Bushmeat Trade
Bushmeat Trade
Bushmeat Trade
in SAVANNA AFRICA:
DRIVERS, IMPAC TS & SOLUTIONS to ADDRESS THE PROBLEM
Recommended citation: Lindsey, P., Balme, G., Becker, M., Begg, C., Bento, C., Bocchino, C., Dickman, A., Diggle, R., Eves, H.,
Henschel, P., Lewis, D., Marnewick, K., Mattheus, J., McNutt, J.W., McRobb, R., Midlane, N., Milanzi, J., Morley, R., Murphree,
M., Nyoni, P., Opyene, V., Phadima, J., Purchase, N., Rentsch, D., Roche, C., Shaw, J., van der Westhuizen, H., Van Vliet, N.,
Zisadza, P. Illegal hunting and the bush-meat trade in savanna Africa: drivers, impacts and solutions to address the prob-
lem. FAO, Panthera/Zoological Society of London/Wildlife Conservation Society report, New York. 79 pages.
Cover:
Buffalo snared in save conservancy.
(credit: p. lindsey)
Illegal hunting &
the bush-meat trade
in savanna Africa:
drivers, impac ts & solutions to address the problem
The designations employed and the presentation of material in this information product do not imply
the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) concerning the legal or development status of any country, territory, city or area
or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The mention of
specific companies or products of manufacturers, whether or not these have been patented, does not
imply that these have been endorsed or recommended by FAO in preference to others of a similar
nature that are not mentioned.
The views expressed in this information product are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect the views or policies of FAO.
© FAO, [2015]
FAO encourages the use, reproduction and dissemination of material in this information product.
Except where otherwise indicated, material may be copied, downloaded and printed for private
study, research and teaching purposes, or for use in non-commercial products or services, provided
that appropriate acknowledgement of FAO as the source and copyright holder is given and that FAO’s
endorsement of users’ views, products or services is not implied in any way.
All requests for translation and adaptation rights, and for resale and other commercial use rights
should be made via www.fao.org/contact-us/licence-request or addressed to [email protected].
FAO information products are available on the FAO website (www.fao.org/publications) and can be
purchased through [email protected].
Table of Contents
1. Executive summary 4
2. Background to this document 13
3. Introduction 14
4. Methods 15
Hunting for bushmeat and the law 15
Illegal hunting methods 17
Spatial, temporal patterns in illegal hunting 20
Impact of illegal hunting on wildlife populations 21
Impact of illegal hunting on wildlife-based land uses 25
5. Illegal hunters, meat traders and the nature of the trade in bushmeat 26
6. Key drivers of illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade 30
Increasing demand for bushmeat in rural areas 30
Increasing demand for bushmeat in urban areas 30
Human encroachment of wildlife areas 31
Lack of alternative livelihoods 33
Lack of alternative food sources 33
Inadequate penal systems and lack of enforcement 34
Lack of clear rights over wildlife or land, and/or inadequate benefits from wildlife 35
Political instability and poor governance 35
Demand for wildlife body parts for traditional medicine and cultural ceremonies 36
Abundant material for making snares 36
7. Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges 37
Addressing human population growth within and near to protected areas 37
Land use planning 37
Developing alternative livelihoods 39
Promoting alternative protein supplies 41
Manipulating the supply and price of illegal bushmeat 43
Developing formal wildlife-based land uses 44
Adequate legal protection and enforcement of wildlife laws 49
Reducing availability of snare wire 52
Funding the necessary interventions 53
8. Differences between savanna and forest biomes relating to the bushmeat trade 54
9. Conclusions 55
5
Foreword
6
I. Executive Summary
Background
In this report, the term ‘bushmeat’ is used to denote meat act as a barometer of the severity of the problem, and also act
from wild animals that have been hunted illegally, which as a basis from which to catalyze conservation action. Key
aside from being used for personal consumption, is often sold experts gathered at the workshop to identify the drivers of
commercially. The bushmeat trade has long been recognized illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade and the interventions
as a severe threat to wildlife populations in the forests of necessary to address the issue.
West and Central Africa and is considered a conservation Hunting of wildlife is regulated in most African countries
crisis in that biome. Far less attention has been focused on through wildlife legislation and permitting systems which
the issue in African savannas, perhaps due to a misconcep- specify restrictions on the times and places that hunting is
tion that illegal hunting for bushmeat in the biome is primar- permitted, the species that may be hunted and the hunting
ily for subsistence and is largely sustainable. However, there methods that may be used. The large majority of hunting
is a growing body of research conducted in the Serengeti for bushmeat contravenes one or more such restrictions.
ecosystem in Tanzania, and from sporadic studies elsewhere Snaring is the most common illegal hunting method and is
that contradict that perception. This report summarizes a particularly undesirable from a conservation perspective as
workshop on illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade in the it is highly effective, difficult to control, unselective in terms
savanna biome organised and sponsored by Panthera, the of the genders or species of animals captured, wasteful, and
Zoological Society of London and Wildlife Conservation has severe animal welfare implications due to the manner of
Society. Growing concern over the impacts of illegal hunting capture and confinement, and frequent incidents of severe,
and the bushmeat trade, particularly on large carnivores non-lethal wounding of wildlife. Other common bushmeat
populations in Southern and East Africa, motivated the hunting methods include the use of rifles, muzzle-loaders,
workshop. Large carnivores are particularly sensitive to the shotguns, dogs, fire, and in some cases, gin traps, pitfall
impacts of illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade and can traps and poison.
Cheetahs resting at
Phinda Private Game
Reserve in South Africa.
(Photo: © L. Hunter)
executive summary
Several temporal and spatial patterns in the incidence of However, all wildlife species are affected by illegal hunting.
illegal hunting in savanna areas are emerging. Wildlife has The impacts of illegal hunting are likely to increase in future
been extirpated from many areas outside of formal conserva- as demand for bushmeat is increasing and supply is declining
tion networks with the effect that illegal hunters are increas- in many areas, resulting in elevated pressure on remaining
ingly focusing their efforts on protected areas. Levels of ille- wildlife populations.
gal hunting and the consumption of bushmeat are invariably In addition to severe ecological impacts, illegal hunting
higher in areas closer to human settlements. Illegal hunting can confer serious negative economic and social impacts.
is typically more frequent in areas with poor anti-poaching Economic consequences include major negative impacts on
enforcement, in areas where wildlife concentrates, during the wildlife industries which can preclude the option to develop
passage of migratory wildlife and during the late dry season wildlife-based land uses. Social consequences include
when wildlife is concentrated around water-sources. Illegal negative impacts on food security in the long term through
hunting also tends to spike when food-shortages are severe, the loss of a potentially sustainable supply of meat protein
and at times of the year when the agricultural time-commit- through legal hunting, the loss of tourism-based employ-
ments of communities are low. ment and the loss of wildlife heritage. The scale and severity
Illegal hunting is emerging as one of, if not the most of the threat is such that without urgent intervention, one of
severe, threats to wildlife in several countries in the savanna Africa’s most valuable resources will be lost across vast areas
biome. Ecological consequences of illegal hunting include of the continent.
overall wildlife population declines, reductions in biodiver- The drivers of illegal hunting for wildlife are varied, and the
sity, local disappearances of many species from both within phenomenon tend to fall somewhere on a continuum, from
and outside protected areas and associated loss of ecosystem that done to obtain meat for direct consumption (subsist-
functionality, reductions in the effective sizes of protected ar- ence) and/or immediate community trade, to commercial
eas due to edge-effects and, in some cases, complete collapse trade in urban centres or even international markets. There
and disappearance of wildlife populations. Notably, wildlife are indications that illegal hunting is increasingly commercial
populations in the savannas of West and Central Africa in many areas in response to increasing human populations,
appear to be collapsing in many areas, though the phenom- and increasing demand for bushmeat both in rural communi-
enon is not restricted to those regions. Large carnivores ties and in growing urban areas. In rural areas, often close to
are particularly affected by illegal hunting because they are wildlife source populations, bushmeat is preferred because it
wide-ranging (and thus particularly vulnerable to snaring), is normally cheaper than alternatives. In urban areas, demand
are killed as by-catch in snares set for other species, specifi- for bushmeat is driven by preference for its taste and is com-
cally targeted for body parts in some cases and affected by monly more expensive than other types of protein.
the loss of prey populations. Furthermore, they occur at low
Data on the scale and economic value of the bushmeat
population densities and even low levels of anthropogenic
trade in the savanna biome are scarce (partly due to the
mortality can drive severe declines and local extinctions.
covert nature of the trade). It is clear that illegally sourced
bushmeat contributes significantly to economies and to food
security in many countries. However, due to the unsustain-
able nature of illegal hunting, those social and economic
benefits are unlikely to be sustainable. Furthermore, most
forms of illegal hunting for bushmeat represent an extremely
wasteful and inefficient form of wildlife use which captures a
tiny fraction of the value of the resource it destroys.
8
executive summary
9
executive summary
Potential solutions
Addressing human population growth
around protected areas
10
executive summary
11
executive summary
Alternative livelihoods
Interventions needed
• Provision of alternative income streams and employment • Risk that alternative income will be used to augment
• Integrated conservation and development projects that from illegal hunting without replacing it
• Development of agricultural projects (livestock, irriga- • Risk that bushmeat consumption and demand will
tion) increase with increasing wealth
• Use of traditional structures for resource management • Risk of a population influx into a wildlife area if the
alternative livelihood programmes are successful
Drivers addressed
• Lack of alternative livelihoods and food sources Where applicable
• Everywhere communities live within or near wildlife
Benefits/advantages of the approach areas
• Clear human welfare benefits
• Unrealistic to expect hunters to give up hunting in the Other solutions that the interventions should be employed with
absence of alternative and more profitable livelihood op- • Land-use planning
tions • Development of wildlife-based land uses/devolution of
user-rights over wildlife to communities
Disadvantages/challenges associated with the approach • Development and enforcement of laws that reflect the
• Illegal hunting can provide instant and significant value of wildlife resource
benefits, so difficult to encourage hunters to swap for • Provision of alternative protein supplies
alternative livelihood options • Capacitating existing traditional institutions for re-
• Limited evidence of success of such projects at reduc- sources management
ing levels of illegal hunting or improving livelihoods/
food security (though the number of attempts to provide
alternative livelihoods is low, and monitoring of existing
projects is often poor)
12
executive summary
13
executive summary
14
executive summary
Conclusion
Illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade are caused by a complex assemblage of factors, the combination of which is likely
to vary from site to site. Consequently, to address the problem an adaptive combination of site-specific interventions will
likely be required. The funding needs for such interventions will be significant, and innovative strategies to generate the
necessary financial resources will be required. Fortunately, the problems of illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade reflect
some inherent development challenges facing African nations and there is scope for attracting funding from both the inter-
national development and conservation community. There is an urgent need for much greater focus, effort and investment to
be directed at mitigating the threats posed by illegal hunting. In the absence of such actions, one of Africa’s greatest assets is
at risk of disappearing from many areas in a short space of time.
15
II. Background to this Document
In recognition of the threat posed by the bushmeat trade, the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has established a
liaison group on bushmeat. This liaison group has since established a set of recommendations for addressing the threat (Secre-
tariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2011). These guidelines were used as the basis for discussion at a brainstorming
session held in May 2012 by Panthera, the Zoological Society of London and the Wildlife Conservation Society where scien-
tific experts and wildlife managers met to identify priority interventions needed to address illegal hunting and the bushmeat
trade in the savanna biome, with particular (though not exclusive) reference to the Southern African Development Community
(SADC) region.
The bushmeat trade has long been recognized as a major arrival of large numbers of refugees, and in Zimbabwe fol-
threat to biodiversity in forest areas of Central and West Af- lowing the seizures of farms and wildlife ranches during the
rica (Noss, 1998; Fa et al., 2003). In those regions, the trade 2000s (Hatton et al., 2001; Jambiya et al., 2007; Lindsey et
in bushmeat is a significant component of local and even na- al., 2011; Bouché et al., In press). However, the threat posed
tional economies (Bowen-Jones et al., 2003). Bushmeat con- by illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade also occurs widely
tributes significantly to food security, often representing the during times of peace and stability (Barnett, 1998; Okello and
single most important source of protein for communities in Kiringe, 2004; Secretariat of the Convention on Biological
rural areas. For example, hunting provides 30-80% of protein Diversity, 2011). Illegal hunting appears to be a widespread
to rural households in Central Africa, and virtually 100% of response to a substantial demand for bushmeat. In Tanza-
animal protein (Nhasi 2008). However, hunting associated nia, for example, a mean of 2,078 tonnes of bushmeat are
with the bushmeat trade is unsustainable and is resulting in confiscated annually, while in Central African Republic, an
widespread wildlife population declines and extirpation of estimated 59,000 tonnes of bushmeat are believed to end up
larger bodied species (Wilkie, 1999; Fa et al., 2000). Con- on the illegal market each year (Secretariat of the Convention
sequently, the current food security benefits associated with on Biological Diversity, 2011).
bushmeat are likely to falter (Bennett, 2002). In African for-
A growing body of research is emerging on illegal hunting
est biomes, for example, protein supplies from bushmeat are
expected to drop by 81% over the next 50 years (Fa et al., and the bushmeat trade in savannas, most notably from the
2003). The bushmeat trade is thus a crisis from both a conser- Serengeti ecosystem in Tanzania (Hofer et al., 2000; Loiboo-
vation and human development perspective. ki et al., 2002; Marealle et al., 2010; Nyahongo et al., 2005;
Ndibalema and Songorwa, 2008).The results from a num-
The scale and impacts of the bushmeat trade have received ber of sporadic studies have also been published from Mo-
much less attention in the savanna biome (Lindsey et al. zambique (Lindsey and Bento, 2012), Zimbabwe (Lindsey
2011). This lack of focus has perhaps been due to a miscon- et al. 2011a,b) and Zambia (Lewis and Phiri, 1998; Lewis,
ception that hunting for bushmeat is largely motivated for 2005; Brown, 2007). However, the comparative shortage of
subsistence and is practised on a limited scale (Barnett, 1998). published material on illegal hunting in the savanna biome
However, recently, there has been a gradual realisation of the reflects an ongoing lack of appreciation of the problem and
significance of the problem following publication of a num- inadequate efforts by state wildlife-agencies and NGOs to
ber of case-studies. Indications are that hunting for bushmeat address the issue. This report represents an attempt to collate
trade is an incipient threat which flares up during periods existing knowledge on the illegal hunting and the bushmeat
of bad governance or political instability, as observed in the trade in savannas, and to provide insights into the underlying
savannas of Central African Republic, Mozambique during causes, impacts and potential solutions.
and after the civil war there, in north west Tanzania with the
IV. Methods
A literature search was conducted using the Web of Science® and search terms such as: bushmeat trade; bows and arrows;
dogs; firearms; gin traps; illegal hunting; poaching; snaring; trapping. The legality of hunting methods was determined for 16
countries in the savanna biome by reviewing the most recent legislation, derived from http://faolex.fao.org/faolex/index.htm
(accessed June 2012). Information on the prevalence of various hunting methods, the primary motivations for illegal hunting,
the key drivers of illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade and impacts of illegal hunting on wildlife populations were gleaned
from the literature and from a survey of field practitioners who attended the meeting (n=12).
In most African countries, hunting is regulated, with har- and the methods commonly used by bushmeat hunters are
vests being controlled through systems of licensing and quo- typically illegal (Table 1). Hunting for bushmeat is typically
tas. For example, all SADC countries that allow hunting have illegal in many of the contexts in which it occurs due to vary-
permitting procedures in an attempt to control it (Morgera, ing combinations of: lack of licenses/permits; being practised
2009). Ownership of wildlife is typically retained by the in areas where hunting is prohibited; the use of prohibited
state, with the exception of some scenarios in South Africa, methods; and the killing of protected species, sexes or ages
Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe of animals. Bushmeat hunting is thus hereafter referred to
where conditional user-rights are granted to private land as ‘illegal hunting’. The term ‘bushmeat’ is used to describe
owners (Bond et al., 2004). In some countries, communi- meat from wildlife that has been acquired via illegal hunting,
ties have also been allocated limited user-rights over wildlife, whereas ‘game meat’ is used to describe meat from wildlife
which provide scope for local people to hunt in possession of that has been hunted legally.
the appropriate permits/licenses, within specified limits and
under certain conditions (Taylor, 2009). In many cases, the
rights to hunt on state and communal land can be purchased
by private safari hunting outfitters (Lindsey et al., 2007). In
some cases, such as in Tanzania, Botswana and Malawi, spe-
cial hunting licenses are allocated to citizens in certain cat-
egories of land for the purpose of obtaining meat (Morgera,
2009). In a minority of countries, such as Malawi, Angola and
Mozambique (in forest areas), hunting of wildlife for subsis-
tence needs is allowed without a permit, subject to such har-
vest not being detrimental to populations (Morgera, 2009).
a The legality of hunting with single-shot firearms, muzzle-loading firearms, shot guns and bows and arrows is more complex as these
methods are legal under some circumstances in some countries, albeit when in possession of the necessary permits and in some cases given
specific calibres/bow strengths for particular species.
19
methods
The most common method used by illegal hunters is the Snares can be used at catching species ranging in size from
use of snares (Table 2). Snares (as used in savanna areas) birds and rodents up to elephants Loxodonta africana (depend-
typically comprise a noose attached to woody vegetation and ing on the size of the snares and material used) and are largely
placed where animals are likely to pass (such as along wildlife unselective, frequently resulting in the collateral death of ani-
trails, close to water sources), in gaps in fences of thorn bush mals that are not the primary target (Hofer et al., 1996; Noss,
erected by the hunter, or along migratory routes (Hofer et 1998; Hofer et al., 2000). In the Serengeti, species killed in
al., 1996). Animals are caught when they put their head (or snares range from dik dik Madoqua kirkiiand to black rhinoc-
a leg) into the snare and pull it tight as they keep moving eros Diceros bicornis, hippopotamus Hippopotamus amphibious
(Noss, 1998). In some cases, wildlife is chased in the direc- and elephants (Hofer et al., 1996). Because of the low value
tion of snare lines by illegal hunters (sometimes using perim- of snares, illegal hunters often check them infrequently, result-
eter fencing around reserves to assist in funnelling wildlife ing in a high degree of wastage when animals are killed and
( J. Mattheus, unpublished data). Snares can be made from rot without being retrieved (Noss, 1998). For example, in Savé
natural fibre or nylon (which are used when targeting small Valley Conservancy during 2001-2009, 1,410 animals rotted
mammals and birds) or wire, which is used when targeting in snares (Lindsey et al., 2011). The carcasses of animals in
larger mammals (small antelopes and upwards in size). Wire snares tend to attract carnivores that become snared in turn;
for snares is readily available in many areas, from telephone consequently snaring represents a significant source of mortal-
and electricity lines, and fencing used for livestock and wild- ity for several predator species (Hofer et al., 1996; Woodroffe
life, and wire extracted from burnt tyres (Hofer et al., 1996; et al., 1997). Finally, there are animal welfare issues associated
Lindsey et al., 2011). Snares are low cost, difficult for enforce- with snaring, as the method results in a slow and painful deaths
ment agencies to detect and if left unchecked, can cause rapid and high rates of severe, non-fatal wounding (Lindsey et al.,
declines in wildlife populations (Lindsey et al., 2011). In Savé
Valley Conservancy (SVC) in Zimbabwe, for example, up to Wire snare in Niassa Reserve (bottom left, Photo: C.
18 animals have been recorded in a single snare line (batch of Begg). Wildebeest killed in snares, Serengeti National
snares set in one localised area) (Lindsey et al., 2011). Park (Photo: M. Borner).
20
methods
2011). In Central Africa, for example, over one third of animals is commonly used by hunters to flush wildlife (and particu-
caught in snares escape with injuries, in some cases leaving a larly cane rats Thryonomys swinderianu), clear undergrowth,
foot in the snare (Noss, 1998). increase visibility, stimulate green growth to concentrate
wildlife, and cover tracks ( J. McNutt unpublished data, Lind-
In addition to snares, dogs are often used by illegal hunt- sey & Bento, 2012). In some cases, poison is used for hunters.
ers to bay wildlife or chase animals into holes, where they are For example, hunters in Ruaha in Tanzania occasionally poi-
despatched with spears or bows and arrows (Grey-Ross et son waterholes to kill wildlife for meat (despite the obvious
al., 2010; Jachmann, 2008a; Lindsey et al., 2011)(Table 2). In health risks) (A. Dickman, unpublished data). In Mun-ya-
some areas firearms are used, including shotguns, single-shot wana Game Reserve in South Africa, poison is commonly
rifles and muzzle-loaders (some of which are home-made) used to kill vultures for body parts for traditional medicine ( J.
(Brown & Marks 2010; Fusari 2001; Lindsey & Bento 2011), Mattheus unpublished data).
though the use of automatic weapons appears to be relatively
rare. In rural Maputo District, illegal hunters use semi-au-
tomatic weapons to supply a lucrative trade to Maputo city
(Barnett, 1998). In Mozambique, illegal hunters commonly
use gin traps, which are manufactured from steel car springs
and used to kill animals as large as buffalo Syncerus caffer and Elephant trunk wounded by a snare, Zambia (Photo: M.
juvenile elephant (Fusari 2001; Lindsey & Bento 2012). Fire Becker/R. McRobb)
21
methods
Table 2. The prevalence of methods used to hunt wildlife for bushmeat in savanna Africa
(NB that in cases where information was sourced from literature, it may be the case that some hunting methods are used in the study areas but were
not mentioned in the papers by the authors) *unpublished data
Area Snares Dogs Muzzle Fire Bows & Gin Nets Small Pit fall Source
loaders/ arrows traps mammal/ traps
Single bird traps
shotguns/
shotguns
Hunting concessions 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 K. Collins*
near Okavango, Bo-
tswana
Tsavo National Park, 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wato et al., 2006
Kenya
Sokoke Forest, Kenya 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 Fitzgibbon et al., 1995
WAP complex, Benin, 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 P Henschel*
Burkina Faso, Niger
Comoé NP, Ivory coast 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 P Henschel*
Batéké Plateau, SE 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 P Henschel*
Gabon
Gile Game Reserve, 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 Fusari and Carpaneto,
Mozambique 2006
Coutada 9, Mozambique 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 Lindsey and Bento, 2012
Niassa, Mozambique 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 C. Begg*
Makuleke concession, 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 C. Roche*
South Africa
Dwesa/Cwebe Reserves, 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Hayward, 2009
RSA
Munyawana Game 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 J. Mattheus*
Reserve, RSA
Ruaha National Park, 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 A. Dickman*
Tanzania
Serengeti National Park, 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 D. Rentsch*
Tanzania
Udzungwa Mountains, 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Nielsen, 2006
Tanzania
Urumwa Forest Reserve, 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Carpaneto and Fusari,
Tanzania 2000
North western Tanzania 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 Jambiya et al., 2007
Luangwa Valley and 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 D. Lewis, R. McRobb, M.
adjacent Game Manage- Becker*
ment Areas, Zambia
Kafue National Park 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 N.Midane*
Total 0.86 0.67 0.67 0.52 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.14
22
methods
Wildlife is rapidly disappearing from unprotected lands, There are consistent temporal patterns in the frequency of
due to a wide array of threats (Newmark, 2008) and as a re- bushmeat hunting. In some areas peaks occur in the late dry
sult, illegal hunters are increasingly focusing their efforts on season when wildlife is concentrated around water sources
protected areas. Within protected areas, illegal hunting is (Brown, 2007; Holmern et al., 2007; Lindsey et al., 2011).
more prevalent in areas close to the borders and near human Bushmeat hunting is also affected by patterns in agricultural
settlements (Muchaal and Ngandjui, 1999; Hofer et al., 2000; activity which dictate household food availability and the
Wato et al., 2006; Marealle et al., 2010). Greater distances amount of time people have available for hunting (Muchaal
mean increased time, effort and costs for hunters to find wild- and Ngandjui, 1999; Lindsey et al., 2011). In the Serengeti
life and transport meat to their home or place of sale (Hofer NP, the frequency of bushmeat hunting increases during the
2000). Greater time spent in protected areas also increases passage of migratory wildebeest Connochaetes taurinus (Hol-
the risk of being apprehended by anti-poaching game scouts mern et al., 2007). In Savé Valley Conservancy and Mun-ya-
(hereafter referred to as ‘scouts’). In Serengeti NP during a wana there are peaks in hunting with dogs during periods
period of high poaching intensity and low levels of enforce- of moonlight, when hunters are more able to see and (in the
ment, there was a positive relationship between distance from case of Mun-ya-wana) on rainy nights, presumably due to
the boundary and occurrence of buffalo (Fitzgibbon et al., reduced risks of being apprehended (Lindsey et al., 2011); J.
1995; Metzger et al., 2010). Similarly, in Sekoke Forest in Mattheus, pers. comm.).
Kenya, the occurrence of hunters’ traps declines with distance
from the boundary (Fitzgibbon et al., 1995). Bushmeat hunt-
ers tend to focus hunting efforts in areas where wildlife con-
centrates, such as close to water holes or along rivers (Hofer
et al., 1996; Wato et al., 2006; Lindsey et al., 2011), or even
close to flowering or fruiting trees (Lindsey and Bento, 2012).
23
methods
24
methods
reform (Lindsey et al., 2012), and in areas adjacent to refu- bushmeat and habitat loss act synergistically with severe con-
gee camps in Tanzania ( Jambiya et al., 2007) the effects on sequences for wildlife (Ogutu et al., 2009; Wilkie et al. 2011).
wildlife populations have been devastating, resulting in dra- The loss of wildlife as a result of illegal hunting can have severe
matic population reductions and local extirpations of various consequences for ecosystem services. For example, the removal
species (Table 3). Similarly, wildlife populations in Central of large herbivores and seed dispersing mammals for example
and West Africa appear to be collapsing in many savanna ar- can affect the structure and species composition of woodlands
eas in addition to the well documented declines in the forest and forests (Wright et al., 2007; Brodie et al., 2009).
biome(Wilkie et al., 2011). For example, wildlife populations
The impacts of illegal hunting can be expected to increase
in northern Central African Republic declined by 65% dur-
in future. As wildlife disappears from many areas outside of
ing 1985-2005, primarily due to illegal hunting and diseases
protected areas, illegal hunters are likely to focus their efforts
transmitted by livestock (Bouché et al., 2010). Wildlife popu-
increasingly on parks networks. With increasing demand
lations in the Comoé National Park in Ivory Coast declined
(due to increasing human populations), and declining sup-
by 60-90% during the 1970s to the late 1990s as a result of
ply, the hunting pressure on remaining wildlife populations is
illegal meat hunting (Fischer and Linsenmair, 2001). Simi-
likely to increase. As wildlife populations decline, sustainable
larly, wildlife populations in Niokolo-Koba NP in Senegal
harvests will decline accordingly and they will become sus-
declined by 60-99% from 1991-2006 (Renaud, 2011).
ceptible to the conservation problems associated with small
Illegal hunters typically target larger species due to the high- population sizes (Caughley and Sinclair, 1994). The scale and
er volumes of meat produced. However, across multiple sites apparent ubiquity of the threat posed by illegal hunting sug-
in East and southern Africa, there is a declining prevalence of gests that without urgent intervention to address the issue,
large-bodied species in bushmeat markets due to over-hunting, wildlife resources will be lost across large areas of the con-
and hunters are having to travel further to acquire the preferred tinent, with severe ecological, economic and social impacts.
species (Barnett, 2002). In Malawi for example, the loss of
most large species has resulted in bushmeat traders relying on
the smaller species that thrive in human-modified landscapes, Spotted hyaena treated after being severely injured by a
such as rodents, birds and insects (Barnett, 1998). snare in Zambia (Photo: M. Becker/R. McRobb).
25
methods
Table 3. Impacts on illegal hunting observed in multiple sites from the literature and a survey of n=12 attendees
at a bushmeat meeting
Batéké Plateau, SE Gabon 1 1 1 Decline in large ungulates, local extinction P. Henschel, un-
of waterbuck, reedbuck, lions & spotted published data
hyaena (due to loss of their prey base)
Private conservancies, SE 1 1 1 Near eradication of wildlife in areas (Lindsey et al.,
Zimbabwe settled during land reform and declin- 2011)
ing populations in adjacent areas, local
extinction of wild dogs in several areas
Gonarezhou National Park, 1 1 1 Wildlife population densities lower in areas H. Van der West-
Zimbabwe adjacent to settlement within the park huizen unpublished
data
Makuleke concession, 1 1 1 On taking over the concession, illegal C. Roche, unpub-
Kruger NP, South Africa hunting had reduced wildlife populations lished data
to the point that a reintroduction of impala
and zebra was deemed necessary to
supplement remaining populations. Lions
were entirely absent from the concession.
Coutada 9, Mozambique 1 1 1 Reduced wildlife densities close to human Lindsey and Bento,
settlements 2012
Five large mammal species have been
extirpated (including endangered African
wild dogs), wildlife densities reduced
by>90%
Niokolo Koba National 1 1 1 Ungulate populations declined by 66- Renaud, 2011
Park, Senegal 97%, reduced densities close to edges,
large species most affected
Kafue National Park, 1 1 0 Reduced wildlife densities close to bound- N. Midlane, unpub-
Zambia aries, high incidence of snaring of large lished data
predators
Luangwa Valley, Up- 1 1 0 Declining populations in areas close to R. McRobb, M.
per and Lower Lupande, human settlements, close to boundary of Becker, D. Lewis
Lumimba and Sandwe park, declining eland, buffalo and puku unpublished data
game management areas, populations, strong edge effects from
Zambia illegal hunting on large carnivores and
herbivores
Hunting concessions near 1 1 0 Declining populations near human settle- K. Collins, unpub-
Okavango, Botswana ments, declining giraffe, impala, wilde- lished data
beest, lechwe populations
Ruaha Game Reserve, 1 1 0 Declining lion population A. Dickman unpub-
Tanzania lished data
26
methods
27
methods
Illegal hunting can significantly undermine the viability in reduction in trophy revenues from Burigi and Biharamulo
of wildlife-based land uses, or even preclude them. Trophy Game Reserves from US$103,100 in 1994 to US$33,670 in
hunting is financial unviable in a significant proportion of 1998 ( Jambiya et al., 2007). Ecotourism operations are likely
hunting blocks in Mozambique (92.3%), Namibia (66.6%), to be even more sensitive to illegal hunting, because the vi-
Zambia (66.6%), Zimbabwe (44.4%) and Tanzania (18.8%), ability of such operations is typically dependent on the pres-
and in most cases the cause is likely the loss of wildlife due to ence of high densities of habituated wildlife (Lindsey et al.,
illegal hunting for bushmeat (Lindsey et al., 2012).In Couta- 2006). For example, in the Makuleke concession of Kruger
da 9 in Mozambique, earnings from trophy hunting are 96% National Park in South Africa, ecotourism operators (and the
lower than what they would be in the absence of illegal hunt- community owners of the land) ran at a loss for the first six
ing (Lindsey and Bento, 2012). In Savé Valley Conservancy, years of operation due to depleted wildlife populations re-
illegal hunting imposed costs of at least US$1.1 million per sulting from illegal hunting (C. Roche, Wilderness Safaris,
year through lost revenues from trophy hunting and the legal pers. comm.). Animals with snare wounds also have potential
sale of meat (Lindsey et al., 2011). Similarly, in Tanzania, il- to create significant negative publicity for tourism companies
legal hunting emanating from refugee camps resulted and wildlife destinations.
28
V. Illegal Hunters, Meat Traders & the Nature of the Trade in Bushmeat
Hunting is an almost exclusively male activity, while wom- angwa Valley in Zambia, meat carriers are employed (all of
en are more likely to do the butchering of the meat (LeBreton whom are male) (Brown, 2007).
et al., 2006; Brown, 2007; Lindsey et al., 2011). In Zimbabwe
Illegal hunting for wildlife appears to operate on a con-
and Central Mozambique, most hunters are in their 20s and
tinuum, from that done to obtain meat for consumption or
30s (Lindsey et al., 2011; Lindsey and Bento, 2012). In many
trade within hunters’ communities, that done partially for
cases, illegal hunters are poor, with low levels of education and
subsistence and partially for trade to local markets, and that
livestock ownership (Loibooki et al., 2002; Nyahongo et al.,
done for trade to local, urban or even international markets
2005; Knapp, 2007; Lindsey et al., 2011; Lindsey and Bento,
(Brashares et al., 2011). In a minority of instances, illegal
2012). In the Serengeti ecosystem however, hunting house-
hunting is practised primarily for sport. For example, ‘taxi
holds are sometimes wealthier than non-hunting households
hunts’ are organised illegally on farms in Kwa-Zulu Natal in
and hunters appear to be those individuals that have the time
South Africa where various hunters set off with dogs to hunt
and opportunity to hunt (Knapp, 2007). In some cases, hunt-
after placing bets on the outcome (Grey-Ross et al., 2010)
ers enjoy elevated social status as a result of their profession
(Table 4). In virtually all cases, illegal hunters use a portion
(Brown, 2007). In the Dande area of Zimbabwe and the Lu-
of their catch for their own consumption and in some areas
angwa Valley of Zambia, hunters are esteemed due to pro-
bushmeat provides a significant contribution to household
viding meat to village leaders and to the capable, elderly, or
female-headed households (Barnett, 2002). In the Serengeti,
women exhibit for a preference for men who hunt (A. Lo-
wassa unpublished data). In areas where the hunting grounds Bushmeat being smoked for transport, Luangwa Valley,
are relatively distant from hunters’ homes, such as in the Lu- Zambia (Photo: R. McRobb/M. Becker)
Illegal hunters, meat traders & the nature of the trade in bushmeat
30
Illegal hunters, meat traders & the nature of the trade in bushmeat
Table 4. The most common reasons for illegal hunting in various savanna sites in Africa
Area Own use Local Commer- For body parts Prestige Sport Source
com- cial trade for traditional of hunting
mercial to urban medicine/cer- /social
trade areas emonies status
Hunting concessions near Oka- 0 1 1 0 0 0 K. Collins, unpublished
vango, Botswana data
31
Illegal hunters, meat traders & the nature of the trade in bushmeat
The relative price of bushmeat duiker Cephalophus natalensis meat quadruples in the lead up
The price of bushmeat is related to the distance of the to Christmas as wealthier consumers prefer bushmeat for the
point of sale from harvestable wildlife populations (Brashares festivities (Barnett, 1998).
et al., 2011). Estimates derived from the literature from indi-
The scale of the bushmeat trade
cated that the price of bushmeat relative to alternative meat
In several countries, the bushmeat trade involves vast quan-
(livestock, and/or poultry and/or fish) was higher in urban
tities of meat and generates significant economic returns. In
areas (1.57±0.16 times higher than the price of alternatives,
Tanzania, for example, a mean of 2,078 tonnes of bushmeat
n=10) than rural areas (bushmeat was 0.72±n=19 the price of
are confiscated annually with a value of >US$50 million (Sec-
alternatives) (F Ratio=17.6, d.f.=1 , p<0.001). In areas where
retariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2011) and
bushmeat is transported 90 km or more from its source, it
in Mozambique 182,000–365,000 tonnes of bushmeat are
costs almost 50% more than fish and chicken (Brashares et
believed to be consumed per year, with an economic value
al., 2011). Correspondingly, illegal hunters in areas closer to
of US$365/730 million per year (Barnett, 1998). Estimates
urban centres sell a greater proportion of their catch than
of bushmeat harvest from Central Africa are even higher:
those in rural areas (Brashares et al., 2011).
Gabon 49,000 tonnes; Central African Republic (59,000);
In keeping with these trends, the basis for preference for Cameroon (234,000); Republic of Congo (189,000) and
game meat appears to vary consistently among rural and ur- Democratic Republic of Congo (1.7 million) (Fa et al., 2003;
ban consumers. Rural consumers typically prefer bushmeat Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2011;
to other proteins because it is cheaper or more available Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2011).
(78.5% of n=19 sites), whereas at urban sites (n=10), selec-
The economic value of the bushmeat trade exceeds that of
tion of bushmeat is invariably (100%) based on preference for
legal forms of wildlife utilization in some countries, including
its taste (x2=8.9, d.f.=1, p=0.003). Rural users of bushmeat
Mozambique and Tanzania (Barnett, 1998). However, com-
are frequently food-insecure with high rates of malnutrition,
parisons with the scale of legal forms of wildlife use are not
whereas urban users tend to be wealthier and view bushmeat
particularly meaningful. First, the illegal bushmeat trade is
as a luxury good superior to fish or meat from domestic ani-
not sustainable in many areas and so estimates of the scale
mals (Barnett, 2002). In Maputo for example, the price of red
of the industry represent snapshots reflecting the state of
wildlife populations at a given moment in time. Second, legal
forms of wildlife-use are extremely under-developed in many
countries and if harnessed fully via tourism, trophy hunting,
legal meat sales could potentially far exceed the value of ille-
gal trade. In Central Africa, for example, the value of the ille-
gal bushmeat trade has been estimated at US42-205 million/
year (Davies, 2002) whereas in South Africa and Namibia
where legal wildlife-based land uses are well developed, the
game ranching industry on private land turns over US$912
million and US$166 annually, respectively, in addition to the
significant earnings from wildlife on state and communal
land (G. Dry Wildlife Ranching South Africa pers. comm;
Barnes et al., 2010). In addition, unlike earnings from the
illegal bushmeat trade, revenue generated from legal wildlife-
based land uses is completely sustainable. However, insights
into the scale of the bushmeat trade do demonstrate the scale
Child selling dried bushmeat on a roadside in central of the threat and the challenge posed in terms of the need
Mozambique (Photo: C. Bento) for developing sustainable alternative livelihood options and
protein supplies for the people involved.
32
VI. Key Drivers of Illegal Hunting & the Bushmeat Trade
Human populations are growing faster in Africa than in any other continent (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Population_
growth#Growth_by_country, accessed May 2012), and population growth in areas close to protected areas is occurring faster
than elsewhere (Wittemyer et al., 2008). Many communities have a long tradition of hunting and of consuming bushmeat, and
levels of off-take have simply increased with increasing human populations, with the effect that even traditional forms of hunt-
ing can impart severe negative impacts on wildlife populations. For example, human densities in the areas adjacent to Serengeti
NP are some of the highest in Tanzania, and populations are increasing by 3.5% per year, in an area where mean household
bushmeat consumption is 2 kg/week, resulting in a steep increase in demand for bushmeat (D. Rentsch unpublished data).
The populations of African cities are increasing rapidly, and as a result, there is a growing demand for bushmeat from ur-
ban centres (Bloom et al., 2008). Bushmeat typically comprises a small proportion of the protein consumed by urban societies
(e.g. 2% in Gabon), but the large populations involved mean that demand for the commodity is significant (Wilkie et al.,
2011). Demand for bushmeat is also increasing beyond the borders of Africa, with increasing African populations in many
international cities. There are significant inflows of bushmeat into Europe (e.g. five tonnes per week into Paris) and the US,
for example, where the product is sold for significantly elevated prices (Chaber et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2012).
Increasing demand for bushmeat from rural populations, urban centres in African and international cities is driving elevated
prices increased commercialization of illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade (Stiles, 2011; Wilkie et al., 2011). These trends are
causing erosion of traditional hunting seasons, ignoring of traditional taboos (which previously caused some species to be left,
such as giraffe Giraffa camelopardalis, hippopotamus and zebra Equus quagga in the Luangwa Valley, and elephant, hippopota-
mus, warthog Phacochoerus africanus and bush pig Potamochoerus larvatus in Niassa Reserve, and the discarding of traditional
hunting methods in favour of more effective techniques, placing further pressure on wildlife populations (Barnett, 2002). For
example, the Masaai and Samburu in Kenya traditionally eschewed hunting and the consumption of bushmeat due to cultural
taboos, but have recently started to utilize the resource (Barnett, 1998).
Key drivers of illegal hunting & the bushmeat trade
Increasing human populations are resulting in increased encroachment of wildlife areas and elevated pressure on natural
resources (Kiringe et al., 2007). Several categories of protected areas in Tanzania and Ethiopia are partially settled, as are the
game management areas in Zambia. In Mozambique, communities settled many parks and hunting blocks during and after
the civil war (Hatton et al., 2001) and steep human population increases are being observed in Niassa National Reserve (C.
Begg unpublished data). In Zimbabwe, a large number of private wildlife-ranches and conservancies and part of Gonarezhou
National Park were settled in the early 2000s during land reform (Lindsey et al., 2011). In some cases, the settlement of wildlife
areas has been facilitated by efforts to control tsetse fly Glossina spp. (Muriuki et al., 2005).
The frequency of illegal hunting declines with distance from human settlements (Hofer et al., 1996; Muchaal and Ngandjui,
1999; Lindsey et al., 2011). Similarly, the rate of bushmeat consumption falls with distance of human settlements from wildlife
populations, and drops steeply from ~30 km (Brashares et al., 2011). As a result of these (and other impacts), human encroach-
ment of protected areas typically imparts negative ecological impacts and wildlife populations fare better in parks where human
settlement is not permitted (Stoner et al., 2007).
Human encroachment is often greatly exacerbated by poorly planned infrastructure such as roads, clinics, schools and bore-
holes in or close to wildlife areas. Though such developments are well-intentioned, they tend to result in influxes of people into
areas that are poorly suited to human settlement, which creates dependency on exploitation of natural resources such as wildlife
for survival. In addition, forestry and mining, which are often practised in wildlife areas and can dramatically increase the vul-
nerability of wildlife to illegal hunting due to the opening of roads and the associated influx of job seekers and their families
(Clark et al., 2009; Poulsen et al., 2009). For example, a major spike in illegal hunting was observed in parks in the Democratic
Republic of Congo following an influx of people to mine coltan (Hayes and Burge, 2003). In some cases, logging companies
perceive bushmeat as a free commodity with which to supplement workers’ income (Wilkie et al., 2011). The development of
industrial logging in the Republic of Congo, for example, led to a 69% increase in the population of nearby towns and a 64%
increase in bushmeat supply, the majority of which accrued to immigrant populations rather than indigenous peoples with a
long-standing and legitimate claim to the wildlife resource (Poulsen et al., 2009). While roads are unlikely to have the same
impact in savanna areas (which are less impenetrable than forests), they are nonetheless likely to improve access to wildlife
populations and decrease the costs and difficulty associated with trading bushmeat and drive an increase in illegal hunting. For
example, in Zambia, it is feared that the Chipata-Mfuwe road will increase access and ease of transport of bushmeat from the
Luangwa valley to urban centres (R.McRobb/M. Becker, unpublished data).
34
Key drivers of illegal hunting & the bushmeat trade
Table 5. Drivers for illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade in the savanna biome (NB that where information was extracted
from literature, the lack of mention of some drivers does not necessarily mean those drivers are not in play in the areas included in the table)
K. Collins, unpublished data; 2 P.Henschel, unpublished data; 3 Fitzgibbon et al., 1995; 4 Saru, 2012; 5Fusari and Carpaneto, 2006 ; 6Lindsey and Bento, 2012 7 C. Roche, unpublished; 8Warchol and Johnson, 2009;
Grey-Ross et al. 2010; 10 Haule et al., 2002; 11 A. Dickman, pers. comm.; 12 Hofer 2000, Barnett 2002, Ndibalema & Songorwa 2002, Nyahongo et al. 2005, Marealle 2010; 13 Nielsen, 2006; 14Wilfred and MacColl, 2010;
Inad- Protein Illegal Poverty/ Weak Corrupt Human Livestock Lack of
equate short- hunting is lack of penal game influxes/ held as benefits
enforce- ages a money alterna- systems scouts/ popula- assets/ from
ment making tive live- employ- tion lack of wildlife
opportu- lihoods/ ees increase livestock
nity employ-
ment
Hunting concessions near 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
15Carpaneto and Fusari, 2000; 16Jambiya et al., 2007; 17 N. Midlane, unpublished data; 18 D. Lewis, R. McRobb, M. Becker unpublished data; 19 Lindsey et al., 2012; 20Gandiwa, 2011
Okavango, Botswana 1
WAP complex, Benin, 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
Burkina Faso, Niger2
Comoé NP, Ivory coast3 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0
Batéké Plateau, SE Gabon 3
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Sokoke Forest, Kenya 3
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Protected areas in Kenya4 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
Gile Game Reserve, Mozam- 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
bique5
Coutada 9, Mozambique6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Niassa Reserve. Mozambique 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Makuleke concession, RSA 7
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
Various reserves, RSA8 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Private farms, Kwa-Zulu 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Natal, RSA9
Kilombero, Tanzania10 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Ruaha National Park, Tan- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
zania11
Serengeti National Park, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tanzania12
Udzungwa Mountains, 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Tanzania13
Ugalla Game Reserve, 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Tanzania14
Urumwa Forest Reserve, 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tanzania15
North western Tanzania16 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0
Kafue National Park, Zam- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
bia17
Luangwa Valley & adjacent 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
Game Management Areas 18
Save Valley Conservancy, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Zimbabwe19
Gonarezhou National Park, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Zimbabwe20
Average 0.87 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.65 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.43
1
9
35
Key drivers of illegal hunting & the bushmeat trade
In many rural parts of Africa, the opportunities for formal employment are limited and communities are characterized by
high levels of unemployment and poverty (Brown, 2007).The urgent need for money for basic necessities, combined with the
availability of free time and the quick cash income that can be made from selling bushmeat creates a key driver for illegal
hunting (Table 5). In rural Zambia, for example, some hunters are able to earn nearly US$100 from a single expedition, which
approaches the local per capita annual income of US$120, and hunters are among the wealthiest community members (Brown,
2007). Unemployment also provides individuals with ample time to spend hunting illegally and correspondingly, rates of hunt-
ing and household bushmeat consumption decline sharply during times of peak agricultural activity (Knapp, 2007; Brashares et
al., 2011). Individuals with low (or seasonal) employment allocate a greater period of time to hunting than those with full time
jobs (Brashares et al., 2011).
Consumers in areas close to wildlife populations are frequently driven to eat bushmeat due to the lack of alternative protein
sources (Foerster et al., 2012) (Table 5). Shortages of carbohydrates also contribute to illegal hunting, as the meat obtained is of-
ten traded for grain or used to generate cash for buying food (Lindsey et al., 2011). Lands where wildlife persists are frequently
poorly suited to agriculture and low levels of food security are prevalent. For example, in South East Zimbabwe, 93.8% of il-
legal hunters were forced to skip meals during the last year due to food shortages (Lindsey et al., 2011). Reliance on bushmeat
is exacerbated in some areas by an absence of livestock due to the presence of tsetse fly (e.g. Central Mozambique (Lindsey
and Bento, 2012)), due to diseases which reduce the productivity of livestock (e.g. Newcastle disease which infects 60% of the
chicken (Gallus domesticus) population (Lewis, 2005). Where livestock are present, communities often retain cattle and other
domestic animals as capital and cultural assets and use bushmeat to fulfil their daily protein needs (Barnett, 1998).
As a consequence of these factors, bushmeat forms a key component of the diets of communities in many areas and contrib-
utes significantly to food security (Nyahongo et al., 2005). In Central Africa, hunting provides 30-80% of protein intakes of
rural communities and almost 100% of animal proteins (Nasi et al., 2008), and around the Serengeti, bushmeat constitutes 31%
of all meat consumed due to the ready availability of the commodity (D. Rentsch, unpublished data). However, due to declining
wildlife populations the contribution of bushmeat to food security is likely to be unsustainable.
36
Key drivers of illegal hunting & the bushmeat trade
In many countries, the gazetted punishments for poaching provide inadequate deterrents and do not reflect the value of the re-
source being destroyed (Barnett, 1998). Penalties often include small fines (often of lower value than the meat obtained), community
service or warnings (Barnett, 2002; Demeke, 2003). For example, of the 64 suspects arrested for illegal hunting in the NG26 conces-
sion in northern Botswana during the last 30 months, none have been convicted (Collins, 2012). In central Mozambique, by contrast,
illegal hunters are granted large (US$485) fines, which are rarely collected (Lindsey and Bento, 2012). Due to a lack of record keep-
ing, magistrates often fail to take into account the criminal history of illegal hunters, with the effect that first time and repeat offend-
ers often receive similarly weak punishments (V. Opyene, unpublished data). Wildlife laws are not harmonized among neighbouring
countries, which can create loopholes for illegal hunters. For example, the penalties for illegal hunting in Kenya are lighter than
those in neighbouring Tanzania, encouraging hunters from Tanzania to operate across the border (V. Opyene, unpublished data).
Wildlife offences are typically granted lower priority than those involving livestock, which has impacts upon the development of
legal wildlife-based land uses. In Zimbabwe, for example, convicted stock thieves are granted six years imprisonment for the theft of
a goat worth US$20-30, whereas a poacher convicted of killing a sable antelope worth US$16,000 would be granted a nominal fine,
or community service or released with a warning (Lindsey et al., 2011). In Zambia, the penal system with regards to wildlife works
on a maximum sentence but does not allow for a minimum penalty, with the effect that magistrates have the discretion to allocate
vastly disparate punishments to illegal hunters based on their personal attitudes (R. McRobb, unpublished data).
Wildlife laws are often not complied with voluntarily (Rowcliffe et al., 2004) and law enforcement in the form of anti-poaching
and measures to prohibit the transport and sale of illegal bushmeat are essential to control illegal hunting. However, in many coun-
tries, state wildlife agencies lack the resources, expertise and political will necessary ( Jachmann, 2008b; Wilkie et al., 2011) and
poor law enforcement is the most frequently cited driver of illegal hunting in savanna areas (Table 5).
Budgets for park managements vary widely, from US$1.8/km2 in Mozambique, US$27/km2 in Botswana, US$110/km2 in
Namibia and $265/km2 in South Africa (Manousrian and Dudley, 2008) and many protected areas lack the manpower, equip-
ment and vehicles necessary to control illegal hunting (Holmern et al., 2007). During the 1990s in Tanzania, for example, a
force of 1,438 personnel was employed to protect 186,000 km2 of protected areas and one vehicle was available to wildlife
staff per district (Masilingi, 1996). Consequently, illegal hunters operate with impunity in many areas. In the Serengeti NP for
example, <1% of illegal hunters are apprehended by scouts (Loibooki et al., 2002). Similarly, in Ethiopia, the density of scouts
in Omo National park was reduced from 1/152 km2 in the 1970s to 1/370 km2 in 2002 due to waning operational budgets
(Demeke, 2003). In some cases, anti-poaching security is simply overwhelmed by the scale of the threat. For example, follow-
ing establishment of refugee camps in North West Tanzania in the mid-1990s, ~9,600 poachers were arrested in a two month
period, 7,480 of whom escaped from custody ( Jambiya et al., 2007).
The efficacy of anti-poaching is further undermined in many areas by poor morale resulting from low salaries, lack of equip-
ment and lack of supervision (Lindsey et al., 2011). Corruption can also reduce the effectiveness of wildlife law enforcement.
Scouts are sometimes bribed by illegal hunters to turn a blind eye, and scouts themselves sometimes hunt illegally in areas they
are deployed to protect (Lindsey et al., 2011). Authorities are often hesitant to prosecute offenders connected to anyone in gov-
ernment (including traditional leaders and their advisors). In some cases, government employees/officials are actively involved
in illegal hunting or the bushmeat trade. For example in Central Mozambique, police and local government officials are known
to buy bushmeat from illegal hunters, creating a clear conflict of interest which contributes to low conviction rates (Lindsey
and Bento, 2012). In Central Africa, government officials pay poachers to hunt elephants for ivory, who then sell the meat as a
lucrative side-product (Stiles, 2011).
37
Key drivers of illegal hunting & the bushmeat trade
In many countries, communities lack clear rights over their land or the wildlife that they live with. In such areas illegal
hunting is often the only means through which communities can access benefits from wildlife. In some places, efforts have
been made to remedy this situation through the development of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM)
programmes through the devolution of user-rights over wildlife to communities. However, in most cases (such as in Botswana,
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) devolution is only partial, with the effect that government retains significant proportions
of revenue from wildlife (Suich et al., 2009). As a consequence, wildlife-based land uses are greatly disadvantaged relative to
alternatives, and the incentives for conservation are weak (Suich et al., 2009).
Communities are also often marginalized from the benefits derived from wildlife in protected areas (or private reserves),
which creates strained relations with the wildlife sector (Newmark et al., 1993). In some cases, such relations are worsened by
human wildlife conflict, heavy-handed anti-poaching and historical grievances over the loss of land. In such instances, illegal
hunting may be practised as a form of protest (Holmes, 2007).
Illegal hunting for bushmeat typically increases in prevalence during periods of political instability and poor governance. In
Mozambique, for example, wildlife populations were decimated through unregulated hunting during and after the civil war
(Hatton et al., 2001) and in Zimbabwe, wildlife populations on many wildlife ranches were decimated following settlement
during land reform and the associated breakdown in wildlife law enforcement (Lindsey et al., 2011). In North West Tanzania,
the placement of refugee camps close to wildlife areas resulted in major spike in illegal hunting and significant reductions in
wildlife populations ( Jambiya et al., 2007). In Garamba NP in Democratic Republic of Congo, bushmeat hunting increased
fivefold during periods of armed conflict (de Merode et al., 2007). In northern Central African Republic, political instability
experienced during 2002-2010 hastened the loss of wildlife due to illegal hunting for meat (Bouché et al., In press). In Liuwa
Plain National Park in Zambia, civil strife in neighbouring Angola caused a major increase in illegal hunting and severe impacts
on wildlife populations (M. Becker, unpublished data).
38
Key drivers of illegal hunting & the bushmeat trade
In some instances, demand for body parts for traditional medicines and cultural practises is a driver for illegal hunting. The
additional value that can be attained from selling body parts for medicinal or ceremonial purposes likely enhances the profitabil-
ity of bushmeat hunting in many cases. In Kilombero in Tanzania, parts of wild animals are used for medicine, making drums
and a variety of other ritual and cultural purposes (Haule et al., 2002). A large haul of genet Genetta spp. skins were seized in
northern Kruger National Park in South Africa in 2006 that were hunted to supply demand for skins for ceremonial dress (C.
Roche, pers. comm.). In KZN in South Africa there is a significant trade in leopard skins for cultural and religious dress (Lind-
sey, 2010b). In Mozambique, hunters obtain US$83-$150 for leopard skins in Niassa Reserve, and as much as US$2,500 in
Lichinga town (C. Begg, unpublished data). In Niassa, Ruaha National Park and Mun-ya-wana lion carcasses have been found
with body parts removed C. Begg, A. Dickman, J. Mattheus, unpublished data).
Controlling illegal hunting is made difficult in some areas due to the abundance of wire which can be used to make snares.
In Zambia, the electricity supply corporation, in an effort to increase the extent of the national grid, has greatly increased the
amount of wire in rural areas and >60% of snares recovered by the South Luangwa Conservation Society is made from such
wire (M. Becker/R. McRobb, unpublished data). In many cases bundles of wire are left unprotected and are stolen by illegal
hunters for snare material. Fencing provides a key supply of snare material in some areas. In Savé Valley Conservancy, for ex-
ample, most of the >84,000 snares removed during 2002-2009 were made from wire from the perimeter fence (Lindsey et al.,
2012). Similarly, at Pafuri in the Makuleke concession, cable from the dilapidated western boundary fence was frequently stolen
by illegal hunters to make snares to capture hippo and buffalo (C. Roche, unpublished data). In Niassa Reserve, where wire is
scarce, a spike in snaring was noted after an NGO erected fences around villages to reduce human-elephant conflict (C. Begg
unpublished data). Similar problems have been experienced with NGO-sponsored fencing projects in Zambia (R. McRobb,
unpublished data). In areas where wire is largely absent, illegal hunters are forced to rely on methods that are easier to control.
In Coutada 9 in Mozambique for example, illegal hunters use steel gin traps which are costly to replace if confiscated by anti-
poaching scouts (Lindsey and Bento, 2012).
39
VII. Potential Solutions to Illegal Hunting,
Bushmeat Trade & Associated Challenges
Human population growth represents a politically sensitive topic and one that conservation agencies appear reluctant to address.
However, frank discussion of the issue of high levels of human population growth within and near to protected areas is required,
because if current trends continue, other interventions to address illegal hunting the bushmeat trade are much less likely to succeed.
Due to the clear relationship between proximity of human settlement with wildlife and levels of illegal hunting, creating dis-
tance or minimizing the interface between people and wildlife is a key means of reducing illegal hunting (Lindsey et al., 2011).
Several options are available. The development and maintenance of large protected areas is important as there is a clear positive
relationship between reserve size and the retention of wildlife diversity (Newmark, 2008). The effective size of protected areas
can be increased in some cases through creating links between parks in neighbouring countries via the creation of transfrontier
protected areas (Newmark, 2008). The creation of buffer zones surrounding parks can also help conserve critical habitats and re-
duce edge-effects (Stokes et al., 2010). Buffer zones can be created either through gazetting of semi-protected areas, or through
the promotion of wildlife-based land uses in land adjacent to parks. In countries where human settlement in protected areas is
prohibited, continued prevention of human incursion is of key importance to limit illegal hunting. Furthermore, movement of
people through and within parks should be controlled, as livestock grazing and resource collection is often used as a cover for
illegal hunting (Lindsey and Bento, 2012); H. van der Westhuizen unpublished data).
Fencing has a potentially important role in land use plan- Challenges associated with land use
ning and in controlling illegal hunting. For example, a fence planning approaches
was recently constructed to contain human encroachment Zoning is likely to be a costly and time consuming exercise
and movement within Gonarezhou National Park in Zim- which is only likely to be effective if local support is achieved
babwe (after ~40 km2 was settled in 2000) (H. van der Wes- (Naughton-Treves et al., 2005). In areas where either wild-
thuizen, unpublished data). Fencing can be used to reduce life or people are dependent on seasonal migration to exploit
edge-effects in small habitat fragments and can reduce illegal natural resources the applicability of zoning approaches is
hunting both by reducing wildlife movement out of protected likely to be limited (Goldman, 2003). Interventions based on
areas and limiting human incursion into parks (Lindsey et fencing are clearly not appropriate for all scenarios as fences
al., 2012). Fences can be important in clearly demarcating a can have major ecological impacts by blocking migrations
protected area and emphasizing the illegality of entering and and reducing movements of wildlife to access patchy primary
hunting therein (Hayward, 2012). Fences can also assist anti- productivity (Lindsey et al., 2012). In addition, inappropri-
poaching security as patrols around the cleared ground main- ately designed fences can create virtually limitless supplies of
tained within fence lines can reveal whether illegal hunters snare-wire and fences are extremely costly to erect and main-
have moved into a park (Lindsey et al., 2012). Finally, by re- tain (Lindsey et al., 2011; Hayward, 2012). In cases where
ducing human-wildlife conflict, fencing has potential to im- budgets are inadequate to maintain fencing properly, the as-
prove the relations between the wildlife-sector and adjacent sociated disadvantages are likely to exceed the benefits.
communities (Lindsey et al., 2012).
Other land uses that occur within and near to wildlife ar-
eas, such as forestry and mining need to be managed care-
fully to ensure that their development does not lead to an
increase in illegal hunting. When allocating forestry rights,
for example, governments should ensure that concessions are
large, contain patches of unlogged forest and include forest
with different logging histories (Clark et al., 2009). When
allocating mining rights in wildlife areas, care is required to
prevent an unregulated influx of people. Finally, care is re-
quired with the establishment of refugee camps to ensure that
they are not located within or near to wildlife areas ( Jambiya
et al., 2007).
41
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
The provision of alternative income sources or employment is a potentially important step for reducing reliance of communi-
ties on exploiting wildlife for survival and as a means of generating cash income.
42
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
the tourism industry who have cash incomes (R. McRobb, Illegal hunting provides a means to acquire an immediate
unpublished data). cash income with little investment. By contrast, alternative
livelihood options often require significant investments of
A meta-analysis of the relationship between wealth and time and capital. Consequently, bushmeat is likely to contin-
bushmeat consumption indicated that the poorest house- ue to represent an attractive option, particularly during times
holds in rural areas consistently consume the most bushmeat, of financial hardship. Alternative livelihood approaches may
whereas wealthier households show higher rates of consump- have more potential in areas where wildlife populations are
tion in urban settings (Brashares et al., 2011). This finding depleted and the ‘costs’ associated with obtaining bushmeat
stresses the potential importance of developing alternative are high, relative to areas where wildlife is abundant and
incomes for the poorest households in areas adjacent to pro- bushmeat is inexpensive to harvest (Van Vliet, 2011).
tected areas. However, because of the tendency for bushmeat
to increase with increasing wealth within sites, support for • Risk of population influx into the area
alternative income projects could be linked to measures of Finally, there is a risk that if development projects are suc-
illegal hunting, and should be combined with increased law cessful, there may be an influx of people into the area, plac-
enforcement and anti-poaching. ing further pressure on wildlife resources and habitat. Market
forces may encourage farmers to develop larger, commercial-
• Limited evidence of success ized operations with associated negative environmental ex-
There is a paucity of data on the social, economic and en- ternalities. Such concerns are particularly valid for land that
vironmental impacts of alternative livelihood projects on lev- is designated primarily for wildlife production, such as game
els of illegal hunting (Van Vliet, 2011). ICDPS have been management areas in Zambia, coutadas in Mozambique or
criticised due to the lack of evidence that they succeeded in game controlled and open areas in Tanzania.
improving livelihoods or in conferring conservation gains
(Naughton-Treves et al., 2005).
43
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
Providing alternative supplies of protein represents a potentially key step for reducing reliance of food insecure communities
on bushmeat, and several possible options exist:
44
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
Legal supplies of game meat sidered acceptable replacements for bushmeat due to cultural
The legal production of game meat has significant potential to preferences. Understanding the bases for meat preferences in a
replace bushmeat obtained from illegal hunting. This potential is given area is an important precursor to any efforts to develop
discussed further in the section on wildlife-based land uses. alternative protein supplies (Van Vliet, 2011). In Savé Valley
Conservancy for example, a challenge associated with efforts
Supplying alternative protein sources to labour forces to replace illegal supplies of bushmeat with elephant meat
In areas where commercial activities such as ranching, log- arose when it became apparent that some bushmeat consumers
ging or mining occur in areas with wildlife, efforts to supply would not eat meat from that species (Lindsey et al., 2011).
employees with protein can be an important means of reduc-
ing the extent of illegal hunting (Poulsen et al., 2009). • Challenges associated with the production of indigenous species
Efforts at intensive breeding of such species have had limited
Challenges with solutions based on alternative protein
success (Bowen-Jones and Pendry, 1999). There are a number
supplies
of key constraints which undermine the effectiveness of the ap-
• Price differentials between bushmeat and alternatives proach as a means for reducing reliance on bushmeat: the farm-
Promoting the use of alternative supplies of protein is ex- ing of indigenous mammals requires significant capital invest-
tremely challenging in areas where the price of bushmeat is ment and specialist expertise; hunting is often an easier option;
lower than alternatives. In most rural sites, and particularly farming of cane rats is generally not viable in areas where the
those where wildlife is abundant, bushmeat is cheaper than species persists in the wild; productivity sometimes suffers from
alternatives and is thus likely to remain attractive to buyers re- outbreaks of rat-transmitted diseases among cane rat stock; and,
gardless of the availability of alternatives. Producing meat from developing breeding programmes involving indigenous species
domestic animals at a price equivalent or cheaper than bush- requires supportive legal and policy frameworks, the develop-
meat in areas with abundant wildlife is likely to be challenging. ment of a legal market and extension services to support farm-
ers, all of which are currently lacking (Van Vliet, 2011).
• Risk that alternative protein sources will be used to augment
bushmeat • Environmental problems associated with livestock production
A key challenge associated with interventions based in Increased livestock production can create environmental prob-
generating alternative protein is that there is no guarantee lems such as erosion due to overgrazing and competition with
that bushmeat would not simply be exploited as an additional wild herbivores. Some domestic species, such as pigs Sus scrofa
source of money and food. In the Serengeti ecosystem, for ex- have potential to be invasive if allowed to form feral populations,
ample, livestock ownership is a poor predictor of bushmeat use and pose a significant environmental threat (Van Vliet, 2011).
and a vaccination programme for chickens actually resulted
in a slight increase in bushmeat usage due to increased cash • Problems associated with aquaculture
income for the households involved (D. Rentsch unpublished The development of aquaculture requires start-up capital and
data). Livestock is often used as a capital asset and chickens expertise which may act as barriers to entry for communities in
are commonly used for commercial trade rather than for home the absence of protracted technical and donor support. There are
consumption (Barnett, 1998). In Gabon, the price of chicken a variety of potential environmental problems with aquaculture,
and fish is a poor predictor of bushmeat use, possibly due to the including the risk of introducing exotic invasive species (such as
relative shortage of those commodities (Foerster et al., 2012). the molluscs introduced to South Africa), the reliance of aqua-
culture on fish meal (which requires harvest of wild stock), the
As a result of these challenges, projects to generate alter-
potential for pollution and risk of introducing parasites to wild
native protein supplies must be combined with other inter-
stock, and habitat conversion (Ronnback et al., 2002). However,
ventions such as enforcement and the development of legal
there is some debate concerning the negative impacts of aqua-
means for communities to benefit from wildlife.
culture and many such impacts can be reduced through proper
management (Tidwell and Allen, 2001; Ronnback et al., 2002).
• Cultural preferences for particular types of meat
In some cases, meat from domestic sources may not be con-
45
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
The effectiveness of efforts to replace bushmeat consumption with alternative protein supplies may be increased by inter-
ventions designed to increase the price and/or reduce the supply of the former. In rural areas, bushmeat is typically preferred
because of its availability and cheapness (Barnett, 1998), and so undermining those qualities could reduce consumption. The
supply (and thus the price) of bushmeat could be curtailed by providing hunters with alternative livelihood options, through
elevated anti-poaching efforts and through imposing controls on the transport of bushmeat. In urban areas where preference
for bushmeat is driven primarily by taste, key interventions are likely to be providing legal and sustainable supply of game meat
while increasing the price of illegal bushmeat through controls on supply of the commodity.
46
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
Illegal hunting is an inefficient form of utilization of a are in place in Zambia and Tanzania (Barnett, 2002). How-
wildlife resource due to high levels of wastage, high impacts ever, there are problems associated with citizen hunting and
on populations due to the lack of gender/age selectivity of the the systems in place are widely abused. Citizen licenses are
harvest, the failure to capture the tourism, trophy or existence heavily subsidized: in Tanzania in 2002, citizen licenses for a
values of the animals killed, and due to the low prices often ob- buffalo were US$10, compared to a meat value of S$211, en-
tained for bushmeat. In Zimbabwe for example, illegal hunters couraging over-use (Barnett, 2002). In addition, the citizens
capture <1% of the wildlife resource that they destroy (Lindsey benefitting from resident hunting licenses are often not the
et al., 2012). Through efficient, regulated and selective harvest, people living with the resource, thus creating weak incentives
legal cropping of wildlife can potentially produce significant for conservation (Lindsey et al., 2007). Finally, resident hunt-
quantities of meat on a sustainable basis. Many African un- ing generates a fraction of the income possible from more
gulates are polygynous and focussing harvest on males in such lucrative forms of wildlife use, such as trophy hunting or eco-
species can yield large quantities of meat with negligible popu- tourism. Consequently, citizen hunting as currently practised
lation impacts. Legal production of meat can also result in the is probably not an advisable form of wildlife-based land use.
production of a fresher, more hygienic, safer product with lower
Wildlife-ranching on private land
risks of zoonotic diseases such as brucellosis, and less wastage
In several southern African countries, the user-rights over
due to spoiling (Lindsey and Tambling, 2009; Alexander et al.,
2012). Furthermore, legal game meat supplies could be used to wildlife were devolved to private land owners during the
provide buyers with meat from known and preferred species, 1960s and 1970s resulting in the rapid growth of wildlife-
avoiding the risk of being lied to about the identity of the spe- based land uses (WBLU) across large areas (Bond et al.,
cies being sold which often happens during transactions with 2004). For example, WBLU are practised across ~287,000
illegal hunters (Lindsey et al., 2011)) km2 of private land in Namibia, 200,000 km2 in South Africa
and 27,000 km2 in Zimbabwe (prior to land reform, which
Broad-based wildlife-based land uses have potential to cap- began in 2000), and smaller (but expanding) areas of land
ture a much more diverse set of values from wildlife than that are used for wildlife-ranching in Botswana, Zambia and Mo-
derived solely from meat. The potential for generating income zambique (Bond et al., 2004; National Agricultural Market-
from trophy hunting, ecotourism and the sale of by-products ing Council, 2006; Lindsey et al., In press). Wildlife is used
such as skins and meat is the reason why wildlife-based land consumptively on a significant scale on these ranches, result-
uses have outcompeted livestock production across large areas ing in the production of large quantities of game meat. In
of private land in semi-arid parts of southern Africa (Child, Namibia, for example, 16-26 million kilograms of game meat
2000). Tourism and trophy hunting decouples income from are produced annually on private wildlife ranches, 96-97% of
grass production, enabling wildlife-based land uses to provide which remains within the country (Lindsey et al., In press).
consistent returns in the variable rainfall regimes that charac- In Zimbabwe, 2.4 million kilograms of game meat were pro-
terize much of the savanna biome (Bond et al., 2004). duced on game ranches prior to land reform (Le Bel et al.,
2004). In South Africa, game meat may contribute as much
There are a number of contexts in which wildlife-based land
as 10% of total meat consumption during the hunting season
uses are, or can be, used to replace illegal supplies of bushmeat
(Dry 2010). These meat harvests have been achieved sustain-
and thus be used as a tool to address illegal hunting:
ably and wildlife populations on private land in Zimbabwe
Citizen hunting (before land reform), Namibia and South Africa have in-
Several countries make provision for hunting by provid- creased dramatically (Bond et al., 2004). In Namibia, for ex-
ing (generally inexpensive) citizen hunting licenses. Approxi- ample 1.8-2.8 million wild ungulates occur on freehold farms
mately 1,400 tonnes of game meat are produced from resi- (Lindsey et al., In press).
dent hunting in Botswana, for example, and similar systems
47
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
Significant potential exists for wildlife ranches to fulfil de- recovering dramatically. For example, in Kunene since 1982,
mand for bushmeat both in urban and rural areas if the prod- populations of springbok Antidorcas marsupialis have in-
uct is channelled to the appropriate markets. There is scope creased from <1,000 to >93,000, Hartmann’s mountain zebra
for the export of game meat from countries with large areas Equus zebra have increased from <1,000 to >27,000, black
of private land and significant legal game meat supplies (such rhinos have tripled in number and the lion population has
as South Africa and Namibia) to countries with high de- increased from 20 (in 1995) to 130 (R. Diggle, unpublished
mand and low legal supplies (such as Zambia, Mozambique, data). In Ankasa in Ghana, the devolution of user-rights over
and Tanzania). In countries with relatively little private land, wildlife to communities has resulted in a massive reduction in
governments could encourage the development of wildlife- illegal hunting and increasing wildlife populations (M. Mur-
based land uses on state land by allocating long term leases phree unpublished data).
and commercial user rights to private investors and/or com-
There are a number of key advantages associated with the
munities. Such developments could even occur in areas where
devolution user-rights and decision-making authority over
wildlife populations are depleted, so long as governments
wildlife to communities, including (M. Murphree, C. Weaver,
provide the necessary support in the form of permissions and
pers. comm.):
source animals for wildlife reintroductions.
• Allows people to have legal rights, access to and utilisa-
Wildlife-based land uses on communal land
tion of wildlife.
Significant potential exists for the development of wildlife-
based land uses and for the generation of game meat on com- • Allows wildlife-based land uses to compete with alter-
munal lands in the savanna biome. A vital precursor for this is native land uses, thus reducing pressure for land conver-
to create the necessary legal framework to allow communities sion.
(and would-be illegal hunters) to capture the value of wildlife • Allows diversification of income sources for communities.
legally and sustainably. Such legal frameworks should involve • Can help prevent external hunting pressure by com-
the devolution of user-rights over wildlife to communities. munity members controlling the access of outsiders to
A variety of CBNRM programmes have been developed wildlife.
• Supports law enforcement by enabling communities to
in southern Africa, including in Zimbabwe (CAMPFIRE),
enforce laws.
Zambia (ADMADE), Mozambique and Namibia (the con-
• Can create synergies with agricultural and/or other land
servancy programme) (Suich et al., 2009). The most success-
ful programme is that in Namibia, where a combination of uses.
• Communities feel their rights and structures have been
the relatively complete devolution of user-rights over wild-
formally recognised.
life to communities, adequate technical and funding support
and conducive climatic and human density conditions have • External bodies have a legitimate partner and structure
resulted in the development of 76 communal land conser- to negotiate with and act through.
vancies covering ~150,000 km2 (http://www.nacso.org.na/ • Can improve local governance and accountability.
• Can strengthen local identities.
SOC_profiles/Namibia’s%20Communal%20Conservancies.
• Can provide previously marginalized communities with
pdf, accessed June 2012). Tourism and trophy hunting gener-
a voice.
ated US$14.7 million and US$11.7 million in Namibian con-
• Can help strengthen community claims to their land.
servancies in 2010 and resulted in the creation of 1,350 full
• Devolution should enable a stronger cooperation
time and 1,500 part time jobs (R. Diggle, unpublished data).
between land use and conservation, with new partners
At least 315,000 kg of game meat were produced in Namib-
where they exist.
ian conservancies in 2010, resulting in significant quantities
accruing to participating households (e.g. 90-120 kg/house- A second model that has been pursued in some commu-
hold/year in Nyae Nyae and Bwabwata) (R. Diggle unpub- nity areas has been the development of legal wildlife-crop-
lished data). In response to the development of conservancies, ping programmes in an attempt to replace illegal hunting
wildlife populations that were previously declining steeply are with regulated legal harvest. For example, a communal game
48
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
ranch in Guruve in Zimbabwe produced five tonnes of meat neighbouring communities (Newmark et al., 1993). Such
in 2004 (Le Bel et al., 2004) and a wildlife harvesting pro- linkages include the preferential employment of people from
gramme has been attempted on the border of the Serengeti adjacent communities, the purchase of produce for tourist
National Park (Holmern et al., 2002). camps from communities, contracting communities to main-
tain perimeter fencing and creating opportunities for income
Involving communities in wildlife-based land uses in generation via curio sales and cultural tourism. Mun-ya-wana
parks/private wildlife areas Game Reserve, for example, employs 325 people, and Wil-
In areas where parks and private game ranches are adja- derness Safaris employs 1,800 people (across nine countries),
cent to communal lands and suffer from illegal hunting, the and in both cases, at least 85% come from local communi-
involvement of communities in wildlife-based land uses have ties. Employment is particularly important, because salaried
potential to improve neighbour relations and create disincen- workers are able to support 6-8 family members (Snyman,
tives for illegal hunting. For example, in Namibia, the govern- 2012). In Laikipia, Kenya, private wildlife ranches running
ment has developed a concession policy for parks, whereby ecotourism operations contributed USD3.5 million to social
communal conservancies are granted concessions in parks development projects among local communities during 2007,
which they can use to attract business and tourism opportu- which included water provision, road construction/mainte-
nities (Chris Weaver, pers. comm. June 2010). In South Af- nance, healthcare, fencing and assistance with enterprise de-
rica, various models have been attempting to extend the ben- velopment (M. Graham, unpublished data).
efits from parks, including the allocation of portions of park
fees to neighbouring communities, the involvement of com- The sustainable harvesting of wildlife from reserves or
munities on management boards, and an increasing trend for private wildlife areas for meat for sale at affordable prices
communities to own portions of conservation areas (Gross- to neighbouring communities could help to address protein
man & Holden 2008). In several cases in South Africa, ‘con- shortages and reduce reliance on illegally sourced meat. In the
tractual parks’ have been developed following successful land Mun-ya-wana GR, for example, meat is allocated to the local
claims within parks, and the development of co-management chief for distribution to communities, with the amount do-
agreements with the conservation authorities (Grossman & nated being linked to the level of illegal hunting ( J. Mattheus
Holding 2008). The Makuleke community in South Africa, unpublished data). In Savé Valley Conservancy, ~54 tonnes of
for example, currently benefitting from leasing their land to meat are distributed to communities annually following the
an ecotourism operator and receives ~US$123,000/year.Sim- harvest of elephants (which is practised to control densities of
ilar arrangements are possible for private land. For example, the species) (Lindsey et al. 2011).
Mun-ya-wana Game Reserve chose not to contest a land
Reducing the costs imposed on communities through hu-
claim placed on the reserve by neighbouring communities,
man-wildlife conflict is a key step to fostering partnerships
and instead lease the land back from those communities who
with communities neighbouring (or living within) wildlife
now receive a constant benefit stream ( J. Mattheus, unpub-
areas and can remove a key source of antagonism (Gilling-
lished data). An alternative means of achieving community
ham and Lee, 2003).
stakeholdings in private wildlife areas would be to seek donor
funding with which to purchase shares on behalf of neigh- Finally, the provision of environmental education repre-
bouring communities. Such models are business-like and sents another form of benefit from wildlife that can be ex-
create a link between park-performance (which is adversely tended to neighbouring communities. Such education can
affected by illegal hunting) and income for communities, thus help to reduce poverty by providing greater opportunities for
creating strong disincentives for illegal hunting: provided the community members to access employment, including in the
community benefitting from the wildlife-based land use is wildlife sector. In addition, environmental education can play
the community living adjacent to or within the area; and pro- a role in raising awareness among communities of the threat
vided the benefits are apparent. posed to their natural heritage and to potential benefits from
wildlife, through illegal hunting. For example, Wilderness
The creation of other forms of business linkages can also
Safaris hosts some 550 children from neighbouring commu-
help to improve relations between the wildlife sector and
49
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
nities each year for 5-day programmes in their camps, and et al., 2008). Furthermore, research suggests that this kind
then follows up with these same children through a series of of approach attracts a more diverse set of donors and more
‘eco-clubs’ linked to the community schools (C. Roche, un- funding than traditional biodiversity conservation (Goldman
published data). Such messages are likely to be more effective et al., 2008).
if coupled with programmes to provide benefits to commu-
Challenges associated with developing legal wildlife-
nities from wildlife (Newmark et al., 1993), and to provide
based land uses
educational and training opportunities for community mem-
A challenge associated with the development of wildlife-
bers to provide them with the skills necessary to embark on
based land uses is the misconception among some politicians
careers in wildlife and conservation.
that private or communal land used for wildlife represents a
Payments to encourage coexistence threat to food security by replacing livestock or agricultural
Payments to promote coexistence of people and wildlife crop production (du Toit, 2004). For example the growth of
represent an additional potential option to address illegal Namibian communal land conservancies has caused concern
hunting. Natural ecosystems have significant economic value among some politicians who fear that they are not a produc-
and the world’s natural goods and services are collective- tive form of land use (R. Diggle, pers. comm.).
ly worth up to US$61 trillion (Costanza et al., 1997). At
a smaller scale, wildlife conservation generates significant The development of successful CBNRM programmes is
income through photographic tourism and trophy hunting associated with a number of challenges. Chief among these
(Lindsey et al., 2005; Lindsey et al., 2006), and people, es- issues is the reluctance of governments to devolve user-rights,
pecially those in developed countries, also imbue charismatic and forego revenues from trophy hunting and tourism ( Jones,
species such as lions and elephants with high existence values 2007) and control over electorates. The development and evo-
(Macdonald, 2001). However, people living with these glob- lution of CBNRM has been a long process associated with
ally valued species are often excluded from the benefits and some failures and set-backs which may serve to strengthen
frequently incur significant costs from with living with them. the reluctance of states to devolve user-rights, and reduce the
Consequently, wildlife is killed to remove the threat and to willingness of donors to support the process ( Jones, 2007).
acquire the only benefit that is often achievable, that from There is a risk that overcoming government reluctance will
meat (Thirgood et al., 2005; Loveridge et al., 2010). not happen sufficiently quickly to address the immediate
threat posed by illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade. Con-
To secure effective conservation, a sufficient proportion of sequently, there is a case for trying alternative (or ‘devolution-
the global value of wildlife has to accrue to the people living lite’) arrangements in the meantime (though proper devolu-
with it to exceed the costs associated with its presence. One tion would be highly preferable). One such example would
method of achieving this is to pay communities for coexisting be allow for the development of community game ranches
with wildlife via payments (which may be monetary or non- in demarcated areas through partnerships between commu-
monetary) linked directly to a desired conservation outcomes, nities and government, the private sector or NGOs. Other
such as a decline in hunting or the successful reproduction challenges associated with CBRNM programmes include the
of target species (Hazzah and Dolrenry, 2007; Zabel and need for protracted investment of technical expertise and do-
Engel, 2010). These approaches have had some marked suc- nor input to get them started and functioning ( Jones, 2007)
cess (Zabel and Holm-Muller, 2008) but can be complicated and the fact that in areas with high human population densi-
(see section on challenges). Diverse income streams (such as ties, potential returns per household are unlikely to provide
income from wildlife, external and governmental financing) sufficient incentives to encourage people to desist from illegal
could be combined into a ‘Payments to Encourage Coexis- hunting.
tence’ (PEC) fund (Dickman et al., 2011).The benefit of this
approach is that conservation investment is directly linked to Challenges associated with replacing illegally sourced
actual conservation success, while the payments may also help bushmeat with legal game meat.
reduce poverty and improve the economic security of people A key challenge to using legally produced game meat to
living alongside wildlife (Groom and Palmer, 2010; Wunder replace illegally sourced meat will be ensuring that the price is
50
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
similar to or lower than illegal bushmeat. An additional chal- provision of wildlife for reintroductions and provide legal
lenge will be overcoming veterinary restrictions on the move- avenues for the distribution of meat. As with other interven-
ment of wildlife products (instituted to restrict the spread of tions to address illegal hunting, the development of wildlife-
key veterinary diseases) in many countries. In addition there based land uses is likely to be more effective if combined with
would be a need to ensure that supplies of legal game meat other interventions, such as the land use planning, generation
are directed at the markets for illegal bushmeat, which would of alternative livelihoods and enforcement of wildlife laws
require quite different marketing strategies to those current- (Barrett and Arcese, 1998).
ly employed by the game ranching industry. There is a risk
Challenges associated with payments for coexistence
that illegal bushmeat could be laundered and sold as legal
The primary challenge associated with PEC approaches
game meat and so some kind of certification system may be
is securing long-term, reliable funding. Once a payment
required. Concurrently, greater controls are required on the
scheme is established, stopping it may result in even greater
movement of illegal bushmeat by stopping and searching ve-
antagonism towards the target species or wildlife in general
hicles and bicycles along roads, and by scanning baggage at
(Montag, 2003). There is a risk that if PEC programmes are
airports. Controlling the movement of illegally sourced bush-
started in one area, there will be resentment towards wildlife
meat is complicated by the fact that the commodity is often
in other areas if they are not replicated. Other challenges in-
hidden, and transported by pedestrians and bicycles, in addi-
clude determining: which conservation indicators are reliable
tion to vehicular traffic (Lindsey and Bento, 2012). Introduc-
enough to determine payment levels; how to deal with fluctu-
ing sniffer dogs at airports could assist with the detection of
ating environmental conditions (such as drought) which may
bushmeat and other wildlife products.
affect the indicator without being related to hunting; who
Wildlife harvesting programmes have faced a number of should receive the payments; how to engage all community
challenges, including: low financial viability associated with members; and, how to ensure that payments are sufficient to
efforts to produce meat at subsidized prices; elite capture of offset wildlife damages (Dickman et al., 2011). There is a risk
benefits; lack of funding to cover capital start-up costs; failure that the PEC approach will entrench the idea that wildlife is
to generate comparable quantities of meat to that produced a liability only to be tolerated on receipt of financial compen-
from illegal hunting; over-reliance on meat for income and sation. Overall, PEC approaches have potential, but would
ignoring of other value streams from wildlife; uncertainty require massive funding, detailed understanding of local situ-
over the appropriate recipients of meat and income; veteri- ations, and careful implementation.
nary restrictions on the distribution of meat; and competing
claims for shared resources (in the case of migratory wildlife)
(Féron et al., 1998; Holmern et al., 2002). The most successful
CBNRM have been those that result in the capture of mul-
tiple-use values from wildlife (including ecotourism, trophy
hunting, and the live sale of wildlife) in addition to the sale of
meat ( Jones, 2007) and such broad-based forms of wildlife-
based land use should be pursued ahead of simple meat crop-
ping programmes. In addition, the development of equitable
long-term partnerships with the private sector should be pro-
moted, to provide for sustained financial and technical input.
51
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
While ‘fortress conservation’ (conservation based purely the economy, and on challenges associated with prosecutions
on the exclusion of local people) has been rightly eschewed for wildlife crimes (V. Opyene pers. comm.). That training
in favour of approaches that combine conservation and lo- resulted in a shift from minor penalties for first time illegal
cal development goals, legal protection for wildlife is of key hunters such as small fines (~US$10-20) or community ser-
importance for conservation and for the development of for- vice to custodial sentences of 6-12 months (V. Opyene pers.
mal wildlife-based land uses. The need for legal protection comm.).
of wildlife, and effective law enforcement is acknowledged
Improved anti-poaching security
in the Lusaka Agreement (http://www.lusakaagreement.org/
Enforcement of legal protection through anti-poaching se-
Documents/3.5.pdf, accessed May 2012) and the African
curity remains a vital step necessary to conservation wildlife
Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Re-
effectively. The significance of enforcement is further empha-
sources (http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/
sized by the fact that anti-poaching security is a key com-
Treaties/Text/nature%20and%20natural%20recesource.pdf,
ponent of even the most successful CBNRM programmes
accessed May 2012).
(Campbell and Shackleton, 2001; Stuart-Hill et al., 2005;
Reform of wildlife laws Taylor, 2009).There is abundant evidence that elevated anti-
There is a need for refinement of existing wildlife laws such poaching security can be effective at reducing illegal hunting
that there is greater uniformity among SADC nations, more (Hilborn et al., 2006; Jachmann, 2008a; Stokes et al., 2010).
effective deterrents against illegal hunting, and to ensure that There is also compelling evidence that stiff punishments for
the penalties reflect the value of the resource being destroyed. illegal hunting are ineffective if the risks to hunters of being
Revised laws should take into account international and Af- caught are low (Leader-Williams and Milner-Gulland, 1993;
rican treaties, conventions and agreements, and protocols that Hofer et al., 2000). Protected areas are generally less effective
have been approved within SADC which incorporate illegal at controlling illegal hunting relative to other threats (Bruner
hunting and trade in wildlife products. Ideally, a new SADC et al., 2001) and there is a clear need for elevated investment
protocol is required on law enforcement for crimes against in anti-poaching in many wildlife areas. An increase in fund-
wild fauna and flora to harmonize domestic legislation and ing of 3-10 times is recommended to stem wildlife popula-
provide guidelines for penalties. Within national laws and the tion declines in African protected areas (Scholte, 2011).
recommended regional protocol, there is a need for recogni-
There are several key elements to effective anti-poaching
tion of illegal hunting and illegal trade in bushmeat to be
security (as suggested by the literature and expert input from
specifically recognized as a priority offence. There is also need
meeting attendees, and notably the presentation by Hugo
for the development of databases of illegal hunters to enable
Van Der Westhuizen):
repeat offenders to be identified and dealt with appropriately.
An additional key step is an effort to raise awareness among a) Adequate funding. The allocation of adequate fund-
policy-makers (and subsequently magistrates and the police) ing can have a significant positive impact on efforts to
of the severity of the threat posed by illegal hunting. Such control illegal hunting (Jachmann, 2008a). However,
education will help ensure that individuals accused of wildlife the level of funding that is actually needed to control il-
crimes are prosecuted, and that wildlife laws are upheld. In legal hunting effectively is poorly understood. In Ghana,
Uganda, for example, a joint initiative was recently under- snaring was effectively controlled in six (relatively small)
taken by the Uganda Wildlife Authority and the Bushmeat savanna parks with an enforcement budget of US$51/
free Eastern Africa Network to train wildlife crime law en- km2/year (Jachmann, 2008a). In the 3,872 km2 Coutada
forcement partners, including police, prosecutors, magistrates 9 in Mozambique, an expenditure of US$28.4/km2 on
and wildlife wardens on wildlife laws, the value of wildlife to
52
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
anti-poaching has been sufficient enable wildlife popula- important to maintain morale, to prevent high rates of
tions to start to recover following high levels of illegal staff turnover and to reduce the likelihood of collusion
harvest (Lindsey and Bento, 2012). However, in the between scouts and illegal hunters. Scout salaries were
3,500 km2 Save Valley Conservancy, a security budget of positively associated with the performance of scouts in
US$72/km2 was not sufficient to prevent wildlife popu- controlling elephant poaching in the Luangwa Valley
lation declines in high-pressure areas close to human during the 1990s, for example (Jachmann and Bil-
settlement (Lindsey et al., 2012). Significant resources liouw, 1997). Essential equipment for scouts includes
are invested in anti-poaching in the 210 km2 Mun-ya- uniforms, hats, boots, radios, handcuffs, GPS units, and
wana Game Reserve in South Africa (US$1,244/km2/ firearms. The timely payment of sufficient bonuses for
year) and illegal hunting is controlled effectively (J. arrests or confiscation of weapons can greatly improve
Mattheus, unpublished data). the effectiveness of anti-poaching scouts (Jachmann and
Billiouw, 1997).
The extent of funding (and manpower) needed to control
illegal hunting is likely to vary with factors such as: the f) Adequate management involvement in anti-poaching,
degree of threat from illegal hunting; terrain (achiev- supervision and guidance of scouts is important to main-
ing control is likely to be harder in more rugged terrain tain morale, reduce the risk of scouts colluding with
and in areas with thicker vegetation); the size and shape illegal hunters and ensure optimal allocation of effort.
of the wildlife area (funding needs/km2 are likely to be In Ghanaian parks, visits of scout camps by senior staff
lower in parks with a lower surface area : volume ratio); members increased the effectiveness of anti-poaching
and, the presence/absence of rhinoceroses(which are a patrol teams (Jachmann, 2008a).
key target for trophy poachers).
g) Intelligence gathering. Information on illegal hunters
b) Adequate manpower. Snaring levels in savanna parks and their planned activities has potential to dramati-
in Ghana were reduced to acceptable levels when patrol cally improve the effectiveness of anti-poaching. Such
effort was increased to 0.40 effective man-patrol days/ information can be gathered by employing appropriately
km2 (Jachmann, 2008a). Effective deployment of scouts connected individuals and/or by paying informants
is crucial, to ensure that: sufficient effective patrol days/ within communities occurring in or next to wildlife ar-
scout/month are achieved; scouts are not deployed in eas. For example, in the early stages of the development
predictable patterns, and that scouts are deployed in line of Namibian conservancies, the employment of local
with temporal and spatial trends in the distribution of game guards was an essential step for reducing illegal
illegal hunting. hunting as they lived in the area and were able to gain
intelligence from tip-offs which dramatically improved
c) Employment of experienced, qualified staff. Anti- the effectiveness of enforcement efforts (R. Diggle un-
poaching security is a specialised venture and requires published data).
suitably qualified employees. Note that ‘qualified’ does not
necessarily mean school-educated, rather proficient and h) Ensuring that anti-poaching is practised continuously,
experienced in tracking and other forms of bush craft. and not simply in response to a discrete incident or set
of incidences of illegal hunting. The degree of enforce-
d) Implementation of training programmes is important ment can be managed adaptively in line with the threat,
to maintain and improve the skills of scouts. Provisions but some level of anti-poaching is likely to be required
should be made for managers to rapidly remove staff indefinitely.
proven to be incompetent and/or corrupt to maintain
standards and morale. i) Developing a good working relationship with the police
and local magistrates is essential to ensure effective pro-
e) Adequate working conditions salaries and equipment are cessing of detainees following capture of illegal hunters.
53
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
j) Adequate monitoring of illegal hunting and anti-poach- Challenges associated with improving wildlife laws and
ing. Monitoring of illegal hunting can ensure that anti- their enforcement
poaching resources are allocated adaptively, in line with A potential challenge associated with enforcing wildlife
spatial and temporal trends in illegal hunting threat. In laws is a perception that controlling illegal hunting represents
addition, the monitoring of illegal hunting can provide a return to exclusionary fortress conservation that threatens
insights into the efficacy of other interventions such as rural food security and undermines traditional rights of com-
community outreach projects – or highlight where such munities, particularly given that the people who rely most
projects are most needed. In Ghanaian parks, evalua- on bushmeat are often those who are the poorest and most
tion of the effectiveness of anti-poaching patrol teams food insecure. However, effective anti-poaching to prevent
created a spirit of competition among parks which unregulated losses of wildlife is an essential step towards en-
resulted in improved performance (Jachmann, 2008b). abling the food security and other benefits from wildlife to be
Monitoring of anti-poaching efforts can also reveal maximized, and sustained over the long term. Furthermore,
where staff members are not performing and insights negative human livelihood impacts of law enforcement can
into whether personnel training or changes are required. be reduced by simultaneously working to provide communi-
The event book monitoring system is a simple method ties with livelihood alternatives and legal benefits from wild-
for monitoring the incidence of illegal hunting which is life (Brashares et al., 2011).
easily applied and interpreted by anti-poaching scouts
and not reliant on high levels of training or education There are also challenges associated with the practical im-
(Stuart-Hill et al., 2005). Hunter reporting of catch per plementation of anti-poaching. Anti-poaching is expensive,
unit effort represents an additional potential method for specialized and can create animosity if not handled in a sensi-
assessing the sustainability of bushmeat harvests (Rist et tive manner and if not coupled with efforts to extend benefits
al., 2010). from wildlife to communities (Keane et al., 2008).
54
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
Reducing the availability of wire in areas in which it is freely available, and limiting the introduction of wire in areas where
the commodity is largely absent are key steps for controlling snaring. Fencing constructed from barbed or steel wire is a major
source of snare-wire. If fencing is constructed with mesh (Bonnox/Veldspan™) fencing, the kinked wire cannot readily be used
to make snares and the risk of wire theft by illegal hunters for making snares is lower (Lindsey et al., 2012). In many cases, wire
for electricity or telephone cables is often left in bundles that are unguarded, providing easy targets for theft for making snares.
Reducing the supply of wire could potentially be achieved by raising awareness among governments, industry, business and
landowners about the negative environmental impacts of wire, promoting the use of mesh rather than steel-wire fencing, and
the importance of securing wire bundles to ensure that they cannot readily be stolen.
55
Potential solutions to illegal hunting, bushmeat trade & associated challenges
Controlling illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade is the bushmeat trade where these occur in forested or wooded
likely to require interventions that are costly and thus de- habitats. However, the scope for such funds to be harnessed
pendent on the sourcing of adequate funding. There is a to address illegal hunting in the savanna biome is limited by
need for significantly elevated government funding for state four factors: first, current programmes only generate carbon
wildlife agencies in many African countries. In addition, en- credits where a risk of tree loss can be demonstrated; second,
couraging greater reinvestment of earnings from protected programmes such as REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from
area networks (from tourism and trophy hunting) into park Deforestation and Forest Degradation), do not adequately
management rather than feeding earnings into central trea- acknowledge the importance of biodiversity for ecosystem
suries is of key importance. Maximizing the economic value services (and so would not reward the presence of wildlife to
of wildlife and harnessing that value to generate incentives a significant degree); third because the carbon-value of dry
for conservation and income for wildlife management is im- savanna is relatively low; and, fourth, because the purchase
portant. Arbitrary restrictions on legal sustainable use (such of carbon off-sets is not yet compulsory and so the market
as the ban on trophy hunting in Kenya, or the ban on lion for carbon is limited (Venter et al., 2009). If the purchase of
hunting and the 25 km no-hunting buffer around protected carbon off-sets were to become compulsory in future and if
areas in Botswana) are thus unadvisable (Norton-Griffiths, international programmes such as REDD+ were adjusted to
2007; Lindsey, 2010a). In areas where state land is leased to take into account biodiversity (and/or if buyers could be en-
tourism and hunting operators, long term leases should be couraged to preferentially invest in areas with healthy wildlife
allocated to incentivize investment in protecting the wildlife populations) some potential for generating funds for wildlife-
resource, and contracts should stipulate minimum contribu- management would exist, particularly in the wetter savanna
tions to anti-poaching (Lindsey et al., 2007). areas (notwithstanding the challenges posed by the high en-
try costs associated with feasibility assessment, certification
There is a need to raise awareness among international and ongoing assessment).
community and among conservation NGOs of the threat
posed by illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade, to encour- Similarly, the development of an international market for
age the allocation of funding to address the problem. Because biodiversity credits (whereby companies or countries can off-
of the obvious links between the bushmeat trade and food set the impacts of development by providing funding for the
security and the need to replace unsustainable harvests of preservation of land with high biodiversity through the pur-
wildlife with more sustainable protein creation options, gain- chase of biodiversity credits) has potential in future to gener-
ing funding from development and humanitarian agencies is ate funds for interventions to address illegal hunting. How-
a realistic possibility (Lindsey et al., 2011). ever, a system for biodiversity and other land-use credits has
not yet been properly developed or implemented, nor is there
The developing market for carbon offset credits represents a any consensus on valuation.
possibility for generating funds to address illegal hunting and
56
VIII. Differences between Savanna & Forest Biomes
Relating to the Bushmeat Trade
The large majority of literature on the bushmeat trade in e) Partly as a consequence of the established tourism
Africa has focused on the issue in the forest biome (Barnett, value of wildlife, there is likely to be stronger political
1998; Lindsey et al., 2011). While some key insights arise recognition of the value of wildlife, and greater wildlife-
from that body of research, a number of key differences ex- management and scientific capacity in countries in the
ist between the forest and savanna biomes and recommen- savanna biome.
dations from work done in the former do not always apply
to the latter. Several of these differences provide reason for f) Savanna habitats generally have higher carrying capaci-
optimism that illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade may ties for livestock than forest areas, thus providing for
be easier to control in the savanna biome and that there is comparatively lower reliance on bushmeat for survival
greater scope for the development of legal and sustainable (H. Eves, personal communication).
wildlife-based land uses:
As a result of these differences, there is a strong case for a
a) Wildlife is easier and cheaper to protect in savanna areas different approach to addressing the problems of unsustain-
than in forests, making control of the illegal bushmeat able hunting for bushmeat in the savanna biomes. The idea
trade a more realistic prospect (Jachmann, 2008a). that the bushmeat trade needs to be accepted and regulated
to reduce harvests to more sustainable levels is a common
b) There is a longer tradition of wildlife-based tourism and position in the current literature on bushmeat trade in forest
trophy hunting in the savanna biome and much more biomes. Some controversial proposed interventions include:
developed wildlife based industries in southern and East establishment of hunting and no-hunting zones, taxes on
Africa than in the forest biome (Wilkie and Carpenter, hunting, quota systems, encouraging more sustainable bush-
1999; Lindsey et al., 2007; Roche, 2011; Roche, 2011). meat hunting, (such as by compromising on the illegality of
In addition, there are significant domestic markets for snaring, implementing less wasteful techniques such as more
wildlife based industries in East and Southern Africa, frequent checking of snares and, restricting the distance that
particularly in South Africa (Lindsey et al., 2007). snares can be set from villages), and restricting trade to meat
collected by resident (non-immigrant) hunters, (Bowen-
c) In several countries in southern Africa there have Jones and Pendry, 1999; Muchaal and Ngandjui, 1999; Wilk-
already been effective legislative changes to allow private ie et al., 2005; Mockrin et al., 2011). In contrast, in savanna
land owners and communities to benefit legally from areas, due to the potential (and in numerous cases, actual)
wildlife production (Bond et al., 2004). economic value of wildlife, accepting the illegal, uncontrolled
and inefficient hunting of wildlife as a legitimate form of
d) The savanna biome is considerably more productive than wildlife/land use is inadvisable. Rather, the legal and sustain-
forest areas, and sustainable wildlife-based land uses
able utilization of wildlife should be pursued in a manner that
including consumptive utilization, are more likely to be confers maximal benefits to communities and governments in
viable (Robinson and Bennett, 2004). conjunction with the other interventions highlighted in this
report (as appropriate for the given scenario).
57
IX. Conclusions
Illegal hunting and the bushmeat trade represent a severe rived from wildlife, devolution of user-rights over wildlife on
threat to wildlife in savanna areas as it does in the forest bi- communal lands to communities is essential. Such devolution
ome. The drivers of illegal hunting are numerous and varied. should ensure that communities are able to retain benefits
Consequently multiple and site specific interventions will be from wildlife on communal land (and that governments do
required to counter this threat. However, a number of general not extract revenues, other than via tax earnings) and have
interventions apply to the majority of sites investigated in significant decision-making authority over their wildlife re-
this review in which illegal hunting occurs. These range from source within the legislated structures in the country.
‘carrot’ approaches, such as providing alternative livelihood
Urgent efforts are required to raise awareness among pol-
and protein options and extending benefits from wildlife to
icy-makers and the international and donor communities of
communities, to ‘stick’ approaches such as strong legal dis-
the severity and urgency of the threat posed by illegal hunt-
incentives for illegal hunting and enforcement of those laws
ing and the bushmeat trade. Failure to address the problem
via anti-poaching. Perhaps the greatest potential comes from
will have dire consequences for biodiversity conservation, will
replacing the inefficient, wasteful and relatively low-profit
preclude the sustainable use of wildlife as a development op-
snaring of wildlife with higher value and more sustainable
tion and have long term negative impacts on food security.
forms of wildlife-use. To allow such legal benefits to be de-
58
appendix I
Attendees at the bushmeat brainstorming session, Shumba Valley Lodge, Lanseria, Johannesburg, May 9-10th 2012
59
APPENDIX 2
Set of “General principles for addressing illegal and unsustainable use and trade of wild meat in the SADC
region of savannah Africa” as discussed, formulated and validated by the Directors of wildlife of SAD region and wildlife
experts at the technical meeting hold in Johannesburg, South Africa, in late 2012 with FAO Technical Cooperation Pro-
gramme support and in close cooperation with the SADC Secretariat.
October 2012
Johannesburg, South Africa
60
APPENDIX 2
Preamble:
In October 2012, member states from the Southern Africa Development Community
with support from the FAOSFS Subregional office (SADC) met to discuss the report
compiled by experts across the region which documented the extent and drivers of the
illegal and unsustainable use and trade of wild meat* and possible interventions to
prevent such use in the context of wild meat’s potential to contribute to overall food
security of the region, and to recognize the wider economic potential of wildlife as a
form of land use with multiple benefits. The member states acknowledged that a new,
multisectorial and unified approach was critical to address the increasing threat of this
unsustainable use and trade to gain commitments of government and to be able to
motivate for the resources to reduce the activity. Illegal, unsustainable use greatly
underuses the wild meat resource, and threatens the viability of key development
projects centred around improving livelihoods through the legal use of wildlife (such
as trophy hunting tourism, photographic tourism and supplies of natural products). It
also threatens natural systems upon which human communities depend.
SADC member states have already committed to protecting natural resources
including wildlife in under the Wildlife Protection and Law Enforcement Protocol and
member states present at the Johannesburg meeting urged all parties involved
(government, community, private and individual) to work together to reduce this
looming threat. Fifteen (15) guiding principles were drawn up at the Johannesburg
meeting as a first step to the development of a comprehensive SADC strategy to
address this issue.
*Note on terminology: The term “wild meat” here refers to meat from wildlife as opposed to meat
from any domesticated animal. Wild meat can be harvested and traded either legally or legally, and
either sustainably or unsustainably. Wild meat can be sourced from a variety of areas including but
not exclusively protected areas, community-managed areas and game farms).
61
APPENDIX 2
Overarching objective
To control and reduce all forms of illegal and unsustainable use and trade of wild
meat in the SADC region, while maximizing the scope for use and trade to improve
food security, economic development and natural ecosystem functioning for the
benefit of the people of the region.
General Principles:
Principle 1.
Governments hold the primary responsibility to ensure the conservation and
sustainable use of wildlife, with the involvement of donors and corporate and
community stakeholders at all levels
Principle 2:
The real and complete values of wildlife to local and national economies and food
security– both actual and potential - should be recognized and reflected in political
commitment, decision making, policy and increased budget allocations
Principle 3:
The food and livelihood needs of communities are major determinants of wild meat
use, and effective and equitable responses to illegal use and trade of wild meat
demand that these needs are met effectively through innovative mechanisms and
public and private sector partnerships
Principle 4:
People and communities who bear the costs of living with wildlife should gain
benefits from wildlife wherever possible, including through innovative mechanisms
and public and private sector partnerships
Principle 5:
A sense of community ownership of wildlife should be encouraged, whereverfeasible,
by devolving rights and benefits right down to community and household level
Principle 6:
Without cross-sectoral coordination and engagement illegal use and trade of wild
meat will continue and efforts to promote legal use will be curtailed. Sectors that need
to be engaged with include agricultural, law enforcement, extractive industries,
health, development and trade and commerce sectors.
Principle 7:
Policy and regulation on legal and illegal use and trade of wild meat should be
harmonized across SADC to enhance transboundary cooperation and enforcement.
Principle 8:
Expanding legal options and creating a favourable policy and taxation environment
for production of legal wild meat are necessary, in order to meet demand for wild
meat and increase benefits from wildlife
62
APPENDIX 2
Principle 9:
Effective land use planning for the protection of wildlife and promotion of compatible
land uses and infrastructure are necessary to reduce illegal use and trade of wild meat.
Principle 10:
Awareness raising and sensitization efforts on the impacts of illegal use of wild meat,
and the benefits of legal use are urgently required, with messages tailored to specific
audiences
Principle 11:
Legal deterrents to illegal wild meat use and trade must be meaningful in the context
they occur if they are to be effective. They require strong, targeted penalties and
enforcement.
Principle 12:
The varying underlying causes of illegal use and trade of wild meat, including the
relevant socio-economic drivers and value chains, need to be understood in different
national and local contexts to enable effective action
Principle 13:
Mechanisms to monitor the patterns and drivers of illegal use and trade of wild meat
to provide early warning of problems, fill critical information gaps (such as onvalue
chains), and collate and share information and research, are required to inform and
guide management action
Principle14:
Adaptive management approaches to address the use and trade of wild meat to ensure
sustainability should be developed, based on most recent research and including
effective monitoring and evaluation
Principle 15:
Capacity to apply all principles needs to be built within key sectors that have been
identified as critical to securing the protection of wildlife populations in the region.
63
APPENDIX 2
October 2012
Johannesburg, Afrique du Sud
64
APPENDIX 2
Préface:
Les étatsmembres de la Communauté pour le Développement de l’AfriqueAustrale
(SADC) se sontrencontrés en octobre 2012, avec le soutien du bureau sous-régional
de la FAO-SFS, pour discuter le rapport préparé par les spécialistesrégionaux. Ce
rapport portait sur l’ampleur et les motifs conduisant au commerce età l’utilisation
illégale et non durable de la viande de brousse*. Les interventions possibles pour
prévenir une telle utilisationy sont évoquées compte tenu du fait que la viande
légalement issue d’animaux sauvages pourrait contribuerà la sécurité alimentaire de la
région,et du large potentiel économique que représente la faune sauvage en
tantqueformed’utilisation des terres avec de nombreuxbénéfices. Les états
membresontreconnu la nécessité d’uneapproche nouvelle, multisectorielle et unifiée
pour faire face à la menace grandissante d’une utilisation et d’un commerce non
durablesafind’obtenirl’engagement des gouvernements et d’acquérir les ressources
nécessaires pourréduireune telleactivité. L’exploitationillégale et non durable de la
viande de brousse limite de manière considérable les autresressources potentielles
liées à la faune sauvage et menace la viabilité de projets de développement clés
portant sur l’amélioration du niveau de vie des populations localesà travers une
utilisation légale de la faune sauvage (comme par exemple le tourisme lié aux
trophées de chasse, le tourisme photo ou encore la réalisation de produits locaux
naturels). Cela menace également les systèmes naturels dont dépendent les
communautéshumaines.
Les étatsmembres de la SADC se sont déjà engagés à protéger les
ressourcesnaturelles, dontla faune sauvage, avec le Protocole de Protection de la
Faune Sauvage et d’Application de la Loi(Wildlife Protection and Law Enforcement
Protocol), et ceux réunisà Johannesburg insistent à présent pour que toutes les
partiesconcernées (gouvernement, communauté, secteur privé et individu) travaillent
ensemble afin de limiter cette menace imminente. Quinze principesgénérauxont été
élaborés lors de la réunion à Johannesburg comme première étape vers le
développementd’unestratégieglobale de la SADC afin de remédier à ce problème.
65
APPENDIX 2
Principal Objectif
Contrôler et réduire toute formeillégale et non durable d’utilisation et de commerce de
viandede broussedans la région de la SADC, tout en maximisant les possibilités
d’exploitation et de commerce afin d’améliorer la sécuritéalimentaire, le
développementéconomique et le fonctionnement de l’écosystèmenaturel pour le
bénéfice despopulationsde la région.
PrincipesGénéraux
Principe 1:
Il est de la responsabilité des gouvernementsd’assurer la conservation etl’exploitation
durable de la faune sauvage, avec la participation à tous les niveaux des parties
prenantes donateurs, partenaires sociaux et communautés.
Principe 2:
Les valeurs réelles et globales de la faune sauvage pour l’économie locale et nationale
et pour la sécurité alimentaire – à la fois actuelle et potentielle –devraient être
reconnues et reflétées par une politique engagée, des prises de décisions, des lois et
une augmentation des allocations budgétaires.
Principe 3
Les besoinsalimentaires et le niveau de vie des communautéssont des éléments
déterminants concernant l’utilisation de viande de brousse. Pour trouver des réponses
efficaces et équitables à l’utilisation illégale et au commerce illégal de viande de
brousse, il est nécessaire que ces besoins soient satisfaits de manière efficace à travers
des mécanismes novateurs et des partenariats entre le secteur publique et privé.
Principe 4
Les populations locales qui endurent les coûts engendrés par la coexistence avec la
faune sauvage devraient bénéficier de la faune sauvage autant que possible,
notamment par des mécanismes novateurs et des partenariats entre le secteur publique
et privé.
Principe 5
Le sentiment de propriété de la faune sauvage au sein de la communauté devrait être
encouragé autant que possible en déléguant des droits et des bénéfices directs à la
communauté et au niveau des ménages.
Principe 6
Sans engagement et coordination entre les différents secteurs,l’utilisation illégale et le
commerce de viande de brousse se poursuivront et les efforts pour promouvoir une
exploitation légale seront limités. Les secteurs qui doivent s’engager sont les
suivants : l’agriculture, la justice, les industries extractives, la santé, le
développementet le commerce.
Principe 7
Les lois sur l’utilisation légale et illégale de viande de brousse et le commerce, ainsi
que l’implémentation de ces lois, doivent être harmonisées à travers la SADC afin de 66
renforcer la coopération et le respect de la loi à travers les frontières.
APPENDIX 2
Principe 8
Elargir les opportunités légales et créer des lois favorables ainsi qu’une taxation
environnementale pour la production légale de viande de brousse sontdes étapes
nécessaires pour répondre à la demande et augmenter les bénéfices provenant de la
faune sauvage pour les populations locales.
Principe 9
Pour réduire l’utilisation illégale et le commerce de viande de brousse, il est
nécessaire de réaliser des plans efficaces d’occupation des sols pour protéger la faune
sauvage etde promouvoir une occupation des sols et des infrastructurescompatibles
avec la protection de la faune.
Principe 10
Une prise de conscience et des efforts de sensibilisation sur l’impact de l’exploitation
illégale de viande de brousse et les bénéfices possibles d’une utilisation légale sont
requis d’urgence par le biais de messages adaptés à l’audience.
Principe 11
Les moyens juridiquesde dissuasionsà l’utilisation illégale et au commercedoiventêtre
significatifs etspécifiques au contexte où ils se produisent pour êtreefficaces. Cela
exige des peines fortes etciblées et des moyens importants pour faire respecter la loi.
Principe 12
Les différents facteursmenant à l’exploitation illégale de viande de brousse et à son
commerce, y compris les raisons socio-économiques et les chaînes de valeur, doivent
être mieux compris dans les différents contextes locaux et nationaux pour pouvoir
mener une action efficace.
Principe 13
Pour informer et orienter les mesures de gestion, il est nécessaire de mettre en
placedes systèmes de suivi des patterns et des facteurs déterminants l’utilisation
illégale de viande de brousse et son commerceafinde repérer des signes indicateurs de
problèmes, de combler les lacunes sur des informations critiques (concernant les
chaînes de valeur par exemple), et pour rassembler et échanger informations et
travaux de recherche.
Principe 14
Des mesuresadaptatives de gestion pour l’utilisation et le commercede la viande de
brousse devraient être développer pour en assurer la durabilité. Ces mesures
devraient être basées sur des études récentes et inclure un suivi et une évaluation
efficaces.
Principe 15
Les compétences permettant d’appliquer tous ces principes doivent être renforcées au
sein des secteurs clés identifiés comme étant critiques pour la protection de la faune
sauvage dans la région.
67
APPENDIX 2
68
APPENDIX 2
Preâmbulo:
Em outubro de 2012 os estados membros da Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da
África Austral, com o apoio do Gabinete Sub-Regional de FAOSFS (SADC)
reuniram-se para debater o relatório preparado pelos especialistas em toda a região,
que salientou a prevalência e as causas do uso ilegal e insustentável de carne do
mato*, as medidas preventivas que poderão ser adoptadas levando em conta o
potencial de carne do mato, para melhorar a segurança alimentar global da região, e
também para reconhecer o grande potencial económico de animais selvagens como
forma de uso da terra com benefícios imensos. Esses estados membros concordaram
que era necessária uma abordagem multi-sectorial e unificada para resolver a ameaça
sempre crescente deste comércio ilegal, a fim de obter o compromisso dos governos e
adquirir recursos para conter essa actividade. O uso ilegal e insustentável não
maximiza os recursos de carne do mato e compromete o ecossitema de que dependem
a communidade humana e a viabilidade de projetos de desenvolvimento importantes
que pretendem melhorar a qualidade de vida através do uso legal de animais
selvagens, como troféu de caça, o turismo cinegético e o fornecimento de produtos
naturais.
Os estados membros da SADC já prometeram proteger os recursos naturais, bem
como os animais selvagens sob o Protocolo de Proteção da Vida Selvagem e da
Aplicação da Lei e aqueles presentes na reunião de Joanesburgo instaram todas as
partes envolvidas (governo, comunidade - privada e individual) a trabalhar em
conjunto para combater essa iminente ameaça. Na reunião de Joanesburgo foram
registrados quinze (15) princípios de base para iniciar o desenvolvimento de uma
estratégia abrangente para a SADC abordar esta questão.
*Nota: "carne do mato" refere-se à carne de animais selvagens em vez de carne de qualquer animal
doméstico. A carne de animais selvagens pode ser adquirida e comercializada pelos meios legais, ilegais,
sustentáveis ou insustentáveis. A carne do mato pode ser obtida a partir de zonas diversas, incluindo,
mas não exclusivamente, áreas proibidas, espaços supervisionados pela comunidade e fazendas que se
destinam à preservação da fauna.
69
APPENDIX 2
Objetivo Global
Monitorar e combater todos os tipos de utilização e comércio ilegais e insustentáveis
de carne do mato na região da SADC e multiplicar a margem para utilização e
comércio de modo a melhorar a segurança alimentar, o desenvolvimento económico e
os ecossistemas naturais do povo da região.
Princípios gerais
Princípio 1
A conservação e o uso sustentável da fauna são primordialmente da responsabilidade
dos governos, com a participação de doadores e partes interessadas na comunidade e
no mundo corporativo a todos os níveis.
Princípio 2
O compromisso político, os processos de decisão política e o aumento das alocações
orçamentais devem reconhecer e mostrar os valores reais e completos – quer atuais
quer potenciais - da vida selvagem para as economias locais e nacionais e para a
segurança alimentar.
Princípio 3
As necessidades alimentares e o sustento das comunidades são os principais fatores de
utilização de carne do mato, e, a fim de responder de forma eficaz ao uso e comércio
ilegal de carne do mato, essas necessidades devem ser cumpridas integralmente,
através de medidas inovadoras e parcerias eficazes entre setores públicos e privados.
Princípio 4
As pessoas e comunidades que vivem com a fauna selvagem devem beneficiar delas
sempre que possível, através de meios inovadores e de parcerias públicas e privadas.
Princípio 5
A comunidade deve ser encorajada a sentir um sentimento de apropriação sobre a vida
selvagem, sempre que possível, mediante a transferência dos direitos e benefícios até
ao nível da comunidade e da família.
Princípio 6
A utilização e comércio de carne do mato continuarão a existir, e sem a intervenção e
a coordenação intersectoriais, os esforços para incentivar o comércio legal vão falhar.
Devem-se mobilizar os setores da agricultura, a aplicação da lei, as indústrias
extrativas, a saúde, o comércio, o desenvolvimento e o comércio.
Princípio 7
As políticas e regulamentações sobre o uso e comércio legais e ilegais de carne do
mato devem ser feitas uniformemente através da SADC, para melhorar a cooperação e
aplicação através das fronteiras.
70
APPENDIX 2
Princípio 8
É importante aumentar as opções legais e criar uma política e uma tributação
propícias para a produção legal de carne do mato, a fim de satisfazer a procura dessa
carne e aumentar os benefícios da fauna.
Princípio 9
A promoção dos usos alternativos da terra e infraestruturas compatíveis são
necessárias para coibir a utilização e comércio ilegais de carne do mato e incentivar a
proteção da vida selvagem.
Princípio 10
Há uma necessidade urgente de mensagens personalizadas para grupos específicos,
incentivando a consciência e a sensibilidade para os efeitos negativos do uso ilegal de
carne do mato e as vantagens de métodos legais.
Princípio 11
A fim de serem eficazes, as medidas punitivas para utilização ilegal de carne do mato
devem ser significativas e devem exigir sanções duras e execução forte.
Princípio 12
A ação eficaz contra o uso e comércio ilegais de carne do mato só é possível quando
as causas fundamentais, incluindo pressões sócio económicas, forem abordadas e
compreendidas em diferentes contextos nacionais e locais.
Princípio 13
São necessárias medidas para monitorar os métodos e as causas do uso e do comércio
ilegais de carne do mato para fornecer os primeiros sinais de problemas, preencher
informações em falta e se reunir e compartilhar informações e pesquisa, de modo a
informar e guiar as medidas de gestão.
Princípio 14
Políticas de gestão flexíveis, baseadas em pesquisas mais recentes, devem ser
elaboradas para abordar o uso e comércio ilegais de carne do mato, com vista a
garantir sustentabilidade, monitorização e avaliação eficazes.
Princípio 15
O reforço das capacidades deve ocorrer em sectores fundamentais que foram
identificados como críticos para assegurar a proteção da vida selvagem na região.
71
references
Albrechtsen, L., Fa, J., Barry, B., Macdonald, D., 2005. Bouché, P., Nzapambetimange, R., Tankalet, F., Zowoya,
Contrasts in availability and consumption of animal protein F., Lejeune, P., Vermeulen, C., In press. Game over! Wildlife
in Bioko Island, West Africa: the role of bushmeat. Environ- collapse in northern Central African Republic. Environmen-
mental Conservation 32, 340-348. tal Monitoring and Assessment.
Alder, J., Sumaila, U., 2004. Western Africa: a fish basket Bouché, P., Renaud, P., Lejeune, P., Vermeulen, C., Fro-
of Europe past and present. The Journal of Environment & ment, J., Bangara, A., Fiongai, O., Abdoulaye, A., Abakar, R.,
Development 13, 156-178. Fay, M., 2010. Has the final countdown to wildlife extinction
in Northern Central African Republic begun? Afr. J. Ecol. 48,
Alexander, K.A., Blackburn, J.K., Vandewalle, M.E., Pesa- 994-1003.
pane, R., Baipoledi, E.K., Elzer, P.H., 2012. Buffalo, Bush
Meat, and the Zoonotic Threat of Brucellosis in Botswana. Bowen-Jones, E., Brown, D., Robinson, E.J.Z., 2003. Eco-
PLoS ONE 7, e32842. nomic commodity or environmental crisis? An interdisciplin-
ary approach to analysing the bushmeat trade in central and
Barnes, J., Alberts, M., MacGregor, J., 2010. An economic west Africa. Area 35, 390-402.
valuation of the impact of climate change on agricultural and
natural resource land uses in Namibia, Environmental Eco- Bowen-Jones, E., Pendry, S., 1999. The threat to primates
nomics Programme, International Institute of Environment and other mammals from the bushmeat trade in Africa, and
and Development, London, UK. how this threat could be diminished 1. Oryx 33, 233-246.
Barnett, R., 2002. Wild meat utilisation in the east and Brashares, J., Goldena, C., Weinbauma, K., Barrettc, C.,
southern Africa region, in: Mainka, S., Trivedi, M. (Eds.), Okello, G., 2011. Economic and geographic drivers of wild-
Links between biodiversity conservation, livelihoods and life consumption in rural Africa. Proceedings of the National
food security: the sustainable use ofwild species for meat. Academy of Sciences 108, 13931-13936.
IUCN, Gland.
Brashares, J.S., Arcese, P., Sam, M.K., Coppolillo, P.B.,
Barnett, R., 1998. Food for Thought: The Utilisation of Sinclair, A.R.E., Balmford, A., 2004. Bushmeat Hunting,
Wild Meat in Eastern and Southern Africa, TRAFFIC East/ Wildlife Declines, and Fish Supply in West Africa. Science
southern Africa, Nairobi. 306, 1180-1183.
Barrett, C.B., Arcese, P., 1998. Wildlife Harvest in Inte- Brodie, J.F., Helmy, O.E., Brockelman, W.Y., Maron, J.L.,
grated Conservation and Development Projects: Linking 2009. Bushmeat poaching reduces the seed dispersal and
Harvest to Household Demand, Agricultural Production, population growth rate of a mammal-dispersed tree. Ecol.
and Environmental Shocks in the Serengeti. Land Econ. 74, Appl. 19, 854-863.
pp. 449-465.
Brown, D., 2007. Is the Best the Enemy of the Good? In-
Bennett, E.L., 2002. Is There a Link between Wild Meat stitutional and Livelihoods Perspectives on Bushmeat Har-
and Food Security? Conserv. Biol. 16, 590-592. vesting and Trade ? Some Issues and Challenges, in: Anony-
mous Bushmeat and Livelihoods: Wildlife Management and
Bloom, D., Canning, D., Fink, G., 2008. Urbanization and Poverty Reduction. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, pp. 111-124.
the Wealth of Nations. Science 319, 772-775.
Bruner, A.G., Gullison, R.E., Rice, R.E., da Fonseca, Gus-
Bond, I., Child, B., De la Harpe, D., Jones, B., Barnes, J.,
tavo A. B., 2001. Effectiveness of Parks in Protecting Tropical
Anderson, H., 2004. Private land contribution to conserva-
Biodiversity. Science 291, 125-128.
tion in southern Africa, in: Child, B. (Ed.), Parks in Transi-
tion: Biodiversity, Rural Development, and the Bottom Line. Campbell, B., Shackleton, S., 2001. The Organizational
Earthscan, London. Structures for Community-Based Natural Resources Man-
agement in Southern Africa. African Studies Quarterly 5,
72
references
73
references
tence Hunting in Arabuko-Sokoke Forest, Kenya, and Its Ef- Cwebe Nature Reserves, Eastern Cape, South Africa. S. Afr.
fects on Mammal Populations. Conserv. Biol. 9, 1116-1126. J. Wildl. Res. 39, 70-84.
Foerster, S., Wilkie, D., Morelli, G., Demmer, J., Starkey, Hayward, M.W., 2012. Perspectives on Fencing for Con-
M., Telfer, P., Steil, M., Lewbel, A., 2012. Correlates of Bush- servation Based on Four Case Studies: Marsupial Conser-
meat Hunting among Remote Rural Households in Gabon, vation in Australian Forests; Bushmeat Hunting in South
Central Africa; Conserv. Biol. 26, 335-344. Africa; Large Predator Reintroduction in South Africa; and
Large Mammal Conservation in Poland. , 7-20.
Fusari, A., Carpaneto, G., 2006. Subsistence hunting and
conservation issues in the game reserve of Gile, Mozambique. Hazzah, L., Dolrenry, S., 2007. Coexisting with predators.
Biodiversity and Conservation 3, 137-155. Seminar 577, 21-27.
Gillingham, S., Lee, P.C., 2003. People and protected ar- Hilborn, R., Arcese, P., Borner, M., Hando, J., Hopcraft,
eas: a study of local perceptions of wildlife crop-damage con- G., Loibooki, M., Mduma, S., Sinclair, A.R.E., 2006. Effec-
flict in an area bordering the Selous Game Reserve, Tanzania. tive Enforcement in a Conservation Area. Science 314, 1266-
Oryx 37, 316. 1266.
Goldman, M., 2003. Partitioned Nature, Privileged Hofer, H., Campbell, K., East, M., Huish, S., 1996. The
Knowledge: Community-based Conservation in Tanzania. impact of game meat hunting on target and non target spe-
Development and Change 34, 833-862. cies in the Serengeti, in: Taylor, V., Dunstone and N. (Eds.),
Exploitation of mammal populations. Chapman & Hall,
Goldman, R.L., Tallis, H., Kareiva, P., Daily, G.C., 2008. Reading, UK, pp. 117-143.
Field evidence that ecosystem service projects support bio-
diversity and diversify options. Proceedings of the National Hofer, H., Campbell, K., East, M., Huish, S., 2000. Model-
Academy of Sciences 105, 9445-9448. ling the spatial distribution of the economic costs and ben-
efits of illegal game meat hunting in the Serengeti. Nat. Re-
Grey-Ross, R., Downs, C.T., Kirkman, K., 2010. An As- sour. Model. 13, 151-177.
sessment of Illegal Hunting on Farmland in KwaZulu-Natal,
South Africa: Implications for Oribi (Ourebia ourebi) Con- Holmern, T., Muya, J., Oslash, R., Skaft, E., 2007. Local
servation. S. Afr. J. Wildl. Res. 40, 43-52. law enforcement and illegal bushmeat hunting outside the
Serengeti National Park, Tanzania. Environ. Conserv. 34, 55.
Groom, B., Palmer, C., 2010. Environmental Services and
Poverty Alleviation: Either, or, or Both? 2012. Holmern, T., Rø, skaft, E., Mbaruka, J., Mkama,
S.Y., Muya, J., 2002. Uneconomical game cropping in a com-
Hatton, J., Couto, M., Oglethorpe, J., 2001. Biodiversity
munity-based conservation project outside the Serengeti Na-
and war: a case study of Mozambique, WWF Biodiversity
tional Park, Tanzania. Oryx 36, 364.
Support Program, Washington DC.
Holmes, G., 2007. - Protection, Politics and Protest: Un-
Haule, K.S., Johnsen, F.H., Maganga, S.L.S., 2002. Striv- derstanding Resistance to Conservation. - Conservat Soc - 5,
ing for sustainable wildlife management: the case of Kilombero 184-201.
Game Controlled Area, Tanzania. J. Environ. Manage. 66, 31-
42. Jachmann, H., Billiouw, M., 1997. Elephant poaching and
law enforcement in the Central Luangwa Valley, Zambia.
Hayes, K., Burge, R., 2003. Coltan Mining in the Demo-
Journal of Applied Ecology 34, 234-244.
cratic Republic of Congo: How tantalum-using industries
can commit to the reconstruction of the DRC, Fauna & Flo- Jachmann, H., 2008a. Illegal wildlife use and protected
ra International, Cambridge, UK. area management in Ghana. Biol. Conserv. 141, 1906-1918.
Hayward, M.W., 2009. Bushmeat Hunting in Dwesa and Jachmann, H., 2008b. Monitoring law-enforcement per-
74
references
formance in nine protected areas in Ghana. Biol. Conserv. O., Cleaveland, S., Karesh, W., et al (Eds.), Conservation
141, 89-99. and development interventions at the wildlife/livestock in-
terfaceimplications for wildlife, livestock and human health.
Jambiya, G., Milledge, S., Mtango, N., 2007. ‘Night Time IUCN, Gland, Switzerland.
Spinach’: Conservation and livelihood implications of wild
meat use in refugee situations in north-western Tanzania, Lewis, D., Bell, S.D., Fay, J., Bothi, K.L., Gatere, L., Kabi-
TRAFFIC East/Southern Africa, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. la, M., Mukamba, M., Matokwani, E., Mushimbalume, M.,
Moraru, C.I., and others, 2011. Community Markets for
Jones, B., 2007. Synthesis of the CBNRM policy and legis- Conservation (COMACO) links biodiversity conservation
lation in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zim- with sustainable improvements in livelihoods and food pro-
babwe, WWF-SARPO, Harare, Zimbabwe. duction. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Keane, A., Jones, J.P.G., Edwards-Jones, G., Milner- 108, 13957-13962.
Gulland, E.J., 2008. The sleeping policeman: understanding Lewis, D.M., Phiri, A., 1998. Wildlife snaring ? an indica-
issues of enforcement and compliance in conservation. Anim. tor of community response to a community-based conserva-
Conserv. 11, 75-82. tion project. Oryx 32, 111-121.
Kiringe, J.W., Okello, M.M., Ekajul, S.W., 2007. Manag- Lindsey, P., Balme, G., Booth, V., Midlane, N., 2012. The
ers’ perceptions of threats to the protected areas of Kenya: Significance of African Lions for the Financial Viability of
prioritization for effective management. Oryx 41, 314. Trophy Hunting and the Maintenance of Wild Land. PLoS
Knapp, E.J., 2007. Who Poaches? Household Economies One, e29332.
of Illegal Hunters in Western Serengeti, Tanzania. Human Lindsey, P., 2010a. The future of wildlife-based land uses in
Dimensions of Wildlife 12, 195-196. Botswana. Current Conservation 3, 23.
Koppmann, R., von Czapiewski, K., Reid, J., 2005. A re- Lindsey, P., 2010b. Human induced mortality and remov-
view of biomass burning emissions, part I: gaseous emissions als of free-ranging cheetahs and leopards in South Africa,
of carbon monoxide, methane, volatile organic compounds, Endangered Wildlife Trust, Johannesburg, South Africa.
and nitrogen containing compounds. Atmos. Chem. Phys.
Discuss. 5, 10455-10516. Lindsey, P., Bento, C., 2012. Illegal Hunting and the Bush-
meat Trade in Central Mozambique. A Case-study from
Le Bel, S., Gaidet, N., Mutake, S., Doze, L., Nyamugure, Coutada 9, Manica Province. TRAFFIC East/Southern Af-
T., 2004. Communal game ranching in Zimbabwe: local em- rica, Harare, Zimbabwe.
powerment and sustainablegame meat production for rural
communities. Game and Wildlife Science 21, 275-290. Lindsey, P., Tambling, C. (Eds.), 2009. The potential pro-
duction of wild meat from Savé Valley Conservancy, Zimba-
Leader-Williams, N., Milner-Gulland, E.J., 1993. Policies bwe, EU-PARSEL, Harare, Zimbabwe.
for the Enforcement of Wildlife Laws: The Balance between
Detection and Penalties in Luangwa Valley, Zambia. Con- Lindsey, P., Havemann, C., Lines, L., Price, A., Retief, T.,
serv. Biol. 7, 611-617. Rhebergen, T., van der Waal, C., Romañach, S., In press. Ben-
efits of wildlife-based land uses on private land in Namibia
LeBreton, M., Prosser, A.T., Tamoufe, U., Sateren, W.,
and limitations affecting their development. Oryx .
Mpoudi-Ngole, E., Diffo, J.L.D., Burke, D.S., Wolfe, N.D.,
2006. Healthy hunting in central Africa. Anim. Conserv. 9, Lindsey, P.A., Roulet, P.A., Romañach, S.S., 2007. Eco-
372-374. nomic and conservation significance of the trophy hunting
industry in sub-Saharan Africa. Biol. Conserv. 134, 455-469.
Lewis, D., 2005. Synergies between animal husbandry and
wildlife conservation: perspectives from Zambia, in: Osofsky,
75
references
Lindsey, P.A., Romañach, S.S., Tambling, C.J., Chartier, Macdonald, D., 2001. Postscript - carnivore conserva-
K., Groom, R., 2011. Ecological and financial impacts of il- tion: science, compromise and tough choices, in: Gittleman,
legal bushmeat trade in Zimbabwe. Oryx 45, 96. J., Funk, S., Macdonald, D. and Wayne, R. (Eds.), Carnivore
Conservation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK,
Lindsey, P.A., Alexander, R., Frank, L.G., Mathieson, A., pp. 524-538.
Romañach, S.S., 2006. Potential of trophy hunting to create
incentives for wildlife conservation in Africa where alterna- Manousrian, S., Dudley, N., 2008. Public fund to protected
tive wildlife-based land uses may not be viable. Anim. Con- areas, WWF, Gland, Switzerland.
serv. 9, 283-291.
Marealle, W.N., Fossa¸Y., F., Holmern, T., Stokke, B.,
Lindsey, P.A., Romañach, S.S., Matema, S., Matema, C., RA¸Skaft, E., 2010. Does illegal hunting skew Serengeti
Mupamhadzi, I., Muvengwi, J., 2011. Dynamics and underly- wildlife sex ratios? Wildl. Biol. 16, 419-429.
ing causes of illegal bushmeat trade in Zimbabwe. Oryx 45,
Masilingi, W., 1996. Social and economic problems experi-
84.
enced in compliance and enforcement in Tanzania.
Lindsey, P.A., Masterson, C.L., Beck, A.L., Romañach,
S., 2012. Ecological, Social and Financial Issues Related to Mendelson, S., Cowlishaw, G., Rowcliffe, J.M., 2003.
Anatomy of a Bushmeat Commodity Chain in Takoradi,
Fencing as a Conservation Tool in Africa, in: Somers, M.J.,
Ghana. Journal of Peasant Studies 31, 73-100.
Hayward, M. (Eds.), Fencing for Conservation. Springer
New York, pp. 215-234. Metzger, K., Sinclair, A., Hilborn, R., Hopcraft, G., Mdu-
ma, S., 2010. Evaluating the protection of wildlife in parks:
Lindsey, P.A., Alexander, R.R., du Toit, J.T., Mills, M.G.L.,
2005. The potential contribution of ecotourism to African the case of African buffalo in Serengeti. 19, 3431-3444.
wild dog Lycaon pictus conservation in South Africa. Biol. Milner-Gulland, E.J., Bennett, E.L., 2003. Wild meat: the
Conserv. 123, 339-348. bigger picture. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 18, 351-357.
Lindsey, P.A., Alexander, R., Mills, M.G.L., Romanach, S., Mockrin, M., Rockwell, R., Redford, K., Keuler, N., 2011.
Woodroffe, R., 2007. Wildlife Viewing Preferences of Visi- Effects of Landscape Features on the Distribution and Sus-
tors to Protected Areas in South Africa: Implications for the tainability of Ungulate Hunting in Northern Congo. Con-
Role of Ecotourism in Conservation. Journal of Ecotourism serv. Biol. 25, 514-525.
6, 19-33.
Montag, J., 2003. Compensation and predator conserva-
Loibooki, M., Hofer, H., Campbell, K.L.I., East, M.L., tion: Limitations of compensation. Carnivore Damage Pre-
2002. Bushmeat hunting by communities adjacent to the vention News 6, 2-6.
Serengeti National Park, Tanzania: the importance of live-
stock ownership and alternative sources of protein and in- Morgera, E., 2009. Wildlife law in the southern African
come. Environ. Conserv. 29, 391. development community, FAO/CIC, Budapest, Hungary.
Loveridge, A., Wang, W., Frank, L., Seidensticker, J., 2010. Muchaal, P.K., Ngandjui, G., 1999. Impact of Village
People and wild felids: conservation of cats and management Hunting on Wildlife Populations in the Western Dja Re-
of conflicts, in: Macdonal, D., Loveridge, A. (Eds.), Biology serve, Cameroon. Conserv. Biol. 13, 385-396.
and Conservation of Wild Felids. Oxford University Press,
Muriuki, G.W., Njoka, T.J., Reid, R.S., Nyariki, D.M.,
Oxford, pp. 161-195.
2005. Tsetse control and land-use change in Lambwe valley,
Lynam, C., Gibbons, M., Axelsen, B., Sparks, C., Coetzee, south-western Kenya. Agric. , Ecosyst. Environ. 106, 99-107.
J., Heywood, B., Brierley, A., 2006. Jellyfish overtake fish in a
Nasi, R., Brown, D., Wilkie, D., Bennett, E., Tutin, C., van
heavily fished ecosystem. Current Biology 16, 492-493.
Tol, G., Christophersen, T., 2008. Conservation and use of
76
references
wildlife-based resources: the bushmeat crisis. Technical Se- and the variations in the Nile perch and other fish stocks of
ries no. 33. Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Di- Lake Kyoga and the northern waters of Lake Victoria (Ugan-
versity, Montreal, and Center for International Forestry Re- da). J. Fish Biol. 37, 55-63.
search (CIFOR), Bogor, Indonesia.
Okello, M.M., Kiringe, J.W., 2004. Threats to Biodiversity
National Agricultural Marketing Council, 2006. Report and their Implications in Protected and Adjacent Dispersal
on the investigation to identify problems for sustainable Areas of Kenya. Journal of Sustainable Tourism 12, 55-69.
growth and development in South African wildlife ranching.
Poulsen, J.R., Clark, C.J., Mavah, G., Elkan, P.W., 2009.
National Agricultural Marketing Council Report, Pretoria,
Bushmeat Supply and Consumption in a Tropical Logging
South Africa.
Concession in Northern Congo. Conserv. Biol. 23, 1597-
Naughton-Treves, L., Holland, M.B., Brandon, K., 2005. 1608.
The role of protected areas in conserving biodiversity and
Redford, K., 1992. The empty forest. Bioscience 42, 412-
sustaining local livelihoods. Annu. Rev. Environ. Resourc. 30,
422.
219-252.
Renaud, P., 2011. Inventaire aérien et terrestre de la faune
Ndibalema, V.G., Songorwa, A.N., 2008. Illegal meat
et relevé des pressions au Parc National du Niokolo Koba,
hunting in serengeti: dynamics in consumption and prefer-
ences. Afr. J. Ecol. 46, 311-319. African Parks Network.
Newmark, W.D., 2008. Isolation of African protected ar- Rist, J., Milner-Gulland, E.J., Cowlishaw, G., Rowcliffe,
eas. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 6, 321-328. M., 2010. Hunter Reporting of Catch per Unit Effort as a
Monitoring Tool in a Bushmeat-Harvesting System. Con-
Newmark, W.D., Leonard, N.L., Sariko, H.I., Gamassa, serv. Biol. 24, 489-499.
D.M., 1993. Conservation attitudes of local people living ad-
jacent to five protected areas in Tanzania. Biol. Conserv. 63, Robinson, J.G., Bennett, E.L., 2004. Having your wildlife
177-183. and eating it too: an analysis of hunting sustainability across
tropical ecosystems. Anim. Conserv. 7, 397-408.
Nielsen, M.R., 2006. Importance, cause and effect of bush-
Roche, C., 2011. Unlocking Tourism Value in an African
meat hunting in the Udzungwa Mountains, Tanzania: Im-
Rainforest, in: Anon. (Ed.), African Parks Network annual
plications for community based wildlife management. Biol.
report, 2011. African Parks Network, Johannesburg, South
Conserv. 128, 509-516.
Africa, pp. 41-41.
Norton-Griffiths, M., 2007. How many wildebeest do you
Ronnback, P., Bryceson, I., Kautsky, N., 2002. Coastal
need? World Economics 8, 41-64.
Aquaculture Development in Eastern Africa and the West-
Noss, A.J., 1998. The Impacts of Cable Snare Hunting on ern Indian Ocean: Prospects and Problems for Food Security
Wildlife Populations in the Forests of the Central African and Local Economies. AMBIO: A Journal of the Human
Republic. Conserv. Biol. 12, 390-398. Environment 31, 537-542.
Nyahongo, J.W., East, J.W., Mturi, F.A., Hofer, H., 2005. Rowcliffe, J.M., de Merode, E., Cowlishaw, G., 2004. Do
Benefits and costs of illegal grazing and hunting in the Seren- wildlife laws work? Species protection and the application of
geti ecosystem. Environ. Conserv. 32, 326. a prey choice model to poaching decisions. Proceedings of
the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences
Ogutu, J.O., Piepho, H., Dublin, H.T., Bhola, N., Reid, 271, 2631-2636.
R.S., 2009. Dynamics of Mara?Serengeti ungulates in rela-
tion to land use changes. J. Zool. 278, 1-14. Scholte, P., 2011. Towards understanding large mammal
population declines in Africa’s protected areas: A West-
Ogutu-Ohwayo, R., 1990. Changes in the prey ingested
77
references
Central African perspective. Tropical Conservation Science Taylor, R.D., 2009. Community based natural resource
4, 1-11. management in Zimbabwe: the experience of CAMPFIRE.
Biodiversity and Conservation 18(10), 2563-2583.
Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
2011. Outcomes of the joint meeting of the CBD liaison Thirgood, S., Woodroffe, R., Rabinowitz, A., 2005. The
group on bushmet and the CITES Central Africa bushmeat impact of human-wildlife conflict on human lives and live-
working group. lihoods, in: Woodroffe, R., Thirgood, S. and Rabinowitz, A.
(Eds.), People and Wildlife: Conflict or Coexistence? Cam-
Simasiku, P., Simwanza, H., Tembo, G., Bandyopadhyay, bridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
S., Pavy, J., 2008. The impact of wildlife management poli-
cies on communities and conservation in Game Management Tidwell, J., Allen, G., 2001. Fish as food: aquaculture’s
Areas in Zambia, Natural Resources Consultative Forum, contribution. Embo 21, 958-963.
Zambia.
Van Vliet, N., 2011. Livelihood alternatives for the un-
Smith, K.M., Anthony, S.J., Switzer, W.M., Epstein, J.H., sustainable use of bushmeat. Report prepared for the CBD
Seimon, T., Jia, H., Sanchez, M.D., Huynh, T.T., Galland, Bushmeat Liaison Group.
G.G., Shapiro, S.E., and others, 2012. Zoonotic Viruses As-
Technical Serices No. 60, Montreal, SCBD, 1-46.
sociated with Illegally Imported Wildlife Products. PLoS
ONE 7, e29505. Venter, O., Laurance, W.F., Iwamura, T., Wilson, K.A.,
Snyman, S.L., 2012. The role of tourism employment in Fuller, R.A., Possingham, H.P., 2009. Harnessing Carbon
poverty reduction and community perceptions of conserva- Payments to Protect Biodiversity. Science 326, 1368-1368.
tion and tourism in southern Africa. Journal of Sustainable Wato, Y.A., Wahungu, G.M., Okello, M.M., 2006. Corre-
Tourism 20, 395-416. lates of wildlife snaring patterns in Tsavo West National Park,
Kenya. Biol. Conserv. 132, 500-509.
Stiles, D., 2011. Elephant meat and ivory trade in Central
Africa. Pachyderm 50, 26-36. Wilfred, P., MacColl, A., 2010. Income sources and their
Stokes, E.J., Strindberg, S., Bakabana, P.C., Elkan, P.W., relation to wildlife poaching in Ugalla ecosystem, Western
Iyenguet, F.C., Madzoka, B., Malanda, G.A.F., Mowawa, Tanzania. African Journal of Environmental Science and
B.S., Moukoumbou, C., Ouakabadio, F.K., and others, 2010. Technology 4, 886-896.
Monitoring Great Ape and Elephant Abundance at Large Wilkie, D., Starkey, M., Abernethy, K., Effa, E., Telfer, P.,
Spatial Scales: Measuring Effectiveness of a Conservation Godoy, R., 2005. Role of Prices and Wealth in Consumer
Landscape. PLoS ONE 5, e10294. Demand for Bushmeat in Gabon, Central Africa. Conserv.
Stoner, C., Caro, T., Mduma, S., Mlingwa, C., Sabuni, G., Biol. 19, 268-274.
Borner, M., 2007. Assessment of Effectiveness of Protection Wilkie, D.S., Carpenter, J., 1999. Can nature tourism help
Strategies in Tanzania Based on a Decade of Survey Data for finance protected areas in the Congo Basin? Oryx 33, 333-
Large Herbivores. Conserv. Biol. 21, 635-646. 339.
Stuart-Hill, G., Diggle, R., Munali, B., Tagg, J., Ward, D., Wilkie, D.S., Bennett, E.L., Peres, C.A., Cunningham,
2005. The event book system: a community-based natural A.A., 2011. The empty forest revisited. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci.
resource monitoring system from Namibia. Biodiversity and 1223, 120-128.
Conservation 14, 2611-2631.
Wilkie, D.S.S., 1999. Bushmeat hunting in the Congo
Suich, H., Child, B., Spenceley, A., 2009. Evolution and Basin: an assessment of impacts and options for mitigation.
innovation in wildlife conservation: parks and game ranches Biodivers. Conserv. 8, 927-955.
to transfrontier conservation areas, Earthscan.
78
references
79