view, here the terrn Kalarn applies to the Kalarn of the inno-
vators (kalüm ahl al-bida') and not to the Kalarn of the traditionalists
(ahl al-sunna). This is his response to other staternents against the
Kalarn which are traced back to al-Shafi'i. Tabyin, pp. 334-7. T h e
Kalarn which agrees with the teachings of Qur'an and the Sunna and
which clarifies the true principles of religion when a controversy takes
place is praised by the scholars. Abstaining frorn dealing with the
Kalarn methods in the period of the Mihna is explained by Ibn 'Asakir
through the scholars' unwillirigness to be involved in debates in the
courts of rulers, which can bring about persecutions. Ibid., pp. 348-51.
Alternatively, h e says that if one engages only in the Kalarn and aban-
dons the learning of the Law and also does not carry out the precepts,
o n e becomes an infidel. Tabyin, p. 334. Al-Suyiiti, quotes a question, to
the contents of which he does not agree, frorn which one learns the
value of the Kalarn as a good innovation, for it fights the unbelievers
and the heretics, distinguishes between truth and lie, cancels man's
doubts and supplies proofs for the trustworthiness of the Prophet and
other religious principles. Sazun, vol. 1, p. 209f. As we have shown (see
above, pp. igff.), the use of Kalarn systerns of discussion was not carried
out only by professional theologians, but also by scholars from differ-
e n t systerns of thought, Shafi'ites, Malikites, Süfis. Cf. Frank, Al-Ghazüli
on Taqlid, p. 218. However, in rnany cases, what was learned through
the Kalarn did not serve as the basis of religious principles, but rather
as a corroboration for what was already known through taqlid. 'Abd al-
Jabbar explains that those who narne the Kalani an innovation d o so
out of ignorance; whoever does not know something, hates it. Fadl al-
i'tizül, p. 184.
71. Ibn Abi al-'Izz, Sharh al-'aqida, vol. I, pp. 17f., 247. O n e should note the
possibility that both al-Ansari's stand and al-Shafi'i's are not authentic
and rnay be a projection of the ideas of later generations in order to
garner legitimation from the ancients, a phenornenon which is well
known in Islarnic religious literature. Anyhow, we can say confidently
that the tendency to discredit the Kalarn is evident in classical Islam at
least in later generations. Likewise, al-Shiifi'i is depicted as favouring
'ilm al-kalüm. E. Chaumont, 'Al-Shafi'i', EI2, vol. 9, p. 183.
72. Sha- al-sunna, vol. 1, p. 228.
73. Among his works there is Marülim al-sunanfi sha- kitüb al-sunan li-abi
da'üd.
74. This is also the view of al-Shafi'i. Al-Baghawi, ibid.
75. Al-Baghawi, ibid., p. 229. This stand is contrary to Ibn T a y m i ~ a ' state-
s
ment that ahl al-sunna neither declare a Muslim an unbeliever on ac-
count of a sin nor prevent people frorn praying behind hirn. A Muslim
should be a friend of his co-religionist, n o t a n enerny. Rmü'il riia-fatüruü
shaykn al-islam, ed. Muharnmad Rashid Rida, Cairo 1992 (repr.), vol. 2,
part 5, PP. 241-4.
 NOTES TO CHAPTER 4 85

76. Al-Baghawi, Sharh al-sunna, p. 219.

77. Ibn Abi al-'Izz, Sha- al-'agida, vol. I , p. 235.
78. According to al-Suyüti, scholars who lived before al-Shafi'i and al-
Shafi'i hirnself rnaintained that the cause of innovations was igno-
rance of the language. As an exarnple, the author brings a discussion
on the obligatoriness of punishing the sinner (wujüb 'adhüb al-fásiq)
between the Mu'tazilite 'Arnr ibn 'Ubayd (d. 144761) and a certain
Abü 'Arnr ibn al-'Ala'. The Mu'tazilites hold that if a rnan deserves a
punishrnent because of a sin and he does not repent, the punishment
will necessarily occur. 'Arnr bases this notion on the verse which seems
to show that God does not break his threat, understanding the word
mirad in inna alúih úi yilkhlifu al-mirad ('God will not break his prornise',
Qur'an 13.31)as 'threat' and not as 'promise'. 'Arnr was accused of
ignorance of the language, and this ignorance was ascribed to his
being non-Arab (his father carne frorn Balkh). Sawn, vol. I, p. 55f.
According to 'Abd aljabbar, scholars rnust know the language and its
grarnrnar in order to understand what God and the Prophet have said.
However, knowledge of the language is needed only for the know-
ledge of the laws (al-shara'i?, for the other three pnnciples of religion,
narnely, God's unity, His justice and Prophecies, are known through
the intellect. Al-Mukhtasarfi usül aldin, in Rasü'il al-'adl wa'l-taruhid,
part 1, p. 199.
79. Al-Taymi, al-Hujja, vol. I, pp. 306-10. The erninent Hanafite scholar
Abii al-'Abbas, known as Qádi aLtAskar,forbids the reading and learn-
ing of the Mu'tazilite works, for these cause people to doubt their reli-
gion, to weaken their belief and to becorne innovators. Ibn 'Asakir,
Tabyin, p. 139.
80. Al-Taymi, al-Hujja, vol. 1, p. 371f. Al-Khattábi's answer also appears in
al-Suyüti ( k w n , vol. 1, pp. 137-47) in a detailed rnanner.
81. Al-Taymi, ibid., p. 372.
82. Ibid., p. 373.
83. Cf. above, n. 57.
84. Al-Taymi, ibid., p. 374. This notion was developed later on by Ibn
Tayrniyya in his Ma'anj al-wusül (p. 175). See above, Chapter I , n. 10.
For al-Ghazáli's attitude towards the Kalarn, see Frank, Al-Ghazali and
the Ash'arile SchooL ch. 2 .

CHAPTER 4: THE FOUNDATIONS OF RATIONALISM

1. Manakdirn, Sha-, p. 39. For the terrn nazar in the Basra school of the
Mu'tazila, see Peters, God's Created Speech, pp. 15,57-61.
2. A l - m i , al-Mahsül, p. 126f.
3. Peters, ibid., p. 63f. Contrary to this position, the Ash'arites teach that
the obligation of theological inquiry derives frorn the Revelation.
Frank, al-Ghazüli, p. 3qf. Al-Suyüti responds to the rationalist notion
expressing the stock argurnent to theeffect that the ancient scholars
did not rnention the idea that rnan's first obligation is to speculate on
God. It is inconceivable that these scholars should not have known
rnan's first obligation. According to traditions based on tawátur (see
86 N O TE S

above), the Prophet urged the unbelievers to ernbrace Islam and to

say the two testimonies (shahadatayn) and not to speculate. Moreover,
speculation is not appropriate to rnost of the people; against one who
succeeds in his speculation, there are many who fail and becorne inno-
vators and unbelievers. Sawn, vol. 1, pp. 224-6.
4. This is a critica1 cornrnentary of the Zaydite Manakdirn (Ahmad ibn
Abi Hashirn al-Husayni, d. 426/1034) on the cornrnentary (Sharh al-
usül al-khamsa) written by 'Abd al-Jabbar on his own treatise Kttab al-
usül al-khama. In some rnanuscripts, Mánakdim's cornrnentary is
entitled Ta'liq sharh al-usül al-khamsa. D. Gimaret, 'Les Usül al-Kharnsa
d u Qadi 'Abd al-Gabbar et leurs cornmentaires', Annaks Islamologiques
'5 (1979)?P P 47-96.
5. Manakdarn, ibid., p. 88f. See Appendix 111. According to 'Abd al-
Jabbár, the truth of revelation and also of the Sunna and the ijma'
should be known through the intellect. Peters, God's Created Speech, p.
95. 'Abd aljabbar, Fadl al-i'tizül, p. 139. Abd al-Jabbar learns that the
obligation to know God can be obtained only through the intellect,
because other ways of learning are not sufficient; taqlid does not con-
stitute a way to this knowledge, for both ttuth and lie can be obtained
through it. 'Abd al-Jabbar, al-Mukhtasar, p. iggf. Aso necessary knowl-
edge ('ilm darilri, in the text danira) and inspiration (ilham) are not
useful here, since we know that there are controversies concerning
God, His attributes and justice. (Abd al-Jabbár's tacit assurnption is
that ilm darilri and ilham lead to one ttuth.) Therefore, what remains
is to state that the obligation to know Cod is obtained only through
the intellect. 'Abd aljabbar, Fadl al-i'tizül, p. 182f. Cf. al-Zarnakhshari,
al-Minhaj, p. 66 of the Arabic text. The Zahirite theologian and juris-
prudent Ibn Hazrn also regards reason as prior to revelation in certain
issues such as God's existence, unity and eternity. Reason, in his view,
helps man to understand the rneanings of value terrns, but not the full
conterits of them, and also to know some general facts of hurnan
psychology. G. F. 1-lourani, 'Reason and Revelatioii in Ibn Hazm's
Ethical Thought', in his Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics, Cambndge
1985, PP. 167-89. This resernbles the stand adopted by al-Máturidi (d.
333/944; on him and the theological school named after him, see W.
Madelung, 'al-Maturidi' and 'Maturidiyya', EI2, vol. 7, pp. 846-8), who
states that religion is known through intellectual argurnent (hujja
'aqliyya) which shows the ttustworthiness of the teacher arid proof
(burhan) of the objective truth (haqq) of the contents of religion.
Pessagno, 'Intellect', p. 20. Cf. Madelung, 'The Spread of Maturidisrn',
p. 118, n. 30.
6. For this purpose, the reader may consult H. A. Davidson's thorough
and profound work Proofsfor Eternity, Creation and the Existence of God in
Medimal Islamic and jeuiish Philosophy, Oxford 1987.
7. Ibid., p. 117. For other theologians who used this proof in its different
forrns, see ibid., pp. r 19-21
8. Manakdirn, Sharh, p. 95. Davidson, Ploofs, pp. 134-46.
9. Davidson, ibid., pp. 146-53. Abrahamov, al-Qasim, p. 2.
ro. Davidson, ibid., pp. 174-212. Abrahamov, ibid., p. 3.
11. Davidson, ibid., pp. 213-36. Abraharnov, ibid., pp. 1-13.
 NOTES T O CHAPTER 4 87

12. For example, Al-Baqillani, aGTamhid, pp. 22ff. Al-Juwayni, al-Zrshüd, pp.
39ff. Al-Baghddi, UsüL,pp. 33ff.
13. Gimaret, La doctrine d'al-Ash'an, p. 213. Cf. Al-Rázi, Muhqsal, p. 134.
14. Al-Baghdádi, Usül, p. 256f. Al-Nasafi, Tabsirat al-adilla, vol. 2, p. 452. See
Appendix 11. Reinhart, Before Revelation, p. 19. Frank, Al-Ghazüli and the
Ash'arite School, p. gf.
15. Manakdim, Sharh, p. 151.
16. Ibid., p. 156.
17. Ibid., p. 161.
18. Al-Baqillani, al-Tamhid, p. 197.
19. Quoting Ibn Manda, Abü 'Abdallah Muhammad ibn Ishaq (d. 395/
I O O ~ al-Taymi
), says: 'Traditions concerning God's attributes have
been transmitted from the Prophet through tawütur. These traditions
are compatible with God's Book. Al-Taymi, al-Hujja, vol. 1, p. gi. 'God
has described himself as being hearing and seeing and said: "There is
nothing like Him; H e is the All-hearing, the All-seeing (Qur'an
42.11)". H e had informed that H e hears al1 the voices from al1 direc-
tions. H e has not ceased to hear and see and He will never cease to
hear and see.' Ibid., p. gq.
20. Wolfson, Kalam p. 132.Abrahamov, al-Qüsim, p. 21.
21. Sctimidtke, al-Hilli, p. 166f.
22. T h e Qur'an mentions God's knowledge ('ilm, e.g. Qur'an 4.166, 2.255)
and power (quwwa, e.g. Qur'án 51.58, 41.15).
23. Abrahamov, al-Qasim, p. 37, n. 229.
24. Abrahamov, 'A Re-examination', pp. 21c-21.
25. Sharh, vol. 2, pp. 639, 65-2.
26. Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 242-8. According to Ibn Abi al-'Izz, some eminent
scholars of the Kalam, such as al-Ghazali, al-Shahrastani and aljuwayni,
have regretted their preoccupation with the Kalam. Ibid., pp. 243-5.
27. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 39f.
28. Abrahamov, al-Qüsim, pp. 190-2, n. 89. See above, Chapter 3, n. 32.
29. R. M. Frank, 'Several Fundamental Assumptions of the Basra School
of the Mu'tazila', Studia Islamica33 (1g71),pp. 5-18. Idem, 'Reason and
Revealed Law: A Sample of Parallels and Divergences in Kalam and
Falsafa', Recherches d%lamologie - Recueil d'articles offd a George C.
Anauiati et Louis Gardet par leurs collegues et amis, Louvain 1978, pp. 124-
9. Idem, al-Ghazali and the Ash'arite School, p. 32. Reinhart, Before Revela-
tion, p. 13. G. F. Hourani, 'The Rationalist Ethics of 'Abd al-Jabbar', in
his Reason and Traúition in Zslamic Ethics, pp. 98-108. It is important to
note that almost al1 the eminent Sháfi'itie theologians beginning with
two generations after al-Anmati (d. 288/900) considered the intellect
as a source of knowledge. Al-Qaffal (365/976) seems to have been
influenced by the Mu'tazilites in this subject matter. Reinhart, ibid., p.
17ff. O n e of the exceptions is Abü Sa'id 'Abd al-Rahman al-Naysabüri
(known as al-Mutawalli al-Shafi'i, d. 478/1085), who says: 'Only Revela-
tion obliges man, and before Revelation there was n o rule'. Al-Ghunya
JZ usül aldin, ed. 'Imad al-Din Ahmad Haydar, Beirut 1987, p. 138. Also
among the Mutakallimün of ahl al-hadith we find Abü al-'Abbas al-
Qalanisi (fl. in the second half of the third/ninth century), who held
rational imposition of duties (taklif 'aqli) and the possibility to know
88 NOTES

good and evil by means of reason. D. Gimaret, 'Cet autre théologien

Sunnite: Abú L-'Abbás Al-Qalanisi', Journal Asiatique, 277:3-4 (1989). p.
257.
30. Schmidtke, al-Hilli, pp. 99-103. Al-Baqilláni ( a l - T q n b wa'l-irshád, vol. 1,
p. 281) proves that reason cannot show ethical values. By reason we
may mean either necessary knowledge (danirat al-'ql) or speculation
(nazar).The first possibility is absurd, for necessary knowledge - implies
.
that al1 people wodd agree on a certain point, which is inconceivable.
Also, through speculation people come to different conclusions, or
deviate from thinking or cannot think. Thus speculation cannot
produce common knowledge on ethical values. The question of
whether ethical values have intrinsinc properties was already discussed
in Plato's Eulhyphro (5, 7, 11). Reinhart, Before Rmelation, p. lo.
31. Mánakdim, Sharh, p. 83. 'Abd al-Jabbár, al-Mughni, vol. 11, p. 134. This
is also the Maturidian position according to which God does not act
purposelessly, but always according to wisdom ( 'ala al-hikma). Pessagno,
'Intellect', p. 22.
32. Abrahamov, "Abd aljabbar's Theory', pp. 41-3.
33. Schmidtke, al-Hilli, pp. r 17-21. Idem, al-Minhaj, pp. 68-70 of the Arabic
text.
34. According to the Mu'tazilites, the taklif is in force only when man
understands its purpose 'Abd al-Jabbar, al-Majmü: 1, ed. J . Houben, p.
iof: Cf. D. E. Sklare, 'Yusuf al-Basír: Theological Aspects of his
Halakhic Works', in The Jaus of Medimal Islam: Community, Society and
Identity, ed. Daniel Frank, Leiden 1995,p. 262. It is to be noted that ir1
al1 these questions 1 d o not intend to enter into the petty details of
divergences among the Mu'tazilite scholars, since they do not contrib-
ute more relevant information.
35. Schmidtke, al-Hilli, p. I 17.
36. Cf. Schrnidtke, ibid, p. 148.
37. Cf. Rasa'il ikhwan al-sufa', vol. 4, pp. 27681. It seems very probable that
al-Razi was influenced in this premise by the teachings of the ikhwan.
The notion that al1 the existents are divided into grades which are
connected to each other also appears in the ~ k p d d i m aof Ibn
Khaldun (Dar al-Fikr, n.p. n.d.), p. 9 (the beginning of the chapter on
prophecy).
38. Al-nubüwruat, pp. 171-6.
39. On account of using ratiorial proofs, the theologians were sometimes
cornpelled to accept philosophical theses. W. Madelung, 'The Late
Mu'tazila and Determinism: The Philosophers' Trap', Yad Nama in
memoria di Alessandro Bausani, Rome 1 ~ ~pp. 1 ~
, ~5-5~.
40. Al-nubüwwát, pp. 177-82.
41. Ibid., p. 182.
42. Schmidtke, al-Hilli, p. 15rf.Also al-Razi admits that some actions such
as the beneficient's are known as good and the nialeficient's are
known as bad due to the decision of reason without the help of revela-
tion. Al-matálib al-'üliya, vol. 3, p. 289f.
43. Ibn Siná, K. al-Najat, ed. M. Fakhri, pp. 326ff.
44. See, for example, the creed of Ahmad ibn Hanbal in al-Lálaká'i, Sharh
usül, vol. 1, p. 158.Cf. alaaghdadi, U& pp. 245-6.
 N O T E S TO C H A P T E K 5 89

45. According to the Shi'ite Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Tüsi (d. 460/
ro67), they are so called because they are detested by the tormented
person: al-Iqtisád, p. 221. They are the angels of death. A. J. Wensinck,
'Munkar wa-Nakir', EIz, vol. 7, p. 576f.
46. Al-Tüsi notes that o n e must not take into consideration 'Amr's view,
since it came after a consensus on the belief in this dogma had been
achieved. Ibid., p. 219. But according to 'Abd al-Jabbar, the denial of
'adháb alqabrwas ascribed to the Mu'tazilites because Dirar ibn 'Amr
was the first to deny this doctrine and h e was one of (the Mu'tazilite)
Wasil ibn 'AtaMsfollowers. Faúl al-l'tizüí, p. 201.
47. Manakdim, Sharh, p. 733.
48. Ibid., p. 730f.
49. Ibid., p. 731, l. I to p. 732, 1. 1.
50. Ibid., p. 732.
51. Cf. Abrahamov, 'A Re-examination', p. 219.
52. For the description of the Balance, its actions and related topics, see
al-Ghazali, Ihyü', KV, pp. 520-4. Al-Qurtubi, aCTadhkira fi ahwal al-muruta
wa-umür al-akhira, Cairo 1980.
53. Manakdim seems to regard light and darkness as bodies and not as
accidents.
54. Mánakdim, Sharh, p. 735.
55. Al-Ghazali, Ihyü', vol. 4, p. 524.
56. Here this term denotes traditionists who accept anthropomorphic tra-
ditions as true. Cf. Abrahamov, al-Qasim, p. 188, n. 69.
57. Sharh, p. 737.

CHAPTER 5: THE RATIONALISTS' CRITICISM O F

TRADITIONALISM
I. In Arabic literature, the main representative of the notion that both
religion and prophecy are superfluous, because intellect is the sole
authority for mankind, is Ibn al-Rawandi (d. 850 o r goo), who used the
name of an Indian sect (al-barühima) to disguise his heretical views.
Abrahamov, 'The Barahima's Enigma'. S. Stroumsa, 'The Blinding
Emerald: Ibn al-Rawandi's Kitüb al-Zumunud', Journal of the Ama'can
O n a t a l Society, 1 1 4 : ~ PP. 163-85. In the theological Arabic litera-
(1994)~
ture from the third/ninth century onwards, this notion appears as the
Barahima's whenever prophecy is dealt with. See, for example, al-
Nasafi, Tabsirat al-adilla, vol. 2, p. 444.
2. Al-Baqillani, al-Tamhid, pp. 104. Al-Baghdadi, Qül, p. 154. 'Abd al-
Jabbar, al-Mughni, vol. 15.
3. See above, pp. 10, 28. In his interpretation of Qur'an 3.7 (the fourth
issue, al-mas'ala al-rübi'a), Faklir al-Din al-Razi states that some infidels
(mulhida, a term which usually applies to those who reject Islam on
philosophical grounds, but also applies to whoever deviates from one
of the doctrines of Islam; Abrahamov, al-Qasim, p. 181, n. 2 ) defame
the Qur'an for containing contradictory verses concerning basic theo-
logical issues, such as predestination, man's vision of God, God's
place.
g0 NOTES

4. Ibn Hanbal, al-Radd 'ala al-zanüdiqa, p. 53, n. I . Cf. S. Stroumsa, 'From

Muslim Heresy to Jewish-Muslim Polemics: Ibn al-Rawandí's Kitab al-
Damigh', JAOS 107:4 (1987)~ PP. 767-72.
5. Dickinson, p. 8.
6. Ta'wi1, p. 3. For the function of the hadith in the controversies among
parties in Islam, see 1. Goldziher, Muslim Studies, vol. 2, ch. 3, pp. 89-125.
7. Ta'wid pp. 3-8.
8. Examples of such follies are: whoever reads a certain süra or acts in a
certain manner will receive in the world to come 70,000 palaces, each
with 70,000 rooms, and so on. The raven is a sinner. The lizard was a
disobedient Jew. The earth stands on the back of a fish. Ibid., pp. 8 3 .
On p. 60, Ibn Qutayba says that al-Jahiz derided the hadith on account
of these follies. Ibn Taymiyya shows his integrity when saying that the
criticism levelled against the traditionists was sometimes justified, for
they based themselves on forged traditions in matters of roots (usül)
and branches Cfurú') and wrongly interpreted the Qur'an and the
Sunna. N&, p. 22. Notwithstanding, he points out that the traditionists'
faults were less harmful than those of the Mutakallimün. For support,
he cites Ahmad ibn Hanbal's dictum: 'A weak tradition is better than a
personal opinion of anyone' (darifal-hadith khayr min ray fulan). Ibid.,
P 23.
g. Ta'wil, p. 76.
10. Ibid., pp. 10-12.
i r . Ibid, pp. 97-8. Ibn Qutayba brings other examples which the editor
includes under the title 'A tradition which is rejected by speculation
and speculative argument', hadith yadfa'uhu al-nazar wa-hujat al-nazar
(instead of hujjat al-'ql [rational argument] in the preceding example).
The title is different but the contents are the same. For example, 'The
sun and the moon, which will be transformed into bulls, will be
thrown into the fire on the Day of Resurrection'. The question is what
is their sin? Ibid., p. 101.
12. Ibid., p. ggf.
13. Ibid., p. 154.
14. Ibid., p. 165.
15. Ibid., p. 170.
16. Ibid., p. 187f.
17. Ibid., p. 193.The abrogating verse is Qur'an 4.4. For the problem of
naskh [abrogation] concerning the bequest verses, see D. S. Powers,
'On the Abrogation of the Bequest Verses', Arabica 29 (1982), pp.
246-95.
18. Ibn Qutayba, Ta'wiL, p. 202. For aja1 in the Mu'tazila, see my 'The
..
Appointed Time of Death (Agal) according to 'Abd al-Gabbar', Israel
Oriental Studies 13 (1993)~ PP. 7-38.
19. Ibn Qutayba, ibid., pp. 260, 270.
20. See above, Chapter I, n. 72.
21. For a discussion of this kind of criticism, see for example K. al-radd 'ala
al-Marisi, pp. 497, 500, 502.
22. Ibid., p. 485.
23. Ibid., p. 492f.
24. Ibid., p. 493.
 NOTES TO C H A P T E R 5 9'

25. Ibid., P. 508.

26. Ibid., p. 498. Except for the first two words, this is a quotation from
Qur'án 5.91 in which the Devil diverts the people. It is to be noted that
what al-Marisi said may have been ascribed to him wrongly, for the
opposition to him probably derived from his being a believer in the
creation of the Qur'an. However, the important point is not whether
al-Marisi expressed such statements o r not, but rather the very fact
that such arguments against Tradition have existed.
27. For the term t a r ü m .see R. M . Frank, Beings and tha'r Attnbutes, Albany
1978. p. 35, n. 36, p. 48, n. 8, p. 81, n. 5.
28. Abd al-Jabbar, Fadl al-l'tizül, p. 185f.
ng. Ibid., pp. 193-5. T h e same accusations are mentioned in Ibn
Taymiya's Naqd, p. 22. T h e traditionalists refer to the Mu'tazilite
claims against khabar al-wühid through introducing several arguments.
Basing himself o n Abú al-Muzaffar al-Sam'ani (d. 48g/iog6), al-Taymi
first states that a tradition which was transmitted by trustworthy
transmitters and the community accepted it enjoins knowledge in
non-practica1 matters (= theological matters). Notwithstanding the
controversies of the different sects in Islam, they al1 base themselves
o n this kind of tradition. It is worth noting that 'Abd al-Jabbar uses
this argument to deny the authority of the traditions mentioned.
~ o r e o ; e r , according to al-Taymi, there is a consensus of the ancients
and the moderns o n relying o n tradition in these issues. If one said
that it was forbidden to use these traditions, then al1 the scholars who
used it would be accused of error, which is inconceivable. Also, if o n e
does not accept the statements of the transrnitter because he is one,
one will not accept the statements of the giver, narnely Muhammad,
because h e is one. Some examples of the Muslim experience are given
to support the author's argumentation. T h e Prophet has sent single
messengers to kings, which proves that knowledge can be obtained
through one person. Likewise h e has sent spies to many places, for
each place one spy, and he has learned from each of them. And a
student learns from a teacher. Besides, the traditionists knew their
work well; they are the experts in traditions, just as the philologists are
the experts in language and the jurispnidents are the experts in juris-
prudence. What finally proves the truth of the traditionists' doctrines
is the fact that they are homogeneous in contrast to the teachings of
the sects. Al-Tayrni, al-Hu~ja,vol. 2 , pp. 214-30. Cf. Al-Suyüti, &un, pp.
213-16.
30. X al-nakth, p. 12.
31. Ibid., p. 38.
32. Ibid., p. 86.
33. Ibid., p. 93.
34. Ibid., p. 96. Cf. Ibn Qutayba, Ta'wii, pp. 21, 25.
35. X al-naklh, p. 102.
36. Ibid., p. 108.
37. Abrahamov, Anthropomurphism, p. 135, n. 164.
38. See above, p. 5.
39. Ibn Qutayba, Ta'wil, p. 18.According to al-Juwayni, al-Nazzam was the
first scholar who rejected the Consensus, then he was followed by
 NOTES TO A P P E N D I X 1 93

5. Ibid., p. 385.
6. According to al-Ghazali, quoting an anonymous Hanbalite, even Ibn
Hanbal used figurative interpretations regarding some anthropomor-
phic expressions such as 'The Black Stone is God's right hand o n the
earth'. Ibn Taymiyya, who relates this report, does not tmst it. Sha-
hadith aCnuzül, pp. 203-5. T h e Máturidite scholar al-Bazdawi (d. 493/
1099) states that Ibn Hanbal was a pious man who did not hold anthro-
pomorphism. Usül a l d i n , p. 253.
7. Al-Iqtisüd fi- al-l'tiqüd, ed. 1. A. Cubukcu a n d H. Atay, Ankara 1962, p.
212.
8. Frank, Al-Ghazüli and &heAsh'arite School, p. 7f.
9. Al-Qistüs al-mustaqim. See above, p. 18. Cf. Reinhart, Before Rtwelation,
p. 158. Peters, God's Created Speech, p. 15.
10. 'Imara, Rasü'il al-'adl wa'l-tawhid, vol. 2, p. 301f.
i r . Al-Zamakhshari, al-Kashshüj vol. 2, p. qqrf.
12. For this term in the Mu'tazilite 'Abd al-Jabbar, see Peters, God's Created
Speech, pp. 65-8.
13. Ibn Taymiyya, Rasü'il wa-fatüwü, vol. 2, part V, p. 45.
14. Ibid., vol. 1, part 1, p. 246. Instead of al-manqül al-sanh, one should read
al-manqül al-sahih. This notion is stated again and again in his volumi-
nous work Dar' taarud al-'aql uia'l-naql (The repuision of the contra-
diction between reason and tradition) o r Muwüfaqat sahih al-manqül
li-sañh al-marqul (The agreement of the t m e tradition with clear
reason). T h e term sanh al-'aql (the plain perception of the intellect)
was already used by Fakhr al-Din al-&¡ in his Ma'ülim usül aldin, ed.
Taha 'Abd al-Ra'üf Sa'd, Cairo n.d., p. 25.
15. Abrahamov, 'Ibn Taymiyya on the Agreement', p. 271f.
16. Ibid., p. 272.
17. See above Chapter 5, p. 35.

CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY
I. For rationalist trends iri early Shafi'ism, see Madelung, Religzous
Trends, p. 28.

APPENDIX 1
1. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh usúl, vol. 1, pp. 176ff. Blessings of God and the
Prophet are omitted. T h e numbers of sections are mine. For transla-
tion of some creeds, see Watt, Islamic Creeds.
2. This dogma reflects the opposition to the teaching of the extreme
sects of the Murji'a, which state that belief is only saying the shahüda
and the knowledge of God (Al-Ash'ari, Maqülat, pp. lyff.), and also to
the teaching of Abü Hanifa, who is said to have belonged to the
Murji'ites. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, pp. 125, 131ff.Since action is
included in belief, belief can increase o r decrease.
3. Since the Qur'an is God's speech and God's speech is one of His
attributes, which are not created but eternal, the Qur'ari is not
created. T h e authors seem to mean by 'in al1 its aspects' the different
 NOTES T O A P P E N D l X 1 95

anthropomorphic expressions of the Qur'án and the Sunna in a figur-

ative way. Cf. Wasij-yat Abi Hanzfa, Wensinck, ibid., p. 127, art. 8. Al-
Rasü'il al-sab'a, p. 81. In Fiqh Akbar, art. 9 (Wensinck, ibid., p. 104; cf.
Daiber, Belid pp. i ~ n f f ;Al-Rasü'il al-sabra, pp. I@.), it is stated, very
probably against the Mu'tazilites who hold that God is everywhere,
that whoever says that h e does not know whether God is in Heaven o r
on the earth is an unbeliever.
8. This creed also appears in the formula of 'meeting God in the world
to come' which is based o n some Qur'an verses (e.g. 2.223). Wasiyyat
Aúi Hanzfa, Wensinck, ibid., p. 130,art. 24. Al-Rasü'il al-suba, p. 97f. Cf.
Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism, pp. 15-18, 108-45. T h e rationalists
argue that God carinot be seen, for o n e can see only a body, a n d since
God is not a body H e cannot be seen. A slightly different notion,
according to which God will speak to the people o n the day o f Resur-
rection, appears in al-Lálaka'i, Sharh usül, pp. 158 (The creed of Ibn
Hanbal), 166 ( T h e creed of ' N i ibn al-Madini [d. 234/84g]). It is based
o n some Qur'an verses (e.g. 15.92-3) according to which God will
interrogate al1 the people o n the day of Resurrection. Cf. al-Ghazáli,
Zhya', vol. 4, pp. 517-20 (sqat musü'ala, T h e Description of the Interro-
gation). Al-Ghazali quotes traditions to the same effect.
9. According to W ~ i y y a Aúit Hanzfa (Wensirick, ibid., p. 129, art. 20; Al-
Rasü'il al-sab'a, p. 92), both Paradise a n d Hell exist at present (wa-
huma makhlükatáni al-üna). It seems that this is the meaning of the
article cited tiere, for the continuation of the article is identical to the
article in the Wasiyya, that is, both of them were created a n d will never
perish. Basing himself o n Qur'an 57.3 ('He is the First and the Last'),
Jahm ibn Safwan maintains that God will exist alone as H e has been
alone before the creation. 'The objects of God's power and knowl-
edge (maqdürüt, ma'lümüt) have an e n d a n d also His actions will termi-
nate. Paradise and Hell will perish as well as their people, uritil God
will be the Last, with whom nothing will exist, as H e has been the First,
with whom nothing has existed.' Al-Ash'ari, Magakit, p. 164 and also
PP. 148-9, 474,542. Al-Khayyát, al-Intisar, p. 18. In Fakhr al-Din al-Razi's
Mafatih al-ghayb (to Qur'an 57.3 vol. 29, p. 212), there occur Jahm's
speculative argurnents o n e of which places two alternatives; either
God knows the movements of the people of Paradise a n d Hell o r H e
does not know them. If H e knows them, H e knows their number, and
everything which has a fixed number has a n end. Hence the move-
ments of the people of Paradise and Hell have a n end, and after tlieir
termination a n eternal non-existence prevails. T h e possibility of God's
being ignorant of their movements is absurd.
ro. Contrary to the Mu'tazilite stand that whoever comniits a grave sin
and does not repent is doorned to eternal punishment in Hell
(Abrahamov, al-Qüsim, p. 48f., n. 290), the traditionalists make God's
mercy a device of changing the sinner's state.
11. After their Judgement, people are led to the Way, which is a bridge
above the Hell sharper than a sword a n d finer than a hair. Whoever
was a righteous person in this world will cross the Way and reach Para-
dise, but whoever was a sinner will stumble and fall into Hell. Al-
Ghazali, Zhya: vol. 4, pp. 524-6 (sfat al-sirüt, The Description of the Way).
g6 NOTES

12. Cf. Wasiyyat Abi Hanija, Wensinck, ibid., p. 130, art. 21. Al-Rasa'il al-
sab'a, p. gq. Al-Ghazali, Ihyü', vol. 4, p. 520f. (sifat al-mizün, T h e Descrip
tion of the Balance).
13. This is the Basin which the Prophet will be given in Paradise. Al-Ajüri,
al-Shan'a, pp. 352-7. Al-Ghazali, ibid., pp. 528-30. EIz, vol. 3, p. 286.
14. Both the traditionalists a n d the Mu'tazilites believe in the intercession
of the Prophet. However, they disagree o n the application of it.
According to the traditionalists, the Prophet rnay intercede with God
for the sinner who is in Hell, whereas the Mu'tazilites state that h e
may d o so only for the repenter. Manakdim, Sharh, p. 688. In al-Ajurí's
view, the Mu'tazilites hold sucti a notion, since they rely o n the ambi-
guous verses of the Qur'an a n d on their reason instead of relying on
traditions. Al-Shañ'a, pp. 331-9. Wensinck's statement that the
Mu'tazilites rejected al1 intercession ( T h e Muslim Creed, p. 182) is mis-
leading. It is worth noting that not only may Muhammad intercede
with God for the sinner but so too may other prophets, angels, saints,
pious scholars, rnartyrs and any person who has high standing in
God's eyes. Al-Ajúri, ibid., pp. 349-52 Al-Ghazali, ibid., p. 526.
15. O n this dogma, there is general agreement among the Muslims.
Husayri Ibn Iskandar al-IJanaA, al-Jawhara al-munvafi sharh wasiyyat al-
imám al-akam Abi Hanifa Al-Rasa'il al-sabá, p. 96. Wensinck, The Muslim
Creed, p. 130.
16. See the following note.
17. Cf. Fiqh Akbar, Wensinck, ibid., p. 103, art. I. Daiber, Belief; pp. 33ff.
Wasiyyat Abi Hanva, Wensinck, ibid., p. 125,art. 4. Al-Rasü'il al-sabra, p.
77. Ibn Abi al-'Izz, Sharh, vol. 2, p. 524. Contrary to the Mu'tazilites,
who brand the grave sinner a n unbeliever, unless h e repents of his sin,
and to the Kharijites, who regard the grave sinner as an unbeliever
and sometimes even as a pagan, the traditionalists, following the
Murji'ites, entrust the judgernent of the grave sinner to God and d o
not exclude him from the Muslim community. Cf. Cook, Early Muslim.
Dogma, chs 5, 7. Watt, The Formative Period, p. 126f.
18. This article and the following ones (18-20) deal with the obligation to
obey the leaders of the community, be they just o r unjust, and to
cooperate with them in carrying out precepts for which they are
responsible o r which are relevant to them, such as the Holy War, the
~ i l g r i m a ~giving
e, alms, division of spoils, and the Friday prayer. Al-
Lalaka'i, Sharh, pp. 160f., 167f., 182f. In the creed of 'Ali ibn al-Madini,
it is stated that people must have an imam. Ibid., p. 167
19. Whoever follows the Qur'an and the Sunna has fixed dogmas which
cannot change, therefore one should refrain from dealing with debates
and controversies. Cf. ibid., pp. 165, 175
2 0 . This is again an article aimed against the Kharijites, who excommuni-
cate anyone who commits a grave sin.
21. That is because one cannot know whether his belief is right in the eyes
of God. This article is divided into three parts: (1) O n e should not say
that h e is a believer, for belief in the present creed is composed of
saying and actions, and one cannot be sure that he carries out good
deeds. Abu Hanifa's teaching that faith consists only of belief (tasdiq)
and knowledge lies in the background of this part. (2) O n e should say:
 NOTES T O A P P E N D I X 1 97

'1 arn a believer, if God wills', for one cannot know what his destiny is.
It seems that the first two parts deal with rnan's status with respect to
belief, whereas the third one is a rnere declaration; o n e says that his
statement of belief in God is tme, that is, one does not refer to his
objective status as a believer, but to his subjective estirnation. Cf. Al-
mi,Mafátih alghayb, vol. 15, p. 121f.(Qur'an 8.4). Wensinck, The Muslim
Creed, pp. 138-40. Al-Rasü'il al-sabra, p. 77.
22. God's foreknowledge irnpairs man's free will, since if God knows
beforehand what o n e will do, one rnust act in accordance with God's
knowledge, otherwise God has no knowledge of one's acts, which is an
absurdity. Most of the Qadarites (we mean by this appellation the
groups which were the forerunners of the Mu'tazila) held that God's
foreknowledge has the function of remernbrance and not of causa-
tion. Van Ess, AnJange, p. 116f.,pp. qq, qg of the Arabic text. Cf. Schwarz,
'The Letter', p. 29f.
23. T h e reason for this appellation is either their holding the view that
the Qur'án is created o r generally their cancellation of the attributes.
See above, n. 3.
24. This pejorative narne is generally applied to thern because they rejected
the first two caliphs, Abu Bakr and 'Uinar. Abraharnov, 'Al-Qasim ibn
Ibrahirn's Theory of the Irnarnate', p. gq, n. 70.
25. They are so called probably because they deviate from the teachings
of rnost Muslirns concerning the status of the grave sinner, the obliga-
tion to rebel against an oppressive leader and so on. Al-Baghdadi, al-
Farq, p. 45.
26. See n. 3 above.
27. T h e text here is not in order.
28. Al-Lalaka'i, Sha. usiiI, vol. 1, p. 152 (the creed of Suban al-Thawri [d.
161/778]) and p. 183 (the creed of Sahl al-Tustari [d. 283/896]). This
article appears as follows in Wasiyyat Abi Hanqa (Wensinck, The Muslim
Creed, p. 129, art. 16. Al-Rasü'il al-sab'a, p. 89): 'We confess that the
moistening of shoes is obligatory for those who are at home diiring a
day and a night, for travellers during three days and nights. This rule
is founded o n a tradition. Whosoever should reject it would be in
danger of unbelief, this tradition being nearly equivalent to an abso-
lutely reliable report.' T h e Shi'ites and the Kharijites opposed wiping
off the shoes instead of washing the feet as it is ordered in Qur'án 5.6.
Contrary to this practice, the traditionalists introduce pieces of
evidence which prove that the Prophet used to wipe off his shoes after
the revelation of Qur'an 5.6. Wensinck, ibid., p. 158. For the develop-
ment of this article in the schools of law, see ibid., p. 15gf.
29. Al-Lálaká'i, ibid., .p. 152 (the creed of Sufyan al-Thawri). Al-Baghawi,
-

Sharh al-sunna, vol. 3, p. 54.

30. Al-Lalaka'i, ibid., p. 154 (the creed o €al-Awza'i [d. 157/774]), P. 156
(the creed of Ahrnad ibn Hanbal [d. 241/855]), p. 180 (the second
version of Abú Hatirn's creed).
31. Ibid., p. 165 (the creed of 'Ali ibn al-Madini).
32. Ibid., p. 156 (the creed of Suban ibn 'Uyayna [d. rg6/811]), p. 158 (the
creed of Ibn Hanbal), p. 181 (the second version of Abü Hatim's
creed). Cf. Fiqh Akbar 1, Wensinck, ibid., p. 104, art. 10. Daiber, BeLieJ
g8 NOTES

pp. 13off. Al-Rasa21 al-sab'a, p. 16f. Wasiyyat A h Hanifa, Wensinck, ibid.,

p. 129, art. 18. Al-Rasü'ilal-sab'a, p. 91.For the creed itself, see Chapter 4,
p. 38.
33. Al-Lalaka'i, Sharh usül, p. 158 (the creed of Ibn Hanbal).
34. Al-Lalaká'i, ibid., p. r5g (the creed of Ibn Hanbal), p. 166 (the creed of
'Ali ibn al-Madini).
35. Al-Lalaka'i, ibid., p. 159 (the creed of Ibn Hanbal), p. 167 (the creed of
'Ali ibn al-Madini) .
36. Al-Lalaka'i, ibid., p. 162 (the creed of Ibn Haribal), p. 169 (the creed of
'Ali ibn al-Madini). Here, one can fault both Ibn Hanbal and 'Ali ibn
al-Madirii for stating definitive criteria concerning God's relationship
towards rnan; they certainly know how God will act in certain circum-
stances. This resernbles the Mu'tazilite view concerning the grave sinner;
if h e repents, God will forgive hirn, and if not, God will punish hirn to
eterna1 sojourri in Hell. In this issue, both the traditionalists arid the
rationalists know what God will do.
37. Al-Lalaka'i, ibid., p. 162 (the creed of Ibn Hanbal), p. 169 (the creed of
'Ali ibn al-Madini). The obligation of stoning the adulterers cancels
Qur'án 24.2, which reads: 'The fornicatress and the fornicator -
scourge each one of thern a tiundred stripes' (tr. Arberry).
38. Al-Lalaka'i, ibid., p. 163f. (the creed of Ibn Hanbal), p. 16gf. (the
creed of 'Ali ibn al-Madini). O n e of these traditions states that if two
Muslinis fight against each other both the killer and the killed are
doorned to Hell.
39. Al-Lalaka'i, ibid., p. 165f. 'Ali ibn al-Madini connects this staternent to
the notion that whoever is engaged in disputes a n d controversies is
not reckoned as o n e of ahl al-sunna, even if he is right in his discussiori
a n d knows the Sunna.
4 0 Al-Lálaká'i, ibid., p. 169 (the creed of 'Ali ibn al-Madini), p. 183 (the
creed of Sahl al-Tustari, who says only that one rnust not defarne the
Cornpanions).
41. Al-Lalaka'i, ibid., p. 169 (the creed of 'Ali ibn al-Madini).
42. Al-Lalaka'i, ibid., p. 176 (the creed of al-Bukhari), p. 183 (the creed of
Sahl al-Tustari). This is an article airned against civil war P t n a ) .
43. Al-Lalaka'i, ibid., p. 181 (the second version of Abü Hatirn's creed).
H.Al-Lalaka'i, ibid., p. 185f. (the creed of Ibn Jarir al-Tabari). For a dis-
cussion of the terrns 'narne', 'object narned' and 'the act of narning'
(tasmiya), see Fakhr al-Din al-Riizi, Lawami' al-bayyinüt, pp. 21-9.
According to the Ash'arites, the narne is identical to the object narned
but different frorn naming. T h e Mu'tazilites, on the other hand, rnain-
tained that the narne is not identical to the narning arid to the object
narned. The view that al1 three terrns are different frorn each other is
ascribed to al-Ghazali and accepted by Fakhr al-Din al-Rázi. Ibid., p.
21. Cf. al-Baqillani, al-Tarnhid, pp. 227-36. Al-Razi proves, for exarnple,
that the narne is other than the object narned through stating that
God's narnes are rnany, whereas the object narned is one. Ibid., p. 22.
It seerns to me that the author of the creed rejects this kind of discus-
sion because it is a kind of speculative debate which has no practica1
effect.
 N O T E S T O A P P E N D I X 111 99

APPENDIX 11
1. This is a treatise of 'Abd al-Jabbár (d. between qi4-16/1023-5), o n e of
the eminent scholars of the Mu'tazila. See, on him, Peters, God's Created
Speech, pp. 6-23. In the following, 1 shall translate some passages from
his introduction to the Mukhtasar. T h e text was edited by Muhammad
'Imára in Rasá'il al-'adl wa'l-taruhid, Beirut and Cairo 1988, part i, pp.
i97ff.
2. This terrn can also be rendered as 'theology'.
3. By taruhid, 'Abd aljabbar rneans several theological issues: (1) proving
the creation of the world; (2) proving the existence of the Creator; (3)
explaining the attributes which H e deserves; (4) the knowledge of the
attributes of the created things which cannot be applied to Him; and
(5) proving His unity. Ibid., p. 202.
4. Answering the following question, 'Do you not (meaning the
Mu'tazilites) hold five principles in addition to the taruhid a n d 'udl, in-
cluding the prornise and the threat (al-wa'ú wa'l-wa'id), the interrnedi-
ate position (manzila bayna al-manzilatayn) and the command o r the
urge to d o what is approved a n d the prohibition against doing what is
reprehensible (al-amr bi'l-marnif rua'l-nahy 'un al-munkar)?', 'Abd al-
Jabbar states that these three principles are subsunied urider the prin-
ciple of God's justice ('adl). Ibid., p. 198.
5. T h e text has al-'ama1 bi'l-taqlid, which seems to be erroneous.
6. These verses and others of the same contents are also used by philoso-
phers and other thinkers to prove that the Qur'an urges people to
examine existence. See, for example, Ibn Rushd, Fasl al-maqül ftma
bayna al-hikma wa'l-shañ'a min al-ittisál, ed. Muhamniad 'Imara, Cairo
1969, p. 22f. Muhammad 'Abduh, al-Arnuilal-Kümila li'l-invim Muhamrnad
'Abduh, ed. Muhammad 'Irnára, Beirut 1972,vol. 3, pp. 278-81.

APPENDIX 111
I. These are passages from al-Báqillani's al-Taqnb wa'l-irshad al-saghir, vol.
I , pp. 228ff. Cf. Aljuwayni, al-Burhán, p. i 10, art. 54.
2. T h e word ahküm, which is usually rendered as 'niles' o r 'precepts'
must be rendered here as 'principles', for as we shall imrnediately see,
ahküm applies to dogmas and not to religious laws.
3. ahdatha means exactly to bring something into being, and hudúth al-
'ülam is the fact that the world was brought into being. Very probably,
the source of this term stenis from verses in the Qur'an (18.70, 20.113,
21.2, 26.5, 56.1) in which the verb ahdatha occurs with the meaning of
'to bring something new'.
4. Cf. Aljuwayni, al-[rshüd, p. 301.
5. According to al-Baqillani, what God orders is good and what H e for-
bids is evil. Thus rationai considerations are not involved in evaluating
the moral state of man. Cf. Al-Juwayni, ibid.
6. Cf. Al-Juwayni, ibid., p. 301, 1. I to p. 302, 11. 1-4.
7. T h e following is a t r a n s l a t i ~ nof a part of this chapter which occurs in
t h e Mu'tazilite Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, al-Mu'tamad, vol. 2, p. 886-9.
8. T h e knowledge that God is o n e a n d wise does not serve as a conditioii
100 NOTES

of knowing the soundness of Tradition, for even if there were two wise
gods, they would not send a liar as a prophet.

APPENDIX IV
t. This work is ascribed to the Zaydite theologian al-Qasirn ibn Ibráhirn
(d. 246/860). Its authenticity is regarded as suspect by Madelung (Dm
Imam, p. 100). However, for our purpose the question of the
genuineness of the treatise is not relevant, because we are concerned
only with operation of reason in it. As we shall see, reason occupies
the highest place in the description of the roots of law. In the follow-
ing, sorne passages of the treatise will be translated. The text appears
in 'Irnára's Rasü'il al-adl wa'l-tawhid, part 1, pp. 124.ff.
2. The author here states that (1) the principie of Consensus occurs in
each of these proofs and ( 2 ) it derives frorn each of thern.
3. For tanal as equivalent to zühir (plain rneaning), see Abraharnov, Anthro
pomorphism, p. 33.
4. For selfevident verses and arnbiguous ones, see ibid., pp. 25-9.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
1 would like to tharik Mr David Brauner for correcting rny English.
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 INDEX

'Abd aljabbar, 3g,40,45-7,8111, 'Ali ibn Abi Tálib, 8, m, 46, 54

85". 8611,8911, grn, 98n 'Ali ibn al-Madini, 56
'Abdallah ibn 'Abbas, 2, lo 'Ali ibn Muhamrnad ibn al-Walid,
'Abdallah ibn Ahrnad ibn Hanbal, 80n
29 al-Amidi, 72n
'Abdallah ibn 'Amr ibn al-'As, 44 'Arnr ibn 'Ubayd, 27, 28, 38, 85n
'Abdallah ibn Mas'üd, 46, 47, Antichrist, 57
7'" ,aqL 17
'Abdallah ibn Mubarak, 45 'arad, 33, 81"
Abü 'Ali aljubba'i, 30 Arberry, A. J., 66n
Abü Bakr, 8 , 4 2 , 4 6 , 5 4 al-Ash'ari, 14, i 7, 34, 80n, 81n
Abü Hamid Muharnmad al- Ash'arites, 34-6, 85n
Maqdisi, jgn asma' allah al-husnü, 82n
Abü Hanifa, 28, 67n, 83n al-Asma'i, 30
Abit Hashim al-Jubbá'i, 30 'awamm, 49
Abü Hatirn Muharnmad ibn Idris al-Awza'i, 56
ibn al-Muridhir, 7, 56, 94n
Abü Hatim al-Razi, 80n bada', 42
Abü al-Hudhayl al-'Allaf, 15, 2 0 , 33, al-Baghawi, 3, 28
79" al-Baghdadi, 39
Abü al-Husayn al-Basri, 49 Bakriyya, 2 0
Abu Ishaq alShirázi, 15 al-Baqillani, 49, 65, 88n, ggn
Abü al-Qasirn al-Ka'bi, 30 al-Barbahari, 23
Abu Talib al-Makki, 31 al-Bayhaqi, 4, 6, 17, 38
Abü Thawr al-Kalbi, 56, gqn al-Bazdawi, 9311
Abü Yüsuf alhnsari, 28, 84n bid'a, 9, 22, 7411, 75"
'Abü Zur'a 'Ubaydalláh ibn 'Abd bi-la kayfa, 40, 54, 94"
al-Karini, 6, 56 al-Bukhari, 6, 56
'adhüb alqabr, 12, 38, 57, 8gn
'adl, 58 dalala, 51
ahkam, ggn dalil al-tamünu: 35, 8 i n
ahl al-ahwü', 29 al-Daraqutni, 27
ahl al-ithbüt, 21 al-Darimi, 2, 16, 20, 44
'A'isha, 2 2 Dirar ibn 'Arnr, 79n, 89"
aja$ 33>44
al-Ajürri, 96n Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, 36-8, 65n,
akhbür, 22 76n, 89n, 92"
 III

Jahm ibn Safwan, 77n, 95"

Jahmites or Jahrniyya, 14, 20, 23. 55,
56
al-Hádi ila al-Haqq Yahyá ibn al- jamü'a, 5, 6
Husayn, 50 al-Jassás, 70"
hadith mutawatzr, 80n jaruhar, 33, 8rn
Hafs al-Fard, 28 J e s w 43,57
~ u J J .55 Jibril, 3
Hanbalites, 1, 13 jihad, 55
al-Harawi, 27, 31 al-Juwayni, 87n
al-Hasan al-Basri, 30
al-hashruzyya. 39, 56 al-Karji, 66n
al-hazud, 55 kasb, 35
H e k 54, 57 khabar al-ühüd, 45, 46
Hudhayfa ibn al-Yarnan, 2 khabar al-wühid, 45, 61, gln
al-Khalil ibn Ahrnad, 30
iblis, 79" Khari~ites,10,42, 55, 96n, 97"
Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, 4, 76n al-Khatib al-Baghdádi, 4
Ibn Abi al-'Izz, 35, 87n al-Khattábí, 29, 30, 31
Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani, 8 al-Khayyat, 47
Ibn al-'Arabi al-Mu'afiri, 8, 18 kuf7, 57
Ibn 'Asakir, 80n, 8111, 84n
Ibn Hanbal, 9, 14, 30, 56, gon, 93"
Ibn Hazm, 9, 86n
Ibn al-Jawzi, 5, g
Ibn Khaldün, 88n
Ibn Kullab, 30 al-Ma'arri, 6gn
Ibn al-Muqaffa' , 6gn Málik ibn Anas, 83n, 84n
Ibn al-Qayyrn al-Jawziyya, 76n Malikites, 31
Ibn Qudarna al-Maqdisi, 24, 25, 27 Manakdim, 32, 38-40,86n, 8gn
Ibn Qutayba, 7, 20,42,43, 48, 79". mansükh, 22
90" al-Marisi, 9, 16, 44, gon
Ibn al-Ráwandi, 32, 42, 48, 6911, al-masti 'ala al-khufayn, 56
75", 89" al-Maturidi, 79n, 86n
Ibn Rushd, 50 al-mizün, 12, 39, 54
Ibn Taymiyya, 7, 9, 18, 2-3. 50, 51, Mu'áwiya ibn Abi Sufyan, 44
65n, 66n, 6811, 6gn, 7on, 71n, al-mubtadi'a, 18
73". 74n, 7 6 gen,
~ 91" Muharnrnad ibn al-Hasan al-Tüsi,
ijtihüú, 6 , 16 89"
'ilm, 17 al-Muhasibi, 31, 76n
ilzam, 27
al-Iskafi, 33 muhkamüt, 24
ism, 57 mukübara, 16
al-istidlal h'l-shühid 'ala ghü'ib, 26, murnida or mulhidün, 18, 42
34, 4'>82" munkar, 38
istinbüt, 6, 14, 15 mu j i a o r Murji'ites, 28, 42, 55, 56,
7911, 83n, 93". 96n
Jabrites, 42 al-musamma, 57
jadal, 6 4 9 mushabbiha, 86
aljahiz, 47, gon mutashübih, 63
mutashübihüt, 24 Shi'a o r Shi'ites, 21, gjn
al-Mutawalli al-Sháfi'í, 87n al-Shirazi, 28
Mu'tazila o r Mu'tazilites, 14, 21, 23, Shu'ba ibn al-Hajaj, 45
28,34,36, 4 1 ~ 5 1 ~ 9 8 n sifüt, 6
sifat aldhüt, 16
Nafi' ibn 'Abd al-Rahrnan, 30 sifat al-f2'L 16
al-Najár, 20, 30, 79" al-sir&, 39, 54, 95"
nakir, 38 Sufyan ibn 'Uyayna, 56
nüsikh, 2 2 Sufyan al-Thawri, 45, 56
nazar, 13, 32, 88n al-Suyüti, 3, 4. 10, 27, 31, 65, 76n,
al-Nazzarn, 20, 30, 33. 46-8, 79n, 85"
9'"
necessary knowledge, 21, 22, 86n, ta'ürul; 45
88n al-Tabañ, 31, 56
nifáq, 57 al-tafsir bi'l-ma'thür, 2
al-tafsir bi 7-ra'y, 19
Paradise, 54 tajhid, I 2
predestination see qadar al-Tahawi, 35
taküfu' al-adilla, 2 0
qadar, 10, 35,54, 57 takjr, 59
qaúari, 78n takftr al-áwümm, 23
qaúariyya o r Qadarites, 28, 42, 55, tamkin, 36
56, 97" taqlid, 13, 58, 59
Qadi al-'Askar, 85n tashbih, 26, 27, 64, 81n
al-Qaffal, 87n taruütur, 5, 13, 22, 80n
al-Qalanisi, 34, 87" taruhid, 58, 64, g8n
al-Qasirn ibn Ibrahirn, 47 tawqif; 12
al-Qinnawji, 66n ta'wil, 23-6, 63
qisma, 14, 25 al-Tayrni, r, 12, 13, 16, 17, 25, 28, 30,
qiyüs, 19, 25, 46, 79n 68n, 76n, 87n, grn
qiyüs al-ghü'ib 'ala al-shühid see al- Thurnarna ibn Ashras, 48
istidlrtl bi'l-shühid 'alü al-ghü'ib Tritton, A. S., 66n

Rafidites, 42, 55, 56 'Urnar, 5, 8, 10, 42,46, 477 54

Resiirrection, 18, 39, 43, 4 9 ~ 5 5 usúl al-fiqh,5
ru'yat allüh, 6 usulis, 5
'Uthrnan, 8,54
sahülñ, 73n
Sahl al-Tustari, 56 Wasil ibn 'Ata', 8gn
samt, 12
al-Sam'ani, 75". 91" Yünus ibn 'Ubayd, 27, 28
shafa'a, 6, 55, 71"
al-Shafi'i, 4, 9, 28, 30, 84n, 85n zühir, 40
Shafi'ites, I, 31 al-Zamakhshari, 50
al-shahüdatayn, 13 zanüdiqa, 41, 42, 44, 56
al-Shahrastani, 87n zandqa, 10, 28
al-Shatibi, 5 zann, 47