FM 3-90 Tactics

*FM 3-90
Field Manual Headquarters

No. 3-90 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 4 July 2001
TACTICS
Contents
Page
FIGURES.................................................................................................................... vi
TABLES .................................................................................................................... xii
PREFACE..................................................................................................................xiii
PART ONE TACTICAL FUNDAMENTALS
Chapter 1 THE ART OF TACTICS ...........................................................................................1-1
The Tactical Level of War.........................................................................................1-2
The Science and Art of Tactics ................................................................................1-3
Historical Example....................................................................................................1-6
Hasty Versus Deliberate Operations ........................................................................1-9
Solving Tactical Problems ......................................................................................1-13
Chapter 2 COMMON TACTICAL CONCEPTS AND GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES......2-1

Doctrinal Hierarchy ...................................................................................................2-1
The Operational Framework.....................................................................................2-3
Principles of War ......................................................................................................2-3
Tenets of Army Operations.......................................................................................2-4
The Factors of METT-TC..........................................................................................2-4
Elements of Operational Design...............................................................................2-4
Battlefield Operating Systems ..................................................................................2-5
Basic Tactical Concepts ...........................................................................................2-5
Basic Tactical Graphic Control Measures ..............................................................2-10
PART TWO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Chapter 3 THE BASICS OF THE OFFENSE............................................................................3-0
Characteristics of Offensive Operations...................................................................3-1
Historical Example....................................................................................................3-1
Types of Offensive Operations .................................................................................3-3
Common Offensive Control Measures .....................................................................3-4
Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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FM 3-90
Forms of Maneuver ................................................................................................ 3-11

Common Offensive Planning Considerations ........................................................ 3-33
Transition ............................................................................................................... 3-50
Chapter 4 MOVEMENT TO CONTACT.................................................................................... 4-1

Historical Example ................................................................................................... 4-2
Organization of Forces............................................................................................. 4-3
Control Measures..................................................................................................... 4-6
Planning a Movement to Contact............................................................................. 4-8
Executing a Movement to Contact ........................................................................... 4-9
Search and Attack.................................................................................................. 4-16
Chapter 5 ATTACK .................................................................................................................. 5-0

Planning an Attack ................................................................................................... 5-4
Preparing an Attack ............................................................................................... 5-11
Executing an Attack ............................................................................................... 5-14
Special Purpose Attacks ........................................................................................ 5-29
Chapter 6 EXPLOITATION....................................................................................................... 6-1

Planning an Exploitation........................................................................................... 6-6
Executing an Exploitation....................................................................................... 6-10
Chapter 7 PURSUIT ................................................................................................................. 7-1

Planning a Pursuit .................................................................................................... 7-7
Executing a Pursuit .................................................................................................. 7-8
PART THREE DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Chapter 8 BASICS OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS ............................................................... 8-1
Historical Example ................................................................................................... 8-2
Types of Defensive Operations................................................................................ 8-4
Common Defensive Control Measures .................................................................... 8-5
Common Defensive Planning Considerations ....................................................... 8-12
Common Defensive Scenarios .............................................................................. 8-30
Transition ............................................................................................................... 8-42
ii
Contents
Chapter 9 THE AREA DEFENSE .............................................................................................9-1

Organization of Forces .............................................................................................9-2
Control Measures .....................................................................................................9-5
Planning an Area Defense........................................................................................9-6
Preparing an Area Defense ....................................................................................9-13
Executing an Area Defense....................................................................................9-16
Chapter 10 THE MOBILE DEFENSE .......................................................................................10-1

Historical Example..................................................................................................10-2
Organization of Forces ...........................................................................................10-3
Control Measures ...................................................................................................10-6
Planning a Mobile Defense.....................................................................................10-7
Preparing a Mobile Defense ...................................................................................10-8
Execution of a Mobile Defense...............................................................................10-9
Chapter 11 THE RETROGRADE..............................................................................................11-1

Delay.......................................................................................................................11-3
Withdrawal ............................................................................................................11-18
Retirement ............................................................................................................11-24
Combat Service Support ......................................................................................11-26
Unique Retrograde Situations ..............................................................................11-28
PART FOUR TACTICAL ENABLING OPERATIONS

Chapter 12 SECURITY OPERATIONS.....................................................................................12-0
Fundamentals of Security Operations ....................................................................12-2
General Considerations for Security Operations....................................................12-4
Screen ..................................................................................................................12-13
Guard....................................................................................................................12-19
Cover ....................................................................................................................12-25
Area Security ........................................................................................................12-31
Local Security .......................................................................................................12-32
Combat Outposts..................................................................................................12-32
Chapter 13 RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ....................................................................13-0

Reconnaissance Objective .....................................................................................13-1
Reconnaissance Fundamentals .............................................................................13-1
Characteristics of Reconnaissance Assets ............................................................13-5
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FM 3-90
Forms of Reconnaissance ..................................................................................... 13-8

Planning a Reconnaissance ................................................................................ 13-14
Executing a Reconnaissance............................................................................... 13-17
Recuperation and Reconstitution of Reconnaissance Assets ............................. 13-19
Chapter 14 TROOP MOVEMENT ............................................................................................ 14-1

Methods of Troop Movement ................................................................................. 14-1
Administrative Movement....................................................................................... 14-3
Tactical Road March .............................................................................................. 14-3
Approach March..................................................................................................... 14-8
Movement Techniques........................................................................................... 14-9
Planning a Troop Movement................................................................................ 14-12
Preparing a Troop Movement .............................................................................. 14-15
Executing a Troop Movement .............................................................................. 14-15
Movement Control................................................................................................ 14-16
Chapter 15 RELIEF IN PLACE................................................................................................. 15-1

Organization of Forces........................................................................................... 15-2
Control Measures................................................................................................... 15-2
Planning a Relief in Place ...................................................................................... 15-2
Preparing a Relief in Place .................................................................................... 15-5
Executing a Relief in Place .................................................................................... 15-6
Chapter 16 PASSAGE OF LINES ............................................................................................ 16-0

Organization of Forces........................................................................................... 16-1
Control Measures................................................................................................... 16-1
Planning a Passage of Lines ................................................................................. 16-3
Forward Passage of Lines ..................................................................................... 16-6
Rearward Passage of Lines ................................................................................... 16-8
Appendix A ARMY BRANCHES AND TACTICAL ECHELONS ................................................A-1

Combat Arms ...........................................................................................................A-2
Combat Support .......................................................................................................A-8
Combat Service Support ........................................................................................A-11
Tactical Echelons ...................................................................................................A-15
Appendix B TACTICAL MISSION TASKS..................................................................................B-1

Actions by Friendly Force.........................................................................................B-3
Effects on Enemy Force.........................................................................................B-13
iv
Contents
Appendix C AIRBORNE AND AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS .................................................. C-1

Common Factors ..................................................................................................... C-1
Airborne Operations ................................................................................................ C-3
Air Assault Operations........................................................................................... C-12
Appendix D ENCIRCLEMENT OPERATIONS ........................................................................... D-0

Offensive Encirclement Operations ......................................................................... D-0
Defending Encircled ................................................................................................ D-7
Breakout from an Encirclement ............................................................................. D-10
Exfiltration .............................................................................................................. D-17
Attacking Deeper into Enemy Territory ................................................................. D-17
Linkup .................................................................................................................... D-17
Appendix E REAR AREA AND BASE SECURITY .................................................................... E-0

Command Responsibilities ...................................................................................... E-1
Control Exercised by US Area Commanders .......................................................... E-7
Base and Base Cluster Defense ........................................................................... E-10
Route Security ....................................................................................................... E-31
Convoy Security..................................................................................................... E-33
SOURCE NOTES.................................................................................Source Notes-1

GLOSSARY................................................................................................. Glossary-1
BIBILOGRAPHY ......................................................................................Biliography-0
INDEX................................................................................................................Index-0
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Figures
Figure Page
1-1. Initial Situation ............................................................................................. 1-7
1-2. British Moves............................................................................................... 1-8
1-3. Final Battle Stage ........................................................................................ 1-8
1-4. Risk Reduction Factors ............................................................................. 1-13
2-1. Doctrinal Hierarchy of Operations ............................................................... 2-2
2-2. Flanks of a Stationary Unit .......................................................................... 2-7
2-3. Flanks of an Armor-Heavy Team Moving in an Echelon Right Formation .. 2-7
2-4. Generic Air Corridor .................................................................................. 2-12
2-5 Corps with Contiguous Areas of Operations ............................................. 2-16
2-6. Corps with Noncontiguous Areas of Operations ....................................... 2-17
2-7. Assembly Areas ........................................................................................ 2-19
2-8. Checkpoint 13 ........................................................................................... 2-19
2-9. Contact Point 8.......................................................................................... 2-20
2-10. Engagement Areas ................................................................................... 2-21
2-11. Sectors of Fire........................................................................................... 2-22
2-12. Target Reference Point ............................................................................. 2-23
2-13. Trigger Lines ............................................................................................. 2-23
2-14. Deep, Close, and Rear Areas ................................................................... 2-25
2-15. Coordinated Fire Line................................................................................ 2-27
2-16. Fire Support Coordination Line ................................................................. 2-27
2-17. Free-Fire Area........................................................................................... 2-28
2-18. A Formal Airspace Coordination Measure ................................................ 2-29
2-19. No-Fire Area.............................................................................................. 2-30
2-20. Restrictive Fire Area.................................................................................. 2-30
2-21. Restrictive Fire Line .................................................................................. 2-31
2-22. Targets ...................................................................................................... 2-31
2-23. Forward Line of Own Troops..................................................................... 2-32
2-24. Line of Contact .......................................................................................... 2-32
2-25. Named Area of Interest ............................................................................. 2-33
2-26. Obstacle Control Measure Graphics ......................................................... 2-34
2-27. Phase Lines Used with Other Control Measures ...................................... 2-37
2-28. Position Area for Artillery........................................................................... 2-38
2-29. Routes ....................................................................................................... 2-38
vi
Figures
2-30. Targeted Area of Interest...........................................................................2-39

3-1. Initial Objectives...........................................................................................3-2
3-2. Attack-by-Fire Position BRANDON..............................................................3-5
3-3. Attack Positions Used with Other Common Offensive Control Measures...3-6
3-4. Axis of Advance ...........................................................................................3-6
3-5. Direction of Attack JOAN.............................................................................3-7
3-6. Final Coordination Line (FCL) ROBERT Used in Conjunction with Other
Offensive Control Measures ........................................................................3-7
3-7. Limit of Advance Used with Other Common Control Measures ..................3-8
3-8. PL DON as a LD ..........................................................................................3-8
3-9. Objective STEVE .........................................................................................3-9
3-10. Point of Departure 7.....................................................................................3-9
3-11. Probable Line of Deployment ROBERT Used with Other Control
Measures ...................................................................................................3-10
3-12. Rally Point 14.............................................................................................3-10
3-13. Support-by-Fire Position SCOTT...............................................................3-11
3-14. Single Envelopment...................................................................................3-12
3-15. Double Envelopment .................................................................................3-13
3-16. Control Measures for Conducting an Envelopment...................................3-14
3-17. Turning Movement—Turning Force Conducting the Decisive Operation..3-16
3-18. Control Measures for a Turning Movement ...............................................3-17
3-19. Infiltration Lane ..........................................................................................3-21
3-20. Linkup Point 8 ............................................................................................3-21
3-21. Penetration: Relative Combat Power.........................................................3-26
3-22. Penetration Graphic Control Measures .....................................................3-27
3-23. Penetration: The Breach............................................................................3-29
3-24. Expanding the Penetration ........................................................................3-30
3-25. Frontal Attack ............................................................................................3-31
3-26. Column Formation .....................................................................................3-36
3-27. Line Formation...........................................................................................3-37
3-28. Echelon Left Formation .............................................................................3-37
3-29. Echelon Right Formation ...........................................................................3-38
3-30. Box Formation ...........................................................................................3-38
3-31. Diamond Formation ...................................................................................3-38
3-32. Wedge Formation......................................................................................3-39
3-33. Vee Formation ...........................................................................................3-40
4-1. Soviet Moves ...............................................................................................4-3
4-2. Force Organized for a Movement to Contact ..............................................4-4
4-3. Movement to Contact Control Measures .....................................................4-7
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FM 3-90
4-4. A Column Advance Guard Attacking to Destroy a Contained Enemy

Force ......................................................................................................... 4-10
4-5. Search and Attack Control Measures ....................................................... 4-17
5-1. Minimum Attack Control Measures ............................................................. 5-3
5-2. Movement from AA to LD.......................................................................... 5-13
5-3. PLD and Assault Positions ........................................................................ 5-21
5-4. Attack of an Objective: The Breach .......................................................... 5-24
5-5. Attack of an Objective: The Assault .......................................................... 5-24
5-6. Ambush Tactical Mission Graphic............................................................. 5-29
5-7. Linear Ambush .......................................................................................... 5-31
5-8. L-Shaped Ambush .................................................................................... 5-32
5-9. Area Ambush ............................................................................................ 5-33
5-10. Major Counterattack.................................................................................. 5-35
5-11. Spoiling Attack .......................................................................................... 5-40
6-1. Exploitation Control Measures in a Contiguous AO .................................... 6-5
6-2. Brigade Exploitation: Battalions in Column Formation ................................ 6-7
6-3. Division Exploitation: Brigades Abreast, No Reserve ................................. 6-8
6-4. Brigade Exploitation: Two Battalions Forward, One in Reserve ................. 6-9
7-1. Frontal Pursuit............................................................................................. 7-3
7-2. Combination Pursuit.................................................................................... 7-4
7-3. Pursuit Control Measures............................................................................ 7-6
8-1. Movements of an Area Defense ................................................................. 8-3
8-2. Use of a BHL in a Rearward Passage of Lines........................................... 8-6
8-3. Forward Edge of the Battle Area................................................................. 8-7
8-4. Task Force Battle Position .......................................................................... 8-8
8-5. AO and Battle Position Control Measures Used in Combination ................ 8-8
8-6. Five Kinds of Battle Positions...................................................................... 8-9
8-7. Strong Point Defense ................................................................................ 8-10
8-8. Final Protective Fire .................................................................................. 8-11
8-9. Direct Fire Control Measures .................................................................... 8-11
8-10. Perimeter Defense .................................................................................... 8-33
8-11. All Company Teams on the Perimeter ...................................................... 8-33
8-12. Three Battalion TFs on Perimeter, Co/Teams Positioned in Depth .......... 8-34
8-13. Two Battalion TFs on the Perimeter, One in Reserve .............................. 8-34
8-14. Perimeter Defense Control Measures....................................................... 8-36
8-15. A Hill in Cross-Section .............................................................................. 8-39
8-16. Oblique Defilade........................................................................................ 8-40
9-1. Typical Control Measures for an Area Defense .......................................... 9-5
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Figures
9-2. Organization of Forces for an Area Defense—Contiguous Area of

Operations ...................................................................................................9-6
9-3. Organization of Forces for an Area Defense—Noncontiguous Area of
Operations ...................................................................................................9-7
9-4. Division Conducting a Defense in Depth with Subordinate Brigades
Deployed in Noncontiguous Areas of Operations with Enemy Avenues
of Approach Depicted ................................................................................9-10
9-5. Brigade Conducting a Forward Defense in a Contiguous Area of
Operations .................................................................................................9-11
9-6. Division Counterattack...............................................................................9-13
9-7. Area Defense Using Static and Dynamic Elements ..................................9-16
9-8. Battle Handover Line .................................................................................9-18
10-1. Donbas Movements...................................................................................10-3
10-2. Mobile Defense..........................................................................................10-4
10-3. Organization of Forces for a Mobile Defense ............................................10-4
10-4. Mobile Defense Control Measures ............................................................10-6
10-5. Mobile Defense Before Commitment of Striking Force ...........................10-10
10-5. Mobile Defense After Commitment of Striking Force ..............................10-12
11-1. Withdrawal from Resaca ...........................................................................11-3
11-2. Delay Tactical Mission Graphic .................................................................11-6
11-3. Control Measures for a Delay....................................................................11-6
11-4. Delay Forward of a Specified Line for a Specified Time............................11-9
11-5. Delay from Alternate Positions ................................................................11-10
11-6. Delay from Subsequent Positions............................................................11-11
11-7. Detachment Left in Contact .....................................................................11-20
11-8. Withdrawal Control Measures .................................................................11-21
11-9. Types of Withdrawals ..............................................................................11-22
11-10. Retirement Tactical Mission Graphic.......................................................11-24
11-11. Organization of Forces for a Retirement Operation.................................11-25
11-12. Stay-Behind Force ...................................................................................11-30
12-1. Common Security Control Measures.........................................................12-5
12-2. Security Force Crossing the LD Separately from the Main Body to
Establish a Flank Screen.........................................................................12-12
12-3. Security Force Continuing to Cross the LD Separately from the
Main Body to Establish a Flank Screen ...................................................12-12
12-4. Second Technique Used by a Moving Flank Security Force to
Establish a Moving Flank Screen ............................................................12-13
12-5. Third Technique Used by a Moving Flank Security Force to
Establish a Flank Guard or Cover ...........................................................12-14
12-6. Control Measures Used in a Screen Mission ..........................................12-16
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FM 3-90
12-7. Moving Flank Screen .............................................................................. 12-17

12-8. Displacement Methods for a Flank Screen ............................................. 12-18
12-9. More Displacement Methods for a Flank Screen.................................... 12-18
12-10. Guard Locations...................................................................................... 12-19
12-11. Advance Guard for a Division Shaping Attack ........................................ 12-21
12-12. Multiple Security Forces .......................................................................... 12-22
12-13. Stationary Flank Guard ........................................................................... 12-23
12-14. Moving Flank Guard Control Measures .................................................. 12-25
12-15. Attack Using a Covering Force ............................................................... 12-27
12-16. Generic Depiction of a Defensive Cover ................................................. 12-29
12-17. Combat Outposts .................................................................................... 12-33
13-1. Mongol Army Route................................................................................... 13-4
13-2. Mongol Army Pursuit ................................................................................. 13-5
13-3. Route Reconnaissance Control Measures................................................ 13-9
13-4. Zone Reconnaissance Control Measures ............................................... 13-11
13-5. Area Reconnaissance Control Measures................................................ 13-13
14-1. Tactical Road March ................................................................................. 14-4
14-2. Route Control Measures ........................................................................... 14-5
14-3. Start Point.................................................................................................. 14-5
14-4. Release Point ............................................................................................ 14-6
14-5. Light Line................................................................................................... 14-6
14-6. Approach March........................................................................................ 14-8
14-7. Movement Techniques............................................................................ 14-10
14-8. Traveling ................................................................................................. 14-10
14-9. Traveling Overwatch ............................................................................... 14-11
14-10. Bounding Overwatch—Alternate Bounds................................................ 14-12
14-11. Bounding Overwatch—Successive Bounds............................................ 14-12
14-12. Corps Movement Control ........................................................................ 14-16
15-1. Overlay of a Brigade Relief in Place.......................................................... 15-3
16-1. Control Measures Associated with a Forward Passage of Lines .............. 16-2
16-2. Passage Point 8 ........................................................................................ 16-2
16-3. Lane .......................................................................................................... 16-2
16-4. Gap ........................................................................................................... 16-3
16-5. Forward Passage of Lines ........................................................................ 16-6
16-6. Rearward Passage of Lines .................................................................... 16-10
A-1. Combat Arms Capabilities...........................................................................A-2
A-2. Combat Support Capabilities ......................................................................A-8
A-3. Combat Service Support Capabilities .......................................................A-12
x
Figures
A-4. Airborne Battalion-Size Task Force.......................................................... A-17

A-5. Heavy Brigade Combat Team .................................................................. A-18
A-6. IBCT Organization .................................................................................... A-19
A-7. Heavy Division .......................................................................................... A-20
A-8. Representative Corps Organizational Diagram ........................................ A-21
B-1. Tactical Mission Tasks ............................................................................... B-2
B-2. Attack-by-Fire Tactical Mission Graphic ..................................................... B-3
B-3. Breach Tactical Mission Graphic ................................................................ B-4
B-4. Bypass Tactical Mission Graphic................................................................ B-4
B-5. Task Force Conducting a Fix and a Bypass............................................... B-5
B-6. Clear Tactical Mission Graphic................................................................... B-6
B-7. Follow and Assume Tactical Mission Graphic ............................................ B-9
B-8. Follow and Support Tactical Mission Graphic .......................................... B-10
B-9. Occupy Tactical Mission Graphic ............................................................. B-11
B-10. Retain Tactical Mission Graphic ............................................................... B-11
B-11. Secure Tactical Mission Graphic .............................................................. B-12
B-12. Seize Tactical Mission Graphic................................................................. B-12
B-13. Support-by-Fire Position Tactical Mission Graphic................................... B-13
B-14. Block Tactical Mission Graphic................................................................. B-13
B-15. Block Obstacle Effect Graphic.................................................................. B-14
B-16. Canalize Tactical Mission Graphic............................................................ B-14
B-17. Canalizing Terrain Enhanced by Obstacles Used with an Engagement
Area .......................................................................................................... B-14
B-18. Contain Tactical Mission Graphic ............................................................. B-15
B-19. Destroy Tactical Mission Graphic ............................................................. B-16
B-20. Disrupt Tactical Mission Graphic .............................................................. B-16
B-21. Disrupt Obstacle Effect Graphic ............................................................... B-16
B-22. Fix Tactical Mission Graphic..................................................................... B-17
B-23. Fix Obstacle Intent Graphic ...................................................................... B-17
B-24. Interdict Tactical Mission Graphic............................................................. B-18
B-25. Isolate Tactical Mission Graphic............................................................... B-18
B-26. Neutralize Tactical Mission Graphic ......................................................... B-19
B-27. Turn Tactical Mission Graphic .................................................................. B-19
B-28. Turn Obstacle Effect................................................................................. B-20
C-1. Assault Objectives ...................................................................................... C-6
C-2. Airhead Line................................................................................................ C-6
C-3. Boundaries and Fire Support Coordinating Measures for an Airhead........ C-7
C-4. Flight Routes Depicted on an Overlay ...................................................... C-14
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FM 3-90
D-1. Inner and Outer Arms of an Encirclement...................................................D-1

D-2. Encirclement Control Measures ..................................................................D-3
D-3. Squeeze Technique ....................................................................................D-5
D-4. Hammer and Anvil Technique.....................................................................D-6
D-5. Wedge Technique.......................................................................................D-6
D-6. Encircled Armor Division’s Perimeter Defense ...........................................D-8
D-7. Organization of Forces for a Breakout Operation .....................................D-10
D-8. Breakout by an Encircled Mechanized Division ........................................D-14
D-9. Continued Breakout by an Encircled Mechanized Division .......................D-15
D-10. Linkup of a Moving Force and a Stationary Force ....................................D-18
D-11. Linkup of Two Moving Forces ...................................................................D-19
E-1. OPCON versus TACON in Rear Area and Base Security ..........................E-1
E-2. Organization of C2 Facilities in a Corps Rear Area ....................................E-4
E-3. Typical Base Defense Organization ..........................................................E-11
E-4. Security Platoon ........................................................................................E-12
E-5. Base Cluster Harrington............................................................................E-16
E-6. Convoy Security Organization ...................................................................E-35
E-7. Convoy Control Measures.........................................................................E-36
Tables
Table Page
5-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Limited-Visibility Attacks...................... 5-8
11-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Delay Techniques............................ 11-10
12-1. Typical Size of Security Forces for a Given Mission and Echelon ............ 12-6
12-2. Screen Movement Methods .................................................................... 12-17
13-1. Typical ISR Assets Available..................................................................... 13-6
13-2. Dedicated Reconnaissance Units and Forms of Reconnaissance
Operations................................................................................................. 13-8
xii
Preface
Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy, a language,
a purpose, and unity of effort. Tactics is the art and science of employing all
available means to win battles and engagements. Specifically, it comprises the
actions taken by a commander to arrange units and activities in relation to each
other and the enemy.
PURPOSE
FM 3-90 introduces the basic concepts and control measures associated with the
art of tactics. It cannot be read in isolation. To understand FM 3-90, the reader
must understand the operational art, principles of war, and links between the
operational and tactical levels of war described in FM 3-0, Operations. He should
understand how the activities described in FM 3-07, Stability Operations and
Support Operations, carry over and affect offensive and defensive operations and
vice versa. He should understand the operations (plan, prepare, execute, and
assess) process described in FM 6-0, Command and Control, and how that
process relates to the military decision making process and troop-leading
procedures described in FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production. FM 3-90
also refers to joint publications (JPs). Reviewing referenced JPs will also aid in
understanding FM 3-90.
FM 3-90 focuses on the tactics used to employ available means to win in combat.
Those tactics require judgment in application. The ability to seize and secure
terrain, with its populations and productive capacity, distinguishes land forces
conducting decisive offensive and defensive operations. FM 3-90 provides a com-
mon discussion of how commanders from the battalion task force level through
the corps echelon conduct tactical offensive and defensive operations and their
supporting tactical enabling operations. It is not prescriptive, but authoritative.
Tactical fundamentals do not change with the fielding of each new piece of
equipment. However, the integration of new equipment and organizations
usually requires changes in related techniques and procedures. FM 3-90 provides
guidance in the form of combat-tested concepts and ideas modified to exploit
emerging Army and joint capabilities.
SCOPE
FM 3-90 focuses on the organization of forces, minimum essential control
measures, and general planning, preparation, and execution considerations for
each type and form of combat operation. It is the common reference for all
students of the tactical art, both in the field and the Army school system. A fam-
ily of subordinate manuals address the techniques and procedures used by
tactical combat forces at each echelon. Assessment concepts described in FM 6-0
and FM 6-22, Army Leadership, also apply. All operations process considerations
are modified as necessary to account for the specific factors of METT-TC existing
during each operation.
xiii
Tactical enabling operations and special environments discussed in other man-
uals are not repeated in FM 3-90. That is why FM 3-90 does not discuss why
information operations (FM 3-13), river-crossing operations (FM 3-97.13), and
combined arms breaching operations (FM 3-34.2).
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
Readers of FM 3-90 should be aware that the rules regarding the use of land
mines are evolving. A commander should seek legal guidance concerning
currently applicable rules and policies regarding land mines before directing
their employment. The rules of engagement he provides to his subordinates
should reflect those guidelines.
The historical examples used in FM 3-90 were deliberately chosen to illustrate
the fact that American tacticians should widen their areas of study of the
military profession to include other armies and other times.
In FM 3-90, the term heavy applies to armored, aviation, cavalry, mechanized
infantry and their associated combined arms elements. The term light applies to
airborne, air assault, and light infantry and their associated combined arms
elements. The term special operations forces applies to rangers, special forces,
special operations aviation, civil affairs, and psychological operations elements.
The initial brigade combat teams (IBCTs) are the prototypes of a medium force
and are included in the discussion of heavy and light forces as appropriate.
In FM 3-90, the term battalion applies to a battalion, battalion task force, or a
cavalry squadron unless differences in capabilities requires that a specific
organization be named. The term company refers to a company, company team,
battery, or troop size organization.
FM 3-90 uses planning process to indicate both the military decision making
process and troop leading procedures. Battalion-sized and larger units use the
military decision making process. Company-sized and smaller units follow troop
leading procedures.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever FM 3-90 uses the singular form of decisive
operation or shaping operation; both the singular and plural forms are included.
The glossary lists most terms used in FM 3-90 that have joint or Army
definitions. Terms for which FM 3-90 is the proponent manual (the authority) are
indicated with an asterisk. Definitions for which FM 3-90 is the proponent
manual are printed in boldface in the text. For other definitions the term is
italicized and the number of the proponent manual follows the definition.
Cross-references use the new field manual numbering system. The bibliography
lists field manuals by new number followed by old number.
Unless stated otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer exclusively to
men.
Headquarters, US Army Training and Doctrine Command is the proponent for
this publication. Send comments and recommended changes and the rational for
those changes to: Commander, US Army Combined Arms Center and Fort
Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-SWW, 1 Reynolds Road, Fort Leavenworth, KS
66027-1352.
xiv
PART ONE
Tactical Fundamentals
Chapter 1
The Art of Tactics

War is, above all things, an art, employing science in all its branches
as its servant, but depending first and chiefly upon the skill of the art-
isan. It has its own rules, but not one of them is rigid and invariable.
As new implements are devised new methods result in its mechanical
execution; but over and above all its mechanical appliances, it rests
upon the complex factors of human nature, which cannot be reduced to
formulas and rules. The proper use of these thinking and animate
parts of the great machine can be divined only by the genius and in-
stinct of the commanders. No books can teach this, and no rules define
it.
Captain Francis V. Greene, 1883
Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered ar-

rangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain
and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles
and engagements (FM 3-0).
1-1. This is the capstone

manual for offensive and CONTENTS
defensive operations at The Tactical Level of War ............................ 1-2
the tactical level. This is The Science and Art of Tactics ................... 1-3
a manual for profession- The Science............................................... 1-3
als and requires dedica- The Art ....................................................... 1-4
tion and study to master. Historical Example ....................................... 1-6
It is authoritative and Hasty Versus Deliberate Operations .......... 1-9
provides guidance in the Choices and Tradeoffs............................. 1-9
form of combat-tested Risk Reduction ....................................... 1-11
concepts and ideas modi- Solving Tactical Problems......................... 1-13
fied to take advantage of
emerging Army and joint capabilities, focusing on the tactics used to employ
available means to win in combat. Those tactics are not prescriptive in nature
but require judgment in application.
1-1
FM 3-90
1-2. The tactics and supporting

Tactics is the employment of
techniques and procedures de-
units in combat.
scribed in this manual are only
starting points for the tactician, Techniques are the general and
who must understand the differ- detailed methods used by troops
ence between tactics and tech- and commanders to perform as-
niques and procedures. Tactics signed missions and functions,
always require judgment and specifically the methods of using
adaptation to the unique cir- equipment and personnel.
cumstances of a specific situa-
Procedures are standard and de-
tion. Techniques and procedures
tailed courses of action that de-
are established patterns that
scribe how to perform tasks.
can be applied repeatedly with
little or no judgment in a variety of circumstances. Tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTP) provide the tactician with a set of tools to use in developing
the solution to a tactical problem. The solution to any specific problem is a
unique combination of these TTP or the creation of new ones based on a criti-
cal evaluation of the situation. The tactician determines his solution by a
thorough mastery of doctrine and existing TTP, tempered and honed by ex-
perience gained through training and operations. He uses his creativity to de-
velop solutions for which the enemy is neither prepared, nor able to cope.
THE TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR

1-3. The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between
strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or
boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and tac-
tical. They apply to all types of military operations.
1-4. The tactical level of war is the level of war at which battles and engage-
ments are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to
tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered ar-
rangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to
the enemy to achieve combat objectives (JP 1-02). It is important to under-
stand tactics within the context of the levels of war. The strategic and opera-
tional levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context,
tactical operations are reduced to a series of disconnected and unfocused ac-
tions. Engagements are linked to battles. One or more battles are linked to
winning major operations and campaigns, leading to operational success,
which can lead to strategic success. (FM 3-0 discusses major operations and
campaigns.)
1-5. A battle consists of a set of related engagements that last longer and in-
volve larger forces than an engagement (FM 3-0). Battles can affect the
course of the campaign or major operation. A battle occurs when a division,
corps, or army commander fights for one or more significant objectives. Bat-
tles are usually operationally significant, if not operationally decisive.
1-6. An engagement is a small, tactical conflict between opposing maneuver
forces, usually conducted at brigade level and below (FM 3-0). An engagement
normally lasts only a short time—minutes, hours, or a day. It can result from
one side’s deliberate offensive movement against an opponent or from a
1-2
The Art of Tactics
chance encounter between two opponents, such as a meeting engagement. An

engagement can be a stand-alone event or one of several related engagements
comprising a battle.
1-7. Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types of forces or
components are not associated with a particular level of war. National assets,
such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered
principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical opera-
tions. Actions are strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or
contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives. Many
times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical
studies.
1-8. Advances in technology, information-age media reporting, and the com-
pression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing interrelation-
ships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize
a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appro-
priate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in
a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut
across the three levels (see FM 3-0).
THE SCIENCE AND ART OF TACTICS

1-9. The tactician must understand and master the science and the art of tac-
tics, two distinctly different yet inseparable concepts. A tactician is an indi-
vidual devoted to mastering the science and art of tactics. Command-
ers and leaders at all echelons and supporting commissioned, warrant, and
noncommissioned staff officers must be tacticians to lead their soldiers in the
conduct of full spectrum operations.
THE SCIENCE
1-10. The science of tactics encompasses the understanding of those
military aspects of tactics—capabilities, techniques, and proced-
ures—that can be measured and codified. The science of tactics includes
the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organizations and systems,
such as determining how long it takes a division to move a certain distance. It
also includes techniques and procedures used to accomplish specific tasks,
such as the tactical terms and control graphics that comprise the language of
tactics. While not easy, the science of tactics is fairly straightforward. Much of
what is contained in this manual is the science of tactics—techniques and
procedures for employing the various elements of the combined arms team to
achieve greater effects.
1-11. Mastery of the science of tactics is necessary for the tactician to under-
stand the physical and procedural constraints under which he must work.
These constraints include the effects of terrain, time, space, and weather on
friendly and enemy forces. However—because combat is an intensely human
activity—the solution to tactical problems cannot be reduced to a formula.
This realization necessitates the study of the art of tactics.
1-3
FM 3-90
THE ART
1-12. The art of tactics consists of three interrelated aspects: the
creative and flexible array of means to accomplish assigned mis-
sions, decision making under conditions of uncertainty when faced
with an intelligent enemy, and understanding the human dimen-
sion—the effects of combat on soldiers. An art, as opposed to a science,
requires exercising intuitive faculties that cannot be learned solely by study.
The tactician must temper his study and evolve his skill through a variety of
relevant, practical experiences. The more experience the tactician gains from
practice under a variety of circumstances, the greater his mastery of the art
of tactics.
1-13. The tactician invokes the art of tactics to solve tactical problems within
his commander’s intent by choosing from interrelated options, including—
· Types and forms of operations, forms of maneuver, and tactical mission
tasks.
· Task organization of available forces, to include allocating scarce re-
sources.
· Arrangement and choice of control measures.
· Tempo of the operation.
· Risks the commander is willing to take.
1-14. These options represent a starting point for the tactician to create a
unique solution to a specific tactical problem. Each decision represents a
choice among a range of options; each balances competing demands requiring
judgment at every turn. While there may be checklists for techniques and
procedures, there are no checklists for solving tactical problems. The com-
mander must not look for a checklist approach to tactics; instead, he must use
his experience and creativity to outthink his enemy.
1-15. There are three aspects to the art of tactics that define a competent tac-
tician. The first is the creative and flexible application of the tools available to
the commander, such as doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures, training,
organizations, materiel, and soldiers in an attempt to render the enemy’s sit-
uational tactics ineffective. The tactician must understand how to train and
employ his forces in full spectrum operations. The factors of mission, enemy,
terrain and weather, troops, time available, and civil considerations
(METT-TC) are variables whose infinite mutations always combine to form a
new tactical pattern. (FM 6-0 discusses the factors of METT-TC in detail.)
They never produce exactly the same situation; thus there can be no check-
lists that adequately address each unique situation. Because the enemy
changes and adapts to friendly moves during the planning, preparation, and
execution of an operation, there is no guarantee that a technique which
worked in one situation will work again. Each tactical problem is unique and
must be solved on its own merits.
1-16. The second aspect of the art of tactics is decision making under condi-
tions of uncertainty in a time-constrained environment and demonstrated by
the clash of opposing wills—a violent struggle between two hostile, thinking,
and independent opposing commanders with irreconcilable goals. Each com-
mander wants to impose his will on his opponent, defeat his opponent’s plans,
1-4
The Art of Tactics
and destroy his opponent’s forces. Combat consists of the interplay between
these two opposing commanders, with each commander seeking to accomplish
his mission while preventing the other from doing the same. Every command-
er needs a high degree of creativity and clarity of thought to outwit a willing
and able opponent. He must quickly apply his judgment to a less than omni-
scient common operational picture provided by his command and control (C2)
system to understand the implications and opportunities afforded him by the
situation. The commander always uses the most current intelligence in order
to facilitate his visualization of the enemy and environment. That same C2
system transmits the decisions resulting from his situational understanding
to those individuals and units required to engage and destroy the enemy
force.
1-17. The third and final aspect of the art of tactics is understanding the
human dimension—what differentiates actual combat from the problems en-
countered during training and in a classroom. Combat is one of the most com-
plex human activities, characterized by violent death, friction, uncertainty,
and chance. Success depends at least as much on this human aspect as it does
on any numerical and technological superiority.
The Human Dimension—Combat at Han-sur-Nied

When only [300] yards from the bridge, the [1-317th IN] skirmish line was hit by
high explosive shells from a detachment of sixteen 40-mm. antiaircraft guns….
The armored infantry froze in their places or tried to reach the shelter of the
ditches alongside the road…, while projectiles…, fired with almost sniperlike ac-
curacy, swept…their ranks. The 231st Armored [FA BN] turned its howitzers on
the enemy…, but as the German gunners were blasted—arms and legs flying
into the air—others ran forward to serve the weapons.
…[1LT Vernon L.] Edwards’ [platoon of the 68th Tank BN] started across the
bridge. The first tank crossed successfully. The second stalled on the bridge
when the platoon commander was hit; for a brief while the tank stood there, [1LT]
Edwards’ body dangling from the open turret. The third received a direct hit and
burst into flame, but was backed off the wooden bridge by its commander after
he had ordered his crew to leave the blazing tank. During this effort…[1LT] Daniel
Nutter and [CPL] Charles Cunningham, B Company 25th Armored [EN BN], ran
forward to cut the wires leading to the demolition charges. [1LT] Nutter, at the
enemy end of the bridge, was killed just as he completed his task. [CPL]
Cunningham, who had cut the wires at the western end…raced across the
bridge, and returned with the body of his commander.
Who [ordered] the final charge probably never will be known. Perhaps it was
[LTC Sterling S.] Burnette, who had been standing erect in the open urging his
lead company on and…was mortally wounded. [CPT James A.] Craig and a few
men rushed the bridge, crossing the 100-foot span “faster than they knew how”
amidst a hail of shell fragments and tracer bullets.… [CPT] Craig disposed his
little force…and through the afternoon held the approach to the bridge against
German tanks and riflemen.
1-5
FM 3-90
1-18. The tactician cannot ignore the human aspect. He seeks to recognize
and exploit indicators of fear and weakness in his enemy, and to defeat the
enemy’s will, since soldiers remain key to generating combat power. More
than any other human activity, continuous combat operations against an in-
telligent enemy takes a toll on soldiers, severely straining their physical and
mental stamina. This creates in soldiers the tangible and intangible effects of
courage, fear, combat experience, exhaustion, isolation, confidence, thirst,
and anger. If left unchecked these effects can result in decreased vigilance,
slowed perception, inability to concentrate, communication difficulties, and
an inability to accomplish manual tasks.
1-19. Leaders must be alert to indicators of fatigue, fear, lapses in discipline
standards, and reduced morale in friendly and enemy soldiers. They must
work to counteract the effects on the friendly force while taking measures to
enhance these effects on the enemy. When the friendly force has the initia-
tive, it can force the enemy to conduct continuous operations to react to
friendly actions and then exploit the effects of continuous operations on the
enemy. These conditions can have a cumulative effect on units that can lead
to collapse. The tactician must understand how they affect human endurance
and factor them into his plans. He must understand the limits of human en-
durance in combat. This is the subtle difference between pushing soldiers be-
yond their limits to exploit success versus resting them to prevent the col-
lapse of unit cohesion. (FM 6-22.5 discusses the effects of continuous combat
operations.)
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
1-20. The following vignette discusses the Battle of Cowpens fought during
the American Revolution. It illustrates the need for the tactician to combine
the effects of the science of tactics with his application of the tactical art.
Cowpens, 17 January 1781

On 17 January 1781, American BG Daniel Morgan defeated British LTC Tarleton
at the Cowpens in South Carolina in a battle that captures the essence of the art
of tactics—the use of intuitive faculties that cannot be learned solely by study. Al-
though outnumbered, Morgan’s troops fought and won against a previously un-
beaten opponent. The battle achieved decisive results with strategic significance.
In December 1780, Morgan was sent with 600 men into the South Carolina high-
lands under orders to protect Americans, forage, and threaten British control of
the highlands. Tarleton’s British Legion—numbering nearly 1,000 men and con-
sisting of a combined cavalry-infantry force reinforced with additional infantry and
two, three-pounder guns—was sent to pursue Morgan. By 16 January 1781,
Tarleton had closed to within six miles of Morgan’s force.
Having known of Tarleton’s mission since 14 January, Morgan obtained informa-
tion on Tarleton’s tactical style while he began to retreat. With Tarleton so close
on 16 January and his own camp nearly six miles from the Broad River, Morgan
decided to fight at the Cowpens. While the two forces were now roughly the same
size, Morgan had only about one-third the cavalry, one-third the regular line
1-6
The Art of Tactics
infantry, and no artillery. However, his militia force’s rifles had a longer range than
the British muskets, and the terrain allowed him to mask his reserves from view.
Morgan deployed his forces on the battlefield, confident that Tarleton would not
attempt to flank his position. Rather, Morgan believed that Tarleton would initially
attack him with part of his cavalry supported by infantry, wait for confusion, and
then exploit those vulnerabilities with his cavalry reserve. This had been his pat-
tern of operations in previous engagements with the Americans.
In the main line of battle, LEGEND
Morgan placed his Continen- American Forces
tals and Virginia militia, who British Forces
SITUATION AS OF
were former Continentals, on III
920
3rd (WASHINGTON)
0700
the military crest of the rise 960

940
960
under COL Howard’s com-
980
-N
mand. They numbered 450.
940
980
-
About 150 meters downhill, 960
toward the expected reaction

940 920
CONTINENTALS
(HOWARD)
of the enemy, he stationed the 900
bulk of his militia under the

command of COL Pickens. MILITIA
(PICKENS)
Another 150 meters down the
hill, he positioned a skirmisher
line of 150 militia riflemen. SKIRMISHERS
960
940
Behind the hill, he placed LTC

Washington’s 120-strong cav- 960
920 900
alry force in reserve. Each line

was within rifle range but out 940
I
of musket range of the line be- 920 I II
hind it. As explained the night 900

LEGION
940
before, skirmishers only need- II

7th FUSILIERS
960
ed to fire one or two shots and Scale
then retire to the second line. 71st HIGHLAND

LEGION
0 100 200 300 400
yards
500
In turn, the militia in the sec-

Figure 1-1. Initial Situation
ond line only needed to fire
two volleys. Then they could retire to their left around to the rear of the hill and,
protected by the cavalry, reform. The cavalry would counterattack British cavalry
as the situation allowed, guard the militia horses, or cover a retreat if necessary.
(See Figure 1-1.)
Tarleton deployed his forces from their march formation into a line, with three
light infantry companies on the right, the Legion infantry in the center, and one
regular British battalion on the left of this main line. He stationed one troop of cav-
alry on each flank of the main line and one three-pounder gun on either side of
the Legion infantry. He kept the other regular British battalion and the remainder
of his Legion cavalry in reserve. The British immediately came under fire from the
skirmishers. Tarleton sent a troop of dragoons to disperse them while his main
forces deployed. The dragoons lost 15 of 50 men. The skirmishers retired to the
American second line.
Tarleton then assaulted the second line. His artillery opened fire, but apparently
on the third line. The American rifle fire disrupted his formation. When his forces
closed to within 50 meters of the second line, they received a volley from the
1-7
FM 3-90
militia that staggered and fur- LEGEND

ther disrupted them. The mili- American Forces
tia’s expected second volley British Forces
SITUATION AS OF
was more ragged as it began 920 0730
to withdraw. Seeing this 940

960
960
MILITIA
movement, Tarleton ordered (REFORMING)
980
-N
his right-hand troop of dra- 980 III 940
-
3rd (WASHINGTON)
goons to charge the militia as 960
CONTINENTALS
it withdrew. The American
940 920
(HOWARD)
cavalry charged this troop 900
and overwhelmed it, driving II
the dragoons off the field in

accordance with Morgan’s 7th FUSILIERS LEGION
plan. (See Figure 1-2.) EN Y

EN
Y II
I
I
As the British moved hastily
960
940
forward to assault the main 71st HIGHLAND

920 900
American position, they fur- 960
ther lost their cohesion as a 940
firefight between the two

forces ensued. Tarleton or-
920
900 940
dered his reserve infantry LEGION
960
battalion up to the left of his

line for this assault, and the
Scale
0 100 200 300 400 500
cavalry troop on his left to en- yards
circle the American line. This Figure 1-2. British Moves

move outflanked the Ameri- LEGEND
can line. Morgan and the American Forces
third-line commander recog- British Forces
SITUATION AS OF
nized the danger to their right 920 0750
flank and ordered the right 940
960
flank units to “refuse” the

960
980
flank. However, the American

-N
940
980
-
units adjoining those right 960
flank units also commenced 940 CONTINENTALS

(HOWARD)
920
moving to the rear. This sit-

900
uation could have crumbled II

IA
the American line except for

IT
MIL
Morgan’s personal order for II

7th FUSILIERS
the rest of the American line

LEGION
to move to the rear with 71st HIGHLAND 960

III
those right flank units.
940
3rd (WASHINGTON)
920 900
Seeing this apparent general 960
withdrawal, Tarleton ordered

940
his forces to close with the

Americans. They did, but suf- 920
900 940
fered further disorganization. LEGION

ENY
960
Just as the British attempted

to close, the Americans 0 100 200
Scale
300 400 500
turned and fired a volley, fol- yards
lowed by a bayonet charge Figure 1-3. Final Battle Stage
1-8
The Art of Tactics
into the British lines. Simultaneously, Morgan’s cavalry attacked the British right
from the rear. Meanwhile, the militia, having reformed, returned to the field on the
American right and attacked the British left flank units. (See Figure 1-3.) The bat-
tle was over within an hour of Tarleton’s first assault. The British losses were 110
killed, 200 wounded, and 700 prisoners, although Tarleton personally escaped
with about 140 of his cavalry. The British could not replace the mobile forces that
Tarleton lost at the Cowpens. Without a mobile force, the British no longer had an
effective counter to American partisans and light forces. The British later won at
Guilford Court House, but suffered such heavy losses that they had to abandon
their operations in the interior of the Carolinas.
Morgan combined the science of tactics with his application of the tactical art to
defeat superior numbers of British forces under Tarleton. Morgan arrived at a
unique and creative solution to his tactical problems. Trusted information about
Tarleton’s style was a crucial part of his deployment plan. Morgan understood the
diverse military and social elements of his force (untried militia, Continentals, and
volunteers). He asked no more of any element than it could deliver and used the
strengths of each to the fullest. Daniel Morgan used tactical art to convert his
understanding of American troops, knowledge of human nature, and rapport with
his soldiers into the vital components of a brilliant tactical victory.
HASTY VERSUS DELIBERATE OPERATIONS

1-21. A hasty operation is an operation in which a commander directs
his immediately available forces, using fragmentary orders
(FRAGOs), to perform activities with minimal preparation, trading
planning and preparation time for speed of execution. A deliberate
operation is an operation in which a commander’s detailed intelli-
gence concerning the situation allows him to develop and coordinate
detailed plans, including multiple branches and sequels. He task or-
ganizes his forces specifically for the operation to provide a fully
synchronized combined arms team. He conducts extensive rehearsals
while conducting shaping operations to set the conditions for the
conduct of his decisive operation.
1-22. Most operations lie somewhere along a continuum between these two
extremes. The 9th Armored Division’s seizure of the bridge at Remagen in
March 1945 illustrates one end, a hasty operation conducted with the forces
immediately available. At the other end of the continuum is a deliberate op-
eration, such as the 1st Infantry Division’s breach operation during the
opening hours of Operation Desert Storm. Ongoing improvements in informa-
tion and C2 systems continue to assist in the development of a common op-
erational picture of friendly and enemy forces while facilitating decision
making and communicating decisions to friendly forces. These improvements
can help diminish the distinction between hasty and deliberate operations;
they cannot make that distinction irrelevant.
CHOICES AND TRADEOFFS

1-23. The commander must choose the right point along the continuum to op-
erate. His choice involves balancing several competing factors. He bases his
decision to conduct a hasty or deliberate operation on his current knowledge
1-9
FM 3-90
of the enemy situation, and his assessment of whether the assets available (to
include time), and the means to coordinate and synchronize those assets, are
adequate to accomplish the mission. If they are not he takes additional time
to plan and prepare for the operation or bring additional forces to bear on the
problem. The commander makes that choice in an environment of uncer-
tainty, which always entails some risk.
1-24. The commander may have to act based only on his available combat in-
formation in a time-constrained environment. Combat information is uneval-
uated data gathered by or provided to a commander that, due to its highly
perishable nature or the critical nature of the tactical situation, cannot be
processed into tactical intelligence or other staff products in time to meet the
commander’s information requirements (FM 6-0). The commander must un-
derstand the inherent risk of acting only on combat information since it is
vulnerable to enemy deception operations and can be misinterpreted at any
stage up through reporting channels. The unit intelligence staff helps the
commander assign a level of confidence to combat information he uses in deci-
sion making.
1-25. Uncertainty and risk are inherent in tactical operations and cannot be
eliminated. A commander cannot be successful without the capability of act-
ing under conditions of uncertainty while balancing various risks and taking
advantage of opportunities. Although the commander strives to maximize his
knowledge about his forces, the terrain and weather, civil considerations, and
the enemy, he cannot let a lack of information paralyze him. The more intelli-
gence on the enemy, the better able the commander is to make his assess-
ment. Less information means that the commander has a greater risk of
making a poor decision for the specific situation. A commander never has per-
fect intelligence, but knowing when he has enough information to make a de-
cision within the higher commander’s intent and constraints is part of the art
of tactics and is a critical skill for a commander.
1-26. The commander should take the minimum time necessary in planning
and preparing to ensure a reasonable chance of success. Reduced coordination
at the start of the operation results in less than optimum combat power
brought to bear on the enemy, but often allows for increased speed and mo-
mentum while possibly achieving surprise. The commander must balance the
effects of reduced coordination against the risk that the effects of increased
coordination will not match the enemy’s improved posture over time. The
more time the commander takes to prepare for the operation, including im-
proving his situational understanding, the more time the enemy has to pre-
pare and move additional units within supporting range or distance. Addi-
tionally, it reduces the time his subordinates have to conduct their own
planning and preparations. If the enemy can improve his disposition faster
than the friendly force can, the delays in execution decrease the commander’s
chances of success.
1-27. It is better to err on the side of speed, audacity, and momentum than on
the side of caution when conducting military operations, all else being equal.
Bold decisions give the best promise of success; however, one must differenti-
ate between calculated risks and a military gamble. A calculated risk is an
operation in which success is not a certainty but which, in case of failure,
leaves sufficient forces to cope with whatever situations arise (FM 6-0). The
1-10
The Art of Tactics
willingness to take calculated risks requires military judgment to reduce risk

by foresight and careful planning and to determine whether the risk is worth
taking to grasp fleeting opportunities. MG Wood’s decision to advance east
toward the German border with his 4th Armored Division after the breakout
from the Normandy beachhead is an example of a justifiable calculated risk.
A military gamble is an operation that can lead either to victory or to com-
plete destruction of one’s force (FM 6-0). Rare situations can arise where even
a gamble may be justified; for example, when defeat is merely a matter of
time and the only chance lies in an operation of great risk. LTC
Chamberlain’s decision to conduct a bayonet charge with what was left of the
20th Maine on the second day of the Battle of Gettysburg is an example of a
military gamble.
1-28. The commander can be less deliberate in planning and preparing for an
operation when facing a clearly less-capable and less-prepared enemy force.
In these circumstances, the commander can forego detailed planning, exten-
sive rehearsals, and significant changes in task organization. For example, an
attacking battalion task force encountering enemy security outposts just mov-
ing into position will conduct actions on contact to immediately destroy the
outposts without the loss of momentum. It then follows that against a larger
and more prepared enemy, the commander needs more preparation time and
a larger force to succeed. If the commander determines that he cannot defeat
the enemy with the forces immediately at hand, he must determine what
additional measures he must take to be successful. The measures can include
any or all of the factors along the continuum.
1-29. This does not imply that a commander conducting a hasty operation
foregoes the advantages provided by his combined arms team. A commander
who chooses to conduct hasty operations synchronizes the employment of his
forces in his head as he issues FRAGOs. He uses tangible and intangible fac-
tors, such as the training level and experience of his subordinates, his own
experience, perception of how the enemy will react, understanding of time-
distance factors, and knowledge of the strengths of each subordinate and sup-
porting unit to achieve the required degree of synchronization.
RISK REDUCTION
1-30. An important factor in reducing a commander’s risk is how much intel-
ligence he has about the enemy. As intelligence becomes available, the com-
mander determines where along the continuum of hasty versus deliberate
operations he will operate to accomplish his mission. There is no set of rules
to determine this point—any choice entails risk. If the commander decides to
execute a hasty operation based on limited intelligence, he risks an uncoordi-
nated operation against an enemy about which he knows little. Moreover his
forces may not be strong enough to accomplish their mission with minimum
casualties. This could lead to piecemeal commitment and potential defeat in
detail. He must balance this option against the risk of waiting to attack,
which allows the enemy time to reinforce or conduct additional preparation.
1-31. When higher headquarters determines the time to start an operation,
or in a defense when the enemy initiates the operation, the commander has
little flexibility regarding where to operate along the continuum of hasty
versus deliberate operations. In these situations he must use all the time
1-11
FM 3-90
available to conduct planning and preparation. While the military decision

making process tasks used in a time-constrained environment are the same
as in the full process, many are done mentally by the commander or with less
staff involvement. Each commander decides how to shorten the process. A
commander may use the complete process to develop the plan, while a sub-
ordinate headquarters abbreviates the process. (See FM 5-0 for a discussion
of decision making in a time-constrained environment.)
1-32. The commander can reduce the risk associated with any situation by in-
creasing his knowledge of the terrain and friendly, neutral, and enemy forces.
He has a greater risk of making a poor decision if his situational under-
standing is incomplete or faulty. If the commander lacks sufficient informa-
tion to make an informed choice, his first priority must be to gain the re-
quired information to support his decision making while at the same time
taking precautions to protect his force from surprise. During an unexpected
encounter with the enemy, often an acceptable way to gain that intelligence is
to conduct a hasty attack to determine the size and disposition of the enemy
force. The commander adapts his reconnaissance and intelligence efforts to
the existing situation and picks the appropriate tools to answer his critical in-
formation requirements. For example, the commander can retask his recon-
naissance assets or increase the size of his reconnaissance effort.
1-33. A commander—supported by a digital C2 system that can access accur-
ate, real-time information—takes advantage of a different operational envi-
ronment than that facing a commander with an analog C2 system. Greatly
improved knowledge of the enemy and friendly situations facilitates his
employment of precision fires, his conduct of decisive maneuver at extended
ranges, and his provision of responsive and flexible support of his forces. The
integration of advanced information technologies, highly capable leaders, and
agile organizational systems reduces risk and facilitates the conduct of full
spectrum operations.
1-34. Risk reduction does not always mean increasing knowledge of the en-
emy at the expense of time. A commander can partially compensate for a lack
of intelligence by being flexible in his troop dispositions through an increase
in the depth of the security area, size and number of security units, and size
of the reserve. The commander’s choices of combat and movement formations
provide the versatility to allow for initial enemy contact with the smallest
possible friendly force. This allows the greatest flexibility in meeting unfore-
seen enemy dispositions. Another way to compensate for increased risk is to
allow time and resources for subordinate elements to develop the situation.
1-35. Because uncertainty exists in all military operations, every military
decision contains risk. The commander exercises tactical art when he decides
how much risk to accept. As shown in Figure 1-4, the commander has several
techniques available to reduce the risk associated in a specific operation.
Some of these techniques for reducing risk take resources from the decisive
operation, which reduces the concentration of effects at the decisive point.
1-36. The commander has the option to redirect the efforts of forces previ-
ously used to reduce his risk toward strengthening his decisive operation as
more information becomes available. In any operation, the relationship be-
tween information, uncertainty, risk, size of reserves and security forces, and
1-12
The Art of Tactics
the disposition of the main body may change frequently. The commander
must continually weigh this balance and make adjustments as needed.
1-37. These adjustments can create problems. Too many changes or changes
made too rapidly in task organization, mission, and priorities can have nega-
tive effects on the operations process. For example, if a commander changes
the task organization of his force too frequently, the force fails to develop the
flexibility provided by teamwork. On the other hand, if he fails to change the
task organization when dictated by circumstances, the force lacks flexibility
to adapt to those changing circumstances. It is then unable to react effectively
to enemy moves or act with the concentration of effects that lead to mission
success.
LESS INFORMATION/INTELLIGENCE MORE

result in
MORE UNCERTAINTY LESS

MORE RISK TO FORCE LESS
WHICH IN TURN LEADS THE

COMMANDERS TO ADJUST HIS
LARGER Reconnaissance Effort SMALLER
LARGER Size Of Reserve SMALLER
MORE Security Information FEWER
SLOWER Speed Of Operations FASTER
FEWER Simultaneous Operations MORE
LESS Attack Precision MORE
Figure 1-4. Risk Reduction Factors
SOLVING TACTICAL PROBLEMS

1-38. Success in tactical problem solving results from the aggressive, intelli-
gent, and decisive use of combat power in an environment of uncertainty, dis-
order, violence, and danger. A commander wins by being on the offense, initi-
ating combat on his own terms—at a time and place of his choosing. He never
surrenders the initiative once he gains it. He builds momentum quickly to
win decisively through the rapid application of available combat power, op-
erating inside the enemy’s decision making cycle, and mastering the transi-
tions between the defense to the offensive and vice versa. These rules of
thumb allow the commander to maximize friendly and minimize enemy com-
bat power by preventing the enemy from fighting as a combined arms force.
1-39. Offensive action is key to achieving decisive results. Tactical com-
manders conduct offensive operations to achieve their assigned missions and
objectives¾destroying enemy forces or seizing terrain¾that cumulatively
produce the theater-level effects required by the operational commander.
1-13
FM 3-90
Circumstances may require defending; however, tactical success normally

requires shifting to the offense as soon as possible. The offense ends when the
forces conducting it accomplish their missions, reach their limits of advance,
or approach culmination. Those forces then consolidate, resume the attack, or
prepare for other operations.
1-40. A commander wants to initiate combat on his own terms to give himself
important advantages. This allows him to mass the effects of his combat
power against selected inferior and isolated enemy units in vulnerable loca-
tions. Possession of the initiative allows a commander to continually seek vul-
nerable spots and shift his decisive operation when opportunities occur. A
commander seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative by—
· Maneuvering more rapidly than the enemy to gain positional advan-
tage (the place where the effects of fires are most destructive) over the
enemy.
· Employing firepower to facilitate and exploit positional advantage.
· Sustaining his forces before, during, and after the engagement with the
enemy.
· Achieving and maintaining information superiority.
· Planning beyond the initial operation and anticipating possible events.
A commander never surrenders the initiative once he gains it. He presses the
fight tenaciously and aggressively. He accepts risk while leading soldiers and
pushing systems to their limits.
1-41. The tactician, notwithstanding his status as a commander or a staff of-
ficer, seeks ways to build momentum quickly by seizing the initiative and
executing shaping, sustaining, and decisive operations at a high tempo. Mo-
mentum helps to retain and complements the initiative. Concentrating the ef-
fects of combat power at the decisive place and time overwhelms an enemy
and gains control of the situation. Rapid maneuver to place the enemy in a
disadvantageous position also builds momentum. Momentum allows the tacti-
cian to create opportunities to engage the enemy from unexpected directions
with unanticipated capabilities. Having seized the initiative, the tactician
continues to control the relative momentum by taking action to maintain
focus and pressure, controlling the tempo of operations, and creating and ex-
ploiting opportunities, while always assessing the situation and taking calcu-
lated risks.
1-42. The commander’s C2 system assists the rapid building of momentum by
allowing him to see and understand the situation so quickly that his forces
can act before the enemy forces can react to the initial situation. His opera-
tions process focuses on executing rather than planning. Modern information
systems allow compressed planning and effective incremental adjustments to
the plan during execution. This allows the commander’s forces to adapt more
quickly to emerging threats and opportunities as they are identified. Units
whose commanders can make and implement decisions faster, even to a small
degree, gain an accruing advantage that becomes significant over time;
making decisions quickly—even with incomplete information—is crucial.
1-43. The tactician chooses from a number of tactical options to create the so-
lution to the tactical problem facing him. (Chapter 2 lists these options as the
types and forms of military operations and forms of maneuver.) Although he
1-14
The Art of Tactics
solves the specific tactical problem facing him by following the general princi-
ples outlined in this manual, there is no single, doctrinally correct, procedur-
ally derived solution to any problem. The tactician who employs the more
appropriate tactics given the existing situation has a distinct advantage over
his opponent, even if their forces have equal combat power.
1-44. The tactician uses his mastery of the art and science of tactics, his
understanding of the situation, and his judgment to create unique solutions
appropriate to the mission and the other specific factors of METT-TC. There
are usually several solutions that might work, although some will be more ef-
fective. He seeks a solution that defeats the enemy in the time available at
the least cost in men and materiel. It should be a decisive solution that pos-
tures the unit for future missions and provides for the greatest flexibility to
account for unexpected enemy actions or reactions. The solution must be in
accordance with the higher commander’s intent. A thorough understanding of
the enemy greatly assists the commander in his development of workable so-
lutions. Commander’s visualization is the doctrinal term for this process.
(FM 6-0 describes commander’s visualization.)
1-45. The tactician learns to cut to the heart of a situation, recognize its im-
portant elements, and base his decisions on those important elements as he
masters his profession. The ability to do this cannot be acquired overnight. A
tactician develops this capability after years of schooling, self-study, and
practical training experiences, which eventually develop the intuitive facul-
ties required to solve tactical problems. He rarely gets the opportunity to
practice the science and art of tactics under actual combat conditions.
1-46. Doctrine requires human judgment when applied to a specific situation.
In choosing a solution to a tactical problem, applicable laws and regulations,
the mission, the laws of physics, human behavior, and logistic realities con-
strain the tactician, not standardized techniques and procedures. The true
test of the tactician’s solution is not whether it uses the specific techniques or
procedures contained in this manual, but whether the techniques and proce-
dures used were appropriate to the situation. Tactical proficiency is not de-
fined by mastery of written doctrine, but by the ability to employ available
means to win battles and engagements. A solution may not match any previ-
ous doctrinal example; however, the language used to communicate that con-
cept must be technically precise and doctrinally consistent, using commonly
understood and accepted doctrinal terms and concepts.
1-47. Transitions between the types and forms of operations are difficult and,
during execution, may create unexpected opportunities for Army or enemy
forces. The tactician must quickly recognize such opportunities. He develops
transitions as branches during the planning process and acts on them immed-
iately as they occur. Transition between one type or form of an operation to
another is a complex operational consideration.
1-48. Tactical victory occurs when the opposing enemy force can no longer
prevent the friendly force from accomplishing its mission. That is the end
goal of all military operations. Decisive tactical victory occurs when the en-
emy no longer has the means to oppose the friendly force. It also occurs when
the enemy admits defeat and agrees to a negotiated end of hostilities. Histori-
cally, a rapid tactical victory results in fewer friendly casualties and reduced
1-15
FM 3-90
resource expenditures. However, the tactician avoids gambling his forces and
losing his combined arms synchronization in search of rapid victory.
1-49. In closing, solutions to tactical problems are a collective effort. Success
results from the commander’s plan and the ability of subordinates to execute
it. The commander must have full confidence in his subordinates’ mastery of
the art and science of tactics and in their ability to execute the chosen solu-
tion. (See FM 6-0 for a full discussion of this concept.)
1-16
Chapter 2
Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures

In war, obscurity and confusion are normal. Late, exaggerated or
misleading information, surprise situations, and counterorders are to
be expected.
Infantry in Battle, 1939
The tactician must understand the common tactical concepts and defini-
tions used by the military profession in the conduct of offensive and de-
fensive operations. This chapter introduces the doctrinal hierarchy that
forms the framework by which this manual is organized. The concepts
and terms in this chapter are common to most operations. This manual
discusses those concepts and terms specific to a type or form of operations
in the corresponding chapter. For example, Chapter 4 discusses the objec-
tive as a control measure.
DOCTRINAL HIERARCHY
2-1. Figure 2-1 on page 2-2 shows the doctrinal hierarchy and relationship
between the types and subordinate forms of operations. While an operation’s
CONTENTS
Doctrinal Hierarchy......................................2-1 Basic Tactical Graphic Control
The Operational Framework .......................2-3 Measures .............................................. 2-10
Principles of War .........................................2-3 Air Corridor........................................... 2-11
Tenets of Army Operations.........................2-4 Area of Operations and Boundaries .. 2-12
The Factors of METT-TC .............................2-4 Assembly Areas ................................... 2-18
Elements of Operational Design ................2-4 Checkpoint ........................................... 2-19
Battlefield Operating Systems....................2-5 Contact Point........................................ 2-20
Basic Tactical Concepts .............................2-5 Critical Friendly Zone .......................... 2-20
Combined Arms ......................................2-6 Direct Fire Control Measures.............. 2-20
Decisively Engaged ................................2-6 Deep, Close, and Rear Areas .............. 2-24
Defeat in Detail ........................................2-7 Fire Support Coordination
Flanks.......................................................2-7 Measures .............................................. 2-26
Maneuver .................................................2-8 Fire Support Targets............................ 2-31
Mutual Support .......................................2-8 Forward Line of Own Troops.............. 2-32
Operation .................................................2-8 Line of Contact..................................... 2-32
Piecemeal Commitment .........................2-9 Names Area of Interest ........................ 2-33
Reconstitution.........................................2-9 Obstacle Control Measures ................ 2-33
Rules of Engagement .............................2-9 Phase Line ............................................ 2-37
Supporting Distance.............................2-10 Position Area of Artillery ..................... 2-37
Supporting Range.................................2-10 Route ..................................................... 2-38
Tactical Mobility....................................2-10 Targeted Area of Interest..................... 2-38
2-1
FM 3-90
predominant characteristic labels it as an offensive, defensive, stability, or

support operation, different units involved in that operation may be con-
ducting different types and subordinate forms of operations, and often
transition rapidly from one type or subordinate form to another. The
commander rapidly shifts from one type or form of operation to another to
continually keep the enemy off balance while positioning his forces for
maximum effectiveness. Flexibility in transitioning contributes to a
successful operation. A good tactician chooses the right combinations of
combined arms to place the enemy at the maximum disadvantage.
TYPES OF
MILITARY OFFENSE DEFENSE STABILITY SUPPORT
OPNS
FORMS OF TYPES OF TYPES OF FORMS OF
MANEUVER DEFENSIVE STABILITY OPNS SUPPORT
TYPES OF —
—
Envelopment
Turning Movement
OPNS — PEACE OPNS OPNS
— AREA — FOREIGN INTERNAL – Relief Opns
MILITARY — Frontal Attack
DEFENSE DEFENSE – Support to
— Penetration — SECURITY ASSIST Incidents
OPNS — Infiltration — MOBILE — HUMANITARIAN & CIVIC Involving WMD
DEFENSE ASSIST – SPT to Civil Law
AND — RETROGRADE — SUPPORT TO Enforcement
TYPES OF
THEIR OFFENSIVE OPNS
OPERATIONS INSURGENCIES
— SUPPORT TO CD OPNS
– Community
Assistance
– Delay
SUBORD- —MOVEMENT TO CONTACT – Withdrawal
— CBTING TERRORISM
– Search and Attack — NONCOMBATANT TYPES OF
INATE —ATTACK
– Ambush*
– Retirement EVACUATION OPNS
SUPPORT
– Feint* — ARMS CONTROL
FORMS –
–
Counterattack*
Demonstration*
– Raid*
— SHOW OF FORCE OPERATIONS
*Also known as
— DOMESTIC SPT
– Spoiling Attack*
—EXPLOITATION special purpose OPNS
—PURSUIT attacks — FOREIGN
HUMANITARIAN
TYPES OF ASSISTANCE
ENABLING INFORMATION OPERATIONS COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

OPNS
•RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS •TROOP MOVEMENT
– Zone – Administrative Movement
TYPES OF – Area – Approach March
TACTICAL – Route – Road March
– Reconnaissance in Force •COMBINED ARMS BREACH OPERATIONS
ENABLING •SECURITY OPERATIONS •RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS
OPNS – Screen – Area (includes •RELIEF IN PLACE
– Guard route and convoy) •PASSAGE OF LINES
– Cover – Local •TACTICAL INFORMATION OPERATIONS
Figure 2-1. Doctrinal Hierarchy of Operations
2-2. The commander conducts tactical enabling operations to assist the plan-
ning, preparation, and execution of any of the four types of military opera-
tions (offense, defense, stability, and support). Tactical enabling operations
are never decisive operations in the context of offensive and defensive opera-
tions; they are either shaping or sustaining operations. Part IV of this man-
ual discusses tactical enabling operations that are not the subject of a sepa-
rate field manual. The commander uses tactical enabling operations to help
him conduct military actions with minimal risk.
2-2
2-3. This hierarchy does not describe discrete, mutually exclusive operations.
All tactical missions can contain elements of several different types and sub-
ordinate forms. For example, an attacking commander may have one subordi-
nate conducting an envelopment, with another subordinate conducting a
frontal attack to fix the enemy. The enveloping force usually attacks once the
direct-pressure force makes a movement to contact while repeatedly
attacking to keep pressure on the fleeing enemy. The encircling force uses an
envelopment to conduct a series of attacks to destroy or clear enemy forces in
its path on the way to its blocking position. Once it occupies the blocking posi-
tion, the unit may transition to a defense as it blocks the retreat of the fleeing
enemy force.
THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

2-4. The operational framework consists of the arrangement of friendly forces
and resources in time, space, and purpose with respect to each other and the
enemy or situation. It consists of the area of operations, battlespace, and the
battlefield organization (FM 3-0). The framework establishes an area of geo-
graphic and operational responsibility for commanders and provides a way
for them to visualize how they will employ forces against the enemy. Army
commanders design an operational framework to accomplish their mission by
defining and arranging its three components. The commander uses the opera-
tional framework to focus combat power. Combat power is the total means of
destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply
against the opponent at a given time (JP 1-02).
2-5. As part of the military decision making process, the commander visual-
izes his battlespace and determines how to arrange his forces. The battlefield
organization is the allocation of forces in the area of operations by purpose. It
consists of three all-encompassing categories of operations: decisive, shaping,
and sustaining (FM 3-0). Purpose unifies all elements of the battlefield
organization by providing the common focus for all actions. The commander
organizes his forces according to purpose by determining whether each unit’s
operation will be decisive, shaping, or sustaining. Those decisions form the
basis of his concept of operations. He describes the area of operations (AO) in
terms of deep, close, and rear areas when the factors of METT-TC require the
use of a spatial reference. FM 3-0 explains the operational framework and
battlefield organization.
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
2-6. The nine principles of war defined in FM 3-0 provide general guidance
for conducting war and military operations other than war at the strategic,
operational, and tactical levels. They are fundamental truths governing
combat operations. The principles are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine.
First published in 1923 as general principles in Field Service Regulations
United States Army, they have stood the tests of analysis, experimentation,
and practice. They are not a checklist and their degree of application varies
with the situation. Blind adherence to these principles does not guarantee
success, but each deviation may increase the risk of failure. The principles of
war lend rigor and focus to the purely creative aspects of tactics and provide a
crucial link between pure theory and actual application.
2-3
FM 3-90
TENETS OF ARMY OPERATIONS

Principles of War
2-7. The tenets of Army operations—initiative,
agility, depth, synchronization, and versatility— · Objective
build on the principles of war. They further de- · Offensive
scribe the characteristics of successful opera- · Mass
tions. While they do not guarantee success, their · Economy of force
absence risks failure. FM 3-0 defines the tenets. · Maneuver
· Unity of command
· Security
THE FACTORS OF METT-TC · Surprise
2-8. The six factors of METT-TC—mission, · Simplicity
enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support
available, time available, and civil considera-
tions—describe the unique situation in which a Tenets of Army
tactician executes the science and art of tactics. Operations
An analysis of the factors of METT-TC is critical · Initiative
during the military decision making process. The · Agility
METT-TC analytical framework is useful in as- · Depth
sessing operations planning, preparing, and exe- · Synchronization
cuting. The tactician considers these six factors · Versatility
for any type of operation. Their impact on an op-
eration will differ, but each must be considered
as factors during the commander’s visualization Factors of
process. That consideration involves both the sci- METT-TC
ence and art of tactics. For example, terrain and · Mission
weather effects on movement rates and fuel con- · Enemy
sumption are quantifiable and, therefore, part of · Terrain and weather
the science of war. Terrain and weather effects · Troops and support
on soldier morale are not totally quantifiable and available
are part of the art of war. FM 6-0 provides a de- · Time available
tailed discussion of the factors of METT-TC. · Civil considerations
ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN Elements of

2-9. A major operation begins with a design—an Operational
idea that guides the conduct (plan, prepare, exe- Design
cute, and assess) of the operation. The opera-
tional design provides a conceptual linkage of · End state and military
ends, ways, and means. The elements of opera- conditions
tional design are tools to aid the commander in · Center of gravity
visualizing major operations and shaping his in- · Decisive points and
tent. They help the commander clarify and refine objectives
his vision by providing a framework for him to · Lines of operation
describe the operation in terms of task and · Culminating point
purpose. FM 3-0 defines each of these elements. · Operational reach,
Their utility diminishes with each succeeding approach, and pauses
tactical echelon. What is envisioned as a decisive · Simultaneous and
point by the land component commander sequential operations
becomes a clearly delineated objective for a · Linear and nonlinear
battalion task force. operations
· Tempo
2-4
BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS

2-10. There are seven battlefield operating
systems (BOS). The seven BOS definitions Battlefield Operating
from FM 7-15 are— Systems
· The intelligence system is the activity · Intelligence
to generate knowledge of and products · Maneuver
portraying the enemy and the · Fire support
environmental features required by a · Air defense
command planning, preparing, and · Mobility/countermobility/
executing operations. survivability
· The maneuver system is the movement · Combat service support
of forces to achieve a position of · Command and control
advantage with respect to enemy
forces. This system includes the employment of forces on the battlefield
in combination with direct fire or fire potential. This system also
includes the conduct of tactical tasks associated with force projection.
· The fire support system encompasses the collective and coordinated use
of target-acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons, fixed-wing aircraft,
offensive information operations, and other lethal and nonlethal means
against targets located throughout an AO.
· The air defense system is the employment of all active measures
designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile
aircraft and missiles after they are airborne.
· The mobility, countermobility, and survivability system.
§ Mobility operations preserve the freedom of maneuver of friendly
forces.
§ Countermobility operations deny mobility to enemy forces.
§ Survivability operations protect friendly forces from the effects of
enemy weapon systems.
· The combat service support system is the support and services provided
to sustain forces during war and military operations other than war.
· The command and control system includes all collective tasks asso-
ciated with supporting the exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander over assigned and available forces in
the accomplishment of the mission.
The BOS provide the Army a common taxonomy of critical tactical activities.
They provide the commander and his staff a means of assessing the planning,
preparation, and execution of an operation in discrete subsets.
BASIC TACTICAL CONCEPTS

2-11. The following paragraphs contain basic tactical concepts common to
both offensive and defensive operations. They are listed in alphabetical order,
not in order of importance. These concepts, along with the principles of war,
tenets of Army operations, factors of METT-TC, estimates, input from other
commanders, and the commander’s experience and judgment allow him to
visualize the conduct of operations as he accomplishes his assigned mission.
2-5
FM 3-90
COMBINED ARMS
2-12. Combined arms is the synchronized or simultaneous application of
several arms—such as infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, air defense, and
aviation—to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm
was used against the enemy separately or in sequence (FM 3-0). Weapons and
units are more effective when they operate in concert. No single action,
weapon, branch, or arm of service generates sufficient power to achieve the
effects required to dominate an opponent.
2-13. Combined arms is more than the combat arms working together. Each
branch of the Army provides unique capabilities that complement the other
branches. A combined arms team consists of two or more arms supporting one
another. The commander takes his available combat, combat support (CS),
and combat service support (CSS) elements and forms them into a combined
arms team focused on mission accomplishment. The proper combination of
actions and systems by the combined arms team is the essence of combined
arms. The use of combined arms provides complementary and reinforcing ef-
fects and may have asymmetrical effects on an enemy force. (See FM 3-0 for
more information on symmetrical and asymmetrical effects.)
2-14. Armor, attack helicopter, and infantry units are normally the nucleus
of the combined arms team. However, emerging capabilities allow the com-
mander to use any combat arms unit, such as artillery and aviation, to form
that nucleus. The commander uses his combat arms forces in different combi-
nations to provide flexibility in conducting different types of operations in
varied terrain. For example, a commander may have his infantry lead in
mountains and cities when moving dismounted, while his armor leads in open
terrain. Attack helicopters can deliver large quantities of precision munitions
throughout the AO. A commander can conduct decisive operations using field
artillery Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS) and cannons augmented
by the effects of fixed-wing aviation, given the correct conditions. Air defense
artillery destroys enemy aerial assets to assist the free movement of the
friendly force. Engineers enhance the friendly force’s mobility, degrade the
enemy’s mobility, and assist in providing for survivability of the friendly
force. Combat support and CSS members of the combined arms team support
the combined arms nucleus by combining capabilities in an appropriate
manner to support and sustain the combined arms force.
DECISIVE ENGAGEMENT
2-15. A decisive engagement is an engagement in which a unit is considered
fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate itself. In the absence of
outside assistance, the action must be fought to a conclusion and either won
or lost with the forces at hand (JP 1-02). The unit’s mission is what usually
results in the acceptance of decisive engagement rather than the unit’s
physical ability to extricate itself. For example, a unit might become
decisively engaged to hold key terrain, defeat a specific enemy force, or secure
a specific objective. Less common is a defender’s decisive engagement as a
result of being placed in a position of disadvantage by an attacker.
2-6
DEFEAT IN DETAIL
2-16. Defeat in detail is achieved by concentrating overwhelming
combat power against separate parts of a force rather than defeating
the entire force at once. A smaller force can use this technique to achieve
success against a larger enemy. Defeat in detail can occur sequentially (de-
feat of separate elements one at a time in succession). For example, a com-
mander can mass overwhelming combat power effects against an enemy
element outside the supporting distance of the rest of the enemy force. This
allows the commander to destroy the targeted enemy element before it can be
effectively reinforced.
FLANKS
2-17. Flanks are the right
or left limits of a unit. For
a stationary unit, they are ENEMY LOCATION
designated in terms of an TEAM TEAM
enemy’s actual or expected LEFT FLANK RIGHT FLANK
location. (See Figure 2-2.)
For a moving unit, they are
defined by the direction of
movement. (See Figure 2-3.)
The commanders tries to
deny the enemy opportuni- BP 74
ties to engage his flanks be-
cause a force cannot concen-
trate as much direct fire on
the flanks as it can to the
front. Commanders seek to
engage enemy flanks for the
same reason. Figure 2-2. Flanks of a Stationary Unit
2-18. An assailable flank

is exposed to attack or
envelopment. It usually re-
sults from the terrain, the
weakness of forces, technical
DIRECTION
capability of the opponent TEAM OF
TEAM
(vertical envelopment), or a LEFT FLANK RIGHT FLANK
MOVEMENT
gap between adjacent units.
If one flank rests on highly
restrictive terrain and the
other flank is on open ter-
rain, the latter is immedi-
ately recognized as the as-
sailable flank for a heavy
ground force. The flank on
the restrictive terrain may Figure 2-3. Flanks of an Armor-Heavy Team
be assailable for a light Moving in an Echelon Right Formation
force. Sufficient room must exist for the attacking force to maneuver for the
flank to be assailable. A unit may not have an assailable flank if both flanks
2-7
FM 3-90
link into other forces. When a commander has an assailable flank, he may at-
tempt to refuse it by using various techniques, such as supplementary posi-
tions.
2-19. A flanking position is a geographical location on the flank of a
force from which effective fires can be placed on that flank. An attack-
ing commander maneuvers to occupy flanking positions against a defending
force to place destructive fires directly against enemy vulnerabilities. A
defending commander maneuvers to occupy flanking positions on the flanks
of a hostile route of advance for the same reason. A flanking position that an
advancing enemy can readily avoid has little value to the defender unless the
enemy does not realize it is occupied.
MANEUVER
2-20. Maneuver is the employment of forces on the battlefield through move-
ment in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of ad-
vantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission (JP 1-02).
Maneuver creates and exposes enemy vulnerabilities to the massed effects of
friendly combat power. A commander employs his elements of combat power
in symmetrical and asymmetrical ways so as to attain positional advantage
over an enemy and be capable of applying those massed effects.
MUTUAL SUPPORT
2-21. Mutual support is that support which units render to each other
against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to
each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities (JP 1-02). Mu-
tual support exists between two or more positions when they support one
another by direct or indirect fire, thus preventing the enemy from attacking
one position without being fired on from one or more adjacent positions. That
same relationship applies to units moving with relation to each other, except
they can maneuver to obtain positional advantage to achieve that support. It
is normally associated with fire and movement (maneuver), although it can
also relate to the provision of CS and CSS.
2-22. In the defense, the commander selects tactical positions to achieve the
maximum degree of mutual support. Mutual support increases the strength
of defensive positions, prevents the enemy from attempting to defeat the at-
tacking friendly forces in detail, and helps prevent infiltration. In the offense,
the commander maneuvers his forces to ensure a similar degree of support
between attacking elements.
OPERATION
2-23. An operation is a military action or the carrying out of a strategic,
tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission (JP 1-02). It
includes the process of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing those
offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations needed to gain the
objectives of any engagement, battle, major action, or campaign. It also
includes activities that enable the performance of full spectrum operations,
such as security, reconnaissance, and troop movement.
2-8
PIECEMEAL COMMITMENT
2-24. Piecemeal commitment is the immediate employment of units in
combat as they become available instead of waiting for larger ag-
gregations of units to ensure mass, or the unsynchronized employ-
ment of available forces so that their combat power is not employed
effectively. Piecemeal commitment subjects the smaller committed forces to
defeat in detail and prevents the massing and synchronizing of combat power
with following combat and CS elements. However, piecemeal commitment
may be advantageous to maintain momentum and to retain or exploit the ini-
tiative. A commander may require piecemeal commitment of a unit to rein-
force a faltering operation, especially if the commitment of small units pro-
vide all of the combat power needed to avert disaster. The “pile-on” technique
associated with search and attack operations employs the piecemeal commit-
ment of troops. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of search and attack opera-
tions.)
RECONSTITUITON
2-25. Reconstitution is those actions that commanders plan and implement to
restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with
mission requirements and available resources. Reconstitution operations
include regeneration and reorganization (FM 4-100.9). Reconstitution is a
total process. It is not solely a CSS operation, though CSS plays an integral
role. The commander conducts reconstitution when one of his subordinate
units becomes combat ineffective or when he can raise its combat effec-
tiveness closer to the desired level by shifting available resources. Besides
normal support actions, reconstitution may include—
· Removing the unit from combat.
· Assessing it with external assets.
· Reestablishing the chain of command.
· Training the unit for future operations.
· Reestablishing unit cohesion.
2-26. Reconstitution transcends normal day-to-day force sustainment actions.
However, it uses existing systems and units to do so. No resources exist solely
to perform reconstitution. (See FM 4-100.9.)
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
2-27. Rules of engagement (ROE) are directives issued by competent military
authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which
United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with
other forces encountered (JP 1-02). Operational requirements, policy, and law
define the commander’s ROE. Rules of engagement impact on how a com-
mander conducts his operations in all four types of military operations by im-
posing political, practical, operational, and legal limitations on his actions.
They may extend to criteria for initiating engagements with certain weapon
systems, such as employing unobserved indirect fires within the echelon rear
area, or reacting to an attack. They always recognize the right of self-defense
and the commander’s right and obligation to protect assigned personnel.
CJCSI 3121.01A establishes the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s standing ROE.
2-9
FM 3-90
Operational level commanders modify those standing ROE as necessary in

response to the factors of METT-TC.
SUPPORTING DISTANCE
2-28. Supporting distance is the distance between two units that can be
traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other. For small units, it is
the distance between two units that can be covered effectively by their fires
(FM 3-0). Supporting distance is a factor of combat power, dispositions, com-
munications capability, and tactical mobility of friendly and enemy forces.
SUPPORTING RANGE
2-29. Supporting range is the distance one unit may be geographically
separated from a second unit, yet remain within the maximum range of the
second unit’s indirect fire weapons systems. (FM 3-0). Major factors that af-
fect supporting range are terrain relief, the range of the supporting unit’s
weapon systems, and their locations in relation to the supported unit’s posi-
tion.
TACTICAL MOBILITY
2-30. Tactical mobility is the ability to move rapidly from one part of
the battlefield to another, relative to the enemy. Tactical mobility is a
function of cross-country mobility, firepower, and protection. The terrain, soil
conditions, and weather affect cross-country mobility. Heavy ground maneu-
ver units have good tactical mobility—except in restrictive terrain—combined
with firepower and protection. They can move on the battlefield against most
enemy forces unless faced with an enemy who can defeat their protection and
cannot be suppressed by friendly fires. Light ground maneuver units have a
tactical mobility advantage against enemy heavy forces in restrictive terrain,
but limited firepower and protection. Army aviation maneuver units have
good tactical mobility in most types of terrain, good firepower, but limited
protection. Extreme weather conditions can restrict the tactical mobility of
Army aviation units.
BASIC TACTICAL GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES

2-31. This section establishes basic tactical graphic control measures common
to offensive and defensive operations. The appropriate chapters of this man-
ual discuss those graphic control measures that apply to only one type of mili-
tary operation. For example, Chapter 3 discusses the objective as a basic of-
fensive control measure since an objective is a graphic control measure that
applies only to offensive operations. These graphics apply to both automated
and hand-drawn graphic displays or overlays. This section portrays control
measures for use on situation maps, overlays, and annotated aerial photo-
graphs. They are also the standard for all simulations, to include those used
in live, virtual, and constructive environments.
2-32. Units conducting tactical operations must have clearly defined tasks
and responsibilities. The commander uses control measures to establish speci-
fic responsibilities that prevent units from impeding one another and impose
necessary restrictions. Control measures can be permissive (which allows
2-10
something to happen) or restrictive

(which limits how something is Basic Tactical Graphic
done). Control measures may be Control Measures
graphical, such as boundaries, or · Air corridor and air control points
procedural, such as target engage- · Area of operations and boundaries
ment priorities. A commander · Assembly areas
should establish only the minimum · Checkpoint
control measures necessary to pro- · Contact point
vide essential coordination and de- · Critical friendly zones
confliction between units. Control · Direct fire control measures
measures must not unduly restrict · Deep, close, and rear areas
subordinates in accomplishing their · Engagement area
missions. The commander removes · Fire support coordination measures
restrictive control measures as soon · Fire support targets
as possible. FM 1-02 discusses the · Forward line of own troops
rules for drawing control measures · Line of contact
on overlays and maps. · Named area of interest
2-33. Well-conceived control meas- · Obstacle control measures
ures facilitate the conduct of cur- · Phase lines
rent and future operations. The · Position areas for artillery
commander adjusts his control · Routes
measures as necessary to maintain · Targeted area of interest
synchronization and ensure mission
accomplishment as the tactical situation evolves. He balances the risk of in-
troducing additional friction into the operation with the benefits gained by
changing them if all of his subordinate elements do not receive the new con-
trol measures when contemplating changes to previously established control
measures.
2-34. Control measures apply to all forces: combat, CS, and CSS. The com-
mander ensures all higher-echelon control measures, such as phase lines
(PLs) and checkpoints, are incorporated into his graphic control measures.
When he reports to higher headquarters, he references only the control meas-
ures established by that headquarters.
AIR CORRIDOR AND AIR CONTROL POINTS

2-35. An air corridor is a restricted air route of travel specified for use by
friendly aircraft and established for the purpose of preventing friendly
aircraft from being fired on by friendly forces (JP 1-02). It is used to deconflict
artillery firing positions with aviation traffic. Low-level transit routes,
minimum-risk routes, standard use army aircraft flight routes, and UAV
routes are types of air corridors. An air corridor always includes air control
points. An air control point (ACP) is an easily identifiable point on the terrain
or an electronic navigational aid used to provide necessary control during air
movement. ACPs are generally designated at each point where the flight
route or air corridor makes a definite change in direction and at any other
point deemed necessary for timing or control of the operation (FM 3-52).
(Figure 2-4 on page 2-12 depicts a generic air corridor and ACPs. See FM 3-52
for more information on aerial control measures.)
2-11
FM 3-90
AREA OF OPERATIONS AND BOUNDARIES

2-36. An AO is the basic
BIRDMAN
Name: _________
control measure for all 200m
Width: _________
types of operations. An ACP 50ft AGL
Min Alt: ________
area of operations is an op- 1 Max Alt: 500ft AGL
________
erational area defined by
BI
the joint force commander
RD
for land and naval forces.
ACP
Areas of operations do not
MA
3
typically encompass the A N
IR D M
N
entire operational area of
the joint force commander,
ACP B
2
but should be large enough
for component command- Figure 2-4. Generic Air Corridor
ers to accomplish their
missions and protect their forces (JP 1-02). The joint force land component
commander (JFLCC) or the Army service component command (ASCC)
commander will in turn assign their subordinates their own AOs. Those
subordinates will further assign their subordinates AOs down to the battalion
or company level based on the factors of METT-TC. A unit assigned an AO,
the owning unit, may not change control measures imposed by a higher
headquarters within their AO. However, it may establish additional control
measures to coordinate and synchronize its operations.
2-37. Assigning an AO to a subordi-
An avenue of approach is
nate headquarters maximizes decen-
the air or ground route
tralized execution by empowering
leading to an objective (or
subordinate commanders to use their
key terrain in its path) that
own initiative to accomplish their
an attacking force can use.
assigned missions. This encourages
the use of mission command. (See FM 6-0 for a discussion of mission com-
mand.) At the same time it adds the responsibilities listed in Paragraph 2-40
below to the lower headquarters. Conversely, failure to designate subordinate
AOs maximizes centralized execution and limits the subordinates’ tactical
options. The latter choice should be made only when mandated by the factors
of METT-TC. For example, a brigade commander responsible for blocking an
enemy advance along a single avenue of approach may assign his subordinate
battalions battle positions to support a brigade engagement area (EA) instead
of subdividing his AO and the avenue of approach into battalion AOs.
2-38. A higher headquarters designates an AO using boundaries. It normally
assigns an AO to a maneuver unit, but it may also assign one to CS or CSS
units. Having an AO assigned both restricts and facilitates the movement of
units and use of fires. It restricts units not assigned responsibility for the AO
from moving through the AO. It also restricts outside units from firing into or
allowing the effects of its fires to affect the AO. Both of these restrictions can
be relaxed through coordination with the owning unit. It facilitates the move-
ment and fires of the unit assigned responsibility for, or owning, the AO. The
assigned AO must encompass enough terrain for the commander to accom-
plish his mission and protect his forces.
2-12
2-39. Ideally, the AO is smaller than the commander’s area of influence. An

area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly cap-
able of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally
under the commander’s command or control (JP 1-02). If the commander’s
area of influence is smaller than his AO, he must consider his options for ex-
tending the size of his area of influence. His options include the following
techniques:
· Changing the geographical dispositions of his current systems to in-
crease the size of his area of influence and ensure coverage of key
areas, installations, and systems.
· Requesting additional assets.
· Requesting boundary adjustments to reduce the size of his AO.
· Accepting the increased risk associated with being unable to provide
security throughout the AO.
· Moving his area of influence by phases to sequentially encompass the
entire AO.
2-40. All units assigned an AO have the following responsibilities:
· Terrain management.
· Movement control.
· Fires.
· Security.
Selected echelons have an additional responsibility to provide airspace com-
mand and control.
Terrain Management
2-41. The commander assigned an AO is responsible for terrain management
within its boundaries. A higher headquarters may dictate that another unit
position itself within a subordinate unit’s AO, but the commander assigned
the AO retains final approval authority for the exact placement. This ensures
the unit commander controlling the AO knows what units are in his AO and
where they are located so that he can deconflict operations, control move-
ment, and prevent fratricide. Only the owning commander assigns subordi-
nate unit boundaries within the AO.
Movement Control
2-42. Units may not move across boundaries into another unit’s AO without
receiving clearance from the unit owning the AO. Once assigned an AO, the
owning unit controls movement throughout the AO. The designation, mainte-
nance, route security, and control of movement along routes within an AO are
the responsibility of the owning unit unless the higher echelon’s coordinating
instructions direct otherwise. The commander may designate movement
routes as open, supervised, dispatch, reserved, or prohibited. Each route’s
designation varies based on the factors of METT-TC. FM 4-01.30 discusses
movement planning and control measures.
2-13
FM 3-90
Fires
2-43. Within its AO, the owning unit may employ any direct or indirect fire
system without receiving further clearance from superior headquarters.
There are three exceptions: The first and most common is that a unit may not
use munitions within its own AO without receiving appropriate clearance if
the effects of those munitions extend beyond its AO. For example, if a unit
wants to use smoke, its effects cannot cross boundaries into another AO
unless cleared with the adjacent owning unit. Second, higher headquarters
may explicitly restrict the use of certain munitions within an AO or parts of
an AO, such as long-duration scatterable mines. Third, higher headquarters
may impose a restrictive fire support coordinating measure (FSCM) within an
AO to protect some asset or facility, such as a no-fire area around a camp
housing dislocated civilians. These FSCM tend to be linear in nature in a con-
tiguous AO while they are more likely areas in a noncontiguous AO.
2-44. The commander may not employ indirect fires across boundaries with-
out receiving clearance from the unit into whose AO the fires will impact. He
may employ direct fires across boundaries without clearance at specific point
targets that are clearly and positively identified as enemy.
Security
2-45. The security of all units operating within the AO is the responsibility of
the owning commander. This fact does not require that commander to con-
duct area security operations throughout his AO. (See Chapter 12 for a dis-
cussion of area security responsibilities.) He must prevent surprise and pro-
vide the amount of time necessary for all units located within the AO to
effectively respond to enemy actions by employing security forces around
those units. If the commander cannot or chooses not to provide security
throughout his AO, he must clearly inform all concerned individuals of when,
where, and under what conditions he is not going to exercise this function.
The commander generally depicts these locations using permissive FSCM.
Each unit commander remains responsible for his unit’s local security.
Airspace Command and Control

2-46. Army airspace command and control (A2C2) are those actions that en-
sure the synchronized use of airspace and enhanced command and control of
forces using airspace (FM 3-52). The ground maneuver commander manages
the airspace below the coordinating altitude, using procedural control meas-
ures and positive control measures implemented by his air traffic service or-
ganization. Corps and divisions are the echelons that routinely have A2C2
responsibilities, although a commander may provide the resources to accom-
plish this function to a brigade operating independently.
2-47. Communications, standardized procedures, and liaison normally pro-
vide the commander with his required connectivity with the theater airspace
control authority. The commander ensures reliable communications through
his area communications network. He supervises airspace activities through
standardized procedures to prevent real-time conflicts among the various air-
space users while achieving the necessary flexibility to ensure the greatest
combat effectiveness. The A2C2 section of the battlefield coordination detach-
ment, co-located with the joint air operations center, provides the commander
2-14
that liaison capability with the airspace control authority (ACA). (See
FM 3-52 and JP 3-52 for additional information regarding airspace control
doctrine.)
2-48. The vertical dimension, or airspace, of the AO is inherently permissive
because all branches and services require the use of airspace. There are pro-
cedural and positive airspace control measures (ACM) available to synchro-
nize military operations in the airspace above the AO. Among the procedural
ACM is the coordinating altitude, which separates fixed- and rotary-wing air-
craft by determining an altitude below which fixed-wing aircraft will norm-
ally not fly and above which rotary-wing aircraft will normally not fly. It al-
lows the ground commander to use the airspace above his AO for his organic
aviation assets to complement ground maneuver forces, but it is not a bound-
ary for which he has responsibility. The ACA, normally the joint force air
component commander, must establish the coordinating altitude, promulgate
it through the airspace control plan, address it in the airspace control order,
and include a buffer zone for small altitude deviations. Coordinating altitudes
are permissive ACM.
Boundaries
2-49. A boundary is a line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of
facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent
units, formations, or areas (JP 0-2). The commander uses graphic control
measures to define the limits of an AO and, as such, establish ground forces’
responsibilities. He uses ACM to control the vertical dimension. The com-
mander bases his subordinates’ boundaries on clearly defined terrain fea-
tures. This requirement is less important if all units in the AO have precision
navigation capabilities. Boundaries should not split roads, rivers, or railways.
Responsibility for an avenue of approach and key terrain should belong to
only one unit. The commander adjusts his boundaries as necessary in re-
sponse to the evolving tactical situation. Any areas not delegated to a subord-
inate remain the responsibility of the commander.
Contiguous and Noncontiguous AOs

2-50. A commander has a contiguous AO when all of his subordinate
forces’ areas of operations share one or more common boundaries. A
commander has a noncontiguous AO when one or more of his sub-
ordinate forces’ areas of operations do not share a common bound-
ary. The intervening area between noncontiguous AOs remains the respon-
sibility of the higher headquarters. The commander can choose to organize
his AO so that his subordinates have contiguous or noncontiguous areas of
operations.
2-51. The forward boundary of an echelon is primarily designated to divide
responsibilities between it and its next higher echelon. Decisive or shaping
operations directed against enemy forces beyond an echelon’s forward bound-
ary are the responsibility of the next higher echelon. The higher echelon
headquarters normally assigns the lower echelon a forward boundary based
on the higher echelon’s scheme of maneuver. The ability to acquire and attack
targets in the area between the forward boundary of its subordinates and the
echelon’s forward boundary determines the exact position of that forward
2-15
FM 3-90
boundary. For example, if a division assigns a forward boundary to a brigade,

then the division conducts operations beyond the brigade’s forward boundary.
That area between the brigade’s forward boundary and the division’s forward
boundary is the division’s deep area. The rear boundary defines the rearward
limits of the unit’s area. It usually also defines the start of the next echelon’s
rear area. Lateral boundaries extend from the rear boundary to the unit’s
forward boundary. (See Figure 2-5.)
CORPS FORWARD BOUNDARY

XXX
CORPS LATERAL BOUNDARIES
CORPS DEEP AREA

DIVISION FORWARD BOUNDARIES
BRIGADE
FORWARD XX XX
BOUNDARIES DIVISION DEEP DIVISION DEEP BRIGADE
AREA AREA SECURITY
X AREAS
X X X X
X X
X
FEBA
DIVISION BRIGADE
FEBA
CLOSE LATERAL
CORPS
XXX
DIVISION
X LATERAL X
xx
XXX
AREA X BOUNDARY
BOUNDARIES CLOSE
X X AREA
X X X X
II DIVISION DIVISION
RESERVE REAR
DIVISION REAR AREA AREA BRIGADE
REAR
xx xx BOUNDARIES
CORPS
DIVISION REAR BOUNDARIES
REAR BOUNDARY
CORPS REAR AREA
XXX
Figure 2-5. Corps with Contiguous Areas of Operations
2-52. The commander bases his decision to establish contiguous AOs on his
analysis of the factors of METT-TC. Units with contiguous AOs are normally
within supporting distance of one another and may be within supporting
range. Other reasons why a commander establishes contiguous AOs include—
· Limited size of the AO in relation to the number of friendly forces.
· Decisive points in close physical proximity to each other.
· Political boundaries or enemy force concentrations require establishing
contiguous AOs.
· Reduced risk of being defeated in detail because of an incomplete op-
erational picture or when the friendly force is significantly outnum-
bered.
· Greater concentration of combat power along a single avenue of
approach or movement corridor.
2-16
2-53. A noncontiguous AO does not have distinctive forward, rear, and lateral
boundaries. It is established by a boundary that encloses the entire area.
Subordinate boundaries will be continuous, 360-degree arcs that closely ap-
proximate the subordinate unit’s area of influence. For example, the com-
mander would normally place a noncontiguous brigade boundary at the limit
of observed fires for its security forces. Because noncontiguous boundaries
must provide all-around security, they generally allow for less concentration
of combat power along a single axis. A brigade, division, or corps commander
who establishes noncontiguous AOs for his subordinates still designates an
echelon rear area. Battle positions are not AOs since a unit is not restricted
from operating outside its battle position. A commander who deploys his sub-
ordinates into battle positions is not conducting noncontiguous operations.
Chapter 8 defines a battle position.
2-54. Operations directed against enemy forces and systems outside a non-
contiguous AO are the responsibility of the organization that owns that loca-
tion. For example, in Figure 2-6 the middle enemy division is the corps’ re-
sponsibility since it is not within either of the corps’ two divisions’ AOs.
SPT
SPT
SPT DAG
III
DAG III
III
X DAG III III
III
X III
X
II III
X
II
II III II
X
II X
X
XX
II
X
X
X X
X
X
X
SPF II
X
SPF
XXX
SPF
DIVISION X DSA
AO DIVISION
ROUTE C
AO
CORPS
SPF
JSOA X
{
AO
{
BLACK XX
X X
X X
LARK
SPT (-) SPF

SPT (-)
RO
UT
EL SPF
EW
SPF IS
SPF
CORPS
DIVISION SPF REAR
REAR
X AREA
AREA III
CORPS MP
RESERVE
Figure 2-6. Corps with Noncontiguous Areas of Operations
2-55. The commander bases his decision to establish noncontiguous AOs on

his analysis of the factors of METT-TC. There is a risk associated with estab-
lishing noncontiguous AOs since units with noncontiguous AOs are normally
out of supporting range from each other. Overcoming this risk places a pre-
mium on situational understanding and tactical mobility. Reasons why a
commander establishes noncontiguous AOs include—
· Encompassing key and decisive terrain within his area of influence
when he has limited numbers of friendly forces for the size of the AO.
Key terrain is any locality, or area, the seizure or retention of
which affords a marked advantage to either combatant.
2-17
FM 3-90
Decisive terrain, when present, is key terrain whose seizure

and retention is mandatory for successful mission accomplish-
ment.
· Comparative weakness of the enemy means that subordinates do not
have to remain within supporting range or distance of one another and
can take advantage of superior situational understanding and tactical
mobility.
· Enemy concentrated in dispersed areas requires a corresponding con-
centration of friendly forces.
· Existence of large contaminated areas within his AO.
2-56. Using noncontiguous AOs place a premium on the use of innovative
means to conduct sustaining operations, including aerial resupply. A com-
mander whose subordinates have noncontiguous AOs has three basic choices
for establishing intermittent ground lines of communications (LOCs) with his
subordinates:
· Assign a subordinate the mission of providing convoy security for each
convoy. For the situation depicted in Figure 2-7, the corps could assign
the corps military police brigade the mission of providing convoy
security for critical ground convoys traveling between the corps rear
area and each division’s rear area.
· Assign a subordinate the mission of providing route security for each
sustainment route. For the situation depicted in Figure 2-7 the corps
could assign the corps armored cavalry regiment an AO that extends
four kilometers on either side of LOCs LEWIS and CLARK. The regi-
ment would be assigned the mission of route security within that AO
for the period required for sustainment convoys to travel to and from
the two subordinate divisions.
· Assume risk by having the corps support command run convoys with
only their organic self-defense capabilities, while assigning another
unit the mission of responding to enemy contacts beyond a convoy’s
self-defense capability.
ASSEMBLY AREAS
2-57. An assembly area (AA) is an area a unit occupies to prepare for
an operation. Ideally, an assembly area provides—
· Concealment from air and ground observation.
· Cover from direct fire.
· Space for dispersion; separate each AA by enough distance from other
AAs to preclude mutual interference.
· Adequate entrances, exits, and internal routes.
· Good drainage and soil conditions that can sustain the movement of the
unit’s vehicles and individual soldiers.
· Terrain masking of electromagnetic signatures.
· Terrain allowing observation of ground and air avenues into the AA.
· Sanctuary from enemy medium-range artillery fires because of its
location outside the enemy’s range.
2-18
2-58. The commander assigns each unit its own AA. In Figure 2-7, the ex-
ample of multiple units occupying one AA is a graphical shortcut taken when
the map scale would make depiction of multiple assembly areas unreadable.
In reality, the commander would subdivide AA Thomas into two smaller AAs,
one for each unit. A unit AA is normally within the AO of another unit. An
AA area is usually treated as a noncontiguous AO. This means that a unit has
the same responsibilities within its assigned AA as it has for any other AO.
AA MEADE II
II 3 68 AA ORD
3 68
OCCUPIED OCCUPIED
{
II
3 68 AA HANCOCK
AA THOMAS
II 3 68
2 13
OCCUPIED BY MULTIPLE UNITS PROPOSED/ON ORDER
Figure 2-7. Assembly Areas
2-59. The proper location of AAs contributes significantly to both security and
flexibility. It should facilitate future operations so movement to subsequent
positions can take place smoothly and quickly by concealed routes. Because of
their smaller signature, light units can use AAs closer to the enemy than
heavy units without excessive risk of enemy detection. The tactical mobility of
heavy units allows them to occupy AAs at a greater distance from the line of
departure (LD) than light units.
CHECKPOINT
2-60. A checkpoint is a predetermined
CP 13
point on the ground used to control move-
ment, tactical maneuver, and orientation.
Units can also use a checkpoint as a fire control
measure in lieu of the preferred control meas-
ure, a target reference point. Checkpoints are
useful for orientation. Units may use check-
points to supplement or as substitutes for phase
lines (PLs). They are also used in the conduct of
CSS. Figure 2-8 depicts Checkpoint 13. Figure 2-8. Checkpoint 13
2-19
FM 3-90
CONTACT POINT
2-61. A contact point is an easily identi-
fiable point on the terrain where two or
more ground units are required to make
physical contact. A commander establishes a
contact point where a PL crosses a lateral
071830Z
FEB02 8
boundary or on other identifiable terrain as a
technique to ensure coordination between two
units. He provides a date-time group to
indicate when to make that physical contact. Figure 2-9. Contact Point 8
Figure 2-9 depicts Contact Point 8.
2-62. The mutual higher commander of two moving units normally desig-
nates the location of contact points and times of contact. When one unit is sta-
tionary, its commander normally designates the location of the contact point
and the meeting time, and transmits this information to the commander of
the moving unit.
CRITICAL FRIENDLY ZONE

2-63. A critical friendly zone (CFZ) is an area, usually a friendly unit
or location, that the maneuver commander designates as critical to
the protection of an asset whose loss would seriously jeopardize the
mission. The exact size and shape of the CFZ reflects the technical charac-
teristics of the sensor coverage and varies in accordance with the terrain.
There is no specific graphic for a CFZ. The designation of a CFZ requires the
availability of a target acquisition sensor to cover that area and fire support
weapon systems to conduct counterfire. The supporting field artillery unit’s
automated fire support system is tied to that sensor to place the location of a
weapon firing into the CFZ ahead of all other targets in priority for
counterfire. This results in an immediate call for fire unless the system
operator manually overrides the automated request for fire. (For additional
information on the employment of a CFZ, see FM 3-09.12.)
DIRECT FIRE CONTROL MEASURES

2-64. The small unit commander communicates to his subordinates the
manner, method, and time to initiate, shift, and mass fires, and when to dis-
engage by using direct fire control measures. The commander should control
his unit’s fires so he can direct the engagement of enemy systems to gain the
greatest effect. The commander uses intelligence preparation of the battle-
field (IPB) and reconnaissance to determine the most advantageous way to
use direct fire control measures to mass the effects on the enemy and reduce
fratricide from direct fire systems. He must understand the characteristics of
weapon systems and available munitions (such as the danger to unprotected
soldiers when tanks fire discarding sabot ammunition over their heads or
near them). Direct fire control measures defined in this manual include
engagement criteria, engagement priorities, sectors of fire, and target
reference points. Platoon and company maneuver manuals address other
direct fire control measures, such as frontal, cross, or depth fire patterns and
simultaneous, alternating, or observed techniques of fire.
2-20
Engagement Area
2-65. An engagement area (EA) is an area where the commander in-
tends to contain and destroy an enemy force with the massed effects
of all available weapons and supporting systems. This includes organic
direct fire systems and supporting systems, such as close air support. Fig-
ure 2-10 depicts several EAs used within the context of a battalion defense.
The commander determines the size and shape of the EA by the relatively un-
obstructed intervisibility from the weapon systems in their firing positions
and the maximum range of those weapons. The commander designates EAs
to cover each enemy avenue of approach into his position. He also can use
them to designate known or suspected enemy locations. Once the commander
selects his EA, he arrays his forces in positions to concentrate overwhelming
effects into these areas. He routinely subdivides his EA into smaller EAs for
his subordinates using one or more target reference points or by prominent
terrain features. The commander assigns sectors of fires to subordinates to
prevent fratricide, but responsibility for an avenue of approach or key terrain
is never split. These sectors normally do not affect friendly maneuver. Com-
manders of units up to battalion task force size normally use this control
measure.
PL JOANN
DISENGAGEMENT
LINE EA
EA ALPHA OMEGA
+ +
NZ1542
I
NZ1540
+
I
TRIGGER
+
TRIGGER NZ1539 NZ1541
LINE/ LINE/
PL JAN PL PEGGY
I I
+
NZ1545
EA + NZ1543
TRIGGER LINE/
PL DICK
PHI
+ NZ1544
I
Figure 2-10. Engagement Areas
Engagement Criteria
2-66. Engagement criteria are protocols that specify those circum-
stances for initiating engagement with an enemy force. They may be
restrictive or permissive. For example, a company commander could tell his
1st Platoon to wait until three enemy tanks reach a target reference point
2-21
FM 3-90
within its EA before initiating fire. Another example is a battalion command-

er telling one of his company commanders not to engage an approaching en-
emy unit until it commits itself to an avenue of approach. The commander
establishes his engagement criteria in the direct fire plan. Commanders and
leaders of small tactical units use engagement criteria in conjunction with
engagement priorities and other direct fire control measures to mass fires
and control fire distribution.
Engagement Priority
2-67. Engagement priority specifies the order in which the unit en-
gages enemy systems or functions. The commander assigns engagement
priorities based on the type or level of threat at different ranges to match
organic weapon systems capabilities against enemy vulnerabilities. Engage-
ment priorities are situationally dependent. The commander uses engage-
ment priorities to distribute fires rapidly and effectively. Subordinate ele-
ments can have different engagement priorities. For example, the commander
establishes his engagement priorities so that his M2 Bradley fighting vehicles
engage enemy infantry fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers while
his M1 Abrams tanks engage enemy tanks. Normally, units engage the most
dangerous targets first, followed by targets in depth.
Sector of Fire
2-68. A sector of fire is that
area assigned to a unit, a
crew-served weapon, or an ENCLOSED PRIMARY
individual weapon within SECTOR

SECTOR
OF FIRE
OF SECONDARY
which it will engage targets FIRE SECTOR OF FIRE
as they appear in accord-

ance with established en-
gagement priorities. (See
Figure 2-11.) Battalions and
smaller echelons primarily use SECTORS OF FIRE EXTENDING
this direct fire control measure. FROM FIRING POSITION
Each sector of fire can extend
from a firing position to the Figure 2-11. Sectors of Fire
maximum engagement range of
the weapon, or it can be an enclosed area at a distance from the firing
position. To increase the commander’s ability to concentrate fires in a certain
area, he should assign each unit or weapon system a primary sector of fire
and a secondary sector of fire. The primary sector of fire is that area in which
the assigned unit, individual, or crew-served weapon is initially responsible
for engaging and defeating the enemy. Fire shifts to the secondary sector, on
order, when there are no targets in the primary sector, or when the
commander needs to cover the movement of another friendly element. This
secondary sector of fire should correspond to another element’s primary
sector of fire to obtain mutual support. Subordinate commanders may impose
additional fire control measures as required.
2-22
Target Reference Point

2-69. A target reference point (TRP) is an
easily recognizable point on the ground,
such as a building or a road junction, used
in conjunction with engagement areas and
032
sectors of fire to initiate, distribute, and
control fires. A TRP may be a natural terrain
feature, a manmade artifact, such as a building,
or a marker emplaced by the unit. Maneuver
leaders at battalion and below designate TRPs to
define unit or individual sectors of fire and ob- Figure 2-12.
servation, usually within an EA. A TRP can also Target Reference Point
designate the center of an area where the com-
mander plans to rapidly distribute or converge fires. A task force commander
designates TRPs for his company teams. Company commanders designate
TRPs for their platoons, sections, and, in some cases, individual weapons.
Platoon leaders or subordinate leaders may designate additional TRPs for
their elements as necessary to control direct and indirect fires. The echelon
fire support officer can also designate TRPs as indirect fire targets by using
the standard target symbol with letters and numbers. Figure 2-12 depicts the
symbol for TRP 032.
Trigger Line
2-70. A trigger line is a
DIRECT-FIRE FIRE SUPPORT
phase line used to initiate TRIGGER TRIGGER
and mass fires into an LINE LINE
engagement area or an
objective at a predeter- ENY
mined range for all or like

weapon systems. It is loca- ENY
ted on identifiable terrain—
like all phase lines—that
DISTANCE THAT CAN BE CROSSED BY
crosses an EA, a direction of THE ENEMY BETWEEN THE TIME THAT
attack, or an axis of advance. INDIRECT FIRES ARE CALLED FOR
The commander can desig- AND WHEN INDIRECT FIRES IMPACT
nate one trigger line for all
weapon systems or separate
trigger lines for each weapon
Figure 2-13. Trigger Lines
or type of weapon system.
The commander specifies the engagement criteria for this specific situation.
The criteria may be either time- or event-driven, such as a certain number or
certain types of vehicles to cross the trigger line before initiating engagement.
He may reserve to himself the authority to initiate engagement by firing his
own weapon or giving the command to fire.
2-71. The commander designates a PL as the trigger line for his fire support
systems. He bases the trigger line’s location on the factors of METT-TC,
including such variables as the time of flight for artillery shells, positioning of
the guns, and the existence of quick-fire links. Its location varies from situa-
tion to situation. Its position reflects the distance that the enemy force is
2-23
FM 3-90
likely to traverse in the time it takes from when fires are requested to when
artillery rounds impact. (See Figure 2-13.) This gives time for the fire support
systems to respond to the initial call for fire. For example, in a desert envi-
ronment—a battalion task force commander’s fire support trigger line is ap-
proximately four kilometers beyond the point where he wants to engage the
enemy with indirect fires when he has M109A6 howitzers in direct support. It
is approximately six kilometers when he has M109A3 howitzers in direct sup-
port. The shorter distance reflects the more rapid response capabilities of the
M109A6 compared to the M109A3, all other factors being equal.
2-72. The commander can establish another trigger line for his most accurate
long-range weapon system in the vicinity of the area where the fire support
impacts to capitalize on the asymmetric attack. However, dust and debris
resulting from the artillery fire may prevent his direct-fire systems from
engaging the enemy. He establishes other trigger lines and TRPs for shorter-
range systems. He may give guidance to extremely proficient crews to engage
the enemy at longer than normal ranges or give them different engagement
priorities than the rest of the force, such as giving priority to engaging air de-
fense or engineer-breaching systems. This could result in losing the effect
that the sudden application of massed fires has on an enemy.
2-73. When the enemy reaches these closer trigger lines, the commander es-
tablishes a decision point to help him determine if he wants his longer-range
systems to continue to fire in depth or to concentrate his fires on a single
point. Many factors impact his decision, most of which concern the enemy and
how he maneuvers and the effects of the defending force’s fires.
DEEP, CLOSE, AND REAR AREAS

2-74. There are times when the factors of METT-TC favor a spatial organi-
zation of the entire AO. Korea is an example of large numbers of enemy units
concentrated in numerous echelons on a contiguous front across the penin-
sula. The terrain and the capabilities and doctrine of allied units require the
use of a spatial organization. The commander conducts simultaneous deci-
sive, shaping, and sustaining operations within a context of deep, close, and
rear areas when this occurs. (See Figure 2-14.)
Deep Area
2-75. When designated, the deep area is an area forward of the close area
that commanders use to shape enemy forces before they are encountered or
engaged in the close area (FM 3-0). It extends from the subordinate’s forward
boundary to the forward boundary of the controlling echelon. Thus, the deep
area relates to the close area not only in terms of geography but also in terms
of purpose and time. The extent of the deep area depends on how far out the
force can acquire information and strike targets. Commanders may place
forces or employ effects in the deep area to conduct shaping operations. Some
of these operations may involve close combat. However, most ground maneu-
ver forces stay in the close area.
2-76. New weapon systems and advanced information technology continue to
increase the capability of Army forces to engage enemy forces in depth. In the
past, deep attacks aimed to slow and disrupt the advance of enemy forces.
2-24
Today, Army forces may engage enemy formations with precision fires at
substantial distances from the close area. This capability allows the
commander to employ greater depth and simultaneity of action than ever
before when conducting operations.
CORPS FORWARD BOUNDARY

XXX
CORPS LATERAL BOUNDARIES
CORPS DEEP AREA

DIVISION FORWARD BOUNDARIES
BRIGADE
FORWARD XX XX
BOUNDARIES DIVISION DEEP DIVISION DEEP BRIGADE
AREA AREA SECURITY
X AREAS
X X X X
X X
X
FEBA
DIVISION BRIGADE
FEBA
CLOSE LATERAL
CORPS
XXX
DIVISION
X LATERAL X
xx
XXX
AREA X BOUNDARY
BOUNDARIES CLOSE
X X AREA
X X X X
II DIVISION DIVISION
RESERVE REAR
DIVISION REAR AREA AREA BRIGADE
REAR
xx xx BOUNDARIES
CORPS
DIVISION REAR BOUNDARIES
REAR BOUNDARY
CORPS REAR AREA
XXX
Figure 2-14. Deep, Close, and Rear Areas
Close Area
2-77. When designated, the close area is where forces are in immediate con-
tact with the enemy and the fighting between the committed forces and
readily available tactical reserves of both combatants is occurring, or where
commanders envision close combat taking place. Typically, the close area
assigned to a maneuver force extends from its subordinates’ rear boundaries
to its own forward boundary (FM 3-0). Typically, the close area is where the
majority of close combat occurs. It also includes the activities of forces directly
supporting the fighting elements, such as direct support field artillery and
logistics elements. The close area is historically the only location where the
commander could conduct his decisive operation. One unit may conduct the
decisive operation, while another conducts shaping operations within a close
area. Division commanders whose AOs constitute the corps close area have
the option of designating their own deep, close, and rear areas. Figure 2-14
illustrates this option.
Rear Area
2-78. Unlike close and deep areas, a rear area can be designated by the
commander regardless of the organization of his AO into contiguous or
2-25
FM 3-90
noncontiguous subordinate AOs. When designated in the context of contig-

uous AOs, the rear area for any command extends from its rear boundary
forward to the rear boundary of the next lower level of command. This area is
provided primarily for the performance of support functions and is where the
majority of the echelon’s sustaining operations occur (FM 3-0). The command-
er designates an individual responsible for conducting his sustaining opera-
tions within the rear area after considering the factors of METT-TC. He pro-
vides that individual the necessary command and control resources to direct
the echelon’s sustaining operations. At the corps and division echelons, this is
the rear command post. Those operations include the following functions that
assure his command’s freedom of action and continuity of operations:
· Combat service support.
· Rear area and base security.
· Movement control throughout the AO.
· Terrain management throughout the AO.
· Infrastructure development.
That individual may be the corps deputy commander, assistant division com-
mander (support), or the forward support battalion commander depending on
the echelon.
2-79. Regardless of the specific sustaining operations performed by an or-
ganization occupying the rear area, its focus on other-than-combat operations
leaves it more vulnerable than combat organizations in close areas. Com-
manders may protect CS and CSS units and facilities in rear areas with com-
bat forces. Geography or other circumstances may cause the commander to
designate a noncontiguous rear area. This increases the challenge associated
with providing rear area security due to the physical separation from combat
units that would otherwise occupy a contiguous close area.
2-80. Between contiguous and noncontiguous AOs, the commander chooses
the battlefield organization best suited to the tactical situation. For example,
in an area defense the proximity of the enemy, the array and density of
friendly forces, and the requirement to protect sustaining functions allows
the commander to visualize decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations in
terms of discrete areas. In contrast, within the context of a search and attack
operation, the lack of information about the enemy, the need to block enemy
escape, the existence of noncontiguous rear areas, and the nature of the AO
may preclude organization of the battlefield into discrete close, deep, and rear
areas.
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATING MEASURES

2-81. Commanders assigned an AO employ FSCM to facilitate the rapid en-
gagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly
forces. Fire support coordinating measures are either permissive or restric-
tive. Boundaries are the basic FSCM. The fire support coordinator recom-
mends FSCM to the commander based on the commander’s guidance, location
of friendly forces, scheme of maneuver, and anticipated enemy actions. Once
the commander establishes FSCM, they are entered into or posted on all the
command’s displays and databases. (FM 3-09 explains the use of all FSCM in
more detail).
2-26
Permissive FSCM
2-82. The primary purpose of permissive measures is to facilitate the attack
of targets. Once they are established, further coordination is not required to
engage targets affected by the measures. Permissive FSCM include a
coordinated fire line, fire support coordination line, and free-fire area.
2-83. Coordinated Fire Line. A
coordinated fire line (CFL) is a
line beyond which conventional,
direct, and indirect surface fire CFL (1ST BDE)
support means may fire at any 080003Z
time within the boundaries of the FLOT FLOT
establishing headquarters without
additional coordination. The pur- 3X1 1X 2
pose of the CFL is to expedite the
surface-to-surface attack of tar-
gets beyond the CFL without co-
ordination with the ground com-
Figure 2-15. Coordinated Fire Line
mander in whose area the targets
are located (JP 3-09). Brigades or divisions usually establish a CFL, although
a maneuver battalion may establish one. It is located as close as possible to
the establishing unit without interfering with maneuver forces to open up the
area beyond to fire support. A higher echelon may consolidate subordinate
unit CFLs. If this occurs, any changes to the subordinate CFLs are co-
ordinated with the subordinate headquarters. (See Figure 2-15.)
2-84. Fire Support Coordination
Line. The fire support coordination line PL III CORPS FSCL
(FSCL) is a FSCM that is established and
IRON EFF 202100Z-270800 SEP
adjusted by appropriate land or
amphibious force commanders within
III (US)
their boundaries in consultation with

XXX
GCC
superior, subordinate, supporting, and

affected commanders. [See Figure 2-16.]
The FSCL facilitates the expeditious
attack of surface targets of opportunity
beyond the coordinating measure. A Figure 2-16. Fire Support
FSCL does not divide an area of opera- Coordination Line
tions by defining a boundary between
close and deep operations or a distinct area [JP 3-09 uses zone] for close air
support. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, and sea-based weapon
systems using any type of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond an
FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow neces-
sary reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements attacking targets be-
yond the FSCL must ensure that the attack will not produce adverse effects
on, or to the rear of, the line. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-
to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or
amphibious force commander. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain
features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to
commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. In exceptional circum-
stances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack
2-27
FM 3-90
of targets beyond the FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk
of fratricide and could waste limited resources (JP 3-09).
2-85. The commander designating a FSCL remains responsible for estab-
lishing the priority, effects, and timing of fires impacting beyond the FSCL.
Coordination for attacks beyond the FSCL is through the air tasking order.
The appropriate land or amphibious commander controls attacks short of the
FSCL. That commander uses the tactical air control system or the Army air-
ground system to control the execution of close air support (CAS).
2-86. Free-Fire Area. A free-fire area (FFA)
is a specific area into which any weapon
system may fire without additional coordina-
tion with the establishing headquarters
(JP 3-09). Normally, division or higher head- FFA
quarters establish a FFA on identifiable ter- 080800-082000ZJUL
rain. (See Figure 2-17.) 1CD
Restrictive FSCM
2-87. A restrictive FSCM prevents fires into
Figure 2-17. Free-Fire Area
or beyond the control measure without
detailed coordination. The primary purpose of restrictive measures is to
provide safeguards for friendly forces. Restrictive FSCM include an airspace
coordination area, no-fire area, restrictive fire area, and restrictive fire line.
Establishing a restrictive measure imposes certain requirements for specific
coordination before the engagement of those targets affected by the measure.
2-88. Airspace Coordination Area. The airspace coordination area (ACA)
is a three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, established by the
appropriate ground commander, in which friendly aircraft are reasonably
safe from friendly surface fires. The airspace coordination area may be formal
or informal (JP 3-09.3). Time, space, or altitude separates aircraft and indi-
rect fire. The purpose of the ACA is to allow the simultaneous attack of tar-
gets near each other by fixed-wing aircraft and other fire support means.
Several techniques may be used in this role. The technique selected depends
on the time available, tactical situation, unit SOPs, and state of training.
(FM 3-52 defines ACM.)
2-89. The airspace control authority establishes formal ACAs at the request
of the appropriate ground commander. This is normally a separate brigade or
higher-echelon commander. Formal ACAs require detailed planning. The de-
sign of the ACA’s vertical and lateral limits allows freedom of action for air
and surface fire support for the greatest number of foreseeable targets.
2-90. The echelon fire support cell coordinates the location and extent of the
ACM with the A2C2) element and the fire direction center. It is located above
the target area as recommended by the air liaison element to the fire support
cell. The type of aircraft and the ordnance dictate the size of the area. Vital
information defining the formal ACA includes minimum and maximum
altitudes, a baseline designated by grid coordinates at each end, the width of
the ACA from either side of the baseline, and effective times. (See Fig-
ure 2-18.)
2-28
III
U
XX S
ED ACA 2A
LLI D
A X 2AD
II XX US MIN ALT: 400
III MAX ALT: 2700
EFF 080600-080630Z
2A
91 XX D D
7
CS 2A X
G X D
4M
Figure 2-18. A Formal Airspace Coordination Measure
2-91. The maneuver commander may establish informal ACAs. He may sep-
arate aircraft and surface fires by distance (lateral, altitude, or a combina-
tion) or by time. Lateral separation is effective for coordinating fires against
targets that are adequately separated by at least one kilometer from flight
routes to ensure aircraft protection from the effects of friendly fires. An ex-
ample of a lateral separation technique is: “Aircraft stay west of grid line 62.”
Altitude separation is effective for coordinating fires when aircraft remain
above indirect fire trajectories and their effects. This technique is effective
when aircrews and firing units engage the same or nearby targets. An ex-
ample of altitude separation is: “Aircraft remain above 3000 feet mean sea
level in quadrant northwest of grid PK7325.”
2-92. A combination of lateral and altitude separation is the most restrictive
technique for aircraft and may be required when aircraft must cross the gun
target line of a firing unit. Time separation requires the most detailed
coordination and may be required when aircraft must fly near indirect-fire
trajectories or ordnance effects. The commander must coordinate the timing
of surface fires with aircraft routing. This ensures that even though aircraft
and surface fires may occupy the same space, they do not do so at the same
time. Surface and air-to-ground fires should be synchronized. All timing for
surface fires will be based on a specific aircraft event time. Fire support
personnel and tactical air controllers should select the separation technique
that requires the least coordination without adversely affecting timely fires or
the aircrew’s ability to safely complete the mission.
2-29
FM 3-90
2-93. No-Fire Area. A no-fire area (NFA)

is a land area designated by the appropri-
ate commander into which fires or their ef-
fects are prohibited (JP 3-09). (See Fig-
ure 2-19.) A commander uses a NFA to pro-
tect independently operating elements,
such as forward observers and special op-
NFA
erating forces. He can also use it to protect 120800-122000ZJUL
friendly forces in the rear area and for hu- 25AD
manitarian reasons, such as preventing
the inadvertent engagement of displaced
civilian concentrations, or to protect
sensitive areas, such as cultural
monuments. There are two exceptions to Figure 2-19. No-Fire Area
this rule:
· The establishing headquarters may approve fires within the NFA on a
case-by-case mission basis.
· When an enemy force within a NFA engages a friendly force, the
friendly force may engage a positively identified enemy force to defend
itself.
2-94. Restrictive Fire Area. A restric-
tive fire area (RFA) is an area in which
specific restrictions are imposed and into
which fires that exceed those restrictions RFA
will not be delivered without coordination 3-68 Armor
with the establishing headquarters
071700-072000 JUL
(JP 3-09). (See Figure 2-20.) The purpose
2nd (St Lo) Bde
of the RFA is to regulate fires into an
OPORD 7-02
area according to the stated restrictions,
such as no unguided conventional or dud-
producing munitions. Maneuver battalion
Figure 2-20. Restrictive Fire Area
or larger ground forces normally establish
RFAs. On occasion, a company operating independently may establish a RFA.
Usually, it is located on identifiable terrain, by grid or by a radius (in meters)
from a center point. The restrictions on a RFA may be shown on a map or
overlay, or reference can be made to an operation order that contains the re-
strictions.
2-95. Restrictive Fire Line. A restrictive fire line (RFL) is a line established
between converging friendly surface forces that prohibits fires or their effects
across that line (JP 3-09). Both or only one of those converging may be
moving. Fires and their effects can cross a RFL when the event has been
coordinated with the establishing and affected organizations. The purpose of
the line is to prevent interference between converging friendly forces, such as
what occurs during a linkup operation. The next higher common commander
of the converging forces establishes the RFL. Located on identifiable terrain,
it is usually located closer to the stationary force—if there is one—than to the
moving force. Alternatively, the commander can use a RFL to protect
sensitive areas, such as cultural monuments. (See Figure 2-21.)
2-30
______________________________________ Common Tactical Concepts and Graphic Control Measures
FIRE SUPPORT TARGETS

2-96. In the fire support context, a
target is an area designated and PL STEELE PL STEELE
RFL (XVIII CORPS)
numbered for future firing RFL (XVIII CORPS)
(JP 1-02). There are graphic con- 121200Z JUL 121200Z JUL
trol measures for point targets, cir-
cular targets, rectangular targets,
and linear targets. Figure 2-22
depicts these symbols. The
commander designates fire support
targets using a two-letter and four-
Figure 2-21. Restrictive Fire Line
digit code established in field
artillery doctrine. He may group two or more targets for simultaneous
engagement. He may also attack individual targets and groups of targets in
series or in a predetermined sequence. When this occurs, it is referred to as a
series of targets.
A1B
AG1712 AG1712 AG1706
AG1709
AG1717
POINT
TARGET GROUP OF CIRCULAR
TARGETS TARGET
A1B
A2B AG1712 AG1706
AG1711
AG1723
AG1717 AG1201
AG7005 AG1744
SANTA FPF A/1-16FA
RECTANGULAR SERIES OF LINEAR TARGET

TARGET TARGETS
Figure 2-22. Targets
2-97. Doctrine classifies each fire support target as either a planned target or
a target of opportunity. Targets of opportunity are not planned in advance
and are engaged as they present themselves in accordance with established
engagement criteria and rules of engagement. Planned targets are ones on
which fires are prearranged, although the degree of this prearrangement may
vary.
2-98. Individually planned fire support targets may be further subdivided
into scheduled and on-call fires. Scheduled targets are planned targets on
2-31
FM 3-90__________________________________________________________________________________
which field artillery and other fire support assets deliver their fires in accord-
ance with a pre-established time schedule and sequence. On-call targets are
planned targets engaged in response to a request for fires rather than in ac-
cordance with an established time schedule. An on-call target requires less
reaction time than a target of opportunity. The degree of prearrangement for
the on-call target influences the reaction time from request to execution–the
greater the prearrangement, the faster the reaction time. Priority targets are
an example of on-call targets that have short reaction times since each prio-
rity target has a fire unit placed on it when it is not engaged in other fire mis-
sions. The final protective fires (FPF) of A Battery, 1st Battalion 16th Field
Artillery in Figure 2-22 is an example of a priority target. (See FM 3-09 for
additional information regarding fire support.)
FORWARD LINE OF OWN TROOPS

2-99. The forward line of own
troops (FLOT) is a line which
FLO T FLO T
indicates the most forward (FRIENDLY PRESENT FLOT)
positions of friendly forces in
any kind of military operation
at a specific time. The forward
(FRIENDLY PLANNED OR
line of own troops normally
ON ORDER FLOT)
identifies the forward location
of covering and screening forces
(JP 1-02). In the defense, it may
be beyond, at, or short of the
forward edge of the battle area
(FEBA), depending on the tacti- Figure 2-23. Forward Line of Own Troops
cal situation. (Chapter 9 de-
fines the FEBA with other defensive control measures.) It does not include
small, long-range reconnaissance assets and similar stay-behind forces.
Friendly forces forward of the FLOT may have a restrictive fire coordination
measure, such as an RFA, placed around them to preclude fratricide. Figure
2-23 depicts the symbol for the FLOT.
LINE OF CONTACT
2-100. The line of contact (LC)
TF 2-13
is a general trace delineating
the location where friendly
and enemy forces are engaged. LC
The commander designates the en- II
EN
emy side of the LC by the abbre- 2 13 Y
viation “ENY.” In the defense, a

ENY
LC is often synonymous with the LC
FLOT. In the offense, a LC is often
combined with the LD. Chapter 4
discusses the LD. Figure 2-24 de-
TF 2-13
picts the symbol for the LC.
Figure 2-24. Line of Contact
2-32
NAMED AREA OF INTEREST

2-101. A named area of interest
(NAI) is the geographical area
where information that will
satisfy a specific information
requirement can be collected. NAI
NAIs are usually selected to cap-
ture indications of enemy courses
of action but also may be related to AUGUSTA
battlefield and environment condi-
tions. The commander tailors the
shape of the NAI symbol to the
actual area he wants observed,
rather than using a prescribed
shape. It is possible to redesignate Figure 2-25. Named Area of Interest
a NAI as a targeted area of interest
on confirmation of enemy activity within the area, allowing a commander to
mass the effects of his combat power on that area. Figure 2-25 depicts NAI
Augusta.
OBSTACLE CONTROL MEASURES

2-102. Obstacles are any obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix,
turn, or block the movement of an opposing force, and to impose additional
losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the opposing force. Obstacles can
exist naturally or can be manmade, or can be a combination of both (JP 1-02).
Obstacle control measures are specific measures that simplify the
granting of obstacle-emplacing authority while providing obstacle
control. They consist of—
· Zones.
· Belts.
· Groups.
· Restrictions.
Figure 2-26 on page 2-34 summarizes these graphic control measures. Unless
he is the senior land component commander within a theater of operations, a
commander assigned an AO does not have emplacement authority for other
than protective obstacles unless specifically granted the authority by a higher
headquarters.
2-103. Procedural measures include restricting specific obstacles by type,
munitions, or point locations in a verbal or written order. They also include
higher commanders tasking subordinate units to construct or execute specific
obstacles. These are known as directed or reserve obstacles and are specified
tasks found in the unit order. FM 3-34.1 discusses the detailed procedural
methods to both restrict and direct obstacle construction.
Obstacle Zones
2-104. An obstacle zone is a division-level command and control measure, nor-

mally done graphically, to designate specific land areas where lower echelons
2-33
FM 3-90__________________________________________________________________________________
are allowed to employ tactical obstacles (JP 1-02). Corps and division
commanders use them to grant obstacle-emplacement authority to brigades
(including armored cavalry regiments and other major subordinate units).
Obstacle zones are permissive, allowing brigades to place reinforcing obsta-
cles to support their scheme of maneuver without interfering with future op-
erations.
EM P LAC EM ENT
O BS TA C LE AU TH OR ITY
C O N T RO L G RA P H IC E XA M PL E
M EA SUR E FR O M TO
CORPS D IV Le tter A
De sign ation 2
ZONE
D IV BDE Effect G ra ph ic
O ption al
3
CORPS BDE 1 1
Nu m b er
De sign ation
B EL T D IV BDE 1
BDE TF
Effect Gra ph ic
No rm a l
D IV BDE 2 Letter O bstacle G roups

Design ation in a B elt
G RO U P BDE TF 2
1
CO E ffect Sy m bol is
TF TR P the G raphic
A B
O BST ACL E
RE STR ICTE D 52 ID
AR EA ANY 12 0900-
16 2400SepXX
(O R A )
1 - R are ly don e by corp s a nd divisio ns, bu t possible.

2 - D one only w he n d irecte d and integ ra te d w ith corps o r division fire p lans.
G raphic
E ffects
Sym bols D isrupt Fix Turn Block
Figure 2-26. Obstacle Control Measure Graphics
2-34
2-105. If the obstacle zone encompasses the entire brigade AO, another
graphic is unnecessary. Commanders may designate the entire AO as an ob-
stacle zone, with the unit boundaries defining the geographical limits of the
zone. Obstacle zones do not cross brigade boundaries. Commanders assign ob-
stacle zones to a single subordinate unit to ensure unity of effort, just as they
would when assigning defensive AOs or battle positions. This keeps tactical
obstacle responsibility along the same lines as control of direct and indirect
fires. This does not normally create vulnerabilities on the boundary between
units since the commander bases his assignment of both subordinate AOs and
obstacle zones on defined avenues of approach.
2-106. A commander does not normally assign an obstacle effect (block, fix,
turn, or disrupt) to an obstacle zone. This allows his subordinate commanders
flexibility in using obstacles. The commander should establish construction
and resourcing priorities between different obstacle zones.
Obstacle Belts
2-107. An obstacle belt is a brigade-level command and control measure,
normally given graphically, to show where within an obstacle zone the
ground tactical commander plans to limit friendly obstacle employment and
focus the defense (JP 1-02). It assigns an intent to the obstacle plan and
provides the necessary guidance on the overall effect of obstacles within a
belt. They plan obstacle belts within assigned obstacle zones to grant
obstacle-emplacement authority to their major subordinate units. Obstacle
belts also focus obstacles to support the brigade scheme of maneuver and
ensure that obstacles do not interfere with the maneuver of any higher
headquarters.
2-108. Obstacle belts are restrictive, but also direct a subordinate unit to con-
struct one or more obstacles to achieve an effect in the area. They do not spe-
cify the type or number of obstacles. Obstacle belts do not cross unit bound-
aries for the same reasons as discussed in obstacle zones. A single unit is re-
sponsible for a belt; however, a commander may assign more than one belt to
a unit.
2-109. A brigade commander normally assigns an obstacle effect and priority
to each obstacle belt. As with the obstacle zone, the target and relative loca-
tion are apparent. Adding a specific obstacle effect gives purpose and direc-
tion to battalion task force obstacle planning. When brigade commanders
assign an obstacle effect, they ensure that obstacles within the belt comple-
ment the brigade fire plan.
2-110. A corps, division, or brigade commander may authorize emplacement
authority for certain types of protective obstacles outside of obstacle zones or
belts. Normally, the commander authorizes company team and base com-
manders to emplace protective obstacles within 500 meters of their positions,
depending on the factors of METT-TC. The commander usually limits the
types of obstacles a unit may use for protective obstacles that are outside of
obstacle-control measures. For example, he may allow only wire- and
command-detonated mines outside of control measures for protective obsta-
cles. Furthermore, he may require that minefields be fenced on all sides to
2-35
FM 3-90__________________________________________________________________________________
prevent fratricide, after obtaining legal guidance concerning current rules

and policies.
Obstacle Groups
2-111. Obstacle groups are one or more individual obstacles grouped
to provide a specific obstacle effect. Task forces use obstacle groups to
ensure that company teams emplace individual obstacles supporting the task
force’s scheme of maneuver. In rare cases, brigades, divisions, or even corps
may use obstacle groups for specific tactical obstacles. Also, units integrate
obstacle groups with their direct- and indirect-fire plans. Brigade and task
force commanders can plan their placement anywhere in the obstacle zones
or belts, respectively.
2-112. Unlike obstacle zones or belts, obstacle groups are not areas but rela-
tive locations for actual obstacles. Commanders normally show obstacle
groups using the obstacle-effect graphics. When detailed planning is possible
(to include detailed on-the-ground reconnaissance), commanders may show
obstacle groups using individual obstacle graphics.
2-113. The company team commander and the engineer can adjust obstacles
in the group if the intent and link to the fire plan remain intact. Company
team commanders make minor changes to obstacles and fire-control meas-
ures based on terrain realities. For example, a commander may move a fixing
obstacle group and direct-fire TRPs a hundred meters to avoid having them
masked by rolling terrain. A major change to the obstacle group location re-
quires the approval of the commander who ordered the obstacle group em-
placement.
Individual Obstacles
2-114. Each type of individual obstacle, such as abatis, antitank ditch, booby
traps, mines and minefields, roadblocks, craters, and wire obstacles has its
associated graphic. Once a unit constructs an individual obstacle, the ob-
stacle’s location is recorded and reported through the chain of command.
Commanders must report individual obstacles in sufficient detail so any unit
moving through the area can bypass or reduce the obstacle without excessive
risk. Each headquarters is responsible to ensure exact obstacle locations are
disseminated throughout its organization. Individual obstacle graphics are
rarely shown on maps above the battalion echelon and are not depicted in
this manual. (FM 3-34.1 defines individual obstacles and establishes the
graphics for them.)
Obstacle Restrictions
2-115. Commanders may use obstacle restrictions to provide additional obsta-
cle control and to limit the specific types of obstacles used, such as no buried
mines. These restrictions ensure that subordinates do not use obstacles with
characteristics that impair future operations. It also allows commanders to
focus the use of limited resources for the decisive operation by restricting
their use elsewhere. An obstacle restricted area (ORA) is a command and
control measure used to limit the type or number of obstacles within an area
(JP 1-02). The commander with emplacement authority uses ORAs to restrict
2-36
obstacle placement. The ORA graphic depicts the area effected, the unit
imposing the restriction, and the restrictions in effect.
PHASE LINE
2-116. A phase line (PL) is a line utilized for control and coordination of mili-
tary operations, usually a terrain feature extending across the operational
area [JP 1-02 uses zone of action] (JP 1-02). (See Figure 2-27.) A commander
establishes PLs to control the maneuver of his units. Phase lines are not
boundaries unless designated as such and do not establish any specific
responsibilities between units, unless the operations order so specifies. When
possible, the commander places them along easily recognizable terrain
features—such as roads, railroad tracks, rivers, and ridgelines—to ensure
easy identification. As with boundaries, this is less important if all units are
equipped with precision navigation devices. Some PLs have additional
designations for specific purposes, such as a LD or a probable line of
deployment (PLD). Chapter 5 discusses these specific purposes.
PL ROBERT
PL RON
X
PL JOHN
PL BASIL
LD/LC
OBJ OBJ
ATTACK ZEKE PAT
PSN OBJ
KAI
(LIMIT OF ADVANCE)
GOLD
TF 2-58
II
TF 3-67
ATTACK
PSN
ASLT
BLUE AXIS PSN
PL JOHN
PL BASIL
PL ROBERT
JAN
LD/LC
PEGGY
PL RON
Figure 2-27. Phase Lines Used with Other Control Measures
POSITION AREA FOR ARTILLERY

2-117. A position area for artillery (PAA) is an area assigned to an ar-
tillery unit where individual artillery systems can maneuver to in-
crease their survivability. A PAA is not an AO for the artillery unit
occupying it. The commander assigns PAAs for terrain management pur-
poses. Establishing a PAA lets other subordinate units know they should
avoid occupying that same terrain, thus avoiding enemy counterfire. While
the exact size of a PAA depends on the factors of METT-TC, a Paladin platoon
2-37
FM 3-90__________________________________________________________________________________
normally requires a PAA encompassing two

PAA
square kilometers, and a Multiple Launch
Rocket System (MLRS) platoon requires nine
square kilometers. (See Figure 2-28.)
2-118. The maneuver echelon operations offi-
cer (G3 or S3) of the unit that owns the ter-
rain establishes the PAA. The occupying ar- PAA PAA
tillery unit does not have the same authority
and responsibilities toward the PAA that are
PAA
associated with a unit assigned an AO. For
example, other units can move through a Figure 2-28. Position
PAA without clearing that movement with Area for Artillery
the artillery unit. The artillery unit occup-
ying a PAA establishes liaison with the unit that owns the AO where the PAA
is located. The echelon fire support officer usually conducts this liaison in ac-
cordance with standard command and support relationships. (For a discus-
sion of common command and control relationships, see FM 6-0. For a discus-
sion of artillery missions, see FM 3-09.)
2-119. The decision to establish a PAA affects A2C2 for rotary and fixed-wing
integration. A PAA is a base upon which to establish future grid-target lines
for lateral deconfliction and areas for rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft to avoid
depending on high- or low-angle artillery fires.
ROUTE
2-120. A route is the pre- 071800ZJUL00 19 RP 3
scribed course to be traveled
from a specific point of TCP 8
origin to a specific destina-
tion (JP 1-02). (See Route 50 80
40 50
Iron in Figure 2-29.) Routes 071600ZJUL00 13 A2
A2
can have different purposes. 25m

ST
20m
RU
Those purposes can be add- O

N
TE
IR 52
ed as adjectives to specify E 23
U
T
XX
RO
U AD MD
20 23 O
different types of routes. Ex- R
XX
ID AD
amples of such routes in- SP 7
LL 23
clude passing route and XX
JTF
main supply route (MSR). AA RAMONA
The commander can further

designate MSRs as open, su- Figure 2-29. Routes
pervised, dispatch, reserved,
or prohibited. The commander can assign names, numbers, or alphanumeric
designations to routes within his AO. (See FM 4-01.30 for additional informa-
tion concerning route classification and marking.)
TARGETED AREA OF INTEREST

2-121. A targeted area of interest (TAI) is the geographical area or
point along a mobility corridor where successful interdiction will
cause the enemy to abandon a particular course of action or requires
him to use specialized engineer support to continue. It is where he
2-38
can be acquired and engaged by

friendly forces. The commander desig-
nates TAIs where he believes his unit can
best attack high-payoff targets. The unit
staff develops TAIs during the targeting TAI
process, based on the currently available
products resulting from the IPB process. WHITETAIL
These TAIs are further refined during war-
gaming and finally approved by the com-
mander during COA approval. The shape
of a TAI reflects the type of target and the
weapon system intended to engage that
target. They are normally cued by surveil- Figure 2-30.
lance assets, which include UAVs, combat Targeted Area of Interest
observation and lasing teams (COLTs),
long-range surveillance units (LSUs), fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft
using a variety of sensors, and special operations forces. A commander can
designate a TAI for any of his organic or supporting systems, including CAS.
Figure 2-30 depicts TAI Whitetail.
2-39
PART TWO
Offensive Operations
Chapter 3
The Basics of the Offense

To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure all the fruits of victory,
is the secret of successful war.
Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, 1863
Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating an enemy. Their pur-

pose is to impose US will on the enemy and achieve decisive victory
(FM 3-0). A commander may also conduct offensive operations to deprive
the enemy of resources, seize decisive terrain, deceive or divert the en-
emy, develop intelligence, or hold an enemy in position. This chapter dis-
cusses the basics of the offense. The basics discussed in this chapter
apply to all types of offensive operations.
CONTENTS
Characteristics of Offensive Operations.... 3-1 Rally Point................................................ 3-10
Historical Example........................................ 3-1 Support-by-Fire Position........................ 3-10
Types of Offensive Operations ................... 3-3 Time of Attack ......................................... 3-11
Movement to Contact ............................... 3-3 Forms of Maneuver..................................... 3-11
Attack ......................................................... 3-3 Envelopment ........................................... 3-12
Exploitation ............................................... 3-4 Turning Movement.................................. 3-15
Pursuit........................................................ 3-4 Infiltration ................................................ 3-19
Common Offensive Control Measures ....... 3-4 Penetration .............................................. 3-25
Assault Position........................................ 3-4 Frontal Attack .......................................... 3-30
Assault Time.............................................. 3-4 Common Offensive Planning
Attack-by-Fire Position............................. 3-5 Considerations........................................ 3-33
Attack Position.......................................... 3-5 Intelligence .............................................. 3-33
Axis of Advance ........................................ 3-5 Maneuver ................................................. 3-35
Direction of Attack .................................... 3-6 Fire Support............................................. 3-41
Final Coordination Line............................ 3-6 Air Defense .............................................. 3-43
Limit of Advance ....................................... 3-7 Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability . 3-43
Line of Departure ...................................... 3-8 Combat Service Support ........................ 3-46
Objective.................................................... 3-9 Command and Control ........................... 3-48
Point of Departure .................................... 3-9 Transition..................................................... 3-50
Probable Line of Deployment .................. 3-9
3-0
3-1. The commander seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative when conduct-
ing offensive operations. Even in the defense, wresting the initiative from the
enemy requires offensive operations.
3-2. Offensive operations are either force- or terrain-oriented. Force-oriented
operations focus on the enemy. Terrain-oriented operations focus on seizing
and retaining control of terrain and facilities.
CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

3-3. Surprise, concentration, tempo, and au-
dacity characterize the offense. Effective of-
Characteristics of
fensive operations capitalize on accurate Offensive Operations
intelligence and other relevant information · Surprise
regarding enemy forces, weather, and terrain. · Concentration
The commander maneuvers his forces to ad- · Tempo
vantageous positions before contact. Security · Audacity
operations and defensive information opera-
tions keep or inhibit the enemy from acquiring accurate information about
friendly forces. Contact with enemy forces before the decisive operation is
deliberate, designed to shape the optimum situation for the decisive opera-
tion. The decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action that capitalizes on
subordinate initiative and a common operational picture (COP) to expand
throughout the area of operations (AO). The commander executes violently
without hesitation to break the enemy’s will or destroy him. FM 3-0 discusses
the four characteristics of offensive operations.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
3-4. The following vignette discusses the offensive operations of the 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault) during OPERATION DESERT STORM. The
actions of the 101st Airborne Division between 24 and 28 February 1991 were
a shaping operation for the XVIII Airborne Corps.
The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 24–28 February 1991

The 101st attacked on 24 February 1991 to interdict, block, and defeat enemy
forces operating in or moving through AO Eagle. On order, they were to attack to
the east to assist in defeating the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command
(RGFC). As part of that attack, the 101st conducted an air assault to establish
forward operating base (FOB) Cobra. The FOB was approximately halfway
between tactical assembly area (TAA) Campbell and the Euphrates River and
Highway 8 (the main road between Basrah and Baghdad). In the FOB, the 101st
would build up supplies and forces by both land and air. That FOB would support
a further air assault by the division’s remaining uncommitted brigade into AO
Eagle. This second air assault would cut both Iraqi lines of communication (LOC)
and retreat routes of Iraqi forces in Kuwait. From FOB Cobra, the 101st, with two
brigades, could launch air assault operations to support other operations.
The operation was scheduled to begin at 0400 on 24 February. The 1st Brigade’s
ground column departed the TAA at 0700. However, weather delayed the air
assault into FOB Cobra, approximately 150 kilometers north of the TAA, until
3-1
FM 3-90
0730. The assault elements of the brigade cleared the area within the FOB of
Iraqi soldiers by 1030, making it secure enough for AH-64 operations. Attack
helicopter operations from FOB Cobra into AO Eagle began by 1330 with patrols
along Highway 8. The CG, MG J.H. Binford Peay III, decided to bring in 2nd
Brigade to FOB Cobra that day while the weather permitted. However, he delayed
3rd Brigade’s assault into AO Eagle until 25 February.
That night, recon-

EA THOMAS
naissance assets
AO EAGLE
found an alterna-
AS SAMAWAH
tive route for the
HIGHW
AN NASIRIYAH
vehicles to use HIGHWAY 8 LZ
from LZ Sand, in SAND
AY 6
AO Eagle, to High-
way 8. The first air
BASRAH
assault on 25 Feb- FOB
ruary landed three COBRA FOB
VIPER
antiarmor compa- 6th
XX
XX
24th
nies, two infantry FR
RK EW
Mech
ET
MA R N
companies, and an
MS
artillery battalion
into the LZ, but
these units were
TAA CAMPBELL
unable to link up
with their parent
battalions until the
next day. The 3rd Figure 3-1. Initial Objectives
Brigade’s main
body cut Highway 8 at 1508 and secured the area by 1848. This later air assault
covered 156 miles and cut Highway 8 only 145 miles from Baghdad. Meanwhile,
the buildup of FOB Cobra continued, with 3rd Brigade’s second lift spending the
night there due to weather. The 101st also established contact with 24th Infantry
Division (ID) to its east. Farther north in AO Eagle, 3rd Brigade made sporadic
contact with Iraqi forces along Highway 8 during the night. With this, the 101st
Airborne achieved all of its initial objectives and began planning for subsequent
missions. It had pressed the fight, never let the enemy recover from the initial
blow, and exploited success at FOB Cobra and AO Eagle. (See Figure 3-1.)
A continuing sandstorm intensified on 26 February, limiting aerial operations.

However, the remaining 3rd Brigade lifts were ferried from FOB Cobra to AO
Eagle, and 2nd Brigade closed into FOB Cobra and began planning for
subsequent operations. Although the sandstorm curtailed aerial operations, the
division continued ground operations. The 3rd Brigade kept Highway 8 closed
from ground battle positions supported by DS artillery despite Iraqi attempts to
bypass. The 1st Brigade continued the buildup of FOB Cobra by ground transport
and established contact with the 82nd Airborne Division. The 24th ID reached the
Euphrates that night and cut Highway 8 farther to the east with heavy forces. The
tempo was such that planned contingencies were overtaken by events; XVIII
Corps had accomplished its initial objectives and issued new orders orienting the
corps’ main effort eastward. As part of this reorientation, MG Peay decided to
establish FOB Viper, 150 kilometers to the east of Cobra, for aerial operations
3-2
against EA Thomas, 200 kilometers northeast of Viper, to destroy Iraqi forces

fleeing north from Basrah. Corps assets, including the 12th Aviation Brigade and
the 5th Battalion, 8th Artillery (155, T), reinforced the 101st Division.
The 101st launched its third major air assault at 0830, 27 February. The 2nd
Brigade assaulted into FOB Viper with an infantry battalion and a reinforced
artillery battalion augmented by engineers and air defense forces. By 1400, four
attack helicopter battalions began operations against EA Thomas. The 2nd
Brigade continued to close into FOB Viper. The division’s attack helicopters cut
the last escape route north out of Kuwait and destroyed 14 APCs, eight BM-21
MRLs, four MI-6 helicopters, and two SA-6 units. The Iraqi forces, unable to
escape north, lay in the paths of VII Corps and 24th ID. The 1st Brigade had
orders to air assault into EA Thomas on 28 February, but the cease-fire
precluded this operation. Although the actions of the 101st during these 100
hours were a shaping operation, they illustrate the tactical application of all of the
characteristics of offensive operations.
TYPES OF OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

3-5. The four types of offensive operations are
movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and
Types of Offensive
pursuit. Entry operations, while offensive in na- Operations
ture, are one of the six subordinate forms of · Movement to contact
force-projection operations. Force-projection op- · Attack
erations are operational level tasks and fall out- · Exploitation
side the scope of this manual. Joint doctrine ad- · Pursuit
dresses force-projection operations. Appendix C
addresses tactical airborne and air assault operations as vertical envelop-
ments.
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT
3-6. Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to develop
the situation and establish or regain contact (FM 3-0). The commander con-
ducts a movement to contact (MTC) when the enemy situation is vague or not
specific enough to conduct an attack. A search and attack is a specialized
technique of conducting a movement to contact in an environment of noncon-
tiguous AOs. Chapter 4 discusses MTC.
ATTACK
3-7. An attack is an offensive operation that
destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and
Forms of the Attack
secures terrain, or both (FM 3-0). Movement, · Ambush
supported by fires, characterizes the conduct of · Spoiling attack
an attack. However, based on his analysis of · Counterattack
the factors of METT-TC, the commander may · Raid
decide to conduct an attack using only fires. An · Feint
attack differs from a MTC because enemy main · Demonstration
body dispositions are at least partially known,
3-3
FM 3-90
which allows the commander to achieve greater synchronization. This enables

him to mass the effects of the attacking force’s combat power more effectively
in an attack than in a MTC.
3-8. Special purpose attacks are ambush, spoiling attack, counterattack, raid,
feint, and demonstration. The commander’s intent and the factors of
METT-TC determine which of these forms of attack are employed. He can
conduct each of these forms of attack, except for a raid, as either a hasty or a
deliberate operation. Chapter 6 discusses the attack and its subordinate
forms.
EXPLOITATION
3-9. Exploitation is a type of offensive operation that rapidly follows a suc-
cessful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth (FM 3-0).
The objective of an exploitation is to complete the enemy’s disintegration.
Chapter 6 discusses exploitation.
PURSUIT
3-10. A pursuit is an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile
force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (JP 1-02). A pursuit
normally follows a successful exploitation. However, if it is apparent that en-
emy resistance has broken down entirely and the enemy is fleeing the battle-
field, any other type or subordinate form of offensive operation can transition
into a pursuit. Chapter 7 discusses the pursuit.
COMMON OFFENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES

3-11. This section defines in alphabetical order those common offensive con-
trol measures that a commander uses to synchronize the effects of his combat
power. The commander uses the minimum control measures required to
successfully complete the mission while providing the flexibility needed to re-
spond to changes in the situation.
ASSAULT POSITION
3-12. An assault position is a covered and concealed position short of
the objective from which final preparations are made to assault the
objective. Ideally, it offers both cover and concealment. These final prepara-
tions can involve tactical considerations, such as a short halt to coordinate
the final assault, reorganize to adjust to combat losses, or make necessary ad-
justments in the attacking force’s dispositions. These preparations can also
involve technical items, such as engineers conducting their final prepare-to-
fire checks on obstacle clearing systems and the crews of plow- and roller-
equipped tanks removing their locking pins. It may be located near to either a
final coordination line (FCL) or a probable line of deployment (PLD). (Para-
graphs 3-18 and 3-23 define a FCL and a PLD respectively.)
ASSAULT TIME
3-13. The assault time establishes the moment to attack the initial ob-
jectives throughout the geographical scope of the operation. It is im-
posed by the higher headquarters in operations to achieve simultaneous
3-4
results by several different units. It synchronizes the moment the enemy feels
the effects of friendly combat power. It is similar to the time-on-target control
method for fire mission processing used by the field artillery. A commander
uses it instead of a time of attack (defined in paragraph 3-26) because of the
different distances that elements of his force must traverse, known obstacles,
and differences in each unit’s tactical mobility.
ATTACK-BY-FIRE POSITION
3-14. An attack-by-fire position des-
ignates the general position from
which a unit conducts the tactical
task of attack by fire. (Appendix B
defines the tactical mission task of at-
tack by fire.) The purpose of these posi-
tions is to mass the effects of direct fire
systems for one or multiple locations
toward the enemy. An attack-by-fire BRANDON
position does not indicate the specific
site. Attack-by-fire positions are rarely
applicable to units larger than com- Figure 3-2. Attack-by-Fire
pany size. Figure 3-2 depicts attack-by- Position BRANDON
fire position BRANDON.
ATTACK POSITION
3-15. The attack position is the last position an attacking force occu-
pies or passes through before crossing the line of departure. An at-
tack position facilitates the deployment and last-minute coordination of the
attacking force before it crosses the LD. It is located on the friendly side of
the LD and offers cover and concealment for the attacking force. It is used
primarily at battalion level and below. Whenever possible, units move
through the attack position without stopping. An attacking unit occupies an
attack position for a variety of reasons; for example, when the unit is waiting
for specific results from preparatory fires or when it is necessary to conduct
additional coordination, such as a forward passage of lines. If the attacking
unit occupies the attack position, it stays there for the shortest amount of
time possible to avoid offering the enemy a lucrative target. (Figure 3-3 on
page 3-6 shows attack positions BLUE and GOLD used in conjunction with
other common offensive control measures.)
AXIS OF ADVANCE
3-16. An axis of advance designates the general area through which
the bulk of a unit’s combat power must move. There are three primary
reasons why a commander uses an axis of advance. First, to direct the bypass
of locations that could delay the progress of the advancing force, such as
known contaminated areas. Second, to indicate that he does not require the
force to clear the AO as it advances. His force will be required to clear the
axis in accordance with specified bypass criteria. The third primary reason is
to indicate to a unit involved in offensive encirclement, exploitation, or
3-5
FM 3-90
II
PL ROBERT
PL JOHN
PL DICK
PL BASIL
TF 3-67
RP 2
LD/LC
3
(LOA)
(PLD)
N
N JOA
T IO
ATTACK 11 C CK
RE TA OBJ
PSN PD 7 I
D AT
PL RON
ZEKE
GOLD OF
PAT
OBJ
A/2-58
OBJ
I KAI
C/3-67 X
ASLT
ATTACK
PSN
PSN AXIS JAN PEGGY
BLUE
PL BASIL
PL ROBERT
(LOA)
LD/LC
PL JOHN
(PLD)
PL DICK
PL RON
TF 3-67
II
Figure 3-3. Attack Positions Used with Other Common Offensive Control Measures
pursuit operations the need to move rapidly toward an objective. Figure 3-4
depicts axis of advance DEBRA.
DIRECTION OF ATTACK
3-17. The direction of attack is a
specific direction or assigned route a
force uses and does not deviate from
when attacking. It is a restrictive con- AXIS DEBRA
trol measure. The commander’s use of a
direction of attack maximizes his control
over the movement of his unit, and he of- Figure 3-4. Axis of Advance
ten uses it during night attacks, infil-
trations, and when attacking through smoke. The commander establishes a
direction of attack through a variety of means, such as target reference
points, checkpoints, global positioning system (GPS) way points, using ground
surveillance radar to track the attack force, and the impact of artillery shells.
Target reference points placed on recognizable terrain provide the com-
mander with the capability to rapidly shift fires and reorient his maneuver
forces. When using a direction of attack, the commander designates a point of
departure (PD). (Figure 3-5 depicts direction of attack JOAN and PD 6.)
FINAL COORDINATION LINE

3-18. The final coordination line (FCL) is a phase line (PL) close to
the enemy position used to coordinate the lifting or shifting of sup-
porting fires with the final deployment of maneuver elements. Final
3-6
adjustments to supporting fires neces-

sary to reflect the actual versus the
planned tactical situation take place
prior to crossing this line. It should be
easily recognizable on the ground. The
FCL is not a fire support coordinating
measure. (Figure 3-6 shows PL ION
ROBERT as the FCL for the 4th Bri- CT
K
E
AN AC
gade.) PD 6 R
DI
JO TT
A
OF
LIMIT OF ADVANCE
3-19. The limit of advance (LOA) is
a phase line used to control for-
Figure 3-5. Direction of Attack JOAN
ward progress of the attack. The
attacking unit does not advance
any of its elements or assets beyond the LOA, but the attacking unit
can push its security forces to that limit. A commander usually selects a
linear terrain feature, perpendicular to the direction of attack, on the far side
of the objective as the LOA because such a terrain feature is easily identifi-
able. The commander employs a LOA to prevent overextending the attacking
force and reduce the possibility of fratricide by fires supporting the attack.
The commander positions a LOA far enough beyond the objective to allow the
unit to defend the objective. An LOA prevents units from exploiting success
and launching a pursuit; therefore, a commander should only use it if he does
not want the unit to conduct an exploitation or pursuit. A forward boundary
is always a LOA, but a LOA is not necessarily a forward boundary. In fact, a
X
PL JOHN
4 RP 2
LD/LC
3
(FCL)
PL ROBERT
N AN
O JO
TI
C CK
ATTACK
PSN PD 7 I R E TA OBJ
D AT ZEKE
GOLD F
O
PAT
OBJ
11 TF 2-58
OBJ
II KAI
TF 3-67 X
ASLT
ATTACK
PSN
PSN AXIS JAN PEGGY
BLUE
PL ROBERT
LD/LC
PL JOHN
(FCL)
2AD
XX
Figure 3-6. Final Coordination Line (FCL) ROBERT Used in Conjunction

with Other Offensive Control Measures
3-7
FM 3-90
LOA and the unit’s forward boundary should rarely coincide because of the
resulting limitations that a forward boundary places on supporting fires be-
yond the forward boundary. Figure 3-7 shows PL BASIL used as 4th Bri-
gade’s LOA.
PL ROBERT
(FCL)
PL JOHN
PL BASIL
(LOA)
LD/LC
4
ATTACK
OBJ
PSN
ZEKE
GOLD
PAT
OBJ
TF 2-58
OBJ
II KAI
TF 3-67 X
ASLT
ATTACK PSN
PSN PEGGY
BLUE
PL ROBERT
PL BASIL
(LOA)
LD/LC
PL JOHN
(FCL)
2AD
XX
Figure 3-7. Limit of Advance Used with Other Common Control Measures
LINE OF DEPARTURE
3-20. The line of departure is a
phase line crossed at a prescribed
time by troops initiating an offen-
sive operation. The purpose of the
LD is to coordinate the advance of the X X
attacking force so that its elements
strike the enemy in the order and at PL DON PL DON
the time desired. The LD also marks (LD) (LD)
where the unit transitions from move-
ment to maneuver. The commander
can also use it to facilitate the coordi- Figure 3-8. PL DON as a LD
nation of fires. Generally, it should be
perpendicular to the direction the attacking force will take on its way to the
objective. Friendly forces should control the LD. The commander analyzes the
terrain before designating his LD. Different units have different movement
rates on leaving their assembly areas (AAs) based on their inherent mobility
characteristics and the terrain being crossed. The commander considers these
different characteristics when establishing the LD to prevent these dif-
ferences from affecting the synchronization of the operation. When possible,
the commander selects the LD so that the terrain the attack unit traverses
before crossing the LD provides sufficient cover for the attacking unit’s final
3-8
deployment into a combat formation before crossing the LD. In many cases
the LD is also the line of contact because the unit in contact is conducting the
attack from its current positions. Figure 3-8 depicts PL DON as the LD.
(Chapter 2 contains a definition for a line of contact.)
OBJECTIVE
3-21. An objective is a location on the
ground used to orient operations, phase
operations, facilitate changes of direc- OBJECTIVE
tion, and provide for unity of effort. An STEVE
objective can be either terrain- or force-
oriented. Terrain objectives should be easily
identifiable on the ground to facilitate their OBJ OBJ
recognition. The commander determines his JOHN HARRY
force-oriented objectives based on known ene-
my positions. The commander normally as-
signs his subordinate commanders only their
final objectives, but can assign intermediate
Figure 3-9. Objective STEVE
objectives as necessary. Figure 3-9 depicts ob-
jective STEVE. Objective STEVE is further broken down into two subordinate
objectives, objective JOHN and objective HARRY.
POINT OF DEPARTURE
3-22. The point of departure is the point
where the unit crosses the LD and
7
begins moving along a direction of
attack. Units conducting reconnaissance and
security patrols and other operations in a
low-visibility environment commonly use a
PD
PD as a control measure. Like a LD, it marks
the point where the unit transitions from
movement to maneuver under conditions of
limited visibility. Figure 3-10 depicts PD 7. Figure 3-10. Point
of Departure 7
PROBABLE LINE OF DEPLOYMENT
3-23. A probable line of deployment is a phase line that a commander
designates as the location where he intends to completely deploy his
unit into assault formation before beginning the assault. The PLD is
used primarily at battalion level and below when the unit does not cross the
LD in its assault formation. It is usually a linear terrain feature perpendi-
cular to the direction of attack and recognizable under conditions of limited
visibility. The PLD should be located outside the range where the enemy can
place the attacking force under effective direct fire. It has no use except as it
relates to the enemy. In Figure 3-11, page 3-10, PL ROBERT is also the PLD.
3-9
FM 3-90
PL JOHN
PL ROBERT
4
LD/LC
(PLD)
ATTACK
OBJ
PSN
ZEKE
G O LD
PAT
OBJ
T F 2-58
OBJ
II KAI
T F 3-6 7 X
ASLT
ATTACK
PSN
PSN
PEG G Y
BLUE
PL ROBERT
LD/LC
PL JOHN
(PLD)
2A D
XX
Figure 3-11. Probable Line of Deployment ROBERT Used with Other Control Measures
RALLY POINT
3-24. A rally point is an easily identifiable
point on the ground at which units can
RLY 14
reassemble and reorganize if they become
dispersed. Alternatively it is an easily identi-
fiable point on the ground at which aircrews
and passengers can assemble and reorganize
following an incident requiring a forced
landing. Forces conducting a patrol or an infiltra-
tion commonly use this control measure. The
objective rally point (ORP) is a rally point Figure 3-12.
established on an easily identifiable point on Rally Point 14
the ground where all elements of the infil-
trating unit assemble and prepare to attack the objective. It is typi-
cally near the infiltrating unit’s objective; however, there is no standard dis-
tance from the objective to the ORP. It should be far enough away from the
objective so that the enemy will not detect the infiltrating unit’s attack prepa-
rations. Figure 3-12 depicts Rally Point 14.
SUPPORT-BY-FIRE POSITION
3-25. A support-by-fire position designates the general position from
which a unit conducts the tactical mission task of support by fire.
(Appendix B defines the tactical mission task of support by fire.) The purpose
of these positions is to increase the supported force’s freedom of maneuver by
placing direct fires on an objective that is going to be assaulted by a friendly
force. Support-by-fire positions are located within the maximum friendly
direct-fire range of the enemy positions. The commander selects them so that
the moving assault force does not mask its supporting fires. For this reason,
3-10
support-by-fire positions are normally located

on the flank of the assault force, elevated above
the objective if possible. Support-by-fire
positions are rarely applicable to units larger
than company size. The support-by-fire posi-
tion graphic depicted in Figure 3-13 indicates
the general location and direction from which
the unit provides fires; it does not indicate a
SCOTT
specific site.
TIME OF ATTACK Figure 3-13. Support-

by-Fire Position SCOTT
3-26. The time of attack is the moment the
leading elements of the main body cross the LD, or in a night attack,
the PD. A commander uses it when conducting simultaneous operation
where a shaping operation must accomplish its mission to set the conditions
for the success of the decisive operation. When determining the time of
attack, the commander considers the time required for his subordinate to—
· Conduct necessary reconnaissance, prepare plans, and issue orders.
· Synchronize plans between all subordinate units.
· Complete attack preparations, such as precombat inspections.
· Move to the LD or PD.
3-27. Orders normally designate the time of attack as H-hour. This is nor-
mally when the main body crosses the LD. However, H-hour can also desig-
nate the time to implement a phase of an operation, such as an airborne or
air assault. The headquarters planning the offensive operation specifies the
term’s exact meaning. This is usually a part of the unit’s standing operating
procedures (SOP).
FORMS OF MANEUVER
3-28. The forms of maneuver are envelopment,
turning movement, frontal attack, penetration, Forms of Maneuver
and infiltration. Combined arms organizations · Envelopment
seeking to accomplish their assigned mission · Turning movement
synchronize the contributions of all battlefield · Frontal attack
operating systems (BOS) to execute these forms · Penetration
of maneuver. The commander generally chooses · Infiltration
one form on which he builds a course of action
(COA). The higher commander rarely specifies the specific form of offensive
maneuver. However, his guidance and intent, along with the mission that in-
cludes implied tasks, may impose constraints such as time, security, and di-
rection of attack that narrow the forms of offensive maneuver to one alterna-
tive. Additionally, the AO’s characteristics and the enemy’s dispositions also
help determine the form of offensive maneuver selected. A single operation
may contain several forms of offensive maneuver, such as a frontal attack to
clear a security area followed by a penetration to create a gap in enemy
defenses. An envelopment would follow to destroy the enemy’s first line of
defense.
3-11
FM 3-90
ENVELOPMENT
3-29. An envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force
seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the en-
emy rear to destroy the enemy in his current positions. At the tactical level,
envelopments focus on seizing terrain, destroying specific enemy forces, and
interdicting enemy withdrawal routes (FM 3-0). Also, at the tactical level, air-
borne and air assault operations are vertical envelopments. (See Appendix C.)
The commander’s decisive operation focuses on attacking an assailable flank.
It avoids the enemy’s strength—his front—where the effects of his fires and
obstacles are the greatest. Generally, a commander prefers to conduct an en-
velopment instead of a penetration or a frontal attack because the attacking
force tends to suffer fewer casualties while having the most opportunities to
destroy the enemy. An envelopment also produces great psychological shock
on the enemy. If no assailable flank is available, the attacking force creates
one. The four varieties of envelopment are single envelopment, double
envelopment, encirclement, and vertical envelopment. (See Figures 3-14
and 3-15.) For a discussion of the use of vertical envelopments, see Appen-
dix C. For a discussion of encirclement operations, see Appendix D.
S S
ENY ENY
ENVELOPING V
FORCE
FIXING FORCES
RESERVE
Figure 3-14. Single Envelopment
3-30. Single and double envelopments force the enemy to fight in two or more
directions simultaneously to meet the converging efforts of the attack. A
double envelopment generally requires a preponderance of force and can be
difficult to control. A force seeking to execute a double envelopment must also
have a substantial mobility advantage over the defender. A unit performs a
double envelopment by conducting a frontal attack as a shaping operation in
the center to fix the enemy in place while enveloping both hostile flanks. Be-
cause of the forces required, normally only divisions and larger organizations
have the resources to execute a double envelopment.
3-12
S S
OBJ
OBJ
KRISTA
GINA
EN Y EN Y
ENVELOPING V
FO RCE
FIX IN G FORCE
E NVELOPIN G
FOR CE
R ESERVE
Figure 3-15. Double Envelopment

Organization of Forces
3-31. The commander envisioning a single envelopment organizes his forces
into the enveloping force and the fixing force. He also allocates forces to con-
duct reconnaissance, security, reserve, and sustaining operations. The envelo-
ping force, conducting the decisive operation, attacks an assailable enemy
flank and avoids his main strength en route to the objective. The fixing force
conducts a frontal attack as a shaping operation to fix the enemy in his cur-
rent positions to prevent his escape and reduce his capability to react against
the enveloping force. A commander executing a double envelopment organ-
izes his forces into two enveloping forces and a fixing force in addition to re-
connaissance, security, reserve, and sustaining forces. The commander typi-
cally designates the more important of the two enveloping forces as the main
effort for resources. That enveloping force will also be the commander’s deci-
sive operation if its action accomplishes the mission.
Control Measures
3-32. The commander, at a minimum, designates AOs for each unit partici-
pating in the envelopment by using boundaries. He also designates PLs,
support-by-fire and attack-by-fire positions, contact points, and appropriate
fire coordination measures, such as a restricted fire line or boundary between
converging forces, and any other control measures he feels are necessary to
control the envelopment. Figure 3-16 on page 3-14 is an example of control
measures used when conducting a single envelopment.
Planning an Envelopment
3-33. Successful planning for an envelopment depends on knowing and un-
derstanding the enemy and his capabilities. The commander wants to maneu-
ver his enveloping force around or over the enemy’s main defenses to secure
objectives on the enemy’s flank or rear. From those objectives the enveloping
force can use its positional advantage to employ superior combat power
3-13
FM 3-90
against a defending enemy oriented in the wrong direction. The commander

uses his intelligence assets and personnel to determine the disposition and
capabilities of enemy forces to detect and react to their operations.
XXX
PL FELIX
PL
(LOA)
BI
LL
Y
XX
PL FELIX
22
(LOA)
S OBJ
D JOHN
XXX
XXX
AR
W
ED
PL
BI
LL
OBJ
S
Y
A XI
PHIL
PL LYNN PL LYNN
(LD/LC) (LD/LC)
17
XX
XX XX
AA RESERVE
XXX
Figure 3-16. Control Measures for Conducting an Envelopment
3-34. The commander plans for the force conducting the envelopment to re-
main within supporting distance of the fixing force. (If the enveloping force is
going outside of supporting distance, it is probably conducting a turning
movement, not an envelopment.)
3-35. Sustaining the enveloping force requires deliberate planning because
only intermittent ground lines of communication (LOCs) between the rear
area and the enveloping force may exist. A line of communication is a route,
either land, water, and/or air that connects an operating military force with a
base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move
(JP 1-02).
3-36. The commander plans how he will exploit the success of his envelop-
ment as he encircles the enemy or transitions to a pursuit to complete the de-
struction of the enemy force. These plans are developed as branches and se-
quels to the envelopment operation.
Executing an Envelopment
3-37. A successful envelopment depends largely on the degree of surprise the
commander achieves against his opponent or the presence of overwhelming
combat power. The envelopment’s probability of success also increases when
the commander’s forces have superior tactical mobility, possess air and
3-14
information superiority, and his shaping operations fix the bulk of the
enemy’s forces in their current positions. The commander uses his intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems to provide continuous
intelligence and combat information to identify changes in enemy COAs
throughout the execution of the envelopment.
3-38. Normally, a unit orients the majority of its combat power toward where
it expects to engage enemy forces, while placing less combat power on its own
flanks. Thus the flanks of most units are more vulnerable to attack. The com-
mander creates an assailable flank using whatever means necessary. The en-
veloping force then moves rapidly to exploit the situation before the enemy
strengthens an assailable flank by preparing positions in depth and by
holding mobile forces in reserve. When faced with the threat of envelopment,
the enemy commander might move his reserves to meet the enveloping force.
Thus, rapid movement around the enemy’s flank is essential to prevent him
from occupying previously prepared positions. Vigorous shaping operations
conducted by ground and air assets aim to prevent him from reconstituting
reserves from other portions of his front.
3-39. The enemy may attempt to cut off the enveloping force and extend his
flank beyond the area that the enveloping force is attempting to attack
through. If the encircling force attempts to outflank such hostile extension, it
may become overextended by moving outside of supporting distance from the
fixing force. Therefore, it is usually better for the encircling force to take ad-
vantage of the enemy’s extension and subsequent weakness by penetrating a
thinly held area of the enemy’s front rather than overextending itself in an
attempt to completely outflank the enemy’s position.
3-40. The enemy may attempt a frontal counterattack in response to an at-
tempted envelopment. In this case, the fixing force defends itself or conducts
a delay while the enveloping force continues the envelopment.
3-41. After the initial envelopment of one flank—which places the enemy at a
disadvantage—the commander has many options. He may choose to establish
favorable conditions for passing to a double envelopment by using reserves or
exploit success by generating additional combat power along the same axis.
Alternatively, he can destroy or defeat the enveloped enemy force in place, or
transition to another type of operation, such as exploitation or pursuit.
TURNING MOVEMENT
3-42. A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force
seeks to avoid the enemy’s principle defensive positions by seizing objectives
to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out of his current positions
or divert major forces to meet the threat (FM 3-0). However, a commander
can employ a vertical envelopment using airborne or air assault forces to
effect a turning movement. (Appendix C discusses airborne and air assault
operations.) A commander uses this form of offensive maneuver to seize vital
areas in the enemy’s rear before the main enemy force can withdraw or
receive support or reinforcements. See Figure 3-17 on page 3-16 for a graphic
depiction of a turning movement. This form of offensive maneuver frequently
transitions from the attack into an exploitation or pursuit. A turning move-
ment differs from an envelopment because the force conducting a turning
3-15
FM 3-90
movement seeks to make the enemy displace from his current locations,
whereas an enveloping force seeks to engage the enemy in his current loca-
tion from an unexpected direction.
OBJ DAVOUT
V
ENY
ENY
OBJ KARL
TURNING
FORCE
ENY
ENY
SHAPING
OPERATION
MAIN BODY RESERVE
Figure 3-17. Turning Movement—Turning Force Conducting the Decisive Operation

3-43. The commander directing a turning movement task organizes his re-
sources into a turning force, a main body, and a reserve. Each of these forces
conducts security and reconnaissance operations. Either the turning force or
the main body can conduct the echelon’s decisive operation given the appro-
priate factors of METT-TC. A turning movement is particularly suited for
division-size or larger forces possessing a high degree of tactical mobility. It is
not until a commander has access to the resources of these echelons that he
has the combat power to resource a turning force that can operate outside
supporting range of his main body to allow the turning force to force enemy
units out of their current positions. He bases the exact task organization of
these forces on the factors of METT-TC and his concept of operations for the
turning movement.
3-44. The maneuver of the turning force is what causes the enemy to leave
his position. A turning force normally conducts the majority of its operations
outside of the supporting range of the main body and possibly outside its sup-
porting distance. Thus, the turning force must contain sufficient combat, com-
bat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) capabilities to operate in-
dependently of the main body for a specific period of time. This normally re-
quires at least a division-size element.
3-16
3-45. The commander task organizes his main body to ensure the success of
the turning force. The main body conducts operations, such as attacks
designed to divert the enemy’s attention away from the area where the
turning force conducts its operations. The operations of the main body can be
either the echelon’s decisive or shaping operations. The commander organizes
his reserve to exploit success by either the turning force or the main body.
The reserve also provides the commander insurance against unexpected
enemy actions.
Control Measures
3-46. The commander designates the AOs for each unit participating in the
turning movement by establishing boundaries. He also designates additional
control measures as necessary to synchronize the operations of his subordi-
nates. These additional control measures include: phase lines (PLs), contact
points, objectives, LOA, and appropriate fire coordination measures. Fig-
ure 3-18 depicts these control measures used to synchronize a turning move-
ment that employs an airborne division as the turning force. (Appendix C dis-
cusses control measures associated with airborne and air assault operations.)
PL JOELLE PL JOELLE
(I CORPS CFL) ( I CORPS CFL)
PL GAVIN
(AIRHEAD LINE)
XX
OBJ
GOOD
PL ROBBIN
(LOA)
PL MONICA XX PL MONICA
XX
CK
LU
J
B
O
Figure 3-18. Control Measures for a Turning Movement
Planning a Turning Movement

3-47. Selecting the geographic objective of the turning movement is of major
importance to the success of the operation. The commander’s scheme of ma-
neuver in a turning movement may vary, depending on the specific situation
and the factors of METT-TC. In addition to common offensive planning con-
siderations addressed on pages 3-33 through 3-50, the commander conducting
3-17
FM 3-90
a turning movement pays special attention to planning branches and sequels

to the turning movement, including—
· Defensive operations by the turning force.
· Link-up operations between the turning force and the main body.
· Retrograde operations for the turning force.
Essential to the planning of the branches and sequels is the linkage between
the branch or sequel and specific decision points supported by situation devel-
opment.
3-48. After developing his tactical plan, the commander plans how the
turning force maneuvers to its objective. The commander develops his move-
ment, loading, and staging plans if outside transportation assets are required.
He can plan to occupy key terrain that will threaten the enemy’s survival or
remain mobile and seek ways to exploit the turning force’s success. Before ini-
tiating the operation, the commander plans how the turning force can exploit
success.
3-49. In a turning movement that envisions an early linkup with the main
body, the turning force normally plans to defend only that terrain required to
protect itself. Once reinforcement or linkup with the main body occurs, the
commander plans how to use the turning force to continue the attack or re-
lieve it so it can prepare for subsequent missions.
3-50. The distances between forces and the existence of intermittent LOCs
magnify the problems inherent in providing CSS to a combat force during a
turning movement. Therefore, in the planning of a turning movement, the
commander emphasizes resupply, equipment maintenance, casualty evacua-
tion, graves registration, and prisoner of war handling to deal with these
likely problems. Prepackaging company- and battalion-size resupply sets can
ease the execution of sustaining operations during periods when CSS units
must push supplies to the combat units.
3-51. Planners must consider the provision of all supplies and equipment re-
quired for mission accomplishment as an integral part of tactical planning.
The commander plans and organizes his CSS operations to support a rapid
tempo of highly mobile and widely dispersed operations. Traditional doctrinal
supporting distances and responsibilities do not always apply to turning
movements. CSS planners recognize this and adjust their plans using avail-
able resources. Only supplies required to meet the force’s immediate needs
are carried into the operation. Excess supplies and equipment can burden the
force. Staffs establish and maintain required supply levels in the objective
area by phasing supplies into the objective area on an accompanying, follow-
up (automatic and on-call), and routine basis. Medical evacuation, resupply,
and reinforcement airlifts may be necessary to sustain the force’s combat op-
erations. Ammunition and petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) normally
constitute the major tonnage items. Lift restrictions affect what can be
supplied using helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.
Executing a Turning Movement

3-52. The primary prerequisites of a successful turning movement are
moving the turning force to the objective area without incurring unacceptable
losses and providing the force with the required combat power and
3-18
sustainment. A commander can reduce his losses by operating under condi-

tions of friendly air and information superiority, suppressing enemy fires,
and having a mobility advantage over the enemy.
3-53. Major sources of firepower to suppress enemy fires are fixed-wing air-
craft, attack helicopters, jammers, and Multiple Launch Rocket Systems that
cover the entire route taken by the turning force. Other sources include naval
surface fire support and artillery units accompanying the turning force.
3-54. When threatened with a turning movement, the enemy commander is
in a dilemma. His original defense is misplaced. He must move forces from
their original position in meeting the new threat. Often he must commit his
available reserves against the new threat. He exposes those forces to friendly
fires as he weakens his defense and moves his forces. He must now engage
friendly forces on ground he has not chosen or prepared. Whenever possible,
the commander tries to reach the decisive location without encountering the
enemy. Techniques to accomplish this include outflanking the enemy or using
airborne, air assault, and amphibious means to avoid his prepared positions.
Once friendly forces find a way deep into the enemy’s rear area, the turning
force moves rapidly to exploit the situation. It seeks to achieve its mission be-
fore the enemy can reposition his committed or uncommitted forces to react.
Rapid movement is essential to prevent the enemy from occupying previously
prepared positions in his rear. Vigorous shaping operations prevent the ene-
my from reconstituting reserves from other portions of the enemy front.
3-55. The enemy may counterattack in an attempt to cut off and destroy the
turning force and prevent the successful completion of the turning movement.
In this case, the turning force’s security elements conduct an area or mobile
defense or engage in delaying actions while the rest of the turning force con-
tinues its mission. Alternatively, the enemy may try to withdraw his forces to
a position where his LOCs are not threatened.
INFILTRATION
3-56. An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force con-
ducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces
to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only small
elements to enemy defensive fires (FM 3-0). Infiltration is also a march
technique used within friendly territory to move forces in small groups at ex-
tended or irregular intervals. (See Chapter 14 for a discussion of infiltration
as a movement technique.)
3-57. Infiltration occurs by land, water, air, or a combination of means. Mov-
ing and assembling forces covertly through enemy positions takes a consider-
able amount of time. To successfully infiltrate, the force must avoid detection
and engagement. Since this requirement limits the size and strength of the
infiltrating force—and infiltrated forces alone can rarely defeat an enemy
force—infiltration is normally used in conjunction with and in support of the
other forms of offensive maneuver. Historically, the scope of the mission for
the infiltrating force has been limited.
3-58. The commander orders an infiltration to move all or a portion of a unit
through gaps in the enemy’s defenses to—
3-19
FM 3-90
· Reconnoiter known or templated enemy positions and conduct surveil-

lance of named areas of interest and targeted areas of interest.
· Attack enemy-held positions from an unexpected direction.
· Occupy a support-by-fire position to support the decisive operation.
· Secure key terrain.
· Conduct ambushes and raids to destroy vital facilities and disrupt the
enemy’s defensive structure by attacking his reserves, fire support and
air defense systems, communication nodes, and logistic support.
· Conduct a covert breach of an obstacle or obstacle complex.
3-59. Special operations forces and light infantry units up to brigade size are
best suited to conduct an infiltration. In some circumstances, heavy forces op-
erating in small units can conduct an infiltration. However, as the prolifera-
tion of technology leads to increased situational understanding, this should
increase the ability of heavy forces to avoid enemy contact and move undetec-
ted through enemy positions. In the future a commander may conduct an in-
filtration with heavy forces in coordination with precision fires as a prelude to
an attack.
3-60. Normally, to be successful, the infiltrating force must avoid detection at
least until it reaches its ORP. Thus, the infiltrating force’s size, strength, and
composition is usually limited. The infiltrating unit commander organizes his
main body into one or more infiltrating elements. The largest size element
possible, compatible with the requirement for stealth and ease of movement,
conducts the infiltration. This increases the commander’s control, speeds the
execution of the infiltration, and provides responsive combat power. The
exact size and number of infiltrating elements are situationally dependent.
3-61. The commander considers the following factors when determining how
to organize his forces. Smaller infiltrating elements are not as easy to detect
and can get through smaller defensive gaps. Even the detection of one or two
small elements by the enemy will not prevent the unit from accomplishing its
mission in most cases. Larger infiltrating elements are easier to detect and
their discovery is more apt to endanger the success of the mission. Also, they
require larger gaps to move through. A unit with many smaller infiltrating
elements requires more time to complete the infiltration and needs more link-
up points than a similar size unit with only a few infiltrating elements. Many
infiltrating elements are also harder to control than fewer, larger elements.
3-62. The commander resources a security force that moves ahead of, to the
flanks of, and to the rear of each infiltrating element’s main body. These se-
curity forces can be given either a screen or a guard mission. (Chapter 12 dis-
cusses screen and guard missions.) The sizes and orientations of security ele-
ments are also situationally dependent. Each infiltrating element is respon-
sible for its own reconnaissance effort.
3-63. Sustainment of an infiltrating force normally depends on the force’s
basic load of supplies and those medical and maintenance assets
accompanying the infiltrating force. After completing the mission, the
commander reopens LOCs to conduct normal sustaining operations.
3-20
Control Measures
3-64. Control measures for an infiltration include, as a minimum—
· An AO for the infiltrating unit.
· One or more infiltration lanes.
· A LD or point of departure.
· Movement routes with their associated start and release points, or a di-
rection or axis of attack.
· Linkup or rally points, including ORPs.
· Assault positions.
· One or more objectives.
· A LOA.
The commander can impose other measures to control the infiltration includ-
ing checkpoints, PLs, and assault positions on the flank or rear of enemy posi-
tions. If it is not necessary for the entire infiltrating unit to reassemble to ac-
complish its mission, the objective may be broken into smaller objectives.
Each infiltrating element would then move directly to its objective to conduct
operations. (Most of these control measures have been previously described.)
The following paragraphs describe using an infiltration lane and a linkup
point.
3-65. An infiltration lane is a control measure that
coordinates forward and lateral movement of
infiltrating units and fixes fire planning responsi-
bilities. The commander selects infiltration lanes that
avoid the enemy, provide cover and concealment, and fa-
cilitate navigation. Figure 3-19 depicts the graphic for an
infiltration lane. Each unit assigned an infiltration lane
picks its own routes within the lane and switches routes
as necessary. The left and right limits of the infiltration Figure 3-19.
lane act as lateral boundaries for the unit conducting the Infiltration Lane
infiltration. Attacks by rotary- or fixed-wing aircraft,
indirect fires, or munitions effects that impact the lane must be coordinated
with the infiltrating unit. Units leaving their assigned lane run the risk of
being hit by friendly fires. Company-size units are normally assigned a single
infiltration lane, although they can use more than one lane. Larger organiza-
tions, battalion and above, are always assigned more than one infiltration
lane.
3-66. A linkup point is where two infiltrating ele-
ments in the same or different infiltration lanes
are scheduled to meet to consolidate before pro-
ceeding on with their missions. Figure 3-20 depicts
Linkup Point 8. A linkup point is normally positioned
LU 8
in the enemy’s rear or along one of his flanks. It should
be large enough for all infiltrating elements to
assemble and should offer cover and concealment for
these elements. It should be an easily identifiable point
on the ground. The commander should position his Figure 3-20. Linkup
linkup points on defensible terrain located away from Point 8
normal enemy troop movement routes.
3-21
FM 3-90
Planning an Infiltration
3-67. The activities and functions associated with the process of planning an
infiltration are the same as with any other combat operation. That planning
takes advantage of that unit’s stealth capabilities to surprise the enemy. The
planning process synchronizes the BOS that support the infiltrating unit, es-
pecially precise, high-resolution intelligence. Without precise, detailed intelli-
gence, infiltration maneuvers become high-risk probing operations, that can
be costly and time-consuming. Careful planning, full ISR integration, detailed
analysis, and aggressive operations security can permit an infiltrating force
to avoid an enemy force, minimize direct contact, and maximize surprise ac-
cording to the commander’s intent.
3-68. After identifying gaps or weaknesses in the enemy’s defensive positions,
the commander assigns infiltration lanes, contact points, and objectives to
subordinate units. These objectives afford the infiltrating force positions of
greatest advantage over the enemy and are not required to be to the geo-
graphic rear of the targeted enemy force. Each subordinate unit commander
picks one or more routes within his assigned lane and establishes additional
contact points, rally points, assault points, and other control measures as re-
quired. The commander wants each of the routes within an infiltration lane
to be far enough apart to prevent an infiltrating element on one route from
seeing other infiltrating elements, but close enough so that an infiltrating ele-
ment could switch quickly to another route if required by the situation. The
commander wants each route to provide his infiltrating elements cover and
concealment while avoiding known enemy and civilian locations and move-
ment routes to the maximum extent possible. If possible, the subordinate unit
commander selects his exact routes during the preparation phase after recon-
noitering each infiltration lane. He decides whether his unit will infiltrate as
a unit, in smaller elements, or even as two-man buddy teams, depending on
the density and strength of the enemy.
3-69. The commander may use single or multiple infiltration lanes depending
on the infiltrating force’s size, the amount of detailed information on enemy
dispositions and terrain accessible, time allowed, and number of lanes avail-
able. A single infiltration lane—
· Facilitates navigation, control, and reassembly.
· Requires the existence or creation of only one gap in the enemy’s posi-
tion.
· Reduces the area for which detailed intelligence is required.
3-70. Multiple infiltration lanes—
· Require the existence or creation of more gaps in the enemy’s security
area.
· Reduce the possibility of compromising the entire force.
· Increase difficulty with maintaining control.
3-71. The sizes and numbers of infiltrating elements are major considerations
for the commander when he is deciding whether to use a single lane or
multiple infiltration lanes. If the infiltration takes place using multiple
elements, contingency plans must address the following situations:
3-22
· A lead element, possibly the advance guard, makes contact, but the
trail elements have not started infiltrating.
· A lead element infiltrates successfully, but compromises one or more
trailing elements.
· A compromised linkup point.
3-72. The commander uses available technology to assist in planning the in-
filtration and avoiding unintended enemy and civilian contact during the
infiltration. This can be as simple as all units using the same infiltrating lane
being on the same frequency to facilitate the avoidance of enemy contact. An
accurate depiction of enemy systems and locations, tied to rapid terrain anal-
ysis, can graphically depict dead spots in the enemy’s battlefield surveillance.
The commander can then plan how to expand those existing dead spots into
infiltration lanes through a precision attack of selected enemy elements and
systems.
3-73. The plan also addresses the following considerations:
· Availability of supporting fires, including rotary- and fixed-wing air-
craft and offensive information operations—especially electronic attack,
throughout the operation, during infiltration and the attack on the ob-
jective.
· Linkup or extraction of the infiltrating unit after mission completion.
· Sustainment of the infiltrating force during the operation, to include
casualty evacuation.
· Deception operations, such as actions by other units designed to divert
enemy attention from the area selected for the infiltration.
· Linkup of the various infiltrating elements.
· Command and control (C2), to include recognition signals.
· Positioning of combat vehicles to support the infiltrating elements.
· Using limited visibility and rough terrain to mask movement and re-
duce the chance of detection.
· Infiltration of the largest elements possible to maintain control.
· Rehearsals.
· Specially required preparations, such as modifying the unit’s SOP re-
garding the soldier’s combat load for the mission. When infiltrating on
foot, units carry only required equipment. For example, in close terrain
and in the absence of an armor threat, heavy antiarmor missile sys-
tems may be a liability.
· Abort criteria.
· Critical friendly zones.
3-74. Planned recognition signals and linkup procedures for the infiltration
should be simple and quick. If there has not been any firing or any other
noises, signals should not violate noise and light discipline. However, if there
have already been assaults, artillery, and small-arms fire, signals, such as
whistles and flares, can be used as linkup aids. A lack of time and the short
distance involved in many infiltration operations may make conducting for-
mal linkup procedures unnecessary.
3-23
FM 3-90
Preparing an Infiltration
3-75. Once the commander selects the objective, infiltration lanes, and linkup
or rally points, he directs ISR operations to update and confirm the details on
which he bases his plan. He identifies enemy sensors and surveillance
systems. He then revises the plan to reflect current conditions within the AO.
Executing an Infiltration
3-76. Moving undetected during an infiltration requires a considerable
amount of time. The infiltrating unit moves from its AA or current position
through the start point and then continues moving along the infiltration
route to a release point. If buddy teams or small elements are conducting the
infiltration, the unit uses a series of linkup points to reassemble into a coher-
ent unit. Units can use a variety of navigation aids, such as GPS, to remain
within the planned infiltration lane, which minimizes their chances of detec-
tion by the enemy. At the same time, they report their progress and status
using communication systems that provide this information automatically to
all command nodes which require this information.
3-77. If the complete unit is conducting the infiltration, the forward security
force begins its movement first, followed by the main body. The distance be-
tween the forward security force and the main body depends on the factors of
METT-TC. The advance guard must be far enough ahead of the main body so
that it can either deploy or move to another route if the forward security force
discovers the enemy. The forward security force in an infiltration must have
enough time to move in a stealthy and secure manner. Enemy units should
not be able to move undetected in the gap between the forward security force
and the main body.
3-78. As the infiltrating unit moves, the advance guard reports to the com-
mander regarding the cover and concealment of each route, enemy activity,
location of danger areas and linkup points, enemy activity on the objective,
and other combat information. The unit attempts to avoid enemy and civilian
contact; however, contact does not always mean the mission is compromised.
The infiltrating unit engages targets first with indirect fires to avoid reveal-
ing its presence and exact location. These fires include the conduct of offen-
sive information operations designed to blind enemy ISR assets and prevent
the enemy from coordinating an effective response to the infiltration.
3-79. If necessary, the forward security force conducts actions on contact
while the main body moves to another route, reconstitutes a forward security
force, and continues the mission. If the main body makes contact unexpec-
tedly, it either overruns the enemy force, if the enemy has little combat
power, or bypasses him and continues the mission. During the infiltration,
the unit ignores ineffective enemy fire and continues to move. The command-
er may use suppressive fires against the enemy to cover the sounds of the in-
filtration or to divert the enemy’s attention to areas other than where the
infiltration lanes are located.
3-80. The infiltrating unit’s elements move to an AA or an ORP to consolidate
its combat power, refine the plan, and conduct any last-minute coordination
prior to continuing the mission. The unit then conducts those tasks needed to
3-24
accomplish its assigned mission, which could be an attack, raid, ambush, seiz-
ing key terrain, capturing prisoners, or collecting specific combat information.
3-81. A commander may need to abort an infiltration operation if the factors
of METT-TC change so drastically during the infiltration that the infiltrating
force is no longer capable of accomplishing its mission. Examples of changes
that might trigger such an action include—
· Significant portions of the infiltrating force’s combat power are lost
through navigation errors, enemy action, accidents, or maintenance
failures.
· Movement or significant reinforcement of a force-oriented objective.
· Detection of the infiltration by the enemy.
· Changes in the tactical situation that make the mission no longer ap-
propriate, such as the initiation of an enemy attack.
The criteria for aborting the operation are developed in the planning process.
The decision to abort the infiltration is transmitted to all appropriate head-
quarters for their action and information.
PENETRATION
3-82. A penetration a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to
rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system
(FM 3-0). Destroying the continuity of that defense allows the enemy’s
subsequent isolation and defeat in detail by exploiting friendly forces. The
penetration extends from the enemy’s security area through his main defen-
sive positions into his rear area. A commander employs a penetration when
there is no assailable flank, enemy defenses are overextended and weak spots
are detected in the enemy’s positions, or time pressures do not permit an
envelopment.
3-83. Penetrating a well-organized position requires overwhelming combat
power in the area of penetration and combat superiority to continue the mo-
mentum of the attack. (See Figure 3-21, page 3-26.) The commander desig-
nates a breach, support, and assault force. He can designate these elements
for each defensive position that he is required to penetrate. He should not
withhold combat power from the initial penetration to conduct additional
penetration unless he has so much combat power that the success of the ini-
tial penetration is assured.
3-84. The commander resources a reserve to deal with expected or unexpec-
ted contingencies, such as an enemy counterattack, to avoid diverting the as-
sault element from attacking the final objective of the penetration. He desig-
nates additional units follow-and-support or follow-and-assume missions to
ensure rapid exploitation of initial success. He designates forces to fix enemy
reserves in their current locations and isolate enemy forces within the area
selected for penetration.
3-25
FM 3-90
XXX
DIVISION
SHAPING
OPERATIONS 3:1
DIVISION DECISIVE X
OPERATIONS 9:1
(LEAD BATTALION 18:1)
XX
CORPS SHAPING OPERATIONS
XXX
Figure 3-21. Penetration: Relative Combat Power
Control Measures
3-85. A commander assigns, as a minimum, an AO to every maneuver unit, a
LD or LC; time of the attack or time of assault; phase lines; objective; and a
LOA to control and synchronize the attack. (A commander can use a battle
handover line instead of a LOA if he knows where he would like to commit a
follow-and-assume force.) The lateral boundaries of the unit making the deci-
sive operation are narrowly drawn to help establish the overwhelming com-
bat power necessary at the area of penetration. The commander locates the
LOA beyond the enemy’s main defensive position to ensure completing the
breach. If the operation results in opportunities to exploit success and pursue
a beaten enemy, the commander adjusts existing boundaries to accommodate
the new situation. (See Figure 3-22.)
3-86. A commander uses the graphics associated with a breach site, such as
gaps and lanes, on the small-scale maps used to control the maneuver of his
forces at each point where he penetrates the enemy’s defenses. FM 3-34.2 de-
fines the graphics.
3-87. Other control measures available to the commander include check-
points, support-by-fire and attack-by-fire positions, probable line of deploy-
ment, fire support coordinating measures, attack position, assault position,
and time of assault. Within the unit’s AO, a commander can use either an
axis of advance or a direction of attack to further control maneuver.
Planning a Penetration
3-88. The success of the penetration depends primarily on a coordinated and
synchronized plan—violently executed at a high tempo to achieve surprise—
3-26
against comparatively weak enemy defenses. However, the terrain behind the
area selected to penetrate must allow the penetration to proceed from the
breach to a decisive objective.
XXX
X Corps
OBJ
)
SUSAN
/O
X Co
XX
(O
XX rps
23
AD XX
)
/O
X Corps
(O
X Corps
XX XX
52MD 103AA
PL CONNEL PL CONNEL
(LOA) (LOA)
OBJ OBJ OBJ
X Corps
X Corps
STRIFE
XXX
XXX
SLICK TREY
PL IAN PL IAN
103AA
23AD
52MD
52MD
XX
XX
PL SEAN PL SEAN
(LD/LC) (LD/LC)
23AD 52MD 103AA
XX XX XX
X Corps X Corps X Corps
RESERVE
AA
X Corps
XXX
Figure 3-22. Penetration Graphic Control Measures
3-89. The depth of the enemy position and the relative strength of attacking
echelons determine the width of the penetration. The availability of artillery,
air support, and other combat multipliers for the attacking force helps the
commander determine relative combat power. A wider gap allows friendly
forces to drive deeper, making it more difficult for the enemy to close the gap.
The deeper the penetration, the easier it is for a unit to seize its objective and
roll up the enemy’s flanks exposed by the breach and the less likely it is that
the enemy will be in a position to restore his front by falling back.
3-90. Plans for penetrating a defensive position include isolating, suppress-
ing, and destroying by fire—to include offensive information operations—
enemy forces in the area selected for the penetration. These plans should also
address how to isolate the area of penetration from support or reinforcement
by enemy forces located outside the area. This consideration includes how to
fix enemy reserves and long-range weapons in their current locations. Posi-
tioning friendly assets so that the commander can mass the effects of their
combat power to accomplish these results without giving away the location of
the penetration is also a critical part of the plan.
3-91. The commander plans to place the majority of his forces and assets in
positions where the effects of their combat power can be felt in the area
3-27
FM 3-90
selected for penetration. The commander’s plan for the penetration normally
has three phases:
· Breaching the enemy’s main defensive positions.
· Widening the gap created to secure the flanks by enveloping one or
both of the newly exposed flanks.
· Seizing the objective with its associated subsequent exploitation.
3-92. Planning the sequence of these phases depends on the specific situa-
tion. In some situations, if there are weaknesses or gaps in the enemy’s front,
it is possible for heavy forces to breach the enemy’s defenses and proceed
straight to the objective. Simultaneously, light units could conduct local en-
velopment and exploitation operations. In other situations, the commander
uses his light forces to create the breach, holding his heavy forces initially in
reserve to exploit gaps in the enemy’s defenses created by light forces.
3-93. The commander plans shaping operations outside the area of penetra-
tion to contain the enemy on the flanks of the penetration and fix his reserves
in their current locations. Synchronizing the effects of rotary- and fixed-wing
aircraft, artillery fires, and obscuration smoke to delay or disrupt reposi-
tioning forces is an example of such shaping operations. These shaping opera-
tions will involve the maintenance of operations security and the conduct of
deception operations. The commander usually attempts to penetrate the ene-
my’s defensive positions along unit boundaries because defenses tend to be
less effective along a boundary.
3-94. The commander plans for the penetration to break through the enemy’s
defenses so he is unable to reestablish his defense on more rearward posi-
tions. Until this event takes place, the commander does not want to divert the
strength of his attacking units to widening the gap to secure the flanks of the
penetration. However, he must develop plans that address contingencies,
such as hostile counterattacks against the flanks of the penetration. The plan
should provide assistance to attacking elements as they close with the enemy
and support the attack until the enemy’s power of resistance is broken.
Executing a Penetration
3-95. After the initial breach of the enemy’s main line of resistance, the
sequence of the remaining two phases is determined by the factors of
METT-TC. If the enemy is in a weak defensive position, it may be possible for
the lead attacking force to seize the penetration’s final objective while simul-
taneously widening the initial breach. In other situations, the commander
must wait to seize the final objective until the breach is wide enough for other
forces, such as reserves and follow-and-assume forces, to be committed. Com-
manders at all levels must take advantage of success within the commander’s
intent throughout the penetration.
3-96. Breaching the Enemy’s Main Defensive Positions. The command-
er launches the actual penetration on a relatively narrow front. (See Fig-
ure 3-23.) He narrows the AO of the unit or units conducting his decisive
operation—the penetration—by adjusting unit lateral boundaries to the exact
point or points where he wants to penetrate the enemy’s defenses. This allows
the force conducting the penetration to focus overwhelming combat power.
The commander assigns his assault force a close-in objective. His support
3-28
force locates where it can support by fire both the breach and the assault
forces. Local reserves are held in readiness to conduct a forward passage
through or around units whose attacks have slowed or stopped.
OBJ
SUSAN
OBJ
OBJ STRIFE OBJ
SLICK TREY
ENY ENY
SHAPING
SHAPING
PENETRATION OPERATION
OPERATION
(FEINT)
(TO FIX)
V BOUNDARIES OF
THE UNIT CONDUCTING
THE PENETRATION
RESERVE
Figure 3-23. Penetration: The Breach
3-97. Shaping operations on the remainder of the hostile front fix the enemy
in his current positions and prevent him from disengaging to reinforce enemy
units opposing the decisive operation. The commander tracks the battle’s
progress to ensure that his forces penetrate entirely through the enemy’s
main defensive positions and not just the enemy’s security area.
3-98. The enemy normally tries to slow down or stop the breach to gain time
to react to the changing situation. Therefore, the attacking commander rap-
idly exploits and reinforces success. He piles on resources and additional
units as necessary to ensure completing the penetration through the enemy’s
defensive positions. He also conducts offensive information operations to de-
synchronize the enemy’s reaction.
3-99. Widening the Breach to Secure the Flanks. Once the attacking
force penetrates the main defenses, it begins to widen the penetration of the
enemy’s defensive positions by conducting a series of shallow envelopments to
roll back its shoulders. (See Figure 3-24, page 3-30.) The task of widening the
initial gap of the penetration is normally assigned to a follow-and-support
force. That task can also be assigned to the reserve as a contingency mission.
If the commander commits his reserve to accomplish that task, he must re-
constitute his reserve from another part of his force. Alternatively, he may as-
sume the risk of not having a reserve for the time necessary to accomplish
this task. The commander makes plans to meet enemy counterattacks by
shifting fires or committing his reserves or follow-and-assume forces. Units
3-29
FM 3-90
can use obstacles on the flanks of the penetration as a combat multiplier to

assist in defeating any local enemy counterattack and to provide additional
security for the force.
OBJ
SUSAN
OBJ
OBJ
s
SLICK
TREY
ENY ENY
ENY
ENY
V
SHAPING
OPERATION ENY ENY
RESERVE SHAPING
OPERATION
Figure 3-24. Expanding the Penetration
3-100. Seizing the Objective and Subsequent Exploitation. The mission

of seizing the objective—which may be a specific enemy force—to destroy the
continuity of the enemy’s defensive position is normally the decisive operation
after completing the penetration. Frequently that objective is so far from the
area of penetration that the unit or units initially conducting the penetration
cannot seize it without a pause. In that case, the commander plans to pass his
reserve or follow and assume forces through the initial attacking force early,
leaving exploitation beyond the objective to higher echelons. While the exact
force mix is METT-TC-dependent, armored, mechanized, and aviation forces
are generally suited for subsequent exploitation.
3-101. In large commands, forces may initiate an attack by simultaneously
launching two or more convergent penetrations against weak localities on the
hostile front. Often this method of attack helps isolate an extremely strong,
hostile defense. The commander assigns shaping operations to initially con-
tain any strong localities. When the multiple attacks have advanced suffic-
iently, the force reduces bypassed enemy forces and unites the penetrating
attacks into a single decisive operation.
FRONTAL ATTACK
3-102. A frontal attack is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force
seeks to destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force in place
over a broad front (FM 3-0). At the tactical level, an attacking force can use a
3-30
frontal attack to rapidly overrun a weak enemy force. A commander

commonly uses a frontal attack as a shaping operation in conjunction with
other forms of maneuver. He normally employs a frontal attack to—
· Clear enemy security forces.
· Overwhelm a shattered enemy during an exploitation or pursuit.
· Fix enemy forces in place as part of a shaping operation.
· Conduct a reconnaissance in force.
Figure 3-25 depicts a frontal attack.
ENY ENY
S S
Figure 3-25. Frontal Attack
3-103. It is also necessary to conduct a frontal attack when assailable flanks

do not exist. Where a penetration is a sharp attack designed to rupture the
enemy position, the commander designs a frontal attack to maintain contin-
uous pressure along the entire front until either a breach occurs or the at-
tacking forces succeed in pushing the enemy back. Frontal attacks conducted
without overwhelming combat power are seldom decisive. Consequently, the
commander’s choice to conduct a frontal attack in situations where he does
not have overwhelming combat power is rarely justified unless the time
gained is vital to the operation’s success.
3-104. There is no unique organization of forces associated with this form of
maneuver. A commander conducting a frontal attack organizes his unit into
an element to conduct reconnaissance and security operations, a main body,
and a reserve. The factors of METT-TC dictate the specific task organization
of the unit.
Control Measures
3-105. A commander conducting a frontal attack may not require any addi-
tional control measures beyond those established to control the overall
3-31
FM 3-90
mission. This includes an AO, defined by unit boundaries, and an objective at

a minimum. The commander can also use any other control measure he feels
is necessary to control the attack, including—
· Attack positions.
· Line of departure.
· Phase lines.
· Assault positions.
· Limit of advance.
· Direction of attack or axis of advance for every maneuver unit.
A unit conducting a frontal attack normally has a wider AO than a unit con-
ducting a penetration.
Planning a Frontal Attack

3-106. It is seldom possible for a commander to exert sufficient pressure to
overwhelm an enemy using a frontal attack, since it strikes the enemy along
a significant portion of his front. The force’s primary objective is to maintain
pressure and help fix the enemy force. The commander’s planning effort
should reflect these two considerations. When considering employing a
frontal attack in a shaping operation, the commander should also consider
other means for holding the enemy in position, such as feints and demonstra-
tions employing indirect fires to preclude excessive losses.
Executing a Frontal Attack

3-107. The unit conducting a frontal attack advances on a broad front, nor-
mally with its subordinate ground maneuver elements abreast (except for the
reserve). This clears the enemy’s security area of his security forces and re-
connaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition assets while
advancing the friendly force into the enemy’s main defenses. Once the unit
makes contact with the enemy, the attacking force’s subordinate elements
rapidly develop the situation and report enemy dispositions immediately to
the commander so he can exploit enemy weaknesses. The attacking force
fixes enemy forces in their current locations and seeks to gain a position of
advantage to destroy them using fire and movement.
3-108. If the attacking unit discovers a gap in the enemy’s defenses, the com-
mander seeks to exploit that weakness and disrupt the integrity of the
enemy’s defense. After assessing the situation to make sure that it is not a
trap, the commander can employ his reserve to exploit the opportunity. He
synchronizes the exploitation with the actions of his other combat, CS, and
CSS units to prevent counterattacking enemy forces from isolating and de-
stroying successful subordinate elements of his force.
3-109. When the unit conducting the frontal attack can no longer advance, it
adopts a defensive posture. The commander may require it to assist the for-
ward passage of lines of other units. It continues to perform reconnaissance of
enemy positions to locate gaps or assailable flanks.
3-32
COMMON OFFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

3-110. Visualizing, describing, and directing are aspects of leadership com-
mon to all commanders. The tactical commander begins with a designated
AO, identified mission, and assigned forces. The commander develops and
issues planning guidance based on his visualization in terms of the physical
means to accomplish the mission.
3-111. The offense is basic to combat operations. Only by a resolute offense,
conducted at a high tempo and to great depth, is total destruction of the ene-
my attained. The offense has a number of indisputable advantages. The prin-
cipal advantage enjoyed is its possession of the initiative. Having the initia-
tive allows a commander to select the time, place, and specific tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures used by the attacking force. The attacker has the time
and opportunity to develop a plan and to concentrate the effects of his forces
and thoroughly prepare conditions for success when he has the initiative. The
commander strikes the enemy in unexpected ways at unexpected times and
places. He focuses on attacking the right combination of targets, not neces-
sarily the biggest or the closest. These attacks are rapidly executed, violently
executed, unpredictable in nature, and disorient the enemy. They enhance
the commander’s capability to impose his will on his enemy and thus to
achieve decisive victory.
3-112. The commander maintains momentum by rapidly following up his at-
tacks to prevent enemy recovery. He denies his enemy any opportunity to ad-
just to his action in spite of the enemy’s desperate attempts to do so. He
changes his means and methods before the enemy can adapt to those in cur-
rent use. The tempo of his operations must be fast enough to prevent effective
counteraction. He orchestrates unrelenting pressure by adjusting combina-
tions to meet the offensive’s ever-changing demands. He maintains relentless
pressure and exploits his gains to make permanent any temporary battlefield
success.
3-113. Each battle or engagement, even those occurring simultaneously as a
part of the same campaign, has its own unique peculiarities, determined by
the actual conditions of the situation. The widespread application of highly
accurate and lethal weapons, high degree of tactical mobility, dynamic
nature, rapid situational changes, and the noncontiguous and large spatial
scope of unit AOs all characterize contemporary combined arms warfare. The
commander first able to see the battlefield, understand the implications of
existing friendly and enemy operational picture, and take effective action to
impose his will on the situation will enjoy tactical success.
3-114. The following discussion uses those physical means—soldiers, organi-
zations, and equipment—that constitute the seven BOS defined in FM 7-15 as
the framework for discussing planning considerations that apply to all types
and forms of tactical offensive operations. The commander synchronizes the
effects of all BOS as part of the visualize, describe, direct, and assess process.
INTELLIGENCE
3-115. A commander uses the products of the intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) process to identify any aspect within his AO or area of inter-
est that will affect how he accomplishes his mission. An area of interest is
3-33
FM 3-90
that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas
adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of cur-
rent or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy
forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 2-03).
3-116. The entire staff, led by the echelon intelligence staff, uses the IPB pro-
cess to identify any aspects of the area of operations or area of interest that
will affect enemy, friendly, and third party operations. The IPB process is col-
laborative in nature and requires information from all staff elements and
some subordinate units. All staff and subordinate elements use the results
and products of the IPB process for planning. FM 2-01.3 describes the IPB
process.
3-117. The commander uses his ISR assets to study the terrain and confirm
or deny the enemy’s strengths, dispositions, and likely intentions, especially
where and in what strength the enemy will defend. These assets also gather
information concerning the civilian population within the AO to confirm or
deny their numbers, locations, and likely intentions, especially with regard to
staying put in shelters or fleeing from combat operations.
3-118. By studying the terrain, the commander tries to determine the princi-
pal heavy and light avenues of approach to his objective. He also tries to de-
termine the most advantageous area for the enemy’s main defense to occupy,
routes that the enemy may use to conduct counterattacks, and other factors,
such as observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obsta-
cles, and cover and concealment (OAKOC). (See FM 6-0 for a discussion of the
components of OAKOC.) It is unlikely that the commander has complete
knowledge of the enemy’s intentions; therefore, he must conduct ISR collec-
tion continuously during the battle.
3-119. The echelon intelligence and operations officers, in coordination with
the rest of the staff, develop an integrated ISR plan that satisfies the com-
mander’s maneuver, targeting, and information requirements. A command-
er’s information requirements are dictated by the factors of METT-TC, but
commonly include—
· Locations, composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of the
defending enemy force, to include high-priority targets and enemy ISR
capabilities.
· Locations of possible enemy assembly areas.
· Location of enemy indirect-fire weapon systems and units.
· Location of gaps and assailable flanks.
· Location of areas for friendly and enemy air assaults.
· Location of enemy air defense gun and missile units.
· Location of enemy electronic warfare units.
· Effects of weather and terrain on current and projected operations.
· Numbers, routes, and direction of movement of dislocated civilians.
· Withdrawal routes for enemy forces.
· Anticipated timetable schedules for the enemy’s most likely COA and
other probable COAs.
· Locations of enemy C2 and ISR systems and the frequencies used by
the information systems linking these systems.
3-34
If friendly ISR systems cannot answer the commander’s information require-

ments, his intelligence staff can send a request for information to higher and
adjacent units, he can commit additional resources, or he can decide to exe-
cute his offensive operation with the current information.
MANEUVER
3-120. The commander conducts maneuver to avoid enemy strengths and to
create opportunities to increase the effects his fires. He secures surprise by
making unexpected maneuvers, rapidly changing the tempo of ongoing
operations, avoiding observation, and using deceptive techniques and
procedures. He seeks to overwhelm the enemy with one or more unexpected
blows before the enemy has time to react in an organized fashion. This occurs
when he is able to engage the defending enemy force from positions that place
the attacking force in a position of advantage with respect to the defending
enemy force, such as engaging the enemy from a flanking position. His secur-
ity forces prevent the enemy from discovering friendly dispositions, capabili-
ties, and intentions, or interfering with the preparations for the attack.
Finally, he maneuvers to close with and destroy the enemy by close combat
and shock effect. Close combat is combat carried out with direct fire weapons,
supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires, and nonlethal engagement
means. Close combat defeats or destroys enemy forces, or seizes and retains
ground (FM 3-0). Close combat encompasses all actions that place friendly
forces in immediate contact with the enemy where the commander uses direct
fire and movement in combination to defeat or destroy enemy forces or seize
and retain ground.
3-121. A commander can overwhelm an enemy by the early seizing and re-
taining of key and decisive terrain that provides dominating observation,
cover and concealment, and better fields of fire to facilitate the maneuver of
his forces. If decisive terrain is present, the commander designates it to com-
municate its importance in his concept of operations, first to his staff and
later to subordinate commanders. The friendly force must control decisive ter-
rain to successfully accomplish its mission.
Combat Formations
3-122. A combat formation is an ordered arrangement of forces for a
specific purpose and describes the general configuration of a unit on
the ground. A commander can use seven different combat formations de-
pending on the factors of METT-TC:
· Column.
· Line.
· Echelon (left or right).
· Box.
· Diamond.
· Wedge.
· Vee.
Terrain characteristics and visibility determine the actual arrangement and
location of the unit’s personnel and vehicles within a given formation.
3-35
FM 3-90
3-123. Combat formations allow a unit to move on the battlefield in a posture

suited to the senior commander’s intent and mission. A unit may employ a
series of combat formations during the course of an attack; each has its ad-
vantages and disadvantages. Subordinate units within a combat formation
can also employ their own combat formations, consistent with their particular
situation. The commander considers the advantages and disadvantages of
each formation in the areas of C2 maintenance, firepower orientation, ability
to mass fires, and flexibility when determining the appropriate formation for
a given situation. All combat formations use one or more of the three move-
ment techniques: traveling, traveling overwatch, and bounding overwatch.
(Chapter 13 describes these three movement techniques.)
3-124. The commander’s use of standard formations allows him to rapidly
shift his unit from one formation to another, giving him additional flexibility
when adjusting to changes in the factors of METT-TC. (This results from a
commander rehearsing his unit so that it can change formations using stand-
ard responses to changing situations, such as actions on contact.) By desig-
nating the combat formation he plans to use, the commander—
· Establishes the geographic relationship between units.
· Indicates how he plans to react once the enemy makes contact with the
formation.
· Indicates the level of security desired.
· Establishes the preponderant orientation of his weapon systems.
· Postures his forces for the attack.
The number of maneuver units available makes some formations, such as the
box and the diamond, impractical for modernized organizations, including the
initial brigade combat team and the limited conversion division, which only
have three subordinate maneuver units at the brigade and battalion echelons
unless task organization occurs.
3-125. Column Formation. The
unit moves in column formation S S
when the commander does not
anticipate early contact, the ob-
jective is distant, and speed and
control are critical. (See Figure
3-26.) The location of fire support
units within the column reflects
the column’s length and the
range fans of those fire support
systems. Normally, the lead ele-
ment uses a traveling overwatch SPT
technique while the following
units are in traveling formation.
Employing a column formation—
· Provides the best forma- Figure 3-26. Column Formation
tion to move large forces
quickly, especially with limited routes and limited visibility.
· Makes enemy contact with a small part of the total force while facilita-
ting control and allowing the commander to quickly generate mass.
3-36
· Provides a base for easy transition to other formations.

· Works in restricted terrain.
3-126. A disadvantage of using the column formation is that the majority of
the column’s firepower can only be immediately applied on the column’s
flanks. The length of the column impacts movement and terrain manage-
ment. Additionally, there are the possibilities of inadvertently bypassing
enemy units or positions and exposing the unit’s flanks or running head on
into an enemy deployed perpendicular to the column’s direction of movement.
3-127. Line Formation. In a
line formation, the unit’s subordi-
nate ground maneuver elements
move abreast of each other. (See
Figure 3-27.) A commander em-
ploys this formation when he as-
saults an objective because it con-
centrates firepower to the front
in the direction of movement. A
line formation also—
· Facilitates speed and shock
in closing with an enemy. SPT
· Allows the coverage of
wide frontages. Figure 3-27. Line Formation
· Facilitates the occupation
of attack-by-fire or support-by-fire positions.
3-128. There are also disadvantages of a line formation:
· Provides less flexibility of maneuver than other formations since it does
not distribute units in depth.
· Linear deployment allows a unit deployed on line to bring only limited
firepower to bear on either flank.
· Provides limited or no reserve.
· Limits overwatch forces.
· Limits control of a unit using a line formation in restricted terrain or
under conditions of limited visibility.
3-129. Echelon Formation. A
commander who has knowledge
of potential enemy locations can
use an echelon formation to de-
ploy his subordinate ground man-
euver units diagonally left or
right. (See Figures 3-28 and 3-29,
page 3-38.) Units operating on
the flank of a larger formation
commonly use this formation.
Using an echelon formation—
SPT
· Facilitates control in open
terrain.
· Allows the concentration of Figure 3-28. Echelon Left Formation
3-37
FM 3-90
the unit’s firepower for-

ward and to the flank in
the direction of echelon.
· Allows forces not in contact
to maneuver against a
known enemy, because all
elements probably will not
come into contact at the
same time.
3-130. The primary disadvan-
tages of the echelon formation SPT
are that it is more difficult to
maintain control over the unit in
Figure 3-29. Echelon Right Formation
restricted terrain than a column
formation and the lack of secur-
ity or firepower available on the
opposite side of the echelon.
3-131. Box Formation. The box
formation arranges the unit with
two forward and two trail ma-
neuver elements. (See Figure
3-30.) A unit with only three ma-
neuver elements cannot adopt
SPT
the box formation. The subordi-
nate elements of the box usually
move in a column formation with
flank security. It is often used
when executing an approach Figure 3-30. Box Formation
march, an exploitation, or a pur-
suit when the commander has
only general knowledge about
the enemy. Employing a box for-
mation—
· Allows the unit to change
quickly and easily to any
other formation.
· Facilitates rapid move-
ment, yet still provides all-
around security.
SPT
· Provides firepower to the
front and flanks.
· Maintains control more
easily when compared to a Figure 3-31. Diamond Formation
line formation.
The primary disadvantages of a box formation are that it requires sufficient
maneuver space for dispersion and the availability of multiple routes.
3-132. Diamond Formation. The diamond formation arranges the unit with
one forward and one trail unit and a unit on each flank. (See Figure 3-31.)
3-38
The subordinate elements of the diamond usually move in a column forma-

tion with flank security. It is most effective during approach marches,
exploitations, or pursuits when the commander has only general knowledge
about the enemy. Employing a diamond formation—
· Allows the commander to maneuver either left or right immediately,
without first repositioning, regardless of which subordinate element
makes contact with the enemy. (This is the chief advantage of and the
difference between a diamond and a box formation.)
· Facilitates making enemy contact with the smallest possible force, yet
provides all-around security.
· Provides firepower to the front and flanks.
· Changes easily and quickly to another formation.
· Facilitates speed of movement while remaining easy to control.
· Provides an uncommitted force for use as a reserve.
3-133. The primary disadvantages of this formation are that it—
· Requires sufficient space for dispersion laterally and in depth.
· Requires four subordinate maneuver elements.
· Requires the availability of multiple routes.
3-134. Wedge Formation. The
wedge formation arranges forces
to attack an enemy appearing to
the front and flanks. (See Figure
3-32.) A unit with only three sub-
ordinate maneuver elements can
adopt the wedge formation. The
commander uses the wedge when
contact with the enemy is pos-
sible or expected, but his location
and dispositions are vague. It is
SPT
the preferred formation for a
movement to contact in an organ-
Figure 3-32. Wedge Formation
ization with three subordinate
maneuver units because it initiates contact with one unit while retaining two
other subordinate uncommitted units positioned to maneuver and further de-
velop the situation. Within the wedge, subordinate units employ the forma-
tion best suited to the terrain, visibility, and likelihood of contact. Employing
a wedge formation—
· Provides maximum firepower forward and allows a large portion of the
unit’s firepower to be used on the flanks.
· Allows rapid crossing of open terrain when enemy contact is not ex-
pected.
· Facilitates control.
· Allows for rapid changes in the orientation of the force.
· Facilitates the rapid change to a line, vee, echelon, or column forma-
tion.
3-135. The primary disadvantages to the wedge formation are that it—
3-39
FM 3-90
· Requires the availability of multiple routes.

· Lacks ease of control in restricted terrain or poor visibility.
3-136. Vee Formation. The vee
formation disposes the unit with
two maneuver elements abreast
and one or more units trailing.
(See Figure 3-33.) This arrange-
ment is well suited for an ad-
vance against a known threat to
the front. The commander may
use this formation when he ex-
pects enemy contact and knows
the location and disposition of
the enemy. Employing a vee for-
mation—
· Provides maximum fire- SPT
power forward and good
firepower to the flanks, but Figure 3-33. Vee Formation
the firepower on the flanks
is less than that provided by the wedge.
· Facilitates a continued maneuver after contact is made and a rapid
transition to the assault.
· Allows the unit to change quickly to a line, wedge, or column formation.
3-137. The primary disadvantages to this formation are that it—
· Makes reorientation of the direction of movement, such as a 90-degree
turn, more difficult than using a wedge.
· Makes control in restricted terrain and under limited-visibility condi-
tions difficult.
Limited-Visibility Conditions
3-138. The capability to fight at night and under limited-visibility conditions
is an important aspect of conducting maneuver. The commander conducts
field training exercises under limited-visibility conditions to ensure that his
unit has this capability as part of his standard training program. A command-
er conducts offensive operations at night or under limited-visibility conditions
when a daylight operation continues into the night or when an operation
could result in heavy losses if conducted in daylight. Offensive operations
conducted in these conditions can achieve surprise, gain terrain required for
further operations, and negate enemy visual target acquisition capabilities
while taking advantage of the friendly force’s night-fighting capabilities.
3-139. All operations conducted in limited visibility or adverse weather re-
quire more planning and preparation time than normal. They require desig-
nating reference points and establishing navigation aids, such as GPS way-
points. The commander ensures that the night-vision and navigation systems
required to maneuver under these conditions are available and functional.
The commander rehearses these operations before execution to ensure com-
plete integration and synchronization of the plan. Rehearsals also ensure that
3-40
his soldiers have the necessary skills to accomplish the mission. Any problem
areas require resolution before beginning the operation.
3-140. Night operations degrade the capabilities of soldiers and units. Cogni-
tive abilities degrade more rapidly than physical strength and endurance.
Night-vision devices degrade the user’s depth perception. This degradation in
performance occurs after as little as 18 hours of sustained work. (Additional
information concerning the impact of extended operations on soldiers and
unit can be found in FM 6-22.5.) The plan should allow time for both soldiers
and units to recuperate after conducting a night attack before being commit-
ted to other operations. The weight that soldiers must carry also directly af-
fects their endurance. The commander carefully determines the fighting load
of his soldiers, taking into account the factors of METT-TC and limits the
fighting load of his soldiers conducting night operations. The equipment car-
ried by a soldier for an extended period should never exceed one-third of his
body weight.
FIRE SUPPORT
3-141. Fire superiority must be gained and maintained throughout all offen-
sive operations. Fire support uses a variety of methods and assets that attrit,
delay, and disrupt enemy forces and enable friendly maneuver. Using prepa-
ratory, counterfire, suppression, and nonlethal fires provides the commander
with numerous options for gaining and maintaining fire superiority. The com-
mander uses his long-range artillery systems and air support to engage the
enemy throughout the depth of his positions.
3-142. Along with the reserve, attacks by indirect-fire systems and close air
support are some of the commander’s principal means for influencing ongoing
actions. Such support helps establish the conditions required for successful
mission accomplishment and is key to the commander’s ability to react to un-
expected situations. Decentralized execution characterizes the employment of
fires when conducting offensive operations. Subordinates must have direct ac-
cess to sufficient firepower to adequately support their maneuvering ele-
ments. Simultaneously, the commander retains control over sufficient fire
support assets to enable him to mass their effects at critical times and places
to support his decisive operation or to respond to the enemy’s counteraction.
3-143. Fire support planning is the continuing process of analyzing, allo-
cating, and scheduling fires. It determines how fires are used, what types of
targets to attack, what collection assets are used to acquire and track those
targets, what assets are used to attack the target, and what assets verify ef-
fects on the target. This planning does not stop at the objective or LOA. The
commander gives attention to flanks and potential enemy hide positions. Co-
ordination among echelon fire support elements (FSEs) and the proper use of
fire support coordinating measures are critical to prevent fratricide.
3-144. The fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) integrates fire support into
the unit’s maneuver scheme for the commander. The FSCOORD supports the
unit’s maneuver by planning preparatory fires, harassing fires, interdiction
fires, suppressive fires, and deception fires. These fires can be time- or event-
driven. The FSCOORD plans fires on known and likely enemy positions,
which may include templated enemy positions. Successful massing of indirect
3-41
FM 3-90
fires and fixed-wing attacks requires a FSE that is proficient in the tracking
of all battery positions and movements and knows the maximum ordinate re-
quirements. It also requires a tactical air control party proficient in the
timely execution of close air support. Fire planning reconciles top-down plan-
ning and bottom-up refinement.
3-145. As the attacking force moves forward, preparatory fires sequentially
neutralize, suppress, or destroy enemy positions. The commander must weigh
its probable effects against achieving a greater degree of surprise against the
enemy, especially under conditions of limited visibility, in determining
whether to fire an artillery preparation. He may decide to employ smart or
brilliant munitions to destroy select high-payoff targets or use these muni-
tions in mass against part of the enemy defense to facilitate a breach and ne-
gate the requirement for long-duration preparation fires using conventional
munitions.
3-146. The commander may choose to make his initial assault without using
preparatory fires to achieve tactical surprise. However, fires are always
planned to support each unit’s operations so that they are available if needed.
Preparatory fires are normally high-volume fires delivered over a short per-
iod of time to maximize surprise and shock effect. These preparatory fires
also include the conduct of offensive information operations. They can con-
tinue while ground combat elements are maneuvering. This consideration ap-
plies to all types and forms of offensive operations.
3-147. Artillery and mortars must occupy positions that are well forward and
still within supporting range of the flanks or maneuver forces to provide res-
ponsive indirect fires. The commander considers the effect that movement by
echelon or battery has on the amount of fire support provided. The command-
er should support his unit’s decisive operation with priority of fires. His main
effort prior to the initiation of the decisive operation will have priority of fires
if the operation contains phases. He places coordinated fire lines (CFLs) as
close as possible to friendly maneuver forces and plans on-order CFLs on
phase lines so that they can be quickly shifted as the force moves. This allows
the expeditious engagement of targets beyond the CFL by the maximum
number of available systems.
3-148. The effective assignment of forward observers and target acquisition
assets to quick-fire or exclusive nets also provides responsive fires. Quick-fire
nets allow the lead observers to associate directly with specific field artillery
or mortar fire units. These kinds of communication arrangements enhance
fire support responsiveness through streamlined net structures and focused
priorities. Communications planning should also include the need for commu-
nication nets for the clearing of targets for rotary- and fixed-wing attacks.
3-149. Offensive information operations perform several functions to support
the offense. As the friendly force moves through the enemy’s security area
and closes into his main defensive positions, jamming resources concentrate
on neutralizing enemy fire control, target acquisition, and intelligence-gath-
ering systems. The commander uses deception to prevent the enemy from
determining the location and objective of his decisive operation. In addition,
electronic warfare resources continue to provide intelligence and guidance to
both friendly jammers and lethal indirect fire weapon systems so attacking
3-42
units can destroy enemy C2, ISR, fire support, and other high-value targets.
The commander synchronizes the timing and conduct of his offensive opera-
tions so they achieve maximum effectiveness.
AIR DEFENSE
3-150. Air defense operations are performed by all members of the combined
arms team; however, ground-based air defense artillery units execute the
bulk of the Army’s air defense tasks. Allocation of air defense artillery assets
within a unit depends on the factors of METT-TC. The commander at each
echelon establishes his air defense priorities based on his concept of opera-
tions, scheme of maneuver, air situation, and the air defense priorities estab-
lished by higher headquarters. He generally will weight his air defense cover-
age toward his decisive operation and establish a protective corridor over the
terrain traversed by the unit conducting that decisive operation. The com-
mander has the option of retaining all assets under his direct control or allo-
cating assets to subordinate units. Command and control of all air defense
assets requires complete and timely communications to ensure proper
weapon status for the protection of friendly air support assets.
3-151. Passive air defense measures are an essential part of air and missile
defense planning at all levels. All units conduct passive actions in conjunction
with their assigned missions. Passive actions reduce the effectiveness of the
enemy air threat.
3-152. Targets selected to support echelon tactical air defense efforts include
the following—
· Unmanned aerial vehicles with their launchers and control nodes.
· Rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft.
· Facilities supporting enemy air operations, such as airfields, launch
sites, logistics support facilities, technical support facilities, forward
arming and refueling points, navigation aids, and C2 sites.
These facilities are normally engaged by maneuver and fire support elements
and not air defense artillery units. (See FM 3-01 for additional information on
using active and passive air defense measures in the offense.)
MOBILITY/COUNTERMOBILITY/SURVIVABILITY
3-153. This BOS has three basic purposes. It preserves the freedom of
maneuver of friendly forces. It obstructs the maneuver of the enemy in areas
where fire and movement can destroy him. Finally, it enhances the surviva-
bility of friendly forces. Time, equipment, and materials may restrict the
amount of work accomplished before, during, and after conducting an offen-
sive operation. The commander’s plan must realistically reflect these limita-
tions. The plan must provide the desired balance among these three basic
purposes and assign support priorities among subordinate units. Normally,
priority of support should be concentrated on the unit or units conducting the
decisive operation rather than distributed evenly throughout the force. That
support will focus on maintaining the mobility of the force conducting the de-
cisive operation while ensuring the survivability of the C2 system.
3-43
FM 3-90
Mobility
3-154. Mobility is key to successful offensive operations. Its major focus is to
enable friendly forces to maneuver freely on the battlefield. The commander
wants the capability to move, exploit, and pursue the enemy across a wide
front. When attacking, he wants to concentrate the effects of combat power at
selected locations. This may require him to improve or construct combat trails
through areas where routes do not exist. The surprise achieved by attacking
through an area believed to be impassable may justify the effort expended in
constructing these trails. The force bypasses existing obstacles and minefields
identified before starting the offensive operation instead of breaching them
whenever possible. Units mark bypassed minefields whenever the factors of
METT-TC allow.
3-155. Maintaining the momentum of an offensive operation requires the
force to quickly pass through obstacles as it encounters them. This translates
to a deliberate effort to capture bridges and other enemy reserved obstacles
intact. Using air assault and airborne forces is an effective technique to ac-
complish this goal. The preferred method of fighting through a defended
obstacle is employing an in-stride breach, because it avoids the loss of time
and momentum associated with conducting a deliberate breach. The com-
mander plans how and where his forces conduct breaching operations. He
plans his breaching operations using a reverse planning sequence from the
objective back to the assembly area. FM 3-34.2 addresses breaching opera-
tions in more detail.
3-156. Rivers remain major obstacles despite advances in high-mobility wea-
pon systems and extensive aviation support. River crossings are among the
most critical, complex, and vulnerable combined arms operations. Rivers are
crossed in-stride as a continuation of the attack whenever possible. The size
of the river, as well as the enemy and friendly situations, will dictate the spe-
cific tactics, techniques, and procedures used in conducting the crossing.
Corps engineer brigades contain the majority of tactical bridging assets. (See
FM 3-97.13 for additional information on conducting hasty and deliberate
river crossings.)
Countermobility
3-157. Countermobility operations are vital to help isolate the battlefield and
protect the attacking force from enemy counterattack, even though force mo-
bility in offensive operations normally has first priority. Obstacles provide se-
curity for friendly forces as the fight progresses into the depth of the enemy’s
defenses. They provide flank protection and deny the enemy counterattack
routes. They assist friendly forces in defeating the enemy in detail and can be
vital in reducing the amount of forces required to secure a given area. Fur-
ther, they can permit the concentration of forces for offensive operations in
the first place by allowing a relatively small force to defend a large AO. The
commander ensures the use of obstacles is fully synchronized with his con-
cept of operations and does not hinder the mobility of the attacking force.
3-158. During visualization, the commander identifies avenues of approach
that offer natural flank protection to an attacking force, such as rivers or
ridgelines. Staff estimates support this process. Flanks are protected by
3-44
destroying bridges, emplacing minefields, and by using scatterable mines to

interdict roads and trails. Swamps, canals, lakes, forests, and escarpments
are natural terrain features that can be quickly reinforced for flank security.
3-159. Offensive countermobility plans must stress rapid emplacement and
flexibility. Engineer support must keep pace with advancing maneuver forces
and be prepared to emplace obstacles alongside them. Time and resources
will not permit developing the terrain’s full defensive potential. The com-
mander first considers likely enemy reactions, then plans how to block enemy
avenues of approach or withdrawal with obstacles. He also plans the use of
obstacles to contain bypassed enemy elements and prevent the enemy from
withdrawing. The plan includes obstacles to use on identification of the
enemy’s counterattack. Speed and interdiction capabilities are vital charac-
teristics of the obstacles employed. The commander directs the planning for
aircraft- and artillery-delivered mines on enemy counterattack routes. The
fire support system delivers these munitions in front of or on top of enemy
lead elements once they commit to one of the routes. Rapid cratering devices
and surface minefields provide other excellent capabilities.
3-160. Control of mines and obstacles, and accurate reporting to all units are
vital. Obstacles will hinder both friendly and enemy maneuver. Positive C2 is
necessary to prevent the premature activation of minefields and obstacles.
(See FM 3-34.1 for additional information on using countermobility obstacles
in the offense.)
Survivability
3-161. Denying the enemy a chance to plan, prepare, and execute an effective
response to friendly offensive operations through maintaining a high opera-
tional tempo is a key means a commander employs to ensure the survivability
of his force. Using multiple routes, dispersion, highly mobile forces, piecemeal
destruction of isolated enemy forces, scheduled rotation and relief of forces
before they culminate, and wise use of terrain are techniques for maintaining
a high tempo of offensive operations. The exact techniques employed in a spe-
cific situation must reflect the factors of METT-TC.
3-162. The commander protects his force to deny the enemy the capability to
interfere with ongoing operations. That protection also meets his legal and
moral obligations to his soldiers. To protect his force, the commander—
· Maintains a high tempo of operations.
· Conducts area security operations.
· Employs operations security (OPSEC) procedures.
· Executes deception operations.
· Conducts defensive information operations.
· Employs camouflage, cover, and concealment.
· Constructs survivability positions for nondisplacing systems and sup-
plies.
· Conducts operations to defend against enemy use of nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons.
Although this list is not all-inclusive, it typifies the measures a commander
takes to secure his force during offensive operations.
3-45
FM 3-90
3-163. The echelon’s OPSEC program and any deception or survivability ef-
forts should conceal from the enemy or mislead him regarding the location of
the friendly objective, decisive operation, the disposition of forces, and the
timing of the offensive operation. This tends to prevent the enemy from
launching effective spoiling attacks. (See FM 3-13 for additional information
on OPSEC, deception, and defensive information operations.)
3-164. The commander normally considers the impact of directing the con-
struction of protective emplacements for artillery, air defense units, and logis-
tics concentrations as part of his planning process. This occurs although units
do not employ protective positions in the offense as extensively as they do in
the defense. The commander may require the hardening of key C2 facilities,
especially those with detectable electronic signatures. Maneuver units
construct as many fighting positions as possible whenever they halt or pause
during offensive operations. They improve existing terrain by cutting reverse-
slope firing shelves or slots when possible. (See FM 3-34.112 for more infor-
mation on constructing protective positions.) Forces conducting offensive
operations will continue to use camouflage, cover, and concealment. (See
FM 3-24.3 for additional information on those topics.)
3-165. The IPB process contributes to survivability by developing products
that help the commander protect his forces, including intervisibility overlays
and situation templates. Intervisibility overlays help protect the force. If an
enemy cannot observe the friendly force, he cannot engage the friendly force
with direct-fire weapons. Situation templates also help protect the force. If a
commander knows how fast an enemy force can respond to his offensive op-
erations, he can sequence his operations at times and places where the enemy
can respond least effectively. This occurs through determining enemy artil-
lery range fans, movement times between enemy reserve assembly area loca-
tions and advancing friendly forces, and other related intelligence items.
3-166. The commander integrates NBC defensive considerations into his of-
fensive plans. Implementing many NBC defensive measures slows the tempo,
degrades combat power, and may also increase logistics requirements. NBC
reconnaissance consumes resources, especially time. Personnel in protective
gear find it more difficult to work or fight. The key fundamental of all NBC
defense activities is to avoid NBC attacks and their effect whenever possible.
Avoidance includes passive and active avoidance measures. The other
fundamentals of NBC defense are protection and decontamination. Avoidance
and protection are closely linked. (See FM 3-11 for additional information on
NBC defensive considerations.)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

3-167. The objective of CSS in offensive operations is to assist the tactical
commander in maintaining the momentum. The commander wants to take
advantage of windows of opportunity and launch offensive operations with
minimum advance warning time. Therefore, logistics and personnel planners
and operators must anticipate these events and maintain the flexibility to
support the offensive plan accordingly. A key to successful offensive opera-
tions is the ability to anticipate the requirement to push support forward,
specifically in regard to ammunition, fuel, and water. Combat service support
3-46
commanders must act, rather than react, to support requirements. The exist-
ence of habitual support relationships facilitates the ability to anticipate.
3-168. Combat service support maintains momentum of the attack by deliver-
ing supplies as far forward as possible. The commander can use throughput
distribution and preplanned and preconfigured packages of essential items to
help maintain his momentum and tempo. The commander examines his
unit’s basic load to determine its adequacy to support the operation. He deter-
mines his combat load, the supplies carried by his individual soldiers and
combat vehicles. His sustainment load consists of what remains of his basic
load once his combat load is subtracted. His tactical vehicles carry the sus-
tainment load. The commander also determines the supplies required for
likely contingencies. He determines the amount of cross-loading of supplies
required by the situation to prevent all of one type of supply from being de-
stroyed by the loss of a single system.
3-169. CSS units and material remain close to the maneuver force to ensure
short turnaround time for supplies and services. This includes uploading as
much critical materiel—such as POL and ammunition—as possible and co-
ordinating to preclude attempted occupation of a piece of terrain by more
than one unit. The commander makes a decision regarding the possibility
that CSS preparation for the attack will be detected by enemy forces and give
away his tactical plans.
3-170. The availability of adequate supplies and transportation to sustain the
operation becomes more critical as it progresses. Supply LOCs are strained,
and requirements for repair and replacement of weapon systems mount.
Requirements for POL increase because of the distance the combat vehicles of
the maneuver force are likely to travel. CSS units in direct support of
maneuver units must be as mobile as the forces they support. One way to
provide continuous support is to task organize elements of CSS units or
complete CSS units with their supported maneuver formations as required by
the factors of METT-TC.
3-171. The variety and complexity of offensive operations requires the Army
to establish a flexible and tailorable transportation system. There may be a
wide dispersion of forces and lengthening of LOCs. Required capabilities in-
clude movement control, in-transit visibility of supplies being carried, termi-
nal operations, and mode operations.
3-172. Maintenance assets move as far forward as consistent with the tactical
situation to repair inoperable and damaged equipment and to return it to bat-
tle as quickly as possible. Crews continue to perform their preventive mainte-
nance checks and services as modified for the climate and terrain in which
they find themselves. Battle damage assessment and repair (BDAR) may be
critical to sustaining offensive operations. Crews as well as maintenance and
recovery teams conduct BDAR to rapidly return disabled equipment for
battlefield service by expediently fixing, bypassing, or jury-rigging compo-
nents. It restores the minimum essential combat capabilities necessary to
support a specific combat mission or to enable the equipment to self-recover.
3-173. The burden on medical resources increases due to the intensity of op-
erations and the increased distances over which support is required as the
force advances. The commander reallocates medical resources as the tactical
3-47
FM 3-90
situation changes. Medical units can anticipate large numbers of casualties in

a short period of time due to the capabilities of modern conventional weapons
and the employment of weapons of mass destruction. These mass casualty sit-
uations will probably exceed the capabilities of local medical units and
require them to alter their normal scope of operations to provide the greatest
good for the greatest number. Key factors for effective mass casualty manage-
ment are on-site triage, emergency resuscitative care, early surgical interven-
tion, reliable communications, and skillful evacuation by air and ground re-
sources.
3-174. Establishing aerial resupply and forward logistics bases may be neces-
sary to sustain maneuver operations such as exploitation and pursuit con-
ducted at great distance from the unit’s sustaining base. The unit or support
activity at the airlift’s point of origin is responsible for obtaining the required
packing, shipping, and sling-load equipment. It prepares the load for aerial
transport, prepares the pickup zone, and conducts air-loading operations. The
unit located at the airlift destination is responsible for preparing the landing
zone to accommodate aerial resupply and for receiving the load.
3-175. Raids conducted by ground maneuver forces within the depths of the
enemy’s rear area tend to be audacious, high-speed, and of short duration.
Logistics support is minimal; units carry as much POL and ammunition as
possible, taking advantage of any captured enemy supplies. Once the raiding
force crosses its LD, only limited, emergency aerial resupply of critical sup-
plies and medical evacuation are feasible because of the absence of a secure
LOC. The commander must thoroughly plan for aerial resupply of the raiding
force since it entails greater risk than normal operations. Under these condi-
tions, units destroy damaged equipment that is unable to maintain the pace
of the operation.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

3-176. The commander’s mission and intent determine the scheme of maneu-
ver and the allocation of available resources. The commander reduces the
scope of the initial mission if only a few resources are available. For example,
a commander could tell his subordinates to clear their AOs of all enemy
platoon-size and larger forces instead of clearing their areas of operation of
all enemy forces if he lacks the time or forces needed to accomplish the latter
task.
3-177. All planning for offensive operations address the factors of METT-TC,
with special emphasis on—
· Enemy positions, strengths, and capabilities.
· Missions and objectives for each subordinate element and task and pur-
pose for each BOS manager.
· Commander’s intent.
· AOs for the use of each subordinate element with associated control
graphics.
· Time the operation is to begin.
· Scheme of maneuver.
· Special tasks required to accomplish the mission.
3-48
· Risk.
· Options for accomplishing the mission.
The commander and his staff translate the unit’s assigned mission into speci-
fic objectives for all subordinates, to include the reserve. These objectives can
involve any type or form of operations. If the type of operation assigned has
associated forms, the commander may specify which form to use, but should
minimize restrictions on his subordinates’ freedom of action. FM 5-0 address-
es the military decision making process and the format for plans and orders.
3-178. Prior planning and preparations that result in synchronizing the
seven BOS increase a unit’s effectiveness when executing operations. How-
ever, the fluid nature of combat requires the commander to guide the actions
of his subordinates during the execution phase. The commander locates him-
self where he can best sense the flow of the operation and influence its critical
points by redirecting the effects of committed forces or employing his reserve.
This normally means that he is well forward in the combat formation, usually
with the force designated to conduct the decisive operation. Once he makes
contact with the enemy, he quickly moves to the area of contact, assesses the
situation, and takes appropriate aggressive actions to direct the continuation
of the offensive operation.
3-179. In addition to assigning objectives, commanders at all echelons con-
sider how to exploit advantages that arise during operations and the seizure
of intermediate and final objectives. The commander exploits success by ag-
gressively executing the plan, taking advantage of junior leader initiative,
and employing trained units capable of rapidly executing standard drills. His
reserve also provides a flexible capability to exploit unforeseen advantages.
3-180. The commander always seeks to surprise his opponent throughout the
operation. Information operations, such as deception, and the choice of an
unexpected direction or time for conducting an offensive operation can result
in the enemy being surprised. Surprise delays enemy reactions, overloads and
confuses enemy C2, induces psychological shock, and reduces the coherence of
his defenses. Tactical surprise is more difficult to achieve once hostilities
begin, but it is still possible. The commander achieves tactical surprise by
attacking in bad weather and over seemingly impassible terrain, conducting
feints and demonstrations, making rapid changes in tempo, and employing
sound OPSEC measures.
3-181. The commander should anticipate any requirements to shift his main
effort during the offensive to press the fight and keep the enemy off balance.
The commander develops decision points to support these changes using both
human and technical means to validate his decision points.
3-182. The commander retains the capability to rapidly concentrate force ef-
fects, such as fires, throughout the extent of his AO during offensive
operations. This capability is also critical to the commander when his force
crosses linear obstacles. Lanes and gaps resulting from combined arms
breaching operations or occurring naturally typically are choke points. There
is a tendency for each subordinate element to move out independently as it
completes its passage through the choke point. This independent movement
detracts from the ability of the whole force to rapidly generate combat power
on the far side of an obstacle.
3-49
FM 3-90
3-183. The commander briefs his plan and the plans of adjacent units and
higher echelons to his unit’s leaders and soldiers. This helps units and sold-
iers moving into unexpected locations to direct their efforts toward accom-
plishing the mission. This exchange of information occurs in all operations.
3-184. The free flow of information between all force elements must be main-
tained throughout the offensive operation. This requires the commander to
maintain communications with all elements of his unit. He plans how to posi-
tion and reposition his information systems to maintain his common
operational picture throughout the operation. The commander plans how to
expand his communications coverage to accommodate increased distances as
his force advances. Accordingly, he provides for redundant communication
means—including wire, radio, visible and ultraviolet light, heat, smoke,
audible sound, messengers, and event-oriented communications, such as the
casualty-producing device that initiates an ambush.
3-185. A unit with advanced information systems and automated decision
aids enjoys reduced engagement times and an enhanced planning process.
This assists the unit commander’s ability to control the operational tempo of
the battle and stay within the enemy’s decision making cycle. Greatly
improved knowledge of the enemy and friendly situations facilitates the
tactical employment of precision fires and decisive maneuver at extended
ranges. These digital systems also enhance the commander’s freedom to move
to those battlefield locations where he can best influence the battle at the
critical time and place.
TRANSITION
3-186. A transition occurs when the commander makes the assessment that
he must change his focus from one type of military operation to another. The
following paragraphs explain why a commander primarily conducting offen-
sive operations would transition to the defense and describe techniques that a
commander can use to ease the transition.
3-187. A commander halts an offensive operation only when it results in com-
plete victory and the end of hostilities, reaches a culminating point, or the
commander receives a change in mission from his higher commander. This
change in mission may be a result of the interrelationship of the other ele-
ments of national power, such as a political decision.
3-188. All offensive operations that do not achieve complete victory reach a
culminating point when the balance of strength shifts from the attacking
force to its opponent. Usually, offensive operations lose momentum when
friendly forces encounter heavily defended areas that cannot be bypassed.
They also reach a culminating point when the resupply of fuel, ammunition,
and other supplies fails to keep up with expenditures, soldiers become physi-
cally exhausted, casualties and equipment losses mount, and repairs and re-
placements do not keep pace. Because of enemy surprise movements, offen-
sive operations also stall when reserves are not available to continue the ad-
vance, the defender receives reinforcements, or he counterattacks with fresh
troops. Several of these causes may combine to halt an offense. In some cases,
the unit can regain its momentum, but this only happens after difficult
fighting or after an operational pause.
3-50
3-189. If the attacker cannot anticipate securing decisive objectives before his
force reaches its culminating point, he plans a pause to replenish his combat
power and phases his operation accordingly. Simultaneously, he prevents the
enemy from knowing when the friendly forces become overextended.
3-190. Once offensive operations begin, the attacking commander tries to
sense when he reaches, or is about to reach, his culminating point. Before
reaching this point, he must transition to some other type of military opera-
tion. The commander has more freedom to choose where and when he wants
to halt the attack if he can sense that his forces are approaching culmination.
He can plan his future activities to aid the defense, minimize vulnerability to
attack, and facilitate renewal of the offense as he transitions to branches or
sequels of the operation. For example, to prevent overburdening the extended
LOCs resulting from the advances away from his sustaining base, some of the
commander’s subordinate units may move into assembly areas before he ter-
minates the offense to start preparing for the ensuing defensive operation.
3-191. A lull in combat operations often accompanies transition. Civilians
may present themselves to friendly forces during this period. The commander
must consider how he will minimize the interference of these civilians with
his military operations while protecting the civilians from future hostile ac-
tions. He must also consider the threat they pose to his force and its opera-
tions if enemy intelligence agents or saboteurs constitute a portion of the ci-
vilian population encountered.
3-192. A commander anticipating the termination of his offensive operation
prepares orders that include the time or circumstances under which the of-
fense transitions to another type of military operation, such as the defense,
the missions and locations of subordinate units, and C2 measures. As he tran-
sitions from the offense to the defense, a commander takes the following ac-
tions:
· Maintains contact and surveillance of the enemy, using a combination
of reconnaissance units and surveillance assets to develop the informa-
tion required to plan future actions.
· Establishes a security area and local security measures.
· Redeploys fire support assets to ensure the support of security forces.
· Redeploys forces based on probable future employment.
· Maintains or regains contact with adjacent units in a contiguous AO
and ensures that his units remain capable of mutual support in a non-
contiguous AO.
· Transitions the engineer effort by shifting the emphasis from mobility
to countermobility and survivability.
· Consolidates and reorganizes.
· Explains the rationale for transitioning from the offense to his soldiers.
3-193. The commander redeploys his air defense assets to cover the force’s de-
fensive position. A transition to the defense may require the commander to
change his air defense priorities. For example, his top priority may have been
coverage of maneuver units in the offense. This may shift to coverage of his
long-range sensors and weapons in the defense.
3-51
FM 3-90
3-194. The commander conducts any required reorganization and resupply

concurrently with the above activities. This requires a transition in the logis-
tics effort, with a shift in emphasis from ensuring the force’s ability to move
forward (POL and forward repair of maintenance and combat losses) to
ensuring the force’s ability to defend on its chosen location (forward stockage
construction, barrier, and obstacle material, and ammunition). Transition is
often a time in which equipment maintenance can be performed. Additional
assets may also be available for casualty evacuation and medical treatment
because of a reduction in the tempo.
3-195. The commander should not wait too long to transition from the offense
to the defense as his forces approach their culminating point. Without prior
planning, transitioning to defensive actions after reaching a culminating
point is extremely difficult for several reasons. Defensive preparations are
hasty, and forces are not adequately disposed for defense. Defensive reorgani-
zation requires more time than the enemy will probably allow. Usually,
attacking forces are dispersed, extended in depth, and weakened in condition.
Moreover, the shift to defense requires a psychological adjustment. Soldiers
who have become accustomed to advancing must now halt and fight defen-
sively—sometimes desperately—on new and often unfavorable terms.
3-196. A commander can use two basic techniques when he transitions to the
defense. The first technique is for the leading elements to commit forces and
push forward to claim enough ground to establish a security area anchored on
defensible terrain. The main force moves forward or rearward as necessary to
occupy key terrain and institutes a hasty defense that progresses into a delib-
erate defense as time and resources allow. The second technique is to estab-
lish a security area generally along the unit’s final positions, moving the main
body rearward to defensible terrain. The security force thins out and the re-
maining force deploys to organize the defense. In both methods, the security
area should be deep enough to keep the main force out of the range of enemy
medium artillery and rocket systems.
3-197. In the first technique, the security area often lacks depth because the
force lacks sufficient combat power to seize required terrain. In the second
technique, the enemy force will probably accurately template the forward
trace of friendly units and engage with artillery and other fire support sys-
tems. These actions often result in the loss of additional friendly soldiers and
equipment and the expenditure of more resources.
3-198. If a commander determines that it is necessary to break off an offen-
sive operation and conduct a retrograde, he typically has his units conduct an
area defense from their current locations until he can synchronize the
retrograde operation. The amount of effort expended in establishing the area
defense depends on the specific factors of METT-TC currently prevailing.
3-52
Chapter 4
Movement to Contact
When armies approach each other, it makes all the difference which
owns only the ground on which it stands or sleeps and which one owns
all the rest.
Winston Churchill: Their Finest Hour, 1949
Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to develop

the situation and establish or regain contact (FM 3-0). A commander con-
ducts this type of offensive operation when the tactical situation is not
clear or when the enemy has broken contact. A properly executed move-
ment to contact develops the combat situation and maintains the com-
mander's freedom of action after contact is gained. This flexibility is es-
sential in maintaining the initiative. All of the tactical concepts, control
measures, and planning considerations introduced in Chapters 2 and 3
apply to the conduct of a movement to contact. Many of the attack prep-
aration consideration introduced in Chapter 5 also apply.
4-1. Purposeful and ag-

gressive movement, de- CONTENTS
centralized control, and Historical Example ....................................... 4-2
the hasty deployment of Organization of Forces ................................ 4-3
combined arms forma- Security Forces......................................... 4-4
tions from the march to Main Body ................................................. 4-6
attack or defend charac- Control Measures ......................................... 4-6
terize the movement to Planning a Movement to Contact ............... 4-8
contact. The fundamen- Executing a Movement to Contact ............. 4-9
tals of a movement to Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact ....... 4-12
contact are— Disrupt the Enemy.................................. 4-14
· Focus all efforts on Fix the Enemy ......................................... 4-15
finding the enemy. Maneuver................................................. 4-15
· Make initial con- Follow Through ...................................... 4-16
tact with the smal- Search and Attack ...................................... 4-16
lest force possible, Organization of Forces .......................... 4-16
consistent with pro- Control Measures ................................... 4-17
tecting the force. Planning a Search and Attack ............... 4-17
Executing a Search and Attack ............. 4-18
· Make initial con-
tact with small, mobile, self-contained forces to avoid decisive engage-
ment of the main body on ground chosen by the enemy. This allows the
commander maximum flexibility to develop the situation.
· Task-organize the force and use movement formations to deploy and at-
tack rapidly in any direction.
4-1
FM 3-90
· Keep forces within supporting distances to facilitate a flexible response.

· Maintain contact regardless of the course of action (COA) adopted once
contact is gained.
Close air support, air interdiction, and counterair operations are essential to
the success of large-scale movements to contact (MTCs). Local air superiority
or, as a minimum, air parity is vital to the operation’s success.
4-2. The Army’s improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR) capabilities reduce the need for corps and divisions to conduct an MTC
since fully modernized units normally have a general idea of the location of
significant enemy forces. However, enemy use of complex terrain and offen-
sive information operations designed to degrade the accuracy of the friendly
common operational picture will continue to require small tactical units to
conduct an MTC.
4-3. A meeting engagement is a combat action that occurs when a moving
force engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place (JP 3-0). Conducting
an MTC results in a meeting engagement. The enemy force may be either sta-
tionary or moving. Such encounters often occur in small-unit operations when
reconnaissance has been ineffective. The force that reacts first to the unex-
pected contact generally gains an advantage over its opponent. However, a
meeting engagement may also occur when the opponents are aware of each
other and both decide to attack immediately to obtain a tactical advantage or
seize key or decisive terrain. A meeting engagement may also occur when one
force attempts to deploy into a hasty defense while the other force attacks be-
fore its opponent can organize an effective defense. Acquisition systems may
discover the enemy before the security force can gain contact. No matter how
the force makes contact, seizing the initiative is the overriding imperative.
Prompt execution of battle drills at platoon level and below, and standard
actions on contact for larger units can give that initiative to the friendly force.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
4-4. The following vignette discusses the Soviet Manchurian Campaign in the
closing days of World War II and illustrates the idea that tacticians can profit
from the lessons learned by other armies in other times. It demonstrates the
conduct of an MTC at the operational level.
The Soviet Manchurian Campaign, August 1945

Shortly after midnight on 9 August 1945, Soviet assault troops crossed the
Soviet-Manchurian border and attacked Japanese positions. This was the van-
guard of a force of more than 1.5 million men that was to advance along multiple
axes on a frontage of more than 4,400 kilometers. Soviet offensive tactics were
shaped by several factors:
· The necessity for speed to increase the effectiveness of maneuver, thus in-
creasing surprise, overcoming initial defenses, and preempting the estab-
lishment of subsequent effective defenses.
· The vast expanse of the area of operations (AO).
· The diversity of the terrain, giving rise to large-scale force tailoring.
· The nature of the opposition.
4-2
Movement to Contact
The Soviets conducted their movement to contact operation at the last possible
moment. This reinforced strategic surprise and yielded tactical surprise as well.
Units deployed for attack from assembly areas 20 to 80 kilometers behind the
border and entered from the march, attacking along every possible axis using
small, task-organized assault groups with heavy engineer and firepower support.
Conduct of operations under adverse weather conditions and at night went con-
trary to Japanese expectations. The Soviet tendency to bypass fortified positions
confused Japanese commanders.
2nd FAR EASTERN FRONT

XXXX
XX
2RBA
XX
XXXX
XXX
15
X
TRANS-BAIKAL FRONT 5
XXXX
XXXX
36 X
XX 35
XX
XXXX
1RBA
XXXX XXX
39 XXXX 10
XXXX
5
53 XXXX
XXXX
6GD
MONGOLIA 25
1ST
SOVIET-MONGOLIAN
CAV-MECH
XXXX MANCHURIA FAR
GROUP 17
XXX
EASTERN
FRONT
SEA OF
JAPAN
KOREA
Figure 4-1. Soviet Moves
The Soviets carefully timed the application of their offensive power by first at-
tacking with forward detachments and advance guards in the first echelon, and
then with the main force. See Figure 4-1. This perpetuated the momentum of ini-
tial assaults and created a momentum that was imparted to army and front-level
operations. Often enemy resistance was eliminated before the main columns had
to deploy. Forces massed at the critical point on each axis and maneuvered over
what was considered to be impassable terrain. All this resulted in a loss of de-
fense coherence that the defending Japanese Kwantung Army was never able to
regain. In seven days Soviet forces penetrated between 500 and 950 kilometers
into Manchuria from their starting points, securing all the objectives necessary for
a complete victory over the Japanese.
ORGANIZATION OF FORCES
4-5. A movement to contact is organized with an offensive covering force or
an advance guard as a forward security element and a main body as a
4-3
FM 3-90
minimum. A portion of the main body composes the commander’s sustaining

base. Based on the factors of METT-TC, the commander may increase his se-
curity forces by having an offensive covering force and an advance guard for
each column, as well as flank and rear security (normally a screen or guard).
(See Figure 4-2.) Chapter 12 discusses security operations.
COVERING FORCE
C (+) C
G G G G G G
ADVANCE GUARD FOR EACH COLUMN

FLANK GUARD/FLANK SCREEN

G G
MAIN BODY
G G
SPT
REAR GUARD/REAR SCREEN

G G
Figure 4-2. Force Organized for a Movement to Contact
4-6. A movement to contact mission requires the commander not to have con-
tact with the enemy main body. However, the commander may still know the
location of at least some enemy reserve and follow-on forces. If the corps or
division commander has enough intelligence information to target enemy un-
committed forces, reserves, or sustaining operations activities, he normally
designates forces, such as long-range artillery systems and attack helicopters,
to engage known enemy elements regardless of their geographical location
within his AO. At all times the forward security element and the main body
perform reconnaissance.
SECURITY FORCES
4-7. A corps or division commander conducting an MTC typically organizes
his security element into a covering force to protect the movement of the
main body and to develop the situation before committing the main body. A
covering force is task-organized to accomplish specific tasks independent of
the main body in accordance with the factors of METT-TC, such as conduct
mobility and breach operations. This covering force reports directly to the es-
tablishing commander.
4-4
Movement to Contact
4-8. If a force conducting an MTC is unable to resource a covering force for

independent security operations, it may use an advance guard in the place of
a covering force. An advance guard is a task-organized combined arms unit or
detachment that precedes a column formation to protect the main body from
ground observation or surprise by the enemy. This typically occurs when a
brigade or battalion conducts an MTC. In cases where the higher echelon
(corps or division) creates a covering force, subordinate elements can estab-
lish an advance guard behind the covering force and ahead of the main body.
This normally occurs when subordinate units are advancing in multiple par-
allel columns. In this case, each main body column usually organizes its own
advance guard.
4-9. The advance guard operates forward of the main body to ensure its unin-
terrupted advance by reducing obstacles to create passage lanes, repair roads
and bridges, or locate bypasses. The advance guard also protects the main
body from surprise attack and fixes the enemy to protect the deployment of
the main body when it is committed to action. The elements composing the
advance guard should have equal or preferably superior mobility to that of
the main body. For this reason, mechanized infantry, cavalry, and armored
units are most suitable for use in an advance guard. Engineer mobility assets
should also constitute a portion of the advance guard, but the main body can
also provide other support.
4-10. The advance guard moves as quickly and as aggressively as possible,
but, unlike the covering force, remains within supporting range of the main
body's weapon systems. It forces the enemy to withdraw or destroys small
enemy groups before they can disrupt the advance of the main body. When
the advance guard encounters large enemy forces or heavily defended areas,
it takes prompt and aggressive action to develop the situation and, within its
capability, defeat the enemy. Its commander reports the location, strength,
disposition, and composition of the enemy and tries to find the enemy's flanks
and gaps or other weaknesses in his position. The main body may then join
the attack. The force commander usually specifies how far in front of his force
the advance guard is to operate. He reduces those distances in close terrain
and under low-visibility conditions.
4-11. When the command’s rear or flanks are not protected by adjacent or fol-
lowing units, it must provide its own flank and rear security. The command
can accomplish this by establishing a screen or a guard on its flanks or to its
rear. The flank columns of the main body normally provide these flank secur-
ity elements; for example, the left flank brigade would provide the left flank
screen for a division MTC. The rear guard normally comes from one of the
subordinate elements of the corps or division and reports directly to the corps
or division headquarters. A corps may conduct a flank cover if there is a clear-
ly identified, significant threat from the flank. A flank cover requires signifi-
cant resources that are unavailable to the main body. Aviation units or intel-
ligence systems may establish a flank screen if the factors of METT-TC allow;
however, this increases the risk to the main body. While aviation units can
use their combat power to delay enemy forces, intelligence systems can only
provide early warning, they cannot trade space for time to “buy” time for the
main body to react. (For more specific information concerning reconnaissance
4-5
FM 3-90
operations see FM 3-55. See Chapter 12 for more detailed information con-
cerning security operations.)
MAIN BODY
4-12. The main body consists of forces not detailed to security duties. The
combat elements of the main body prepare to respond to enemy contact with
the unit's security forces. Attack helicopter units normally remain under divi-
sion and corps control until contact is made. If the situation allows, the com-
mander can assign a follow and support mission to one of his subordinate
units. This allows that subordinate unit to relieve his security forces from
such tasks as observing bypassed enemy forces, handling displaced civilians,
and clearing routes. This prevents his security forces from being diverted
from their primary mission.
4-13. The commander designates a portion of the main body for use as his re-
serve. The size of the reserve is based upon the factors of METT-TC and the
amount of uncertainty concerning the enemy. The more vague the enemy sit-
uation, the larger the size of the reserve. The reserve typically constitutes ap-
proximately one-fourth to one-third of the force. On contact with the enemy,
the reserve provides the commander flexibility to react to unforeseen circum-
stances and allows the unit to quickly resume its movement.
4-14. The commander tailors his sustainment assets to the mission. He de-
centralizes the execution of the sustainment support, but that support must
be continuously available to the main body. This includes using preplanned
logistics packages (LOGPACs). A logistics package is a grouping of mul-
tiple classes of supply and supply vehicles under the control of a
single convoy commander. Daily LOGPACs contain a standardized alloca-
tion of supplies. Special LOGPACs can also be dispatched as needed.
4-15. The commander frequently finds that his main supply routes become
extended as the operation proceeds. Aerial resupply may also be necessary to
support large-scale MTCs or to maintain the momentum of the main body.
Combat trains containing fuel, ammunition, medical, and maintenance assets
move with their parent battalion or company team. Fuel and ammunition
stocks remain loaded on tactical vehicles in the combat trains so they can in-
stantly move when necessary. Battalion field trains move in more depth, with
the forward support battalion in the main body of each brigade. Aviation
units use forward arming and refuel points (FARPs) to reduce aircraft turn-
around time.
CONTROL MEASURES
4-16. A commander uses the minimal number and type of control measures
possible in an MTC because of the uncertain enemy situation. These meas-
ures include designation of an AO with left, right, front, and rear boundaries,
or a separate AO bounded by a continuous boundary (noncontiguous opera-
tions). The commander further divides the AO into subordinate unit AOs to
facilitate subordinate unit actions.
4-17. The operation usually starts from a line of departure (LD) at the time
specified in the operations order (OPORD). The commander controls the MTC
by using phase lines, contact points, and checkpoints as required. (See
4-6
Movement to Contact
Figure 4-3.) He controls the depth of the movement to contact by using a limit
of advance (LOA) or a forward boundary. Figure 4-3 shows an LOA and not a
forward boundary. The commander could designate one or more objectives to
limit the extent of the MTC and orient the force. However, these are often
terrain-oriented and used only to guide movement. Although an MTC may re-
sult in taking a terrain objective, the primary focus should be on the enemy
force. If the commander has enough information to locate significant enemy
forces, then he should plan some other type of offensive action.
PL TAL PL TAL
(LOA) (LOA)
OBJ
011500Z MITLA
176
JAN01 + NC 1701
CP 7
PL SHARON
PL SHARON 011230ZJAN01
II
II
PL YOFFE PL YOFFE
LD/LC 010730ZJAN01 LD/LC
Figure 4-3. Movement to Contact Control Measures
4-18. Corps, division, or brigade commanders use boundaries to separate the

various organizational elements of a movement to contact and clearly estab-
lish responsibilities between different organizations. Battalion task force
commanders use positive control over maneuver units, coupled with battle
drills and formation discipline. Company teams are not normally assigned
their own areas of operation during the conduct of a movement to contact.
4-19. The commander can designate a series of phase lines that can succes-
sively become the new rear boundary of the forward security elements as that
force advances. Each rear boundary becomes the forward boundary of the
main body and shifts as the security force moves forward. The rear boundary
of the main body designates the limit of responsibility of the rear security ele-
ment. This line also shifts as the main body moves forward. (See Chapter 12
for a discussion of boundaries for a security force.)
4-20. Commanders may use an axis of advance in limited visibility. However,
there is the risk of enemy forces outside the axis not being detected, and thus
being inadvertently bypassed.
4-7
FM 3-90
PLANNING A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

4-21. The commander conducts intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
operations to determine the enemy’s location and intent while conducting se-
curity operations to protect the main body. This includes the use of available
fixed-wing aircraft. This allows the main body to focus its planning and prep-
aration, to include rehearsals, on the conduct of hasty attacks, bypass maneu-
vers, and hasty defenses. The plan addresses not only actions anticipated by
the commander based on available intelligence information but also the con-
duct of meeting engagements at anticipated times and locations where they
might occur.
4-22. The commander wants to gain contact by using the smallest elements
possible. These elements are normally ground scouts or aeroscouts per-
forming reconnaissance, but may also be unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or
other intelligence systems. He may task organize his scouts to provide them
with additional combat power to allow them to develop the situation. The
unit’s planned movement formation should contribute to the goal of making
initial contact with the smallest force possible. It should also provide for effi-
cient movement of the force and adequate reserves. The commander can
choose to have all or part of his force conduct an approach march as part of
the movement to contact to provide that efficient movement. An approach
march can facilitate the commander's decisions by allowing freedom of action
and movement of the main body. (See Chapter 14 for a discussion of an ap-
proach march.)
4-23. The frontage assigned to a unit in a movement to contact must allow it
to generate sufficient combat power to maintain the momentum of the opera-
tion. Reducing the frontage covered normally gives the unit adequate combat
power to develop the situation on contact while maintaining the required mo-
mentum. Both the covering force and advance guard commanders should
have uncommitted forces available to develop the situation without requiring
the deployment of the main body. The commander relies primarily on fire
support assets to weight the lead element’s combat power but provides it with
the additional combat multipliers it needs to accomplish the mission. The fire
support system helps develop fire superiority when organized correctly to fire
immediate suppression missions to help maneuver forces get within direct-
fire range of the enemy.
4-24. The reconnaissance effort may proceed faster in a movement to contact
than in a zone reconnaissance because the emphasis is on making contact
with the enemy. However, the commander must recognize that by increasing
the speed of the reconnaissance effort, he increases the risk associated with
the operation.
4-25. Bypass criteria should be clearly stated and depend on the factors of
METT-TC. For example, a brigade commander in an open desert environment
could declare that no mounted enemy force larger than a platoon can be by-
passed. All other forces will be cleared from the brigade’s axis of advance.
Any force that bypasses an enemy unit must maintain contact with it until
handing it off to another friendly element, usually a force assigned a follow
and support mission. The commander tasks his forward security force with
conducting route reconnaissance of routes the main body will traverse.
4-8
Movement to Contact
4-26. The echelon intelligence officer (G2 or S2), assisted by the engineer and
air defense staff representatives, must carefully analyze the terrain to in-
clude air avenues of approach. He identifies the enemy's most dangerous
COA in the war gaming portion of the military decision making process. Be-
cause of the force’s vulnerability, the G2 must not underestimate the enemy
during a movement to contact. A thorough intelligence preparation of the bat-
tlefield (IPB)—by developing the modified combined obstacle overlay to in-
clude intervisibility overlays and other products, such as the event tem-
plates—enhances the force's security by indicating danger areas where the
force is most likely to make contact with the enemy. It also helps to deter-
mine movement times between phase lines and other locations. Potential
danger areas are likely enemy defensive locations, engagement areas, obser-
vation posts (OPs), and obstacles. The fire support system targets these areas
and they become on-order priority targets placed into effect and cancelled as
the lead element can confirm or deny enemy presence. The reconnaissance
and surveillance plan supporting the movement to contact must provide cov-
erage of these danger areas. If reconnaissance and surveillance forces cannot
clear these areas, more deliberate movement techniques are required.
4-27. The commander develops decision points to support changes in the
force's movement formation or change from an approach march to a combat
formation. Uses both human and technical means to validate his decision
points, the commander must determine the degree of risk he is willing to ac-
cept based on his mission. The commander's confidence in the products of the
IPB process and the risk he is willing to accept determine his combat forma-
tion and maneuver scheme. In a high-risk environment, it is usually better to
increase the distance between forward elements and the main body than to
slow the speed of advance.
4-28. Corps and divisions can execute shaping operations as part of a move-
ment to contact although, by definition, a force conducts a movement to con-
tact when the enemy situation is vague or totally unknown. This occurs when
the necessary information regarding enemy reserves and follow-on forces is
available, but information regarding those enemy forces in close proximity to
the friendly force is not available. As in any other type of operation, the com-
mander plans to focus his operations on finding the enemy and then delaying,
disrupting, and destroying each enemy force element as much as possible be-
fore it arrives onto the direct-fire battlefield. This allows close combat forces
to prepare to engage enemy units on their arrival.
4-29. In a movement to contact, the commander can opt not to designate his
decisive operation until his forces make contact with the enemy, unless there
is a specific reason to designate it. In this case, he retains resources under his
direct control to reinforce his decisive operation. He may designate his deci-
sive operation during the initial stages of a movement to contact because of
the presence of a key piece of terrain or avenue of approach.
EXECUTING A MOVEMENT TO CONTACT

4-30. Each element of the force synchronizes its actions with adjacent and
supporting units, maintaining contact and coordination as prescribed in
orders and unit standing operating procedures (SOP). The advance guard
4-9
FM 3-90
maintains contact with the covering force. The lead elements of the main
body maintain contact with the advance guard. The rear guard and flank se-
curity elements maintain contact with and orient on the main body's move-
ment. These security forces prevent unnecessary delay of the main body and
defer the deployment of the main body as long as possible. Reconnaissance
elements operate to the front and flanks of each column's advance guard and
maintain contact with the covering force. The commander may instruct each
column's advance guard to eliminate small pockets of resistance bypassed by
forward security force. (See Figure 4-4.)
COVERING FORCE
C (+) C
G G G G
ADVANCE GUARD FOR EACH COLUMN


G G
MAIN BODY
G G
SPT
Figure 4-4. A Column Advance Guard Attacking to Destroy a Contained Enemy Force
4-31. The commander of the advance guard chooses a combat formation,

based on the factors of METT-TC, to make contact with the smallest possible
force while providing flexibility for maneuver. Whatever combat formation is
chosen, it must be able to deploy appropriately once the commander becomes
aware of the enemy’s location. He ensures that the route or axis of advance
traveled by the main body is free of enemy forces. It may move continuously
(traveling and traveling overwatch) or by bounds (bounding overwatch). It
moves by bounds when contact with the enemy is imminent and the terrain is
favorable. Some indirect-fire assets, such as a mortar platoon or artillery bat-
tery and combat observation and lasing teams (COLTs), may be positioned
with the formation. The COLTs can help overwatch the advance guard move-
ment, and indirect fires focus on suppressing enemy weapons, obscuring ene-
my observation posts, and screening friendly movement.
4-32. The main body keeps enough distance between itself and its forward se-
curity elements to maintain flexibility for maneuver. This distance varies
4-10
Movement to Contact
with the level of command, the terrain, and the availability of information
about the enemy. The main body may execute an approach march for all or
part of the movement to contact to efficiently use the available road network
or reduce the time needed to move from one location to another. Command
posts and trains travel along high-mobility routes within the AO and occupy
hasty positions as necessary.
4-33. Behind these forward security elements, the main body advances over
multiple parallel routes with numerous lateral branches to remain flexible
and reduce the time needed to initiate maneuver. (While it is preferred for a
battalion to use multiple routes, battalions and smaller units can move on
just one route.) In a movement to contact, the main body's march dispositions
must allow maximum flexibility for maneuvering during movement and when
establishing contact with the enemy force.
4-34. The commander’s fire support systems tend to focus on suppression
missions to disrupt enemy forces as they are encountered and smoke missions
to obscure or screen exposed friendly forces when conducting a movement to
contact. The commander schedules the movements of fire support systems in
synchronization with the movement of the rest of the force. Fire support sys-
tems that cannot match the cross-country mobility of the combat units cause
them to slow their rate of advance. If these units do not slow down, they run
the risk of outrunning their fire support. The commander synchronizes the
employment of close air support to prevent the enemy from regaining his bal-
ance while his ground fire support assets are repositioning. The main body
updates its priority target list during a movement to contact operation.
4-35. The same considerations apply to air defense when the enemy pos-
sesses aerial capabilities. The commander ensures that his force stays within
the air defense umbrella provided by corps and division assets.
4-36. The enemy has a difficult time detecting and targeting the main body
when executing a movement to contact until contact is made because of its
tempo, momentum, and dispersal; and the attention the commander pays to
electromagnetic emission control. Once the force makes contact and concen-
trates its effects against detected enemy forces, it becomes vulnerable to
strikes by enemy conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. It
must concentrate its combat effects rapidly and disperse again as soon as it
overcomes resistance to avoid enemy counteractions.
4-37. Movement should be as rapid as the terrain, the mobility of the force,
and the enemy situation permit. Open terrain provides maneuver space on
either side of the line of march and facilitates high-speed movement. It also
allows for greater dispersal and usually permits more separation between for-
ward security elements and the main body than restricted terrain allows. The
commander should never commit his main body to canalizing terrain before
these forward security elements have advanced far enough to ensure that the
main body will not become fixed within that terrain. The enemy may have
also established fire support control measures that allow him to employ
nonobserved harassing and interdiction fires to interdict friendly forces tra-
versing these choke points. As the enemy situation becomes known, the com-
mander may shorten the distance between elements of the force to decrease
reaction time or he may deploy to prepare for contact.
4-11
FM 3-90
4-38. At the battalion and company levels, a moving force should move along
covered or concealed routes from one covered or concealed position to another,
using terrain to minimize its vulnerability to enemy weapons. Further, an
overwatching force should cover the moving force. (Chapter 14 describes
movement techniques, such as traveling overwatch.) Regardless of the speci-
fic movement technique employed, both forces need to provide mutual sup-
port and be knowledgeable about their counterpart’s sectors of fire.
4-39. The force must attempt to cross any obstacles it encounters without loss
of momentum by conducting in-stride breaches. The commander uses his for-
ward security forces in an attempt to seize intact bridges whenever possible.
Lead security elements bypass or breach obstacles as quickly as possible to
maintain the momentum of the movement. If these lead elements cannot
overcome obstacles, the commander directs subsequent elements of the main
body to bypass the obstacle site and take the lead. Following forces can also
reduce obstacles that hinder the unit’s sustainment flow.
4-40. The commander locates himself well forward in the movement forma-
tion. Once the formation makes contact with the enemy, he can move quickly
to the area of contact, analyze the situation, and direct aggressively. The com-
mander's security elements conduct actions on contact to develop the situa-
tion once they find the enemy. Once they make contact with the enemy, a
number of actions occur that have been divided into the following sequence.
(Units equipped with a full set of digital command and control systems may
be able to combine or skip one or more of the steps in that sequence. Those
units will conduct maneuver and remain within supporting distance of each
other with a significantly larger AOs than units equipped with analog sys-
tems.)
GAIN AND MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

4-41. All ISR assets focus on determining the enemy's dispositions and pro-
viding the commander with current intelligence and relevant combat infor-
mation; this ensures that he can commit friendly forces under optimal condi-
tions. The commander uses all available sources of combat information to find
the enemy's location and dispositions in addition to his intelligence systems.
Corps and divisions employ long-range surveillance units and detachments in
conjunction with data provided by available special operating forces, joint,
and multinational assets, in addition to their organic ISR assets. The com-
mander may use his surveillance systems to cue the conduct of aerial and
ground reconnaissance.
4-42. The enemy situation becomes clearer as the unit's forward security ele-
ments conduct actions on contact to rapidly develop the situation in accord-
ance with the commander's plan and intent. By determining the strength, lo-
cation, and disposition of enemy forces, these security elements allow the
commander to focus the effects of the main body’s combat power against the
enemy main body. The overall force must remain flexible to exploit both
intelligence and combat information. The security force should not allow the
enemy force to break contact unless it receives an order from the commander.
When a strong covering force has not preceded the advance guard, it should
seize terrain that offers essential observation.
4-12
Movement to Contact
4-43. Actions on contact are a series of combat actions often con-

ducted simultaneously taken on contact with the enemy to develop
the situation. Actions on contact are:
· Deploy and report.
· Evaluate and develop the situation.
· Choose a course of action.
· Execute selected course of action
· Recommend a course of action to the higher commander.
4-44. Once the lead elements of a force conducting a movement to contact en-
counter the enemy, they conduct actions on contact. The unit treats obstacles
like enemy contact, since it assumes that the obstacles are covered by fire.
The unit carries out these actions on contact regardless of whether the enemy
has detected its presence. The unit’s security force often gains a tactical ad-
vantage over an enemy force by using tempo and initiative to conduct these
actions on contact, allowing it to gain and maintain contact without becoming
decisively engaged. How quickly the unit develops the situation is directly re-
lated to its security. This tempo is directly related to the unit's use of well-
rehearsed SOP and drills.
Deploy and Report

4-45. When a unit’s security element encounters an enemy unit or obstacle, it
deploys to a covered position that provides observation and fields of fire. If
the security element is under enemy fire, it uses direct and indirect fire to
suppress the enemy and restore freedom of maneuver. Simultaneously, the
commander of the security element reports the contact using a spot report
format to provide all available information on the situation to his higher
headquarters. This alerts the commander and allows him to begin necessary
actions. (FM 6-99.2 provides the format for a spot report.)
Evaluate and Develop the Situation

4-46. The unit’s security force develops the situation rapidly within mission
constraints by employing techniques ranging from stealthy, foot-mobile re-
connaissance to reconnaissance by fire, which uses both direct and indirect
weapons. If possible the commander continues the security mission with
other elements not currently in contact with the enemy after evaluating the
situation. This helps to develop the situation across the front and provides
more maneuver space to execute further actions. As the situation develops,
the security force submits additional reports.
Choose a Course of Action

4-47. After the security force makes contact, its commander gathers informa-
tion, makes an assessment, and chooses a course of action (COA) consistent
with his higher commander's intent and within the unit's capability. The unit
initiates direct and indirect fires to gain the initiative if it is appropriate to
engage the enemy. This allows the security force to resume its mission as
soon as possible. The commander cannot allow small enemy forces to delay
the movement of the security force. Usually, available intelligence and the
concept of the operation indicate the COA to follow. For obstacles not covered
4-13
FM 3-90
by fire, the unit can either seek a bypass or create the required number of
lanes to support its maneuver or the maneuver of a supported unit. Once ene-
my contact is made, these COAs are normally to conduct an attack, bypass,
defend, delay, or withdrawal. For obstacles covered by fire, the unit can eith-
er seek a bypass or conduct breaching operations as part of a hasty attack.
Execute Selected Course of Action

4-48. The security force commander should determine quickly whether to by-
pass the enemy or attack. The security force attacks (see Chapter 5) if it has
sufficient, immediately available combat power to overwhelm the enemy and
the attack will not detract from mission accomplishment. Such attacks are
usually necessary to overcome enemy attempts to slow the movement of the
security force. If this initial attack fails to defeat enemy defenses, the security
force commander must consider other options, such as making a more deliber-
ate attack or assuming the defense while continuing to find out as much as
possible about the enemy’s positions.
4-49. The security force may bypass the enemy if it does not have sufficient
combat power or an attack would jeopardize mission accomplishment. It must
request permission to bypass an enemy force unless the operations order pro-
vides bypass criteria. The security force commander must report bypassed
enemy forces to the next higher headquarters, which then assumes responsi-
bility for their destruction or containment. Alternatively, the security force
could keep a minimum force in contact with the bypassed enemy so that he
cannot move freely around the battlefield. (See Appendix B for a discussion of
bypass as a tactical task.)
4-50. If the security force cannot conduct either a hasty attack or a bypass, it
attempts to establish a defense (see Chapter 8). In the defense, the security
force maintains enemy contact, continues to perform reconnaissance, and pre-
pares to support other forces. When the security force commander decides to
defend, responsibility for further action rests with his higher commander. In
the event other COAs would lead to decisive engagements or destruction, the
security force conducts those activities necessary to assure self-preservation,
such as delay or withdrawal (see Chapter 11), but maintains enemy contact
unless the higher commander orders otherwise.
Recommend a Course of Action to the Higher Commander

4-51. Once the security force commander selects a COA keeping in mind his
commander’s intent, he reports it to his higher commander, who has the op-
tion of disapproving it based on its impact on his mission. To avoid delay, unit
SOP may provide automatic approval of certain actions. If the higher com-
mander assumes responsibility for continuing to develop the situation, the se-
curity force supports his actions as ordered. The higher commander must be
careful to avoid becoming overly focused on initial security fights to the deter-
ment of operations directed against the enemy main body.
DISRUPT THE ENEMY

4-52. Once contact is made, the main body commander brings overwhelming
fires onto the enemy to prevent him from conducting either a spoiling attack
or organizing a coherent defense. The security force commander maneuvers
4-14
Movement to Contact
as quickly as possible to find gaps in the enemy's defenses. The commander

uses his ISR assets to gain as much information as possible about the enemy's
dispositions, strengths, capabilities, and intentions. As more intelligence be-
comes available, the main body commander attacks to destroy or disrupt ene-
my command and control (C2) centers, fire control nodes, and communication
nets. The main body commander conducts operations to prevent enemy re-
serves from moving to counter his actions.
FIX THE ENEMY

4-53. The commander tries to initiate maneuver at a tempo the enemy cannot
match, since success in a meeting engagement depends on effective actions on
contact. The security force commander does not allow the enemy to maneuver
against the main body. The organization, size, and combat power of the secur-
ity force are the major factors that determine the size of the enemy force it
can defeat without deploying the main body.
4-54. The commander uses his aerial maneuver and fire support assets—in-
cluding offensive information operations—to fix the enemy in his current po-
sitions by directly attacking his combat and command systems and emplacing
situational obstacles. The priorities are typically to attack enemy forces in
contact, C2 and fire control facilities, fire support assets, and moving enemy
forces not yet in contact, such as follow-on forces and reserves. These priori-
ties vary with the factors of METT-TC. Attack helicopters and close air sup-
port fixed-wing aircraft working in joint air attack teams (JAAT) are ideally
suited to engage the enemy throughout the depth of his area of operations.
4-55. The techniques a commander employs to fix the enemy when both
forces are moving are different than those employed when the enemy force is
stationary during the meeting engagement. In both situations, when the se-
curity force cannot overrun the enemy by conducting a hasty frontal attack,
he must deploy a portion of the main body. When this occurs the unit is no
longer conducting a movement to contact but an attack.
MANEUVER
4-56. If the security force cannot overrun the enemy with a frontal attack, the
commander quickly maneuvers his main body to conduct a penetration or an
envelopment. (See Chapter 5 for a discussion of attack.) He does this to over-
whelm the enemy force before it can react effectively or reinforce. The com-
mander attempts to defeat the enemy in detail while still maintaining the
momentum of his advance. After a successful attack, the main body com-
mander resumes the movement to contact. If he did not defeat the enemy he
has three main options: bypass, transition to a more deliberate attack, or con-
duct some type of defense. In all cases, he makes every effort to retain the ini-
tiative and prevent the enemy from stabilizing the situation by conducting
violent and resolute attacks. Simultaneously he must maintain his mo-
mentum by synchronizing the actions of his combat, combat support, and
combat service support elements.
4-57. Main body elements deploy rapidly to the vicinity of the contact if the
commander initiates a frontal attack. Commanders of maneuvering units co-
ordinate forward passage through friendly forces in contact as required. The
4-15
FM 3-90
intent is to deliver the assault before the enemy can deploy or reinforce his
engaged forces. The commander may order an attack from a march column
for one of the main body's columns, while the rest of the main body deploys.
The commander can also wait to attack until he can bring the bulk of the
main body forward. He avoids piecemeal commitment except when rapidity of
action is essential and combat superiority at the vital point is present and can
be maintained throughout the attack, or when compartmentalized terrain
forces such a COA.
4-58. When trying to conduct an envelopment, the commander focuses on at-
tacking the enemy's flanks and rear before he can prepare to counter these
actions. The commander uses the security force to fix the enemy while the
main body maneuvers to look for an assailable flank or he uses the main body
to fix the enemy while the security force finds the assailable flank.
FOLLOW THROUGH
4-59. If the enemy is defeated, the unit transitions back into an MTC and
continues to advance. The movement to contact terminates when the unit
reaches the final objective or limit of advance, or it must transition to a more
deliberate attack, a defense, or retrograde. (For more discussion of these
types of operations, see the respective chapters in this manual.)
SEARCH AND ATTACK

4-60. Search and attack is a technique for conducting a movement to contact
that shares many of the characteristics of an area security mission (FM 3-0).
A commander employs this form of a movement to contact, conducted pri-
marily by light forces and often supported by heavy forces, when the enemy is
operating as small, dispersed elements, or when the task is to deny the ene-
my the ability to move within a given area. The battalion is the echelon that
normally conducts a search and attack. A brigade will assist its subordinate
battalions by ensuring the availability of indirect fires and other support.
4-61. The commander task organizes his unit into reconnaissance, fixing, and
finishing forces, each with a specific purpose and task. The size of the recon-
naissance force is based on the available intelligence about the size of enemy
forces in the AO. The less known about the situation, the larger the recon-
naissance force. The reconnaissance force typically consists of scout, infantry,
aviation, and electronic warfare assets. The fixing force must have enough
combat power to isolate the enemy once the reconnaissance force finds him.
The finishing force must have enough combat power to defeat those enemy
forces expected to be located within the AO. The commander can direct each
subordinate unit to retain a finishing force, or he can retain the finishing
force at his echelon. The commander may rotate his subordinate elements
through the reconnaissance, fixing, and finishing roles. However, rotating
roles may require a change in task organization and additional time for
training and rehearsal.
4-16
Movement to Contact
CONTROL MEASURES
4-62. The commander establishes control measures that allow for decentra-
lized actions and small-unit initiative to the greatest extent possible. The
minimum control measures for a search and attack are an AO, target refer-
ence points (TRPs), objectives, checkpoints, and contact points. (See Fig-
ure 4-5.) The use of TRPs facilitates responsive fire support once the recon-
naissance force makes contact with the enemy. The commander uses objec-
tives and checkpoints to guide the movement of subordinate elements. Coord-
ination points indicate a specific location for coordinating fires and movement
between adjacent units. The commander uses other control measures, such as
phase lines, as necessary. (See Chapters 2 and 3 for definitions of available
control measures.)
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Figure 4-5. Search and Attack Control Measures
PLANNING A SEARCH AND ATTACK

4-63. A commander conducts a search and attack for one or more of the fol-
lowing purposes:
· Destroy the enemy: render enemy units in the AO combat-ineffective.
· Deny the area: prevent the enemy from operating unhindered in a
given area; for example, in any area he is using for a base camp or for
logistics support.
· Protect the force: prevent the enemy from massing to disrupt or destroy
friendly military or civilian operations, equipment, property, and key
facilities.
· Collect information: gain information about the enemy and the terrain
to confirm the enemy COA predicted as a result of the IPB process.
4-17
FM 3-90
4-64. The products of the IPB process are critical to conducting a search and
attack. They focus the force's reconnaissance efforts on likely enemy loca-
tions.
4-65. The search and attack plan places the finishing force, as the decisive
operation, where it can best maneuver to destroy enemy forces or essential fa-
cilities once located by reconnaissance assets. Typically, the finishing force oc-
cupies a central location in the AO. However, the factors of METT-TC may al-
low the commander to position the finishing force outside the search and at-
tack area. The commander weights this decisive operation by using priority of
fires and assigning priorities of support to his other available combat multi-
pliers, such as engineer elements and helicopter lift support. The commander
establishes control measures as necessary to consolidate units and concen-
trate the combat power of the force before the attack. Once the reconnais-
sance force locates the enemy, the fixing and finishing forces can fix and de-
stroy him. The commander also develops a contingency plan in the event that
the reconnaissance force is compromised.
4-66. Fire support plans must provide for flexible and rapidly delivered fires
to achieve the commander’s desired effects throughout the AO. The com-
mander positions his fire support assets so they can support subordinate ele-
ments throughout the AO. The commander must establish procedures for
rapidly clearing fires. To clear fires rapidly, command posts and small-unit
commanders must track and report the locations of all subordinate elements.
Because of the uncertain enemy situation, the commander is careful to assign
clear fire-support relationships.
EXECUTING A SEARCH AND ATTACK

4-67. Each subordinate element operating in its own AO is tasked to destroy
the enemy within its capability. The commander should have in place previ-
ously established control measures and communications means between any
closing elements to prevent fratricide. The reconnaissance force conducts a
zone reconnaissance to reconnoiter identified named areas of interest (NAIs).
4-68. Once the reconnaissance force finds the enemy force, the fixing force de-
velops the situation, then executes one of two options based on the com-
mander's guidance and the factors of METT-TC. The first option is to block
identified routes that the detected enemy can use to escape or rush reinforce-
ment over. The fixing force maintains contact with the enemy and positions
its forces to isolate and fix him before the finishing force attacks. The second
option is to conduct an attack to fix the enemy in his current positions until
the finishing force arrives. The fixing force attacks if that action meets the
commander's intent and it can generate sufficient combat power against the
detected enemy. Depending on the enemy's mobility and the likelihood of the
reconnaissance force being compromised, the commander may need to posi-
tion his fixing force before his reconnaissance force enters the AO.
4-69. Brigades (and possibly battalions) may establish fire-support bases as
part of the operations of their fixing force to provide fire-support coverage
throughout the area of operations during search and attack operations con-
ducted in restricted terrain. These positions should be mutually supporting
and prepared for all-around defense. They are located in positions that
4-18
Movement to Contact
facilitate aerial resupply. The development of these positions depends on the

factors of METT-TC because their establishment requires diverting combat
power to ensure protecting fire support and other assets located within such
bases.
4-70. If conditions are not right to use the finishing force to attack the de-
tected enemy, the reconnaissance or the fixing force can continue to conduct
reconnaissance and surveillance activities to further develop the situation.
Whenever this occurs, the force maintaining surveillance must be careful to
avoid detection and possible enemy ambushes.
4-71. The finishing force may move behind the reconnaissance and fixing
forces, or it may locate at a pickup zone and air assault into a landing zone
near the enemy once he is located. The finishing force must be responsive
enough to engage the enemy before he can break contact with the reconnais-
sance force or the fixing force. The echelon intelligence officer provides the
commander with an estimate of the time it will take the enemy to displace
from his detected location. The commander provides additional mobility as-
sets so the finishing force can respond within that timeframe.
4-72. The commander uses his finishing force to destroy the detected and
fixed enemy during a search and attack by conducting hasty or deliberate at-
tacks, maneuvering to block enemy escape routes while another unit conducts
the attack, or employing indirect fire or close air support to destroy the ene-
my. The commander may have his finishing force establish an area ambush
and use his reconnaissance and fixing forces to drive the enemy into the am-
bushes.
4-19
Chapter 5
Attack
I approve of all methods of attacking provided they are directed at the
point where the enemy’s army is weakest and where the terrain favors
them the least.
Frederick the Great
An attack is an offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces,

seizes and secures terrain, or both (FM 3-0). When the commander de-
cides to attack or the opportunity to attack occurs during combat opera-
tions, the execution of that attack must mass the effects of overwhelming
combat power against selected portions of the enemy force with a tempo
and intensity that cannot be matched by the enemy. The resulting combat
should not be a contest between near equals. The attacker must be deter-
mined to seek decision on the ground of his choosing through the deliber-
ate synchronization and employment of his combined arms team.
5-1. Attacks take place along a continuum defined at one end by fragmentary
orders that direct the execution of rapidly executed battle drills by forces im-
mediately available. Published, detailed orders with multiple branches and
sequels; detailed knowledge of all aspects of enemy dispositions; a force that
has been task organized specifically for the operation; and the conduct of ex-
tensive rehearsals define the other end of the continuum. Most attacks fall
between the ends of the continuum as opposed to either extreme. (Chapter 1
discusses this continuum between hasty and deliberate operations.)
5-2. Once a commander determines his scheme of maneuver, he task organ-
izes his force to give each unit enough combat power to accomplish its
CONTENTS
Organization of Forces................................. 5-0 Executing an Attack....................................5-14
Security Forces ......................................... 5-1 Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact........5-15
Main Body.................................................. 5-1 Disrupt the Enemy ..................................5-16
Reserve ...................................................... 5-2 Fix the Enemy..........................................5-17
Sustainment Organization ....................... 5-2 Maneuver .................................................5-18
Control Measures.......................................... 5-3 Follow Through .......................................5-27
Planning an Attack........................................ 5-4 Special Purpose Attacks ............................5-29
Intelligence ................................................ 5-4 Ambush ....................................................5-29
Maneuver ................................................... 5-6 Counterattack ..........................................5-35
Fire Support............................................... 5-9 Demonstrations and Feints....................5-38
Command and Control ........................... 5-11 Raid...........................................................5-38
Preparing an Attack .................................... 5-11 Spoiling Attack ........................................5-39
5-0
Attack
mission. He normally organizes into a security force, a main body, a reserve,

and a sustainment organization. He should complete any changes in task
organization in time to allow units to conduct rehearsals with their attached
or supported unit. The best place and time for an attacking force to task
organize is when it is in an assembly area.
SECURITY FORCES
5-3. Under normal circumstances, a commander resources dedicated security
forces during an attack only if the attack uncovers one or more flanks or the
rear of the attacking force as it advances. In this case, the commander desig-
nates a flank or rear security force and assigns it a guard or screen mission,
depending on the factors of METT-TC. Normally an attacking unit does not
need extensive forward security forces; most attacks are launched from posi-
tions in contact with the enemy, which reduces the usefulness of a separate
forward security force. The exception occurs when the attacking unit is tran-
sitioning from the defense to an attack and had previously established a se-
curity area as part of the defense.
MAIN BODY
5-4. The commander organizes his main body into combined arms formations
to conduct his decisive operation and necessary shaping operations. The com-
mander aims his decisive operation toward the immediate and decisive de-
struction of the enemy force, its will to resist, seizure of a terrain objective, or
the defeat of the enemy’s plan. His maneuver scheme identifies the focus of
the decisive operation. All of the force’s available resources operate in concert
to assure the success of the decisive operation. The subordinate unit or units
designated to conduct the decisive operation can change during the course of
the attack. The commander designates an assault, breach, and support force
if he expects to conduct a breach operation during his attack.
5-5. If it is impractical to determine initially when or where the echelon’s de-
cisive operation will be, such as during a hasty attack, the commander re-
tains flexibility by arranging his forces in depth, holding out strong reserves,
and maintaining centralized control of his long-range fire support systems.
As soon as the tactical situation clarifies enough to allow the commander to
designate his decisive operation, he focuses his resources to support that deci-
sive operation’s achievement of its objective. Enemy actions, minor changes
in the situation, or the lack of success by other elements cannot be allowed to
divert either forces or their effects from the decisive operation.
5-6. The commander may need to designate a unit or units to conduct shap-
ing operations to create windows of opportunity for executing his decisive op-
eration. He allocates the unit or units assigned to conduct shaping operations
the minimal combat power necessary to accomplish the missions since he can-
not employ overwhelming combat power everywhere. Units conducting shap-
ing operations usually have a wider area of operations (AO) than those con-
ducting a decisive operation. If the commander has sufficient forces as part of
his shaping operations, he can assign the tasks of follow and assume or follow
and support to subordinate units. (Appendix B defines these two tactical mis-
sion tasks.)
5-1
FM 3-90
RESERVE
5-7. The commander uses his reserve to exploit success, defeat enemy coun-
terattacks, or restore momentum to a stalled attack. Once committed, the re-
serve’s actions normally become or reinforce the echelon’s decisive operation,
and the commander makes every effort to reconstitute another reserve from
units made available by the revised situation. Often a commander’s most dif-
ficult and important decision concerns the time, place, and circumstances for
committing the reserve. The reserve is not a committed force, it is not used as
a follow and support force or a follow and assume force.
5-8. In the attack, the combat power allocated to the reserve depends primar-
ily on the level of uncertainty about the enemy, especially the strength of any
expected enemy counterattacks. The commander only needs to resource a
small reserve to respond to unanticipated enemy reactions when he has de-
tailed information about the enemy. When the situation is relatively clear
and enemy capabilities are limited, the reserve may consist of a small frac-
tion of the command. When the situation is vague, the reserve may initially
contain the majority of the commander’s combat power.
5-9. In addition, the strength and composition of the reserve vary with the
reserve’s contemplated missions, the forces available, the form of offensive
maneuver selected, the terrain, and acceptable risk. For example, in a hasty
attack the reserve can contain up to one-third of the force’s combat power. Al-
ternatively, in a deliberate attack the reserve is normally sized to defeat the
enemy’s counterattack forces. The commander should not constitute his re-
serve by weakening his decisive operation. A reserve must have mobility
equal to or greater than the most dangerous enemy ground threat, and be
able to fight that threat.
5-10. In an attack the commander generally locates his reserve to the rear of
the unit making his decisive operation in a location that provides maximum
protection from hostile observation and fire. However, it must be able to move
quickly to areas where it is needed in different contingencies. This is most
likely to occur if the enemy has strong counterattack forces. For heavy re-
serve forces, the key factor is cross-country mobility or road networks. For
light forces, the key factor is the road network if trucks are available, or the
availability of pickup zones (PZs) for air assault forces. The commander prior-
itizes the positioning of his reserve to reinforce the success of the decisive op-
eration first, then to counter the worst-case enemy counterattack.
SUSTAINMENT ORGANIZATION
5-11. The commander resources his sustaining operations to support the at-
tacking force. A battalion commander organizes his combat service support
and other logistics assets into combat and field trains. Higher echelon com-
manders appoint someone to control sustaining operations within their eche-
lon rear areas. In an attack, the commander tries to position his CSS units
well forward. From these forward locations they can sustain the attacking
force, providing priority of support to the units conducting the decisive
operation. As the attacking force advances, CSS units displace forward as re-
quired to shorten the supply lines, using different displacement techniques to
ensure uninterrupted support to maneuver units. The size of the force a
5-2
Attack
commander devotes to rear area security depends on the threat in the

attacking force’s rear area. A significant enemy threat requires the
commander to resource a tactical combat force. (Chapter 12 addresses area
security operations in more detail.)
CONTROL MEASURES
5-12. Units conducting offensive operations are assigned an AO within which
to operate. Within the AO the commander normally designates the following
control measures regardless of whether he operates in a contiguous or non-
contiguous environment:
· Areas of operations for subordinate units of battalion size or larger.
· Phase line as the line of departure (LD), which may also be the line of
contact (LC).
· Time to initiate the operation.
· Objective.
If necessary, a commander can use either an axis of advance or a direction of
attack to further control his maneuver forces. (Figure 5-1 depicts the mini-
mum control measures for an attack.)
PL CAT
II PL CAT
OBJ
LINK
II
II
PL DOG PL DOG
LD/LC 120630ZJUL01 LD/LC
Figure 5-1. Minimum Attack Control Measures
5-13. A commander can use any other control measures necessary to control
his attack. Short of the LD/LC, the commander may designate assembly
areas and attack positions where the unit prepares for offensive operations or
waits for the establishment of the required conditions to initiate the attack.
Beyond the LD/LC he may designate checkpoints, phase lines (PLs), probable
line of deployment (PLD), assault positions, and direct and indirect fire
support coordinating measures. Between the PLD and the objective he can
use a final coordination line (FCL), assault positions, support-by-fire and
attack-by-fire positions, and time of assault to further control the final stage
of the attack. Beyond the objective he can impose a limit of advance (LOA) if
he does not want the unit to conduct an exploitation or a pursuit. (Chapters 2
5-3
FM 3-90
and 3 discuss these control measures. They describe how a commander can
use attack positions, axis of advance, combat formations, direction of attack,
limit of advance, a LD, objectives, PLD, and a time of attack to help control
the operation. Chapter 3 describes the use of AOs, assembly areas, line of
contact, phase lines, and common direct and indirect fire coordinating
measures.)
5-14. In an attack during limited-visibility conditions, the commander wants
positive control over the movement of all attacking elements. He typically im-
poses additional control measures beyond those he would use in a daylight at-
tack. These additional measures may include using a point of departure (PD)
and a direction of attack.
PLANNING AN ATTACK
5-15. In an attack, friendly forces seek to place the enemy in a position where
he can easily be defeated or destroyed. The commander seeks to keep the ene-
my off-balance while continually reducing the enemy’s options. In an attack
the commander focuses the maneuver effects, supported by the other battle-
field operating systems (BOS), on those enemy forces that prevent him from
accomplishing his mission and seizing his objective. Planning helps a com-
mander synchronize the effects of his combat power through the military de-
cision making process outlined in FM 5-0 and troop leading procedures out-
lined in FM 6-0.
5-16. This section addresses those considerations unique to an attack by
BOS. There are no unique air defense, mobility/countermobility/survivability,
or CSS BOS planning considerations that apply only to the attack. Those
BOS planning considerations discussed in Chapter 3 continue to apply.
5-17. Fire superiority is that degree of dominance in the fires of one
force over another that permits that force to conduct maneuver at a
given time and place without prohibitive interference by the enemy.
The commander plans to focus the effects of friendly systems to achieve fire
superiority and allow friendly maneuver forces to breach the enemy’s defen-
sive network. The force must gain and maintain fire superiority at critical
points during the attack. Having fire superiority allows the commander to
maneuver his forces without prohibitive losses. The commander gains fire su-
periority by using a variety of tactics, techniques, and procedures. This in-
cludes using counterfires and precision fires, suppressing enemy positions,
and destroying key facilities and assets. Achieving fire superiority requires
the commander to take advantage of—
· The range and lethality of available weapon systems.
· Offensive information operations to prevent the enemy commander
from synchronizing the effects of his available combat power.
· Movement to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage where his
weapons can be destroyed, one or more at a time, with little risk to
friendly weapon systems.
INTELLIGENCE
5-18. To employ the proper capabilities and tactics, the commander must
have detailed knowledge of the enemy’s organization, equipment, and tactics.
5-4
Attack
He must understand the enemy’s strengths and weaknesses. Ideally, this

knowledge is available during the military decision making process. The com-
mander and his staff develop enemy situational and weapons templates
based on analysis of all available combat information and intelligence data.
These templates help to determine the feasibility of available courses of ac-
tion (COAs) designed to achieve a position of advantage.
5-19. Before the attack a unit conducts ISR operations to ascertain those in-
formation requirements addressed in paragraph 3-111. Other ISR require-
ments can include—
· The location and depth of enemy reserves.
· The location and extent of contaminated areas.
· The location and extent of obstacles, possible breach sites, and enemy
engagement areas.
· The location of areas where attacking units could become disoriented,
such as rough or restrictive terrain.
· The most favorable routes of approach to the attack objective.
· Areas that the attacker can use for flanking fire and maneuver, such as
support-by-fire and attack-by-fire positions.
· Suitability of planned friendly assault, support, artillery, and CSS posi-
tions.
· Enemy deception operations.
Commanders and leaders at all echelons personally participate in this
process.
5-20. The commander takes every opportunity to gain and refine combat in-
formation regarding the enemy. He uses his available ISR assets to gather
combat information and process it into intelligence. Information gathered
during the planning phase of the plan, prepare, and execute cycle is espec-
ially useful in determining the viability of each COA developed. Generally, if
a commander does not have good intelligence and, therefore, does not know
where the overwhelming majority of the enemy’s units and systems are locat-
ed, he cannot conduct a deliberate attack. He must conduct a movement to
contact, conduct a hasty attack, or collect more combat information.
5-21. The two fundamental employment techniques for reconnaissance in the
attack are: reconnaissance-pull and reconnaissance-push. In reconnaissance-
pull, the reconnaissance objective is to find weaknesses in enemy dispositions
that can be exploited by the main force. Reconnaissance is launched over a
broad area that allows the reconnaissance elements to identify enemy weak-
nesses to exploit and enemy strengths to avoid. Once these are identified, the
commander exploits the situation by choosing a COA that allows his decisive
operation to attack enemy weaknesses and penetrate gaps in the enemy’s de-
fense. The commander can then commit forces to widen the gap and envelop
the enemy. The reconnaissance elements continue to move, seeking paths of
least resistance and pulling the main body deep into the enemy’s rear.
5-22. In reconnaissance-push, the reconnaissance objective is to identify the
obstacles and enemy forces the attack forces must overcome to assault the ob-
jective in a previously chosen location in accordance with a COA selected
prior to the reconnaissance. Once friendly reconnaissance elements gain
5-5
FM 3-90
contact with the enemy, they develop the situation within their capabilities.
If the objective is an enemy force, the reconnaissance element orients on it to
maintain contact and determine as much as possible about its dispositions.
5-23. The commander ensures that reconnaissance and surveillance of the
enemy’s defensive positions and any terrain critical to the scheme of maneu-
ver continue throughout the attack. If the enemy attempts to modify his de-
fenses, those actions will be detected. In turn, this allows the commander to
adjust his scheme of maneuver as the enemy situation becomes clearer. The
commander can use human and technological means, acting separately or in
combination, to provide the required degree of reconnaissance and surveil-
lance.
5-24. A commander’s organic capability to gain information about the enemy
and the AO’s environment varies by echelon. At the corps echelon these as-
sets include a military intelligence (MI) brigade, an armored cavalry regi-
ment (ACR), and parts of almost every major subordinate command within
the corps. Even a company conducts reconnaissance patrols. (For more infor-
mation on reconnaissance operations, see FM 3-55.)
MANEUVER
5-25. In his plan of attack, the commander seeks to surprise his enemy by
choosing an unexpected direction, time, type, or strength for the attack and
by exploiting the success of military deception operations. Surprise delays
enemy reactions, overloads and confuses enemy C2, induces psychological
shock in the enemy, and reduces the coherence of the enemy defense. The
commander achieves tactical surprise by attacking in bad weather and over
seemingly impassible terrain, conducting feints and demonstrations, main-
taining a high tempo, destroying enemy forces, and employing sound opera-
tions security (OPSEC). He may plan different attack times for his decisive
and shaping operations to mislead the enemy and allow the shifting of sup-
porting fires to successive attacking echelons. However, simultaneous attacks
provide a means to maximize the effects of mass in the initial assault. They
also prevent the enemy from concentrating his fires against successive at-
tacks.
5-26. In planning the commander and subordinate leaders focus on the
routes, formations, and navigational aids they will use to traverse the ground
from the LD or PD to the objective. Some terrain locations may require the
attacking unit to change its combat formation, direction of movement, or
movement technique when it reaches those locations. The unit can post
guides at these critical locations to ensure maintaining control over the move-
ment.
5-27. The commander attacks targets throughout the depth of the enemy’s
defense to keep him off balance and limit his freedom of action. However, at
the point of the decisive operation, the commander wants to concentrate the
effects of overwhelming combat power against the enemy to shatter the
cohesion of his defense. The commander accomplishes this by applying com-
bat power against the enemy at a level of violence and in a manner that he
cannot match. For example, the commander could concentrate a tank-heavy
battalion task force’s shock action and firepower against one enemy rifle
5-6
Attack
platoon’s hastily prepared defensive position. (Field Manual 3-0 discusses

symmetric and asymmetric attack in more detail.)
5-28. Another aspect of concentration is the ability to rapidly concentrate
force effects such as fires and offensive information operations during move-
ment. This is especially critical when crossing linear obstacles. Each subordi-
nate element tends to move out independently when it completes passage
through a choke point. This independent movement detracts from the ability
of the whole force to rapidly generate combat power on the far side of the ob-
stacle.
Daylight Attacks
5-29. Daylight attacks allow friendly forces to effectively use their equipment
while facilitating command and control (C2). They are the least stressful
psychologically and physically on the attacking units. One major disadvan-
tage is that the enemy can effectively use his systems to oppose the attack.
Another disadvantage is that it does not take advantage of the Army’s super-
ior thermal viewer capabilities.
Limited-Visibility Attacks
5-30. The factors of METT-TC normally require an attack conducted during
limited visibility to be more deliberate in nature, except when it occurs as
part of the follow-up to a daylight attack or as part of an exploitation or pur-
suit operation. The commander planning a night attack considers how limited
visibility complicates controlling units, soldiers, and fires; identifying and en-
gaging targets; navigating and moving without detection; locating, treating,
and evacuating casualties; and locating and bypassing or breaching obstacles.
5-31. Commanders attack in limited-visibility conditions to take advantage of
American night-vision and navigational superiority against most potential
enemy ground forces. Intensively trained forces equipped for such combat
have significant advantages over an enemy who is unprepared for limited-
visibility combat. When the friendly force’s limited-visibility operations capa-
bilities are significantly greater than the enemy’s, limited-visibility attacks
may be the norm. Table 5-1 on page 5-8 outlines the advantages and disad-
vantages of conducting limited-visibility attacks.
5-32. Highly trained units equipped with modern night-vision devices con-
duct limited-visibility attacks in a manner similar to the way they conduct
daylight attacks. Units without extensive night-vision devices can use the
darkness to their advantage to conceal their movement, allowing them to get
as close to the enemy positions as possible if the enemy also does not have ex-
tensive night-vision capabilities. Troops that are well trained for limited-
visibility operations and take full advantage of the superiority of their night-
vision equipment gain significant tactical and psychological advantages when
attacking the enemy at night or in other conditions of reduced visibility. The
commander should understand the different night-vision capabilities of all
elements participating in the attack, to include the enemy’s night-vision
capabilities, and make any adjustments necessary to his plan based on these
differences. The commander should take advantage of his superior night-
fighting capabilities whenever possible.
5-7
FM 3-90
Table 5-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Limited-Visibility Attacks
ADVANTAGES OF DISADVANTAGES OF
LIMITED-VISIBILITY ATTACKS LIMITED-VISIBILITY ATTACKS
· Defenses are more susceptible to infil- · Command and control is more difficult.
tration. · The defender can react easier to
· Darkness can conceal the movement of changing situations.
large forces. · The attacker has difficulty determining
· Physical and psychological factors favor the limits of obstacle systems.
the attacker, as shock, disorientation, · Restrictive terrain is more difficult to
and isolation are easier to achieve. traverse.
· Air assets can operate more safely be- · Light, smoke, noise, and fires can de-
cause air defenders with only optical ceive the attacker.
sights have greater difficulty acquiring · The attacker loses momentum because
targets at night. he attacks at a reduced speed to main-
· The element of surprise may increase tain the coherence of his unit.
because defenders are more susceptible · Land navigation, without GPS, is more
to deception techniques, such as dummy difficult at night; units may become
lights, noise, smoke, and fires. separated, cohesion can be lost, and
· The defender cannot employ his re- support elements can move to the wrong
serves as quickly at night as he can positions.
during daylight conditions. · The enemy can reposition or emplace
obstacles during darkness without being
detected by friendly reconnaissance,
surveillance, and intelligence assets.
· Attacking units are easier to ambush at
night.
· Adjusting indirect fire is difficult, even
with night-vision devices or illumination.
· Units require significantly larger quanti-
ties of signal ammunition such as
smoke, tracers, flares, and illumination
rounds.
· The task of locating and evacuating
casualties is more difficult to execute.
· The risk of fratricide may increase.
5-33. The basic organization of forces for a limited-visibility or night attack is

the same as for any other attack. However, changing an existing task organi-
zation under limited-visibility conditions requires much more time and effort
than it does during daylight. Small tactical organizations, such as combat
crews and infantry squads, should be resourced as close as possible to full
strength even if it means reducing the total number of these small tactical
groups.
5-34. The presence or lack of illumination characterizes the conduct of
limited-visibility attacks. Nonilluminated attacks offer the best chance of
gaining surprise. Illumination, however, is normally planned for every
limited-visibility attack so that it can be readily available if required. The
commander can choose to conduct a nonilluminated attack until his forces
5-8
Attack
make contact with the enemy. At that point, he can illuminate the objective.
The enemy can also choose to employ illumination to increase the effective-
ness of his defensive efforts. Units generally conduct nonilluminated attacks
although they always plan for illumination. All leaders within the attacking
unit must understand the time, conditions, and authority required to employ
illumination.
5-35. Illuminated, supported attacks are almost like daylight attacks. They
are most effective when speed is essential, time for reconnaissance is limited,
or the enemy is weak and disorganized. If the commander employs illumina-
tion, it should continue until the force secures the objective. The commander
should place the illumination beyond the objective to silhouette objects on the
objective. This helps the assaulting force see and fire at withdrawing or
counterattacking enemy forces. The commander may also employ illumina-
tion in several locations to confuse the enemy about the exact place of attack.
5-36. The commander plans for limited-visibility operations in the same man-
ner that he does for daylight operations, with emphasis on—
· Keeping the plan simple.
· Taking additional time for reconnaissance.
· Taking advantage of easily identifiable terrain features, such as roads
and railroad tracks, when establishing control measures.
· Using intermediate objectives as necessary to control and maintain the
correct movement direction during the attack.
· Concealing preparations.
· Scheduling initial rehearsals during daylight, with the final rehearsal
at night.
5-37. To simplify control problems, the commander may weight his support
element over the assault force to reduce the number of friendly soldiers movi-
ng on the objective in the darkness. Developing a plan that does not require
the unit to change its movement azimuth after it crosses the LD/PD helps to
simplify the plan execution.
5-38. The commander must assume that the enemy possesses, in at least lim-
ited quantities, the same limited-visibility observation capabilities as his own
forces—absent positive information to the contrary—when conducting a
limited-visibility attack. Using terrain to mask movement and deployment
remains critical because limited visibility may create a false sense of protec-
tion from enemy observation. During movement, leaders reduce the distances
between vehicles or individual soldiers as necessary to allow one system or
soldier to observe the other. This decreases the time necessary to react to ene-
my contact. The attacking force wants to maintain its momentum; therefore,
it does not preserve the alignment of units within the selected combat
formation at the expense of additional time. However, it must adhere more
closely to the plan of attack than under daylight conditions.
FIRE SUPPORT
5-39. The planning process synchronizes the unit’s maneuver with the provi-
sion of fire support. It must identify critical times and places where the com-
mander needs the maximum effects from his fire-support assets. The
5-9
FM 3-90
commander combines his maneuver with fires to mass effects, achieve

surprise, destroy enemy forces, and obtain decisive results. His guidance
gives specified attack criteria for fire support assets, thus focusing the
planning and execution efforts on those critical times and events. The
specified attack criteria are a compilation of the commander’s guidance,
desired effects, and high-payoff targets and attack priorities. The amount of
time available to plan the operation constrains the commander’s ability to
synchronize fire-support operations that employ well-matched effects of all
available assets against high-payoff targets.
5-40. The goal of the commander’s attack criteria is to focus fires on seizing
the initiative. The commander emphasizes simple and rapidly integrated fire
support plans. This is done using quick-fire planning techniques and good
standing operating procedures (SOPs). The commander integrates his fire
support assets as far forward as possible in the movement formation to facili-
tate early emplacement. Fires concentrate (mass) on forward enemy elements
to enable maneuver efforts to close with the enemy positions. Fire support
isolates forward enemy elements by using long-range fires, air support, and
electronic warfare.
5-41. Fires facilitate his unit’s maneuver by destroying or neutralizing strong
enemy forces and positions. His fire support system must take full advantage
of available preparation time to achieve these demanding effects criteria.
Fire-support plans feature the following characteristics:
· Targets that are confirmed or denied by ISR efforts.
· Designation of target sensor-to-shooter communication links.
· Possible use of preparation and deception fires to shape the enemy’s de-
fense.
· Air support to destroy high-payoff targets on the objective and then
shift to reinforcing enemy units, artillery assets, and C2 nodes.
· Proactive suppression of enemy air-defense effort.
· Preparation fires that shift just as the maneuver force arrives on the
objective.
· Suppression and obscuration fire plan to support breaching operations.
· Pre-positioned ammunition backed by prepackaged munitions stocks
capable of rapid delivery.
· Integration of nonlethal fires, such as electronic attack and PSYOPS,
into the attack guidance matrix.
· Integration of primary and backup observers to engage high-priority
targets.
· Fire support coordinating measures, accounting for danger close and
other technical constraints, to allow maneuver forces to get as close as
possible to the objective before lifting fires.
· Signals for lifting and shifting fires on the objective, primarily by com-
bat net radio and by visual signals as a backup means.
These later fire support coordinating measures should also facilitate the
massing of fires, including CAS, against high-payoff targets throughout the
AO.
5-10
Attack
COMMAND AND CONTROL

5-42. The commander states the desired effect of fires on the enemy weapon
systems, such as suppression or destruction, as part of his planning process.
He assigns subordinate units their missions and imposes those control meas-
ures necessary to synchronize and maintain control over the operation.
5-43. Using the enemy situational and weapons templates previously devel-
oped, the commander determines his probable line of contact and enemy trig-
ger lines. As he arrays his subordinate elements to shape the battlefield, he
matches his weapon systems against the enemy’s to determine his PLD. Once
he determines his PLD, he establishes how long it takes him to move from
the LD to the PLD and any support-by-fire positions the attack requires. He
establishes when and where his force must maneuver into enemy direct-fire
range.
5-44. In addition to accomplishing the mission, every attack plan must con-
tain provisions for exploiting success or any advantages that may arise
during the operation. The commander exploits success by aggressively exe-
cuting the plan, promoting subordinate leader initiative, and using units that
can rapidly execute battle drills.
PREPARING AN ATTACK
5-45. Even in fluid situations, attacks are best organized and coordinated in
assembly areas. If the commander decides that rapid action is essential to re-
tain a tactical advantage, he may opt not to use an assembly area. Detailed
advance planning—combined with digital communications, SOP, and battle
drills—may reduce negative impacts of such a decision.
5-46. Unless already in an assembly area, the attacking unit moves into one
during the preparation phase. The unit moves with as much secrecy as pos-
sible, normally at night and along routes that prevent or degrade the enemy’s
capabilities to visually observe or otherwise detect the movement. It avoids
congesting its assembly area and occupies it for the minimum possible time.
While in the assembly area, each unit provides its own local ground security
and air defense.
5-47. Units moving to assembly areas send out their quartering parties and
link up with their guides at the designated locations. While subordinate units
move to and occupy assembly areas, the commander completes the process of
planning and coordinating the attack.
5-48. The attacking unit should continue its troop leading procedures and
priorities of work to the extent the situation and mission allow prior to
moving to attack positions. These preparations include but are not neces-
sarily limited to—
· Protecting the force.
· Conducting task organization.
· Performing reconnaissance.
· Refining the plan.
· Briefing the troops.
· Conducting rehearsals, to include test firing of weapons.
5-11
FM 3-90
· Moving logistics support forward.

· Promoting adequate rest for both leaders and soldiers.
· Positioning the force for subsequent action.
As part of troop leading procedures, leaders at all levels should conduct a per-
sonal reconnaissance of the actual terrain. If a limited-visibility attack is
planned, they should also reconnoiter the terrain at night.
5-49. A thorough reconnaissance of the objective, its foreground, and other
enemy positions is a critical part of attack preparations. The commander ex-
ploits all available ISR assets to provide the necessary information. This in-
cludes requesting JSTARS feeds of enemy movements from higher echelons
or imagery of enemy obstacles. Reconnaissance forces infiltrate through the
enemy security area to conduct an area reconnaissance. They can employ pre-
cision munitions and conventional indirect fires to destroy detected enemy
outposts while remaining undetected. They locate and attempt to infiltrate
the enemy’s main defensive positions to confirm his dispositions. When prop-
erly task-organized, forces conducting reconnaissance may also be given a
mission to conduct covert breaches in the enemy’s obstacle complexes to facil-
itate rapid movement of the decisive or shaping operation.
5-50. During this phase, the commander positions his artillery target-acquisi-
tion radars to provide support throughout the AO. Divisions and corps estab-
lish quick-fire channels between sensors, such as counterbattery radars and
firing units, to rapidly silence enemy indirect fire systems. These channels do
not change command relationships or priority of fires.
5-51. The commander exercises and refines his maneuver and fire plans
during rehearsals which are an important part of ensuring the plan’s coordi-
nation and synchronization. As part of the rehearsal process, the commander
and his subordinates review the anticipated battle sequence to ensure all
units understand the plan, the relationship between fire and movement, and
the synchronization of critical events. These critical events include:
· Moving from the assembly area to the line of departure.
· Maneuvering from the line of departure to the probable line of
deployment.
· Occupying support-by-fire positions.
· Conducting the breach.
· Assaulting the objective.
· Consolidating on the objective.
· Exploiting success or pursuing a withdrawing enemy.
· Actions of echelon reserves.
The unit should conduct rehearsals under as many types of adverse
conditions as possible with time and other restraints to identify and prepare
the unit to cope with problems. At lower tactical echelons, the rehearsal
includes battle drills, such as creating lanes through minefields.
5-52. From their assembly areas, attacking units move to their respective
LDs. (See Figure 5-2.) Units move from assembly areas to the LD in the same
way as for any other tactical movement. (Chapter 13 details troop move-
ments.) The number of columns a unit employs in its movement depends on
the availability of suitable routes and the friendly and enemy situation.
5-12
Attack
Primarily the tactical situation
PL SPADA/
LD
and the order in which the
commander wants his sub-
SP 31
POSITION
RP 7
ATTACK
ordinate units to arrive at
176
their attack positions govern AA
SHIRLEY ROUTE MARY
the march formation. Using an
LD facilitates the simul-
taneous initiation of the attack
at the prescribed time by all RP 2
POSITION
SP 74
ATTACK
attacking units.
173
AA
ARTHUR ROUTE KIM
PL SPADA/
5-53. Light infantry units
should move by tactical vehi-
cles to the maximum extent
LD
possible to avoid prematurely
Figure 5-2. Movement from AA to LD
exhausting their soldiers. How-
ever, light infantry forces should not travel too far forward in tactical
vehicles. The enemy can detect the noise and other battlefield signatures
associated with using tactical vehicles at a greater distance than he can
detect dismounted infantry soldiers, and will probably respond to the
presence of tactical vehicles with direct- and indirect-fire systems. The
commander must weigh the need for security against the time required to
conduct a foot march and its resulting effects on soldiers.
5-54. Units move rapidly through their attack positions and across the LD,
which should be controlled by friendly forces. A unit uses its designated at-
tack position only by exception, such as when it must refuel prior to crossing
the LD to ensure sufficient fuel to reach the objective or the conditions re-
quired to ensure the success of the planned maneuver are not yet established.
A unit does not occupy its attack positions for more than 10 to 15 minutes
without initiating actions to protect itself and increase its survivability, such
as deploying local security and camouflage nets and starting the construction
of fighting and survivability positions. If necessary, a unit can use guides to
assist in occupying the attack position. These guides may come from organic
resources or from another unit.
5-55. For units attacking on foot using infiltration and stealth, a commander
may designate a point of departure for the attacking units instead of an LD.
Armor and mechanized infantry units normally use gaps or lanes through the
friendly positions to allow them to deploy into combat formations before they
cross the LD.
5-56. Preliminary operations for an attack may include using preparatory
fires and the relief of units in contact by executing a relief in place or a
forward passage of lines. The relief of units may be desirable to continue the
momentum of the attack with fresh troops, change the direction of the attack,
exploit a weakness in the enemy position with reserve forces, or initiate an
offensive on a stabilized front. (Chapter 14 details a relief in place. Chap-
ter 15 details a forward passage of lines.)
5-57. The commander uses available artillery, mortar, CAS, and offensive in-
formation operations to conduct preparatory fires. Preparatory fires are de-
veloped from the top down, with bottom-up refinement. The subordinate
5-13
FM 3-90
commander most affected by the effects of these preparatory fires must

strongly emphasize the bottom-up refinement process. Preparatory fires can
accomplish the following functions:
· Destroy the enemy.
· Suppress, neutralize, or disrupt high-value or high-priority targets.
· Gain fire superiority.
· Suppress the enemy in his defensive positions.
· Facilitate the attacking force’s maneuver.
· Deceive the enemy.
5-58. If the attacking forces are in contact with the enemy’s security zone,
preparatory fires may initially destroy or disrupt only the enemy’s reconnais-
sance and security forces and positions. In either case, counterfires and coun-
terbattery fires conducted as part of preparatory fires serve to degrade the
enemy’s fire-support systems and assist in achieving fire superiority.
5-59. The commander ensures that his maneuver forces have the CS and
CSS assets necessary to conduct the operation and continue the momentum
of the attack as part of the preparation process. That support effort must an-
ticipate future maneuvers to ensure the uninterrupted sustainment of the
maneuver force.
EXECUTING AN ATTACK
5-60. A series of advances and assaults by attacking units until they secure
the final objective characterizes the attack. Commanders at all levels must
use their initiative to rapidly shift their main effort between units as neces-
sary to take advantage of opportunities and momentum to ensure the ene-
my’s rapid destruction. Attacking units move as quickly as possible, following
reconnaissance elements or successful probes through gaps in the enemy’s de-
fenses. They shift their strength to reinforce success and carry the battle deep
into the enemy’s rear. A commander does not delay his attack to preserve the
alignment of subordinate units or to adhere closely to the preconceived plan
of attack. This manual discusses executing the attack in a five-step sequence:
· Gain and maintain enemy contact.
· Disrupt the enemy.
· Fix the enemy.
· Maneuver.
· Follow through.
This sequence is for discussion purposes only and is not the only way of con-
ducting an attack. The reader should understand that these sequences over-
lap during the conduct of an attack.
5-61. The commander must avoid becoming so committed to the initial plan
that he neglects opportunities. He is prepared to abandon failed attacks and
to exploit any unanticipated successes or enemy errors by designating
another unit to conduct his decisive operation in response to the changing sit-
uation.
5-62. When maneuvering his force, the commander strives to retain freedom
of action while protecting his force. Although he may have a detailed plan to
5-14
Attack
defeat the enemy, the commander continually seeks any opportunity to at-
tack to defeat, destroy, or reduce the enemy’s combat power or shatter his co-
hesion and will to fight. The commander avoids dogged adherence to a plan
no longer appropriate to current battlefield conditions. The difference be-
tween success and failure in combat often depends on the commander’s abil-
ity to make the plan fit existing circumstances rather than trying to make
circumstances fit the plan.

5-63. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy when he is deter-
mined to break that contact is vital to the success of offensive operations. A
defending enemy generally establishes a security area around his forces to
make early contact with the attacking forces to determine their capabilities,
intent, and chosen COA and to delay their approach. The enemy commander
wants to use his security area to strip away friendly reconnaissance forces
and hide his dispositions, capabilities, and intent. His goal is to compel the
attacking force to conduct a movement to contact against his forces that know
the exact location of the attacking forces.
5-64. A commander employs his combat power to overwhelm enemy forces in
accordance with his situational understanding. However echelons below divi-
sion do not normally have the detection, tracking, and weapon systems neces-
sary to conduct decisive or shaping operations directed against enemy forces
not currently committed to close combat. The manner in which a unit gains
and maintains contact depends on whether the unit is in contact with the
enemy’s security area or the enemy’s main line of resistance and the echelon
of the unit in the nested layers of reconnaissance and security. For example,
the intent of the corps’ reconnaissance effort is to determine the dispositions,
composition, direction of movement, and rate of movement of the enemy’s sig-
nificant forces. The corps’ armored cavalry regiment, acting as a covering
force or advance guard, can fight through a security area, develop the situa-
tion, confirm information provided by technical means, and force the enemy
to reveal more information than could be acquired solely through using intel-
ligence sensors. This additional information includes locating the enemy’s re-
serve. At a lower level, a battalion constituting the advance guard of the
main body can use its scout platoon to conduct a zone reconnaissance that fo-
cuses on acquiring updates of enemy positions and obstacles.
5-65. The commander’s ability to sense the enemy’s actions by gaining and
maintaining contact with all significant parts of the enemy force, to include
tracking enemy reserves, fire support, and follow-on forces, increases the se-
curity of the attacking force. The enemy’s attempts to shift major elements of
his forces or launch a counterattack will be detected. Additionally, by sending
out a force to conduct area reconnaissance with an on-order mission to be pre-
pared to conduct a security mission, the commander can prevent enemy re-
connaissance assets from detecting the friendly force’s major movements and
increase the enemy’s risk. The risks to the enemy force increase to the extent
friendly forces impede or deny success to enemy ISR assets. Combining these
factors results in providing the attacking commander with additional time to
take advantage of the changing situation. Moving within the enemy’s deci-
sion cycle allows the commander to take advantage of his successes by
5-15
FM 3-90
transitioning to the exploitation and pursuit to complete the destruction of

the enemy.
5-66. The capabilities of digital C2 systems offer additional techniques a com-
mander can use to gain and maintain enemy contact. The improved common
operational picture provided by those systems enhances his situational un-
derstanding and ensures rapid, clear communication of orders and intent,
thereby reducing the confusion, fog, and friction of battle. Advanced Army
and joint intelligence systems feeding those C2 systems enable him to detect
and track enemy forces throughout a given AO without having his forces
make physical contact with the enemy. The commander’s ability to see and
understand the situation before the enemy can allows him to act first and
maneuver out of contact with the enemy at a high tempo. This allows him to
position his forces where they can overwhelm selected elements of the enemy
force to disrupt and destroy the enemy’s combined arms team. Such attacks—
delivered simultaneously with precision by air, ground, and naval systems
throughout the width, height, and depth of the battlefield—stun the enemy
and rapidly lead to his defeat.
DISRUPT THE ENEMY

5-67. Disrupting one or more parts of the enemy’s combined arms team
weakens his entire force and allows the friendly commander to attack the re-
maining enemy force in an asymmetrical manner. The assessment and deci-
sions regarding what to disrupt, when to disrupt, and to what end are criti-
cal. For example, the goal of disrupting the enemy’s fire-support system is to
allow friendly forces to maneuver and mass the effects of their weapon sys-
tems against the enemy without being engaged by the enemy’s indirect-fire
weapons. Attacking forces can accomplish this by attacking enemy forward
observers, fire-direction centers, command posts, artillery and rocket sys-
tems, or their ammunition supply. Each set of targets requires a different
amount of resources. The probability of success, the effectiveness of the at-
tack, and the time necessary to achieve the desired target effects varies with
each set of targets.
5-68. Once any type of contact—even sensor contact—is made with the ene-
my, the commander wants to use the element of surprise to conduct shaping
operations that strike at the enemy and disrupt both the enemy’s combined
arms team and his ability to plan and control his forces. Once this disruption
process begins, it continues throughout the attack. The commander uses any
existing technological advantage over the enemy in the following areas to aid
the disruption process:
· Offensive information operations.
· Lethal firepower effects.
· Range of direct-fire weapons.
· Protection.
· Battlefield mobility.
· Information management.
· C2 systems.
5-69. Whatever form of disruption takes place helps the commander seize, re-
tain, and exploit the initiative; maintain his freedom of action; impose his
5-16
Attack
will on the enemy; set the terms, and select the place for battle. That disrup-
tion also allows the commander to exploit enemy vulnerabilities and react to
changing situations and unexpected developments more rapidly than the ene-
my. This disruption effort usually occurs at division level and above because
lower echelons lack the necessary reconnaissance, target acquisition, intelli-
gence analysis, and target attack assets to engage forces not committed to
close combat.
5-70. The commander plans his shaping operations to occur at the place and
time necessary to establish the conditions for his decisive operation. Targets
of a shaping operation may include: enemy C2 facilities, ISR assets, fire-sup-
port systems, reserves, and logistics support. If a commander executes a
shaping operation too early, the enemy has time to recover and respond be-
fore friendly forces conducting the decisive operation can complete their ma-
neuver.
5-71. The commander plans to use harassment, suppressive, or interdiction
fires against positions likely to contain high-payoff targets to disrupt enemy
reactions to the attacking unit’s advance. These fires deny the enemy unre-
stricted use of the terrain and can prevent his reserves from entering the
fight before the unit seizes the objective. Additional benefits may result from
these fires over time, including increased psychological pressure on enemy
forces and a reduction in their mental and physical capabilities by disrupting
their sleep and rest patterns.
5-72. Surprise denies the enemy the opportunity to focus and synchronize his
combat power against the attacking force. It prevents the enemy from mass-
ing his forces or fires at a critical, possibly decisive, place and time. In place
of cohesive resistance, surprise can produce confusion, fear, and piecemeal re-
sistance. Factors that contribute to surprise include: the tempo and intensity
in executing the attack plan and employing unexpected factors, such as selec-
ting a less than optimal COA, varying operational tactics and methods, con-
ducting deception operations, and ensuring OPSEC.
FIX THE ENEMY

5-73. A primary purpose in fixing the enemy is to isolate the objective of the
force conducting the echelon’s decisive operation to prevent the enemy from
maneuvering to reinforce the unit targeted for destruction. Since war is a
contest between thinking opponents, the enemy will oppose the friendly
commander’s attempts to fix his forces. Every friendly move causes the
enemy to attempt to counter that move. The commander does everything in
his power to limit the options available to his opponent. Fixing an enemy into
a given position or a COA and controlling his movements limit his options
and reduce the amount of uncertainty on the battlefield.
5-74. Reducing uncertainty allows the friendly force to use maneuver to mass
the effects of overwhelming combat power against a portion of the enemy. It
gives the commander more time to modify his plan as necessary and
orchestrate the employment of his forces. It allows him to mass forces in one
place by using economy of force measures in other areas. The commander
may also try to fix an enemy unit, such as the enemy reserve or follow-on
5-17
FM 3-90
force, to prevent it from repositioning or maneuvering against the force con-

ducting his decisive operation.
5-75. Fixing the enemy must be done with the minimum amount of force. The
commander normally allocates the bulk of his combat power to the force con-
ducting his decisive operation, so fixing operations are, by necessity, shaping
operations that illustrate economy of force as a principle of war. Therefore,
the commander must carefully consider which enemy elements to fix and tar-
get only those that can significantly affect the outcome of the fight. The
longer the requirement to fix these forces, the more resources the commander
needs to accomplish the mission. Generally, an enemy force only needs to be
fixed until it cannot respond to the actions of the unit conducting the decisive
operation in time to affect the outcome. This may require a commander to
slow down the rate of march of an enemy unit to prevent it from influencing
the outcome of the engagement or battle.
5-76. One method of isolating the objective is to conduct a shaping operation
using lethal and nonlethal fires. Lethal fires may range from sniper fire to a
joint fire plan designed to totally destroy a selected portion of the enemy
force. Nonlethal fires, such as electronic jamming, can prevent the enemy
from receiving orders or vital intelligence and combat information.
5-77. Severing enemy lines of communication over prolonged periods of time
by using interdiction measures is another way to fix the enemy. These meas-
ures can range from air interdiction that destroys bridges and rail switching
yards to ambushes conducted by infiltrating combat patrols.
5-78. Another method of fixing the enemy is to tie obstacles into the existing
terrain to canalize and slow the movement of enemy reserves. At lower tacti-
cal echelons, scatterable minefields employed in accordance with the rules of
engagement can seal the objectives from possible enemy reinforcement or
counterattacks and neutralize enemy actions to the flanks. Deception opera-
tions and activities, such as demonstrations and false preparatory fires, can
fix the enemy. Using extensive smoke screens and vehicle mock-ups in a de-
ception effort can also assist in fixing an enemy force.
MANEUVER
5-79. The commander maneuvers his forces to gain positional advantage so
he can seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. He avoids the enemy’s defen-
sive strength. He employs tactics that defeat the enemy by attacking through
a point of relative weakness, such as a flank or the rear.
5-80. Offensive maneuver seeks to achieve a decisive massing of effects at the
decisive point, or at several decisive points if adequate combat power is avail-
able. The commander exploits maneuver by—
· Taking maximum advantage of dead space and covered and concealed
routes to close with the enemy.
· Using his advantages in the effective ranges of weapon systems.
· Repositioning friendly forces rapidly.
· Navigating accurately cross-country.
· Obtaining situational understanding of friendly and enemy locations.
· Taking effective security measures.
5-18
Attack
· Synchronizing the application of all BOS at a time and place on the

battlefield to maximize their effects.
5-81. The key to success is to strike hard and fast, overwhelm a portion of the
enemy force, and then quickly transition to the next objective or phase, thus
maintaining the momentum of the attack without reducing the pressure. The
commander must retain freedom of maneuver with multiple COAs
throughout the operation and responsive CSS. Additionally, he must make
every effort to locate and track enemy reserve and follow-on forces, which
prevents friendly forces from being attacked unexpectedly by significant ene-
my forces. This allows the commander time to delay, disrupt, or destroy these
enemy forces before they can interfere with the attack.
5-82. Depending on the conditions of METT-TC, artillery and mortars may
advance with the attacking formation or move forward by bounds. The eche-
lon fire support coordinators (FSCOORDs) position direct support and rein-
forcing artillery in coordination with their maneuver commanders. The force
field artillery headquarters, normally a division or corps artillery headquar-
ters, coordinates position areas for general support and general support-rein-
forcing artillery units through the fire support officers at corps, division, and
brigade. The commander considers the maneuver of fire support assets along
with maneuver forces to ensure that proper fire support is available at all
times.
5-83. The maneuver process normally follows this sequence:
· Movement from the LD to the PLD.
· Actions at the PLD, assault position, or FCL.
· Breaching operations (discussed in FM 3-34.2).
· Actions on the objective.
The movement from the assembly area to the LD that precedes many attacks
is troop movement and is discussed in Chapter 13.
Movement from the LD to the PLD

5-84. The unit transitions from troop movement to maneuver once it crosses
the LD. It moves aggressively and as quickly as the terrain and enemy situa-
tion allow. It moves forward using appropriate movement techniques assisted
by the fires of supporting units. Fire and movement are closely integrated
and coordinated. Effective suppressive fires facilitate movement, and move-
ment facilitates more effective fires. Whenever possible, the attacking unit
uses avenues of approach that avoid strong enemy defensive positions, takes
advantage of all available cover and concealment, and places the unit on the
flanks and rear of the defending enemy. Where cover and concealment are
not available, the unit uses obscurants to conceal its movement. Any delays
in establishing obscuration and suppressive fires prior to crossing the PLD
may require the attacking unit to occupy its assault positions.
5-85. Artillery and other fire-support assets move as necessary to ensure that
the attacking unit remains within supporting range. Previously conducted
analysis of the time it takes the maneuver unit to move from the LD to the
PLD and the distances involved ensures that their fire support systems are
prepared to provide fire support before maneuver units move inside the
5-19
FM 3-90
effective range of enemy direct-fire weapon systems. The existence of enemy

artillery systems that have a longer range than fielded US artillery systems
complicates this process. The commander uses fires delivered from fixed- and
rotary-wing systems and the autonomous operation capabilities of moder-
nized artillery systems to help counter any enemy range advantage.
5-86. If the commander expects to make enemy contact at or shortly beyond
the LD, he deploys his unit so that he can maintain maximum firepower
against the enemy’s known positions. He chooses the combat formation that
best balances firepower, tempo, security, and control in the specific situation.
The commander has the option of deploying a security force in front of his at-
tacking unit. He may also employ a flank or rear security force if required by
the enemy situation. The commander may not want to change formations
during his attack because of the potential loss of momentum resulting from
such changes. If the commander finds it necessary to transition from one
combat formation to another, he should base the transition on thoroughly
trained drills. Once enemy contact is expected, he transitions to the bounding
overwatch technique of movement. (Chapter 13 addresses movement tech-
niques.)
5-87. Between the LD and the PLD, the attacking unit secures intermediate
objectives only to eliminate enemy positions or bring additional suppressive
fires to bear. Fire-support assets engage targets of opportunity. The com-
mander uses CAS and artillery to destroy enemy security forces. As the unit
approaches suspected enemy positions or danger areas, the commander di-
rects his forces to occupy predesignated support-by-fire positions. Fire sup-
port, suppression, and obscuration are key enablers that allow a force to occu-
py these positions. Commanders use fires from these positions to suppress
enemy forces while the unit continues its advance toward the objective.
5-88. The commander engages known enemy forces with the maximum pos-
sible combat power to overwhelm them as quickly as possible. The attacking
unit that encounters small enemy units on the way to the objective either
quickly overruns or bypasses them if they meet the bypass criteria. The at-
tacking unit then reports the location of bypassed enemy elements to its high-
er headquarters and maintains contact until they can be handed off to follow
and support forces. The commander uses minimal force to maintain that con-
tact to avoid significantly weakening the force conducting his decisive opera-
tion.
Actions at the PLD, Assault Position, or FCL

5-89. The attacking unit maintains the pace of its advance as it approaches
its PLD. (See Figure 5-3.) The attacking unit splits into one or more assault
and support forces once it reaches the PLD if not previously completed. At the
PLD infantry soldiers dismount from their infantry fighting vehicles as
required by the situation. All forces supporting the assault force should be set
in their support-by-fire positions before the assault force crosses the PLD.
The commander synchronizes the occupation of these support-by-fire posi-
tions with the maneuver of the supported attacking unit to limit the
vulnerability of the forces occupying these positions. The commander uses his
unit’s tactical SOP, prearranged signals, engagement areas (EAs), and target
5-20
Attack
reference points (TRPs) to control the direct fires from these supporting posi-
tions. He employs restricted fire lines between converging forces.
5-90. The PLD can be co-
PL PALMER/
PLD
LD
PL SPADA/
located with the assault po-
sition. (See Figure 5-3.) The ASSAULT
commander ensures that the POSITION
CAROLE
final preparations of his
breach force in an assault
position do not delay its ma- OBJ
neuver to the point of breach CHANT
as soon as the conditions are
set. Whenever possible, the
PL PALMER/
assault force rapidly passes
PL SPADA/
through the assault position.
It may have to halt in the as-
PLD
LD
sault position while fires are
lifted and shifted. In this Figure 5-3. PLD and Assault Positions
case, if the enemy antici-
pates the assault, the assault force deploys into covered positions, screens its
positions with smoke, and waits for the order to assault. As long as the as-
sault force remains in the assault position, support forces continue their sup-
pressive fires on the objective.
5-91. Once the support force sets the conditions, the breach force reduces,
proofs, and marks the required number of lanes through the enemy’s tactical
obstacles to support the maneuver of the assault force. The commander must
clearly identify the conditions that allow the breach force to proceed to avoid
confusion. From the PLD, the assault force maneuvers against or around the
enemy to take advantage of the support force’s efforts to suppress the tar-
geted enemy positions. The support force employs direct and indirect fires
against the selected enemy positions to destroy, suppress, obscure, or neutra-
lize enemy weapons and cover the assault force’s movement. The assault
force must closely follow these supporting fires to gain ground that offers po-
sitional advantage. This COA normally results in the fewest casualties.
5-92. The key to forward movement when the assault force is under enemy
direct fire is to return effective fire, which prevents the enemy from firing ef-
fectively at the moving assault force. Destructive or suppressive fires are
most effective when fired by the stationary support force. These fires prevent
the enemy from firing effectively at the moving assault force. Once the
support force is in position and the assault force is prepared to move, the sup-
port force places a heavy volume of fires on the enemy to destroy, neutralize,
or suppress him. The ability of the support force to move to advantageous ter-
rain is critical to accomplishing its purpose of ensuring the assault force’s
success. Once it suppresses the enemy position, it reduces its rate of fire to
sustainable levels to conserve ammunition as the assault force closes on the
objective to ensure that it has enough to support the assault. When the as-
sault force nears its objective, the support force increases its rate of fire to en-
sure the continued suppression of the enemy. This allows the assault force to
assault the position before the enemy can react. Either on signal or when the
5-21
FM 3-90
assault begins, the support force ceases fire, shifts its fire to another target
area, or walks its fire across the objective in front of the assault force.
5-93. The commander uses smoke to help conceal units and individual wea-
pons. It degrades enemy laser designators, range finders, and directed energy
weapons. When planning to employ smoke, the commander remembers that
smoke can have the same effects on friendly and enemy forces. If possible
during the assault, the commander uses obscuration to blind the enemy and
screen friendly movement onto the objective. Obscuration is placed in front of
enemy positions, on the far side of obstacles, and in areas that restrict ma-
neuver. The commander may use a smoke haze over rear areas to limit ene-
my observation. The defeat of enemy thermal viewers requires the use of
multispectral smoke.
Assault on the Objective

5-94. The effects of the overwhelming and simultaneous application of fire,
movement, and shock action characterize the final assault. This violent as-
sault destroys or drives the enemy from the objective area. Small units con-
duct the final assault while operating under the control of the appropriate
echelon command post. Heavy forces have the option of conducting this final
assault in either a mounted or dismounted configuration.
5-95. The commander employs all fire support means to destroy and suppress
the enemy and sustain the momentum of the attack. By carefully synchroni-
zing the effects of his indirect-fire systems and available CAS, the command-
er improves the likelihood of success. He plans fires in series or groups to
support maneuver against enemy forces on or near the geographical objective.
As the commander shifts artillery fires and obscurants from the objective to
other targets, the assault element moves rapidly across the objective. The
support element must not allow its suppressive fires to lapse. These fires iso-
late the objective and prevent the enemy from reinforcing or counterattack-
ing. They also destroy escaping enemy forces and systems. The commander
employs offensive information operations, such as electronic warfare, to at-
tack enemy C2 nodes as part of this effort.
5-96. Supporting artillery may need to displace forward during the attack to
ensure maximum support is available for the assault. However, changes in
position are held to a minimum because they reduce the volume of available
fires. The commander balances the need to maintain that amount of fire
support against the enemy’s counterbattery capabilities with the need to pro-
vide continued coverage as the attacking unit continues to move forward. Fire
support assets supporting the unit move into their new positions one subordi-
nate unit at a time, by echelon, to maintain fire support to the attack. The
commander can use his available CAS to provide supporting fires while his
artillery batteries displace.
5-97. Small enemy units moving toward the penetrated area can disrupt the
synchronization of this final assault. As small units and weapon systems
crews become engaged, they tend to focus on their immediate opponent
rather than the overall situation. Loss of situational understanding, com-
bined with the enemy’s more detailed knowledge of the terrain, allows small
enemy forces to inflict a great deal of damage on the attacking force. The
5-22
Attack
attacking unit’s leaders must understand the flow of combat and retain the
capability to engage these enemy forces before they can alter the outcome of
the assault. The commander can commit his reserve to maintain the attack
momentum and keep relentless pressure on the enemy. This action also
hinders enemy attempts to stabilize the situation.
5-98. Against a well-prepared, integrated enemy defense, the commander
must isolate and destroy portions of the enemy defense in sequence. (See Fig-
ures 5-4 and 5-5, page 5-24.) His forces must isolate, suppress, obscure, and
bypass selected enemy positions. For example, smoke delivered by field artil-
lery and mortars in front of the objective—between the force and the enemy—
screens friendly movement and obscures the enemy’s weapon systems. Fires
placed on and beyond the flanks of the objective serve to isolate the enemy’s
position. These fires include: smoke, high explosives, improved conventional
munitions, and precision-guided munitions delivered by a mix of field artil-
lery, fixed-wing aviation assets, and attack helicopters. In addition, the com-
mander may employ short-duration scatterable mines in accordance with the
rules of engagement in conjunction with terminally guided munitions to help
isolate and impair the enemy’s ability to counterattack. (Their use must not
impede the commander’s conduct of exploitation and pursuit operations.)
Jamming can be used to cut C2 links between the enemy’s maneuver force
and its supporting artillery. The commander can also use any available CAS
to accomplish the desired effects.
5-99. The commander generates overwhelming combat power in sequence
against isolated centers of resistance. The assault element can task organize
itself to assault one portion of the objective at a time. For example, within the
assault company of a task force attack, two platoons may suppress while one
platoon seizes a portion of the company objective. This initial platoon, having
seized a foothold, then suppresses to allow a second platoon to continue the
assault. The third platoon may have a third portion of the objective assigned
to it to seize in turn. The enemy may attempt to reinforce its defending forces
or counterattack during the friendly force’s attack. Once the attacking force
reaches the far side of the objective, selected elements clear remaining pock-
ets of resistance while the bulk of the assault force prepares for a possible
enemy counterattack. After the assault force reaches the objective, the sup-
port force leaves its support-by-fire position and rejoins the assault force or
moves to a blocking position to counter possible enemy counterattacks.
5-100. Mounted Assault. In determining whether to conduct a mounted or
dismounted attack, the commander considers the primary factors of the ter-
rain, obstacles, and the strength of enemy antiarmor defenses. Mounted
assaults accelerate the execution of the operation by allowing the greatest
speed and shock action and providing the best protection against small arms
and indirect fires while conserving the strength of the infantry soldiers con-
ducting the assault.
5-101. When facing weak, hastily prepared, disorganized resistance, or when
attacking with overwhelming combat power in relation to enemy forces on the
objective, a heavy force commander can conduct a mounted assault. The com-
mander conducting a mounted assault concentrates all of his supporting fires
to destroy and neutralize the enemy and fix local reserves. Tanks and
infantry fighting vehicles use cannon and machineguns to engage targets for
5-23
FM 3-90
as long as possible, taking advantage of their accuracy, destructiveness, and

small bursting radius of their munitions. As the fires from one type of weapon
are lifted or shifted, other weapons increase their rate of fire. The assault
force advances close to its objective under the cover of these supporting fires.
OBJECTIVE + AB0107
SMOKE
CHRIS
+ AB0101
AC0301
+
AC0304
AB0110
+
AB0109
+ +
AB0112
AB0108
X
X
X
X X X BREACH SITE X
X X X
X X X
BREACH
SUPPORT
ASSAULT
RESERVE
Figure 5-4. Attack of an Objective: The Breach
+
AB0107 SMOKE
OBJECTIVE
CHRIS
+ AB0101
AC0301
+
AB0110
+
AB0109
+
AB0112 ASSAULT
X
X
X
X X X
BREACH X
X X X
X X X
SUPPORT RESERVE
Figure 5-5. Attack of an Objective: The Assault
5-24
Attack
5-102. The assault force attacks using shock action aided by the firepower of
organic systems to rapidly overrun the enemy position as soon as the com-
mander shifts his supporting fires beyond the objective. Mechanized infantry
elements move as close as possible to the objective while remaining mounted
in their infantry fighting vehicles. When the danger to the mounted infantry
elements exceeds the protection offered by their combat vehicle, the com-
mander gives the order for his infantry elements to dismount from their car-
riers.
5-103. The following technique applies to a heavy force assigned the mission
of rapidly clearing an objective against an enemy that does not have a robust
antiarmor capability. The heavy force overruns the objective. The accompa-
nying mechanized infantry soldiers dismount from their vehicles on the far
side of the objective and sweep the objective from the far side back to the near
side to clear any remaining pockets of resistance. The ability of heavy forces
to closely follow friendly mortar and artillery fires as they shift across the ob-
jective is a major advantage. Any delay in launching the assault after the
commander shifts the supporting fires allows the enemy time to move from
his protective positions to his firing positions.
5-104. Dismounted Assault. A heavy force commander usually conducts a
dismounted assault when any of the following conditions apply:
· Terrain favors dismounted operations.
· The enemy is in prepared positions.
· The enemy has a strong antiarmor capability.
· Tanks are not available to lead the assault even though the factors of
METT-TC favor their employment.
· Obstacles prevent maneuver across the objective.
· Stealth is required to close on the objective.
· A mounted assault stalls on or short of the objective.
Based on his analysis of the factors of METT-TC and the degree of risk he is
willing to accept, the commander determines if, when, and where any
mechanized infantry forces in the assault force will dismount from their in-
fantry fighting vehicles.
5-105. Consolidation. Consolidation is the process of organizing and
strengthening a newly captured position so that it can be defended.
Normally, the attacking unit tries to exploit its success regardless of the type
of the assault. In some situations, however, the unit may have to consolidate
its gains. Consolidation may vary from a rapid repositioning of forces and se-
curity elements on the objective, to a reorganization of the attacking force, to
the organization and detailed improvement of the position for defense. Ac-
tions taken to consolidate gains include—
· Conducting reconnaissance.
· Establishing security.
· Eliminating enemy pockets of resistance.
· Positioning forces to enable them to conduct a hasty defense by block-
ing possible enemy counterattacks.
· Adjusting the fire planning.
· Preparing for potential additional missions.
5-25
FM 3-90
5-106. Immediately after the assault, the commander must maintain contact
with those enemy forces that have abandoned the objective. If he has de-
stroyed all enemy forces on the objective, he takes those actions necessary to
regain contact with the enemy. The commander sends out patrols in any di-
rection required to maintain or regain contact with the enemy within his AO.
Higher echelons reposition their ISR collection assets and adjust their as-
signed missions as necessary to maintain that contact.
5-107. The commander also dispatches patrols to ensure contact with any ad-
jacent friendly units. A unit is normally responsible for establishing contact
with the units to its front and right as defined by the direction to the enemy.
Unless a commander knows that units to his left and rear are preparing to
make contact, he takes actions to initiate that contact. Otherwise, a danger-
ous gap could occur, which the enemy could exploit during a counterattack.
5-108. The task of establishing security is accomplished as soon as the force
occupies the objective. Each subordinate element establishes observation
posts (OPs) that monitor likely enemy avenues of approach and conduct other
security operations. Units must remain aware that the enemy will have de-
fensive fires planned on his former positions, including headquarters bunkers
and supply caches.
5-109. Once subordinate units seize the objective, they clear it of enemy
forces. They then occupy firing positions to prepare for an enemy counter-
attack. Normally, an attacking unit does not occupy vacated enemy positions
because the enemy is familiar with and normally targets them. Therefore, the
attacking unit should position itself away from established enemy positions
usually on the next defensible piece of terrain. This positioning is also impor-
tant because the unit needs to orient on different avenues of approach and in
a different direction. The commander positions his armored and antitank sys-
tems to cover likely enemy mounted avenues of approach. Mechanized infan-
try forces normally dismount and orient along likely dismounted and moun-
ted infantry avenues of approach. Overwatching forces, such as antitank sys-
tems, orient along likely mounted avenues of approach. Mortars, command
posts, and CSS assets move forward to assist in the consolidation.
5-110. The commander should preplan the location and future missions of
each element. Artillery and other fire support systems mass fires on enemy
assembly areas and troops forming for counterattacks. The commander may
alert his reserve to protect the flanks of the attacking units, hold ground
seized by them, or counter an enemy counterattack. The commander may use
antitank minefields or other obstacles to cover likely enemy avenues of ap-
proach. As the unit has time and resources, it improves these obstacles and
defensive positions.
5-111. The commander normally designates TRPs, final protective fires, en-
gagement areas, and other direct- and indirect-fire control measures as part
of the consolidation process. Once in position, subordinate elements modify
preplanned measures and improve the its defensive capabilities as required.
As local security is being established, the commander directs subordinate ele-
ments to conduct mounted or dismounted patrols along likely enemy avenues
of approach. The echelon scout or cavalry unit deploys beyond these local
security patrols to conduct its assigned reconnaissance or security mission.
5-26
Attack
5-112. Reorganization. Reorganization includes all measures taken by the

commander to maintain the combat effectiveness of his unit or return it to a
specified level of combat capability. Commanders of all types of units at each
echelon conduct reorganization. Any reorganization actions not completed
when conducting the attack are accomplished during consolidation. These ac-
tions include—
· Redistributing or cross-leveling supplies, ammunition, and equipment
as necessary.
· Matching operational weapon systems with crews.
· Forming composite units by joining two or more attrited units to form a
single, mission-capable unit.
· Replacing key personnel lost before or during the battle.
· Reporting unit location and status to keep the next higher commander
informed; digitized units can do this automatically.
· Recovering, treating, and evacuating casualties, prisoners of war, and
damaged equipment in accordance with its SOP.
· Resupply of its basic loads of ammunition, fuel, and repair parts as
time permits.
· Integrating replacement soldiers and systems into the unit.
· Revising communication plans as required. The unit places its C2 fa-
cilities in position to conduct further operations and control the consoli-
dation.
· Reestablishing unit cohesion.
· Conducting essential training, such as training replacements on the
unit’s SOP.
FOLLOW THROUGH
5-113. After seizing the objective, the commander has two alternatives: ex-
ploit success and continue the attack or terminate the offensive operation. At
brigade echelon and below, the unit maintains contact and attempts to ex-
ploit its success. Normally, a division or corps commander makes the decision
regarding whether to initiate a general—as opposed to local—exploitation or
pursuit or terminate offensive actions.
5-114. After seizing an objective, the most likely on-order mission is to con-
tinue the attack. During consolidation, the commander and his staff continue
troop leading procedures in preparation for any on-order missions assigned
by a higher headquarters. They use available combat information and intelli-
gence products to adjust contingency plans. The commander redirects his ISR
collection effort to support his next mission.
5-115. Fire support assets move quickly to take advantage of the natural re-
duction in support requirements that occur when a position is taken and
when the enemy can organize a counterattack to provide depth to a defense.
Field artillery units reposition to where they can support a renewed attack
when ammunition supply and enemy action permit. Attacks by rotary- and
fixed-wing aircraft can provide support while artillery systems reposition.
Road conditions, such as destroyed bridges or dislocated civilians, and the
unit’s existing cross-country mobility abilities given the current environment
conditions will also impact on the exact time of the decision to reposition.
5-27
FM 3-90
5-116. The commander attempts to exploit the deterioration of the enemy po-
sition by administering quick and powerful blows before the enemy can recon-
stitute his defense. Using mass quantities of precision-guided munitions,
combined with the action of large, heavy formations and air support, may
prove decisive.
5-117. Ordinarily, the enemy attempts to hold his position until nightfall and
complete his withdrawal under cover of darkness. The attacking unit main-
tains relentless pressure, continuing the attack at night. Through these at-
tacks, the unit maintains contact with the enemy, keeps him off balance, and
makes his withdrawal from action extremely difficult. If the enemy tries to
delay, the unit continues its attack, concentrating its efforts on enveloping or
encircling the retrograding enemy force if the enemy is too strong to overrun.
An attack aggressively pushed through the hostile front may isolate major
elements and force the enemy to evacuate the entire defensive position before
he can construct a viable fall-back position.
5-118. When conducting a successful penetration, attacking units penetrate
deeper into the hostile position to attack enemy reserves, artillery, C2 cen-
ters, and lines of communication. Either the assault or a support unit attacks
the enemy’s newly exposed flanks to widen the gap. The commander sends
forces through the gap that have a high degree of tactical mobility to exploit
the advantages gained, attack the enemy from the rear, and prevent his es-
cape. At this time, the commander’s force multipliers—such as fixed-wing
aviation—concentrate on supporting the ground force exploiting the penetra-
tion.
5-119. As part of the follow through to the attack, the commander plans logi-
cal sequels to his attack. Attacking forces plan for exploitation. Exploiting
forces plan for the pursuit of a defeated enemy. Furthermore, the commander
must use his force without overextending its logistics capabilities. The com-
mander must plan to have fresh units pass around or through forward units
to sustain the momentum of the attack. He may assign these fresh units the
task of follow and support or follow and assume in an effort to maintain the
tempo of the attack. (Appendix B discusses both tactical mission tasks in
greater detail.) A commander conducting either type of offensive operation
envisions how, under what conditions, where, and when he will need to tran-
sition to the defense based on possible enemy countermoves and other events.
5-120. If the attacking unit is transitioning to a pursuit or exploitation, it
may have to bypass enemy units to maintain the operational tempo. Units
bypass enemy forces according to the previously established bypass criteria.
As a minimum, the bypassed force is left under observation or fixed in place
by other units.
5-121. If the enemy succeeds in withdrawing his major forces from action, the
commander intensifies reconnaissance to obtain the information necessary to
decide on a COA. Aggressive action may prevent the enemy from reconstitu-
ting his defense in a rearward position. The commander may have to delay
the renewal of his attack until completing additional reconnaissance so he
can formulate a tactically sound plan if the enemy succeeds in occupying new
5-28
Attack
SPECIAL PURPOSE ATTACKS

5-122. The commander can launch an attack to achieve various results or for
special purposes. These subordinate forms of an attack are—
· Ambush.
· Counterattack.
· Demonstration.
· Feint.
· Raid.
· Spoiling attack.
The commander’s intent and the factors of METT-TC determine the specific
form of attack. As attack forms, they share many of the planning, prepara-
tion, and execution considerations of the offense. This section discusses the
unique considerations of each form of attack. Demonstrations and feints,
while forms of attack, are also associated with military deception operations.
(See FM 3-13.)
AMBUSH
5-123. An ambush is a form of attack by fire or other destructive means from
concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy (FM 3-0). It
may include an assault to close with and destroy the engaged enemy force. In
an ambush, ground objectives do not have to be seized and held.
5-124. The two types of ambush are point ambush and area ambush. In a
point ambush, a unit deploys to attack a single kill zone. In an area ambush,
a unit deploys into two or more related point ambushes. A unit smaller than
a platoon does not normally conduct an area ambush.
5-125. Ambushes are cate-
gorized as either hasty or
deliberate but take place
along a continuum. A hasty
ambush is an immediate
reaction to an unexpected
opportunity conducted using
SOPs and battle drill. A de-
liberate ambush is planned
as a specific action against a
specific target. Detailed
information about the tar-
get, such as size, organiza- THE ARROW SHAFT’S BASE IS THE CENTER OF MASS
tion, and weapons and OF THE AMBUSH UNIT’S POSITION. THE ARROW POINTS
IN THE DIRECTION OF FIRE FROM THE AMBUSH UNIT.
equipment carried; route
and direction of movement; Figure 5-6. Ambush Tactical Mission Graphic
and times the target will
reach or pass certain points on its route may be available. Heavy or light
forces may conduct an ambush. (Figure 5-6 shows the tactical mission
graphic for an ambush.) Doctrine categorizes ambushes as near or far
ambushes, based on the proximity of the friendly force to the enemy.
5-29
FM 3-90
5-126. The typical goal of the ambush force is the death or capture of all ene-
my personnel located within the kill zone. Another goal could be to destroy
certain designated vehicles, such as all missile transporter-erector launchers.
Ideally, the ambush force can destroy the ambushed enemy so quickly that he
is unable to report the engagement while the ambush force accomplishes its
mission.
5-127. A typical ambush is organized into three elements: assault, support,
and security. The assault element fires into the kill zone. Its goal is to destroy
the enemy force. When used, the assault force attacks into and clears the kill
zone and may be assigned additional tasks, to include searching for items of
intelligence value, capturing prisoners, and completing the destruction of
enemy equipment to preclude its immediate reuse. The support element sup-
ports the assault element by firing into and around the kill zone, and it pro-
vides the ambush’s primary killing power. The support element attempts to
destroy the majority of enemy combat power before the assault element
moves into the objective or kill zone. The security element isolates the kill
zone, provides early warning of the arrival of any enemy relief force, and pro-
vides security for the remaining ambush force. It secures the objective rally
point and blocks enemy avenues of approach into and out of the ambush site,
which prevents the enemy from entering or leaving.
Planning an Ambush
5-128. Planning considerations for an ambush include—
· A “no-later-than” time to establish the ambush.
· A tentative ambush formation or, for an area ambush, element loca-
tions.
· Insertion and exit routes.
· A forward passage of lines and movement to the ambush site in tactical
formation.
· Location of a rally point where the ambush force can reassemble and
reorganize if required.
· Actions if the ambush is prematurely detected.
· A scheme of maneuver that maximizes engagement of the enemy’s
flank or rear, provides early warning of target approach, includes as-
sault element actions in the kill zone, and details how the ambush ele-
ment displaces from the ambush site.
· Actions at the objective,
· Obstacles to augment the effects of the friendly fire.
· A fire support plan that integrates the direct fire and obstacle plans,
which results in the enemy’s isolation, inflicts maximum damage, and
also supports forces in the rally point.
· The criteria for initiating the ambush; for example, only engage enemy
formations of the same or smaller size and withhold fire until the tar-
get moves into the kill zone.
· Any required changes to the ambushing unit’s fire distribution SOP,
based on the factors of METT-TC.
5-30
Attack
· Rear security measures.

5-129. A point ambush usually employs a line or an L-shaped formation. The
names of these formations describe deployment of the support element
around the kill zone. The kill zone is that part of an ambush site where
fires are concentrated to isolate, fix, and destroy the enemy. The
ambush formation is important because it determines whether a point
ambush can deliver the heavy volume of fire necessary to isolate and destroy
the target. The commander determines the formation to use based on the
advantages and disadvantages of each formation in relation to the factors of
METT-TC.
5-130. The as-
sault and sup- FLANK RESTRICTED BY TERRAIN
port elements AND EMPLACED OBSTACLES
generally deploy
parallel to the
KILL ZONE
target’s route of
movement—the xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxxxxxxx
long axis of the
kill zone—which
subjects the tar-
get to flanking
fire in the line
formation. (See SUPPORT ASSAULT
RLY 2
Figure 5-7.) The ELEMENT ELEMENT
size of the target SECURITY
that can be TEAMS SECURITY
trapped in the TEAM
kill zone is Figure 5-7. Linear Ambush
limited by the
size of the area that can be covered by the support element’s weapons.
Natural, manmade, and military obstacles—reinforced with tactical obstacles
integrated with direct and indirect fires—traps the target in the kill zone. A
disadvantage of the line formation is that the target may be so dispersed that
it is larger than the kill zone.
5-131. The line formation is effective in close terrain, which restricts the tar-
get’s movement, and in open terrain where one flank is blocked by existing or
reinforcing obstacles. The commander may place similar obstacles between
the assault and support elements and the kill zone to protect the ambush
force from the target’s counterambush drills. When the ambush force deploys
in a line formation, it leaves access lanes through these protective obstacles
so that it can assault the target. An advantage of the line formation is that it
is relatively easy to control under all conditions of visibility.
5-132. The L-shaped formation is a variation of the line formation. (See Fig-
ure 5-8, page 3-32.) The long leg of the “L” (assault element) is parallel to the
kill zone and provides flanking fire. An advantage of the “L” formation is that
the short leg (support element) is at the end of the kill zone and at a right an-
gle to it and blocks the enemy’s forward movement. It also provides enfilad-
ing fire that interlocks with fire from the other leg. The commander can
5-31
FM 3-90
employ an L-shaped formation on a straight stretch of trail, road, stream, or

at a sharp bend.
xxxxxx
FLANK RESTRICTED BY TERRAIN
AND EMPLACED OBSTACLES
x xxx
KILL ZONE
xx
xx
xxxx xxxxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx x
xxxxxxxxx
SUPPORT
ELEMENT
RLY 2
ASSAULT
SECURITY ELEMENT
TEAMS SECURITY
TEAM
Figure 5-8. L-Shaped Ambush
5-133. An area ambush is most effective when enemy movement is largely re-
stricted to trails or roads. The area should offer several suitable point
ambush sites. The commander selects a central ambush site around which he
can organize outlying ambushes. Once he selects his site, he must determine
the enemy’s possible avenues of approach and escape routes. He assigns
outlying point ambush sites to his subordinates to cover these avenues. Once
they occupy these sites, they report all enemy traffic going toward or away
from the central ambush site to the commander. These outlying ambushes
allow the enemy to pass through their kill zone until the commander initiates
the central ambush. Once the central ambush begins, the outlying ambushes
prevent enemy troops from escaping or entering the area. (See Figure 5-9.)
5-134. The ambush unit commander normally specifies the signals required
to control the ambush. He changes the meaning of audible and visual signals
frequently to avoid setting patterns that the enemy can recognize. Otherwise,
the enemy might recognize a signal and react in time to avoid the full effects
of the ambush. For example, if a white star cluster is always used to signal
withdrawal in a night ambush, an alert enemy might fire one and cause the
ambush force to withdraw prematurely. The subordinate elements of the
ambush unit must receive communications—in the form of signals—that re-
lay the following information:
· Target approaching, normally given by a member of the security team
to warn the ambush commander and the ambush elements of the tar-
get’s progress.
· Initiate the ambush, given by the ambush unit commander. (This sig-
nal should be a mass casualty-producing signal, such as a main gun
round from a tank, machine gun fire, the detonation of mines or explo-
sives, or other direct fire crew-served weapons.)
5-32
Attack
· Lift or shift fire, given when the target is to be assaulted; all fires must
stop or be shifted at once so that the assault element can attack before
the target can react.
· Assault, given when the assault force is to move into the kill zone and
complete its activities.
· Cease fire, given to cease all fires.
· Withdraw from the kill zone or ambush site, given when the ambush is
completed or an enemy relief force is approaching.
OUTLYING
AMBUSH
CENTRAL AMBUSH
Figure 5-9. Area Ambush
5-135. The commander uses a variety of signals to communicate this informa-

tion, such as radio transmissions, voice commands, vehicle horns, whistles, or
pyrotechnics. All signals must have at least one backup. For example, if the
signal to shift fire fails, the assault element should not attack the target un-
less it receives the backup signal. Signals sent out before initiation of the am-
bush should not expose the ambush to detection by the enemy. The
commander reviews SOP signals to see if they need to be revised or
augmented to meet specific situational requirements.
Preparation for an Ambush

5-136. Surprise, coordinated fires, and control are the keys to a successful
ambush. Surprise allows the ambush force to seize control of the situation. If
total surprise is not possible, it must be so nearly complete that the target
does not expect the ambush until it is too late to react effectively. Thorough
planning, preparation, and execution help achieve surprise.
5-137. The commander conducts a leader’s reconnaissance with key person-
nel to confirm or modify his plan. This reconnaissance should be undetected
by the enemy to preclude alerting him. If necessary, the commander modifies
the ambush plan and immediately disseminates those changes to subordinate
leaders and other affected organizations. The commander must maintain
close control during movement to, occupation of, and withdrawal from the
5-33
FM 3-90
ambush site. Control is most critical when the ambush unit is approaching
the target. Leaders enforce camouflage, noise, and light discipline.
5-138. The ambush unit’s security element remains at full alert and uses all
available observation devices to detect the enemy’s approach to the ambush
site. Each soldier’s duties within each element are rotated as necessary to
maintain alertness.
5-139. All elements of the ambush force reconnoiter their routes of with-
drawal to the selected rally point. When possible, soldiers or crews reconnoit-
er the route they will use.
5-140. The commander positions all his weapons, including mines and demo-
litions authorized by his rules of engagement, to obtain the maximum effec-
tiveness against the target in the kill zone. He coordinates all fires, including
those of supporting artillery and mortars. The goals of the support element
are to isolate the kill zone, prevent the target’s escape or reinforcement, and
deliver a large volume of highly concentrated surprise fire into the kill zone.
This fire must inflict maximum damage so the assault element can quickly
assault and destroy the target.
Execution of an Ambush
5-141. Fire discipline is a key part of any ambush. Fire must be withheld un-
til the ambush commander gives the signal to initiate the ambush. That
signal should be fire from the most deadly weapon in the ambush. Once ini-
tiated, the ambush unit delivers its fires at the maximum rate possible given
the need for accuracy. Otherwise, the assault could be delayed, giving the tar-
get time to react and increasing the possibility of fratricide. Accurate fires
help achieve surprise as well as destroy the target. When it is necessary to
assault the target, the lifting or shifting of fires must be precise. The assault
element does not conduct its assault until enemy fires or resistance has been
negated or eliminated.
5-142. If the ambush fails and the enemy pursues the ambush force, it may
have to withdraw by bounds. It should use smoke to help conceal its with-
drawal. Activating limited-duration minefields along the withdrawal routes
after the passage of the withdrawing ambush force can help stop or delay
enemy pursuit. The commander positions the support element to assist in the
withdrawal of the assault element.
5-143. On the commander’s order, the ambush force withdraws to the rally
point, reorganizes, and starts its return march. At a previously established
location, it halts and disseminates any combat information obtained as a re-
sult of the ambush to all elements of the ambush force. However, future in-
formation systems should be able to disseminate this information without the
need to halt a heavy force.
5-144. The commander or his representative debriefs the ambush force to
help identify enemy patterns of response, activities, and procedures, both in-
side and outside the ambush area once the force returns from conducting the
ambush. Patterns should be analyzed and reported to all appropriate
organizations through intelligence channels. The commander adjusts his
tactics, techniques, and procedures to account for these patterns.
5-34
Attack
COUNTERATTACK
5-145. A counterattack is a form of attack by part or all of a defending force
against an enemy attacking force, with the general objective of denying the
enemy his goal in attacking (FM 3-0). The commander directs a counter-
attack—normally conducted from a defensive posture—to defeat or destroy
enemy forces, exploit an enemy weakness, such as an exposed flank, or to re-
gain control of terrain and facilities after an enemy success. A unit conducts a
counterattack to seize the initiative from the enemy through offensive action.
A counterattacking force maneuvers to isolate and destroy a designated
enemy force. It can attack by fire into an engagement area to defeat or de-
stroy an enemy force, restore the original position, or block an enemy pene-
tration. Once launched, the counterattack normally becomes a decisive opera-
tion for the commander conducting the counterattack.
5-146. The commander plans and conducts a counterattack to attack the ene-
my when and where he is most vulnerable, while he is attempting to over-
come friendly defensive positions. Normally, the commander attempts to re-
tain his reserve or striking force to conduct a decisive counterattack once the
enemy commits his main force to the attack. The commander assigns objec-
tives to counterattacking forces when he intends for them to assault the ene-
my. He normally assigns attack-by-fire positions when he intends to counter-
attack using primarily direct and indirect fires.
5-147. The two
levels of counter-
CAT K
attacks are major

and local coun- EA Carol
#1A
terattacks. In both
cases, waiting for
the enemy to act
first may reveal
1
the enemy’s main

K#
effort and create

CA T
an assailable flank
to exploit. A de- #2
TK
fending unit con- CA
RESERVE
ducts a major
counterattack to
seize the initiative
from the enemy Figure 5-10. Major Counterattack
through offensive
action after an enemy launches his attack. A commander also conducts major
counterattacks to defeat or block an enemy penetration that endangers the
integrity of the entire defense, or to attrit the enemy by the defeat or destruc-
tion of an isolated portion of the attacking enemy. (See Figure 5-10.)
5-148. The commander of a major counterattack force typically organizes his
combined arms assets into security, reconnaissance, main body, and reserve
forces. He uses those defending forces already in contact with the enemy to
fix or contain those same enemy forces. The commander may use a force
5-35
FM 3-90
committed to the counterattack, such as the striking force in a mobile

defense, his reserve, another echelon’s reserve, or designate any other force
he deems appropriate to be the counterattack force. Any changes in task
organization should be completed in time to allow units to conduct rehearsals
with their attached or supported unit.
5-149. A commander conducts a local counterattack with whatever forces are
immediately available to retake positions that have been lost to enemy action
or to exploit a target of opportunity. The forces often consist of the reserves of
subordinates and defending forces that survive after completing their
withdrawal from lost positions. While it is unlikely that the commander
changes the task organization of the forces conducting a local counterattack,
he organizes the force into a security force and a main body. He may be able
to designate an element to conduct reconnaissance.
5-150. The counterattack force is a committed force from the beginning of the
defensive operation if the commander’s defensive scheme hinges on a counter-
attack as the defeat mechanism, such as the strike force in a mobile defense.
In this case, the commander should designate another force as his reserve.
Planning a Counterattack
5-151. The commander plans the counterattack to strike the enemy when the
enemy force is vulnerable. As the enemy force advances, the defense may
create gaps between enemy units, exposing the flanks and rear of elements of
the attacking force. Immediately after an enemy force occupies a defended po-
sition, it is often disorganized and ill prepared to meet a sudden counter-
attack. Opportunity for effective counterattacks are usually brief; the com-
mander must assess the situation rapidly, and the force must execute the
counterattack swiftly. The commander assigns objectives or attack-by-fire po-
sitions to counterattacking forces, depending on whether he intends for the
counterattacking force to close with and assault the enemy.
5-152. Major counterattack plans are normally developed as a branch or se-
quel to the main defensive plan. A major counterattack may achieve surprise
when it strikes the enemy from an unanticipated direction. For that reason
the force directed to conduct a major counterattack, such as the strike force in
a mobile defense, should be involved in developing those plans as well as any
plans to exploit potential success. Local counterattacks may or may not be
the result of previous deliberate planning.
Preparing a Counterattack
5-153. Surprise, coordinated fires, and control are the keys to a successful
counterattack. Surprise allows the counterattacking force to seize control of
the situation. If total surprise is not possible, it must be so nearly complete
that the targeted enemy force does not expect the attack until it is too late to
react effectively. Thorough planning and preparation help achieve surprise.
The commander adjusts the positioning of his ISR assets and the taskings he
gives those assets so he can determine the location and targets for his coun-
terattack.
5-36
Attack
5-154. The commander conducts a leader’s reconnaissance with key person-

nel to confirm or modify his counterattack plan. If necessary, the commander
modifies the plan and disseminates those changes to subordinate leaders and
other affected organizations. Each element of the counterattack force recon-
noiters its planned axis of advance and routes it will take if possible. The
commander maintains close control during movement to and occupation of
hide positions and this reconnaissance process so the enemy does not detect
the counterattack force prior to initiating the counterattack. Leaders enforce
camouflage, noise, and light discipline.
5-155. The commander adjusts the planned positions of his weapon systems
to obtain the maximum effectiveness against targets in the planned engage-
ment area. He coordinates all fires, including those of supporting artillery
and mortars. He wants his fires to isolate the targeted enemy force in the
planned engagement area while preventing the target’s escape or reinforce-
ment. These fires must inflict maximum damage quickly before the enemy
can respond to the counterattack.
Executing a Counterattack
5-156. A commander should not counterattack unless he has a reasonable
chance of success. The commander attempts to retain his reserve for his
decisive operation, conducted after the enemy reveals his main effort by com-
mitting the majority of his combat power. If the commander orders his re-
serve to conduct a planned counterattack, the reserve becomes a committed
force and the commander should take measures to designate or reconstitute a
new reserve.
5-157. The commander conducts the counterattack in the same manner in
which he conducts any other attack. He shifts support and priorities of fire,
designates targets to be engaged by offensive information operations. The
counterattack force also performs those activities discussed in para-
graphs 5-61 to 5-122.
5-158. Subordinate commanders initiate local counterattack with the forces
on hand when it fits within the higher commander’s intent. The conduct of a
local counterattack should be swift and violent. It should exploit any disor-
ganization on the part of the enemy, such as the confusion that temporarily
exists in an attacking force after it seizes a defended position. A rapidly
mounted local counterattack may yield better results than a more deliberate
counterattack executed by a higher echelon because of the speed at which it
can be launched.
5-159. In the face of a strong enemy penetration, a commander may conduct
local counterattacks to retain or seize positions on the shoulders of the ene-
my’s penetration. This prevents the enemy from widening the penetration
while forces from other defending units engage the penetrating enemy forces.
Holding the shoulders can also prevent the sacrifice of positional depth be-
cause the limited gap in the defensive position prevents an attacking enemy
from fully exploiting his success.
5-37
FM 3-90
DEMONSTRATIONS AND FEINTS

5-160. A demonstration is a form of attack designed to deceive the enemy as
to the location or time of the decisive operation by a display of force. Forces
conducting a demonstration do not seek contact with the enemy (FM 3-0). A
feint is a form of attack used to deceive the enemy as to the location or time of
the actual decisive operation. Forces conducting a feint seek direct fire
contact with the enemy but avoid decisive engagement (FM 3-0). A
commander uses them in conjunction with other military deception activities.
They generally attempt to deceive the enemy and induce him to move
reserves and shift his fire support to locations where they cannot im-
mediately impact the friendly decisive operation or take other actions not
conducive to the enemy’s best interests during the defense. Both forms are
always shaping operations. The commander must synchronize the conduct of
these forms of attack with higher and lower echelon plans and operations to
prevent inadvertently placing another unit at risk.
5-161. The principal difference between these forms of attack is that in a
feint the commander assigns the force an objective limited in size, scope, or
some other measure. Forces conducting a feint make direct fire contact with
the enemy but avoid decisive engagement. Forces conducting a demonstration
do not seek contact with the enemy. The planning, preparing, and executing
considerations for demonstrations and feints are the same as for the other
forms of attack.
RAID
5-162. A raid is a form of attack, usually small scale, involving a swift entry
into hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy in-
stallations. It ends with a planned withdrawal from the objective area on
mission completion (FM 3-0). A raid can also be used to support operations
designed to rescue and recover individuals and equipment in danger of cap-
ture.
5-163. A simplified chain of command is an essential organizational require-
ment. A raid usually requires a force carefully tailored to neutralize specific
enemy forces operating in the vicinity of the objective and to perform what-
ever additional functions are required to accomplish the objective of the raid.
These additional functions can consist of the demolition of bridges over major
water obstacles or the recovery of an attack helicopter pilot shot down
forward of the forward line of own troops (FLOT). The commander
incorporates any necessary support specialists during the initial planning
stage of the operation.
5-164. When a commander and his staff plan a raid, they develop COAs that
meet ethical, legal, political, and technical feasibility criteria. Planners re-
quire precise, time-sensitive, all-source intelligence. The planning process de-
termines how C2, sustainment, target acquisition and target servicing will
occur during the raid. Techniques and procedures for conducting operations
across the FLOT, given the specific factors of METT-TC expected to exist dur-
ing the conduct of the raid, are also developed. The commander and his staff
develop as many alternative COAs as time and the situation permit. They
carefully weigh each alternative. In addition to those planning considerations
5-38
Attack
associated with other offensive operations, they must determine the risks
associated with conducting the mission and possible repercussions.
5-165. Time permitting, all elements involved in a raid should be fully re-
hearsed in their functions. The key elements in determining the level of de-
tail and the opportunities for rehearsal prior to mission execution are time,
OPSEC, and deception requirements.
The Raid in Mogadishu, 3–4 October 1993

At 1530 on 3 October 1993, Task Force (TF) RANGER launched another of a
series of air assault raids designed to capture key lieutenants of Mohammed
Aidid, a clan leader and self-proclaimed general. Aidid and his clan were waging
combat operations against UN and US forces and impeding ongoing humani-
tarian efforts in Somalia. Within 30 minutes TF RANGER had captured several
key Aidid lieutenants. The raiding force’s HMMWV-equipped ground element
was notified to proceed from its assembly area and pick up the prisoners. The
ground convoy arrived at the target house, and the prisoners were loaded for the
short trip back to the US compound. However, the situation changed drastically
during the time it took for the ground convoy to arrive. Two UH-60 Black Hawks
had been shot down. In response, TF RANGER attempted to secure the crash
sites and was immediately drawn into a series of intense ambushes. The ground
convoy with their prisoners could never link up with other task force elements.
After several attempts, it arrived with its prisoners back at the US compound at
1818, having suffered almost 70-percent casualties. The commitment of the
reaction force was delayed due to the fact that it was not fully briefed (for OPSEC
reasons) and was not under direct US control. Failure to maintain a substantial
reserve when the situation is not well known and lack of unity of command contri-
buted significantly to TF RANGER’s losses that day when the operation quickly
transitioned from a raid to a relief of an encircled force.
SPOILING ATTACK
5-166. A spoiling attack is a form of attack that preempts or seriously im-
pairs an enemy attack while the enemy is in the process of planning or pre-
paring to attack (FM 3-0). The objective of a spoiling attack is to disrupt the
enemy’s offensive capabilities and timelines while destroying his personnel
and equipment, not to secure terrain and other physical objectives. (See
Figure 5-11, page 3-40.) A commander conducts a spoiling attack whenever
possible during friendly defensive operations to strike the enemy while he is
in assembly areas or attack positions preparing for his own offensive
operation or is temporarily stopped. It usually employs heavy, attack
helicopter, or fire support elements to attack enemy assembly positions in
front of the friendly commander’s main line of resistance or battle positions.
5-167. The commander’s reasons for conducting a spoiling attack include—
· Disrupt the enemy’s offensive preparations.
· Destroy key assets that the enemy requires to attack, such as his fire
support systems, fuel and ammunition stocks, and bridging equipment.
· Gain additional time for the defending force to prepare its positions.
· Reduce the enemy’s current advantage in the correlation of forces.
5-39
FM 3-90
The commander synchronizes the conduct of the spoiling attack with his
other defensive operations.
5-168. The commander can employ his reserves in a spoiling attack to throw
the enemy’s offensive preparations off stride. He assumes the risk of not
having a reserve or designates another force as his reserve in this case. The
following basic considerations affect the spoiling attack:
· The commander may want to limit the size of the force used in execut-
ing the spoiling attack.
· Spoiling attacks are not conducted if the loss or destruction of the
friendly attacking force would jeopardize the commander’s ability to ac-
complish his defensive mission.
· The mobility of the force available for the spoiling attack should be
equal to or greater than that of the targeted enemy force.
· Operations by artillery or aviation systems to prevent enemy elements
not in contact from interfering with the spoiling attack are necessary to
ensure the success of the operation.
AO ROTTEN
OBJ
F
FALEN
F
ENY
ENY
Figure 5-11. Spoiling Attack
5-169. There are two conditions that must be met to conduct a successful and
survivable spoiling attack:
· The spoiling attack’s objective must be obtainable prior to the enemy
being able to respond to the attack in a synchronized and coordinated
manner.
· The commander must prevent the force conducting the spoiling attack
from becoming overextended.
If the spoiling attack fails to meet both conditions, it will likely fail, with
grave consequences to the defense.
5-40
Chapter 6
Exploitation
The most important goal of our action is the destruction of the enemy
to the last limit of possibility
Field Marshal Prince Mikhail I. Kutuzov
Exploitation is a type of offensive operation that usually follows a suc-

cessful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth
(FM 3-0). Commanders at all echelons exploit successful offensive actions.
Attacks that succeed in annihilating a defending enemy are rare. Failure
to aggressively exploit success at every turn may give the enemy time to
reconstitute an effective defense by shifting his forces or by regaining the
initiative through a counterattack. Therefore, every offensive operation
not restricted by higher authority or lack of resources should be followed
without delay by bold exploitation. The commander designs his exploita-
tion to maintain pressure on the enemy, compound and take advantage of
his disorganization, shatter his will to resist, and seize decisive or key
terrain.
6-1. Exploitation is the

primary means of trans- CONTENTS
lating tactical success Organization of Forces ................................ 6-2
into operational advan- Reconnaissance and Security................. 6-4
tage. It reinforces enemy Combat Support and Combat Service
force disorganization and Support ...................................................... 6-4
confusion in the enemy’s Control Measures ......................................... 6-5
command and control Planning an Exploitation.............................. 6-6
(C2) system caused by Executing an Exploitation.......................... 6-10
tactical defeat. It is an in- Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact ....... 6-12
tegral part of the concept Disrupt the Enemy.................................. 6-12
of the offense. The psych- Fix the Enemy ......................................... 6-13
ological effect of tactical Maneuver................................................. 6-13
defeat creates confusion Follow Through....................................... 6-14
and apprehension
throughout the enemy C2 structure and reduces the enemy’s ability to react.
Exploitation takes advantage of this reduction in enemy capabilities to make
permanent what would be only a temporary tactical effect if exploitation were
not conducted. Exploitation may be decisive.
6-2. Those plan, prepare, and execute concepts introduced previously con-
tinue to apply during an exploitation. Assessment concepts described in
FM 6-0 and FM 6-22 also apply. The commander modifies these concepts as
necessary to reflect the specific existing factors of METT-TC.
6-1
FM 3-90
6-3. Local exploitation by the committed force follows a successful attack. A

unit conducts a local exploitation when it capitalizes on whatever tactical op-
portunities it creates in the course of accomplishing its assigned offensive
mission. Whenever possible, the lead attacking unit transitions directly to the
exploitation after accomplishing its mission in a local exploitation. If this is
not feasible, the commander can pass fresh forces (follow and assume) into
the lead. The commander acts quickly to capitalize on local successes. Al-
though such local exploitations may appear insignificant, their cumulative ef-
fects can be decisive. Subordinate commanders, working within a higher com-
mander’s intent, can use their initiative to launch an exploitation. When a
commander initiates a local exploitation, he informs his higher headquarters
to keep that commander informed of his intentions. This prevents the inad-
vertent disruption of the higher echelon’s battle or campaign and allows the
higher headquarters to assess the possibility of general collapse and to direct
the initiation of pursuit operations.
6-4. Conduct of a major exploitation is a specific contingency mission as-
signed to a large unit in anticipation of offensive success by another unit of
equivalent size. Divisions and brigades are the echelons that conduct a major
exploitation although a corps can conduct a major exploitation as part of a
multicorps operation.
6-5. The forces conducting an attack are also the forces that initially exploit
that attack’s success. Typically, the commander does not assign a subordinate
unit the mission of exploitation before starting a movement to contact (MTC)
or an attack. The commander reorganizes his unit internally to reflect the
existing factors of METT-TC when the opportunity to exploit success occurs.
He uses fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) to conduct actions on contact. (See
Chapter 4 for a discussion of actions on contact.) If a commander needs addi-
tional resources to support the exploitation, he requests them from the appro-
priate headquarters. The additional resources may include intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to help identify targets for attack,
as well as attack helicopters and controlled munitions, such as the Army tac-
tical missile system, to attack identified targets. Each exploitation force
should be large enough to protect itself from those enemy forces it expects to
encounter. It should also be a reasonably self-sufficient combined arms force
capable of operations beyond the supporting range of the main body.
6-6. The units that create an opportunity to exploit should not be expected to
perform the exploitation to an extended depth. If the commander plans to
exploit with a specific subordinate unit, he must specify the degree of damage
or risk to that force he is willing to accept in the course of the current
operation. If the initially attacking units incur significant losses of combat
power, the commander should replace them as soon as possible. When the
exploiting force’s combat power weakens because of fatigue, disorganization,
or attrition, or when it must hold ground or resupply, the commander should
continue the exploitation with a fresh force. In both cases, the replacement
force should have a high degree of tactical mobility so it can conduct the ex-
ploitation.
6-2
Exploitation
6-7. The exploitation may be more effective if the commander can commit ad-
ditional forces and assign them the task of either follow and support or follow
and assume. The commander assigns follow and support missions to units
designated to assist exploiting forces by relieving them of tasks that would
slow their advances. The lead unit and any follow and assume or follow and
support units exchange liaison teams to facilitate the transfer of responsibili-
ties. Units designated to follow and assume conduct a forward passage of
lines and replace the initial exploiting forces when they approach their culmi-
nating point. Normally, the next higher commander retains control of the
forces performing the tasks of follow and support or follow and assume. (Ap-
pendix B expands the discussion of these tasks.) When possible, units as-
signed these tasks should possess mobility equal to that of the exploiting unit
or receive additional engineers and transportation assets to provide the nec-
essary mobility. Once organized, they are committed forces and should re-
ceive habitually associated artillery, air defense, engineer, and other combat
support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) forces in accordance with the
factors of METT-TC. In an exploitation operation projected to cross signifi-
cant distances, the commander may attach elements of a follow and support
unit to the exploiting force to ensure unity of command and effort.
6-8. Since an exploitation operation typically covers a wider front than an at-
tacking force, fire support assets may find their supported elements operating
outside normal supporting ranges. They must displace forward to ensure the
continued provision of fires on and beyond enemy formations, which may
cause some difficulty in supporting the exploiting force’s flank elements. To
provide the required support, these fire support units, as well as independ-
ently operating assets, can be attached to subordinate elements of the exploit-
ing force. Otherwise, the commander can move additional reinforcing fire
support units and systems forward to fill the void.
6-9. Responsive air defense coverage provides rapid transition to an exploita-
tion without the loss of momentum. The commander plans on repositioning
his air defense artillery assets to ensure this responsiveness. Adequate mo-
bile air defense units should accompany exploiting forces. Air defense ar-
rangements for the initial attack are likely to remain effective throughout the
exploitation. However, when the commander extends his formations and as-
sets to cover more area, the air defense coverage becomes less effective. The
commander needs to consider the risks associated with moving out from
under his air defense artillery umbrella. Alternatively, he can request adjust-
ments in the air defense coverage of higher echelons. Counterair operations
by the other services (USAF, USN, and USMC) may provide the desired de-
gree of air defense protection. The commander can use available air interdic-
tion and close air support by fixed-wing aircraft to augment or replace Army
fire support assets during an exploitation.
6-10. The exploitation mission demands a force with a significant mobility
advantage over the enemy. Attack helicopters and air assault assets may con-
stitute a portion of the exploiting force’s combat power. They are extremely
useful in seizing defiles, crossing obstacles, and otherwise capitalizing on
their mobility to attack and cut off disorganized enemy elements. They can
also seize or control key terrain such as important river-crossing sites or vital
enemy transportation nodes along the exploiting force’s route of advance into
6-3
FM 3-90
and through the enemy’s rear area. The commander integrates combat engi-
neers into the exploiting force to help breach obstacles; keep ground forces
maneuvering, and provide countermobility protection to the flanks. Typical,
problems that degrade an exploiting force’s mobility are minefields and other
obstacles. The commander also uses engineers to keep his supply routes open.
6-11. The commander retains only those reserves necessary to ensure his
flexibility of operation, continued momentum in the advance, and likely ene-
my responses to the exploitation. (Chapter 5 discusses employment considera-
tions for the reserve.)
RECONNAISSANCE AND SECURITY

6-12. When a commander initiates an exploitation operation, the exact ene-
my situation may not be clearly known or understood. The commander estab-
lishes a reconnaissance force to gain and maintain enemy contact. He comple-
ments his reconnaissance effort with sensors and surveillance assets and
intelligence products produced by adjacent, higher, and lower echelons to
maintain his situational understanding of the strength, dispositions, capabili-
ties, and intentions of all significant enemy elements within his area of inter-
est. The commander normally emphasizes reconnaissance more than security
operations when conducting an exploitation. Nevertheless, since the exploit-
ing force moves independently, he addresses the security needs of that force.
6-13. The commander assigns the appropriate security missions to his desig-
nated security forces the same way he would for an MTC. (See Chapter 4.) An
exploiting corps or division commander typically organizes his forward-most
security element into a covering force to protect the main body’s movement
and develop the situation before he commits his main body. These security
elements respond directly to him.
6-14. If an exploiting force is unable to resource a covering force for indepen-
dent operations, it may use an advance guard in place of a covering force.
This is typical for a brigade conducting an exploitation on its own. In some
cases when the higher echelon (corps or division) creates a covering force, a
brigade may still push out an advance guard behind the covering force. This
normally occurs when subordinate units in an exploitation advance in multi-
ple parallel columns.
COMBAT SUPPORT AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

6-15. Combat support and combat service support arrangements must be ex-
tremely flexible during exploitation operations. In the conduct of exploitation
operations directed against uncommitted enemy forces or in exploitation op-
erations directed along diverging lines of advance, the commander commonly
attaches CS and CSS units to the exploiting maneuver force. Alternatively,
the support assets can follow the exploiting force in an echeloned manner
along main supply routes (MSRs). Transportation and supplies to sustain the
force become increasingly important as the exploitation progresses. As supply
lines lengthen, the condition of lines of communications and the conduct of
route and convoy security can become problems. The largest possible stocks of
fuel, spare parts, and ammunition should accompany the force so that it does
not lose momentum because of a lack of support. The exploitation effort may
6-4
Exploitation
be limited more by vehicle mechanical failures and the need for fuel than by
combat losses or a lack of ammunition. Therefore, direct support maintenance
support teams accompany the exploiting force to assess the problem and re-
pair disabled vehicles within a limited time period or evacuate them to main-
tenance collection points for repair by general support maintenance units.
The commander should consider using his utility and cargo helicopters to
move critical supplies forward during the exploitation.
CONTROL MEASURES
6-16. An exploitation uses fewer control measures than many other opera-
tions because of the uncertain enemy situation and the need to provide
subordinate commanders with the maximum possible flexibility to take ad-
vantage of fleeting opportunities. (See Figure 6-1.) Planners develop graphic
control measures as part of the planning process. The commander issues
these control measures as part of the attack order to facilitate C2 when the
force transitions to an exploitation.
PL KATELIN
X X
PL KATELIN
OBJ
OBJ
STETSON
BUCK
XX
XX
PL KEVIN PL KEVIN
021230ZJAN01
PL ARIC 010730ZJAN01 PL ARIC
Figure 6-1. Exploitation Control Measures in a Contiguous AO
6-17. A unit conducting an exploitation normally operates in the same area of

operations (AO) it was assigned for the attack. The exploiting unit assigns
subordinate units their own AOs. Boundaries between subordinate units may
change often to take advantage of opportunities. Since an exploiting unit de-
ploys both reconnaissance and security forces, the commander must rapidly
adjust his boundaries as the exploiting force advances. The commander desig-
nates obstacle-restricted areas to prevent friendly obstacles from hindering
the movement of the exploiting force. He designates obstacle zones on the
flanks of the exploiting force’s movement corridors to enhance his security.
He uses phase lines and subsequent objectives to control the conduct of the
exploitation. The commander uses objectives to orient the movement of ex-
ploiting forces. Although an exploitation may result in taking a terrain objec-
tive, the primary focus should be on destroying the enemy force. The com-
mander may establish a limit of advance if he can anticipate a culminating
6-5
FM 3-90
point or some other restriction, such as political considerations regarding an

international border, which requires its establishment.
6-18. A commander normally employs permissive fire support control meas-
ures during an exploitation. A coordinated fire line (CFL) ensures rapid re-
sponse. Movement of the CFL is particularly important to provide adequate
support as the force continues to advance. Even if the culmination of the ex-
ploitation is not anticipated, establishing a forward boundary is important to
facilitate operations beyond that boundary by a higher headquarters. The
commander can use additional control measures, such as targets and check-
points, as required.
PLANNING AN EXPLOITATION
6-19. The commander’s ability to deny the enemy options by proactive use of
his battlefield operating systems is critical to a successful exploitation. He
does this by arranging his battlefield operating systems within his opponent’s
time and space relationship in accordance with the factors of METT-TC.
6-20. The commander must plan for the decentralized execution of an exploi-
tation. His commander’s intent is especially important because subordinates
must be able to exercise initiative in a rapidly changing, fluid situation. The
commander must state the purpose of the exploitation, which may be to force
the retrograde of enemy forces from an area, encircle enemy forces so they
cannot withdraw, or destroy enemy artillery and other fire support systems.
The intent must describe the desired end state. That intent will also deter-
mine his decisive and shaping operations and guide the designation of his
main effort at any given point.
6-21. A clear commander’s intent provides subordinates with guidance on
how to integrate their operations into the overall operations of the higher
headquarters. Only subordinates who can act quickly can seize all opportuni-
ties to damage the enemy or accelerate the tempo of operations. A command-
er should place minimal restrictions on his subordinates. These may include
clear instructions regarding the seizure of key terrain and the size of enemy
forces that may be bypassed. Reliable, secure communications between the
exploiting force, the follow and support force, and the commander facilitate
coordination that can maximize the impact of the exploitation. However, all
subordinates should have a clear picture of the desired end state to conduct
operations that support it, even if communications are lost.
6-22. Planning for an exploitation begins during the preparation phase of all
offensive operations. To avoid losing critical time during the transition from
an MTC or an attack to an exploitation, the commander tentatively identifies
forces, objectives, and AOs for subordinate units before the offensive opera-
tion begins. When the opportunity to exploit occurs, brigade and higher-
echelon commanders should initiate the exploitation, either as a branch of or
a sequel to the existing operation. The commander’s plan should attempt to
avoid driving the enemy back in the direction of his own sustaining base.
6-23. During exploitation planning and execution, the commander balances
the exploiting force’s need for speed and momentum against its need for se-
curity as it begins to move beyond supporting range of the rest of the force.
6-6
Exploitation
The commander must be careful not to allow an exploiting force to move out-
side of his main body’s supporting distance. Determining the supporting dis-
tance requires some knowledge of the enemy’s remaining capabilities. Gener-
ally, the commander should approach exploitation planning with a sense of
guarded optimism. It is an excellent opportunity to shatter enemy cohesion
and gain a position of advantage over the enemy. However, the commander
cannot allow the exploiting force to fall into an enemy trap where it could be
drawn into a salient and destroyed in detail.
6-24. The exploitation may take the form of an MTC with a series of hasty at-
tacks. The commander usually issues a series of FRAGOs that designate—
· Movement formation.
· The position of each major element of the exploiting force within that
formation.
· Any required modifications to task organization.
· Bypass criteria.
· Revised or new control measures that assist with the maneuver, such
as objectives, boundary changes, a limit of advance (LOA), and FSCM.
X X
II
X
II XX
XX
ENY I I I
ENY
ENY I I I II
ENY
ENY ENY
II
X
II
Figure 6-2. Brigade Exploitation: Battalions in Column Formation
6-25. Exploiting forces normally maneuver on a wide front and on at least

two axes. The forces on each axis are capable of independent action, de-
pending on the mobility of the force, the road net, and other aspects of the
terrain. In some cases, rather than assigning subordinates their own AOs, the
commander may designate a movement formation for his entire unit so he
can concentrate all his combat power against a specific enemy element. In
this case, the commander normally adopts a variation of the column, line, or
vee formation. (Chapter 3 discusses combat formations.) (Figure 6-2 shows a
brigade conduct an exploitation with its battalions in column.) Movement on
parallel routes is preferred; however, the terrain and the enemy situation
may force the exploiting force to advance in a column formation. Generally,
using a column in the exploitation emphasizes flexibility at the expense of
placing maximum firepower forward.
6-7
FM 3-90
6-26. In exceptional circumstances, when the enemy is clearly incapable of ef-

fectively resisting, the commander can choose temporarily not to retain a re-
serve but commit all his forces to the exploitation. He may employ a line
formation with two or more elements abreast without a reserve when the ap-
proach to the objective must be made on as wide a front as possible. For ex-
ample, a commander could use this formation when attempting to secure
crossing sites over a major river. (See Figure 6-3.) He could also employ this
formation against sporadic and weakening resistance when the enemy lacks a
significant counterattack capability or when the counterattack can be blocked
by means other than employing the reserve. Despite the lack of a constituted
reserve, other actions, such as the effective employment of massed indirect
fires, can provide the commander with the flexibility usually provided by the
reserve for influencing actions during an exploitation.
ENY
XX
XXX
ENY XXX
XX
XX
X X X
Figure 6-3. Division Exploitation: Brigades Abreast, No Reserve
6-27. A vee formation with two or more elements abreast and a reserve al-
lows the unit to advance on a reasonably wide front with the bulk of the unit’s
direct firepower oriented forward. This configuration helps when creating
gaps in the enemy’s defenses. While the bulk of the unit is committed, the re-
serve is available to exploit the success of the attacking elements, assume the
mission of the attacking elements, or counter enemy threats as they develop.
(See Figure 6-4.)
6-28. Because of the need to rapidly transition from an attack to an exploita-
tion, fire support planning for the exploitation must take place as part of the
planning for the attack. The commander establishes links between his mili-
tary intelligence, reconnaissance, attack aviation, field artillery, offensive in-
formation operations, and supporting fixed-wing assets to expedite the detec-
tion and delivery of effects against situationally dependant high-priority tar-
gets. He selects those targets regardless of their location within the enemy’s
defensive area to support the exploitation. During the exploitation, there is
little time to revise target lists. Target considerations are similar in nature to
those of an MTC. In addition, the exploitation requires a flexible, responsive,
and redundant fire control net that must be planned in advance. Coordina-
tion with the echelon intelligence officer is critical as the situation develops
6-8
Exploitation
into exploitation. The exploiting force templates known enemy locations with-
in its AO as danger areas and targets them.
X X
II
XX
XX
ENY II
III II
ENY
ENY I I I
ENY
II
ENY ENY
X
II
Figure 6-4. Brigade Exploitation: Two Battalions Forward, One in Reserve
6-29. The fire support plan includes allocating support for meeting engage-
ments or hasty attacks that occur during the exploitation. The fire support co-
ordinator plans targets beyond the projected locations of the exploiting ma-
neuver force to shield the force from enemy counterattacks. He then
addresses how to provide fire support to the force in its movement to the LOA
and targets locations beyond the LOA to interdict the enemy’s lines of com-
munication (LOCs).
6-30. The commander plans for artillery displacement as an integral part of
the exploitation. Artillery assets must displace at a pace that exceeds normal
offensive operations, while maintaining the capability to provide accurate and
lethal fires. The commander can normally plan on his forces using less am-
munition during an exploitation than in an attack because fleeing enemy
forces are normally not in prepared positions, and thus more vulnerable. The
commander should also consider using close air support in the exploitation,
especially to support those units moving beyond supporting range of the main
body. Airborne forward air controllers can help identify and track high-payoff
targets forward of the exploiting force.
6-31. The commander plans situational obstacles for each phase of the opera-
tion. For example, he plans in accordance with his rules of engagement to em-
place scatterable minefields in those areas that could be used by an enemy
counterattack force as his forces move forward.
6-32. The enemy may be willing to commit his aircraft against a friendly ex-
ploitation that endangers the viability of his defense, buying him time to
prepare a defense while weakening the friendly force. The commander plans
to move his air defense assets with priority of protection to the decisive opera-
tion. He also uses them to protect his lines of communication from enemy air
6-9
FM 3-90
attack, thereby allowing his CS and CSS elements to keep pace with the oper-
ation. Planning must address how to rapidly resupply air defense missiles as
they are used. It must also allow for adjustments in the priority of protection
assigned to different elements during the exploitation.
6-33. The commander must anticipate the exploitation and ensure that his
logistics plan supports the force all the way to the LOA. Planning for CSS in
the exploitation includes designating future MSRs, logistics release points,
unit maintenance collection points, casualty collection points, medical treat-
ment facilities, ambulance exchange points , and the depositing of enemy
prisoners of war. In sustaining the exploitation, petroleum, oil, and lubricants
(POL) consumption and vehicle maintenance are primary concerns of CSS
planners. A significant factor is that an exploiting force tends to travel on a
broad front, which may necessitate designating one or more lateral MSRs to
handle the dispersion. Logistics operations must be prepared to bound their
CSS assets farther forward and move them more often than in an attack.
6-34. Selecting a flexible MSR is critical because it must be able to respond to
changes in the direction of the exploitation. Maintaining the MSR is a respon-
sibility of the force engineer. During planning, the commander must specifi-
cally address the control of logistics units and convoys. He calls them forward
and redirects them as needed. He may have to plan for guides to assist their
movement around bypassed enemy positions and obstacles. He may assign
some combat elements from the reserve an “on-order” mission to conduct rear
area security to help protect CSS elements or secure the MSR. The command-
er must also ensure adequate plans exist for controlling displaced civilians on
the battlefield so that they do not interfere with follow-on maneuver, CS, and
CSS assets. This is a critical function of civil-military operations.
EXECUTING AN EXPLOITATION
6-35. Exploitation requires physical and mental aggressiveness to combat the
friction of limited visibility, fatigue, bad weather, dangers of fratricide, and
extended operations. It requires bold and aggressive reconnaissance, prompt
use of firepower, and rapid employment of previously uncommitted units. Ex-
ploiting forces maneuver swiftly toward their objectives, sever escape routes,
and strike at enemy command posts, communications nodes, reserves,
artillery, and CS units to prevent the enemy from reorganizing an effective
defense. Well supported by tactical air support, air cavalry, and attack heli-
copters, exploiting forces should be able to change direction on short notice.
6-36. To maintain sufficient forces to conduct an exploitation, the commander
must ensure that his subordinates focus on his intent. They should not dissi-
pate his combat power by seeking minor tactical successes or reducing incon-
sequential enemy forces. His aim is to reach the final objective with the
maximum possible strength as rapidly as possible. The commander must
provide his exploiting forces with mobile support, including air resupply, to
move emergency lifts of POL and ammunition.
6-37. The transition from attack to exploitation may be so gradual that it is
hardly distinguishable; it may also be abrupt. The abrupt transition may oc-
cur when a force uses massed quantities of precision munitions, achieves sur-
prise, or overwhelms a much weaker enemy force. Normally, exploitation
6-10
Exploitation
occurs after the force secures its objective. With adequate support, the com-
mander can launch the exploitation with his initial assault or at any time
after that, depending on the effects of the fires and his desires.
6-38. Since the exploitation takes advantage of previous success, forces
previously allocated toward attacking enemy forces normally continue their
ongoing activities. These activities include—
· Attrition or defeat of enemy reserves prior to their commitment.
· Destruction of enemy countermobility assets prior to their employment
on a friendly avenue of advance for the exploiting force.
· Disruption of enemy units attempting to reestablish a coherent de-
fense.
· Disruption of enemy sustaining operations.
This assumes the commander has accurate intelligence data to target these
enemy actions.
6-39. Generally, as one part of the attacking force finishes clearing an objec-
tive, the commander orders the remaining elements to exploit that success.
To accomplish this with minimal confusion, the commander must know where
each of his elements is and what combat formation each has adopted. If the
commander has previously trained and rehearsed his force to change rapidly
from one combat formation to another, to change missions, and to change the
direction of advance, he can time the execution of such changes to maintain
the initiative over an enemy.
6-40. The commander can also initiate an exploitation when he realizes that
the enemy force is having difficulty maintaining its position or cohesion. Up-
dated intelligence is crucial to the commander since it is difficult to accu-
rately predict the exact conditions required to transition from an attack to an
exploitation. Therefore, the commander and his subordinates watch the
enemy’s defenses for indications of disintegration that may signal the oppor-
tunity to transition to exploitation. Such indicators include—
· The threat or use of weapons of mass destruction by enemy forces, de-
spite the probable US retaliation, may signal impending enemy col-
lapse.
· Enemy reconnaissance intensifies.
· Rearward movement increases, especially by fire support and reserves.
· The enemy prepares to demolish or destroy his facilities, installations,
equipment, and supply stockpiles.
· Various units intermix their vehicles and personnel in combat forma-
tions or march columns.
· Number of prisoners captured increases significantly.
· Enemy fire decreases in intensity and effectiveness.
· Fires increase in one or more individual sectors of the front that do not
appear to be synchronized with the developing situation and at a time
when the amount of defensive fires appears to be decreasing.
· Enemy resistance decreases considerably, or the enemy lacks any type
of organized defense.
· Amount of abandoned enemy war materiel encountered increases sig-
nificantly.
6-11
FM 3-90
· Reports confirm the capture or absence of enemy leaders.

· Friendly forces overrun enemy artillery, C2 facilities, and supply
points.
· Enemy units disintegrate and friendly companies and battalions can
defeat enemy battalion- and brigade-size units, respectively.
In any case, the commander ruthlessly exploits vulnerable enemy forces after
weighing and accommodating the risks.

6-41. The exploiting force must gain and maintain contact with the enemy.
This is a critical aspect of the exploitation since the enemy may be trying to
break contact and distance himself from the friendly force to give him time to
recover. After a successful attack, the exploiting force must perform aggres-
sive reconnaissance to both its front and flanks. Mission and intent of exploi-
tation determine how much enemy contact is required to maintain pressure
on him, compound his disorganization, shatter his will, and seize key or deci-
sive terrain. As discussed in Chapter 5, this reconnaissance effort must start
almost immediately after an attacking unit secures its objective. If the com-
mander has dedicated reconnaissance assets, he uses them to maintain ene-
my contact, observe the enemy’s movements, and search for weakly defended
enemy positions. If those assets are not available, other maneuver units per-
form those reconnaissance tasks. While maintaining contact with the enemy,
the reconnaissance force tries to locate enemy reserves, uncommitted forces,
and blocking positions. This effort helps the exploiting force avoid being led
into ambushes as the enemy seeks to recover the initiative by counter-
attacking.
6-42. When the previously assigned offensive mission is accomplished, units
at all echelons push out their reconnaissance and security forces to discover
whether the opportunity exists to initiate an exploitation. At brigade and bat-
talion echelons, these reconnaissance and security forces must gain and
maintain enemy contact while remaining within the supporting range of their
parent brigade or battalion.
6-43. The commander uses air reconnaissance to augment his ground recon-
naissance. He can employ aerial sensors, such as JSTARS, air cavalry, and
unmanned aerial vehicles in advance of ground maneuver reconnaissance.
This allows aerial observation of named and targeted areas of interest that
facilitate the unit’s movement and cue the attack of high-payoff targets. Scout
and attack helicopters can locate enemy positions and engage the enemy to
disrupt his movement and preparations. Aviation assets surge to maintain
constant contact with the enemy and keep pressure on him.
DISRUPT THE ENEMY

6-44. Exploitation presumes the enemy has already been somewhat disrup-
ted. An exploitation seeks to maintain or increase this disruption by
preventing the enemy from effectively reconstituting his defenses. At the
division and corps levels, the commander combines the effects of his
operations against enemy reserves and uncommitted forces with the rapid
maneuver of his close combat forces to maintain this disruption. Attack
6-12
Exploitation
helicopters can maneuver in front of exploiting ground maneuver forces to

destroy high-payoff targets. The commander integrates available fixed-wing
aircraft into his plan for attacking these targets. Rapid advances by the
exploiting force keep the enemy force off balance and degrade his intelligence
and surveillance capabilities, thus providing some security from attack. The
commander uses all available resources to maintain pressure on the enemy,
using both overwhelming combat power and asymmetric weapon systems.
The commander never allows the enemy an opportunity to recover from the
initial blow. The exploiting force’s fire support system must deliver massed
fires quickly to respond to any contingencies that arise during the
exploitation.
FIX THE ENEMY

6-45. An exploiting force has three goals in fixing an enemy force. First, it
tries to break down the enemy’s combined arms organization by fixing enemy
units in positions out of supporting distance of each other. This allows the ex-
ploiting force to defeat the enemy in detail. Second, the commander attacks
out-of-contact enemy forces before they can adversely affect the exploitation.
By attacking these enemy forces, the commander seeks to fix them in their
current positions or force them to move to locations where they can be harm-
lessly contained until the exploiting force or a follow and support force can
engage and defeat them. Third, it achieves a specific targeting effect—such as
causing 15-percent casualties—that disrupts the enemy commander’s plan.
MANEUVER
6-46. During an exploitation, the exploiting force maneuvers to maintain
pressure on the enemy. The commander can use any heavy and mobile light
forces, such as airborne and air assault elements, to secure terrain objectives
or choke points critical to the advance and to cut enemy lines of escape. The
commander takes advantage of available vertical envelopment capabilities.
The exploiting force clears only enough of its AO to permit its advance. It cuts
through enemy logistics units and LOCs to seize objectives vital to the
enemy’s defense. It attacks from the march to overrun weak enemy forma-
tions. In accordance with the bypass criteria, the exploiting force can contain
and bypass those enemy pockets of resistance too small to jeopardize the
mission while its commander reports these enemy forces to adjacent units,
following units, and higher headquarters.
6-47. If an enemy unit is too strong for the leading elements of the exploiting
force to overrun and destroy, succeeding elements of the force conduct a hasty
attack based on the combat information provided by its leading elements.
Such enemy forces are rarely attacked frontally. In almost all cases, the com-
mander uses another form of maneuver to produce faster and better results
with fewer casualties. While the exploiting force is seeking one or more as-
sailable flanks, available fire support systems continue to engage the enemy
to divert attention from the attempted envelopment and destroy as much ene-
my combat power as possible.
6-48. The exploiting force may face prepared belts of defensive positions in
depth when it is exploiting the initial success of the attack. Therefore, the ex-
ploiting force must move rapidly to attack and destroy the enemy before he
6-13
FM 3-90
can settle into his subsequent or supplemental positions. The more rapidly
this can be done, the less likely it is that succeeding defensive lines will be
fully prepared and the less effort it will take to penetrate each successive de-
fensive position. The exploiting force repeats this process as many times as
necessary until it breaks completely through the enemy’s defenses.
6-49. The commander’s primary concern when initiating an exploitation re-
sulting from a successful attack is to shift his force into the appropriate com-
bat formation and task-organize it with additional capabilities and resources
to take advantage of a short window of opportunity. Assuming that the force
accomplishes this with relative ease, he must control the formation as it
moves and prevent its overextension. The commander must anticipate the
enemy’s reaction to his actions. The real danger to the exploiting force is not
the immediate enemy but the enemy not yet engaged. Overextension is a risk
inherent in exploitation. While the commander must be concerned with this,
he must also guard against being overcautious.
6-50. Surrender appeals and ultimatums are particularly effective when di-
rected against enemy units that have been surrounded, isolated, or bypassed.
JP 3-53 and FM 3-05.30 detail the techniques for communicating with the
enemy.
6-51. While the exploiting force is conducting its operations, the follow and
support force, if available—
· Widens or secures the shoulders of a penetration.
· Destroys bypassed enemy units.
· Relieves supported units that have halted to contain enemy forces.
· Blocks the movement of enemy reinforcements.
· Opens and secures lines of communications.
· Guards prisoners, key areas, installations, and lines of communication.
· Controls dislocated civilians.
FOLLOW THROUGH
6-52. Once the exploitation begins, forces move to attack enemy forces with-
out any operational pauses. Exploitation continues around the clock so the
enemy cannot escape the relentless offensive pressure. The exploiting force
retains terrain only as necessary to accomplish its mission. The commander
must be careful not to dissipate combat power to achieve minor tactical suc-
cesses or to reduce small enemy forces. Once he reaches the LOA, the com-
mander quickly shifts his attention to survivability and countermobility be-
cause of the possibility of an enemy counterattack.
6-53. At some point a unit conducting an exploitation reaches a culminating
point or transitions to a pursuit. Culmination can occur for the variety of
reasons, such as friendly losses or the enemy’s commitment of his reserve.
The commander, when he makes an assessment that his force is approaching
culmination, should transition to another type of operation. On the other
hand, a pursuit enables the commander to complete his destruction of the
enemy.
6-14
Chapter 7
Pursuit
In pursuit you must always stretch possibilities to the limit. Troops
having beaten the enemy will want to rest. They must be given as ob-
jectives, not those that you think they will reach, but the farthest they
could possibly reach.
Field Marshal Viscount Allenby of Meggido, Order to XXI Corps, 1917
A pursuit is an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile

force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (JP 1-02). Pur-
suit operations begin when an enemy force attempts to conduct retro-
grade operations. At that point, it becomes most vulnerable to the loss of
internal cohesion and complete destruction. A pursuit aggressively exe-
cuted leaves the enemy trapped, unprepared, and unable to defend, faced
with the options of surrendering or complete destruction. The rapid
shifting of units, continuous day and night movements, hasty attacks,
containment of bypassed enemy forces, large numbers of prisoners, and a
willingness to forego some synchronization to maintain contact with and
pressure on a fleeing enemy characterize this type of offensive operation.
Pursuit requires swift maneuver and attacks by forces to strike the ene-
my’s most vulnerable areas. A successful pursuit requires flexible forces,
initiative by commanders at all levels, and the maintenance of a high op-
erational tempo during execution.
7-1. The enemy may con-

duct a retrograde when CONTENTS
successful friendly offen- Organization of Forces ................................ 7-2
sive operations have shat- Frontal ....................................................... 7-3
tered his defense. In ad- Combination.............................................. 7-4
dition, the enemy may Control Measures ......................................... 7-5
deliberately conduct a Planning a Pursuit ........................................ 7-7
retrograde when— Executing a Pursuit ...................................... 7-8
· He is reacting to a Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact ......... 7-9
threat of envelop- Disrupt the Enemy.................................. 7-10
ment. Fix the Enemy ......................................... 7-10
· He is adjusting his Maneuver................................................. 7-10
battlefield disposi- Follow Through ...................................... 7-11
tions to meet
changing situations.
· He is attempting to draw the friendly force into fire sacks, kill zones, or
engagement areas.
· He is planning to employ weapons of mass destruction.
7-1
FM 3-90
Therefore, the friendly force must always consider the enemy’s actions when-
ever it sees an opportunity to conduct a pursuit.
7-2. Division is the lowest echelon equipped with the intelligence assets to
determine if the enemy is conducting a retrograde under Army of Excellence
tables of organization and equipment. When faced with enemy attempts to
break contact, lower echelons act to maintain contact until a division or corps
commander directs them to initiate a pursuit operation.
7-3. Unlike an exploitation, which may focus on seizing key or decisive ter-
rain instead of the enemy force, the pursuit always focuses on destroying the
fleeing enemy force. This is seldom accomplished by directly pushing back the
hostile forces on their lines of communication (LOCs). The commander in a
pursuit tries to combine direct pressure against the retreating forces with an
enveloping or encircling maneuver to place friendly troops across the enemy’s
lines of retreat. This fixes the enemy in positions where he can be defeated in
detail. If it becomes apparent that enemy resistance has broken down entirely
and the enemy is fleeing the battlefield, any type of offensive operation can
transition to a pursuit.
7-4. Conducting a pursuit is a calculated risk. Once the pursuit begins, the
commander maintains contact with the enemy and pursues retreating enemy
forces without further orders. The commander maintains the pursuit as long
as the enemy appears disorganized and friendly forces continue to advance.
Like exploitation, pursuit tests the audacity and endurance of soldiers and
leaders. In both operations, the attacker risks becoming disorganized. Extra-
ordinary physical and mental effort is necessary to sustain the pursuit, tran-
sition to other operations, and translate tactical success into operational or
strategic victory.
7-5. The commander must be aware of any approaching culmination point.
The enemy is usually falling back on his supply base, and potentially on fresh
units, while friendly forces become less effective as they expend resources
faster than they can be replaced. Reasons to discontinue the pursuit include
the presence of fresh enemy forces, greatly increased resistance, fatigue,
dwindling supplies, diversion of friendly units to security missions, and the
need to contain bypassed enemy units.
7-6. Those plan, prepare, and execute concepts introduced previously con-
tinue to apply during a pursuit. Assessment concepts described in FM 6-0 and
FM 6-22 also apply. The commander modifies them as necessary to account
for the specific existing factors of METT-TC.
7-7. Normally, the commander does not organize specifically for a pursuit
ahead of time, although he may plan for a pursuit as a branch or sequel to his
offensive operation. Therefore, he must be flexible to react when the situation
presents itself. The commander’s maneuver and sustainment forces continue
their ongoing activities while he readjusts their priorities to better support
the pursuit. He acquires additional support from his higher headquarters in
accordance with the factors of METT-TC. For most pursuits, the commander
organizes his forces into security, direct-pressure, encircling, follow and
7-2
Pursuit
support, and reserve forces. The commander can employ available airborne
and air assault units as part of his encircling force because of their ability to
conduct vertical envelopments. Given sufficient resources, there can be more
than one encircling force. The follow and support force polices the battlefield
to prevent the dissipation of the direct-pressure force’s combat power. Appen-
dix B addresses the duties of a follow and support force. The reserve allows
the commander to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities or respond to
enemy counterattacks.
7-8. There are two basic organizational options in conducting a pursuit; each
involves a direct-pressure force. The first is a frontal pursuit that employs
only a direct-pressure force. The second is a combination that uses a direct-
pressure force and an encircling force. The combination pursuit is generally
more effective. Either the direct-pressure force or the encircling force can
conduct the decisive operation in a combination pursuit.
FRONTAL
7-9. In a frontal pursuit, the commander employs only a direct-pressure force
to conduct operations along the same retrograde routes used by the enemy.
(See Figure 7-1.) The commander chooses this option in two situations. The
first is when he cannot create an encircling force with enough mobility to get
behind the enemy force. The second is when he cannot create an encircling
force capable of sustaining itself until it links up with the direct-pressure
force. Either situation can occur because of restrictive terrain or because an
enemy withdraws in a disciplined, cohesive formation and still has significant
available combat power.
ENY
RESERVE
ENY
Figure 7-1. Frontal Pursuit
7-3
FM 3-90
COMBINATION
7-10. In the pursuit, the most decisive effects result from combining the fron-
tal pursuit with encirclement. (See Figure 7-2.) In the combination pursuit,
the direct-pressure force initiates a frontal pursuit immediately on discover-
ing the enemy’s initiation of a retrograde operation. This slows the tempo of
the enemy’s withdrawal (or fixes him in his current position if possible), and
may destroy his rear security force. The direct-pressure force’s actions help to
set the conditions necessary for the success of the encircling force’s operation
by maintaining constant pressure. The encircling force conducts an envelop-
ment or a turning movement to position itself where it can block the enemy’s
escape and trap him between the two forces, which leads to complete annihi-
lation.
ENCIRCLING FORCES
ENY
ENY DIRECT PRESSURE FORCE
Figure 7-2. Combination Pursuit
7-11. The direct-pressure force conducts hasty attacks to maintain contact

and apply unrelenting pressure until it destroys the enemy force. The direct-
pressure force prevents enemy disengagement and subsequent reconstitution
of the defense and inflicts maximum casualties. It forces the enemy to deploy
frequently to delay the direct-pressure force and restricts his ability to disen-
gage and rapidly move away. The direct-pressure force must be at least as
mobile as the enemy. Heavy forces are ideally suited to this role, but the com-
mander can employ light forces if the enemy is also foot-mobile. The direct-
pressure force organizes to conduct a movement to contact and must be able
to conduct a series of hasty attacks. It must be powerful enough to defeat ene-
my rear guard actions and maintain pressure on the enemy’s main body.
7-12. The mobility of the encircling force must be equal—preferably super-
ior—to the withdrawing enemy. If there is no inherent mobility differential,
the commander must create one. This differential can also result from the
direct-pressure force forcing the enemy to deploy. The commander can
7-4
Pursuit
enhance, and sometimes create, this mobility advantage by conducting

countermobility operations against the enemy, specifically targeting locations
such as choke points or bridges that will hinder the fleeing enemy’s
withdrawal. Heavy, air assault, and airborne forces are well suited for this
mission. Attack helicopters are also effective when used as part of the
encircling force. The encircling force must be strong enough to protect itself
from the enemy’s main body and slow or stop it until the friendly direct-
pressure force can combine with the encircling force to destroy the enemy. It
must be capable of mounting a hasty defense without placing itself at risk of
annihilation. The encircling force must be self-contained since it normally
operates out of supporting range of friendly indirect-fire systems. Therefore,
it frequently has its supporting artillery attached. The primary mission of the
encircling force is to prevent the enemy’s escape by trapping him between the
encircling force and the direct-pressure force. The commander can assign
other missions to the encircling force, such as—
· Destroying the enemy’s weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
means.
· Linking up with airborne or air assault forces in their airheads.
· Reporting terrain conditions and other combat information beyond that
normally addressed in the unit standing operating procedures.
The commander can assign the encirclement mission, wholly or in part, to
available airborne or air assault units because their vertical envelopment
capabilities allow friendly forces to be inserted deeper into enemy-controlled
territory than would be possible with ground operations. The time required to
plan airborne operations and stage airlift platforms impacts on the utility of
airborne forces in small-scale pursuit operations.
7-13. The direct-pressure and encircling forces require engineer support to
create lanes through obstacles, which enables them to move rapidly and con-
tinuously. The commander should place his engineers well forward in his
movement formations to quickly breach any obstacles that cannot be by-
passed. Engineers accompanying the encircling force must also be prepared to
conduct countermobility and survivability tasks.
CONTROL MEASURES
7-14. The commander uses control measures to retain his tactical options to
converge on the most important axis or to redirect his pursuit effort on a new
axis. These control measures should be flexible and capable of rapid adjust-
ments to reflect changing conditions. This flexibility is also necessary when
engaging advancing enemy reserves or counterattack forces.
7-15. Centralized planning and decentralized execution characterize the pur-
suit. The commander balances the need to prevent fratricide with the need to
allow subordinates to take advantage of fleeting opportunities in a pursuit
with rapidly moving forces and a rapidly changing situation. The commander
designates an area of operations (AO) for each maneuver unit involved in the
pursuit. He establishes few control measures for the direct-pressure force
other than phase lines and checkpoints because of the pursuit’s nature. He
uses these phase lines to designate a forward and rearward boundary for the
direct-pressure force. The forward boundary relieves the direct-pressure force
7-5
FM 3-90
of any responsibility beyond the forward boundary. It also gives the higher
headquarters flexibility to deal with the encircling force and enemy elements
located beyond that forward boundary. The rear boundary becomes the
boundary between the direct-pressure force and the follow and support force.
7-16. If the encircling force is a ground element, the control measures are
almost identical to those of an envelopment. The commander must designate
a route, an axis of advance, or an AO adjacent to that of the direct-pressure
force to allow the encircling force to move parallel to and eventually get
ahead of the fleeing enemy force. He designates a terrain objective as a guide
for the encircling force. (See Objective HAWKE in Figure 7-3.) However, he
may change this objective rapidly and frequently, based on the progress of
the encircling force and the enemy. The objective should be a piece of ground
that provides the encircling force good, defensible terrain that the enemy can-
not easily bypass. The commander often selects choke points, such as defiles
and bridges, as objectives for his encircling force.
PL MONTCALM
PL MONTCALM
XX
PL GORDON PL GORDON
o/o 2AD CFL o/o 2AD CFL
X
OBJ
030730Z
4 HAWKE
JAN01
X
X
AXIS HOOD
PL WELLINGTON (LOA)
XX
o/o RFL 2AD 8ID
X
XX
1CD 2AD OBJ

NELSON
021230ZJAN01 PL WOLFE
PL WOLFE
RODNEY
AXIS
PL CLIVE 010730ZJAN01 PL CLIVE
Figure 7-3. Pursuit Control Measures
7-17. The commander establishes a boundary or a restricted fire line between

the encircling force and the direct-pressure force before the encircling force
reaches its objective. He establishes other fire support coordinating measures
(FSCM) around the area currently occupied by the encircling force to relieve
it of unnecessary fire support coordination responsibilities. He directs
security operations beyond the encircling force, allowing it to engage the
withdrawing enemy without devoting resources to flank and rear security.
The commander establishes additional control measures to control the con-
vergence of both elements of the friendly force, such as phase lines and con-
tact points.
7-6
Pursuit
PLANNING A PURSUIT
7-18. The commander anticipates an enemy retrograde operation as either a
branch or a sequel to the plan. The plan should identify possible direct-pres-
sure, encircling, follow and support, and reserve forces and issue on-order or
be-prepared missions to these forces. The commander should employ the
maximum number of available combat troops in the pursuit. He bases the de-
tails of his plan on the enemy’s anticipated actions, the combat formation of
the attacking troops, and the amount of planning time available. The com-
mander also considers—
· Possible routes the enemy might use to conduct his retrograde opera-
tions.
· Availability of his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets
to detect enemy forces and acquire targets in depth.
· Scheme of maneuver.
· Availability and condition of pursuit routes.
· Availability of forces to keep the pressure on the enemy until his de-
struction is complete.
· Critical terrain features.
· Use of reconnaissance and security forces.
· Allocation of precision-guided munitions and aviation support.
· Availability of CS and CSS resources.
Pursuit planning must address the possibility of defending temporarily
during operational pauses while making preparations to continue the pursuit
or to consolidate gains. However, the use of an operational pause generally
results in the abandonment of the pursuit because the enemy is able to use
that time to organize a coherent defense.
7-19. The commander must specifically address how to detect the enemy
retrograde operations; otherwise, the enemy may succeed in breaking contact.
The commander relies on active reconnaissance, an understanding of enemy
tactics, and knowledge of the current tactical situation. He must watch for
signs that indicate the enemy is preparing to conduct a retrograde, such as
when the enemy—
· Lacks the capability to maintain his position or cohesion.
· Conducts limited local counterattacks.
· Intensifies his reconnaissance and intelligence efforts.
· Increases the amount of rearward movements and changes the type of
elements conducting them, especially by fire support and reserves.
· Prepares his facilities, installations, equipment, and supply stock-piles
for demolition and destruction.
· Decreases fire in intensity and effectiveness through the AO.
· Increases his fires in one or more individual sectors of the front, which
does not appear to be in accordance with the developing situation, and
at a time when the amount of defensive fires seems to be decreasing.
The presence or absence of any of the above signs may not necessarily indi-
cate the start of a retrograde operation. The enemy could be attempting to
draw friendly forces into an ambush or setting up a counterattack as part of
his defense. The decision of when to start a pursuit is part of the art of tactics.
7-7
FM 3-90
7-20. When the commander initiates a pursuit, he often creates the encircling
force from uncommitted or reserve elements. Normally, these forces do not
have fire support assets allocated to them. The commander must plan how to
redistribute his fire support assets to properly support the encircling force.
Attack helicopters and close air support are well suited to support the encir-
cling force.
7-21. Engineer mobility and countermobility assets are instrumental in sus-
taining the rate of advance and hindering the enemy’s withdrawal. Engineers
prepare the route of advance and support the lateral dispersion of units tran-
sitioning to the pursuit and the movement of the reserve. During the pursuit,
the commander must plan for his engineers to provide assault bridging and
emergency road repairs to sustain the tempo of the pursuit. The commander
also plans to use his engineer assets to block any bypassed enemy’s with-
drawal routes by using antitank and command-operated mines, demolitions,
and obstacles.
7-22. Logistics units should plan for increases in the demand for fuel and
maintenance as the tempo of operations increases. In the pursuit, priority of
logistics normally goes to units having the greatest success. Logistics plan-
ners need to anticipate success since the depth of the pursuit depends on the
capability of logistics assets to support the operation. The logistics elements
supporting the pursuing force should be as mobile as possible. Logistics plan-
ners are particularly concerned with supporting the encircling force, such as
casualty evacuation over possibly unsecured LOCs. The commander may
need aerial resupply or heavily guarded convoys to support this force. Secur-
ity for logistics convoys and LOCs are major planning considerations.
7-23. The commander uses all available logistics assets to provide essential
support to the force pursuing the enemy. His pursuit plan must result in a
force prepared to conduct wide-ranging operations using all available maneu-
ver assets throughout his AO to complete the destruction and morale collapse
of the enemy force.
EXECUTING A PURSUIT
7-24. The decisive operation in a pursuit destroys the withdrawing enemy.
This generally occurs as a result of encircling the enemy between the direct-
pressure and the encircling forces or a major geographic barrier—such as an
unfordable river—and his defeat in detail. The timely and correct decision to
initiate a pursuit is critical to its success. If the enemy begins a retrograde
undetected, he avoids the constant pressure that results in disrupting that
operation. The commander expects the enemy forces to conduct retrograde
operations at times advantageous to them—usually at night or during bad
weather.
7-25. A pursuit is often conducted as a series of encirclements in which suc-
cessive portions of the fleeing enemy are intercepted, cut off from outside sup-
port, and captured or destroyed. (Appendix D discusses encirclement opera-
tions.) The direct-pressure force conducts a series of hasty attacks to destroy
the enemy’s rear security force, maintain constant pressure on the enemy’s
main body, and slow the enemy’s withdrawal. At every opportunity, the
direct-pressure force fixes, slows down, and destroys enemy elements,
7-8
Pursuit
provided such actions do not interfere with its primary mission of

maintaining constant pressure on the enemy’s main body. The direct-
pressure force can bypass large enemy forces if it can hand them off to follow
and support units, or if they do not pose a risk to the direct-pressure force.
7-26. As soon as the commander designates a unit as the encircling force and
directs its actions, the force moves as swiftly as possible by the most advan-
tageous routes to cut off the enemy’s retreat. If the encircling force cannot
move farther and faster than the enemy, it attacks the enemy’s main body
from the flank. When this occurs, the commander should constitute and dis-
patch a new encircling force.

7-27. At the first indication of an enemy retrograde, the brigade or lower-
echelon commander who discovers the enemy’s rearward movement acts to
maintain contact with the enemy across a wide area without waiting for
orders from higher headquarters. This ensures that the enemy does not break
contact and conduct an orderly retirement. These forces in contact constitute
the nucleus of the direct-pressure force. As the situation permits, they reform
into a movement column with reconnaissance and security elements in the
lead and, if necessary, to the flank.
7-28. During a pursuit, the reconnaissance effort is intensive. Reconnais-
sance elements concentrate on all routes the enemy could use when conduct-
ing a retrograde operation. These elements provide information on the dispo-
sition of retreating enemy formations and on the forward movement of his
reserves as the pursuit develops. The tactical situation during a pursuit may
become obscure because of its potential depth. Much of the combat informa-
tion needed during a pursuit is located behind the fleeing enemy force. There-
fore, air reconnaissance, backed by technical intelligence systems, is vital to
the overall reconnaissance effort. It can determine—
· The beginning of the rearward movement of enemy sustainment forces.
· The composition of retrograding forces and their direction of move-
ment.
· The composition and direction of enemy reserve forces moving forward.
· The nature of obstacles and intermediate defensive positions.
Information about fresh enemy reserves and prepared positions is vital at the
stage when a pursuit force may be approaching a culminating point; it may be
the basis for terminating the pursuit.
7-29. The primary mission of the encircling force’s reconnaissance assets is to
find routes for the encircling force to allow it to move behind withdrawing
enemy units and establish blocking positions. This mission may force these
reconnaissance assets to operate outside the supporting range of the main
body as they try to maneuver behind the retrograding enemy force. The encir-
cling force avoids combat when possible until it reaches its assigned objective
area. However, en route to its objective, it overruns any small enemy posi-
tions while bypassing larger enemy units. Forward security elements of the
encircling force conduct activities to prevent the enemy from interfering with
the forward movement of the encircling force’s main body. These security ele-
ments move rapidly along all available roads or routes and overrun or bypass
7-9
FM 3-90
small enemy pockets of resistance. If they encounter strongly held enemy

positions, they attempt to find routes around or through these positions. The
encircling force can then avoid these enemy positions and occupy blocking po-
sitions before withdrawing enemy forces can reach them. If necessary, the en-
circling force organizes a hasty defense behind the enemy to block his retreat.
DISRUPT THE ENEMY

7-30. Keeping the enemy from reconstituting an effective defense is critical to
success. Constant pressure by direct-pressure forces and echelon fire support
systems disrupts and weakens the enemy. The commander uses lethal and
nonlethal direct and indirect fires to keep pressure on the enemy. The enemy
commander must not be allowed to freely adjust his dispositions to counter
the actions of the friendly force. Artillery fire and air strikes harass and dis-
rupt the enemy’s attempts to move engaged forces to the rear or bring pre-
viously uncommitted forces into action. In a pursuit, decisive operations may
include the ground maneuver of the direct-pressure or the encircling force.
Fire support targets in a pursuit include fires on enemy columns and troop or
vehicle concentrations at road junctions, defiles, bridges, and river crossings.
They also include the repulsion of enemy counterattacks, destruction or delay
of enemy reserves, and destruction of the enemy’s fire support means. The
commander conducts offensive information operations against the enemy’s
command and control (C2) system as an integral part of this disruption pro-
cess, with emphasis on destroying or degrading the enemy’s capability to re-
constitute and synchronize an effective defense.
FIX THE ENEMY

7-31. Using movement and fire effects or fire potential, the commander fixes
a withdrawing enemy. If the direct-pressure force disrupts the enemy’s C2
system, his ability to counter friendly efforts is significantly degraded, and
the goal of fixing the enemy is much easier to accomplish.
7-32. The enemy attempts to use his reserves to restore the integrity of his
defenses or prevent his withdrawing force from being overrun. Fixing enemy
reserves is essential to the pursuit’s success and is normally the focus of eche-
lon shaping operations. The direct-pressure force fixes enemy reserves in
place or slows them down so that they remain outside supporting distance
until the withdrawing enemy force is completely annihilated.
MANEUVER
7-33. To execute the pursuit, the commander normally combines a frontal
pursuit with an encirclement. The direct-pressure force conducting the fron-
tal pursuit advances in a column formation as quickly as possible. After a
penetration, existing gaps between the different units of the direct-pressure
force are likely to increase in size. Aware of the vulnerability of his open
flanks in this situation, the commander must deploy his reserves where they
can respond to dangers on his flanks. He does not expect a uniform rate of ad-
vance on all axes. Some columns may move rapidly while others are still en-
gaged in penetrating the enemy’s rear guard defensive positions or meeting
enemy counterattacks.
7-10
Pursuit
7-34. The actions of the direct-pressure force should facilitate the commit-
ment of an encircling force that moves parallel to the rearward-moving ene-
my. The depth of the pursuit depends on the size of the forces involved. It
takes a division-level or higher commander to make the decision to initiate a
pursuit because of the resources necessary to conduct a pursuit. The com-
mander directing the initiation of a pursuit informs his higher commander of
his intentions. This allows even greater resources to be devoted to the pursuit
and avoids desynchronizing the higher headquarters’ major operation or cam-
paign.
7-35. The direct-pressure force normally employs an advance guard to pre-
vent the enemy from ambushing the main body of the direct-pressure force
and to overrun or bypass small enemy forces. The security element moves on
multiple avenues of advance. If it encounters enemy units beyond its capacity
to defeat, it conducts actions on contact to develop the situation. The com-
mander uses combat information provided by these actions on contact to
guide the main body of the direct-pressure force to destroy withdrawing ene-
my forces. These actions of the direct-pressure force may or may not be in
conjunction with the actions of any encircling force.
7-36. The commander does everything possible to place his encircling force
behind the withdrawing enemy and trap the bulk of that enemy force be-
tween the encircling force and the direct-pressure force. The direct-pressure
force maintains enough pressure on the withdrawing enemy force so the en-
circling force can envelop it. To perform this task, the direct-pressure force
must be strong enough to overcome any enemy rear guard before the enemy’s
main body can make a successful withdrawal. Once in position, the encircling
force defends or attacks as necessary, responding to the enemy’s actions and
those of the direct-pressure force to complete the enemy’s encirclement.
7-37. The pursuing force must not give the enemy time to reorganize for an
all-around defense after it is encircled. If the enemy forms a perimeter, the
pursuing commander must repeatedly split it into smaller elements until he
destroys the encircled enemy force. If time is not critical, the commander can
keep the encirclement closed, defeat enemy breakout attempts, and weaken
the enemy by fires alone. He can greatly accelerate the collapse of a large, en-
circled enemy force by using psychological operations, precision-guided wea-
pons, and improved conventional munitions in mass. (Appendix D addresses
the reduction of an encircled enemy force.) If the resulting encirclement does
not destroy the withdrawing enemy force, the commander conducts additional
pursuit operations until the enemy is destroyed.
FOLLOW THROUGH
7-38. Once the commander initiates a pursuit, he continues pursuing the ene-
my until a higher commander terminates the pursuit. Conditions under
which a higher commander may terminate a pursuit include the following—
· The pursuing force annihilates or captures the enemy and resistance
ceases.
· The pursuing force fixes the enemy for follow-on forces.
· The high commander makes an assessment that the pursuing force is
about to reach a culminating point.
7-11
FM 3-90
7-39. A pursuit often transitions into other types of offensive and defensive
operations. If the enemy attempts to reorganize, forces conducting a pursuit
execute hasty attacks. They conduct an exploitation to capitalize on the suc-
cess of these attacks and then move back into pursuit. Forces conducting a
pursuit may also transition into a defensive operation if the pursuing force
reaches a culminating point. This usually occurs when the enemy introduces
strong reinforcements to prepare for a counteroffensive.
7-12
PART THREE
Defensive Operations
Chapter 8
Basics of Defensive Operations

So the defensive form of war is not a simple shield, but a shield made
up of well-directed blows.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 1832
Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces,

or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive opera-
tions alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create
conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the
initiative (FM 3-0). Other reasons for conducting defensive operations
include—
· Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to the enemy.
· Attritting or fixing the enemy as a prelude to offensive operations.
CONTENTS
Historical Example ........................................8-2 Maneuver .................................................8-14
Types of Defensive Operations ...................8-4 Fire Support.............................................8-18
Area Defense ..............................................8-4 Air Defense ..............................................8-20
Mobile Defense ..........................................8-4 Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability .8-23
Retrograde..................................................8-5 Combat Service Support ........................8-27
Common Defensive Control Measures .......8-5 Command and Control ...........................8-29
Battle Handover Line.................................8-5 Common Defensive Scenarios ..................8-30
Main Battle Area.........................................8-5 Defense Against Airborne and Air
Forward Edge of the Battle Area ..............8-6 Assault Attacks .......................................8-30
Battle Positions..........................................8-7 Defense of a Linear Obstacle ................8-31
Fire Support Coordinating Measures ....8-10 Perimeter Defense ..................................8-32
Direct Fire Control Measures..................8-11 Reverse Slope Defense ..........................8-38
Disengagement Lines..............................8-11 Transition .....................................................8-42
Common Defensive Planning Transition to the Offense ........................8-42
Considerations.........................................8-12 Transition to the Retrograde ..................8-45
Intelligence ..............................................8-13
8-1
FM 3-90
· Surprise action by the enemy.

· Increasing the enemy’s vulnerability by forcing him to concentrate
his forces.
8-1. While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the de-
fense is the stronger type. The inherent strengths of the defense include the
defender’s ability to occupy his positions before the attack and use the avail-
able time to prepare his defenses. Preparations end only when the defender
retrogrades or begins to fight. The defender can study the ground and select
defensive positions that mass the effects of his fires on likely approaches. He
combines natural and manmade obstacles to canalize the attacking force into
his engagement areas (EAs). He can coordinate and rehearse his defensive
plan while gaining intimate familiarity with the terrain. The defender does
not wait passively to be attacked. He aggressively seeks ways of attriting and
weakening attacking enemy forces before the initiation of close combat. He
maneuvers to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage and attacks him
at every opportunity, using his direct and indirect fires. The fires include the
effects of offensive information operations and joint assets, such as close air
support. The static and mobile elements of his defense combine to deprive the
enemy of the initiative. He contains the enemy while seeking every oppor-
tunity to transition to the offense.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
8-2. The following historical example illustrates how conducting a defense
can attrit and fix an enemy as a prelude to offensive actions.
The Battle of Kursk, July 1943

Using an area defense, the Red Army defeated the German Army’s last Eastern
Front operational-level attack at Kursk. The Red Army maximized its defensive
advantage using mass, security, objective, and offensive as principles of war.
Soviet intelligence discovered the German offensive objective and concept: a
double envelopment of the Kursk salient by panzer-heavy forces. The Red Army
massed forces in the most threatened areas. The Soviets reinforced the two
fronts defending the salient, prepared defenses, and established a strategic re-
serve behind the salient. They weighted the forward defenses on the northern
and southern shoulders within the salient. They developed their defenses in
depth, carefully tying them to the terrain and organizing infantry positions for all-
around defense. Above all, they organized an antitank defense, with mutually
supporting positions and mobile counterattack forces at all levels. Nearly 6,000
antitank (AT) guns and 3,300 tanks packed the defense.
The German attack in the northern part of the salient would fall on the 13th Army.
The 13th Army consisted of 12 rifle divisions (RDs) organized into four rifle corps
(RCs) supported by 700 guns, separate tank brigades, assault gun regiments,
and antitank regiments. Within 30 kilometers of the front, the 13th Army estab-
lished three fortification belts. Within each belt there were large numbers of
8-2
mutually supporting antitank positions. Each position consisted of four to six AT

guns, with protection provided by infantry, machine guns, and obstacles.
The 29th RC occupied the 13th Army’s main defensive position in a sector 19
kilometers wide and 15 kilometers deep, with the 15th RC on its right, the 70th
Army on its left, and the 17th Guards Rifle Corps (GRC) rearward in the army se-
cond echelon. At the start of the battle, the 29th RC consisted of three rifle
divisions (the 15th, 81st, and 307th), with supporting tank and artillery units. It de-
ployed the 15th RD and 81st RD, with 12 to 15 antitank positions each, as the
corps’ first echelon. The 307th RD was the corps’ second echelon. Both first-
echelon divisions also deployed in two echelons. Each division established a bat-
talion security force to its front.
XI I
X I
XXX
XLVII
X LI
XLVII
XX
XX
XL
I
XXX
XLVI
4
XX XX
XX XX 216
XX 10 XX
2 9 XX
12
18 78
XX XX XX XX XX
15 X
XX XX 31 86
XX 9
20 6 292
258 7
2
XX
XX 81
13(29TH RC)
15 MALOARKHANGELSK
XXXX
XX
70
PONYRI 4Gd
(o/o 5
XX
JULY
XXXX XX 307
XXX
43
2 3Gd
OLKHOVATKA 3
XXX
17Gd
29
Front line at the beginning of "Citadel” 0 5 10

Front line evening of 5 July 1943
Front line evening of 6 July 1943 N KILOMETERS
Figure 8-1. Movements of an Area Defense
During a week of intense defensive combat, the 29th RC conducted an area de-
fense, making the Germans pay so dearly for every gain that they reached their
culminating point short of Kursk. See Figure 8-1. Tested by nine German divi-
sions, the 29th RC was able to keep German forces from breaking through its
area of operations (AO), despite having its initial three divisions rendered
combat-ineffective. In the course of the defense, the 29th RC inflicted 10,700
German casualties and destroyed an estimated 220 tanks and 71 guns. Key to
the defense was the construction of those mutually supporting antitank positions,
organized for all-around defense, with extensive engineer works to enhance the
terrain. The 29th RC employed its attached forces aggressively, creating com-
bined arms teams to hold terrain or maneuver against German forces within the
defensive belt. It employed counterattacks to retake key terrain or gain time to
develop defenses.
8-3
FM 3-90
TYPES OF DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

8-3. There are three basic types of defensive operations: the area defense, the
mobile defense, and the retrograde. These three types have significantly dif-
ferent concepts and pose significantly different problems. Therefore, each
type of defensive operations must be dealt with differently when planning
and executing the defense. Although the names of these types of defensive op-
erations convey the overall aim of a selected defensive operation, each typi-
cally contains elements of the other and combines static and mobile elements.
8-4. Although on the defense, the commander remains alert for opportunities
to attack the enemy whenever resources permit. Within a defensive posture,
the defending commander may conduct a spoiling attack or a counterattack, if
permitted to do so by the factors of METT-TC. (Chapter 5 discusses these two
forms of attack.)
AREA DEFENSE
8-5. The area defense a type of defensive operation that concentrates on
denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather
than destroying the enemy outright (FM 3-0). The focus of the area defense is
on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in
mutually supporting, prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and
control the terrain between these positions. The decisive operation focuses on
fires into EAs possibly supplemented by a counterattack. The reserve may or
may not take part in the decisive operation. The commander can use his re-
serve to reinforce fires; add depth, block, or restore the position by counter-
attack; seize the initiative; and destroy enemy forces. Units at all echelons
can conduct an area defense. (Chapter 9 discusses the area defense.)
MOBILE DEFENSE
8-6. The mobile defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on
the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking
force (FM 3-0). The mobile defense focuses on defeating or destroying the ene-
my by allowing him to advance to a point where he is exposed to a decisive
counterattack by the striking force. The decisive operation is a counterattack
conducted by the striking force. The striking force is a dedicated counterat-
tack force constituting the bulk of available combat power. A fixing force sup-
plements the striking force. The commander uses his fixing force to hold at-
tacking enemy forces in position, to help channel attacking enemy forces into
ambush areas, and to retain areas from which to launch the striking force.
8-7. A mobile defense requires an AO of considerable depth. The commander
must be able to shape the battlefield, causing the enemy to overextend his
lines of communication (LOCs), expose his flanks, and dissipate his combat
power. Likewise, the commander must be able to move around and behind
the enemy force he intends to cut off and destroy. Divisions and larger forma-
tions normally execute mobile defenses. However, subordinate echelons may
participate as part of the fixing force or the striking force. (Chapter 10 dis-
cusses the mobile defense.)
8-4
RETROGRADE
8-8. The retrograde is a type of defensive operation that involves organized
movement away from the enemy (FM 3-0). The enemy may force these opera-
tions, or a commander may execute them voluntarily. The higher commander
of the force executing the retrograde must approve the retrograde operation
before its initiation in either case. The retrograde is a transitional operation;
it is not conducted in isolation. It is part of a larger scheme of maneuver de-
signed to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy. (Chapter 11 further dis-
cusses the retrograde.)
COMMON DEFENSIVE CONTROL MEASURES

8-9. The commander controls the defense by using control measures to pro-
vide the flexibility needed to respond to changes in the situation and allow
the defending commander to rapidly concentrate combat power at the deci-
sive point. Defensive control measures within a commander’s AO include des-
ignating his security area, the battle handover line (BHL), and the main bat-
tle area (MBA) with its associated forward edge of the battle area (FEBA).
(Chapter 12 discusses security operations.) (Paragraph 8-13 defines the
FEBA.) The commander can use battle positions and additional direct fire
control and fire support coordinating measures (FSCM) in addition to those
control measures introduced in Chapter 2 to further synchronize the employ-
ment of his combat power. He can designate disengagement lines to trigger
the displacement of his forces.
BATTLE HANDOVER LINE

8-10. The battle handover line (BHL) is a designated phase line on the
ground where responsibility transitions from the stationary force to
the moving force and vice versa. The common higher commander of the
two forces establishes the BHL after consulting with both commanders. The
stationary commander determines the location of the line. The BHL is
forward of the FEBA in the defense or the forward line of own troops (FLOT)
in the offense. The commander draws it where elements of the passing unit
can be effectively supported by the direct fires of the forward combat ele-
ments of the stationary unit until passage of lines is complete. The area be-
tween the BHL and the stationary force belongs to the stationary force com-
mander. He may employ security forces, obstacles, and fires in the area. (Fig-
ure 8-2, page 8-6, depicts a BHL used in conjunction with other control
measures for a rearward passage of lines.)
MAIN BATTLE AREA

8-11. The main battle area (MBA) is the area where the commander
intends to deploy the bulk of his combat power and conduct his deci-
sive operations to defeat an attacking enemy. In the defense, the com-
mander’s major advantage is that he normally selects the ground on which
the battle takes place. He positions his forces in mutually supporting posi-
tions in depth to absorb enemy penetrations or canalize them into prepared
EAs, defeating the enemy’s attack by concentrating the effects of overwhelm-
ing combat power. The natural defensive strength of the position has a direct
8-5
FM 3-90
bearing on the distribution of forces in relation to both frontage and depth. In

addition, defending units typically employ field fortifications and obstacles to
improve the terrain’s natural defensive strength. The MBA also includes the
area where the defending force creates an opportunity to deliver a decisive
counterattack to defeat or destroy the enemy.
ENY ENY
PL DANIEL/ PL DANIEL/
PP 14 PP 91
BHL PP 62 PP 34 BHL
PL FULTON PL FULTON
I I I 2
X I
II
II
ATK ATK I
1 4
5 I ATK ATK
PL COLLEEN RP 7 PL COLLEEN
II II
RP 17
ROUTE BLUE
ROUTE
GOLD
SP 45 SP 11
PL JONES PL JONES
X
Figure 8-2. Use of a BHL in a Rearward Passage of Lines
8-12. The MBA extends from the FEBA to the unit’s rear boundary. The com-
mander locates his subordinate unit boundaries along identifiable terrain fea-
tures and extends them out beyond the FLOT by establishing forward bound-
aries. Unit boundaries should not split avenues of approach or key terrain.
The commander selects the MBA based on the products of the intelligence
preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process and his own analysis using the
factors of METT-TC. The IPB process indicates how the enemy will most
likely use the available avenues of approach.
FORWARD EDGE OF THE BATTLE AREA

8-13. The forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) is the foremost limits of a
series of areas in which ground combat units are deployed, excluding the
areas in which the covering or screening forces are operating, designated to
coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver of units
(JP 1-02). The US Army uses a FEBA only in defensive operations. The FEBA
is not a boundary, but conveys the commander’s intent. It marks the foremost
limits of the areas in which the preponderance of ground combat units deploy,
excluding the areas in which security forces are operating. MBA forces can
temporarily move forward of the FEBA to expedite the retrograde operations
of security forces. The commander designates a FEBA to coordinate fire
8-6
support and to maneuver his forces. A phase line designating the forward-
most point of the MBA indicates the FEBA. The FEBA shows the senior com-
mander’s planned limit for the effects of direct fires by defending forces. De-
fending units must address this area in their scheme of maneuver and
exchange information regarding tactical plans at the coordinating points.
(Figure 8-3 graphically depicts the current FEBA and a proposed FEBA.)
21 25
FEBA FEBA
(PL ENGLISH) [CURRENT FEBA]
(PL ENGLISH)
192245Z DEC 192245Z DEC
XX
25AD 52MD
1 2
X
FEBA
FEBA
(PL TEST)
200830Z DEC [PROPOSED FEBA] (PL TEST)
200830Z DEC
Figure 8-3. Forward Edge of the Battle Area
BATTLE POSITIONS
8-14. A battle position is a defensive location oriented on a likely ene-
my avenue of approach. The battle position is an intent graphic that de-
picts the location and general orientation of the majority of the defending
forces. A commander’s use of a battle position does not direct the position of
the subordinate’s entire force within its bounds since it is not an AO. (See
Figure 8-4, page 8-8.) Units as large as battalion task forces and as small as
squads or sections use battle positions. They may occupy the topographical
crest of a hill, a forward slope, a reverse slope, or a combination of these
areas. The commander selects his positions based on terrain, enemy capabili-
ties, and friendly capabilities. A commander can assign all or some of his sub-
ordinates battle positions within his AO. (See Figure 8-5, page 8-8.)
8-15. The commander may assign his subordinates battle positions in situa-
tions when he needs to retain a greater degree of control over the maneuver
of his subordinate units than what he has with only an AO, as he controls
maneuver outside the general location of the battle position. He may assign
multiple battle positions to a single unit, which allows that unit to maneuver
between battle positions. The commander specifies mission and engagement
criteria to the unit assigned to a battle position. Security, combat support
(CS), and combat service support (CSS) forces may operate outside a unit’s
battle position.
8-7
FM 3-90
8-16. Battle positions are not normally held at all costs. The commander as-
signing a unit to a battle position should specify when and under what
conditions the unit displaces from the position. If a unit is ordered to defend a
battle position, its commander has the option of moving off the battle posi-
tion. If that unit is directed to retain a battle position, its commander needs
to know the specific conditions that must exist before his unit can displace.
S S
I I
I I EA BP I
3 I
EAGLE I (-)
I
I BP
I
(-) 68
II
MORT
CBT
II
MORT
Figure 8-4. Task Force Battle Position

BRIGADE SECURITY AREA
FEBA
FEBA
EA
GOLF
BP 18
BP
II
II
13
II
X
EA BP
X
BP BP 12
16
II
ZOO II
II
15
BP 17
II X
Figure 8-5. AO and Battle Position Control Measures Used in Combination
8-17. There are five kinds of battle positions—primary, alternate, supple-

mentary, subsequent, and strong point. (See Figure 8-6.) When assigning bat-
tle positions, the commander always designates the primary battle position.
8-8
He designates and prepares alternate, supplementary, and subsequent

positions as time and other resources permit and if the situation, especially
terrain, requires them.
PRIMARY
BATTLE POSITIONS SUPPLEMENTARY
BATTLE
POSITION
BP
BP EA EA 8
7 DOVE HEN
BP
BP
I
BP 18 21
I 17
STRONG POINT
ALTERNATE
BATTLE POSITIONS
SUBSEQUENT
BATTLE POSITION
BP 23
I
Figure 8-6. Five Kinds of Battle Positions
8-18. The primary position is the position that covers the enemy’s
most likely avenue of approach into the AO. It is the best position from
which to accomplish the assigned mission, such as cover an EA.
8-19. An alternate position is a defensive position that the command-
er assigns to a unit or weapon for occupation when the primary posi-
tion becomes untenable or unsuitable for carrying out the assigned
task. It covers the same area as the primary position. He locates alternate
positions so the occupant can continue to fulfill his original task, such as cov-
ering the same avenue of approach (AA) or EA as the primary position. These
positions increase the defender’s survivability by allowing him to engage the
enemy from multiple positions. For example, a unit moves to its alternate
positions when the enemy brings suppressive fires on the primary position.
8-20. A supplementary position is a defensive position located within
a unit’s assigned AO that provides the best sectors of fire and defen-
sive terrain along an avenue of approach that is not the primary ave-
nue where the enemy is expected to attack. For example, an AA into a
unit’s AO from one of its flanks normally requires establishing supplement-
ary positions to allow a unit or weapon system to engage enemy forces travel-
ing along that avenue.
8-21. A subsequent position is a position that a unit expects to move
to during the course of battle. A defending unit may have a series of
subsequent positions. Subsequent positions can also have primary, alternate,
and supplementary positions associated with them.
8-9
FM 3-90
8-22. A strong point is a heavily fortified battle position tied to a

natural or reinforcing obstacle to create an anchor for the defense or
to deny the enemy decisive or key terrain. The commander prepares a
strong point for all-around defense. (See Figure 8-7.) He positions strong
points on key or decisive terrain as necessary. The unit occupying the strong
point prepares positions for its weapon systems, vehicles, soldiers, and sup-
plies. The commander also establishes a strong point when he anticipates
that enemy actions will isolate a defending force retaining terrain critical to
the defense.
ENEMY
AVENUE OF
R
VE
APPROACH
RI
LE
AB
RD
FO
UN
II
RANGE FAN
OF STRONGPOINT
ANTIARMOR WEAPONS
Figure 8-7. Strong Point Defense
8-23. Before assigning a strong point mission, the commander must ensure
that the strong point force has sufficient time and resources to construct the
position, which requires significant engineer support. A minimally effective
strong point typically requires a one-day effort from an engineer unit the
same size as the unit defending the strong point. Normally, companies and
battalions occupy strong points, although brigades may construct them. The
commander does not normally establish strong points for units smaller than
company size. This is because a platoon or squad cannot secure a perimeter
large enough to encompass all required assets and supplies.
FIRE SUPPORT COORDINATING MEASURES

8-24. The commander tries to engage the enemy at extended ranges and
attrit him as his attack advances. To control indirect fires in the defense, the
commander uses those common FSCM introduced in Chapter 2. He can also
employ final protective fires.
8-10
8-25. Final protective fires (FPFs) are im-

mediately available preplanned barriers of
fires designed to impede enemy movement AG 1201
across defensive lines or areas (JP 3-09).
Both direct- and indirect- fire weapons can FPF
provide FPFs. The commander can only as- A/1-16 FA
sign each firing battery or platoon a single
FPF. A FPF is a priority target for an ele- Figure 8-8. Final Protective Fire
ment or system, and those fire units are
laid on that target when they are not engaged in other fire missions. When
the enemy initiates his final assault into a defensive position, the defending
unit initiates its FPFs to kill enemy infantry soldiers and suppress his ar-
mored vehicles. Selected crew-served weapons fire along predesignated final
protective lines (FPLs) to break up infantry assaults. (Figure 8-8 depicts a
FPF.)
DIRECT FIRE CONTROL MEASURES

8-26. The commander engages the enemy force with all available defensive
fires when they enter the defending unit’s EA. Chapter 2 defines these direct
fire control measures, such as target reference points and EAs. (See Fig-
ure 8-9.)
PL JOANN
DISENGAGEMENT
LINE EA
EA ALPHA OMEGA
+ +
NZ1542
I
NZ1540
+
I
TRIGGER
+
TRIGGER NZ1539 NZ1541
LINE/ LINE/
PL JAN PL PEGGY
I I
+
NZ1545
EA + NZ1543
TRIGGER LINE/
PL DICK
PHI
+ NZ1544
I
Figure 8-9. Direct Fire Control Measures
DISENGAGEMENT LINE
8-27. A disengagement line is a phase line located on identifiable ter-
rain that, when crossed by the enemy, signals to defending elements
that it is time to displace to their next positions. Phase Line JOANN is
a disengagement line in Figure 8-9. The commander uses these lines in the
8-11
FM 3-90
delay and the defense when he does not intend for the defending unit to be-
come decisively engaged. He establishes criteria for the disengagement, such
as number of enemy vehicles by type, friendly losses, or enemy movement to
flanking locations. Multiple disengagement lines, one for each system in the
defense, may exist.
COMMON DEFENSIVE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

8-28. At the onset of the attack, the defending commander yields the ini-
tiative to the enemy. However, he exploits prepared, mutually supporting po-
sitions organized for all-around defense and uses his knowledge of the terrain
to slow the enemy’s momentum. The defending force maintains its security
and disrupts the enemy’s attack at every opportunity. The defending com-
mander hinders enemy offensive preparations by using long-range fires and
deep maneuver to reduce the force of the enemy’s initial blows and start the
process of wresting the initiative from the enemy. He draws the enemy into
EAs where he can initiate combat on his own terms. The commander sur-
prises the enemy as concentrated and integrated fires violently erupt from
concealed and protected positions. He then counterattacks the enemy, repeat-
edly imposing unexpected blows. The widespread application of highly accu-
rate and lethal weapons, high degree of tactical mobility, dynamic situational
changes, and extended spatial scope of unit AOs all characterize contempo-
rary combined arms warfare. The commander exploits small tactical success
and opportunities to build momentum rapidly. The commander first able to
see the battlefield, understand the common operational picture’s implications,
and take effective action will defeat his opponent’s combined arms team,
shatter his cohesion, degrade his strength and ability to concentrate, and de-
stroy his exposed forces.
8-29. The defending force does not have to kill every enemy soldier, squad, or
combat system to be successful. It only has to destroy the enemy’s ability to
synchronize his combined arms team or his will to fight. Those events signal
a transition period that affords the defending commander the opportunity to
seize the initiative and return to the offense.
8-30. A defense is more effective when there is adequate time to thoroughly
plan and prepare defensive positions. Lack of preparation time may cause the
commander to maintain a larger-than-normal reserve force or accept greater
risks than usual. All units must be capable of mounting a defense with mini-
mal preparation, but a strong defense takes time to organize and prepare. If
the enemy attack does not take place at the predicted time, the commander
should use the additional time to improve his unit’s defensive positions. He
can increase the effectiveness of the security area, establish additional alter-
nate and supplementary positions, refine the defensive plan to include
branches and sequels, conduct defensive rehearsals, and maintain vehicles
and personnel. To gain time to organize a defense, the commander may order
his security force to conduct a delay while the main body disengages and
moves to more advantageous positions. The security force must know how
long it needs to delay the enemy for the main body to prepare its defense and
be task organized to conduct a delay. (Chapter 11 discusses the delay.)
8-12
8-31. The common defensive planning considerations addressed in the follow-

ing paragraphs apply to all types of defensive operations. In the defense,
synchronizing the effects of his combat and supporting systems allows a com-
mander to apply overwhelming combat power against selected advancing ene-
my forces to unhinge the enemy commander’s plan and destroy his combined
arms team. Defensive synchronization is normally the result of detailed
planning and preparation among the various units participating in an opera-
tion. While these activities may be separated in time and space, they are
synchronized if their combined consequences are felt at decisive times and
places. All defensive operations are a mix of static and dynamic actions. As an
operation evolves, the commander knows that he will probably be required to
shift his decisive and shaping operations to press the fight and keep the ene-
my off balance. Synchronized prior planning and preparation bolster the com-
mander’s combat power, increasing the effectiveness of the defense. The com-
mander must remain cognizant of the possibility of dislocated civilians at-
tempting to move through his positions in an effort to escape approaching
enemy forces throughout the defense.
INTELLIGENCE
8-32. During the planning process, the commander uses intelligence products
to identify probable enemy objectives and various approaches. He studies pat-
terns of enemy operations and the enemy’s vulnerability to counterattack, in-
terdiction, electronic warfare, air attacks, and canalization by obstacles. The
commander must also examine the enemy’s capability to conduct air attacks
against his force, insert forces behind friendly units, and employ nuclear, bio-
logical, and chemical weapons. He must determine how soon follow-on forces
can join the fight against an enemy attacking in echelons.
8-33. The commander uses his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
(ISR), and engineer assets to study the terrain. By studying the terrain, the
commander tries to determine the principal enemy and friendly heavy, light,
and air avenues of approach. He wants to determine the most advantageous
area for the enemy’s main attack, as well as other factors of observation and
fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain, obstacles, and cover and con-
cealment (OAKOC). (See FM 6-0 for a detailed discussion of OAKOC.)
8-34. The commander approves an integrated ISR plan that provides early
identification of as many of the following requirements as possible:
· Locations, composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of the
advancing enemy force.
· Enemy reconnaissance objectives or goals.
· Locations of possible enemy assembly areas.
· Location of enemy indirect fire weapon systems and units.
· Location of gaps, assailable flanks, and other enemy weaknesses.
· Location of areas for enemy helicopter and parachute assaults.
· Location of artillery and air defense gun and missile units.
· Location of enemy electronic warfare units.
· Location, numbers, and intentions of civilian populations.
· Effects of weather and terrain on current and projected operations.
8-13
FM 3-90
· Likely withdrawal routes for enemy forces.

· Numbers, routes, and direction of movement of dislocated civilians.
· Anticipated timetable for the enemy’s most likely COA.
· Locations of enemy command posts, fire direction control centers,
electronic warfare sites, and target acquisition sensor and target fusion
sites and the frequencies they are using.
It is unlikely that the commander has complete knowledge of the enemy’s in-
tentions; therefore, he must plan to continue his intelligence efforts during
the battle. (FM 2-0 provides an overview of the intelligence process and the
capabilities of technical surveillance systems. FM 3-55 discusses reconnais-
sance assets available at each echelon. FMs 3-11.9 and 3-34.170 discuss the
specialized tasks associated with NBC and engineer reconnaissance.)
8-35. The commander’s ability to see the enemy is critical to the conduct of all
defensive operations. Defensive plans must address the sustainment, replace-
ment, and reconstitution of ISR assets throughout the preparation and execu-
tion of the defense.
MANEUVER
8-36. The commander’s intent is to defeat the enemy force’s attack by over-
whelming it with repeated, unexpected blows before it conducts its final as-
sault on friendly defensive positions. As the enemy attack fails, the enemy
must attempt to withdraw or transition to a defense in the face of friendly
counterattacks. If the enemy succeeds in overrunning a key defensive posi-
tion, the defending force counterattacks to overwhelm the enemy before he
can either organize that position for defense or exploit his success.
Exploit the Advantages of Terrain

8-37. The defending commander exploits the defending force’s advantages of
occupying the terrain where the fight will occur. The defending force engages
the attacker from locations that give the defending force an advantage over
the attacking enemy. These locations include defiles, rivers, thick woods,
swamps, cliffs, canals, built-up areas, and reverse slopes. Defensive positions
in the MBA should make use of existing and reinforcing obstacles. The com-
mander may choose to shape the battlefield by defending one area to deny
terrain to the enemy while delaying in another area to deceive the enemy
commander into believing he has achieved success.
8-38. The defending commander plans how to use key terrain to impede the
enemy’s movement. He seeks out terrain that allows him to mass the effects
of his fires but forces the enemy to commit his force piecemeal into friendly
EAs. This exposes portions of the enemy force for destruction without giving
up the advantages of fighting from protected positions. Examples of key ter-
rain include terrain that permits the defending force to cover a major obstacle
system by fire, and important road junctions and choke points that impact
troop movements, such as the movement of reserves and LOCs.
8-39. The commander determines the probable force ratios he will face and
arrays his forces accordingly. The terrain impacts how fast the enemy can
close on his positions and how much time is available to employ combat mul-
tipliers, such as indirect fires. Once the commander arrives at acceptable
8-14
force ratios—or the degree of risk he must take is clear—he allocates his
available forces and begins planning his EAs.
8-40. On each enemy AA, the commander determines where he wants to de-
stroy the enemy. He arrays forces allocated to that AA around this point to
establish an EA. He uses obstacles and fires to canalize enemy forces into this
EA. The commander takes actions to increase the kill probabilities of his var-
ious weapon systems at different ranges. This includes establishing range
markers for direct fire weapons, confirming the zero on his weapons, or
clearing obstacles that might snag the cables over which the commands of his
wire-guided munitions, like the TOW missile, travel.
8-41. Generally, defending forces have the advantage of preparing the terrain
by reinforcing natural obstacles, fortifying positions, and rehearsing opera-
tions. First, they prepare the ground to force the piecemeal commitment of
enemy forces and their subsequent defeat in detail. Second, they prepare the
ground to force the enemy to fight where he does not want to fight, such as in
open areas dominated by terrain that offers adequate cover and concealment
for the occupying friendly forces. The defending force tries to guide or entice
the enemy into prepared EAs. Units employ and continuously strengthen ob-
stacles and fortifications to improve the natural defensive strength of the po-
sition, which has a direct bearing on the distribution of forces, frontages, and
depth of the defense.
8-42. Terrain features that favor defensive operations include—
· A series of parallel ridges across the line of hostile advance.
· Unfordable streams, swamps, lakes, and other obstacles on the front
and flanks.
· High ground with good observation and long-range fields of fire.
· Concealed movement routes immediately behind defensive positions.
· Limited road network in front of the line of contact to confine the
enemy to predictable avenues of approach.
· Good road network behind the line of contact that allows the command-
er to reposition his forces as the battle progresses.
The opposite of the terrain conditions listed above degrades a force’s ability to
conduct defensive operations. For example, terrain with a limited road net
that canalizes the defending force allows the enemy to predict its movement
and take steps to interdict that movement.
Maintain Security
8-43. Security operations seek to confuse the enemy about the location of the
commander’s main battle positions, prevent enemy observation of prepara-
tions and positions, and keep the enemy from delivering observed fire on the
positions. They also try to force the attacking enemy to deploy prematurely.
They can offset the attacker’s inherent advantage of initiative regarding the
time, place, plan, direction, strength, and composition of his attack by forcing
him to attack blind into prepared defenses. The commander must not permit
enemy reconnaissance and surveillance assets to determine the precise loca-
tion and strength of defensive positions, obstacles, EAs, and reserves. First,
the defending force conducts reconnaissance to gain and maintain contact
with the enemy. Second, each echelon normally establishes a security area
8-15
FM 3-90
forward of its MBA. All units conduct aggressive security operations within
their AO, including the rear area, to seek out and repel or kill enemy recon-
naissance and other forces. Units implement operations security (OPSEC)
measures and other defensive information operations to deny the enemy in-
formation about friendly dispositions. (See Chapter 12 for more information
on security operations.)
Disrupt the Enemy Attack at Every Opportunity

8-44. The defending force conducts operations throughout the depth of the
enemy’s formation in time and space to destroy his key units and assets, par-
ticularly his artillery and reserves, or disrupt their timely introduction into
battle at the point of engagement. This allows the defending force to regain
the initiative. It conducts spoiling attacks to disrupt the enemy’s troop con-
centrations and attack preparations. The defending force counterattacks ene-
my successes rapidly with its reserve, the forces at hand, or a striking force
before the enemy can exploit success. It conducts offensive information opera-
tions to assist this process.
Mass the Effects of Combat Power

8-45. The defending force must mass the effects of its combat power to over-
whelm the enemy and regain the initiative. The commander uses economy of
force measures in areas that do not involve his decisive operation to mass the
effects of his forces in the area where a decision is sought. This decisive point
can be a geographical objective or an enemy force. In an area defense, de-
fending units use EAs to concentrate the effects of overwhelming combat
power from mutually supporting positions. In a mobile defense, the com-
mander uses the striking force to generate overwhelming combat power at
the decisive point. Another way he can generate the effects of mass is through
committing his reserve.
Ensure Mutual Support

8-46. Mutual support exists when positions and units support each other by
direct, indirect, lethal, and nonlethal fire, thus preventing the enemy from at-
tacking one position without being subjected to fire from one or more adjacent
positions. Mutual support increases the strength of all defensive positions,
prevents defeat in detail, and helps prevent infiltration between positions.
Tactical positions achieve the maximum degree of mutual support between
them when they are located to observe or monitor the ground between them
or conduct patrols to prevent any enemy infiltration. At night or during
periods of limited visibility, the commander may position small tactical units
closer together to retain the advantages of mutual support. Unit leaders must
coordinate the nature and extent of their mutual support.
Heavy Forces
8-47. When the majority of a defending force consists of mechanized or ar-
mored units, the commander can conduct a defense designed to take advan-
tage of the tactical mobility and protection offered by organic combat vehicles.
Heavy forces can maneuver to delay the advance of a strong enemy force and
then immediately change from a mobile to a static form of defense or
8-16
counterattack. Such forces are well suited for use as security and MBA forces.
They are more suited for operations within an NBC contaminated environ-
ment than light forces because of their built-in protection.
Light Forces
8-48. When facing enemy light forces, the commander deploys and uses de-
fending light forces in the same manner as heavy forces are used against
other heavy forces. Light forces facing a heavy enemy are primarily used in
static roles within the MBA or in security roles within the rear area. When
facing heavy enemy forces, light infantry forces are most effective when fight-
ing from prepared defenses or in close terrain, such as swamps, woods, hilly
and mountainous areas, and urban areas where they can take advantage of
their foot mobility and short-range infantry and anti-armor weapons.
8-49. The commander uses an air assault unit in the same manner as other
light forces once it deploys into its landing zones (LZs). (See Appendix C for a
discussion of air assault operations.) However, there may be more problems
in extracting such a force, particularly if it is in direct contact with the ene-
my. Because of its mobility and potential reaction speed, an air assault force
is often well-suited for a reserve role during defensive operations. Its tasks
might include—
· Rapid reinforcement of a threatened position.
· Occupation of a blocking position, possibly in conjunction with existing
· Rear area security operations, such as containment of an enemy air-
borne or helicopter assault.
· Reinforcement of encircled friendly forces.
· Flank protection.
Rotary- and Fixed-Wing Aviation

8-50. Aviation assets are particularly valuable in the defense because of their
speed, mobility, and versatility. Their tasks can include—
· Conducting reconnaissance and security operations.
· Conducting shaping operations to establish the necessary conditions for
decisive operations by other forces through attritting, disrupting, and
delaying the enemy.
· Conducting counterattacks and spoiling attacks.
· Controlling ground for limited periods where a commander does not
wish to irrevocably commit ground forces; for example, forward of an
executed obstacle.
· Blocking enemy penetrations.
· Closing gaps in a defense plan before the arrival of ground maneuver
forces.
· Facilitating the disengagement of ground forces.
· Countering enemy activities in the rear area, in particular enemy air-
borne or air assault forces.
· Using available utility and cargo helicopters in their normal roles to
support the defensive effort, such as resupplying the defending force
with Class IV barrier material or facilitating casualty evacuation.
8-17
FM 3-90
· Assisting in the countermobility effort.

· Providing long-range biological surveillance.
FIRE SUPPORT
8-51. In the defense, the commander uses his fire support systems to neutra-
lize, suppress, or destroy enemy forces; to delay or disrupt the enemy’s ability
to execute a given COA; and to enhance the effects of massed direct fires.
Thus fire support systems support both the commander’s decisive and
shaping operations.
8-52. The defending force is more effective if it can locate and attack enemy
forces while the enemy is stationary and concentrated in assembly areas or
advancing along LOCs, as opposed to when he is deployed in combat forma-
tions within the MBA. To accomplish this, the defending force must employ
its fire support system throughout its AO. It must be closely linked to target
acquisition means, including ISR assets.
8-53. As the commander develops his defensive plans, he must visualize how
to synchronize, coordinate, and distribute the effects of indirect and direct fire
at the decisive time and place. He places permissive FSCM as close as pos-
sible to friendly positions to facilitate the rapid engagement of attacking ene-
my forces. Prior coordination facilitates the massing of the effects of fires
before enemy targets concentrated at obstacles and other choke points can
disperse. Proper distribution of fire effects ensures the massing of over-
whelming combat power at the decisive point. Proper fire distribution also en-
sures that high-payoff targets are destroyed without wasting assets through
repetitive engagement by multiple friendly systems.
8-54. Indirect fires have the greatest impact on the enemy when they are
synchronized with direct fires and the use of obstacles, defensive positions,
and counterattack plans. The commander must integrate the defensive fire
and obstacle plans from the beginning. Indirect fires complement the effects
of obstacles and can disrupt enemy attempts to breach or bypass these obsta-
cles. For the plans to work, all elements in the fire support chain—from for-
ward observers in fire support teams to the fire support coordinator including
the supporting tactical air control party—must understand the commander’s
intent, the scheme of maneuver, and the obstacle plan.
8-55. There are various fire support considerations for each phase of the
fight. As part of his shaping operations during defense preparations, a com-
mander tries to disrupt the enemy’s attack preparations by—
· Conducting harassing fires on choke points and likely enemy assembly
areas.
· Employing air support on known, suspected, and likely enemy loca-
tions.
· Attritting his resources by continuously engaging high-payoff targets.
· Conducting offensive information operations to degrade the enemy’s
ability to command and control his forces.
· Employing counterfires to engage and destroy enemy artillery and mor-
tar systems attempting to deliver suppressive fires.
8-18
· Providing fires in support of the unit’s security operations, such as a

unit conducting the tactical mission task of counterreconnaissance.
In some situations it may be better to wait to execute a counterfire mission
until the fighting begins in the MBA. However, when defending forces enjoy
qualitative advantages in fire support, the advantages accruing from a count-
erfire battle usually outweigh the risks to the defending maneuver force. The
defender’s ability to mass fires quickly and then rapidly reposition its forces
is a major factor in disrupting the enemy and establishing the required condi-
tions for successful decisive operations.
8-56. The commander employs fires to support his security forces, using pre-
cision and other munitions to destroy enemy reconnaissance and other high-
payoff targets. This also helps to deceive the enemy about the location of the
MBA. He supports the security force by planning the delivery of the effects of
fires at appropriate times and places throughout his area of influence to slow
and canalize the enemy forces as they approach the security area. This allows
the security force to engage the enemy on more favorable terms. To prevent
fratricide, he places no fire areas over his security forces. Finally, he uses
fires to support the withdrawal of the security force once its shaping mission
is complete and the defending unit is prepared to conduct MBA operations.
8-57. Air support can play an important part in delaying enemy forces follow-
ing or attempting to bypass rearward-moving defending forces. Air operations
contribute to overcoming the enemy’s initial advantage of freedom of action.
Often, only aircraft are available to initially oppose an enemy penetration
until ground forces can redeploy to engage it. Close air support (CAS) can be
instrumental in disrupting an enemy advance. It can operate with Army heli-
copters and artillery assets to form a joint air attack team (JAAT). The com-
mander also incorporates artillery fires with electronic warfare and joint sys-
tems to suppress enemy air defenses while CAS hits a target. Air interdiction
can delay, destroy, or neutralize enemy follow-on forces, thereby providing
the commander with additional time to prepare his defensive positions.
8-58. Once the fight moves into the MBA, fire support assets continue to tar-
get enemy combat units to force them to deploy. At the same time, fire sup-
port assets inflict casualties, disrupt the cohesion of the enemy’s attack and
impede his ability to mass combat power. Fire support assets continue to at-
tack enemy follow-on forces before they can be committed to the MBA. This
further isolates the attacking enemy force. They attack C2 facilities and logis-
tics sites in depth to contribute to isolating the attacking enemy. The com-
mander takes advantage of the range and flexibility of his fire support wea-
pons to mass fires at critical points, such as obstacles and EAs, to slow and
canalize the enemy to provide better targets for direct fire systems. Fire sup-
port systems cover barriers, gaps, and open areas within the MBA. Tasks as-
signed to these fire support systems include closing obstacle gaps or reseeding
previously breached obstacles in accordance with the rules of engagement.
Other tasks include—
· Massing fires to suppress enemy direct and indirect fire systems to fa-
cilitate defensive maneuver, especially the counterattack and disen-
gagement.
· Neutralizing or isolating enemy forces that have penetrated the defen-
sive area and impeding the movement of enemy reserves.
8-19
FM 3-90
· Attacking enemy artillery and forward air defense elements.

· Using jamming to degrade or destroy the enemy’s ability to transmit
data and information.
· Reallocating fire support assets, after identifying the enemy’s main ef-
fort, to reinforce fires in the most vulnerable areas.
· Separating attacking enemy combat vehicles from light infantry, dis-
rupting the enemy’s combined arms team.
8-59. In response to shallow enemy penetrations, artillery commanders nor-
mally reposition their systems laterally, away from that point. This allows
artillery systems to provide fire support throughout the area of penetration.
AIR DEFENSE
8-60. Freedom of movement is essential to successful defensive operations. In
a hostile air environment, the defending force must establish air defense in
depth around critical points, areas, units, and activities. The dedicated air de-
fense artillery resources probably cannot provide adequate cover completely
throughout the AO against all possible threats; therefore, the commander
must establish priorities for coverage and assume risk.
Active Air Defense

8-61. Normally, the commander’s priorities for air defense protection in the
defense begin with his C2 facilities. Because they are generally fixed or semi-
fixed sites with high-electronic signatures, they are susceptible to attack by
enemy aircraft. Air defense coordinators examine air avenues of approach
toward C2 facilities and position guns and missiles to prevent enemy aircraft
from reaching their targets.
8-62. Logistics support areas, main supply routes (MSRs), and other logistics
sites are also relatively fixed and easily identified from the air. Passive air de-
fense measures help prevent detection. However, once the enemy detects
them, he will attempt to attack them. Therefore, route and point security mis-
sions require air defense units to locate along the MSR and in positions to
protect fixed locations. The commander allocates his air defense assets to pro-
tect these locations in accordance with the factors of METT-TC.
8-63. The air defense responsibility may be most critical in forward areas
since the commander will task air defense artillery (ADA) units along the
FEBA to engage enemy aircraft providing CAS or attempting low-level pene-
tration of friendly air defenses en route to a target in the friendly rear area.
Air defense assets protecting combat forces in forward battle positions and
strong points are more exposed to destruction by enemy direct and indirect
systems than air defense systems located elsewhere on the battlefield. The
commander must take steps to ensure their survivability, such as placing
man-portable air defense missile gunners inside combat vehicles when not ac-
tively engaging enemy aircraft.
8-64. The reserve or striking force is initially a stationary hidden force. How-
ever, it is easy to observe from the air as it moves on its commitment by the
commander. It is especially vulnerable once discovered. Therefore, the
8-20
commander positions air defense assets to protect the reserve or striking

force, whether it is stationary or moving.
8-65. Air defense systems that protect the reserve and the striking force must
be as mobile and protected as the forces they are protecting. The less mobile
equipment is usually kept in more static roles. The commander continually
coordinates his air defense activities with his air and artillery operations to
avoid fratricide. Air defense units and support assets move in support of the
defensive effort. If the enemy can disrupt this support from the air, it will af-
fect the defense. Correct assessment of enemy air corridors and tactics is es-
sential to guarantee protection and management of these resources.
8-66. The destruction of key bridges or the closing of choke points interrupts
the defender’s freedom of movement. The force must protect these positions to
sustain the defense and allow the conduct of counterattacks. The commander
locates air defense assets to protect these vital locations.
Passive Air Defense

8-67. The commander also uses passive air defense measures to protect his
force. Passive air defense measures are all measures other than active defense
taken to minimize the effects of the hostile air action (FM 3-01.8). Passive de-
fense measures are of two types: attack avoidance and damage-limiting meas-
ures. Both include the use of cover, concealment and camouflage, and decep-
tion.
8-68. Attack Avoidance. Attack avoidance means taking steps to avoid
being seen by the enemy. If the force cannot be seen, the probability of it
being hit diminishes to near zero. The commander uses the same techniques,
procedures, and materials for concealment from aerial observation as for con-
cealment from ground observation. He employs three principles to enhance
concealment—
· Siting. Siting means selecting the most advantageous position in
which to hide a man, an object, or an activity. This is often the shadows
provided by woodlines, wadies, and buildings.
· Discipline. Success in any concealment effort hinges on strict conceal-
ment discipline by units and individual soldiers. The unit should avoid
activities that change the appearance of an area or reveal the presence
of military equipment. Laxness and carelessness will undoubtedly re-
veal a position. Tracks, spoil, and debris are the most common signs of
military activity, which indicate concealed objects. Ensure that new
tracks follow existing paths, roads, fences, or natural lines in the ter-
rain pattern. Do not end exposed routes at a position, but extend them
to another logical termination. If practical, the unit should brush out,
camouflage, or cover its tracks. It should cover or place spoil and debris
to blend with the surroundings. The unit adds artificial camouflage
when the terrain and natural vegetation are such that natural conceal-
ment is not possible.
· Construction. Adding natural materials to blend with the surround-
ing terrain augments this type of concealment.
8-69. There are three fundamental methods of concealing installations and
activities—hiding, blending, and disguising.
8-21
FM 3-90
· Hiding. Hiding is the complete concealment of an object by some form

of physical screen. For example, sod placed over mines in a minefield
hides the mines; the overhead canopy of trees hides the objects beneath
from aerial observation; a net hides objects beneath it; a defilade posi-
tion hides objects from ground observation. In some cases, the screen
may be invisible. In other instances, the screen may be visible, but it
hides the activity behind it.
· Blending. Blending is arranging or applying camouflage materials on,
over, and around the object so that it appears to be part of the back-
ground. Examples include applying face paint to the exposed areas of
skin, and adding burlap, paint, and live vegetation to helmets and
clothing to closely resemble or blend into the background. Units can ap-
ply the same technique for equipment or structures.
· Disguising. Clever disguises can often mislead the enemy about the
friendly force’s identity, strength, and intention, and may draw his fire
from real assets. Therefore, the simulation of objects, pieces of equip-
ment, or activities may have military significance. Inflatable tanks,
tents, and buildings can look like the real thing to an aerial observer.
8-70. In addition to hiding equipment, units can avoid detection by using
mud for glassy surfaces and unfilled sandbags over windshields. Camouflage
is one of the basic weapons of war. Soldiers must understand the importance,
the principles, and the techniques of camouflage. All personnel must ensure
the effectiveness of all camouflage measures and maintain strict camouflage
discipline.
8-71. Damage-Limiting Measures. The other type of passive air defense,
damage limiting, is also used for survival. These measures attempt to limit
damage if the enemy detects the position. If the enemy is to destroy any
equipment, he is forced to do it one piece at a time. Enemy forces should
never be able to put a unit out of action with just a single attack. The com-
mander uses the same measures taken to limit damage from field artillery
attack—dispersion, protective construction, and cover.
· Dispersion. Dispersed troops and vehicles force the attacker to con-
centrate on a single small target that he will likely miss. The wider the
dispersion, the greater the potential for limiting damage.
· Protective Construction. Using cover, natural or manmade, acts to
reduce damage and casualties. Folds in the earth, natural depressions,
trees, buildings, and walls offer damage-limiting cover; individuals and
units should seek them out and use them habitually. If deployment is
in flat terrain lacking cover, digging in or sandbagging can offer some
protection. The unit employs smoke if it is moving and cannot use
natural cover or cannot build fortifications. Smoke makes target acqui-
sition much more difficult for the attacker.
· Cover. Cover emphasizes the importance of passive defense against an
air attack. The unit must do everything it can to avoid an attack in the
first place, but if it is attacked, it uses cover and dispersion to limit the
amount of damage.
8-22
Air Defense Role in Reconnaissance and Surveillance

8-72. A commander can direct his air defense systems to deploy forward with
scouts along potential air corridors based on the aerial IPB developed by his
intelligence and air defense officers. This provides early warning of enemy air
infiltration and allows timely engagement of enemy aerial platforms attempt-
ing to insert dismounted reconnaissance, infantry, and antiarmor teams. The
air defense systems can report stationary locations of enemy aircraft to assist
the supported unit in confirming templated LZs. This allows the unit to
quickly react to potential ground threats by calling for indirect fires or em-
ploying a quick reaction force to defeat this threat. The commander assigns a
clear mission to these systems to ensure that they do not compromise the sup-
ported unit’s integrated ISR plan by prematurely engaging enemy aerial re-
connaissance platforms. He establishes a well-defined trigger event to pre-
vent this from happening. Additionally, he ensures the integration of ADA
unique munitions into the supported unit’s CSS plan based on the planned
time that these assets will be forward.
8-73. An attacking enemy has the initiative in terms of where and when he
will attack. A defending commander must take a wide range of actions to pro-
tect the mobility of his force while degrading the mobility of the enemy. He
takes those steps simultaneously to protect his force from losses due to enemy
actions.
Mobility
8-74. During the defense, mobility tasks include maintaining routes, coordi-
nating gaps in existing obstacles, and supporting counterattacks. Engineers
also open helicopter LZs and tactical landing strips for fixed-wing aircraft.
Maintaining and improving routes and creating bypass or alternate routes at
critical points are major engineering tasks because movement routes are sub-
jected to fires from enemy artillery and air support systems. These enemy
fires may necessitate deploying engineer equipment, such as assault bridging
and bulldozers, forward. The commander can also evacuate dislocated civil-
ians or restrict their movements to routes not required by his forces to en-
hance his mobility. He can do this provided he coordinates the action with the
host nation or the appropriate civil military operations agency and fulfills his
responsibilities to displaced civilians under international law.
8-75. Priority of mobility support is first to routes used by counterattacking
forces, then to routes used by main body forces displacing to subsequent posi-
tions. This mainly involves breaching obstacles and improving combat roads
and trails to allow tactical support vehicles to accompany moving combat ve-
hicles. Careful coordination ensures leaving required lanes or gaps in obsta-
cles for repositioning main body units and committing the counterattack force
during the defense. Chemical reconnaissance systems also contribute to the
force’s mobility in a contaminated environment.
Countermobility
8-76. In the defense, the commander normally concentrates his engineer ef-
forts on countering the enemy’s mobility. A defending force typically requires
8-23
FM 3-90
large quantities of Class IV and V material and specialized equipment to con-

struct fighting and survivability positions and obstacles. With limited assets,
the commander must establish priorities among countermobility, mobility,
and survivability efforts. He ensures that his staff synchronizes these efforts
with the echelon’s logistic plans.
8-77. The commander may plan to canalize the enemy force into a salient. In
this case, he takes advantage of the enemy force’s forward orientation by fix-
ing the enemy and then delivering a blow to the enemy’s flank or rear. As the
enemy’s attacking force assumes a protective posture, the defending com-
mander rapidly coordinates and concentrates all effects of his fires against
unprepared and unsupported segments of the enemy force in rapid sequence.
The unit may deliver these fires simultaneously or sequentially.
8-78. When planning obstacles, commanders and staffs must consider not
only current operations but also future operations. The commander should
design obstacles for current operations so they do not hinder future opera-
tions. Any commander authorized to employ obstacles can designate certain
obstacles that are important to his ability to shape the battlefield as high-
priority reserve obstacles. He assigns responsibility for preparation to a sub-
ordinate unit but retains authority for ordering their execution or final com-
pletion. An example of a reserve obstacle is a highway bridge over a major
river. Such obstacles receive the highest priority in preparation and, if or-
dered, execution by the designated subordinate unit.
8-79. A commander integrates reinforcing obstacles with existing obstacles to
improve the natural restrictive nature of the terrain to halt or slow enemy
movement, canalize enemy movement into EAs, and protect friendly positions
and maneuver. He may choose to employ scatterable mines in accordance
with the rules of engagement. Direct and indirect fires must cover obstacles
to be effective. This requires the ability to deliver effective fires well beyond
the obstacle’s location. When possible, units conceal obstacles from hostile ob-
servation. They coordinate obstacle plans with adjacent units and conform to
the obstacle zone or belts of superior echelons.
8-80. Effective obstacles force the enemy to attempt to breach them if he
wants to maintain his momentum and retain the initiative. While the defend-
ing force is aware that the enemy is going to breach an obstacle, the enemy
tries to conceal exactly where and when he will try to breach. The defending
force’s plan addresses how to counter such a breach, to include reestablishing
the obstacle by using scatterable mines and other techniques.
8-81. Given time and resources, the defending force generally constructs ad-
ditional obstacle systems to its flanks and rear. These systems can provide
additional protection from enemy attacks by forcing the enemy to spend time
and resources to breach or bypass the obstacle. This, in turn, gives the
defending force more time to engage enemy forces attempting to execute
breach operations or bypass these obstacles.
8-82. The commander designates the unit responsible for establishing and se-
curing each obstacle. He may retain execution authority for some obstacles or
restrict the use of some types of obstacles to allow other battlefield activities
to occur. He allows his subordinate commanders some flexibility in selecting
the exact positioning of obstacles. However, all units must know which gaps—
8-24
through obstacles and crossing sites—to keep open for the unit’s use, as well
as the firing and self-destruct times of scatterable mines to prevent delays in
movement. The commander must be specific and clear in his orders for firing
demolitions, emplacing obstacles, and closing lanes. As each lane closes, the
closing unit reports the lane’s closure to the higher, subordinate, and adjacent
headquarters to preclude displacing units from moving into areas with
unmarked or abandoned obstacles.
8-83. Tactical and protective obstacles are constructed primarily at company
level and below. Small unit commanders ensure that observation and fires
cover all obstacles to hinder breaching. Deliberate protective obstacles are
common around fixed sites. Protective obstacles are a key component of sur-
vivability operations. They are tied in with FPFs and provide the friendly
force with close-in protection. Commanders at all echelons track defensive
preparations, such as establishing Class IV and V supply points and start or
completion times of obstacle belts and groups. The commander plans how he
will restore obstacles the enemy has breached. He uses artillery, air, or
ground systems to reseed minefields.
8-84. FM 3-34.1 provides additional information about obstacles and obstacle
integration, such as planning factors relating to emplacing obstacles and ob-
stacle function versus lethality. It also describes the methods and essential
principles for planning protective obstacles.
Survivability
8-85. Since the attacking enemy force usually has the initiative in terms of
where and when it will attack, a defending commander must take a wide
range of actions to protect his force from losses due to enemy actions. These
steps include ensuring all-around defense, NBC defense, and using smoke.
8-86. The survivability effort for the defense must enable units to concentrate
firepower from fixed positions. To avoid detection and destruction by the ene-
my, units move frequently and establish survivability positions quickly. To
provide flexibility, units may need primary, alternate, and supplementary po-
sitions. This is particularly true of units defending key or decisive terrain.
Units enhance their survivability through concealment, deception, dispersion,
and field fortifications.
8-87. Survivability tasks include using engineer equipment to assist in pre-
paring and constructing trenches, command post shelters, and artillery firing,
radar, and combat vehicle fighting positions. The commander provides guid-
ance on the level of protection—such as hull defilade or overhead cover, sys-
tem priorities, and early use of specialized engineer systems that can con-
struct survivability positions. He should protect supply stocks against blast,
shrapnel, incendiaries, and NBC contamination. Supplies loaded on tactical
vehicles can be protected against almost anything but a direct hit by con-
structing berms large enough to accommodate the vehicles and deep enough
to keep supplies below ground level. The force’s engineer officer can advise
CSS logistics operators about storage area site selection that reduces the re-
quirements for engineer survivability support without reducing the degree of
protection provided. FMs 3-34.1 and 3-34.112 provide additional information
concerning the construction and maintenance of survivability positions.
8-25
FM 3-90
8-88. The commander should avoid predictable defensive preparations

because an enemy will tend to attack lightly defended areas. Major positions,
facilities, and operational logistics sites may require special camouflage.
Camouflage measures that provide this protection include constructing dum-
my positions and decoys. The commander carefully plans the use of such
measures within the framework of real positions and ongoing and future op-
erations. The echelon’s OPSEC program and any deception efforts conducted
in accordance with guidance from higher echelons should conceal from the
enemy or mislead him about the location of the MBA and the disposition of
friendly forces.
8-89. Ensure All-Around Defense. Units employ all-around security at all
times although they deploy the bulk of their combat power against likely ene-
my avenues of approach. This is because the battlefield offers many oppor-
tunities for small enemy elements to move undetected.
8-90. NBC Defense. Because defending units are often in fixed positions,
they increase their vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction. The com-
mander specifies the degree of risk he is willing to accept and establishes pri-
orities for his NBC defense units. He positions forces and installations to
avoid congestion, but he must not disperse to the extent that he risks defeat
in detail by an enemy employing conventional munitions.
8-91. The commander determines the mission oriented protective posture
(MOPP) level assumed by his force if the MOPP level has not already been es-
tablished by a higher headquarters. Environmental factors determine where
he places his NBC detection devices. He ensures that his unit can conduct
hasty and deliberate decontamination of its soldiers and equipment. He drills
his unit on measures taken in response to the enemy’s use of weapons of mass
destruction.
8-92. The commander should employ NBC reconnaissance units along move-
ment routes and at potential choke points. Proper use of these assets enables
the commander to reduce casualties and complete his mission. (FMs 3-11
and 3-12 detail NBC defense operations.)
8-93. Smoke and Obscuration. The commander uses smoke to disrupt the
enemy’s assault or movement formations and deny his use of target acquisi-
tion optics, visual navigation aids, air avenues of approach, LZs, and drop
zones (DZs). Smoke creates gaps in enemy formations, separating or isolating
attacking units, and disrupting their planned movement. Bispectral obscura-
tion can blind attackers who lack thermal viewers or other enhanced optical
systems. It prevents overwatching enemy elements from observing and en-
gaging the defender, whereas defending forces with advanced optical systems
can acquire and engage the enemy within the smoke. The commander can use
smoke to facilitate friendly target acquisition by highlighting enemy systems
against a light background while degrading the enemy’s optics. Smoke used
to mask obstacles located in low-level flight corridors and on LZs and DZs can
prevent an enemy from using them or greatly increase his risk.
8-94. The commander uses his smoke-generation capabilities to mark targets
and screen and obscure friendly positions. Modern bispectral obscurants pro-
vide protection from thermal as well as visual viewing devices. This gener-
ated capability must be carefully sited with regard to enemy systems and
8-26
friendly capabilities. Improper use can create an advantage for the enemy.
The effectiveness of smoke depends on weather conditions and the quantity of
smoke employed. The commander coordinates the use of smoke generators,
artillery/mortar smoke, and smoke pot employment. The capabilities of each
of these smoke-producing systems are complementary and most effective
when used together to achieve synergistic effects. Using smoke can also en-
hance the effects of deception operations and cover friendly movement to in-
clude a river crossing. (FM 3-11.50 provides details on planning, preparing,
and executing smoke operations.)

8-95. The commander addresses several CSS considerations unique to the de-
fense in his plan. Priorities for replenishment are normally ammunition and
materials to construct obstacles and defensive positions. There is normally a
reduced need for bulk fuel. There may be an increased demand for decontami-
nants and chemical protective equipment. The defense should consider stock-
piling or caching ammunition and limited amounts of petroleum products in
centrally located positions within the main battle area. The commander
should plan to destroy those stocks if necessary as part of denial operations.
The supply of obstacle materials in a defense can be a significant problem
that requires detailed coordination and long lead times. The commander
should not overlook the transportation and manpower required in obtaining,
moving, and uncrating barrier material and associated obstacle creating
munitions, such as demolition charges and mines.
8-96. The logistics officer (G4 or S4) and the commanders of the logistics
units supporting the defending force must understand the commander’s tacti-
cal intent. They can then establish service support priorities in accordance
with the commander’s intent and plan logistics operations to ensure the sup-
portability of the operations. Logistics plans should address the provision of
CSS during branches and sequels to the defense plan, such as a counterattack
into the flank of an adjacent unit.
8-97. Combat units top off regularly with supplies in case an enemy break-
through disrupts the replenishment flow. At the battalion and brigade level
the commander ensures that his CSS operators deliver combat-configured
loads to his combat units on a scheduled basis. Combat-configured loads are
packages of potable and nonpotable water, NBC defense supplies, barrier ma-
terials, ammunition, POL, medical supplies, and repair parts tailored to a
specific size unit. This eliminates the need to request supplies and reduces
the chance that a lapse in communications will interrupt the supply flow and
jeopardize the integrity of the defense. The supported combat unit is resup-
plied using this push system until it issues instructions to the contrary. The
commander can use utility and cargo helicopters to deliver supplies directly
from the rear area to the defending unit. Advances in information systems
should allow these combat-configured push packages to be accurately tailored
to the demands of the supported combat units.
8-98. As a technique, the defending force conducts resupply during periods of
limited visibility if the commander does not expect the enemy to conduct a
limited-visibility attack. This tends to reduce the chance for enemy interfer-
ence with the resupply process but also tends to lengthen the amount of time
8-27
FM 3-90
it takes to complete the process. Resupply should take place during daylight
hours if the commander expects the enemy to conduct a limited visibility at-
tack. The commander may be required to infiltrate resupply vehicles to re-
duce detection chances when the enemy possesses a significant air, satellite,
or unmanned aerial vehicle capability. The commander may also use smoke
to help conceal his logistics operations.
8-99. The CSS commander remains responsible for the defense of his unit.
Concealment is an important factor in reducing the risk factors of these units.
The commander must plan for the reconstitution of CSS capability lost to ene-
my activities.
8-100. Terrain management is a critical consideration in the rear area. The
commander seeks to position each CSS unit where it can best fulfill its sup-
port tasks while using minimal resources to maintain security in conjunction
with other units located in the rear area. In contiguous operations, the com-
mander positions his CSS facilities farther to the rear in a defense than in the
offense to avoid interfering with the movement of units between battle posi-
tions or the forward movement of counterattack forces. It also should be loca-
ted far enough behind friendly lines that likely enemy advances will not com-
pel the relocation of critical CSS at inopportune times. At the same time CSS
must be close enough to provide responsive support. In noncontiguous opera-
tions, the commander positions his CSS facilities within the perimeters of his
combat units to provide security and avoid interrupting support services. The
commander distributes his similar functional CSS units throughout his de-
fensive area in both environments. This distribution allows him to designate
one support unit to pick up the workload of a displacing second support unit
until that unit is operational.
8-101. The defending commander provides maintenance support as far for-
ward as possible to reduce the need to evacuate equipment. The thrust of the
maintenance effort is to fix as far forward as possible those systems that can
be quickly returned to the unit in combat-ready condition. He must ensure
that multifunctional forward logistics elements contain the maximum variety
of DS personnel with appropriate equipment, such as repair sets, kits, and
outfits to ensure rapid repair of weapon systems.
8-102. The commander must plan to augment his available ambulances if a
mass-casualty situation develops. Units should always plan for mass casual-
ties and have an evacuation plan, including air evacuation, that specifies the
use of nonstandard air and ground platforms.
8-103. The conduct of troop movements and resupply convoys is critical to a
successful defense. Staffs balance terrain management, movement planning,
and traffic-circulation control priorities. They plan multiple routes
throughout the AO and closely control their use. The commander may allo-
cate mobility resources to maintain MSRs in a functional condition to support
units and supplies moving forward and to evacuate personnel and equipment
to the rear. Military police ease these movements, prevent congestion, and re-
spond to maneuver plan changes. Civil affairs and host nation agencies are
involved as necessary to minimize the impact of displaced civilians on unit
and convoy movements. The commander coordinates air and ground move-
ments supporting the commander’s maneuver scheme with any other affected
8-28
services. Commanders also coordinate such movements with any affected or-
ganic and external Army aviation, fire support, air defense units, and ground
maneuver units.
8-104. During the preparatory phase of the defense, logistics operators nor-
mally pre-position supply stocks, particularly ammunition and barrier mater-
ials, in the battle positions of defending forces. They also establish mainte-
nance and medical collection points. Logistics operators must address these
and other logistics preparations in the planning process to avoid compro-
mising the operation. These logistics preparations can also be included in
military deception plans.
COMMAND AND CONTROL

8-105. A defensive mission generally imposes few restrictions on the
defending commander. It allows freedom of maneuver within assigned bound-
aries, but requires him to prevent enemy penetration of the rear boundary.
Defending an AO is a typical mission for battalion and higher-echelon units.
This mission allows the commander to distribute forces to suit the terrain and
plan an engagement that integrates direct and indirect fires. The commander
must ensure that subordinate unit defensive plans are compatible and that
control measures, such as contact points and phase lines, are sufficient for
flank coordination when assigning AOs. The defensive plan must address
what happens when it succeeds and the opportunity exists to transition from
defense to offense.
8-106. Defensive operations are often difficult to conduct because they may
occur against an enemy who has the initiative and usually superior combat
power. The commander must have a clear understanding of the battlefield
situation to mass the effects of his forces to disengage committed forces. He
takes advantage of war gaming that takes place in the military decision
making process to derive his decision points. He bases these decision points
on enemy and friendly actions, such as shifting fires, moving between battle
positions, and rearming part or all of the defending force. He may require ad-
ditional signal support to sustain communications across wide frontages char-
acteristic of many defensive operations.
8-107. Because the enemy has the initiative, the commander may have to fre-
quently shift his shaping operations to contain the enemy’s attack until he
can seize the initiative. This may require him to adjust subordinate unit AOs,
repeatedly commit and reconstitute his reserve, and modify the original plan.
8-108. The defending commander may change his task organization to re-
spond to the existing or projected situation, such as forming a detachment left
in contact prior to conducting a withdraw. Whenever possible the commander
ensures that changes in task organization take place between units that have
previously trained or operated together to take advantage of established in-
terpersonal relationships. The commanders of such recently reorganized
units place special attention on ensuring that each element directs its efforts
toward accomplishing the overall unit’s mission, thus obtaining the maximum
combat capability provided by combined arms. This requires them to ensure
synchronizing objectives, control measures, movement routes, defensive posi-
tions, and specifically assigned tasks. It also requires using standing
8-29
FM 3-90
operating procedures by each element of the task-organized unit. Failure to

synchronize the effects of task-organized elements has often resulted in mis-
sion failure in training and actual operations.
8-109. To break through the MBA, the enemy often attacks along the bounda-
ries of defending units when he can identify them. Therefore, it is extremely
important for commanders at every echelon to ensure that the plan for their
part of the defense is properly coordinated not only within their units but also
with flanking and supporting units. This coordination is best done by person-
al visits to subordinate commanders on the ground. The staff should promptly
pass on decisions reached during coordination to all concerned. The following
planning aspects require attention in the coordination process:
· Understanding the superior commander’s intent and concept of opera-
tions.
· Understanding the tactics to be applied by flanking and supporting
units.
· Selecting boundary locations that do not increase the coordination
problem.
· Planning for mutual support.
· Surveillance and target acquisition plans.
· Location and composition of security forces.
· Obstacles and demolition plans.
· Fire plans, to include employing AT systems, illumination, and smoke.
· Air defense coverage areas.
· Employing the reserve in conjunction with information operations and
fire support systems, such as artillery and aviation.
· Boundaries and other control measures.
· Communications.
8-110. Because C2 facilities tend to be more stationary in the defense, the
commander should place them in hardened areas or protective terrain and re-
duce their electronic signature. They must remain capable of rapidly relocat-
ing to respond to battlefield developments.
COMMON DEFENSIVE SCENARIOS

8-111. Certain common defensive scenarios have their own unique planning
considerations. The following section addresses these scenarios and the
unique considerations associated with—
· Defense against airborne and air assault attacks.
· Defense of a linear obstacle.
· Perimeter defense.
· Reverse slope defense.
DEFENSE AGAINST AIRBORNE AND AIR ASSAULT ATTACKS

8-112. Defeating an enemy airborne or air assault begins with a good IPB
process to determine the enemy’s capabilities to conduct vertical envelopment
and identify enemy airfields, pickup zones, DZs, and LZs. Armed with an ap-
preciation of the enemy’s capability to conduct vertical envelopment, the
8-30
commander takes steps to counter the threat before they launch, during their
movement to the DZ, or at the LZ. After prioritizing the risk of each potential
DZ or LZ to his operation, the commander establishes systematic surveillance
of these areas to alert him if the enemy attempts to insert his forces. Units
also sight their weapons to cover the most probable DZs and LZs. The fire
support plan includes these zones in its target list for conventional munitions
and scatterable mines and reflects current rules of engagement and host
nation restrictions. Units and engineers emplace obstacles in these locations
and block avenues of approach from such areas to critical friendly installa-
tions and activities as part of their countermobility and rear area surviva-
bility efforts.
8-113. Once enemy forces succeed in landing, the key to a successful defense
is speed in containing and counterattacking the inserted enemy force before it
becomes organized and reinforced. Field artillery and attack helicopters must
commit rapidly to take advantage of the concentration of targets in the inser-
tion area. Affected base and base cluster defense forces and available re-
sponse forces keep the enemy force under observation at all times, calling in
and designating targets for available fire support systems. The commander
rapidly musters and commits available heavy units and combat systems to
take advantage of enemy light forces’ vulnerabilities to attack by armored ve-
hicles while they remain concentrated in the insertion area. If more enemy
troops land and succeed in consolidating, local base and base cluster defense
forces and the response force try to fix the enemy force in a chosen location to
allow a tactical combat force (TCF) to counterattack. If the enemy force is too
large for the TCF to reduce, the commander may need to commit his reserve.
DEFENSE OF A LINEAR OBSTACLE

8-114. A commander may conduct either an area or mobile defense along or
behind a linear obstacle. An area defense is normally preferred because it ac-
cepts less risk by not allowing the enemy to cross the obstacle. Linear obsta-
cles such as mountain ranges or river lines generally favor a forward defense.
The defending force seeks to defeat any enemy attempt to secure a bridge-
head across the linear obstacle. Local defending units immediately and vio-
lently counterattack any enemy bridgeheads established to destroy enemy
forces located within the bridgehead, while higher echelons attempt to isolate
enemy bridgehead sites. If the enemy secures a bridgehead and strikes out
rapidly, it could quickly penetrate the defending force. This requires the com-
mander to conduct retrograde operations, either a delay or a withdrawal.
8-115. It is extremely difficult to deploy in strength along the entire length of
a linear obstacle. The defending commander must conduct economy of force
measures in some areas. Within an area defense, the commander’s use of a
defense in depth accepts the possibility that the enemy may force a crossing
at a given point. The depth of the defense should prevent the enemy from
rapidly exploiting its success. It also defuses the enemy’s combat power by
forcing him to contain bypassed friendly defensive positions in addition to
continuing to attack positions in greater depth. Once the enemy force secures
several bridgeheads, the defending force moves to contain them. The defend-
ing force commander may choose not to counterattack until he can mass over-
whelming combat power. He will probably choose to eliminate the
8-31
FM 3-90
bridgeheads sequentially in this case. However, he risks allowing the enemy

to establish and fortify bridgehead crossing sites sufficiently to prevent the
counterattack force from eliminating them.
8-116. The mobile defense gives the enemy an opportunity to cross the obsta-
cle with a portion of his force. The commander conducting a mobile defense
along a linear obstacle normally employs minimal forces along the obstacle as
his fixing force. This generally allows the enemy to cross in at least one loca-
tion. Once the enemy has partially crossed and the obstacle divides his forces,
the commander conducts shaping operations to isolate the enemy bridgehead.
Once the bridgehead is isolated, the defending commander launches a deci-
sive attack by the striking force to destroy that isolated enemy bridgehead.
He may also choose this technique when the enemy is likely to use weapons of
mass destruction.
8-117. Alternatively, in a mobile defense the commander may take advantage
of terrain or smoke to hide a striking force until the enemy’s forward ele-
ments pass this force. Until committed, the striking force maintains a peri-
meter defense. This technique closely resembles the use of stay-behind forces.
Similarly, the commander may order units inadvertently bypassed by the
enemy not to break out immediately so that he may capitalize on their posi-
tion to destroy the enemy.
PERIMETER DEFENSE
8-118. The commander can employ the perimeter defense as an option when
conducting an area or mobile defense. The commander uses it in many other
circumstances, such as when his unit is bypassed by the enemy or in base and
base cluster defense in the rear area.
8-119. A perimeter defense is oriented in all directions. Aggressive patrolling
and security operations outside the perimeter are prerequisites for a success-
ful perimeter defense. These activities can be undertaken by the unit within
the perimeter or by another force, such as the territorial defense forces of a
host nation. The unit can organize a perimeter defense to accomplish a speci-
fic mission, such as protecting a fire base, or providing immediate self-protec-
tion, such as during resupply operations when all-around security is required.
The commander establishes a perimeter when the unit must hold critical ter-
rain, such as a strong point, or when it must defend itself in areas where the
defense is not tied in with adjacent units. This occurs when the unit is opera-
ting behind enemy lines or when it is securing an isolated objective, such as a
bridge, mountain pass, or airfield. A unit may also form a perimeter when it
has been bypassed and isolated by the enemy and it must defend in place, or
it is located in the friendly rear area within the confines of a base or base
cluster. (See Figure 8-10.) However, divisions and corps can also organize a
perimeter defense when necessary.
8-120. A major characteristic of a perimeter defense is a secure inner area
with most of the combat power located on the perimeter. Another characteris-
tic is the ease of access for resupply operations. The commander coordinates
direct and indirect fire plans to prevent accidentally engaging neighboring
friendly units and noncombatants. Normally, the reserve centrally locates to
react to a penetration of the perimeter at any point.
8-32
8-121. Perimeters vary in shape depending on the terrain and situation. If

the commander determines the most probable direction of enemy attack, he
may weight that part of the perimeter to cover that approach. The perimeter
shape conforms to the terrain features that best use friendly observation and
fields of fire. The commander can increase the effectiveness of the perimeter
by tying it into a natural obstacle, such as a river, which allows him to con-
centrate his combat power in more threatened sectors.
SPT
RESERVE
Figure 8-10. Perimeter Defense
8-122. The commander may
employ all of his forces forward
along the perimeter or establish I I I
a defense in depth within the
II
II
perimeter. The commander em-

I
ploys patrols, raids, ambushes,

I
air attacks, and supporting

fires to harass and destroy ene-
I
my forces before they make

II
contact with the perimeter, I

thus providing defense in depth
I
with both techniques. I

8-123. In the first technique, he
places all of his subordinate
Figure 8-11. All Company Teams
units in positions along the
on the Perimeter
perimeter. He divides the peri-
meter into subordinate unit AOs with boundaries and coordinating points.
(See Figure 8-11.) This reduces the possibility of fratricide within the peri-
meter and maximizes combat power on the perimeter.
8-33
FM 3-90
8-124. Constructing an outer

and inner perimeter creates
some depth in the defense in
the second technique. Using I I
a brigade assembly area as II
an example, the commander
I II
I
places two companies in
I
each battalion task force
I
along the outer perimeter
I
and one company in reserve I
II
along the inner perimeter.
(See Figure 8-12.) This con- I
figuration gives depth to the
battalion task force’s posi-
tions and facilitates control.
It also gives one company Figure 8-12. Three Battalion TFs on
from each battalion task Perimeter, Co/Teams Positioned in Depth
force the mission to support
frontline platoons. It enables
the company commander to
I
II
I
locate any indirect fire sys-
tems, such as mortars, near
I
the reserve platoon, en-

I
II
hancing control and security.
I
Alternatively, the command-
I
er could elect to assign two
battalion task forces to the I I
outer perimeter and a third
battalion to an inner peri- I
meter, retaining a larger,
II
more cohesive central re-

serve. (See Figure 8-13.)
8-125. The commander posi- Figure 8-13. Two Battalion TFs on the
tions his forces within the Perimeter, One in Reserve
perimeter to decrease the
possibility of an enemy simultaneously suppressing his inner and outer
perimeter forces with the same fires regardless of the method used. Friendly
forces within the perimeter must be capable of providing mutual support. The
commander covers gaps on the outer perimeter between units in open terrain
with fires. He should allow no gaps between defensive fighting positions
when his unit is in restrictive terrain with restricted fields of fire and
observation. This may mean that a unit defends along a narrower frontage
than on more open terrain. The commander may also have to employ all of
his subordinate units on the line formed by the perimeter. The commander
ensures that outer perimeter positions have rearward protection from inner
perimeter weapons once he establishes the inner perimeter.
8-126. The commander normally assigns combat vehicles supporting the de-
fense firing positions on the perimeter to cover the most likely mounted ave-
nues of approach. He should select and prepare alternate and supplemental
firing positions and routes to and from them. If the perimeter has several
8-34
mounted avenues of approach leading to it, the commander may elect to hold
his combat vehicles in hide positions until the enemy approaches. Units pre-
pare routes, firing positions, and range cards in advance for all positions.
Small-unit leaders must ensure that vehicles do not destroy communication
wires when they displace from one position to another.
8-127. The need to hold or protect features—such as bridges, airfields, or
LZs—from enemy observation and fires may restrict the positioning of units
within a perimeter. These factors, as well as the inability to achieve depth,
make a perimeter defense vulnerable to penetration by heavy enemy forces.
The commander reduces these vulnerabilities by—
· Developing reconnaissance and surveillance plans that provide early
warning.
· Positioning antiarmor weapon systems on armor-restrictive terrain to
concentrate fires on armor approaches.
· Providing as much depth as the diameter of the perimeter to allow the
proper placement of security elements and the reserve and the designa-
tion of secondary sectors of fire for antiarmor weapons.
· Constructing obstacles to fix or block enemy forces, so that friendly
units can effectively engaged them.
· Using smoke and deception.
8-128. If isolation from other friendly units drives the commander to form a
perimeter, such as during rear operations, CS and CSS elements from other
units may seek the perimeter’s protection. These elements are given defen-
sive missions based on their capabilities. The commander coordinates and in-
tegrates any fire support provided from outside the perimeter into the overall
defensive plan. This extra fire support conserves the ammunition of units
within the perimeter.
8-129. The commander normally employs any reconnaissance assets, such as
a scout platoon, outside the perimeter to provide early warning. He may aug-
ment security with squad-size or smaller observation posts that are provided
and controlled by units on the perimeter. He positions these security ele-
ments to observe avenues of approach. Patrols cover areas that cannot be ob-
served by stationary elements. Any security forces operating outside the peri-
meter must coordinate their passage of lines into and out of the perimeter
with the appropriate perimeter units.
8-130. The reserve may be a designated unit or a provisional force organized
from available personnel and equipment. The reserve forms a second line of
defense behind the perimeter forces. Ideally, the reserve is mobile to react to
enemy action along any part of the perimeter. The commander positions the
reserve to block the most dangerous AA and assigns on-order positions on
other critical avenues. The commander may task available combat vehicles
initially occupying firing positions on the perimeter with the mission of rein-
forcing the reserve.
Control Measures
8-131. The commander in a perimeter defense designates the trace of the
perimeter, battle positions, coordinating points, and lateral and forward
8-35
FM 3-90
boundaries. He can use EAs, target reference points, final protective fires,
and principal direction of fire as fire control measures. The commander desig-
nates checkpoints, contact points, passage points, and passage routes for use
by local reconnaissance, surveillance, and security elements operating outside
the boundary of the perimeter. (See Figure 8-14.)
+
AG7005
260630Z 3
OCT04
SP 13
+ AG7003
I
EA
RP 7 WEASEL
16
I
I
+ AG7001
RP 8
I
AG FPF OR
2-
50
12
2M
01
260830Z
11
OCT04
+
AG7002
17 SP 5
T
EA SKUNK
Figure 8-14. Perimeter Defense Control Measures
Planning a Perimeter Defense

8-132. The defending commander positions his forces and plans fire and
movement so he can respond to the widest possible range of enemy actions.
He prepares plans, including counterattack plans. He rehearses, evaluates,
and revises these plans as needed. The availability of LZs and DZs protected
from enemy observation and fire is a major consideration when selecting and
organizing the perimeter defense. The commander must emphasize supply
economy and protect existing supply stocks since aerial resupply is
vulnerable to weather and enemy fires. The commander considers the follow-
ing fundamentals when planning a perimeter defense.
8-133. Use of Terrain. Proper evaluation and organization of the area are
essential to maximize the effectiveness of a force conducting perimeter de-
fense. Factors considered are—
· Natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
· Using artificial obstacles to enhance the natural defensive characteri-
stics of the terrain.
· Existing roads, railways, and waterways used for military LOCs and ci-
vilian commerce.
8-36
· Controlling land areas surrounding the perimeter to a range beyond

that of enemy mortars and rockets and also controlling water ap-
proaches.
8-134. Security. Early warnings of pending enemy actions ensure the com-
mander time to react to any threat. Combat outposts, patrols, sensors, target
acquisition radars, and aerial surveillance provide early warning. Civilian in-
formants and actions of indigenous personnel near the position are excellent
indicators of pending enemy actions. Security measures vary with the enemy
threat, forces available, and the other factors of METT-TC; however, all-
round security is essential.
8-135. Mutual Support. The commander positions his defending forces to
ensure mutual employment of defensive resources, such as crew-served wea-
pons, observation, and maneuver elements. Mutual support between defen-
sive elements requires careful planning, positioning, and coordination be-
cause of the circular aspects of the perimeter defense. He uses surveillance,
obstacles, prearranged indirect fires, and the provision for maneuver ele-
ments to exploit or reinforce fires to control any gaps in the perimeter. Defen-
sive plans provide for using all available support, including field artillery sys-
tems firing danger close, attack helicopters, and close air support.
8-136. All-Around Defense. In defensive planning, the commander has to
be prepared to defend against enemy attack from any direction. His plans are
sufficiently flexible, and he positions his reserve to permit reaction to any
threat. The commander commits maneuver elements and available sup-
porting weapons to detect, engage, and destroy the attacking enemy force. He
assigns all personnel within the perimeter positions and sectors of fire.
8-137. Defense in Depth. Alternate and supplementary positions, combat
outposts, and mutually supporting strong points forward of the perimeter ex-
tend the depth. The commander plans fires throughout the defensive area up
to the maximum range of available weapons. He may place portable obstacles
around critical locations within the perimeter during periods of reduced visi-
bility to disrupt the enemy’s plan based on visual reconnaissance and add
depth to the defense.
8-138. Responsiveness. Attacks against a perimeter may range from long-
range sniper, mortar, or artillery and rocket fire to attacks by demolition
teams or major forces. The enemy has the advantage of deciding when,
where, and with what force he will attack. The commander prepares plans, to
include counterattack plans, and rehearses, assesses, and revises them as
necessary. The defensive plan contains procedures for timely response by fire
support teams and maneuver forces.
8-139. Maximum Use of Offensive Action. Since the objective of the peri-
meter defense is to maintain a secure position, the commander uses offensive
actions to engage enemy forces outside the base. On initial occupation of the
perimeter, friendly forces take offensive actions to destroy enemy forces in
the immediate area. Once the perimeter area is clear, a relatively smaller
force can defend the perimeter, thereby releasing other forces for their pri-
mary operations. The commander employs patrols, raids, ambushes, aerial at-
tacks, and supporting fires to harass and destroy enemy forces to prevent
their regaining the capability to threaten the perimeter. The commander
8-37
FM 3-90
maintains constant communications with his subordinates within the peri-

meter and provides them the information necessary to maintain a common
operational picture among all units located within the perimeter. He directs
them to conduct appropriate actions to remove threats located within their
AOs and sectors of fire.
Executing a Perimeter Defense

8-140. Attacks against a perimeter may range from long-range sniper, mor-
tar, or rocket fire; to attacks by suicide demolition squads; to attacks by major
enemy ground and air forces. Mortars, artillery, tanks, and antiarmor missile
systems from within the perimeter engage the enemy at long ranges. As the
enemy comes within small arms range, other weapons on the perimeter en-
gage him. If the assault continues, the force employs its available FPFs. If the
enemy penetrates the perimeter, the reserve blocks the penetration or coun-
terattacks to restore the perimeter. After committing the initial reserve, the
commander must reconstitute another reserve to meet other threats. This
force normally comes from an unengaged unit on another portion of the peri-
meter. If the commander uses an unengaged force to constitute a new re-
serve, he must retain sufficient forces to defend the vacated sector, unless he
is forced to assume that degree of risk.
8-141. Combat service support elements may provide support from within the
perimeter or from another location, depending on the mission and the status
of the unit forming the defensive perimeter, type of transport available,
weather, and terrain. Units in contested areas without secure ground LOC
are often resupplied by air.
REVERSE SLOPE DEFENSE

8-142. The commander organizes a reverse slope defense on the portion of a
terrain feature or slope with a topographical crest that masks the main defen-
sive positions from enemy observation and direct fire. All or part of the de-
fending force may employ this technique. It is generally useful at lower tacti-
cal levels, such as battalion and below.
8-143. The commander bases a successful reverse slope defense on denying
the topographical crest to the enemy. Although the defending unit may not
occupy the crest in strength, controlling the crest by fire is essential for suc-
cess. This defensive situation reduces the effects of massive indirect fire
(mortar, artillery, and close-air support) and draws the battle into the small-
arms range of infantry weapons. Using the reverse slope defense provides the
defending force with an opportunity to gain surprise. Its goal is to make the
enemy commit his forces against the forward slope of the defense, causing his
forces to attack in an uncoordinated fashion across the exposed topographical
crest. Firing from covered and concealed positions throughout the battle area,
the defending force maintains a distinct advantage over the exposed enemy
forces and canalizes them through unfamiliar terrain into kill zones. (Fig-
ure 8-15 shows the terminology associated with the reverse slope defense.)
8-144. The commander chooses to conduct a reverse slope defense when—
· The crest and forward slope are untenable because the enemy enjoys a
quantative or qualitative advantage in firepower at that point.
8-38
· His weapons cannot depress enough to engage.

· The crest and forward slope offer little or no cover and concealment.
· The forward slope has been lost or has not been seized.
· Units on the flanks can adequately cover the forward slope.
· Variance in the force’s tactical pattern is advisable to deceive or
surprise the enemy.
· The commander is forced to assume a hasty defense while in contact
with or in proximity to the enemy.
8-145. The reverse slope defense may deceive the enemy regarding the true
location and organization of the main defensive positions. This defense pro-
tects the main defensive positions from preparation fires and causes the
enemy to deploy into assault formations prematurely. The forward crest of
the main defensive positions limits the enemy’s observation. It reduces the ef-
fectiveness of enemy indirect fires and close air support and renders his di-
rect fire weapons ineffective. The defending force may bring surprise fires to
bear on the enemy as he crests the high ground. Units on the reverse slope
have more freedom of movement until the crest is lost.
TOPOGRAPHICAL
CREST
FORWARD REVERSE
SLOPE SLOPE
ENEMY
MOVEMENT
CONCAVE SLOPE
FORWARD REVERSE
MILITARY MILITARY
CREST CREST
CONVEX SLOPE COUNTERSLOPE
Figure 8-15. A Hill in Cross-Section
8-146. Using the reverse slope defense has several disadvantages:

· The effective range of direct fire weapons may be limited.
· Once security elements withdraw, the enemy can advance largely un-
impeded until he has crested the high ground in front of the main de-
fensive positions.
· The enemy has the advantage of attacking downhill.
· Maintaining observation of the enemy is difficult.
· In some cases the best locations for obstacles can only be covered from
positions on the forward slope.
8-39
FM 3-90
8-147. The commander places his overwatching elements forward of the topo-
graphic crest and on the flanks of the position in a valley or depression.
Another variation available to the commander is to organize a system of re-
verse slope defenses firing to the oblique defilade, each covering the other. A
commander uses an oblique defilade to protect his defending systems from
enemy frontal and flanking fires and from fires coming from above. For ex-
ample, in Figure 8-16, the two units defending on the reverse slope cannot en-
gage half of the hill to their direct front because of line of sight restrictions
caused by small forests, but they can cover each other using oblique defilade.
Figure 8-16. Oblique Defilade
8-148. The defending force positions its reconnaissance and security elements
where it can observe the forward slope, the terrain forward of it, and other
approaches to the defending position. Security elements destroy enemy recon-
naissance assets, delay the enemy, disorganize his attack, and deceive him re-
garding the exact location of the main defense. The commander should
position his reconnaissance and surveillance assets in observation posts (OPs)
located near or forward of the topographical crest to provide long-range obser-
vation of both the enemy’s flanks and front. Forces manning these OPs, which
can be provided by the commander’s reserve, may vary in size from a two-
man buddy team to a rifle squad or a multiple combat vehicle section in each
position. The commander should employ sufficient forces to provide
observation and a security screen for the MBA on ground that should be re-
tained. During darkness and periods of reduced visibility, he should
strengthen these detachments in size and numbers to provide security
against infiltration or surprise attack. Aggressive night combat patrols and
ambushes are an essential part of the security process.
8-149. In order to achieve surprise and limit the enemy’s ability to maneuver,
the commander organizes the main defensive positions to mass the effects of
his concentrated fires on the enemy as he crosses the topographical crest. In a
reverse slope defense, the key position denies enemy penetration and sup-
ports forward elements by fire. The defending force maintains observation
8-40
and fires over the entire forward slope as long as possible to destroy enemy
forces, thus preventing the enemy from massing for a final assault. From de-
fensive positions on the reverse slope, the close-in battle builds in intensity.
The defending force does not fire its direct fire weapons, which are located
throughout the MBA (adjacent slope positions, counterslope positions, or re-
verse slope positions), until suitable targets appear. At the same time, the
force shifts the effects of its indirect fires to those areas forward of the crest
and forward military slope.
8-150. When possible other units on complementary terrain should support
units in reverse slope positions. This is especially desirable when those sup-
porting units can observe and place fires on the crest and forward slope. In a
defense on a counterslope (reverse forward slope), fires must cover the area
immediately in front of the reverse slope positions to the topographical crest.
The commander organizes defensive positions to permit fires on enemy ap-
proaches around and over the crest and on the forward slopes of adjacent ter-
rain features if applicable. The key factors that affect the organization of
these areas are mutually supporting covered and concealed positions, numer-
ous existing and reinforcing obstacles, the ability to bring devastating fires
from all available weapons onto the crest, and a counterattack force. Depend-
ing on the terrain, the most desirable location for the reserve may be on the
counterslope or the reverse military crest of the counterslope.
Control Measures
8-151. Defensive control measures introduced in previous chapters apply
equally to the reverse slope defense. The commander places his EAs and ob-
stacles on the reverse slope. The topographical crest normally marks the far
edge of the EA. He must dominate it by fires to prevent the enemy from suc-
cessfully engaging the defending force.
Executing a Reverse Slope Defense

8-152. When executing a reverse slope defense, the commander places special
emphasis on—
· A fire support plan to prevent the enemy’s occupation and use of the
topographical crest.
· The proper organization of the forward slope to provide observation
across the entire front and security to the main battle positions.
· A counterattack plan that specifies measures necessary to clear the
creast or regain it from the enemy.
· Fire support to destroy, disrupt, and attrit enemy forces on the forward
slope.
8-153. The commander normally places his final protective fires along the
topographical crest and employs them as the enemy reaches the first row of
defiladed obstacles. He uses his reserve to counterattack and expel the enemy
from the topographical crest if massed indirect fires do not defeat the attack.
As always, in a reverse slope defense, the commander can employ his desig-
nated reserve to conduct rear area security operations, prepare withdrawal
routes, provide flank security, and conduct other actions with the
understanding that this increases the time required to reassemble the re-
serve and prepare it to support the defense.
8-41
FM 3-90
8-154. The reverse slope defense pursues offensive opportunities through sur-
prise and deceptive actions. It is uniquely suited to infantry forces in moun-
tainous terrain. When conducting a reverse slope defense, surprise results
from defending in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared. Once this de-
fense is employed successfully to halt an enemy attack, it may have limited
further value because the effect of surprise will be difficult to attain. (For ad-
ditional information on the use of a reverse slope defense, see FM 3-21.30 and
other brigade- and lower-echelon field manuals.)
TRANSITION
8-155. If a defense is successful, the commander anticipates and seeks the op-
portunity to transition to the offense. If the defense is unsuccessful, the com-
mander needs to transition from a defensive posture into retrograde opera-
tions. Transition from one type of operation to another requires mental as
well as physical agility on the part of the commanders, staffs, and units in-
volved as well as accurate situational assessment capabilities.
8-156. Deliberate contingency planning for either event greatly assists the
transition process and allows the commander to set the conditions necessary
for a successful transition. Such planning addresses the need to control the
tempo of operations, maintain contact with both enemy and friendly forces,
and keep the enemy off balance. It establishes the procedures and priorities
by which a unit reconstitutes itself for the next mission. In accordance with
the factors of METT-TC, it establishes the required organization of forces and
control measures necessary for success.
8-157. Such contingency planning decreases the time needed to adjust the
tempo of combat operations when a unit transitions from defensive to offen-
sive operations. It does this by allowing subordinate units to simultaneously
plan and prepare for subsequent operations. Preparations typically include
resupplying unit basic loads and repositioning or reallocating supporting sys-
tems. (Chapters 3-7 address the planning, preparation, and execution of all
types of offensive operations.)
8-158. Contingency planning also reduces the amount of time and confusion
inherent when a unit is unsuccessful in its defensive efforts and must transi-
tion to retrograde operations. It does this through designating units to con-
duct denial operations and early evacuation of casualties and inoperative
equipment. The intent of retrograde operations is to preserve the force as a
combat-capable formation until the commander can establish those conditions
necessary for a successful defense. (Chapter 11 discusses retrograde opera-
tions.)
TRANSITION TO THE OFFENSE

8-159. A defending commander transitioning to the offense anticipates when
and where the enemy force will reach its culminating point or require an op-
erational pause before it can continue. At those moments, the combat power
ratios most favor the defending force. The enemy force will do everything it
can to keep the friendly force from knowing when it is becoming overex-
tended. Indicators that the enemy is approaching this point include—
8-42
· Enemy forces begin to transition to the defense—this defense may be

by forces in or out of contact with friendly forces.
· Enemy forces suffer heavy losses.
· Enemy forces start to deploy before encountering friendly forces.
· Enemy forces are defeated in most engagements.
· Enemy forces are committed piecemeal in continued enemy attacks.
· Enemy reserve forces are identified among attacking forces.
· Examination of captured or killed enemy soldiers and captured or de-
stroyed enemy equipment and supplies shows that the enemy force is
unable to adequately sustain itself.
· A noticeable reduction in the tempo of enemy operations.
· Local counterattacks meet with unexpected success.
8-160. The commander must be careful that he is not the target of enemy in-
formation operations designed to tempt him to abandon the advantages of
fighting from prepared defensive positions. He ensures that his force has the
assets necessary to accomplish its assigned offensive mission.
8-161. In a mobile defense, transitioning to the offense generally follows the
striking force’s attack. In an area defense, the commander designates a por-
tion of his force to conduct the attack, selecting units based on his concept for
achieving his mission. However, he allocates available reserves to this effort.
8-162. As the commander transitions his force from the defense to the of-
fense, he takes the following actions—
· Establishes an LD for his offensive operation. This may require him to
conduct local, small-scale attacks to secure terrain necessary for the
conduct of the offensive operation or destroy enemy forces that could
threaten the larger offensive operation.
· Maintains contact with the enemy, using combinations of his available
ISR assets to develop the information required to plan future opera-
tions and avoid being deceived by enemy information operations.
· Redeploys his combined arms team based on the probable future em-
ployment of each element of that team. For example, fire support assets
would tend to move forward so that additional enemy forces and ter-
rain would be encompassed within their range fans.
· Maintains or regains contact with adjacent units in a contiguous AO
and ensures that his units remain capable of mutual support in a non-
contiguous AO.
· Transitions the engineer effort by shifting the emphasis from counter-
mobility and survivability to mobility.
· Provides his intent for transitioning from the defense to the offense to
his commanders and soldiers.
8-163. The commander redeploys his air defense assets to provide coverage of
combat forces and other assets necessary to conduct offensive operations.
This may require him to change or modify his air defense priorities. For ex-
ample, his top priority in the defense may have been his long-range sensors
and weapons. This may shift to providing priority air defense coverage of his
ground combat arms units and combat engineers.
8-43
FM 3-90
8-164. The commander conducts any required reorganization and resupply

concurrently with the above activities. This requires a transition in the logis-
tics effort, with a shift in emphasis from ensuring a capability to defend from
a chosen location to an emphasis on ensuring the force’s ability to advance
and maneuver. For example, in the defense, the sustainment effort may have
focused on the forward stockage of Class IV and V items and the rapid evac-
uation of combat-damaged systems. In the offense, the sustainment effort
may need to focus on providing POL and forward repair of maintenance and
combat losses. Transition is often a time in which deferred equipment main-
tenance can be performed. Additional assets may also be available on a temp-
orary basis for casualty evacuation and medical treatment because of a reduc-
tion in the tempo of operations.
8-165. The commander should not wait too long to transition from the de-
fense to the offense as the enemy force approaches its culminating point. Ene-
my forces will be dispersed, extended in depth, and weakened in condition. At
that time, any enemy defensive preparations will be hasty and enemy forces
will not be adequately disposed for defense. The commander wants the enemy
in this posture when he transitions to the offense. He does not want to give
the enemy force time to prepare for the defense. Additionally, the psychologi-
cal shock on enemy soldiers will be greater if they suddenly find themselves
desperately defending on new and often unfavorable terms while the com-
mander’s own soldiers will enjoy a psychological boost by going on the offense.
8-166. A commander can use two basic techniques when he transitions to the
offense. The first, and generally preferred, technique is to attack using forces
not previously committed to the defense. This is because defending MBA
units may still be decisively engaged. These attacking forces may come from
his reserve or consist of reinforcements. Since these forces have not recently
been actively involved in combat, they are more likely to—
· Be at authorized strength levels.
· Enjoy a higher combat system operationally ready rate.
· Have leaders and soldiers who are more likely to be rested and thus
capable of prolonged, continuous operations.
· Have a complete basic load of supplies.
· Have the time and energy to plan and prepare for offensive action.
· Be able to maneuver out of physical contact with the enemy.
8-167. A drawback to the use of this technique is the requirement to conduct
a forward passage of lines. Additionally, enemy ISR systems are likely to
detect the arrival of significant reinforcements.
8-168. Another consideration of using units not in contact occurs when they
are operating in noncontiguous AOs. The commander rapidly masses the ef-
fects of overwhelming combat power in his decisive operation. This might re-
quire him to adopt economy of force measures in some AOs while temporarily
abandoning others in order to generate sufficient combat power. (See Chap-
ters 3 and 5 for offensive planning, preparing, and executing considerations.)
8-169. The second technique is to conduct offensive actions using the cur-
rently defending forces. This technique generally has the advantage of being
more rapidly executed and thus more likely to catch the enemy by surprise.
8-44
Speed of execution in this technique results from not having to conduct an ap-
proach or tactical road march from reserve AAs or, in the case of reinforce-
ments, move from other AOs and reception, staging, organization, and inte-
gration (RSO&I) locations. Speed also results from not having to conduct a
forward passage of lines and perform liaison necessary to establish a common
operational picture that includes knowledge of the enemy force’s patterns of
operation. The primary disadvantage of this technique is that the attacking
force generally lacks stamina and must be quickly replaced if friendly
offensive operations are not to culminate quickly.
8-170. If units in contact participate in the attack, the commander must re-
tain sufficient forces in contact to fix the enemy. He concentrates the attack
by reinforcing select subordinate units so they can execute the attack and, if
necessary, maintain the existing defense. He can also adjust the defensive
boundaries of subordinate units so entire units can withdraw and concentrate
for the attack.
TRANSITION TO THE RETROGRADE

8-171. A defending commander transitions from the defense to the retrograde
for those reasons outlined in paragraph 11-1. A retrograde usually involves a
combination of delay, withdrawal, and retirement operations. These op-
erations may occur simultaneously or sequentially. As in other operations,
the commander’s concept of operations and intent drive planning for retro-
grade operations. Each form of retrograde operation has its unique planning
considerations, but considerations common to all retrograde operations are
risk, the need for synchronization, and rear operations. The planning, pre-
paring, and executing considerations associated with retrograde operations
are found in Chapter 11, but a number of key considerations receive special
emphasis during the transition from the defense to the retrograde.
8-172. To accomplish the above purposes, the transition to retrograde opera-
tions must be accompanied by efforts designed to—
· Reduce the enemy’s strength and combat power.
· Provide friendly reinforcements.
· Concentrate forces elsewhere for the attack.
· Prepare stronger defenses elsewhere within the AO.
· Lure or force part or all of the enemy force into areas where it can be
counterattacked.
8-173. The complexity and fluidity of retrograde operations and the absolute
need to synchronize the entire operation dictates the need for detailed, cen-
tralized planning and decentralized execution. Planning for retrograde opera-
tions begins with the preparation of plans for the follow-on mission and is
driven by the commander’s concept of operation and his intent.
8-174. The nature of retrograde operations involves an inherent risk of de-
grading the defending force’s morale. Therefore, maintaining offensive spirit
is essential among subordinate leaders and soldiers. Rearward movements
may be seen as a defeat, or as an action that could result in isolation of the
force. The commander must be well forward and visible. He must ensure that
the leaders and soldiers understand the purpose and intent of the operation
8-45
FM 3-90
and their role in accomplishing the mission. Thorough planning, effective con-
trol, and aggressive leadership will minimize risk during the retrograde or
enhance the probability of success.
8-175. The commander’s ISR requirements dramatically increase as his
forces begin their movement to other locations and the combat capabilities of
units in contact are subsequently reduced. It is imperative that an integrated
ISR collection plan be in place to identify and locate enemy attempts to
pursue, outflank, and isolate the defending force as it transitions to the
retrograde.
8-176. As the commander transitions to the retrograde, he makes every effort
to conserve his combat power. He considers the need to—
· Balance the risk of conserving combat power while remaining disposed
to the intent of the defensive mission.
· Disengage and withdraw units with the least tactical mobility and non-
essential elements prior to the retrograde of the main body.
· Use mobile forces to cover the retrograde of less mobile forces.
· Use the minimum essential combat power necessary to provide security
for the retrograde of the main body.
8-46
Chapter 9
The Area Defense

Regardless of the considerations which dictated the adoption of a de-
fensive attitude, the tactics of defensive combat are essentially to de-
velop the maximum firepower against an advancing enemy, to reduce
our own losses by a better knowledge and utilization of the terrain,
and thereby to stop the enemy’s advance or throw him back by counter-
attack.
FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations, May 1941, Para 652
The area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on

denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time
rather than destroying the enemy outright (FM 3-0). An area defense
capitalizes on the strength inherent in closely integrated defensive or-
ganization on the ground. The commander may assign corps, divisions,
and separate brigades the task of conducting an area defense as part of
their mission. Subordinate echelons defend within their assigned areas of
operations (AOs) as part of the larger-echelon’s operation.
9-1. A commander should conduct an area defense when the following con-
ditions occur:
· When directed to defend or retain specified terrain.
· When he cannot resource a striking force.
· The forces available have less mobility than the enemy.
· The terrain affords natural lines of resistance and limits the enemy to a
few well-defined avenues of approach, thereby restricting the enemy’s
maneuver.
· There is enough time to organize the position.
· Terrain constraints and lack of friendly air superiority limit the
striking force’s options in a mobile defense to a few probable employ-
ment options.
CONTENTS
Organization of Forces .................................9-2 Positioning the Reserve .........................9-10
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Spoiling Attacks and Counterattacks....9-12
Reconnaissance Operations ....................9-2 Preparing an Area Defense.........................9-13
Security Operations ..................................9-2 Executing an Area Defense ........................9-16
Main Battle Area Operations ....................9-3 Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact ........9-17
Reserve Operations ..................................9-3 Disrupt the Enemy...................................9-19
Control Measures..........................................9-5 Fix the Enemy ..........................................9-20
Planning an Area Defense ............................9-6 Maneuver..................................................9-20
Position Selection .....................................9-8 Follow Through .......................................9-23
9-1
FM 3-90
9-2. The commander conducting an area defense combines static and mobile
actions to accomplish his assigned mission. Static actions usually consist of
fires from prepared positions. Mobile actions include using the fires provided
by units in prepared positions as a base for counterattacks and repositioning
units between defensive positions. The commander can use his reserve and
uncommitted forces to conduct counterattacks and spoiling attacks to de-
synchronize the enemy or prevent him from massing.
9-3. The commander organizes his force to accomplish reconnaissance, se-
curity, main battle area (MBA), reserve, and sustaining operations. He has
the option of defending forward or defending in depth. When the commander
defends forward within an AO, he organizes his force so that he commits most
of his combat power early in the defensive effort. To accomplish this he may
deploy forces forward or plan counterattacks well forward in the MBA or even
beyond of the MBA. If the commander has the option of conducting a defense
in depth, he uses his security forces and forward MBA element to identify, de-
fine, and control the depth of the enemy’s main effort while holding off secon-
dary thrusts. This allows him to conserve his combat power, strengthen his
reserve, and better resource the counterattack.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS

9-4. The commander directs his intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (ISR) assets to determine the locations, strengths, and probable inten-
tions of the attacking enemy force before and throughout the defensive opera-
tion. The commander places a high priority on early identification of the
enemy’s main effort. He may need to complement surveillance with combat
actions that test enemy intentions. Fighting for information can have two
benefits—it can force the enemy to reveal his intentions and disrupt his prep-
arations.
9-5. In the defense, ISR operations overlap the unit’s planning and preparing
phases. Leaders performing reconnaissance tasks must understand that they
often deploy before the commander fully develops his plan and they must be
responsive to changes in orientation and mission. The commander ensures
that his staff fully plans, prepares, and executes reconnaissance missions.
SECURITY OPERATIONS
9-6. The commander balances the need to create a strong security force to
shape the battle with the resulting diversion of combat power from his main
body’s decisive operation. The commander usually allocates security forces to
provide early warning and protect those forces, systems, and locations neces-
sary to conduct his decisive operation from unexpected enemy contact. On a
battlefield where forces are contiguous with one another, the location of se-
curity forces is usually in front of the main defensive positions. On a
noncontiguous battlefield they are located on avenues of approach between
the protected force and known or suspected enemy locations.
9-7. Battalion and brigade security forces normally conduct screen or guard
missions. At division level and above, the commander may use a covering
9-2
The Area Defense
force. A division commander may elect to have his security force conduct a
guard mission if a corps covering force exists. Because an area security mis-
sion usually ties in closely with flank units, flank security forces are needed if
there are gaps on the unit’s flanks, which occurs during noncontiguous opera-
tions, or if gaps develop during the operation. A flank screen or guard is criti-
cal if an enemy avenue of approach into the defended area from the flanks
could be uncovered during the defense. A commander does not normally as-
sign a force the mission of conducting rear guard or rear cover during contig-
uous operations since it is unlikely that his force’s rear area will become un-
covered during the defense. He resources rear area security forces, to include
a tactical combat force (TCF) or accepts the risk to his sustainment effort of
not performing this function.
MAIN BATTLE AREA OPERATIONS

9-8. The commander builds his decisive operation around identified decisive
points, such as key terrain or high-payoff targets. The commander’s decisive
operation in an area defense focuses on retaining terrain by using fires from
mutually supporting, prepared positions supplemented by one or more coun-
terattacks and the repositioning of forces from one location to another. The
commander’s decisive operation normally involves close combat since an area
defense emphasizes terrain retention.
9-9. The commander normally positions his main body—the bulk of his com-
bat power—within the MBA where he wants to conduct his decisive opera-
tion. The commander organizes his main body to halt, defeat, and ultimately
destroy attacking enemy forces. The majority of the main body deploys into
prepared defensive positions within the MBA. However, mobile elements of
the force are ready to deploy where and when needed.
RESERVE OPERATIONS
9-10. The commander’s defensive plan should be able to succeed without
using his reserve. However, the most likely mission of the reserve is to con-
duct a counterattack in accordance with previously prepared plans. A lower-
echelon commander uses his reserve primarily to conduct local counter-
attacks to restore his defense’s integrity or to exploit an opportunity. A senior
commander uses his reserve to seize the initiative from the enemy when the
opportunity presents itself. For example, a corps commander may target the
effects of his reserve against enemy fire support and follow-on forces to
achieve that effect.
9-11. The reserve is not a committed force. The commander can assign it a
wide variety of tasks on its commitment, and it must be prepared to perform
other missions. In certain situations, it may become necessary to commit the
reserve to restore the integrity of the defense by blocking an enemy penetra-
tion or reinforcing fires into an engagement area (EA). These secondary tasks
include—
· Reinforcing the defense of committed forces.
· Blocking or containing enemy forces that penetrate friendly defensive
positions.
· Relieving depleted units and providing for continuous operations.
9-3
FM 3-90
· Reacting to threats directed against the friendly force’s sustainment

effort. This includes acting as the echelon TCF when a separate TCF
cannot be resourced.
· Extending the flanks of a defending unit to prevent its envelopment.
· Covering a retrograde movement.
9-12. Defending commanders are usually hard-pressed to establish and re-
source reserve forces because they are normally facing an enemy with super-
ior combat power. Nevertheless, commanders at each echelon down to the
battalion task force retain reserves as a means of ensuring mission accom-
plishment and for exploiting opportunities through offensive action. (Com-
pany commanders may retain a reserve based on the factors of METT-TC.)
Commanders do not hold artillery and other fire support systems in reserve.
(Such systems committed to rear area security operations are not in reserve.)
Each echelon’s reserve must have the mobility and striking power required to
quickly isolate and defeat breakthroughs and flanking attempts. It must be
able to seize and exploit fleeting opportunities in a powerful manner to throw
the enemy’s overall offensive off balance. The commander must resource his
reserve so it can repeatedly attack, regroup, move, and attack again.
9-13. The size of the reserve is relative to the commander’s uncertainty about
the enemy’s capabilities and intentions. The more uncertainty that exists, the
larger the reserve. The reverse is also true. If the commander knows the size,
dispositions, capabilities, and intentions of the enemy, he requires only a
comparatively small reserve.
9-14. In some situations, the commander may not be able to resource a sepa-
rate reserve. Therefore, he may constitute all or a portion of his reserve from
his security force after it conducts a rearward passage of lines through MBA
units. If the security force is the reserve for an area defense, the commander
must withdraw it so it has sufficient time to occupy its reserve position, per-
form the necessary degree of reconstitution, and prepare plans for its reserve
role. However, this is not the preferred option. Before battle handover, the
senior commander must state the acceptable risk to the security force or the
disengagement criteria in quantifiable terms, such as friendly strength levels,
time, or event. In this case, after completing the rearward passage, the secur-
ity force moves to an assembly area to prepare for its subsequent operations.
This area should be free from enemy interference and clear of MBA units,
main supply routes (MSRs), and the movements of other portions of the re-
serve.
9-15. The operations of the reserve usually become the echelon’s decisive op-
eration once committed. However, the commander can commit his reserve in
a shaping operation to allow his ongoing decisive operation to achieve suc-
cess. It no longer constitutes the force reserve on its commitment in either
case, so the commander should designate another uncommitted force as his
reserve. If he does not have that flexibility, he must hold his reserve for com-
mitment at the decisive moment and accept risk.
9-4
The Area Defense
CONTROL MEASURES
9-16. The commander organizes an area defense by designating his MBA and
assigning AOs, battle positions (BPs), or both to subordinate units located
within the MBA. He creates a security area in front of the MBA. When pos-
sible, the boundaries of the subordinate elements of the security force coin-
cide with those of the major defending units in the MBA. The security area
should be deep enough to make the enemy displace as much of his supporting
forces as possible, such as cannon artillery, sensors, and air defense artillery
gun systems, before carrying his attack into the MBA. The commander also
designates his rear area. (See Chapter 12 for a discussion of security opera-
tions.)
9-17. Area defense maneuver graphic control measures also include EAs, the
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), battle handover line (BHL), strong
points, target reference points (TRPs), named areas of interest (NAIs), tar-
geted areas of interest (TAIs), decision points, and various other fire control
and countermobility control measures. (Figure 9-1 depicts the most common
control measures. Chapters 2 and 8, and Appendix B define these defensive
control measures.)
PL TROI PL TROI
X
NAI 7 2
BRIGADE SECURITY AREA
PL PICARD 7 PL PICARD
(BHL) (BHL)
PL RIKER PL RIKER
FEBA FEBA
EA 1 EA 2
I
I
EA 3
I
+ NC 1701
TAI 9 3-41 2-58
II
2X3
X 2
I
MAIN BATTLE AREA
3-41 2-58 PL WORF
PL WORF
II II
BRIGADE REAR AREA

2
X
Figure 9-1. Typical Control Measures for an Area Defense
9-18. If the commander assigns a BP and an AO to a subordinate, the subord-

inate commander has specific guidance on the initial positioning of his forces.
The commander ensures the synchronization of each of his subordinate units’
defensive plans, and that his control measures, such as contact points and
phase lines, are sufficient to ensure the continued control of his subordinates.
He is responsible for fire and movement planning between the positions of his
9-5
FM 3-90
subordinate units. If subordinate unit commanders prepare their defensive

plans in isolation, one or more assailable flanks between subordinate units
could easily develop. (The organization of forces, control measures, planning,
preparation, and execution of a passage of lines—a tactical enabling opera-
tion—are the subject of Chapter 15.)
PLANNING AN AREA DEFENSE

9-19. The key to a successful area defense is the integration and synchroniza-
tion of all available assets. The commander achieves this when he can employ
the effects of his combined arms team at the decisive time and place. (The
general defensive planning considerations addressed in Chapter 8 apply to
the area defense.) The commander assigns missions, allocates forces, and ap-
portions combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) resources
within the battlefield organization of decisive, shaping, and sustaining opera-
tions. He decides where to concentrate his effort and where to take risks. The
commander can rapidly redirect attack aviation and artillery systems initially
allocated to shaping operations to support decisive operations at the appropri-
ate time. (See Figure 9-2 for a graphical depiction of the organization of forces
for an area defense in a contiguous AO. See Figure 9-3 for a graphical depic-
tion of the organization of forces for an area defense in a noncontiguous AO.)
FLOT FLOT
SECURITY AREA
BHL BHL
FEBA FEBA
MAIN BATTLE AREA
RESERVE SPT
REAR AREA
Figure 9-2. Organization of Forces for an Area Defense—Contiguous Area of Operations
9-20. The commander describes his concept of operation in sufficient detail so

that his staff and subordinate commanders understand precisely how he in-
tends to fight the battle. He ensures the coordination of maneuver and sup-
porting actions among his subordinates. (FM 5-0 discusses the military deci-
sion making process and troop leading procedures.)
9-6
The Area Defense
SECURITY AREA
MAIN
BATTLE
II
AREA II
REAR
AREA
II
II
Figure 9-3. Organization of Forces for an Area Defense—Noncontiguous Area of Operations
9-21. The commander’s keys to a successful area defense are—

· Capability to concentrate effects.
· Depth of the defensive area.
· Security.
· Ability to take full advantage of the terrain, such as intervisibility
lines.
· Flexibility of defensive operations.
· Timely resumption of offensive actions.
The crux of the commander’s defensive challenge is to gain time to ensure a
synchronized, effective defense. The commander organizes his defensive ef-
fort based on an analysis of the factors of METT-TC and the higher com-
mander’s concept. He decides where to concentrate his efforts and how to
economize his forces. He forces the enemy forces to enter his EAs. To succeed
in its area defense mission, the unit must also counteract the enemy’s initia-
tive. The commander should take advantage of available offensive opportuni-
ties that do not risk the integrity of his defense, such as a spoiling attack or
counterattack.
9-22. In planning an area defense, the commander may choose between two
forms of defensive maneuver. He can organize either a defense in depth or a
forward defense. A higher commander may dictate the form of maneuver or
impose restrictions that eliminate a subordinate commander’s form of maneu-
ver. These restrictions can include time, security concerns, and directed re-
tention of specific terrain. These two deployment choices are not totally
exclusionary. Part of a commander’s forces can conduct a forward defense
while the other part conducts a defense in depth.
9-7
FM 3-90
9-23. In determining the form of maneuver, the commander decides where

the defensible terrain is located within his assigned AO based on its terrain
characteristics and his estimate of the enemy’s chosen course of action (COA).
Those terrain characteristics include terrain relief patterns, avenues of ap-
proach into and within the AO, the location of any key or decisive terrain,
existing obstacles and choke points, to include rivers and fording sites. The
other factors of METT-TC also influence the commander’s decision.
POSITION SELECTION
9-24. Attempting to defend everything defends nothing. Therefore, the com-
mander carefully designs his defense plan to ensure his defending force can
halt the enemy attack and develop an opportunity to seize the initiative and
undertake offensive operations. The cohesion of the defending force has a sig-
nificant impact on the overall effectiveness of the defense. The commander
must be prepared to adjust the defensive dispositions to meet changes in the
enemy’s dispositions to maintain that cohesion if the defense is to remain
viable.
9-25. The area defense concept requires that defensive positions accomplish
their mission independently or in combination by defeating the enemy by fire,
absorbing the strength of the attack within the position, or destroying the
enemy with a local counterattack. The commander combines the advantages
of fighting from prepared positions, obstacles, planned fires, and local coun-
terattacks to isolate and overwhelm selected enemy formations. He must be
prepared to rapidly shift the nature and location of his main effort through-
out his AO. The commander may have to reposition defending units within
their defensive positions or reposition between terrain features as he masses
overwhelming effects against the attacking enemy. The defensive plan should
designate axes of advance and routes for the commitment or movement of re-
serves, or the forward or rearward passage of one unit through another. It
should identify air axes for aerial maneuver by attack helicopters, air assault
units, or fixed-wing aircraft. This capability to reposition is dependent on the
defending force having superior tactical mobility. Without tactical mobility,
defending forces stay in their prepared positions and accept the possibility of
becoming decisively engaged.
9-26. The commander assigning the defensive mission defines the area to de-
fend. A commander defending on a broad front is forced to accept gaps and
conduct noncontiguous operations. His forward line of own troops (FLOT) will
be discontinuous. Defending shallow areas of operations reduces flexibility
and requires the commander to fight well forward. Narrow frontages and
deep areas of operations increase the elasticity of an area defense by in-
creasing the commander’s maneuver options.
9-27. The ideal area defense is where effective mutual support exists
throughout the width and depth of the defender’s tactical positions. The com-
mander organizes and occupies these positions based on their natural defen-
sive strength; their retention ensures the integrity of his defense whether he
employs a defense in an AO, defends by BP, or employs a combination of both.
He maintains tactical integrity within each defensive area. A unit conducting
an area defense normally addresses the security requirements of each flank
9-8
The Area Defense
by assigning responsibility to a subordinate element or organizing a security

force to specifically execute that mission.
Defense in Depth
9-28. A defense in depth is normally the commander’s preferred option.
Forces defending in depth absorb the momentum of the enemy’s attack by
forcing him to attack repeatedly through mutually supporting positions in
depth. Depth gives the commander’s fire support assets time to generate dev-
astating effects and affords him multiple opportunities to concentrate the ef-
fects of overwhelming combat power against the attacking enemy. This also
provides more reaction time for the defending force to counter the attack. The
commander gathers more information about the attacking enemy’s intentions
before the enemy commits to a COA. This reduces the risk of the enemy force
quickly penetrating the main line of defense.
9-29. The commander also employs a defense in depth when the enemy has
the capability to employ large quantities of precision-guided munitions or
weapons of mass destruction. Defense in depth results in friendly units and
facilities being dispersed throughout the defensive AO. The commander takes
area damage-control measures to reduce the effects of weapons of mass de-
struction on the friendly force and denies the enemy lucrative targets. The
degree of dispersal adopted by defending forces is both a function of the ene-
my’s capabilities and the friendly forces’ capability to rapidly concentrate
overwhelming combat power at decisive points.
9-30. The commander positions his units in successive layers of battle posi-
tions along likely enemy avenues of approach when he conducts a defense in
depth. (See Figure 9-4, page 9-10.) The commander usually decides to conduct
a defense in depth when—
· The mission is not restrictive and allows the commander to fight
throughout the depth of the battlefield.
· The terrain does not favor a defense well forward, and there is better
defensible terrain deeper within the AO.
· The AO is deep compared to its width, and there is significant depth
available.
· The cover and concealment on or near the FEBA is limited.
· The enemy has several times the combat power of the defender.
9-31. Divisions and corps employing a defense in depth can conduct an area
defense on a wider frontage than they can if they adopt a forward defense be-
cause a forward defense has no time or space to reposition forces. A defense
in depth allows the commander to use his security and forward MBA forces to
identify the enemy’s decisive operation and control the depth of the enemy’s
penetration into the MBA. By their defensive actions, they provide the com-
mander with time to react to enemy actions and allow him to take offensive
steps that eliminate enemy options, such as conducting a counterattack into
the flank of an enemy force.
9-9
FM 3-90
XX
ENY
ENY
Y
EN
Y
BD
Y
EN
E
EN
SEC
UR
ITY
II AR
EA II ENY
II
II
X1 1X X2
BSA
II
BSA II 2X
II
II
II
X3
BSA 3 X
II DSA
XX
Figure 9-4. Division Conducting a Defense in Depth with Subordinate Brigades Deployed in
Noncontiguous Areas of Operations with Enemy Avenues of Approach Depicted
Forward Defense
9-32. The commander conducts his decisive operation from forward defensive
positions near the FEBA in a forward defense. (See Figure 9-5.) He concen-
trates a significant portion of his available combat power into EAs along the
FEBA. His intent is to prevent significant enemy penetration into the defen-
sive area. The commander conducting a forward defense fights to retain these
positions along the FEBA and violently counterattacks any enemy penetra-
tion. However, if the enemy penetrates the main defensive positions, the de-
fender’s lack of depth may allow the enemy to rapidly exploit success.
9-33. In general, the commander uses a forward defense when a higher com-
mander directs him to retain forward terrain for political, military, economic,
and other reasons. Alternatively, a commander may choose to conduct a for-
ward defense when the terrain in that part of his AO—including natural ob-
stacles—favors the defending force because—
· The best defensive positions are located along the FEBA.
· Strong natural obstacles are located near the FEBA.
· Natural EAs occur near the FEBA.
· Cover and concealment in the rear portion of the AO are limited.
POSITIONING THE RESERVE

9-34. Whatever the commander’s choice—forward or in depth—once the ene-
my commits his forces, the defending commander has the ability to seize the
initiative by counterattacking over familiar ground to destroy a halted,
9-10
The Area Defense
disorganized enemy while protected by overwatching fires from friendly posi-

tions. Whenever possible, the commander should direct these counterattacks
against the enemy’s rear or flanks. The commander’s reserve is a key com-
ponent of the counterattack.
X
SECURITY AREA FEBA
FEBA
PL PAULA PL PAULA
MAIN BATTLE AREA
BP 17 BP 42
BP 21
II
PL DIANE
II II
II II
PL DIANE
BSA
X APOD X
REAR AREA
X
Figure 9-5. Brigade Conducting a Forward Defense in a Contiguous Area of Operations
9-35. When deciding where to place his reserve, the commander decides
whether to orient his reserve on its most likely mission or its most important
mission. He expends significant effort during the planning process to ensure
he can effectively use his reserve when needed. He may locate his reserve
within the AO where it can employ the road network to rapidly displace
throughout the AO in response to a number of opportunities or contingencies.
The commander must consider terrain, MSRs of forward units, enemy ave-
nues of approach, and probable enemy penetrations when determining the
exact location for his reserve. He may choose to initially position his reserve
in a forward location to deceive the enemy and obscure subordinate unit
boundaries, especially those of dissimilar units such as armor and light infan-
try.
9-36. In restrictive terrain that lacks routes for movement, the commander
can task organize his reserve into small elements and position them where
they can react quickly to local combat developments. This dispersion im-
proves force protection but reduces the ability of the reserve to mass fires.
Covered lateral and forward high-speed deployment routes should be
available. The reserve must have movement priority along those routes. He
must ensure the maintenance of communication between these dispersed ele-
ments. This may require establishing retransmission nodes for combat net
radios. In open terrain, the commander maintains a centrally located reserve
9-11
FM 3-90
positioned somewhat farther from the FLOT. He considers the enemy’s poten-
tial to employ weapons of mass destruction and conduct air interdiction when
deciding where to position his reserve.
9-37. Whenever possible, the commander positions his reserve beyond the
enemy’s direct fire range. This is easier to achieve at higher echelons than at
lower echelons. The reserve takes defensive measures to prevent being ac-
quired and attacked by enemy indirect fire systems. These include camou-
flage, local security, and control of electronic emissions.
9-38. The commander also plans how to reconstitute his reserve once he com-
mits his original reserve. Forces most easily designated are subordinate unit
reserves. If his higher headquarters has not committed its reserve, he has
more flexibility and can take greater risk in employing his reserve.
SPOILING ATTACKS AND COUNTERATTACKS

9-39. A spoiling attack preempts or seriously impairs the enemy’s ability to
launch an attack, while a counterattack prevents the enemy from exploiting
his successes. The forces conducting either form of attack must be large and
strong enough to develop the situation, protect themselves, and force the ene-
my to react, placing his plan at risk.
9-40. The commander considers the enemy situation and estimates the time
and distance factors of any follow-on enemy forces in planning either a spoil-
ing attack or a counterattack by his reserve and other forces. Then he deter-
mines which of his units will attack, where they will be after the attack, and
what interdiction is necessary to isolate the targeted enemy element. (See
Figure 9-6.) His counterattacking forces plan to avoid enemy strength when
possible. The most effective attacks seize strong positions that permit the
counterattacking force to deliver fire on an exposed enemy unit’s flanks and
rear. If it is tasked to stay and defend against enemy follow-on forces, the
counterattacking force must establish a viable defensive position before any
following enemy units can make contact.
9-41. Counterattack plans include assumptions regarding the size and shape
of the anticipated penetration or enemy formation; the strength and composi-
tion of the enemy force; and the status of the reserve and forces in the MBA.
Other factors that affect the counterattack include the capability to contain
the enemy, shaping operations to support the attack, and the strength and re-
sponsiveness of the reserve at the time of the counterattack.
9-42. The commander’s staff prepares counterattack plans and then allocates
subordinate headquarters sufficient time to make their plans. The control
measures for a counterattack are the same ones discussed in Chapter 5 for
the attack. If possible, the commander distributes his counterattack plans
along with the basic defense plan. Reserve unit commanders conduct detailed
counterattack planning that includes conducting reconnaissance, selecting
multiple routes, determining time and space factors, rehearsing, coordinating
with appropriate elements of the forward defending force, and fire planning.
The commander adjusts his counterattack plans as necessary based on the
lessons learned during rehearsals.
9-12
The Area Defense
9-43. Enemy movement into an NAI helps the commander determine the
enemy’s scheme of maneuver and possible objectives. He uses decision points
and NAIs throughout his AO to trigger his counterattack. The commander
identifies TAIs for attack to support his operations.
III
XX
X
III III
X III
ON ORDER
X III
X X
X
X X
X
X III
X X
X III
XX
Figure 9-6. Division Counterattack
PREPARING AN AREA DEFENSE

9-44. Preparations focus on planning those additional ISR operations re-
quired to answer the commander’s critical information requirements, refining
the plan, increasing coordination and synchronization, and conducting shap-
ing actions within the force’s capability and operations security guidelines. If
the commander decides that he must conduct a deliberate defense but knows
that the enemy will attack before he is prepared, he may have to commit sub-
stantial forces to security operations or conduct a spoiling attack. This buys
time and space to prepare for a deliberate defense.
9-45. A unit normally transitions to the defense after it completes the deploy-
ment process of force projection, completes offensive operations, or is in an as-
sembly area. The commander issues a warning order stating the mission and
identifying any special considerations. His staff conducts detailed planning
while the rest of the unit completes its current mission. The staff coordinates
for the pre-positioning of ammunition and barrier material in a secure area
near the unit’s defensive positions before starting the operation.
9-46. Before occupying any position, leaders at all echelons conduct some
type of reconnaissance. This reconnaissance effort is as detailed as the factors
of METT-TC permit. It may consist of a simple map reconnaissance or a more
detailed leaders’ reconnaissance and initial layout of the new position.
9-13
FM 3-90
9-47. The defending unit occupies its defensive positions as soon as practical
after receiving the mission. It conducts reconnaissance of the defensive area
and establishes a forward security area before occupying the positions The
unit may pre-position supplies such as ammunition and barrier materiel once
it establishes security. The unit can accomplish many defensive tasks simul-
taneously; the factors of METT-TC are the deciding consideration in estab-
lishing priorities of work. Those priorities may be—
· Establishing local security and deploying a security force.
· Identifying EAs where the commander wants to engage and destroy the
enemy.
· Planning fire control measures, such as TRPs, trigger lines, and final
protective fires to support the EAs.
· Positioning key weapon systems to engage into the EAs and TRPs and
develop range cards and sector sketches.
· Positioning observers who can see both targets and trigger lines.
· Siting obstacle groups to support weapon systems.
· Designating and clearing fields of fire.
· Preparing primary fighting positions based on the anticipated fighting
conditions, such as the time of day and weather conditions.
· Emplacing obstacles and surveying indirect fire targets to support
these obstacles.
· Providing concealment and camouflage for fighting and survivability
positions as they are constructed.
· Positioning any available critical friendly zones over friendly positions
by establishing sensor coverage and quickfire links between the sensor
and shooter.
· Installing night and limited-visibility aids, such as thermal hot spots
and chemical lights on TRPs during daylight.
· Updating range cards and sector sketches as required.
· Preparing alternate fighting positions.
· Designating and preparing supplementary positions.
· Designating hide positions and rehearsing movements to and from
fighting positions. (Units may place their combat and tactical vehicles
in hide positions at any time while preparing the defensive position.)
· Positioning the reserve.
· Establishing contact points with any adjacent units so that the defen-
sive efforts of both units can be tied together.
· Emplacing wire for communications.
· Improving mobility on counterattack routes.
· Prestocking ammunition in revetments or bunkers where it can survive
the enemy’s preparatory fires.
· Rehearsing movements under daylight and limited-visibility condi-
tions.
· Continuing to improve the defense.
9-48. Survivability positions enhance the strength of a defensive position by
providing soldiers and weapon systems with some degree of cover from enemy
9-14
The Area Defense
fires. Units initiate construction of survivability positions in accordance with

their priority of work and continue to build and improve them until the last
possible moment. The overhead cover provided varies with the location of the
sheltered troops and enemy capabilities. As time and resources allow, the de-
fending unit improves communication routes throughout its defensive posi-
tions to ease movement of supplies and forces, particularly the reserve. It
quickly establishes wire communications among its various subordinate ele-
ments to reduce its electromagnetic signature.
9-49. The defending unit rehearses how to move from its hide positions to its
primary positions and how it will occupy alternate and supplementary posi-
tions to continue to engage the enemy if he progresses into the unit’s defen-
sive positions. These rehearsals establish the time necessary to conduct these
movements under different environmental conditions. It modifies existing
plans based on the results of rehearsals and changes in the factors of
METT-TC. The commander takes steps to ensure that the routes taken
during these rehearsals do not show obvious signs of heavy use. These steps
can include the conduct of only dismounted rehearsals, only moving one vehi-
cle per platoon, and taking steps to eliminate signs of movement such as
sweeping snow back over the tracks made during the rehearsal.
9-50. The commander ensures close coordination among his subordinates.
During the preparation phase, he can take his subordinate commanders to a
vantage point in the MBA to rehearse the battle and plan coordination among
their units if such a site is available. This helps the commander in transmit-
ting his intent and in establishing common control measures for subordinate
units.
9-51. The location, composition, and movement of the reserve are essential
elements of friendly information. Enemy reconnaissance efforts focus on
finding the reserve and reporting when and where it is committed. Avoiding
detection by the enemy is vital to the success of the reserve.
9-52. The CSS rehearsal should be integrated into the maneuver rehearsal to
verify that routes for support do not cross or conflict with routes used by re-
serve forces or other maneuver elements. The commander should balance the
use of ammunition caches against the defending unit’s ability to guard them.
The commander should also ensure that alternate MSRs are adequate to ac-
commodate contingency plans and that changing MSRs can be accomplished
effectively.
9-53. The commander ensures that his combat multipliers are completely in-
tegrated with his intended maneuver. This includes the use of camouflage,
deception, and smoke to confuse enemy reconnaissance assets. Having key
representatives from each of these multipliers simultaneously rehearse the
plan with his subordinate maneuver unit is an effective technique for en-
suring integration. After issuing the order and receiving briefbacks from his
subordinate commanders and other leaders, the commander verifies that they
have a common understanding of the plan and can execute it with minimal
guidance.
9-15
FM 3-90
EXECUTING AN AREA DEFENSE

9-54. A defending unit within the MBA uses a variety of tactics, techniques,
and procedures to accomplish the mission. At one end of the defensive con-
tinuum is a totally static defense oriented on terrain retention. This defense
depends on the use of firepower from fixed positions to deny the enemy ter-
rain. At the other end is a dynamic defense focused on the enemy. That de-
fense depends on maneuver to disrupt and destroy the enemy force.
9-55. A commander combines the static element to control, stop, or canalize
the attacking enemy and the dynamic element to strike and defeat him. A
successful area defense uses forces in relatively fixed positions to create the
opportunity for the reserve to strike at the enemy from an unanticipated di-
rection and strength. (See Figure 9-7.) The defending force repeatedly lures
the enemy into EAs where it kills selected portions of the enemy force.
PL BOBCAT PL BOBCAT
XX
G G
PL WOLF (BHL) PL WOLF (BHL)
PL BEAR PL BEAR
II II X
II
BP
27
EA TIGER
II
BP
II
26
II II
XX
BP 25
X
BP BP II X
EA
II
42 34 STAR
BP
II
38
BP 32
PL LION II PL LION
X X
X
AA EAGLE AA LIFE
(DSA)
Figure 9-7. Area Defense Using Static and Dynamic Elements
9-56. In an area defense, defending forces fight mainly from prepared, pro-
tected positions to concentrate combat power effects against attempted enemy
breakthroughs and flanking movements. The commander uses mobile forces
to cover gaps between defensive positions, reinforce those positions as neces-
sary, and counterattack to seal penetrations or block enemy attempts at
flanking movements.
9-57. Conducting shaping operations in an area defense is similar to shaping
operations in the offense. The factors of METT-TC determine how closely the
commander synchronizes his shaping operations with his decisive operations.
The commander conducts shaping operations designed to regain the initiative
by limiting the attacker’s options and disrupting the enemy’s plan. He
9-16
The Area Defense
conducts shaping operations to prevent enemy forces from massing and

creates windows of opportunity for decisive offensive operations, allowing his
force to defeat them in detail. The commander also employs shaping opera-
tions to disrupt enemy operations by attacking command posts at critical
stages in the battle or by striking and eliminating key elements, such as river
crossing equipment and supplies in a region that contains numerous unford-
able rivers. Reconnaissance and security operations are normally components
of the echelon’s shaping operations.
9-58. This manual divides execution into five steps:
· Disrupt the enemy.
· Fix the enemy.
· Maneuver.
· Follow through.
This does not imply that these steps occur sequentially; they may occur
simultaneously.

9-59. Gaining and maintaining contact with the enemy in the face of his
determined efforts to destroy friendly ISR assets is vital to the success of de-
fensive operations. As the enemy’s attack begins, the defending unit’s first
concerns are to identify committed enemy units’ positions and capabilities,
determine the enemy’s intent and direction of attack, and gain time to react.
Initially, the commander accomplishes these goals in the security area. The
sources of this type of intelligence include reconnaissance and security forces,
intelligence units, special operations forces, and aviation elements. The com-
mander ensures the distribution of a common operational picture throughout
the force during the battle as a basis for subordinate commanders’ actions.
(See FM 6-0.) The commander uses the information available to him, in con-
junction with his military judgment, to determine the point at which the ene-
my is committed to a COA.
9-60. The security force seeks to strip enemy reconnaissance forces and hide
the defending force’s dispositions, capabilities, and intent at the same time as
friendly ISR assets help to determine the enemy’s chosen COA. Ideally, the
fight in the security area should force the enemy to conduct a movement to
contact against a prepared defense.
9-61. A single force in the security area can perform both reconnaissance and
security functions. The security force uses every opportunity for limited offen-
sive action to delay and harass the enemy and to gain information. As the
security element displaces, the commander makes preparations to pass it
through or around the MBA force as quickly as possible by using multiple
passage points, gaps, or lanes along the FEBA. This usually occurs in one lo-
cation at a time until the security force has completely withdrawn. However,
the security force may pass in sequence based on enemy pressure. Transfer of
responsibility occurs forward of the FEBA at the BHL. (See Figure 9-8,
page 9-18.) Taking advantage of previous liaison and plans, the security force
makes any required last-minute coordination with MBA forces at contact
points to ensure its rapid passage through the MBA force.
9-17
FM 3-90
XXX
CFL CFL
FLOT FLOT
5 7
11
PP 5 PP 11
3
PP 3 PP 7
PL KARL V PL KARL
(BHL) V (BHL)
LANE 11 V
LANE 7
LANE 5 LANE 3
PL BLUCHER SP 3 PL BLUCHER
V V
FEBA SP 5 V FEBA
SP 11 SP 7
XXX
von HOBE
RODER
ROUTE
XX
ROUTE
WAHLEN-JURGASS
WILLIAM
ROUTE
XXX
ROUTE
RP 3
XX RP 7 XX
RP 11
RP 5 TAA
SEYDLITZ
XXX
Figure 9-8. Battle Handover Line
9-62. The entire security force should not withdraw automatically as soon as
the first enemy units reach the FEBA. The commander can leave in place se-
curity elements located in areas where the enemy has not advanced. The se-
curity force adjusts to the enemy’s advance and continues to conduct security
operations as far forward as possible. It continues to resist the enemy’s
shaping operations, such as the enemy’s reconnaissance effort, thereby upset-
ting his coordination and allowing the MBA commander to fight one engage-
ment or battle at a time. Doing this increases the chances for success even if
the enemy attack penetrates into the MBA in some areas. In some cases, the
security force can attack the enemy force from its rear, engage high-payoff
targets, or drive between echelons to isolate leading enemy units.
9-63. As the enemy force approaches the MBA, the commander may order re-
connaissance and surveillance assets within his security force to displace to
one or both sides of the enemy penetration and continue to maintain surveil-
lance. By observing and providing access to enemy flanks, reconnaissance
and surveillance elements can facilitate the conduct of friendly counter-
attacks. However, to prevent the encirclement of these assets, the commander
may plan to monitor those areas where the enemy has not advanced into the
MBA solely by technical means.
9-64. Battle handover between the security force and MBA forces requires
close coordination and occurs as quickly and efficiently as possible to mini-
mize their vulnerability to enemy fire. The security force commander must
retain freedom to maneuver until he initiates the passage of lines. The com-
mander’s fire support assets help cover the withdrawal of security forces.
9-18
The Area Defense
Combat support and CSS elements of the security force should move to the
rear as early as possible to avoid hampering the movement of combat forces.
Normally, battalion-size units of the security force hand off the battle to the
brigades through which they pass. (See Chapter 16 for a discussion of rear-
ward passage of lines.)
9-65. The commander must consider the security force’s next mission prior to
battle handover between the security force and the MBA force. Factors that
may affect his decision are the status of the security force, its subsequent mis-
sion preparation requirements, and the size and nature of the reserve re-
quired by the situation. He may decide to employ it immediately as his re-
serve, which would release his initial reserve for other tasks. Alternately, the
commander may decide to use the security force to conduct additional secur-
ity operations on the flanks of MBA forces as the battle progresses. However,
it may be some time before the security force is ready for commitment. There-
fore, the commander is more likely to wait until the security force has been
reconstituted and the initial reserve committed before designating the former
security force as his reserve.
9-66. The commander should base the location of his security force’s assem-
bly area on its follow-on mission. The commander wants those assembly areas
located to rapidly support ongoing operations yet keep withdrawn security
units from interfering with ongoing decisive and shaping operations. After
passage, the security force normally moves to these locations to prepare for
subsequent operations. At a minimum he must rearm and refuel the security
force. Additional CSS concerns include casualty evacuation, maintenance re-
quirements, and resupply of the other classes of supply.
DISRUPT THE ENEMY

9-67. The commander executes his shaping operations to disrupt the enemy
regardless of his location within the AO. After making contact with the ene-
my, the commander seeks to disrupt his plan, his ability to control his forces,
and his combined arms team. Ideally, the results of the commander’s shaping
operations should force a disorganized enemy, whose ability to synchronize
its elements has been degraded, to conduct a movement to contact against
prepared defenses. Once the process of disrupting the enemy begins, it con-
tinues throughout a defensive operation.
9-68. The commander initiates his shaping operations simultaneously with
the preparation of his MBA positions. These shaping operations typically
focus on high-payoff targets, command and control nodes, engineer, fire sup-
port, and air defense assets for destruction or disruption. They can also force
the enemy to use avenues of approach covered by friendly EAs. These
shaping operations destroy the enemy’s cohesion and disrupt the tempo of his
approach to the MBA. This, in turn, disrupts the timely introduction of ene-
my follow-on forces into the engagement. For example, offensive information
operations directed against the enemy’s C2 nodes and air defense assets in-
crease the enemy’s vulnerability to other shaping operations while simultan-
eously slowing the enemy’s reaction to these shaping operations. (FM 3-13
discusses offensive information operations.) Follow-on engagements focus on
degrading the enemy’s fire support and engineer assets, thereby disrupting
the movement of his approaching units.
9-19
FM 3-90
9-69. Other targets for shaping operations include enemy reconnaissance and
intelligence assets. Destroying these assets allows the commander to repeat-
edly force enemy units to deploy into combat formations on ground of his
choosing, thus contributing to the disruption and desynchronization of the
enemy’s plan. The timing of these shaping operations is important. The ene-
my cannot be allowed to recover from their effects prior to the decisive operat-
ion. The commander may also execute offensive operations to further disrupt
the enemy, such as spoiling attacks, raids, ambushes, feints, or demonstra-
tions.
FIX THE ENEMY

9-70. The commander does everything in his power to limit the options avail-
able to the enemy when conducting an area defense. In addition to disrupting
the enemy, the commander conducts shaping operations to constrain the ene-
my into a specific COA, control his movements, or fix him in a given location.
These actions limit the enemy’s options. While executing these operations,
the commander continues to find, and delay or attrit enemy follow-on and re-
serve forces to keep them from entering the MBA.
9-71. The commander has several options to help him fix an attacking force.
The commander can design his shaping operations—such as securing the
flanks and point of a penetration—to fix the enemy and allow friendly forces
to execute decisive maneuver elsewhere. Previously discussed in Chapter 8,
combat outposts and strong points can also deny enemy movement to or
through a given location. A properly executed military deception operation
can constrain the enemy to a given COA.
9-72. The commander uses obstacles covered by fire to fix, turn, block, or dis-
rupt to limit the options available to the enemy. Properly executed obstacles
are a result of the synthesis of top-down and bottom-up obstacle planning and
emplacement. Blocking forces can also affect enemy movement. A blocking
force may achieve its mission from a variety of positions depending on the
factors of METT-TC.
MANEUVER
9-73. In an area defense, the decisive operation occurs in the MBA. This is
where the effects of shaping operations, coupled with sustaining operations,
combine with the decisive operations of the MBA force to defeat the enemy.
The commander’s goal is to prevent the enemy’s further advance through a
combination of fires from prepared positions, obstacles, and mobile reserves.
9-74. Generating massed effects is especially critical to the commander con-
ducting the defense of a large area against an enemy with a significant ad-
vantage in combat power. The attacker has the ability to select the point and
time of the attack. Therefore, the attacking enemy can mass his forces at a
specific point, thus dramatically influencing the ratio of forces at the point of
attack. An enemy three-to-one advantage in overall combat power can easily
turn into a local six-to-one or higher ratio. The defending commander must
quickly determine the intent of the enemy commander and the effects of ter-
rain. This allows his units and their weapon systems to use agility and
9-20
The Area Defense
flexibility to generate the effects of combat power against the enemy at those
points and restore a more favorable force ratio.
9-75. Forces in the MBA assume responsibility for the battle at the BHL. As
the security force approaches the FEBA, it may be necessary to increase the
intensity of fire support from the MBA to allow the security force to break
contact. Both direct and indirect fire assets from MBA forces provide support
to cover the withdrawal of the security force and to close passage lanes
through obstacle complexes. The commander may also employ smoke to assist
the security force break contact with the enemy. The security force’s with-
drawal through the forward positions of the MBA must be carefully planned
and coordinated. The commander must guard gaps in obstacles left for the
withdrawal of the security force and arrange for closing them after the pas-
sage of the security force.
9-76. After the enemy reaches the MBA, he tries to find weak points and at-
tempts to force a passage, possibly by a series of probing attacks. As the at-
tack develops, defending units engage the enemy’s lead forces. The enemy ad-
vance may slow because of canalization and the increased density of forces
resulting from limited maneuver space, presenting good targets for defensive
fire and air support. The maximum effects of simultaneous and sequential
fires are brought to bear at this stage of the battle.
9-77. The commander’s subordinate elements maneuver using massed direct
and indirect fire and movement to gain positional advantage over the assault-
ing enemy force. The commander also directs the engineer obstacle and sus-
tainment effort by his assignment of priorities. The commander must reposi-
tion his forces to meet the enemy where he is rather than where the com-
mander would like him to be. The commander directs operations and sup-
ports his subordinate elements by providing the necessary CS and CSS. He
controls the commitment of the reserve and, at division echelon and above,
engages enemy follow-on forces. If enemy follow-on forces can be delayed, the
enemy’s attack may be defeated in detail, one echelon at a time. If the defend-
ing unit can force the enemy to commit follow-on forces sooner than planned,
it can disrupt the enemy’s timetable, which can lead to the creation of exploit-
able gaps between the committed and subsequent echelons.
9-78. Gaps between defensive positions may be necessary, but they are not
left where the commander expects the enemy’s probable main effort. They are
kept under surveillance, covered by fire or, where possible, blocked by bar-
riers or repositioned friendly forces. The commander clearly defines the re-
sponsibility for dealing with each enemy penetration. He leverages the use of
choke points and obstacles to prevent enemy penetration. If the enemy suc-
ceeds in penetrating the MBA, the commander blocks the penetration immed-
iately and destroys this enemy force as soon as possible; hence, the need for a
mobile reserve. He may extend his actions within the depth of his AO to coun-
ter enemy penetrations that cannot be stopped farther forward.
9-79. The commander never allows the attacking enemy to consolidate unless
it fits his scheme of maneuver. He conducts a local counterattack with all
available local resources to prevent the enemy from consolidating his gains.
The lowest possible echelon conducts this local counterattack; however, the
commander must be aware of the problem of piecemeal commitment. A unit
9-21
FM 3-90
does not abandon a position unless it fits within the higher commander’s in-
tent or he grants permission to do so. If the defending force is unable to re-
pulse the enemy, it tries to contain the enemy penetration until it can attack
in concert with major counterattacking forces. The commander coordinates
his counterattacks with the efforts of his fire support system.
9-80. Although the commander plans for the counterattack in his defensive
planning, he is aware that his plan may not correspond exactly with the
existing situation when he launches the counterattack. As the situation de-
velops, the commander reassesses his plan based on his revised situational
understanding that results from an updated common operational picture as
new intelligence and combat information becomes available to answer the fol-
lowing basic questions:
· Is a counterattack feasible, or should the commander use the reserve to
contain enemy successes?
· When and where should the defending forces counterattack?
· In the case of enemy penetrations, what should the defending forces
counterattack and what should they block or contain?
· Is there enough time to complete the counterattack before the arrival of
enemy follow-on forces?
· Can he conduct a counterattack using his fire support systems?
9-81. When counterattacking, the commander employs all available resources
necessary to ensure success. The reserve usually becomes the echelon’s deci-
sive operation on its commitment, so he avoids its premature or piecemeal
commitment. One of the commander’s most critical decisions is committing
the reserve. He may reinforce his reserve force before committing it to give it
greater capability to counter enemy action. The commander does not counter-
attack as an automatic reaction to an enemy penetration, nor does he commit
the reserve solely because the enemy has reached a certain phase line or
other location. Fire support assets and local counterattacks by forces already
defending could destroy, disrupt, or attrit enemy penetrations, thus relieving
the commander of the need to commit his reserve. When possible, the com-
mander launches the counterattack when the enemy presents his flank or
rear, overextends himself, or his momentum dissipates. Once the commander
identifies the flanks of the enemy’s main effort, he can target counterattacks
to isolate and destroy enemy forces within the MBA.
9-82. Sometimes the commander may determine that he cannot afford to use
his reserve to counterattack. Therefore, he must use his resources to block,
contain, or delay the enemy to gain time to employ higher-echelon reserves.
In these cases, the commander and his staff must plan how to integrate rein-
forcing companies and battalions into the defensive scheme, adjust bound-
aries, and place BPs. He plans the routes these units will use, and what ad-
justments will be necessary in existing C2 arrangements. He can speed the
process of positioning and moving reinforcements or the reserve by desig-
nating routes and providing traffic-control personnel and guides at contact
points to lead and brief them on the situation. Scouts, military police, and di-
visional cavalry units can provide traffic control.
9-22
The Area Defense
FOLLOW THROUGH
9-83. The purpose of defensive operations is to retain terrain and create con-
ditions for a counteroffensive that regains the initiative. The area defense
does this by causing the enemy to sustain unacceptable losses short of his
decisive objectives. A successful area defense allows the commander
transition to an attack. An area defense could also result in a stalemate with
both forces left in contact with each other. Finally, it could result in the
defender being overcome by the enemy attack and needing to transition to a
retrograde operation. Any decision to withdraw must take into account the
current situation in adjacent defensive areas. Only the commander who
ordered the defense can designate a new FEBA or authorize a retrograde
operation.
9-84. During this follow-through period, time is critical. Unless the com-
mander has a large, uncommitted reserve prepared to quickly exploit or re-
verse the situation, he must reset his defense as well as maintain contact
with the enemy. Time is also critical to the enemy, because he will use it to
reorganize, establish a security area, and fortify his positions.
9-85. There is a difference between local counterattacks designed to restore
the defense and a decisive operation designed to wrest the initiative from the
enemy and then defeat him. To conduct a decisive counterattack, the de-
fending force must bring the enemy attack to or past its culminating point be-
fore it results in an unacceptable level of degradation to the defending force.
To do this, the defending force must disrupt the enemy’s ability to mass, caus-
ing him to disperse his combat power into small groups or attrit his forces to
gain a favorable combat power ratio. The defending force must continue to
disrupt the enemy’s ability to introduce follow-on forces and to destroy his
sustainment system. In the defense, the commander must prepare to quickly
take advantage of fleeting opportunities, seize the initiative, and assume the
offense. Ideally, he already has a counterattack plan appropriate to the
existing situation. He must rapidly reorganize and refit selected units, move
them to attack positions, and attack. Alternatively, he must conduct an at-
tack using those units already in contact with the enemy, which is normally
the least favorable COA.
9-86. It is extremely difficult for the enemy to fight a defensive battle in re-
sponse to a friendly counterattack after he reaches a culminating point for
the following reasons:
· His defensive preparations are hasty.
· His forces are not adequately organized for defense.
· Reorganizing for a defense requires more time than the friendly com-
mander should allow.
· The enemy force is dispersed, extended in depth, and weakened.
· Enemy attacks rarely culminate on ground ideally suited for defense.
· Physical fatigue.
9-87. The shift to defense requires enemy soldiers to make a psychological
adjustment. Soldiers who have become accustomed to advancing, and thus
winning, must now halt deep in the opposing force’s territory and fight defen-
sively, sometimes desperately, on new and often unfavorable terms. If the
9-23
FM 3-90
enemy commander decides to conduct retrograde operations to more defen-

sible ground, his soldiers find it even harder to adjust psychologically.
9-88. If the defensive battle leads to a stalemate with both forces left in con-
tact with each other, the defending force must seek to retain the initiative
and set the conditions for the next encounter. The commander must prepare
the defending unit to move rapidly to a subsequent defensive position during
a lull in the battle because it is risky to defend from the same position twice.
The enemy will know the location of the defending force’s position and subject
them to his supporting fires unless the defending force moves. Nevertheless
the defending unit should normally stay in place and continue to fight unless
it can suppress the enemy’s approaching forces or take other actions to dis-
tract the enemy. This is because of the risk to a unit when it moves out of its
prepared positions while still under enemy pressure.
9-89. If the defending unit is unable to maintain the integrity of its defense,
it must transition to a retrograde operation or risk destruction. The com-
mander must analyze how to execute this transition and prepare contingency
plans. If the situation requires a retrograde movement, the commander con-
ducts the operation according to the retrograde fundamentals and principles
addressed in Chapter 11. In the retrograde, if the defending force can trade
space for time without sustaining unacceptable losses, the commander can
usually reestablish the conditions required for a successful defense.
9-24
Chapter 10
The Mobile Defense

A swift and vigorous transition to attack—the flashing sword of
vengeance—is the most brilliant point of the defensive.
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, 1832
The mobile defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on

the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a
striking force (FM 3-0). It focuses on destroying the attacking force by
permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to coun-
terattack and envelopment. The commander holds the majority of his
available combat power in a striking force for his decisive operation, a
major counterattack. He commits the minimum possible combat power to
his fixing force that conducts shaping operations to control the depth and
breadth of the enemy’s advance. The fixing force also retains the terrain
required to conduct the striking force’s decisive counterattack. The area
defense, on the other hand, focuses on retaining terrain by absorbing the
enemy into an interlocked series of positions, where he can be destroyed
largely by fires.
10-1. The factors of METT-TC may dictate that a unit conducts a mobile
defense when defending against an enemy force with greater combat power
but less mobility. A commander may also employ a mobile defense when
defending a large area of operations (AO) without well-defined avenues of
approach, such as flat, open terrain. The mobile defense is preferred in an
environment where the enemy may employ weapons of mass destruction
because this type of defense reduces the vulnerability of the force to attack
and preserves its freedom of action. Future technology associated with
command and control (C2) should improve the ability of the friendly force to
gain and maintain a common operational picture, which reduces the risk
associated with this type of defense. Among these risks are—
CONTENTS
Historical Example......................................10-2 Combat Service Support ........................10-8
Organization of Forces...............................10-3 Preparing a Mobile Defense .......................10-8
Control Measures........................................10-6 Executing a Mobile Defense.......................10-9
Planning a Mobile Defense ........................10-7 Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact ........10-9
Maneuver .................................................10-7 Disrupt the Enemy.................................10-10
Fire Support.............................................10-7 Fix the Enemy ........................................10-10
Air Defense ..............................................10-7 Maneuver................................................10-11
Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability .10-8 Follow Through .....................................10-12
10-1
FM 3-90
· The fixing force may be isolated and defeated in detail because of the
need to resource the striking force to the detriment of the fixing force.
· Operations in noncontiguous AOs associated with conducting a mobile
defense can lead to defeat in detail.
· Enemy operations may impair the ability of the striking force to react
at critical points.
· The enemy may not move into the area intended by the defending com-
mander.
· The attacking enemy retains at least some momentum as he approach-
es the desired engagement areas (EAs).
· The defending force may not gain an accurate picture of the enemy’s lo-
cations and dispositions required by the striking force to launch deci-
sive operations in time to react.
· The decentralized operations required by the mobile defense increase
the potential for fratricide.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
10-2. The concept of a mobile defense did not enter into Army doctrine until
it had the chance to review German lessons learned as a result of its World
War II experiences in Russia. The following historical example illustrates
how conducting a mobile defense can result in recapturing the initiative and
accomplishing the mission.
Manstein’s Donbas Operation, February 1943

In January 1943, the Soviets launched a number of successful offensives follow-
ing their Stalingrad counteroffensive. By the end of the month, this culminated in
plans to drive German forces back to the Dniepr River. The Soviet high com-
mand (STAVKA) approved plans to liberate simultaneously the Donets Basin in-
dustrial area, Kharkov, and Kursk, and drive the Germans as far west as pos-
sible. The plan required that operations be continued without an operational
pause, using forces weakened by previous operations, tenuously sustained by
overextended supply lines with virtually no operational reserve.
German Field Marshal Manstein’s mission was to preserve the German southern
wing in the Donets area. His defensive concept consisted of allowing Soviet
forces to advance in some areas, holding tightly to a few critical positions, and
deliberately reducing his own forces in other areas to create a striking force cap-
able of mounting a coordinated counterattack. See Figure 10-1. Reinforcements
began arriving for his Army Group Don. He deployed his 1st Panzer Armee to
defend Voroshilovgrad as a fixing force, 4th Panzer Armee and Army Detach-
ment Hollidt to defend the central and southern parts of Manstein’s lines, and the
1st SS Panzer Korps to defend Kharkov. The 1st SS Panzer Korps, consisting of
the 1st (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler), 2nd (Das Reich), and 3rd (Totenkopf) SS
Panzer Divisions) (PzDiv), formed his striking force.
STAVKA continued to pursue its offensive plans. However, the farther west the
Soviet forces moved, the more overextended their supply lines became. On
20 February, Manstein’s plan went into action. The 2nd SS PzDiv attacked from
south of Krasnograd and struck the Russian 6th Army and linked up with the 15th
10-2
The Mobile Defense
Infantry Division at Novo Moskovsk, thereby severing communications between

the Soviet 267th Rifle Division (RD) and the 106th Rifle Brigade and the rear. On
21 February, the German units consolidated their positions and prepared to ad-
vance on Pavlograd. Meanwhile, XL Panzer Korps attacked the Southwestern
Front’s mobile group, ultimately routing it. Units of the 3rd SS PzDiv moved into
the Krasnograd area to prepare for their advance on Pavlograd. Despite this new
situation, the Soviet front did not deviate from its offensive plans.
On 22 February, the 2nd XXXX XXXXX
Front Lines 19 Feb 1943
German Counteroffensive
SS PzDiv drove through OREL
2 BRYANSK 20 Feb - 25 Mar 1943
to Pavlograd and cut off Russian Counterattacks
24 Feb 1943
the 35th Guards RD’s Suzemka
Livny
Stabilized Front
communications with its Dmitriev-
26 March 1943
6th Army headquarters. Lgovskiy

Kastornoye
The 3rd SS PzDiv ad- KURSK Voronezh
vanced, widening the XXXX
XXXXX
breach between the VOR-
Stary
Oskol
Soviet 6th Army’s main KEMPF
Oboyan ONEZH Liski
Ostrogrozhsk
forces and the 267th RD. Sumy Korocha
On 23 February, the 6th Belogrod
and 17th PzDivs, pre-

Valuyki
viously the 4th Panzer KHARKOV Rossosh
Armee (fixing force) res-

erve, began their offen- PoltnyaXXX Zmiyev
sive, smashing the 6th Andreyevka XXXXX
SOUTH-
Army and 1st Guards Krasnograd WEST
Army and cutting the I Krasny
Liman
Lozovaya Lisichansk
supply lines of and vir- Slavyansk
Novomoskovsk Voroshilovgrad
tually encircling the 25th Pavlograd Do
Tank Corps, which had Riv nets
Krasnoarmeyskoye er
been ordered to continue Dnepropetrovsk
XXXXX
its advance. The 2nd SS Stalino
SOUTH
Zaporozhye XXXX
PzDiv consolidated posi- XXXX XXXX
tions at Pavlograd. The Dniepr 4 1 ROSTOV
3rd SS PzDiv advanced River HOLLIDT
against the 16th Guards
Figure 10-1. Donbas Movements
Tank Brigade and the
35th Guards RD. Its southern column reached positions just northeast of
Pavlograd. The 6th and 17th PzDivs advanced northward from the southeast,
both divisions ultimately linking up with the 1st SS Panzer Korps to advance far-
ther north on 24 February.
By the evening of 24 February, Vatutin, the Soviet Southwest Front commander,
finally recognized the dangerous situation his forces were facing and ordered
what remained of the front’s right flank to go over to the defensive. The Germans
continued their counteroffensive and ultimately recaptured Kharkov on 14 March.
10-3. Units smaller than a corps do not normally conduct a mobile defense
because of their inability to fight multiple engagements throughout the
width, depth, and height of the AO, while simultaneously resourcing striking,
10-3
FM 3-90
fixing, and reserve forces. Typically, the striking force in a mobile defense
may consist of one-half to two-thirds of the defender’s combat power. (See
Figure 10-2.) Division and smaller units generally conduct an area defense or
a delay as part of the fixing force as the commander shapes the enemy’s pene-
tration or they attack as part of the striking force. Alternatively, they can
constitute a portion of the reserve.
S H A P IN G O P E R A T IO N S
SOF
ENY
ENY
S T R IK IN G
FORCE
F IX IN G
FORCE
SPT
RESERVE
Figure 10-2. Mobile Defense
10-4. The commander organizes his main body into two principal groups—
the fixing force and the striking force. In the mobile defense, reconnaissance
and security, reserve, and sustaining forces accomplish the same tasks as in
an area defense. (See Figure 10-3.) The commander completes any required
adjustments in task organization before he commits his units to the fight.
FIXING
FORCE
SECURITY
FORCE
STRIKING
FORCE
RESERVE
Figure 10-3. Organization of Forces for a Mobile Defense
10-4
The Mobile Defense
10-5. Organized by the commander with the minimum combat power needed
to accomplish its mission, the fixing force turns, blocks, and delays the at-
tacking enemy force. It tries to shape the enemy penetration or contain his
advance. Typically, it has most of the countermobility assets of the defending
unit. The fixing force may conduct defensive actions over considerable depth
within the main battle area (MBA). However, it must be prepared to stop and
hold terrain on short notice to assist the striking force on its commitment.
The operations of the fixing force establish the conditions for a decisive attack
by the striking force at a favorable tactical location. The fixing force executes
its portion of the battle essentially as a combination of an area defense and a
delaying action. The actions of the fixing force are shaping operations.
10-6. The striking force decisively engages the enemy as he becomes exposed
in his attempts to overcome the fixing force. The term “striking force” is used
rather than reserve because the term “reserve” indicates an uncommitted
force. The striking force is a committed force and has the resources to conduct
a decisive counterattack as part of the mobile defense. It is the commander’s
decisive operation.
10-7. The striking force contains the maximum combat power available to the
commander at the time of its counterattack. The striking force is a combined
arms force that has greater combat power and mobility than the force it seeks
to defeat or destroy. The commander considers the effects of surprise when
determining the relative combat power of the striking force and its targeted
enemy unit. The striking force is normally fully task organized with all com-
bat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) assets before its actual
commitment. The commander positions engineer mobility-enhancing assets
with the lead elements of the striking force.
10-8. The striking force is the key to a successful mobile defense. All of its
contingencies relate to its attack. If the opportunity does not exist to deci-
sively commit the striking force, the defender repositions his forces to estab-
lish the conditions for success. The striking force must have mobility equal to
or greater than that of its targeted enemy unit. It can obtain this mobility
through proper task organization, countermobility operations to slow and dis-
rupt enemy movements, and mobility operations to facilitate the rapid
shifting of friendly formations. The striking force requires access to multiple
routes because an attacking enemy normally goes to great length to deny the
defending force freedom of action.
10-9. The commander responsible for orchestrating the overall mobile de-
fense should retain control of the striking force unless communication diffi-
culties make this impossible. Normally this is the overall defending force
commander. The commander’s most critical decisions are when, where, and
under what conditions he should commit his striking force. The commander
normally accompanies the striking force.
10-10. Resourcing a reserve in a mobile defense is difficult and requires the
commander to assume risk. He generally uses his reserve to support the
fixing force. However, if the reserve is available to the striking force, it ex-
ploits the success of the striking force. If the reserve is composed largely of
aviation forces and long-range fire support systems, it may have contingen-
cies to support the fixing and striking forces.
10-5
FM 3-90
CONTROL MEASURES
10-11. A commander conducting a mobile defense uses control measures to
synchronize conducting the operation. These control measures include desig-
nating the AOs of the fixing and striking forces with their associated bound-
aries, battle positions, and phase lines. He designates a line of departure or a
line of contact as part of the graphic control measures for the striking force.
He may designate an axis of advance for the striking force. He can designate
attack-by-fire or support-by-fire positions. The commander uses EAs, target
reference points, targeted areas of interest, and final protective fires as neces-
sary. He designates named areas of interest to focus the efforts of his intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. This allows him to de-
termine the enemy’s course of action (COA). He designates checkpoints, con-
tact points, passage points, passage routes, and passage lanes for use by re-
connaissance and surveillance assets, security units, and the striking force.
(See Figure 10-4.)
XX
NAI 8
2
PL CATBERT V PL CATBERT
FEBA/LOA
X X FEBA/LOA
LANE 2
TAI BLUE
PL DILBERT OBJ GOLD

PL DILBERT
14 SP
V
XX
XX
X (o/o)
2 3
X
1 3
X
(o/o)
ALICE
ROUTE
48 2
PL PAULA/LD
)
/o
(o/o)
(o
PL DOGBERT 17 RP PL DOGBERT
X X
AA X X
X
X 48 X
MOZART 2
(ESB)
212
STRIKING FORCE
XX
Figure 10-4. Mobile Defense Control Measures
10-12. The commander must provide the striking force commander with con-
trol measures to focus his force at the decisive time and place and to decon-
flict fires with the fixing force. As a minimum, the striking force commander
needs to know the anticipated objective decision points that could lead to the
commitment of his force, limit of advance, and boundaries of his AO. If the
overall commander imposes either an axis of attack or a direction of attack as
a control measure, he restricts the striking force commander’s freedom of ma-
neuver. However, such restrictions may be necessary to avoid contact with
enemy forces that could distract the striking force from accomplishing its pri-
mary mission. These control measures may have to be drawn “on the fly”
while the commander, his staff, and his subordinates move to take advantage
10-6
The Mobile Defense
of an opportunity to commit the striking force in a decisive counterattack.

They should also help the commander recover the integrity of his defense if
the striking force is not successful in its attack. (Chapters 2, 5, and 8 explain
these control measures.)
PLANNING A MOBILE DEFENSE

10-13. The key to successful mobile defensive operations is the integration
and synchronization of all available assets to maximize the combat power of
the defending unit, particularly the striking force. The commander achieves
integration and synchronization when he can employ their combined effects
at decisive times and places. (The general defensive planning considerations
addressed in Chapter 8 apply to the mobile defense.)
MANEUVER
10-14. The commander’s ability to maintain the mobility advantage of his
forces is an important aspect of the mobile defense. This mobility advantage
may result from or be enhanced by countermobility actions directed against
the enemy force. In his mobile defense plan, the commander ensures that his
forces—including reserves and the striking force—can move freely around the
battlefield, while at the same time restricting the enemy’s mobility, slowing
his momentum, and guiding or forcing him into areas that favor the friendly
defensive effort.
FIRE SUPPORT
10-15. The effectiveness of a mobile defense is based on the carefully planned
fires of all weapons. The striking force conducts the commander’s decisive op-
eration in a mobile defense. It requires continuous and concentrated fire sup-
port. The commander weights his decisive operation, in part, by allocating to
it field artillery and other fire support weapon systems. He must rapidly shift
indirect fire support from the fixing force to the striking force. These fire
support systems do not have to move with the striking force if it remains
within supporting range.
10-16. If the striking force’s planned maneuver places it outside the support-
ing range of the defending commander’s fire support systems, he must either
plan the movement of fire support assets to locations where they can support
the striking force or incorporate them into the striking force. Fire support as-
sets can partially compensate for a lack of maneuver forces in the striking
force. The commander takes precautions to prevent fratricide as the striking
force approaches the fixing force’s EAs, while supporting air and artillery as-
sets try to interdict enemy movements.
AIR DEFENSE
10-17. In the mobile defense, air defense is normally initially used to cover—
· Security forces and fixing force units in forward areas.
· C2 facilities.
· Critical assets, including fire support systems, reserves, and the
striking force.
· Sustainment resources.
10-7
FM 3-90
· Choke points along movement corridors planned for use by reserves or

the striking force.
Once the commander commits the striking force, it receives priority of sup-
port as the decisive operation. If the striking force attacks to extended
depths, the commander ensures that it and other critical assets remain with-
in the coverage of available air defense systems. This may require him to re-
position air defense radars and systems to maintain air defense coverage of
the defending force.
10-18. The majority of the commander’s countermobility and survivability as-
sets support the operations of the fixing force. The majority of the command-
er’s mobility assets support the operations of the striking force. Situational
obstacles provide him a tremendous advantage in the mobile defense. These
obstacles are a combat multiplier because they enable the commander to use
economy of force measures. He uses situational obstacles to exploit enemy
vulnerabilities, exploit success, separate enemy follow-on forces, and provide
flank protection.

10-19. When planning for the mobile defense’s sustaining operations, logis-
tics operations planners must look beyond the fixing force’s shaping opera-
tions to prepare to support the striking force’s decisive counterattack. The
greater the distance the striking force must cover when moving from its as-
sembly area (AA) to its final objective, the greater the amount of supplies
needed to support that move. Once committed, units in the striking force re-
quire priority of fuel, ammunition, and maintenance support over comparable
units in the fixing force. Casualty evacuation will be a challenge because the
fixing force will likely suffer a higher percentage of casualties but the lines of
communications to the striking force must also support casualty treatment
and evacuation. When the striking force must move a considerable distance
from its sustaining base, the commander should consider establishing an in-
termediate support base (ISB). Before establishing an ISB, he must weigh the
benefits of establishing the base against the cost in terms of combat power or
effort diverted from the support mission to secure the ISB.
PREPARING A MOBILE DEFENSE

10-20. Preparations for conducting a mobile defense include developing the
fixing force’s defensive positions and EAs as discussed in Chapter 8. The com-
mander aggressively uses his reconnaissance assets to track enemy units as
they approach. Engineers participate in conducting route and area reconnais-
sance to find and classify existing routes. They improve existing routes and
open new routes for use during the battle.
10-21. The striking force assembles in one or more areas depending on the
width of the AO, the terrain, enemy capabilities, and the planned manner of
employment. Before the enemy attack begins, the striking force may deploy
all or some of its elements forward in the MBA to—
· Deceive the enemy regarding the purpose of the force.
10-8
The Mobile Defense
· Occupy dummy battle positions.

· Create a false impression of unit boundaries, which is important when
operating with a mix of heavy and light forces or multinational forces.
· Conduct reconnaissance of routes between the striking force’s AAs and
potential EAs.
10-22. The enemy attempts to discover the strength, composition, and loca-
tion of the units that constitute the fixing force and the striking force. The
commander uses security forces and information operations to deny the ene-
my this information and degrade the collection capabilities of enemy ISR as-
sets. The commander routinely repositions to mislead the enemy and to pro-
tect his force. In addition, his plans and preparations incorporate defensive
information operations. The commander normally tries to portray an area de-
fense while hiding the existence and location of the striking force.
EXECUTING A MOBILE DEFENSE

10-23. This manual divides the execution of a mobile defense into five phases
for discussion purposes. The length and nature of each phase, if it occurs at
all, varies from situation to situation according to the factors of METT-TC.
The phases of defensive operations are gain and maintain enemy contact, dis-
rupt the enemy, fix the enemy, maneuver, and follow through.
10-24. The commander must have the flexibility to yield terrain and shape
the enemy penetration. He may even entice the enemy by appearing to un-
cover an objective of strategic or operational value to the enemy. The striking
force conducts the decisive operation—the attack—once the results of the ac-
tions of the fixing force meet the commander’s intent.

10-25. The commander conducting a mobile defense focuses on discovering
the exact location of the enemy and his strength to facilitate the effectiveness
of the striking force. The security force (guard or cover) or the fixing force
confirms the enemy’s COA and main avenues of approach. The commander
normally tasks other ISR assets to determine the location of enemy reserves
and follow-on forces. Early detection of the enemy’s decisive operation pro-
vides the commander with reaction time to adjust the fixing force’s positions
and shape the enemy penetration, which, in turn, provides the time nec-
essary to commit the striking force. The striking force commander requires as
close to real-time updates of the enemy situation as are possible to ensure
that the striking force engages the enemy at the right location and time.
10-26. While conducting operations, the security force determines what
routes the enemy is using, where the enemy is strong or weak, and where
gaps in and between enemy formations exist. This information aids the com-
mander in his attempt to seize the initiative. That information also increases
the striking force’s agility by identifying opportunities. Further, it helps pull
the striking force along the path of least resistance as it maneuvers to employ
its combat power at the critical time and place.
10-9
FM 3-90
DISRUPT THE ENEMY

10-27. In a mobile defense, the commander conducts shaping operations de-
signed to shape the enemy’s penetration into the MBA and disrupt the ene-
my’s introduction of fresh forces into the fight. These shaping operations help
establish the preconditions for committing the striking force by isolating the
object of the striking force and destroying the enemy’s key C2 nodes, logistics
resupply units, and reserves. Whenever possible the commander sequences
these shaping operations, to include offensive information operations, so that
the impact of their effects coincides with the commitment of the striking
force. To generate a tempo that temporarily paralyzes enemy C2, the inten-
sity of these shaping operations may increase dramatically on the commit-
ment of the striking force. The commander continues to conduct shaping op-
erations once the striking force commits to prevent enemy forces from outside
the objective area from interfering with executing the decisive counterattack.
FIX THE ENEMY

10-28. Fixing the enemy is the second half of shaping operations and results
in establishing the conditions necessary for decisive operations by the strik-
ing force. Typically, the commander of the defending force allows the enemy
force to penetrate into the defensive AO before the striking force attacks. (See
Figure 10-5.) The fixing force may employ a combination of area defense, de-
lay, and strong point defensive techniques to shape the enemy penetration.
The intent of the fixing force is not necessarily to defeat the enemy but to
shape the penetration to facilitate a decisive counterattack by the striking
force. The commander ensures that the missions and task organization of
subordinate units within the fixing force are consistent with his concept for
shaping the enemy penetration. Defensive positions within the fixing force
may not be contiguous since the fixing force contains only the minimum-es-
sential combat power to accomplish its mission.
ENY
ENY
FIXING FORCE
RESERVE
STRIKING
FORCE
Figure 10-5. Mobile Defense Before Commitment of Striking Force
10-10
The Mobile Defense
10-29. The fixing force’s extensive use of obstacles supports this shaping ef-
fort and helps to gain an overall mobility advantage over the enemy. The
commander may want to yield ground quickly to make the enemy think he
has been successful or to entice him to a decisive point where the striking
force can attack. Normally, in a mobile defense, the commander retains
ground only to facilitate the commitment of his striking force.
10-30. When conducting a mobile defense, the commander may need to com-
mit his reserve to reinforce the fixing force and help shape the battlefield. He
positions his reserve so it effectively reacts to the most likely contingency and
the enemy’s most dangerous COA. Without a reserve, the commander as-
sumes significant risk in attempting to shape the enemy penetration. Cir-
cumstances may also force the commander to employ elements of the striking
force to assist the fixing force. If that occurs, the commander prefers to use
his available long-range fire support assets and attack helicopters. They are
the best choice because of their ability to rapidly disengage and shift their ef-
fects to support the efforts of the rest of the striking force on its commitment.
MANEUVER
10-31. The commander’s situational understanding is critical in establishing
the conditions that initiate the striking force’s movement and in determining
the general area that serves as a focus for the counterattack. Situational un-
derstanding includes identifying those points in time and space where the
counterattack proves decisive. A force-oriented objective or an EA usually in-
dicates the decisive point. The staff synchronizes the unit’s activities in time
and space to sufficiently mass the effects of the striking force at the right
time and place.
10-32. The actions of the striking force are the echelon’s decisive operation on
its commitment. The commander’s ISR systems focus entirely on tracking the
enemy’s advance. The striking force commander continuously receives intelli-
gence and combat information updates that allow him to adjust his coun-
terattack as necessary to defeat the targeted enemy. Once the enemy starts
his attack, any forward-deployed elements of the striking force withdraw to
AAs or attack positions and prepare for their commitment in counterattack.
10-33. The defending commander launches his striking force in a counter-
attack when its offensive power, relative to that of the targeted attacking
enemy element, is the greatest. (See Figure 10-6.) Piecemeal commitment of
the striking force in support of local objectives jeopardizes the success of the
overall operation. The striking force must execute the counterattack rapidly
and violently, employing all combat power necessary to ensure success. The
striking force may be committed at a time different than anticipated and in
an entirely different area than previous contingency plans envisioned. Thus,
it must be able to respond to unexpected developments rapidly and decisively.
10-34. Because the striking force normally attacks a moving enemy force, it
generally assumes a combat formation with a covering force, an advance
guard, a main body, and either a follow-and-support or a follow-and-assume
force. The striking force attempts to take advantage of obstacles, such as ri-
vers or obstacle zones that block the enemy’s movement. The commander
designates flank responsibilities and may even allocate a designated force
10-11
FM 3-90
against a particularly vulnerable flank. However, the striking force moves

quickly and takes risk on its flanks, using its speed of movement and super-
ior situational understanding to provide security.
10-35. The striking force attacks in a formation that provides maximum com-
bat power forward to devastate the targeted enemy force and achieve decisive
results. The striking force takes advantage of its mobility and fire power to
seize the initiative by overwhelming the enemy force with swift, violent blows
that cripple the enemy’s command and control system, disrupt his forma-
tions, and destroy his combat systems. The commander ensures that his fire
support and fixing force capture the enemy’s attention and posture the enemy
for attack by the striking force. During the counterattack, he may have one
element of the striking force occupy support-by-fire positions to suppress the
enemy, while another striking force element prepares to assault the objective.
Either heavy or light forces may make this assault. (Chapter 5 discusses the
actual conduct of an assault on an objective.)
10-36. Engineers should be well forward to enhance the mobility of the strik-
ing force. These lead engineers search for existing obstacles and clear the
route as much as possible within their capabilities. Follow-on engineers ex-
pand breaches, improve routes, and replace assault bridges with more perma-
nent structures. Engineers with flank units focus on countermobility to pro-
tect the flanks.
ENY
ENY
STRIKING FORCE
Figure 10-6. Mobile Defense After Commitment of Striking Force

FOLLOW THROUGH
10-37. All defensive operations intend to create the opportunity to transition
to the offense. In a mobile defense, that transitional opportunity generally re-
sults from the success of the striking force’s attack. The commander exploits
his success and attempts to establish conditions for a pursuit if his assess-
ment of the striking force’s attack is that there are opportunities for future of-
fensive operations. (Chapters 6 and 7 discuss exploitation and pursuit.) If
conducting the mobile defense is unsuccessful and the enemy retains the
initiative, the commander must either reestablish a viable defense or conduct
retrograde operations. (Retrograde operations are the topic of Chapter 11.)
10-12
Chapter 11
The Retrograde
The withdrawal should be thought of as an offensive instrument, and
exercises framed to teach how the enemy can be lured into a trap,
closed by a counter-stroke or a devastating circle of fire.
B.H. Liddell Hart, 1944
The retrograde is a type of defensive operation that involves organized

movement away from the enemy (FM 3-0). The enemy may force these op-
erations or a commander may execute them voluntarily. In either case,
the higher commander of the force executing the operation must approve
the retrograde. Retrograde operations are transitional operations; they
are not considered in isolation.
11-1. The commander executes retrogrades to—

· Disengage from operations.
· Gain time without fighting a decisive engagement.
· Resist, exhaust, and damage an enemy in situations that do not favor a
defense.
· Draw the enemy into an unfavorable situation or extend his lines of
communication (LOCs).
· Preserve the force or avoid combat under undesirable conditions, such
as continuing an operation that no longer promises success.
· Reposition forces to more favorable locations or conform to movements
of other friendly troops.
· Position the force for use elsewhere in other missions.
· Simplify the logistic sustainment of the force by shortening LOCs.
· Position the force where it can safely conduct reconstitution.
· Adjust the defensive scheme, such as secure more favorable terrain.
CONTENTS
Historical Example ......................................11-2 Planning a Withdrawal ..........................11-21
Delay.............................................................11-3 Preparing a Withdrawal ........................11-23
Organization of Forces ...........................11-4 Executing a Withdrawal ........................11-23
Control Measures ....................................11-5 Terminating a Withdrawal.....................11-24
Plan ...........................................................11-7 Retirement..................................................11-24
Prepare ...................................................11-14 Organization of Forces .........................11-25
Execute...................................................11-15 Control Measures ..................................11-26
Termination of a Delay..........................11-18 Combat Service Support ..........................11-26
Withdrawal .................................................11-18 Unique Retrograde Situations..................11-28
Organization of Forces .........................11-19 Denial Operations..................................11-28
Control Measures ..................................11-20 Stay-Behind Operations........................11-30
11-1
FM 3-90
· Deceive the enemy.

11-2. The three forms of retrograde are delay, withdrawal, and retirement. In
each form, a force moves to the rear, using combinations of combat formations
and marches. (Chapter 3 discusses combat formations; Chapter 14 discusses
troop movement.) The commander may use all three forms singularly or in
combination with other types and forms of offensive or defensive operations.
11-3. Retrogrades can negatively affect the participating soldiers’ attitude
more than any other type of operation because they may view the retrograde
as a defeat. A commander must not allow retrograde operations to reduce or
destroy unit morale. Leaders must maintain unit aggressiveness. By plan-
ning and efficiently executing the retrograde and ensuring that soldiers un-
derstand the purpose and duration of the operation, the commander can
counter any negative effects of the operation on unit morale. After completing
a retrograde operation, the commander may reconstitute the force.
FM 4-100.9 establishes the basic principles of reconstitution.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
11-4. The following historical example illustrates how conducting a retro-
grade operation can preserve an army for future operations.
The Atlanta Campaign, 1864

The first two months of the Atlanta campaign illustrate the successful conduct of
a delay in the face of superior forces. Between 5 May and 17 July, Johnston held
Sherman to an average gain of one mile a day while preserving his freedom of
maneuver and his army for future operations. This part of the campaign contains
examples of successful delays, withdrawals, and retirements. Confederate ac-
tions at Resaca early in the campaign will be used to illustrate an unassisted with-
drawal under enemy pressure. See Figure 11-1, page 11-2.
In May 1864, Confederate GEN Joseph E. Johnston and his 55,000-man Army of
Tennessee had the mission of defending Atlanta. Johnston faced 110,000 Union
soldiers, organized into seven corps under MG William T. Sherman’s overall
command. Johnston’s campaign strategy was to force Sherman to culminate
before reaching Atlanta, conserving his army’s strength until he crippled the
Union army in a defensive battle, and then launch a counteroffensive.
Union forces began the campaign on 5 May with an advance from positions
southeast of Chattanooga. Forced to withdraw from his initial positions at Dalton
because of a turning movement around his left flank by two Union corps,
Johnston raced to position his forces to defend Resaca, Georgia. Johnston in-
tended to hold at Resaca until he could cross his entire force over the Oostanaula
River to its southern bank. At Resaca were three bridges that supported the Con-
federate’s line of communication with the logistics base at Atlanta.
Johnston positioned the three corps—then constituting his army—to defend
Resaca as they arrived on 13 May. May 14th and 15th saw attacks around
Resaca, with neither side gaining a marked advantage. However, the right flank
of the Union army moved within cannon range of the bridges. Forces that
Sherman sent four miles to the southwest on another turning movement crossed
11-2
The Retrograde
the river on 15 May, al-

Tilton
though they did not
break out from their XX
XXX XXIII
bridgehead on that day. 0 1/2 XXX XX
Sherman intended to HOVEY
IV XX
follow with his main Scale in Miles
XX
force and either enve- STEWART
XXX
lope Johnston or strike XX STEVENSON
XXIII (-)
R.
his flank during a re-
R.
HINDMAN
ic
nt
tla
treat. Faced with these
A
&
XX
rn
prospects, Johnston de-
te
es
W
BATE
cided to withdraw XXX Connasauga River
across the river. A de- N XIV
XX
ceptive Confederate at- CLEBURNE
Ca
tack late on the 15th
pm
convinced Sherman that Cr
ee
k XX
Johnston intended to CHEATAM
stay in his current posi-
tions. The withdrawal XX Resaca
commenced at mid- XXX
LORING Confederate Fort
night. Johnston left skir- XV XX Pontoon Bridge

Oo stan
mishers along the line R o ad to
S n ak
e Cre CANTEY
aula R
iver
ek G a XX
(a detachment left in p
XVI
contact), withdrawing Lay’s Ferry
VEATCH
forces in succession
from his corps farthest Withdrawal from Resaca
from the bridges, then Figure 11-1. Withdrawal from Resaca
from his center corps,
and finally from the corps closest to the bridges. One division from his right-wing
corps constituted the army’s rear guard. After the rear guard crossed the bridges,
Johnston’s engineers commenced their destruction. During the three hours re-
quired to withdraw Johnston’s army across the river, Union forces did not detect
the withdrawal until the Confederates began to destroy the bridges.
Johnston’s mix of retrograde and defensive operations preserved his army as a
constant threat to Sherman. Nevertheless, his strategy was unacceptable to
Confederate President Jefferson Davis. Davis replaced him on 17 July 1864 with
GEN John B. Hood. Hood attacked Sherman three time in two weeks, suffering
heavy casualties and failing to seize the initiative. On 1 September, Sherman
seized Atlanta, achieving the Union’s strategic objective in the Western Theater
before the national elections.
DELAY
11-5. A delay is a form of retrograde [JP 1-02 uses an operation] in which a
force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s
momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in prin-
ciple, becoming decisively engaged (JP 1-02, see delaying operation). The de-
lay is one of the most demanding of all ground combat operations. A delay
wears down the enemy so that friendly forces can regain the initiative
through offensive action, buy time to establish an effective defense, or
11-3
FM 3-90
determine enemy intentions as part of a security operation. Normally in a de-

lay, inflicting casualties on the enemy is secondary to gaining time. For exam-
ple, a flank security force conducts a delay operation to provide time for the
protected force to establish a viable defense along its threatened flank. Ex-
cept when directed to prevent enemy penetration of a phase line (PL) for a
specific duration, a force conducting a delay normally does not become deci-
sively engaged.
11-6. A delay operation can occur when the commander does not have enough
friendly forces to attack or defend. It may also occur, based on a unit’s mis-
sion, in conjunction with a higher commander’s intent. The decision to con-
duct a delay may not be based on the unit’s combat power, but on the other
factors of METT-TC. For example, during security operations, the commander
may conduct a delay as a shaping operation to draw the enemy into an area
where he is vulnerable to a counterattack. Another example would be a delay
instituted as an economy of force effort to allow the commander to conduct an
offensive operation elsewhere.
11-7. The ability of a force to trade space for time requires depth within the
area of operations (AO) assigned to the delaying force. The amount of depth
required depends on several factors, including the—
· Amount of time to be gained.
· Relative combat power of friendly and enemy forces.
· Relative mobility of the forces.
· Nature of the terrain.
· Ability to shape the AO with obstacles and fires.
· Degree of acceptable risk.
Ordinarily, the greater the available depth, the lower the risk involved to the
delaying force and the greater the chance for success.
11-8. A delay succeeds by forcing the enemy to repeatedly concentrate his
forces to fight through a series of defensive positions. A delaying force must
offer a continued threat of serious opposition, forcing the enemy to repeatedly
deploy and maneuver. Delaying forces displace to subsequent positions before
the enemy is able to concentrate sufficient resources to decisively engage and
defeat delaying forces in their current position. The length of time a force can
remain in a position without facing the danger of becoming decisively en-
gaged is primarily a function of the factors of METT-TC, such as the relative
combat power and the terrain and weather.
11-9. The commander normally organizes the delaying force into a main
body, a security force, and a reserve. The security force usually conducts a
screen forward of the initial delay positions. For a divisional cavalry squadron
or a corps cavalry regiment conducting a delay, the security force executing
the screen mission may consist of scouts or air cavalry. For a brigade or bat-
talion conducting a delay, the security force may consist of the brigade recon-
naissance troop, battalion scouts, or another element tasked to conduct secur-
ity operations.
11-4
The Retrograde
11-10. The main body, which contains the majority of the delaying force’s
combat power, may use alternate or subsequent positions to conduct the de-
lay. The commander usually deploys his main body as a complete unit into a
forward position when conducting a delay from subsequent positions. He di-
vides his main body into two parts, roughly equal in combat power, to occupy
each set of positions when conducting a delay from alternate positions.
11-11. The commander normally retains a reserve to contain enemy penetra-
tions between positions, to reinforce fires into an engagement area (EA), or to
help a unit disengage from the enemy. All of these missions require that the
reserve has the mobility and strength to strike with such force that an enemy
has no option but to face the immediate threat.
11-12. The extended frontages and ranges common to retrograde operations
make the provision of fire support difficult and act to limit the commander’s
ability to mass fires. Therefore, retrograde forces, especially delay forces,
often have more than the normal allocation of fire support assets. The com-
mander’s risk of losing artillery systems and their ammunition also increases
when he is supporting retrograde operations. Therefore, he balances his deci-
sion to commit fire support systems forward against anticipated requirements
in subsequent battle stages. In particular, he protects his towed artillery sys-
tems from being overrun by a mobile enemy. He can use available rotary- and
fixed-wing aircraft to augment or replace his artillery systems.
11-13. Combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) assets are
widely dispersed and often attached to the units they support because of the
width of the AOs normally assigned in a delay. Engineer priorities are nor-
mally countermobility first, then mobility. However, restrictive terrain that
impedes friendly movement may require the commander to reverse the prior-
ities. Close coordination is necessary so that engineer obstacles are covered
by fire and do not impede the planned withdrawal routes of delaying forces or
the commitment of a counterattacking reserve force. The delaying force
should have a greater-than-normal allocation of fire support systems.
11-14. The requirement to maintain continuous support during the delay re-
quires CSS organizations to echelon their assets. This echelonment, coupled
with the wide dispersion of combat forces that is inherent in a delay, compli-
cates conducting the delay.
CONTROL MEASURES
11-15. The delay consists of a series of independent small-unit actions that
occur simultaneously across the front. Subordinate commanders must have
freedom of action. The tactical mission graphic for the delay appears in Fig-
ure 11-2. It is not a control measure. The control measures used in the delay
are the same as those introduced in Chapter 8. Common graphics used in a
delay include AOs, PLs, battle positions (BPs), coordination points, check-
points, EAs, trigger lines, target reference points (TRPs), and disengagement
lines. (See Figure 11-3.) The commander designates contact points in front of,
between, and behind units to assist coordination, ensure continuity of the
delay, and draw attention to enemy avenues of approach into unit flanks.
(Chapter 15 addresses passage points with the passage of lines discussion.)
11-5
FM 3-90
7 1
PL HENHOUSE PL HENHOUSE
011100JUL 011100JUL
(DELAY LINE)
PL ELM
PL ELM
D
II
II
9
3
PL FOX
PL FOX
012200JUL
012200JUL
(DELAY LINE)
Figure 11-2. Delay Tactical Mission Graphic
PL PAT (DELAY LINE) PL PAT (DELAY LINE)

120030JAN 120030JAN
NZ1541
+
NZ1540
+
NZ1542 EA
+
NZ1539 +
I 2
PL P
BP
1
PL JAN EA E
(T R IG G G Y
BP
(TRIGGER LINE) GE R
L IN E
ALPHA
15
OMEGA )
I
PL JOAN
BP 11 BP PL JOAN
(DISENGAGE-
17 (DISEN-
MENT LINE) I I GAGEMENT
LINE)
NZ1545
PL DICK (2ND TRIGGER LINE)
+ +NZ1543PL DICK (2ND TRIGGER LINE)
EA PHI
NZ1544
BP + 22
II
I 23 BP I
II
PL
M IC
PP 4 4
(BH K EY
L) BP 21
I PL MICKEY
(BHL)
Figure 11-3. Control Measures for a Delay
11-16. In planning for a delaying action, the commander assigns an AO to

each committed unit down through the company or troop level. The com-
mander assigns each likely enemy avenue of approach to only one subordi-
nate unit when he designates subordinate units’ AOs. When the commander
draws the boundaries of these subordinate AOs, he includes the terrain that
controls fire and observation into those areas.
11-6
The Retrograde
11-17. The commander designates additional PLs beyond those established

by his higher commander as necessary to control movement during the delay.
A delay line is a phase line where the date and time before which the
enemy is not allowed to cross the phase line is depicted as part of the
graphic control measure. Designating delay lines is a command decision
that imposes a high degree of risk on the delaying unit. The delaying unit
must do everything in its power—including accepting decisive engagement—
to prevent the enemy from crossing that line before the time indicated. A
delay line may also be event-driven. For example, a commander can order a
delaying unit to prevent penetration of the delay line until his engineers com-
plete construction of a rearward obstacle belt.
PLAN
11-18. Unit commanders and soldiers must understand and exercise the
basics of defensive operations outlined in Chapter 8 to conduct a successful
delay. However, these defensive basics have unique considerations, and the
significance of these considerations varies depending on the factors of
METT-TC. In a delay, units operate on extended frontages at great risk from
advancing enemy forces. The tactical situation constantly changes with ma-
neuver opportunities existing for only extremely short periods. Subordinate
commanders must have the flexibility to take immediate action to retain the
integrity of their forces. This helps retain their freedom of maneuver and in-
flict maximum destruction on the enemy.
11-19. The commander identifies ground and air avenues for enemy attacks
and friendly counterattacks. When avenues of approach diverge or pass from
one AO to another, adjacent units must coordinate with each other. Using the
intelligence preparation of the battlefield process, the commander designates
initial and subsequent delay positions on key terrain that covers likely enemy
avenues of approach throughout the depth of the AO allocated to the delay
mission.
11-20. Maintaining a mobility advantage over the attacker by the delaying
force is key to successfully conducting a delay. Robust engineering and fire
support are critical to this effort. The commander plans to maintain this ad-
vantage by taking full advantage of the mobility inherent in the combat and
tactical systems available to the delaying force. In addition he takes other
steps to enhance friendly mobility and degrade the enemy’s mobility, such as
building combat trails between delay positions and preparing bridges over
major rivers for demolition. The delaying force should be capable of con-
structing large numbers of obstacles and delivering long-range fires. For ex-
ample, while the enemy seeks to travel in movement formations that allow
him to press his attack at the greatest speed, the delaying force’s aim is to en-
gage the enemy as early and often as possible. This forces the enemy out of
those formations through a multiple series of time-consuming deployments
into an assault formation.
11-21. The air defense portion of the plan has three main considerations—the
protection of the force while it is in position, the protection of any forces left
in contact, and the protection of the force as it moves to the rear. Priority of
protection should be toward maintaining the mobility of the force. Air defense
assets remain mobile yet able to engage aerial targets with little advance
11-7
FM 3-90
warning. These assets should work in teams, able to move to the rear in alter-
nating bounds. This ensures that dedicated air defense assets will always be
in position, with the flexibility to keep pace with the operations. These firing
points are not obvious positions that an enemy will probably target as part of
his preparatory or support fires. Early warning of enemy air attack is pro-
vided over combat net radios using the command net at the brigade echelon
and below.
11-22. Flanks and gaps between units are always areas of concern for a com-
mander. In a linear deployment, the enemy can bypass or outflank the de-
laying force if coordination between adjacent friendly units is weak, or if one
unit creates a gap by moving rearward too rapidly. Therefore, the commander
normally designates BPs to guard approaches into his AO. Adjacent units of
different commands must exchange liaison.
11-23. Displacement criteria should specify at what point—either event, or
time-driven—the delaying force should begin its displacement. The com-
mander should calculate enemy closure rates for the terrain and compare
them to friendly displacement rates between positions. By comparing time
and distance factors, he can calculate his movement window of time. By ap-
plying the enemy’s probable rates of advance and formations to the avenues
of approach, the commander can decide what obstacles to use and where to
emplace them (covered by fires). It also helps the commander determine if
and where decisive engagement is likely or required to achieve the delay ob-
jective. Careful consideration of the factors of METT-TC, especially terrain
analysis, is an inherent part of delay planning.
Parameters of the Delay Order

11-24. An order for a delay mission must specify certain parameters. First, it
must direct one of two alternatives: delay within the AO or delay forward of a
specified line or terrain feature for a specified time. That time is usually
based on another unit completing its activities, such as establishing rearward
defensive positions. A mission of delay within the AO implies that force inte-
grity is a prime consideration. In this case, the delaying force delays the ene-
my as long as possible while avoiding decisive engagement. Generally, this
force displaces once predetermined criteria have been met, such as when the
enemy force reaches a disengagement line. The control measures are the
same for both alternatives, except that during a delay forward of a specified
line for a specified time, the commander annotates the PL with the specified
time. (See Figure 11-4.) If the commander establishes a delay line, mission ac-
complishment outweighs preservation of the force’s integrity. It may require
the force hold a given position until ordered to displace.
11-25. The second parameter is that the order must specify the acceptable
risk. Acceptable risk ranges from accepting decisive engagement in an at-
tempt to hold terrain for a given time to maintaining the integrity of the de-
laying force. The depth of the AO available for the delay, the time needed by
higher headquarters, and subsequent missions for the delaying force deter-
mine the amount of acceptable risk. A delay mission that does not specify
times, control of key terrain, or other guidance and control measures implies
a lower degree of risk.
11-8
The Retrograde
11-26. Third, the order must specify whether the delaying force may use the
entire AO or must delay from specific BPs. A delay using the entire AO is pre-
ferable, but a delay from specific positions may be required to coordinate two
or more units in the delay. To enhance command and control and to coordi-
nate the battle across a broad front, the commander assigns units down to
platoon-level specific BPs. However, he may assign them missions to delay
within their AO if that best supports the scheme of maneuver.
II
+ AD0106
4
+
AB0107
5
PL MAGEY PL MAGEY
+
(070600) AD0102 (070600)
EA HIT
+AD0101
I
31
BP
B
7
P
21
PL SUSAN PL SUSAN
(071200) (071200)
2
+ AB0101 BP 32
+
II
ADO110
II
+ AD0107
I
+
AD0103
EA 8
+
3 AD0108
AX
PL SANDY HAMMER PL SANDY

IS
(071600) (071600)
S TR
BP 41
IKE
+ AD0111
AA ANVIL
PL LINDA
II
+ AD0109
PL LINDA
(071800) (071800)
Figure 11-4. Delay Forward of a Specified Line for a Specified Time
Alternate and Subsequent Positions

11-27. The commander normally assigns his subordinate units contiguous
AOs that are deeper than they are wide. He uses obstacles, fires, and move-
ment throughout the depth of each assigned AO. He may be forced to fight
from a single set of positions if the delay is only planned to last a short time
or the AO’s depth is limited. If the delay is expected to last for a longer
period, or if sufficient depth is available, he may delay from either alternate
or successive positions.
11-28. In both techniques, delaying forces normally reconnoiter subsequent
positions before occupying them and, if possible, post guides on one or two
subsequent positions. Additionally, in executing both techniques, it is critical
that the delaying force maintains contact with the enemy between delay posi-
tions. (The advantages and disadvantages of the two techniques are sum-
marized in Table 11-1, page 11-10.)
11-29. A commander normally prefers to use alternate positions when he has
adequate forces and his AO has sufficient depth. In a delay from alternate po-
sitions, two or more units in a single AO occupy delaying positions in depth.
(See Figure 11-5, page 11-10.) As the first unit engages the enemy, the second
occupies the next position in depth and prepares to assume responsibility for
11-9
FM 3-90
the operation. The first force disengages and passes around or through the
second force. It then moves to the next position and prepares to reengage the
enemy while the second force takes up the fight. Alternate positions are nor-
mally used when the delaying force operates on a narrow front. A delay from
alternate positions is particularly useful on the most dangerous avenues of
approach because it offers greater security than a delay from successive posi-
tions. However, it requires more forces and continuous maneuver coordina-
tion. Additionally, the delaying forces risk losing contact with the enemy
between delay positions.
Table 11-1. Advantages and Disadvantages of Delay Techniques
METHOD OF
USE WHEN ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
DELAY
· AO is wide. · Masses fires of all · Limited depth to the
Delay from · Forces available do not available combat delay positions.
Subsequent allow themselves to be elements. · Less available time to
Positions split. prepare each position.
· Less flexibility.
· AO is narrow. · Allows positioning in · Requires continuous
Delay from · Forces are adequate to depth. coordination.
be split between · Allows more time for · Requires passage of
Alternate different positions. equipment and soldier lines.
Positions maintenance. · Engages only part of the
· Increases flexibility. force at one time.
STEP 1: Elements of the delaying STEP 2: Elements from the STEP 3: Elements at the
force disengage and move to the initial position delay back second position pick up the
rear to organize the next position. through the second position delay. The third delay
ENY ENY to the third delay position. position is occupied.
ENY ENY ENY ENY
INITIAL II
DELAY A
POSITION II
SECOND II II II
DELAY B
D B B
POSITION
II II II
X
X
X
X
X
THIRD
DELAY II
POSITION II
A A D
II II II
Figure 11-5. Delay from Alternate Positions
11-10
The Retrograde
11-30. The commander uses a delay from subsequent positions when the
assigned AO is so wide that available forces cannot occupy more than a single
tier of positions. (See Figure 11-6.) In a delay from subsequent positions, all
delaying units are committed to each of the series of BPs or across the AO on
the same PL. Most of the delaying force is located well forward. The mission
dictates the delay from one BP or PL to the next. The commander staggers
the movement of delaying elements so that not all elements are moving at the
same time.
STEP 1: Elements of the delaying STEP 2: Elements STEP 3: Delaying elements

force disengage and move to the remaining in contact fight rejoin parent organizations
rear to organize the next position. to the rear while maintain- at the next position and
ENY ENY ing continuous contact continue the delay.
ENY ENY ENY
ENY
INITIAL II
DELAY (-)
POSITION II II
(-)
I
D
X
X
X
X
X
SECOND I II
DELAY
POSITION
II II II
Figure 11-6. Delay from Subsequent Positions
Effects of Terrain
11-31. The commander always takes advantage of the terrain when planning
how he positions his forces and conducts operations. He wants the terrain to
favor his actions and not be a neutral factor. The terrain dictates where a de-
laying force can orient on a moving enemy force and ambush it. During a
delay, compartmentalized terrain facilitates shorter displacements initiated
at closer range to the enemy. The commander conducting operations in such
terrain looks for locations that restrict the enemy’s movement and prevent
him from fully exploiting his combat superiority. On the other hand, flat or
open terrain requires earlier displacements at greater distances to stay in
front of the advancing enemy. In open terrain, the most important considera-
tion in selecting a position is a good, long-range field of fire. A field of fire is
the area that a weapon or group of weapons may cover effectively
from a given position.
11-32. In restricted terrain, where a light force conducts the primary action,
positions may be close together, except when conducting a delay using air as-
sault techniques. In open terrain, delay positions are often far apart. In
11-11
FM 3-90
selecting positions, the commander considers natural and artificial obstacles,

particularly when the enemy has numerous armored combat systems.
11-33. The commander identifies routes that reinforcements, artillery units,
command posts (CPs), and CSS elements will use and keeps them under his
control and free of obstacles. Alternate routes should be available so that a
friendly force can bypass choke points if they are closed or contaminated.
11-34. Disengaging from the enemy while displacing from one position to the
next is difficult. The unit’s disengagement plans include the following:
· The maneuver concept of operations for tactical elements after disen-
gagement, which includes the movement routes for each small unit.
· Fires to suppress the enemy and cover the unit’s movement.
· Offensive information operations to disrupt enemy C2 at critical mo-
ments.
· Screening smoke to conceal the unit’s movement, conduct a deception
operation, or cover passage points.
· Contact and passage points if moving through friendly lines.
· Disengagement start times.
· The earliest time for CS and CSS elements to move.
· Designating units responsible for closing lanes through obstacles and
executing reserve obstacles.
Intelligence
11-35. When conducting a delay operation, the commander may not get the
most effective use of his intelligence assets. The commander echelons his or-
ganic and supporting ISR systems rearward to maintain at least partial
coverage of the AO during the delay. This increases his need to ensure the
effective management of collection assets. However, he must rely on a down-
ward flow of intelligence and combat information, such as unmanned aerial
vehicle and joint surveillance target attack radar system data, from higher
echelons to make up for the degradation in collection capabilities that occurs
when systems displace.
11-36. Initially, intelligence assets attempt to determine if the enemy recog-
nizes the delay. Subsequently, the focus is on how the enemy reacts to the de-
lay. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems monitor and pre-
dict enemy attempts to envelop the flanks or strike the rear of the rearward-
moving friendly force. They also focus on actions of any enemy airborne, air
assault, and attack aviation units that may try to interdict the movement of
the friendly force. The delaying commander must detect the enemy’s advance
early to adjust his maneuver scheme and concentrate sufficient combat power
to effectively delay the enemy.
Maneuver
11-37. A delay is one of the most difficult forms of defensive operations to
execute. The primary reason is that the delaying force must engage the ene-
my sufficiently to slow his movement, yet not become decisively engaged.
Also, the delaying unit must maintain continuous coordination with any flank
units as it displaces rearward.
11-12
The Retrograde
11-38. There are many similarities in the tactics and techniques of a mobile
defense and a delay. However, units conducting a delay normally do not be-
come decisively engaged except to prevent the enemy from prematurely
crossing a delay line or to risk a part of the force to prevent the whole de-
laying force from being jeopardized.
11-39. Heavy forces—armor, mechanized infantry, and armored cavalry ele-
ments supported by indirect fires—are highly suitable for delay operations in
most terrain. Their organic firepower allows them to engage the enemy effec-
tively at long ranges, and their mobility allows them to move quickly between
successive positions or to a flank. Their vehicles provide protection that simp-
lifies battlefield movement. These same characteristics also allow heavy re-
serve forces to rapidly launch counterattacks to extract delaying forces from
untenable situations.
11-40. Light forces are especially suited to conduct delays in broken, close,
and built-up terrain. They take advantage of such terrain, reinforced by the
extensive use of situational obstacles, to hinder the mobility of enemy combat
systems and supporting tactical vehicles. They can also participate in stay-be-
hind operations. (See paragraphs 11-118 to 11-122.) This type of terrain offers
cover for the movement of light forces and favors using ambushes against the
enemy. Because of the restrictions on organic motorized transportation assets
and the limited protection available to light infantry units, the commander
must specifically plan for their displacement. While all light forces can move
rapidly by air, a delay offers little opportunity for airborne forces to use their
unique capability.
11-41. The commander may employ air assault forces in a manner similar to
that of other light infantry units in a delay. However, they possess additional
useful capabilities in a delay operation. They can rapidly deploy, redeploy,
and disperse in open terrain if the weather is suitable and the necessary
landing zones and pickup zones exist. The combination of light infantry, at-
tack helicopters, and fire support systems found in air assault units allows
the delaying commander to rapidly concentrate combat power at key locations
to attrit the enemy through repeated ambushes. The combined arms nature
of air assault units also makes them extremely useful for conducting security
and reserve operations over large geographical areas against heavy and light
enemy forces. However, their extraction is a high-risk activity when pres-
sured by a heavy enemy or in the presence of a significant air defense threat.
11-42. The mobility, lethality, and long range of attack aviation firepower
make it invaluable to the force conducting a delay. The commander can also
use them to conduct counterattacks and spoiling attacks as part of his com-
bined arms team. Other uses of Army aviation in a delay include the rapid
rearward movement of CSS assets, the deployment of light forces, and recon-
naissance.
Command and Control

11-43. Centralized planning and decentralized execution characterize com-
mand and control in a delay operation. Communications are essential to the
success of this type of operation, and the commander ensures that redun-
dancy is built into his communications architecture. Digital command and
11-13
FM 3-90
control systems help ensure that redundancy through the promulgation of a

common operating picture and a distributed database. This allows one CP to
temporarily assume the duties of another CP if the latter is destroyed.
11-44. The echelon rear CP is normally the first CP within an echelon to dis-
place during a delay. It displaces by echelon with other CSS assets. The eche-
lon main CP controls the movement of forces not in contact. It displaces by
echelon with the main body. The echelon tactical CP usually remains forward
to control and support forces in contact.
11-45. Normally, countermobility is the most important engineer task, unless
the delaying force must cross one or more major obstacles, in which case the
major engineer task is mobility, specifically breach operations. The com-
mander must set realistic and specific priorities for the engineer effort. He
monitors its progress to prevent it from dissipating throughout the area. The
commander employs his engineers in depth. This is crucial when the com-
mander conducts noncontiguous operations or when the enemy attacks deep
into the rear area of a force conducting contiguous operations, or when the
enemy has the ability to employ weapons of mass destruction. The maneuver
element provides security for the engineers so that they can concentrate their
efforts on engineer tasks.
11-46. Because of the importance of mobility and countermobility tasks, a
unit conducting a delay probably has few engineer assets to devote to the sur-
vivability function. Units should maximize the use of smoke when and where
weather conditions allow to provide concealment for movement and assembly.
Smoke curtains, blankets, and haze may protect withdrawing columns, criti-
cal points, and routes. The commander takes precautions to ensure that the
smoke does not provide a screen for the enemy’s advance. (See FM 3-11.50.)
PREPARE
11-47. The defensive preparations outlined in Chapter 8 also apply when con-
ducting a delay. As always, resources—including the time available—deter-
mine the extent of preparations. The commander assigns a high priority to re-
connaissance. Additionally, the preparation of subsequent positions receives a
higher priority than it does in either a mobile or an area defense. It is not
always possible to complete all preparations before starting the delay opera-
tion. Consequently, delaying units continue to prepare and adapt plans as the
situation develops.
11-48. In the delay, the commander uses BPs in a manner similar to the de-
fense. However, when organizing his BPs, he places more emphasis on width
than depth, as well as reconnaissance and preparing routes for displacement.
Within each BP, most of the available firepower is oriented toward the ex-
pected enemy avenue of approach. However, the commander must provide
adequate flank and rear security since the delaying unit must furnish its own
security. Each crew and squad should be familiar with the routes from its pri-
mary positions to alternate, supplementary, and sequential positions. In
preparing a BP, the commander conducting a delay places less emphasis on
installing protective obstacles, final protective fires (FPFs), and ammunition
11-14
The Retrograde
stockpiling than he would in either an area or a mobile defense. In a delay,

BPs are sometimes referred to as delay positions.
EXECUTE
11-49. The complex nature of a delay requires the subordinate elements of a
delaying force to execute different yet complementary actions. In a single de-
laying operation, attacks, area defenses, mobile defenses, and other actions
may occur in any sequence or simultaneously. For example, the commander
may elect to assign one delaying element the task of holding a key road inter-
section for a period of time so a reserve force can strike the enemy’s flank.
Therefore, the enemy must deploy into a hasty defense, which delays his at-
tack.
11-50. The commander deploys his security force well forward of his initial
delay position to give early warning of any enemy approach. When the secur-
ity force detects and reports an approach, the commander reconciles these re-
ports against his decision support and event templates to confirm the enemy’s
probable course of action. Based on his interpretation of how the battle will
unfold, the commander can direct one subordinate element to maneuver in a
manner designed to draw the advancing enemy into a position of disadvan-
tage.
11-51. The security force fixes, defeats, and destroys the enemy’s reconnais-
sance and security elements without risking decisive engagement. It directs
fires at the approaching enemy force as far forward of the delay positions as
possible. Engaging a moving enemy at long ranges tends to inflict far more
casualties on him than he can inflict on the delaying force; it also slows his
tempo of operations. The more a delaying force can blind an enemy and elimi-
nate his reconnaissance assets, the more likely he is to hesitate and move
with caution.
11-52. Once the security force makes contact with the enemy, it maintains
contact. As the enemy approaches, it moves by bounds back to the flanks of
the defending units, keeping the enemy under constant observation. This
helps prevent the enemy from finding gaps between delaying units and at-
tacking the exposed flanks of delaying units. The security force uses covered,
concealed, and coordinated routes to avoid enemy and friendly fires.
11-53. Recovering security assets may be more difficult if the security force
needs to pass through the range fan of friendly tanks and other direct-fire
weapons in their movement. Recovery should be to the flanks of delay posi-
tions and not through EAs and TRPs unless necessary. Security forces should
move so that they do not reveal the locations of other friendly elements.
11-54. The main body uses a variety of tactics to execute the delay. These in-
clude ambushes, counterattacks, spoiling attacks, artillery raids, jamming,
and close air support. The commander of the delay force preserves his free-
dom to maneuver by engaging the enemy with sufficient force to temporarily
stop his advance. The delay force uses obstacles and defensive positions in
depth to slow and canalize the enemy and exploit the mobility of its combat
systems to confuse and defeat the enemy. Once a delay starts, units displace
rapidly between positions. Whenever possible, the commander grasps any
fleeting opportunity to seize the initiative, even if only temporarily. By
11-15
FM 3-90
aggressively contesting the enemy’s initiative through offensive action, the

delaying force avoids passive patterns that favor the attacking enemy. The
delaying force may conduct strong counterattacks from unexpected directions
to temporarily confuse the enemy commander. Attacking an enemy throws
him off stride, disorganizes his forces, confuses his picture of the fight, and
helps prolong the delay. In turn, this confusion may affect the enemy’s tempo
and momentum. It also affects the movement of enemy reserves and other
follow-on forces. However, the delaying force seeks to avoid decisive engage-
ment.
11-55. In a delay, the commander uses his fire support assets to delay enemy
forces, inflict casualties on them, and assist the friendly force to gain a mobil-
ity advantage over them. Indirect fires continue throughout the delay. The ef-
fects of the commander’s fire support assets can disrupt the enemy’s follow-on
forces and restrict the immediate battle to his committed forces. Close air
support and attack helicopters can engage enemy forces before they come
within range of the supporting field artillery systems. The commander should
weigh the effects required, however, since attack aviation is a limited re-
source and CAS aircraft are a fleeting resource. Massing of fires, to include
the killing power of the unit in contact, should be the objective. However, this
should not delay integration of CAS aircraft, given limited loiter times.
11-56. Artillery and mortar systems support the direct-fire fight to prevent
the enemy from conducting a combined arms attack on the delay position. As
the enemy encounters each situational obstacle, he is engaged by these fire
support systems. These fires should cause enemy armored forces to button up
and slow down. Artillery and mortar systems can use fires to separate enemy
formations by striking the enemy when he concentrates near choke points
and in EAs. Integrating fires and obstacles makes it difficult for the enemy to
traverse EAs. The delaying force breaks the enemy’s momentum by forcing
him to deploy and by inflicting casualties. Fires assist delaying forces by—
· Assisting in disengaging maneuver forces.
· Suppressing the enemy.
· Degrading the enemy’s ability to move and communicate.
· Obscuring the enemy’s overwatching support by fire positions and de-
grading his ISR and target acquisition systems.
· Reinforcing or closing breaches or lanes in obstacles.
· Executing FPFs.
· Screening friendly displacements and disengagements by using smoke.
(This also degrades the enemy’s terminal guidance of his precision-
guided munitions.)
· Destroying high-payoff targets.
· Supporting limited counterattacks.
11-57. As the enemy approaches the delay position, he crosses one or more
trigger lines and moves into EAs within the range of the delaying force’s anti-
armor missiles, tank cannons, and small arms. The commander holds his di-
rect fire until the enemy is positioned where the fire plan and scheme of ma-
neuver require their use. He controls these fires from the delaying force in
the same manner as in any defensive operation. The more damage the de-
laying force can inflict on the enemy, the longer it can stay in position.
11-16
The Retrograde
11-58. As the enemy presses his attack and attempts to maneuver against the
delaying force, the commander constantly assesses the action to guide the dis-
placements of the delay force to anticipate possible decisive engagement
while accomplishing the delay mission. When the enemy begins to think he is
successfully maneuvering against a friendly position, he is engaged by indi-
rect fires while the delaying force disappears behind a cloud of smoke, dust,
and exploding munitions. Intense FPFs and fires aimed at and behind recent-
ly evacuated friendly delay positions allow the delaying force to disengage
from an attacking enemy.
11-59. Division and brigade commanders generally decentralize execution of
a delay to battalion and lower levels. Those senior commanders must rely on
their subordinates to execute the mission and request help when needed. The
commander establishes the acceptable risk and displacement criteria. Sub-
ordinates displace once they meet the previously established delay criteria.
This displacement may be a preplanned event or time dependent. The senior
commander monitors the delay and intervenes when the displacement of one
unit threatens the survival of another.
11-60. The delaying force relies heavily on artillery fires and air support to
suppress the enemy so the force can disengage, move, and occupy new posi-
tions. If a subordinate element cannot maintain separation from the enemy,
the commander can shift additional combat multipliers and other resources to
that particular AO to counter the enemy’s unplanned success. As one subordi-
nate element displaces, the delaying commander may order other subordinate
elements to change their orientation to cover the move. Each displacing ele-
ment travels along its designated route, using reserve demolitions as required
and requesting additional fire support if the enemy is able to maintain con-
tact.
11-61. Passing through obstacle lanes during displacement between positions
poses significant risks to the delaying force. The unit passing through a linear
obstacle becomes more vulnerable to enemy attack because of the danger of
the delaying force becoming congested on the far side of the obstacle. Obstacle
lanes also increase the amount of time required for a passing unit to transit
through a given area. The commander must attempt to prevent the enemy
from engaging the passing unit until it can redeploy into a tactical formation.
11-62. The commander retains his reserve for the decisive moment. As with
aviation, the reserve should not be committed early in the delay unless its in-
tegrity is threatened. Typically, the commander commits his reserve to help a
unit disengage and regain its ability to maneuver or to prevent the enemy
from exploiting an advantage. The reserve normally uses a support-by-fire
position for this task. If the reserve is committed early, the commander’s abil-
ity to influence the battle is greatly reduced unless he can reconstitute a new
reserve. It is possible to commit the reserve several times throughout the bat-
tle, but only when it can be extracted, redesignated, or otherwise reconsti-
tuted quickly.
11-63. In the delay, the force’s CSS elements should be located outside of ene-
my artillery range but be able to provide adequate support. Artillery ammu-
nition stocks must be capable of sustaining the quantity of fire support re-
quired in the delay. Maintenance operations focus on evacuating rather than
11-17
FM 3-90
returning damaged vehicles to combat. Unless vehicles can be fixed quickly

on the spot, the unit should evacuate them to the rear area because vehicles
left behind must be destroyed to prevent their capture.
TERMINATION OF A DELAY
11-64. A delay operation terminates when the delaying force conducts a rear-
ward passage of lines through a defending force, the delaying force reaches
defensible terrain and transitions to the defense, the advancing enemy force
reaches a culminating point, or the delaying force goes on the offense after
being reinforced. If the advancing enemy force reaches a culmination point,
the delaying force may maintain contact in current positions, withdraw to
perform another mission, or transition to the offense. In all cases, the senior
commander must plan for the expected outcome of the delay executed by a
subordinate. If he expects a friendly counterattack, he plans for the forward
passage of the counterattack force, husbands resources to ensure relative
combat superiority, and provides for the smooth handoff of appropriate AOs.
WITHDRAWAL
11-65. A withdrawal, a form of retrograde, is a planned operation in which a
force in contact disengages from an enemy force (FM 3-0). The commander
may or may not conduct a withdrawal under enemy pressure. Subordinate
units may withdraw without the entire force withdrawing. A unit conducts a
withdrawal for a variety of reasons, which are listed at the beginning of this
chapter. In addition, a withdrawal may precede a retirement operation.
11-66. Although the commander avoids withdrawing from action under ene-
my pressure, it is not always possible. He may conduct a withdrawal when
the situation requires rapid action to save the command from disaster. This
usually occurs after a tactical reverse or after a unit reaches its culminating
point. When an aggressive enemy becomes aware of a friendly force’s with-
drawal or its intention to withdraw, he attempts to exploit the withdrawal,
using all his capabilities to try to turn the withdrawal into a rout. He may
have ground and air superiority and continuously attempt to pursue, encircle,
and destroy the withdrawing force. He will try to use a combination of direct
pressure and enveloping forces and fires to isolate the withdrawing friendly
force for later destruction.
11-67. Withdrawals are inherently dangerous because they involve moving
units to the rear and away from what is usually a stronger enemy force. The
heavier the previous fighting and the closer the contact with the enemy, the
more difficult the withdrawal. Operations security (OPSEC) is extremely im-
portant. A unit usually confines its rearward movement to times and condi-
tions when the enemy cannot observe the activity, so that he cannot easily de-
tect the operation. To help preserve secrecy and freedom of action, for
example, the commander must consider visibility conditions and times when
enemy reconnaissance satellites can observe friendly movements. Operations
security is especially critical during the initial stages of a delay when the ma-
jority of CS and CSS elements displace.
11-68. A unit withdraws to an assembly area or a new defensive position. Al-
ternatively, it can withdraw indirectly to either area through one or more
11-18
The Retrograde
intermediate positions. When preparing the new position, the commander

balances the need for security with the need to get an early start on the de-
fensive effort.
11-69. The commander typically organizes his withdrawing unit into a secur-
ity force, a main body, and a reserve. He also organizes a detachment left in
contact (DLIC) and stay-behind forces if required by his scheme of maneuver.
He avoids changing task organization unless his subordinates have sufficient
planning time. However, circumstances may dictate rapid task organization
changes immediately before the withdrawal, such as when the unit must con-
duct an immediate withdrawal to prevent encirclement.
11-70. The security force maintains contact with the enemy until ordered to
disengage or until another force takes over. It simulates the continued
presence of the main body, which requires additional allocation of combat
multipliers beyond those normally allocated to a force of its size. The greater
its mobility and range advantages over the enemy, the easier for the security
force to successfully cover the main body’s withdrawal. The commander orga-
nizes the majority of available combat power to the security force as a rear
guard or a rear-covering force; the most probable threat to a withdrawing
force is a pursuing enemy. However, the commander must maintain all-
around security of the withdrawing force. When the enemy can infiltrate or
insert forces ahead of the withdrawing force, the commander may establish
an advance guard to clear the route or AO. He designates a flank guard or
screen, if required.
11-71. When a security zone exists between the two main opposing forces, the
existing security force can transition on order to a rear guard or rear-covering
force. It then conducts delay operations until ordered to disengage and break
contact with the enemy. When the withdrawing force is in close contact with
the enemy, a security zone does not normally exist. Withdrawals under these
conditions require that security forces adopt different techniques. One tech-
nique is to establish a DLIC to provide a way to sequentially break contact
with the enemy.
11-72. A detachment left in contact is an element left in contact as
part of the previously designated (usually rear) security force while
the main body conducts its withdrawal. Its primary purpose is to remain
behind to deceive the enemy into believing the parent unit is still in position
while the majority of the unit withdraws. It simulates—as nearly as pos-
sible—the continued presence of the main body until it is too late for the ene-
my to react by conducting activities, such as electronic transmissions or at-
tacks. The DLIC must have specific instructions about what to do when the
enemy attacks and when and under what circumstances to delay or with-
draw. If the DLIC must disengage from the enemy, it uses the same tech-
niques as in the delay. If required, this detachment receives additional
recovery, evacuation, and transportation assets to use after disengagement to
speed its rearward movement.
11-73. Two methods to resource the DLIC exist. The first is for each major
subordinate element of the withdrawing force to leave a subelement in place.
11-19
FM 3-90
For example, in a brigade withdrawal, each task force leaves a company team
in contact. Typically, these teams fall under a senior DLIC commander desig-
nated by the brigade commander. Alternatively, one major subordinate com-
mand of the withdrawing force can stay behind as the DLIC. For example, a
brigade could leave one battalion task force as the DLIC, which then expands
its security responsibilities to cover the width of the AO. (See Figure 11-7.)
PL ARROW
PL SWORD
PL SPEAR
RP 14 SP 1
ROUTE DAN
SP 3 II
RP 18 ROUTE SKYLER
SP 7
RP 12 II I
ROUTE ALEXIS
II
I
RP 19 SP 2
ROUTE JIM I
RP 21 II
ROUTE KELLY
SP 8
II
RP 33 ROUTE SAMANTHA SP 4
PL ARROW
PL SPEAR
PL SWORD
Figure 11-7. Detachment Left in Contact
11-74. Often when a DLIC is used, the commander creates an additional se-
curity force behind the existing main defensive positions to assist in the with-
drawal process. The commander can create an additional force from the with-
drawing unit or from an assisting unit. The DLIC can delay to this additional
security force and join it, or delay back, conduct battle handover, and then
conduct a rearward passage of lines. In either case, the additional security
force becomes the rear guard.
11-75. The main body of the withdrawing force consists of all elements re-
maining after the commander resources his security force and his reserve. He
generally finds it difficult to resource a reserve, but he makes every attempt
to do so. When the complete formation withdraws under pressure, the reserve
may take limited offensive action, such as spoiling attacks, to disorganize,
disrupt, and delay the enemy. It can counter penetrations between positions,
reinforce threatened areas, and protect withdrawal routes. Reserves may also
extricate encircled or heavily engaged forces.
CONTROL MEASURES
11-76. Withdrawing forces must apply combat power to protect themselves
while simultaneously moving combat power away from the enemy. This
11-20
The Retrograde
requires careful coordination among all forces. Throughout the operation, the
commander must tightly control rearward movement and maintain the
ability to generate decisive combat power at key times and places. As shown
in Figure 11-8, the control measures used in the withdrawal are the same as
those in a delay or a defense. The routes used by each unit in the withdrawal
and the block movement times are also withdrawal control measures.
PL NORIE (BHL)
PL GLORIA
PL SUSAN
PL JUDY
X
II
II
I
71 77 73
ENY
ENY
87 G
II
85 81
I
II
II
(+) ENY
G
ENY
93
94
II
II
97
I
B2
PL GLORIA
PL SUSAN
PL NORIE
PL JUDY
X (BHL)
DETACHMENTS
LEFT IN
CONTACT
Figure 11-8. Withdrawal Control Measures
PLANNING A WITHDRAWAL
11-77. The commander plans and coordinates a withdrawal in the same man-
ner as a delay. Some factors of METT-TC apply differently because of the dif-
ferences between a delay and a withdrawal. A withdrawal always begins
under the threat of enemy interference. Because the force is most vulnerable
if the enemy attacks, the commander always plans for a withdrawal under
pressure. He then develops contingencies for a withdrawal without pressure.
In both cases, the commander’s main considerations are to—
· Plan a deliberate break from the enemy.
· Displace the main body rapidly, free of enemy interference.
· Safeguard the withdrawal routes.
· Retain sufficient combat, CS, and CSS capabilities throughout the op-
eration to support forces in contact with the enemy.
11-78. A withdrawal may be assisted or unassisted. It may or may not take
place under enemy pressure. These two factors combined produces the four
variations shown in Figure 11-9, page 11-22. That figure also depicts the tac-
tical mission graphic for a withdrawal and a withdrawal under enemy pres-
sure. The withdrawal plan considers which variation the force currently fac-
es. Each variation requires a different blend of the three retrograde options.
11-21
FM 3-90
11-79. A com- ASSISTED UNASSISTED

WITHDRAWAL WITHDRAWAL
mander prefers to
conduct a with-
drawal while not
ENY
WITHDRAWAL ENY
under pressure UNDER ENEMY
WP
ENY
and without assis- PRESSURE WP
tance. Actions by ENY
the enemy, as well

as the additional
coordination need-
ed because of the WITHDRAWAL
presence of an as- NOT UNDER W W
ENEMY
sisting unit, com- PRESSURE
plicate the opera-
tion.
11-80. A with- Figure 11-9. Types of Withdrawals
drawing force can
receive assistance from another force in the form of—
· Additional security for the area through which the withdrawing force
will pass.
· Information concerning withdrawal routes.
· Forces to secure choke points or key terrain along withdrawal routes.
· Elements to assist in movement control, such as traffic control points.
· Required combat, CS, and CSS, which can involve conducting a coun-
terattack to assist the withdrawing unit in disengaging from the
enemy.
11-81. In a withdrawal under enemy pressure, all units withdraw simultan-
eously when available routes allow, using delaying tactics to fight their way
to the rear. In the usual case, when simultaneous withdrawal of all forces is
not practical, the commander decides the order of withdrawal. Several factors
influence his decision:
· Subsequent missions.
· Availability of transportation assets and routes.
· Disposition of friendly and enemy forces.
· Level and nature of enemy pressure.
· Degree of urgency associated with the withdrawal.
The commander must make three interrelated key decisions: when to start
the movement of selected CS and CSS elements, when forward elements
should start thinning out, and when the security force should start its disen-
gagement operations. The commander avoids premature actions that lead the
enemy to believe a withdrawal is being contemplated. Commanders must an-
ticipate enemy means of interference and plan for employing security forces,
attack helicopters, and close air support.
11-82. The commander conducting a withdrawal without enemy pressure can
plan when to begin the withdrawal. He has the option of taking calculated
risks to increase the displacement capabilities of his force. For example, he
may order the main body to conduct a tactical road march instead of moving
11-22
The Retrograde
in tactical formations. The commander can plan for stay-behind forces as part
of the operation. (The stay-behind operations starts on page 11-30.)
PREPARING A WITHDRAWAL
11-83. Before withdrawing, the main body dispatches quartering parties to
help it occupy the new position. (Chapter 14 details the responsibilities of a
quartering party.)
11-84. In an unassisted withdrawal, the withdrawing unit establishes its own
security force and reserve. It reconnoiters and secures the routes it will use in
its rearward movement while sustaining itself during the withdrawal. The
withdrawing unit must disengage from the enemy.
11-85. By concealing supplies along movement routes, CSS operators can
simplify support requirements and reduce the enemy’s ability to interfere
with logistics operations. This allows CSS units to withdraw earlier than they
otherwise could. The commander carefully considers whether to place his
supplies in caches. Once cached, supplies are difficult to recover if the opera-
tion does not go as planned. Other than medical items, the unit evacuates or
destroys all supplies to prevent their capture. The commander establishes his
destruction criteria, which is time- or event-driven for each class of supply.
EXECUTING A WITHDRAWAL
11-86. Typically, when under enemy pressure, the less heavily engaged ele-
ments of the withdrawing force withdraw first. The more heavily engaged
units generally withdraw under the cover of a security force using support
provided by available fire support and electronic warfare assets. They take
advantage of obstacles to assist in breaking contact with the enemy. The com-
mander conducts night movements and uses obscuration smoke to screen
friendly movement while reducing both the accuracy of enemy direct-fire
systems and his ability to visually observe friendly movements. The security
force continues to use alternate and successive positions until the entire force
breaks contact with the enemy.
11-87. The security force may remain in position and maintain a deception.
The main body moves rearward to intermediate or final positions as rapidly
as possible. After the main body withdraws a safe distance, the security force
begins its rearward movement. Once the security force begins moving, it as-
sumes the duties of a rear guard. Even if the enemy does not pursue the with-
drawing force, the security force continues to act as the rear guard unless the
commander assigns that mission to another element. However, if not pursued
by the enemy, the security force may remain in a march column. (Chapter 14
provides a definition of a march column.)
11-88. On order, the main body moves rapidly on multiple routes to reconnoi-
tered positions. It may occupy a series of intermediate positions before com-
pleting the withdrawal. Usually CS and CSS units, along with their convoy
escorts, move first and precede combat units in the withdrawal movement
formation. The commander needs to maintain the disciplined use of routes
during a withdrawal. Despite confusion and enemy pressure, subordinate
units must follow specified routes and movement times.
11-23
FM 3-90
11-89. When the main body withdraws, its reserve remains well forward to
assist the security force and other units by fire and counterattack. The re-
serve can launch spoiling attacks to disorganize and delay the enemy and ex-
tricate encircled or heavily engaged forces.
11-90. If the security force and the reserve cannot prevent the enemy from
closing on the main body, the commander must commit some or all of the
main body to prevent the enemy from further interfering with the with-
drawal. The main body delays or defends if the security force fails to slow the
enemy. In this event, the withdrawal resumes at the earliest possible time. If
the enemy blocks movement to the rear, the commander shifts to alternate
routes to bypass the interdicted area. Alternatively, he can attack through
the enemy.
TERMINATING A WITHDRAWAL
11-91. Once the withdrawing force successfully disengages from the enemy, it
has two options. It can rejoin the overall defense under more favorable
conditions or transition into a retirement and continue its movement away
from the enemy and toward its next mission.
RETIREMENT
11-92. A retirement is a form of retrograde in which a force out of contact
with the enemy moves away from the enemy (JP 1-02). Figure 11-10,
page 11-24 shows the tactical mission graphic for a retirement. A retiring
unit organizes for combat but does not anticipate interference by enemy
ground forces. Typically, another unit’s security force covers the movement of
one formation as the unit conducts a retirement. However, mobile enemy
forces, unconventional forces, air strikes, air assaults, or long-range fires may
attempt to interdict the retiring unit. The commander must plan for enemy
actions and organize the unit to fight in self-defense. The commander usually
PL TOM PL TOM
271100Z 271100Z
OCT04 OCT04
PL LYNN
PL LYNN
R
II
II
PL ERIN
PL ERIN
281100Z
OCT04 281100Z
OCT04
Figure 11-10. Retirement Tactical Mission Graphic
11-24
The Retrograde
conducts retirement operations to reposition his forces for future operations

or to accommodate the current concept of the operation.
11-93. When a withdrawal from action precedes a retirement, the actual re-
tirement begins after the unit breaks contact and organizes into its march
formation organization. (While a force withdrawing without enemy pressure
can also use march columns, the difference between the two situations is the
probability of enemy interference.) Units conduct retirements as tactical road
marches where security and speed are the most important considerations.
11-94. The retiring unit generally moves toward an assembly area, which
should support the preparations for the unit’s next mission. When
determining the routes the retiring force takes to the assembly area, the com-
mander considers the unit’s capability to support defensive actions if combat
occurs during the retirement.
11-95. The initial action in a retirement is to move CSS units and supplies to
the rear. At the designated time, the retiring unit executes a withdrawal from
action and forms into a march formation. The unit can first move into an as-
sembly area if this step is necessary before moving into a march formation to
reestablish command and control or resupply. Once it forms a march forma-
tion, the force is prepared to initiate the retirement. During the initial phase,
the force retires in multiple small columns. As the distance from the enemy
increases, smaller columns can consolidate into larger ones for ease of move-
ment control. Road nets and the potential for hostile interference influence
how and when this consolidation occurs.
11-96. The commander normally designates security elements and a main
body in a retirement. (See Figure 11-11.) The formation and number of col-
umns employed during a retirement depend on the number of available
routes and the potential for enemy interference. The commander typically
wants to move his major elements to the rear simultaneously. However, a
A DV A N C E
REAR
G U A RD
}
G U ARD
}
S S
G
E
M A IN B O D Y
G
G
E
S S
Figure 11-11. Organization of Forces for a Retirement Operation
11-25
FM 3-90
limited road net or a flank threat may require echelonment of the movement
in terms of time and ground locations.
11-97. The terrain and the enemy threat dictate whether the retiring force
establishes a single rear security force, which is usually a rear guard, or
whether each column forms a separate rear security force. These security
forces protect the rearward moving columns from surprise, harassment, and
attack by any pursuing enemy force. Their size and composition depend on
the strength and imminence of the enemy threat. These security elements
generally remain in march columns unless there is a potential for enemy in-
terference. If the enemy establishes contact, the rear security element con-
ducts a delay.
11-98. The retiring march columns normally require an advance guard aug-
mented by engineers. The commander assigns a flank security element to
prevent potential enemy interference with the retiring force’s extended
columns. The commander may designate flank security responsibilities to
subordinate march units.
11-99. The main body organizes in a manner opposite that of an approach
march. (Chapter 14 explains the approach march.) The movement of CS and
CSS units should precede the movement of combat forces. When necessary,
elements of the main body can reinforce the rear guard or any other security
element. Because fire support elements and attack helicopter elements of the
main body can respond most rapidly, they are usually the first elements
tasked for this mission.
CONTROL MEASURES
11-100. The control measures used in a retirement are the same as those in a
delay and a withdrawal. As in a withdrawal, thorough planning and strict ad-
herence to routes and movement times facilitate an orderly retirement. Typi-
cally, the commander controls movement using movement times, routes, and
checkpoints. (Chapter 14 discusses movement control measures.)

11-101. During retrograde operations, CSS units echelon their movements to
maintain adequate support to the committed force. They maintain maximum
dispersion consistent with control and local security. Their goal is to provide
uninterrupted support and maximum protection during the time it takes to
conduct the retrograde operation. By echeloning support, the commander re-
duces the amount of time each CSS unit spends moving, preventing it from
performing its primary support tasks. High-priority assets may require added
protection to prevent their loss or capture. To reduce congestion and interfer-
ence with the operations of combat and combat support units, the commander
should displace his CSS assets as early as possible, normally in an environ-
ment that provides the enemy limited visibility. The early displacement of
CSS units can also prevent revealing friendly future operations to the enemy.
11-102. The commander anticipates the effects of retrograde movements on
logistics support to ensure adequate support for the operation and the prompt
evacuation of casualties. Retrograde movements generally result in increased
distances between CSS and combat units, which makes providing this
11-26
The Retrograde
support more difficult. Executing retrograde operations generally requires

more Class III, and possibly more Class V, supplies than other types of defen-
sive operations. These supplies must be available for emergency issue. These
two factors combine to increase the demand for transportation assets and the
allocation of space on main supply routes. This, in turn, increases the need
for movement management and pre-positioned services and supplies. Combat
service support units carry and cache necessary fuel and ammunition stocks
as required by the specific situation.
11-103. The logistics support provided must be mobile to cope with demands
of the fluid tactical situation that typically occurs during a retrograde opera-
tion. The commander prevents unnecessary supplies from accumulating in
areas that will be abandoned. Only essential medical and logistics support
should be located in the area involved in the retrograde operation.
11-104. The commander establishes his maintenance, recovery, and evacua-
tion priorities and his destruction criteria for inoperable equipment in para-
graph 4 of the operations order. Maintenance requirements generally over-
whelm the organic capabilities of forward units during a retrograde opera-
tion. Forward units place as much maintenance, recovery, and evacuation as-
sets forward as possible to augment or relieve combat elements of the burden
of repairing unserviceable equipment. Recovery and evacuation vehicles posi-
tion themselves at critical locations to keep disabled vehicles from blocking
movement routes. Forward units evacuate systems that cannot be repaired
within established timelines, using all available means, such as equipment
transporters and armored vehicles with inoperative weapon systems. When
recovery and evacuation are impossible, units destroy inoperable equipment
to prevent capture. When possible, units destroy the same vital components
in each type of system to prevent the enemy from rapidly exploiting captured
friendly systems through battlefield cannibalization.
11-105. The commander assigns transportation priorities to the movement of
combat troops and their supplies, the movement of obstacle materials to im-
pede the enemy, and the evacuation of casualties and repairable equipment.
He keeps his main supply routes open and decontaminated as necessary.
Units control the back-haul of transportation assets before the retrograde be-
gins, reducing the amount of transportation needed to support the operation.
11-106. Generally, the commander prefers to use many separate supply
routes rather than just a few main supply routes. Some routes remain open
for traffic moving to the front while the bulk of CS and CSS units displace
farther rearward. Routes reserved for evacuating displaced civilians avoid
crossing or otherwise interfering with the unit’s main supply routes to the
maximum extent possible.
11-107. The commander bases his medical evacuation priorities on the availa-
bility of transportation assets and the results of casualty triage by medical
personnel. Medical elements supporting the retrograding force must provide
rapid evacuation of casualties to medical facilities. Medical evacuation re-
quirements are especially demanding in the large AOs common to the retro-
grade. The commander should consider augmenting the ground ambulance
capabilities of his forward medical units.
11-27
FM 3-90
11-108. Military police elements of the retrograde force are involved pri-
marily in battlefield circulation control to ensure smooth traffic flow. The
commander may augment his military police force to establish traffic control
points and route and convoy security. They also help control dislocated civil-
ians and enemy prisoners of war.
UNIQUE RETROGRADE SITUATIONS

11-109. Conditions that require conducting denial and stay-behind operations
can arise during retrograde operations. These two operations have their own
unique planning and execution considerations.
DENIAL OPERATIONS
11-110. Denial operations are actions to hinder or deny the enemy the
use of space, personnel, supplies, or facilities. It may include destroying,
removing, and contaminating those supplies and facilities or erecting
obstacles. It is inevitable that, on occasion, an enemy will be in a position to
capture friendly equipment and supplies. This situation often occurs during
retrograde or defensive operations. As a result, the defending commander
may be required to conduct denial operations. The principles of denial are:
· The commander should deny his enemy the use of military equipment
and supplies.
· Steps taken to deny equipment and supplies to the enemy should, if
possible, not preclude their later use by friendly forces.
· The commander orders the destruction of military equipment and sup-
plies only when friendly forces cannot prevent them from falling into
enemy hands.
· The user is responsible for denying the enemy the use of its military
equipment and supplies by means of its destruction, removal, or con-
tamination.
· Deliberately destroying medical equipment and supplies and making
food and water unfit for consumption is unlawful under the terms of
the Geneva Conventions.
In denial operations, the definition of a unit’s military equipment and sup-
plies could expand to include military installations and any civilian equip-
ment and supplies used by the friendly force. Under the law of war the de-
struction of civilian property is only permitted where required by immediate
military necessity. The determination of whether there is sufficient necessity
to justify destruction is a complex analysis that requires consideration of
moral, political, and legal considerations.
11-111. The commander who orders the denial operation must consider the
potential value of the military equipment and supplies to an enemy when de-
termining the priorities and the extent of the denial operation. Examples of
high priorities for denial include—
· Classified equipment, material, and documents.
· POL.
· Sophisticated weapon systems or electronic equipment.
· Heavy weapons and associated ammunition.
11-28
The Retrograde
· Communications equipment.
· Ferrying and bridging equipment.
· Air, sea, and land transport systems.
Of lesser priority for denial would be any other military supplies, equipment,
or facilities that may be of use to an enemy.
11-112. The commander must issue detailed instructions to deny military
equipment and supplies to prevent the enemy from directly using such assets.
Denial must also prevent an enemy from repairing a system through the can-
nibalization of several systems. The unit must destroy the same parts in each
type of system.
11-113. Denial differs from countermobility operations because the com-
mander designs denial operations to deprive the enemy of some or all of the
short-term benefits of capturing a geographical region. The impact of denial
operations on civilian inhabitants and the environment of the region act as a
moral and a legal restraint on their use and scope by US forces. The
commander should involve his staff judge advocate and civil-military
operations officer in planning denial operations.
11-114. The commander ensures that executing the denial plan does not ad-
versely affect his future operations. This includes carefully considering the
force’s demolition policy in relation to the purpose of the rearward movement
and the contemplated subsequent actions of the force. Widespread demoli-
tions during a retrograde may become a greater hindrance to a friendly force
moving back into the area than to the enemy during the friendly retrograde.
For example, destroying the transportation infrastructure increases friendly
logistics difficulties once the area is recaptured. Removing or destroying
militarily significant supplies and equipment, such as fuel, obstacle mater-
ials, and rail cars, from an area requires the friendly force to bring similar as-
sets with them when they reoccupy the area.
11-115. The commander can expand a denial operation to prevent the enemy
from exploiting resources, such as fuel, minerals, and the indigenous popula-
tion; routes of communication, such as river locks, railroad switching yards,
road interchanges, and bridges; and facilities, such as telephone exchanges,
radio and television stations, and the industrial plants of a region. The de-
fending force can assist civil authorities in evacuating the civilian population.
The defending force either removes the resources, supplies, and facilities from
the geographical area being abandoned to the enemy or destroys them in
place. Such denial operations may be either total or limited in nature.
11-116. Total denial operations can produce long-term political, economic,
military, and environmental effects. Total denial operations have operational-
level, and possibly strategic-level, impact. Total denial operations consume
large quantities of transportation and engineer resources and require consid-
erable time to plan and execute.
11-117. Limited or partial denial operations are particularly suitable if the
defending force expects to regain control of the geographical area within a
short time. The removal or destruction of only a few key components can
reduce a facility to limited utility, yet it allows for the facility’s quick restora-
tion of all functions once it is returned to friendly control. American forces
11-29
FM 3-90
only destroy discrete targets of significant military value. Limited denial op-
erations normally do not affect the advance of properly supported enemy com-
bat formations possessing cross-country mobility. However, they can seriously
impede an enemy’s road-bound and rail-bound logistics support if executed
with skill and imagination according to an overall plan.
STAY-BEHIND OPERATIONS
11-118. A stay-behind operation is an operation in which the com-
mander leaves a unit in position to conduct a specified mission while
the remainder of his forces withdraw or retire from an area. The force
should consist of enough combat, CS, and CSS elements to protect and sus-
tain its fighting capability for the duration of the mission. A stay-behind force
may also result from enemy actions that bypass friendly forces.
11-119. The main purpose of a stay-behind force is to destroy, disrupt, and
deceive the enemy. This force has a high-risk mission because of the danger
that it will be located, encircled, and destroyed by the enemy. Resupply and
casualty evacuation are also extremely difficult. A commander considers
assigning this mission only after a thorough METT-TC analysis. The stay-be-
hind force attacks enemy combat forces and C2, CS, and CSS elements from
unexpected directions. (See Figure 11-12.) These attacks may cause enemy
follow-on forces to be more cautious and to slow down to clear possible attack
and ambush sites. The stay-behind force may be required to conduct a break-
out from encirclement and linkup operations after it completes its mission.
(Appendix D discusses the conduct of a breakout from encirclement.)
FLOT
PL THOR
PL FREDA
ENY
ENY
AA
LOKI
13 PP
7 RP 6 SP
ROUTE BP 8
VALHALLA
PL THOR
PL FREDA
FLOT
Figure 11-12. Stay-Behind Force
11-30
The Retrograde
11-120. A light infantry, stay-behind force surprises an enemy by conducting

a series of raids and ambushes. The light infantry force can be inserted via in-
filtration, air assault, or parachute; it can also be a bypassed force. Attacks in
the enemy rear area by heavy forces can cover a larger area than attacks by
light infantry forces.
11-121. Stay-behind operations eventually require the force to reenter
friendly lines or link up with other elements, often in more than one location.
The commander must carefully coordinate this reentry to prevent fratricide.
The return routes for the stay-behind force must be the best-covered and con-
cealed routes available. Obstacles along these routes that cannot be bypassed
should have guarded lanes or gaps.
11-122. A stay-behind operation is not a suicide mission. The commander con-
ducts this operation only when he has confidence that the stay-behind force
will rejoin the main body, extract itself in alternative ways, or the main body
will fight its way forward to link up with the stay-behind force.
11-31
PART FOUR
Tactical Enabling Operations
Chapter 12
Security Operations
The officers and men who permit themselves to be surprised deserve to
die, and the commanding general will spare no efforts to secure them
their desserts.
D. H. Hill, 1863
Security operations are those operations undertaken by a com-

mander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy opera-
tions, to provide the force being protected with time and maneu-
ver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the
situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected
force. The ultimate goal of security operations is to protect the force from
CONTENTS
Fundamentals of Security Operations...... 12-2 Organization of Forces......................... 12-15
Provide Early and Accurate Warning.... 12-2 Screen Control Measures .................... 12-15
Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Executing a Stationary Screen ............ 12-15
Space ....................................................... 12-2 Executing a Moving Screen ................. 12-17
Orient on the Force or Facility to be Screening Operations During Limited
Secured.................................................... 12-2 Visibility ................................................. 12-19
Perform Continuous Reconnaissance . 12-3 Guard ......................................................... 12-19
Maintain Enemy Contact ........................ 12-3 Organization of a Guard Force ............ 12-20
Historical Example...................................... 12-3 Control Measures ................................. 12-20
General Considerations for Security Advance Guard ..................................... 12-21
Operations............................................... 12-4 Flank Guard ........................................... 12-22
Common Security Control Measures ... 12-4 Rear Guard ............................................ 12-25
Planning Considerations for Security Cover.......................................................... 12-25
Missions .................................................. 12-5 Organization of a Covering Force ....... 12-26
Movement into Security Areas for Offensive Cover .................................... 12-27
Stationary Security Missions............... 12-10 Flank Cover ........................................... 12-29
Movement During Moving Flank Defensive Cover.................................... 12-29
Security Missions ................................. 12-11 Area Security............................................. 12-31
Screen........................................................ 12-13 Local Security ........................................... 12-32
Critical Tasks for a Screen................... 12-14 Combat Outposts...................................... 12-32
12-0
Security Operations
surprise and reduce the unknowns in any situation. A commander may

conduct security operations to the front, flanks, or rear of his force. The
main difference between security operations and reconnaissance opera-
tions is that security operations orient on the force or facility being pro-
tected, while reconnaissance is enemy and terrain oriented. Security op-
erations are shaping operations.
12-1. There are five forms of security operations—screen, guard, cover, area
security, and local security.
· Screen is a form of security operations that primarily provides
early warning to the protected force.
· Guard is a form of security operations whose primary task is to
protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also ob-
serving and reporting information and preventing enemy
ground observation of and direct fire against the main body.
Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate indepen-
dently because they rely upon fires and combat support assets
of the main body.
· Cover is a form of security operations whose primary task is to
protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also ob-
serving and reporting information and preventing enemy
ground observation of and direct fire against the main body.
· Area security is a form of security operations conducted to pro-
tect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within a
specific area.
· Local security consists of low-level security operations conduct-
ed near a unit to prevent surprise by the enemy.
The screen, guard, and cover, respectively, contain increasing levels of com-
bat power and provide increasing levels of security for the main body. How-
ever, more combat power in the security force means less for the main body.
Area security preserves the commander’s freedom to move his reserves, posi-
tion fire support means, provide for command and control, and conduct sus-
taining operations. Local security provides immediate protection to his force.
12-2. All maneuver forces are capable of conducting security operations.
Ground and air cavalry units and scout platoons are specially trained, equip-
ped, and organized to conduct security missions; however, there are rarely
enough of them to meet all the security needs of a force. A commander should
ensure that subordinate maneuver units train to perform specific security
missions. This allows subordinate units to add these missions to their
mission-essential task list (METL) and train for them. Habitual relationships
with attachments are required to obtain proficiency in these missions.
12-3. A maneuver force commander normally designates the security area

within which his security force operates. In this chapter, the force (or facility)
being secured is called the main body. When discussing the forms of security
operations, the terms stationary and moving describe the actions of the main
body, not the security force.
12-1
FM 3-90
12-4. All forces, regardless of whether they are combat, combat support (CS),
or combat service support (CSS), have an inherent responsibility to provide
for their own local security. Local security consists of observation posts (OPs),
local security patrols, perimeter security, and other measures to provide
close-in security of a force. This chapter focuses on security operations con-
ducted by one force or a subordinate element of a force that provides security
for the larger force. Echelon-specific manuals discuss local security.
FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY OPERATIONS

12-5. Successful security operations depend on properly applying five funda-
mentals:
· Provide early and accurate warning.
· Provide reaction time and maneuver space.
· Orient on the force or facility to be secured.
· Perform continuous reconnaissance.
· Maintain enemy contact.
PROVIDE EARLY AND ACCURATE WARNING

12-6. The security force provides early warning by detecting the enemy force
quickly and reporting information accurately to the main body commander.
The security force operates at varying distances from the main body based on
the factors of METT-TC. As a minimum, it should operate far enough from
the main body to prevent enemy ground forces from observing or engaging
the main body with direct fires. The earlier the security force detects the ene-
my, the more time the main body has to assess the changing situation and
react. The commander positions ground security and aeroscouts to provide
long-range observation of expected enemy avenues of approach, and he rein-
forces and integrates them with available intelligence collection systems to
maximize warning time.
PROVIDE REACTION TIME AND MANEUVER SPACE

12-7. The security force provides the main body with enough reaction time
and maneuver space to effectively respond to likely enemy actions by operat-
ing at a distance from the main body and by offering resistance to enemy
forces. The commander determines the amount of time and space required to
effectively respond from information provided by the intelligence preparation
of the battlefield (IPB) process and the main body commander’s guidance re-
garding time to react to enemy courses of action (COA) based on the factors of
METT-TC. The security force that operates farthest from the main body and
offers more resistance provides more time and space to the main body. It at-
tempts to hinder the enemy’s advance by acting within its capabilities and
mission constraints.
ORIENT ON THE FORCE OR FACILITY TO BE SECURED

12-8. The security force focuses all its actions on protecting and providing
early warning to the secured force or facility. It operates between the main
body and known or suspected enemy units. The security force must move as
the main body moves and orient on its movement. The security force
12-2
Security Operations
commander must know the main body’s scheme of maneuver to maneuver his
force to remain between the main body and the enemy. The value of terrain
occupied by the security force hinges on the protection it provides to the main
body commander.
PERFORM CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE

12-9. The security force aggressively and continuously seeks the enemy and
reconnoiters key terrain. It conducts active area or zone reconnaissance to de-
tect enemy movement or enemy preparations for action and to learn as much
as possible about the terrain. The ultimate goal is to determine the enemy’s
COA and assist the main body in countering it. Terrain information focuses
on its possible use by the enemy or the friendly force, either for offensive or
defensive operations. Stationary security forces use combinations of OPs, avi-
ation, patrols, intelligence collection assets, and battle positions (BPs) to per-
form reconnaissance. Moving security forces perform zone, area, or route re-
connaissance along with using OPs and BPs, to accomplish this fundamental.
MAINTAIN ENEMY CONTACT

12-10. Once the security force makes enemy contact, it does not break contact
unless specifically directed by the main force commander. The security asset
that first makes contact does not have to maintain that contact if the entire
security force maintains contact with the enemy. The security force com-
mander ensures that his subordinate security assets hand off contact with the
enemy from one security asset to another in this case. The security force must
continuously collect information on the enemy’s activities to assist the main
body in determining potential and actual enemy COAs and to prevent the
enemy from surprising the main body. This requires continuous visual con-
tact, the ability to use direct and indirect fires, freedom to maneuver, and
depth in space and time.
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
12-11. Military history contains numerous examples of the importance of se-
curity operations. The following historical example illustrates the major role
of security operations in ensuring the success of an operation. This non-US
example illustrates that the study of other armies and other times can con-
tribute toward helping to understand the art and science of tactics.
Operation Bagration, 1944

During Operation Bagration, 22 June to 29 August 1944, the Red Army destroyed
the German Army Group Center and recaptured the last significant part of the
Soviet Union remaining under German control. Soviet security operations played
a major role in this operation’s success. Soviet field regulations of 1944 specified
the purposes of security operations: prevent surprise attack of the main body by
enemy ground or air forces, prevent enemy reconnaissance, and give friendly
forces time and conditions for deployment against the enemy.
From April through June, the Red Army conducted security operations against
German reconnaissance and intelligence activities. During this period, Soviet op-
erations directed against German sustaining operations and facilities, conducted
12-3
FM 3-90
by partisans, kept the Germans so busy conducting area security operations that
they had few resources to devote to ground reconnaissance. The Red Army Air
Force kept German aerial reconnaissance from looking deep into the Red Army’s
rear to operational depths. All the Soviet fronts (army groups) preparing for the
summer offensive established a 25-kilometer-deep security area against German
ground reconnaissance. Frontline divisions conducted numerous and frequent
patrols to counter German reconnaissance efforts and maintain regular physical
contact with adjoining divisions.
The Soviets used all available assets to maintain the security of forces involved in
the operation. Throughout the operation, the Red Army Air Force provided aerial
cover, especially for mobile groups and forward detachments. Because the
marshy nature of much of the terrain prevented using large mechanized forma-
tions, the Soviets used horse cavalry corps, augmented with tanks, to cover
ground unsuitable for heavier forces and maintain contact between separated
elements of their forward mobile forces.
On the flanks of Operation Bagration, the Soviet 1st Guards Tank Corps served
as a covering force against reinforcements or relief efforts from the German
Army Group North. A combined horse-cavalry mechanized group served the
same role in the south for the 1st Byelorussian Front against the German Army
Group North Ukraine.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURITY OPERATIONS

12-12. There are a number of general considerations when conducting secur-
ity operations. These apply to all forms of security operations but are most
applicable to screen, guard, and cover missions.
COMMON SECURITY CONTROL MEASURES

12-13. Security operations are depicted on overlays using a lightning bolt on
either side of the symbol representing the unit conducting the security opera-
tion and are labeled with the letter S, G, or C to denote screen, guard, or
cover. The end of the lightning bolt has arrowheads that touch the designated
operational graphics, which define the left and right limits of the security op-
eration. (See Figure 12-1.)
12-14. The screen, guard, and cover have many common control measures,
starting with boundaries defining the security area. The main body com-
mander establishes the security area. For a security force operating to the
front of the main body, the lateral boundaries of the security area are nor-
mally an extension of the lateral boundaries of the main body. The security
force’s rear boundary is normally the battle handover line (BHL).
12-15. To establish a screen to the rear of a force, the lateral boundaries are
also an extension of the boundaries of the main body, with the screening
force’s rear boundary being the rear boundary of the entire force. For a flank
screen, the lateral boundaries of the security area are an extension of the rear
boundary of the main body and its forward edges of the battle area (FEBA) or
forward line of own troops (FLOT). The rear boundary of a flank screen is the
lateral boundary of the main body. The rear boundary or another phase line
(PL) may serve as a BHL between the security force and the main body to
12-4
Security Operations
control the passing of responsibility for the enemy to the main body. Nor-
mally, the responsibility of the flank security force begins at the trail element
of the advance security force or the lead combat element in the main body. It
ends at the rear of the main body or the lead element of the rear security
force. The main body commander clarifies responsibilities as necessary.
12-16. Either the main body or the security force commander designates ad-
ditional PLs to control the operation. These PLs may serve as subsequent
screen or delay lines. Each element of the security force must report when
crossing or occupying them. Displacement to these subsequent PLs is event-
driven. The approach of an enemy force, relief of a friendly unit, or movement
of the protected force dictates the movement of the security force. The secur-
ity force commander normally assigns additional lateral boundaries within
the security area to delineate the areas of operations (AOs) for subordinate
units.
12-17. The commander uses checkpoints and named areas of interest (NAIs)
to indicate specific areas of interest and to coordinate movement and surveil-
lance. He uses contact points to facilitate coordination with flank units during
front and rear security missions or between elements of a security force with-
in the security area. Units conducting flank security for a moving force physi-
cally contact the main body at contact points. If the security force commander
wants to ensure coverage of a specific NAI or avenue of approach, he estab-
lishes OPs.
X X
AC P UAV ACP
1 270 600Z - 27 0 900Z 2
II
S 3-8 (+) S
D IV IS IO N S EC U RITY A R E A
P L TIG E R
3-8
3-8 X (B H L )
P L T IG E R
X 2
(B H L ) 3 FEB A
S
D IV ISIO N M A IN B AT TLE A R EA I
FEB A 3 X 2 2 X
XX
2 51M D
XX
52M D 25A D S
3 X
X D IV IS IO N
R EAR
A REA
II
II
G 1-87 (-) G
25A D
X X
Figure 12-1. Common Security Control Measures
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR SECURITY MISSIONS

12-18. In addition to the planning considerations applicable to other types of
operations discussed in this manual, such as control of key terrain and ave-
nues of approach, the commander assigning a security mission and the secur-
ity force commander must address special considerations:
· Force to be secured.
· Location and orientation of the security area.
12-5
FM 3-90
· Initial observation post locations.

· Types of OPs.
· Time to establish the security force.
· Criteria for ending the security mission.
· Augmentation of security forces.
· Intelligence support to security operations.
· Special requirements or constraints.
· Fire planning.
· Integration of ground and air operations.
· Planning the engineer effort.
· Reporting.
· Positioning of command and control (C2) and CSS assets.
Force to Be Secured
12-19. The main body commander must designate the exact force to secure.
This designation determines the limits of the security force’s responsibilities.
The security force must orient on the force it is securing. If the main body
moves, the security force also moves to maintain its position in relation to the
main body. Table 12-1, page 12-8, shows the typical size of security forces for
a given echelon. The limited capabilities of most maneuver platoons prohibit
them from having a mission separate from their parent company. Scout
platoons are the exception to this rule.
Table 12-1. Typical Size of Security Forces for a Given Mission and Echelon
SECURITY MISSION
ECHELON Screen Advance Guard Flank/Rear Guard Cover
Battalion/Task Force PLATOON CO/TM
Brigade CO/TM BN TF CO/TM BN TF(+)

DIV CAV DIV CAV (+) DIV CAV DIV CAV (+)
Division BN TF BDE BN TF BDE
AR CAV SQD AR CAV SQD(+) ACR (+)
Corps BN TF ACR or or
BDE BN TF Division
DIV (+) ACR DIV (+)
Echelons Above Corps ACR (+) or or or
(JTF/Numbered Army) Corps BDE Corps
Location and Orientation of the Security Area

12-20. The main body commander determines the location, orientation, and
depth of the security area in which he wants his security force to operate. He
identifies specific avenues of approach and NAIs he wants covered. Depth in
the security area provides the main body with more time to react to
approaching enemy ground units. Occupying a deep security area allows the
security force to destroy enemy reconnaissance assets without compromising
12-6
Security Operations
critical OPs or positions. It also prevents the enemy from penetrating the se-
curity area too easily and prevents gaps from occurring when OPs or units
displace or are lost. The wider the area to secure, the less the security force
can take advantage of the increased depth because it will have fewer forces to
position in depth. A very shallow security area may require a guard to pro-
vide needed reaction time.
12-21. The security force commander conducts a detailed analysis of the ter-
rain in the security area. He establishes his initial dispositions (usually a
screen line) as far forward as possible on terrain to allow good observation of
avenues of approach. Next, he assigns clear responsibility for identified ave-
nues of approach and designated NAIs. For a screen or guard, the initial
screen line must be within supporting range of the main body, yet provide the
desired amount of early warning.
Initial Observation Post Locations

12-22. The security force commander determines tentative initial OP loca-
tions along or behind the screen line to ensure effective surveillance of the
sector and designated NAIs. The unit or asset that occupies each OP may
shift its exact location to achieve the commander’s intent. A commander may
place more than one OP along a high-speed avenue of approach to allow an
enemy contact to be tracked from one OP to another, thus maintaining enemy
contact without requiring security forces to displace. The security force com-
mander tasks subordinate units to perform reconnaissance and combat pa-
trols to cover gaps between OPs. To prevent fratricide, the commander places
a restrictive fire support coordinating measure around OP locations.
Types of Observation Posts

12-23. Observation posts may be either mounted or dismounted. Mounted
OPs can use their vehicular optics, weapon systems, and speed of displace-
ment. However, an enemy can detect them more readily than dismounted
OPs. Dismounted OPs provide maximum stealth but lack the speed of dis-
placement, optics, and weapons of mounted OPs. It takes a minimum of two
soldiers to man an OP, and then for no more than 12 hours. Observation
posts manned for more than 12 hours require, as a minimum, an infantry
squad or scout section to ensure continuous operation. The screening force pa-
trols dead space and the area between OPs, conducts resupply operations,
and rests or sustains its personnel.
Time the Security Force Must Be Established

12-24. The main body commander must determine when to establish the se-
curity force. He decides this based on the activity of the main body and ex-
pected enemy activity. He must allow enough time for the security force to
move into and occupy the security area to prevent enemy forces from penetra-
ting the security area undetected. The factors of METT-TC influence how the
security force deploys to and occupies the screen line. If the security mission
is the result of a current reconnaissance mission, the security force is already
positioned to begin its mission. This occurs frequently when a reconnaissance
mission halts at a designated PL. Analyzing the factors of METT-TC deter-
mines which deployment technique meets mission requirements.
12-7
FM 3-90
Criteria for Ending the Security Mission

12-25. Security missions are usually time- or event-driven. The criteria for
ending a security mission can be an action by the main body (such as com-
pleting a specific mission), a fixed-time period (for example, not allowing ene-
my penetration of a PL for two hours), or criteria based on the enemy force
(such as its size). To terminate its security mission, the security force com-
mander normally requires the permission of the main body commander to
withdraw behind the rear boundary.
Augmentation of Security Forces

12-26. The main body commander is responsible for reinforcing the security
force. When the security area is large, additional combat and CS assets may
reinforce the security force’s organic combat power. Any unique requirement
posed by the mission may require assets not organic to the security force.
Ground surveillance radars, engineers, and chemical reconnaissance ele-
ments are common attachments at the company or troop level.
Intelligence Support to Security Operations

12-27. Intelligence assets can greatly enhance security operations. These as-
sets can conduct rapid surveillance of large areas to detect enemy presence.
Remote sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, battlefield surveillance radars,
signal intelligence systems, and downlinks from theater and national assets
can expand the area under surveillance and cue the security force. Advanced
aircraft, such as the OH-58D Kiowa Warrior and the AH-64D Longbow, can
detect and report enemy forces at extended ranges with thermal imaging and
other advanced detection equipment. This permits a commander to concen-
trate his security force on likely enemy avenues of approach, NAIs, targeted
areas of interest (TAIs), and restrictive terrain that degrades sensor perform-
ance. The commander can use his intelligence assets to detect enemy move-
ments. This gains time to reposition his security force and mass other assets
to counter enemy actions. The commander increases the size of his security
force to reduce his risk if he cannot anticipate sufficient advance warning
from his intelligence assets.
Special Requirements or Constraints

12-28. The main body commander may impose special requirements or con-
straints, including engagement, disengagement, and bypass criteria. He may
order the security force not to become decisively engaged or fall below a cer-
tain combat strength. He may be willing to accept a lesser degree of security,
which results from either the loss of more terrain or reduced preparation time
by the main body, to preserve his security force for later use.
Fire Planning
12-29. The main body commander positions his fire support assets to support
his screen and guard forces. He allocates additional artillery to support a
covering force. If the security force is assigned a wide AO, the commander
may have to position his fire support assets to provide effective coverage of
only the most likely enemy avenues of approach. This is particularly impor-
tant for a screen because often the screen force can rely only on indirect fire
12-8
Security Operations
to delay or disrupt the enemy. Providing adequate indirect fire support to the
security force may require the main body to position its artillery well forward
in the formation of the main body.
Integration of Ground and Air Operations

12-30. Integrating ground and air operations is critical to the success of many
security missions. Aviation units, especially air cavalry, assist in reconnais-
sance of the security area as the ground element of the security force moves
forward. They can perform the following tasks:
· Extend the screen in front of the flank security element’s screen line.
· Screen forward of the ground security force.
· Conduct reconnaissance of areas between ground maneuver units.
· Assist in maintaining contact between the security force and the main
body.
· Assist in clearing the area between the flank security element and the
main body during moving flank security missions.
· Assist in disengaging ground units, which is especially valuable when
conducting battle handover and passage of lines with the main body.
· Monitor terrain that is hard to reach or would require too much time to
cover with ground reconnaissance assets.
Planning the Engineer Effort

12-31. Countermobility plays a critical role in the security area. With proper-
ly integrated obstacles, the security force can maintain a mobility advantage
over the enemy. The commander may mass engineer support in the security
area initially and then shift support to the main battle area (MBA) once those
units are prepared to begin developing engagement areas. They also enhance
the mobility of the security force by identifying repositioning routes and task
organizing engineers to provide breaching capability. However, the senior
commander must consider the impact of prioritizing the countermobility ef-
fort in the security area rather than in the MBA or at the decisive point. In
the offense, a commander can employ situational obstacles, covered by fire, on
the flanks of an advancing force to provide additional security.
Reporting
12-32. The security force reports enemy activities to the main body. The main
body headquarters is responsible for disseminating that information to other
affected friendly forces. The main body commander ensures that the security
force has access to all pertinent intelligence and combat information obtained
by the main body. This supplements the security force’s capabilities. By con-
tinuously exchanging information, both the security force commander and the
main body commander have time to choose a suitable COA. Force digitization
greatly assists commanders in maintaining a common operational picture.
Combat Service Support

12-33. The unit logistics staff ensures that security element sustainment re-
quirements are embedded in the unit’s logistic chain and CSS orders and an-
nexes. A key component in security element sustainment is developing,
12-9
FM 3-90
maintaining, and using standing operating procedures (SOP). Logisticians

and operators must use the SOP and should be involved in their develop-
ment. The SOP should be exercised and tested during training and changes
made as needed. The commander ensures that his staff includes the sustain-
ment of these security elements in logistics rehearsal.
12-34. The security element commander designates the individual within the
security element who is responsible for sustaining the element. This is nor-
mally the senior noncommissioned officer within platoons and companies as-
signed security tasks. For example the platoon sergeant of a scout platoon as-
signed the mission of establishing a flank screen for a battalion task force
would coordinate with the first sergeant of the adjacent company team to in-
clude the scout platoons sustainment requirements in the company team’s lo-
gistics package. Likewise the first sergeant of a brigade reconnaissance troop
assigned a screening mission coordinates directly with the brigade logistics
and forward support battalion staffs for resupply and medical treatment. This
individual must have access to the appropriate nets to coordinate logistic sup-
port and casualty evacuation.
12-35. That individual coordinates with the appropriate supporting logistics
point of contact as soon as possible after receiving the security mission warn-
ing order. Coordination includes such items as the mission of the security ele-
ment, the AO assigned to the security element, the routes it will take to that
area from its current location, and movement times. He gives the exact sus-
tainment requirements for the security element—including any specialized
items of supply required by the mission, such as cratering charges—to the
supporting logistics element. He ensures the support element establishes
communication links with the security element and receives a copy of the
support element’s CSS overlay.
12-36. The commander must place special attention on treating and evacuat-
ing casualties for security elements operating removed from normal medical
support because of time, terrain, or distance factors, or a need for the security
element to remain undetected by the enemy. For this reason, the security ele-
ment should include as many soldiers trained as combat lifesavers as is pos-
sible. The more combat lifesavers within the security element, the more pre-
pared it is for casualties.
Positioning of C2 and CSS Assets

12-37. The security force commander positions himself where he can best
control the operation. This is often where he can observe the most dangerous
enemy avenue of approach. He positions his command post to provide contin-
uous control and reporting during initial movements. His combat trains posi-
tion behind masking terrain but remain close enough to the combat elements
of the security force to provide rapid response. They are best sited along
routes that provide good mobility laterally and in-depth.
MOVEMENT INTO SECURITY AREAS FOR STATIONARY SECURITY MISSIONS

12-38. All stationary security missions are established in a similar manner.
In deploying into the security area, the security force must deal with compet-
ing requirements: to establish the security area quickly to meet mission
12-10
Security Operations
requirements, and to provide the necessary level of security for itself. The se-
curity force moves into the security area using one of three basic methods:
tactical road march, movement to contact, or zone reconnaissance.
12-39. The fastest but least secure method of deploying is a tactical road
march from the rear boundary of the security area to the initial positions. The
security force moves to a release point on the rear boundary. From the re-
lease point, subordinate elements deploy to occupy initial positions, moving
by the quickest means possible. This method is appropriate when enemy con-
tact is not expected, time is critical, or an aviation unit is conducting a zone
reconnaissance forward of the ground element and has found no enemy in the
security area.
12-40. In the second method, the security force conducts a movement to con-
tact from a line of departure (usually the rear boundary of the security area)
to the initial positions. This method is slower than a tactical road march but
more secure. It is appropriate when enemy contact is likely, time is limited,
terrain reconnaissance is not needed, or an aviation unit is conducting zone
reconnaissance forward of the ground element and enemy forces have been
detected in the security area.
12-41. The most secure method for moving to the initial positions is for the
security force to conduct a zone reconnaissance from the security area rear
boundary to its initial security line positions or the forward limit of the secur-
ity area. Given adequate time, this method is preferred because it allows the
security force to clear the security area and become familiar with the terrain
that it may have to defend. The security force can reconnoiter potential sub-
sequent positions and fire support system firing positions as it moves to its
initial positions. A zone reconnaissance is appropriate when time is available
and information about the enemy or terrain is unknown. While this technique
provides information of tactical value on the enemy and terrain in the area, it
may also be time consuming. Using air reconnaissance forward of the ground
units increases the speed and security of the movement.
MOVEMENT DURING MOVING FLANK SECURITY MISSIONS

12-42. There are three techniques of occupying and moving in a flank secur-
ity area for moving security missions based on how the security force crosses
the line of departure:
· Security force crosses the line of departure (LD) separately from the
main body and deploys to perform the mission.
· Security force crosses the LD separately from main body; lead elements
conduct a movement to contact.
· Security force crosses the LD with the main body and conducts a zone
reconnaissance out to the limit of the security area.
12-43. The security force should not be required to make its own penetration
when it faces prepared enemy defenses. This may prevent or significantly
delay the security force from assuming its duties. These three techniques are
often combined.
12-44. In the first technique, illustrated in Figures 12-2 and 12-3, page 12-12,
the security force crosses the LD separately from the main body and deploys
12-11
FM 3-90
to perform the mission. The security force then conducts a tactical road
march, an approach march, or tactical movements parallel to the main body
and drops off OPs or occupies BPs along the flank of the main body. This
technique keeps the two forces from interfering with each other during de-
ployment. It is appropriate when another force penetrates the line of contact,
the main body is not in contact with the enemy and is moving quickly, the LD
is uncontested, and the IPB process indicates that enemy contact is not likely
in the area through which the security force is moving. It is the fastest but
least secure technique.
32
PL
OBJECTIVE
PL TIN RP 8 TIN
LYNN
II
PL STEEL PL STEEL
II
II
PL COPPER PL COPPER
II
SP 12
PL IRON (LD) (LD) PL IRON
Figure 12-2. Security Force Crossing the LD Separately from

the Main Body to Establish a Flank Screen
32
PL
OBJECTIVE
PL TIN TIN
LYNN RP 8
II
PL STEEL PL STEEL
II
II
II
PL COPPER PL COPPER
SP 12
Figure 12-3. Security Force Continuing to Cross the LD

Separately from the Main Body to Establish a Flank Screen
12-12
Security Operations
12-45. In the second technique, the security force crosses the LD separately
from the main body, and its lead elements conduct a movement to contact.
Follow-on elements occupy positions as they are reached. (See Figure 12-4.)
This technique is appropriate to use when the main body is moving slower
than in the first method, the LD is uncontested, and the IPB process indicates
possible enemy contact. It is slower than the previous technique but provides
better security.
32
PL
OBJECTIVE
PL TIN TIN
LYNN RP 8
II
PL STEEL PL STEEL
II
PL COPPER PL COPPER
II
2
II
SP 12
Figure 12-4. Second Technique Used by a Moving Flank

Security Force to Establish a Moving Flank Screen
12-46. Finally, in the third technique, the security force crosses the LD with
the main body and conducts a zone reconnaissance out to the far limit of the
security area. (See Figure 12-5, page 12-14.) This technique is appropriate
when the LD is also the line of contact, the main body makes its own penetra-
tion of the enemy defenses along the line of contact, the main body is moving
slowly, and the enemy situation is not clearly understood. The security force
may follow the lead element of the main body through the gap and deploy
when the situation permits. This technique provides increased security for
both the security force and the main body; it is also the most time-consuming.
SCREEN
12-47. A unit performing a screen observes, identifies, and reports enemy ac-
tions. Generally, a screening force engages and destroys enemy reconnais-
sance elements within its capabilities—augmented by indirect fires—but
otherwise fights only in self-defense. The screen has the minimum combat
power necessary to provide the desired early warning, which allows the com-
mander to retain the bulk of his combat power for commitment at the decisive
place and time. A screen provides the least amount of protection of any secur-
ity mission; it does not have the combat power to develop the situation.
12-13
FM 3-90
PL REVELATIONS
99
PL NUMBERS
(LOA)
PL GALATIONS
PL NUMBERS
DIVISION OBJECTIVE I
I
5
85
AXIS LUKE
I
PL LEVITICUS
77 PL LEVITICUS
5
I
I
PL EXODUS I S
I
43 PL EXODUS
X I I 2 S
I
XX
PL REVELATIONS
PL GENESIS
PL GALATIONS
X II PL GENESIS
X X
LD/LC LD/LC
Figure 12-5. Third Technique Used by a Moving Flank

Security Force to Establish a Flank Guard or Cover
12-48. A screen is appropriate to cover gaps between forces, exposed flanks,

or the rear of stationary and moving forces. The commander can place a
screen in front of a stationary formation when the likelihood of enemy action
is small, the expected enemy force is small, or the main body needs only
limited time, once it is warned, to react effectively. Designed to provide mini-
mum security with minimum forces, a screen is usually an economy-of-force
operation based on calculated risk. If a significant enemy force is expected or
a significant amount of time and space is needed to provide the required de-
gree of protection, the commander should assign and resource a guard or
cover mission instead of a screen. The security element forward of a moving
force must conduct a guard or cover because a screen lacks the combat power
to defeat or contain the lead elements of an enemy force.
12-49. A security force normally conducts a screen by establishing a series of
OPs and patrols to ensure adequate surveillance of the assigned area. The
commander uses reconnaissance patrols (mounted, dismounted, and aerial),
relocates OPs, and employs technical assets to ensure continuous and over-
lapping surveillance. The commander also employs terrain data base analy-
tical support systems to ensure the integration of his reconnaissance and sur-
veillance assets to provide that necessary coverage.
CRITICAL TASKS FOR A SCREEN

12-50. Unless the commander orders otherwise, a security force conducting a
screen performs certain tasks within the limits of its capabilities. A unit can
normally screen an avenue of approach two echelons larger than itself, such
as a battalion scout platoon screening a battalion-size avenue of approach or
a cavalry troop screening a regimental or brigade-size avenue of approach. If
a security force does not have the time or other resources to complete all of
these tasks, the security force commander must inform the commander as-
signing the mission of the shortfall and request guidance on which tasks must
be completed and their priority. After starting the screen, if the security unit
12-14
Security Operations
commander determines that he cannot complete an assigned task, such as

maintain continuous surveillance on all avenues of approach into an AO, he
reports and awaits further instructions. Normally, the main force commander
does not place a time limit on the duration of the screen, as doing so may
force the screening force to accept decisive engagement. Screen tasks are to—
· Allow no enemy ground element to pass through the screen undetected
and unreported.
· Maintain continuous surveillance of all avenues of approach larger
than a designated size into the area under all visibility conditions.
· Destroy or repel all enemy reconnaissance patrols within its capabili-
ties.
· Locate the lead elements of each enemy advance guard and determine
its direction of movement in a defensive screen.
· Maintain contact with enemy forces and report any activity in the AO.
· Maintain contact with the main body and any security forces operating
on its flanks.
· Impede and harass the enemy within its capabilities while displacing.
12-51. A screen normally requires the subordinate elements of the security
force to deploy abreast. A screen force normally organizes itself into a number
of OPs determined by the number of avenues of approach into the main force
and any additional NAIs it must cover, as specified by the main force com-
mander. The screening force may retain a small reaction force or reserve to
extract endangered OPs.
12-52. The size of the avenue of approach kept under surveillance varies by
echelon. Normally, a unit maintains observation over avenues of approach
used by operationally significant enemy forces. These are normally avenues
of approach used by enemy forces one echelon smaller than the friendly unit.
For example, a battalion maintains surveillance over enemy company-size
avenues of approach, while the corps maintains surveillance over division-
size avenues of approach. The situation may require the unit to maintain sur-
veillance over mobility corridors that can be used by enemy units two eche-
lons smaller than the friendly force.
SCREEN CONTROL MEASURES

12-53. The control measures necessary to conduct a screen were previously
discussed in this chapter under common security control measures in para-
graphs 12-13 to 12-17. (Figure 12-6, page 12-16 displays examples of control
measures associated with a screen.)
EXECUTING A STATIONARY SCREEN

12-54. In setting up the screen, the screening force establishes OPs with over-
lapping fields of observation. The screen commander adjusts the location of
his screening elements to take advantage of established links with higher-
echelon sensors and collection assets. Patrols reconnoiter areas that cannot
be observed from an OP. The force retains a small reserve if possible. If forces
are available and the depth of the security area allows, the screening force
12-15
FM 3-90
establishes OPs in-depth on high-speed avenues of approach. The commander

plans routes between the initial and subsequent screen lines to facilitate rap-
id occupation of subsequent screen lines. The screening force reserve deploys
in-depth and positions itself to react to contingencies that develop during the
screen. The screening force takes advantage of its surveillance, target acquisi-
tion, and night-observation equipment and information provided by higher-
level systems to expand the area and quality of security provided.
10
NAI 15 NAI 25
PL PL
RED RED
EA EA
PINK ROSE
A C
I
B A
I
PL PL
WHITE I I WHITE
PL PL
BLUE BLUE
Figure 12-6. Control Measures Used in a Screen Mission
12-55. Observation posts should remain undetected while those manning

them report the presence of enemy elements. Prompt, accurate reporting is
essential to keep the assets constituting the screen from being overrun or un-
knowingly bypassed. Once the enemy is detected, the OP uses fire support
channels to direct engagement of the enemy at maximum range. This helps
the OP avoid detection by the enemy and prevents the enemy from penetra-
ting the screen line. The screening force may destroy enemy reconnaissance
assets with direct fire if indirect fire cannot accomplish this task. It also
attempts to slow the movement of other enemy elements, primarily using in-
direct fires and close air support.
12-56. As enemy pressure threatens the security of the OP, the unit reports
and requests to move to the next screen line. The commander may have pre-
viously established criteria that allow the screening force to displace to subse-
quent screen lines, based on certain enemy or friendly actions. These criteria
should allow subordinates to use their initiative when conducting operations.
When displacing from one screen line to another, the screening force empha-
sizes rapid movement while maintaining contact with the enemy. This en-
sures that any gaps that occur during movement are quickly closed. The
screen’s C2 elements displace as required to maintain control and keep from
being overrun. The force repeats this procedure as often as necessary.
12-57. The screening force commander decides when to move from one screen
line to another. However, the main body commander decides when the
12-16
Security Operations
screening force can move behind the PL that designates the rear boundary of
the security area and hand off the battle to the main body.
EXECUTING A MOVING SCREEN

12-58. The screening force may use several methods to
move the screen as the protected force moves. Table 12-
2 summarizes each method’s advantages and G G
disadvantages.
12-59. A force maintains a moving screen along the
flanks and rear of the protected force. The screen move- M
ment is keyed to time and distance factors associated A
I
with the main body’s movement. (See Figure 12-7.) N S
Responsibilities for a moving flank screen begin at the B
front of the main body’s lead combat element and end O S
D
at the rear of the protected force. They do not include Y
front and rear security forces. A force executes a
moving screen in the same way it conducts a stationary S S
screen, except for the movement techniques.
Figure 12-7. Moving
Table 12-2. Screen Movement Methods Flank Screen
METHOD CHARACTERISTICS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES

· Main body moves faster · Very secure method · Execution takes time
Alternate · Conducted by platoon or · Maintains maximum · Disrupts unit integrity
company/ troop surveillance over the
Bounds · Contact is possible security area
by OPs · Conducted from rear to
front
· Main body moves faster · Execution does not take · May leave temporary
· Conducted by platoon or a great deal of time gaps in coverage
Alternate
company/ troop · Maintains good
Bounds · Contact is possible surveillance over the
by Units · Conducted from rear to security area
front · Maintains unit integrity
· Main body is moving slowly · Most secure method · Execution takes the
· Conducted by platoon or · Maintains maximum most time
company/troop surveillance · Unit is less secure
· Contact is possible · Maintains unit integrity when all elements are
Successive · Conducted simultaneously moving simultaneously
Bounds or in succession · Simultaneous
· Unit should maintain an air movement may leave
screen during ground temporary gaps
movement
· Main body is moving · OPs displace quickly · Least secure method
relatively quickly · Maintains unit integrity
Continuous · Performed as a route
reconnaissance
Marching · Enemy contact is not likely
· Unit should maintain an air
screen on the flank
12-17
FM 3-90
12-60. The commander considers the factors of METT-TC in his decision re-
garding the movement method employed. Figures 12-8 and 12-9, page 12-18,
illustrate four methods of controlling movement along a screen line:
· Alternate bounds by individual OPs from the rear to the front. (This
method is usually employed at the company/troop level and below.)
· Alternate bounds by subordinate units from the rear to the front.
· Successive bounds by units along the screen line.
· Continuous marching along the route of advance.
PL PL
M
M
A
A PL
I
I
N
N I
I
II
B
PL B
O PL
O
D
D
Y
Y
LD LD
Method 1 - Alternate bound by OP Method 2 - Alternate bound by unit
Figure 12-8. Displacement Methods for a Flank Screen
PL
PL
M M
A A
I I
PL N
N PL
S
I
B B
O O
D S
D
Y PL Y PL
LD
LD
Method 3 - Successive bound by unit Method 4 - Continuous marching

Figure 12-9. More Displacement Methods for a Flank Screen
12-18
Security Operations
SCREENING OPERATIONS DURING LIMITED VISIBILITY

12-61. Limited visibility often affects the screening force’s ground and air ob-
servation capabilities. During limited visibility, the screening force uses all
available night and thermal observation devices and depends more on elec-
tronic surveillance devices. Although the screening force can use technical re-
connaissance and surveillance assets to offset limited visibility, it should also
adjust its techniques and procedures to the conditions. For example, the
commander of a screening force may need to adjust the number and location
of his OPs in limited-visibility conditions. He can establish more OPs to cover
avenues of approach that become masked in these conditions. He plans for
indirect illumination and uses it when necessary. He closely coordinates his
patrols to prevent misidentification and engagement by friendly elements.
Rigorous sound and light discipline prevents compromise and potential
bypass of OPs by enemy reconnaissance forces. Near OPs and along
dismounted avenues of approach, the screening force can use trip flares,
protective minefields, and mechanical devices, such as noisemakers
integrated into tanglefoot obstacles, to detect the enemy and warn of his
approach. Additional OPs along enemy avenues of approach can provide
depth to facilitate detecting enemy forces that may have eluded forward
security elements.
GUARD
12-62. A guard differs from a screen in that a guard force contains sufficient
combat power to defeat, cause the withdrawal of, or fix the lead elements of
an enemy ground force before it can engage the main body with direct fire. A
guard force routinely engages enemy forces with direct and indirect fires. A
screening force, however, primarily uses indirect fires or close air support to
destroy enemy reconnaissance elements and slow the movement of other ene-
my forces. A guard force uses all means at its disposal, including decisive en-
gagement, to prevent the enemy from penetrating to a position were it could
observe and engage the main body. It operates within the range of the main
body’s fire support weapons, deploying over a narrower front than a
comparable-size screening force to permit concentrating combat power.
12-63. The three types of
G
guard operations are advance, G G
G
flank, and rear guard. A

commander can assign a
M
guard mission to protect
A
either a stationary or a mov- G MAIN
G
I
ing force. (See Figure 12-10.) G N G
BODY
12-64. A unit conducting a G G B
O
guard performs certain tasks G G
D
within its capabilities unless Y
ordered otherwise. If a unit
does not have the time or G G
other resources to complete all G G
of these tasks, it must inform
the commander assigning the Figure 12-10. Guard Locations
mission of the shortfall and
12-19
FM 3-90
request guidance on which tasks to complete or the priority of tasks. After

starting the guard, if the unit determines that it cannot complete an assigned
task, such as cause deployment of the enemy advance guard, it must report
this to the commander and await further instructions. Guard tasks—
· Destroy the enemy advance guard.
· Maintain contact with enemy forces and report activity in the AO.
· Maintain continuous surveillance of avenues of approach into the AO
under all visibility conditions.
· Impede and harass the enemy within its capabilities while displacing.
· Cause the enemy main body to deploy, and then report its direction of
travel.
· Allow no enemy ground element to pass through the security area un-
detected and unreported.
· Destroy or cause the withdrawal of all enemy reconnaissance patrols.
· Maintain contact with its main body and any other security forces
operating on its flanks.
12-65. A commander employs a guard when he expects enemy contact and re-
quires additional security beyond that provided by a screen. The multiple re-
quirements of the guard mission are often performed simultaneously over
relatively large areas. While the guard force’s exact size is determined by pre-
vailing METT-TC conditions, Table 12-1 provides general guidance on the
size of an echelon’s guard force.
ORGANIZATION OF A GUARD FORCE

12-66. Whether the guard is for a stationary (defending) or moving (attack-
ing) force, the various types of guard missions and knowledge of the terrain
and enemy dictate the specific task organization of the guard force. The guard
force commander normally plans to conduct the guard mission as an area de-
fense (Chapter 9), a delay (Chapter 11), a zone reconnaissance (see FM 3-55),
or a movement to contact (Chapter 4) mission within the security area.
CONTROL MEASURES
12-67. The commander uses graphic control measures to control the opera-
tions of his guard force within the security area. The assigned mission also in-
fluences the size of the AO given to subordinate elements. For example, a
movement to contact normally takes place across a narrower frontage than if
the same unit makes a zone reconnaissance to allow adequate concentration
of combat power.
12-68. The guard force may task its subordinate elements to conduct screen
missions to the front and flanks of the guard force. This provides early warn-
ing of enemy forces and helps maintain contact with flank forces and any
higher-echelon security force. An example of the latter would be a corps
covering force operating in front of a division advance guard. The presence of
a higher-echelon security force also influences how the guard force command-
er organizes his force and conducts operations. It specifically impacts the
areas of fire support and CSS.
12-20
Security Operations
ADVANCE GUARD
12-69. An advance guard for a stationary force is defensive in nature. It de-
fends or delays in accordance with the main body commander’s intent. An ad-
vance guard for a moving force is offensive in nature. (See Figure 12-11.) The
advance guard develops the situation so the main body can use its combat
power to the greatest effect. The main body’s combat power must not be dissi-
pated through piecemeal commitment. The full combat power of the main
body must be available immediately to defeat the main enemy force.
3 71
(LOA) PL CORN
(LOA)
PL CORN 53
OBJ WHEAT
72
I
SC 1-103 S
PL MILO PL MILO
I
I I 1-4
B
A 1-4 A 2-13
6 I
PL BARLEY
PL BARLEY
C 1-5
52
54
54MD
81
23AD
X 3 X 1
II
X S CBT
1-4
PL OATS
PL OATS
1-4
II
S 1 16 74
7
X
PL SOYBEANS
PL SOYBEANS 3 23
Figure 12-11. Advance Guard for a Division Shaping Attack
12-70. An advance guard for a moving force normally conducts a movement

to contact. It organizes and uses the graphics of a movement to contact. (See
Chapter 4.) Ground subordinate elements of a guard are normally deployed
abreast to cover the axis of advance or the main body’s AO.
12-71. The advance guard is responsible for clearing the axis of advance or
designated portions of the AO of enemy elements. This allows the main body
to move unimpeded, prevents the unnecessary delay of the main body, and
defers the deployment of the main body for as long as possible.
12-72. The advance guard may operate behind the security force of a higher
echelon. For example, a division may use its cavalry squadron (reinforced) as
an offensive covering force, while each subordinate brigade column organizes
one of its battalion task forces into an advance guard. (See Figure 12-12,
page 12-22.) In these situations, the higher-echelon security force will ini-
tially develop the situation. A commander may task the advance guard to—
· Coordinate and conduct the rearward passage of lines of the covering
force.
· Reduce obstacles to create lanes or improve existing lanes as required
to support the maneuver of the main body.
12-21
FM 3-90
· Eliminate enemy forces bypassed by the covering force.

· Coordinate and conduct a forward passage of lines through the cover-
ing force and fix enemy forces in the enemy’s main defensive positions
to allow the friendly main body to maneuver.
12-73. The move-
II
ment of multiple
security forces and
}
(+) OFFENSIVE COVERING FORCE
the handoff of a
detected
force from the
enemy
II II II
} BRIGADE COLUMNS
ADVANCE GUARDS
II II
higher-echelon se- II
curity force to the II

lower-echelon se- II
(-) II
curity force is con- II PROTECTED
trolled using PLs, II (-)
II
FORCE/
checkpoints, con- X MAIN
tact points, BHLs, II BODY
X
and disengage- XX
ment criteria, in X
addition to other II
graphic control
measures. As a
minimum, the cov- Figure 12-12. Multiple Security Forces
ering force has a
rear boundary that is also the forward boundary of the advance guard.
12-74. The advance guard engages in offensive operations when necessary to
accomplish the mission. After the guard makes enemy contact, the command-
er determines whether the guard mission requires an attack, a defense, or a
delay based on the factors of METT-TC. For example, if the guard force has
sufficient combat power to defeat an enemy, it may conduct a hasty attack or
defend from its current location. The guard force will not assault strong ene-
my positions from the front if this can be avoided. The advance guard then
destroys the withdrawing enemy force as it exposes itself by moving to other
positions. If the advance guard encounters an enemy force that it cannot stop
from interfering with the movement of the main body, the security force re-
ports its presence to the main body. It then establishes a defense, continues
reconnaissance operations, and prepares to pass elements of the main body
forward while facilitating the deployment of the main body.
12-75. If the guard force does not have enough combat power to defeat an ap-
proaching enemy, and the depth of the security area permits, the commander
can delay back one or more positions before becoming decisively engaged.
This reduces the enemy’s combat power. Unless the security force is relieved
of the guard mission, it must accept decisive engagement to prevent enemy
ground forces from using direct fires to engage the main body.
FLANK GUARD
12-76. A flank guard protects an exposed flank of the main body. A flank
guard is similar to a flank screen except that the commander plans defensive
positions in addition to OPs.
12-22
Security Operations
12-77. The commander of the main body designates the general location of
the flank guard’s positions. Areas of operation assigned to the flank guard
should be sufficiently deep to provide early warning and reaction time. How-
ever, flank guards must remain within supporting range of the main body. To
determine the guard force’s exact initial positions, the flank guard com-
mander considers the front and rear of the flank of the main body, the axis
taken by the main body, the enemy’s capabilities, and the available avenues
of approach.
12-78. The flank guard moves to its initial positions using one of the move-
ment techniques discussed on pages 12-11 to 12-13. On reaching the initial
positions, the flank guard establishes defensive positions in assigned BPs or
within its assigned AO and establishes a screening element forward of these
positions. (See Figure 12-13.) In situations where knowledge about the enemy
is vague, the flank guard maintains a larger reserve than in situations where
the enemy’s actions are more predictable.
ENY ENY
MAIN
FEBA
PL BLUE
PL CAT
PL EAGLE
PL RED
PL BIRD
ENEMY
THREAT
II
I
ENY
I
I
ED
CT
PE NK
EX FLA EAT
S TH
R
EA ENY
I
I
X 3
I
S
XX
I
I
I
I PL CAT
PL RED
PL BIRD
PL BLUE
XX
(BHL)
PL HAWK
Figure 12-13. Stationary Flank Guard
12-79. Once the flank guard makes contact with the enemy, it can attack; de-
fend to defeat or fix enemy ground forces in their current positions before
they can engage the main body; or conduct a delay as required by the situa-
tion.
12-80. When conducting a moving flank guard, a commander must address
additional considerations beyond those applying to conducting a moving flank
screen. Instead of occupying a series of OPs, the security force plans a series
of BPs. The tasks associated with a guard mission apply to a moving flank
guard. However, the number and location of echelon-specific avenues of ap-
proach over which the security force maintains continuous surveillance
change as the main body moves. The security force monitors potential enemy
avenues of approach for as long as they threaten the main body.
12-23
FM 3-90
12-81. The lead element of a moving flank guard must accomplish three
tasks. It must maintain contact with the protected force’s main body, recon-
noiter the area between that main body and the flank guard’s routes of ad-
vance, and reconnoiter the flank guard’s route. It accomplishes these tasks by
conducting a zone reconnaissance. The speed of the main body determines
how thoroughly it can carry out the reconnaissance. The exact size of the AO
for any given unit conducting a guard is METT-TC dependent. For example,
on typical central European terrain, an AO wider than 10 kilometers from the
guard line to the boundary of the main body should not be assigned to a com-
pany or troop. An organization of this size quickly finds itself unable to match
the movement of the main body. When the distance from the guard line to the
main body boundary exceeds 10 kilometers, the commander of the flank se-
curity element should use two or more company-size elements abreast. This
ensures that the element making contact with the main body is not over-
tasked and can match the tempo of the main body. An air cavalry troop may
maintain contact with the main body, or a following ground element may per-
form route reconnaissance along the flank guard’s route of advance. Under
these conditions, the lead security element does not reconnoiter BPs or oc-
cupy them unless required when making contact.
12-82. The rest of the flank guard marches along the route of advance and oc-
cupies BPs as necessary. Criteria for the route are the same as in a moving
flank screen. The commander designates company-size BPs parallel to the
axis of the main body. He places these BPs outside the flank guard’s route of
advance and along avenues of approach into the flank guard. The flank guard
occupies OPs along a screen line forward of these BPs.
12-83. Since the flank guard is moving in one direction and orienting on pro-
viding protection to the secured force in another direction, the flank guard
commander plans control measures to facilitate this dual orientation. These
control measures are normally associated with the moving screen, as well as
PLs that run parallel to the direction of movement of the main body. The
commander uses these PLs to control the delay or defense if the enemy at-
tacks from the flank being protected. (See Figure 12-14.) He may also assign
the flank guard an objective that secures the flank for the main body’s objec-
tive or otherwise serves to orient its security efforts.
12-84. The flank guard regulates its movement along the route of advance by
the pace of the main body, the distance to the objective, and the enemy situa-
tion. The three methods of movement are successive bounds, alternate
bounds, or continuous marching. (See Chapter 14.) If the main body stops, the
flank guard occupies blocking positions. As the speed of the main body
changes, the flank guard changes its movement methods. The guard com-
mander must not allow the force to fall behind the main body or present a lu-
crative target by remaining stationary along the route.
12-85. If the flank guard becomes overextended, the guard commander in-
forms the main body commander and recommends one of the following COAs:
· Reinforce the flank guard.
· Reduce the size of the flank guard’s AO.
· Screen a portion of the area and guard the rest.
12-24
Security Operations
PL STEFFAN (LOA)
PL PINK (BHL)
PL RED
PL WHITE
ENY
OBJECTIVE
ENY
FALLON RP 7
3
PL IVAN
I
I
1
S
PL BORRIS
II
I
I
I S
G
5
G
PL PINK (BHL)
PL YURI
G
TE
PL WHITE
XX
AS
9
I
ROU
TEX
G
PL RED
PL MACHIAL/LD
Figure 12-14. Moving Flank Guard Control Measures
REAR GUARD
12-86. The rear guard protects the exposed rear of the main body. This occurs
during offensive operations when the main body breaks contact with flanking
forces or during a retrograde. The commander may deploy a rear guard be-
hind both moving and stationary main bodies. The rear guard for a moving
force displaces to successive BPs along PLs or delay lines in depth as the
main body moves. The nature of enemy contact determines the exact move-
ment method or combination of methods used in the displacement (successive
bounds, alternate bounds, and continuous marching).
12-87. During a retrograde, the rear guard normally deploys its ground ma-
neuver elements abreast, behind the main body’s forward maneuver units,
generally across the entire AO. After the main body conducts a rearward pas-
sage of lines, the rear guard accepts battle handover and then defends or de-
lays. Alternatively, the rear guard may conduct a relief in place as part of a
deception plan or to take advantage of the best defensive terrain. In both
cases, the rear guard establishes passage points and assists the rearward
passage of the main body, if necessary. The rear guard accomplishes its de-
fensive mission in the same way as any other guard operation after the main
body clears the security area. As the main body moves, the rear guard moves
to subsequent PLs in depth. Contact with the enemy force may eventually be
lost if it does not follow the retrograding friendly force. Fighting a defense or
a delay is necessary if the enemy detects the movement and attacks. (Chap-
ter 11 discusses retrograde operations.)
COVER
12-88. The covering force’s distance forward of the main body depends on the
intentions and instructions of the main body commander, the terrain, the lo-
cation and strength of the enemy, and the rates of march of both the main
12-25
FM 3-90
body and the covering force. The width of the covering force area is the same
as the AO of the main body.
12-89. A covering force is a self-contained force capable of operating
independently of the main body, unlike a screening or guard force. A
covering force, or portions of it, often becomes decisively engaged with enemy
forces. Therefore, the covering force must have substantial combat power to
engage the enemy and accomplish its mission. A covering force develops the
situation earlier than a screen or a guard force. It fights longer and more
often and defeats larger enemy forces.
12-90. While a covering force provides more security than a screen or guard
force, it also requires more resources. Before assigning a cover mission, the
main body commander must ensure that he has sufficient combat power to
resource a covering force and the decisive operation. When the commander
lacks the resources to support both, he must assign his security force a less
resource-intensive security mission, either a screen or a guard.
12-91. A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard
forces. A covering force for a stationary force performs a defensive mission,
while a covering force for a moving force generally conducts offensive actions.
A covering force normally operates forward of the main body in the offense or
defense, or to the rear for a retrograde operation. Unusual circumstances
could dictate a flank covering force, but this is normally a screen or guard
mission.
ORGANIZATION OF A COVERING FORCE

12-92. Whether the cover is for a stationary (defending) or moving (attacking)
force, the various types of cover missions, as well as knowledge of the terrain
and enemy, dictate the specific task organization of the covering force. The
covering force commander normally plans to conduct the cover mission as an
area defense (Chapter 9), a delay (Chapter 11), a zone reconnaissance (see
FM 3-55), or a movement to contact (Chapter 4) mission within the security
area.
12-93. The commander normally assigns subordinate units one of these mis-
sions or the mission of screen or guard. The covering force uses those organi-
zations and control measures associated with these missions. In addition, the
commander establishes those control measures necessary for conducting the
covering force’s passage of lines (forward and rearward). (See Chapter 15.)
12-94. Although the commander can deploy any mobile force as a covering
force, the corps covering force is normally built around the armored cavalry
regiment or a division. Both have the C2 structures necessary for the forces
involved and the capability to cover the geographical area typically required
in a cover security mission. The corps commander tailors this unit to be self-
contained by reinforcing it with assets such as attack helicopters, field artil-
lery, engineers, air defense, tank, and infantry units with appropriate CSS to
sustain the resulting force. A covering force is usually allocated additional ar-
tillery and engineer support beyond that normally given to a force of its size
because it is operating beyond the main body’s supporting range. The cov-
ering force commander normally maintains a sizable reserve to conduct coun-
terattacks in the defense and to defeat enemy counterattacks in the offense.
12-26
Security Operations
12-95. A division covering force is normally a reinforced brigade, often with

the divisional cavalry squadron as part of the covering force, to perform re-
connaissance or other security missions. If the division AO is narrow enough,
an adequately reinforced cavalry squadron may perform a cover mission. At
both corps and division echelons, the amount of reinforcement provided to the
covering force determines the distance and time it can operate away from the
main body. These reinforcements typically revert to their parent organiza-
tions on passage of the covering force. Brigades and battalions typically or-
ganize a guard force instead of a covering force because their resources are
limited.
12-96. Since one task of the covering force is to deceive the enemy into think-
ing he has found the main body, the commander should supply the covering
force with combat systems that are representative of the main body. For
example, if the main body has organic or reinforcing systems, such as MLRS,
available to it, the commander should organize the covering force with the
same systems.
OFFENSIVE COVER
12-97. An offensive covering force
S S
seizes the initiative early for the main
body commander, allowing him to att-
ack decisively. Figure 12-15 shows an
attacking main body with an advance
} COVERING
FORCE
covering force and a flank guard.

F
12-98. Unless the commander orders L
A
otherwise, an offensive covering force ADVANCE
GUARD
N
performs specific tasks within its cap- G
K
abilities. If a unit does not have the
G
time or other resources to complete G
U
all of these tasks, it must inform the MAIN BODY A
commander assigning the mission of R
D
the shortfall and request guidance on
which tasks to complete or the prior-
ity of tasks. After starting the mis- Figure 12-15. Attack Using a
sion, if the unit determines that it Covering Force
cannot complete an assigned task,
such as destroying or repelling enemy reconnaissance and security forces in
the enemy security area, it must report this to the commander and await fur-
ther instructions. Offensive covering force tasks include—
· Performing zone reconnaissance along the main body’s axis of advance
or within the AO.
· Clearing or bypassing enemy forces within the AO in accordance with
bypass criteria.
· Denying the enemy information about the strength, composition, and
objective of the main body.
12-99. Covering tasks against a defending enemy include—
· Penetrating the enemy’s security area to locate enemy main defensive
positions.
12-27
FM 3-90
· Determining enemy strengths and dispositions.

· Locating gaps or weaknesses in the enemy’s defensive scheme.
· Defeating or repelling enemy forces as directed by the higher
commander.
· Deceiving the enemy into thinking the main body has been committed
and causing him to launch counterattacks prematurely.
· Fixing enemy forces to allow the main body to maneuver around enemy
strengths or through weaknesses.
12-100. In a meeting engagement, covering tasks include–
· Destroying enemy reconnaissance, the advance guard, and the lead ele-
ments of the main body.
· Determining the location of enemy assailable flanks.
· Fixing enemy forces to allow the main body to maneuver around enemy
strengths or through weaknesses.
12-101. Planning for offensive covering force operations is similar to planning
for zone reconnaissance or movement to contact. Mission analysis using the
products of the IPB process helps determine the width of the area to cover
and areas (NAIs and TAIs) or routes of special importance. The commander
determines specific missions for subordinate elements and assigns bounda-
ries. The covering force commander retains a reserve, which is ready to de-
ploy anywhere in the covering force area. This reserve may be centrally
located; it typically locates itself on the most dangerous or critical avenue of
approach in the security area.
12-102. The covering force advances on a broad front, normally with its sub-
ordinate ground maneuver elements abreast (except for the reserve). This
force should clear the enemy’s security area of small combat elements while
penetrating into the enemy’s main defenses. Air cavalry normally reconnoi-
ters forward of advancing ground covering force elements. On enemy contact,
the air cavalry reports the enemy’s location to the appropriate ground unit
and maintains contact. Once the air cavalry makes contact, the covering force
rapidly develops the situation. It reports enemy dispositions immediately to
the main body commander so he can exploit enemy weaknesses. The covering
force fixes encountered enemy forces and destroys them using fire and move-
ment. The covering force does not bypass enemy forces without the permis-
sion of the main body commander.
12-103. If the covering force discovers a gap in the enemy’s defenses, it pre-
pares to exploit the weakness and disrupt the integrity of that defense. The
covering force commander immediately reports this to the main body com-
mander so he can divert main body follow-on forces to support the penetra-
tion. The main body commander synchronizes the penetration by the covering
force with the arrival of other maneuver units, CS, and CSS to prevent coun-
terattacking enemy forces from isolating and destroying the penetrating ele-
ments of the covering force.
12-104. When the covering force can advance no farther, it defends and pre-
pares to assist the forward passage of lines of main body units. It continues to
perform reconnaissance of enemy positions to locate gaps or assailable flanks.
The covering force may guide main body units as they attack through or
12-28
Security Operations
around the covering force. If the covering force has accomplished its mission,
the main body commander will attack the enemy’s weak point with pre-
viously uncommitted main body forces at the appropriate time.
FLANK COVER
12-105. When the main body commander perceives a significant threat to one
of his flanks, he normally establishes a flank covering force. That force con-
ducts its mission in much the same way as a flank guard performs its mis-
sion. The main differences between the two missions are the scope of opera-
tions and the distance the covering force operates away from the main body.
12-106. Just as in a flank guard, the flank covering force must clear the area
between its route of advance and the main body. It must also maintain con-
tact with an element of the main body specified by the main body
commander. This element is normally part of the advance guard for the flank
unit of the main body.
DEFENSIVE COVER
12-107. A defensive covering force prevents the enemy from attacking at the
time, place, and combat strength of his choosing. (See Figure 12-16.) Defen-
sive cover gains time for the main body, enabling it to deploy, move, or pre-
pare defenses in the MBA. It accomplishes this by disrupting the enemy’s at-
tack, destroying his initiative, and establishing the conditions for decisive op-
erations. The covering force makes the enemy deploy repeatedly to fight
through the covering force and commit his reserve or follow-on forces to sus-
tain momentum.
I
S S
PL BRIAN
PL BRIAN II
II
II
X
II X
X II
X TAC X
II
PL TOM II PL TOM
X
X
(BHL) PL DANIEL
PL DANIEL (BHL)
MAIN
X X
FEBA
FEBA X
Figure 12-16. Generic Depiction of a Defensive Cover
12-108. Unless the commander orders otherwise, a defensive covering force

performs certain tasks within its capabilities. If a unit does not have the time
or other resources to complete all of these tasks, it must inform the
12-29
FM 3-90
commander assigning the mission of the shortfall and request guidance on

which tasks to complete or the priority of tasks. After starting the mission, if
the unit determines that it cannot complete an assigned task, such as defeat
enemy advance guard formations, it must report this to the commander and
await further instructions. A defensive covering force emphasizes the follow-
ing tasks—
· Prevent the main body from being surprised and becoming engaged by
direct-fire weapons.
· Defeat enemy advance guard formations.
· Maintain continuous surveillance of high-speed avenues of approach
into the security area.
· Defeat all enemy reconnaissance formations before they can observe
the main body.
· Cause the deployment of the enemy main body.
· Determine the size, strength, composition, and direction of the enemy’s
main effort.
· Destroy, defeat, or attrit enemy forces within its capacity.
· Deprive the enemy of his fire support and air defense umbrellas, or re-
quire him to displace them before he attacks the MBA.
· Deceive the enemy regarding the location of main body and main de-
fensive positions.
· Avoid being bypassed.
12-109. The defensive covering force may be required to defend, delay, or
counterattack. If the covering force area is not occupied, the force may have
to reconnoiter and clear the area before establishing the cover. As in offensive
operations, aerial reconnaissance is necessary to extend the area covered.
Aviation units can screen less threatened areas and rapidly reinforce with
their fires when other elements of the covering force are heavily engaged.
12-110. Whatever the command relationships may be at the outset, as the de-
fensive covering force battle progresses, the covering force will be forced back
toward the MBA. At this time, some or all of the covering force units fall
under the control of the brigades charged with defending the MBA. Once the
defensive covering force completes its mission, ground maneuver task forces
reinforcing the covering force can do one of three things, separately or in com-
bination. They can take up positions in the MBA, undergo reconstitution, or
become part of the echelon reserve. The commander may use cavalry and
other reconnaissance elements from the covering force as flank or rear secur-
ity forces. Alternatively, he may use them to locate and follow the movement
of the enemy’s follow-on forces. They only establish BPs in the MBA as a last
resort.
12-111. The conduct of a rearward passage of lines is an inherent part of the
conduct of a defensive cover with its associated requirement to transfer re-
sponsibility for the battle between units. The commander must thoroughly
plan this complex task as an integral part of the covering force mission. Pas-
sage of lines may not occur simultaneously for all covering force units. As
some units begin passage, others may still be taking advantage of offensive
opportunities in other parts of the security area. The covering force
12-30
Security Operations
commander prepares to continue fighting in those portions of the security

area where his forces are successful to set up offensive opportunities for the
main body.
12-112. The covering force commander must exercise caution when issuing
orders within the covering force. Commanders at each echelon will have a dif-
ferent perspective of the battle. This is never truer than in a covering force
action. For example, while the covering force commander may be told to delay
forward of a river line for 72 hours, he may tell his task force commanders to
defend in certain BPs, perhaps for a specified period of time. Once the period
expires, the covering force should not automatically retire from the covering
force area. It must create enough resistance to force the enemy to deploy his
main forces. Commanders at each echelon must precisely state the mission to
their subordinate commanders without telling them how to do it. (This is mis-
sion command. See FM 6-0.) All too often, a small-unit commander, when told
to delay, yields to an urge to shoot too little, pull back too early, and move
back too far. Thus, it is imperative that each commander conveys to his sub-
ordinates precisely what their mission is in the context of the overall mission.
Within a covering force, company teams and troops are mainly involved in a
series of defensive operations.
AREA SECURITY
12-113. Area security operations may be offensive or defensive in nature.
They focus on the protected force, installation, route, or area. Forces to pro-
tect range from echelon headquarters through artillery and echelon reserves
to the sustaining base. Protected installations can also be part of the sustain-
ing base or they can constitute part of the area’s infrastructure. Areas to se-
cure range from specific points (bridges and defiles) and terrain features
(ridge lines and hills) to large population centers and their adjacent areas.
12-114. Operations in noncontiguous AOs require commanders to emphasize
area security. During offensive and retrograde operations, the speed at which
the main body moves provides some measure of security. Rapidly moving
units in open terrain can rely on technical assets to provide advance warning
of enemy forces. In restrictive terrain, security forces focus on key terrain
such as potential choke points.
12-115. A commander executes rear area and base security as part of an eche-
lon’s sustaining operations responsibilities or as part of stability operations
and support operations. (Rear area and base security and route and convoy
security operations are the subject of Appendix E.) During conventional op-
erations, area security operations are normally economy-of-force measures
designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustaining operations designed to
support the echelon’s decisive and shaping operations. All area security op-
erations take advantage of the local security measures performed by all units
regardless of their location within the AO.
12-116. Since civilians are normally present within the AO, a unit restrains
its use of force when conducting area security operations. However, the com-
mander always remains responsible for protecting his force and considers this
responsibility when establishing his rules of engagement. Restrictions on con-
ducting operations and using force must be clearly explained and understood
12-31
FM 3-90
by everyone. Soldiers must understand that their actions, no matter how

minor, may have far-reaching positive or negative effects. They must realize
that either friendly or hostile media and psychological operations organiza-
tions can quickly exploit their actions, especially the manner in which they
treat the civilian population.
12-117. Sometimes area security forces must retain readiness over long per-
iods without contact with the enemy. This occurs most often during area se-
curity operations when the enemy knows that he is seriously overmatched in
terms of available combat power. In this case, he normally tries to avoid en-
gaging friendly forces unless it is on his terms. Forces conducting area
security should not develop a false sense of security even if the enemy ap-
pears to have ceased operations within the secured area. The commander
must assume that the enemy is observing his operations and is seeking rou-
tines, weak points, and lax security for the opportunity to strike with mini-
mum risk.
LOCAL SECURITY
12-118. Local security includes any local measure taken by units against ene-
my actions. It involves avoiding detection by the enemy or deceiving the ene-
my about friendly positions and intentions. It also includes finding any
enemy forces in the immediate vicinity and knowing as much about their
positions and intentions as possible. Local security prevents a unit from being
surprised and is an important part of maintaining the initiative. The require-
ment for maintaining local security is an inherent part of all operations.
Units perform local security when conducting full spectrum operations,
including tactical enabling operations.
12-119. Units use both active and passive measures to provide local security.
Active measures include—
· Using OPs and patrols.
· Establishing specific levels of alert within the unit. The commander ad-
justs those levels based on the factors of METT-TC.
· Establishing stand-to times. The unit SOP should detail the unit’s ac-
tivities during the conduct of stand-to.
12-120. Passive local security measures include using camouflage, movement
control, noise and light discipline, and proper communications procedures. It
also includes employing available ground sensors, night-vision devices, and
daylight sights to maintain surveillance over the area immediately around
the unit.
COMBAT OUTPOSTS
12-121. A combat outpost is a reinforced OP capable of conducting
limited combat operations. (See Figure 12-17.) Using combat outposts is a
technique for employing security forces in restrictive terrain that precludes
mounted security forces from covering the area. They are also used when
smaller OPs are in danger of being overrun by enemy forces infiltrating into
and through the security area. The commander uses a combat outpost when
he wants to extend the depth of his security area, when he wants his forward
12-32
Security Operations
OPs to remain in place until they can observe the enemy’s main body, or
when he anticipates that his forward OPs will be encircled by enemy forces.
Both mounted and dismounted forces can employ combat outposts.
II
II
II
II
II
II
Figure 12-17. Combat Outposts
12-122. While the factors of METT-TC determine the size, location, and num-
ber of combat outposts established by a unit, a reinforced platoon typically oc-
cupies a combat outpost. A combat outpost must have sufficient resources to
accomplish its designated missions, but not so much as to seriously deplete
the strength of the main body. It is usually located far enough in front of the
protected force to preclude enemy ground reconnaissance elements from ob-
serving the actions of the protected force.
12-123. The commander organizes a combat outpost to provide an all-around
defense to withstand a superior enemy force. When the enemy has significant
armored capability, a combat outpost may be given more than a standard al-
location of antitank weapons. Forces manning combat outposts can conduct
aggressive patrolling, engage and destroy enemy reconnaissance elements,
and engage the enemy main body prior to their extraction. The commander
should plan to extract his forces from the outpost before the enemy has the
opportunity to overrun them.
12-33
Chapter 13
Reconnaissance Operations
You can never have too much reconnaissance.
General George S. Patton Jr., War As I Knew It, 1947
Reconnaissance operations are those operations undertaken to

obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, infor-
mation about the activities and resources of an enemy or poten-
tial enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hy-
drographical or geographical characteristics and the indigenous
population of a particular area. Reconnaissance primarily relies on
the human dynamic rather than technical means. Reconnaissance is a fo-
cused collection effort. It is performed before, during, and after other op-
erations to provide information used in the intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) process, as well as by the commander in order to formu-
late, confirm, or modify his course of action (COA). The four forms of re-
connaissance are route, zone, area, and reconnaissance in force.
13-1. Reconnaissance identifies terrain characteristics, enemy and friendly

obstacles to movement, and the disposition of enemy forces and civilian popu-
lation so the commander can maneuver his forces freely and rapidly. Recon-
naissance prior to unit movements and occupation of assembly areas is criti-
cal to protecting the force and preserving combat power. It also keeps the
force free from contact as long as possible so that it can concentrate on its de-
cisive operation.
CONTENTS
Reconnaissance Objective ........................ 13-1 Forms of Reconnaissance ......................... 13-8
Reconnaissance Fundamentals ................ 13-1 Route Reconnaissance .......................... 13-8
Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance ... 13-1 Zone Reconnaissance .......................... 13-10
Do Not Keep Reconnaissance Assets Area Reconnaissance........................... 13-12
in Reserve................................................ 13-2 Reconnaissance in Force..................... 13-13
Orient on the Reconnaissance Planning a Reconnaissance .................... 13-14
Objective.................................................. 13-2 Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Report Information Rapidly and Reconnaissance Plan ........................... 13-15
Accurately................................................ 13-3 Reconnaissance-Pull Versus
Retain Freedom of Maneuver ................ 13-3 Reconnaissance-Push.......................... 13-15
Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact........ 13-3 Reconnaissance Management ............ 13-16
Develop the Situation Rapidly ............... 13-3 Sustainment .......................................... 13-17
Historical Example...................................... 13-4 Executing a Reconnaissance .................. 13-17
Characteristics of Reconnaissance Recuperation and Reconstitution of
Assets ..................................................... 13-5 Reconnaissance Assets ....................... 13-19
13-0
RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE
13-2. The commander orients his reconnaissance assets by identifying a re-
connaissance objective within the area of operation (AO). The reconnais-
sance objective is a terrain feature, geographic area, or an enemy
force about which the commander wants to obtain additional infor-
mation. The reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnais-
sance effort by specifying the most important result to obtain from the recon-
naissance effort. Every reconnaissance mission must specify a reconnaissance
objective. The commander assigns a reconnaissance objective based on his
priority information requirements (PIR) resulting from the IPB process and
the reconnaissance asset’s capabilities and limitations. The reconnaissance
objective can be information about a specific geographical location, such as
the cross-country trafficability of a specific area, a specific enemy activity to
be confirmed or denied, or a specific enemy unit to be located and tracked.
When the reconnaissance unit does not have enough time to complete all the
tasks associated with a specific form of reconnaissance, it uses the
reconnaissance objective to guide it in setting priorities.
13-3. A commander may need to provide additional detailed instructions be-
yond the reconnaissance objective, such as the specific tasks he wants accom-
plished or the priority of tasks. He does this by issuing additional guidance to
his reconnaissance unit or by specifying these instructions in his tasks to his
subordinate units in the operation order. For example, if, based on all techni-
cal and human intelligence (HUMINT) sources, a division G2 concludes that
the enemy is not in an area and the terrain appears to be trafficable without
obstacles, the division commander may decide he does not need a detailed re-
connaissance effort forward of his unit. He may direct his cavalry squadron to
conduct a zone reconnaissance mission with guidance to move rapidly and re-
port by exception terrain obstacles that will significantly slow the movement
of his subordinate maneuver brigades. Alternatively, when the objective is to
locate an enemy force, the reconnaissance objective would be that force, and
additional guidance would be to conduct only that terrain reconnaissance nec-
essary to find the enemy and develop the situation.
RECONNAISSANCE FUNDAMENTALS
13-4. The seven fundamentals of successful reconnaissance operations are as
follows:
· Ensure continuous reconnaissance.
· Do not keep reconnaissance assets in reserve.
· Orient on the reconnaissance objective.
· Report information rapidly and accurately.
· Retain freedom of maneuver.
· Develop the situation rapidly.
ENSURE CONTINUOUS RECONNAISSANCE

13-5. Effective reconnaissance is continuous. The commander conducts recon-
naissance before, during, and after all operations. Before an operation,
13-1
FM 3-90
reconnaissance focuses on filling gaps in information about the enemy and

the terrain. During an operation, reconnaissance focuses on providing the
commander with updated information that verifies the enemy’s composition,
dispositions, and intentions as the battle progresses. This allows the com-
mander to verify which COA is actually being adopted by the enemy and de-
termine if his plan is still valid based on actual events in the AO. After an op-
eration, reconnaissance focuses on maintaining contact with the enemy to
determine his next move and collecting information necessary for planning
subsequent operations. When information regarding the current operation is
adequate, reconnaissance focuses on gathering information for branches and
sequels to current plans. As a minimum, reconnaissance is conducted contin-
uously as an integral part of all security missions, including the conduct of
local security for forces not in contact. (See Chapter 12.)
13-6. Reconnaissance operations over extended distances and time may re-
quire pacing reconnaissance assets to maintain the effort, or rotating units to
maintain continuous coverage. The human and technical assets used in the
reconnaissance effort must be allowed time for rest, resupply, troop leading
procedures, additional and refresher training, and preventative maintenance
checks and services. The commander must determine not only where, but also
when he will need his maximum reconnaissance effort and pace his recon-
naissance assets to ensure that adequate assets are available at critical times
and places.
DO NOT KEEP RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS IN RESERVE

13-7. Reconnaissance assets, like artillery assets, are never kept in reserve.
When committed, reconnaissance assets use all of their resources to accom-
plish the mission. This does not mean that all assets are committed all the
time. The commander uses his reconnaissance assets based on their capabili-
ties and METT-TC to achieve the maximum coverage needed to answer the
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIR). At times, this re-
quires the commander to withhold or position reconnaissance assets to ensure
that they are available at critical times and places. The rest required by re-
connaissance assets to sustain the reconnaissance effort is not to be obtained
by placing them in reserve. However, all reconnaissance assets should be
treated as committed assets with specific missions assigned at all times.
Units with multiple roles, specifically armored and air cavalry, that can con-
duct reconnaissance, security, and other combat missions in an economy-of-
force role may be kept as a reserve for security or combat missions.
ORIENT ON THE RECONNAISSANCE OBJECTIVE

13-8. The commander uses the reconnaissance objective to focus his unit’s re-
connaissance efforts. Commanders of subordinate reconnaissance elements
remain focused on achieving this objective, regardless of what their forces en-
counter during the mission. When time, limitations of unit capabilities, or
enemy action prevents a unit from accomplishing all the tasks normally
associated with a particular form of reconnaissance, the unit uses the recon-
naissance objective to focus the reconnaissance effort.
13-2
REPORT INFORMATION RAPIDLY AND ACCURATELY

13-9. Reconnaissance assets must acquire and report accurate and timely in-
formation on the enemy, civil considerations, and the terrain over which op-
erations are to be conducted. Information may quickly lose its value. Recon-
naissance units report exactly what they see and, if appropriate, what they do
not see. Seemingly unimportant information may be extremely important
when combined with other information. Negative reports are as important as
reports of enemy activity. Failure to report tells the commander nothing. The
unit information management plan ensures that unit reconnaissance assets
have the proper communication equipment to support the integrated intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan.
RETAIN FREEDOM OF MANEUVER

13-10. Reconnaissance assets must retain battlefield mobility to successfully
complete their missions. If these assets are decisively engaged, reconnais-
sance stops and a battle for survival begins. Reconnaissance assets must have
clear engagement criteria that support the maneuver commander’s intent.
They must employ proper movement and reconnaissance techniques, use
overwatching fires, and standing operating procedures (SOP). Initiative and
knowledge of both the terrain and the enemy reduce the likelihood of decisive
engagement and help maintain freedom of movement. Prior to initial contact,
the reconnaissance unit adopts a combat formation designed to gain contact
with the smallest possible friendly element. This provides the unit with the
maximum opportunity for maneuver and enables it to avoid having the entire
unit become decisively engaged. The IPB process can identify anticipated
areas of likely contact to the commander. Using indirect fires to provide sup-
pression and obscuration as well as destroy point targets is a method recon-
naissance assets use to retain their freedom of maneuver.

13-11. Once a unit conducting reconnaissance gains contact with the enemy,
it maintains that contact unless the commander directing the reconnaissance
orders otherwise or the survival of the unit is at risk. This does not mean that
individual scout and reconnaissance teams cannot break contact with the
enemy. The commander of the unit conducting reconnaissance is responsible
for maintaining contact using all available resources. That contact can range
from surveillance to close combat. Surveillance, combined with stealth, is
often sufficient to maintain contact and is the preferred method. Units con-
ducting reconnaissance avoid combat unless it is necessary to gain essential
information, in which case the units use maneuver (fire and movement) to
maintain contact while avoiding decisive engagement.
DEVELOP THE SITUATION RAPIDLY

13-12. When a reconnaissance asset encounters an enemy force or an obsta-
cle, it must quickly determine the threat it faces. For an enemy force, it must
determine the enemy’s composition, dispositions, activities, and movements
and assess the implications of that information. For an obstacle, it must de-
termine the type and extent of the obstacle and whether it is covered by fire.
Obstacles can provide the attacker with information concerning the location
13-3
FM 3-90
of enemy forces, weapon capabilities, and organization of fires. In most cases,

the reconnaissance unit developing the situation uses actions on contact. (See
Chapter 4 for a discussion of actions on contact.)
HISTORICAL EXAMPLE
13-13. Military history contains numerous examples of the importance of re-
connaissance operations. The following historical example illustrates the
major role of reconnaissance operations in ensuring the success of an opera-
tion. This non-US, medieval example illustrates that the study of other
armies and other times has a great deal to contribute in helping the tactician
understand the art and science of tactics.
The Battle of the Sajo River

Reconnaissance was critical in determining enemy dispositions and taking ad-
vantage of the terrain in this and many other Mongol battles. The Mongol army
conducted continuous reconnaissance with a definite reconnaissance objective,
and a significant part of their success resulted from their reconnaissance opera-
tions. During operations, light cavalry preceded each of their army’s main
columns performing reconnaissance. They reported on terrain and weather con-
ditions as well as the enemy’s size, location, and movements. If a Mongol column
met an enemy force that it could defeat, it did so. If it could not, its light cavalry
maintained contact with the enemy, developed the situation to its advantage, and
maintained freedom of movement. The Mongol light cavalry inflicted casualties
and disrupted the enemy’s movements while the main Mongol army deployed for
action.
In March 1241, a Mongol army of
Mohi Heath
some 70,000 crossed the Sajo
Carpathian Mountains from Russia River
into the Hungarian Plain. By mid-
April, its light cavalry located the
100,000-man Hungarian army near
the cities of Buda and Pest on the
Danube River. In response, the
Mongol army concentrated its pre- Danube
River
viously dispersed columns as it ap-
Buda
proached the Danube. Once that
Pest
the Mongols knew that they had
been detected by the Hungarians,
they deliberately withdrew about Figure 13-1. Mongol Army Route
100 miles northeast and led the
Hungarians to a previously selected spot, Mohi Heath, on the Sajo River. The
Mongols crossed the Sajo using an existing stone bridge and camped east of the
river. The Hungarians followed and halted on the west bank, built a camp, took
the stone bridge, and left a bridgehead on the east bank. Mongol reconnaissance
discovered the location and dispositions within the Hungarian camp as well as a
river-crossing site north of the camp. After dark, the main body of the Mongol
army moved to cross the river at the crossing site. In addition to using the ford,
the Mongols constructed a bridge to aid their crossing.
13-4
The next morning, the remainder of

the Mongol army conducted a sup-
porting attack on the Hungarian Existing Ford
force at the stone bridge, drawing Bridge constructed during the attack delays
the Hungarian army out of its camp main body
to fight. While the supporting Mongol

forces succeeded in recrossing the Mohi Heath
Sajo via the stone bridge, the fight-
ing was hard and they nearly lost
Stone Bridge
their battle while waiting for the main
body to come to their support. After
2 hours, the Mongol main body fell Hungarian Camp
on the Hungarian rear and flank,
driving the Hungarians back into Figure 13-2. Mongol Army Pursuit
their camp. As was Mongol practice,
they deliberately left an escape route from the enemy camp open. The ensuing
Mongol pursuit destroyed the Hungarian army when they tried to withdraw from
their camp.
CHARACTERISTICS OF RECONNAISSANCE ASSETS

13-14. The responsibility for conducting reconnaissance does not reside solely
with specifically organized units. Every unit has an implied mission to report
information about the terrain, civilian activities, and friendly and enemy dis-
positions, regardless of its battlefield location and primary function. Frontline
troops and reconnaissance patrols of maneuver units at all echelons collect in-
formation on enemy units with which they are in contact. In rear areas, re-
serve maneuver forces, fire support assets, air defense, military police, host
nation agencies, combat support, and combat service support elements ob-
serve and report civilian and enemy activity. Although all units conduct re-
connaissance, those specifically trained in reconnaissance tasks are ground
and air cavalry, scouts, long-range reconnaissance units, and Special Forces.
Some branches, such as the Corps of Engineers and the Chemical Corps, have
specific reconnaissance tasks to perform that complement the force’s overall
reconnaissance effort. However, the corps and division commanders will pri-
marily use their organic cavalry and intelligence elements to conduct recon-
naissance operations.
13-15. At battalion level and above, the commander assigns missions to his
ISR assets based on their organization, equipment, and training. The com-
mander must know the capabilities and limitations of his available reconnais-
sance assets to ensure the employment of these assets within their capa-
bilities and on missions for which they have been trained and equipped.
Table 13-1 on page 13-6 shows the typical nesting of ISR assets available at
different tactical echelons.
13-5
FM 3-90
Table 13-1. Typical ISR Assets Available
Platoon Co/Tm BN/TF Brigade Division Corps EAC

XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX
Observation Post
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX
Reconnaissance
Patrol
AAA AAA XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX
Combat Outpost
AAA AAA XXX XXX
Scout Platoon
AAA AAA XXX XXX
Brigade Recon
Troop
AAA AAA XXX XXX XXX XXX
Cavalry Troop
(Sep Bde)
AAA XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX
Chemical
Reconnaissance
AAA AAA XXX XXX
FA COLT Team
AAA AAA XXX XXX
FA Target Acq
Systems
AAA AAA XXX XXX XXX
ADA Target Acq
Systems
AAA XXX XXX
Grd Surveillance
Radars
AAA XXX XXX XXX XXX
Other MI
Collection Sys
AAA XXX XXX
Division Cavalry
Squadron
AAA XXX XXX XXX
Air Cavalry
AAA* XXX* XXX XXX XXX
Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles
AAA XXX XXX
Cavalry
Regiment
AAA* XXX XXX
Long-Range
Surveillance Unit
AAA AAA XXX
SOF (SF/RGR)
Technical
Surveillance AAA AAA AAA AAA XXX
Platforms
XXX = Echelon controls or routinely tasks the asset.
AAA = Echelon can routinely expect the information from that source to be made available to it.
* Can be found in some divisions.
13-6
13-16. A commander primarily conducts reconnaissance with a combination

of manned ground and air assets supported by technical systems. Acting in
concert, these assets create a synergy, using the strengths of one system to
overcome the weaknesses of another. To produce this synergy, the command-
er must delineate reporting procedures for all units to pass on information
gathered during reconnaissance operations. This facilitates rapid mission
execution.
13-17. Dedicated reconnaissance assets are easily overtasked and overex-
tended. The commander uses all available resources, not just reconnaissance
units, to satisfy his information requirements. Ground reconnaissance can in-
volve assets not specifically tailored for the mission. Engineer reconnaissance
units collect information on how the terrain affects the movement of enemy
and friendly forces. Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance
teams can determine the presence or absence of NBC contamination and the
extent of that contamination. Artillery forward observers, fire support teams,
and combat observation and lasing teams (COLTs) report combat information
as they observe the battlefield. Air defense units observe and report enemy
aircraft and air corridors in use.
13-18. Ground reconnaissance elements are generally limited in the depth to
which they can conduct reconnaissance. However, they can operate under
weather conditions that prohibit air reconnaissance operations.
13-19. Reconnaissance conducted by manned Army aviation platforms com-
plements ground reconnaissance by greatly increasing the speed and depth
with which reconnaissance operations can be conducted over a given area. Air
reconnaissance can operate easily over terrain that hinders ground opera-
tions, such as swamps, extremely rugged terrain, or deep snow. Aviation as-
sets can operate at a considerable depth, far in advance of the normal capabil-
ity of dedicated ground reconnaissance elements normally focused on the
close fight. Thus, they provide the commander with additional time to attack
or otherwise react to the enemy’s presence. Scout and attack helicopters use
their optics, video, thermal imaging, and communications capabilities to de-
tect and report the enemy. All types of aviation units generate pilot reports in
the course of conducting their primary missions. These reports are often a
source of valuable combat information.
13-20. While several technical systems can perform reconnaissance, the ma-
jority of these types of systems can be more accurately described as surveil-
lance platforms. Surveillance complements reconnaissance by cueing the com-
mitment of reconnaissance assets against specific locations or specially
targeted enemy units. Surveillance provides information while reconnais-
sance answers the commander’s specific questions.
13-21. Military intelligence (MI) assets conduct both surveillance and recon-
naissance missions. They provide intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW)
support, such as electronic intercept, ground surveillance radars, unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs), and remotely emplaced sensors. Theater and national
reconnaissance and surveillance systems provide broadcast dissemination of
information and intelligence to the commander and can provide near real-
time imagery as a part of an integrated ISR effort. Artillery and air defense
target acquisition radars can complement MI surveillance systems as a part
13-7
FM 3-90
of the ISR effort. HUMINT collection occurs through face-to-face interroga-

tion of captured enemy soldiers, screening of the civilian population, and
debriefing of friendly soldiers, such as scouts and SOF.
FORMS OF RECONNAISSANCE
13-22. The four forms of reconnaissance operations are—
· Route reconnaissance.
· Zone reconnaissance.
· Area reconnaissance.
· Reconnaissance in force (RIF).
Table 13-2 shows what types of dedicated reconnaissance units are typically
assigned the missions of conducting the four forms of reconnaissance opera-
tions.
Table 13-2. Dedicated Reconnaissance Units and Forms of Reconnaissance Operations
SCOUT TROOP/CO AIR CAV AR CAV AR CAV

DIV
PLATOON TEAM TROOP SQD/ BN REGT/ BDE
Route X X X
Zone X X X X X
Area X X X X X
Recon in X X X
Force
ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
13-23. Route reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that focuses
along a specific line of communication, such as a road, railway, or
cross-country mobility corridor. It provides new or updated information
on route conditions, such as obstacles and bridge classifications, and enemy
and civilian activity along the route. A route reconnaissance includes not only
the route itself, but also all terrain along the route from which the enemy
could influence the friendly force’s movement. The commander normally as-
signs this mission when he wants to use a specific route for friendly move-
ment.
13-24. The commander may assign a route reconnaissance as a separate mis-
sion or as a specified task for a unit conducting a zone or area reconnaissance.
A scout platoon can conduct a route reconnaissance over only one route at a
time. For larger organizations, the number of scout platoons available di-
rectly influences the number of routes that can be covered at one time. Inte-
grating ground, air, and technical assets assures a faster and more complete
route reconnaissance.
13-25. A ground reconnaissance effort is essential if the mission is to conduct
detailed reconnaissance of the route or the mission requires clearing the ene-
my from an AO that includes the route and the terrain around the route. The
13-8
forces assigned to conduct this ground reconnaissance must be robust enough

to handle expected enemy forces in the AO. If the commander expects them to
make contact with enemy forces possessing more combat power than that ty-
pically found in enemy reconnaissance elements, he ensures that his forces
conducting ground reconnaissance have access to readily available fire sup-
port. If the commander requires detailed information on the route, engineer
reconnaissance assets can determine the classification of critical points along
the route more quickly and accurately than scouts can. If the commander an-
ticipates significant obstacles, combat engineers should be included as part of
the force. If NBC contamination is expected, NBC reconnaissance assets
should accompany the force conducting ground reconnaissance because they
can detect and determine the extent of contamination more accurately and
quickly than scouts can. Air reconnaissance can be used if the reconnaissance
mission must be completed quickly. However, aerial reconnaissance can rare-
ly clear an enemy force from a location where it can affect movement on the
route and aircraft cannot breach obstacles. When time is limited, air recon-
naissance is essential to determine which areas are clear of enemy forces and
obstacles, and to cue ground reconnaissance regarding where to focus its
efforts.
Control Measures
13-26. Control measures for a
RP PL ELK
route reconnaissance create an
(LOA)
AO for the unit conducting the
reconnaissance. (See Fig- PL ELK (LOA)
NAI
ure 13-3.) The commander IRENE
+
places lateral boundaries on NC1701
EER
both sides of the route, far 2 PL D
enough out to allow reconnais-
sance of all terrain from which PL DEER
the enemy could dominate the
route. He places a line of de- 4
parture (LD) perpendicular to A/2-6
I
the route short of the start 1 3

point (SP), allowing adequate PL QUAIL
space for the unit conducting PL QUAIL
7
the reconnaissance to deploy
into formation. The LD creates
the rear boundary of the AO. A SP
limit of advance (LOA) is placed
far enough beyond the route’s
release point (RP) to include PL DOVE (LD)
any terrain from which the ene- PL DOVE (LD)
my could dominate the route. A
SP and a RP define that section Figure 13-3. Route Reconnaissance
of the route where the unit Control Measures
collects detailed information.
He may add phase lines (PLs) and checkpoints to maintain coordinated recon-
naissance, control movement, or designate critical points. He places addi-
tional control measures to coordinate indirect and direct fire as necessary. He
13-9
FM 3-90
places these control measures on terrain features that are identifiable from
both the ground and the air to assist in air-to-ground coordination.
Tasks
13-27. Unless the commander orders otherwise, the unit conducting a route
reconnaissance performs specific tasks within the limits of its capabilities. If
a unit does not have the time or resources to complete all of these tasks, it
must inform the commander assigning the mission. He must then issue fur-
ther guidance on which tasks the unit must complete or the priority of each
task, which is usually clear from the reconnaissance objective. If, after start-
ing the reconnaissance, the unit determines that it cannot complete an
assigned task, such as clearing the enemy or reducing obstacles to create
lanes as required to support the maneuver of the main body along the route,
it must report and await further instructions.
13-28. Route reconnaissance tasks are as follows:
· Find, report, and clear within capabilities all enemy forces that can in-
fluence movement along the route.
· Determine the trafficability of the route; can it support the friendly
force?
· Reconnoiter all terrain that the enemy can use to dominate movement
along the route, such as choke points, ambush sites, and pickup zones,
landing zones, and drop zones.
· Reconnoiter all built-up areas, contaminated areas, and lateral routes
along the route.
· Evaluate and classify all bridges, defiles, overpasses and underpasses,
and culverts along the route.
· Locate any fords, crossing sites, or bypasses for existing and reinforcing
obstacles (including built-up areas) along the route.
· Locate all obstacles and create lanes as specified in execution orders.
· Report the above route information to the headquarters initiating the
route reconnaissance mission, to include providing a sketch map or a
route overlay.
(See FM 3-34.212 and FM 3-20.95 for additional information concerning route
reconnaissance.)
ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
13-29. Zone reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that involves
a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obsta-
cles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries.
Obstacles include both existing and reinforcing, as well as areas with NBC
contamination. The commander assigns a zone reconnaissance mission when
he needs additional information on a zone before committing other forces in
the zone. It is appropriate when the enemy situation is vague, existing know-
ledge of the terrain is limited, or combat operations have altered the terrain.
A zone reconnaissance may include several route or area reconnaissance mis-
sions assigned to subordinate units.
13-10
13-30. A zone reconnaissance is normally a deliberate, time-consuming pro-

cess. It takes more time than any other reconnaissance mission, so the com-
mander must allow adequate time to conduct it. A zone reconnaissance is nor-
mally conducted over an extended distance. It requires all ground elements
executing the zone reconnaissance to be employed abreast of each other.
However, when the reconnaissance objective is the enemy force, a commander
may forgo a detailed reconnaissance of the zone and focus his assets on those
named areas of interest (NAI) that would reveal enemy dispositions and in-
tentions. A reconnaissance unit can never disregard terrain when focusing on
the enemy. However, it minimizes its terrain reconnaissance to that which
may influence an NAI.
13-31. Considerations for organizing a zone reconnaissance are the same as
for organizing a route reconnaissance except that several subordinate units,
rather than just one unit, operate abreast during the zone reconnaissance. If
the commander expects significant enemy forces to be found within the zone,
he should provide the force conducting the zone reconnaissance with a re-
serve. This reserve should have adequate combat power to extract elements of
the reconnaissance force from decisive engagement. In an armored cavalry
squadron of an armored cavalry regiment, the tank company normally per-
forms this task. If a unit conducts a zone reconnaissance out of supporting
range of the main body, the commander ordering the zone reconnaissance
provides the reconnaissance unit with adequate fire support assets that can
move with the reconnaissance unit.
Control Measures 010845R

7
PL LEE DEC01 PL LEE (LOA)
13-32. The commander controls
(LOA) NC 1701
a zone reconnaissance by as-
signing an AO to the unit
conducting the reconnaissance. NAI
PL MERRIT 2
(See Figure 13-4.) The lateral PL
boundaries, a LD, and a LOA 302230R
MERRIT
4
define this AO. Within the AO, NOV01
the force conducting the zone PL CUSTER

TM Y B
I
reconnaissance further divides

PL CUSTER
the AO with additional lateral
boundaries to define subordi-
nate unit AOs. Subordinate 2-6 1/A/
II
TF 3-68 2-13 1
AOs are not necessarily the CAV 1 3
same size. Phase lines and con-
tact points, located where the PL BUFORD
commander determines that it PL BUFORD
is necessary for adjacent units

to make physical contact, are
used to coordinate the move-
PL HAMPTON
ment of elements operating PL HAMPTON (LD)
(LD)
abreast. He may further desig-
nate the time that this physical
Figure 13-4. Zone Reconnaissance
contact takes place. He uses
Control Measures
13-11
FM 3-90
checkpoints to indicate critical terrain features and to coordinate air and

ground teamwork. He may use fire support coordinating measures to control
direct and indirect fires. He uses additional control measures as necessary. In
addition, the commander assigning the zone reconnaissance mission must
specify the route the reconnaissance unit must use to enter the AO. All con-
trol measures should be on recognizable terrain when possible.
Tasks
13-33. Unless the commander orders otherwise, a unit conducting a zone re-
connaissance performs the following tasks within the limits of its capabilities.
If a unit does not have the time or resources to complete all of these tasks, it
must inform the commander assigning the mission. He must then issue fur-
ther guidance on which tasks the unit must complete or the priority of tasks,
which is usually clear from the reconnaissance objective. After starting the
reconnaissance, if the unit determines that it cannot complete an assigned
task, such as clear enemy or reduce obstacles in zone to create lanes as re-
quired to support the main body’s maneuver, it must report and await further
instructions.
13-34. Zone reconnaissance tasks are as follows:
· Find and report all enemy forces within the zone.
· Clear all enemy forces in the designated AO within the capability of the
unit conducting reconnaissance.
· Determine the trafficability of all terrain within the zone, including
built-up areas.
· Locate and determine the extent of all contaminated areas in the zone.
· Evaluate and classify all bridges, defiles, overpasses, underpasses, and
culverts in the zone.
· Locate any fords, crossing sites, or bypasses for existing and reinforcing
obstacles (including built-up areas) in the zone.
· Locate all obstacles and create lanes as specified in execution orders.
· Report the above information to the commander directing the zone
reconnaissance, to include providing a sketch map or overlay.
AREA RECONNAISSANCE
13-35. Area reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that focuses
on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activ-
ity within a prescribed area. This area may include a town, a ridgeline,
woods, an airhead, or any other feature critical to operations. The area may
consist of a single point, such as a bridge or an installation. Areas are nor-
mally smaller than zones and are not usually contiguous to other friendly
areas targeted for reconnaissance. Because the area is smaller, an area recon-
naissance moves faster than a zone reconnaissance.
13-36. Considerations for the organization of forces for an area reconnais-
sance are the same as for organizing a zone reconnaissance. (See para-
graphs 13-31 to 13-33.)
13-12
Control Measures
13-37. The commander assign- 071800Z
14
ing an area reconnaissance PL SALINA JUN04
PL SALINA
specifies the area for reconnais- (LOA)
(LOA)
sance with a single continuous
+
NC 1701
line to enclose the area to re- 070800Z A
connoiter. Alternatively, he JUN04
may designate the area by
marking lateral boundaries, a PL IOLA
PL IOLA
LD, and a LOA. An area recon-
AO LEAVENWORTH
naissance mission always speci-
I
fies the route to take in moving
+
NC 1703
to the area. The commander of
the unit conducting the area
reconnaissance mission can use PL GYPSUM PL GYPSUM
control measures for a zone re-
connaissance within the AO to
control the operation of his sub-
ordinate elements. (See Fig- PL KIPP (LD)
PL KIPP (LD)
ure 13-5.)
Tasks
13-38. The tasks for an area re-
connaissance are also the same
Figure 13-5. Area Reconnaissance
as for a zone reconnaissance.
Control Measures
(See paragraph 13-34.)
RECONNAISSANCE IN FORCE
13-39. A reconnaissance in force is a deliberate combat operation de-
signed to discover or test the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and re-
actions or to obtain other information. Battalion-size task forces or larg-
er organizations usually conduct a reconnaissance in force (RIF) mission. A
commander assigns a RIF mission when the enemy is known to be operating
within an area and the commander cannot obtain adequate intelligence by
any other means. A unit may also conduct a RIF in restrictive-type terrain
where the enemy is likely to ambush smaller reconnaissance forces. A RIF is
an aggressive reconnaissance, conducted as an offensive operation with clear-
ly stated reconnaissance objectives. The overall goal of a RIF is to determine
enemy weaknesses that can be exploited. It differs from other reconnaissance
operations because it is normally conducted only to gain information about
the enemy and not the terrain.
13-40. While specifically trained and equipped units usually conduct the
other forms of reconnaissance operations, any maneuver force can conduct a
RIF. The force conducting a RIF is organized as if it is conducting offensive
operations. However, the lack of enemy information dictates that the force be
large and strong enough to develop the situation, protect the force, cause the
enemy to react, and put the enemy at some risk. The less known about the
13-13
FM 3-90
enemy, the stronger the force conducting the RIF must be. Because of the
lack of information about the enemy, a commander normally conducts a RIF
as a movement to contact or a series of frontal attacks across a broad front-
age.
Control Measures
13-41. The control measures for a RIF are the same as for offensive opera-
tions. The operation is conducted as an movement to contact with limited
objectives. (Chapter 4 discusses the conduct of a movement to contact.)
Tasks
13-42. A unit conducting a RIF performs the following tasks within the limits
of its capabilities. If a unit does not have the time or resources to complete all
of these tasks, it must inform the commander assigning the mission. He must
then issue further guidance on which tasks the unit must complete or the
priority of tasks, which is usually clear from the reconnaissance objective.
After starting the RIF, if the unit determines that it cannot complete an as-
signed task, it must report and await further instructions. Reconnaissance in
force tasks are—
· Penetrating the enemy’s security area and determining its size and
depth.
· Determining the location and disposition of enemy main positions.
· Attacking enemy main positions and attempting to cause the enemy to
react by using local reserves or major counterattack forces, employing
fire support assets, adjusting positions, and employing specific weapon
systems.
· Determining weaknesses in the enemy’s dispositions to exploit.
PLANNING A RECONNAISSANCE
13-43. Reconnaissance contributes significantly to a commander’s battlefield
visualization. It supports the overall integrated ISR plan, which in turn sup-
ports the commander’s decision making process.
13-44. The commander must make judicious yet aggressive use of his recon-
naissance assets. Reconnaissance planning ensures that available reconnais-
sance assets produce the greatest results. Because there are never enough
assets to accomplish all tasks, the commander must set priorities. Generating
many unfocused missions rapidly wears down assets, making them ineffec-
tive. Improperly using assets can also leave an enemy vulnerability undis-
covered.
13-45. The commander ensures the coordination and synchronization of his
reconnaissance effort at all echelons. Since the need for reconnaissance cuts
across all parts of the operational framework and core functions, reconnais-
sance operations demand an integrated approach to planning, preparation,
and execution. The two habitual participants in the reconnaissance planning
process are the echelon operations and intelligence staff officers. The echelon
operations staff officer (G3 or S3) has primary staff responsibility for recon-
naissance planning, allocating, and tasking resources. Normally, he has staff
13-14
responsibility for ground and air reconnaissance assets, which includes

engineers, NBC, and artillery. The echelon intelligence staff officer (G2 or S2)
has primary responsibility for ground surveillance systems and special elec-
tronics mission aircraft. The commander ensures these two staff elements
adopt an integrated combined arms approach to planning, preparing, execut-
ing, and assessing reconnaissance.
INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE PLAN

13-46. The commander closely integrates reconnaissance missions with other
intelligence-collection efforts to ensure that each ISR asset is used to its best
advantage. The echelon staff, primarily the intelligence staff officer, identifies
gaps in the intelligence available, based on the initial IPB and the situation-
ally dependent CCIR. The IPB process helps determine factors that impact on
the reconnaissance effort, such as—
· Avenues of approach that support friendly movement and exploit ene-
my weaknesses.
· Key terrain, choke points, obstacles, and danger areas.
· Enemy positions, especially flanks that can be exploited.
· Observation points.
The reconnaissance effort and the IPB process are interactive and iterative,
each feeding the other. (See FM 2-0 for more information on the intelligence
cycle. FM 2-01.3 addresses the IPB process.)
13-47. The intelligence staff officer develops an initial integrated ISR plan to
acquire information to help answer those PIR based on available reconnais-
sance and surveillance assets. The ISR plan assigns specific intelligence ac-
quisition tasks to specific units for action. It integrates surveillance and
reconnaissance into the overall intelligence-collection plan.
13-48. The echelon operations staff officer uses the initial ISR plan as the
base in preparing the ISR annex to the operation order. The ISR annex pro-
vides for the flexible execution of reconnaissance tasks, including providing
for adequate command and control, indirect fires, and logistics when com-
pleted. (FM 5-0 discusses reconnaissance and the military decision making
process.)
RECONNAISSANCE-PULL VERSUS RECONNAISSANCE-PUSH

13-49. In reconnaissance-pull, the commander uses the products of the IPB
process in an interactive and iterative way. He obtains combat information
from his reconnaissance assets to determine a preferred COA for the tactical
situation presented by the factors of METT-TC. In reconnaissance-push, the
commander uses the products of the IPB process in an interactive, but not
iterative, way with combat information obtained from his reconnaissance as-
sets in support of a previously determined COA. The time available to a com-
mander is normally the chief reason for preferring one method over the other.
13-50. The time required to develop a preferred COA can give the enemy
enough time to recover and prepare so that an objective which could be ob-
tained with few casualties one day will cost far more to seize the next day.
13-15
FM 3-90
There is no available model that a commander can use to determine how

much is enough; that determination is part of the tactical art.
RECONNAISSANCE MANAGEMENT
13-51. No single reconnaissance asset can answer every intelligence require-
ment, and there are rarely enough reconnaissance assets to cover every re-
quirement. The echelon staff uses as mix of reconnaissance management
methods, such as cueing, mixing, redundancy, and task organizing, in an at-
tempt to use limited assets most effectively and collect the most critical
information with the fewest assets as quickly as possible,.
13-52. Cueing is the integration of one or more types of reconnais-
sance or surveillance systems to provide information that directs
follow-on collecting of more detailed information by another system.
Cueing helps to focus limited reconnaissance assets, especially limited ground
reconnaissance assets, which can rarely examine every part of a large area
closely. Electronic, thermal, visual, audio, and other technical assets with
wide-area surveillance capabilities, often working from aerial platforms, can
quickly determine areas of enemy concentration or areas where there is no
enemy presence. These assets may cue ground and air reconnaissance assets
to investigate specific areas to confirm and amplify information developed by
technical assets. For example, joint surveillance target attack radar system
(JSTARS) and Guardrail-equipped aircraft can cover large areas and cue
ground reconnaissance or UAVs once an enemy force is identified. The com-
mander may dispatch ground reconnaissance or UAVs to verify the infor-
mation and track the enemy for targeting purposes. Similarly, a ground re-
connaissance asset could cue surveillance assets. The key point is to use
reconnaissance assets based on their capabilities and use the complementary
capabilities of other assets to verify and expand information available.
13-53. Mixing is using two or more different assets to collect against
the same intelligence requirement. Employing a mix of systems not only
increases the probability of collection, but also tends to provide more com-
plete information. For example, a JSTARS aircraft may detect and locate a
moving enemy tactical force, while the G-2 analysis and control element uses
organic and supporting assets to determine its identity, organizational struc-
ture, and indications of future plans. Employing a mix of systems is always
desirable if the situation and available resources permit. Mixing systems can
also help uncover deception attempts by revealing discrepancies in informa-
tion reported by different collectors.
13-54. Redundancy is using two or more like assets to collect against
the same intelligence requirement. Based on the priority of the informa-
tion requirement, the commander must decide which NAI justifies having
more than one asset covering it. When more than one asset covers the same
NAI, a backup is available in the event that one asset cannot reach the NAI
in time, the first asset suffers mechanical failure, or the enemy detects and
engages the first asset. Redundancy also improves the chances that the re-
quired information will be collected.
13-55. To increase the effectiveness and survivability of a reconnaissance
asset, the commander may task organize it by placing additional assets under
13-16
the control of the unit. For example, to conduct an area reconnaissance of

possible river crossing sites at extended distances from a division’s current
location, a ground reconnaissance troop of the division cavalry squadron
could be task-organized with a COLT, a signal retransmission element, an
engineer reconnaissance element, and a mechanized infantry platoon. The
engineers would provide additional technical information on proposed cross-
ing sites; the signal retransmission elements would allow the reconnaissance
troop’s combat net radios to reach the division tactical command post. The
COLT provides additional observation, lazing, and fire coordination capabili-
ties. Last, the infantry platoon would provide additional protection for the
reconnaissance troop.
SUSTAINMENT
13-56. Sustaining reconnaissance assets before, during, and after their com-
mitment is a vital part of maintaining the commander’s capability to conduct
reconnaissance. Because the way that a commander deploys his reconnais-
sance assets in a given situation depends on the factors of METT-TC, the
methods he employs to sustain those assets are equally situationally depend-
ent. He must address them as part of the planning process for each reconnais-
sance operation.
13-57. Reconnaissance elements frequently operate in locations distant from
their organic sustaining base. In this event, reconnaissance elements must
either carry a large enough basic load or be task organized with those assets
necessary to ensure their sustainment until they can be relieved. With either
COA, casualty evacuation remains a problem. An alternative solution would
be to plan and coordinate their sustainment from units near their operating
locations.
EXECUTING A RECONNAISSANCE
13-58. Reconnaissance can be characterized as either stealthy or aggressive.
Depending on how they are employed, scout helicopters and other aerial plat-
forms, as well as mounted and dismounted ground reconnaissance, can be
characterized as either stealthy or aggressive.
13-59. A key factor in reconnaissance execution is the time available to con-
duct the reconnaissance mission. The commander must recognize that he ac-
cepts increased risk to both the reconnaissance element and the main body
when he accelerates the pace of reconnaissance. This risk can be somewhat
offset by employing air reconnaissance and technical means to cover open ter-
rain or areas of lower threat.
13-60. Aggressive reconnaissance is characterized by the speed and manner
in which the reconnaissance force develops the situation once it makes con-
tact with an enemy force. A unit conducting aggressive reconnaissance uses
both direct- and indirect-fire systems and movement to rapidly develop the
situation. Firepower, aggressive exploitation of actions on contact, operations
security, and training are required for the unit to survive and accomplish its
mission when conducting aggressive reconnaissance. Mounted reconnais-
sance is normally characterized as aggressive.
13-17
FM 3-90
13-61. Stealthy reconnaissance emphasizes avoiding detection and engage-

ment by the enemy. It is more time consuming than aggressive reconnais-
sance. Stealthy reconnaissance takes maximum advantage of covered and
concealed terrain and the reduced battlefield signatures associated with sys-
tems that typically conduct stealthy reconnaissance, such as dismounted
scouts. However, stealth cannot be guaranteed. As a result, units attempting
to conduct stealthy reconnaissance must also be drilled to react correctly once
the enemy makes contact, and they must have immediate access to sup-
porting fires.
13-62. The commander considers the factors of METT-TC to determine
whether to conduct mounted or dismounted reconnaissance. Conditions that
may result in a decision to conduct mounted or aerial reconnaissance
include—
· Time is limited.
· Detailed reconnaissance is not required.
· Air units are available to perform coordinated reconnaissance with the
ground assets.
· The IPB process has provided detailed information on the enemy.
· Terrain is relatively open.
· Environmental conditions permit this type of reconnaissance. Deep
snow and muddy terrain greatly hinder mounted reconnaissance.
· Dismounted reconnaissance cannot complete the mission within
existing time constraints, while mounted reconnaissance can.
13-63. The following conditions may result in the commander directing a dis-
mounted reconnaissance effort:
· Time is available.
· Detailed reconnaissance is required.
· Stealth is required.
· The IPB process indicates close proximity to enemy positions.
· The reconnaissance force encounters danger areas.
· Restrictive terrain limits the effectiveness of mounted reconnaissance.
FM 3-21.92 describes dismounted patrolling in detail.
13-64. Typically, air reconnaissance operates in concert with ground recon-
naissance units. (Friendly ground forces in an area offer additional security to
aircrews.) Aviation units can insert surveillance teams at observation posts.
Aircraft can observe and provide security on station for extended times using
rotation techniques if they have detailed requirements in advance. Dis-
mounting an aircrew member to evaluate bridges, fords, or crossing sights is
a last alternative because of the danger to the aircrew and the aircraft. Before
resorting to this, the aircrew uses the sophisticated systems on the aircraft to
avoid risk and to avoid drawing attention to the area of interest.
13-65. Reconnaissance by fire is a technique in which a unit fires on a sus-
pected enemy position to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by move-
ment or return fire. This technique is appropriate when time is critical and
13-18
stealthy maneuver to further develop the situation is not possible. The fires
may be either direct, indirect, or a combination. The advantage of indirect fire
is that it does not give away friendly locations and usually causes the enemy
to displace from the impact area. However, reconnaissance by fire may not
cause a seasoned or prepared enemy force to react. Reconnaissance by fire is
always characterized as aggressive.
13-66. Smoke and battlefield obscuration, fog, rain, and snow all result in re-
duced visibility. Generally, reconnaissance during limited-visibility conditions
takes more time. However, these conditions provide for better stealth and en-
hance the survivability of reconnaissance assets. A commander frequently
employs dismounted reconnaissance patrols at night. These patrols use light
amplification and thermal observation devices, electronic surveillance de-
vices, and surveillance radars to compensate for reduced visibility conditions.
13-67. In limited visibility, mounted reconnaissance tends to focus on road
networks. The enemy can detect engine and track movement noises of
friendly mounted reconnaissance elements at considerable distances at night,
which makes them susceptible to ambush. Strict sound and light discipline,
along with masking sounds, such as artillery fires, helps a mounted recon-
naissance force from being compromised or ambushed.
13-68. High winds, extreme temperature, and loose topsoil or sand may ad-
versely affect aerial reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance units plan their mis-
sions in much the same way as ground units. They use the same type of op-
erations graphics and consider the same critical tasks. The air reconnaissance
commander organizes his assets to accomplish his mission by considering the
same IPB aspects as those associated with ground forces. He focuses on air
hazards to navigation and anticipated enemy air defense capabilities. (The
effects or weather and atmosphere conditions are discussed in FM 2-01.3.)
RECUPERATION AND RECONSTITUTION OF RECONNAISSANCE

ASSETS
13-69. When any small unit is employed continuously for an extensive period
of time, it can become ineffective. When this occurs, restoring the unit to an
acceptable level of effectiveness may require either recuperation or reconsti-
tution. Recuperation—a short break for rest, resupply, and maintenance—is
often sufficient to return the unit to the desired degree of combat effective-
ness. Leaders in reconnaissance units probably need more rest than their
subordinates. If the recuperation period is extended, it can also be used to
conduct refresher training, new equipment training, or any required special-
ized training for the next mission.
13-70. Units and systems performing reconnaissance are vulnerable to detec-
tion, engagement, and destruction by the enemy. When this occurs and the
unit can no longer perform its primary mission, the commander must deter-
mine whether to reconstitute, by either regenerating or reorganizing the unit.
(See FM 4-100.9 for additional information concerning reconstitution.)
13-71. Regenerating a unit requires significant resources. The organization
two echelons above the unit being regenerated conducts the procedure. For
example, a battalion task force can regenerate its scout platoon. In the
13-19
FM 3-90
regeneration process, the battalion could use a combination of weapon system

replacement operations, battle damage assessment and repair, normal re-
placement operations, and medical returnees to provide the needed resources.
These resources, combined with training, could be used to regenerate the
scout platoon. Alternatively, the commander could designate one of his line
platoons as the task force’s new scouts. This approach has significant training
implications and requires adjustments to the line platoon’s table of organiza-
tion and equipment.
13-72. A unit commander can reorganize his unit with the approval of the
next higher commander. For example, an armored cavalry troop commander
could reorganize his two scout and two tank platoons into three platoons
containing a mix of scouts and tanks. This approach to reconstitution also re-
quires training time and other equipment resources to ensure the combat
effectiveness of the resulting composite organization.
13-20
Chapter 14
Troop Movement
Aptitude for war is aptitude for movement.
Napoleon I, Maxims of War, 1831
Troop movement is the movement of troops from one place to

another by any available means. The ability of a commander to pos-
ture his force for a decisive or shaping operation depends on his ability to
move that force. The essence of battlefield agility is the capability to con-
duct rapid and orderly movement to concentrate the effects of combat
power at decisive points and times. Successful movement places troops
and equipment at their destination at the proper time, ready for combat.
The three types of troop movement are administrative movement, tactical
road march, and approach march.
METHODS OF TROOP MOVEMENT
14-1. Troop movements are made by foot marches, motor transport, rail,
water, air, and various combinations of these methods. The method employed
depends on the situation, the size and composition of the moving unit, the
distance the unit must cover, the urgency of execution, and the condition of
the troops. It also depends on the availability, suitability, and capacity of the
different means of transportation. Troop movements over extended distances
have extensive logistics considerations.
DISMOUNTED MARCHES
14-2. Dismounted marches, also called foot marches, are movements
of troops and equipment, mainly by foot, with limited support by ve-
hicles. They increase the number of maneuver options available to a com-
mander. Their positive characteristics include combat readiness—all soldiers
CONTENTS
Methods of Troop Movement.....................14-1 Approach March ..........................................14-8
Dismounted Marches..............................14-1 Movement Techniques ...............................14-9
Mounted Marches....................................14-2 Traveling ................................................14-10
Army Air Movement ................................14-2 Traveling Overwatch.............................14-10
Administrative Movement ..........................14-3 Bounding Overwatch ............................14-11
Tactical Road March ...................................14-3 Planning a Troop Movement ....................14-12
Organization for a Tactical Road March14-3 Preparing a Troop Movement ..................14-15
Graphic Control Measures .....................14-5 Executing a Troop Movement ..................14-15
Tactical March Techniques ....................14-6 Movement Control.....................................14-16
14-1
FM 3-90
can immediately respond to enemy attack without the need to dismount, ease
of control, adaptability to terrain, and their independence from the existing
road network. Their limitations include slow rate of movement and increased
personnel fatigue—soldiers carrying heavy loads over long distances or large
changes in elevation get tired. A unit conducts a dismounted march when the
situation requires stealth, the distance to travel is short, transport or fuel is
limited, or the situation or terrain precludes using a large number of vehicles.
(FM 3-25.18 has more information on the techniques and procedures for con-
ducting dismounted marches.)
MOUNTED MARCHES
14-3. A unit conducts mounted marches when it employs combat and tactical
vehicles to move all of its personnel and equipment. Armored and mechanized
units routinely conduct mounted marches. The speed of the march and the in-
creased amounts of supplies that can accompany the unit characterize this
march method. Heavy maneuver units are normally self-sufficient to conduct
mounted marches over short distances. Light maneuver units and most com-
bat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units are not completely
motorized and need assistance from transportation elements to conduct
mounted marches. Considerations for mounted marches over extended dis-
tances include:
· The ability of the route network to support the numbers, sizes, and
weights of the tactical and combat vehicles assigned to or supporting
the unit making the move.
· Available refueling and maintenance sites and crew-rest areas.
· The need for recovery and evacuation assets.
(FM 4-01.30 discusses considerations for mounted marches.)
ARMY AIR MOVEMENTS

14-4. Army air movements are operations involving the use of utility
and cargo rotary-wing assets for other than air assaults. The com-
mander conducts air movements to move troops and equipment, to emplace
systems, and to transport ammunition, fuel, and other high-value supplies.
He may employ air movements as a substitute for a ground tactical move-
ment. Army air movements are generally faster than ground tactical moves.
The same general considerations that apply to air assault operations also ap-
ply to Army air movements. (See Appendix C for air assault operations. See
FM 3-04.113 for additional information concerning air movement.)
14-5. Tactical forces can use rail and water modes to conduct troop movement
if they are available within an area of operations (AO). Their use can provide
flexibility by freeing other modes of transport for other missions. Their use
normally involves a mixture of military and commercial assets, such as de-
fense freight railway interchange railcars pulled by privately owned diesel-
electric engines to transport tanks along railroad right of ways from one rail
terminus to another. Responsibility for coordinating the use of railroads and
waterways resides within the ARFOR headquarters within the theater of
operations. (FMs 4-01.41 and 4-01.50 provide additional information concern-
ing these two transportation modes.)
14-2
Troop Movement
14-6. In cases of tactical necessity, a unit can accelerate its rate of movement
by conducting a forced march so that it arrives at its destination quickly.
Both heavy and light units can conduct a forced march. Forced marches re-
quire speed, exertion, and an increase in the number of hours marched or
traveled by vehicles each day beyond normal standards. Soldiers cannot sus-
tain forced marches for more than a short period. In a forced march, a unit
may not halt as often nor for as long as recommended for maintenance, rest,
feeding, and fuel. The commander must understand that immediately follow-
ing a long and fast march, his soldiers and combat vehicles experience a
temporary deterioration in their physical condition. The combat effectiveness
and cohesion of his unit also temporarily decreases. His plan must accommo-
date the presence of stragglers and address the increased number of mainte-
nance failures.
ADMINISTRATIVE MOVEMENT
14-7. Administrative movement is a movement in which troops and vehicles
are arranged to expedite their movement and conserve time and energy when
no enemy interference, except by air, is anticipated (JP 1-02). The com-
mander conducts administrative movements only in secure areas. Examples
of administrative movements include rail and highway movement within the
continental United States. Once a unit deploys into a theater of war, admini-
strative movements are the exception, not the norm. Since these types of
moves are nontactical, the echelon logistics officer (the G4 or S4) usually
supervises the moves. (FM 4-01.40 discusses administrative movement and
convoy planning.)
TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

14-8. A tactical road march is a rapid movement used to relocate units within
an area of operations to prepare for combat operations (FM 3-0). Security
against enemy air attack is maintained and the unit is prepared to take im-
mediate action against an enemy ambush, although contact with enemy
ground forces is not expected.
14-9. The primary consideration of the tactical road march is rapid move-
ment. However, the moving force employs security measures, even when con-
tact with enemy ground forces is not expected. Units conducting road
marches may or may not be organized into a combined arms formation. Dur-
ing a tactical road march, the commander is always prepared to take immedi-
ate action if the enemy attacks. (See Figure 14-1, page 14-4.)
ORGANIZATION FOR A TACTICAL ROAD MARCH

14-10. The organization for a tactical road march is the march column. A
march column consists of all elements using the same route for a sin-
gle movement under control of a single commander. The commander
organizes a march column into four elements: reconnaissance, quartering
party, main body, and trail party. A brigade conducting a tactical road march
is an example of a march column. The subordinate elements of a march col-
umn are a march serial and a march unit. A march serial is a major sub-
division of a march column that is organized under one commander
14-3
FM 3-90
who plans, regulates, and controls the serial. An example is a battalion

serial formed from a brigade-size march column. A march unit is a sub-
division of a march serial. It moves and halts under the control of a
single commander who uses voice and visual signals. An example of a
march unit is a company from a battalion-size march serial.
M A IN B O D Y
SPT
C
C
T R A IL Q U A R T E R IN G RECON
PARTY PARTY
Figure 14-1. Tactical Road March
14-11. A march column provides excellent speed, control, and flexibility, but
sacrifices flank security. It provides the ability to deploy forces to the front of
the column. The commander uses a march column when speed is essential
and enemy contact is unlikely. However, the commander spaces combat sup-
port (CS) elements, such as air defense and engineers, throughout the column
to protect and support the movement. Reconnaissance elements augmented
by engineer, nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance, and other CS
assets, as appropriate, conduct a route reconnaissance of the march routes.
This reconnaissance confirms and supplements the data obtained from map
studies and other headquarters.
14-12. A unit quartering party usually accompanies the reconnaissance effort
to the designated assembly area (AA). Unit standing operating procedures
(SOP) establish the exact composition of the quartering party and its trans-
portation, security, and communications equipment needs, and its specific
duties. The quartering party secures, reconnoiters, and organizes an area for
the main body’s arrival and occupation. It typically reconnoiters and confirms
the tentative locations selected by the commander of its parent element,
based on a map reconnaissance. When necessary, the quartering party chang-
es previously assigned unit locations within the AA. The quartering party
guides the main body into position from the release point (RP) to precise loca-
tions within the AA.
14-13. The main body of the march column consists of the remainder of the
unit, including attachments minus the trail party. The trail party is the last
march unit in a march column and normally consists of primarily mainte-
nance elements in a mounted march. It maintains communications with the
main body. The function of the trail party is to recover disabled vehicles or
control stragglers in a dismounted march. If the trail party cannot repair a
disabled vehicle immediately, it tows the disabled vehicle and moves its crew
14-4
Troop Movement
and passengers to a unit maintenance collection point (UMCP) located at a

secure area near the movement route.
GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES

14-14. The commander directing a tactical road march often uses a strip map
or overlay to graphically depict critical information about the route to his sub-
ordinates. The overlay or strip map should show the route of march, start
points (SPs), RPs, checkpoints, critical points (such as bridges), light line, and
traffic control points (TCPs). (See Figure 14-2.) Other graphic control meas-
ures include AA sand phase lines.
UMCP 31
141-5. RP 3 The start
point is a
TCP 8 location
TCP 12
on a route
where the
40 50 TCP 13 50 80 marching
A2
A2 elements
25m fall under
ST
20m
the con-
RU
N
O trol of a
IR E
UT
52
TE 23
XX
RO
U TCP 14 AD MD
20 23 O
R
XX
ID AD
SP 7
LL 23 AD
XX
JTF180
AA RAMONA
Figure 14-2. Route Control Measures
designated march commander. Figure 14-3 shows SP 7. All routes must

have a designated SP and it must be easily
recognizable on the map and on the ground, such as a
road junction. It must be far enough from the AA to
allow units to organize and move at the prescribed
speed and interval when they reach the SP.
14-16. A release point is a location on a route
SP 7
where marching elements are released from cen-
tralized control. Figure 14-4, page 14-6, shows RP 11.
Each SP must have a corresponding RP, which must
also be easy to recognize on the ground. Marching units Figure 14-3.
do not stop at the RP; instead, as they move through Start Point
the RP, unit guides meet each march unit and lead it to
AAs.
14-5
FM 3-90
14-17. The commander designates checkpoints along

the route to assist marching units in gauging their
compliance with the timetable. Also, the movement
overlay identifies critical points along the route
where interference with movement might occur. The
RP 11
commander positions manned TCPs along the route
to prevent congestion and confusion. They may be
manned by MPs or unit personnel. These soldiers
report to the appropriate area movement control Figure 14-4.
organization when each convoy, march column, and Release Point
march serial arrives at and completes passage of its
location.
14-18. A light line is a designated
phase line, forward of which ve-
hicles are required to use black-
out lights during periods of lim-
ited visibility. Commanders at
either corps or division echelon es- PL GEORGE 2nd AD PL GEORGE
tablish it based on the risk that the XX LL
III (US)
enemy will be able to detect moving
vehicles using white light. Fig- Figure 14-5. Light Line
ure 14-5 depicts the light line for the
2nd Armored Division as the division rear boundary. (FM 4-01.40 details
other march control measures, such as the bridge classification symbols de-
picted in Figure 14-2.)
TACTICAL MARCH TECHNIQUES

14-19. Units conducting tactical road marches employ three tactical march
techniques: open column, close column, and infiltration. Each of these tech-
niques uses scheduled halts to control and sustain the road march. The fac-
tors of METT-TC require adjustments in the standard distances between ve-
hicles and soldiers. During movement, elements within a column of any
length may encounter many different types of routes and obstacles simultane-
ously. Consequently, parts of the column may be moving at different speeds,
which can produce an undesirable accordion-like effect. The movement order
establishes the order of march, rate of march, interval or time gaps between
units, column gap, and maximum catch-up speed. Unless the commander di-
rects them not to do so for security reasons, march units report when they
have crossed each control point. During the move, the commander maintains
air and ground security.
Open Column
14-20. In an open column, the commander increases the distance between ve-
hicles and soldiers to provide greater dispersion. The vehicle distance varies
from 50 to 100 meters, and may be greater if required. The distance between
dismounted soldiers varies from two to five meters to allow for dispersion and
space for marching comfort. Any distance that exceeds five meters between
soldiers increases the length of the column and hinders control. The open col-
umn technique is normally used during daylight. It may also be used at night
14-6
Troop Movement
with infrared lights, blackout lights, or passive night-vision equipment. Using

an open column roughly doubles the column’s length and thereby doubles the
time it takes to clear any given point when compared to a close column. The
open column is the most common movement technique because it offers the
most security while still providing the commander with a reasonable degree
of control. In an open column, vehicle density varies from 15 to 20 vehicles
per kilometer. A single light infantry company, with intervals between its
platoons, occupies roughly a kilometer of road or trail.
Close Column
14-21. In a close column, the commander spaces his vehicles about 20 to 25
meters apart. At night, he spaces vehicles so each driver can see the two
lights in the blackout marker of the vehicle ahead. The commander normally
employs a close column for marches during darkness under blackout driving
conditions or for marches in restricted terrain. This method of marching
takes maximum advantage of the traffic capacity of a route but provides little
dispersion. Normally, vehicle density is from 40 to 50 vehicles per kilometer
along the route in a close column.
14-22. The dismounted equivalent to the close column is a limited-visibility
march. The distance between individual soldiers is reduced to one to three
meters to help maintain contact and facilitate control. Limited-visibility
marches are characterized by close formations, difficult command and control
(C2) and reconnaissance, a slow rate of march, and good concealment from
enemy visual observation and air attack.
Infiltration
14-23. The commander dispatches vehicles in small groups, or at irregular in-
tervals, at a rate that keeps the traffic density down and prevents undue
massing of vehicles during a move by infiltration. Infiltration provides the
best possible passive defense against enemy observation and attack. It is suit-
ed for tactical road marches when there is enough time and road space and
when the commander desires the maximum security, deception, and disper-
sion. The disadvantages of an infiltration are that more time is required to
complete the move, column control is nearly impossible, and recovery of
broken-down vehicles by the trail party is more protracted when compared to
vehicle recovery in close and open columns. Additionally, unit integrity is not
restored until the last vehicle arrives at the destination, complicating the
unit’s onward deployment. Infiltration during troop movement should not be
confused with infiltration as a form of maneuver as discussed in Chapter 3.
14-24. During extended road marches, halts are necessary to rest personnel,
service vehicles, and adjust movement schedules as necessary. The march or-
der or unit standing operating procedures (SOP) regulates when to take
halts. In motor movements, the commander schedules short halts for every
two to three hours of movement and may last up to an hour. Long halts occur
on marches that exceed 24 hours and last no more than two hours. Long halts
are not scheduled at night, which allows maximum time for night movement.
During halts, each unit normally clears the march route and moves to a
previously selected AA to prevent route congestion and avoid being a lucra-
tive target. Units establish security and take other measures to protect the
14-7
FM 3-90
force. Unit leaders receive prompt notification of the time and approximate
length of unscheduled halts.
14-25. The commander emphasizes the need to maintain security during
halts. Once a unit stops moving, there is a natural tendency for soldiers to let
their guard down and relax their vigilance. The commander addresses this
problem by explicitly defining unit actions in his SOP for various types of
halts, such as maintenance halts, security halts, and unexpected halts.
APPROACH MARCH
14-26. An approach march is the advance of a combat unit when direct con-
tact with the enemy is intended (FM 3-0). However, it emphasizes speed over
tactical deployment. Both heavy and light forces conduct tactical road march-
es and approach marches.
14-27. The commander employs an approach march when the enemy’s ap-
proximate location is known, since it allows the force to move with greater
speed and less physical security or dispersion. (See Figure 14-6.) Units con-
ducting an approach march are task-organized before the march begins to al-
low them to transition to an on-order or a be-prepared mission without mak-
ing major adjustments in organization. For example, artillery units march
within their supported unit’s columns, while engineer units are well forward
to facilitate mobility. Air defense units may leapfrog short-range and
medium-range assets to ensure continuous coverage. The approach march
terminates in a march objective, such as an attack position, AA, or assault po-
sition, or can be used to transition to an attack. Follow-and-assume and re-
serve forces may also conduct an approach march forward of a LD.
SPT
Figure 14-6. Approach March
14-28. Based on the products of his intelligence preparation of the battlefield

(IPB) process, the overall commander should assign an AO or an axis of ad-
vance in combination with routes to the unit conducting the approach march.
These routes, AOs, or axes should facilitate the force’s movement and maxi-
mize its use of available concealment. Within the approach march, the
14-8
Troop Movement
commander should assign the force conducting the decisive operation and
forces conducting each shaping operation separate routes, AOs, or axes of ad-
vance unless an individual unit has the task of either follow-and-assume or
follow-and-support.
14-29. As the approach march nears areas of likely enemy interference, the
commander divides his main body into smaller, less vulnerable columns that
move on additional multiple routes or cross-country while continuing to em-
ploy security elements. The commander takes advantage of successful recon-
naissance and security operations to increase the distance traveled before the
main body must transition to a tactical formation. As discussed in Chap-
ter 12, the advance and any flank guards remain within supporting distance
of the main body, which stays in these smaller columns to facilitate rapid
movement.
14-30. Tactical road marches and approach marches occur within a theater of
war when contact with the enemy is possible or anticipated. This style of
movement emphasizes tactical considerations such as security and de-empha-
sizes efficiency and ease of movement. The commander organizes his unit to
conduct combat operations in a tactical movement. A unit generally main-
tains unit integrity throughout its movement. It plans for enemy interference
either en route to or shortly after arrival at its destination. Units conducting
either a tactical road march or an approach march use formations and tech-
niques consistent with the factors of METT-TC. The unit may conduct them
over unsecured routes if there are no friendly forces between the foremost
elements of the moving force and the enemy. The echelon operations officer
(the G3 or S3) is the primary staff officer responsible for planning these tacti-
cal movements, with input from other staff members.
14-31. There are several differences between an approach march and a tacti-
cal road march. A force conducting an approach march employs larger secur-
ity forces because of its greater exposure to enemy attack. Units conducting
an approach march arrange their systems into combined arms organizations.
An approach march allows the commander to disperse his task-organized
force into a tactical formation in unrestricted terrain without being constrain-
ed to existing roads and trails. On the other hand, road marches can organize
their columns for administrative convenience; for example, vehicles of similar
type, speed, and cross-country capabilities move together. Units conducting
an approach march establish appropriate tactical intervals between vehicles;
they do not normally employ a close column. They also use more routes than
units conducting road marches.
MOVEMENT TECHNIQUES
14-32. The commander uses the combat formations described in Chapter 3 in
conjunction with three movement techniques: traveling, traveling overwatch,
and bounding overwatch. Figure 14-7 on page 14-10 shows when a unit is
most likely to use each technique.
14-33. Movement techniques limit the unit’s exposure to enemy fire and posi-
tion it in a good formation to react to enemy contact. The commander selects
the appropriate movement technique based on the chance of enemy contact.
While moving, individual soldiers and vehicles use the terrain to protect
14-9
FM 3-90
themselves anytime enemy con-

tact is possible or expected. They IF ENEMY CONTACT IS: MOVE BY:
use natural cover and conceal-
ment to avoid enemy fires. The
NOT LIKELY TRAVELING
following rules apply to soldiers
and vehicle crews using terrain
for protection:
POSSIBLE TRAVELING
· Do not silhouette yourself OVERWATCH
against the skyline.
· Cross open areas quickly.
· Do not move directly for- EXPECTED BOUNDING
ward from a concealed fir- OVERWATCH
ing position.
Figure 14-7. Movement Techniques
· Avoid possible kill zones
because it is easier to cross difficult terrain than fight the enemy on un-
favorable terms.
· Avoid large, open areas, especially when they are dominated by high
ground or by terrain that can cover and conceal the enemy.
· Take active countermeasures, such as using smoke and direct and indi-
rect fire, to suppress or obscure suspected enemy positions.
TRAVELING
14-34. The commander uses
the traveling movement tech-
nique when speed is necessary
and contact with enemy forces
is not likely. All elements of the
unit move simultaneously. The
commander or small-unit
leader locates where he can
best control the situation.
Trailing elements may move in
parallel columns to shorten the
column and reaction time. (See
Figure 14-8.)
TRAVELING OVERWATCH In te rval B etw een E lem en ts is B as ed o n

14-35. The commander uses Visibility, T errain , an d W eap o ns R an g es
the traveling overwatch move-
Figure 14-8. Traveling
ment technique when contact
with enemy forces is possible, but speed is important. The lead element is
continuously moving, while the trailing elements move at variable speeds,
sometimes pausing to overwatch movement of the lead element. (See Fig-
ure 14-9.) The trailing elements key their movement to the terrain, over-
watching from a position where they can support the lead element if it en-
gages the enemy. The trailing elements overwatch from positions and at dis-
tances that will not prevent them from firing or moving to support the lead
element.
14-10
Troop Movement
M A N EU V E R ELE M EN T
I
O V E R W A TC H
ELE M EN T
I
O VE R W A T C H U N IT D IS P LA C E S A S N E C ES S A R Y ,
M O V IN G A T A V A R IA B LE S P EE D
Figure 14-9. Traveling Overwatch
BOUNDING OVERWATCH
14-36. The commander uses the bounding overwatch movement technique
when he expects to make contact with enemy forces. There are two variations
of this technique: alternate bounds and successive bounds. In both cases, the
overwatching elements cover the bounding elements from covered, concealed
positions with good observation and fields of fire against possible enemy posi-
tions. They can immediately support the bounding elements with maneuver
or fires alone if the bounding elements make contact. Unless they make con-
tact en route, the bounding elements move via covered and concealed routes
into the next set of support-by-fire positions. The length of the bound is based
on the terrain and the range of overwatching weapons. The commander can
use the uncommitted part of the force whenever he feels it is needed as part
of an immediate and controlled reaction to any threat to the bounding force.
In bounding overwatch, all movement keys on the next support-by-fire posi-
tion, which should offer at least some of the following advantages:
· Cover and concealment.
· Good observation and fields of fire.
· Protection for stationary weapon platforms.
14-37. If the unit uses alternate bounds, the lead element moves forward,
halts, and occupies a support-by-fire position that is covered at all times by
the rear overwatching element. That former rear overwatching element ad-
vances past the former lead element and takes an overwatch position. The
initial lead element then advances past the initial trail element and occupies
a new support-by-fire position. One element moves at a time. This method is
usually more rapid than successive bounds. (See Figure 14-10.)
14-38. If the unit uses successive bounds, the lead element, covered by the
trail element, advances and occupies a support-by-fire position. The trail ele-
ment advances to a support-by-fire position abreast of the lead element and
halts. The lead element moves to the next position and the move continues.
14-11
FM 3-90
Only one element moves at a time, and the trail element avoids advancing be-
yond the lead element. (See Figure 14-11.)
FIRST THIRD
SUPPORT-BY-FIRE SUPPORT-BY-FIRE
POSITION POSTION
SECOND BOUND
SPT
SECOND
REST OF MOVING FORCE SUPPORT-BY-FIRE
POSTION
FIRST THIRD
BOUND BOUND
Figure 14-10. Bounding Overwatch—Alternate Bounds
FIRST SECOND THIRD

SUPPORT-BY-FIRE SUPPORT-BY-FIRE SUPPORT-BY-FIRE
POSITION POSTION POSTION
SECOND FOURTH
BOUND BOUND
BP BP
FIRST THIRD
BOUND BOUND
17 27
Figure 14-11. Bounding Overwatch—Successive Bounds
PLANNING A TROOP MOVEMENT

14-39. The commander plans, prepares, executes, and assesses troop move-
ments to ensure the organized and uninterrupted flow of tactical units
throughout the AO. The objective of a successful move is for the unit to arrive
at its destination in a condition suitable to its probable employment. The goal
of all movement planning is to retain flexibility to execute a variety of plans
to meet ever-changing conditions. The commander ensures that his unit’s
movement SOP contain specifics, and he conducts rehearsals to ensure that
his soldiers and subordinate leaders understand them. The SOP should use a
standard task organization to simplify planning, provide flexibility, and allow
greater responsiveness. Such SOP allow for smoother cooperation by
14-12
Troop Movement
establishing habitual relationships between the unit’s subordinate elements

and outside supporting elements.
14-40. The movement order is the end result of the commander’s planning
process. The movement order is prepared as an annex to an operations order
(OPORD) or as a separate OPORD. Prepared in a five-paragraph format, it
consists of critical information needed by a unit to plan and execute the move-
ment. Information normally found in the movement order includes the desti-
nation, routes, orders of march, rates of march, times that each serial (or
march element for serial movement orders) will arrive and clear its SP, inter-
vals, speeds, scheduled maintenance halts, communications, and location of
the commander. The commander should also identify logistics sites and ser-
vices in his movement order. He need not include information and procedures
contained in movement SOP in the movement order. The movement order
should include a strip map or overlay. (The format for a movement order is
covered in FM 5-0.)
14-41. The commander bases his movement order on the best available infor-
mation on the enemy, terrain, weather, unit capabilities, and civil considera-
tions. This plan establishes how the unit will move from its current location
to the desired location. The integration of and support from combat and CS—
such as artillery, air defense, intelligence, military police, and engineers—are
critical for a successful tactical movement. The commander’s operations staff
develops the detailed movement order, with the assistance of the command-
er’s logistics staff, in accordance with his established priorities.
14-42. The movement order and unit SOP must address the possibility of am-
bushes, indirect fires, and air attacks. A small-unit SOP includes drills for re-
acting to these circumstances. Passive measures to mitigate the effects of an
air attack include route selection, vehicle intervals, and movement during
limited visibility. In case of attack, the commander has an evacuation plan for
casualties. This plan takes into account SOP items, such as using combat life-
savers and dispersing medical evacuation assets throughout the convoy.
14-43. For units that are not 100-percent mobile in organic vehicles, such as a
corps headquarters and many CSS units, the commander can either conduct
a shuttle with organic vehicles or request assistance from transportation
units. Shuttling requires transporting troops, equipment, and supplies by a
series of round trips with the same vehicles. It may also be performed by car-
rying successive parts of a load for short distances while the remaining sol-
diers continue on foot.
14-44. The higher headquarters logistics staff normally coordinates the provi-
sion of logistics support to moving units, although units carry sufficient fuel
and lubricants in their unit trains to conduct local movements. In coordina-
tion with the engineers, the logistics staff ensures that routes are adequate to
support the movement of the types and numbers of vehicles and supplies pro-
jected for movement. The commander must be aware of the load-carrying
capability of each route and the distances over which forces can be supported.
His logistics operators determine if any logistics assets should displace to sup-
port the mission. The commander also establishes halts for refueling as part
of his movement plan. Halt times should be long enough and locations large
enough to allow the entire march unit to refuel.
14-13
FM 3-90
14-45. The simplest troop movement scenario to plan and conduct is one
where the commander directing the movement controls the entire AO. In this
situation, he can use his normal C2 system. The headquarters ordering the
tactical road march schedules the movement times and approves the routes,
while its movements control organization allocates the required space and
time on the approved routes. If the movement results in a unit going outside
its parent headquarters’ AO, coordination through various movement control
centers is required. Otherwise, a higher headquarters must plan and control
the movement.
14-46. Whenever possible, the commander should use multiple routes to
move his unit. This reduces the length of columns, the vulnerability to enemy
air attack, and the amount of time the routes are not available to other units.
Multiple routes provide the commander with the flexibility to react to unex-
pected situations and permit more rapid concentration of combat power. The
two primary disadvantages of using multiple routes are difficulty in exer-
cising C2, and the unit may not have enough resources to provide logistic and
maintenance support on all routes.
14-47. The echelon transportation officer uses route classification compon-
ents, such as route widths, route types, military load classifications, overhead
clearance, route obstructions and special conditions, as he determines his
traffic circulation plan. A supporting engineer terrain detachment provides
his the majority of this information. Engineer reconnaissance obtains neces-
sary information not contained in existing databases. FM 3-34.212 and
FM 3-34.310 defines these components and describes how to use them.
14-48. The staff depicts the echelon traffic circulation plan on overlays using
transportation control measures. The traffic circulation plan takes into ac-
count—
· The most restrictive route features and route designations.
· Direction of movement over each route.
· Location of boundaries, units, highway regulation points, TCPs, and
principal supply points.
· Major geographic features and light lines, if applicable.
· Routes designated for one-way traffic.
· Separate routes for CSS and tactical units.
· Current data on traffic regulation and control restrictions, obstructions,
detours, defiles, capacities, surface conditions, and enemy activities
that affect the highway net.
From information contained in the traffic circulation plan, a traffic control
plan is prepared—usually by the provost marshal—from information con-
tained in the traffic circulation plan. The traffic control plan normally is pre-
pared in the form of an overlay. The commander primarily uses available
aviation, movement regulating teams, and MP units to assist in traffic con-
trol, but can assign this mission to other units, such as battalion scout pla-
toons.
14-14
Troop Movement
PREPARING A TROOP MOVEMENT

14-49. Reconnaissance precedes unit movement. Before a unit starts any
march, a reconnaissance element from that unit should reconnoiter the route
from its current location to the SP and determine how long it will take the
unit to reach the SP. This reconnaissance effort continues beyond the start
point and carefully examines the route’s trafficability, including the impact of
weather, such as ice, snow, and rain. This reconnaissance should also include
alternative routes and choke points, such as defiles, bridges, and fords, which
could slow the march. This reconnaissance effort complements map and tech-
nical reconnaissance and provides the commander with important informa-
tion about the terrain, obstacles, and potential enemy forces within his AO.
He can then take steps to establish TCPs at critical locations along the route
or mark the route where it becomes confusing.
14-50. A quartering party often accompanies reconnaissance elements to
mark routes and battle positions. The party may also secure new positions
with observation posts or limited forces until the unit conducting the move-
ment arrives.
14-51. The unit begins a tactical movement, such as a road march, fully sup-
plied. The unit should refuel at every opportunity, such as at halts and on ar-
rival at the final destination. The transportation of fuel and the security of
existing stockpiles are major factors in any mounted road march. The com-
mander may choose to conduct a refuel on the move (ROM) to extend the
range of his vehicles. Refuel on the move is a technique in which the com-
mander positions tankers just off the route of the march to refuel combat and
tactical vehicles rapidly, but only in the previously established quantities nec-
essary to extend their range to the desired length.
14-52. Based on the form of movement selected and the march and movement
techniques adopted, the commander may have to pre-position CSS assets to
conduct rapid and efficient refueling and resupply. Generally, a column for-
mation is the easiest movement technique to support. Any other formation re-
quires increased logistics planning. Night movements require special prepa-
ration because not all soldiers have night-vision devices. These special prepa-
rations include marking vehicles and equipment for easy identification by
friendly forces and repositioning vehicles and soldiers closer together so they
can detect each others’ movement.
EXECUTING A TROOP MOVEMENT

14-53. A unit’s ability to execute movement depends on its march discipline
and ability to maintain required movement standards and procedures as pre-
scribed by its movement SOP and movement order. This includes staying on
the given route and maintaining start, passage, and clear times. March disci-
pline is absolutely essential throughout the movement. Any deviation from
the movement order may interfere with the movements of other units and
may have serious consequences. However, march discipline can only be main-
tained when the plan matches conditions and the unit’s ability to move.
14-54. The strength and composition of the moving unit’s security elements
vary, depending on the factors of METT-TC. The commander employs his
14-15
FM 3-90
organic assets and any supporting security assets to protect his forces from
enemy activities. He positions them to the front, rear, and flanks of his forma-
tions while moving and at the halt to provide all-around security for the main
body. He can also enhance security by adopting a march formation and move-
ment technique that facilitate applying combat power in the direction he ex-
pects to make contact with the enemy.
14-55. Higher-echelon CSS organizations may support some tactical move-
ments. When the situation permits, CSS organizations establish mainte-
nance, ambulance exchange, and supply points along the route. While proced-
ures, amounts, and types of external support vary among major commands,
each logistics organization ensures that these sites are operational at the
designated times and locations. External CSS along the route may include
aeromedical evacuation, maintenance, water, and POL. Maintenance sites
generally consist of UMCPs where disabled vehicles can be moved for limited
maintenance and Class IX supplies. Vehicles unable to continue the move-
ment remain at a UMCP and join their parent organization when repaired.
The troop movement is complete when the last march unit clears the RP.
CORPS
REAR CP COSCOM SUPPORT

OPERATIONS
OPS CSS
DMC
CSG CSG
RAOC REAR FWD
MCB MMC
- COSCOM
UNITS
COMMAND
- CORPS MCT MRT
COORDINATION ELEMENTS
STAFF SUPERVISION
Figure 14-12. Corps Movement Control
MOVEMENT CONTROL
14-56. Movement control is the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of
personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications (JP 1-02). It is
a continuum that involves coordinating and integrating logistics, movement
information, and programs that span the strategic, operational, and tactical
levels of war. The balancing of requirements against capabilities and assign-
ing resources based on the commander’s priorities guides the conduct of
movement control. Movement control gives the commander the ability to de-
conflict the movement of units—troop movement—and the distribution of
supplies and services inherent in the provision of CSS. It is not a simple sys-
tem as is shown in Figure 14-12 by the number of different agencies involved
in corps movement control. (FM 4-01.30 discusses movement control.)
14-16
Chapter 15
Relief in Place
… the necessity for conservation of the fighting power of the troops
requires provision for the periodic relief of units in line.
FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations, 22 May 1941
A relief in place is a tactical enabling operation in which, by the

direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in
an area by the incoming unit. The directing authority transfers the re-
sponsibilities for the mission and the assigned area of operations (AO)
from the replaced elements to the incoming unit. A commander conducts
a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the
combat effectiveness of committed units. The higher headquarters directs
when and where to conduct the relief and establishes the appropriate
control measures. Normally, the unit relieved is defending. However, a
relief may set the stage for resuming offensive operations. A relief may
also serve to free the relieved unit for other tasks, such as decontamina-
tion, reconstitution, routine rest, resupply, maintenance, or specialized
training. Sometimes, as part of a larger operation, a commander wants
the enemy force to discover the relief, because that discovery might cause
it to do something in response that is prejudicial to its interest, such as
move reserves from an area where the friendly commander wants to con-
duct a penetration.
15-1. There are three CONTENTS

techniques for conducting
Organization of Forces............................... 15-2
a relief: sequentially, sim-
Control Measures ....................................... 15-2
ultaneously, or staggered.
Planning a Relief in Place .......................... 15-2
A sequential relief occurs
Preparing a Relief in Place......................... 15-5
when each element with- Executing a Relief in Place........................15-6
in the relieved unit is re-
lieved in succession, from
right to left or left to right, depending on how it is deployed. A simultaneous
relief occurs when all elements are relieved at the same time. A staggered re-
lief occurs when the commander relieves each element in a sequence deter-
mined by the tactical situation, not its geographical orientation. Simultane-
ous relief takes the least time to execute, but is more easily detected by the
enemy. Sequential or staggered reliefs can take place over a significant
amount of time.
15-2. A relief is either deliberate or hasty, depending on the amount of plan-
ning and preparations. The major differences are the depth and detail of
planning and, potentially, the execution time. Detailed planning generally
15-1
FM 3-90
facilitates shorter execution time by determining exactly what the command-

er believes he needs to do and the resources needed to accomplish the mis-
sion. Deliberate planning allows him and his staff to identify, develop, and co-
ordinate solutions to most potential problems before they occur and to ensure
the availability of resources when and where they are needed.
15-3. Both units involved in a relief in place should be of similar type—such
as mounted or dismounted—and task organized to help maintain operations
security (OPSEC). The relieving unit usually assumes as closely as possible
the same task organization as the unit being relieved. It assigns responsibili-
ties and deploys in a configuration similar to the relieved unit.
15-4. The relieving unit establishes advance parties to conduct detailed co-
ordination and preparations for the operation, down to the company level and
possibly to the platoon level. These advance parties infiltrate forward to avoid
detection. They normally include the echelon’s tactical command post, which
co-locates with the main headquarters of the unit being relieved. The com-
mander may also attach additional liaison personnel to subordinate units to
ensure a smooth changeover between subordinate units.
CONTROL MEASURES
15-5. Control measures associated with a relief in place are generally restric-
tive to prevent fratricide. As a minimum, these control measures include the
AO with its associated boundaries, battle positions, contact points, start
points, routes, release points, assembly areas (AAs), fire support coordinating
measures, and defensive fire coordination measures, such as target reference
points and engagement areas. (See Figure 15-1.) Expanded discussions of all
these control measures appear elsewhere in this manual. A commander may
use any control measure he feels is necessary to conduct a relief in place.
PLANNING A RELIEF IN PLACE

15-6. Once ordered to conduct a relief in place, the commander of the re-
lieving unit contacts the commander of the unit to be relieved. The co-location
of unit command posts also helps achieve the level of coordination required. If
the relieved unit’s forward elements can defend the AO, the relieving unit
executes the relief in place from the rear to the front. This facilitates move-
ment and terrain management.
15-7. In a deliberate relief, units exchange plans and liaison personnel, con-
duct briefings, perform detailed reconnaissance, and publish orders with de-
tailed instructions. In a hasty relief, the commander abbreviates the planning
process and controls the execution using oral and fragmentary orders. In both
cases, the relieved unit designates liaison personnel from its combat, combat
support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) elements to remain with the
relieving unit until completing the necessary plans. The relieving unit re-
ceives current intelligence, operations, and logistics information from the unit
being relieved, as well as from common higher headquarters, adjacent units,
and subordinate elements. The complexity of a relief in place requires
15-2
Relief in Place
extensive liaison and reconnaissance. Exchanging information about the ene-

my and civilian situations, friendly dispositions, terrain analysis, and fire
support and obstacle plans, coupled with reconnaissance, helps the relieving
commander plan and execute his mission.
6 11 I
RP 15 RP 3
9 I I
I
I SP
17 X SP 14
II
I
1
5
TAC SP 10
SP 16
II
II RP 8
RP 7 X
X 1 RP 2
SP 13 RESERVE X
TAC
X
X 174
RP 1 SP 12
TOC
RELIEVED FORCE
RELIEVING FORCE
Figure 15-1. Overlay of a Brigade Relief in Place
15-8. The relief is a tactically vulnerable operation. The units involved must
concentrate on security while preparing for and executing the operation. The
intent of the operation is to complete the relief without discovery by the ene-
my. Consequently, commanders typically plan reliefs for execution during
periods of reduced visibility, such as night or fog. Concealment of the relief
from the enemy is a primary concern when the unit is conducting the relief as
part of an economy of force measure to free forces for other operations. The
enemy should perceive only one unit’s command structure in operation—that
of the unit being relieved—until completing the operation. This requires a de-
tailed knowledge of friendly vulnerabilities. A counterintelligence assessment
of enemy collective capabilities directed against the friendly forces involved in
the relief can provide that detailed knowledge.
15-9. Generally, as soon as the mutual higher headquarters issues the warn-
ing order, the commander of the relieving unit co-locates one of his command
posts with the command post of the unit being relieved. As a minimum, he es-
tablishes communications and liaison with that unit. The warning order des-
ignates the time of relief, relieving and relieved units, and sequence of events.
It specifies the future missions of the relieved force, route priorities, any re-
strictions on advance parties, any extraordinary security measures, and the
time and place for issuing the complete order.
15-3
FM 3-90
15-10. During a relief, commanders and leaders from the relieving unit
should conduct reconnaissance of the area for which they will assume respon-
sibility. This leaders’ reconnaissance should include the lowest-echelon leader
allowed by the tactical situation. The reconnaissance should focus on the
route into the position the unit is to occupy, the positions themselves, the cur-
rent disposition of the unit being relieved, and any obstacles that could affect
troop movement.
15-11. The two commanders must decide on a time or an event that initiates
the passage of command. This allows the smooth transition of command and
control from one commander to another. Normally, this occurs when the
frontline subordinate commanders have assumed responsibility for their re-
spective AOs and the incoming commander has sufficient communication fa-
cilities in operation to control the operation. Regardless of their parent organ-
ization, all units in the AO come under the operational control of the AO com-
mander if the AO comes under attack or when a specified event occurs during
the relief.
15-12. The fire support coordinators coordinate fire support coordinating
measures and identify those artillery and other fire support units that are
available to support the relief. The relieving unit adopts the fire plan of the
unit being relieved. The fire support assets of both units support the relief.
This is critical if the enemy detects the relief and tries to exploit the situation.
Units plan their fires to deceive the enemy and expedite the relief. Units
should maintain normal activity patterns. For example, a unit should con-
tinue to expend the same average number of artillery rounds per day during
the relief that it expended prior to the initiation of the relief. The commander
should not relieve fire support and other CS and CSS units at the same time
as the maneuver units they support. The commander relieves these organiza-
tions at other times.
15-13. The relief plan must specify the method to use in relieving artillery
units. If terrain allows, relieving artillery units should not occupy previously
used firing positions. Instead, relieving firing units should establish firing po-
sitions nearby those firing positions of the relieved unit and carefully inte-
grate their fire with that of the relieved unit. Occupying firing positions at
night or during periods of poor visibility enhances OPSEC.
15-14. Priority of the air defense effort is to protect identified choke points,
battle positions, routes to conduct the operation, and AAs. The air defense as-
sets of both units support the relief. The air defense unit supporting the re-
lieving force coordinates with the replaced force’s supporting air defense unit.
This coordination covers, but is not limited to, air intelligence preparation of
the battlefield, rules of engagement, current air activity, present fire unit po-
sitions, Army airspace command and control information, the operation plan,
logistics, and communications. Higher-echelon and joint air defense organiza-
tions may also support the relief. Provisions to obtain local air superiority re-
duce the vulnerability of the forces during the relief in place when the units
involved cannot avoid congestion on the ground.
15-15. The relieving unit verifies the obstacle records of the unit being re-
lieved. Handover of obstacles is a complex procedure. Initially, the engineer
priority is on mobility to get the relieving unit into the AO. It focuses on those
15-4
Relief in Place
routes and lanes leading into the AO. Once the relief occurs, priority of the
mobility and survivability effort transitions to support the relieving unit’s
continuing mission. The commander may require his engineers to assist with
survivability tasks to support the relieving force.
15-16. Force-intermingling inherent in a relief, places an increased burden on
command and control systems. The consequences of mutual interference be-
tween the units and the complexity associated with such areas as traffic con-
trol, fire support coordination, obstacle plans, and communications require
close coordination between all headquarters involved. Establishing early liai-
son between the stationary and the relieving forces is critical.
15-17. The relieving unit is responsible for all sustaining operations. As the
support elements of the unit being relieved displace, they leave the relieving
unit supply stocks according to previously coordinated arrangements. If the
units conducting the relief have different modified tables of organization and
equipment (MTOEs), mission analysis must be conducted to determine how
the relieving unit will meet all of its responsibilities and what weapon sys-
tems will be used. The unit logistics staff must determine any special support
requirements the relieving unit will have and address supporting those re-
quirements with the available supporting organizations. The unit logistics
staff ensures that both commanders know of any CSS constraints that might
affect the relieving unit. The two units’ rear command posts also co-locate and
a single headquarters coordinates traffic movement into and out of the AO.
PREPARING A RELIEF IN PLACE

15-18. The commander conceals the relief from the enemy for as long as pos-
sible. At the first indication that a relief is necessary, which is usually the
warning order for the relieving unit, both the relieved unit and the relieving
unit review their OPSEC plans and procedures. Commanders may use decep-
tion measures when conducting a relief in place to maintain secrecy. To main-
tain security during the relief in place, the relieving unit makes maximum
use of the relieved unit’s radio nets and operators. Both units involved in the
relief operate on the command frequencies and encryption variables of the re-
lieved unit at all levels. The relieved unit’s signal officer is in charge of com-
munications throughout the relief operation.
15-19. To enhance security, commanders impose light and noise discipline
and electromagnetic emission control measures, such as radio silence or
radio-listening silence. In joint and multinational operations, the senior com-
mander specifies the frequency bands and equipment types affected. Radio si-
lence is a condition when the commander turns off all or specific radio equip-
ment. Radio-listening silence is a situation in which combat net radios remain
turned on and monitored, with strict criteria governing when a station on the
radio network is allowed to break silence. An example of radio-listening si-
lence would be, “Maintain radio listening silence until physical contact with
the enemy is made.”
15-20. The units conduct rehearsals to discover any weaknesses in the plan
and familiarize all elements of both forces with the plan. Finding time for re-
hearsals requires commanders and staffs to focus on time management.
15-5
FM 3-90
15-21. Reconnaissance elements of the relieving unit precede its movement

with a route reconnaissance to the AA. They conduct reconnaissance of the
routes leading from the AAs to the positions of the unit being relieved. The
commander of the relieving unit normally conducts a leader’s reconnaissance
before starting the operation.
15-22. The commander must allocate time to construct individual vehicle
fighting positions if a heavy unit is relieving a light unit. In a similar fashion,
preparations for an armor heavy unit to relieve a mechanized infantry heavy
unit must include expanding individual vehicle fighting positions to accom-
modate the larger tanks.
15-23. While the units involved plan, prepare, and execute the relief in place,
their common higher headquarters and other units continue actions to mask
the relief. These include using demonstrations, feints, smoke, and harassing
and interdiction fires. The common higher headquarters executes operations
to attack and disrupt the enemy’s uncommitted and reserve forces during the
relief. Its intent is to fix or distract the enemy so that he does not detect or in-
terfere with the relief.
EXECUTING A RELIEF IN PLACE

15-24. In situations where the commander desires to conceal the relief from
the enemy, such as during a sequential or staggered relief, the relieving unit
may occupy the same positions as the unit it relieves. Alternatively, it may
establish more favorable positions within the vicinity of the relieved unit’s lo-
cation. Occupying different positions makes early discovery by the enemy
more likely. Any increase in activity in forward positions can reveal the relief
to the enemy. Friendly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems
attempt to detect if the enemy can discover the relief before its completion.
15-25. The enemy can usually detect a relief effort because of the increased
activity resulting from the movement of soldiers and equipment out of posi-
tion by the relieved unit and into position by the relieving unit. Additionally,
after any period of combat, there are differences in the types and amount of
equipment between the relieving unit and the relieved unit, even if they have
the same MTOEs. These differences can also reveal the relief to the enemy.
The two units establish guidelines for exchanging compatible equipment and
supplies to limit these differences. In addition, it may be necessary to ex-
change certain weapons, supplies, equipment, and occasionally, vehicles be-
tween units. When major differences in the number of combat systems
between the units exist—for example, a tank-heavy task force relieves a
mechanized infantry-heavy task force—inoperable equipment or visual simu-
lators may assist in hiding the change of units.
15-26. In a simultaneous relief, the relieving unit begins moving from its cur-
rent location to AAs in the AO of the unit being relieved. Once the relief be-
gins, all elements involved execute the relief as quickly as possible. Both
units are vulnerable to enemy attack because of the concentration, move-
ment, and intermingling of forces in a simultaneous relief. Any unnecessary
delay during execution provides the enemy additional time to acquire and en-
gage the forces involved. All units in the AO come under the operational
15-6
Relief in Place
control of the relieving unit commander at the time or triggering event pre-
viously established by the plan for the operation.
15-27. As the first relieving element arrives from the AA to assume the posi-
tion, it establishes a screen of the relieved unit’s positions as the tactical sit-
uation permits. The remainder of the relieving unit moves forward to posi-
tions behind the unit being relieved. The relieving unit may use the relieved
unit’s alternate and supplementary defensive positions to take advantage of
any previous defensive preparations. At the previously established time or
event, passage of command takes place. At that point, if possible, the com-
mander of the relieving unit informs all units involved in the relief of the pas-
sage of command.
15-28. The relieved unit continues to defend. The relieving unit’s advance
parties coordinate procedures for the rearward passage of the relieved unit.
On order, the relieved unit begins withdrawing through the relieving unit
and moves to AAs. Crew-served weapons are usually the last elements re-
lieved after exchanging range cards. The relieving unit replaces them on a
one-for-one basis to the maximum extent possible to maintain the illusion of
routine activity. The relieved unit’s CS and logistics assets assist both the re-
lieved unit and the relieving unit during this period.
15-29. A relief does not normally require artillery units to relieve weapon sys-
tem for weapon system unless the terrain limits the number of firing posi-
tions available. Generally, the relieved unit’s artillery and other fire support
assets remain in place until all other relieved elements displace and are
available to reinforce the fires of the relieving unit in case the enemy tries to
interfere. If the purpose of the relief is to continue the attack, the artillery of
both forces generally remains in place to support the subsequent operation.
15-30. Multiple main supply routes that allow only one-way traffic can simp-
lify the forward and rearward movement of both units. The relieving unit’s
rear command post controls both units’ military police and any other traffic
management assets. (The main command post performs these functions if the
echelon does not have a rear command post.) The commander uses these as-
sets to help control unit and convoy movement on lines of communications,
main supply routes, and movement routes throughout his AO.
15-31. In the future, it is likely that conflicts will involve the relief of an
allied or coalition force. The commander should consider the following addi-
tional points when such reliefs occur:
· Dissimilar unit organizations may require special adjustments in as-
signed areas.
· Control of fire support may require special liaison.
· Language difficulties may require an increased use of guides and trans-
lators.
· Using relieved unit communications requires special signal arrange-
ments and additional operators.
· Ammunition and equipment incompatibility may make exchanging as-
sets more difficult.
· Impact of civilians on the operations.
15-7
Chapter 16
Passage of Lines
The principal task involved in a passage of lines is the preparation for
continuing the attack.
FM 1005, Field Service Regulations: Operations, 22 May 1941
Passage of lines is a tactical enabling operation in which one unit

moves through another unit’s positions with the intent of moving
into or out of enemy contact. A commander conducts a passage of
lines to continue an attack or conduct a counterattack, retrograde secur-
ity or main battle forces, and anytime one unit cannot bypass another
unit’s position. The conduct of a passage of lines potentially involves close
combat. It involves transferring the responsibility for an area of opera-
tions (AO) between two commanders. That transfer of responsibility usu-
ally occurs when roughly twothirds of the passing force has moved
through the passage point. If not directed by higher authority, the unit
commanders determine—by mutual agreement—the time to pass com-
mand. They disseminate this information to the lowest levels of both or-
ganizations.
16-1. The commander’s reasons for conducting a passage of lines are to—
· Sustain the tempo of an offensive operation.
· Maintain the viability of the defense by transferring responsibility from
one unit to another.
· Transition from a delay or security operation by one force to a defense.
· Free a unit for another mission or task.
The headquarters directing the passage of lines is responsible for determining
when the passage starts and finishes.
16-2. A passage of lines occurs under two basic conditions. A forward pas-
sage of lines occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s posi-
tions while moving toward the enemy. A rearward passage of lines
occurs when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while
CONTENTS
Organization of Forces............................... 16-1 Executing a Forward Passage ............... 16-7
Control Measures ....................................... 16-1 Rearward Passage of Lines ....................... 16-8
Planning a Passage of Lines ..................... 16-3 Planning a Rearward Passage............... 16-8
Forward Passage of Lines ......................... 16-6 Preparing a Rearward Passage ............. 16-9
Preparing a Forward Passage ............... 16-6 Executing a Rearward Passage............. 16-9
16-0
Passage of Lines
moving away from the enemy. Ideally, a passage of lines does not inter-
fere with conducting the stationary unit’s operations.
16-3. A unit may participate in a passage of lines as either the passing or sta-
tionary force. Except for co-locating command posts and providing for guides
by the stationary force, conducting a passage of lines does not require a spec-
ial task organization. Both the passing force and the stationary force main-
tain their previous combat organization during the passage. Usually, if the
stationary unit has the capability, it is responsible for conducting operations
against uncommitted enemy forces. However, operations directed against un-
committed enemy forces may be the responsibility of a higher echelon, de-
pending on the echelon at which the passage takes place.
16-4. A forward passing unit’s order of march is generally reconnaissance
and security elements first. The ground combat force move next, followed by
combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. The commander
integrates his artillery, air defense, and engineers into the order of march in
accordance with the factors of METTTC. The passing unit reverses this order
of march in a rearward passage of lines. The stationary unit normally pro-
vides the moving unit with guides to expedite the passage. Attack helicopters
and air cavalry are useful in providing security.
CONTROL MEASURES
16-5. Control measures associated with a passage of lines are generally re-
strictive to prevent fratricide. As a minimum, they include the AO, assembly
areas (AAs), attack positions, battle handover line (BHL), contact points, pas-
sage points, passage lanes, routes, gaps, phase lines, and recognition signals.
The headquarters directing the passage designates or recommends contact
points, passage lanes, AAs, routes, and start and end times for the passage.
The commander may also use start points, release points, fire support coordi-
nating measures, such as coordinated fire lines (CFLs), and other control
measures as necessary to conduct this task. (See Figure 16-1, page 16-2.)
Unless the higher headquarters of the two units establishes the necessary
graphic control measures, the stationary unit establishes them for the pas-
sage. However, the stationary unit commander must coordinate them with
the passing unit commander. The stationary unit establishes these measures
because it owns the terrain, it knows where the obstacles are, and it knows
the tactical plan. If the control measures dictated by the higher headquarters
are not sufficient—because they do not contain enough passage points, lanes,
and so forth—the two units can agree to add the necessary measures.
16-6. A passage point is a specifically designated place where the
passing units pass through the stationary unit. The location of this
point is where the commander wants subordinate units to physically execute
a passage of lines. In a forward passage of lines, the passage point marks the
location where the passing unit is no longer bound by the restrictions placed
on it by the stationary force. On the other hand, in a rearward passage of
lines, the passage point marks the location where the stationary unit can re-
strict the movement and maneuver of the passing force. Between the contact
16-1
FM 3-90
ENY ENY
PL DANIEL/ PL DANIEL/
PP 14 PP 91
BHL PP 62 PP 34 BHL
PL FULTON PL FULTON
I I I 2
X I
II
II
ATK ATK I
1 4
5 I ATK ATK
PL COLLEEN RP 7 PL COLLEEN
II II
RP 17
ROUTE BLUE
ROUTE
GOLD
SP 45 SP 11
AA
SCOTT
PL JONES PL JONES
X
Figure 16-1. Control Measures Associated with a Forward Passage of Lines
point and the passage point, the stationary unit

controls the passing force’s movement. Fig-
ure 16-2 depicts the graphic control measure for
passage point 8.
PP 8
16-7. A passage lane is a lane through an
enemy or friendly obstacle that provides
safe passage for a passing force. The lane may
be cleared, including being reduced and proofed,
as part of a breach operation, or it may be in- Figure 16-2.
cluded as part of the design of a friendly obstacle. Passage Point 8
It is a clear route all the way through an obstacle.
Passage lanes normally end where a route begins. That
route should allow the passing unit to move rapidly
through the stationary unit’s area. Figure 16-3 depicts
the graphic control measure for a lane.
16-8. A gap is an area free of armed mines or ob-
stacles whose width and direction allow a friendly
force to pass through the area containing obsta-
cles while dispersed in a tactical formation. The
presence of gaps prevents inadvertent concentrations of
soldiers and equipment around the entry points of lanes.
Figure 16-3. Lane
Figure 16-4 depicts the graphic control measure for a
gap.
16-2
Passage of Lines
PLANNING A PASSAGE OF LINES

16-9. As with any activity involving transferring
combat responsibility from one unit to another, the
complex nature of a passage of lines involves risk.
As with other operations, a passage of lines may be
categorized as deliberate or hasty. During a passage
of lines, the commander normally maintains the es-
tablished tempo. Sustaining that established tempo
requires detailed planning and preparations for a
deliberate passage of lines. In this case, both the sta- Figure 16-4. Gap
tionary and moving force have time to—
· Publish written orders.
· Exchange plans, intelligence information, databases, and liaison per-
sonnel.
· Conduct briefings and detailed reconnaissance.
· Conduct rehearsals.
The commander uses oral and fragmentary orders to conduct a hasty passage
of lines.
16-10. In a passage of lines, the headquarters directing the passage is respon-
sible for designating—
· Subsequent missions for both forces.
· When and under what conditions passage of command takes place.
· Start and finish times for the passage.
· Contact points between the units involved.
· Common maneuver control measures and graphics.
The directing headquarters normally establishes this information in either
the warning order or the order directing the passage. In the absence of
higher-echelon guidance, close coordination and understanding between the
commanders and staffs of the two units are essential to a smooth passage.
16-11. The unit commanders plan the passage of lines to maintain enemy
contact and provide constant fires on the enemy. Commanders reduce risk
and ensure synchronization through detailed planning and decentralized exe-
cution. With forces intermingling during the passage, the need for positive
control increases. The passage requires close coordination, clearly understood
control measures, liaison between all headquarters and echelons involved in
the passage, and clear identification of the moment or event that causes one
force to assume responsibility for the AO from another.
16-12. After receiving the warning order that directs a passage of lines, the
passing unit’s commander and key staff representatives generally co-locate
with the command post of the stationary unit to facilitate in planning the
passage and establishing common situational understanding. If the passing
unit cannot co-locate one of its command posts to help plan the passage, it
conducts extensive liaison with the stationary unit. The planning focus for
both the passing unit and the stationary unit is on operations following the
passage. While this occurs, the two units involved coordinate the following:
16-3
FM 3-90
· The exchange of intelligence and combat information.

· Current friendly dispositions and tactical plans, especially deception
and obstacle plans.
· Direct and indirect fires and close air support plans.
· Any necessary maneuver control measures and graphics not directed
by the higher headquarters, such as boundary changes, the BHL, emer-
gency CSS points, and AA and firing positions for artillery, air defense,
and other units.
· Long-range and short-range recognition symbols and vehicle markings
to reduce the probability of fratricide.
· When and under what conditions control of the AO transfers from one
headquarters to the other, if not previously established.
· Provisions for movement control, including contact points, start and re-
lease points, primary and alternate routes, route selection, priorities
for using routes and facilities, passage points, and provision for guides.
· Reconnaissance by elements of the passing unit.
· Signal operating instruction details, such as call signs, frequencies, and
recognition signals.
· Security measures during the passage, including nuclear, biological,
and chemical reconnaissance or biological detection systems.
· Fires, obscurants, and any other combat, CS, and CSS provided by the
stationary unit.
· Measures to reduce both units’ vulnerability to attack by enemy wea-
pons of mass destruction.
· Operations security measures required before or during the passage.
· Allocation of terrain for use by the passing force.
· Air defense cover—up to and forward of the BHL.
· Logistics support for the passing unit provided by the stationary unit,
especially fuel, maintenance, and medical treatment.
16-13. The fire support elements of both the stationary and the passing unit
must agree on allocating firing positions. The AO commander controls the al-
location of firing positions in case of disagreement. These positions must be
far enough forward to support the operation without having to redeploy dur-
ing critical stages of the battle. The fire support elements normally position
in areas not identified by the enemy.
16-14. Detailed air defense planning is essential for a passage of lines. Mov-
ing units tend to move slowly and often in some type of column formation
during the passage. Vehicle congestion presents lucrative targets to enemy
aircraft. In most cases, the stationary air defense elements can protect the
passing force, allowing the air defense units supporting the passing force to
move with the passing force. Dissemination of early warning and Army air-
space command and control information reduces the risk of fratricide to
friendly aviation assets while increasing the probability of the timely detec-
tion of enemy air. Strict adherence to identification, friend-or-foe (IFF)
16-4
Passage of Lines
procedures among pilots and air defense fire units is critical, especially dur-
ing periods of limited visibility. Local air superiority also reduces the vulnera-
bility of the two forces when congestion cannot be avoided on the ground.
16-15. Once a passage of lines begins, it occurs quickly. Where possible, the
operation takes place when the enemy has the least capability to detect it,
such as at night or during periods of reduced visibility. In any passage of
lines, the commander considers using smoke to screen friendly movement,
even at night.
16-16. The passing unit prefers to conduct the passage through a gap in the
stationary unit’s positions rather than through a lane or a route that tra-
verses those positions. This reduces the vulnerability that results from con-
centrating forces when one unit passes directly through the occupied posi-
tions of another unit. It also avoids the danger of concentrating the passing
unit into passage lanes.
16-17. In a forward passage of lines, when there are no gaps through the sta-
tionary unit’s positions, each battalion task force normally needs at least two
passage lanes. In a rearward passage of lines, each battalion needs at least
one passage lane. In both cases, a brigade needs at least one additional lane
for its tactical vehicles. The routes and lanes provide cover, concealment, and
rapid movement of the passing force. The commander may designate alterna-
tive routes and lanes for elements of the moving force that are contaminated.
They should not disrupt the combat capability of the stationary unit. The
commander seeks additional lanes to speed the process if the terrain and ene-
my situation allow.
16-18. The passing unit normally has priority of route use to and within the
stationary unit’s AO. Clearing and maintaining passage routes up to the BHL
are the responsibility of the stationary force. The stationary force must pro-
vide an obstacle overlay of its obstacles. The passing unit must be prepared to
help maintain these routes, and it positions its engineer equipment accord-
ingly. The stationary unit is responsible for traffic control within its AO until
the passing unit assumes control. During the passage, the passing unit aug-
ments the traffic-control capability of the stationary unit as required.
16-19. Based on the commander’s concept and intent, the passing force focus-
es its planning effort on two general areas: coordination with the stationary
force and guidance to subordinate units conducting the passage. These plan-
ning efforts occur simultaneously. If the enemy attacks during the passage,
the plan probably requires modification to prevent hampering friendly ma-
neuver.
16-20. Executing a passage of lines successfully requires effective communi-
cation between the two units. The commanders build redundancy of com-
munication signals and means into their passage plans, such as using mobile
subscriber equipment and combat net radios. The commanders also designate
contact points to ensure effective communication between the two forces at
the lowest tactical level.
16-5
FM 3-90
FORWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

16-21. The purpose of a forward passage of lines is to move forces forward to
conduct operations. It ensures the maintenance of enemy contact while allow-
ing the relief of previously committed forces. The stationary force must con-
trol and secure the AO far enough to its front that the moving force can pass
through the stationary force and reform into a combat formation prior to con-
tact with an enemy force. Generally, the stationary unit supports the passing
unit until the passing unit masks the stationary unit’s direct fires. The sta-
tionary unit continues to support the passing force with its fire support sys-
tems until the passing unit moves beyond the supporting range of the station-
ary force. The stationary unit is also responsible for the security of the line of
departure of the forward passing unit until it is able to assume that respon-
sibility. The boundaries of the forward passing force after it completes its pas-
sage do not have to coincide with the boundaries of the stationary force. (See
Figure 16-5.)
54
II
PP
II
RP 21
II
PP 1 PP 17 PP 91 PP 23 PP 4 BHL
BHL II II
II ATK PSN AT ATK PSN KP
SN KP
SN
AT LEE
AT YLA KY
ATK PSN PETER JO K P S KATELYN KA
ATK PSN SE N
II
OLIVIA PH
LANE 4
IRENE
LANE 14
LD
LANE 1
II
LANE 39
E GO
17
I
RP 11
LANE 32
NE
RP 5
LA
II
I T
ROU
II
NKEL
E2
RP 9 CP 22
LAN
CP 97 CP 117
S
SCHRA
PP
CP 51
CA
II II II
DAVIS
RTE
E
SP 92
E
RT
CP 53
ROUT
BSA CP 111
AA CP 24
HAWK
Figure 16-5. Forward Passage of Lines
PREPARING A FORWARD PASSAGE

16-22. The passing unit conducts reconnaissance from its current location to
its designated AAs, which are generally located to the rear of the stationary
unit. After completing its reconnaissance, the passing unit occupies these
AAs.
16-23. The commander should organize the passing force for its subsequent
mission before initiating the forward passage of lines. The passing force
avoids regrouping in forward AAs or attack positions.
16-6
Passage of Lines
EXECUTING A FORWARD PASSAGE

16-24. When the passing force moves forward, it should move without a halt
through the stationary unit while deployed in a combat formation. That mini-
mizes the time the two forces are concentrated in the forward area, making
them less vulnerable to enemy attack.
16-25. Support by the stationary force ends when the combat elements of the
moving force, including the reserve, have moved beyond direct-fire range.
However, artillery, air defense, and other long-range systems may remain to
support the passing unit until a previously designated event occurs or a high-
er headquarters directs another mission.
16-26. When executing the forward passage, the passing unit’s reconnais-
sance elements operate forward of the release points and establish a screen in
front of the passing unit. The stationary unit continues to conduct aggressive
security operations throughout the passage of lines. The movement of main
body forces begins from their AAs to attack positions, where the passing unit
conducts its final preparations for the passage of lines and the attack. The
passing unit moves to and occupies attack positions when observation by the
enemy is unlikely. The stationary unit clears any obstacles from designated
passage gaps, lanes, or routes, and guides elements of the passing unit from
the contact point through the passage points.
16-27. The direct and indirect-fire assets of the stationary unit normally sup-
port the movement of the passing unit. Offensive information operations—es-
pecially electronic attack—directed against enemy command and control (C2)
nodes disrupt his dissemination of information and his reaction to friendly
operations. Any preparatory or covering fires should coincide with the pass-
ing unit’s movement from the attack position to the passage lanes. After the
forward moving unit commander assumes responsibility for the AO, he co-
ordinates all fire support. Depending on the situation at the time, the passing
commander may continue to use only the fire support assets of the stationary
force until the passage of lines is complete. This allows the passing unit’s fire
support assets to move forward, in the case of artillery, or remain available to
support the passing unit’s forward movement, in the case of attack helicop-
ters and close air support. On passage of command, the passing commander
also assumes control of fires forward of the BHL. For example, he moves the
CFL forward to conform to the movement of his forward security elements.
16-28. The superior headquarters of the forces involved should exercise over-
all C2 of the passage. In a forward passage, the commander of the passing
force normally assumes responsibility for conducting operations beyond the
BHL once the attack begins. In practice, however, it is useful to complete the
transfer of responsibility, including fire support, just before starting the op-
eration. During the passage, two parallel chains of command are operating in
one area simultaneously, and the possibility of confusion exists. A successful
passage of lines requires clear C2 responsibilities. The passing unit’s com-
mand post passes through the lines as soon as possible after the lead ele-
ments complete their passage and locates where it can best control opera-
tions.
16-7
FM 3-90
16-29. The stationary unit furnishes the passing unit with any previously co-
ordinated or emergency logistics assistance within its capabilities. These typi-
cally include—
· Evacuating casualties and enemy prisoners of war.
· Controlling dislocated civilians.
· Using areas and facilities such as water points and medical facilities.
· Controlling routes and traffic management.
· Recovering disabled vehicles and equipment.
The passing force normally assumes full responsibility for its CSS support
forward of the BHL.
16-30. When dissimilar units, such as light infantry and mounted forces, are
involved in a passage of lines, the principles involved are the same; however,
the execution is different. For example, the type and amount of support pro-
vided by the stationary unit will change. In some cases, the higher head-
quarters ordering the passage needs to provide assets to support the passage.
REARWARD PASSAGE OF LINES

16-31. A rearward passage of lines is similar in concept to a forward passage
of lines. It continues the defense or retrograde operation, maintaining enemy
contact while allowing for recovery of security or other forward forces. This
operation may or may not be conducted under enemy pressure. Counterintel-
ligence analysis provides an assessment of enemy collection against friendly
forces, specified by gaps and vulnerabilities, and countermeasures to enemy
collection. Additionally, that analysis provides the commander with a view
into the enemy’s decision making and intelligence cycles and the time period
in which the enemy may discover the movement.
PLANNING A REARWARD PASSAGE

16-32. Planning procedures for a rearward passage of lines closely resemble
the planning procedures for a forward passage of lines. However, rearward
movement is likely to be more difficult because of the following:
· The enemy probably has the initiative, which tends to reduce the time
available to conduct liaison and reconnaissance and make detailed
plans.
· If the rearward moving force has been in action, its soldiers are tired
and possibly disorganized to some degree.
· The enemy may be applying pressure on the passing force.
· Friendly forces may be more difficult to recognize because enemy forces
may be intermixed with them.
16-33. Close coordination between the two commanders is crucial to success-
fully executing the rearward passage and subsequent transfer of responsibil-
ity. This requirement for close coordination is even more critical when the
tactical situation results in a staggered or incremental rearward passage
across an AO. The passing commander relinquishes control of his elements
remaining in contact at the time of the transfer of responsibility to the sta-
tionary commander. Generally, the stationary unit assumes control of the AO
16-8
Passage of Lines
forward of the BHL after twothirds of the passing force’s combat elements
move through the passage points.
16-34. After receiving the warning order, the passing unit begins coordina-
tion and establishes communication with the stationary unit. The command-
ers of these units coordinate the same details as those outlined for a forward
passage of lines. For example, the stationary commander coordinates for fires
to support the rearward passing force. The two staffs coordinate those control
measures necessary to support retrograde operations and their associated
rearward passage of lines. (See paragraphs 16-5 to 16-8.) The commanders es-
tablish a probable time to initiate passage. The stationary commander
assigns responsibility for closing and executing obstacles.
16-35. The stationary unit identifies multiple routes through its AO and
across its rear boundary to AAs. The passing unit begins reconnaissance of
these routes as soon as possible. The stationary unit must physically show all
obstacles and routes and gaps through them to the passing unit. It provides
guides for the passing unit—especially through obstacles—and mans contact
points and passage points. The passing unit begins to reconnoiter its routes to
the established contact points with the stationary unit’s troops. The station-
ary unit establishes a security area in which responsibility transitions from
the moving force to the stationary force. Normally, a BHL designates the for-
ward edge of this area. The BHL is within direct-fire range and observed
indirect-fire range of the stationary force.
PREPARING A REARWARD PASSAGE

16-36. The command posts of both units involved should move to a position
where they can co-locate as part of the preparations for the rearward passage.
This co-location reduces the risk associated with a passage because it makes
it easier to coordinate between the two units. If circumstances prevent the
units’ command posts from co-locating, they must exchange liaison teams to
ensure thorough coordination. If necessary, fire support assets from the sta-
tionary force occupy positions forward of their primary positions to give maxi-
mum coverage of forces of rearward moving unit.
EXECUTING A REARWARD PASSAGE

16-37. The passing unit maintains command of its subordinate elements
throughout the retrograde and rearward passage. The normal order of march
in a rearward passage of lines is CSS elements, main command post, CS ele-
ments, tactical command post, and combat units. The passage point marks
the location where the passing unit comes under the control of restrictions
placed by the stationary unit. (See Figure 16-6.) Note that the unit on the far
right does not have a passage point because of the gap existing at that loca-
tion. If the enemy continues to press his attack during the passage, the pass-
ing unit controls the battle from co-located command posts while the station-
ary unit monitors and controls the passage of lines until battle handover oc-
curs. The passing unit’s command post passes through the lines as soon as
possible after the lead elements complete their passage. On passage of com-
mand, the stationary unit assumes the defense of the AO.
16-9
FM 3-90
17 4 54
II
PP
II
PP PP 23 PP
1
II
54 SP 21
PP 1 23
91 4
17 BHL
BHL II II
II PP 91
LA
II
II
NE
LANE 4
LANE 14
OLD
1
LANE 39
LA N E
17
I
I
SP 11
TE G
LANE 32
SP 5
I II
ROU
II
RED
SP 9 CP 22
CP 117
ROUTE
N
CP 97
EE
CP 51
GR
II II II
BLUE
RTE
E
RP 92
RT
CP 53
BSA CP 111
AA CP 24
HAWK
Figure 16-6. Rearward Passage of Lines
16-38. The stationary unit provides the passing unit with as much assistance
as possible. Pivotal to the success of the rearward passage of lines is pro-
viding indirect and direct fire support by the stationary unit to the passing
unit. This is especially important in covering the withdrawal of elements left
in contact during a delay. The stationary unit’s fire support assets answer
calls for fire from the passing unit until battle handover occurs. The passing
unit’s fire support assets echelon rearward to provide continuous fire support
for the passing unit until it successfully disengages. Once the passing unit
hands over control of the battle to the stationary unit, the stationary unit ini-
tiates and clears calls for all fires forward of its location. The same procedure
applies to the dedicated air defense assets of the passing and stationary units.
16-39. The stationary unit’s engineer assets provide support to prepare the
defense and execute the passage. Priority of effort initially ensures that the
passing unit is able to move through passage lanes around the stationary
unit’s defensive positions. It shifts to close these passage lanes once the pass-
ing unit and any security elements disengage and withdraw through the se-
curity area and obstacles.
16-40. The stationary unit provides the passing unit with the previously co-
ordinated CSS as far forward as possible. The stationary unit concentrates on
providing the passing unit with emergency medical, recovery, and fuel sup-
plies to enable the passing unit to rapidly move through the stationary unit’s
positions.
16-10
Appendix A
Army Branches and Tactical Echelons

It is not so much the mode of formation as the proper combined use of
the different arms which will insure victory.
Antoine Henri, Baron de Jomini: Precis de l’Art de la Guerre, 1838
The Army consists of the active component, reserve components, and ci-
vilians acting in concert with other US services and allies. Its flexibility,
versatility, and adaptability are based on a broad range of branch capa-
bilities and echelons that can be rapidly tailored for deployment and
task-organized for the prevailing conditions of METT-TC. The Army
groups its force structure into three general categories: combat, combat
support (CS), and combat service support (CSS). Each category incorpo-
rates diverse capabilities of varying degrees of lethality, deployability,
sustainability, and survivability. There are more than 400 types of Army
units. Each category complements and reinforces the others and the joint
force. Appropriate combinations provide a balanced and versatile force
mix, maximizing the commander’s freedom of action in virtually any
METT-TC condition.
A-1. There is no primary or dominant branch or arm. One branch reinforces

or complements the effects of another, such as heavy forces in a support-by-
fire position reinforcing an assault by light forces with their large-caliber,
direct-fire weapons. Some branches have capabilities that can be described as
combat arms, CS, or CSS, depending on the specific situation. Much of a
CONTENTS
Combat Arms ................................................A-2 Combat Service Support ........................... A-11
Air Defense Artillery..................................A-3 Adjutant General Corps......................... A-12
Armor .........................................................A-4 Aviation ................................................... A-12
Aviation ......................................................A-4 Chaplain Corps....................................... A-13
Engineers...................................................A-5 Finance Corps ........................................ A-13
Field Artillery .............................................A-5 Engineers................................................ A-13
Infantry.......................................................A-6 Medical Corps ........................................ A-13
Special Operations Forces.......................A-7 Ordnance Corps ..................................... A-14
Combat Support............................................A-8 Quartermaster Corps ............................. A-14
Aviation ......................................................A-8 Transportation Corps ............................ A-15
Chemical Corps.........................................A-8 Tactical Echelons....................................... A-15
Engineers...................................................A-9 Companies, Batteries, and Troops....... A-16
Military Intelligence...................................A-9 Battalions and Squadrons .................... A-17
Military Police Corps ................................A-9 Brigades, Regiments, and Groups ....... A-18
Signal Corps............................................A-10 Division ................................................... A-19
Special Operations Forces.....................A-10 Corps....................................................... A-20
A-1
FM 3-90
commander’s effectiveness during an operation relies on his ability to rapidly

reinforce and complement weapon systems’ effects in symmetrical and asym-
metrical ways.
COMBAT ARMS
A-2. Combat arms are units and soldiers who close with and destroy
enemy forces or provide firepower and destructive capabilities on
the battlefield. Combat branches of the US Army include Air Defense Artill-
ery, Armor, Aviation, Engineers, Field Artillery, Infantry, and Special Forces
(SOF). Figure A-1 lists some types of units that deploy to support operations.
The Army classifies combat arms units as heavy, light, or special operations
forces. However, the Army is currently developing a medium weight force
capable of increased strategic responsiveness in full spectrum operations.
l AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY l INFANTRY

n Short Range n Light
n Theater Air Defense n Mechanized
n Theater Ballistic Missile n Motorized
Defense n Air Assault
l ARMOR n Airborne
n Armor l FIELD ARTILLERY
n Armored Cavalry n Target Acquisition
n Light Cavalry n Cannon Artillery
l AVIATION n MLRS/ATACMS
n Attack l SPECIAL OPERATIONS
n Assault FORCES
n Air Cavalry n Ranger
l ENGINEERS n Special Forces
n Mobility n Special Operations
n Countermobility Aviation
n Survivability
Figure A-1. Combat Arms Capabilities
A-3. Heavy forces employ a combination of armored and mechanized forces

that use their tactical mobility, protection, and firepower to close with and de-
stroy the enemy, seize and hold terrain, and conduct reconnaissance. They
consist of armor, mechanized infantry, aviation, and armored cavalry. Heavy
forces employ tanks, armored fighting vehicles, attack and utility helicopters,
and dismounted infantry to form the nucleus of a combined arms team that
delivers mobile, protected firepower to create tremendous shock effect. The
combination of mobile, protected firepower with dismounted infantry
achieves complementary and reinforcing effects that neither can attain separ-
ately. However, restricted and urban terrain place limits on where the com-
mander can employ them.
A-4. Light forces close with and destroy the enemy, seize and hold terrain,
and gain information. Light forces traditionally include light infantry,
A-2
airborne, and air assault forces. Light forces are particularly suited to opera-
tions in restricted and urban terrain, where they have a mobility advantage
over heavy forces. Light forces are limited by a relative lack of protection
against direct and indirect fires and limited firepower compared with heavy
forces. They also have limited organic tactical mobility once deployed into an
area of operations (AO) compared to heavy forces. While light forces may be
lifted into engagement areas (EAs) by truck, helicopter, or airplane, they
fight mainly on foot. Depending on the factors of METT-TC, light forces either
complement or are complemented by heavy forces.
A-5. Special operations are actions conducted by specially organized, trained,
and equipped military forces to achieve military, diplomatic, economic, or
psychological objectives by unconventional means. Special operations forces
can reinforce, augment, and complement conventional forces, heightening the
effectiveness of the total effort. These forces can also conduct independent op-
erations in situations that demand a small, discrete, highly trained force. The
principal SOF missions are—
· Unconventional warfare.
· Foreign internal defense.
· Psychological operations. (See Paragraph A-37.)
· Civil affairs. (See Paragraph A-36.)
· Information operations.
· Direct action.
· Special reconnaissance.
· Combating terrorism.
· Counterproliferation.
Five types of units compose Army SOF. Army special operations aviation
(SOA), rangers, and special forces (SF) units are combat arms forces. Civil af-
fairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) units are CS organizations.
FM 3-05 is the capstone manual for Army SOF.
A-6. The Army is currently fielding two initial brigade combat teams (IBCTs)
as the prototypes of a medium weight force designed for increased strategic
responsiveness across all types of military operations. After experimentation,
these two IBCTs will transform into an interim, strategically responsive
force, which may expand to encompass almost a third of the regular Army’s
ground maneuver brigades. The desired end state of the objective force is an
operational force strategically responsive through increased deployability and
greatly reduced sustainability requirements when compared with current
heavy forces. The goal for the objective force is to deploy a brigade anywhere
in the world and close within 96 hours, given sufficient ports and strategic
lift. The objective force will also retain or increase the tactical agility, lethal-
ity, and survivability of current heavy forces and the versatility of current
light forces. Developing the objective force’s combat and tactical vehicles re-
quires scientific and technological breakthroughs.
AIR DEFENSE ARTILLERY

A-7. Air defense artillery (ADA) units provide force protection against air and
missile threats. Tactical air defense supports the overall objectives of divi-
sions and corps. Air defense artillery air and missile defense units protect
A-3
FM 3-90
maneuver forces and vital assets. Divisional ADA units provide short-range
air defense (SHORAD) protection for units conducting tactical combat opera-
tions. Corps ADA brigades have both SHORAD and high-to-medium altitude
air defense (HIMAD) missile defense units to protect corps assets and rein-
force divisional ADA units.
A-8. Air defense artillery units contribute to intelligence and information op-
erations by gathering and disseminating information about the enemy air or-
der of battle. They also contribute by denying the enemy the ability to operate
his own reconnaissance and command and control (C2) aircraft. (FM 3-01 is
the capstone ADA manual. FM 3-01.12 discusses Army theater missile de-
fense.)
ARMOR
A-9. The tank is the primary offensive ground weapon in mounted warfare.
Its firepower, protection from enemy fire, and speed create the shock effect
necessary to disrupt or defeat the enemy. Tanks can destroy enemy armored
vehicles, infantry, and antitank guided missile carriers. Tanks can break
through suppressed defenses, exploit the success of an attack by striking deep
into the enemy’s rear area, and pursue defeated enemy forces. Armored units
can also blunt enemy attacks and launch counterattacks as part of a defense.
A-10. The primary missions of cavalry units are reconnaissance and security.
A cavalry unit’s ability to find the enemy, develop the situation, and provide
the commander with reaction time and security also makes it ideal for op-
erating in an economy-of-force role. Cavalry forces can delay an attacking
enemy and assist in a withdrawal. (There is no capstone manual for armor
operations. Doctrine on heavy combined arms echelons is found in
FMs 3-91.1, 3-91.2, 3-91.3, and 3-93. FM 3-20.95 addresses cavalry
operations.)
AVIATION
A-11. The firepower, agility, and speed of Army aviation permit ground com-
manders to close with and defeat a wide range of enemy forces. Attack heli-
copters are ideally suited for rapid reaction during decisive, shaping, and sus-
taining operations where the terrain restricts or prohibits ground force occu-
pation. Attack helicopters can influence the battle when ground forces are de-
cisively engaged. The tactical mobility provided to airborne, air assault, and
light infantry by assault aviation is limited by weather and lift asset availa-
bility.
A-12. Air cavalry platoons and troops can reconnoiter and maintain surveil-
lance coverage over a much larger area in a shorter period of time than
ground platoons and troops, but with less detail on ground features. During
security operations, air cavalry reconnoiters, screens forward and to the
flanks of ground forces, and acts as a rapid-reaction force. Scout helicopters
provide a wide range of reconnaissance and security capabilities. Air cavalry
scouts are essential in detecting and identifying enemy forces throughout the
battlefield—an important source of real-time battlefield information. On-
board radars and digital communications are key to the rapid dissemination
A-4
of combat information that these systems obtain. (FM 3-04.100 is the cap-
stone manual for aviation doctrine.)
ENGINEERS
A-13. The commander task organizes combat engineer units with maneuver
units and integrates them into a combined arms formation. The engineer unit
provides demolition and breaching capabilities to the combined arms team.
The engineer unit also can employ direct-fire weapon systems to aid in em-
ploying demolition and breaching assets. These breaching assets include as-
sault bridges, rafts, and mechanized breaching systems. Regardless of the
mission, armored engineer vehicles are combat vehicles and provide a signifi-
cant contribution to the combat power of the entire formation. To accomplish
the mission, engineers fire and move under the direction of the formation
commander, as necessary, using engineer skills where appropriate. (FM 3-34
is the capstone engineer manual.)
A-14. When involved in an assault, engineers fight dismounted on the objec-
tive, focusing on breaching enemy close-in protective obstacles, as well as
demolishing fighting positions and dug-in vehicles. Demolition charges pro-
duce significant shock and concussion effects on defenders, as well as destroy-
ing critical positions, munitions, and combat vehicles.
A-15. Combat engineers employed on reserve demolition targets in the de-
fense mainly execute the technical procedures necessary to ensure target de-
struction. However, the engineer demolition party responds to enemy contact.
They assist the demolition guard in securing the target by holding it open or
gaining time to ensure that it is destroyed. The engineer force may assist in
target defense by installing command-detonated mines to support the de-
fensive scheme.
A-16. Combat-engineer units have a secondary mission to fight as infantry.
While engineers fight continually as engineers, employing them as infantry
requires serious considerations. Engineers employed as infantry require aug-
mentation, including crew-served weapons and medical support. Any com-
mander who owns engineers in a command relationship has the authority to
employ them as infantry unless otherwise prohibited. A commander must
carefully weigh the gain in infantry strength against the loss of engineer sup-
port. Engineers provide far more combat power in their primary mission than
when configured as infantry. Stopping the engineer work may reduce the
combat power of the commander’s entire force. Because of the long-term im-
pact, a commander notifies the next higher headquarters when he employs
his engineers as infantry.
FIELD ARTILLERY
A-17. Field artillery (FA) is the commander’s principal means for providing
indirect-fire support to his maneuver forces. Self-propelled or towed FA units
contain cannon or multiple rocket launchers. Field artillery can neutralize,
suppress, or destroy enemy direct-fire forces, attack enemy artillery and mor-
tars, and deliver scatterable mines to isolate and interdict enemy forces or
protect friendly operations. The commander may use artillery fires to cover
key terrain, flanks, obstacles, and dead space to reduce his risk when
A-5
FM 3-90
maneuver forces are not available. Field artillery elements within maneuver
organizations serve as the integrating center for all fire support elements.
Field artillery units contribute both to attacking the enemy throughout the
depth of his formations and suppressing enemy air defense systems to
facilitate ground and air operations. Artillery fires can provide simultaneous
precision strikes of targets at long ranges that other means cannot attack
without significant risk. As mobile as the maneuver force it supports, FA
systems provide continuous fires in support of the commander’s scheme of
maneuver. (FM 3-09 is the capstone FA manual.)
INFANTRY
A-18. There are many different types of infantry units, such as airborne, air
assault, light, long-range reconnaissance, mechanized, and ranger. Each dif-
ferent type of infantry unit has its own unique skills and organizational de-
sign, but all share the common mission: “To close with and destroy the enemy
by means of close combat, fire, and movement.” Regardless of their mode of
conveyance to the battlefield—aircraft, tracked or wheeled armored fighting
vehicle, truck, or foot—they all serve as a key source of combat power in close
combat. (There is not a capstone infantry manual. Echelon and unit specific
manuals, such as FMs 3-21.7, 3-21.8, 3-21.10, 3-21.20, and 3-21.30, describe
infantry operations at different tactical echelons.)
A-19. Airborne infantry units have the greatest capability for large-scale
force-projection operations. They rapidly deploy over great distances and con-
duct combined arms parachute or air-landing assaults to seize and secure
vital objectives. The commander can insert these units on virtually any objec-
tive area under almost any weather conditions. Once on the ground, their
capabilities and lethality are similar to other nonmechanized infantry units.
A-20. Air assault infantry units have great tactical mobility and train to fight
across the range of military operations. Their significant antiarmor capabil-
ity—coupled with strategic deployability—makes them well suited as an early
deploying force in contingency operations against heavy forces. They train
and fight as a team in combination with artillery, attack, and lift aviation.
They can penetrate deep into enemy territory to cut lines of communications,
seize airfields, destroy C2 nodes, block reinforcing units, or seize key terrain.
Because of their agility and mobility, air assault infantry units are well
suited for covering force operations in appropriate terrain.
A-21. Light infantry units can operate effectively in most terrain and weather
conditions. They may be the dominant arm in fast-breaking operations bec-
ause of their rapid strategic deployability. In such cases, they can wrest the
initiative early, seize and hold ground, and mass fires to stop the enemy.
They are particularly effective in urban terrain, where they can infiltrate and
move rapidly to the rear of enemy positions. The commander can enhance
their tactical mobility by using helicopters and tactical airlift.
A-22. Mechanized and motorized infantry forces integrate mobile, survivable,
and lethal, vehicle-mounted direct-fire and indirect-fire weapon systems and
dismounted infantry skills into an effective fighting system that enhances the
striking power of the combined arms force. Mechanized infantry has the same
mobility as armor forces, but less firepower and protection. Armor and
A-6
mechanized infantry train and fight as a team to defeat enemy heavy forces.
When equipped with infantry fighting vehicles, mechanized infantry can ac-
company tanks in mounted assaults. The commander must carefully deter-
mine if, when, and where his infantry must dismount to accomplish its mis-
sion. Mechanized infantrymen can act as fixing forces in an attack and serve
as pivot points for maneuvering tank-heavy forces in the defense.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

A-23. Special operations are actions conducted by specially organized,
trained, and equipped personnel to achieve military, political, economic, or
psychological objectives by nonconventional means in hostile, denied, or polit-
ically sensitive areas. They are conducted in peace, conflict, and war, inde-
pendently or in coordination with operations of conventional forces. Politico-
military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clan-
destine, covert, or low-visibility techniques and oversight at the national
level. Special operations usually differ from conventional operations in their
degree of risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence
from friendly support, and dependence on operational intelligence and indige-
nous assets. (The Army’s capstone manual on special operations is FM 3-05.)
A-24. Army SOA units are specialized aviation assets dedicated to conducting
special operations missions. They provide a mix of short-, medium-, and long-
range lift and light attack capabilities to support all principal and collateral
mission areas and conduct autonomous special operations.
A-25. Ranger units are rapidly deployable, airborne-capable, and trained to
conduct joint strike operations with or in support of special operations units
of all services in any environment. They plan and conduct special military op-
erations to support national policies and objectives. They also conduct direct-
action missions to support conventional operations and operate as conven-
tional light infantry units when integrated with other combined arms ele-
ments. (FM 3-21.85 is the capstone manual for ranger operations.)
A-26. Special Forces units plan, conduct, and support special operations ac-
tivities in all operational environments, throughout the range of military op-
erations. The US Army organizes, trains, and equips SF units to perform
seven primary missions:
· Unconventional warfare.
· Foreign internal defense.
· Information operations.
· Counterproliferation.
· Direct action.
· Special reconnaissance.
· Combating terrorism.
Mission priorities vary from theater to theater. Special Forces missions are
dynamic because politico-military considerations affect them directly. A
change in national security policy or national military strategy may radically
alter the nature of a SF mission. (FM 3-05.20 is the capstone SF manual.)
A-7
FM 3-90
COMBAT SUPPORT
A-27. Combat support encompasses critical combat functions pro-
vided by units and soldiers, in conjunction with combat arms units
and soldiers, to secure victory. Those functions include Army Aviation,
Chemical Corps, Engineers, Military Intelligence, Military Police Corps, Sig-
nal Corps, and Special Operations Forces (CA and PSYOP units). Figure A-2
lists some CS units and their capabilities that support tactical operations.
l AVIATION l MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

n Air Traffic Services n Counterintelligence
n C2 Aircraft n Analysis
l CHEMICAL CORPS n HUMINT
n Staff Support n IMINT
n Decontamination n MASINT
n NBC Reconnaissance & n SIGINT
Surveillance n TECHINT
n Smoke & Obscuration n Electronic Warfare
l ENGINEERS l MILITARY POLICE CORPS
n Mobility n Criminal Investigation
n Countermobility n EPW Support
n Survivability n Military Police CS
n Topographic Support
l SPECIAL OPERATIONS
l SIGNAL CORPS FORCES
n Signal Support n Civil Affairs
n Combat Camera n Psychological Operations
Figure A-2. Combat Support Capabilities
AVIATION
A-28. Army aviation units provide CS to the commander in the following
areas:
· C2, communications, and intelligence.
· Air movement of combat power.
· Aerial delivery of mines.
· Search and rescue.
· Air traffic services.
CHEMICAL CORPS
A-29. The chemical corps provides CS to the Army through two major activi-
ties. The first is chemical staff support organic from the battalion through the
corps echelon. Integrating organizational equipment and individual technical
expertise permits units to continue operations with minimal degradation of
capability. The second activity is the support provided by chemical units at
corps and higher levels, including nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) re-
connaissance, decontamination, smoke and obscuration, and further staff
augmentation. Both activities are critical; the former optimizes unit effective-
ness under NBC conditions, the latter augments and reinforces unit combat
A-8
power and sustainability. (FM 3-11 is the capstone manual for chemical op-
erations.)
ENGINEERS
A-30. Engineers multiply the effectiveness of friendly forces on a lethal bat-
tlefield. Four of the five primary engineer functions are CS. Combat engi-
neers operate as an integral member of the combined arms team to provide a
full range of mobility, countermobility, survivability, and topographic capa-
bilities. Engineers advise the maneuver commander on the effective use of
terrain; construct, improve, and maintain routes, bridges, and airfields; and
reorganize to fight as infantry when required.
A-31. In offensive operations, combat engineers concentrate their efforts to
support maneuver by breaching and crossing obstacles, assisting in the as-
sault of fortified positions, and emplacing obstacles to protect the flanks of
friendly attacking forces. In defensive operations, engineers reinforce the ter-
rain to anchor the defense in critical areas, maximize the effects of defenders’
fires, provide maximum protection to friendly fighting positions, and facili-
tate the movement of counterattack forces. Topographic engineer units fur-
nish detailed terrain analysis products, maps, and digital terrain data. Topo-
graphic engineering products help the commander identify avenues and
routes, obstacle locations, EAs, unit positions, and possible target areas.
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
A-32. Military intelligence (MI) units provide the commander with early
warnings of enemy intentions, intelligence preparation of the battlefield pro-
ducts, aid in the development of his situational understanding, and assist in
target development, force protection, and battle damage assessment. They
participate in offensive information operations, as well as provide critical
counterintelligence support to friendly command force protection programs.
(FM 2-0 is the capstone intelligence manual.)
A-33. Military intelligence involves four intelligence disciplines—human in-
telligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, and
signals intelligence. There are two multidiscipline intelligence functions—
counterintelligence and technical intelligence. However, rarely will a single
discipline or function produce a comprehensive picture of the enemy. Each of
these disciplines and functions complement and cue each other. Each disci-
pline or function produces bits and pieces of information that analysts use to
create the enemy and environment portion of the common operational picture
and other products that facilitate the commander’s situational understand-
ing. The commander should compare information gained by one discipline or
function with information provided by the other disciplines and functions
whenever the situation permits to avoid deception by enemy information op-
erations. United States Code prohibits collecting intelligence information on
US personnel or institutions by MI assets except under specific situations.
MILITARY POLICE CORPS

A-34. Military police units provide the commander with a versatile, respon-
sive force capable of performing a wide range of combat, CS, and CSS mis-
sions that include—
A-9
FM 3-90
· Maneuver and mobility operations—MP units enhance maneuver and

mobility by expediting and monitoring the flow of personnel and mater-
ials throughout the depth and breadth of the battlefield.
· Area security operations—MP units provide security to critical person-
nel and facilities within their assigned AO because of their tactical mo-
bility, firepower, and communications capabilities.
· Internment and resettlement operations—MP units conduct intern-
ment and resettlement operations for US military prisoners, enemy
prisoners of war, and dislocated civilians to relieve the tactical com-
mander of the burden they impose.
· Police intelligence operations—MP and MI units collect, analyze, and
disseminate police intelligence, aiding commanders in identifying and
defeating threats from criminals, saboteurs, and terrorists.
· Law and order operations—MP units assist the commander in main-
taining law and order in both garrison and the field.
Military police units perform these operations independently or in combina-
tion with other units. United States Code prohibits MP and other Army units
from performing routine law enforcement operations within US territory.
State and federal law allow Army National Guard units to conduct law en-
forcement operations within their sponsoring state when performing their
mission as state militia. (FM 3-19.1 is the capstone MP manual.)
SIGNAL CORPS
A-35. The signal corps provides worldwide information systems and networks
for real-time C2 of Army, joint, and multinational forces. Signal corps units
enable effective control systems to operate. In force-projection operations, sig-
nal units make split-based operations possible by employing satellite down-
link equipment. (FM 6-02 is the capstone signal manual.)
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

A-36. Civil affairs units are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to
conduct CA activities and to support civil-military operations. These opera-
tions focus on the civil center of gravity and establish, maintain, influence,
and support the commander’s moral obligations and legal responsibilities
with government organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and interna-
tional organizations. Civil Affairs activities include populace and resources
control, foreign nation support, humanitarian assistance, military civil action,
civil defense, civil assistance, and civil administration in recently liberated
friendly territory and in occupied territory. Civil Affairs efforts enhance the
relationships between military forces, civilian authorities, and populations in
friendly, neutral, or hostile AOs through these activities. They provide op-
portunities to use local human and material resources to support the assigned
mission. Civil Affairs forces facilitate military operations by reducing civilian
interference with military operations and gaining popular understanding,
support, and compliance with measures required to accomplish the mission.
In the aftermath of combat, CA units conduct activities that stabilize dis-
rupted areas. They are often tasked to create a military government to temp-
orary control institutions, populations, and resources. Civil Affairs functional
specialist’s capabilities reside in the reserve component and are additional
A-10
areas of expertise, normally acquired through civilian education, training,

and experience. These special functions teams include—
· Emergency services
· Public administration
· Public education
· Public health
· Public safety
· Public welfare
· Civilian supply
· Economic development
· Food and agriculture
· Public communications
· Public transportation
· Public works and utilities
· Civil information
· Cultural relations
· Dislocated civilians
· International law
· Environmental management
(FM 3-57 is the capstone manual for civil affairs operations.)
A-37. Psychological operations are planned operations to convey selected in-
formation and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, mo-
tives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign govern-
ments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological
operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable
to the originator’s objectives (JP 3-53). PSYOP is a functional area and not a
branch. PSYOP units provide the commander with the ability to communicate
information to non-US audiences via radio, television, leaflets, and loud-
speakers. The PSYOP soldier’s language skills, regional orientation, and
knowledge of communication media provide a means of delivering critical in-
formation to host nation, neutral, and enemy audiences. Joint direction from
the operational-level commander characterizes PSYOP. Federal law prohibits
using PSYOP against US citizens or organizations. (FM 3-05.30 is the cap-
stone PSYOP manual.)

A-38. The primary role of Army tactical CSS units is to sustain Army forces.
The CSS effort is successful only when it concentrates and supports forces by
focusing on the sustainment and reconstitution of tactical units. Warfare con-
sumes massive amounts of resources. The CSS system must provide res-
ources in a way that minimizes constraints on the commander. Tactical-level
CSS support must be responsive. (Figure A-3 on page A-12 illustrates CSS
branch capabilities.)
A-39. While not traditional Army branches, forward elements of the US Army
Materiel Command (USAMC) and the Military Traffic Management Com-
mand within a theater of operations assist in providing that combat service
A-11
FM 3-90
support necessary to sustain tactical forces. These forward elements provide

logistic assistance, conduct port operations, sustainment at Army field sup-
port centers, control Army prepositioned stocks, and manage USAMC con-
tract support. Those forward commands or subordinate logistics support ele-
ments deploy to support operations. Logistics assistance personnel, who are
part of USAMC forward elements, deploy with major combat units. They as-
sist and advise the unit; they also can reach back to the continental United
State for required additional augmentation of sustainment capabilities.
l ADJUTANT GENERAL lMEDICAL

n Personnel Services n Combat Stress
n Postal n Dental
n Replacement n Hospital
l AVIATION (GS AVN) n Medical Evacuation/Support/
Surveillance
l CHAPLAIN n Veterinary
l ENGINEERS (GEN ENG) lORDNANCE CORPS
l FINANCE CORPS n Ammunition Maintenance
n Support To Local n Ammunition Supply
Procurement n Electronic Maintenance
n Pay Services n Explosive Ordinance Disposal
n Resource Management n Mechanical Maintenance
l JUDGE ADVOCATE n Missile Maintenance
GENERAL CORPS lQUARTERMASTER CORPS
n Court Martial Trial & n Supply & Field Services
Defense lTRANSPORTATION CORPS
n Legal Assistance n Highway/Rail/Water
n Contract Advisory Transportation
Assistance n Movement Control
n Intermodel (Terminal) Operations
Figure A-3. Combat Service Support Capabilities
ADJUTANT GENERAL CORPS

A-40. The Adjutant General Corps helps to build and sustain combat readi-
ness through planning, operating, and managing all human resources sup-
port activities. Human resources support functions include manning the
force; personnel services; personnel readiness management; personnel ac-
counting; replacement management; personnel information management;
casualty operations management; postal operations management; morale,
welfare, and recreation; and band support. (FM 1-0 is the capstone manual
for military personnel activities.)
AVIATION
A-41. Aviation units provide CSS to sustain combat forces, primarily through
air movement of personnel, supplies, and equipment and performing aero-
medical evacuation and aviation maintenance. Air movement CSS missions
include the aerial movement of personnel and supplies, to include—
· Over-the-shore logistics operations.
· Aerial preplanned and immediate resupply.
· Air movement of critically short or sensitive supplies.
A-12
· Pre-positioning and movement of fuel and ammunition.

· Air movement of security forces.
· Medical evacuation.
CHAPLAIN CORPS
A-42. The chaplain corps advises the commander on matters of religion,
morals, and morale as affected by religion; to include the impact of indige-
nous religions on the mission. The role of the chaplain is the personal deliv-
ery of religious support—worship care and counseling—to the soldier. Chap-
lains assist in reducing the rate and severity of psychiatric casualties by
working with combat stress teams. (FM 1-05 is the capstone doctrinal manual
for chaplains and chaplain assistants.)
FINANCE CORPS
A-43. Financial management operation provides a commander with—
· Financial support for soliders.
· Financial support for non-US military personnel and all Department of
Defense civilians.
· Pay for local hire civilians.
· Contract support.
· Payments to commercial vendors that provide services and supplies in
support of military forces on an immediate or recurring basis.
· Disbursements of public funds to support an Army presence on an
area-support basis.
· Accounting and disclosing expended funds.
(FM 1-06 is the capstone doctrinal manual for financial management sup-
port.)
ENGINEERS
A-44. Sustainment engineering is the primary CSS engineer function. It in-
volves a variety of roles, such as civil engineering, fire fighting, maintaining
lines of communications, managing inland waterways, prime power, and en-
vironmental protection.
MEDICAL CORPS
A-45. The Army’s health care team provides all types of medical support to
the commander and his soldiers. The Army’s health care team comprises six
medical corps: Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Medical Service Corps, Nurse
Corps, Veterinary Corps, and Medical Specialist Corps. (FM 4-02, is the cap-
stone doctrinal manual for health service support.)
A-46. Ordnance units sustain the commander’s weapon systems, ammunition,
missiles, and ground-mobility materiel. Ordnance soldiers are trained to re-
pair and manage tank-automotive/ground-mobility materiel, missile materiel,
and ammunition materiel, including explosive ordnance disposal. (There is no
capstone manual addressing all the activities of the ordnance corps, but
FM 4-0 provides references and information on ordnance support.)
A-13
FM 3-90
A-47. Future maintenance concepts call for the consolidation of the current
four levels of maintenance into two levels—field and sustainment. Field
maintenance combines the current organizational and direct support levels of
maintenance. Field maintenance includes those tasks performed by operators
and maintainers at the point of breakdown or the point of repair. This main-
tenance level focuses on the repair of vehicles through the replacement of
major system components. Sustainment maintenance consists of tasks nor-
mally focused on the repair of component items, and it combines the current
general support and depot maintenance levels. Additionally, it includes some
current direct support-level tasks. At this level of maintenance, maintainers
focus on the repair of component items, such as major assemblies, line-
replaceable units, and reparable items and their return to the distribution
system.
ORDNANCE CORPS
A-48. Ordnance units sustain the commander’s weapon systems, ammunition,
missiles, and ground-mobility materiel. Ordnance soldiers are trained to re-
pair and manage tank-automotive/ground-mobility materiel, missile materiel,
and ammunition materiel, including explosive ordnance disposal. There is no
capstone manual addressing all the activities of the ordnance corps, but
FM 4-0 provides references and information on ordnance support.
A-49. Future maintenance concepts call for the consolidation of the current
four levels of maintenance into tow levels-field and sustainment. Field main-
tenance combines the current organizational and direct support levels of
maintenance. Field maintenance includes those tasks performed by operators
and maintainers at the point of breakdown or the point of repair. This maint-
enance level focuses on the repair of vehicles through the replacement of
major system components. Sustainment maintenance consists of tasks nor-
mally focused on the repair of component items and combines the current
general support and depot maintenance levels. Additionally, it includes some
current direct-support-level tasks. At this level of maintenance, maintainers
focus on the repair of component items, such as major assemblies, line-
replaceable units, and reparable-type items and their return to the distribu-
tion system.
QUARTERMASTER CORPS
A-50. The quartermaster corps arranges for or provides supplies, materiel
management, distribution, procurement, and field services to support and
sustain soldiers, units and their equipment. These support functions are
broken down into two areas: supply and field services. Supplies provided by
quartermaster units include—
· Class I—substance and commercial bottled water.
· Class II—clothing, individual equipment, tentage, tool sets, and admin-
istrative and housekeeping supplies equipment including nonclassified
maps.
· Class III—petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL), including petroleum
fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquid
and compressed gases, checmical products, and coolants.
A-14
· Class IV—construction materials, including installed equipment and

all fortification and barrier materials.
· Class VI—health and comfort packs/support to tactical field exchanges.
· Class VII—major end items
· Class IX—repair parts
· Class X—miscellaneous supplies
A-51. Field services provided by the quartermaster corps includes—
· Airdrop—parachute packing, air-item maintenance, slingload opera-
tions, and rigging of supplies and equipment for airdrop.
· Field feeding—the standard is three quality meals each day, with the
capability to distribute, prepare, and serve at least one heated unitized
group rations, with semi-perishable components (UGR-A), meal per day
to include supplements in accordance with the factors of METT-TC.
· Laundry—soldiers will each be provided with up to 15 pounds of laun-
dry support a week.
· Shower—the army standard is one shower per soldier per week, with a
goal of two showers per week.
· Water purification. (Note that storage and distribution of purified
water are supply functions.)
· Mortuary affairs—recovery, tentative identification, and processing of
human remains.
· Clothing and light textile repair—minor repairs made at the laundry.
(FM 4-20 is the capstone manual for quartermaster units.)
TRANSPORTATION CORPS
A-52. The transportation corps provides transportation services to the com-
mander. These services include—
· Performing transportation unit operations, to include truck, boat, rail
and trailer/cargo transfer operations. Planning, scheduling, and super-
vising the use of each mode of transportation for effectively moving per-
sonnel and cargo.
· Providing terminal services for all modes of transportation and steve-
doring services at fixed ports and unimproved beach sites.
· Providing transportation engineering services.
· Providing direct maintenance and supply for marine and rail equip-
ment.
(FM 4-01 is the capstone doctrinal manual for the transportation corps.)
TACTICAL ECHELONS
A-53. The Army echelons its broad array of capabilities to perform diverse
functions. These functions vary with the type of unit and, particularly at op-
erational echelons, with the organization of the theater, the nature of the con-
flict, and the number of friendly forces committed to the effort. For a discus-
sion of operational echelons, including ARFOR, joint force land component,
and joint task force (JTF) see FMs 3-0 and 3-93.
A-15
FM 3-90
A-54. At each echelon, the commander task organizes his available capabili-
ties to accomplish the mission. The commander’s purpose in task organization
is to maximize subordinate commanders’ abilities to generate a combined
arms effect consistent with the concept of operations. Commanders and staffs
work to ensure the distribution of capabilities to the appropriate components
of the force to weight the decisive operation. The relationships between units
within and supporting an echelon are described in terms of command and
support relationships. (See FM 5-0 for a discussion of these relationships.)
COMPANIES, BATTERIES, AND TROOPS

A-55. A company is a unit consisting of two or more platoons, usually
of the same type, with a headquarters and a limited capacity for self-
support. A troop is a company-size unit in a cavalry organization. A
battery is a company-size unit in a field artillery or air defense artil-
lery organization. A company normally consists of more than 75 soldiers.
Exceptions to this rule are some aviation and tank companies. Companies
and air defense and artillery batteries are the basic elements of battalions.
Armored, light, and air cavalry troops are the basic elements of squadrons.
Companies, batteries, and troops may also be assigned as separate units of
brigades and larger organizations. Some companies, such as SF companies,
have subordinate detachments, instead of platoons, which are organized and
trained to operate independently for extended periods.
A-56. Company-size combat units can fight in mass or by subordinate pla-
toons. In attack helicopter battalions, companies fight as integral units. Cav-
alry troops fight more frequently with their platoons in separate areas. In in-
fantry and armor battalions, companies fight either as integral units or as
task-organized teams reinforced with close-combat platoons of the same or
different types. A company team is a combined arms organization
formed by attaching one or more nonorganic tank, mechanized in-
fantry, or light infantry platoons to a tank, mechanized infantry, or
light infantry company, either in exchange for, or in addition to, its
organic platoons. These company teams can include other supporting
squads or platoons, such as short-range air defense (SHORAD) and ground
surveillance radar teams. Company teams are task-organized for a specific
mission. Such teams can match capabilities to missions with greater preci-
sion. However, the attachment of different units at the company level de-
mands thorough training to achieve the maximum complementary effects.
Whenever possible, platoons and detachments should train together before
they are committed.
A-57. FA batteries are the basic firing units of FA battalions. They are organ-
ized with firing platoons, a headquarters, and limited support sections. They
may fire and displace together or by platoons. Normally, batteries fight as
part of their parent battalions, but the commander can attach them to other
batteries or FA battalions. In rare cases they respond directly to a maneuver
battalion or company. Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) batteries usu-
ally operate independently. Regimental armored cavalry squadrons have or-
ganic howitzer batteries.
A-58. ADA batteries operate as the fighting elements of ADA battalions or, if
they are SHORAD batteries, in direct support of maneuver brigades or
A-16
battalions. Separate SHORAD batteries exist in separate brigade-size organi-

zations.
A-59. Combat engineer companies control three or four engineer platoons.
Their parent battalion may employ them in a variety of tasks, or they may
support maneuver brigades or battalions.
A-60. Most CS and CSS units organize as separate companies with greater
self-sustainment capabilities than normally found in comparable size combat
arms organizations. However, they may receive unit-level sustainment sup-
port on an area basis. Such CS and CSS companies vary widely in size, em-
ployment, and assignment.
BATTALIONS AND SQUADRONS

A-61. A battalion (or a cavalry squadron) is a unit consisting of two or
more company-, battery-, or troop-size units and a headquarters.
Most combat arms battalions are organized by branch, arm, or service and, in
addition to their line companies, contain a headquarters company that gives
them the ability to perform some administrative and logistic services. Typi-
cally, battalions have three to five companies in addition to their head-
quarters.
A-62. The commander can reinforce his maneuver battalions with other com-
bat and CS companies to form task forces for special missions. A battalion
task force is a combat arms battalion-size unit consisting of a battal-
ion headquarters, at least one assigned company-size element, and at
least one attached company-size element from another combat arms
or combat support unit. Task organization increases the capability of ma-
neuver battalions. For example, based on a brigade commander’s understand-
ing of the factors of METT-TC, he may task-organize tank, mechanized infan-
try, and light infantry battalions by cross-attaching companies between these
units. (See Figure A-4.) FA battalions can be reinforced with batteries of any
kind to form artillery task forces. The commander can reinforce engineer bat-
talions with the same or different types of engineer companies and platoons
to form engineer task forces.
Il
l l l l
HHC l
Figure A-4. Airborne Battalion-Size Task Force
A-17
FM 3-90
A-63. CS and CSS battalions vary widely in type and organization. They may
be separate divisional or nondivisional battalions, performing functional ser-
vices for a larger supported unit within that unit’s AO. All battalions are cap-
able of short-term limited, self-defense. ADA and signal battalions assigned
to or supporting divisions routinely operate throughout the division AO.
Their commanders also perform the additional duties of division special staff
officers.
BRIGADES, REGIMENTS, AND GROUPS

A-64. A brigade is a unit consisting of two or more battalions and a
headquarters. Its capacity for independent action varies by type. A com-
mander can use separate infantry, armor, FA, ADA, engineer, and aviation
brigades and armored cavalry regiments to reinforce corps or divisions and
shift these units from one division or corps to another to tailor forces for com-
bat. (See Figure A-5.)
I II II II I
HHC (DS)
MP (DS)
l II II
(DS) (DS) (DS) FSB (DS)
I
SD
(DS)
(from corps) MI (DS)
Figure A-5. Heavy Brigade Combat Team
A-65. Maneuver brigades are the major combat units of divisions; they can
employ any combination of maneuver battalions. Division commanders adjust
the organization of their brigades and change their task organization into bri-
gade combat teams as required by the factors of METT-TC. A brigade com-
bat team is a semipermanent combined arms organization consisting
of a brigade headquarters, at least two combat arms battalions, and
all necessary supporting combat support and combat service sup-
port, formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuing specific
task. They normally include a direct support FA battalion, a combat engineer
battalion (in heavy divisions and heavy separate brigades), forward support
battalions, and smaller combat, CS, and CSS units. Brigades combine the ef-
forts of their battalions and companies to fight engagements and battles and
perform tactical tasks within division-level battles and engagements. Their
A-18
chief tactical responsibility is synchronizing the plans and actions of their

subordinate units to accomplish tasks for the division or corps.
A-66. Separate maneuver brigades and armored cavalry regiments have a
fixed organization with organic cavalry, engineer, air defense, FA, MI, chemi-
cal, and CSS units. The commander can use separate brigades and armored
cavalry regiments to reinforce corps or divisions, but they are capable of oper-
ating as independent units. The two initial brigade combat teams (IBCTs) at
Fort Lewis, Washington, are organized as separate brigades even though they
are designated as divisional brigades. (See Figure A-6.)
I II II II II
II
HHC II BSB
I I I I
MI
Figure A-6. IBCT Organization
A-67. The commander organizes other combat, CS, and CSS brigades and
groups to control capabilities for divisions, corps, and larger units. Engineer,
ADA, signal, aviation, MP, and transportation brigades are typical of such
units. They may also be the building blocks of large-unit support structures,
such as corps and theater army support commands, and CS commands, such
as engineer commands. When the span of control for a brigade exceeds seven
battalion-size subordinate units, the commander can establish a group head-
quarters under the brigade as an intermediate headquarters for two or more
CS and CSS battalions. Organic, brigade-size division artillery (DIVARTY),
an aviation brigade, and a division support command (DISCOM) of CSS bat-
talions and separate companies provide support for divisions. Heavy divisions
have an organic engineer brigade.
DIVISION
A-68. The division possesses great flexibility. Divisions are the largest
fixed organizations in the Army that train and fight as tactical
teams, and are organized with varying numbers and types of combat,
CS, and CSS units. Their commanders task organize their organic brigades
and attached forces for specific combat missions. The division commander
may attach or place any or all divisional CS and CSS battalions and separate
companies in support of one or more brigades for particular missions. (Fig-
ure A-7 on page A-20 depicts a heavy division’s organic elements.) They are
A-19
FM 3-90
capable of performing any tactical mission over a wide range of environments

and are largely self-sustaining for up to 72 hours. The Army’s division organi-
zational concept embraces six types of divisions—armored, mechanized infan-
try, medium, light infantry, airborne and air assault—with each having spe-
cific capabilities and resources for conducting military operations. The Army
continues to examine its divisional design to ensure it possesses forces that
are decisive across the full spectrum of operations. The Army is currently ex-
perimenting with Force XXI and Interim Division variants in a search for de-
signs that have greater strategic responsiveness and effectiveness.
XX
I X X X X X
HHC SPT
II I I II
II I
II HHC HHC A HHC
X MMC
II II II II
U
II II
DASB
I I
MP II
SPT Main
II
II
SPT Fwd
Figure A-7. Heavy Division
A-69. Divisions perform major tactical operations for the corps and conduct
sustained engagements. With significant augmentation, a corps or a num-
bered army may direct a division to perform tasks of operational importance.
These may include exploiting tactical advantages to seize objectives in depth,
moving to gain contact with enemy forces, or moving by air to seize positions
behind an enemy force.
A-70. Critical division roles include—
· Deployment.
· Conduct of full spectrum operations as part of a corps.
· Airborne and air assault divisions able to conduct force entry
operations.
With augmentation a division headquarters can perform as the ARFOR or
joint force land component headquarters. (FM 3-91 describes how divisions
conduct full spectrum operations.)
CORPS
A-71. The corps is the Army’s largest tactical unit and the instrument
by which higher echelons of command conduct maneuver at the op-
erational level. There is no standard organizational structure for a corps,
A-20
although every corps typically has the components shown in Figure A-8. Op-
erational headquarters tailor corps to the theater and mission for which they
are deployed. Once tailored a corps contains all the combat, CS, and CSS
capabilities required to sustain its operations for an extended period.
XXX
XX X III X XXX
ACR Aviation Corps

Divisions Sep Bde Artillery
X X X X X
MI
Engineer Air Defense Signal Chemical Intelligence
III X X III III XXX

CA MP PERS SPT
PSYOP Civil Military Finance Personnel COSCOM
Affairs Police Group Group
Figure A-8. Representative Corps Organizational Diagram
A-72. A corps is normally tailored to comprise two to five divisions of any type
and combination required by the theater and the mission. It possesses organic
support commands and is assigned combat and CS organizations based on its
needs for a specific operation. Armored cavalry regiments and FA, engineer,
ADA, and aviation brigades are the nondivisional units commonly available
to the corps to weight its decisive operation and to perform special combat
functions. The commander may also assign separate infantry or armor bri-
gades to corps. Signal brigades, MI groups, and MP groups are the CS organi-
zations normally present in a corps.
A-73. A corps plans and conducts battles and major operations. Corps opera-
tions are combined arms operations that synchronize tactical activities, in-
cluding the maneuver of divisions, the fires of artillery units and supporting
aerial forces, and the actions of CS and CSS units. A corps may operate under
the control of a higher echelon, such as a numbered army. Its headquarters
may provide the headquarters for a land component command of a unified or
subunified command or JTF. The corps headquarters could also be employed
as the ARFOR headquarters of a JTF. A corps commander may serve as a
JTF commander. A corps normally exercises a mixture of operational and tac-
tical responsibilities. It may have a key role in translating strategic and op-
erational objectives of higher echelons into the specific and detailed tactics
used to achieve those objectives.
A-21
FM 3-90
A-74. Critical corps roles in the planning, preparing, executing, and assessing
full spectrum operations include—
· Planning, preparing, and executing operations with other elements of
the joint force to achieve campaign objectives, including force projection
of corps units to the AO.
· Integrating available joint, interagency, and multinational assets in
support of sustained land operations, including intelligence, target ac-
quisition, target attack, electronic warfare, suppression of enemy air
defenses, and CSS.
· Collecting intelligence, and anticipating enemy activities and inten-
tions.
· Providing the information pipelines over which the corps distributes
the common operational picture to all corps units.
· Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing shaping and sustaining
operations by corps troops that support the corps decisive operations.
With augmentation a corps headquarters can perform as an ARFOR, joint
force land component, or JTF headquarters. (FM 3-92 describes how corps
conduct full spectrum operations.)
A-22
Appendix B
Tactical Mission Tasks

Doctrine provides a military organization with a common philosophy,
a common language, a common purpose, and a unity of effort.
General George H. Decker, address at Fort Leavenworth, 16 Dec 1960
The tactical mission tasks in this appendix describe the results or effects
the commander wants to achieve—the what and why of a mission state-
ment not previously addressed in this manual. A mission statement con-
tains the who, what, when, where, and why associated with a specific op-
eration. The what and why of a mission statement are not the same thing
and both are needed. The what is an effect that is normally measurable.
The why of a mission statement provides the mission’s purpose or reason.
These tasks have specific military definitions that are different from
those found in a dictionary. In some cases, the discussion includes more
than just a definition; it includes results or effects in relation to the ene-
my, terrain, or friendly forces not associated with any specific type or
form of an operation. Tasks that identify a friendly action rarely provide
sufficient clarity for a mission statement.
B-1. As shown in Figure B-1, there is no definitive list of words or terms to

describe the what and the why of a mission state-ment. The commander is not
limited to the tactical mission tasks listed in this appendix in specify-ing
what actions he wants from his subordinates in an OPORD or OPLAN. Many
of the words and terms used to describe the what and why of a mission state-
ment do not have special connotations beyond their common English
CONTENTS
Actions by Friendly Force ........................... B-3 Seize ........................................................ B-12
Attack-by-Fire ........................................... B-3 Support-by-Fire ...................................... B-12
Breach ....................................................... B-3 Effects on Enemy Force ............................ B-13
Bypass ...................................................... B-4 Block ....................................................... B-13
Clear .......................................................... B-6 Canalize................................................... B-14
Control ...................................................... B-6 Contain.................................................... B-15
Counterreconnaissance .......................... B-6 Defeat ...................................................... B-15
Disengage................................................. B-7 Destroy.................................................... B-15
Exfiltrate.................................................... B-8 Disrupt..................................................... B-16
Follow and Assume ................................. B-8 Fix ............................................................ B-17
Follow and Support ................................. B-9 Interdict ................................................... B-17
Occupy.................................................... B-10 Isolate...................................................... B-18
Reduce .................................................... B-11 Neutralize ................................................ B-19
Retain ...................................................... B-11 Suppress................................................. B-19
Secure ..................................................... B-11 Turn ......................................................... B-19
B-1
FM 3-90
language meanings. However, both the commander and the subordinate must
have a common understanding of the what and why of the operation. It
should be noted that tasks involving only actions by friendly forces rarely pro-
vide sufficient clarity for a mission statement thus the addition of a solid pur-
pose coupled with the task adds understanding and clarity. The commander
ensures that the missions he assigns his subordinate units are consistent
with his scheme of maneuver and the resources allocated to his subordinates.
For example, a defending unit requires far greater effort (resources) to de-
stroy an enemy force than to defeat it. Likewise, an attacking unit requires
more combat power to clear the enemy from a given area than to contain him
in that same area.
B-2. Many of the tactical mission tasks in this appendix have a tactical mis-
sion graphic associated with them. Tacticians use these graphics in conjunc-
tion with course of action development.
EFFECTS ON
ACTIONS BY FRIENDLY FORCE
ENEMY FORCE
Assault* Follow and Assume Block
Attack-by-Fire Follow and Support Canalize
Breach Linkup* Contain
Bypass Occupy Defeat
Clear Reconstitutioin** Destroy
Combat Search and Rescue Reduce Disrupt
Consolidation & Reorganization* Retain Fix
Control Secure Interdict
Counterreconnaissaince Seize Isolate
Disengagement Support-by-Fire Neutralize
Exfiltrate Suppress Penetrate
Turn
TYPES AND FORMS OF OPERATIONS
MOVEMENT TO CONTACT* RETROGRADE OPERATIONS*
Search and Attack* Delay*
ATTACK* Withdrawal*
Ambush* Retirement
Demonstration* RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS**
Feint* SECURITY OPERATIONS*
Raid* INFORMATION OPERATIONS**
COMBINED ARMS BREACH
Spoiling Attack*
OPERATIONS**
EXPLOITATION* PASSAGE OF LINES*
PURSUIT* RELIEF IN PLACE*
FORMS OF OFFENSIVE MANEUVER* RIVER CROSSING OPERATIONS**
Envelopment* TROOP MOVEMENT*
Frontal Attack* Administrative Movement*
Infiltration* Approach March*
Penetration* Road March*
Turning Movement*
AREA DEFENSE* *Defined elsewhere in this manual
MOBILE DEFENSE** **Defined in other manuals
Figure B-1. Tactical Mission Tasks
B-2
Tactical Mission Tactics
ACTIONS BY FRIENDLY FORCE

ATTACK-BY-FIRE
B-3. Attack-by-fire is a tactical mission task
in which a commander uses direct fires,
supported by indirect fires, to engage an
enemy without closing with him to de-
stroy, suppress, fix, or deceive him. A com-
mander assigning this task to a subordinate
must also state the desired effect on the enemy,
such as neutralize, fix, or disrupt. A commander
normally employs this task when the mission
does not dictate or support close combat and oc-
Figure B-2. Attack-by-Fire
cupation of a geographical objective by another
Tactical Mission Graphic
friendly force. The commander may assign the
force conducting an attack by fire a battle position with either a sector of fire
or an engagement area (EA), or he may assign it an axis of advance and a
force-oriented objective. The enemy may be stationary or moving. Figure B-2
shows the tactical mission graphic for attack by fire. The arrow points at the
targeted force or objective, and the commander places the base of the arrow
in the general area from which he wants to deliver the attack.
B-4. An attack by fire closely resembles the task of support by fire. The chief
difference is that one unit conducts the support-by-fire task to support
another unit so it can maneuver against the enemy. The attack by fire task
includes—
· Assigning sectors of fire or EAs to each subordinate weapon system to
include the enemy’s defensive positions or avenues of approach.
· Designating control measures to allow massing, distributing, and shift-
ing of direct and indirect fires.
· Designating battle positions, area of operations (AO), or axis of advance
to allow the friendly force to engage the enemy.
· Providing for security and all-around defense, including control meas-
ures to ensure tie-in of subordinate elements and maximum use of hide
positions.
· OPSEC to deceive the enemy about movement, occupation, and intent
of the operation.
· Reconnaissance, preparing and securing movement routes and firing
positions before the movement of the main body, and stocking Class V
items.
· Movement instructions to the initial battle positions.
BREACH
B-5. Breach is a tactical mission task in which the unit employs all
available means to break through or secure a passage through an
enemy defense, obstacle, minefield, or fortification. A commander at-
tempts to bypass and avoid obstacles and enemy defensive positions to the
maximum extent possible to maintain tempo and momentum. Breaching
enemy defenses and obstacle systems is normally his last choice. When they
occur, they are a synchronized combined arms operation under the control of
B-3
FM 3-90
the maneuver commander. (Figure B-3

shows the control graphic for a breach.)
The area located between the arms of
the graphic shows the general location
for the breach. The length of the arms
extend to include the entire depth of the
area that must be breached. Breaching
operations may be required to support
an attack anywhere along the contin-
uum from deliberate to hasty attack. B
Regardless of where the attack falls
along the continuum, the breaching Figure B-3. Breach Tactical
tenets—intelligence, breaching funda- Mission Graphic
mentals, breaching organization, mass,
and synchronization—apply when conducting breaching operations in sup-
port of an attack. (FM 3-34.2 gives detailed information concerning breaching
operations.)
BYPASS
B-6. Bypass is a tactical mission task
in which the commander directs his
unit to maneuver around an obsta-
cle, position, or enemy force to main-
tain the momentum of the operation
while deliberately avoiding combat
with an enemy force. A commander
orders a bypass and directs combat power
toward mission accomplishment. A by-
pass can take place in offensive or defen-
sive actions. (Figure B-4 shows the tacti- B
cal mission graphic for a bypass.) The
arms of the graphic go on both sides of Figure B-4. Bypass Tactical
the location or unit that will be bypassed. Mission Graphic
B-7. The commander bases his bypass decision on—

· The requirement to maintain momentum and aggressive action.
· Knowledge of enemy strength, intent, or mission.
· The degree to which the bypassed enemy can interfere with the ad-
vance.
· The general state of the enemy force; for example, if enemy resistance
is crumbling, the friendly force can take greater risks.
· Any bypass criteria established by a higher headquarters.
B-8. The force conducting the bypass immediately reports any bypassed ob-
stacles and enemy forces to its higher headquarters. The force normally keeps
the bypassed enemy under observation until relieved by another force unless
as part of a raid. A senior commander does not normally delegate authority to
bypass below the battalion task force level. He establishes bypass criteria to
limit the size of the enemy force that can be bypassed without the authority
of the next higher commander. Before approving the bypass, the commander
B-4
ensures that the bypassing force checks the bypass route for enemy presence
and trafficability. At no time can the bypassing force allow the bypassed ene-
my force to interfere with the moving friendly force.
B-9. The two bypass techniques that the force can employ are—
· Avoiding the enemy totally.
· Fixing the enemy in place with fires and then conducting the bypass.
B-10. If the force cannot avoid the enemy, the bypassing force must fix the
enemy with part of its maneuver elements and bypass with the balance of the
force. (See Figure B-5.) Generally, a commander will not attempt to bypass an
enemy force if more than a third of his combat power is required to fix the
enemy. The commander assigns one subordinate unit the mission of fixing
the enemy in this situation, reinforcing the fixing force as required by the fac-
tors of METT-TC. The fixing force coordinates with the unit assigned to re-
lieve him as soon as possible and provides the new commander with all avail-
able information about the enemy and terrain. The relieving unit is normally
another unit assigned a follow-and-support task. Once relieved, the force fix-
ing the enemy either rejoins its parent organization or becomes part of the
following element and comes under its control.
F
Figure B-5. Task Force Conducting a Fix and a Bypass
B-11. Occasionally the commander may direct the fixing force to break con-
tact with the enemy after the bypassing force completes the bypass. This oc-
curs when the bypassing force has no requirement to maintain an uninter-
rupted logistics flow, such as in a raid. In this case, the fixing force fixes the
enemy by employing defensive and limited offensive actions in synchroniza-
tion with all available fire support until ordered to rejoin the bypassing force.
B-5
FM 3-90
CLEAR
B-12. Clear is a tactical mission task
that requires the commander to re-
move all enemy forces and eliminate
organized resistance within an
assigned area. The force does this by
destroying, capturing, or forcing the
C
withdrawal of enemy forces so they can-
not interfere with the friendly unit’s mis-
sion. In all cases, this task requires a
thorough reconnaissance to discover the
enemy’s locations. After discovering the
location, the clearing force maneuvers Figure B-6. Clear Tactical
against the enemy force. (Figure B-6 Mission Graphic
shows the tactical mission graphic for
clear.) The bar connecting the arrows designates the desired limit of advance
for the clearing force. The bar also establishes the width of the area to clear.
B-13. This task requires significant time and other resources. In his mission
statement, a commander can modify the objective associated with this task to
destroying, capturing, or forcing the withdrawal of only enemy forces larger
than a stated size. In this case, the clearing force keeps smaller enemy forces
under observation while the rest of the friendly force bypasses them.
CONTROL
B-14. Control is a tactical mission task that requires the commander
to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its
use by an enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful
friendly operations. That influence can result from friendly forces occupy-
ing the specified area or dominating that area by their weapon systems. Con-
trol of an area does not require the complete clearance of all enemy soldiers
from the specified area. The tactical mission task of control differs from that
of secure because secure does not allow enemy fires to impact on the secured
area. The enemy can engage targets within the controlled area but cannot
move his ground forces through that area.
B-15. Control may also mean a command relationship or a function com-
manders exercise through their C2 system. (See FMs 3-0, 3-52, and 6-0.)
COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE
B-16. Counterreconnaissance is a tactical mission task that encom-
passes all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy recon-
naissance and surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a
distinct mission, but a component of all forms of security operations.
It prevents hostile observation of a force or area. Counterreconnaissance is an
element of all security operations and most local security measures. It in-
volves both active and passive elements and includes combat action to destroy
or repel enemy reconnaissance units and surveillance assets.
B-17. Destroying enemy ground reconnaissance assets while denying the ene-
my information through other collection systems allows friendly force
B-6
commanders to operate against an enemy who is operating blindly. The ene-

my commander’s inability to see the battlefield eventually desynchronizes his
actions and renders his command vulnerable to aggressive action by friendly
forces. (See Chapter 12 for additional information on counterreconnaissance.)
DISENGAGE
B-18. Disengage is a tactical mission task where a commander has his
unit break contact with the enemy to allow the conduct of another
mission or to avoid decisive engagement. It involves moving to a location
where the enemy cannot engage the friendly force with either direct fires or
observed indirect fires. Disengaging from the enemy while displacing from
one position to the next is a difficult procedure. A disengagement plan in-
cludes—
· The maneuver concept of operations for tactical elements after disen-
gagement, along with the movement routes for each subordinate unit.
· Fires to suppress the enemy and cover the unit’s movement.
· Screening smoke to conceal the unit’s movement, as part of a deception
operation, or to cover passage points.
· Contact and passage points if moving through friendly lines. (See
Chapter 15.)
· The time disengagement starts.
· The earliest time that CS and CSS elements move.
B-19. The senior headquarters conducts operations to support the disengag-
ing forces and relieve pressure on units in contact with the enemy. For ex-
ample, if a division is conducting a delay, the division commander uses his
aviation assets to help a ground maneuver brigade disengage from the close
fight. Simultaneously, the division uses its long-range artillery, rocket, and
EW systems to destroy or disrupt enemy follow-on echelons to prevent them
from interfering with the disengagement. The intent is to create conditions
that allow the unit to disengage while avoiding decisive combat.
B-20. To facilitate disengagement, the commander suppresses the enemy in
contact by bombarding him with large volumes of both direct and indirect
fires provided by forces other than the disengaging unit. In open terrain, the
unit generally moves its short-range systems first. In close terrain, it gener-
ally moves its long-range systems first to support by fire positions. The time
involved to move a system to its next position also affects when that system
moves. Small unit leaders usually direct this movement because of the
limited range of combat net radios and the fact that the tactical situation
varies across a unit’s front. The process repeats as necessary. Once disen-
gagement starts, units must complete it rapidly. The commander can employ
supporting units or reserves to protect the disengaging unit’s flanks and as-
sist in freeing any closely engaged elements. The unit then moves to its next
position using the appropriate movement techniques. (See Chapter 14.)
B-21. If enemy combat systems have not closed within direct-fire range of the
friendly disengaging unit, all its elements may be able to move simultane-
ously under the cover of intense fires and smoke. Speed of execution and con-
tinued coordination are essential to the success of this task.
B-7
FM 3-90
EXFILTRATE
B-22. Exfiltrate is a tactical mission task where a commander re-
moves soldiers or units from areas under enemy control by stealth,
deception, surprise, or clandestine means. Friendly forces exfiltrate
when they have been encircled by enemy forces and cannot conduct a break-
out or be relieved by other friendly forces. Forces returning from a raid, an in-
filtration, or a patrol behind enemy lines can also conduct an exfiltration. The
commander exfiltrates an encircled force to preserve a portion of the force; it
is preferable to the capture of the entire force. A force exfiltrates only after
destroying or incapacitating all equipment (less medical) it must leave be-
hind. Only as a last resort, when the alternative is the capture of the entire
force, does a force conducting an exfiltration leaves its casualties in place
with supplies, chaplain support, and medical attendants.
B-23. Exfiltration is most feasible through rough or difficult terrain in areas
lightly covered by enemy observation and fire. These conditions often allow
undetected movement of small elements, when movement of the entire force
would present more risk. Exfiltration requires resourcefulness, a high degree
of discipline, expert land navigational skills, and motivation. It is unlikely
that the entire force will be able to exfiltrate, since part of it may have to cre-
ate a diversion. Good, small-unit leadership is essential in this type of opera-
tion.
B-24. The exfiltrating force first establishes its rally points and exfiltration
lanes. It coordinates its linkup plans with other friendly units. The com-
mander designates exfiltration lanes as restricted fire areas (RFAs) or no-fire
areas (NFAs). The exfiltrating force uses preparatory fires to cover its move-
ment and to expend stockpiled ammunition. Based on reconnaissance and
available intelligence, the exfiltrating force subdivides into small groups and
exfiltrates during periods of limited visibility, passing through or around ene-
my defensive positions. If detected, it tries to bypass the enemy. Exfiltration
may be more difficult with combat and tactical vehicles because of the noise
they make and the limitations they impose on exfiltration routes, make detec-
tion more likely.
FOLLOW AND ASSUME

B-25. Follow and assume is a tactical mission task in which a second
committed force follows a force conducting an offensive operation
and is prepared to continue the mission if the lead force is fixed,
attritted, or unable to continue. The follow-and-assume force is not a re-
serve but is committed to accomplish specific tasks. Figure B-7 shows the tac-
tical mission graphic for follow and assume. The commander places the box
part of the graphic around the symbol of the unit being assigned this task.
B-26. Tasks for a follow-and-assume force include—
· Preparing to execute all missions of the followed unit.
· Maintaining contact with the trail elements of the leading force.
· Preparing to conduct a forward passage of lines through the force it is
following.
· Monitoring all combat information and intelligence being provided to
and from the force it is following.
B-8
· Avoiding engaging enemy forces bypassed by the force it is following.

B-27. A commander assigns a follow-and-assume mission to ensure that he
can maintain the momentum of his offensive operation. The follow-and-
assume force ensures that it can immediately execute a forward passage of
lines and assume the mission of the lead force.
B-28. The commander assigning a unit the task of follow and assume has two
options in establishing the relationship between the lead and trail units. He
normally retains command of both units and requires that all requests for
support from the supported unit to the supporting unit pass through his
headquarters. Alternatively, in situations where the commander will not be
able to maintain control over both units, he places the supporting unit in a
standard command relationship with the supported unit, such as attached or
operational control. An example of this occurs when both units are trying to
encircle a retrograding enemy force and the commander remains with the
direct-pressure force.
OBJECTIVE
OBJECTIVE
DAN
MARGE
ENY
ENY
{
FOLLOW
AND
ASSUME
FORCE
Figure B-7. Follow and Assume Tactical Mission Graphic
FOLLOW AND SUPPORT

B-29. Follow and support is a tactical mission task in which a commit-
ted force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive
operation. The follow-and-support force is not a reserve but is a force com-
mitted to specific tasks. (Figure B-8 on page B-10 shows the tactical mission
graphic for follow and support.) The commander places the box part of the
graphic around the symbol of the unit being assigned this task.
B-30. Tasks for a follow-and-support force include—
· Destroying bypassed enemy units when the lead unit does not clear the
AO as it advances.
· Blocking movement of enemy reinforcements.
B-9
FM 3-90
· Relieving in place any direct-pressure or encircling force halted to con-

tain the enemy.
· Securing lines of communication.
· Clearing obstacles.
· Guarding prisoners, key areas, and installations.
· Recovering friendly battle losses.
· Securing key terrain.
· Controlling dislocated civilians.
OBJECTIVE
OBJECTIVE
DONALD
BEULAH
{
FOLLOW
AND
SUPPORT
FORCE
Figure B-8. Follow and Support Tactical Mission Graphic
B-31. A commander assigns a unit the task of follow and support to keep the
supported force from having to commit its combat power to tasks other than
the decisive operation, which would slow the offensive operation’s momentum
and tempo. The follow-and-support force must accomplish its tasks to prevent
the enemy, obstacles, and other factors from interfering with offensive opera-
tions, especially along the lines of communications.
B-32. The commander assigning the follow-and-support task has two options
in establishing the relationship between the supported and the supporting
units. He can place the follow-and-support unit in a standard command rela-
tionship with the supported unit, such as attached or operational control. Al-
ternatively, he can retain command of the follow-and-support force and re-
quire that all tasking request from the supported unit go through his head-
quarters.
OCCUPY
B-33. Occupy is a tactical mission task that involves moving a
friendly force into an area so that it can control that area. Both the
B-10
force’s movement to and occupation of

the area occur without enemy opposi-
tion. A unit can control an area without occu-
pying it, but not vice versa. That is the differ-
ence between the tactical mission tasks of O
occupy and control. (Figure B-9 shows the oc-
cupy tactical mission graphic.) The X on the
tactical mission graphic has no significance,
but the graphic should encompass the entire
area that the commander desires to occupy.
Units typically occupy assembly areas, objec- Figure B-9. Occupy
tives, and defensive positions. (Chapters 2, 3, Tactical Mission Graphic
and 8 discuss this process in detail.)
REDUCE
B-34. Reduce is a tactical mission task that involves the destruction
of an encircled or bypassed enemy force. There is no tactical mission
graphic for this task. This task can occur at any location on the battlefield.
(Appendix D discusses the reduction of an encircled enemy.) Reduce is also a
mobility task that involves creating sufficient lanes through an obstacle to ne-
gate its intended effect.
RETAIN
B-35. Retain is a tactical mission task in
which the commander ensures that a ter-
rain feature controlled by a friendly force
remains free of enemy occupation or use.
The commander assigning this task must spec-
ify the area to retain and the duration of the R
retention, which is time- or event-driven.
While a unit is conducting this task, it expects
the enemy to attack and prepares to become
decisively engaged. A unit tasked to retain a
specific piece of terrain does not necessary
have to occupy it. (Figure B-10 shows the tacti- Figure B-10. Retain
cal mission graphic for retain.) The direction of Tactical Mission Graphic
the arrow has no significance, but the graphic
should include the entire area the commander wants to retain.
SECURE
B-36. Secure is a tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit,
facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed
as a result of enemy action. This task normally involves conducting area
security operations. (See Chapter 12.) A force given the mission of securing a
unit, facility, or geographical location not only prevents enemy forces from
over-running or occupying the secured location, but also prevents enemy di-
rect fires and observed indirect fires from impacting the secured location.
This is the primary difference between control and secure. The control tacti-
cal mission task allows enemy direct and indirect fires to affect the location
being controlled. A unit does not have to physically occupy the area
B-11
FM 3-90
immediately around the unit, facility, or geo-

graphical location it is securing if it can pre-
vent the enemy from occupying or firing at
that location by other means. The commander
states the mission duration in terms of time
or event when assigning a mission to secure a S
given unit, facility, or geographical location.
(Figure B-11 shows the tactical mission
graphic for secure.) The direction of the arrow
has no significance, but the graphic should
include the entire area the commander wants Figure B-11. Secure
to secure. Tactical Mission Graphic
SEIZE
B-37. Seize is a tactical mission task
that involves taking possession of a
designated area by using overwhelm-
ing force. (Figure B-12 shows the tactical S
mission graphic for seize.) An enemy force
can no longer place direct fire on an objec-
tive that has been seized. The arrow points
to the location or objective to seize. This
task differs from secure because it requires
offensive action to obtain control of the des-
Figure B-12. Seize
ignated area or objective. It differs from the
Tactical Mission Graphic
task of occupy because it involves overcom-
ing anticipated enemy opposition. Once a force seizes a physical objective, it
clears the terrain within that objective by killing, capturing, or forcing the
withdrawal of all enemy forces.
SUPPORT-BY- FIRE
B-38. Support-by-fire is a tactical mission task in which a maneuver
force moves to a position where it can engage the enemy by direct
fire in support of another maneuvering force. The primary objective of
the support force is normally to fix and suppress the enemy so he cannot ef-
fectively fire on the maneuvering force. The secondary objective is to destroy
the enemy if he tries to reposition. The commander must specify the desired
effect on the enemy when assigning this task to a subordinate.
B-39. A unit conducting the task of support by fire does not maneuver to cap-
ture enemy forces or terrain. The commander gives this task to another unit
as part of a larger maneuver. When assigning a support-by-fire mission, the
commander designates the enemy, when to attack, the general location from
which to operate, the friendly force to support, and the purpose of the task,
such as fix or suppress. (Figure B-13 shows the tactical mission graphic for
support by fire.) The ends of the arrows should point in the general direction
of the targeted unit or location. The base of the area indicates the general
area from which to deliver fires.
B-40. Once the commander gives an element the task of support by fire, it
should occupy support by fire positions that have cover and concealment,
B-12
good observation, and clear fields of fire.

Elements occupying support-by-fire posi-
tions should—
· Check the security of the position.
· Search for targets.
· Orient weapons on likely or sus-
pected enemy positions.
· Assume fighting positions that
provide some degree of protection.
Heavy forces occupy hull-down
firing positions, while light forces
use trees, natural berms, build- Figure B-13. Support-by-Fire
ings, and similar existing terrain Position Tactical Mission Graphic
features.
· Assign observation sectors to each soldier or weapon system in the
support-by-fire element.
· Use its available thermal sights to locate heat sources not visible to the
naked eye, such as vehicles concealed in tree lines or other wooded
areas or personnel serving at OPs.
B-41. Support by fire closely resembles the task of attack by fire. The differ-
ence is that support by fire supports another force so it can maneuver against
the enemy, while an attack by fire does not support the maneuver of another
friendly force.
EFFECTS ON ENEMY FORCE

BLOCK
B-42. Block is a tactical mission task
that denies the enemy access to an
area or prevents his advance in a di-
rection or along an avenue of ap- B
proach. A blocking task normally requires
the friendly force to block the enemy force
for a certain time or until a specific event
has occurred. The line perpendicular to Figure B-14. Block Tactical
the enemy’s line of advance indicates the Mission Graphic
limit of enemy advance. A blocking unit may have to hold terrain and become
decisively engaged. (Figure B-14 illustrates the tactical mission graphic for a
blocking task.)
B-43. Block is also an engineer obstacle effect that integrates fire
planning and obstacle effort to stop an attacker along a specific ave-
nue of approach or prevent him from passing through an engage-
ment area. The vertical line in the obstacle effect graphic indicates the limit
of enemy advance. They also indicate where the obstacle ties in to restricted
terrain. (Figure B-15 on page B-14 illustrates the block obstacle effect
graphic.) A blocking force may employ blocking obstacles to assist in the task.
Blocking obstacles are complex, employed in depth, and integrated with fires
to prevent the enemy from proceeding along an avenue of approach, or to
B-13
FM 3-90
proceed only at unacceptable cost. When

employed, blocking obstacles should serve
ENY
as a limit, not allowing the enemy beyond
that point. Obstacles alone cannot accom-
plish a blocking task. (FM 3-34.1 describes ENY
the block engineer obstacle effect.)

B-44. Block as a tactical mission task dif- Figure B-15. Block
fers from the tactical mission task of fix Obstacle Effect Graphic
because a blocked enemy force can move
in any direction other than the obstructed one, while a fixed enemy force can-
not move in any direction.
CANALIZE
B-45. Canalize is a tactical mission
task in which the commander re-
stricts enemy movement to a narrow
zone by exploiting terrain coupled
with the use of obstacles, fires, or
friendly maneuver. (See Figure B-16.)
Figure B-17 shows how successful
canalization results in moving the
enemy formation or individual soldiers
and weapon systems into a predeter- C
mined position where they are vul-
nerable to piecemeal destruction by di- Figure B-16. Canalize
rect and indirect fires. Tactical Mission Graphic
TREES 20 TO 25 CM IN DIAMETER,
SPACED NOT MORE THAN 5
METERS APART
COMPLETED ANTITANK
DITCH REINFORCED BY
AT MINES AND AN ABATIS
C
EA
COLLEEN
SLOPE > 45% ANGLE
Figure B-17. Canalizing Terrain Enhanced by Obstacles Used with an Engagement Area
B-14
CONTAIN
B-46. Contain is a tactical mission
task that requires the commander
to stop, hold, or surround enemy
ENY
forces or to cause them to center
their activity on a given front and
prevent them from withdrawing C
any part of their forces for use else-
where. Containment allows an enemy ENY
to reposition himself within the desig-
nated geographical area, whereas fixing
an enemy does not. Geo-graphic terms
or time may express the limits of the Figure B-18. Contain
containment. The contain graphic en- Tactical Mission Graphic
compasses the entire geographical area
in which the commander desires to contain the enemy during the develop-
ment of alternative courses of action. (Figure B-18 shows the tactical control
graphic for contain.)
DEFEAT
B-47. Defeat is a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy
force has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the
will to fight. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling or unable
to pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the
friendly commander’s will and can no longer interfere to a signifi-
cant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can result
from the use of force or the threat of its use.
B-48. A commander can generate different effects against an enemy to defeat
him:
· Physical. The enemy loses the physical means to continue fighting. He
no longer has the personnel, weapon systems, equipment, or supplies to
carry out his assigned mission.
· Psychological. The enemy loses the will to fight. He becomes mentally
exhausted, and his morale is so low that he can no longer continue to
carry out his assigned mission.
These effects typically occur as a result of catastrophic losses inflicted over a
very short time or from sustained attrition. An opponent who is not ideologi-
cally motivated opponent may be defeated psychologically on observing prep-
arations for the delivery of clearly overwhelming combat power on his posi-
tion. Defeat manifests itself in some sort of physical action, such as mass sur-
renders, abandonment of significant quantities of equipment and supplies, or
retrograde operations.
DESTROY
B-49. Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an ene-
my force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to
destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot per-
form any function or be restored to a usable condition without being
entirely rebuilt. The amount of damage needed to render a unit combat-
B-15
FM 3-90
ineffective depends on the unit’s type,

discipline, and morale. Destroying
armored or dug-in targets with area fire
weapons requires considerable ammuni-
tion and time, so forces do not normally
attempt it unless they have terminally D
guided munitions. (Figure B-19 shows
the tactical mission graphic for destroy.)
DISRUPT
B-50. Disrupt is a tactical mission
task in which a commander inte- Figure B-19. Destroy
grates direct and indirect fires, ter- Tactical Mission Graphic
rain, and obstacles to upset an ene-
my’s formation or tempo, interrupt
his timetable, or cause his forces to
commit prematurely or attack in a
piecemeal fashion. This increases the
enemy’s vulnerability to friendly fires. It
may temporarily knock a unit out of the D
battle. Disruption is never an end; it is the
means to an end. (Figure B-20 shows the
tactical mission graphic for disrupt. The
center arrow points toward the targeted
enemy unit.)
Figure B-20. Disrupt
B-51. The maneuver force attempting to Tactical Mission Graphic
disrupt an enemy must attack him with
enough combat power to achieve desired results with one mass attack or sus-
tain the attack until it achieves the desired results. It may involve attacking
the enemy while he is still in his assembly areas or in an approach march be-
fore he can deploy into a combat formation. The commander deter-mines the
amount of risk he is willing to accept based on anticipated friendly losses, the
location of the attack, and the number of attacks.
B-52. Disrupt is also an engineer ob-
stacle effect that focuses fire plan-
ning and obstacle effort to cause the
enemy to break up his formation and
tempo, interrupt his timetable, com-
mit breaching assets prematurely,
and attack in a piecemeal effort. It
also helps to deceive the enemy concern-
ing the location of friendly defensive posi- I
tions, to separate combat echelons, or to

Figure B-21. Disrupt
separate combat forces from their logistic
Obstacle Effect Graphic
support. As shown in Figure B-21, the
short arrow(s) in the obstacle-effect graphic indicates where obstacles impact
the enemy’s ability to maneuver. The longer arrow(s) indicate where the com-
mander allows the enemy to bypass the obstacle effect so he can attack him
with fires. The arrows indicate the direction of enemy attack. A defending
B-16
commander normally uses the disrupt obstacle effect forward of his EAs. Ob-
stacles alone cannot disrupt an enemy unit. (FM 3-34.1 describes the disrupt
engineer obstacle effect.)
FIX
B-53. Fix is a tactical mission
task where a commander pre-
vents the enemy from moving
any part of his force from a spe- F
cific location for a specific per-
iod. This may occur by engaging him
Figure B-22. Fix Tactical Mission
to prevent his withdrawal for use
Graphic
elsewhere, or by using deception,
such as transmitting false orders. The commander uses fix in offensive and
defensive actions; it is always a shaping operation. (Figure B-22 shows the
tactical mission graphic for fix.) The commander points the arrow toward the
enemy unit that he desires to fix. The broken part of the arrow indicates the
desired location for that event to occur.
B-54. Fixing an enemy force does not mean destroying it. The friendly force
has to prevent the enemy from moving in any direction. This task usually has
a time constraint, such as fix the enemy reserve force until OBJECTIVE
FALON, the decisive operation, is secured. The tactical mission task of fix dif-
fers from that of block in that a fixed enemy force cannot move from a given
location, but a blocked enemy force can move in any direction other than the
one obstructed.
B-55. Fix is also an engineer obstacle
effect that focuses fire planning and
obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s
movement within a specified area,
normally an engagement area. Primary
use of this effect is to give the friendly unit
Figure B-23. Fix Obstacle
time to acquire, target, and destroy the at-
Intent Graphic
tacking enemy with direct and indirect
fires throughout the depth of an EA or avenue of approach. The irregular part
of the arrow in the obstacle-intent graphic indicates the location where the
enemy’s rate of advance will be slowed by complex obstacles. The arrow indic-
ates the direction of enemy advance. (See Figure B-23.) (FM 3-34.1 describes
the fix engineer obstacle effect.)
INTERDICT
B-56. Interdict is a tactical mission task where the commander pre-
vents, disrupts, or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route. Interdic-
tion is a shaping operation conducted to complement and reinforce other on-
going offensive or defensive operations. (Figure B-24 on page B-18 shows the
tactical mission graphic for interdict.) The two arrows should cross on the
unit or location targeted for interdiction. An interdiction tasking must specify
how long to interdict, defined as a length of time or some event that must oc-
cur before the interdiction is lifted, or the exact effect desired from the inter-
diction.
B-17
FM 3-90
B-57. The depth at which the attacking

force conducts the interdiction generally
determines the friendly force’s freedom of
action. Increasing the depth of operations
reduces the danger of fratricide to air and
surface forces, reduces the coordination
required, and allows increasingly flexible I
operations. With more freedom of action,
aerial forces leave the enemy with no
location immune from attack.
B-58. The depth at which interdiction
takes place also determines the speed Figure B-24. Interdict
with which its effects are observed. Nor- Tactical Mission Graphic
mally, ground maneuver units first focus
on targets close to the forward of line own troops (FLOT). Interdiction efforts
there have immediate impact on enemy forces near the interdiction target but
do not affect the enemy’s ability to mass force effects. Attacks at greater
distances from the FLOT have a delayed impact on close combat but
eventually degrade the enemy’s ability to mass effects.
B-59. The friendly force’s capability to interdict may have a devastating
impact on the enemy’s plans and ability to respond to friendly actions. For
example, interdiction efforts that result in the enemy’s maneuver being
delayed or disrupted enhances the friendly force’s ability to achieve tactical
advantages. Delaying or disrupting enemy resupply efforts limits his ability
to sustain intense, high-tempo offensive or defensive operations and restricts
the mobility of his forces.
B-60. Interdicting the movement of enemy units can be extremely effective in
assisting their encirclement and eventual destruction. Fixed enemy ground
forces—or those trapped by the loss of their mobility—provide lucrative tar-
gets. The commander should plan to interdict withdrawing enemy forces to
enhance his pursuit. While interdiction can contribute to success by hamper-
ing reinforcement and resupply, it can also contribute by trapping enemy
forces or canalizing their maneuvers, leading to their destruction in detail.
ISOLATE
B-61. Isolate is a tactical mission task
that requires a unit to seal off—both
physically and psychologically—an ene-
my from his sources of support, deny him
freedom of movement, and prevent him
from having contact with other enemy
forces. A commander does not allow an iso-
lated enemy sanctuary within his present po-
sition but continues to conduct offensive ac-
tions against him. (Figure B-25 shows the tac- I
tical mission graphic for isolate.) The position
or direction of the arrow has no significance, Figure B-25. Isolate
but the graphic should surround the targeted Tactical Mission Graphic
enemy unit.
B-18
NEUTRALIZE
B-62. Neutralize is a tactical mission task
that results in rendering enemy per-
sonnel or materiel incapable of interfer-
ing with a particular operation. (Fig-
ure B-26 shows the neutralize tactical mis-
sion graphic.) The two lines cross over the N
symbol of the unit or facility targeted for neu-
tralization. When assigning a task to neu-
tralize, the commander must specify the ene-
my force or materiel to neutralize and the
duration, which is time- or event-driven. The Figure B-26. Neutralize
neutralized target may become effective Tactical Mission Graphic
again when casualties are replaced, damage
is repaired, or effort resulting in the neutralization is lifted. The commander
normally uses a combination of lethal and nonlethal fires to neutralize enemy
personnel or materiel. The assets required to neutralize a target vary
according to the type and size of the target and the weapon and munitions
combination used.
SUPPRESS
B-63. Suppress is a tactical mission task that results in the temporary

degradation of the performance of a force or weapon system below
the level needed to accomplish its mission. It occurs when a commander
employs direct or indirect lethal fires, offensive information operations, or
smoke on enemy personnel, weapons, and equipment to prevent or degrade
enemy fires, sensors, and visual observation of friendly forces. As opposed to
the neutralization task, the original target regains its effectiveness without
needing to reconstitute once the effects of the systems involved in the sup-
pression effort lift or shift to another target.
TURN
B-64. Turn is a tactical mission task
that involves forcing an enemy ele-
ment from one avenue of approach or T
movement corridor to another. The
commander relates obstacles, fires, and ter-
rain to improve his tactical situation while
degrading the enemy’s situation. For ex-
ample, in the offense, a commander might Figure B-27. Turn
want to turn an enemy force he is pursuing Tactical Mission Graphic
to place it in a position where he can de-
stroy it. In the defense, a commander might want to turn an attacking enemy
force to allow him to conduct a counterattack into its flank. (Figure B-27
shows the turn tactical mission graphic.) The place where the arrow breaks
indicates the general location of the obstacle complex that will force the ene-
my to move from one avenue of approach to another.
B-65. Turn is also a tactical obstacle effect that integrates fire plan-
ning and obstacle effort to divert an enemy formation from one
B-19
FM 3-90
avenue of approach to an adja-

cent avenue of approach or into
an engagement area. Its develop-
ment requires well-defined mobility
corridors and avenues of approach. To
achieve this effect, the obstacles have
a subtle orientation relative to the
enemy’s approach as shown in Fig-
ure B-28. The obstacles and their as-
sociated fires allow bypasses in the di-
rection desired by the friendly scheme
of maneuver. Finally, the obstacles tie Figure B-28. Turn Obstacle Effect
into restrictive terrain at the initial
point of the turn. A commander normally uses the turn effect on the flanks of
an EA. The direction of the arrow indicates the desired direction of turn. (See
FM 3-34.1 for more information on tactical obstacle effects.)
B-20
Appendix C
Airborne and Air Assault Operations

A landing against organized and highly trained opposition is prob-
ably the most difficult undertaking which military forces are called
upon to face.
General of the Army George C. Marshall, 1943
Joint force commanders conduct entry operations at the operational level

of war. Commanders operating at the tactical level conduct airborne or
air assault operations to gain a positional advantage or to envelop or turn
the enemy. Airborne and air assault operations are types of entry opera-
tions that use a vertical envelopment to insert a force into an area of op-
erations (AO). An enemy may or may not be in a position to oppose the
operation. While the commander should attempt to achieve an unopposed
landing, he must prepare for the presence of opposition.
C-1. The capability to conduct airborne and air assault operations allows the
commander to—
· Threaten enemy rear areas, causing the enemy to divert combat ele-
ments to protect vital installations and hold key terrain.
· Overcome distances quickly, overfly barriers, and bypass enemy de-
fenses.
· Extend the area over which he can exert his influence.
· Disperse his reserve forces widely for force protection reasons while
maintaining their capability for effective and rapid response.
· Exploit his combat power by increasing tactical mobility.
COMMON FACTORS
C-2. Factors common to airborne and air assault operations are the use of the
reverse planning process, condition setting, and the impact of meteorological
conditions (weather and light data).
CONTENTS
Common Factors.......................................... C-1 Planning Considerations ......................... C-8
Reverse Planning Process ...................... C-2 Executing Airborne Operations .............. C-9
Condition Setting ..................................... C-2 Air Assault Operations............................... C-12
Meteorological Conditions ...................... C-3 Organization of Forces .......................... C-12
Airborne Operations .................................... C-3 Control Measures ................................... C-13
Organization of Forces ............................ C-4 Planning Considerations ....................... C-13
Control Measures..................................... C-5 Executing Air Assault Operations ........ C-16
C-1
FM 3-90
REVERSE PLANNING PROCESS

C-3. An inverse sequence of detailed planning and joint coordination char-
acterizes both operations. As a minimum, airborne and air assault plans
include a–
· Ground tactical plan.
· Landing plan.
· Movement plan.
· Marshaling plan. (The air assault terminology for this last plan is the
staging plan.)
Intelligence regarding the enemy and terrain characteristics of the objective
area is vital to this process.
C-4. Airborne and air assault operations result in establishing positions that
support completing the force’s assigned mission. The ground tactical plan is
the first plan completed. It must address the early destruction of any enemy
forces that pose an immediate threat to the lodgment area. Commanders and
their staffs normally develop the landing plan from the ground tactical plan.
From the landing plan, they develop the movement plan. This continues until
the staff completes the marshaling plan.
C-5. The ground tactical plan is the basis for planning throughout the plan-
ning process. However, each plan affects the others, and changes in one plan
can require adjustments in the other plans. The commander must determine
if such adjustments entail acceptable risk. If the risk is unacceptable, the con-
cept of operations must change. For example, the amount of lift available de-
termines the feasibility of the ground tactical plan. If there are not enough
lift systems to put all the required forces in place at the required time, the
commander should adjust the ground tactical plan as well as the other plans.
Therefore, planning for airborne and air assault operations requires the staff
to obtain vital planning data, such as the availability of lift systems and the
technical and tactical capabilities of those systems as early as possible.
C-6. Commanders ensure continuous coordination between the parallel eche-
lons of the assaulting combat force and the unit or service providing the
transportation from the beginning of an operation until its completion or
abandonment. Units jointly coordinate and staff each detail before initiating
operations. The commander makes maximum use of combined arms capabili-
ties to ensure the assault force has sufficient power to accomplish its mission
and protect itself. Short planning times often require staffs to modify existing
contingency plans and standing operating procedures to meet the exact situa-
tion while still ensuring adequate coordination.
CONDITION SETTING
C-7. Setting conditions is also a common factor necessary for the success of
air assault and airborne operations. Condition setting postures the air assault
or parachute force for success with minimal or acceptable losses. The com-
mander determines the exact conditions required in accordance with the fac-
tors of METT-TC, to include the degree of risk he is willing to accept with re-
gard to each condition. Setting conditions is not limited to conducting sup-
pression of enemy air defense and preparatory fires. It requires the
C-2
participation of numerous staffs, units, cells, and boards in different echelons

and services.
C-8. Condition setting is an iterative process. The commander through his
situational understanding, decides what part of the situation must change to
ensure the success of the vertical envelopment. He tasks his intelligence, sur-
veillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets to detect the location of those ene-
my systems that unacceptably endanger the success of the operation. This al-
lows his fire support systems to target and deliver fire effects against those
enemy systems. He tasks his other battlefield operating systems to continue
planning and preparing for the operation. The commander requests assist-
ance from his higher headquarters if he does not have sufficient organic as-
sets and information to accomplish the mission. He then assesses the pro-
gress of his battlefield operating systems. This process repeats until he is sat-
isfied with the result or operational necessity forces him to either cancel or
conduct the vertical envelopment.
METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS
C-9. Meteorological conditions affect airborne and air assault operations more
than they affect any other type of operation. Long-range forecasts are vital to
planning. As part of the planning process, commanders determine what ad-
verse weather conditions would delay or cancel operations.
C-10. Commanders consider current and forecasted weather conditions in
terms of their impact on tactical operations and aircraft performance. To
issue the execution order that initiates the operation, the commander must
know the current weather information at departure sites and pickup zones
(PZs), along approach routes, and in the objective area. Operations conducted
during marginal weather conditions may enhance the element of surprise,
but they also increase the risk of accidents. The commander may have to
postpone a planned operation or reduce the tempo of an ongoing operation
when the risk becomes unacceptable because of deteriorating weather condi-
tions.
C-11. Weather conditions affect aircraft performance and influence the con-
duct of operations. These conditions include: wind shears, crosswinds, and the
ambient temperatures throughout the course of the operation. High tempera-
ture and altitude degrade aircraft lift performance. The combination of these
factors results in trade-offs in the operating parameters of all missions. For
example, a commander may insert dismounted reconnaissance teams on
mountainsides in the cool of the morning, but be unable to execute the same
mission in the noonday heat.
AIRBORNE OPERATIONS
C-12. An airborne operation is an operation involving the air movement into
an objective area of combat forces and their logistic support for execution of a
tactical, operational, or strategic mission. The means employed may be any
combination of airborne units, air transportable units, and types of transport
aircraft, depending on the mission and the overall situation (JP 3-17). The ob-
jective area is known as the airhead. The airhead contains enough drop zones
(DZs) and landing zones (LZs) to allow airborne forces to mass effects on their
C-3
FM 3-90
objectives. The airhead should also contain extraction zones (EZs), interior
lines of communications (LOCs), and terrain that allows for conducting a de-
fense in depth. An administrative air movement of personnel, supplies, or
equipment is not an airborne operation, although some procedures used in an
airborne operation may apply. (JP 3-18 and FM 3-18.11 provide the doctrinal
basis for airborne operations.)
C-13. Airborne operations are joint operations because of the interservice
links of modern command and control (C2) systems, the multiservice struc-
ture of the defense transportation system, and the broad range of forces and
support involved. Airborne operations require secure staging and departure
areas coupled with the need to maintain operations security (OPSEC).
OPSEC measures may include establishing intermediate support bases with-
in tactical airlift range. The operation begins and ends on the order of the
commander who establishes the joint airborne force.
C-14. Once the commander determines the principal components of the
ground tactical plan and the maneuver and fire support schemes, the air-
borne force organizes to execute its assigned mission. The commander bal-
ances the immediate need for combat power with the need to ensure force
sustainability over time. To ensure unity of effort, part or all of the assigned
forces’ subordinate units can form into one or more temporary tactical group-
ings, such as teams or task forces. Each tactical group has a designated com-
mander. Doctrine cannot prescribe in advance a standard organization to
meet all conditions. However, airborne forces generally divide into one of
three echelons: the assault echelon, the follow-on echelon, and the rear eche-
lon.
C-15. The assault echelon is the element of a force that is scheduled for initial
assault on the objective area (JP 4-01.2). In an airborne assault it normally
comprises those forces capable of insertion by parachute in a single drop by
the available lift systems. The assault echelon is a combined arms organiza-
tion with only limited sustainment capabilities. The commander cross-loads
vital assets, such as commanders, principal staff, communication systems, re-
connaissance and security forces, and crew-served weapons among the vari-
ous transportation systems so the loss of a single air frame will not compro-
mise the operation. (Cross-loading also applies to air assault operations.)
C-16. The follow-on echelon contains those additional forces moved
into the objective area after the assault echelon. They provide the com-
bat power necessary to expand the initial airhead, secure the lodgment area,
and establish one or more air or seaports of debarkation. The composition of
the follow-on echelon depends on the factors of METT-TC. It can consist of
heavy and light combined arms formations, field and air defense artillery as-
sets, and combat engineers, as well as significant combat support (CS) and
combat service support (CSS) elements. Introducing this echelon can extend
over several days and involve multiple sorties by individual lift systems. Usu-
ally, this echelon does not require cross-loading of its allocated lift systems.
This increases the carrying capacity of the lift systems delivering this eche-
lon. This echelon contains increased sustainment capabilities.
C-4
C-17. The rear echelon contains those elements of the force that are not re-
quired in the objective area. It may remain at home station or at an intermed-
iate staging base or intermediate support base throughout short-duration op-
erations. This echelon generally contains the airborne unit’s long-term sus-
tainment capabilities.
CONTROL MEASURES
C-18. The commander has the full range of graphic control measures to help
control his operation. As a minimum, the commander must assign each sub-
ordinate unit an AO. The airborne operation commander also use DZs, LZs,
EZs, assault objectives, and the airhead line to focus the efforts of his subordi-
nates.
C-19. Selecting DZs and LZs is a joint responsibility. The mission commander
is responsible for delivering personnel and cargo to the DZ or LZ and for se-
lecting approaches to the landing area. Both the joint and component com-
manders must base their decisions on their knowledge of respective problems
and on the needs of the overall operation. The nature and location of landing
areas are important when preparing the scheme of maneuver. The mission
governs the general area where they should be established. At higher eche-
lons, commanders can assign landing areas in broad terms. At lower echelons,
they must describe these locations specifically. The commander selects his
DZs only after conducting a detailed analysis. He uses the information pro-
vided by his intelligence system and Army pathfinders as he considers the fol-
lowing factors when selecting DZs and LZs:
· Ease of identification.
· Straight-line approach.
· Suitable for the weather and terrain.
· Out of range of enemy air defenses, strong ground defenses, and sup-
pressive indirect fires.
· Close to or on top of an assault objective.
Since the last two entries conflict, he must decide which consideration has
priority. (FM 3-17 provides detailed information regarding the desired char-
acteristics of DZs and LZs.)
C-20. When assigning objectives and boundaries in airborne operations, the
commander must consider other factors in addition to those inherent in con-
ventional operations. He selects specific assault objectives based on an analy-
sis of the situation. (See Figure C-1, page C-6.) The assault objectives dictate
the size and shape of the airhead, although the commander develops the air-
head line and determines the assault objectives concurrently. He selects as-
sault objectives for his subordinate elements. Concurrently, the commanders
of these subordinate elements decide the size, type, or disposition of the force
that they commit to gain and maintain control of their objectives.
C-21. Selecting assault objectives should allow forces to accomplish mission-
essential tasks while meeting the commander’s intent. However, they may
not include those objectives that must be seized to secure the airhead line. An
appropriate assault objective is one that the force must control early in the
assault to accomplish the mission or enhance the security of the airborne
force. This can include key terrain within the airhead or terrain required for
C-5
FM 3-90
linkup. The airborne force is

vulnerable from the time it
lands until follow-on forces OBJ
arrive at the airhead. A

mounted enemy unit that at-
tacks the airhead immedi- OBJ
OBJ
ately following the airborne
assault can completely dis-
rupt the operation or even OBJ
cause it to fail. Therefore,

OBJ
the assault objectives select-
ed by the commander are
terrain locations that domi-
nate high-speed enemy ave-
nues of approach into the Figure C-1. Assault Objectives
airhead. He can also select
enemy positions that threaten the mission and are within the airhead. The
unit must seize its assault objectives immediately to establish the airhead
and provide security for follow-on forces.
C-22. The commander ranks the assault objectives based on the most likely
threat or mission requirements. The airborne force secures its assault objec-
tives before it establishes a perimeter defensive line along the trace of the air-
head. It clears the terrain within the airhead of organized enemy resistance
and positions forces to secure the airhead line.
C-23. The commander se-
AIRHEAD LINE
lects assault objectives at
the same time as he con-
siders the extent of the air-
head. He draws the airhead
line to delineate the specific
area to seize and designate
the airhead. An airhead line
resembles a forward edge of
the battle area in that se-
curity and other forces op-
erate outside of the airhead
line. The airhead acts as a
base for further operations
and as the lodgment to allow Figure C-2. Airhead Line
the airborne force to build
up combat power. Once the assault force secures the airhead, it clears all ene-
my forces within it, not just organized enemy units. The following factors de-
termine the location, extent, and form of the airhead line:
· The actual trace of the airhead line reflects the control of key or critical
terrain essential to the mission. (See Figure C-2.) The air-head line
should place the arrival airfield and any LZs or DZs out of the range of
enemy direct fires and observed indirect fires.
· The airhead line is anchored on obstacles, and the airhead takes advan-
tage of existing natural and man-made obstacles.
C-6
· The airhead contains enough DZs, LZs, and EZs to ensure the force has
interior LOCs and to permit one massed parachute assault by the en-
tire assault echelon rather than piecemeal insertion.
· The airhead allows enough space to disperse units and supplies to re-
duce the airhead’s vulnerability to nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons if they are a threat.
· The airhead must be large enough to provide for defense in depth, yet
small enough for the airborne unit to defend. Although this depends
largely on the factors of METT-TC, a battalion can defend an airhead 3
to 5 kilometers in diameter. A brigade can occupy an airhead 5 to 8
kilometers in diameter.
C-24. When assigning boundaries and subordinate AOs in airborne op-
erations, the commander considers several factors beyond those affecting
more routine operations. Ideally, each unit’s AO should include at least one
DZ and one LZ to enable the unit and its attachments to land within its as-
signed AO during the assault. Each unit’s presence also facilitates resupply
and evacuation of enemy prisoners of war and casualties. Establishing a LZ
and a DZ reduces coordination requirements with adjacent units. The com-
mander assigns boundaries that should not require a unit to defend in more
than one direction at the same time. Boundaries should extend as far as nec-
essary beyond forward security forces to coordinate fires. This enables sub-
ordinate security units to operate forward of the airhead with minimal coordi-
nation. (See Figure C-3.)
X
2
20
7
1-501 2-502
II
DZ ABLE
1-501 AIRHEAD LINE
II DZ BAKER
2-508 DZ EAGLE
2-502
BDE
II
REAR 3-187
AREA 11
DZ CHARLIE
DZ DOG
2-508 3-187 9
II
2
X
CFL (2nd BDE 11TH ABN DIV)
071800 JUN 99
Figure C-3. Boundaries and Fire Support Coordinating Measures for an Airhead
C-7
FM 3-90
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
C-25. The airborne force commander begins planning when he receives an
initiating directive or a warning order. JP 3-18 describes the contents of an
initiating directive or warning order as including the—
· Mission for subordinate units.
· Higher commander’s concept of the operation.
· Command structure for the operation.
· Time and duration of the operation, including D-day and H-hour (exe-
cution time).
· Intelligence and security requirements.
· Allocation and distribution of airlift assets.
· Unit deployment list and sequence.
· Departure airfields, remote marshaling bases, and intermediate stag-
ing bases.
· Signal requirements and instructions.
· Linkup and withdrawal concept.
C-26. In an airborne operation that envisions an early linkup with conven-
tional ground maneuver forces, the airborne unit defends the airhead until
completing the linkup. After linkup, the airborne force either resumes the of-
fensive within the commander’s concept of the operation or prepares for sub-
sequent operations. Tactical airborne operations begin with an initial assault
followed by independent operations. They then transition to the defense of
the established airhead until enough forces can be delivered to the objective
area to break out of the established lodgment or linkup with ground forces.
C-27. The flexibility of airborne forces gives the commander wide latitude to
select approach routes and objective areas. Airborne forces bypass ground ob-
stacles and enemy positions to strike objectives in otherwise inaccessible
areas. The ability of airborne forces to move rapidly and land on or near their
objectives increases the element of surprise. It also facilitates the massing of
relative combat power because airborne forces can attack the objective from
any direction, which leads to the dissipation of the enemy’s defenses. The
presence of airborne forces also constitutes a threat that affects the enemy’s
capability to mass. These forces compel him to disperse combat power to pro-
tect vital sustainment installations and other key locations.
C-28. The primary prerequisites to conducting successful airborne operations
are moving forces to an objective area without incurring unacceptable losses
and supplying these forces with the required combat power, CS, and CSS.
Steps taken to attain these objectives include—
· Obtain and maintain air superiority.
· Suppress enemy air defense capabilities and ground fires.
· Provide adequate air defense in the marshaling area and en route to
and within the objective area.
C-29. In an airborne operation, the commander’s primary initial sources of
long-range fire support are air support and rocket or missile fires that can
range the airhead. Other sources may include naval surface fires. The com-
mander may insert airborne artillery cannon units and attack helicopters to
C-8
provide close supporting fires during the initial assault. He may also intro-
duce additional cannon, MLRS, and helicopter assets into the airhead during
subsequent phases of the operation.
C-30. The capacity and availability of aircraft limit the size and amount of
equipment and supplies available for movement to the objective area. The
commander can insert his heavy equipment into the objective area by heavy
parachute airdrops or an air landing. The limited number of vehicles in air-
borne units reduces the unit’s tactical mobility in open terrain compared with
that of armored and mechanized formations. However, airborne units may
gain considerable mobility by using helicopters. Units also make concerted ef-
forts to capture and exploit enemy supplies, equipment, weapons, vehicles,
and petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL).
C-31. Because of the displacement range of forces and the need for air LOCs,
airborne operations magnify the problems normally inherent in sustaining a
combat force. Therefore, commanders must emphasize planning for resupply,
equipment maintenance, casualty evacuation, graves registration, and pris-
oner of war handling. Prepackaging company- and battalion-size resupply
sets can ease these problems when support units must push supplies to the
combat units.
C-32. Commanders consider all supplies and equipment required for mission
accomplishment as part of their tactical planning. The initial combat require-
ments dictate the quantities and types of supplies and equipment carried by
assault forces in the operation. Commanders ensure that only supplies re-
quired to meet the immediate needs of the assault force initially deploy into
the objective area. Excess supplies and equipment can constitute a burden on
the assault force. Staffs establish and maintain required levels of supply by
phasing supplies into the objective area on an accompanying, follow-on (auto-
matic and on-call), and routine basis. Ammunition, water, and POL products
normally constitute the major tonnage items in airborne operations.
C-33. As part of the preparation for the airborne operation, soldiers receive
briefings on the plan of their unit, adjacent units, and higher echelons in-
cluding contingencies. It is particularly important that all personnel under-
stand the commander’s intent of the next two higher echelons. This helps
units or soldiers landing in unplanned areas direct their efforts toward ac-
complishing the mission.
EXECUTING AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

C-34. Airborne operations may precede, accompany, or follow other types of
operations. An airborne unit conducts day or night operations; each has its
advantages and disadvantages, such as ease of target acquisition and identifi-
cation of DZs. Initially, as part of preparatory fires, available fires destroy or
suppress enemy systems and units that pose an immediate danger to the air-
borne assault. Using precision munitions increases the probability of
achieving the desired effect. At the same time, it reduces the number of
friendly fire support systems required to achieve this effect.
C-35. Executing the ground tactical plan involves initially seizing DZs and
LZs in and around an airfield, or actually seizing an airfield. The assault
echelon lands as close as possible to its objective by parachute and
C-9
FM 3-90
immediately assembles. Its initial assault emphasizes the coordinated action

of small units to seize initial objectives before the advantage of surprise has
worn off. Aggressive small-unit actions characterize this critical phase. Small-
unit leader initiative is a key factor in a unit’s ability to accomplish the mis-
sion. As assault forces seize assault objectives, the airborne force directs its
efforts toward consolidating the airhead.
C-36. Tactical surprise and detailed planning should enable units to seize
their assault objectives and to establish the airhead before the enemy has
time to react in force. This ensures the uninterrupted landing of air-trans-
ported troops, equipment, and supplies. The commander changes the mis-
sions of his units as necessary in response to the enemy’s actions. Units can
expect the enemy to launch uncoordinated attacks quickly along major ave-
nues of approach, using his locally available forces. Since the degree of coordi-
nation and strength of these attacks increases progressively, the airborne
force must develop correspondingly greater strength in its defensive positions
and prepare to defend against a mounted counterattack.
C-37. Units assigned to perform reconnaissance and security missions land in
early serials so they can establish roadblocks, locate enemy forces, and dis-
rupt enemy communication facilities. Since ground reconnaissance by unit
commanders is seldom possible before the airborne operation, it must begin
as soon as the unit lands. The flow of information must be continuous. The
airborne commander’s information requirements do not vary greatly from
those of other light force commanders. However, his unit’s method of arriving
into the combat area makes immediate and thorough reconnaissance and
transmission of combat information to higher headquarters necessary.
C-38. If the initial assault objectives are heavily defended, the bulk of the
force has the task of seizing them. When initial objectives are lightly defend-
ed, the bulk of the force can clear assigned AOs and prepare defensive posi-
tions in depth. The commander initiates extensive patrolling as soon as pos-
sible between adjacent defensive positions within the airhead line and
between the airhead and the forward trace of his security area. He uses his
scout helicopters to support this patrolling effort. In most cases, the com-
mander establishes contact with any special operations forces or friendly ir-
regular forces in the area through a special operations command and control
element that accompanies the assault force. Advanced ISR and digital C2 sys-
tems can assist this process by detecting the location of enemy forces within
the airhead line and rapidly disseminating an accurate and timely common
operational picture to all command posts involved in the operation. This pre-
cludes the necessity of conducting a zone reconnaissance of the entire area
within the airhead line by foot mobile soldiers.
C-39. Sufficient communications personnel and equipment must move into
the airhead before, (or simultaneously with) the assault command post to en-
sure the timely installation of vital communications. As soon as communica-
tions and the tactical situation permit, the commander establishes—
· Command fire control channels within the airborne forces.
· Communications with supporting air and naval forces.
· Communications with airlift forces concerned with buildup, air supply,
and air evacuation.
C-10
· Communications with bases in friendly territory.

· Communications between widely separated airborne or ground forces
with a common or coordinated mission, such as link-up forces.
C-40. The commander influences the action by shifting or reallocating avail-
able fire support means. He may also—
· Move forces.
· Modify missions.
· Change objectives and boundaries.
· Employ reserves.
· Move to a place from which he can best exercise personal influence,
especially during the initial assault.
C-41. With initial objectives secured, subordinate units seize additional objec-
tives to expedite establishing a coordinated defense or conducting future op-
erations. The commander then organizes defensive positions, supplements
combat net radio communications as required, and establishes a reserve.
These, as well as other measures, prepare the force to repel enemy counter-
attacks, minimize the effects of weapons of mass destruction, or resume the
offensive.
C-42. The reserve prepares and occupies defensive positions pending its com-
mitment. The commander commits his reserve to exploit success, take over
the mission of a unit delivered to the wrong locations, deal with unexpected
opposition in seizing assault objectives, and secure the initial airhead. He re-
constitutes a reserve on the commitment of his initial reserve, in accordance
with the factors of METT-TC.
C-43. After the force makes the initial assault landing and accomplishes its
first missions, the commander must organize his airhead line. The situation
dictates how units occupy and organize the airhead line. The commander ad-
justs the disposition of his units and installations to fit the terrain and the
situation. Units take reconnaissance and security measures, which usually
include reinforcing the security area. The mission, enemy capabilities, and
defensive characteristics of the terrain determine the degree to which the air-
head line is actually occupied and organized for defense.
C-44. Introducing follow-on echelon forces in the buildup of the airhead pro-
ceeds concurrently with the seizure and organization of the airhead line. The
intent of the buildup is to provide a secure operating logistics base for forces
working to move the airhead away from the original point of attack. As addi-
tional combat troops arrive, they reinforce the airhead defensive positions, se-
cure additional requisite terrain features and maneuver space as required by
the mission, constitute reserves, and prepare for offensive operations. Follow-
on ground operations exploit the advantages provided by the airhead. After
firmly establishing the airhead or lodgment area, or after executing a linkup
with ground forces, a higher commander will usually relieve airborne units to
allow them to prepare for subsequent airborne assaults. If they cannot be re-
lieved immediately, he provides them with additional combat power and sus-
tainment capabilities.
C-11
FM 3-90
AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

C-45. Air assault operations are those in which assault forces (combat, com-
bat support, and combat service support) using the firepower, mobility, and
total integration of helicopter assets, maneuver on the battlefield under the
control of the ground or air maneuver commander to engage and destroy en-
my forces or to seize and hold key terrain (FM 3-97.4). They are often high-
risk, high-payoff operations.
C-46. An air assault task force (AATF) can dramatically extend the command-
er’s ability to influence operations within his AO and to execute operations in
locations beyond the capability of more conventional forces. The air assault
force retains the flexibility to rapidly redeploy to conduct subsequent offen-
sive or defensive operations. Air assault operations closely resemble airborne
operations. Air assault forces are most vulnerable during the takeoff from
PZs and the landing at LZs in unsecured areas.
C-47. The assault force uses the firepower, mobility, and total integration of
helicopter assets to maneuver throughout the AO. Its purpose is to engage
and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. Joint doctrine re-
gards air assault operations as a subset of airborne operations. Air assault op-
erations are not administrative movements of soldiers, weapons, and materiel
by Army aviation units. An air assault is a deliberate, precisely planned, and
vigorously executed combat operation designed to allow friendly forces to
strike over extended distances and terrain barriers to attack the enemy when
and where he is most vulnerable. The commander plans these operations
using the previously described reverse planning process. (The primary refer-
ences for air assault operations are FMs 3-04.113 and 3-97.4.)
C-48. The substantial mobility of an air assault force enables its commander
to achieve surprise and deception and to conduct operations throughout his
AO. However, air assault operations conducted in locations geographically re-
mote from supporting forces may place the air assault force at increased risk
if its ISR systems do not accurately detect enemy forces positioned to disrupt
the air assault. Air assault units are well suited for use as reaction forces and
in search and attack operations when information about the enemy’s location,
strength, and disposition is vague.
C-49. The large-scale use of helicopters in air assault operations greatly mul-
tiplies the mobility of ground units and contributes directly to an increase in
combat effectiveness. Their use allows the ground commander to take advan-
tage of the speed and flexibility of Army aircraft to accomplish a variety of
tasks. For example, during a river-crossing operation, an air assault can help
secure the crossing site or bridgehead line.
C-50. Air assault operations employ AATFs. An AATF is a combined arms
force specifically designed to hit fast and hard. It is under the command of a
single headquarters. Tactical commanders use an AATF in situations that
provide a calculated advantage because of surprise, terrain, threat, or mobil-
ity. An AATF consists of infantry, attack helicopters, fire support, electronic
warfare, and logistic assets. The ground or air maneuver commander is desig-
nated as the AATF commander.
C-12
C-51. The lowest-echelon headquarters capable of controlling and coordina-

ting the entire air assault operation exercises control of the aircraft in accord-
ance with the overall plan. As a minimum, this is normally a battalion head-
quarters. This headquarters must coordinate airspace with other users, in-
cluding artillery, air defense, air support, and other Army aviation units. It
must also coordinate the air assault force’s plans for maneuver and logistics
with those of higher, subordinate, and adjacent units.
C-52. The airlift unit is either in direct support of the ground combat unit or
under the operational control (OPCON) of the AATF. The AATF commander
determines—with the air mission commander’s input—when the OPCON
relationship begins and ends. The commander does not attach the airlift unit
to the AATF, because it is unlikely that a ground unit can control the aviation
unit and supply the aviation-specific munitions and large amounts of fuel re-
quired by aviation units. Direct support (DS) and OPCON command relation-
ships place no logistics responsibility for the supporting unit on the supported
unit. Consequently, DS or OPCON is usually the desired relationship be-
tween air and ground units in air assault operations.
CONTROL MEASURES
C-53. The control measures that apply to an airborne operation also apply to
an air assault operation. As a minimum, the commander assigns each sub-
ordinate unit an AO. The AATF and aviation staffs select LZs that support
the ground tactical plan and offer the best survivability for the AATF. As in
airborne operations, designating LZs within the unit’s AO simplifies the pro-
vision of additional support to the unit. The AATF commander also uses as-
sault objectives and the airhead line to focus the efforts of his subordinates.
As necessary, the commander uses those attack control measures introduced
in Chapter 5 to help control the force’s maneuver once it enters the AO.
C-54. In air assault operations, the commander makes extensive use of Army
airspace command and control (A2C2) measures to control the movement of
the assault, attack, special electronic mission, and cargo aircraft. For ex-
ample, Figure C-4 on page C-14 shows flight routes as depicted on an overlay.
(FM 3-52 details A2C2 measures.)
C-55. Integrating aviation and infantry does not fundamentally change the
nature of combat operations. The air assault force continues to fight as a com-
bined arms team. However, the tempo and distance involved in such opera-
tions change dramatically. Missions normally assigned to an AATF should
take advantage of its superior mobility. However, the commander should not
employ an AATF without a detailed resupply plan in operations that require
sustained ground combat. Once the air assault is complete, the aviation unit
can continue to support the infantry by conducting aerial movement of sys-
tems and critical supplies.
C-56. There are several basic air assault planning operational guidelines—
· Assign a mission that takes advantage of the AATF’s mobility.
· Task organize the AATF as a combined arms team.
· Ensure the air assault plan supports the AATF commander’s intent.
C-13
FM 3-90
· Allow extra time for planning and preparing for limited-visibility and
adverse weather air assaults.
· Maintain small-unit integrity throughout the air assault to ensure the
ability to fight as a cohesive unit immediately upon landing.
· Plan and posture fire support to provide suppressive fires along flight
routes, on LZs, and on enemy air defense systems.
C-57. The foundation of a successful air assault operation is the commander’s
ground tactical plan. The AATF staff prepares this plan based on input from
all task force elements. All aircrews must be familiar with the ground tactical
plan and the ground commander’s intent.
LZ 2 LZ 5
ACP
OBJ
QUEEN RP
ACP EAGLE
CLUB LZ 14
E
UT EY
ACP RO CE TR RP
KING DU
ACP IS
AX
PZ 6
ACP ACP
19 JACK 11
ACP
ACP 3
2 ACP
SP
5 ACE
DOR
PZ RRI
SP CO
7 SP
PZ 4
Figure C-4. Flight Routes Depicted on an Overlay
C-58. The ground tactical plan for an air assault operation comprises essen-
tially the same elements as any other infantry attack but differs in the re-
quirements for speed and mobility. The plan places task-organized assault
units on or near the objective so they are capable of seizing objectives immed-
iately and consolidating quickly. If the commander cannot introduce adequate
combat power quickly into the objective area, the air assault force must land
away from the objective and build up combat power. This force then assaults
like any other infantry unit; however, this diminishes the effectiveness of the
air assault operation. The scheme of maneuver may take many forms depend-
ing on the situation and the factors of METT-TC.
C-59. The ground tactical plan addresses—
· Assault objectives for subordinate elements.
C-14
· Designating the LZs available for each subordinate element, consider-

ing the distance from each unit’s LZ to the assault objective.
· D-day and H-hour.
· Special tasks.
· Task-organization and command relationship of all organic and sup-
porting units.
· Fire support during the assault, such as close air support, field artil-
lery, mortars, and jammers.
· Flight corridors.
· Air defense suppression.
· Subsequent operations, such as defense, linkup, and withdrawal.
· Enemy locations, including air defense positions and type.
C-60. To achieve tactical surprise, the commander may decide to make the
initial assault without preparatory fires. However, he always plans fires to
support helicopter assault and combat operations on each LZ so that they are
rapidly available if needed. These fires are normally short with a high volume
to maximize surprise and shock effect. All indirect fires should end just before
the first assault element lands. The commander uses attack helicopters to
suppress and destroy enemy systems during the interim between when in-
direct fires stop impacting and the initial assault element lands and prepares
to conduct operations. Fire support planning provides suppressive fires along
flight routes and near LZs to help ensure the air assault unit lands as
planned. The commander normally assigns a high priority to the suppression
of enemy air defense systems. The location of those systems is critical infor-
mation needed by the commander.
C-61. A unit maintains its tactical integrity throughout the air assault. All
members of a squad load onto the same aircraft, and platoons are in the same
serial. Both ensure unit integrity upon landing. The commander cross-loads
key weapons, ammunition, and command groups to ensure that the loss of
one aircraft does not result in losing a given weapon system or disrupting the
chain of command.
C-62. The ground commander uses aviation resources to the maximum degree
of effectiveness. He should not retain aircraft under his direct control without
viable aircraft mission requirements. The air mission commander must have
the flexibility to shift idle aircraft to support other combat units, conduct re-
quired maintenance, or allow for crew rest. Plans to commit preplanned
reaction forces should include provisions for their airlift to be on standby or
alert status. The AATF commander makes the decision to release supporting
aviation resources. The air mission commander ensures that the AATF com-
mander is aware of subsequent or competing missions for his aviation re-
sources. At times, the AATF commander may need to retain aviation support
beyond the original time planned. In this case, he must inform higher head-
quarters immediately. The air mission commander continues to provide air-
craft support until the AATF commander releases his unit.
C-63. The commander plans and organizes his CSS operations to support a
rapid tempo of highly mobile and widely dispersed operations. Traditional
C-15
FM 3-90
doctrinal supporting distances and support responsibilities do not always ap-

ply to air assault operations. The air assault logistics planner recognizes this
from the outset and adapts the plan using available resources. Just as the
commander tailors the AATF for combat operations by air, the logistics sys-
tem must tailor itself to support by air. Medical evacuation, resupply, and re-
inforcement airlifts may be necessary to sustain the force’s combat opera-
tions. Lift restrictions limit what can enter the airhead by helicopter. How-
ever, careful planning by the aviation staff provides methods for inserting
reinforcements and most equipment lines and supplies.
EXECUTING AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS

C-64. At the prescribed time, units move from the assembly area to the hold-
ing area via a route designated by the AATF commander. Each unit com-
mander notifies the PZ control party when his unit arrives in the holding
area. The PZ control officer (PZCO) coordinates the arrival of aircraft and
troops so that they arrive at their respective loading points just before the
aircraft land. This prevents congestion, facilitates security, and reduces vul-
nerability to enemy actions during PZ operations.
C-65. When the aircraft are loaded and ready, the PZCO signals the flight
leader. Lift-off should be at the time prescribed in the air-movement table.
However, aircraft will not loiter in the PZ. If they are early, they lift off and
later speed to cross the start point (SP) or first ACP on time.
C-66. The air movement commander predetermines the enroute flight speed,
and the flight leader paces the flight to ensure it crosses the SP on time. Com-
manders remain oriented throughout the flight by following and verifying the
flight route using terrain observation, maps, global positioning systems, and
other aids.
C-67. Attack helicopters and air cavalry assets assist in providing security for
the air assault force. Under the control of the air mission commander, these
helicopters provide reconnaissance of the routes and LZs, provide security for
the lifting helicopters en route to the LZ, and protect the lifted ground ma-
neuver force as it assembles on the LZs and moves toward its objective. At the
conclusion of the air assault phase of the mission, attack helicopters may re-
main OPCON to the ground maneuver force and provide reconnaissance and
security operations in the objective area.
C-68. After passing the release point (RP), serials proceed to assigned LZs.
The commander uses the RP crossing to time the lifting and shifting of fire
support assets. The RP is also where aircraft shift to LZ formation (if re-
quired) and the commander initiates preparatory fires.
C-69. Incendiary ordnance is not normally used on an LZ and its immediate
vicinity just prior to landing because foliage fire and smoke could endanger
aircraft or hamper the mission. However, helicopters equipped with smoke
generators can provide a smoke screen.
C-70. The AATF lands as planned unless last-minute changes in the tactical
situation force the commander to abort or alter the landing. Aviation crews
keep soldiers in their aircraft informed of the situation, especially of any
changes to the original plan. The commander wants his unit to land
C-16
simultaneously to place the maximum number of soldiers on the ground in a

given area in the shortest possible time. Individual soldiers are most vulner-
able during landing; they disembark rapidly and deploy to carry out assigned
missions.
C-71. At the LZ, leaders at each command echelon account for all personnel
and equipment and submit appropriate reports to higher headquarters. After
the unit completes its consolidation of the LZ, the commander reorganizes it
as necessary. The ground combat operations of an air assault unit are no dif-
ferent from those conducted by other infantry units.
C-17
Appendix D
Encirclement Operations
When the enemy is driven back, we have failed, and when he is cut off,
encircled and dispersed, we have succeeded.
Field Marshal Prince Aleksander V. Suvorov
Encirclement operations are operations where one force loses its

freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate
it by controlling all ground lines of communication and reinforce-
ment. A unit can conduct offensive encirclement operations designed to
isolate an enemy force or conduct defensive encirclement operations as a
result of the unit’s isolation by the actions of an opposing force. Encircle-
ment operations occur because combat operations involving modernized
forces are likely to be chaotic, intense, and highly destructive, extending
across large areas containing relatively few units as each side maneuvers
against the other to obtain positional advantage.
OFFENSIVE ENCIRCLEMENT OPERATIONS

D-1. The commander intends offensive encirclements to isolate an enemy
force. Typically, encirclements result from penetrations and envelopments, or
are an extension of exploitation and pursuit operations. As such, they are not
a separate form of offensive operations but an extension of an ongoing opera-
tion. They may be planned sequels or result from exploiting an unforeseen op-
portunity. They usually result from the linkup of two encircling arms con-
ducting a double envelopment. However, they can occur in situations where
the attacking commander uses a major obstacle, such as a shoreline, as a sec-
ond encircling force. Although a commander may designate terrain objectives
in an encirclement, isolating and defeating enemy forces are the primary
goals. Ideally, an encirclement results in the surrender of the encircled force.
This minimizes friendly force losses and resource expenditures.
CONTENTS
Offensive Encirclement Operations........... D-0 Organization of Forces.......................... D-10
Organization of Forces............................ D-1 Control Measures................................... D-12
Control Measures..................................... D-2 Planning a Breakout .............................. D-12
Planning an Encirclement ....................... D-2 Executing a Breakout ............................ D-14
Executing an Encirclement ..................... D-4 Exfiltration .................................................. D-17
Defending Encircled .................................... D-7 Attacking Deeper into Enemy Territory ... D-17
Organization of Forces............................ D-8 Linkup ......................................................... D-17
BOS Considerations ................................ D-9 Control Measures................................... D-17
Breakout from an Encirclement ............... D-10 Execution ................................................ D-18
D-0
D-2. An encirclement operation usually has at least two phases—the actual
encirclement and actions taken against the isolated enemy. The commander
should consider adjusting his task organization between phases to maximize
his unit’s effectiveness in each phase. The first phase is the actual encircle-
ment that results in the enemy force’s isolation. The organization of forces for
an encirclement is similar to that of a movement to contact or an envelop-
ment. The commander executing an encirclement operation organizes his
forces into a direct pressure force and one or more encircling arms. Armor,
mechanized and motorized infantry, aviation, air assault, and airborne units
are especially well suited for use as an encircling arm since they have the tac-
tical mobility to reach positions that cut enemy lines of communications
(LOCs). The presence of bypassed and encircled enemy forces on the flanks
and rear of advancing friendly forces requires all-around security, which in-
cludes local security measures and security forces.
D-3. One commander should direct the encirclement effort. However, there
must also be unity of command for each encircling arm. The encircling force
headquarters may name one of its subordinate units as the headquarters for
an encircling arm. Alternatively, that force headquarters may create a tempo-
rary command post from organic assets, such as its tactical command post, to
control one or more arms of the encirclement. If that encircling arm has sub-
ordinate inner and outer arms, each of them also requires separate
subordinate commanders. The missions and spatial orientation between the
inner and outer encircling arms are sufficiently different; therefore, one force
cannot act in both directions at once. (See Figure D-1.)
OUTER ENCIRCLING ARM II

AO DEEP
2-50 2 50
1-73 AX
AO BLUE AXIS BILL
IS
RU
II LE
1 73
ENY
PL OWL
1/51MD PL OWL
X
2/51MD
INNER
Y
ENCIRCLING
EN
ARMS II
EN
LD
2 87
AXIS SLICK
GO
AO DOG
IS
2-87
AX
1-34 II
1 34
OUTER ENCIRCLING ARM
AO THRUSH
Figure D-1. Inner and Outer Arms of an Encirclement
D-1
FM 3-90
D-4. The commander organizes only an inner encircling arm if there is no

possibility of the encircled forces receiving relief from enemy forces outside
the encirclement. If there is danger of an enemy relief force reaching the en-
circled enemy force, the commander organizes both inner and outer encircling
arms. He assigns the outer encircling arm a security mission, an offensive
mission to drive away any enemy relief force, or a defensive mission to pre-
vent the enemy relief force from making contact with the encircled enemy
force. Once the encirclement is complete, these inner or outer encircling arms
form a perimeter.
D-5. The second phase of an encirclement operation involves actions taken
against an isolated enemy. The commander’s decision on whether to fix, con-
tain, or destroy isolated enemy forces affects his task organization, as will
enemy attempts to break out from the encirclement or linkup with the encir-
cled force. All these possible outcomes require resources in terms of units and
supplies, but some require more resources than others do. If the commander’s
mission is to contain or fix an isolated enemy, he organizes his forces for de-
fensive action and arranges them around the enemy’s perimeter. If the com-
mander’s mission is to reduce or destroy that same enemy, he organizes his
forces for offensive action. A higher commander often assigns either mission
to the commander of a follow-and-support force.
D-6. Regardless of whether the commander decides to fix, contain, or destroy
the enemy, he conducts reconnaissance to maintain contact and monitor ene-
my actions in response to the encirclement. This allows him to respond effec-
tively to any enemy movement. The most effective reconnaissance combines
ground, aerial, and surveillance systems to provide constant coverage and
multiple assessments of enemy activities throughout the encircled area.
CONTROL MEASURES
D-7. Control measures for an encirclement are similar to those of other offen-
sive operations, especially an envelopment, but with a few additional consid-
erations. (See Figure D-2.) If the commander uses both an inner and an outer
encircling arm, he must establish a boundary between them. He should place
the boundary so that each element has enough space to accomplish the mis-
sion. The inner force must have enough space to fight a defensive battle to
prevent the encircled force from breaking out. The outer force must have ade-
quate terrain and enough depth to its area of operations (AO) to defeat any
attempt to relieve the encircled force.
D-8. The commander who controls both converging forces establishes a re-
stricted fire line (RFL) between them. The commander may also establish a
free fire area (FFA), which encloses the area occupied by a bypassed or en-
circled enemy forces. (Chapter 2 discusses the use RFLs, FFAs, and other fire
support coordinating measures.)
PLANNING AN ENCIRCLEMENT
D-9. Encirclement operations may require allocating large forces and signifi-
cant resources. They take a great deal of time and usually slow an advance. If
the mission of the encircling force is to maintain contact with a bypassed ene-
my force, the following general planning considerations apply:
D-2
· Determine the best available assets that gain and maintain contact
with the enemy.
· Keep the enemy isolated and incapable of receiving intelligence, logis-
tics, and fire support from enemy formations outside of the encircle-
ment.
· Use intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets so that
the commander knows the capabilities of the encircled force and, as
much as possible, its commander’s intentions.
· Retain freedom of maneuver.
D-10. The commander applies the general defensive planning considerations
outlined in Chapter 8 if the mission is to contain or fix the encircled enemy
force in a given location. If the mission is to attack and destroy the encircled
enemy force, he applies the planning considerations outlined in Chapters 3
and 5. Commanders should plan to rotate the forces involved in reducing the
encircled pocket to maintain constant pressure on the enemy.
AO DEEP 2-50
II
1-73
I
BP 19
AO BLUE I
B
P
13
I
17
BP
FFA 51MD
EN
BP
1/51
I
291400Z
14
RFL (51MD) PL OWL RFL (51MD)

X
291200Z 2/51 PL OWL 291200Z
4
BP
9
Y
I
BP
91
EN
I
BP9 93
AO DOG 2 BP
I I
II
1-34 2-87
AO THRUSH
Figure D-2. Encirclement Control Measures
D-11. Every encircled enemy unit reacts differently. Initially, some become
demoralized and cannot offer any serious resistance. However, if left undis-
turbed, most enemy units recover and attempt to break out and regain con-
tact with their main force or attack the flank and rear of advancing friendly
units. The encircling force must plan for the enemy’s most probable reactions.
D-12. If the enemy force is not reduced and it can be resupplied, or it has ac-
cess to considerable supply stocks, it continues to be a serious threat to the
commander in future operations. The encircling force must be approximately
equal in size to this type of encircled force to fix or contain it. This situation
occurred when German forces occupied various fortified French ports after
Allied armies liberated the rest of France in 1944. Each encircled German
D-3
FM 3-90
division took approximately one Allied division to maintain its isolation. Con-
versely, an enemy force isolated without adequate supplies either surrenders
or faces containment by considerably smaller forces. This situation occurred
in Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War when an Israeli division isolated
the Egyptian 3rd Army. Planning considerations for the linkup of encircling
forces, such as command and control relationships, are outlined later in this
appendix.
EXECUTING AN ENCIRCLEMENT
D-13. When feasible, the encircling force advances parallel to the enemy’s di-
rection of movement. It attempts to reach defiles, bridges, and other critical
points before the main enemy force reaches them. When the encircling force
cannot outdistance the enemy, it engages his flanks to force him to fight un-
der the most unfavorable conditions possible, ultimately in two or more direc-
tions simultaneously. Engineer units rapidly breach obstacles in the path of
the encircling force. Friendly forces emplace obstacle complexes, supported by
fires, to block probable avenues of escape as they counter attempted enemy
breakouts from encirclement. The commander may use air assault and air-
borne forces to seize defiles or other critical terrain objectives to cut enemy
LOCs. He completes the encirclement when all enemy ground LOCs are cut.
This generally occurs when the two arms of a double envelopment complete
their linkup.
D-14. A commander usually creates intervals between the advancing units of
an enveloping force to provide protection from enemy weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD). They can also occur during combat operations as the result
of different rates of advance by combat formations that face dissimilar de-
grees of enemy resistance and different terrain. The encircled enemy at-
tempts to discover intervals and take advantage of them as he tries to escape
from or breakout of the encirclement. Once the enveloping force completes
the linkup that actually creates the encirclement, it must close these inter-
vals as quickly as possible to prevent the enemy from exploiting them.
D-15. The enemy may attempt to cut off the encircling force and extend his
flank beyond the area of the friendly attack. If the commander attempts to
outflank such a hostile extension, it may lead to his own overextension or to a
dangerous separation of the enveloping force from support. It is usually bet-
ter to take advantage of the enemy’s extension and subsequent weakness by
penetrating his thinly held front rather than overextending in an effort to
completely outflank his position. Alternatively—in response to the unfolding
encirclement—the enemy may attempt a frontal, spoiling attack. In this case,
the friendly force in contact defends itself or engages in a delaying operation
while the enveloping force continues the envelopment or moves directly
toward the enemy force in a counterattack.
D-16. The commander of a highly mobile force forming the inner encircling
arm may choose not to establish a continuous series of positions around an
encircled enemy. He may order his forces to occupy only key terrain from
which they can strike at the encircled enemy to prevent him from concentra-
ting forces and to further isolate him. To effectively isolate the enemy, a com-
mander who adopts this technique must be able to detect enemy attempts to
breakout and concentrate sufficient combat power against these attempts to
D-4
thwart them. The commander of the outer encircling arm prevents additional
enemy forces from reinforcing the isolated enemy force or interfering with the
activities of the inner encircling arm.
D-17. Other operations may result in the encirclement of enemy forces. These
include offensive operations that bypass large enemy forces to maintain the
momentum of the force. Reconnaissance and security missions conducted by
the main body must focus on detecting and reporting bypassed units. The
main body should conduct these missions not only to its flanks, but also to its
rear to discover if enemy forces move in behind them. Unit ISR assets should
watch for measures taken by the enemy’s main body to relieve or assist its by-
passed or encircled forces.
D-18. Once the commander decides to destroy an encircled enemy force, he re-
duces the enemy as rapidly as possible to free resources for use elsewhere.
The reduction of an encircled enemy force should continue without interrup-
tion, using the maximum concentration of forces and fires, until the encircled
enemy force’s complete destruction or surrender. A commander may destroy
encircled enemy forces by fires alone or by a combination of fire and move-
ment. The five main methods for reducing an encircled enemy are fire strike,
squeeze, hammer and anvil, wedge, and escape route.
D-19. A fire strike is the massed, synchronized, and nearly simultane-
ous delivery of precision-guided munitions. It is the preferred method
for destroying an encircled enemy force. The initial targets for these muni-
tions are systems that present the greatest danger to the encircling force,
such as the enemy’s WMD, command posts, fire support and air defense sys-
tems, and field fortifications. However, the commander’s ability to use
precision-guided munitions in mass may be limited by the ability of the comb-
at service support (CSS) system to supply them. Therefore, fixed-wing and
rotary-wing aircraft and conventional artillery continue to play an important
role in the destruction of encircled forces. The commander also conducts of-
fensive information operations—such as psychological operations (PSYOP)
and electronic warfare (EW)—against the encircled enemy force. In some sit-
uations, fire strikes result in the rapid destruction of the encircled enemy.
However, destruction is not guaranteed. In most cases, reducing the enemy
pocket requires using ground maneuver forces.
D-20. The squeeze technique uses simul-
taneous, coordinated blows on the enemy
from various directions. (See Figure D-3.)
Following the initial encirclement, the cap-
I
ture or destruction of the enemy force is

methodical and thorough. The commander
ENY
uses fire and movement together in a con-

trolled contraction of the encirclement. As
Y
EN
the enemy’s perimeter contracts, the com-

mander removes units from the inner peri-
meter and adds them to his reserve de-
pending on the terrain and other factors of
METT-TC. This technique is effective
Figure D-3. Squeeze Technique
against battalion or smaller groups of
encircled enemy forces.
D-5
FM 3-90
D-21. The squeeze technique promotes the enemy’s confusion and rapid dis-
persion of combat power and prevents him from using his reserves in a decis-
ive manner. The commander should shape the operation by initially concen-
trating on destroying enemy command nodes, air defense systems, artillery
systems, and CSS capabilities. These CSS capabilities include any drop zones,
landing zones, or airstrips available to the enemy that would allow him to re-
ceive support from outside the encirclement.
D-22. The hammer and anvil technique em-
HAMMER (MOVING FORCE)
ploys a stationary blocking force as an anvil
on one or more sides of the inner perimeter
while other elements of the encircling force
use offensive action as a hammer to force
the encircled enemy force against the block-
ENY
ENY
ing force. (See Figure D-4.) Either the anvil
or the hammer can destroy the enemy.
Usually the hammer, as the attacking ele-
ment, accomplishes this task. This tech-
nique is most effective when the blocking
force is located on or to the rear of a na- ANVIL (STATIONARY FORCE)
tural terrain obstacle. On favorable terrain,
Figure D-4. Hammer and
an airborne or air assault force can be used
Anvil Technique
as an anvil or a blocking element.
D-23. The wedge technique uses a unit to II
divide enemy forces within the pocket
while the rest of the encircling force re-
mains in place. (See Figure D-5.) This ENY
II
X
technique allows the commander to con-
centrate against a small portion of the en-
circled enemy. However, the encircling
force must maintain pressure on other en-
circled enemy forces to prevent them from ENY
II
reinforcing or supporting the threatened

II
area. It is important that the unit dividing
II
the pocket conduct sudden and swift at-
tacks immediately after the end of sup- Figure D-5. Wedge Technique
porting preparatory fires.
D-24. The escape route technique involves leaving one or more gaps in the in-
ner encircling arm to entice the enemy to attempt a breakout. Once the ene-
my starts moving, and is no longer sheltered in defensive positions, he is
more vulnerable to acquisition, attack, and destruction. A commander using
this technique should use PSYOP and constant offensive action to demoralize
the escaping enemy force.
D-25. The negative aspect of these techniques is that they require consider-
able forces and supplies, which are not always available. Therefore, at times
the encircling force has to limit itself to less decisive measures. These include
temporarily containing or fixing bypassed enemy forces until resources be-
come available to enable the encircling force to destroy the enemy. Continued
isolation of the encircled force can only be guaranteed when the enemy
cannot strengthen his forces by inserting additional units and supplies by air.
D-6
Even total, long-term isolation does not necessarily lead to decisive defeat of
the encircled enemy. It is a temporary measure designed to provide the at-
tacking force additional time.
DEFENDING ENCIRCLED
D-26. An encircled force can continue to defend encircled, conduct a breakout,
exfiltrate toward other friendly forces, or attack deeper into enemy-controlled
territory. The commander’s form of maneuver once his unit becomes encircled
depends on his senior commander’s intent and the factors of METT-TC, in-
cluding the—
· Availability of defensible terrain.
· Relative combat power of friendly and enemy forces.
· Logistic status of the encircled force and its ability to be resupplied, in-
cluding the ability to treat and evacuate wounded soldiers.
· Morale and fighting capacity of the soldiers.
D-27. Encirclement of a friendly force is likely to occur during highly mobile
fluid operations, or when operating in restricted terrain. A unit may find it-
self encircled as a result of its offensive actions, as a detachment left in con-
tact, when defending a strong point, when occupying a combat outpost, or
when defending an isolated defensive position. The commander must antici-
pate becoming encircled when he has a mission as a stay-behind force, or
when he occupies either a strong point or a combat outpost. He must then
make the necessary preparations.
D-28. The senior commander within an encirclement assumes command over
all encircled forces and takes immediate action to protect them. In the confu-
sion leading to an encirclement, it may be difficult to even determine what
units are being encircled, let alone identify the senior commander. However,
the senior commander must be determined as quickly as possible. When that
commander determines he is about to be encircled, he must decide quickly
what assets stay and what assets leave. He immediately informs his superior
of the situation. Simultaneously, he begins to accomplish the following tasks:
· Establish security.
· Reestablish a chain of command.
· Establish a viable defense.
· Maintain morale.
D-29. The commander positions his security elements as far forward as pos-
sible to reestablish contact with the enemy and provide early warning. Vigo-
rous patrolling begins immediately. Each unit clears its position to ensure
that there are no enemy forces within the perimeter. Technical assets, such
as JSTARS and EW systems, augment local security and locate those areas
along the perimeter where the enemy is deploying additional forces.
D-30. The commander reestablishes unity of command. He reorganizes any
fragmented units and places soldiers separated from their parent units under
the control of other units. He establishes a clear chain of command through-
out the encircled force, reestablishes communications with units outside the
encirclement, and adjusts support relationships to reflect the new organiza-
tion.
D-7
FM 3-90
D-31. The commander of the encircled force establishes a perimeter defense.
(Chapter 8 discusses conducting a perimeter defense.) He must be aware of
the unique capabilities and limitations of the different units within the encir-
clement. Therefore, he designs his defense to maximize the capabilities of his
available forces. Forward units establish mutually supporting positions
around the perimeter and in depth along principal avenues of approach.
Units occupy the best available defensible terrain. It may be necessary to at-
tack to seize key or decisive terrain so that it is incorporated within the peri-
meter defense. Once the commander assigns defensive AOs and battle posi-
tions, preparations are the same as in the defense. (See Figure D-6.) Encir-
cled units make their defensive positions as strong as possible given time and
resource constraints. The defensive scheme must anticipate that the enemy
will attempt to split the defenses of the encircled force and defeat it in detail.
II
II
X
II x II
II HHC (+)
II II
II
x II X X
HHC HHC
II
II II II
FSB
II X
x X
FSB
CBT (-)
(-)
II II
II
MI (-) CBT
CBT
X
II
XX
HHC (+)
II X
DISCOM (-)
II
Figure D-6. Encircled Armor Division’s Perimeter Defense
D-32. The encircled force commander establishes a reserve, which must have
sufficient mobility to react in a timely manner. Therefore, given the availabil-
ity of sufficient fuel, the commander uses armored and mechanized infantry
units as his reserve. He centrally positions them to take advantage of interior
lines, which exist if he can shift his forces’ locations or reinforce faster than
the enemy can shift location or reinforce. He can achieve interior lines
through central position (with operations diverging from a central point),
from superior lateral LOCs, or greater tactical mobility. If only dismounted
infantry forces are available, the commander should establish small local re-
serves to react to potential threats. He organizes a mobile antiarmor element
from the best available antiarmor systems. If possible, subordinate echelons
should also retain a reserve.
D-8
D-33. While defending encircled, the commander may use his reserve to limit
penetrations along the perimeter. It may conduct spoiling attacks or vigorous
counterattacks. He initiates a counterattack at the decisive moment and loca-
tion as the enemy force attempts to penetrate the defensive positions.
BOS CONSIDERATIONS
D-34. Divisions and corps may consider relocating their aviation systems to
locations that are not encircled. Aviation can rapidly bring additional fire-
power to bear on the encircling enemy force or rapidly move reaction forces to
threatened locations along the defensive perimeter. Generally, aviation assets
fly out of the encirclement when it becomes small enough to allow the ene-
my’s artillery to range throughout the area.
D-35. The commander centrally controls his fire support systems, such as ar-
tillery, to provide support at numerous points along the perimeter and mass
the effects of his fires. Designating a fire support coordinator for all fire sup-
port systems is a technique for centrally controlling his fires. At lower levels,
mortars from various units may be co-located under centralized control, espe-
cially if there are insufficient artillery assets. The encircled commander also
centrally controls his air defense assets, ensuring that the forward units have
sufficient short-range air defense coverage.
D-36. Generally, engineers concentrate first on countermobility, then surviva-
bility. An encircled force is particularly vulnerable to the enemy’s use of
WMD. Dispersal is difficult in a perimeter-type defense; therefore, the next
best alternative is position hardening by constructing field fortifications.
D-37. Encircled units must closely monitor their logistic assets, especially if
they cannot be resupplied for an extended period. Conservation and central-
ized control of available resources are imperative. The commander may force
his forward units to virtually cease all vehicle movement to allocate remain-
ing fuel assets to the reserve. He retains essential CSS capabilities to sustain
his operations. They fall under the control of a senior logistician. When pos-
sible, the commander positions these units and their assets out of the reach of
potential penetrations in protected and concealed locations. He may incorpo-
rate other CSS units into defensive positions in depth or around key facilities.
He may choose to use soldiers from CSS units as fillers for combat units, al-
though this action may affect his sustainment capabilities.
D-38. Casualty evacuation and mortuary affairs pose particular challenges for
the encircled force. The commander evacuates his wounded from the encircle-
ment whenever possible for humanitarian reasons. This also reduces the lo-
gistic burden of providing long-term medical care to wounded soldiers.
D-39. Soldiers have an inherent fear of being encircled by the enemy. Un-
checked, this fear can lead to a degradation in morale and discipline. When
encircled, soldiers under the firm control of their leaders can withstand the
mental strain. Discipline can disintegrate rapidly in an encirclement. Officers
and NCOs must uphold the highest standards of discipline. Their personal
conduct sets the example. The commander must be seen frequently by his
troops and display a calm and confident manner.
D-9
FM 3-90
D-40. Soldiers in the encirclement must not regard their situation as desper-
ate or hopeless. Commanders and leaders at all levels maintain the confi-
dence of soldiers by resolute action and a positive attitude. They must keep
soldiers informed to suppress rumors. The commander counters enemy
PSYOP by conducting defensive information operations.
BREAKOUT FROM AN ENCIRCLEMENT

D-41. A breakout is an offensive and a defensive operation. An encircled force
normally attempts to conduct breakout operations when one of the following
four conditions exist:
· The commander directs the breakout or the breakout falls within the
intent of a higher commander.
· The encircled force does not have sufficient relative combat power to
defend itself against enemy forces attempting to reduce the encircle-
ment.
· The encircled force does not have adequate terrain available to conduct
its defense.
· The encircled force cannot sustain itself long enough to be relieved by
forces outside the encirclement.
D-42. Units typically task organize into a rupture force, follow-and-assume
force, main body, and rear guard to conduct a breakout attack. (Figure D-7).
If sufficient forces exist within the encirclement, the commander can organize
a reserve and a separate diversionary force from his available resources.
Some encircled units will be weakened, and if sufficient combat power does
not exist to resource each of these forces, the commander must prioritize
POINT
OF
ATTACK
RUPTURE FORCE
FOLLOW AND ASSUME
MAIN BODY
RESERVE
DIVERSIONARY/
SHAPING DIVERSIONARY/
FORCE SHAPING
FORCE
REAR GUARD
Figure D-7. Organization of Forces for a Breakout Operation
D-10
which ones to resource. Normally, his first priority is to resource the rupture
force. He assigns the responsibilities of those unresourced forces to the forces
he can resource. For example, the follow-and-assume force could receive a be-
prepared mission to help extract the rear guard, a mission generally given to
the reserve. Forces located outside the encirclement can assist the breakout
by conducting shaping operations. Above all, the encircled force must main-
tain the momentum of the attack; otherwise, it is more vulnerable to destruc-
tion than it was before the breakout attempt.
D-43. The force must reorganize based on available resources to conduct the
breakout. Without resupply, armored and mechanized infantry units may not
be able to move all of their vehicles during the breakout attack. Priority of
support may be limited to the rupture force and the rear guard, with the re-
maining force keeping only sufficient transportation assets to move the
wounded and critical assets and supplies. The breakout plan should outline
the commander’s destruction criteria for equipment or supplies left behind.
All vehicles, critical munitions and other supplies, and equipment—less
medical—that cannot be moved should be destroyed as soon as possible.
D-44. An encircled force attacks by using the rupture force to penetrate the
enemy defensive positions in at least one location. The commander must pro-
duce overwhelming combat power at each breakout point. The commander
assigns the rupture force, which varies in size from one-third to two-thirds of
the total encircled force, the mission to penetrate the enemy’s encircling posi-
tion, widen the gap, and hold the shoulders of the gap until all other encircled
forces can move through. The rupture force must have sufficient strength to
penetrate the enemy line. This force must use surprise, mobility, and fire-
power to achieve a favorable combat power ratio over the enemy at the point
of attack. (Chapter 3 discusses the penetration as a form of maneuver.)
D-45. Initially, the rupture force is the decisive operation. The attack occurs
at a location where the commander anticipates a successful rupture of the
enemy’s inner ring, which facilitates subsequent operations by enabling the
commander to attack enemy units from their flanks and rear. The rupture
force commander most likely has additional assets attached to his unit, such
as air defense artillery assets or additional engineer soldiers. The commander
should integrate these assets to achieve the rupture.
D-46. The follow-and-assume force follows the rupture attack and is commit-
ted, as necessary, to maintain the momentum of the attack and secure objec-
tives past the rupture. After the rupture force secures a gap in the enemy en-
circlement, the follow-and-assume force normally conducts the decisive opera-
tion until completing linkup operations with another friendly force. When a
unit receives a follow and assume mission in a breakout, its commander must
coordinate closely with the rupture force commander regarding the location of
the gap, the enemy situation at the rupture point, and the enemy situation, if
known, along the direction of attack past the rupture point. The commander
should not assign this force supporting shaping tasks, such as clear routes
and fix bypassed enemy forces, if those tasks would dissipate its available
combat power. If executing these support tasks is vital to the success of the
breakout and resources permit, the commander should designate a separate
follow and support force to perform these tasks.
D-11
FM 3-90
D-47. The main body consists of the main command post, the bulk of the CSS,
the unit’s casualties, and some CS assets. It contains combat forces not re-
quired for other missions and has sufficient combat power to protect itself.
The commander should place one individual in charge of the various elements
of the main body to ensure orderly movement. Typically, the main body estab-
lishes a flank security force that deploys once the main body passes through
the point of penetration and performs flank screen or a guard mission.
D-48. The rear guard consists of soldiers and equipment left on the perimeter
to provide protection for the rupture attack and any shaping operations, such
as diversionary forces. Forces left in contact must conduct a vigorous delaying
operation on the perimeter so that no portion of the rear guard gets cut off.
Under a single commander, the rear guard protects the main body from at-
tack while it moves from the area. In addition to providing security, the rear
guard deceives the enemy about the intentions of the encircled force, simu-
lating its activities until the main body clears the gap.
D-49. The primary purpose of a reserve is to retain flexibility through offen-
sive action. The commander makes every attempt to keep a small portion of
the encircled force uncommitted so he can employ it at the decisive moment
to ensure the success of the breakout. The situation may preclude establish-
ing a separate reserve force because of the need to resource either the rupture
force, the follow-and-assume force, or the rear guard. In this event, the com-
mander assigns and prioritizes various be-prepared missions to the follow-
and-assume force.
D-50. A successful diversion is important to the success of any breakout op-
eration. If the diversion fails to deceive the enemy regarding the intentions of
the encircled force, he could direct his full combat power at the rupture point.
On the other hand, the diversionary force may rupture the enemy’s lines. If a
rupture occurs, the diversion force commander must know the intent of the
commander of the encircled force. The encircled force commander may choose
to exploit the success of forces conducting a diversion, or he may have to dis-
engage them for use elsewhere in the breakout attempt.
CONTROL MEASURES
D-51. As a minimum, a commander uses boundaries; a line of departure (LD)
or line of contact; time of the attack; phase lines; axis of advance or direction
of attack; objectives; and a limit of advance (LOA) to control and synchronize
the breakout. (Chapter 2 describes using boundaries and phase lines. Chap-
ter 3 discusses using axis of advance, direction of attack, objectives, LD or
line of contact, LOA, and time of attack.) The commander imposes only those
control measures necessary to synchronize his operations.
PLANNING A BREAKOUT
D-52. The commander should initiate a breakout attack as quickly as possible
after the enemy encircles his force. While detailed combat information about
the enemy’s disposition is probably not available, the enemy is normally dis-
organized at that point in time and is least likely to respond in a coordinated
manner. The enemy has not yet brought in sufficient combat power to en-
circle the friendly force in strength, and weak points exist in his perimeter.
D-12
However, sometimes the commander will not attempt a breakout until all
other options fail.
D-53. Early in an encirclement, there are gaps between or weaknesses in the
enemy’s encircling forces. The commander uses his available ISR assets to
provide information that increases the accuracy of his situational under-
standing and determines enemy weak points. The commander plans for the
breakout attack to capitalize on identified weak points. Although the re-
sulting attack may be along a less-direct route or over less-favorable terrain,
it is the best course of action (COA) because it avoids enemy strength and in-
creases the chance for surprise.
D-54. An encircled force may be operating under adverse conditions and may
not have all of its ISR systems operating. This forces the commander to op-
erate with low levels of intelligence regarding enemy strengths, weaknesses,
and intentions. Within this environment, he should conduct aggressive recon-
naissance to gather information on the enemy. The commander should also
obtain information from long-range surveillance units, stay-behind units, and
special operations forces in the area. If the enemy is in close contact, the com-
mander may be forced to conduct a reconnaissance in force to ascertain infor-
mation on enemy strengths. In either case, he must select a COA quickly and
develop a plan accordingly.
D-55. A shaping operation, such as a diversionary attack, can assist a break-
out by diverting enemy attention and resources away from the rupture effort.
The force conducting shaping operations may be located either inside or out-
side the encirclement area. The enemy must regard the efforts of this force as
credible and a threat to the continuity of his maneuver plan. The commander
should direct the force’s efforts to a point where the enemy might expect a
breakout or relief effort. The diversionary force is as mobile as available vehi-
cles, fuel stocks, and trafficability allow so it can reposition to take part in the
breakout or maneuver elsewhere to support the breakout. Mobile, self-pro-
pelled weapon systems suit the needs of forces conducting shaping opera-
tions. Additionally, the probability of a successful breakout increases measur-
ably if another friendly force attacks toward the encircled force as it attempts
to breakout.
D-56. The commander conducts offensive information operations to assist the
breakout attempt. Deception operations mislead the enemy about the inten-
tions of the encircled force, especially the location of the breakout attempt. If
it is not possible to breakout immediately, the commander attempts to de-
ceive the enemy regarding the time and place of the breakout by concealing
his preparations and changing positions. He can also give the appearance
that the force will make a resolute stand and await relief.
D-57. The commander can use dummy radio traffic for the enemy to monitor
or landlines that he might tap to convey false information. The breakout
should not be along the obvious route toward friendly lines unless there is no
other alternative. In this respect, the preparations for a breakout mirror the
preparations for any other type or form of offensive operations. As in other of-
fensive actions, secrecy, deception, and surprise allow for success. The other
planning considerations for the breakout are the same as for any other
attack.
D-13
FM 3-90
EXECUTING A BREAKOUT
D-58. The commander exploits darkness and limited visibility during a break-
out if his encircled forces have superior night-operations capabilities. The
cover of darkness, fog, smoke, or severe weather conditions favor the break-
out because the encircling enemy weapons are normally less effective then.
The enemy has difficulty following the movements of the breakout force dur-
ing conditions of limited visibility. However, if the encircled force commander
waits for darkness or limited visibility, the enemy may have time to consoli-
date his containment positions. If friendly forces enjoy air superiority, they
may initiate a breakout attack during daylight to fully exploit the capabilities
of close air support.
D-59. The unit takes all possible precautions to deceive the enemy about the
location of the decisive operation. The rupture force minimizes occupation of
attack positions before starting the breakout. A commander may require one
or more shaping operations to assist the rupture force in penetrating enemy
positions and expanding the shoulders. He may use feints and demonstra-
tions to deceive the enemy concerning the location and time of the decisive
operation. However, diversionary attacks need not always occur first.
D-60. The commander organizes and controls his rupture force as he would
an attack or movement to contact. (See Figure D-8.) The rupture force gener-
ates overwhelming combat power at the point of penetration and attempts to
rapidly overwhelm enemy positions and expand the penetration. A command-
er hard pressed to generate sufficient combat power for both the rupture force
and the perimeter defense can thin his defensive perimeter in certain areas
by using a detachment left in contact in conjunction with a withdrawal prior
to executing the attack. He may also shorten the perimeter’s length, which re-
duces the size of the area occupied by the encircled force.
{
X 1 ATK HEL BN (OPCON)
G
X 3 AR BNS
X XX
2 MECH BNS
REAR (-) 2 FA BNS
GUARD FOLLOW AND
RUPTURE
G MAIN ASSUME FORCE FORCE DIV CAV SQDN
BODY
Figure D-8. Breakout by an Encircled Mechanized Division
D-14
D-61. The rupture forces applies the breaching fundamentals of suppress, ob-
scure, secure, reduce, and assault to ensure its success at the point of pene-
tration. These fundamentals always apply, but their application will vary
based on the prevailing factors of METT-TC. FM 3-34.2 defines these breach-
ing fundamentals and provides guidance regarding the organization of forces,
control measures, and planning, preparation, execution, and assessment con-
siderations of combined arms breaching operations.
D-62. If enemy forces at the point of penetration have roughly the same com-
bat power as the rupture force, the commander orders the rupture force to
hold the shoulders of the penetration while the follow-and-assume force
moves forward. It then becomes the decisive operation. (See Figure D-9.) If
the enemy is not in strength, the commander may have the rupture force con-
tinue its attack. If there are no identified enemy formations beyond the pene-
tration, the rupture force may transition to a movement to contact. After the
encircled friendly force breaks out, it moves toward other friendly forces and
links up with them. The next section addresses the control measures and con-
siderations associated with conducting a linkup.
PL JOHN
D6-3. PL DAN
PL MARK
RUPTURE FORCE
(MOST ASSETS TRANSFERRED
TO FOLLOW & ASSUME FORCE)
II
G C
XX X II
X II
Rear (-) (+)
Guard MAIN BODY
FOLLOW & ASSUME C
G RESERVE II FORCE
PL MARK
PL JOHN PL DAN
Figure D-9. Continued Breakout by an Encircled Mechanized Division
D-63. Initially, the follow-and-assume force passes through the gap created by
the rupture force. It is essential that this force continue to move rapidly from
the encircled area toward its final objective. If the follow-and-assume force
becomes the encircled commander’s decisive operation, it cannot allow itself to
become bogged down. Preparatory fires by artillery, Army aviation, close air
support, and air interdiction may help the follow-and-assume force in main-
taining momentum out of the encircled area.
D-15
FM 3-90
D-64. Once the breakout attack starts, the rear guard and any diversion
forces disengage or delay toward the area of the rupture. Perimeter forces
integrate smoothly into the rear of the breakout column. The commander
shifts his priority of fires as required by METT-TC once the breakout occurs.
D-65. As other encircled units support or move through the area of penetra-
tion, the rear guard commander must spread his forces over an extended
area. This requires flexibility and mobility by the rear guard. The perimeter
must withstand enemy pressure. If the enemy succeeds in destroying or en-
circling the original rear guard in the breakout process, the commander must
reconstitute a new rear guard.
D-66. The main body follows the follow-and-assume force. It moves rapidly as
a single unit on multiple routes in an approach march or road march forma-
tion immediately behind the follow-and-assume force, protected on its flanks
by security elements. It contains sufficient combat power to protect itself and
reinforce the flank or rear security forces if they come under attack.
D-67. Normally, the rear guard initially conducts a withdrawal to break con-
tact with the enemy forces around the perimeter. It contracts the perimeter
as it delays back behind the main body. If the enemy closely pursues the
breakout force, the efforts of the rear guard may become the decisive op-
eration for the encircled force. The commander should position the reserve
where it can also support the rear guard.
D-68. Initially, the priority for fire support is with the rupture force and
should focus on suppressing and obscuring the point of penetration. Fire sup-
port assets move as part of the main body and rear guard so security forces
have adequate fire support. Target identification difficulties resulting from
close proximity and intermixing of forces, as well as the rapidly changing
ground situation during the execution of a breakout, make the provision of
close air support difficult.
D-69. Engineers with the rupture force focus on mobility operations. Engi-
neers with the follow-and-assume force or the reserve improve routes as nec-
essary. Engineers supporting flank security elements focus on conducting
countermobility operations. The rear guard must also have enough engineers
to conduct countermobility operations.
D-70. The commander prioritizes his air defense assets to protect the rupture
force, the rear guard, and the main body. The rear guard is second in priority
of protection to help prevent it from being overrun by an enemy pursuit tar-
geted at the main body. The commander must dedicate air defense systems to
cover critical points through which the encircled force will pass.
D-71. The commander can relieve his logistics shortfalls by using aerial re-
supply, ordering external forces to establish support areas, and by using cap-
tured supplies. All units and vehicles carry the maximum supplies possible,
with emphasis on carrying POL and ammunition. The encircled force only
takes vehicles it can support. It may be possible for the higher headquarters
of the encircled force to establish an intermediate support base as the break-
out attack moves toward a linkup.
D-16
EXFILTRATION
D-72. If the success of a breakout attack appears questionable, or if it fails
and a relief operation is not planned, one way to preserve a portion of the
force might be through organized exfiltration. (Appendix B describes exfiltra-
tion as a tactical mission task.)
ATTACKING DEEPER INTO ENEMY TERRITORY

D-73. A COA that the enemy is not likely to expect from an encircled force is
to attack deeper to seize key terrain. It involves great risk but may offer the
only feasible COA under some circumstances. Attacking may allow the encir-
cled unit to move to a location where it can be extracted by other ground,
naval, or air forces. It is only feasible if a unit can sustain itself while iso-
lated, although that sustainment can come from aerial resupply and enemy
supply stocks.
D-74. When the enemy is attacking, an encircled friendly force that attacks
deeper into the enemy rear may disrupt his offense and provide an opportun-
ity for linkup from another direction. If the enemy is defending and the at-
tacking force finds itself isolated through its own offensive action, it may con-
tinue the attack toward its assigned objective or a new objective located on
more favorable defensive terrain.
LINKUP
D-75. A linkup is a meeting of friendly ground forces, which occurs in
a variety of circumstances. It happens when an advancing force reaches
an objective area previously seized by an airborne or air assault; when an en-
circled element breaks out to rejoin friendly forces or a force comes to the re-
lief of an encircled force; and when converging maneuver forces meet. Both
forces may be moving toward each other, or one may be stationary. Whenever
possible, joining forces exchange as much information as possible before start-
ing an operation.
D-76. The headquarters ordering the linkup establishes—
· A common operational picture.
· Command relationship and responsibilities of each force before, during,
and after linkup.
· Coordination of fire support before, during, and after linkup, including
control measures.
· Linkup method.
· Recognition signals and communication procedures to use, include-ing
pyrotechnics, armbands, vehicle markings, gun-tube orientation,
panels, colored smoke, lights, and challenge and passwords.
· Operations to conduct following linkup.
CONTROL MEASURES
D-77. The commander establishes minimum control measures for units con-
ducting a linkup. He assigns each unit an AO defined by lateral boundaries
and a RFL that also acts as a LOA. The commander establishes a no-fire area
around one or both forces and establishes a coordinated fire line beyond the
D-17
FM 3-90
area where the forces linkup. The linkup forces use the linkup points estab-
lished by the commander to initiate physical contact. The commander desig-
nates alternate linkup points since enemy action may interfere with the pri-
mary linkup points. He adjusts such control measures during the operation to
provide for freedom of action as well as positive control.
EXECUTION
D-78. There are two methods of conducting a linkup. The preferred method is
when the moving force has an assigned LOA near the other force and con-
ducts the linkup at predetermined contact points. Units then coordinate fur-
ther operations. The commander uses the other method during highly fluid
mobile operations when the enemy force escapes from a potential encircle-
ment, or when one of the linkup forces is at risk and requires immediate rein-
forcement. In this method, the moving force continues to move and conduct
long-range recognition via radio or other measures, stopping only when it
makes physical contact with the other force.
D-79. When one of the units involved is stationary, the commander usually lo-
cates the linkup points near the RFL/LOA. (See Figure D-10.) The linkup
points are also located near the stationary force’s security elements. Station-
ary forces assist in the linkup by opening lanes in minefields, breaching or re-
moving selected obstacles, furnishing guides, and designating assembly
areas. When a moving force is coming to relieve an encircled force, it brings
additional logistics assets to restore the encircled unit’s combat effectiveness
to the desired level.
LINKUP OPERATIONS CFL

EARLY STAGE LINKUP
POINTS
CONTACT
LU 13
STATIONARY
POINT FORCE
LINKUP FORCE
4 LU 24
LOA CFL
LINKUP OPERATIONS
LAST STAGE
RFL/LOA LU 13 STATIONARY
CFL FORCE
LU 24
LINKUP FORCE
RFL/LOA
CFL
LOA
Figure D-10. Linkup of a Moving Force and a Stationary Force
D-80. Linkup between moving units is one of the most difficult operations.
The commander establishes a LOA to prevent fratricide. He establishes
D-18
primary and alternate linkup points for the moving forces near the LOA. Fire
support considerations are similar to when a stationary and moving force
linkup. Leading elements of each force should exchange liaison teams and be
on a common radio net. (See Figure D-11.)
3
X
1 II II II
LU 31
LU 42
LU 8
1
LO A/RFL X OBJ JASON
O/O
2
52ID(M)
II
II
I
S
S S
52ID
XX
25AD
Figure D-11. Linkup of Two Moving Forces
D-81. The commander must carefully coordinate linkup operations with forces
of other nations. This is especially true if the two armies are not both
members of an alliance with established internationally standardized
procedures, or if the units involved have not previously established the
necessary procedures.
D-19
Appendix E
Rear Area and Base Security

The base commander’s plan of action must achieve adequate protec-
tion to ensure accomplishment of missions by base elements with as
small a force as necessary, since any drain of time and personnel from
operational activities will adversely affect the accomplishment of their
missions.
Preface, FM 31-81 (Test), Base Defense, March 1970
This appendix provides basic guidance for commanders and staff officers
on the organization of forces, control measures, and planning, preparing,
and executing considerations pertaining to rear area and base security
and route and convoy security operations. The tactics and techniques ex-
pressed in this appendix are applicable across the full spectrum of opera-
tions (offense, defense, stability, and support). However, commanders
must interpret them in accordance with the enemy’s capabilities. For ex-
ample, the physical layout of a base will be vastly different if the enemy
has a significant air capability than if the enemy has no air capability.
The purpose of rear area and base security operations is to prevent inter-
ruption of current and future operations. Rear area and base security op-
erations constitute one of the five elements that constitute sustaining op-
erations. (See FM 3-0 for a discussion of sustaining operations as part of
the battlefield framework.)
CONTENTS
Command Responsibilities ......................... E-1 Preparing a Base Defense .....................E-23
DOD Civilians and Contractors ............... E-2 Executing a Base Defense .....................E-25
Command Relationships ......................... E-3 Route Security ............................................E-31
Base ........................................................... E-4 Passive Security .....................................E-32
Base Cluster.............................................. E-6 Route Reconnaissance ..........................E-32
Control Exercised by US Area Cordon Security......................................E-32
Commanders............................................. E-7 Combat Security .....................................E-33
Threat Levels ............................................ E-7 Convoy Security .........................................E-33
Utility of Different Locations ................... E-8 Organization of a Convoy Escort..........E-34
Political Considerations Impacting Convoy Control Measures .....................E-35
the Rear Area ............................................ E-9 Planning Convoy Operations ................E-36
Base and Base Cluster Defense ............... E-10 Preparing Convoy Security Measures..E-38
Organization of Forces .......................... E-10 Executing Convoy Security
Control Measures ................................... E-15 Operations...............................................E-38
Planning Considerations ....................... E-15
E-0
COMMAND RESPONSIBILITIES
E-1. One of the fundamental
considerations in rear area ECHELON
and base security is the resolu- COMMANDER
tion of command authority.
The echelon commander must
clearly define command rela- SUPPORT REAR AREA COMMANDER
tionships before initiating any COMMAND/ OR COMMANDER
operations. A conflict of in- FUNCTIONAL ASSIGNED AN
COMMAND AREA SECURITY MISSION
terest can occur if command
relationships and responsibili-
ties for rear area and base BASE/ COMBAT
security are not clearly identi- BASE CLUSTER FORCES
fied. All tenant units in a
specific geographical area are OPCON
responsible to the commander TACTICAL CONTROL WHEN COMMITTED
TO SECURITY OPERATIONS
of that area for rear area and
base security. Therefore, a Figure E-1. OPCON versus TACON in
rear area commander has tac- Rear Area and Base Security
tical control (TACON) over
tenant units for conducting rear area and base security. The echelon com-
mander resolves conflicts between the tactical and functional command ele-
ments. (See Figure E-1.)
E-2. There are units subordinate to commanders other than the echelon com-
mander located throughout an echelon’s rear area. Many units operating in
the rear areas of a corps, division, or brigade are not organic to those eche-
lons. For example, units from the theater support command and other thea-
ter organizations, such as the theater signal command or theater engineer
command, operate within the corps rear area. The division has elements of
corps support groups (forward) and other corps organizations, such as a corps
signal battalion, operating within the division rear area. The brigade many
have elements of theater, corps, and division organizations operating within
its rear area.
E-3. However, an echelon rear area, base cluster, or base commander is re-
sponsible for the rear area and base security of all units in his assigned area.
The echelon rear area commander has the authority for terrain management
within the echelon rear area and assigns every unit to a base or base cluster.
All units assigned to a base or base cluster are TACON to the commander of
that base or base cluster when an emergency or tactical situation requires
the implementation of rear area and base security measures unless specifi-
cally exempted by order of the echelon commander.
E-4. The echelon commander establishes the relationships between the sub-
ordinate forces of different countries occupying the same geographical area.
This structure unifies the different forces to the maximum degree feasible.
Resulting language, doctrinal, and philosophical differences may be resolved
by—
· Recognizing national affinities and permitting homogenous elements to
operate together.
E-1
FM 3-90
· Combining units of different nationalities only where a clear require-

ment exists.
· Cross-assigning liaison personnel to improve understanding.
· Organizing area responsibilities along national lines.
· Establishing a mutually supporting warning system.
E-5. Using host nation forces presents a distinct advantage to a commander
responsible for rear area and base security because of their knowledge of the
area, its language, and customs. Commanders involved in sustaining opera-
tions take all possible efforts to use these assets effectively.
DOD CIVILIANS AND CONTRACTORS

E-6. Civilian employees supporting US military forces are subject to hostile
action. Protecting DOD civilians and contractors providing battlefield support
to Army units is the responsibility of the commander of the host base. The
supported base or military unit assures the protection of its operations and
personnel. DOD civilians and contractor personnel cannot take an active role
in conducting security operations, but retain the inherent right to self-de-
fense.
E-7. Commanders and staff planners assess the need for protecting these in-
dividuals and designate forces to provide security when appropriate. The mis-
sion, threat, and location where DOD civilians or contractors operate deter-
mine the degree of security required.
E-8. Protecting DOD civilians and contractors involves not only active protec-
tion through the use of armed military forces to provide escort or perimeter
security, but also training and equipping of these personnel for self-protec-
tion. Base cluster commanders may train and equip DOD civilian and con-
tractor personnel, if they agree, to work in a nuclear, biological, and chemical
(NBC) environment and to carry individual, military specification weapons
for personal protection when the threat exists and the geographic combatant
commander grants approval.
E-9. The base commander identifies specific security and protection require-
ments for DOD civilians and contractors located on or transiting the base and
designates resources and forces to address those requirements. He includes
these decisions in the base’s OPLANs/OPORDs and their supporting plans
and standing operating procedures (SOP). This allows the base’s tenant units
and civilians to properly integrate these protection requirements into their
operational procedures.
E-10. DOD civilians and contractors are responsible for following all protec-
tion requirements and policies—as stated in the contractual agreement. This
includes ensuring they receive training in NBC protection and weapons fa-
miliarization, when authorized, and informing them of local threats, facility
and travel security requirements, and off-limits restrictions directed by the
base commander. Failure to adhere to protection requirements and policies
could result in disciplinary actions for DOD civilians and possible contract
termination for contractors.
E-2
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS
E-11. The success of rear area and base security hinges on binding together
diverse resources. The commander must meet the following requirements to
eliminate a potential confusion and to achieve a cohesive effort—
· There must be a single responsible commander.
· Geographical areas of operations (AOs) and thus responsibility must be
clearly defined.
E-12. Overall responsibility for conducting sustaining operations in a com-
mander’s AO rests with the commander. Because the commander cannot af-
ford to focus strictly on sustaining operations he assigns that responsibility to
another officer and gives that individual a staff to help him accomplish that
operation. The individual responsible for a tactical echelon’s sustaining op-
erations is called the rear area commander.
E-13. A corps commander normally assigns the mission of sustaining opera-
tion to the deputy corps commander. In a similar manner, the assistant divi-
sion commander (support) is responsible to the division commander for sus-
taining operations in the division rear area. The forward support battalion
commander supporting the brigade is normally responsible to the maneuver
brigade commander for sustaining operations in the brigade rear area. While
the echelon commander has the authority to designate someone else as the
echelon’s rear area commander, doing so complicates staff relationships.
E-14. The responsible rear area commander at each of these three echelons
uses the echelon rear command post to monitor the echelon’s sustaining op-
erations. This assures the synchronization of the five elements of sustaining
operations and an orderly, effective, and timely escalation when conducting
rear area and base security. This encompasses the use of host nation and or-
ganic combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units through
employing a tactical combat force (TCF). The echelon rear command post de-
velops plans integrating the rear area and base security activities of all units
located within the echelon rear area. Each echelon rear area commander has
the authority to further divide the echelon rear area into subordinate AOs,
base clusters, and bases.
E-15. A rear operations center (ROC) provides the corps or division rear area
commander with the nucleus of an operations cell within the corps or division
rear command post. It is a reserve component organization since the func-
tions it performs are not required in garrison. It contains no organic life sup-
port capabilities, such as mess, supply, and maintenance, and relies on the
echelon headquarters’ commandant for those functions. The soldiers assigned
in peacetime to these organization lose their separate identity after being
activated and deployed. They are assigned to the corps or division head-
quarters company and become the rear command post representatives of the
echelon G2 and G3.
E-16. A corps rear area commander generally subdivides the corps rear area
into subordinate AOs that correspond to the AOs of his subordinate corps
support groups. A rear area operations center (RAOC) provides the corps sup-
port group commander with a greatly increased plans and operations capabil-
ity for his operations center to assist in conducting terrain management, rear
area and base defense, movement control and area damage control (ADC)
E-3
FM 3-90
within his AO. It also provides him a limited capability to conduct liaison
with subordinate base cluster defense operations centers (BCOCs) and base
defense operations centers (BDOCs). (See Figure E-2.)
XXX
HQS
REAR
CSS OPS
III III III

CSG RAOC CSG RAOC CSG RAOC
BCOC BCOC BCOC BCOC BCOC BCOC
BDOC
BDOC BDOC
BDOC BDOC
BDOC BDOC
BDOC BDOC
BDOC BDOC BDOC
BDOC
BDOC BDOC
BDOC BDOC
BDOC BDOC
BDOC BDOC
BDOC BDOC
BDOC
BDOC BDOC BDOC BDOC
Figure E-2. Organization of C2 Facilities in a Corps Rear Area
E-17. Like a ROC, a RAOC is a reserve component organization that contains

no organic life support capabilities, such as mess, supply, and maintenance.
It must rely on its assigned CS/CSS brigade/group headquarters to which
they are assigned for those functions. The soldiers assigned to a RAOC main-
tain their separate identity after being activated and deployed, unlike those
assigned to a ROC. Therefore, the corps rear area commander can move them
as necessary to provide additional command and control (C2) capabilities
within the corps rear area.
E-18. Responsibility for overall rear area and base security, as well as de-
fense against large enemy attacks, belongs to the echelon rear area com-
mander. He charges each base and base cluster commander with responsibil-
ity for his local and internal security to safeguard the base/base cluster and
its facilities from infiltration and small-scale attacks. Each base and base
cluster defense plan is coordinated with, and becomes a part of, the echelon
rear area defense plan.
BASE
E-19. A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported
(JP 1-02). It can contain one unit or multiple units. It has a defined peri-
meter, established access controls, and is situated and configured to take ad-
vantage of natural and man-made terrain features. Missions and security
considerations determine the selection of a base site. To nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of enemy attack, the rear area commander assigns all units lo-
cated in the rear area that are not actively involved in operations to a base.
E-4
Bases may be further organized into base clusters or organized as a separate

bases that report directly to the ROC or RAOCs controlling rear area and
base security for the AO where the base is located. A commander may name
his base or use a mixture of alphanumeric characters to designate it.
Base Commander
E-20. In base defense operations, the base commander is the officer assigned
to command a base (JP 1-02). The base commander is responsible for de-
fending his base. He is normally the senior Army competitive category officer
on the base unless the base contains only medical units. He exercises C2 over
the base and necessary control of resident and transient units. The base com-
mander’s responsibilities include establishing the overall base defense org-
anization as well as planning, preparing, executing, and assessing all local
security measures. This includes the tactical control of US Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps forces assigned to the base primarily for the purpose of
local base defense, such as a US Air Force security flight. Forces of other ser-
vices or functional components assigned or attached to the base for primary
purposes other than local base defense will support local base defense during
an imminent attack or threat of an attack. For more information on joint rear
area and base security see JPs 3-10 and 3-10.1.
E-21. The base commander uses all assets within the base perimeter to create
the required level of local security. He has the authority to position units as-
signed to his base in mutually supporting positions. He directs employing of
obstacles, such as wire- and command-detonated antipersonnel mines, to de-
fend each base within the guidance of his rules of engagement (ROE). He
identifies shortages in materiel or weaknesses in required defensive capabili-
ties early and requests the necessary reinforcements and supplies to correct
those weaknesses.
E-22. A base commander is also usually a battalion commander, and the
BDOC forms around the nucleus provided by his battalion staff. The echelon
rear area commander normally does not assign the function of base command
to MP commanders because of their need to exercise command over MP ele-
ments responding to Level II threats within the echelon rear area.
Base Defense Operations Center

E-23. The base defense force (BDF) commander needs a BDOC to ensure the
integration of defense plans and maximum effectiveness of the total base de-
fense effort. A base defense operations center is a command and control
facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base
security and defense. It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls
all base defense efforts, and coordinates and integrates into area security
operations with the rear area operations center/rear tactical operations
center (JP 3-10.1). The nature of the BDOC depends on the combination of
forces involved and may be joint, interagency, or multinational depending on
the combination of forces involved.
E-24. The BDOC is similar in many respects to the tactical operations center
found in maneuver brigades and battalions. Representatives of the intelli-
gence, maneuver, and fire support battlefield operating systems (BOS) staff
E-5
FM 3-90
the BDOC. The base commander provides other BOS representatives to his
BDF commander on an “as required” basis. Multiservice, other agency, and
multinational representation, with decision making authority, is present in
the BDOC when elements of their armed forces, police, or paramilitary forces
are directly involved in the overall base defense effort.
E-25. The center consists of two primary sections—the command section and
the plans and operations section—with additional sections as deemed neces-
sary. These additional sections could include a CSS section to plan the provi-
sion of services and support to the base, and an ADC section that provides in-
spection, planning, and control of the base’s ADC resources. This center is
fully manned and operates continuously. It primary functions are—
· Keeping the base commander informed of the current situation within
his AO, including enemy, friendly, and civilian activities.
· Preparing comprehensive plans to implement the commander’s overall
base defense and security guidance.
· Ensuring the participation of all units within the base perimeter in
conducting active and passive defense and security measures.
· Reducing any conflicting interests inherent in multiservice or multina-
tional BDF environment.
· Providing centralized collection and processing of information from
various intelligence and operational sources and disseminating resul-
tant intelligence products as appropriate.
· Providing the essential C2 organization necessary to conduct coordi-
nated defensive operations.
E-26. The base commander establishes the BDF from available base CS and
CSS assets if MP and combat arms units are not available to provide the nec-
essary local security. He designates the BDF commander to avoid confusion
and provides that individual necessary guidance.
BASE CLUSTER
E-27. A base cluster in base defense operations, is a collection of bases, geo-
graphically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control
(JP 3-10). A base cluster normally does not have a defined perimeter or estab-
lished access points. The base cluster is normally the next higher tactical C2
headquarters of the base. A base cluster typically contains five bases but can
range from two to seven bases. The rear area commander designates each
base cluster and assigns it either a name or an alphanumeric designation.
Base Cluster Commander

E-28. The senior Army competitive category officer in each cluster becomes
the commander of that cluster. Like a base commander, he establishes a con-
tinuously operating BCOC to support the tactical chain of command. This
officer is normally the commander of a CS or CSS brigade or group and his
staff forms the BCOC nucleus. The BCOC integrates each base defense plan
into the base cluster defense plan.
E-6
Base Cluster Operations Center

E-29. The BCOC keeps the base cluster commander informed of the situation
in his area and of the resources available to cope with emergencies. It repre-
sents the commander’s planning capability and provides him a C2 system to
control the execution of rear area and base security missions. The BCOC can
provide functional elements with current information they may require to
conduct their normal CS and CSS functions. This includes—
· Highway road conditions, new unit or activity locations, security and
support activities, refueling points, emergency maintenance and re-
covery facilities, medical facilities, rest stops, and reroutes.
· Intelligence data, including weather, terrain, and civil considerations.
· Location of area communications sites that units, convoys, or soldiers
on the move can link into to maintain a current common operational
picture.
· Location and level of contamination from enemy use of weapons of
mass destruction or chemical contamination resulting from the use of
conventional munitions and industrial accidents.
· Location of hazards resulting from battlefield activities of both sides.
· Available explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) support.
CONTROL EXERCISED BY US AREA COMMANDERS

E-30. There are three basic considerations in determining command policies
governing the authority and limitations of the echelon rear area commander.
These three factors are—
· The threat levels and situation within the echelon rear area.
· The utility of different locations within the echelon rear area.
· Political considerations.
THREAT LEVELS
E-31. Threats to bases in the rear area are categorized by the three levels of
defense required to counter them. Any or all levels may exist simultaneously
in the rear area. Emphasis on specific base defense and security measures
may depend on the anticipated threat level. A Level I threat is a small ene-
my force that can be defeated by CS and CSS units operating in the
rear area or by the perimeter defenses established by friendly bases
and base clusters. A Level I threat for a typical base consists of a squad-
size unit or smaller groups of enemy soldiers, agents, or terrorists. Typical ob-
jectives for a Level I threat include supplying themselves from friendly sup-
ply stocks; disrupting friendly C2, logistics, and facilities; and interdicting
friendly lines of communication (LOC).
E-32. A Level II threat is enemy activities that can be defeated by a
base or base cluster augmented by a response force. A typical response
force is a MP platoon; however, it can be a combat arms maneuver element.
Level II threats consist of enemy special operations teams, long-range recon-
naissance units, mounted or dismounted combat reconnaissance teams, and
partially attritted small combat units. Typical objectives for a Level II threat
include the destruction, as well as the disruption, of friendly C2 and logistics
and commercial facilities, and the interdiction of friendly LOCs.
E-7
FM 3-90
E-33. A Level III threat is beyond the defensive capability of both the
base and base cluster and any local reserve or response force. It nor-
mally consists of a mobile enemy force. The friendly response to a Level III
threat is a TCF. Possible objectives for a Level III threat include seizing key
terrain, interfering with the movement and commitment of reserves and
artillery, and destroying friendly combat forces. Its objectives could also in-
clude destroying friendly CSS facilities, supply points, command post facili-
ties, airfields, aviation assembly areas, arming and refueling points, and in-
terdicting LOCs and major supply routes.
UTILITY OF DIFFERENT LOCATIONS

E-34. The utility of a given location is a vital factor to the rear area com-
mander. Some areas are critical to conducting the echelon’s sustaining opera-
tions. Others are priority areas important to conducting the echelon’s sus-
taining operations. Still others are areas where he must exercise some
general control but which are neither critical nor priority areas. Finally,
there are areas of no importance in the echelon’s sustaining operations.
E-35. A critical area is an area or geographical point essential to accomplish-
ing the echelon’s sustaining operations. The loss, neutralization, or interdic-
tion of this area allows no alternate operations and adversely affects sustain-
ing operations. An example of a critical area would be the only available port
within an AO.
E-36. A priority area is also an area or geographical point essential to accom-
plishing the echelon’s sustaining operation except that within an acceptable
amount of time sustaining operations functions can be transferred to an al-
ternate location without an immediate significant impact on the total CSS ef-
fort. An example of a priority area would be a supply point containing the
ammunition designed to support an offensive operation or an installation per-
forming an important function, such as repairing thermal sights. Another ex-
ample of a priority area would be a bridge over a major waterway.
E-37. Areas retained under general control are normally the best areas for
their designated purpose, but sustaining operations conducted within them
can move to other locations without major problems. Examples of areas over
which the rear area commander must have some general control are LOCs
and main supply routes.
E-38. The rear area commander coordinates with the host nation, using avail-
able civil affairs (CA) and operational law personnel to obtain the necessary
authority to conduct security measures required by the sensitivity of the area
and the situation. These security measures include conducting patrols out-
side of base perimeters, establishing procedures for clearing indirect fires,
and conducting counterintelligence operations. Negotiations also address
such measures as establishing a curfew, imposing circulation control over
civilian traffic, and similar policies for the host nation civilian populace as
dictated by the factors of METT-TC.
E-39. At the division and corps echelons, there could be areas within the
echelon rear area commander’s AO that do not affect the echelon’s sustaining
operations. The rear area commander prefers not to commit his scarce intelli-
gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance resources in those areas but leaves
E-8
the responsibility for detecting and countering enemy activity in those areas
to the host nation.
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS IMPACTING THE REAR AREA

E-40. The degree of control that the rear area commander has over host na-
tion authorities and the civilian population depends primarily on the political
conditions under which US forces entered the AO. Generally, US military
presence occurs in one of two ways:
· Entry by invitation of the host nation.
· Forcible entry.
The extent of and limitations on military activities are prescribed by custo-
mary international law or by international agreements to which the US is a
party, or by both in either environment.
E-41. The rear area commander may encounter a range of situations extend-
ing from a host-guest relationship to total US authority under conditions of
military government. He may have no power over the host nation authorities
and civilian population except what he can exert through influence and co-
ordination in some cases. Populace controls, mutual support between civilian
and military resources, and the coordination of civilian and military security
and damage control measures are of utmost importance to rear area and base
security. The commander must constantly be aware of and understand his re-
lationship with host nation authorities and the civilian population. A clear
understanding of his authority is essential to the rear area commander in
exercising that degree of control necessary to ensure security and safety to all
friendly military forces and the civilian population located within the AO.
Assisted Unopposed Entry

E-42. Through legitimate agreement by the interested governments, a host
nation may request US forces to assist the host nation for a mutually agreed
reason. Liaison and coordination are the primary means of establishing ac-
ceptable military-civilian communications. The commander’s initial require-
ment is the provision of maximum civilian support for and the prevention of
civil interference with military operations. Host nation forces may be effec-
tive in rear area and base security because of their knowledge of the area, its
language, and customs. US military advice and assistance rendered in ac-
cordance with applicable laws and regulations may enhance their effective-
ness.
Forcible Entry
E-43. Forcible entry entails the seizure of terrain and facilities from enemy
forces. Depending on circumstances, the operation may require the removal
of existing civil or martial governmental apparatus or the restoration of a
suppressed government. In the absence of civil authority, Army forces estab-
lish measures to control the civilian population and provide basic services.
When US combat forces enter enemy territory to occupy it, initial disclosure
of the nature and extent of US authority should include basic occupation
directives in accordance with the laws of land warfare and CA doctrine. (See
FMs 1-27.10 and 3-57.) These actions include issuing necessary proclama-
tions concerning US authority as it relates to civil government, curfew,
E-9
FM 3-90
movement control, public order, and similar matters. Civil affairs units ini-
tiate, coordinate, and supervise local compliance with these directives.
US-Host Nation Relationships

E-44. The rear area commander must have the authority to protect and se-
cure his installations and protect resources traveling along LOCs within his
AO. Since this control affects the host nation governmental agencies and the
civilian populace, he must not use that authority in a manner that alienates
those audiences to the US mission and objectives.
E-45. Within the limits of the authority granted to them under local law, host
nation civil officials may delegate political authority over local government to
the military commanders of their own nation. The rear area commander must
coordinate his operations with the host nation military area commander in
conformance with US policy directives and requirements when this condition
exists. Otherwise, the rear area commander coordinates his operations with
the appropriate host nation agency.
E-46. The host nation military commander normally assumes responsibility
for reconnaissance and security outside the perimeter of US military bases.
The base commander provides for interior guard and control within the con-
fines of his base and the security of his perimeter. The rear area commander
may not have exclusive authority over local national civilian employees with-
in his installation. Authority to hire and fire, investigative jurisdiction in
matters of sabotage or espionage, and other vital matters of mutual concern
to both the US command and the host nation must be delineated and agreed
on for effective rear area and base security. The US rear area commander
must maintain authority to control access to his bases when the situation
warrants. Counterintelligence units are responsible for investigating sabo-
tage, espionage, and subversion. Military police criminal investigation teams
assist them as appropriate. In response to events having significant high-
level interest, other governmental agencies, such as the FBI, may participate
in these investigations.
BASE AND BASE CLUSTER DEFENSE

E-47. Base and base cluster defense is the cornerstone of an echelon’s suc-
cessful rear area and base security effort. The following paragraphs outline
the organization of forces, control measures, and considerations pertaining to
planning, preparing, and executing base and base cluster defense.
E-48. The rear area commander uses a combination of base and base cluster
defense forces, designated response forces, and TCF, to provide the required
security within the echelon rear area. Special operations forces (SOF) may
conduct counterterrorism operations within the rear area on an exception
basis.
Base Defense Force

E-49. A base defense force is a security element established to provide
local security to a base. It normally consists of the combined security
E-10
assets provided by each unit on the base toward the ongoing security re-
quirements of the base. These assets include crews, weapon systems, and
radios of combat vehicles temporarily located on the base for maintenance or
other reasons. It may consist of MP, infantry, armor, or cavalry units when
the echelon commander’s mission focuses on stability or support operations.
The mission of the BDF is to conduct reaction operations to deter, resist, or
destroy an enemy Level I force attacking the base. The BDF must be suffi-
ciently flexible to defend the base perimeter, provide for the base’s interior
guard requirements, and conduct local offensive operations beyond the base
perimeter if allowed by the host nation.
E-50. The base commander
Base
normally appoints a BDF Commander
commander to assist in
executing base defense Base Defense
Operations Center
functions. He tasks units (BDOC)
located within the base to
provide soldiers, equip-
BDF
ment, and materiel to form Commander
Emergency
Augmentation
the BDF. The principal From
Base Units
I
BDF tactical increments I
I
are normally provisionally BDF Security
HQ Security
organized security pla- Security
Security
toons. (See Figure E-3.)
The base commander or-
ganizes his BDF as re- Figure E-3. Typical Base Defense Organization
quired by the intensity of
enemy activity within the rear area.
E-51. A BDF should have a high degree of direct-fire lethality provided by a
mixture of small arms, automatic weapons, and antitank systems. It should
also have access to supporting indirect fires, a high degree of tactical mobil-
ity, and a reasonable span of control. It should be capable of—
· Conducting reconnaissance patrols for detecting and reporting the loca-
tion, strength, and capabilities of enemy forces located near the base.
· Developing positions within and outside the base from which enemy
advances can be stopped or destroyed.
· Using reserve elements to attack relatively small enemy units that
threaten to penetrate the base perimeter.
· Providing internal security for critical capabilities located on the base.
The base commander must reconcile any issues about personnel and equip-
ment resources shortfalls affecting the BDF and the desired level of security.
E-52. Most CS and CSS companies can provide a platoon-size security ele-
ment toward the defense of their assigned base. (Figure E-4 on page E-12
shows a possible organization of such a security platoon.) A base having more
than one security platoon also establishes a provisional security company
headquarters for the BDF. The BDF commander will be the commander of
this provisional security company. Most CS and CSS battalion headquarters
can provide the resources for a provisional security company headquarters.
The BDF commander designates a portion of the available security force as
E-11
FM 3-90
his reserve. In an emergency, the BDF is augmented by the defensive efforts

of all units assigned to or transiting the base.
Security
Platoon
1 Officer/21 Enlisted
Security Platoon Weapons Security

Security
Headquarters Squad Security
Squad
Squad
1 Officer 5 Enlisted Squad
55Enlisted
Enlisted
1 Enlisted 5 Enlisted
1 SAW
1 AT System
3 M-16s 4 M-16s X3
or 1 M-203
2 SAWs
3 M-16s
Figure E-4. Security Platoon
E-53. Operational requirements frequently modify a unit’s ability to contri-

bute resources to the defense effort of its base. Responsibility for reporting
such modifications rests with the individual unit. The base commander
brings these unrelated and unfamiliar groups together when creating his
BDF. Every effort must be made to retain the unit integrity of these security
platoons while assigning security tasks to the BDF.
E-54. Providing a BDF from CS and CSS organizations results in two un-
desirable conditions—
· Reduced operational effectiveness of the units from which the resources
are drawn.
· Soldiers performing duties other than those for which they are specifi-
cally trained.
The unit commanders providing these security platoons assign personnel to
them. Soldiers assigned to the BDF should remain there if operations permit,
in order to facilitate training, provide for continuity of defense operations,
and ensure force efficiency.
E-55. The base commander considers all available Army, joint, and multina-
tional resources and forces in determining the exact organization of the BDF.
Host nation police, paramilitary, and military elements will frequently be
available to assist in providing rear area and base security. Early clarifica-
tion of the positions, responsibilities, and authority of these elements reduces
possible confusion and duplication of effort. The degree of cooperation the
base commander attains from local host nation or third nation officials large-
ly determines the effectiveness of those countries resources as they apply to
base defense, regardless of the existence or absence of agreements made
E-12
between forces at the national level. Special considerations for US employ-

ment of host nation elements include—
· Designated host nation security force must be responsive to the de-
mands of the base commander.
· Caution may be necessary when assigning host nation security forces
tasks requiring specialized equipment or skills.
· The base commander should consult with the appropriate civil-military
operations office to clarify any restrictions that might apply to the use
of these forces.
Base Cluster Defense Force

E-56. The base cluster defense force consists of all of the BDFs within the
base cluster. The base cluster commander can direct the employment of BDFs
within the base cluster or segments of those BDFs to counter identified Level
II threats within the geographical area of the base cluster. The more normal
course of action (COA) is to have a response force engage these Level II
threats. Base commanders must reconstitute those portions of their BDFs
committed to these missions.
Rear Area Security Forces

E-57. The purpose of rear area security forces is to facilitate a base’s ability to
return to mission accomplishment as quickly as possible rather than devoting
CS and CSS resources to limited tactical operations. Rear area security forces
can be further broken down into response forces and TCFs.
E-58. Response Forces. A response force is a mobile force with appropriate
fire support designated, usually by the area commander, to deal with Level II
threats in the rear area (JP 1-02). It usually consists of MP forces supported
by available fire support and Army aviation assets. They are usually either
platoon- or company-size forces. Military police elements may be temporarily
or permanently unavailable in sufficient strength for response force opera-
tions because of their commitment to other missions. The commander should
designate alternative response forces before this occurs. Other possible re-
sponse force options include engineer units, chemical units, transiting combat
units, elements of the reserve, or host nation assets. The rear command post
coordinates with the echelon G3/S3 before committing forces other than MP
units to response force missions.
E-59. The MP chain of command directs the size and composition of the re-
sponse force when the echelon is primarily focused on conducting offensive
and defensive operations. The nature and size of the threatening enemy force
influences the size and number of MP elements that make up the response
force. So, too, does the current rear intelligence preparation of the battlefield
(IPB) and the echelon’s rear area commander’s risk assessment. The echelon
provost marshal, in coordination with his rear area commander, considers—
· The priority of ongoing operations.
· The criticality of the base under attack.
· The amount of time needed for given elements to consolidate.
The rear area commander continuously assesses the situation and, if appro-
priate, commits more response force assets to deal with the threat.
E-13
FM 3-90
E-60. Tactical Combat Forces. A tactical combat force (TCF) is a combat

unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets,
that is assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats (JP 1-02). These
threats can result from enemy forces infiltrating friendly positions or pene-
trating friendly defensive positions and moving into the friendly rear area, or
conducting airborne/air assault operations. A successful defense against such
a Level III threat requires planning and preparing for the TCF’s employment.
The echelon commander can dedicate a TCF to deal with such a threat, desig-
nate another force as the on-order TCF, or accept the risk of not having a des-
ignated TCF. A dedicated TCF has the necessary assets, such as artillery and
combat engineers, allocated to it to accomplish the mission. The echelon com-
mander decides the exact composition of the TCF after weighing the risk of
allocating forces to the TCF and thus decreasing the combat power available
for his decisive operation.
E-61. The echelon G3 designates the number of TCFs in accordance with the
situation and the echelon commander’s guidance. Designating more than one
TCF provides flexibility of response to competing needs. The primary advan-
tage of having a dedicated, rather than an on-order, TCF is the assurance
that it will be available when needed. Other advantages include the ability of
the TCF staff to focus the force’s planning and preparing activities on just one
mission. This includes establishing liaison and communications with support-
ed bases or base clusters and echelon Level II response forces. It also allows
the dedicated TCF to rehearse its plans. When the commander assigns a sub-
ordinate unit an on-order TCF mission, he must establish criteria on when to
commit that unit as the TCF.
E-62. A TCF can expect support from the following types of assets:
· MPs with working dogs.
· Military intelligence (includes counterintelligence).
· Field artillery.
· Engineers.
· Army aviation (attack, air cavalry, air assault, C2, and possibly special
electronic mission aircraft).
· Public affairs.
· Air defense artillery.
· Area signal nodes.
· Civil affairs assisted by psychological operations (PSYOP) elements.
· CSS elements required to sustain the force conducting area security.
Any or all of these types of assets may not be immediately available to the
TCF on its commitment. They are limited assets and may be engaged in other
missions. The force conducting the rear area security mission may also re-
ceive support from other US and allied services, including the host nation.
E-63. The factors of METT-TC determine the size of the TCF. For a corps,
this normally results in at least one battalion task force being assigned the
mission. A division typically designates a reinforced company team as its
TCF. The echelon commander configures his TCF to conduct offensive opera-
tions. The TCF must be extremely mobile and capable of moving by air and
ground modes because of limited reaction time and extended distances
E-14
between units common to the rear area. The TCF must be as mobile as the
enemy. It should be capable of destroying armor-protected vehicles and dis-
mounted infantry and of suppressing enemy shortrange air defense
(SHORAD) systems. Consequently, a TCF typically consists of infantry, Army
aviation (attack and utility helicopters), and air cavalry elements with engi-
neer and field artillery support. The commander may also organize a TCF
with armored cavalry, armor, and mechanized infantry units if the situation
so dictates.
E-64. The commander strives to obtain tactical self-sufficiency within both
the response force and the TCF. He does this by attaching or placing in direct
support adequate fire support, CS, and CSS elements so that they can per-
form semiindependent operations. In addition, he must obtain resources,
such as CA, PSYOPS, and interpreters, for interacting with the civilian popu-
lation of the area being secured.
Special Operations Forces

E-65. Special operations forces other than CA and PSYOP may combat terror-
ism within the AO of a conventional unit. A unit conducting rear area and
base security may be tasked by a higher headquarters to provide conven-
tional support to SOF elements conducting counterterrorism operations with-
in its AO. If SOF operate in the area, a special operations command and con-
trol element (SOCCE) will normally be deployed at the Army forces or corps
echelon, with liaisons attached lower for a specific mission to the unit respon-
sible for the appropriate AO for the duration of the SOF mission.
CONTROL MEASURES
E-66. Control measures in base defense operations are the same as those
used in other defensive operations. (See Figure E-5, page E-16.) The head-
quarters establishing the base or base cluster designates the base’s AO using
rear, lateral, and forward boundaries. The AO for the base may or may not be
contiguous to the AO of other units. The echelon rear area commander may
further subdivide his assigned area into subordinate AOs, bases, and base
clusters. He can assign maneuver forces to assembly areas and battle posi-
tions. He establishes phase lines, contact points, objectives, and checkpoints
as necessary to control his maneuver. He establishes fire support coordi-
nating measures (FSCM) to permit or restrict fires in and around the base.
(See Chapters 2, 3, and 8 and FM 3-09 for a discussion of FSCM.) No-fire
areas may be required to protect civilians, prevent disruption of sustaining
operations, or protect combat outposts, observation posts, and patrols from
friendly fire. All established control graphics are coordinated with host nation
agencies to minimize interference, misunderstandings, and unnecessary col-
lateral damage. The BDF commander, in coordination with the base com-
mander, designates the base perimeter, target reference points, and sectors of
fire to organizations located within the base.
E-67. The echelon commander designs his rear area and base security system
to ensure—
· Maximum effectiveness of BDFs provided by CS and CSS units.
E-15
FM 3-90
· Minimum degradation to unit mission performance while providing the

unit’s contribution to the BDF.
· Combat arms units are not diverted to provide dedicated rear area and
base security forces.
E-68. Commanders in the rear area can improve their capability to effectively
use available manpower and materiel by establishing logical priorities. The
commander must allocate resources available to protect personnel, supplies,
and facilities in consonance with the degree of risk involved. Sufficient per-
sonnel and materiel will not usually be available in the rear area to provide
simultaneous protection to all of the echelon’s sustaining operations.
E-69. Base defense plans are flexible and allow for differing degrees of secur-
ity based on the probability of threat activity to maximize unit mission ac-
complishment. The common defensive planning considerations outlined in
Chapter 8 apply to planning for base security. The following paragraphs ex-
plain fundamental principles of rear area and base security. They also ad-
dress BOS specific planning considerations that apply to base security.
3
MS 108
MP
I
II
CSB
BASE CLUSTER
RM
AN
ICO
I
CON
543
I HARRINGTON
E
555 PS
RE II 993
CSB I
501
II
102
II
II
I
447
II
NFA NFA CSB
917 CSG 917 CSG 711
EFF 051000ZAUG05 EFF 051000ZAUG05
III
CSG
917
GRIFFIN
II
MS
13 RM
AN
70 7
M15 ICO SPHINX
M17 RE I
881
I
NFA
917 CSG
EFF 051000ZAUG05 663
Figure E-5. Base Cluster Harrington
Fundamentals of Base Defense

E-70. The fundamentals of base defense are—
· Understand the enemy.
· See the AO.
· Use the defender’s advantages.
· Concentrate at critical times and places.
· Conduct counterreconnaissance and counterattacks.
· Coordinate critical defense assets.
· Balance base security with political and legal constraints.
E-16
· Know the ROE.

· Responsiveness.
E-71. Understand the Enemy. Defenders must be familiar with the capa-
bilities and limitation of enemy forces, weapons, equipment, and tactics. The
base commander also must have access to the latest intelligence concerning
probable enemy intent.
E-72. See the AO. Intelligence operations are key to assembling an accurate
picture of the AO. The IPB process provides the commander a continuous,
integrated, and comprehensive analysis of the effects of enemy and neutral
capabilities, terrain, and weather on operations. It helps the commander
anticipate events and develop the priority intelligence requirements and in-
formation requirements tied to those events. Intelligence and multidiscipline
counterintelligence estimates are prepared, continuously updated, and inte-
grated into the base commander’s staff decision making process. Space-based,
airborne, and ground sensors, patrols, and counterintelligence activities are
all means that rear area commanders can employ to detect possible indicators
of planned enemy action.
E-73. Use the Defender’s Advantages. Defender’s advantages may permit
a numerically inferior force to defeat a much larger one. Some of these advan-
tages are:
· The ability to fight from cover.
· More detailed knowledge of local terrain and environment.
· The ability to prepare positions, routes between them, obstacles, and
fields of fire in advance.
· The ability to plan communications, control measures, indirect fires,
and logistic support to fit any predictable situation.
· The ability to deceive enemy forces about friendly defensive capabili-
ties, dispositions, and execution of operations.
E-74. Concentrate at Critical Times and Places. A base commander
must measure and continually evaluate the various risks to his base. An ene-
my usually concentrates his resources on the most sensitive or vulnerable
targets. Defense of a base is normally conducted along interior lines, permit-
ting the timely and secure movement of forces to engage the most critical
threats. The commander must mass enough combat power at points of deci-
sion by economizing in some areas, employing a reserve, and maneuvering to
gain local superiority at critical points.
E-75. Conduct Counterreconnaissance and Counterattacks. A major
contributing factor to vulnerability in the rear area is the relatively fixed na-
ture of operations. An enemy can study the operational patterns of semifixed
units and installations to determine their existing defensive measures. Fur-
ther, fixed bases having well-established perimeters usually have limited
depth. Counterreconnaissance and counterattack add depth to the battle out-
side the perimeter, allowing the base to continue its primary mission with
minimal interference.
E-76. Coordinate Critical Defense Assets. Synchronization of indirect
fires, air and missile defense resources, tactical aircraft, engineers, dis-
mounted troops, armored vehicles, naval surface fire support, and helicopters
E-17
FM 3-90
can produce a combined arms effect. Synchronizing forces and fires produces
a synergy capable of defeating a larger enemy force. This synergy results
from making enemy movement difficult or impossible and by causing a reac-
tion that may make enemy forces more vulnerable to other friendly capabili-
ties. Periodic rehearsals of security plans ensure effectiveness of the alert
system, proficiency of key individuals, and identification of potential problem
areas.
E-77. Balance Base Security with Political and Legal Constraints.
Base security may have to be designed around numerous political con-
straints.
E-78. Know the ROE. The base commander and his subordinates must com-
ply with established ROE. He ensures the reconciliation of any inconsisten-
cies between service component and multinational ROE.
E-79. Responsiveness. The echelon rear area commander and his subordi-
nate base cluster and base commanders have the authority and the capability
to communicate operational requirements directly to units located within
their AOs. The chain of command frequently changes from the functional to
the tactical chain of command after implementing a rear area and base secur-
ity plan. Therefore, the rear area commander must critically analyze and test
his communication systems that filter through various levels of command to
assure that they are responsive under given emergency conditions. The eche-
lon rear area commander establishes direct communication links between the
echelon rear command post and its subordinate base cluster and base opera-
tions centers if existing information systems are not adequate to transmit
rear area and base security-related information to those centers in a timely
manner.
E-80. Responsiveness may be attained by many different procedures and
capabilities, some of which are listed below:
· Clearly established authority granted to base cluster and base com-
manders.
· A wide-area information system that provides a flexible warning sys-
tem for a large variety of situations.
· Continuous identification and tracking of resources that can assist in
providing rear area and base security, such as maintenance float wea-
pon systems and replacement crews.
· Response forces have communication systems capable of using the
existing wide-area information systems to communicate directly with
the threatened BDOC. They also can communicate with the BCOC lo-
cated in the threatened base cluster and the echelon rear command
post.
· MP forces responding to Level II rear area threats have combat vehi-
cles with a mixture of firepower, armor protection, and a high degree of
tactical mobility.
· Identifying dual-capable units. For example, a rear area security force
identified to respond to Level I or Level II threats also has capabilities
to perform rescue or provide labor in an ADC mission. However, a rear
area security element is not concurrently identified as an ADC ele-
ment.
E-18
Other Planning Considerations

E-81. When the rear area commander commits his forces to semifixed instal-
lations or sites, the rear area security mission may become defensive in na-
ture. Therefore, he must carefully balance his approach with the need for of-
fensive action. Detecting enemy activity early is critical when conducting rear
area security; it provides the commander with time to react to any threat.
Proper integration of the BOS is key to successful operations.
E-82. Intelligence. A review is made of all available information about the
general area before occupying a site. The IPB process addressing the rear
area includes not only enemy information, but terrain, weather, and informa-
tion about the civilian population and infrastructure. Intelligence, cavalry,
scout, and CA organizations obtain relevant information about the area from
host nation governmental organizations and the civilian population.
E-83. In the commander’s visualization of the factors of METT-TC for the
rear area security mission, he focuses on the enemy situation to determine
how to organize and conduct the mission. Tactical intelligence is the key to
defeating enemy operations directed against friendly sustaining operations.
It provides the commander with information on current and possible future
enemy locations, activities, strengths, weaknesses, and plans, which helps
him seize the initiative. The commander should exploit all relevant sources of
information within his AO, including information provided by civilian
agencies and individuals. The IPB process is a vital part of answering the
commander’s intelligence requirements which include—
· Size and capabilities of enemy forces within the commander’s AO.
· Natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.
· Movement corridors throughout the AO for mounted and dismounted
operations.
· Conditions of existing roads, railways, pipelines, and waterways for use
as both military LOCs and civilian commerce.
· Proximity of enemy forces to critical facilities and installations, such as
airfields, power generation plants, petroleum tank farms, and civic
buildings.
E-84. Maneuver. The commander should not employ any organization in a
role or configuration for which it is not principally designed unless such ac-
tion is unavoidable. Rear area commanders employ the defensive potential of
CS and CSS units to counter enemy actions. The defensive potential of each
unit is that portion of a CS or CSS unit that may be used to provide rear area
and base security with minimum degradation to overall mission capability.
The echelon commander does not divert his combat forces to provide rear
area and base security unless required by the factors of METT-TC. The rear
area commander takes maximum advantage of host nation capabilities to
provide response forces and TCFs.
E-85. Site selection is also an important factor in planning rear area and base
security. Combat support and CSS operational requirements do not corre-
spond to security requirements. Supporting units need a good road net, ready
source of labor, storage areas, and other facilities that are available in estab-
lished commercial areas. However, such placement decreases the security
capabilities. The best site, from a security standpoint—given no air threat—is
E-19
FM 3-90
in a cleared area, occupying high ground with sufficient vegetation to conceal

base facilities from observation. The worst site contains complex terrain and
large numbers of noncombatants. The former extremely limits observation
and fields of fire from the base and the latter limits the firepower that can be
employed to defend the base. The most common tendency is to occupy the low
ground through which most roads run, a balance between operational re-
quirements and security requirements. A commander can justify the cost,
time, and manpower needed to relocate a site to more defensible terrain
rather than secure a poor position. The base commander locates his base in a
place that enhances its physical security. The base cluster and echelon rear
area commanders must approve the location.
E-86. Forces engaged in rear area security must be flexible and able to adapt
to rapidly changing tactical situations. Rear area and base security are nor-
mally the domain of small units. The organization of forces for base defense
also differs, depending on how the commander plans to accomplish his mis-
sion. The base commander task-organizes his forces into combined arms ele-
ments to counter the level of enemy capabilities as determined by his intelli-
gence assets. This enables him to find the enemy with the smallest possible
element, maintain contact without risking the destruction of the element in
contact before it can receive outside support, and mass his combat power rap-
idly to destroy the detected enemy.
E-87. All security measures must have an inherent offensive capability. The
echelon TCF, response forces provided by echelon MP and other assets, and
local security measures undertaken by bases and base clusters contain the
rear area commander’s offensive capabilities. The base commander uses the
potential combat power available within CS and CSS units located within his
AO to provide those local security measures. He organizes and trains that
identified potential combat power to conduct limited offensive operations
against confirmed enemy Level I threats that threaten his bases and base
clusters.
E-88. Absent a direct enemy threat, there is a tendency to relax security
measures after completing the base’s fighting and survivability positions.
However, well-established security patterns allow enemy elements to recon-
noiter the base and determine its points of vulnerability with little risk.
E-89. The base commander designates reconnaissance and patrol areas out-
side the base’s perimeter to provide additional security if allowed to do so by
the host nation. The objective is to provide the base additional early warning.
E-90. The factors of METT-TC and unit capabilities determine the specific se-
curity element tasks of subordinate maneuver units. For example, mounted
forces are more suited to secure key points, such as major road junctions,
bridges, tunnels, canal locks, dams, and power plants; while dismounted
forces are well-suited for securing areas containing restricted terrain or large
numbers of civilians.
E-91. The base commander should plan to use only the minimum firepower
required to accomplish the base security mission. While his right to self-
defense is never denied, it may be limited in some manner. For example, un-
limited use of firepower that negatively affects civilians in the secured area
may cause them to embrace the enemy’s cause or withhold support to the
E-20
friendly force. Soldiers must understand this and follow strict ROE when
conducting sustaining operations.
E-92. Because of the decentralized nature of sustaining operations and the
intermingling of military forces and civilians, the commander must address
fratricide prevention when planning for rear area and base security. Fires
that miss their intended targets can affect other forces, routes, and installa-
tions in the secured area. When considering a COA, the commander weighs
the risk of fratricide against losses to enemy fire.
E-93. Fire Support. Artillery and mortars, if available, are the fastest
means of responding to intruders beyond the base perimeter in the absence of
maneuver forces positioned there. The commander desires the designation of
a free-fire area beyond the base perimeter to allow for the optimum employ-
ment of available fire support systems. He positions no-fire or restricted fire
areas over locations occupied by civilians and friendly forces operating out-
side the base, such as patrols and observation posts. These areas are large
enough to provide the necessary degree of standoff protection.
E-94. Air Defense. Air and missile attacks are perhaps the greatest threats
to units in the rear area. Rear area bases normally rely on passive air defense
for protection against enemy air threats. Most rear area bases will not be
supported by SHORAD systems. They will normally be located within the
coverage provide by high- to medium-altitude air defense (HIMAD) systems.
They will not normally control the positioning of HIMAD systems. (Chapter 8
discusses passive and active air defense considerations. Ballistic missile de-
fense is an operational-level task addressed in FM 3-01.12.)
E-95. Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability. The commander directs
the construction and improvement of perimeter barriers. This includes estab-
lishing clear fields of fire and implementing physical security measures, such
as checkpoints on vehicle and pedestrian routes leading into the base, to im-
prove overall base security. Barriers, natural obstacles, and aggressive offen-
sive actions deny enemy access to the area immediately surrounding the
base. If the force keeps the enemy at a distance, he cannot launch damaging
attacks toward the base. The commander continues to direct improvement in
his base defenses, as time and other resource permit, to ensure a stable se-
curity system.
E-96. Force protection considerations against terrorist attack are part of base
defense planning. The base commander assesses the vulnerability of the base
to terrorist attack and other nonbattlefield threats. He must assess the base’s
vulnerability to each identified threat. Risk and vulnerability assessments
are the foundation for priorities of work and resource distribution.
E-97. The base defense plan includes those ADC measures necessary to mini-
mize damage to the base’s critical facilities resulting from fire, natural disas-
ter, or enemy action. The commander dedicates resources to protect areas
that, if destroyed, could cause catastrophic loss or mission failure since force
protection resources are limited. The plan delineates responsibilities for ADC
activities, such as fire fighting, light rescue and labor, and decontamination,
and assigns appropriate priorities for assistance furnished by each unit on
the base.
E-21
FM 3-90
E-98. Combat Service Support. Since base security forces generally oper-
ate in close proximity to the base, the commander tailors the load carried by
his dismounted elements to the immediate requirements of METT-TC. Re-
supply of dismounted elements takes place using ground or air modes.
E-99. Command and Control. Planning for rear area and base security op-
erations, like all planning, requires the rear area commander to have an ac-
curate common operational picture of his AO. This includes the strength and
security potential of available units, terrain and environmental data, and in-
telligence information. The rear area commander uses existing echelon rear
command posts and information systems to provide him and his subordinate
commanders that common operational picture.
E-100. In planning for base security, a simple, flexible defensive plan dis-
seminated to the lowest level of command is normally the best COA. The plan
should include the maximum use of standing operating procedures (SOPs)
and battle drills at the user level. It should incorporate adequate control
measures to ensure the safety of friendly troops and civilians. Such a plan
minimizes the impact of the inevitable miscues that accompany any combat
operation.
E-101. The base commander integrates the base security plans with those of
its base cluster and supporting rear area security forces. He periodically re-
views the base defense plan. Alterations in the units assigned to the base and
changes to their defense capabilities because of mission requirements also re-
quire updating the base defense plan. Frequent alterations of base security
procedures reduce the base’s vulnerability. The continuous monitoring of
plans also allows adjustments based on experience to be incorporated into
those plans.
E-102. The base commander establishes communications with the BCOC (or
the echelon rear command post if the base in not part of a base cluster). He
also establishes communications with the headquarters of the designated
Level II response force.
E-103. Communication problems can occur in information exchanges during
the planning for base security involving multinational forces. The commander
must address any language barriers because units operating in the rear area
normally need to communicate with various host nation governmental agen-
cies and the civilian population. The ability to communicate with these differ-
ent agencies and the local population helps to protect the force.
E-104. The echelon rear area commander maintains simplicity by making the
minimum number of plans necessary. Rear area and base security is a
secondary mission for CS and CSS units. The echelon rear command post,
BCOC, and the BDOC must ensure that rear area and base security is not
neglected in favor of the parent organization’s primary mission. A BDOC
sends out liaison teams to each base in its base cluster, with RAOC assist-
ance, to ensure that each base’s defensive plans are workable, coordinated
with the BCOC, and routinely practiced.
E-22
PREPARING A BASE DEFENSE

E-105. Preparing for base defense begins before base units arrive, if possible.
Normally, combat units provide the initial defense in the base area, as they
are the first forces into an area. An exception may occur when conducting
force projection operations supported by a host nation. In this case, the host
nation’s forces are the first forces into the area. These forces can be conven-
tional military forces or police and internal security forces.
E-106. The rear area commander uses his available resources to initiate an
area reconnaissance to determine the physical characteristics of the area and
the presence or absence of enemy forces. Since rear area and base security is
normally an economy of force measure, it is unlikely that sufficient forces will
be available to secure the echelon’s entire rear area at one time. Therefore,
they concentrate on those areas immediately adjacent to the protected ele-
ment, such as friendly forces. It is essential that base, base cluster, and other
rear area security forces conduct continuous reconnaissance operations. They
may focus their efforts on people, materiel, buildings, or terrain.
E-107. Reconnaissance operations that involve only US forces may not be ef-
fective if language problems prevent communication with the local popula-
tion. In these instances, interpreters—US Army or host nation—should ac-
company forces conducting reconnaissance. When possible, host nation auth-
orities, such as the civil police, should also accompany the reconnaissance
force. Distributing leaflets and handbills before or during an area reconnais-
sance and using loudspeaker teams during the reconnaissance can aid the re-
connaissance effort by informing civilians of what information the US recon-
naissance force is seeking and how they can report that information to US
forces.
E-108. The rear area commander directs units within his AO to establish
bases and base clusters even while this initial area reconnaissance is on-
going. These bases and base clusters provide security to units located within
them and can provide perimeter security around critical locations. Perimeters
vary in shape depending on the factors of METT-TC. The perimeter shape
conforms to the terrain features that offer the best use of observation and
field of fire.
E-109. When the units constituting the base arrive, they immediately start
organizing the defense of the base. Many tasks occur simultaneously, but
some may require priority. The base commander specifies the sequence for
preparing the defense system. (Chapter 9 provides a recommended sequence
in its discussion of the preparation for an area defense.)
E-110. Construction of personnel shelters throughout the billeting, admini-
strative, and maintenance areas provides individual protection against stand-
off attacks. These shelters may vary in construction. Shipping containers,
dugouts, and double-walled plywood shelters with sand or gravel fill, all with
sandbag reinforcement and overhead cover, provide acceptable protection.
These shelters are close to the billets and work areas to permit rapid access.
(To the degree possible, construction will be in consonance with the guidance
provided in FM 3-34.34.)
E-23
FM 3-90
E-111. Units may construct fighting positions or prefabricate and move them
into position for assembly. These bunkers are constructed to withstand a di-
rect hit by a medium antitank missile on the front and sides and a direct hit
by a mortar on the top. Installing chain link fences around these positions
can prematurely detonate shaped-charge warheads.
E-112. Constructing revetments for critical resources provides protection
against mortar or rocket fragmentation. These revetments may be sand-
filled, double-walled construction with either plywood or steel plate sides.
Units within the base provide overhead cover for critical facilities and func-
tions when possible. The base commander’s preventive measures to avoid or
minimize effects of enemy attacks also contribute to his ADC efforts by pro-
viding units, soldiers, facilities, and supplies on the base protection from
major accidents and natural disasters as well.
E-113. The commander uses tactical wire barriers within the perimeter to
limit and canalize penetrations by enemy groups or individuals. These inter-
ior barriers can be as simple as a single roll of concertina wire. Generally, the
commander should place them to prevent a direct approach to vital facilities
within the base. He should make provisions to cover these barriers by auto-
matic weapons. The base should construct inconspicuous barriers and peri-
odically relocate them to prevent counterplanning by the enemy. Further, the
barriers should not be so intensive as to preclude freedom of movement by
the reaction or reserve force. These forces, as well as all soldiers, should be
familiarized with the location of all barriers through daylight and night
drills.
E-114. Base defense training is an essential element of preparing to conduct a
base defense. Base defense requires integrating the BDF and its emergency
augmentation by all units on the base. Because they rarely function together,
the commander can form an efficient fighting entity only through proper
training. The BDF commander carefully coordinates the training of base
units for base defense operations with the support operations of the base. All
individuals receive training to allow them to participate, at least to a limited
degree, in the base’s defense. All units receive training to provide at least
limited local security for the facilities they operate. Conducting rehearsals
that test the base defense plan is an essential part of base defense training.
Some equipment deemed necessary for base defense or for training purposes
may not be available. The BDF commander must use his initiative to over-
come these shortfalls.
E-115. Most of the training required to support base defense operations is
currently a part of individual and unit training programs. Soldiers desig-
nated to take any part in base defense operations will probably require addi-
tional training in the following areas as applicable to their roles in the base
defense effort:
· Ambush techniques and defensive measures against enemy ambushes.
· Use of hearing, sight, and smell as detection means.
· Police-type patrolling and operating roadblocks and checkpoints.
· Limited-visibility operations to include using night vision devises, sen-
sors, and techniques for using sign and countersign procedures.
· Marksmanship, especially night firing.
E-24
· Observation post operations with emphasis on security, sound and

light discipline, and reporting procedures.
· Operation and operator maintenance of base defense equipment, such
as sensors, night observation devices, radios, and computer systems.
· Cross-training on all communications equipment available within the
base and communication techniques.
· Barrier construction and, if authorized, using mines and boobytraps.
· Patrolling.
· Small-unit attacks, such as the employing movement formations,
rushes, and a base of fire.
· Fire control and fire distribution of available weapons.
E-116. The existence of a common operational picture and the commander’s
situational understanding are the keys to knowing how and when a response
force will be needed. Separate bases and base clusters establish continuous
communications with the echelon rear command post to allow timely res-
ponse and information dissemination.
E-117. The commander of the response force has a copy of the base defense
plan so he can effect necessary coordination between the base and the re-
sponse force once the latter is activated for the response mission. This coordi-
nation occurs through the BDOC. The response force commander coordinates
with the base to ensure that he understands the base defense plan, to in-
clude—
· Method of contacting the BDOC or BCOC, including call signs and fre-
quencies.
· Base defense plans and layouts to include—
§ Positions of critical internal assets, external coordination points, and
no-fire areas.
§ Locations of any obstacles or mines near the base.
§ Locations and direction of fire of crew-served weapons.
§ Locations of target reference points and preplanned fires.
§ Locations of OPs and friendly patrols if employed by the base.
§ Signal for final protective fires.
· How to obtain available fire support.
E-118. The response force commander designated for each base must have
the capability to mass the effect of supporting fires and support TCF opera-
tions. He must know which fire support targets are approved for engagement
and the locations of the nearest medical treatment facility, NBC decontami-
nation site, and ammunition supply point. He must be able to communicate
with—
· Any supporting artillery and Army aviation units tasked to respond.
· The TCF, BDOC, BCOC, and the echelon rear command post.
EXECUTING A BASE DEFENSE

E-119. The preferred way to conduct a base defense is as an offensive opera-
tion designed to clear the area of enemy forces. Detecting and destroying sig-
nificant enemy forces are responsibilities of the echelon rear area
E-25
FM 3-90
commander. However, the individual conducting rear area security may be

forced to adopt a primarily defensive posture because of—
· The size of the rear area.
· A lack of resources.
· Inability to detect and track the enemy.
· Enemy capabilities in relation to the friendly force capabilities.
E-120. Forces engaged solely in base defense operations conduct aggressive
patrols, develop and occupy defensive positions within their assigned AOs,
and provide security forces to counter enemy attacks. These actions may be
multiservice or multinational depending on the composition of the base.
E-121. Rear area commanders at all echelons request ground maneuver
forces to use as BDFs when the net effect of enemy activities in the echelon’s
rear area is beyond the limited defensive capabilities of CS or CSS resources.
If a threat exceeds a base’s ability to defend itself, the base commander re-
quests response force support through his BCOC or the echelon rear com-
mand post if he commands a separate base.
E-122. The conduct of base defensive operations against a ground attack is
the same as for conducting a perimeter defense. (Chapter 8 discusses the
perimeter defense.) The paragraphs below discuss those execution considera-
tions unique to base defense.
Patrols
E-123. Base defense operations to counter small enemy forces include ag-
gressive, frequent patrolling by squad- and platoon-size forces to detect and
capture or destroy small enemy bands. Host nation personnel are well suited
to assist BDF patrols. Their knowledge of the terrain, inherent ability to op-
erate effectively in the environment, language skills, and familiarity with
local customs increases the effectiveness of these patrols.
E-124. Small, highly mobile units conduct patrols by moving on foot or by
land, water, or air vehicles during daylight and darkness. They search popu-
lated areas contiguous to the base and establish surprise checkpoints along
known or suspected routes used by enemy forces.
E-125. The BDF mans dug-in or concealed night ambush sites located outside
of the base’s external barrier system on a random basis. Host nation security
personnel should accompany patrols traveling through populated areas. The
base develops fire support targets to support the ambush in accordance with
their availability and the ROE. If the area adjacent to the base perimeter is a
free fire area, it is seldom necessary to occupy ambush sites there. When local
restrictions preclude establishing a free-fire area, ambush sites are manned
forward of the perimeter and the BDF is prepared to assist those elements
conducting the ambush as necessary.
E-126. Patrols can install sensors in locations enemy forces threatening the
base would cross to provide early warning of enemy movements. Such patrols
also observe and report enemy activities, such as assembling personnel; mov-
ing weapons, amunition, or other supplies; and preparing firing positions for
indirect-fire weapons. In addition to the acquisition of specific targets, patrols
E-26
may confirm or deny the presence of enemy activity in named areas of in-
terest located near to base.
E-127. The base uses any available small boats to patrol nearby rivers and
coasts. An infiltrating enemy takes advantage of waterways to transport
heavy weapons because of their weight and bulk. Detecting these weapon sys-
tems is an important river and coastal surveillance mission for the BDF com-
mander. The Army has type-classified small watercraft suitable for use in
this type of patrol, as does the Navy and Coast Guard.
E-128. Military working dogs are a valuable asset in base defense operations.
Their employment should habitually be considered in planning all patrol and
security operations. Successfully using these dogs depends on the skill of the
handler and the knowledge and full understanding of the capabilities and
limitations of the dogs by employing commanders and staffs. (Army Regula-
tion 190-12 provides this information.)
E-129. During base security operations, the base commander monitors the lo-
cation of friendly troops and their relationship to friendly fires. The base com-
mander must be constantly aware of the relative location of enemy, friendly,
and neutral personnel. Subordinate elements, such as patrols, must under-
stand the importance of accurately reporting their positions. Automation and
navigation aids, such as the global positioning system (GPS) tied to combat
net radios, assist in maintaining a common operational picture. When em-
ploying artillery, mortars, and air support, the commander must exercise pos-
itive control, whereby an observer must be able to see the target area. Unit
SOP at all levels must address specific procedures for clearing indirect fires
directed against identified targets located within the rear area.
Static Positions
E-130. The static positions of the base defense consist primarily of the bunk-
ers and towers forming the base’s defensive positions. Positioning bunkers
and towers correctly affords maximum observation and mutually supporting
fires over the area forward of the perimeter to include the perimeter barrier
and sensor system.
E-131. The base commander establishes communications between the BDOC,
the command posts of the units occupying the base, and the base’s bunkers,
towers, and reserve. In addition, each node be able to communicate laterally
with adjacent units and defensive positions.
E-132. Bunkers. Although full-time observation and all-around defense of
the base are essential, the BDF commander may reduce the number of sol-
diers conducting static defense mission by designating key bunkers around
the perimeter to be manned at all times, with the remainder to be fully man-
ned during periods of reduced visibility and increased enemy threat. The base
prepares individual fighting positions near the bunkers to provide supporting
fires. Night vision devices, binoculars, automatic weapons, grenade launch-
ers, and hand grenades are commonly available within the bunker positions,
and antitank systems cover possible ground vehicle approaches.
E-133. Towers. Towers provide increased visibility, which may be desired in
specific situations. Elevated platforms enhance the capability of detecting
E-27
FM 3-90
perimeter infiltration when coupled with night vision devices, binoculars, and
spotter scopes. They may enhance the base’s ability to determine the firing
positions of enemy indirect weapon systems. Towers can be constructed ac-
cording to standard military design using standard construction materiels or
constructed from local materiels. Multistory buildings, such as grain silos,
can also serve as towers. Installating sandbags or steel plating around the ob-
servation platform provides protection against automatic weapons and small-
arms fire. Constructing a ground-level bunker near the base of the tower pro-
vides additional protection when the enemy directs fires against the tower.
Access to the bunker from the tower may be by means of a fireman’s pole or a
ladder. Towers should incorporate the following safety measures—
· Lightning arresters.
· Built to withstand strong winds and to support two observers and their
equipment.
· Enclosed mounting ladder.
· Provision of safety nets around tall towers.
· Painted an appropriate color to reduce reflection from moonlight.
· Installation of a suitable roof to shield observers from the elements
without interference to observation. (A double-roof design can cause
some types of mortar rounds to detonate at a height that affords some
protection to the observers positioned in the tower.)
The base commander’s decision to use towers is a result of his analysis of the
factors of METT-TC. For example, he must decide if the additional security
they provide is worth the effort to construct them in a fluid situation or the
risk that they will attract additional enemy attention to the base.
Reaction Operations
E-134. Reaction operations are operations conducted by the BDF, operating
from the base or from positions outside the base, for the purpose of counter-
ing local enemy activities. They are offensive in nature and conducted as
either spoiling attacks or counterattacks.
E-135. The commander uses his BDF to destroy any small enemy units de-
tected in the vicinity of the base. The base requests assistance if its forces
cannot destroy or contain the enemy force in its current location. Elements of
the BDF do not pursue a retrograding enemy outside of supporting distance
from the base, because it could be part of a diversion designed to weaken the
base’s defensive capabilities. Pursuit of such fleeing enemy forces is turned
over to rear area response forces instead.
E-136. Reaction operations are simple, planned, and rehearsed because the
majority of actions are required at night. Designating primary and alternate
checkpoints within the base facilitates response to multiple contingencies.
Within security limitations, the force uses actual checkpoints during rehears-
als to promote familiarity with the area and the reaction plan.
Response Force Operations

E-137. Response force operations are offensive operations conducted by the
response force to countering Level II attacks. The response force moves
quickly to counter the enemy before he can extensively damage the base. The
E-28
base commander lifts or shifts base defense fires to support the maneuver of
the response force. The response force attempts to delay and disrupt the
threat until a TCF arrives if it cannot destroy or deter the enemy. The base
commander notifies his BCOC if the base defense and the response forces
engage an enemy they cannot defeat. They maintain contact with the enemy
force until the TCF arrives. The TCF commander has operational control
(OPCON) of all base and response forces within his designated AO on com-
mitment of the TCF.
Host Nation and Third Country Forces

E-138. The BDF commander integrates available host nation and third coun-
try forces in the overall base defense effort. Particular emphasis is placed on
integrating host country forces in patrol and population control activities.
Both host nation and third country forces provide local security for their own
units. However, to ensure maximum benefit, all such local plans should be co-
ordinated with and integrated in the base defense plan. The actual degree of
host nation and third country force participation in base defense depends on
the orders and guidance of their respective governments and the personal
relationship their commanders have with the base commander.
Defense Against an Enemy Conducting an Attack-by-Fire

E-139. An enemy may conduct an attack by fire against a base when he
knows that he is unable to penetrate the base perimeter. He wants to place a
large volume of fire on the base to inflict casualties and destroy resources.
Such an attack is normally of short duration, from 10 to 20 minutes. He may
also direct harassing fires toward the base to accomplish the same purpose.
The weapon systems delivering these attacks normally displace after com-
pleting their mission to prevent their destruction by friendly maneuver, and
direct fires, and counterfires.
E-140. The base develops an aggressive reconnaissance and surveillance plan
to detect the infiltration of enemy mortars, artillery, rockets, and antitank
systems and to locate firing positions. The BDF commander considers likely
firing positions and routes to them, intelligence reports, and available re-
sources when formulating this plan. He plans offensive opertions to locate
and destroy the enemy force prior to, during, and after such attacks and pas-
sive defensive actions to reduce friendly casualties and damage associated
with them.
E-141. Primary active measures employed against these types of attack are
airborne observers, establishing a critical friendly zone (CFZ) over the base,
and using reaction forces. An unmanned aerial vehicle or attack helicopter
may provide the airborne observer. The airborne observer orbits the base
area, checking likely or suspected positions and noticeable changes in the ter-
rain. The base acts against an enemy weapon system on its discovery by em-
ploying friendly fire support systems or maneuver forces against it. A CFZ
over the base allows friendly counterfires against the enemy weapon system
as soon as it attacks the base. In the absence of radar coverage, the base may
use visual observation of the muzzle blast from two or more points to provide
an intersection. This requires these observation posts to have properly
oriented azimuth boards so the direction of sightings can be rapidly
E-29
FM 3-90
determined and reported to the BDOC. Using a reaction force deployed by

helicopter or tactical vehicle to engage and destroy the enemy weapon system
is a primary consideration. The reaction force must be careful to prevent es-
tablishing a pattern, such as always using the same route or landing zone. If
the enemy is aware of the pattern, he can set up an ambush to destroy the
reaction force.
Sniper Teams
E-142. Sniper teams are useful when forces come under harassing small-arms
fire by a small enemy element firing from, among, or near areas where civil-
ians or cultural monuments protect it from the return fires of more non-
discriminating weapons. These teams allow the BDF commander to fix the
enemy and move other BDF elements into positions where they can engage
the enemy without endangering civilian lives or causing excessive collateral
damage. The commander can employ smoke and, if authorized, riot-control
agents to aid in this maneuver. If the force cannot engage the enemy without
endangering civilian life or property, the BDF commander can try to
disengage his forces and move them to positions that block the enemy’s
escape routes. However, the base commander must use all available means to
protect his forces, even when it may place civilians at risk.
E-143. These teams may be provided from infantry units. Alternatively, this
capability may be provided by giving special training to selected BDF soldiers
to maximized the capabilities of their assigned individual weapons or special-
ized equipment provided to them.
Passive Defensive Measures

E-144. Passive defense measures are always practiced within the confines of
the base. In addition, the commander employs CA and PSYOP programs to
ensure the cooperation of the local civilian population. The BDOC evaluates
all patrol, guard, and intelligence reports indicating an attack. Preparation of
firing or assault positions, movement of weapons or ammunition, unusual
actions or movement of the civilian population, and reports by host nation
personnel may be indications of an attack.
Area Damage Control

E-145. When an attack occurs, the objective is to resume operations, in-
cluding the maintaining or restoring of control, evacuating casualties, isolat-
ing danger areas, and reducing personnel and materiel losses. The base com-
mander conducts an immediate survey of the damage and reports his assess-
ment to the BCOC. Simultaneously, he initiates actions to isolate the danger
areas and prevent extension or continuation of the damage, such as fighting
fires and minimizing flooding.
E-146. Casualties receive self-, buddy-, and first aid care. If possible, medical
personnel and vehicles evacuate casualties. However, timely transportation
of casualties is important. The situation may require using nonmedical vehi-
cles for mass casualties. If possible, medical personnel accompany those pa-
tients being transported in nonmedical vehicles to provide en route patient
care.
E-30
E-147. The base establishes traffic control using MP or other elements to en-
sure fire-fighting equipment gains access to the area and ambulances and
evacuation vehicles clear the area. The BDOC notifies the BCOC of blocked
routes and necessary traffic diversions. The element conducting traffic con-
trol can also temporarily provide for controlling displaced civilians and strag-
glers and provide a degree of local security for the damaged area.
E-148. The BDOC coordinates with the BCOC and echelon rear command
post for engineer support to restore critical facilities and any specialized fire
fighting capabilities required. Engineer support is normally needed to clear
debris and rubble to support the base damage control mission and extinguish
extensive fires. The BDOC also coordinates for any necessary explosive ord-
nance disposal (EOD) and decontamination support.
E-149. The base commander takes precautions by maintaining local security
and interior guard posts when receiving ADC support from host nation re-
sources to ensure the security of the base. He cannot afford confusion sur-
rounding the base’s damage control efforts to provide an opportunity for sabo-
teurs and other hostile personnel to penetrate the base perimeter.
ROUTE SECURITY
E-150. Route security operations are a specialized kind of area secur-
ity operations conducted to protect lines of communication and
friendly forces moving along them. Enemy attempts to interdict LOCs
may have little immediate impact on ongoing decisive and shaping operations
because of unit basic loads and previously positioned caches. However, the se-
curity of those routes over which the echelon’s sustaining operations flow is
critical to sustained land operations, regardless of whether the commander is
attempting to exploit success or recoup from failure.
E-151. The security of routes and LOCs, whether rail, pipeline, highway, or
waterway, presents one of the greatest security problems in an echelon’s rear
area. Route security operations are defensive in nature and are terrain-
oriented. A route security force prevents an enemy force from impeding,
harassing, or destroying traffic along the route or portions of the route itself.
Having a base permits the concentration of security resources. LOC security
requires dedicated resources at almost infinite points or reaction forces to
counter possible enemy action. Units performing missions that require the
habitual use of LOCs, such as MP, transportation, supply, and service units,
can perform route security operations in conjunction with their primary ac-
tivities. The echelon rear area commander can employ the following tech-
niques to provide route security:
· Passive security.
· Route reconnaissance.
· Cordon security.
· Combat security.
While the scope of these operations depends on the factors of METT-TC, route
security operations tend to require significant resources. A combination of
passive and route reconnaissance is commonly used over secured routes such
as a LOC.
E-31
FM 3-90
PASSIVE SECURITY
E-152. The passive security technique for provide route security includes
measures initiated to achieve security without a significant expenditure of
manpower or resources. It includes—
· Camouflage
· Formation and march control of convoys so they present the least
lucrative target possible under prevailing conditions.
· Proper selection of routes.
· Capitalizing on security offered by other activities not related to the
route’s security requirements. These activities include aircraft travers-
ing the route, maintenance activities taking place along the route,
training exercises or troop movements adjacent to or along the route,
military and host nation police traffic control activities, and the activi-
ties of the civilian population.
· Defensive information operations.
E-153. The commander uses passive security for all conditions or situations
and as an adjunct to any other technique of route security employed. They
are the products of a long-term and continually improved program for an
integrated security system.
ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE
E-154. Route reconnaissance addresses not only the route itself, but also all
terrain along the route from which the enemy could influence a friendly
force’s movement. Route reconnaissance takes place at irregular intervals to
avoid developing a regular pattern that an enemy could exploit. (Chapter 13
discusses route reconnaissance.)
CORDON SECURITY
E-155. It is normally not feasible to secure all points on a route by physically
allocating resources to each point. Cordon security is the security pro-
vided between two combat outposts positioned to provide mutual
support. A commander can assign air assault, mechanized, or motorized
units to combat outposts established at critical locations along the route. He
locates these combat outposts within supporting distance of each other when-
ever possible. Units assigned to these combat outposts provide response
forces in the event of enemy activity along the route within their assigned
AO. Forces based at these combat outposts conduct reconnaissance patrols
and offensive operations to counter enemy activities between these two points
on a frequent but irregular schedule. Cordon security requires considerable
manpower and other resources. The commander uses it only when a clear and
evident requirement exists.
E-156. Normally, each combat outpost contains at least a platoon-size ele-
ment equipped with automatic weapons, communications, and sensors and
supported by those fire support assets available to the rear area commander.
(Chapter 12 contains additional information on the combat outpost.) The out-
post commander rotates his soldiers between duty at the combat outpost and
duty on patrol. The higher commander contacts each of his deployed combat
outposts frequently to check its status.
E-32
E-157. The establishment of cordon security will do little to eliminate the rear
area threats that require its adoption. A commander directing the establish-
ment of cordon security should also direct a series of parallel corrective
actions, to include—
· Searching for a new route.
· Vigorous search and attack operations to destroy the enemy within the
echelon rear area.
· Rigorously enforcing circulation control measures in coordination with
the host nation over the civilian population.
· Removing cover from areas offering concealment to an enemy.
· Constructing new routes to bypass dangerous areas.
· Repositioning supply activities to permit better route selection.
· Mass evacuation of the civilian population from towns and villages
along the route. (This is an extreme measure and requires consultation
with host nation authorities and adherence to the laws of land wa-
rfare.)
E-158. The commander must recognize the loss of complete control over any
given route early. The continued investment of resources into a “lost route”
merely serves the enemy. Those resources and energy should be diverted to
security measures elsewhere whenever feasible.
COMBAT SECURITY
E-159. The combat security technique for providing route security includes all
measures taken by combat arms units to seize and secure the terrain neces-
sary to permit use of the route in question. Units conduct combat security
along a route to prevent enemy ground forces from moving into direct fire
range of the protected route. The route and its adjoining terrain compose the
AO. A route security force operates on and to the flanks of a designated route.
E-160. Combat security is the most costly technique for providing route secur-
ity and draws on the strength of the maneuver force. For example, because of
the distances involved, a commander usually assigns at least one battalion-
size unit, if not more, to secure one route through a division-size AO. The ma-
neuver force establishes a perimeter around the route or cordons sections of it
to search suspected enemy locations while establishing roadblocks and check-
points along the main route and lateral routes to stop and search vehicles
and people as they enter or leave the route. Special considerations include
coordinating with segments manned by rear area security forces and the ech-
elon rear command posts integrating the maneuver force’s operations with
other rear area and base defense activities, and clarifying of C2 arrange-
ments.
CONVOY SECURITY
E-161. Convoy security operations are specialized area security oper-
ations conducted to protect convoys. Units conduct convoy security op-
erations anytime there are not enough friendly forces to continuously secure
LOCs in an AO and there is a significant danger of enemy ground action di-
rected against the convoy. The commander may also conduct them in conjunc-
tion with route security operations. A convoy security force operates to the
E-33
FM 3-90
front, flanks, and rear of a convoy element moving along a designated route.
Convoy security operations are offensive in nature and orient on the force
being protected. (Chapter 14 discusses convoy movement operations; this sec-
tion only addresses convoy security concerns.)
E-162. To protect a convoy, the convoy escort element must accomplish the
following critical tasks:
· Reconnoiter the convoy route.
· Clear the route of obstacles or positions from which the enemy could
affect movement along the route.
· Provide early warning of enemy presence along the route.
· Prevent the enemy from attacking the convoy.
ORGANIZATION OF A CONVOY ESCORT

E-163. The size of the escort needed to conduct convoy security operations is
METT-TC dependent. However, as a general rule, an average-size convoy of
50 vehicles normally requires at least a maneuver company, an MP company,
or air defense artillery battery equipped with self-propelled cannons to con-
duct the mission. Without such an escort, the transportation unit will have to
provide security using its organic assets. This results in the reduction of
cargo-hauling capabilities of each transportation unit to the degree that it
must convert cargo vehicles into ad hoc gun trucks and leave other trucks in
a motor pool because of their drivers being diverted to provide the necessary
degree of security.
E-164. Cavalry, tank, mechanized infantry units, and MP elements equipped
with tracked or wheeled armored vehicles are well suited to protect a convoy
because of their organic reconnaissance capabilities and combat power. The
commander may reinforce the convoy security force with engineers, dedicated
air defense, and other assets as required. Usually the convoy’s trail party also
provides CSS support to the convoy escort, such as vehicle recovery and medi-
cal evacuation. If the convoy’s trail element cannot provide that support, then
the convoy escort provides its own CSS support. Other METT-TC considera-
tions, such as restrictive terrain and limited time, dictate how to use aviation
assets as part of the coordinated effort.
E-165. The convoy security force organizes into several elements to accom-
plish its tasks. (See Figure E-6.) The advance guard performs a route recon-
naissance forward of the convoy. The security element provides early warning
and security to the convoy’s flanks and rear. This element can also perform
the duties of the escort element. The escort element provides close-in protec-
tion to the convoy. It may also provide an immediate response force to assist
in repelling or destroying enemy forces if they engage the convoy. The rear
guard prevents an enemy from overrunning the convoy from the rear. It can
also act as an immediate response force to enemy contact made on either
flank of the convoy. Finally, a reaction force is available to respond to emer-
gencies. Since the reaction force is a committed force, and not a reserve, it is
task organized to include available fire support assets and other combat mul-
tipliers. It provides firepower and support to all convoy elements to help de-
velop the situation, conduct a hasty attack, or prevent the convoy’s destruc-
tion. The headquarters directing the convoy, rather than the convoy
commander, controls the reaction force. It monitors the progress of the convoy
E-34
and responds if the convoy encounters an enemy unit the escort element
cannot defeat or repel. It must be able to respond within 15 minutes. The
reaction force always anticipates an ambush when moving to the relief of a
convoy under enemy attack.
E-166. When a lack of resources prevents establishing all five elements, the
commander normally first resources his forward reconnaissance or advance
guard. He then resources his escort, flank screening, and rear guard elements
in that order. It is the responsibility of the headquarters directing the convoy
to designate the response element.
E-167. If available, air cavalry assets can participate in the convoy security
operation by screening the convoy’s movement as it moves along the route of
march. Alternatively, they can assist in clearing the route ahead of the con-
voy as it moves along the route of march, or clearing the route in conjunction
with the route reconnaissance element. Air cavalry can also assist by control-
ling indirect-fire support and coordinating with forward air controllers from
other services for close air support. The supporting air cavalry unit must
know the maneuver intentions of the ground element if contact with the ene-
my occurs. If heavy forces are not available for use as a convoy escort, the
commander can use light infantry to augment the self-defense capabilities of
transportation units.
FWD RECON/GUARD
S ELEMENTS
EN
RE
SC
ESCORT
K
S
ELEMENTS
AN
FL
SCREEN
ELEMENTS
S
N
EE
R
SC
REACTION FORCE
S K
N
A
FL
G
REAR G
GUARD
Figure E-6. Convoy Security Organization
CONVOY CONTROL MEASURES

E-168. As shown in Figure E-7 on page E-36, convoy security control meas-
ures typically include the following:
· Routes (primary and alternate).
· Start point.
· Release point.
E-35
FM 3-90
· Checkpoints.
· Phase lines.
· Observation posts.
· Target reference points.
· Areas of operation for various units that affect the convoy.
· Staging or marshaling areas.
· Known obstacles and lanes.
E-169. Although convoy size, passage time, and march speed are not graphic
control measures, they determine how long it takes to execute the convoy se-
curity mission. Rules of engagement are also not a graphic control measure,
but they greatly influence how a commander conducts convoy security opera-
tions.
III
E
2 4 7A S G 917C S G
(-)
+
A B 0171
TC P 2
S T A G IN G
CSA
AREA
DUKE
M S R W A G G A W A G G A (P R IM A R Y )
RP 7
SP 3
5 to n 57
MS PL OTTAWA
R S
H R IN
E
PA
RK
(A L
T)
Figure E-7. Convoy Control Measures
PLANNING CONVOY OPERATIONS

E-170. Because of the inherent dangers of convoy operations, the commander
emphasizes security measures during the planning process. The best defense
is to avoid being ambushed. These security measures include—
· Secrecy when planning and disseminating orders.
· Strict noise and light discipline during movement.
· Varying routes and schedules.
· Avoiding routes with known danger areas.
· Conducting route reconnaissance using aerial and ground systems.
· Using current intelligence information concerning the condition of the
route and any enemy or other forces that may impact on the convoy’s
use of that route.
· Coordinating with supporting air liaison officers to ensure the schedul-
ing of close air support to assist the movement if the convoy warrants
committing these assets.
E-36
· Fire support elements to provide close and continuous fire support for
the movement.
· Training in immediate actions drills, including actions at danger areas
and in case of a near ambush, a far ambush, booby traps, encounters
with enemy tactical combat vehicles, sniper contact, aerial attack, and
indirect fire.
· Communications and coordination with supporting units and other
units along the route, adjacent host nation forces, and higher head-
quarters, including airborne radio relay.
· Various locations for leaders, communications, medical support, and
weapon systems within the movement formation.
· Questions asked of local civilians along the movement route for intelli-
gence information, including possible enemy ambush sites.
E-171. The convoy commander must consider the unique requirements of con-
voy security when formulating his plan. He briefs his subordinates on the
latest information regarding the enemy situation and the area through which
the convoy will pass. He formulates his plan and issues his order, which in-
cludes the movement formation, intervals between echelons and vehicles,
rate of travel, and a detailed plan of action if the convoy encounters an enemy
force. Since there is seldom time to issue complicated orders during an am-
bush, subordinate commanders must plan the actions of the escort element
and reaction force in the event of an ambush. Units should rehearse these
actions before movement and execute them as drills if enemy contact takes
place.
E-172. Communications are vital to the success of convoy movements. The
convoy commander must plan for radio communication and ensure the avail-
ability and compatibility of communication means between convoy elements
and indirect-fire support and air cavalry assets, as well as with units and
host nation agencies in areas along the movement route. The convoy com-
mander prearranges visual and sound signals, such as colored smoke, identi-
fication panels, whistles, or horns. Many of these signals can be SOP items.
He must ensure that all convoy members understand these signals and re-
hearse the actions required by each. This is necessary because of the limited
number of radios and other communications equipment in tactical vehicles.
E-173. The commander’s fire support plan covers the entire convoy route,
paying special attention to known danger areas and potential choke points.
Convoy security elements may have mortars organic to the escort element or
indirect fires provided by fire support elements positioned to range all or por-
tions of the route. Coordinating with fire direction centers before the convoy’s
departure enables fire support teams in the convoy security element to enter
the appropriate fire control nets, calling for and adjusting fires as necessary.
E-174. The convoy security commander must carefully plan for the appropri-
ate CSS to support the operation. He should include fuel, maintenance, and
recovery elements in the convoy or pre-position them in secure areas along
the route. He also plans for casualty evacuation support that covers the en-
tire route.
E-37
FM 3-90
E-175. Convoy security operations in an urban environment or built-up area

require different emphasis and techniques than those in rural areas. The
population density and characteristics of the area may require using non-
lethal weapons and carefully employing lethal weapons. When applying
minimum-essential force to minimize loss of life and destruction of property,
subordinate commanders must conduct detailed planning, coordination, and
control. Whenever possible, convoys should move through populated areas
when they are the least congested and, therefore, less dangerous to the secur-
ity of the convoy. Convoy operations may require assistance from military or
local police and other governmental agencies to secure the route before the
convoy enters a built-up area.
PREPARING CONVOY SECURITY OPERATIONS

E-176. The convoy commander must rehearse maintaining march intervals
and actions on contact for a variety of scenarios, including air attack, artillery
or indirect fire, snipers, and ambush. Since the purpose of a convoy is to
reach its destination—not to destroy the enemy in a movement to contact—
the goal of these responses should be to free the convoy from enemy contact
so it can continue its mission. All soldiers and vehicles traveling in the convoy
should undergo precombat inspections to ensure they know and adhere to
unit SOP, and that vehicles have a reasonable expectation of completing the
convoy without mechanical failure. During this stage, drivers act to harden
their vehicles, such as adding sandbags and Kevlar blankets and cover loads
to prevent an enemy from identifying the cargo. The convoy commander
spaces prime targets throughout the convoy and cross-loads his trucks as
much as feasible to avoid losing all of one type of supply, such as all artillery
fuzes, if a single vehicle is destroyed.
E-177. If possible, the convoy commander and his key subordinates perform a
route reconnaissance. Shortly before the convoy’s departure, MPs or scouts
should perform another route reconnaissance to determine current condi-
tions. This last route reconnaissance should also remove or neutralize indi-
vidual mines emplaced by the enemy that endanger the convoy.
EXECUTING CONVOY SECURITY OPERATIONS

E-178. Unless the security force encounters the enemy during the convoy, the
convoy conducts operations as discussed in Chapter 14. If the forward recon-
naissance element, advance guard, or flank screen first encounters the ene-
my, it performs those actions on contact discussed in Chapter 4. (Chapter 8
discusses the active and passive air defense measures a convoy can take.)
Artillery or Indirect Fire

E-179. An enemy may use his fire support systems in an attempt to destroy
convoys or to harass and interdict the movement of supplies and personnel.
Artillery fires are either preplanned fires or fires called in and adjusted on a
target of opportunity by a forward observer. The adjusted fires present the
most complex problem, as the enemy can adjust the effects of his artillery
fires to follow the actions of the convoy. The two active measures that a con-
voy can take against enemy artillery fires are using direct or indirect fires
against the enemy forward observer, if his location can be identified and
E-38
calling for counterfire if the direction and approximate distance to the enemy
artillery system can be estimated.
E-180. The convoy commander has three passive options when the convoy
comes under enemy artillery fire: halt in place, continue to march, or disperse
quickly to concealed positions. Regardless of the option selected, the unit SOP
should cover the action taken and the signal directing the action. The pri-
mary consideration is the immediate departure from the impact area. The
convoy only halts when the artillery concentration is ahead of the convoy. The
convoy commander looks for an alternate route around the impact area and
the convoy should remain prepared to move out quickly. The mission or the
terrain may require the convoy to continue through the beaten area. In this
case, the convoy increases its speed of movement and spreads out to the
maximum extent allowed by the terrain.
Sniper Fire
E-181. The convoy commander takes caution when receiving sniper fire to en-
sure that any return fire does not harm friendly troops or civilians in the
area. The best reactive measures against sniper attack by a convoy are pas-
sive. Ensure all soldiers wear helmets and available body armor. Vehicles
move through the area without stopping. Convoy escort personnel act as nec-
essary to locate, suppress, and kill snipers in accordance with the ROE.
Ambush
E-182. The very nature of an ambush—a surprise attack from a concealed po-
sition—places an ambushed convoy at a disadvantage. No single defensive
measure, or combination of measures, prevents or effectively counters all am-
bushes. The training of the convoy elements directly relates to the effective-
ness of counterambush measures. Immediate reaction and aggressive leader-
ship are essential to limit casualties and damage to vehicles, cargo, and per-
sonnel. Small enemy forces are seldom able to contain an entire convoy in a
single kill zone. This is due to the extensive road space occupied by even
platoon-size convoys and because of the presence of security elements es-
corting the convoy. More often, an enemy is able to ambush only a part of a
convoy—either the head, trail, or a section of the main body. Fire in the kill
zone may be from only one side of the road, with a small holding force on the
opposite side. An enemy frequently places mines and booby traps on the hold-
ing force side to contain the convoy in the kill zone. The part of the convoy
that is in the kill zone and receiving fire must exit as quickly as possible if
the road ahead is open. The security escort takes care in assaulting the main
ambush forces because an enemy will commonly use mines and booby traps
to protect his flanks.
E-183. The convoy leaves disable vehicles behind or, if they are blocking the
road, pushes them out of the way with following vehicles. Combat vehicles
providing escort to the convoy must not block convoy vehicles by halting in
the traveled portion of the road to return fire. If the main body splits into two
or more elements because of the ambush, those elements forward of the am-
bush site move to a secure location. Vehicles that have not entered the kill
zone must not attempt to do so. They should stop, their personnel should dis-
mount, take up a good defensive position, and await instructions. Since escort
E-39
FM 3-90
vehicles may have left the road to attempt to overrun a hostile position, ele-
ments of the convoy should not fire on suspected enemy positions without
coordinating with the escort forces.
E-184. Other actions that the convoy commander can take to neutralize the
ambushing enemy force include—
· Calling for artillery fire on enemy positions.
· Calling for attack helicopters to engage the enemy positions.
· Directing the crew-served weapons mounted on convoy vehicles and the
individual weapons of nondriving personnel to suppress the ambush
force while the rest of the convoy’s vehicles move out of the kill zone.
· Calling for the reaction force.
E-185. A convoy with a limited escort is seldom able to defeat an ambushing
enemy force and should not attempt to do so. When part of the convoy is iso-
lated in the kill zone, vehicles that have not entered the ambush area must
not attempt to do so. They should stop in a herring bone formation; personnel
should dismount, take good defensive positions, and await instruction until
supporting forces clear the ambush area. Normally, the transportation unit
conducting the convoy will not maneuver to attack the enemy ambush force
unless it is necessary for self-preservation. It relies on its escort force, fire
support, and reaction forces.
E-186. Convoy personnel will dismount, take cover, and return fire on enemy
positions when an element of a convoy halts in the kill zone and is unable to
proceed because of disabled vehicles, damaged bridges, or other obstacles,
Personnel dismount their vehicles away from the direction of enemy fire.
Escorting security forces that have passed through the kill zone or have not
yet entered the kill zone maneuver to destroy the ambushing element. The
convoy commander calls for the reaction force as soon as the ambush occurs.
E-187. The convoy clears the route and movement resumes as soon as pos-
sible after the ambushing enemy force is defeated or withdraws. Wounded
soldiers are evacuated using the fastest possible mode. When the convoy
cannot tow disabled vehicles, it should distribute their cargo among other
vehicles if time permits. The convoy destroys vehicles and cargo on order of
the convoy commander if it is not feasible to evacuate them. The convoy re-
covers combat net radios and other critical items before it destroys the vehi-
cles. These items should not fall into enemy hands.
E-40
Source Notes
These are the sources quoted or used as sources for historical examples in
this publication. They are listed by page number. Boldface indicates the
titles of historical vignettes.
1-1 “War is, above all things, an art…”: Francis V. Greene, “The Important Improvements in the Art of
War During the Past Twenty Years and Their Probable Effect on Future Military Operations,”
Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States 4, no. 13 (1883): 41.
1-5 The Human Dimension—Combat at Han-sur-Nied: Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign,
volume 5, United States Army in World War II—The European Theater of Operations
(Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, United States Army, 1950), 358–361. The action took place
on 11 November 1944. The American units were from Combat Command A, 6th Armored Division.
They were opposed by elements of the German 48th and 17th SS Panzer Genadier Divisions.
1-6 Cowpens, 17 January 1781: John Moncure, The Cowpens Staff Ride and Battlefield Tour (Fort
Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College,
1996.
2-1 “In war, obscurity…”: The Infantry Journal, Infantry in Battle, 2d edition (Washington, D.C.:
Infantry Journal, 1939; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Command and General Staff
College, 1981), 16.
3-0 “To move swiftly,…”: Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson, cited in Dictionary of Military and Naval
Quotations, compiled by Robert Debs Heinl (Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1966 [hereafter
cited as Heinl]), 131.
3-1 The 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), 24–28 February 1991: Command Report, 101st
Airborne Division (Air Assault) for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 2 August 1990
through 1 May 1991 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combined Arms Research Library Archives, 1991),
17–26, 46–60; see also Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army, 1993; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.:
US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1994); Richard M. Swain, “Lucky War”:
Third Army in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Command and General Staff
College Press, 1994).
4-1 “When armies approach each other…”: Winston Churchill, (1949), cited in Heinl, 186.
4-2 The Soviet Manchuria Campaign, August 1945: David M. Glantz, August Storm: The Soviet
1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, Leavenworth Papers No. 7; August Storm: Soviet Tactical
and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945, Leavenworth Papers No. 8 (Fort Leavenworth
Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1983).
5-0 “I approve of all methods of attacking…”: Frederick the Great (1747), cited in Heinl, 20.
5-39 The Raid in Mogadishu, 3–4 October 1993: Kent DeLong, Mogadishu!: Heroism and Tragedy
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994); see also Kenneth C. Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995); John L. Hirsch, Somalia and
Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping (Washington, D.C.: United
States Institute of Peace Press, 1995).
6-1 “The most important goal…”: Field Marshal Prince Mikhail I. Kutuzov (1745-1813), cited in
Warriors’ Words: A Quotation Book, compiled by Peter G. Tsouras (London: Arms and Armour
Press, 1992 [hereafter cited as Tsouras]), 134.
7-1 “In pursuit you must…”: Field Marshal Viscount Allenby of Meggido (1917), cited in A Dictionary
of Military Quotations, compiled by Trevor Royle (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 4.
8-1 “So the defensive form…”: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard
and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 357.
Source Notes-1
FM 3-90
8-2 The Battle of Kursk, July 1943. David M. Glantz, “Soviet Defensive Tactics at Kursk,” CSI
Report No. 11 (Fort Leavenworth Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and
General Staff College, 1986).
9-1 “Regardless of the considerations…”: FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations: Operations (Washington,
D.C.: War Department, 22 May 1941; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: US Army Command and
General Staff College Press, 1992 [hereafter cited as FM 100-5 (1941)]), 152 (paragraph 652).
10-1 “A swift and vigorous transition…”: Carl von Clausewitz, cited in Heinl, 83.
10-2 Manstein’s Donbas Operation, February 1943: David M. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr:
Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942–August 1943, Cass Series on Soviet Military
Experience (London: Frank Cass, 1991), 82-150.
11-1 “The withdrawal should be…”: B.H. Liddell Hart (1944), cited in Heinl, 362.
11-2 The Atlanta Campaign, 1864: Albert Castel, Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 151–181, 188.
12-0 “The officers and men who…”: D.H. Hill (1863), cited in Heinl, 317.
12-3 Operation Bagration, 1944. William M. Connor, “Analysis of Deep Attack Operations: Operation
Bagration, Belorussia, 22 June–29 August, 1944” (unpublished paper, Combat Studies Institute,
US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kans., March, 1987).
13-0 “You can never have too much reconnaissance.”: George S. Patton Jr., in War As I Knew It (Boston:
Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1947), 400.
13-4 The Battle of the Sajo River: Simon Goodenough, Tactical Genius in Battle (Oxford, England:
Phaidon Press, Limited, 1979), 123-126.
14-1 “Aptitude for war…”: Napoleon I (1831), cited in Heinl, 198.
15-1 “…the necessity for conservation…”: FM 100-5 (1941), 158 (paragraph 669).
16-0 “The principal task involved…”: FM 100-5 (1941), 130 (paragraph 572).
A-1 “It is not so much…”: Antoine Henri, Baron de Jomini, Precis de l’Art de la Guerre (1838), cited in
Heinl, 58.
B-1 “Doctrine provides a military organization…”: George H. Decker (1960), cited in Heinl, 95.
C-1 “A landing against organized…”: George C. Marshall (1943), cited in Heinl, 11.
D-0 “When the enemy is driven…”: Field Marshal Prince Aleksandr V. Suvorov (1729-1800), cited in
Tsouras, 134.
E-0 “The base commander’s plan…”: FM 31-81 (Test), Base Defense, 17 March 1970, i.
Source Notes-2
Glossary
The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions, and
other selected terms. Where Army and joint definitions are different,
(Army) follows the term. Terms for which FM 3-90 is the proponent
manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent
manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.
A2C2 Army airspace command and control

AA assembly area
AATF air assault task force
AATFC air assault task force commander
ACA airspace coordination area
ACM airspace control measure
ACP air control point
acq acquisition
ACR armored cavalry regiment
*actions on contact a series of combat actions, often conducted simultaneously, taken
on contact with the enemy to develop the situation
active air defense direct defensive action taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness
of hostile air action. It includes such measures as the use of air-
craft, air defense weapons, weapons not used primarily in an air
defense role, and electronic warfare. (FM 3-01.8)
AD armored division
ADA air defense artillery
ADC area damage control
administrative movement a movement in which troops and vehicles are arranged to expe-
dite their movement and conserve time and energy when no
enemy interference, except by air, is anticipated (JP 1-02)
AG adjutant general
AGL above ground level
AH attack helicopter
AI air interdiction
air assault operations those operations in which assault forces (combat, combat support,
and combat service support)—using the firepower, mobility, and
total integration of helicopter assets—maneuver on the battlefield
Glossary-1
FM 3-90
under the control of the ground or air maneuver commander to

engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain
(FM 3-97.4)
airborne operation an operation involving the air movement into an objective area of
combat forces and their logistic support for execution of a tactical,
operational, or strategic mission. The means employed may be
any combination of airborne units, air transportable units, and
various types of transport aircraft, depending on the mission and
the overall situation. (JP 3-18)
air control point an easily identifiable point on the terrain or an electronic naviga-
tional aid used to provide necessary control during air movement.
ACPs are generally designated at each point where the flight
route or air corridor makes a definite change in direction and at
any other point deemed necessary for timing or control of the
operation. (FM 3-52)
air corridor a restricted air route of travel specified for use by friendly aircraft
and established for the purpose of preventing friendly aircraft
from being fired on by friendly forces (JP 1-02)
air defense battlefield operating system the employment of all active measures designed
to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile aircraft
and missiles after they are airborne (FM 7-15)
airspace coordination area a three-dimensional block of airspace in a target area, established
by the appropriate ground commander, in which friendly aircraft
are reasonably safe from friendly surface fires. The airspace
coordination area may be formal or informal. (JP 3-09.3)
alt altitude
*alternate position a defensive position that the commander assigns to a unit or
weapon for occupation when the primary position becomes
untenable or unsuitable for carrying out the assigned task
ambush a form of attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed
positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy (FM 3-0)
AO area of operations
APOD aerial port of debarkation
approach march (Army) the advance of a combat unit when direct contact with the
enemy is intended (FM 3-0)
AR armor
area defense a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy
forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than
destroying the enemy outright (FM 3-0)
area of influence a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of
influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems
normally under the commander’s command or control (JP 1-02)
Glossary-2
Glossary
area of interest that area of concern to the commander, including the area of
influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy terri-
tory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area
also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize
the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 2-03)
area of operations an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land
and naval forces. Areas of operations do not typically encompass
the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but
should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish
their missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02)
*area reconnaissance a form of reconnaissance that focuses on obtaining detailed
information about the terrain or enemy activity within a
prescribed area
*area security a form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces,
installations, routes, and actions within a specific area
ARFOR the senior Army headquarters and all Army forces assigned or
attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force
command, joint functional command, or multinational command
(FM 3-0)
*Army air movements operations involving the use of utility and cargo rotary-wing
assets for other than air assaults
Army airspace command and control those actions that ensure the synchronized use of
airspace and enhance the command and control of forces using
airspace (FM 3-52)
*art of tactics The art of tactics consists of three interrelated aspects: the
creative and flexible array of means to accomplish assigned
missions, decision making under conditions of uncertainty when
faced with an intelligent enemy, and understanding the human
dimension—the effects of combat on soldiers
ASCC Army service component command
ASG area support group
aslt assault
*assailable flank a flank exposed to attack or envelopment
assault echelon the element of a force that is scheduled for initial assault on the
objective area (JP 4-01.2) [The joint definition includes a sentence
relating to amphibious operations that is omitted.]
*assault position a covered and concealed position short of the objective, from
which final preparations are made to assault the objective
*assault time the moment to attack the initial objectives throughout the geo-
graphical scope of the operation
*assembly area an area a unit occupies to prepare for an operation
AT antitank
Glossary-3
FM 3-90
ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System

atk attack
ATS air traffic service
attack an offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces,
seizes and secures terrain, or both (FM 3-0)
*attack by fire a tactical mission task in which a commander uses direct fires,
supported by indirect fires, to engage an enemy without closing
with him to destroy, suppress, fix, or deceive him
*attack-by-fire position the general position from which a unit conducts the tactical
mission task of attack by fire
*attack position the last position an attacking force occupies or passes through
before crossing the line of departure
*avenue of approach (Army) the air or ground route leading to an objective (or key
terrain in its path) that an attacking force can use
avn aviation
*axis of advance the general area through which the bulk of a unit’s combat power
must move
AXP ambulance exchange point
base a locality from which operations are projected or supported
(JP 1-02)
base cluster in base defense operations, a collection of bases geographically
grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control
(JP 3-10)
base commander In base defense operations, the officer assigned to command a
base (JP 1-02)
*base defense force A base defense force is a security element established to provide
local security to a base
base defense operations center a command and control facility established by the base
commander to serve as the focal point for base security and
defense. It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all
base defense efforts, and coordinates and integrates into area
security operations with the rear area operations center/rear
tactical operations center. (JP 3-10.1)
*battalion A battalion (or a squadron) is a unit consisting of two or more
company-, battery-, or troop-size units and a headquarters.
*battalion task force a combat arms battalion-size unit consisting of a battalion
headquarters, at least one assigned company-size element, and at
least one attached company-size element from another combat
arms or combat support unit
*battery a company-size unit in a field artillery or air defense artillery
organization
Glossary-4
Glossary
battle a set of related tactical engagements that last longer and involve
larger forces than an engagement (FM 3-0)
battlefield organization the allocation of forces in the area of operations by purpose. It
consists of three all-encompassing categories of operations:
decisive, shaping, and sustaining. (FM 3-0)
*battle handover line a designated phase line on the ground where responsibility
transitions from the stationary force to the moving force and vice
versa
*battle position a defensive location oriented on a likely enemy avenue of
approach
BCD battlefield coordination detachment
BCOC base cluster operations center
BCT brigade combat team
BDAR battle damage assessment and repair
BDOC base defense operations center
bde brigade
BDF base defense force
BFV Bradley fighting vehicle
BG brigadier general
BHL battle handover line
*block a tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or
prevents his advance in a direction or along an avenue of
approach. Block is also an engineer obstacle effect that integrates
fire planning and obstacle effort to stop an attacker along a
specific avenue of approach or prevent him from passing through
an engagement area
bn battalion
Bn TF battalion task force
BOS battlefield operating systems
boundary a line that delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating
coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent
units, formations, or areas (JP 0-2)
BP battle position
*breach a tactical mission task in which the unit employs all available
means to break through or secure a passage through an enemy
defense, obstacle, minefield, or fortification
*brigade combat team a semipermanent combined arms organization, consisting of a bri-
gade headquarters, at least two combat arms battalions, and all
necessary supporting combat support and combat service support,
formed for the purpose of carrying out a continuing specific task
Glossary-5
FM 3-90
*brigade a unit consisting of two or more battalions and a headquarters

BSA brigade support area
*bypass a tactical mission task in which the commander directs his unit to
maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to
maintain the momentum of the operation while deliberately
avoiding combat with an enemy force
C cover (used on graphics to indicate a security mission. See
paragraph 12-13)
C2 command and control
CA civil affairs
calculated risk an exposure to chance of injury or loss when the commander can
visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or
damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost
*canalize (Army) a tactical mission task in which the commander restricts
enemy movement to a narrow zone by exploiting terrain coupled
with the use of obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver
CAS close air support
cbt combat
CCIR commander’s critical information requirements
CD cavalry division
counterdrug
CFL coordinated fire line
CFZ critical friendly zone
*checkpoint a predetermined point on the ground used to control movement,
tactical maneuver, and orientation
CI counterintelligence
*clear a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all
enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an
assigned area
close area where forces are in immediate contact with the enemy and the
fighting between the committed forces and readily available tac-
tical reserves of both combatants is occurring, or where com-
manders envision close combat taking place. Typically, the close
area assigned to a maneuver force extends from its subordinates’
rear boundaries to its own forward boundary. (FM 3-0)
close combat combat carried out with direct-fire weapons, supported by indirect
fires, air-delivered fires, and nonlethal engagement means. Close
combat defeats or destroys enemy forces or seizes and retains
ground. (FM 3-0)
CNR combat net radio
Glossary-6
Glossary
co company
COA course of action
COL colonel
COLT combat observation and lasing team
*combat arms units and soldiers who close with and destroy enemy forces or
provide firepower and destructive capabilities on the battlefield
*combat formation an ordered arrangement of forces for a specific purpose and the
general configuration of a unit on the ground
combat information (Army) unevaluated data gather by or provided to a commander
that, due to its highly perishable nature or the critical nature of
the tactical situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelli-
gence or other staff products in time to meet the commander’s
information requirements (FM 6-0)
*combat outpost a reinforced observation post capable of conducting limited com-
bat operations
combat power the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a
military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given
time (JP 1-02)
combat service support battlefield operating system the support and services provided
to sustain forces during war and military operations other than
war (FM 7-15)
*combat support (Army) critical combat functions provided by units and soldiers in
conjunction with combat arms units and soldiers to secure victory
combined arms the synchronized or simultaneous application of several arms—
such as infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, air defense, and
aviation—to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if
each arm was used against the enemy separately or in sequence
(FM 3-0)
command and control battlefield operating system all tasks associated with the
exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated
commander over assigned and available forces in the
accomplishment of the mission (FM 7-15)
*company a unit consisting of two or more platoons, usually of the same
type, with a headquarters and a limited capacity for self-support
*company team a combined arms organization formed by attaching one or more
nonorganic tank, mechanized infantry, or light infantry platoons
to a tank, mechanized infantry, or light infantry company, either
in exchange for, or in addition to, its organic platoons
*consolidation the process of organizing and strengthening a newly captured
position so that it can be defended
*contact point an easily identifiable point on the terrain where two or more
ground units are required to make physical contact
Glossary-7
FM 3-90
*contain (Army) a tactical mission task that requires the commander to

stop, hold, or surround enemy forces or to cause them to center
their activity on a given front and prevent them from
withdrawing any part of their forces for use elsewhere
*contiguous area of operations when all of a commander’s subordinate forces’ areas of
operations share one or more common boundaries
COP common operational picture
*control a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain
physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an
enemy or to create conditions necessary for successful friendly
operations
CONUS continental United States
*convoy security operations a specialized kind of area security operations conducted to
protect convoys
coordinated fire line a line beyond which conventional, direct, and indirect surface fire
support means may fire at any time within the boundaries of the
establishing headquarters without additional coordination. The
purpose of the CFL is to expedite the surface-to-surface attack of
targets beyond the CFL without coordination with the ground
commander in whose area the targets are located. (JP 3-09)
*cordon security the security provided between two combat outposts positioned to
provide mutual support
*corps the Army’s largest tactical unit and the instrument by which
higher echelons of command conduct maneuver at the operational
level
COSCOM corps support command
co/tm company/team
counterattack (Army) a form of attack by part or all of a defending force against
an enemy attacking force, with the general objective of denying
the enemy his goal in attacking (FM 3-0)
*counterreconnaissance (Army) a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures
taken by a commander to counter enemy reconnaissance and
surveillance efforts. Counterreconnaissance is not a distinct
mission, but a component of all forms of security operations
*cover a form of security operation whose primary task is to protect the
main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and
reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation
of and direct fire against the main body
*covering force a self-contained force capable of operating independently of the
main body, unlike a screening or guard force
CP checkpoint; command post
Glossary-8
Glossary
*critical friendly zone an area, usually a friendly unit or location, that the maneuver
commander designates as critical to the protection of an asset
whose loss would seriously jeopardize the mission
CS combat support
CSG corps support group
CSS combat service support
*cueing the integration of one or more types of reconnaissance or surveil-
lance systems to provide information that directs follow-on
collecting of more detailed information by another system
DAG division artillery group
DASB division aviation support battalion
*decisive terrain key terrain whose seizure and retention is mandatory for success-
ful mission accomplishment
decisive engagement in land and naval warfare, an engagement in which a unit is
considered fully committed and cannot maneuver or extricate
itself. In the absence of outside assistance, the action must be
fought to a conclusion and either won or lost with the forces at
hand. (JP 1-02)
deep area an area forward of the close area that commanders use to shape
enemy forces before they are encountered or engaged in the close
area (FM 3-0)
*defeat a tactical mission task that occurs when an enemy force has
temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to
fight. The defeated force’s commander is unwilling or unable to
pursue his adopted course of action, thereby yielding to the
friendly commander’s will and can no longer interfere to a
significant degree with the actions of friendly forces. Defeat can
result from the use of force or the threat of its use.
*defeat in detail Defeat in detail is achieved by concentrating overwhelming
combat power against separate parts of a force rather than
defeating the entire force at once.
defensive operations operations to defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces,
or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Defensive
operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their
purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows
Army forces to regain the initiative. (FM 3-0)
delay a form of retrograde [JP 1-02 uses an operation] in which a force
under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the
enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the
enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged
(JP 1-02, see delaying operation)
*delay line a phase line where the date and time before which the enemy is
not allowed to cross the phase line is depicted as part of the
graphic control measure
Glossary-9
FM 3-90
*deliberate operation an operation in which a commander’s detailed intelligence

concerning the situation allows him to develop and coordinate
detailed plans, including multiple branches and sequels. He task-
organizes his forces specifically for the operation to provide a fully
synchronized combined arms team. He conducts extensive
rehearsals while conducting shaping operations to set the
conditions for his decisive operation.
demonstration (Army) a form of the attack designed to deceive the enemy as to
the location or time of the decisive operation by a display of force.
Forces conducting a demonstration do not seek contact with the
enemy. (FM 3-0)
*denial operations actions to hinder or deny the enemy the use of space, personnel,
supplies, or facilities
*destroy a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force
combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to
destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot
perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without
being entirely rebuilt.
*detachment left in contact an element left in contact as part of the previously designated
(usually rear) security force while the main body conducts its
withdrawal
*direction of attack a specific direction or assigned route a force uses and does not
deviate from when attacking
DISCOM division support command
*disengage a tactical mission task where a commander has his unit break
contact with the enemy to allow the conduct of another mission or
to avoid decisive engagement
*disengagement line a phase line located on identifiable terrain that, when crossed by
the enemy, signals to defending elements that it is time to
displace to their next positions
*dismounted marches Dismounted marches, also called foot marches, are movements of
troops and equipment, mainly by foot, with limited support by
vehicles.
*disrupt a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct
and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy’s
formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to
commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion. Disrupt is
also an engineer obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and
obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break up his formation and
tempo, interrupt his timetable, commit breaching assets pre-
maturely, and attack in a piecemeal effort.
div division
DIVARTY division artillery
DIVCAV division cavalry
Glossary-10
Glossary
*divisions (Army) the largest fixed organizations in the Army that train and
fight as tactical teams, and are organized with varying numbers
and types of combat, CS, and CSS units
DLIC detachment left in contact
DOD Department of Defense
DS direct support
DSA division support area
DZ drop zone
EA engagement area
EAC echelon above corps
eff effective
*encirclement operations operations where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because
an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground
lines of communication and reinforcement
engagement a small, tactical conflict between opposing maneuver forces,
usually conducted at brigade level and below (FM 3-0)
*engagement area where the commander intends to contain and destroy an enemy
force with the massed effects of all available weapons and
supporting systems
*engagement criteria protocols that specify those circumstances for initiating
engagement with an enemy force
*engagement priority the order in which the unit engages enemy systems or functions
envelopment (Army) a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to
avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the
enemy rear to destroy the enemy in his current positions. At the
tactical level, envelopments focus on seizing terrain, destroying
specific enemy forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes.
(FM 3-0)
ENY enemy (graphics)
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EPW enemy prisoner of war
ESB enhanced separate brigade
evac evacuation
EW electronic warfare
*exfiltrate a tactical mission task where a commander removes personnel or
units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception,
surprise, or clandestine means
exploitation a type of offensive operation that usually follows a successful at-
tack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth (JP 1-02)
Glossary-11
FM 3-90
EZ extraction zone
FA field artillery
FARP forward arming and refueling point
FCL final coordination line
FEBA forward edge of the battle area
feint (Army) a form of attack used to deceive the enemy as to the
location or time of the actual decisive operation. Forces
conducting a feint seek direct fire contact with the enemy but
avoid decisive engagement. (FM 3-0)
FFA free-fire area
*field of fire the area that a weapon or group of weapons may cover effectively
from a given position
*final coordination line a phase line close to the enemy position used to coordinate the
lifting or shifting of supporting fires with the final deployment of
maneuver elements
final protective fires an immediately available preplanned barrier of fires designed to
impede enemy movement across defensive lines or areas (JP 3-09)
*fire strike the massed, synchronized, and nearly simultaneous delivery of
precision-guided munitions
*fire superiority that degree of dominance in the fires of one force over another
that permits that force to conduct maneuver at a given time and
place without prohibitive interference by the enemy
fire support battlefield operating system the collective and coordinated use of target-
acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons, fixed-wing aircraft, offen-
sive information operations, and other lethal and nonlethal
means against targets located throughout an area of operations
(FM 7-15)
fire support coordination line a FSCM that is established and adjusted by appropriate land
or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in
consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected
commanders. The FSCL facilitates the expeditious attack of
surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure.
A FSCL does not divide an area of operations by defining a
boundary between close and deep operations or a distinct area
[JP 3-09 uses zone] for close air support. The FSCL applies to all
fires of air-, land-, and sea-based weapon systems using any type
of ammunition. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must
inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow
necessary reaction to avoid fratricide. Supporting elements
attacking targets beyond the FSCL must ensure that the attack
will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line.
Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack
operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious
force commander. The FSCL should follow well-defined terrain
Glossary-12
Glossary
features. Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially

critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces.
In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this
coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the
FSCL. However, failure to do so may increase the risk of
fratricide and could waste limited resources. (JP 3-09)
fire support target see target
*fix a tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy
from moving any part of his force from a specific location for a
specific period to of time. Fix is also an engineer obstacle effect
that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker’s
movement within a specified area, normally an engagement
*flanking position a geographical location on the flank of a force from which effective
fires can be placed on that flank
*flanks the right or left limits of a unit
FLE forward logistics element
FLOT forward line of own troops
FM field manual
FOB forward operating base
*follow and assume a tactical mission task in which a second committed force follows
a force conducting an offensive operation and is prepared to
continue the mission if the lead force is fixed, attrited, or unable
to continue
*follow and support a tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and
supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation
*follow-on echelon those additional forces moved into the objective area after the
assault echelon
foot march see dismounted marches
forward edge of the battle area the foremost limits of a series of areas in which ground
combat units are deployed, excluding the areas in which the
covering or screening forces are operating, designated to
coordinate fire support, the positioning of forces, or the maneuver
of units (JP 1-02)
forward line of own troops a line which indicates the most forward positions of friendly
forces in any kind of military operation at a specific time. The
forward line of own troops normally identifies the forward
location of covering and screening forces. (JP 1-02)
*forward passage of lines when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving
toward the enemy
FPF final protective fires
FRAGO fragmentary order
Glossary-13
FM 3-90
free-fire area a specific area into which any weapon system may fire into
without additional coordination with the establishing
headquarters (JP 3-09)
front an echelon of the Soviet Army two levels above corps, the
equivilent of a US army group
frontal attack (Army) a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to
destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force in place
over a broad front (FM 3-0)
FSB forward support battalion
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSCM fire support coordinating measure
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
G guard (used on graphics to indicate a security mission. See
paragraph 12-13)
G1 assistant chief of staff, personnel
G2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G3 assistant chief of staff, operations
G4 assistant chief of staff, logistics
G5 assistant chief of staff, civil affairs
G6 assistant chief of staff, communications
*gap (Army) an area free of armed mines or obstacles whose width and
direction allow a friendly force to pass through the area
containing obstacles while dispersed in a tactical formation
GEN general
GPS global positioning system
GRC guards rifle corps
grd ground
GS general support
GSR ground surveillance radar
*guard (Army) a form of security operations whose primary task is to pro-
tect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing
and reporting information and preventing enemy ground obser-
vation of and direct fire against the main body. Units conducting
a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely
upon fires and combat support assets of the main body.
*hasty operation an operation in which a commander directs his immediately
available forces, using fragmentary orders, to perform activities
with minimal preparation, trading planning and preparation time
for speed of execution
Glossary-14
Glossary
hel helicopter
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HIMAD high- to medium-altitude air defense
HQ headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence
IBCT initial brigade combat team
ID infantry division
IFF identification, friend or foe
IMINT imagery intelligence
IN infantry
infiltration (Army) a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts
undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy
forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while
exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires (FM 3-0)
*infiltration lane a control measure that coordinates forward and lateral movement
of infiltrating units and fixes fire planning responsibilities
intelligence battlefield operating system the activity to generate knowledge of and products
portraying the enemy and environmental features required by a
commander in planning, preparing, executing, and assessing
operations (FM 7-15)
*interdict a tactical mission task where the commander prevents, disrupts,
or delays the enemy’s use of an area or route
IO information operations
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
ISB intermediate support base
*isolate a tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both
physically and psychologically—an enemy from his sources of
support, deny an enemy freedom of movement, and prevent an
enemy unit from having contact with other enemy forces
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
JAAT joint air attack team
JAG judge adcocate general
JAOC joint air operations center
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JP joint publication
JSOA joint special operations area
Glossary-15
FM 3-90
JSTARS joint surveillance target attack radar system

JTF joint task force
*key terrain any locality or area, the seizure or retention of which affords a
marked advantage to either combatant in a given course of action
*kill zone that part of an ambush site where fires are concentrated to
isolate, fix, and destroy the enemy
LC line of contact
LD line of departure
*Level I threat a small enemy force that can be defeated by CS and CSS units
operating in the rear area or by the perimeter defenses
established by friendly bases and base clusters
*Level II threat enemy activities that can be defeated by a base or base cluster
augmented by a response force
*Level III threat a threat beyond the defensive capability of both the base and base
cluster and any local reserve or response force
lg long
*light line a designated phase line, forward of which vehicles are required to
use blackout lights during periods of limited visibility
*limit of advance a phase line used to control forward progress of the attack. The
attacking unit does not advance any of its elements or assets
beyond the LOA, but the attacking unit can push its security
forces to that limit.
*line of contact a general trace delineating the location where friendly and enemy
forces are engaged
*line of departure a phase line crossed at a prescribed time by troops initiating an
offensive operation
line of communication a route, either land, water, and/or air, which connects an
operating military force with a base of operations and along
which supplies and military forces move (JP 1-02)
*linkup point a point where two infiltrating elements in the same or different
infiltration lanes are scheduled to meet to consolidate before
proceeding on with their missions
*linkup a meeting of friendly ground forces, which occurs in a variety of
circumstances
LL light line
LLTR low-level transit route
LOA limit of advance
LOC line of communication
*local security low-level security operations conducted near a unit to prevent
surprise by the enemy
Glossary-16
Glossary
*logistic package a grouping of multiple classes of supply and supply vehicles under
the control of a single convoy commander
LOGPAC logistic package
LRP logistics release point
LRSU long-range surveillance unit
LTC lieutenant colonel
LU linkup
LZ landing zone
M mechanized
meters
*main battle area the area where the commander intends to deploy the bulk of his
combat power and conduct his decisive operation to defeat an
attacking enemy
maneuver the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in
combination with fires, or fires potential, to achieve a position of
advantage with respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the
mission (JP 1-02)
maneuver battlefield operating system the movement of forces to achieve a position of
advantage with respect to enemy forces. This system includes the
employment of forces on the battlefield in combination with direct
fire or fire potential. This system also includes the conduct of
tactical tasks associated with force projection. (FM 7-15)
*march column all elements using the same route for a single movement under
control of a single commander
*march serial a major subdivision of a march column that is organized under
one commander who plans, regulates, and controls the serial
*march unit a subdivision of a march serial. It moves and halts under the
control of a single commander who uses voice and visual signals.
MASINT measurement and signature intelligence
max maximum
MBA main battle area
MCC movement control center
MD mechanized division
MDMP military decision making process
MECH mechanized infantry
MED medical
meeting engagement (Army) a combat action that occurs when a moving force engages
an enemy at an unexpected time and place (FM 3-0)
METL mission-essential task list
Glossary-17
FM 3-90
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support avail-
able, time available, and civil considerations (FM 6-0)
MG major general
MI military intelligence
military gamble a situation in which a commander risks the force without a
reasonable level of information about the outcome (FM 6-0)
min minimum
*mixing using two or more different assets to collect against the same
intelligence requirement
MLRS Multiple Launch Rocket System
MMC materiel management center
mobile defense (Army) a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the
destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a
striking force (FM 3-0)
mobility/countermobility/survivability battlefield operating system Mobility
operations preserve the freedom of maneuver of friendly forces.
Countermobility operations deny mobility to enemy forces.
Survivability operations protect friendly forces from the effects of
enemy weapon systems. (FM 7-15)
MOPP mission-oriented protective posture
mort mortar
movement control the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and
cargo movement over lines of communication (JP 4-01.3)
movement to contact a type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and
establish or regain contact (FM 3-0)
MP military police
MRB motorized rifle battalion
MRR minimum risk route
MRT movement regulating team
MSR main supply route
MTC movement to contact
mutual support support that units render to each other against an enemy because
of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to
the enemy, and their inherent capabilities (JP 1-02)
NAI named area of interest
*named area of interest the geographical area where information that will satisfy a
specific information requirement can be collected
NBC nuclear, biological, and chemical
Glossary-18
Glossary
*neutralize (Army) a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy

personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular
operation
NFA no-fire area
NGO nongovernmental organization
no-fire area a land area designated by the appropriate commander into which
fires or their effects are prohibited (JP 3-09)
*noncontiguous area of operations when one or more of a commander’s subordinate forces’
areas of operation do not share a common boundary
OAKOC observation and fields of fire, avenues of approach, key terrain,
obstacles, and cover and concealment
O/O on-order
OBJ objective
*objective (Army) a location on the ground used to orient operations, phase
operations, facilitate changes of direction, and provide for unity of
effort
*objective rally point a rally point established on an easily identifiable point on the
ground where all elements of the infiltrating unit assemble and
prepare to attack the objective
obstacle any obstruction designed or employed to disrupt, fix, turn, or
block the movement of an opposing force, and to impose
additional losses in personnel, time, and equipment on the
opposing force. Obstacles can exist naturally or can be manmade,
or can be a combination of both. (JP 1-02)
obstacle belt a brigade-level command and control measure, normally given
graphically, to show where within an obstacle zone the ground
tactical commander plans to limit friendly obstacle employment
and focus the defense (JP 1-02)
*obstacle control measures specific measures that simplify the granting of obstacle-emplacing
authority while providing obstacle control
obstacle restricted area a command and control measure used to limit the type or number
of obstacles within an area (JP 1-02)
*obstacle groups one or more individual obstacles grouped to provide a specific
obstacle effect
obstacle zone a division-level command and control measure, normally done
graphically, to designate specific land areas where lower echelons
are allowed to employ tactical obstacles (JP 1-02)
*occupy a tactical mission task that involves moving into an area so that
it can control that entire area. Both the force’s movement to and
occupation of the area occur without enemy opposition.
Glossary-19
FM 3-90
offensive operations Offensive operations aim at destroying or defeating an enemy.

Their purpose is to impose US will on the enemy and achieve
decisive victory. (FM 3-0)
OH observation helicopter
OP observation post
OPCON operational control
operation a military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational,
tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission
(JP 1-02)
operational framework the arrangement of friendly forces and resources in time, space,
and purpose with respect to each other and the enemy or
situation. It consists of the area of operations, battlespace, and
the battlefield organization. (FM 3-0)
OPLAN operation plan
OPNS operations
OPORD operation order
OPS operations
OPSEC operations security
ORA obstacle restricted area
ord ordnance
ORP objective rally point
PAA position area for artillery
*passage lane a lane through an enemy or friendly obstacle that provides a safe
passage for a passing force
*passage of lines (Army) a tactical enabling operation in which one unit moves
through another unit’s positions with the intent of moving into or
out of enemy contact
*passage point a specifically designated place where the passing units pass
through the stationary unit
passive air defense all measures, other than active air defense, taken to minimize the
effects of hostile air action. They include cover, concealment,
camouflage, dummy positions, dispersion, and protective
construction. (FM 3-01.8)
PD point of departure
*penetration (Army) a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to
rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the
defensive system (FM 3-0)
phase line a line utilized for control and coordination of military operations,
usually a terrain feature extending across the operational area
[JP 1-02 uses zone of action] (JP 1-02)
Glossary-20
Glossary
*piecemeal commitment the immediate employment of units in combat as they become

available instead of waiting for larger aggregations of units to
ensure mass, or the unsynchronized employment of available
forces so that their combat power is not employed effectively
PL phase line
PLD probable line of deployment
*point of departure the point where the unit crosses the line of departure and begins
moving along a direction of attack
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
*position area for artillery an area assigned to an artillery unit where individual artillery
systems can maneuver to increase their survivability. A PAA is
not an area of operations for the artillery unit occupying it.
PP passage point
*primary position the position that covers the enemy’s most likely avenue of
approach into the AO
*probable line of deployment a phase line that a commander designates as the location
where he intends to completely deploy his unit into assault
formation before beginning the assault
*procedures standard and detailed courses of action that describe how to
perform tasks
psn position
PSYOP psychological operations
pursuit an offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force
attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it (JP 1-02)
PZ pickup zone
PZCO pickup zone control officer
PzDiv panzer division
raid a form of attack [JP 1-02 uses operation], usually small scale,
involving a swift entry into hostile territory to secure information,
confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a
planned withdrawal from the objective area upon mission
completion. (FM 3.0)
*rally point an easily identifiable point on the ground at which units can
reassemble and reorganize if they become dispersed.
Alternatively, it is an easily identifiable point on the ground at
which aircrews and passengers can assemble and reorganize
following an incident requiring a forced landing.
RAOC rear area operations center
RC rifle corps
RD rifle division
Glossary-21
FM 3-90
rear area (Army) The rear area for any command extends from its rear
boundary forward to the rear boundary of the next lower level of
command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of
support functions and is where the majority of the echelon’s
sustaining operations occur. (FM 3-0)
*rearward passage of lines when a unit passes through another unit’s positions while moving
away from the enemy
recon reconnaissance
*reconnaissance in force (Army) a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test
the enemy’s strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain
other information [The Army definition adds dispositions, and
reactions to the joint definition.]
*reconnaissance objective a terrain feature, geographical area, or an enemy force about
which the commander wants to obtain additional information
*reconnaissance operations (Army) those operations undertaken to obtain, by visual observa-
tion or other detection methods, information about the activities
and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data
concerning the meteorological, hydrographical or geographical
characteristics and the indigenous population of a particular area.
[The Army definition adds and the indigenous population to the
joint definition.]
reconstitution those actions that commanders plan and implement to restore
units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate
with mission requirements and available resources. Reconstitu-
tion operations include regeneration and reorganization.
(FM 4-100.9)
*reduce a tactical mission task that involves the destruction of an
encircled or bypassed enemy force
*redundancy using two or more like assets to collect against the same
intelligence requirement
*release point a location on a route where marching elements are released from
centralized control
*relief in place (Army) a tactical enabling operation in which, by the direction of
higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the
incoming unit
reorganization action taken to shift internal resources within a degraded unit to
increase its level of combat effectiveness (FM 4-100.9)
response force a mobile force with appropriate fire support designated, usually
by the area commander, to deal with Level II threats in the rear
area (JP 1-02)
restrictive fire area an area in which specific restrictions are imposed and into which
fires that exceed those restrictions will not be delivered without
coordination with the establishing headquarters (JP 3-09)
Glossary-22
Glossary
restrictive fire line a line established between converging friendly surface forces that
prohibits fires or their effects across that line (JP 3-09)
*retain a tactical mission task in which the commander ensures that a
terrain feature already controlled by a friendly force remains free
of enemy occupation or use
retirement a form of retrograde [JP 1-02 uses operation] in which a force out
of contact with the enemy moves away from the enemy (JP 1-02)
retrograde (Army) a type of defensive operation that involves organized
movement away from the enemy (FM 3-0)
RFA restricted fire area
RFL restricted fire line
RGR ranger
RIF reconnaissance in force
RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
rly rally
ROC rear operations center
ROE rules of engagement
ROM refuel on the move
route the prescribed course to be traveled from a specific point of origin
to a specific destination (JP 1-02)
*route reconnaissance a form of reconnaissance that focuses along a specific line of
communication, such as a road, railway, or cross-country mobility
corridor
*route security operations a specialized kind of area security operations conducted to protect
lines of communication and friendly forces moving along them
RP release point
rte route
rules of engagement directives issued by competent military authority which delineate
the circumstances and limitations under which United States
forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other
forces encountered (JP 1-02)
S screen (used on graphics to indicate a security mission. See
paragraph 12-13)
S1 battalion/brigade personnel staff officer
S2 battalion/brigade intelligence staff officer
S3 battalion/brigade operations staff officer
S4 battalion/brigade logistics staff officer
S5 battalion/brigade civil-military operations staff officer
Glossary-23
FM 3-90
S6 battalion/brigade communications staff officer

SAAFR standard use Army aircraft flight route
SAW squad automatic weapon
*science of tactics the understanding of those military aspects of tactics—capabil-
ities, techniques, and procedures—that can be measured and
codified
*screen (Army) a form of security operations that primarily provides early
warning to the protected force
SEAD suppression of enemy air defenses
search and attack a technique for conducting a movement to contact that shares
many of the characteristics of an area security mission (FM 3-0)
*sector of fire (Army) that area assigned to a unit, a crew-served weapon, or an
individual weapon within which it will engage targets as they
appear in accordance with established engagement priorities
*secure a tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or
geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a
result of enemy action
*security operations those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early
and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force
being protected with time and maneuver space within which to
react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the
commander to effectively use the protected force
*seize a tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a
designated area using overwhelming force
sep separate
SF special forces
SHORAD short-range air defense
SIGINT signals intelligence
SOA special operations aviation
SOCCE special operations command and control element
SOF special operations forces
SOI signal operating instruction
SOP standing operating procedures
SP start point
SPF special-purpose forces
spoiling attack (Army) a form of attack that preempts or seriously impairs an
enemy attack while the enemy is in the process of planning or
preparing to attack (FM 3-0)
spt support
Glossary-24
Glossary
sqd squadron
*start point a location on the route where the marching elements fall under
the control of a designated march commander
STAVKA acronym for the Soviet high command during World War II
*stay-behind operation an operation in which the commander leaves a unit in position to
conduct a specified mission while the remainder of his forces
withdraw or retire from an area
striking force a committed force organized to conduct the decisive attack in a
mobile defense. It normally comprises the maximum combat
power available to the commander at the time of the attack.
(FM 3-0)
*strong point (Army) a heavily fortified battle position tied to a natural or
reinforcing obstacle to create an anchor for the defense or to deny
the enemy decisive or key terrain
*subsequent position a position that a unit expects to move to during the course of
battle
*supplementary position a defensive position located within a unit’s assigned AO that
provides the best sectors of fire and defensive terrain along an
avenue of approach that is not the primary avenue along which
the enemy is expected to attack
*support-by-fire position the general position from which a unit conducts the tactical
mission task of support by fire
*support by fire a tactical mission task in which a maneuver force moves to a
position where it can engage the enemy by direct fire in support of
another maneuvering force
*supporting distance the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for
one to come to the aid of the other. For small units, it is the dis-
tance between two units that can be covered effectively by their
fires. (FM 3-0)
*supporting range the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a
second unit, yet remain within the maximum range of the second
unit’s indirect-fire weapon systems (FM 3-0)
*suppress (Army) a tactical mission task that results in the temporary
degradation of the performance of a force or weapon system below
the level needed to accomplish its mission
surveil surveillance
sys system
TAA tactical assembly area
tactical combat force a combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat
service support assets, that is assigned the mission of defeating
Level III threats (JP 1-02)
Glossary-25
FM 3-90
tactical level of war the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned
and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical
units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered
arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to
each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives.
(JP 1-02)
*tactical mobility the ability to move rapidly from one part of the battlefield to
another, relative to the enemy
tactical road march a rapid movement used to relocate units within an area of
operations to prepare for combat operations (FM 3-0)
*tactician an individual devoted to mastering the science and art of tactics
tactics (Army) the employment of units in combat. It includes the
ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each
other, the terrain, and the enemy to translate potential combat
power into victorious battles and engagements. (FM 3-0)
TAI targeted area of interest
target in the fire support context, an area designated and numbered for
future firing (JP 1-02)
*target reference point an easily recognizable point on the ground, such as a building or a
road junction, used in conjunction with engagement areas and
sectors of fire to initiate, distribute, and control fires
*targeted area of interest the geographical area or point along a mobility corridor where
successful interdiction will cause the enemy to abandon a
particular course of action or require him to use specialized
engineer support to continue. It is where he can be acquired and
engaged by friendly forces.
TCF tactical combat force
TCP traffic control point
TECHINT technical intelligence
*techniques the general and detailed methods used by troops and commanders
to perform assigned missions and functions, specifically, the
methods of using equipment and personnel
TF task force
*time of attack the moment the leading elements of the main body cross the line
of departure, or in a night attack, the point of departure
tm team
TOC tactical operations center
TOW tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (refers to the Ar-
my’s heavy, antitank missile system)
trans transportation
Glossary-26
Glossary
*trigger line a phase line used to initiate and mass fires into an engagement
area or an objective at a predetermined range for all or like wea-
pon systems
*troop a company-size organization in a cavalry organization
*troop movement the movement of troops from one place to another by any
available means
TRP target reference point
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
*turn a tactical mission task that involves forcing an enemy force from
one avenue of approach or movement corridor to another. Turn is
also a tactical obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and
obstacle effort to divert an enemy formation from one avenue of
approach to an adjacent avenue of approach or into an
engagement area
turning movement (Army) a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to
avoid the enemy’s principal defensive positions by seizing
objectives to the enemy rear and causing the enemy to move out
of his current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat
(FM 3-0)
UAV unmanned aerial vehicle
UMCP unit maintenance collection point
US United States
USAF United States Air Force
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
withdrawal a planned operation in which a force in contact disengages from
an enemy force (JP 1-02) [The Army considers it a form of retro-
grade.]
WMD weapons of mass destruction
*zone reconnaissance a form of reconnaissance that involves a directed effort to obtain
detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy
forces with a zone defined by boundaries
Glossary-27
Bibliography
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are online at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/
(S) CJCSI 3121.01A. Standing Rules of Engagement for US Forces (U).

15 January 2000.
JP 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). 24 February 1995.
JP 1-02. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 12 April 2001.
Available online at http://www.dtic.mil./doctrine/jel/doddict/
JP 2-0. Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 09 March 2000.
JP 2-03. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Geospatial Information
and Services Support to Joint Operations. 31 March 1999.
JP 3-09. Doctrine for Joint Fire Support. 12 May 1998.
JP 3-09.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS).
01 December 1995.
JP 3-10. Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations. 28 May 1996.
JP 3-10.1. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense.
23 July 1996.
JP 3-17. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Theater Airlift Operations.
18 July 1995.
JP 3-18. Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations. TBP.
JP 3-52. Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. 22 July 1995.
JP 3-53. Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations. 10 July 1996.
JP 4-01.2. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint
Operations. 09 October 1996.
JP 4-01.3. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.
21 June 1996.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army doctrinal publications are online at http://155.217.58.58/atdls.htm
AR 190-12. Military Working Dogs. 30 September 1993. Available online at

http://www.usapa.army.mil/gils/epubs1.html
FM 1-0 (12-6). Personnel Doctrine. 09 September 1994.
FM 1-02 (101-5-1). Operational Terms and Graphics. 30 September 1997.
FM 1-05 (16-1). Religious Support. 26 May 1995.
FM 1-06 (14-100). Financial Management Operations. 07 May 1997.
Bibliography-0
Bibliography
FM 1-27.10 (27-10). The Law of Land Warfare. 18 July 1956.

FM 2-0 (34-1). Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations.
27 September 1994.
FM 2-01.3 (34-130). Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 08 July 1994.
FM 3-0 (100-5). Operations. 14 July 2001.
FM 3-01 (44-100). US Army Air and Missile Defense Operations. 15 June 2000.
FM 3-01.8 (44-8) Combined Arms for Air Defense. 01 June 1999.
FM 3-01.12 (100-12). Army Theater Missile Defense Operations. 31 March 2000.
FM 3-04.100 (1-100). Army Aviation Operations. 21 February 1997.
FM 3-04.113 (1-113). Utility and Cargo Helicopter Operations.
12 September 1997.
FM 3-05 (100-25). Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 01 August 1999.
FM 3-05.20 (31-20). Doctrine for Special Forces Operations. 20 April 1990.
FM 3-05.30 (33-1). Psychological Operations. 19 June 2000.
FM 3-07 (100-20). Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict.
05 December 1990. When revised, FM 3-07 will be retitled Stability
Operations and Support Operations.
FM 3-09 (6-20). Fire Support in the Airland Battle. 17 May 1988.
FM 3-09.12 (6-121). Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Field Artillery Target
Acquisition. 25 September 1990.
FM 3-11 (3-100). Chemical Operations Principles and Fundamentals.
08 May 1996.
FM 3-11.9 (3-9). Potential Military Chemical/Biological Agents and Compounds.
12 December 1990.
FM 3-11.50 (3-50). Smoke Operations. 04 December 1990.
FM 3-12 (100-30). Nuclear Operations. 29 October 1996.
FM 3-13 (100-6). Information Operations. 27 August 1996.
FM 3-17 (100-27). USA/USAF Doctrine for Joint Airborne and Tactical Airlift
Operations. 31 January 1985. FM 3-17 will be incorporated into FM 3-52.
FM 3-18.11 (90-26). Airborne Operations. 18 December 1990.
FM 3-19.1 (19-1). Military Police Operations. 22 March 2001.
FM 3-20.95 (17-95). Cavalry Operations. 24 December 1996.
FM 3-21.7 (7-7). Mechanized Infantry Platoon and Squad (APC). 15 March 1985.
FM 3-21.8 (7-8). Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 22 April 1992.
FM 3-21.10 (7-10). The Infantry Rifle Company. 14 December 1990.
FM 3-21.20 (7-20). The Infantry Battalion. 06 April 1992.
FM 3-21.30 (7-30). The Infantry Brigade. 03 October 1995.
Bibliography-1
FM 3-90
FM 3-21.85 (7-85). Ranger Unit Operations. 09 June 1987.

FM 3-21.92. (7-92). The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne,
Air Assault, Light Infantry) 23 December 1992.
FM 3-24.3 (20-3) Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys. 30 August 1999.
FM 3-25.18 (21-18). Foot Marches. 01 June 1990.
FM 3-34 (5-100). Engineer Operations. 27 February 1996.
FM 3-34.1 (90-7). Combined Arms Obstacle Integration. 29 September 1994.
FM 3-34.2 (90-13-1). Combined Arms Breaching Operations. 31 August 2000.
FM 3-34.112 (5-103). Survivability. 10 June 1985.
FM 3-34.212 (5-170). Engineer Reconnaissance. 05 May 1998.
FM 3-34.310 (5-34). Engineer Field Data. 30 August 1999.
FM 3-52 (100-103). Army Airspace Command and Control in a Combat Zone.
07 October 1987. When revised, FM 3-52 will be retitled Army Airspace
Command and Control.
FM 3-55. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations. TBP.
FM 3-57 (41-10). Civil Affairs Operations. 14 February 2000.
FM 3-91 (71-100). Division Operations. 28 August 1998.
FM 3-91.1 (71-1). Tank and Mechanized Infantry Company Team.
26 January 1998.
FM 3-91.2 (71-2). The Tank and Mechanized Infantry Battalion Task Force.
27 September 1998.
FM 3-91.3 (71-3). The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade.
08 January 1996.
FM 3-92 (100-15). Corps Operations. 29 October 1996.
FM 3-93 (100-7). Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations. 31 May 1995.
FM 3-97.4 (90-4). Air Assault Operations. 16 March 1987.
FM 3-97.13 (90-13). River-Crossing Operations. 26 January 1998.
FM 3-100.14 (100-14). Risk Management. 23 April 1998.
FM 4-0 (100-10). Combat Service Support. 03 October 1995.
FM 4-01 (55-1). Transportation Operations. 03 October 1995.
FM 4-01.30 (55-10). Movement Control. 09 February 1999.
FM 4-01.40 (55-30). Army Motor Transport Units and Operations. 27 June 1997.
FM 4-01.41 (55-20). Rail Transport in a Theater of Operations. 01 June 2000.
FM 4-01.50 (55-60). Army Terminal Operations. 15 April 1996.
FM 4-02 (8-10). Health Service Support in a Theater of Operations.
01 March 1991.
Bibliography-2
Bibliography
FM 4-20 (10-1). Quartermaster Principles. 11 August 1994.

FM 4-100.9 (100-9). Reconstitution. 13 January 1992.
FM 5-0 (101-5). Staff Organizations and Operations 31 May 1997. When revised,
FM 5-0 will be retitled Army Planning and Orders Production.
FM 6-0. Command and Control. TBP.
FM 6-02 (24-1). Signal Support to the Army. TBP.
FM 6-22 (22-100). Army Leadership. 31 August 1999.
FM 6-22.5. Combat Stress. 23 June 2000.
FM 6-99.2 (101-5-2). US Army Report and Message Formats. 29 June 1999.
FM 7-0 (25-100). Training the Force. 15 Nov. 1988.
FM 7-15. The Army Universal Task List. TBP.
Bibliography-3
Index
Entries are by paragraph number unless page (p.), figure (fig.), or table
(tbl.) is specified.
A fire support for, C-60 breakout, during, D-58

A2C2, AO and, 2-46–2-48 ground tactical plan, C-58–C-59 envelopment, during, 3-37
PAA and, 2-119 linkup, D-75 exploitation, during, 6-9, 6-30
AATF. See air assault operations, pursuit, use during a, 7-7, 7-12 delay, during, 11-60
ACA, 2-88–2-92 military deception, use for, C-48 MTC, during, 4-2
ACM, AO and, 2-48, 2-49 reaction force, use during, C-62 passage of lines, during, 16-15
actions on contact, defined, 4-43 reaction force, use as, C-48 relief in place, during, 15-14
active air defense, during river-crossing, use during, C-49 turning movement, during, 3-52
defensive operations, 8-61– search and attack operations, air tasking order, FSCL and, 2-85
8-65 C-48 airborne forces/operations, 3-155,
ADC, E-97, E-112, E-145–E-149 security for, C-67 C-12–C-44. See also
area defense and, 9-29 smoke support for, C-69 airborne/air assault operations
administrative movement, 14-7 stay-behind operations use for, airhead, C-12
advance guard, 12-69–12-75 11-120 airhead line, C-23, C-44
exploitation, use during, 6-14 supporting distance, for CSS, Army aviation and, C-29, C-30,
C-63 C-38
infiltration (form of maneuver)
and, 3-71, 3-77 air control point, 2-35 assault echelon, C-35
MTC, use during, 4-8–4-10, air corridor, 2-35 assault objectives, C-20–C-23
12-70 air defense, aerial IPB and, 8-72 communications for, C-39
pursuit, use during, 7-35 base/base cluster defense, COP, C-38
retirement, use during, 11-98 E-94 CSS, C-15, C-28, C-31–C-32,
suitable units for, 4-9 breakout, during, D-70 C-44
advance party, relief in place, CSS considerations for, 8-72 defined, C-12
15-4, 15-28 defensive operations, during, defense against, 8-112–8-113
air assault forces/operations, 8-59–8-70 DZ selection, C-19
3-155, C-45–C-71 defensive encirclement envelopment, use during, 3-29
as a subset of airborne operations, D-35
exploitation, use during, 6-47
operations, C-47 delay, during, 11-21
FEBA for, C-23
C2 of, C50–C54 ISR and, 8-72
fire support for, C-29, C-34
CSS for, C-63 mobile defense, 10-17
follow-on echelon, C-15, C-44
defense against, 8-112–8-113 MTC, during, 4-35
ground tactical plan, C-35
defense, use during a, 8-49 passage of lines, during, 16-14
human dimension and, C-33,
defined, C-45 relief in place, during, 15-14 C-35
delay, use during a, 11-41 TCF, for, E-63 information management
envelopment, use during, 3-29 air movements, 14-4 during, C-37
example of, p. 3-1–3-3 air support (US Air Force), area initiating directive for, C-25
exploitation, use during, 6-47 defense and, 9-1
Index-0
Index
airborne forces/operations formation for, 3-131, 3-132 reserve, 9-2, 9-10–9-15, 9-51,
(continued) IPB, 14-28 9-65, 9-81–9-82, 9-84
ISR for, C-38 reconnaissance operations reserve, positioning of, 9-34–
linkup operations and, C-26, and, 14-29 9-38
C-44, D-75 security operations and, 14-29 retransmission nodes for, 9-36
NBC operations and, C-23 tactical road march, compared risk during, 9-7
patrolling and, C-38 with, 14-31 security operations during,
pursuit, use during, 7-7, 7-12 area ambush, 5-133 9-27, 9-57–9-66, 9-75
reconnaissance operations, area defense, battlefield shaping operations during,
C-37, C-43 organization for, 2-80 9-57, 9-67–9-71
reserve, C-41–C-42 BHL, 9-75 smoke, use during, 9-75
security operations, C-37, C-43 control measures for, 9-16– spoiling attacks during, 9-39–
9-18 9-43
stay-behind operations, use for,
11-120 counterattacks during, 9-39– stalemate, 9-83–9-84, 9-88
tactical mobility of, C-30 9-43 TCF, resourcing, 9-7
airspace C2. See A2C2, CSS for, 6-64, 9-66, 9-77 transitions from, 3-198, 8-161,
decisive operation of, 9-8 9-88–9-89
alternate bounds, 14-37
defense in depth, as a, 9-3, WMD threat during, 9-29, 9-36
alternate position, 8-19
9-28–9-31 area of influence, AO and, 2-39,
ambush, 5-123–5-144
defined, p. 9-1 2-53
area, 5-133
example of, p. 8-2–8-3 area of interest, 3-115
base/base cluster defense, use
execution of, 9-54–9-89 area reconnaissance, 13-35–
during, E-125
13-38
categories of, 5-125 force protection during, 9-6,
9-36 base/base cluster defense,
control of, 5-134–5-135, 5-137 E-106, E-107
forward defense, as a, 9-3,
defined, 5-123 zone reconnaissance,
9-32–9-33
delay, use in, 11-40 compared with, 13-35
guard as an, 12-66
infiltration (form of maneuver), area security, 12-113–12-117
ISR during, 9-4–9-5, 9-44, 9-57
and, 3-58 civil considerations, 12-116
keys to a successful, 9-21
point, 5-129–5-132 defined, 12-1
linear obstacle, of, 8-114
AO, 2-36–2-56 force protection, 12-116
local counterattack during,
A2C2 and, 2-46–2-48 hostile IO, 12-116
9-10, 9-25, 9-79–9-82
ACM and, 2-48,2-49 human dimension, 12-116
MBA operations for, 9-8–9-9
area of influence and, 2-39 local security and, 12-115
movement planning for, 9-18
assembly area and, 2-58 rear area and base security,
obstacles, use of, 9-72, 9-77
assignment of and mission E-23
offensive operations during,
command, 2-37 route security, E-150
9-69
contiguous. See contiguous AO rules of engagement, 12-116
planning for, 9-19–9-43
defined, 2-36 Army air movements, 14-4
possible results of, 9-83, 9-88–
fires and, 2-43–2-44 9-89 Army aviation. See also airborne
noncontiguous. See preparing for, 9-44–9-53 operations; air assault
noncontiguous AO operations,
rear area and base security
PAA and, 2-117 during, 9-7 attack, use during, 5-85
security and, 2-45 rehearsals for, 9-49–9-50, base/base cluster defense, use
approach march, 14-26–14-31 9-52–9-53 during, E-76
defined, 14-26 breakout, use during, D-63
Index-1
FM 3-90
Army aviation (continued) assembly area, 2-57–2-59 civil affairs, E-82, E-144
communications for, 3-148 attack, breakout, D-60 civil considerations, E-66, E-77,
CSS, in support of, 3-174 daylight, 5-29 E-82, E-90, E-107
defense, use in the, 8-50 defined, p. 5-1 COP, E-99, E-116
defensive encirclement fire support for, 5-5, 5-39–5-41, counterattacks during, E-75
operations, use during, D-34 5-50, 5-82, 5-85, 5-96 counterintelligence for, E-72
delay, use during, 11-12, 11-41, ISR for, 5-19, 5-20, 5-49, 5-65 countermobility operations
11-42, 11-55 limited-visibility, 5-30–5-38 during, E-95
exploitation, use during, 6-10, maneuver sequence during, counterreconnaissance during,
6-44, 6-45 5-83 E-75
fire support and, 3-144, 5-115 MTC, differences, 3-7 CSS and, E-98
flank guard and, 12-81 offensive IO and, 5-28 fire support, E-76, E-93, E-125,
forward passage of lines, use E-129
preparation tasks, 5-48
during, 16-27 force protection, E-96
rehearsal for, 5-51
infiltration (form of maneuver), fratricide, E-90
reserve and, 5-5, 5-6, 5-7–5-10
and, 3-73 fundamentals of, E-70–E-80
shaping operations and, 5-6
mobile defense, use during, IPB, E-59, E-72, E-82, E-83
10-10, 10-30 situational understanding
during, 5-65 ISR, E-82, E-140
MTC, use during, 4-12, 4-54
attack position, defined, 3-15, local security and, E-87
offensive encirclement
5-54 military working dogs and,
operations, D-6, D-19
attack-by-fire position, defined, E-128
passage of lines, 16-4
3-14 MP forces, use of during, E-59
penetration, 3-93, 3-100
axis of advance, defined, 3-16 multinational operations, E-55,
pursuit, use during, 7-20 E-66, E-84, E-103,
trigger line and, 2-70
reconnaissance operations, E-105, E-107, E-120, E-123,
13-13, 13-58, 13-68 E-138
B
retirement, 11-99 NBC operations, E-118
base, 8-113, E-19–E-22. See also
security operations, 12-30, offensive IO, E-144
perimeter defense
12-39, 12-40
base/base cluster defense, E-47– offensive operations during,
spoiling attacks and, 5-166, E-119
E-149. See also perimeter
5-168
defense patrols, E-123–E-129
TCF, as a, E-63
ADC, E-97, E-112, E-145– perimeter defense, E-122
troop movement, use for, 14-48 E-149 reaction operations, E-134–
art of tactics, 1-12–1-19, p. 1-6– air defense for, E-94 E-136
1-9
ambush, use during, E-125 rear area security forces, E-57–
artillery. See fire support (assets), E-64
area reconnaissance for,
assailable flank, defined, 2-18 E-106, E-107 reconnaissance operations,
envelopment and an, 3-29, Army aviation, E-76 E-106, E-107
3-31, 3-38 reserve, E-51
attack-by fire, defense against,
frontal attack and an, 3-102 E-139 response force, E-56, E-84,
penetration and an, 3-82 base cluster defense force, E-87, E-117–E-118, E-137
assault echelon, airborne E-56 responsiveness of, E-79–E-80
operations, C-15, C-35 BDF, E-49–E-55 risk, E-59
assault position, defined, 3-12, bunkers, E-130, E-132 security operations, E-72,
5-84, 5-89–5-93 E-89–E-90, E-129
C2 of, E-79
assault time, 3-13 security platoons, E-50, E-52
CFZ, E-141
Index-2
Index
base/base cluster defense, bounding overwatch (movement situational understanding

(continued) technique), 14-36 during, D-53
situational understanding bounds, withdraw by, 5-142 stay-behind operations during,
during, E-116 box formation, 3-131 11-119
snipers, use of, E-142–E-143 branches. See transitions, troop movement during, D-66
static positions, E-130–E-134 breach, breakout, during a, D-61 bypass (tactical mission task),
survivability operations, E-95, 5-120
infiltration (form of maneuver),
E-110–E-112 and, 3-58 attack, during, 5-88
TCF, E-60–E-64, E-84, E-87, penetration, during a, 3-96– exploitation, during, 6-47
E-118 3-99 pursuit, during, 7-25, 7-29
training, E-114–E-115 breach force, 5-90–5-91 execution of, 4-30–4-59
base cluster, E-19, E-27–E-29. breakout, D-41–D-71 MTC during, 4-25, 4-49
See also base
air defense for, D-70
base cluster defense force, E-56
air support for, D-58 C
battle, 1-4, 1-5
attack during, D-44, D-60 C2 system, decision making and,
battle position, AO, compared 1-16, 1-33
breach during, D-61
with, 8-14–8-15
countermobility operations for, modernized, 5-66
defined, 8-13
D-69 momentum and, 1-42
types of, 8-17
CSS for, D-47, D-70 caches, 11-85
battlefield mobility. See tactical
delay during, D-48, D-64 calculated risk, defined, 1-27. See
mobility,
destruction criteria, D-43 also risk
battlefield organization, 2-5, 2-74–
DLIC, D-60 camouflage, 8-70
2-80
fire support for, D-63, D-68 campaign, 1-4
battlefield visualization,
reconnaissance operations, follow and assume force during, CAS. See also air support
13-43 D-42, D-46, D-62, D-63 delay, during, 11-55
BDAR, offensive operations, follow and support force during, exploitation, during, 6-9, 6-30
3-172 D-46 fire support, during, 3-144
BDOC, E-23–E-26 ISR during, D-53–D-54 forward passage of lines, 16-27
BHL, 8-10 limited visibility, D-58 MTC, during, 4-34, 4-54
area defense, 9-75 military deception during, D-50, pursuit, during, 7-20
area defensive operations, D-55–D-57, D-59
CFL, defined, 2-83
during, 9-61, 9-64 mobility operations during, D-69
exploitation, use during, 6-18
security area for rearward momentum, D-42
passage of lines, and, 16-35 offensive operations, use
MTC during, D-60 during, 3-147
security operations, 12-14, offensive IO for, D-55–D-57
12-15 CFZ, base/base cluster defense,
penetration during, D-44 E-141
BOS, defined, 2-10
rear guard for, D-48, D-65, defined, 2-61
boundaries, ACM and, 2-49 D-67 infiltration (form of maneuver),
AO and, 2-38 reconnaissance in force during, and, 3-73
defined, 2-49 D-54 check point, 2-60
infiltration lane as, 3-65 reserve for, D-42, D-49 civil affairs. See CMO,
infiltration (form of maneuver), rupture force for, D-44–D-45 civil considerations, area security,
and, 3-65 security operations during, for, 12-116
noncontiguous AO, 2-53–2-54 D-47 base/base cluster defense,
obstacles and, 2-105, 2-108 shaping operations during, during, E-66, E-77, E-82, E-90,
penetration and, 3-85 D-55–D-57, D-59 E-107
Index-3
FM 3-90
civil considerations (continued) cohesion, 5-112. See also human linkup, during a, D-76
defensive operations, during, dimension mobile defense, during a, 10-1
8-31, 8-74 column formation, 3-125–3-126 offensive operations, during,
denial operations, during, combat formation, 3-122–3-137 3-3, 3-184
11-110, 11-113, 11-116 combat information, 1-24. See security operations, during,
exploitation, during, 6-34 also information 12-32
forward passage of lines, combat load, 3-168 transitions, during, 8-169
during, 16-29 combat outpost, 12-121–12-123. cordon security (route security
infiltration (form of maneuver), See also defensive technique), E-155–E-158
during, 3-68, 3-72 encirclement operations counterattack(s), 5-145–5-159,
movement of fire support combat power, 2-4, 8-176 8-44
assets, for, 5-115 combat security (route security area defense, during, 9-39–
offensive operations, during, technique), E-159–E-160 9-43
3-117 combat-configured loads, 8-97 base/base cluster defense,
perimeter defense, during, combination pursuit, 7-10–7-13 during, 8-113, E-75
8-120 cover, during, 12-94
combined arms, 2-12–2-14
rear area and base security, defensive cover, during, 12-109
commander’s visualization. See
during, E-29, E-40–E-46
visualization, defined, 5-145
reconnaissance operations,
complementary effects, 2-13 delay, during, 11-54
13-1, 13-9, 13-14
concealment, 8-68–8-69 local, 5-149, 5-152, 5-158,
retirement, during, 11-106,
consolidation, 5-105–5-112, 5-114 5-159
11-108
contact point, 2-61–2-62, 11-15 major, 5-147, 5-152
RFL, for, 2-95
contiguous AO, 2-50, 2-52, 2-74– mobile defense, during. See
route reconnaissance, during,
2-80 striking force
13-23
continuous operations, 1-19 withdrawal, during, 11-89
TCF, for, E-64
contractors, E-6–E-10 counterfire missions, timing of,
troop movement, for, 14-5,
8-55
14-41 control measures, basic, 2-31–
2-34 counterintelligence, rear area and
clear (tactical mission task),
base security, E-46, E-72
base/base cluster defense, direct fire. See 2-64–2-73
during, E-119 countermobility operations,
labeling for security operation,
base/base cluster defense,
heavy force technique for, 12-13
E-95
5-103 convex slope, fig. 8-14
breakout, during, D-69
close area, 2-77 convoy security, CSS for, E-174
CSS considerations, 8-76, 8-83
close column, 14-21–14-22 fire support for, E-173, E-179
defensive encirclement
close combat, close area and, urban environment, in an, operations, during, D-36
2-77 E-175
defensive operations, during,
defined, 3-120 coordinating altitude, 2-46, 2-48 8-76–8-84, 8-112
CMO, base/base cluster defense, COP, 1-22, 5-66 delay, during, 11-45
during, E-82, E-144
airborne operations, during, denial operations, compared to,
defensive operations, during, C-38 11-113
8-74
area defense, during an, 9-59, mobile defense, during, 10-14,
denial operations, during, 9-80 10-18
11-113
base/base cluster defense, offensive encirclement
exploitation, during, 6-34 during a, E-99, E-116 operations, during, D-13
rear area and base security, decision making and, 1-16 offensive operations, during,
during, E-43
delay, during a, 11-43 3-157–3-160
troop movements and, 8-103
Index-4
Index
countermobility operations base/base cluster defense, for, TCF, for, E-64

(continued) E-98 terrain management and, 8-100
pursuit, during, 7-12 breakout, for, D-47, D-70 transitions and, 8-164
security operations, during, C2 of, 2-78 troop movements, for, 14-44,
12-31 convoy security and, E-174 14-52, 14-55
striking force, during, 10-8, defensive operations, during, turning movement, for, 3-50–
10-36 8-87, 8-95–8-104 3-51
counterreconnaissance, defensive encirclement withdrawal, 11-67, 11-81,
base/base cluster defense, operations, during, D-37–D-38 11-85, 11-88
E-75
delay, during, 11-13–11-14, cueing reconnaissance assets,
counterslope, fig. 8-14 11-63 13-52
counterterrorism operations, rear exploitation for, 3-174, 6-15 culmination/culminating point, 6-7
area and base security, E-48,
forward passage of lines, for, delay, during a, 11-64
E-65
16-29 enemy, indications of, 8-159
cover (form of security
frontal attack, for, 3-108 exploitation, during an, 6-7,
operations)/covering force,
12-88–12-112 infiltration (form of maneuver), 6-52
for, 3-63 offensive operations, during,
counterattack, during, 12-94
mobile defense, for, 10-19 3-186–3-198
defensive, 12-107–12-112. See
also defensive cover momentum and, 3-167, 3-168 pursuit, during, 7-5, 7-28, 7-39
defined, 12-1 movement control and, 14-55 transitions to the offense and,
MTC, for, 4-14–4-15 8-159
flank, 12-91, 12-105–12-106
mutual support of, 2-21 withdrawal, during, 11-66
guard, during, 12-93
guard, compared to, 12-89– noncontiguous AOs and, 2-56
12-90 offensive encirclement D
MTC, during, 4-7 operations, for, D-19 deception operations. See military
offensive operations, during, deception,
offensive, 12-97–12-104. See
also offensive cover 3-167–3-175 decision making, art of tactics
perimeter defense, of, 8-141 and, 1-16
reserve for, 12-94
positioning of, 8-100, 8-104 C2 system and, 1-33
screen and, 12-93
pursuit, during, 3-174 time-constrained environment,
screen, compared to, 12-89–
in a, 1-31
12-90 raid, for a, 3-175
training and, 1-29
covering force. See cover rear area and, 2-78–2-79
decision point(s), offensive
criminal investigation, rear area rear area and base security
operations, 3-181
and base security, E-46 and, E-25, E-36
trigger line and, 2-73
critical area, rear area and base rearward passage of lines,
security, E-35 during, 16-37, 16-40 transitions and, 3-47
CS. See CSS reconnaissance operations, for, decisive counterattack, area
13-56–13-57 defense, and, 9-85–9-87
CSS (assets). See also perimeter
defense rehearsals and, 9-52 local counterattack, comparison
with, 9-85
air assault operations, for, C-63 relief in place, for, 15-7, 15-12,
15-17, 15-28 decisive engagement, 2-15
air defense considerations,
8-72 retirement, for, 11-95, 11-99, decisive operation, attack, of an,
11-101–11-108 5-4
airborne operations, for, C-15,
C-28, C-31–C-32, C-44 security operations, for, 12-33– counterattack and, 5-145
area defense, during, 6-64, 12-36 designation of, 4-29
9-66, 9-77 striking force, for, 10-7 width of AO and, 5-6
Index-5
FM 3-90
decisive point, defensive IPB for, 8-112 conducted by, 11-9

operations, during, 8-45 ISR during, 8-31–8-94 contact points and, 11-15
decisive terrain, defined, 2-55, linear obstacle, of a, 8-114– counterattacks during, 11-54
3-121 8-117 countermobility operations for,
deep area, 2-75–2-76 maintenance during, 8-100 11-45
forward boundary and, 2-51 mass-casualties during, 8-102 CP displacement during, 11-44
defeat in detail, 1-30, 7-23, 8-46, offensive IO and, 8-1 CSS for, 11-13–11-14, 11-63
9-57, 9-77
offensive operations during, culmination during, 11-64
defensive encirclement 9-21, 9-24 defensive cover during, 12-109
operations and, D-31
positioning of assets, 8-104 defined, 11-5
defined, 2-16
pursuit, transition to, 7-39 displacement criteria, 11-23
exploitation and, 6-46
rear area and base security, effects of terrain on, 11-31–
mutual support and, 2-22 during, 8-112 11-34
offensive operations and, 3-157 reasons for conducting, p. 8-1 engineer priorities for, 11-13
penetration and, 3-82 reserve, use of, 8-107 fire support for, 11-12, 11-20,
piecemeal commitment and, reverse slopes and, 8-142– 11-55, 11-60
2-24 8-154 flanks, 11-22, 11-48
pursuit and, 7-3 risk during, 8-112, 8-115 guard as a delay force, 12-66
defense. See defensive security operations during, 8-43 heavy forces, use of, 11-39
operations
seizing the initiative during, ISR, 11-35–11-36, 11-47
defense in depth, linear obstacle, 9-21, 9-24
of, 8-115 light forces, use of, 11-40
shaping operations during,
perimeter defense and, 8-122, mobile defense, compared with,
8-107
8-124, 8-137 11-38
signal support for, 8-106
defensive cover, 12-107–12-112 obstacle lane
situational understanding and,
defensive encirclement obstacles, use during, 11-20,
8-106
operations, D-26–D-40. See 11-23, 11-32, 11-40, 11-56,
strengths of, 8-1 11-61
also perimeter defense
survivability operations during, offensive IO during, 11-34
defensive IO, defensive
8-112
operations, during, 8-43 reasons to conduct, 11-6
tactical mobility and, 9-25
defensive encirclement recovery operations during,
operations, during, D-40 task organization for, 8-108 11-53
mobile defense, during, 10-22 terrain features that favor, 8-42 reserve, use of, 11-11, 11-41,
offensive operations, during, transitions and, 3-196–3-197, 11-62
3-3, 3-163 8-155–8-176 risk involved, 11-7, 11-25
defensive operations/defense. troop movements during, 8-103 security operations for, 11-41,
See also base/base cluster types of, 8-3 11-48, 11-50–11-53
defense; perimeter defense delay, 11-5–11-64 smoke, 11-34, 11-46
advantages of, 8-1, 8-11 air defense for, 11-21 survivability operations during,
C2 considerations, 8-9–8-27, air support for, 11-55, 11-60 11-46
8-105–8-110 tactical mobility and, 11-20
ambushes during, 11-40
countermobility efforts, 8-112 techniques of, 11-24–11-30, tbl.
Army aviation, use of, 11-12,
covering force operations and, 11-41, 11-55 11-1
12-109 termination of, 11-64
assessing, 11-58
CSS considerations, 8-95– transitions and, 11-64
8-104 breakout, D-48, D-64
C2 of, 11-43–11-44 trigger lines, use of, 11-57
defined, p. 8-1
communications for, 11-43 delay line, 11-17
Index-6
Index
delay order, 11-24–11-26 area security as, 12-115 supporting distance and, 3-34,
delaying operation, offensive base/base cluster defense as, 3-39
encirclement operations, D-15 E-106 transitions during, 3-36, 3-41
deliberate operation, 1-21–1-37 defensive operations, during, turning movement, compared
demolition policy, denial 8-45, 8-115 with, 3-42, 3-34
operations and, 11-114 delay as, 11-6 varieties of, 3-29
demonstration, 5-160–5-161 screen as, 12-48 vertical, 3-29, 3-42
frontal attack, and, 3-106 electronic warfare. See offensive escape route (reduce technique),
denial operations, 11-110–11-117 IO D-24
destruction criteria, breakout, elements of operational design, exfiltration, D-72
D-43 2-9 exploitation. See also follow and
withdrawal, 11-85 emergency destruction of support; follow and assume
equipment. See denial advance guard, use of, 6-14
destruction of civilian property,
operations
11-110 air assault operations during,
enabling operations, tactical, 2-2 6-47
destruction of equipment to
prevent capture, 11-104. See encirclement operations, 8-49 air defense considerations for,
also denial operations breakout and, D-41–D-71. See 6-9, 6-32
diamond formation, 3-132–3-133 also breakout air support and, 6-9, 6-30
direct fire control measures, 2-64– defensive, D-26–D-40. See airborne operations during,
2-73. See also under individual also defensive encirclement 6-47
control measures operations
Army aviation, use of, 6-10,
direct fire plan, engagement defined, p. D-0 6-44, 6-45
criteria and, 2-66 envelopment and, 3-36 CFL, use of, 6-18
direct pressure force. See pursuit, example, D-12 civil considerations, during,
directed obstacle. See obstacle, exfiltration and, D-72 6-34
direction of attack, defined, 3-17 linkup and, D-75–D-81 civil-military operations, during,
trigger line and, 2-70 offensive. See offensive 6-34
disengagement line, 8-27 encirclement operations commander’s intent and, 6-20–
pursuit during, 7-10, 7-25, 6-21
disintegration, indications of, 6-40
7-33–34 conducting an, 5-119
dismounted assault, 5-100–5-103
encircling force. See pursuit control of, 6-21, 6-24
dismounted march, 14-2
engagement, 1-4, 1-6 CS factors, 6-15
disrupt (tactical mission task),
5-67–5-72 engagement criteria, 2-66 CSS for, 3-174, 6-15, 6-33–
engagement priority, 2-67 6-34
diversion. See military deception
engineer reconnaissance, troop defined, 3-9
DLIC, 11-72–11-74, D-60.See
also defensive encirclement movement, for, 14-44, 14-47 engineers, use of, 6-10, 6-34
operations entry operations, 3-5 fire support for, 6-8, 6-28–6-30
doctrinal hierarchy, 2-1–2-3 envelopment, 3-29–3-41 follow and support during, 6-52
DOD civilians, E-6–E-10 defined, 3-29 force, size of, 6-5
double envelopment, 3-30 double, 3-30 formation for, 3-131, 3-132,
encirclement and, 3-36 6-25–6-27
E pursuit, during, 3-36, 7-3, 7-10, information and, 6-48
EA, 2-65, 2-70 7-16 initiative during, 6-39
echelon formation, 3-129–3-130 reserve, use of, 3-41 ISR during, 6-38, 6-40, 6-42–
shaping operations and, 3-38 6-44
economy of force (operation),
5-74, 5-75 liaison, requirement for, 6-7
Index-7
FM 3-90
exploitation (continued) fire support (assets), air assault reconnaissance operations, for,
LOA and, 3-19 operations, for, C-60 13-10, 13-17, 13-21, 13-65
local, 6-3 airborne operations, for, C-29, relief in place, for, 15-12, 15-13,
C-34 15-29
major, 6-3
Army aviation, and, 3-144 screen, for, 12-55
mobility requirements for, 6-7,
6-10 assault on an objective, for, search and attack, for, 4-66
5-95 security operations, for, 12-29
obstacles, use of, 6-17, 6-31
attack criteria, 5-39–5-40 spoiling attacks, for, 5-166,
offensive IO and, 6-28
attack, for, 5-41 5-168
penetration and, 3-100
base/base cluster defense, for, supporting range and, 3-147
pursuit, transition to, 7-39
E-76, E-93, E-125, E-129 trigger line for, 2-71–2-72
rear area and base security,
breakout, for, D-63, D-68 zone reconnaissance, for,
during, 6-34
CAS and, 3-144 13-31
reconnaissance forces, use of,
6-12 CFZ and, 2-61 fire support base, search and
control of, 5-5 attack, use during, 4-69
reserve, use of during, 6-11,
6-26, 6-34, 6-54 convoy security and, E-173, fire support target, 2-96–2-98. See
E-179 also target
risk during, 6-49
defensive encirclement TRP as, 2-69
security forces, use of, 6-13
operations, for, D-35 fires, AO and, 2-43–2-44, 3-7
security, during, 6-23, 6-45
defensive operations, for, 8-50– fix (tactical mission task), air
targeting considerations, 6-28
8-58 interdiction, as a means of,
delay, for, 11-20, 11-55, 11-60 5-77
F attack and, 5-73–5-78
exploitation, for, 6-28–6-30
FCL, 3-12, 3-18, 5-89–5-93 exploitation and, 6-46
FCL and, 3-18
FEBA, airhead line, compared interdiction, as a means of,
forward passage of lines, for,
with, C-23 5-77
16-21, 16-27
defined, 8-13 pursuit, during, 7-25, 7-31
fratricide and, 3-143
FLOT and, 2-99 fixing force, mobile defense, in,
LD and, 3-20
security force, 8-13 8-6, 10-28. See also search
linkup, for, D-76, D-80
feint, 3-106, 5-160–5-161 and attack
maneuver of, 5-82, 5-85, 5-96,
FFA, 2-86 flank(s), 2-17–2-19
5-115
field artillery. See fire support defined, 2-17
mobile defense, for, 10-15–
field of fire, 11-31 10-16 delay and, 11-22, 11-48
finishing force. See search and MTC, for, 4-23, 4-34, 4-54 envelopment and, 2-38
attack, obstacle belts and, 2-109 offensive operations and, 3-158
fire and movement, mutual offensive encirclement penetration and, 3-99
support of, 2-21 operations, for, D-19 screen and, 12-48
fire control measure(s), 2-64–2-73 offensive operations, for, support-by-fire position and,
check point as, 2-60 3-141–3-149 3-24
defensive operations, during, passage of lines, for, 16-13 flank cover, 12-91, 12-105–12-106
8-28–8-27 planned targets, 2-98 flank guard, 12-76–12-85, 12-105
fire discipline, ambush, during, position areas for, 5-82 flank security. See security
5-141 operations,
pursuit, for, 7-12, 7-30
fire plan. See fire support, flanking position, 2-19
quick-fire net and, 3-148
fire strike (reduce technique), FLOT, 2-99
rearward passage of lines, for,
D-19
16-36, 16-38
fire superiority, 5-17
Index-8
Index
follow and assume (force), defensive operations, during, frontal attack, 3-102–3-109
breakout, in a, D-42, D-46, 8-12 CSS for, 3-108
D-62, D-63 LOA and, 3-19 defined, 3-102
exploitation, in the, 5-119, 6-3, forward defense, linear obstacle, reconnaissance in force
6-7 of, 8-114 conducted as, 13-40, 13-41
forward passage of lines, in a, perimeter defense and, 8-122, reserve for, 3-108
6-7 8-123
shaping operation, 3-31, 3-102,
penetration, in a, 3-82, 3-85, forward military crest, fig. 8-14 3-106
3-99, 3-100
forward passage of lines, 16-21– frontal pursuit, 7-9
follow and support (force), 16-30
breakout, during a, D-46 FSCL, 2-84–2-85
civil considerations for, 16-29
bypassed enemy, and, 5-88 FSCM, 2-81–2-95. See also
CSS for, 16-29 individual measures
exploitation, during an, 5-119,
defined, 16-2 defensive operations, during,
6-7, 6-52
exploitation, in the, 6-7 8-24–8-25, 8-53
offensive encirclement
operations, during, D-5 fire support for, 16-21, 16-27 permissive, 2-82–2-86. See
offensive IO for, 16-27 also individual measures
penetration, during a, 3-82
reconnaissance operations for, pursuit, during, 7-17
pursuit, during a, 7-7, 7-15,
7-25 16-26 restrictive, 2-87–2-95. See also
security of LD and, 16-21 individual measures
follow-on echelon, C-15
security operations and, 16-26 security operations, 12-22
foot march, 14-2
force protection, 1-32 forward slope, fig. 8-14
FPF, 8-25 G
area defense, during, 9-6, 9-36
fratricide (prevention), 5-141, gamble. See military gamble,
area security and, 12-116
8-56, 8-65 general control (rear area and
base/base cluster defense and,
base/base cluster defense and, base security), E-37
E-96
E-90 ground tactical plan, C-4, C-5
contractors for, E-6–E-10
EA and, 2-65 air assault operations, C-58–
DOD civilians for, E-6–E-10
fire support and, 3-143 C-59
obstacles and, 2-110
FLOT and, 2-99 airborne operations, C-35
offensive operations, 3-157–
FSCL and, 2-84 guard (form of security operation),
3-166
12-62–12-87
perimeter defense and, 8-127 infiltration (form of maneuver),
and, 3-65 advance, 12-69–12-75
rear area and, 2-79
linkup and, D-80 area defense, as a, 12-66
security operations and, p. 12-0
LOA and, 3-19 breakout and, D-47
forced march, 14-6
mobile defense and, 10-1 cover and, 12-93
formation, box, 3-131
obstacles and, 2-110 cover, compared to, 12-89–
column, 3-125–3-126 12-90
passage of lines, and, 16-5,
diamond, 3-132–3-133 defined, 12-1
16-14
echelon, 3-129–3-130 delay, as a, 12-66
pursuit and, 7-15
line, 3-127–3-128 flank, 12-76–12-85. See also
relief in place and, 15-5
vee, 3-136–3-137 flank guard
search and attack and, 4-67
wedge, 3-134–3-135 MTC, as a, 12-66
security operations and, 12-22
forms of maneuver, 3-28–3-107. rear, 12-86–12-87
stay-behind operations and,
See also individual forms screen and, 12-62
11-120
forward boundary, 2-51 screen as part of, 12-68
striking force and, 10-16
terrain management and, 2-41 types of, 12-63
Index-9
FM 3-90
guard (form of security operation) retrograde, 11-3 intermediate staging area, C-15
(continued) transitions, during, 3-195, intermediate staging base, 10-19,
zone reconnaissance, as a, 8-165, 8-174 C-15
12-66 IPB, aerial, 8-72
I–J approach march, for, 14-28
H IBCT, combat formations for, base/base cluster defense, for,
hammer and anvil (reduce 3-124 E-59, E-72, E-82, E-83
technique), D-22 illumination, during limited visibility defensive operations, during,
hasty attack, ISR, as a means of, attacks, 5-34–5-35 8-12
1-32 infiltration, rally point and, 3-24 delay, during, 11-19
pursuit and, 7-11, 7-25, 7-39 infiltration (form of maneuver), direct fire control measures
hasty defense, pursuit during, 3-56–3-82 and, 2-64
7-12 aborting of, 3-81 offensive cover and, 12-101
hasty operation, 1-21–1-37 defined, 3-56 offensive operations, for, 3-115
heavy forces, assailable flank for, mutual support and preventing, reconnaissance operations,
2-18 2-22 and, 13-2, 13-10, 13-46, 13-68,
assembly area location and, infiltration (movement technique), p. 13-0
2-59 14-23–14-25 reconnaissance-pull/push and,
defense, use in the, 8-47 relief in place and, 15-4 13-49–13-50
delay, use in, 11-39 infiltration lane, 3-65 search and attack and, 4-64
infiltration (form of maneuver), information, attack planning, and, security operations, and, 12-7,
and, 3-58 5-20 12-45
penetration, 3-92, 3-100 exploitation, during, 6-48 survivability operations and,
pursuit, use during, 7-11, 7-12 3-165
pursuit, during, 7-12, 7-28, 7-35
rear area and base security, isolate (tactical mission task),
information management, rear
use in, 8-113 nonlethal fires and, 5-76
area and base security, E-25
tactical mobility and, 2-30 ISR (assets/operations). See also
reconnaissance by fire;
H-hour, different meanings of, 13-9
reconnaissance in force;
3-27 information requirements, reconnaissance objective;
host nation support. See offensive operations, 3-119 reconnaissance operations;
multinational operations, reconnaissance operations, reconnaissance-pull;
human dimension, 1-17–1-19 13-17 reconnaissance-push,
airborne operations, during, information superiority, air defense, role in, 8-72
C-33, C-35 envelopment and, 3-37 airborne operations, and, C-38
area security and, 12-116 turning movement and, 3-52 area defense, during, 9-4–9-5,
cohesion and, 5-112 initiating directive, airborne 9-44, 9-57
defensive encirclement operations, C-25 attack, for, 5-19, 5-20, 5-65
operations, during, D-26, D-28, initiative, 1-38–1-42 base/base cluster defense,
D-39–D-40 area defense, during, 9-10 E-82, E-140
example of, p. 1-5 exploitation, during, 6-3, 6-39 breakout, for, D-53–D-54
limited visibility operations, offensive operations during, characteristics of, 13-14
during, 3-140 3-1, 3-111 consolidation, during, 5-106
march discipline and, 14-53 intelligence. See ISR cueing of, 13-52
offense to defense, during shift interdiction, fix and, 5-77 defensive operations, for, 8-31–
from, 9-87
TAI and, 2-121 8-94
intermediate objective, 3-21, 5-87 delay, for, 11-47, 11-35–11-36
during, p. 13-0
Index-10
Index
ISR (assets/operations) LD, attack position and, 3-15 methods of, D-78–D-80
(continued) defined, 3-20 multinational, D-81
exploitation, during, 6-12, 6-38, fire support, 3-20 RFL and, 2-95
6-40, 6-42–6-44
LC and, 3-20, 2-100 stay-behind operations and,
fighting for information, 9-4 11-119
time of attack and, 3-26
follow-though, during, 5-114, transitions and, 3-49
transitions and, 3-20
5-121
leadership. See human linkup point, 3-66
hasty attack as a means of,
dimension, LOA, defined, 3-19
1-32
levels of war, 1-3, 1-4, 1-7–1-8 exploitations and, 3-19
infiltration(form of maneuver),
and, 3-62, 3-67 light forces, assailable flank for, forward boundary and, 3-19
2-18 objective and, 3-19
mobile defense, 10-25, 10-32
assembly area location and, pursuit and, 3-19
modernized, 5-66
2-59
MTC, use during, 4-2, 4-41 LOC(s), defined, 3-35
defense, use in the, 8-48
offensive encirclement noncontiguous AO and, 2-56
delay, use in the, 11-32
operations, during, D-6, D-17 offensive operations, 3-170,
delay, use in the, 11-40 3-171
offensive operations, during,
3-115–3-119 infiltration(form of maneuver), local counterattack, area defense,
use in a, 3-58 9-10, 9-79–9-82
PD and, 3-22
penetration, use in a, 3-92 decisive counterattack,
perimeter defense, during,
8-129 pursuit, use during, 7-11 comparison, 9-85
plan, 13-47, 13-48 stay-behind operations, use in, local exploitation, 6-3
11-120 local security, 12-118–12-120
pursuit, during, 7-19, 7-28, 7-29
light line, 14-18 area security and, 12-115
rear area and base security,
during, E-39 limited conversion division, base/base cluster defense and,
combat formations for, 3-124 E-87
13-9, 13-20, 13-21, 13-43, limited visibility operations, defined, 12-1
13-47, 13-48 breakout, during a, D-58
rear area and base security
relief in place, 15-21 human dimension, 3-140 and, E-21
reverse slope defense, for, offensive operations, during, reconnaissance operations
8-148 3-138–3-140 and, 13-5
risk and, 1-30 passage of lines, during a, LOGPAC, 4-14
16-15
security operations, support to,
12-9, 12-27, 12-32 reconnaissance operations,
M
during, 13-66–13-67
tactical road march, 14-11 main effort, 3-181
relief in place, 15-8
transitions, 8-175 maintenance operations,
troop movement, during a,
troop movement, 14-49–14-52 defensive operations, during,
14-22, 14-52
list, tbl. 13-1 8-100
withdrawal, during a, 11-86
line formation, 3-127–3-128 3-172
K–L
linear obstacle, defense of, 8-114 retirement, during, 11-104
key terrain, defined, 2-55
linkup operations, D-75–D-81 major exploitation, 6-3
examples of, 8-38
airborne operations, C-26, C-44 major operation, 1-4
kill zone, 5-129
communications for, D-76 maneuver, defined, 2-20
landing plan, C-4
COP, D-76 forms of, 3-28–3-107. See also
LC, defined, 2-100
fire support for, D-76, D-80 individual forms
LD and, 3-20
fratricide during, D-80 means of exploiting, 5-80
Index-11
FM 3-90
march column, 14-10 military gamble, 1-27 defensive operations, during,

march discipline, 14-53 mines. see obstacle, 8-74–8-75
march serial, 14-10 mission command, 2-37, 12-112 mobile defense, during, 10-18
march techniques, 14-19–14-25 mixing reconnaissance assets, MTC, during, 4-9
march unit, 14-10 defined, 13-53 NBC reconnaissance, during,
mobile defense, air defense 8-75
marshaling plan, C-4
during, 10-17 offensive encirclement
mass, defensive operations,
Army aviation, use of, 10-30 operations, during, D-13
during, 8-45
counterattack during, . See offensive operations, during,
example of, p. 8-2–8-3
striking force 3-154–3-156
risk and, 1-35
countermobility operations, relief in place, during, 15-14
mass-casualties, defensive
10-14, 10-18 route reconnaissance, during,
operations, during, 8-101
CSS during, 10-19 13-25
MBA, 8-11
defensive IO during, 10-22 striking force, during, 10-8,
medical equipment and supplies, 10-36
destruction of, 11-110 defined, p. 10-1
troop movements and, 8-103
medical operations, offensive delay, compared with, 11-38
momentum, 1-41–1-42
operations, during, 3-173 example of, p. 10-2–10-3
security operations, during, fire support for, 10-15–10-16
12-36 CSS and, 3-167, 3-168
fixing force during, 10-5, 10-28
meeting engagement, covering offensive operations, during,
ISR during, 10-25, 10-32
tasks for, 4-3, 12-100 3-112, 3-155
linear obstacle, of, 8-116–8-117
METT-TC, 2-8 piecemeal commitment and,
military deception during, 2-24
military crest, p. 1-7, fig. 8-14 10-21, 10-22
morale. See human dimension,
military deception, 2-122, 5-160– mobility operations during,
5-161 mortars. See fire support (assets),
10-18
air assault operations, during, obstacles, use of, 10-18, 10-29
C-48 mounted assault, 5-100–5-103
offensive IO during, 10-22,
area defense, during, 9-71 mounted march, 14-3
10-27
attack, during, 5-25 movement control, 2-42, 14-56,
phases of, 10-23–10-37
15-30
breakout, during, D-50, D-55– reserve, use of, 10-3, 10-30
D-57, D-59 movement control centers, 14-45
reserve, resourcing of, 10-10
combat information and, 1-24 movement order, 14-40–14-42
risks associated with, 10-1
defensive operations, during, movement plan, airborne/air
security operations, 10-25, assault operations, C-4
8-56
10-26
DLIC and, 11-72 movement techniques, 14-32
shaping operations, 10-27,
fix, as a means of, 5-78 movements, 14-4–14-5
10-28
flank guard and, 12-87 movement to contact, advance
shaping operations,
guard and, 12-70
infiltration (form of maneuver), striking force. See striking force
and, 3-73 air defense and, 4-35
survivability operations, 10-18
mobile defense, during, 10-21, air support and, 4-2, 4-34, 4-54
transitions to the offense, 8-161
10-22 Army aviation and, 4-12, 4-54
when to conduct, 10-1
relief in place, during, 15-18, attack, compared with, 3-7
15-23 mobility (assets/operations),
breakout and, D-60
breakout, during a, D-69
reverse slope defense and, bypass (tactical task) 4-25
8-145, 8-154 defensive encirclement
operations, during, D-36 concentration during, 4-36
smoke and, 8-94
Index-12
Index
control measures for, 4-16– reconnaissance operations, O

4-20 E-46
objective, 3-19, 3-21
movement to contact (continued) relief in place, 15-31
example of, p. 8-2
decision points and, 4-27 security operations, E-46
objective rally point, 3-24
defined, p. 4-1 troop movement, 8-103
oblique defilade, 8-147, fig. 8-15
fire support for, 4-23, 4-34, 4-54 mutual support, 2-21–2-22
obscurants. See smoke
flank and rear security for, 4-11 civil considerations, E-41
obstacle(s), actions on
formation for, 3-134 defensive operations, during, encountering, 4-39, 4-44, 4-47
fundamentals of, 4-1 8-46
ambush, use in an, 5-130–
guard as a, 12-66 defined, 2-21 5-131
ISR, use of, 4-2, 4-41 perimeter defense and, 8-125, area defense, use during, 9-77
8-135
JAAT during, 4-54 area defensive operations, use
rear area and base security during, 9-72
location of commander during,
and, E-41
4-40 consolidation, use during,
sectors of fire and, 2-68 5-110
LOGPAC during, 4-14
meeting engagement during, defensive operations, use
4-3 N during. See countermobility
movement during, 4-37–4-38 NAI, defined, 2-101 defined, 2-102
noncontiguous AOs, and, 3-6 infiltration (form of maneuver), delay, 11-20, 11-23, 11-32,
and, 3-58 11-40, 11-56
offensive cover during, 12-101
search and attack and, 4-67 directed, 2-103
offensive IO during, 4-2, 4-54
TAI and, 2-101 emplacement authority for,
operational-level example, 2-102
p. 4-2 zone reconnaissance and,
13-30 exploitation, use during, 6-17,
pursuit and, 7-11 6-31
NBC operations, 8-47
reconnaissance and fix, as a means of, 5-78
surveillance plan for, 4-26 airborne operations, during,
C-23 force protection and, 2-110
reconnaissance in force
conducted as, 13-40, 13-41 base/base cluster defense, fratricide and, 2-110
during, E-118 mobile defense, use during,
reserve and, 4-13
defensive operations, during, 10-18, 10-29
security operation, as a, 12-40
8-75, 8-90–8-92 offensive operations, use
shaping operation as a, 4-28 during, 3-157, 3-159
situations requiring, 4-2 3-166 penetration, use during, 3-99
sustainment of, 4-14–4-15 rear area and base security protective. See protective
use of advance guard during, and, E-8, E-10 obstacles
4-8 reconnaissance operations, reconnaissance operations, use
MP forces, base/base cluster during, 13-17, 13-25 during, 13-12
defense and, E-59 NFA, 2-93, 8-56 recording/reporting, 2-114
troop movements and, 8-103, noncontiguous AO, 2-53–2-54, relief in place, use during,
14-48 2-55, 2-56 15-14
MSR, designations for, 2-120 area security and, 12-114 reserve, 2-103
multinational operations. See also defensive operations and, 9-7, restrictions on the use of, 2-115
rear area and base security 9-26
security operations, use during,
base/base cluster defense, defined, 2-50 12-31
E-55, E-66, E-84, E-103,
MTC and, 3-6 smoke and, 8-93
E-105, E-120, E-123, E-138
noncontiguous rear area, security stay-behind operations, use
linkup operations, D-81
of, 2-79 during, 11-120
Index-13
FM 3-90
offensive cover, 12-97–12-104 defensive operations, use example of, p. 3-1–3-3, p. 8-2–
offensive encirclement operations. during, 8-44 8-3
See also envelopment, defensive operations, use fire support during, 3-143–
exploitation, MTC, penetration, during, 8-1 3-149
pursuit, delay, use during, 11-34 flanks during, 3-158
Army aviation, use during, D-19 disrupt, use during, 5-68 force protection during, 3-157–
C-2 of, D-3 exploitation, use during, 6-28 3-166
countermobility operations, fire superiority and, 5-17 force-oriented, 3-2
during, D-13 initiative during, 3-111
forward passage of lines, use
CSS for, D-19 during, 16-27 IPB during, 3-115
delay and, D-15 hostile, area security and, limited visibility, during, 3-138–
escape route (reduce 12-116 3-140
technique), D-24 infiltration (form of maneuver), LOC for, 3-170, 3-171
fire strike (reduce technique), and, 3-73, 3-78 main effort of, 3-181
D-19 mobile defense, use during, maintenance operations during,
fire support for, D-19 10-22, 10-27 3-172
follow and support and, D-5 MTC and, 4-2, 4-54 medical operations during,
hammer and anvil (reduce offensive encirclement 3-173
technique), D-22 operations, use during, D-19, mobility operations during,
ISR during, D-6, D-9, D-17 D-24 3-154–3-156
mobility operations during, D-13 offensive operations, use momentum during, 3-112,
during, 3-149, 3-180 3-155
offensive IO during, D-19, D-24
penetration, use during, 3-90 NBC operations use during,
phases of, D-2–D-6
preparation fires, use during, 3-166
reconnaissance operations
3-146, 5-57 obstacles use during, 3-157,
during, D-17
pursuit, use during, 7-30 3-159
reducing and enemy, D-18–
D-25 reconnaissance operations, use offensive IO use during, 3-149,
during, 13-21 3-180
security of, D-2
offensive operations, air defense perimeter defense, during,
security operations during, D-4,
for, 3-150–3-152 8-139
D-17
area defense, during, 9-69 preparation fires for, 3-145–
spoiling attack during, D-15
base/base cluster defense, 3-146
squeeze (reduce technique),
during, E-87, E-119 reconnaissance in force
D-20–D-21
BDAR, during, 3-172 conducted as, 13-39, 13-40
wedge (reduce technique),
C2 of, 3-176–3-185 rivers, effect on, 3-156
D-23
CFL, 3-147 security operations during, 3-3,
WMD, use during, D-14
3-157, 3-158
offensive IO, area defense, use characteristics of, 3-3
survivability operations, 3-161–
during, 9-68 communications during, 3-148,
3-166
assault on an objective, use 3-184
TCF use during, E-63
during, 5-95 COP during, 3-3, 3-184
tempo of, 3-185
attack, use during, 5-28 CSS during, 3-167–3-175
terrain-oriented, 3-2
base/base cluster defense, use culminating point of, 3-186–
during, E-144 3-198 transitions during, 3-186–3-198
breakout, use during, D-55– decision points during, 3-181 transportation operations
D-57 during, 3-171
decisive terrain for, 3-121
counterattacks, use during, types of, 3-5–3-9
defensive IO use during, 3-3
5-157 visualization of, 3-110
defined, p. 3-0
Index-14
Index
OP, types of, 12-23 perimeter defense, use during, PIR, 13-2
open column, 14-20 8-119, 8-129 PL, checkpoint as a substitute for,
operation, defined, 2-23 rally point and, 3-24 2-60
operational framework, 2-4–2-5 screen, use during, 12-23, defined, 2-116
12-54 FCL and, 3-18
operational pause, transitions to
the offense, 8-159 PD, defined, 3-22 flank guard, 12-83
OPSEC, during withdrawal, 11-67 direction of attack and, 3-18 LD as, 3-20
ORA, 2-115 ISR and, 3-22 LOA and, 3-19
ORP, infiltration (form of security operations and, 3-22 PLD and, 3-22
maneuver), and, 3-60 time of attack and, 3-26 security operations and, 12-16
use of, 5-55 PLD, actions at, 5-89–5-93
P–Q penetration, 3-82–3-101 assault position and, 3-12
PAA, 2-117–2-119 conducting a, 5-118 defined, 3-22
passage lane, 16-7 exploitation and, 3-100 point ambush, 5-129–5-132
passage of lines, 16-1, p. 16-0 flanks during, 3-99 position areas, 5-82
air defense during, 16-14 local counterattacks during, preparation fires, 5-57–5-58
air support during, 16-15 5-159
offensive IO and, 3-146, 5-57
area defensive operations, obstacles, use during, 3-99
during, 9-64 offensive cover during, 12-103 3-145–3-146
communications during, 16-20 phases of, 3-91–3-92, 3-96– primary position, 8-18
defensive cover during, 12-111 3-100
principles of war, 2-6
fire support during, 16-13 shaping operations during,
priority area (rear area and base
3-93, 3-97,3-101
forward, 16-21–16-30. See also security), E-36
forward passage of lines transitions during, 3-100
protective obstacles, 2-110, 8-83
fratricide during, 16-5, 16-14 perimeter defense, 8-118–8-141.
emplacement authority for,
See also base/base cluster
limited visibility operations 2-102
defense; defensive
during, 16-15 provost marshal, troop movement
encirclement operations
order of march for, 16-4 and, 14-48
perimeter defense, during, E-122 psychological factors. See human
8-129 dimension
control measures for, 8-131
rearward, 16-31–16-40. See PSYOP, encirclement, use during,
CSS of, 8-141
also rearward passage of lines 7-37
force protection and, 8-127
reasons for conducting, 16-1 pursuit, Army aviation, use of,
ISR during, 8-129 7-20
security operations during, 16-4
offensive operations during, CAS, use of, 7-20
traffic control during, 16-18
8-139
passage point, 16-6 combination, 7-10–7-13
passage of lines during, 8-129
passive air defense, 8-67–8-70 control of, 7-14–7-17
patrolling during, 8-129
passive security (route security countermobility operations
planning, 8-132–8-139 during, 7-21
technique), E-152–E-153
rear operations and, 8-128 CSS during, 3-174, 7-22–7-23
patrols/patrolling, combat outpost
and, 12-123 reserve and, 8-120, 8-130, culmination during, 7-5
8-136, 8-140
consolidation, during, 5-106– decisive operation of, 7-24,
5-107 security operations during, 7-30
8-129
defense, use during, 8-46 defensive operations, transition
piecemeal commitment, 2-24 to, 7-39
operations, use during, D-29 pile on technique, 2-24, 3-98 defined, p. 7-1
Index-15
FM 3-90
pursuit (continued) CSS for, 3-175 host nation support of. See rear
encirclement during, 7-10, example of, p. 5-39 area and base security,
7-33–7-34 multinational operations
engineer considerations, 7-13, and, 3-58 information management for,
7-21 E-25
rail movements, 14-5
envelopments during, 3-36 ISR and, E-39
rally point, ambushes and, 5-139
exploitation, compared with, multinational operations and,
defined, 3-24
7-3, 7-4 E-4, E-5, E-23, E-24, E-38,
RAOC, E-16–E-17 E-39
exploitation, transition to, 7-39
reaction force, air assault NBC operations and, E-8, E-10
fire support for, 7-20, 7-30 operations, C-48, C-62
priorities of, E-34–E-39
follow and support during, 7-18 reaction operations, E-134–E-136
purpose of, p. E-0
formation for, 3-131, 3-132 rear area, 2-78–2-79. See also
RAOC, E-16–E-17
frontal, 7-9 rear area and base security
rear area commander, E-12–
FSCM for, 7-17 terrain management in, 8-100
E-14, E-18
hasty attack, transition to, 7-39 rear area and base security. See
rear area security forces, E-57–
hasty defense during, 7-29 also base/base cluster defense,
E-64
initiation of, 6-3 rear area threat levels, E-31–
area classifications, E-34–E-39
ISR during, 7-19, 7-28, 7-29 E-33
area defense, and, 9-7
LOA and, 3-19 rear command post, 2-78
area security and, 12-115
mobility operations during, 7-21 reconnaissance operations for,
base, E-19–E-22 E-46
mobility requirements for, 7-11–
7-12 base/base cluster defense, response force, E-32, E-33
E-47–E-149. See also
MTC during, 7-11 responsibilities, E-1–E-31
base/base cluster defense
offensive IO during, 7-30 ROC, E-15
base cluster, E-19, E-27–E-29
operational pause during, 7-18 route security, E-150–E-160.
base commander, E-20
organization for, 7-8–7-13 See also route security
BDOC, E-23–E-26
planning considerations for, security operations and, E-38–
civil affairs, E-43 E-39, E-46
7-18
civil considerations, E-29, Special Operations Forces, role
reserve, use during, 7-7, 7-18,
E-40–E-46 of, E-65
7-20
command relationships, E-11– TCF, role of, E-33
risk and, 7-4
E-18
security considerations, 7-22 threat levels, E-31–E-33
control of, E-30–E-46
security operations during, utility of locations, E-34–E-39
convoy security, E-161–E-187.
7-29, 7-35 rear area operations. See rear
See also convoy security
termination of, 7-5, 7-38 area and base security,
counterintelligence operations
quartering party, tactical road rear area security forces, E-57–
during, E-46
march, 14-12 E-64
counterterrorism operations
troop movement, 14-50 rear area threat levels, E-31–E-33
during, E-48, E-65
withdrawal, 11-84 rear guard, 12-86–12-87
criminal investigation and, E-46
quick-fire net, 3-148 breakout, during, D-48, D-65,
CSS and, E-25, E-36
D-67
withdrawal, during, 11-74,
R 8-49, 8-112–8-113
11-87
radio silence/listening silence, DOD civilians and contractors
rear operations. See rear area
15-19 and, E-6–E-10
and base security
raid, 5-162–5-165 exploitation, during, 6-34
Index-16
Index
rearward passage of lines, 16-2, ISR and, 13-9, 13-43, 13-47, CSS and, 9-52
16-31–16-40 13-48 exploitation and, 6-39
reconnaissance. See ISR ISR plan, 13-47, 13-48 reinforcing effects, 2-13
reconnaissance by fire, 13-65 limited-visibility operations and, release point, 14-16
reconnaissance in force, 13-39– 13-66–13-67
relief in place, advance party for,
13-42 local security and, 13-5 15-4, 15-28
breakout, during, D-54 military intelligence assets and, air defense and, 15-14
defined, 13-39 13-21
air support and, 15-14
frontal attack, conducted as, multinational, E-46
communications for, 15-18–
3-102, 13-40, 13-41 NBC operations and, 13-17 15-19
MTC, conducted as, 13-40, obstacles and, 13-12 CSS, 15-7, 15-12, 15-17, 15-28
13-41 offensive encirclement defined, p. 15-1
offensive operations, conducted operations and, D-17
fire support for, 15-12, 15-13,
as, 13-39, 13-40 offensive IO during, 13-21 15-29
reconnaissance operations, rear area and base security fratricide during, 15-5
compared with other, 13-39 and, E-46, E-51
military deception during,
reconnaissance objective, 13-2— relief in place and, 15-10 15-18, 15-23
13-3
reserve and, 13-7 mobility operations during,
risk and, 13-59, 13-64 15-14
airborne operations, during,
C-37, C-43 security operations and, 13-5 movement control during, 15-30
approach march, 14-29 security operations, compared multinational, 15-19, 15-31
with, p. 12-1 reconnaissance for, 15-10,
Army aviation, use during,
13-19, 13-58, 13-64, 13-68 smoke for, 13-66 15-21
base/base cluster defense and, surveillance, compared with, security of, 15-8
E-106, E-107 13-20 survivability operations during,
civil considerations for, 13-1, task organizing for, 13-55 15-14
13-9, 13-14 visualization of, 13-43 techniques for, 15-1
close combat and, 13-11 reconnaissance-pull, 5-21, 13-49 warning order for, 15-9
decisive engagement and, reconnaissance-push, 5-22, 13-49 reorganization, 2-25, 5-112, 13-72
13-10, 13-11 reconstitution, defensive cover, replacements, 5-112
defined, p. 13-0 12-110 reserve(s), 5-156, 9-15
fire support for, 13-10, 13-17, defined, 2-25 airborne operations, use during,
13-21, 13-65 reconnaissance operations, C-41–C-42
forms of, 13-22–13-42, p. 13-0. and, 13-69–13-72 area defense, use during, 9-2,
See also individual forms training for, 13-71 9-51, 9-65, 9-81–9-82, 9-78,
forms of, unit capabilities, tbl. recovery operations, delay and, 9-84
13-2 11-53 attacks, use during, 5-5, 5-6
forward passage of lines and, retirement and, 11-104 base/base cluster defense, use
16-26 during, E-51
recuperation, 13-69
fundamentals of, 13-4–13-12 breakouts, use during, D-42,
redundancy, reconnaissance
historical example, 13-13 assets, of, 13-54 D-49
human dimension and, p. 13-1 refuel on the move, 14-51 consolidation, use during,
information management and, 5-110
regeneration, 2-25
13-9 counterattack force, use as,
rehearsal(s), area defense, for,
IPB and, 13-2, 13-10, 13-46, 5-146
9-49–9-50, 9-52–9-53
13-68, p. 13-0 covering force operations, use
combat formations, 3-124
during, 12-94
Index-17
FM 3-90
reserve(s) (continued) withdrawal, use in, 11-75, indications of an enemy, 7-1,

defensive operations, use 11-84, 11-90 7-19
during, 8-5, 8-30, 8-44, 8-49, zone reconnaissance, use in, transitions to, 3-198
8-64–8-65, 8-107 13-31 reverse military crest, fig. 8-14
defensive cover, use as a, reserve obstacle, example of, reverse planning, airborne/air
12-110 8-78. See also obstacle assault operations, C-3–C-6,
defensive encirclement response force, base/base cluster C-47
operations, use during, D-32– defense, 8-113, E-32, E-33, reverse slope, fig. 8-14
D-33 E-56, E-58–E-59, E-84, E-87,
reverse slope defense, 8-142–
delay, use during a, 11-11, E-117–E-118, E-137
8-154
11-41, 11-62 retirement, 11-92–11-108
RFA, defined, 2-94, 2-99
envelopment, use during an, advance guard and, 11-98
RFL, defined, 2-95, 7-17
3-41 Army aviation, use during,
risk, air defense and, 8-60
example of absence, p. 5-39 11-99
airborne/air assault operations
example of proper use, p. 1-7– battlefield circulation during,
during, C-5
1-8 11-108
area defense, during, 9-7
exploitation, use during an, civil considerations for, 11-106,
6-11, 6-26, 6-34, 6-54 11-108 decision making and, 1-23–
1-26, 1-30–1-37
fire support and, 9-12 CSS during, 11-95, 11-99,
11-101–11-108 defensive operations, during,
flank guard, use as, 12-78
8-30, 8-112, 8-115
frontal attack and, 3-108 defined, 11-92
delay, during, 11-7, 11-25
mobile defense, use during a, maintenance operations during,
11-104 exploitation, during, 6-49
10-3, 10-6, 10-10, 10-30
medical evacuation priorities ISR and, 1-30
momentum, use of to maintain,
5-97 during, 11-107 mass and, 1-35
MTC, use during, 4-13 MP forces, use during, 11-108 noncontiguous AOs and, 2-55
offensive cover, use as an, recovery operations during, pursuit during, 7-4
12-101, 12-102 11-104 reconnaissance operations
penetration, use during a, 3-82, security operations during, during, 13-59
3-99 11-92, 11-97–11-99 reduction factors, fig. 1-4
perimeter defense, use during, tactical road marches during, security operations during, 1-34
8-120, 8-130, 8-136, 8-140 11-93
tactical enabling operations
pursuit, use during, 7-7 transportation priorities for, and, 2-2
11-105
reconnaissance operations, use time and, 1-26
during, 13-7 retrograde. See also individual
forms river-crossing, air assault
response force, use as a, E-58 operations and, C-49
area defense and, 9-88–9-89
reverse slope defense, use in rivers, offensive operations and,
a, 8-148, 8-153 defined, p. 11-1 3-156
security force, use as, 9-14 denial operations and. See ROC, E-15
denial operations
size of, 9-13 ROE, 2-27
emergency destruction of
spoiling attacks and, 5-168 route reconnaissance, 13-23–
equipment during. See denial
stationary screen, use during, operations 13-28
12-54 route security technique, as a,
flank guard during, 12-87
tasks for, 9-11 E-154
forms of, 11-2
transitions to the offense and, route security, E-150–E-160
historical example, p. 11-2–
8-166 routes, designation of, 2-42
11-3
turning movement, use during,
3-45
Index-18
Index
S piecemeal commitment and, historical example, p. 12-3–

2-24 12-4
scatterable mines, fix, as a means
of, 5-78 purposes of, 4-63 infiltration (form of maneuver),
sector of fire, 2-68 and, 3-62, 3-77, 3-79
science of tactics, 1-10–1-11
security (area/force[s]/operations), IPB and, 12-7, 12-45
screen, 12-47–12-61
12-20–12-21, 12-113–12-117, ISR and, 12-9, 12-27, 12-32
screen (form of security
p. 12-0 medical operations during,
operations), Army aviation and
ISR systems, use in place of, air assault operations during, 12-36
4-11 C-67 mobile defense and, 10-25,
boundaries for, 12-15 airborne operations during, 10-26
C-37, C-43 movement during flank, 12-42–
breakout and, D-47
AO and, 2-45 12-46
cover, compared to, 12-89–
12-90 approach march during, 14-29 movement for stationary
area defense, during, 9-6–9-7, missions, 12-38–12-41
defined, 12-1
9-27, 9-57–9-66, 9-75 MTC and, 4-7–4-11, 12-40
economy of force, as a, 12-48
base/base cluster defense, multinational, E-46
fire support for, 12-55
during, E-72, E-89–E-90, E-129 obstacles and, 12-31
flank guard and, 12-78
BHL and, 12-14, 12-15 offensive encirclement
flanks and, 12-48
breakout, during, D-47 operations, D-4, D-17
forward passage of lines and,
constraints on, 12-28 offensive operations, 3-157,
16-26
control measures, labeling of, 3-158
guard, as part of, 12-68
12-13 OPs, types of, 12-23
guard, compared with, 12-62,
COP and, 12-32 passage of lines, 16-4
12-65
countermobility operations and, PD and, 3-22
limited visibility, during, 12-61
12-31 perimeter defense, during,
movement methods for, tbl.
CSS for, 12-33–12-36 8-119, 8-129, 8-134
12-2
defensive encirclement PLs and, 12-16
moving, 12-58–12-60
operations, during, D-29 pursuit, during, 7-17, 7-22,
patrols, 12-23, 12-54
defensive operations, during, 7-29, 7-35
relief in place, during, 15-27 8-30, 8-43, 8-47 rear area and base, . See rear
reserve and, 12-54 delay, during, 11-5, 11-41, area and base security
stationary, 12-54–12-57 11-48, 11-50–11-53 rear boundary and, 12-14
search and attack operations, diamond formation and, 3-132 rearward passage of lines and,
4-60–4-72 ending, 12-25 16-35
air assault operations and, example of, p. 8-2–8-3 reconnaissance operations
C-48 and, 13-5
exploitation, during, 6-13, 6-23,
AOs and, 3-6 6-45 reconnaissance operations,
battlefield organization for, 2-80 FEBA, and the, 8-13 compared with, p. 12-1
control measures for, 4-62 fire support for, 12-29 reserve, as a, 9-14, 9-66
defined, 4-60 force size, Tbl. 12-1 retirement, 11-92, 11-97–11-99
fire support during, 4-66 forms of, 12-1 risk during, 1-34
fire support base, use during, forward passage of lines and, tactical mobility and, 12-31
4-69 16-26 transitions during, 12-25
fractricide, prevention of during, fratricide during, 12-22 troop movement during, 14-54
4-67
FSCM for, 12-22 withdrawal, 11-70–11-71,
IPB for, 4-64 11-74, 11-84, 11-87, 11-90
fundamentals of, 12-5–12-10
NAIs and, 4-67 zone reconnaissance, 12-41
Index-19
FM 3-90
security platoons, E-50, E-52 attacks, use of during, 5-84 striking force, 5-146, 5-148, 8-44,
sequels. See transitions, defensive operations, use 8-64–8-65, 10-6–10-12, 10-21,
during, 8-93–8-94, 8-117 10-24, 10-25, 10-27, 10-32
shaping operation, breakout as a,
D-55–D-57, D-59 delay, use of during, 11-34, area defense and, 9-1
delay as a, 11-5 11-46 combat formation for, 10-34
frontal attack as a, 3-31, 3-102 fix, as a means of, 5-78 composition of, 10-3
area defense, during, 9-57, military deception and, 8-94 countermobility operations and,
9-67–9-71 MTC, use of during, 4-34 10-36
attacks and, 5-6 obstacles and, 8-93 defined, 8-6
attack, during, 5-68, 5-70 passage of lines, use of during, linear obstacle, defense of,
16-15 8-117
8-107 penetration, use of during, 3-93 mobility operations and, 10-36
mobile defense and, 10-5, rear areas, use of to protect, reserve, compared with, 10-6
10-27, 10-28 5-93 strongpoint, 8-22. See also
MTC and, 4-27 reconnaissance operations, use defensive encirclement
of during, 13-66 operations; perimeter defense
penetration and, 3-93, 3-97,
3-101 support-by-fire positions and, subsequent position, 8-21
width of AO and, 5-6 5-87 successive bounds, 14-38
shuttling (troop movement), 14-43 thermal viewers, defeating with, supplementary position, 8-20
5-93, 8-93, 8-94 support-by-fire position, bounding
situational understanding, 1-32,
5-66 withdrawal use of during, 11-86 overwatch and, 14-37, 14-38
airborne/air assault operations, SOF, infiltration (form of defined, 3-24
during, C-8 maneuver), and, 3-58 infiltration (form of maneuver),
area defense, during, 9-80 rear area and base security, and, 3-58
role in, E-65 supporting distance, 6-23, 6-46,
assault on an objective, during,
5-97 spoiling attack, 5-166–5-169, 8-44 7-32
attack execution and, 5-64 area defense, during, 9-39– air assault operations and,
9-43 C-63
E-116 defensive encirclement contiguous AOs and, 2-52
operations, during, D-15, D-33 defined, 2-28
withdrawal, during, 11-89 envelopment and, 3-34, 3-39
decision making and, 1-16
squeeze (reduce technique), turning movement and, 3-43,
defensive operations and,
D-20–D-21 3-51
8-106
staff estimates, 3-158 supporting range, 6-23, 6-30,
exploitation, during, 6-12
start point, 14-15 7-12, 7-29
and, 3-58 stay-behind force/operations, contiguous AOs and, 2-52
11-118–11-122. See also defined, 2-29
mobile defense, during, 10-31
noncontiguous AO and, 2-55 fire support and, 3-147
operations
passage of lines, during, 16-12 flank guard and, 12-77
breakout and, 11-119
smoke, 5-90, 5-93 forward passage of lines and,
defined, 11-118
16-21
air assault operations, use of delay and, 11-40
during, C-69 mobile defense and, 10-15–
fratricide and, 11-120 10-16
area defense, use of during,
linkup and, 11-119 noncontiguous AO and, 2-55
9-75
obstacles and, 11-120 security operations and, 12-21
assault on an objective, use of
during, 5-95, 5-98 turning movement and, 3-43,
3-44
Index-20
Index
supporting range (continued) BDF and, E-51 rear area and base security
zone reconnaissance, 13-31 defense operations and, 9-25 and, 8-113
surprise, air assault operations defined, 2-30 risk and, E-60
and, C-48, C-60 delay and, 11-20 tempo, modernized systems and,
airborne operations and, C-36 5-66
envelopment and, 3-37
ambushes and, 5-136, 5-141 offensive operations, 3-185
mobile defense and, 10-14
attacks, and, 5-25 techniques for maintaining,
noncontiguous AOs and, 2-55
3-161
counterattacks and, 5-153 reconnaissance operations
tenets of Army operations, 2-7
envelopments and, 3-37 and, 13-10
terrain information,
factors that contribute to, 5-72 security operations and, 12-31
reconnaissance operations
offensive operations and, TCFs and, E-63 and, 13-17
3-138, 3-180 turning movements and, 3-43 terrain management, 2-41
preparation fires and, 3-145 tactical obstacles, 8-83 fratricide and, 2-41
reverse slope defense and, tactical problems, solving, 1-38– rear area and base security
8-143, 8-145, 8-149, 8-154 1-49 and, E-3
shaping operations and, 5-68 tactical problems, TTP and, 1-2 rear area, in the, 8-100
survivability operations, area tactical proficiency, 1-46 thermal viewers, defeating, 5-93,
defense, during, 9-48
tactical road march, 14-8–14-25 8-93–8-94
base/base cluster defense,
approach march, compared threat levels, rear area, E-31–
during, E-95
with, 14-31 E-33
CSS considerations for, 8-87
quartering party for, 14-12 time-constrained environment,
damage-limiting measures, decision making in a, 1-31
reconnaissance and, 14-11
8-71
retirement and, 11-93 time of attack, defined, 3-26
tactician, defined, 1-9 topographic crest, fig. 8-14
8-85–8-94, 8-112
tactics, defined, p. 1-1 traffic circulation plan, 14-48
delay, during, 11-46
TAI, defined, 2-121 traffic control, area defense, 9-82
IPB for, 3-165
infiltration (form of maneuver), passage of lines, 16-18
military deception and, 8-88
and, 3-58 traffic control plan, 14-48
mobile defense, during, 10-18
NAI and, 2-101 training, 5-112
3-161–3-166 target(s), 2-96–2-98. See also base/base cluster defense, for,
indirect fire target E-114–E-115
OPSEC and, 8-88
targeting, exploitation, during, decision making and, 1-29
relief in place, during, 15-14
6-28 exploitation and, 6-39
sustaining operations, 2-78. See
task organization, defensive offensive operations and, 3-138
also CSS
operations, for, 8-108
sustainment load, 3-168 reconstitution for, 13-71
task organizing and, 8-108
13-55
T transitions, 1-47, 2-1, 5-120, 7-39
training and, 8-108
tactical enabling operations, 2-2 area defense and, 9-83, 9-87–
TCF, E-33, E-60–E-64, E-118
9-89, 3-198
tactical level of war, 1-3–1-8 area defense, and, 9-7
attacks, during, 5-81, 5-86
tactical march techniques, 14-19– base/base cluster defense,
14-25 combat power and, 8-176
and, E-84, E-87
tactical mobility, airborne COP and, 8-169
civil considerations for, E-64
operations and, C-30 CSS and, 8-164
CSS for, E-64
assembly area location and, decision points and, 3-47
fire support for, E-63, E-64
2-59 defense to offense, 8-105
Index-21
FM 3-90
transitions (continued) approach march, 14-26–14-31 U–V

defensive cover and, 12-110 breakouts and, D-66 uncertainty. See risk
defensive operations, during, civil considerations, 14-5, 14-41 vee formation, 3-136–3-137
8-8, 8-155–8-176 coordination of, 14-45 vertical envelopment, 3-29, 3-42
defensive operations, to, CSS, 14-44, 14-52, 14-55 visualization, 2-5, 2-8, 3-110,
3-196–3-197
defined, p. 14-1 3-158, E-83
delay and, 11-64
engineer reconnaissance and,
envelopment and, 3-36, 3-41 14-44, 14-47 W–Z
example of, p. 5-39 forced march, 14-6 water, making unfit to drink,
exploitation during, 6-22 halts, 14-24–14-25 11-110
human dimension of, 3-195, limited visibility, during, 14-22, water movements, 14-5
8-165, 8-174 14-52 wedge formation, 3-134–3-135
ISR and, 8-175 march column, 14-10 wedge (reduce technique), D-23
LD and, 3-20 march serial, 14-10 withdraw by bounds, 5-142
mobile defense and, 10-37 march unit, 14-10 withdrawal, 11-65–11-91
offensive cover and, 12-104 methods of, 14-1–14-6 caches and, 11-85
offensive operations and, 3-10, mobility resources and, 8-103 counterattacks and, 11-89
3-186–3-198, 8-159–8-170
movement techniques, 14-32 CSS, 11-67, 11-81, 11-85,
passage of lines and, 16-1,
MP forces and, 14-48 11-88
p. 16-0
provost marshal, 14-48 defined, 11-65
PD and, 3-22
quartering party, 14-50 destruction criteria and, 11-85
penetration and, 3-100
rail, 14-5 DLIC and. See DLIC
planning for, 8-155–8-157
reconnaissance and, 14-49– key decisions during, 11-81
pursuit and, 7-3, 7-4
14-52 OPSEC and, 11-67
relief in place and, p. 4-1
refuel on the move, 14-51 quartering parties and, 11-83
reserve and, 8-166
security operations and, 14-54 rear guard and, 11-74, 11-87
retrograde and, 3-198, 8-171–
shuttling, 14-43 reserve and, 11-75, 11-84,
8-176, p. 11-1
tactical road march, 14-8– 11-90
risk and, 9-88
14-25. See also tactical road security operations and, 11-70–
security operations and, 12-25 march 11-71, 11-74, 11-84, 11-87,
timing of, 8-165 traffic circulation plan, 14-48 11-90
turning movements and, 3-42, traffic control plan, 14-48 smoke, use of during, 11-86
3-47
types of, p. 14-1 spoiling attacks during, 11-89
withdrawals and, 11-90
water, 14-5 stay-behind force and. See
traveling (movement technique), stay-behind force
TRP, 2-69
14-34
TTP, tactical problems and, 1-2 termination of, 11-90
traveling overwatch (movement
turning movements, 3-42–3-55 transitions, 11-90
technique), 14-35
CSS and, 3-44, 3-50–3-51 variations of, fig. 11-78
trigger line, 2-70–2-73, 11-57
defined, 3-42 WMD, defensive operations and,
troop movements, administrative
8-116
movements and, 14-7 envelopment, compared to,
3-34, 3-42 delays and, 11-45
air, 14-4
linkup and, 3-49 mobile defense and, 10-1
air assault operations and,
C-12 pursuit and, 7-10 offensive encirclement
operations and, D-14
airborne/air assault operations reserve and, 3-45
and, C-12 threat of, 9-29, 9-36
transitions, 3-47
Index-22
Index
WMD (continued)
zone reconnaissance, 13-29–
13-34
airborne operations and, C-38
area reconnaissance,
compared with, 13-35
defined, 13-29
fire support for, 13-31
flank guard and, 12-81
guard as an, 12-66
offensive cover and, 12-101
reserve and, 13-31
security operation, as a, 12-41
supporting range and, 13-31
Index-23
*FM 3-90
4 JULY 2001
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Official: Chief of Staff
JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0117305
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in

accordance with the initial distribution number 115848, requirements for FM 3-90.

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*FM 3-90

Field Manual Headquarters

Chapter 2 COMMON TACTICAL CONCEPTS AND GRAPHIC CONTROL MEASURES......2-1

PART TWO OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Forms of Maneuver ................................................................................................ 3-11

Chapter 4 MOVEMENT TO CONTACT.................................................................................... 4-1

Chapter 5 ATTACK .................................................................................................................. 5-0

Chapter 6 EXPLOITATION....................................................................................................... 6-1

Chapter 7 PURSUIT ................................................................................................................. 7-1

PART THREE DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Chapter 9 THE AREA DEFENSE .............................................................................................9-1

Chapter 10 THE MOBILE DEFENSE .......................................................................................10-1

Chapter 11 THE RETROGRADE..............................................................................................11-1

PART FOUR TACTICAL ENABLING OPERATIONS

Chapter 13 RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS ....................................................................13-0

Forms of Reconnaissance ..................................................................................... 13-8

Chapter 14 TROOP MOVEMENT ............................................................................................ 14-1

Chapter 15 RELIEF IN PLACE................................................................................................. 15-1

Chapter 16 PASSAGE OF LINES ............................................................................................ 16-0

Appendix A ARMY BRANCHES AND TACTICAL ECHELONS ................................................A-1

Appendix B TACTICAL MISSION TASKS..................................................................................B-1

Appendix C AIRBORNE AND AIR ASSAULT OPERATIONS .................................................. C-1

Appendix D ENCIRCLEMENT OPERATIONS ........................................................................... D-0

Appendix E REAR AREA AND BASE SECURITY .................................................................... E-0

SOURCE NOTES.................................................................................Source Notes-1

2-30. Targeted Area of Interest...........................................................................2-39

4-4. A Column Advance Guard Attacking to Destroy a Contained Enemy

9-2. Organization of Forces for an Area Defense—Contiguous Area of

12-7. Moving Flank Screen .............................................................................. 12-17

A-4. Airborne Battalion-Size Task Force.......................................................... A-17

D-1. Inner and Outer Arms of an Encirclement...................................................D-1

The Art of Tactics

Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered ar-

1-1. This is the capstone

1-2. The tactics and supporting

THE TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR

chance encounter between two opponents, such as a meeting engagement. An

THE SCIENCE AND ART OF TACTICS

The Human Dimension—Combat at Han-sur-Nied

Cowpens, 17 January 1781

tals and Virginia militia, who British Forces

the military crest of the rise 960

under COL Howard’s com-

toward the expected reaction

bulk of his militia under the

Behind the hill, he placed LTC

alry force in reserve. Each line

of musket range of the line be- 920 I II

hind it. As explained the night 900

before, skirmishers only need- II

ed to fire one or two shots and Scale

then retire to the second line. 71st HIGHLAND

In turn, the militia in the sec-

militia that staggered and fur- LEGEND

tia’s expected second volley British Forces

to withdraw. Seeing this 940

cavalry charged this troop 900

and overwhelmed it, driving II

the dragoons off the field in