JOSEPH BIEN

University o[ Missouri - Columbia

and
PETER KIRK AUGUSTINE
Austin, Texas

ON NATURE AND DESTINY

IN JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU'S
DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY

This paper is limited to an analysis of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's the Discourse

on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality Among Mankind (1755). It
will not be an interpretation of this text in its entirety. Instead the analysis
will be an inspection of the work in the light of a specific thesis that Ernst
Cassirer articulated in his two studies, Rousseau, Kant, and Goethe and The
Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
Rousseau's repeated references to and characterizations of man's "natural
condition" and "natural state" should not, Cassirer argued, be interpreted as
historical or even quasi-historical claims, but rather are to be seen as state-
ments concerning man's destiny. Thus Cassirer felt it valid, for example, to
state that, for Rousseau, man is by nature a political being--"provided that
man's nature be equated with his destiny. ''1 And this proviso was precisely
the thesis upon which Cassirer wished to build his interpretation of
Rousseau

What is truly permanent in human nature is not any condition in which it

once existed and from which it has fallen, rather it is the goal for which and
toward which it moves. =

The aim of this paper, then, is to examine the Discourse on Inequality in the
light of this thesis. The fundamental hypothesis underlying this effort is that,
if Rousseau is to be understood as having intended "man's destiny is to be
x" whenever he wrote "man is by nature x " - - f o r precisely that appears to
be Cassirer's claim, then a close inspection of the contexts in which "na-
ture," "natural," "by nature," and "naturally" occur should confirm that
claim--or at least allow it.
Let us look, then, at Rousseau's usage in the Discourse on Inequality
beginning with the term "naturellement." This term's first occurrence is in a
context in which Rousseau is criticizing earlier theoreticians of the state of

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nature for having attributed to men in that condition ideas and knowledge
they could in fact have acquired only through a social existence. Speaking
specifically of the want of an acceptable definition for natural law, Rousseau
complains

Aussi toutes celies qu'on trouve dans les livres, outre le d6faut de n'~tre
point uniformes, ont-elles encore celui d'&re tir&s de plusieurs connaissances
que les hommes n'ont point naturellement [our emphasis], et des avan-
rages dont ils ne peuvent concevoir l'id6e qu'apr~s &re sortie de l'&at de na-
ture. a
The only plausible rendering of this sentence would seem to be one in which
"naturellement" is read as equivalent in meaning to "originally," or "in
their primitive condition."
Footnote (i) provides the only context in the entire essay in which the
claim is advanced that man is "naturally good," and this passage accordingly
is worthy of particular attention. Rousseau writes

Les hommes sont m&hants, une triste et continuelle exp&ience dispense de

la preuve; cependant l'homme est rmturelleme~t bon [our emphasis], je
crois l'avoir d6montr4 : qu'est-ce donc qui peut l'avoir d6prav4 ~ ce point,
sinon les changements survenu dans sa constitution, les prog~s qu'il a faits
etles connaissances qu'il a acquises ?4

Here the use of the verb "d6praver" seems dearly to indicate a transition
from a prior and somehow better to a subsequent and worse condition. And
though the logic of the use of that verb does not demand that the prior
and better state be identical to man's original condition, the larger context
makes this the most reasonable supposition.
There are other cases, however, in which "naturellement" seems to mean,
not "originally," but rather "in the ordinary course of events," "if nothing
unusual intervenes." So, at least, do we interpret the term in contexts such
as the following

9 . .on salt que la plupart des animaux, sans en excepter l'homme, sont
naturellement ~our emphasis] paresseux, et qu'ils se refusent ~t toutes sortes
de soins qui ne sont pas d'une absolue n6cessit6. 5
While it seems likely that this was meant to apply to men in their primitive
c.ondition, there is no suggestion that it could no equally well apply to men
living in society as well. The verbs are all in the present tense, and there is
no prior/subsequent distinction analogous to that introduced in the previous

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 JOSEPH BIEN / PETER KIRK AUGUSTINE

example by the use of "drprav&" On the other hand, it does not seem
plausible that "naturellement" could be read here as referring to man's
destiny, though to our knowledge Rousseau never excluded the notion that
men were destined to be lazy.
Does this mean that Rousseau's use of "naturellement" in the second
Discourse never can be interpreted as referring to destiny ? That is not quite
the case, as there is one instance in which, it seems to us, a reasonable person
might have some legitimate grounds for feeling that Rousseau was bringing
nature and destiny into a close relation

Ajoutons qu'il ne paralt pas qu'aucun animal fasse naturellement [our

emphasis] la guerre ~t l'homme hors le cas de sa propre ddfense ou d'une
extrdme faim, ni t~moigne contre lui de ces violentes antipathies qui sc~
blent annoncer qu'une esp&ce est destin$e par la nature ~. servir de p~ture
l'autre..6

There may indeed be here some evidence of a wish on Rousseau's part to

link what does (or does not) occur naturally with what is (or is not)
destined by nature; this single example does not by itself make for a strong
argument, but it could serve as supporting evidence if firmer indications
could be found elsewhere in the text.
Passing to an analysis of the adjectival form, one finds again a variety of
uses, not all of them of simple evaluation. Rousseau asserted, for example,
that "l'homme barbare ne plie point sa tdte au joug que l'homme civilis6
porte sans murmure ''7 and concluded from this that

Ce n'est donc pas par l'avilissement des peuples asservis qu'il faut juger des
dispositions naturdles [our emphasis] de l'homme pour ou contre la servi-
tude, mais par les prodiges qu'on faits tousles peuples libres pour se garantir
de l'oppression, s

Here the rendering of "naturelle" would not likely be "original" or "primi-

tive," for such a reading would reduce Ro.usseau's point to an undisputed
tautology; no one would maintain that man's original or primitive dispositions
should be sought in civilized man. Thus it seems that "most basic" or
"fundamental" would be a better rendering of "naturelle" in this instance, as
such terms avoid the chronological question altogether. But here again a
reasonable person might feel that the question of "destiny" is involved in
defining what is "basic" or "fundamental." This is not a position that we
support, but it is not absurd.

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 ROUSSEAU'S DISCOURSE ON I N E Q U A L I T Y

Another possible interpretation is suggested by the analysis of Rousseau's

treatment of the "natural" character of natural law. "Pour qu'elle soit naiu-
relle [our emphasis]," he insisted, "(il fant) qu'elle parle imm4diatement
par ta voix de la nature. ''~
What does this last cryptic phrase mean ? If one reads the immediately
subsequent paragraph, it is clear that Rousseau here wished to have "na-
turelle" understood as "pre-rational," for he discards scientific books and
instead mediates "sur Its premieres et plus simples op&ations de l'~me hu-
maine. ''a~ By this means he discovers "deux principes ant&ieurs ~ la raison ''ix
which serve as the source of "routes les r~gles du droit naturel"

r~gles que la raison est ensuite forc& de r&ablir sur d'antres fondements,
quand, par ses d&eloppements successifs, die est venue ~ bout d'&ouffer la
nature. 12

But while this passage seems to firmly establish "pre-rational" as one of

Rousseau's understandings of the adjective "natural," there are other in-
stances that appear to lead in the opposite direction. In Roussean's discussion
of the origin of political societies, for example, he claims that "celle que
je viens d'exposer me paralt la plus naturelle [our emphasis] par les raisons
suivantes. ''1~ He then lists several logical considerations that he feels sup-
port his point. It seems, then, that "naturelle" in this context should be
read as "logical" or perhaps "plausible;" certainly it could not, as in the
previous instance, be read as "pre-rational."
Another meaning of the adjective "natural" seems to be in play when
Rousseau divides inequality into two sorts

l'une, que j'appelle nat~relle [our emphasis] ou physique, parce qu'elle est
6tablie par la nature... ; l'antre, qu'on peut appeler in6galit6 morai ou po.li-
tique, parce qu'elle d4pend d'une sorte de convention, et qu'elle est &ablie
ou du moins autoris& par le consentement des hommes) 4
Here the meaning seems to be clear : that which is natural is "pre-social."
This is confirmed when Rousseau, in discussing the period of the most
rudimentary forms of social organization, claims that it was extremely happy
and durable, "quoique... la piti6 naturelle [our emphasis] eut d6j~ souffert
quelque alt6ration,"15 and that the laws established in society "d&ruisirent
sans retour la libert4 naturelle. ''1~ These "natural" things must have ante-
dated society, for otherwise they could not have been subsequently "altered"
or "destroyed,"

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 JOSEPH BIEN / PETER KIRK A U G U S T I N E

The distinction between pre-social and early-social is not clear, however,

in the Discourse of Inequality. For example, in footnote (k) Rousseau treats
as equivalents 'Thomme naturel" and 'Thomme sauvage, T M though his
usage elsewhere indicates that "l'homme sauvage" lives in primitive societies,
not in the state of nature, is
An interesting case is that in which Rousseau makes a very clear-cut
distinction between the organs of speech and speech itself : "quoique l'organe
de la parole soit naturel [our emphasis], la parole elle-m~me ne lui est
pourtant pas naturelle [our emphasis]. ''.9 This sentence is perhaps the
strongest single textual objection to Cassirer's theory of nature-as-destiny,
for it states dearly that what existed originally (the speech organs) are
natural, whereas the end they are "destined" to serve (speech) is not natural
to man.
On the other hand, the force of this distinction is blunted in another
passage in which Rousseau indicates that "la perfectibilil~ [Rousseau's em-
phasis], les vertus sociales, e t . . . autres facult6s" were "retues en puissance"
by 'Thomme naturel. T M There would then seem to be no strong grounds
for claiming that Rousseau could not have seen speech as being natural to
man as "puissance." It should be pointed out that this passage is of no hdp
to Cassirer's thesis, for he certainly would not want it hdd that "natural
man" has such things as the "social virtues" only "en puissance;" such
things are destined to be realized, presumably, not merely potential.
Still another meaning of "natural" seems to be "formed without man's
intervention," for presumably Rousseau's grounds for caIIing tree branches
and stones "les armes naturelles [our emphasis]" of man 21 were that, in
distinction to swords, bows and arrows, etc., they are not man-made. And
his references to the "fertilit6 naturelle de la terre ''2~ pertain to the pre-
agricultural era.
Before passing to an inspection of Rousseau's uses of the noun "nature,"
it might be well to recapitulate briefly the results so far obtained, as there
has been no smooth line of development, no logical concatenation of the
analyses. The adverbial form ("naturally") was interpreted both as "ori-
ginally" and as "ordinariity," and in one case it was noted that the notion of
destiny might be claimed to be present as well. The adjectival form ("nat-
ural") was read variously as "basic," as "pre-rational," as "plausible," as
"pre-social," and as "existing independent of human activity." One might
say that there is a general intention visible in most of these uses, but there

47O
 ROUSSEAU'S DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY

is surely sufficient divergence to explain why the analyses do not follow

one another in a strictly logical progression.
The noun is no less equivocal. There is in some passages the dear sug-
gestion that nature is to be seen as a primitive force opposed to reason--as,
for example, in the passage already cited (see above, p. 469) in which
Rousseau relates how "la raison.., par ses d6veloppements successifs, . . .est
venue ~ bout d'&ouffer la nature. T M One might also cite, in this connection,
the passage where Rousseau "ose presque assurer que l'&at de r~flexion est
un 6tat contre nature. ''24 It seems, then, that the exercise of reason is to be
viewed as non-natural, even anti-natural.
The question, however, is not so simple. In a passage in which Rousseau
adopts the rhetorical device of attributing his own views to "all concerned
readers," it is stated that the latter, having been aided by Rousseau's prior
clarifications, will now be able to explain

9 .comment l'~me et les passions humaines, s'alt&ant insensiblement, chan-

.

gent pour ainsi dire de nature; . . .pourquoi, l'homme originel s'~vanouissant

par degr6s, la soci6t6 n'offre plus aux yeux du sage qu'un assemblage d'hom-
rues artifidels et de passions lattices qui sont i'ouvrage de routes ces nouvel-
les relations, et n'ont aucun vrai fondement dans la nature. =5

Here we find that the human soul can ("pour ainsi dire") change its nature,
but that the resulting artificial man has no true foundation in nature. This
seems confirmed elsewhere, as Rousseau discusses the purpose of the essay
as being to "d~mdler ce qu'il y a d'originaire et d'artificiel dans Ia nature ac-
tuelle de l'homme. T M Hence there is no assertion that man has any "eternal"
nature : it varies from epoch to epoch, and Rousseau's concern is to study "la
nature actuelle" of man. Further notice that artificial elements can be in-
cluded in man's nature, along with original elements. Thus to determine that
x is a part of man's nature is not to determine that x is natural; it can be
non-natural and yet be natural to man, in the sense of being a part of his
nature. Consequently the conclusion noted above that reason is contrary to
nature--should not be interpreted to imply that reason is contrary to man's
nature. It is, of course, contrary to natural man's nature, but natural man is
not the only man. The man to whom reason is natural is himself contrary to
nature; his nature is non-natural.
This, it seems, has familiar overtones : man emerges from (impersonal)
nature and, through a socio-historical process, develops his own nature. The

471
 JOSEPH BIEN / PETER KIRK AUGUSTINE

recognition that this "unnatural" nature is unnatural is not in itself, of

course, an evaluation, for one might judge this altered nature to be either
more or less desirable than that of natural man.
H o w does Cassirer see this historical process in which man's nature is to
be clearly distinguished from nature itself, though in certain eras they may
coincide ? He sees it, once again, in terms of destiny

9 . .Rousseau did not demand from the community that it should increase
man's happiness, well-being, and pleasure--nor did he expect these benefits
to result from the establishment and consolidation of a future community--
but that it should secure his freedom and thus restore him to his true
destiny. 2z

Does this indeed represent what Rousseau wrote ? W e think not. In discussing
that earliest-social condition of man--already out of the state of nature, but
prior to the introduction of property, prior to. the establishment of laws,
and prior to any full development of morality--Rousseau wrote unequivocally

Plus on y r6fl&hit, plus on trouve que cet 6tat 6tait le moins sujet aux
r6votutions, le meilleur a l'homme [our emphasis], et qu'il n'en a dfi sortir
que par quelque funeste hasard, qui, pour l' utilit~ commune, edt d~ ne jamais
arriver [our emphasis]. L'exemple des sauvages qu'on a presque tous trouv~s
k ce point, semble confirmer clue le genre humain &ait [ait pour y rester
toujours [our emphasis]...28

If the preceding analyses, in which it was shown that Rousseau's use of

"naturally," "natural," and "nature" was sufficiently inconsistent and varied
to disallow any facile equation of "nature" with "destiny" (or with anything
else, for that matter), were judged insufficient to rebut Cassirer's thesis, the
above quotation should we think nonetheless suffice alone. Mankind's destiny
was, Rousseau here asserts, to "remain always" in the early-social (savage)
condition, and his emergence from that condition should never have occured.
It may be that in other works Rousseau speaks differently; that is beyond the
scope of this paper. The present ccncern is the degree to which Cassirer's
thesis is supported by the text of the Discourse of Inequality, and the
conclusion is : clearly insufficiently.
A few concluding remarks on destiny seem in order. There is a passage
in which Cassirer writes that man can take "control of his destiny into his
own hands, by substituting 'I will' and 'I shall' for a mere 'I must'. ''z~ If
man truly takes control of his destiny, then it is not the case that he thereby

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goes beyond ("d6passe") the concept of destiny altogether ? Man's destiny

(as it were) is to have no destiny, and consequently continued use of this
term adds nothing intelligible to serious discourse. If the term "destiny"
were submitted to any close inspection, we suspect it would yield either
predictions about an ineluctable future (which would likely be disavowed
when made explicit) or simple exhortations and moral proddings, both of
which can be very nicely phrased without bringing in the notion of destiny. 8~

NOTES

1 Cassirer, Ernst : T h e Question o~ Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Translated and edited by Peter Gay.
NY, C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2954. P. ~26.
2 Cassirer, Ernst : Rousseau, K a n t , Goethe : T w o Essays. Translated by James G u t m a n n et al.
Princeton, Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, ~945, P. 2o.
8 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques : CEuvres completes, t. 2 : CEuvres philosophiques et politiques : des
premiers dcrits au Contrat social ~735-1762. Paris, Editions du Seuil, I97I. p. 21o.
4 Ibid., p. 25I.
5 Ibid., p. 256.
6 Ibid., p. 256.
7 Ibid., p. 235.
8 Ibid., p. 238.
9 Ibid., p. 2~o.
10 Ibid., p. 2Io.
111 Ibid., p. 21o.
12 Ibid., p. 2io.
i13 Ibid., p. 234.
:14 Ibid., p. 2:~1.
15 lbid., p. 23I.
!1,6 Ibid., p. 234.
17 Ibid., p. 257.
9 8 Ibid., p. 246, for example.
19 Ibid., p. 256.
2o Ibid., p. 227.
21 Ibid., p. 227.
22 Ibid., p. 213, 249.
2a Ibid., p. 210.
24 Ibid., p. 216.
25 Ibid., p. 246.
2~ Ibid., p. 2o~.
27 Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. ~o6.
~8 Rousseau, p. 23i.
29 Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, p. 64.
so The authors wish to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of A n t o n i o Cue and Louis W h i t e
Beck.

473