15 Servando Vs Steam Navigation
15 Servando Vs Steam Navigation
15 Servando Vs Steam Navigation
ESCOLIN, J.:
This appeal, originally brought to the Court of Appeals, seeks to set aside the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Cases Nos. 7354
and 7428, declaring appellant Philippine Steam Navigation liable for damages for
the loss of the appellees' cargoes as a result of a fire which gutted the Bureau of
Customs' warehouse in Pulupandan, Negros Occidental.
The Court of Appeals certified the case to Us because only pure questions of law
are raised therein.
The facts culled from the pleadings and the stipulations submitted by the parties are
as follows:
Clara Uy Bico —
at P40,907.50;
Amparo Servando —
On the bases of the foregoing facts, the lower court rendered a decision, the
decretal portion of which reads as follows:
1. In case No. 7354, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
Amparo C. Servando the aggregate sum of P1,070.50 with legal
interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully
paid, and to pay the costs.
Article 1736 of the Civil Code imposes upon common carriers the duty to observe
extraordinary diligence from the moment the goods are unconditionally placed in
their possession "until the same are delivered, actually or constructively, by the
carrier to the consignee or to the person who has a right to receive them, without
prejudice to the provisions of Article 1738. "
The court a quo held that the delivery of the shipment in question to the warehouse
of the Bureau of Customs is not the delivery contemplated by Article 1736; and since
the burning of the warehouse occurred before actual or constructive delivery of the
goods to the appellees, the loss is chargeable against the appellant.
It should be pointed out, however, that in the bills of lading issued for the cargoes in
question, the parties agreed to limit the responsibility of the carrier for the loss or
damage that may be caused to the shipment by inserting therein the following
stipulation:
Appellees would contend that the above stipulation does not bind them because it
was printed in fine letters on the back-of the bills of lading; and that they did not sign
the same. This argument overlooks the pronouncement of this Court in Ong Yiu vs.
Court of Appeals, promulgated June 29, 1979, 3 where the same issue was resolved in
this wise:
While it may be true that petitioner had not signed the plane ticket (Exh.
'12'), he is nevertheless bound by the provisions thereof. 'Such
provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage, and
valid and binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of
knowledge or assent to the regulation'. It is what is known as a contract
of 'adhesion', in regards which it has been said that contracts of
adhesion wherein one party imposes a ready made form of contract on
the other, as the plane ticket in the case at bar, are contracts not
entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the contract is in reality
free to reject it entirely; if he adheres, he gives his consent." (Tolentino,
Civil Code, Vol. IV, 1962 Ed., p. 462, citing Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
Lawyer's Journal, Jan. 31, 1951, p. 49).
Besides, the agreement contained in the above quoted Clause 14 is a mere iteration
of the basic principle of law written in Article 1 1 7 4 of the Civil Code:
Thus, where fortuitous event or force majeure is the immediate and proximate cause
of the loss, the obligor is exempt from liability for non-performance. The
Partidas, 4 the antecedent of Article 1174 of the Civil Code, defines 'caso fortuito' as 'an
event that takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. Examples of this
are destruction of houses, unexpected fire, shipwreck, violence of robbers.'
There is nothing in the record to show that appellant carrier ,incurred in delay in the
performance of its obligation. It appears that appellant had not only notified
appellees of the arrival of their shipment, but had demanded that the same be
withdrawn. In fact, pursuant to such demand, appellee Uy Bico had taken delivery of
907 cavans of rice before the burning of the warehouse.
Nor can the appellant or its employees be charged with negligence. The storage of
the goods in the Customs warehouse pending withdrawal thereof by the appellees
was undoubtedly made with their knowledge and consent. Since the warehouse
belonged to and was maintained by the government, it would be unfair to impute
negligence to the appellant, the latter having no control whatsoever over the same.
The lower court in its decision relied on the ruling laid down in Yu Biao Sontua vs.
Ossorio 6, where this Court held the defendant liable for damages arising from a fire
caused by the negligence of the defendant's employees while loading cases of gasoline
and petroleon products. But unlike in the said case, there is not a shred of proof in the
present case that the cause of the fire that broke out in the Custom's warehouse was in
any way attributable to the negligence of the appellant or its employees. Under the
circumstances, the appellant is plainly not responsible.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the extraordinary liability of the
common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored
in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee has
been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity
thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them".
From the time the goods in question were deposited in the Bureau of Customs'
warehouse in the morning of their arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the
same day, when the warehouse was burned, Amparo C. Servando and Clara Uy
Bico, the consignees, had reasonable opportunity to remove the goods. Clara had
removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to her.
Moreover, the shipping company had no more control and responsibility over the
goods after they were deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre and
stevedoring operator.
No amount of extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented
the loss of the goods by fire which was of accidental origin.
Under those circumstances, it would not be legal and just to hold the carrier liable to
the consignees for the loss of the goods. The consignees should bear the loss which
was due to a fortuitous event.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur. Under article 1738 of the Civil Code "the extraordinary liability of the
common carrier continues to be operative even during the time the goods are stored
in the warehouse of the carrier at the place of destination, until the consignee has
been advised of the arrival of the goods and has had reasonable opportunity
thereafter to remove them or otherwise dispose of them".
From the time the goods in question were deposited in the Bureau of Customs'
warehouse in the morning of their arrival up to two o' clock in the afternoon of the
same day, when the warehouse was burned, Amparo C. Servando and Clara Uy
Bico, the consignees, had reasonable opportunity to remove the goods. Clara had
removed more than one-half of the rice consigned to her.
Moreover, the shipping company had no more control and responsibility over the
goods after they were deposited in the customs warehouse by the arrastre and
stevedoring operator.
No amount of extraordinary diligence on the part of the carrier could have prevented
the loss of the goods by fire which was of accidental origin.
Under those circumstances, it would not be legal and just to hold the carrier liable to
the consignees for the loss of the goods. The consignees should bear the loss which
was due to a fortuitous event.