FM3 90X31 Meb Ops
FM3 90X31 Meb Ops
31
MANEUVER
ENHANCEMENT
BRIGADE
OPERATIONS
FEBRUARY 2009
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Approved for public release;
distribution is unlimited.
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
This publication is available at
Army Knowledge Online (www.us.army.mil) and
General Dennis J. Reimer Training and Doctrine
Digital Library at (http://www.train.army.mil).
FM 3-90.31
Contents
Page
PREFACE ............................................................................................................. vi
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. viii
Chapter 1 THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND THE ARMY’S OPERATIONAL
CONCEPT .......................................................................................................... 1-1
Operational Environment .................................................................................... 1-1
Unified Action ..................................................................................................... 1-4
Continuum of Operations ................................................................................... 1-6
Operational Concept .......................................................................................... 1-6
Combat Power .................................................................................................... 1-7
Maneuver Support Operations as Part of Full Spectrum Operations ................ 1-8
Chapter 2 MEB MISSION AND ORGANIZATION ............................................................. 2-1
Capabilities ......................................................................................................... 2-1
MEB Organization .............................................................................................. 2-2
Supported Commands ....................................................................................... 2-7
Chapter 3 BATTLE COMMAND FOR THE MEB ............................................................... 3-1
Command and Control ....................................................................................... 3-1
Role of the Commander ..................................................................................... 3-2
Command and Control System .......................................................................... 3-3
Information Superiority (Includes Information Management) ............................. 3-7
Chapter 4 MEB OPERATIONS ........................................................................................... 4-1
Overview ............................................................................................................. 4-1
Simultaneous Combinations ............................................................................... 4-1
General MEB Considerations ............................................................................. 4-2
Transition Operations ....................................................................................... 4-10
Offensive Operations ........................................................................................ 4-13
Defensive Operations ....................................................................................... 4-14
Civil Support Operations .................................................................................. 4-15
Joint and Force Projection Considerations ...................................................... 4-20
Task Organization and Staff Augmentation ..................................................... 4-21
i
Contents
Figures
Figure 2-1. A possible MEB task organization ................................................................ 2-3
Figure 2-2. MEB HHC organization ................................................................................. 2-4
Figure 2-3. Example division organization ...................................................................... 2-9
Figure 2-4. Example MEB organization........................................................................... 2-9
Figure 4-1. ASCOPE construct with examples ............................................................... 4-9
Figure 4-2. Force projection process ............................................................................ 4-21
Figure 5-1. Complementary and reinforcing capabilities ................................................. 5-7
Figure 5-2. The MEB and MANSPT operations .............................................................. 5-8
Figure 5-3. Increasing functional capabilities .................................................................. 5-9
Figure 5-4. Example of an MEB supporting a movement corridor ................................ 5-17
Figure 5-5. Example of an MEB performing sustainment ............................................. 5-19
Figure 6-1. Example of MEB conducting support area operations ............................... 6-19
Figure 6-2 Example of an MEB performing ADC .......................................................... 6-20
Figure 7-1 Example of an MEB conducting consequence management ........................ 7-8
Figure 8-1. Examples of lines of effort............................................................................. 8-6
Figure 8-2. Example of an MEB conducting stability operations ................................... 8-16
Figure B-1. MEB main CP ............................................................................................... B-3
Figure B-2. Tactical operations center ............................................................................ B-4
Figure B-3. Current operations cell number 1 ................................................................. B-5
Figure B-4. Current operations cell number 2 ................................................................. B-6
Figure B-5. Area operations section ................................................................................ B-7
Figure B-6. Intelligence cell and other staff ..................................................................... B-8
Figure B-7. Fires cell ....................................................................................................... B-9
Figure B-8. Sustainment cell ......................................................................................... B-10
Figure B-9. Network operations cell .............................................................................. B-11
Figure B-10. Company headquarters tent ..................................................................... B-12
Tables
Table 5-1. MEB protection support.................................................................................. 5-3
Table 7-1. MEB consequence management operations tasks relationships to other
operations .................................................................................................... 7-4
Table 9-1. Logistics considerations for tactical operations ............................................. 9-3
Table A-1. Command section .......................................................................................... A-1
Table A-2. Personnel section .......................................................................................... A-2
Table A-3. Intelligence section ........................................................................................ A-2
Table A-4. Operations section ......................................................................................... A-2
The supported MEB higher headquarters may assign missions for assets assigned or attached to an MEB
executed outside its AO, such as CBRN, CA, engineer, MP, and EOD assets. This requires careful coordination
between the tasked unit, the MEB headquarters, and the headquarters of the unit in which the mission occurs.
As an example, a fragmentary order may direct the MEB to provide an EOD capability in direct support (DS)
of a BCT for a specified period or mission. This capability would allow a BCT to safely inventory a newly
discovered ammunition storage facility. The order authorizes direct liaison between the MEB and the BCT to
coordinate numerous tactical and sustainment issues. These issues could include but are not limited to
movement routes and times, linkup points and times, recognition measures, location of supply points,
maintenance collection points, medical treatment facilities, and communications-electronics operating
instructions. Another approach would be to place MEB capabilities operational control (OPCON) (or TACON)
to the BCT for a specific mission profile if conditions require more than just a support relationship.
The number of MEBs supporting a headquarters depends on the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather,
troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (METT-TC) and the critical considerations of
span of control and functional area focus. A joint force commander (JFC) may place an MEB in support of
another Service or functional component, such as a Marine expeditionary force (MEF). An MEB may also be
placed in support of multinational forces.
The MEB provides a staff trained to C2 many of the key constructive capabilities required to conduct
consequence management. The consequence management could be conducted during any full spectrum
operation. The robust C2 and modular capabilities of the MEB make it effective in responding to disasters.
When the supported headquarters is task-organized with functional brigades, the MEB may also be required to
provide support to these brigades. An example of this might find the MEB providing support to an MP brigade
focused on providing control of dislocated civilians and handling detainees. In this case, the MEB may be
tasked to provide general engineering support to construct detainee facilities for the MP brigade.
To effectively understand the doctrinal employment of the MEB, it will also be important to understand the
keystone and other specialized CBRN, CA, engineer, EOD, and MP doctrine. The MEB is an evolving
organization that fills a critical role as a unique brigade headquarters optimized to perform MANSPT
operations in support of the division and echelons above division. Its unique staff organization is designed to
facilitate organizational flexibility for the echelon that it supports. At the BCT level, the brigade special troops
battalion (BSTB) can provide a similar role as a multifunctional headquarters to support MANSPT operations
in support of the BCT and its subordinate elements.
Understanding the OE and how Army forces conduct operations within it as part of
an interdependent joint force underpins mission success and lays the framework for
the roles and mission of the MEB within the OE. This understanding requires a broad
perspective of operational problems and their relevance to each mission. The OE
must be understood from the perspective of land operations and the role of Army
forces in unified action. (See FM 3-0.) This chapter includes a brief discussion of the
continuum of operations, the Army’s operational concept of full spectrum operations,
an overview of the elements of combat power, and the linkage of MANSPT
operations to the elements of combat power and the operations process. All of this is
framed, where applicable, to the specific and unique capabilities and roles of the
MEB. The following chapters will address the specific considerations for the role of
the MEB and how it conducts operations.
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-1. Joint doctrine describes the operational environment as the composite of the conditions,
circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the
commander (joint publication [JP] 3-0). The OE encompasses physical areas and factors (geography,
weather, infrastructure, and population factors) and the information environment, to include information
concerning enemy, friendly, and neutral forces; and other variables relevant to a specific operation.
Understanding the OE is essential to the successful execution of operations. To gain a broad understanding
of these influences, commanders will normally consult with specialists in each area.
1-2. Operations on land are complex, dynamic, and uniquely tied to the geography and airspace of the
area of responsibility (AOR). The complexity of land combat stems from the geography, from the large
number of Soldiers and weapons platforms involved, and from the close, continuous interaction of land
forces with the enemy, noncombatants, and each other. Complexity is also a function of the combined arms
and joint nature of land combat, involving the interaction and mutual support of different arms and
services. Instantaneous global communications multiplies this complexity. Uncertainty and chaos
characterize operations on land. Technology, intelligence, and the design of operations can reduce
uncertainty. However, regardless of the effort allocated to intelligence, commanders still have to make
decisions based on incomplete, inaccurate, or contradictory information. An understanding of the OE
underpins the commander’s ability to make decisions.
THREATS
1-3. The threats faced by the MEB will be the same threats faced by other Army organizations and
included in the four major categories of traditional, catastrophic, irregular, and disruptive. (See FM 3-0.)
Preparing for and managing these threats requires employing all instruments of national power—
diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The MEB must be prepared to support operations
against each of these threats. The organizational design of the MEB fills a previous void in Army and joint
force structure. The MEB is uniquely optimized to conduct MANSPT operations in support of Army, joint,
multinational, and interagency operations. The MEB is also designed to C2 forces to defeat level II and
level III threats within an assigned AO. (See paragraph 1-7 below and FM 3-0 for a more detailed
discussion of the threat.)
1-4. Military forces will face a range of threats that extend from smaller, lower-technology opponents to
larger, more modernized conventional forces. It is likely that both will employ asymmetric methods that
avoid or counter U.S. strengths, without attempting to oppose them directly, while seeking to exploit
weaknesses. One technique to defeat the challenges associated with using improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) may be by using movement corridor operations. (See chapter 5 for more information on movement
corridor operations.)
1-5. Our adversaries will attempt to leverage the environment to achieve maximum advantage. To defeat
our adversaries, Army and joint forces must equip, train, and operate in complex situations impacted by
multiple variables. In addition to traditionally organized military forces, friendly forces will encounter
fractured governmental structures, terrorists, and armed gangs when committed. The standing government
may have lost control over sections of its country, allowing the free flow of weapons, drugs, and other
contraband across state boundaries. Criminal and terrorist elements, with transnational interests and links,
take advantage of the decay in state control and even attempt to accelerate it. Police, constabulary, and
other elements of state control are often under resourced, corrupted, and/or dissolved. The MEB conducts
operations to support the shaping of the OE and mitigate its negative effects on friendly operations.
1-6. The MEB has an organic staff that is optimized to provide for the planning and execution of key
tasks associated with protection, movement and maneuver, and sustainment. It uses attached and OPCON
units to conduct MANSPT operations in its AO and within the broader AO of the organization it supports.
The MEB’s capability to conduct support area operations in the assigned echelon support area provides
added security and defense for other units and enhances freedom of action for the supported echelon. The
capability to synchronize MANSPT operations and support area operations under the MEB provides a
unique set of capabilities to other Army, joint, and multinational elements for addressing challenges
presented by the threat.
THREAT LEVELS
1-7. Using threat levels assists commanders in managing risk, identifying vulnerabilities, and allocating
forces and resources in time and space in the OE. At the tactical level, enemy threat activities can be
generally described and categorized in three levels (see FM 3-90 for additional detail). Each level or any
combination of levels may exist in the AO.
1-8. More than one level of threat may be active in an AO and may operate in either an independent or a
coordinated fashion. (See chapter 6 for a discussion of how the MEB organizes to defeat these threats
during the conduct of support area operations.)
z Level I threat. A small enemy force that can be defeated by a unit’s organic resources.
z Level II threat. Enemy activities that require the commitment of a reaction force to defeat them.
z Level III threat. A threat that requires the commitment of a TCF to defeat it.
Operational Variables
1-11. Joint planners describe the OE in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those
aspects of the environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to
another and affect the campaigns and major operations. Operational variables describe not only the military
aspects of an OE, but also the population’s influence on it. Joint and Army planners analyze the OE in
terms of operational variables.
1-12. The variables provide a broad view of the OE that emphasizes its human aspects. Since land forces
always operate among populations, understanding the human variables is crucial. They describe each
operation’s context for commanders and other leaders. Understanding them helps commanders appreciate
how the military instrument complements other instruments of national power. Comprehensive analysis of
the variables occurs at the joint level; Army commanders use the comprehensive joint analysis of the
variables to shape their understanding of the situation.
1-13. A quick look at the eight Army operational variables is discussed below to highlight potential
implications for the MEB. The examples are not meant to be all-inclusive treatment of MEB concerns or
applicability for each of the variables. (For more information on the variables, see FM 3-0.)
z Political. Understanding the political circumstances within an OE will help the commander
recognize key actors and visualize their explicit and implicit aims and their capabilities to
achieve their goals. The MEB view might add challenges associated with political circumstances
permitting or denying access to key ports of entry or critical sustainment facilities. Opportunities
in the form of alternative access routes might be added. The MEB would be interested in the
effect of laws, agreements, or positions of allies that might affect planning and operations. The
political variable, always important, takes on a more prominent role during stability and civil
support operations.
z Military. The military variable explores the military capabilities of all relevant actors in a given
OE. The MEB view adds a MANSPT focus to the view of the OE that integrates CA, CBRN,
engineer, EOD, and MP capabilities. Its multifunctional organic staff is concerned with the
aspects of movement and maneuver, selected sustainment, and many of the tasks associated with
protection and their effects on the force that the MEB is supporting. Using task-organized units
and other specialized staff augmentation, the MEB responds to those challenges presented by an
adversary’s capabilities in its own AO and the more extensive AO of the unit that it supports.
The MEB view might add the challenges associated with an adversary’s capability to employ
CBRN, explosive hazards or other obstacles, and the capability to challenge traditional
survivability standards of protection.
z Economic. The economic variable encompasses individual behaviors and aggregate phenomena
related to the production, distribution, and consumption of resources. The MEB view might add
challenges associated with production or availability of key materials and resources.
z Social. The social variable describes the cultural, religious, ethnic makeup, and social cleavages
within an OE. The MEB view would incorporate aspects of stability or civil support and the
necessary support to the stability or civil support plan provided by the units task-organized to
the MEB. The MEB must overcome the challenges associated with specific cultural or religious
buildings or installations and a host of other potential social concerns. Opportunities in the form
of the potential to provide for culturally related activities or building requirements might be a
consideration.
z Information. This variable describes the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems
that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The MEB uses information engagement
to shape the OE as part of its operations.
z Infrastructure. Infrastructure comprises the basic facilities, services, and installations needed
for the functioning of a community or society. The MEB view might add challenges associated
with specific deficiencies in the basic infrastructure. Opportunities in the form of improvements
to existing infrastructure and specific new projects might be added. The organic staff of the
MEB provides for a detailed understanding of infrastructure by subcategories in the context of
combat operations, stability, and civil support operations. Several manuals that include more
detailed information on this are FM 3-34.400 and FM 3-34.170.
z Physical environment. The defining factors are complex terrain and urban settings (super-
surface, surface, and subsurface features), weather, topography, hydrology, and environmental
conditions. The MEB view might add the challenges associated with natural and manmade
obstacles. Insights into environmental considerations are also a concern (see FM 3-100.4).
Opportunities in the form of existing routes, installations, and resources might be added. The
organic staff supports a broad understanding of the physical environment through geospatial
engineering which is discussed in detail in FM 3-34.230 and JP 2-03.
z Time. The variable of time influences military operations within an OE in terms of the
decision—cycles, operational tempo, and planning horizons. The MEB view might add
challenges associated with completing required CA-related plan missions in the time allotted
because of the impact on perceptions of civilians during civil support or stability operations.
Opportunities in the form of potential to accelerate priority projects might be added for the
positive effect it would have on civil considerations and the perception of mission success.
Mission Variables
1-14. Analysis of the OE in terms of the operational variables provides the relevant information that
commanders can use to frame operational problems. While such analysis improves situational
understanding (SU) at all levels, land operations require more specific information. When commanders
receive a mission, they require a more detailed mission analysis focused on their specific situation.
1-15. The Army uses the mission variables identified in the memory aid of METT-TC as a framework for
this detailed mission analysis. When used together, mission and operational variables help commanders
visualize their situation. (Chapter 4 provides a more complete discussion of analysis using the mission
variables in terms of planning MEB operations.)
UNIFIED ACTION
1-16. Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of
governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). It
involves applying all instruments of national power, including actions of other United States Government
(USG) agencies and multinational military and nonmilitary organizations. Combatant commanders play a
pivotal role in unified actions; however, subordinate commanders also integrate and synchronize their
operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations
in their AO.
1-17. Unified action includes joint integration. Joint integration extends the principle of combined arms to
operations conducted by two or more Service components. The combination of diverse joint force
capabilities generates combat power more potent than the sum of its parts. Joint integration does not
require joint commands at all echelons; it does require joint interoperability and an understanding of joint
synergy at all levels of command. Joint synergy extends the principles of combined arms to operations
conducted by two or more Service components. The strengths of each Service or functional component
combine to overcome the limitations or reinforce the effects of the other components. The combination of
multiple and diverse joint force capabilities generates combat power more potent than the sum of its parts.
Integrating the variety of MANSPT capabilities requires an understanding of the various capabilities and
limitations of those MANSPT assets available for any given mission. Integration also requires a common
understanding of the C2 structure and processes in place to employ the various MANSPT capabilities in
unified action.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
1-18. Because of the leverage of their wide range of expertise and funding resources, USG agencies can
support the JFC’s mission objectives and can greatly expand the capabilities of the joint force. This is true
whether the response is international in nature or within the United States (for example, during
consequence management in the United States, MEB forces may respond to incidents, which require close
coordination with other USG agencies). Coordination and a clear understanding of the commander’s intent
are critical when synchronizing operational efforts involving multiple USG agencies. The JFC will be
required to coordinate with USG agencies to achieve overall U.S. objectives. The MEB staff must have an
understanding of the capabilities of these agencies and their support functions. While USG agencies may
increase the resources engaged in a given operation, they may also increase and complicate the
coordination efforts. Stability operations are now regarded as a core U.S. military mission and are given
priority comparable to combat operations. Because integrated civilian and military efforts are key to
successful stability operations, the MEB staff must be prepared to conduct or support stability operations
by working closely with U.S. departments and agencies, foreign governments and security forces, global
and regional international organizations, U.S. and foreign nongovernmental organizations, and private
sector individuals and for-profit companies. The MEB may routinely participate in interagency
coordination during the conduct of consequence management operations within stability and civil support
operations.
1-19. The intricate linkages among the instruments of national power demand that commanders consider
all capabilities and agencies to help achieve the common end state. Interagency coordination forges a vital
link between military operations and activities conducted by such organizations as U.S. government
agencies; agencies of partner nations; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and regional, international,
and United Nations (UN) organizations, and agencies of a host nation (HN).
1-20. CA activities are fundamental to the execution of full spectrum operations. Designated CA units,
other military forces, and other government agencies, or a combination of the three perform and conduct
activities for the commander to establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces
and other nonmilitary forces (see FM 3-05.40). CA operations assist in coordinating activities of engaged
military forces, and other USG agencies, NGO, and regional and intergovernmental organizations to
facilitate military operations and achieve objectives. These activities enhance the relationship between
military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present. CA operations also involve
the applying functions normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national civil government, but for
various reasons, are not being accomplished.
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS
1-21. Multinational operations are conducted within the structure of an alliance or a multinational.
Achieving true unity of command is difficult in multinational operations and in many cases unity of effort
is the best that can be achieved. Agreement among the multinational partners establishes the level of
command authority vested in a multinational force commander. The President of the United States retains
command authority over U.S. forces. Most nations have similar restrictions. However, in certain
circumstances, it may be prudent or advantageous to place Army forces under OPCON of a multinational
commander. To compensate for limited unity of command, commanders concentrate on achieving unity of
effort. Consensus building, rather than direct command authority, is often the key element of successful
multinational operations. The MEB may provide the C2 for Army and potentially selected joint forces
supporting a multinational force.
1-22. During multinational operations, U.S. forces establish liaisons with multinational forces early. Army
forces exchange specialized liaison personnel in fields such as aviation, CBRNE, fire support, engineer,
intelligence, MP, public affairs (PA), and CA based on mission requirements. Missions to multinational
units should reflect the capabilities and limitations of each national contingent. Some significant factors are
relative mobility and size; intelligence collection assets; and long-range fires, special operations forces
(SOF), and organic sustainment capabilities. When assigning missions, commanders should also consider
special skills, language, and rapport with the local population, and the national pride of multinational
partners. Multinational commanders may assign HN forces home defense or police missions, such as
sustainment area and base security. Commanders should give special consideration to “niche” capabilities
such as mine clearance that may exceed U.S. capabilities.
1-23. Due to its multifunctional C2 capabilities and the ability to conduct multiple MANSPT operations,
support area operations, consequence management operations, and stability operations and tasks (see
chapter 2), the MEB may be a unit of choice for the employment of Army forces in support of joint or
multinational operations. Its organic staff ability to integrate CBRN, engineer, EOD, MP, and other units
also makes it ideal for use in stability or civil support operations and situations where interagency
coordination will be high.
CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS
1-24. The continuum of operations frames the application of land power and links the OE with the Army’s
operational concept of full spectrum operations. It includes the full spectrum operations and operational
themes. Each of these has described major categories but they are not discrete; they overlap; they occur
simultaneously. There are three tools for understanding and visualizing operations—continuum of
operations, full spectrum operations, and operational themes. (See FM 3-0.)
1-25. The full spectrum operations are the backdrop for Army operations. It is a tool to understand and
visualize the level of politically motivated violence and the corresponding role of the military in resolving
a conflict. It places levels of violence on an ascending scale marked by graduated steps from stable peace
to general war (see FM 3-0). While the MEB operates across this spectrum, it is uniquely capable of
performance on the lower side of the spectrum. It is also designed to effectively operate and adjust to
transitions within the spectrum.
1-26. The MEB conducts operations to shape the OE, lower the level of violence, set conditions favorable
for conducting subsequent operations and tasks, and to enhance freedom of action for the supported force.
1-27. An operational theme describes the character of the dominant major operation being conducted at
any time within a land force commander’s AO. The operational theme helps convey the nature of the major
operation to the force to facilitate common understanding of how the commander broadly intends to
operate (FM 3-0). The theme of a major operation may change for various reasons. Operational themes
have implications for approaches, task organizing, resource allocation, protection, and tactical task
assignment. The MEB may support operations within each of the operational themes.
OPERATIONAL CONCEPT
1-28. The Army’s operational concept of full spectrum operations is the core of its doctrine. Army forces
combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations simultaneously as part of an
interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to achieve decisive results. They
employ synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a
thorough understanding of all dimensions of the OE. Mission command that conveys intent and an
appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces (FM 3-0).
Note: FM 3-0 discusses simultaneity and synchronization, lethal and nonlethal actions, and
mission command in detail. Each of these affects the role of the MEB in full spectrum
operations.
1-29. Full spectrum operations are the purposeful, continuous, and simultaneous combinations of offense,
defense, and stability or civil support. Operations conducted overseas simultaneously combine three
components—offensive, defensive and stability operations. Within the United States and its territories,
operations simultaneously combine offensive, defensive, and civil support operations.
1-30. MEB operations contribute significant combat power, both lethal and nonlethal in nature, to all of
the components of full spectrum operations. Based on a METT-TC analysis, the MEB will be task-
organized with additional modular capabilities to meet mission requirements. The MEB conducts only very
limited offensive and defensive operations as a brigade and typically supports other organizations in
performing them. Staff augmentation by CBRN, CA, engineer, EOD, MP, and other capabilities may be
necessary to C2 the mix of modular units and capabilities task-organized to the MEB. These same
capabilities may be employed at division, corps, and theater echelons to conduct MANSPT operations
tasks and provide other support to the force. Force tailored MANSPT capabilities can provide critical
nonlethal capabilities to conduct or support stability or civil support operations.
1-31. The MEB can simultaneously support the elements of offense, defense, and stability (or civil
support) in support of a higher echelon or focus on a single element of full spectrum operations during a
phase of a larger operation or within a specific AO. The MEB provides the C2 of multifunctional units and
is designed with staff capabilities and robustness to complement and reinforce any combination of full
spectrum operations. When specific functional requirements or magnitude of mission exceed the
capabilities of the MEB, functional brigades or multiple MEBs are employed to properly focus and C2
those actions. The unique design of the MEB, based on the factors of METT-TC, postures it to be a
potential unit of choice when conducting stability or civil support operations.
COMBAT POWER
1-32. Full spectrum operations require the continuous generating and applying of the eight elements of
combat power, often for extended periods. Joint doctrine defines combat power as the total means of
destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a
given time (JP 1-02). Army doctrine adds “Army forces generate combat power by converting fighting
potential into effective action. Combat power includes a unit’s constructive and information capabilities as
well as its disruptive and destructive force.” (FM 3-0) The MEB generates combat power to conduct
operations in its own AO and supports and enables the generation of combat power within the unit it
supports.
1-33. .Six of the elements of combat power—movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment,
C2, and protection—are collectively described as the warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat
power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information (see FM 3-0). The MEB
provides complementary and reinforcing capabilities across the warfighting functions with support that is
primarily focused on the protection, movement and maneuver, and selected sustainment functions.
1-34. Commanders use the warfighting functions to help them exercise battle command. A warfighting
function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a
common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (this definition was
shortened; the complete definition is printed in the glossary). Decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations
combine all the warfighting functions to generate combat power. No warfighting function is exclusively
decisive, shaping, or sustaining. The Army’s warfighting functions are fundamentally linked to the joint
functions. They also parallel those of the Marine Corps.
1-35. Commanders use combined arms to generate and increase the effects of combat power. Army forces
obtain combined arms through force tailoring, task organization, and mutual support. Mutual support takes
the form of complementary and reinforcing capabilities. Commanders balance the ability to mass the
effects of lethal and nonlethal systems with the requirements to deploy and sustain the units that employ
those systems. Sustaining combat power throughout the operation is important to success. Tailored force
packages maximize the capability of initial-entry forces consistent with the mission and the requirement to
project, employ, and sustain the force. Follow-on forces increase the entire force’s endurance and ability to
operate in depth. Employing reserves, focusing joint support, arranging rest for committed forces, and
staging sustainment assets to preserve momentum and synchronization all assist in applying combat power
effectively over time and space.
1-36. Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous application of the elements of combat power
to achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially (FM 3-0). The term
combined arms is not reserved solely for close combat or maneuver units. Combined arms employ each of
the warfighting functions and its supporting systems. Used destructively, combined arms integrate different
capabilities such that counteracting one makes the enemy vulnerable to another. Used constructively,
combined arms multiply the effectiveness and the efficiency of Army capabilities used in stability or civil
support. The MEB uses combined arms to generate combat power and applies it to conduct operations. It
routinely supports divisions and echelons above division and their subordinate headquarters to generate
and maintain combat power. Based on METT-TC, the MEB may create combined arms battalion TFs or
company teams from its assigned CBRN, engineer, and MP battalions and other units to facilitate
operations within its own AO, and in support of other units within the higher headquarters to which it is
assigned.
1-37. Combined arms use complementary and reinforcing capabilities. Complementary capabilities protect
the weaknesses of one system or organization with the capabilities of a different arm or warfighting
function. Reinforcing capabilities combine similar systems or capabilities within the same warfighting
function to increase the function’s overall capabilities. The MEB may use task-organized CBRN, EOD,
engineer, and MP elements (TFs or company teams) to conduct route reconnaissance and use MP,
engineer, CBRN, and EOD elements to perform various tasks primarily subordinate to the movement and
maneuver, protection, and sustainment warfighting functions. In these examples, the combined arms
applications of these elements are both complementary and reinforcing and provide MANSPT operations
support to the force as a whole and specifically to the echelon headquarters they are supporting. (See
FM 3-0.)
1-38. Task organizing is the act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistic package of
specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task
organizing the force include, but are not limited to training, experience, equipage, sustainability, operating
environment, enemy threat, and mobility (JP 3-05). To the joint definition, Army doctrine adds: The act of
designing an operating force, support staff, or logistics package of specific size and composition to meet a
unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task organizing the force include, but are not
limited to, training, equipage, sustainability, operating environment, enemy threat, and mobility. For Army
forces, it includes allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command
and support relationships (FM 3-0).
1-41. MANSPT operations provide the commander with capabilities to be predictive and proactive while
at the same time provide the ability to react to enemy initiatives. The commander must understand the OE
and its implications to friendly and enemy operations. This understanding allows the commander to predict
enemy actions that leverage the environment, to take proactive actions against the enemy to deny him the
means to do so, and to avoid areas of highest risk or engage the enemy in those areas within enhanced
situational awareness (SA). The commander may also shape the OE using the integrated capabilities of
MANSPT operations to enhance the operational performance of each unit in support of full spectrum
operations. MANSPT operations not only enable the performance of units but also seek to deny the enemy
options—including the ability to maneuver freely. To develop and maintain this understanding of the OE,
the commander applies a wide range of dedicated and collateral sensors. The commander also considers the
physical, human, and informational factors when considering the impact of the OE on MANSPT
operations.
PROTECTION
1-42. The protection warfighting function is presented along with the other five warfighting functions in
FM 3-0. MANSPT operations integrate many of the tasks within this warfighting function, but not all of
them. (When revised, FM 3-13 will address information protection.)
1-43. The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the
commander can apply maximum combat power (FM 3-0). Preserving the force includes protecting
personnel (combatants and noncombatants), physical assets, and information of the United States and
multinational military and civilian partners. The protection warfighting function facilitates the
commander’s ability to maintain the force’s integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree
to which potential threats can disrupt operations and counters or mitigates those threats. Protection is a
continuing activity; it integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect
forces. The protection warfighting function includes the following tasks:
z AMD.
z Personnel recovery.
z Information protection.
z Fratricide avoidance.
z Operational area security.
z Antiterrorism (AT).
z Survivability.
z Force health protection.
z CBRN operations.
z Safety.
z Operations security.
z EOD.
1-44. Those tasks within the protection warfighting function that are best integrated by the MEB in
MANSPT operations and support area operations are discussed in chapter 5. The integration and
synchronization of MANSPT-related tasks shape the environment to protect the force, enhance
survivability and other protection tasks, and expand the freedom of action of friendly forces while denying
it to the enemy. This allows combat power to be applied at the decisive point and time and facilitates
simultaneous combinations at the operational level and rapid transitions at the tactical level. (FM 3-90
provides a discussion of many of the tasks included in the movement and maneuver warfighting function.)
assault. Another is deploying forces to intermediate staging bases in preparation for an offensive.
Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires
to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission (this
definition was shortened; the complete definition is printed in the glossary). Maneuver is the means by
which commanders mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective
maneuver requires close coordination with fires. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force
as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Both tactical and operational maneuver require logistic support.
The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes the following tasks:
z Deploy.
z Move.
z Maneuver.
z Employ direct fires.
z Occupy an area.
z Conduct mobility and countermobility operations.
z Employ battlefield obscuration.
1-46. Those tasks within the movement and maneuver warfighting function that may be best integrated by
the MEB in MANSPT operations and support area operations are discussed in chapters 5 and 6. The
integration and synchronization of MANSPT-related tasks shape the environment to provide mobility and
countermobility, provide or enhance other movement and maneuver tasks, and expand the freedom of
action of friendly forces while denying it to the enemy. This allows combat power to be applied at the
decisive point and time and facilitates simultaneous combinations at the operational level and rapid
transitions at the tactical level. The movement and maneuver warfighting function does not include
administrative movements of personnel and materiel. These movements fall under the sustainment
warfighting function. (FM 3-90 provides a discussion of many of the tasks included in the movement and
maneuver warfighting function.)
SUSTAINMENT
1-47. The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and
services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (FM 3-0). The
endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the depth
and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Sustainment is the
provision of the logistics, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations
until mission accomplishment. Internment, resettlement, and detainee operations fall under the sustainment
warfighting function and include elements of all three major subfunctions. (FM 4-0 describes the
sustainment warfighting function.)
1-48. Sustainment is discussed in several ways in this manual—the sustainment warfighting function,
sustainment operations; and sustainment tasks. The sustainment discussed as part of MANSPT operations
only includes the sustainment operations performed by the MEB with task-organized forces. The MEB
provides support to the sustainment warfighting function primarily through its focus on tasks associated
with general engineering support and internment and resettlement operations.
FREEDOM OF ACTION
1-49. MANSPT operations are intended to enhance freedom of action for the supported force. Gaining and
maintaining freedom of action is necessary during all full spectrum operations. Freedom of action in this
context focuses on providing the commander with options that would otherwise be unavailable if actions
by the threat were successful. These actions include, but are not limited to, tactical security, mobility,
countermobility, survivability, CBRN operations, and other aspects of the movement and maneuver,
protection, and sustainment warfighting functions. They include moderating or eliminating effects of
obstacles (primarily terrain and weather) to enable the commander to deploy and maneuver where and
when desired, without interruption or delay, to achieve the mission. Protection, movement and maneuver,
and sustainment each have proactive and reactive actions associated with this focus.
1-50. Initiative is directly impacted by the freedom of action that a commander has. A commander may be
impacted by many things to include constraints, restraints, and operational limitations (or control measures)
imposed because of primarily legal, political, or C2 decisions. MANSPT operations may not directly affect
these, but they do contribute capabilities for the supported commander to seize, retain, and exploit the
initiative as the surest way to achieve decisive results. MANSPT operations emphasize creating options
and opportunity for the commander.
1-51. There is no approved definition for freedom of action in either joint or Army doctrine. It is currently
used as a part of the definitions for the terms centers of gravity, constraint, operational limitation,
restraint, space control, and tactical security. FM 3-0 highlights only the sustainment warfighting function
as providing freedom of actions but so do other warfighting functions. MANSPT operations contribute to
the commander’s freedom of action to decisively exercise his/her will to complete the mission, protect the
force, and to affect movement (of both the enemy and his/her own forces). The MEB is specifically
designed to conduct MANSPT operations for the commander at division and echelons above division and
provide the supported commander with capabilities that contribute to freedom of action as a result.
CAPABILITIES
2-1. The MEB is designed to C2 forces from multiple branches but especially those that conduct
MANSPT operations for the force. It employs them to conduct full spectrum operations in support of Army
division, echelon above division (EAD), joint, interagency, or multinational headquarters. More than one
MEB may be assigned to a higher headquarters. The MEB is capable of operating across the full spectrum
operations to support, reinforce, or complement offensive and defensive major combat operations and can
support or conduct stability or civil support operations. It can enable the decisive operation or lead shaping
or sustaining operations with a focus on general engineering or internment and resettlement (I/R). In
special situations, the MEB may conduct the decisive operation. The MEB is not a maneuver brigade;
however, it is normally assigned an AO and controls terrain. The only maneuver the MEB is capable of is
defensive maneuver and very limited offensive maneuver by employing its reserve to counter or spoil a
threat. The MEB does not typically maneuver as a brigade. The MEB is designed to be assigned an AO and
C2 with higher headquarters designated TACON for security and defense of tenant units. (See chapter 6.)
2-2. The MEB shares these characteristics with the other support brigades—
z Tailorable—can be task-organized based on the factors of METT-TC.
z Modular—easily attaches/detaches subordinate units.
z Expeditionary—can be quickly deployed in modules.
z Networked—has an organic signal company and liaison officers (LNOs) to link with other
headquarters/forces.
z Joint interdependent—uses and contributes to other Service capabilities.
z Agile—can reinforce other brigades with subordinate capabilities.
z Multifunctional—headquarters employs multiple branch capabilities to accomplish multiple
types of mission tasks.
2-3. Unlike other support or functional brigades, the MEB is staffed and trained to C2 an assigned AO
and to control terrain. In this regard, it is similar to a BCT, without the inherent maneuver capability of a
BCT. It has the added staff to perform the tasks needed to operate an AO to include conducting selected
combat operations within that AO. Many of the units not staffed to control terrain become tenants within
the assigned AO (especially if the AO is the echelon support area) of the MEB. (See chapter 6.) The MEB
can also conduct up-to-battalion-level close combat within its AO when assigned a TCF. It provides an
“economy of force” capability so BCTs/maneuver units can focus on combat operations. It directly
supports and synchronizes operations across all six Army warfighting functions.
2-4. The MEB has limited organic structure and depends on other organizations for some additional
capabilities. Detailed mission analysis and running estimates identify requirements. Examples of MEB
dependencies include fires (counterfire radar, forward observers, and ability to lase targets, Air Force
TACON party), sustainment (forward support company, area support medical company, aerial medical
evacuation), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability (unmanned aircraft system
[UAS], MI units, geospatial staff).
MEB ORGANIZATION
2-10. The MEB is designed to perform MANSPT operations in support of the division and its assigned
elements and EAD organizations. The MEB is optimized to conduct operations and C2 those elements that
conduct MANSPT operations (primarily focused on combinations of CBRN, engineer, EOD, and MP
capabilities/units). The brigade also conducts combat operations up to the level of a maneuver battalion
when task-organized with a TCF or task-organized with other maneuver forces. The compact size of the
organic elements of the MEB facilitates rapid deployment, enabling strategic responsiveness while
maintaining enough capability to provide C2 and the functional expertise necessary for rapid tailoring. The
unique staff provides the MEB with the capability to conduct the other key tasks in ways no other brigade
may do. This is discussed further in the chapter on each MEB key task.
2-11. Beyond its three organic units (HHC, NSC, and BSB), the MEB has no fixed structure. When
assigned or attached in support of a theater specific operation, OPORD, OPLAN, or CONPLAN, the
brigade staff will conduct a mission analysis to determine the capabilities, task organization, and command
and support relationships necessary to accomplish the mission. The organization is tailored to respond to
the elements of METT-TC. It receives a mix of modular units from detachments to battalions. Figure 2-1
depicts possible units task-organized to the MEB for a specific mission. In many cases, the broad
geographic responsibilities and extensive functional capabilities that the MEB represents will require a
variety of subordinate, functionally based formations, mission tailored for the environment.
2-12. It will be a challenge for the MEB to integrate task-organized units and employ them as cohesive
tactical formations the way units with organic subunits, leaders, and Soldiers can. The trust and teamwork
required to conduct close combat with combined arms formations (both technical/functional and maneuver)
is difficult to develop quickly. The Army force generation collective training events and continuous in-
theater training will be essential to prepare the unit, develop trust and teamwork, and certify leaders.
HHC, MEB
2-13. The HHC provides the basis for effective C2 in support of the MEB commander. Its primary mission
is to provide C2 capabilities for the MEB across full spectrum operations in both complex and urban
terrain and against conventional and asymmetric threat capabilities. This is accomplished by core staff
from the MEB HHC and their associated signal support. See figure 2-2, page 2-4, for the major elements
within the HHC organization.
2-14. The MEB staff is unique in its capabilities to C2 many of the tasks associated with its mission. No
other brigade level organization has such a large and complete organic staff with the capabilities required
to conduct these operations.
2-15. The command group contains the commander and deputy commanding officer (DCO) and provides
continuous command presence at one location or the ability to provide C2 for split-based operations. The
executive officer, command sergeant major, and three enlisted members complete the command group.
2-16. The headquarters company contains the company commander and first sergeant and 12 other
personnel to include a food management team, supply personnel, and an administrative noncommissioned
officer (NCO). The company provides sustainment support for the MEB headquarters and staff.
2-17. The area operations section and airspace management section, along with the fires cell (FC) under
the operations staff officer (S-3), gives the MEB the ability to be assigned an AO and control terrain. The
area operations section includes engineer, area security, protection, ADC, infantry, and CBRN staff
members. The airspace management section includes airspace command and control (AC2), electronic
warfare system operator, and tactical airspace integration system operator staff to provide the MEB with
the ability to control Army airspace within its assigned AO.
2-18. The FC includes a fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), fire support officer (FSO), and targeting
staff. The MEB depends upon indirect fires and counterfire radar support from a fires brigade or BCT and
must be augmented with forward observers and the ability to lase targets within its assigned AO. Based on
METT-TC, the MEB may have an artillery element in a command or support relationship to provide
indirect fires in support of its AO.
2-19. The S-3 operations section is unique due to the depth and breadth of its capabilities. It contains
engineer, MP, and CBRNE cells that provide a staff that is designed to integrate and synchronize the
conduct of MANSPT operations. This capability allows the staff to perform the MANSPT tasks associated
with full spectrum operations in a more complete manner than any other brigade level staff. The engineer
operations cell includes combat engineer, reconnaissance, terrain data, and power system technician staff
that provides the MEB with the ability to conduct most engineer operations. The MP operations cell staff
includes maneuver and mobility support, protective services, and I/R expertise that provides the MEB with
the ability to C2 most MP operations. The CBRNE operations cell includes intelligence, CBRN, and the
fusion of EOD staff to provide the ability to C2 many CBRNE operations. The liaison team can provide
three 2-person liaison teams and a construction inspector. These assets give the MEB the ability to
integrate with other organizations and inspect construction performed in their AO by military units, HN, or
contractors.
2-20. The typical S-1, brigade surgeon section, medical treatment team, chaplain, public affairs, and S-4
logistics section, along with the organic BSB, provide the MEB with sustainment capability.
2-21. The S-2 intelligence section includes vulnerability assessment, intelligence analyst, criminal
intelligence staff members, and UAS operators (but no assigned UASs). If there is a significant threat, the
MEB must be augmented or task-organized with ISR capability, normally from the battlefield surveillance
brigade (BFSB), when assigned an AO.
2-22. The S-5 plans section includes engineer, MP, CBRN, infantry, and power systems technical staff
members to provide the necessary expertise to produce plans that capture both operational and tactical
considerations.
2-23. The S-6 communication section and the organic signal network support company provide the MEB
with communications connectivity that most functional brigades do not have.
2-24. All of the sections within the headquarters will be organized according to METT-TC factors to
support the organization and operation of command posts (CPs). The MEB will normally field two CPs (a
main CP and a tactical CP). The brigade will also have the capability to deploy command groups for short
or limited duration requirements as CPs. The MEB can also use the tactical CP as an early entry command
post. (See chapter 3.)
2-25. Key command and staff positions within the MEB organization will be uniquely identified as
requiring the special skills of the chemical, engineer, or MP branches. The staff must synchronize and
integrate many unique functional branches into brigade level operations. The range of employment options
requires the staff to have an understanding of the joint operations. The Army has established a new special
reporting code (SRC) 01C (chemical/engineer/MP immaterial) to identify the duty positions of
commander, DCO, executive officer (XO), S-3, S-3 operations officer, LNO (team chief), and headquarters
company commander.
Note: The NSC has a secondary role of data retransmission where enhanced position location
reporting system (EPLRS), TI, or Army Common User System capabilities do not exist for the
MEB.
z Global Broadcast Service with the ability to receive high bandwidth products such as imagery,
logistics data, and digital map information to support ABCS employment by commanders and
staffs.
z Multichannel TACSAT to extend the range of the MEB’s communications services.
Water purification up to 30,000 gallons per day, and storage/distribution for the brigade of
up to 22,000 gallons per day.
z Support maintenance company (SMC) (with assigned platoons).
C2 of subordinate elements performing field maintenance functions.
Consolidated unit administration, maintenance, supply, and field feeding support for up to
250 assigned personnel.
Maintenance control, shop stock, and wheeled vehicle recovery capability.
Field maintenance and technical inspection of small arms, artillery, fire control equipment,
armament, tracked and wheeled vehicles.
Field maintenance and technical inspection of utilities equipment, power generators,
construction equipment, quartermaster, and chemical equipment.
Field maintenance, operation, and technical inspection of microwave equipment,
COMSEC/radio equipment, support electronics devices, and radar.
SUPPORTED COMMANDS
SUPPORT OF THE DIVISION AND ABOVE
2-32. The MEB is primarily designed to provide support to the division but is capable of being employed
to provide support to EAD organizations as well. The division is the primary tactical warfighting
headquarters for C2 of up to six BCTs, the five types of supporting brigades (to include the MEB), and
other functional brigades conducting full spectrum operations. The division shapes the operation for
subordinate brigades, resources them for assigned missions, coordinates, synchronizes, and sequences their
operations. The MEB and its capabilities provide the division with the ability to shape operations and
provide selected sustainment for other brigades (for example, I/R and general engineering). The division
uses BCTs to fight battles and engagements and uses its attached support brigades primarily for shaping
and sustaining operations and to complement or reinforce the BCTs. The MEB will normally be assigned
an AO by the division that is focused on support area activities. This AO may contain all or part of a
division’s supporting sustainment brigade and other tenant units or headquarters positioned in support of
the division. The MEB would conduct support area operations when given this role by the division. (See
chapter 6.) (See FMI 3-0.1 for a discussion of modular force headquarters.)
2-33. Each MEB is uniquely tailored and task-organized for the role it is projected to perform for the
echelon that it is supporting. The MEB will typically receive its missions from a division or other echelon
headquarters it is supporting. Typical MEB support to the division (and potentially EAD organizations)
would include the key tasks discussed on page 2-2. Of special note is the ability to conduct operations
within a movement corridor (see chapter 5). As part of its support to a division, the MEB may
simultaneously be supporting BCT offensive operations while conducting defensive operations in its
assigned AO or division area. It may also be conducting stability operations in its own AO while it is
supporting other units conducting stability operations in their AOs. These examples may be sequential or in
some cases, occur simultaneously.
2-34. The key tasks associated with the MEB cover a broad range of potential support to the division or
other echelon that is being supported. Depending on the types and numbers of elements assigned, the MEB
can perform a significant portion of the functional or combined arms missions/tasks typically associated
with CA, CBRN, engineer, EOD, and MP forces. The MEB is also capable of providing C2 to other forces,
to include but not limited to, AMD elements and a TCF.
EXAMPLE
As an example of support to a division, the MEB is capable of providing the C2
headquarters for a division river crossing operation while conducting other minor
operations. The MEB could do this one of two ways.
• The first is for the commander and DCO to each command different operations of
the brigade and use the main CP for the largest operation.
• The second, with a more complex crossing, is for the division commander to
position one deputy commanding general (DCG) and mobile command group with
the MEB to perform as the crossing site commander using the staff of the MEB to
facilitate C2.
Units are task-organized to the MEB to support this type of a gap crossing. A similar
role could also be performed by the MEB in support of a complex passage of lines.
2-35. While capable of performing multiple simultaneous tasks, a higher headquarters must ensure that it
does not exceed the span of control of the MEB with the number and types of missions that are given to the
MEB. When the amount of functional missions challenge the ability of the MEB to perform its
multifunctional role, functional brigades may need to be task-organized to the division. For example, an
MEB responsible for a complex AO is not able to also perform as a headquarters supporting a major
division gap-crossing operation within the division AO. In this example, another MEB or an engineer
brigade would need to support the division to provide the necessary C2 headquarters for this mission.
Multiple MEBs may be assigned to a division or higher echelon.
2-36. When assigned the mission of supporting EAD, joint, or multinational forces, the MEB could be task
organized with other Service or national units and integrate staff augmentation to C2 a variety of elements
necessary to support those forces. The MEB may or may not be assigned its own AO in such a role. The
MEB could conduct operations to support the corps or joint command. When assigned to a joint command,
the MEB may provide C2 of the joint security area (JSA). In this case, the MEB commander may be
designated as the joint security coordinator by a joint force commander. The MEB may be required to
establish or support a theater-level Joint Security Coordination Center. (FM 3-0 provides an example of the
MEB being OPCON to a MEF that highlights the modular nature of Army forces and the role that the MEB
plays in supporting Army modularity.)
2-39. Elements out of the MEB may also provide specific CBRN or engineer technical reconnaissance
capability to a BCT AO. MPs may secure a sensitive site within a BCT AO. CBRN, engineer, EOD, and
MP forces may provide a wide range of support to the BCT or other brigades within a division AO.
2-40. The MEB may also support mission staging operations (MSO) where a BCT rests, refits, and
receives large quantities of supplies. This may occur with the MEB having been assigned the AO within
which the MSO will occur or in another AO with the MEB providing support through MANSPT
operations.
EMPLOYMENT EXAMPLES
2-41. Figure 2-3 is an example of a division task organization that contains a single MEB. This particular
example does not provide the division with any functional brigades. Units that might otherwise be found in
functional CBRN, engineer, MP, or other brigades would likely be task-organized to the MEB. Support
that might otherwise be drawn from a functional brigade would likely come from the MEB if the necessary
assets have been task-organized to the MEB.
2-42. Figure 2-4 provides an example of the MEB organic units and of forces that may be assigned or
attached to the MEB in support of a division. This is but one of many possible task organizations for the
MEB. In special situations, the MEB may also have EOD, CA, and AMD units assigned or attached to it.
2-43. The effectiveness and success of the MEB depends on the synergy leveraged from integrating and
synchronizing contributions from all attached or OPCON units. Depending on the METT-TC factors, MEB
can task-organize assigned units into combined arms TFs and company teams. These combined arms
elements can then perform both pure functional tasks and MANSPT collective tasks more effectively and
efficiently. (See also chapters 5 and 7.) The MI unit reflected in this example (figure 2-4) would likely
come from the BFSB and be task-organized to an MEB when the METT-TC factors associated with a
particular AO require this augmentation of the MEB, similar to the organic MI companies that are found in
all BCTs and the ACR. The TCF shown in this example could be made up of a variety of maneuver forces
and its actual size and composition would be based on the level III threat it would be focused against. The
MEB is not designed to C2 multiple maneuver battalions.
Each MEB headquarters begins with the same basic organization structure, staffing,
and capabilities. The personality of the commander, the experience of the staff, the
directed mission, task-organized units, and staff augmentation will require each MEB
to exercise battle command with some variations. This chapter discusses principles
and operational concepts of C2 for the MEB. Some procedures for the MEB must
still be developed or refined by units in the field and shared with new MEBs as those
units are formed and are prepared for employment. Battle command and mission
command are applied as described in FM 3-0, FM 5-0, FM 6-0, and FMI 5-0.1. The
MEB C2 system supports the commander as the MEB conducts operations.
MISSION COMMAND
3-7. Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on
mission orders (this definition was shortened; the complete definition is printed in the glossary). Mission
orders leave the how of mission accomplishment to the subordinates by allowing them maximum freedom
of planning and action to accomplish missions. Successful mission command results from subordinate
leaders exercising disciplined initiative to accomplish missions within the commander’s intent. Mission
command requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding.
Note: There are times when factors such as high risk or the technical nature of some operations
will require the MEB commander to be more prescriptive in guidance. (See chapter 6.)
3-8. The four elements of mission command are as follows: (See FM 3-0.)
z Commander’s Intent. The commander’s intent is a clear, concise statement of what the force
must do and the conditions the force must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil
considerations that represent the desired end state (FM 3-0). MEB commanders formulate and
communicate their intent to ensure unity of effort during operations, allowing subordinates to
exercise disciplined initiative.
z Initiative (Individual). Initiative (individual) is the willingness to act in the absence of orders
when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats
arise. (See FM 3-0.) MEB subordinates decide how to achieve their assigned missions within the
delegated freedom of action and the exercise of disciplined initiative during execution; they
have an absolute responsibility to fulfill the commander’s intent.
z Mission Orders. A mission order is a technique for developing orders that emphasizes to
subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them. It provides maximum
freedom of action in determining how to best accomplish the assigned missions. (See FM 3-0.)
The MEB commander intervenes to direct coordination, restore operations, or exploit success.
At a minimum, mission orders state the following:
Task organization.
Situation.
Commander’s intent and concept of operations.
Unit mission.
RISK
3-11. Commanders may assess, evaluate, and decide when to accept prudent risk to create opportunities to
achieve decisive results. Risk is an element of operational design. (See FM 3-0.) The MEB will often be
required to accept operational or tactical risk somewhere to increase support elsewhere—to balance effort
between support area operations and MANSPT operations. The MEB can mitigate this risk by developing
branches and sequels and by providing subordinate commanders “be prepared” missions so that they are
better prepared to react to planned and unplanned events and opportunities and changing mission priorities.
The “be prepared” planning effort increases mental and organizational agility to respond to inevitable
changes.
3-12. The MEB can mitigate some tactical risks by shifting resources, changing priorities, phasing or
sequencing operations, reducing a subordinate units assigned tasks or size of AO, and deciding where to
assume risk when required. (FM 3-90 and FM 6-0 discuss tactical risk. See FM 5-19 for discussion on risk
management and composite risk management [CRM]).
3-13. Some high risk situations may require the MEB commander to exercise detailed command and less
mission command. (See FM 6-0.) For example, an MEB commander may use detailed command where
positive or central control is necessary to increase the probability of a specific effect occurring or when
time and procedural discipline is critical to success. To use positive control, the MEB C2 system must be
properly functioning.
z Personnel. The C2 system in an MEB begins with people. No amount of technology can reduce
the importance of the human dimension since combat involves Soldiers.
z Information management is the science of using information systems (INFOSYSs) and
methods. Information management (IM) consists of the INFOSYS C2, information systems, and
relevant information (RI). The C2 INFOSYS provides the commander with a major physical
component of the C2 system. These computer and communication systems provide an accuracy
and reliability of information that can accelerate decisionmaking in the MEB. The C2 INFOSYS
also makes mission execution efficient and effective, allowing the commanders and staffs to
spend more time and energy on the art and human dimension of C2.
z Procedures. Procedures are standard and detailed sequences of activities in the MEB to
accomplish tasks. They govern actions in the C2 system to effectively and efficiently exercise
C2. Adhering to procedures minimizes confusion, misunderstanding, and hesitance as
commanders rapidly shift forces to meet contingencies.
z Equipment and facilities. The equipment and facilities provide sustainment and a work
environment for the other elements of the C2 system.
3-16. The C2 system supports the commander by performing three functions—
z Creating and maintaining the common operational picture (COP).
z Supporting decisionmaking by improving its speed and accuracy.
z Supporting preparation and communication of execution information.
3-17. The MEB headquarters may be used as an additional division command post or to reinforce one. The
breadth and depth of the MEB C2 system provides it with the capability to be collocated or linked with a
division command group and C2 some division operations. An example would be a deliberate division gap
(river) crossing operation under the C2 of a DCG using the mobile command group and the MEB main CP.
A similar example would be a complex passage of lines. Depending on the complexity of the operation,
this may be the only mission the MEB could support during that timeframe.
3-18. The commander decides how to use the MEB DCO and XO. Considerations include the
personalities, individual strengths and weaknesses, and the unit’s mission. The commander uses the DCO
to help command; this gives the MEB the ability to have the commander continuously available in the main
CP or to command a separate operation. The commander may use the DCO to C2 specific areas within the
MEB so that the commander may focus elsewhere. The XO normally performs the role of chief of staff in
the main CP.
PERSONNEL
3-19. This section includes organization of the staff for C2. (See appendix A, appendix B, and chapter 2.)
The staff operates the commander’s C2 system. (See FM 6-0 for further discussion of staff functions.) The
MEB’s staff sections normally are distributed among three C2 organizations—the command groups,
tactical (TAC) CP, and main CP. The MEB commander organizes the staff within each CP to perform
essential staff functions to aid him or her with planning and in controlling operations. Enhanced CP
capabilities allow the commander to maintain CP functionality regardless of the spatial positioning of the
staff. The modularized design of each function (for example, maneuver and MANSPT, protection, and
ISR) provides commanders with the flexibility to tailor their CPs based on their assessment of the current
and future situation.
3-20. These C2 organizations are normally positioned within the MEB’s AO to maintain flexibility,
redundancy, survivability, and mobility. The CP of the BSB, while not a MEB-level CP, performs
functions that have significant impact on MEB operations. Accordingly, the BSB staff is often closely
involved in parallel or collaborative planning with the MEB CPs.
Command Group
3-23. Command group 1 is for the commander and command group 2 is for the DCO C2 organization. The
command groups are formed any time the MEB commander or deputy commander relocates to control the
operation. They will be equipped to operate separately from a CP whenever commanders or their deputy
commander must locate to influence operations with rapid decisions and orders. The commander will
determine the location of the command group.
3-24. The commander chooses how often to control operations from the command group and positions it
at the decisive point to observe, influence, sense, and ensure communications. The DCO’s command group
complements the commander’s command group in the direction of C2 of the MEB. Command group 2 is
organized when the MEB commander requires it to control an operation or the commander needs an
additional senior leader presence to influence the operations with rapid decisions and orders. The DCO
uses the same considerations as commanders in positioning their command groups in the AO.
z The commander may control operations from the command group and locates near the most
critical event, normally with the main effort CP. From this location, the commander is better
able to observe critical events, maintain communications, and sense operations. Despite the
increased capability provided by the C2 INFOSYS, command remains a personal endeavor and
often requires a commander’s on-site assessment and leadership. Commanders should leverage
the C2 INFOSYS to allow adequate capabilities within the CP physical view of subordinates
and the terrain without affecting their decision-making ability.
z Commanders consider the following in determining their location in the AO:
Linkage of the ABCS network to make timely decisions, including the ability to judge the
progress, condition, and morale of their forces. Within technical limitations,
communications systems adapt to the needs of the commander, not vice versa.
Time and location of critical events and/or decision points that have the greatest impact on
mission accomplishment. Ideally, commanders select a location where they can observe the
conditions that aid in making a critical decision.
Security for the command group, including the commander’s personal protection.
commander’s decision-making process. The TAC CP can execute collaborative, distributed, and
simultaneous decisionmaking to translate the decision to action. This allows rapid decisionmaking focused
on current operations.
BSB CP
3-31. The BSB CP has a special role in controlling and coordinating the administrative and logistical
support for the MEB. The improvements in communications and INFOSYS means the MEB does not have
to operate a rear CP collocated with the BSB CP. If necessary, MEB sustainment staff (S-1, S-4, and
surgeon), may locate portions of their sections with the BSB CP.
3-32. The BSB CP performs the following functions for the MEB:
z Tracking the current battle so it may anticipate support requirements before units request them.
z Serving as the entry point for units entering the MEB AO.
z Monitoring main supply routes (MSR) and controlling sustainment vehicle traffic.
z Coordinating the evacuation of casualties, equipment, and detainees.
z Coordinating movement of personnel killed in action.
z Coordinating with the sustainment brigade for resupply requirements.
z Assisting in operation of a detainee facility or a dislocated civilian (DC) point.
z Providing ad hoc representation to the main CP to support the logistics section.
3-34. The MEB LNO team provides liaison, when required, to designated division, corps, SOF, joint,
interagency, multinational, multinational units in the AO to ensure effective coordination between the
designated unit and the MEB. The LNOs convey information and its meaning and context by interpreting
and explaining it. It is essential to have an LNO at the immediate higher headquarters during development
of plans and orders to help their staff fully understand the MEB capabilities and limitations and how to best
employ it. After the higher headquarters is more familiar with the MEB, the LNO can be reassigned. The
LNO team may need to be augmented to effectively link the brigade with multiple headquarters in a
complex operation. For example, due to the lack of organic ISR capability, the MEB may need to provide a
LNO to the BFSB to ensure the flow of information needed for MEB operations. At times, the MEB may
need to provide an LNO to a unit that receives significant assets from the MEB in a command or support
relationship. Other units in the MEB AO may need to provide LNOs to the MEB to coordinate their
operations.
SUCCESSION OF COMMAND
3-35. Succession of command occurs automatically on the death, capture, or evacuation of the brigade
commander. It also occurs when communications are lost with the commander for an extended period of
time. The brigade must treat succession of command as a type of drill. The MEB should establish an SOP
and consider METT-TC factors and other relevant considerations when determining succession of
command.
3-36. All leaders must understand the procedures required for a quick, smooth succession. The following
is one logical succession of command:
z Brigade commander.
z DCO.
z BSB commander.
z Brigade XO.
z Brigade S-3.
understand how to avoid potential information overload while developing SU within the MEB; well
structured SOPs assist them by rapidly conveying necessary information within the MEB.
3-42. The XO is responsible for IM within the MEB. The XO outlines responsibilities and supervises the
staff’s performance in collecting and processing relevant information. During operations, the XO ensures
that all staff members understand and support the CCIR. The XO ensures all staff members understand the
requirements, review incoming and outgoing information traffic, and understand procedures for informing
the commander and other designated staff officers of critical or exceptional information.
PROCEDURES
3-43. The MEB uses the Army operations process and military decision-making process (MDMP) to plan
and conduct operations. (See chapters 4 through 8 for more information.)
3-44. The MEB typically develops standardized battle drills to respond to episodic events during the
conduct of operations in the CP. One technique is to use the Combined Arms Center’s “Tactical Operations
Center (TOC) Battle Drills” as a basis of developing unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) and CP
procedures. The MEB develops SOPs for integrating task-organized units and staff augmentees, and
highlighting those tasks that are associated with MANSPT, support area, consequence management, and
stability operations.
This chapter discusses how the MEB conducts operations and some of the
considerations that may be more important to the MEB than other organizations as
the operations process are conducted. The MEB must be prepared to support the
simultaneous combinations used during full spectrum operations whether they are
conducted overseas or within the United States and its territories. Changes in the
scope and focus of each operation are likely to occur during the execution of a
mission and the MEB must be prepared to transition to support the needs of the unit
to which it is attached or OPCON. The operations process supports the requirement
for the MEB to balance efforts across what will likely be multiple missions, some
conducted sequentially, and others simultaneously as part of the role of this unique
organization.
OVERVIEW
4-1. The MEB uses Army planning processes. The MEB should understand joint planning processes
when their controlling headquarters is a JTF and the national planning processes when conducting civil
support operations. (See chapter 8.) The standard Army planning processes and staff functions are
contained in FM 5-0, FMI 5-0.1, and FM 6-0, and they apply to all operations. MEB operations demand an
integrated combined arms approach. The key tasks that the MEB trains to conduct are unique and include
MANSPT operations, support area operations, consequence management operations, and stability
operations. These operations are each discussed in chapters 5 through 8 respectively.
4-2. The MEB will require tailoring or task organization for every mission that it performs since its
organic organization only includes the brigade’s HHC, an NSC, and a BSB. Capability requirements
should be identified early in the planning process and constantly reevaluated to ensure the MEB is able to
perform all of the specified and implied tasks that are necessary to achieve mission success. Some of the
shortfalls in the organic structure of the MEB are also discussed in this chapter.
Notes: For additional information to support the planning process for the MEB, see FM 3-0,
FM 5-0, FMI 5-0.1, and FM 6-0. For additional information on the capabilities of the CBRN,
engineer, and MP organizations that will typically make up the majority of MEB assets, see
FM 3-11, FM 3-19.1, and FM 3-34.
SIMULTANEOUS COMBINATIONS
4-3. The Army conducts full spectrum operations with few significant pauses, creating a relentless tempo
that overwhelms the enemy's capability to respond effectively. A tactical pause allows an enemy to
reorganize, reconstitute, prepare for our next action, or potentially seize the initiative. Not only does this
provide an enemy with an advantage, it prolongs the duration of operation leading to unnecessary
additional operations. High operational tempo and continuous pressure can seriously hinder the enemy’s
ability to reconstitute capabilities or reconfigure forces to prepare for subsequent operations. Simultaneous
and continuous operations combine defeat and stability mechanisms to achieve decisive results. The MEB
operations must also be simultaneous and continuous to facilitate the actions and the desired operational
tempo of the supported commander. Proper task organization of the necessary MEB assets must occur
early in the process and provide the necessary flexibility of employment and the necessary transitions that
will occur in operations. Effective multifunctional and functional C2 of MEB capabilities are essential to
achieving this.
4-4. Each element of full spectrum operations—offense, defense, and stability or civil support—is
necessary in most the campaigns. There are exceptions in that during most domestic operations Army
forces will only conduct civil support operations. Offensive and defensive operations may be required
within the continental United States (CONUS) in support of Homeland Security (HLS). Stability
operations may predominate in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) with minor defensive operations,
and with little or no offensive component.
PLANNING
4-7. The MEB must conduct its operations in collaboration with higher, lower, and adjacent units. It
conducts a broad range of tasks in full spectrum operations, with a broad range of task-organized units and
capabilities. This requires it to conduct integrated (this includes “synchronized”) planning and balance
effort across several operations. It must integrate several major simultaneous operations. It must integrate
the functions, activities, processes, staffs, and the units, tasks, systems and capabilities of numerous Army
branches and joint, interagency, and multinational forces, often into combined arms teams, to conduct
complex operations. It must integrate planning with its higher headquarters, planning processes, staff
sections, warfighting functions, directorates, centers, and boards. It must integrate with supported units. It
must integrate plans, measures, actions, and activities. The MEB commander, staff, and LNOs all
contribute to this integrated planning effort.
4-8. FM 5-0 and FM 6-0 discuss integration in its various forms and the many things that must be
integrated during planning. FM 3-0 discusses the use of integrating processes to synchronize operations
during all operations process activities. They must be synchronized with each other and integrated into the
overall operation—
z Intelligence preparation of the battlefield. (See FM 34-130 [to be revised as FM 2-01.3].)
z Targeting. (See FM 6-20-10.)
z ISR synchronization. (See FM 34-2.)
z CRM. (See FM 5-19.)
z Knowledge management. (See FM 3-0.)
4-9. The MEB uses the operations process to synchronize across all of the warfighting functions within
the brigade and with its supported higher headquarters. The MEB commander uses the warfighting
functions to assist in exercising battle command. Some of the key tasks within each warfighting function,
or related to the warfighting functions that the MEB focuses on for planning include—
z Movement and maneuver.
Deploy.
Move.
Maneuver.
Employ direct fires (typically, when task-organized with a TCF).
Occupy an area.
Conduct mobility and countermobility operations.
Employ battlefield obscuration.
z Intelligence.
Support to situational understanding.
Conduct ISR.
z Fires.
Decide which surface targets within MEB AO that should be attacked.
Detect and allocate surface targets.
Provide fires support (if task-organized, TCF has artillery or mortar systems).
Assess effectiveness of fires delivered.
Integrate C2 warfare, including nonlethal fires, into MEB operations.
z Sustainment.
Provide general engineering support.
Conduct I/R.
Support of distribution (within an assigned AO).
Coordinate for Army Health System health service support (HSS).
z C2.
Execute the operations process.
Conduct CP operations.
Integrate the IS contributors.
Conduct information engagement.
Conduct terrain management.
Provide C2 to a support AOs.
Conduct CA activities.
Integrate AC2 (within an assigned AO).
Execute command programs.
z Protection.
AMD (within an assigned AO).
Personnel recovery (within an assigned AO).
Information protection.
Fratricide avoidance.
Operational area security.
AT.
Survivability.
Force health protection.
CBRN operations.
Safety.
Operations security.
EOD.
4-10. Commanders use integrating processes and continuing activities to synchronize operations during all
operations process activities. They are synchronized with one another and integrated into the overall
operation. (See FM 3-0 for additional information.)
4-11. Maintaining balance is critical for the MEB staff and commander. The MEB must continually
maintain a balance of effort across the elements of full spectrum operations to ensure the success of the
supported headquarters. The MEB must initially allocate resources against all required tasks. The MEB can
request additional capabilities to meet identified shortfalls. When the brigade’s assets will not allow the
simultaneous conduct of all tasks, the MEB must sequence or phase tasks or operations or assume risk on
some tasks by executing them with less than ideal resources or not at all. Through continuous assessment,
the MEB adjusts the balance of effort across operations by changes in task organization, resource
allocation, and priorities. The MEB can use uncommitted resources to add combat power as necessary. One
tool the MEB can use to maintain balance is a synchronization matrix that tracks all MEB resources against
the warfighting functions, operations, tasks, or similar categories. Any tool or process used by the brigade
to maintain balance must be very flexible and adaptive to continually identify emerging requirements, and
then weigh them against ongoing efforts and make changes. The MEB must be very responsive in the
conduct of tasks, assessing risk, and shifting effort between competing requirements. Contingency plans,
branches and sequels, and be prepared missions help provide responsiveness. MEBs must develop other
techniques or processes to maintain balance and share these lessons learned.
GENERAL PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4-12. The MEB will normally conduct MANSPT operations and support area operations in support of full
spectrum operations. The MEB performs tactical level planning even when attached or OPCON to an
operational level headquarters. The MEB conducts assessment during planning to include—
z Monitoring the OE.
z Monitoring the measures of performance (MOPs) and measures of effectiveness (MOEs).
z Evaluating courses of action (COAs) for their operations and supported and supporting
headquarters planning.
4-13. The commander and staff visualize how to creatively arrange forces and group missions to provide
MANSPT operations in the most effective fashion. MANSPT operations are a combined arms activity.
(See chapter 5.) The MEB may use lines of effort to help visualize stability and civil support operations.
(See example in chapter 8.)
4-14. The MEB must balance support across conflicting mission areas. (See chapter 2.) The MEB must
balance between detailed and mission command orders. The support area operations orders may be more
detailed while MANSPT operations orders may be more mission command. (See chapter 6.)
4-15. The MEB uses mission variables (as discussed in chapter 1 and later in this chapter) to support
analysis of the OE and conditions in their designated AO. (See FM 3-07 for more complete discussion of
the relevance of each of these variables to stability operations.) The initial assessment conducted by the
MEB is continuously updated and supported by running estimates maintained by each staff section.
4-16. The MEB commander considers mutual support when task organizing forces and assigning areas of
operations and positioning units. Mutual support is that support which units render each other against an
enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their
inherent capabilities (JP 3-31). In Army, doctrine mutual support is a planning consideration related to
force disposition, not a command relationship. The concept of mutual support is useful to plan MANSPT
operations and support area operations. Mutual support can be between MEB units, between units in the
echelon support area, or between MEB units and supported units. (See FM 3-0.) The MEB uses mutual
support between bases to conduct base cluster security and defense when assigned responsibility for an
echelon support area. (See chapter 6.)
4-17. The continuum of operations helps understand the context and purpose of MEB operations. While
conducting its current operations or missions, the MEB affects the OE to establish conditions for
conducting subsequent operations. The operations of the supported headquarters are generally conducted to
move conditions to a lower level of violence and ideally establish a stable peace. A stable peace may
include any or all of the following:
z A safe and secure populace.
z A legitimate central government.
z A viable market economy.
z Effective rule of law.
4-18. A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat
forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational
objectives in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially according to
a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. See JP 3-0 for noncombat operations to the
relative size and scope of a military operation. Major operations have varying levels of violence over time
and location within the AO. The operational theme for a major operation may change with phases or
changes in the OE.
4-19. The development of task organization may be a more significant effort for the MEB than most units.
This is due to the large number and range of specified and implied tasks for the MEB, the lack of organic
units and the wide range of assigned, attached, or OPCON units, and the variety of operations it must
conduct. (See FM 5-0 for general considerations.)
4-20. Some considerations for task organizing versus employing function units:
z Although based on METT-TC, the MEB may form battalion TFs and company teams. (See
chapter 5.)
z A mission with a broad range of tasks (multifunctional), uncertain or quickly changing
requirements, and geographically spread out with a desire to minimize unit travel to mission
sites may be better performed by a battalion TF or company team.
z A mission with mostly functional task requirements, with a long duration, conducted within a
smaller area and where other capabilities may be integrated without changing the task
organization may be better performed by functional units rather than a battalion TF or company
team. (See FM 3-0 for further discussion on supporting range and supporting distance.)
4-21. Some other considerations for developing the task organization (see paragraph 1-37, page 1-8) for
the MEB include:
z Decide what to retain under MEB control and what to allocate to each subordinate based on
METT-TC.
z Forces under brigade control give the commander flexibility to shift or mass resources without
affecting forces task-organized to subordinates.
z The assigned command and support relationships either increase responsiveness to subordinate
or supported units or limit the MEB commander’s flexibility or agility in shifting resources.
z Consider how to weight the MEB decisive operation and support the higher headquarters
decisive operation.
z When directing the execution of “be prepared” task organization changes to subordinates,
consider their response time to detach and attach forces and prepare them for new tasks.
z It is much easier to change task organization upon immediate mission completion or changes in
phases of an operation.
z The MEB should expect to change task organization frequently and rapidly to meet changes in
the METT-TC factors.
MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
4-22. The MEB uses the operations process to critically think about how to conduct its operations. The
MEB routinely conducts parallel and collaborative planning with subordinates and higher headquarters.
(See FM 5-0 and FMI 5-0.1.) Throughout the planning process, the MEB staff may need to advise
supported commanders and their staffs about MEB capabilities, methods of employment, and possible
capabilities shortfalls. The MEB may also need to provide planning support to those units without
embedded functional staff capabilities, such as construction engineering, that are resident in the MEB staff
that might otherwise only be available through reachback. The MEB staff will use the automated tools and
systems of their functional areas such as Joint Warning and Reporting Network (JWARN) and Joint
Engineer Planning and Execution System.
4-23. The large number of essential tasks developed during MDMP for the MEB may be grouped into
larger doctrinally approved tasks in the restated mission. Any nondoctrinal terms used must be defined to
reduce confusion. The commander’s intent and concept of the operation can provide details. (See FM 5-0.)
4-24. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) remains the same for all types of military operations;
however, its focus may change depending on the predominant type of operation or the unit’s primary focus.
Products required to portray the information may also change based on the type of operation or unit focus.
Doctrinal and situation templates used to portray the various threats will differ. In addition, civil
considerations have assumed an importance on a par with the enemy and environment for all types of
operations. IPB products must provide enough detail for commanders and staffs to make informed
decisions.
4-25. Because of the current limited organic ISR capabilities of the MEB, the staff must carefully develop
the ISR plan and set priorities to gain critical information first. Additional assets may be attached or
otherwise provided to the MEB to accomplish the ISR mission when the MEB is responsible for an
echelon support area. In most cases, UAS support would come from the BFSB or combat aviation brigade.
4-26. The MEB may use the rapid decision-making and synchronization process (RDSP) as a tool to make
decisions, and rapidly resynchronize forces and warfighting functions when presented with opportunities or
threats during execution. (See FMI 5-0.1.) One of the significant differences between the RDSP and the
MDMP is that RDSP is based on an existing order. A second difference between the RDSP and the MDMP
is that RDSP seeks an acceptable solution, while the MDMP seeks the optimal (most desirable) one.
4-27. The MEB staff balances the time to plan at brigade level and allows subordinates time to plan and
prepare. Parallel planning, collaborative planning, and warning orders (WARNOs) help subordinate units
and staffs prepare for new missions by providing them with maximum time. MEB subordinate units
without staffs use troop leading procedures (TLPs) to prepare for a mission.
MISSION VARIABLES
4-28. This section discusses in more detail the mission variables METT-TC introduced in chapter 1. The
information from the operational variables analysis is used during MEB mission analysis using six mission
variables—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available and civil
considerations. (See chapter 1.) (FM 3-0, FM 3-90, and FM 6-0 discuss METT-TC in more detail.) This
section will discuss the OE in terms of the tactical tool of METT-TC.
4-29. The tactical level is the level at which the MEB headquarters typically operates as it narrows the
focus to the mission variables of METT-TC. The MEB staff will use METT-TC to synthesize operational
and tactical level information with local knowledge relevant to its missions.
4-30. Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables into METT-TC emphasizes the OE’s human
aspects, most obviously in civil considerations, but in the other factors as well. This requires critical
thinking, collaboration, continuous learning, and adaptation. It also requires analyzing local and regional
perceptions. Many factors affect perceptions of the enemy, adversaries, supporters, and neutrals. These
include—
z Language.
z Culture.
z Geography.
z History.
z Education.
z Beliefs.
z Perceived objective and motivation.
z Communications media.
z Personal experience.
Mission
4-31. The mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the
reason therefore (this definition was shortened; the complete definition is printed in the glossary). Mission
is always the first factor commanders consider during decisionmaking. Commanders and staff view all
other METT-TC factors in terms of their impact on mission accomplishment. A thorough understanding of
why the unit is conducting an operation provides the focus for planning. Under mission command, the staff
determines the minimum control measures necessary to ensure coordination. (See FM 6-0.)
4-32. The MEB assigns a mission to each subordinate commander. The commander allocates resources
between subordinates and the often competing mission requirements to best support the decisive operation
and the higher commander’s intent. Consider the mission of adjacent units and support AO tenant units to
ensure complementary and reinforcing efforts. The missions of support AO tenant units are also considered
in locating units within the support area.
Enemy
4-33. The second factor to consider is the enemy—disposition (strength, location, and tactical mobility),
doctrine, equipment, vulnerabilities, and probable COAs. (See FM 34-130.) Commanders look for enemy
weaknesses and strengths in order to deny options to enemy commanders and keep them reacting to
friendly maneuvers. They also analyze their forces for weaknesses and vulnerabilities that enemies might
exploit and act to counter them. (See FM 6-0.)
4-34. The MEB is optimized with the capability to enhance friendly or inhibit enemy maneuver and
movement options and to conduct selected protection and sustainment tasks. These capabilities facilitate
retaining the initiative while maximizing combat power potential at the operational and tactical levels of
war. The IPB helps the staff identify opportunities to shape the OE. The staff must analyze the enemy
across their higher headquarters AO, the AOs of supported units, the assigned support AO, and unassigned
areas. The MEB depends on supported units sharing their COP, higher headquarters assistant chief of staff,
intelligence (G-2), and the BSFB information, and ISR support.
4-35. The MEB staff assists in the operational analysis of the enemy’s ability to deny United States access
to the region itself—to ports and airfields along with maritime zones. Future adversaries will use all means
possible to prevent U.S. forces from establishing a foothold in the region and seek to disrupt the flow of
organizations and supplies. These likely enemy operational goals drive the requirement for the MEB to
support rapid entry through unimproved or expedient ports, austere forward airfields, and across all
environmental domains—air, ground, maritime, space, and information.
Terrain and Weather
Terrain
4-36. Terrain is not neutral. Terrain includes natural conditions and manmade structures. The staff
analyzes how the terrain affects trafficability, wind patterns, drainage, operations, weapons and other
systems, selecting objectives, movement and maneuver, protective measures, locating bases and facilities,
and Soldiers. (See FM 6-0.) OEs feature a wide range of terrain characteristics that include various soils,
topographies, elevations, and densities of vegetation and populations.
4-37. The MEB has the capability to conduct and leverage engineer topographic teams to provide a
detailed topographical analysis of the five military aspects of terrain—observation and fields of fire,
avenues of approach, key and decisive terrain, obstacles, and cover and concealment. This analysis is
especially critical to conduct both MANSPT and support area operations. The MEB also provides the
supported commander with the ability to influence terrain and use the effects of weather to friendly forces’
advantage especially with engineer and CBRN capabilities. Terrain analysis and effective use of terrain is
important to position bases and facilities within an assigned MEB AO. This is especially important within
an echelon support area where positioning bases add to their inherent defensive capabilities and reduces
demand on other resources to defend them. (See chapter 6.)
4-38. Complex terrain describes areas that feature jungles, dense forests, mountains, and urban areas.
Steep slopes and high elevations found in mountainous environments will challenge MEB Soldiers,
aviation, and ISR support. All terrain, open, jungle, mountain, and urban must be analyzed in relation to
three disparate dimensions: elevated, surface, and subsurface. Complex terrain can often provide an
opponent with the opportunity to offset the advantages of a superior force. Adaptive opponents will
leverage jungles, tunnel complexes, high ground, and other aspects of complex terrain to minimize friendly
forces advantages and to create conditions for close combat. The enemy may use highly restricted and
urban terrain to hide and shield themselves from our precision fires. They may also use cultural, religious,
and civilian structures to hide and shield themselves, to stockpile weapons, to limit line of sight, and to
constrain weapon trajectories and effects.
4-39. Complex terrain in general and urban terrain in particular can restrict and canalize forces along a
finite number of predictable routes where they can be destroyed or attacked by a prepared and patient
enemy. The MEB deliberately shapes designated or critical routes through a series of developed tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to ensure protected access to a specific route or to retain maneuver
options among a number of different routes.
Weather
4-40. Planners consider climate with longer-range plans, while most tactical planners consider weather for
shorter-range plans. Weather effects are classified as direct and indirect. Weather can create opportunities
or difficulties for each side. (See FM 6-0.)
4-41. Weather affects the operational performance of troops, equipment, and technology and when not
properly anticipated and considered, can result in mission failure. The MEB analyzes weather effects in the
OE by assessing all phases of the concept of operations in relation to the five military aspects of weather—
temperature and humidity, visibility, precipitation, winds, and clouds.
4-42. Land forces must be capable of conducting operations anywhere that our national interests are at
issue. Historically and geographically, these locations have typically been environments that experience
extreme variations in many of the military aspects of weather. These extremes will challenge the endurance
and performance of MEB troops and even the most hardened high-technological systems. When operating
in environments with extreme weather variations, the MEB emphasizes responsive and layered protective
postures for troops and equipment. Sensor, communication, and situational awareness technologies are
susceptible to extreme weather degradation and the MEB insulates and arrays them, using TTPs that are
redundant, integrated, and overlapping.
Time Available
4-46. Effective commanders and staff know how much time and space their units need to plan, prepare,
and execute operations. They also consider time with respect to the enemy ability to plan, prepare, and
execute. (See FM 6-0.)
4-47. The MEB must consider the time needed to effect task organization changes, move to supported
units locations, link up, rehearse, and integrate forces. Parallel and collaborative planning maximizes use of
available time. SOPs to conduct routine tasks, especially in the support area, also reduce planning and
orders preparation time.
Civil Considerations
4-48. Civil considerations comprise the influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and
attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an AO on the conduct
of military operations. If the military’s mission is to support civil authorities, civil considerations define the
mission. (See FM 6-0.)
4-49. The staff analysis of civil considerations improves SU and lends directly to mission accomplishment.
Civil considerations are essential to developing effective plans for all operations—not just those dominated
by stability or civil support. Full spectrum operations often involve stabilizing the situation, securing the
peace, and transitioning authority to civilian control. Combat operations directly affect the populace,
infrastructure, and the force’s ability to transition to HN authority. The degree of the populace’s expected
support or resistance to Army forces affects nearly all operations.
4-50. At the tactical level, commanders and staffs analyze civil considerations in terms of the six
categories expressed in this memory aid (ASCOPE: areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people,
and events). MEB operations require the consideration of many of the items identified here and others that
are not represented in this example. Figure 4-1, page 4-10, provides a graphical depiction and an example
of the use of the memory aid ASCOPE. The ASCOPE characteristics further expand into 29 subcategories
to provide a framework for greater fidelity and a more detailed analysis of the civil dimension as needed.
The ASCOPE structure and categories can form the basis for the development of evaluation criteria, MOP,
or MOE.
4-51. The MEB may encounter a multitude of difficult political, economic, religious, social, and
technological variables when conducting operations. During stability and civil support operations, the
MEB may assist in performing functions that would otherwise fall to local governmental agencies. The
MEB may also control populations or restore humanitarian infrastructure while supporting a division or
corps or while directly engaged in combat operations. The MEB must prepare for operations in areas and
environments where the fabric of society is in tremendous disarray.
4-52. Full spectrum operations recognize that military land power formations must defeat enemy forces
and capabilities while effectively shaping the civil environment in which they operate. This is often done
simultaneously and should be accomplished in a way that gives all elements of national power the greatest
chance of lasting success. When a mission is specified, civil considerations must be included in the
planning process and during the METT-TC analysis as associated with a particular operation or mission.
To do this, the MEB draws upon information and analysis already developed and derived from a thorough
understanding of the operational variables characteristics of the OE.
4-53. The conduct of military operations and Soldiers are often essential to popular support. Populations
that accept the presence and behavior of intervening or occupying military forces may be the greatest
source of information and the best protection against insurgencies and unconventional warfare. An
understanding of the civil and human dimensions of the operating environment is necessary to prevent the
unintended consequences of deliberate military action and to effective decisionmaking.
TRANSITION OPERATIONS
4-54. Transitions between missions and operations have the potential to be challenging. The design of the
MEB optimizes its ability to deal with transitions. The design of the staff and the typical augmentation
received by the MEB are those elements that are critical to performing MANSPT operations and the tasks
associated with stability or civil support operations.
4-55. The MEB may hand over all or some of its AO to other military forces, governmental agencies,
NGOs, or the local authorities as stability is achieved. This transfer is similar to a relief and must be
carefully planned, coordinated, and executed with the relieving force or agency. The MEB may also
transition only some sectors to local authorities.
4-56. Transitions may be a continuation of an ongoing operation, execution of a completely new tactical
mission, or conducting logistical resupply operations. Increased flexibility and agility afforded by
improved SA and collaborative C2 tools facilitates transitions to the next mission without halting to
conduct extended decision-making processes. With increased capability to affect the enemy over a larger
area of influence, the MEB can begin setting the conditions for the next engagement during the transition
from the last mission.
4-57. The MEB facilitates rapid transition between operations for the unit it is supporting. Its ability to
rapidly transition denies the enemy an opportunity to recover, regroup, and conduct preparations.
Similarly, it allows commanders to quickly deal with consequences arising out of tactical action precluding
its growth into a separate operational requirement. The MEB normally conducts combat replenishment
operations as part of transitional activities. This series of tactical sustainment operations will continue until
the supported commander’s cycle of operations accommodates a transition to a mission staging operation
and a subsequent change in mission for the MEB.
PREPARE
4-58. Back briefs and rehearsals occur during preparation. They are essential to ensure those responsible
for execution have a clear understanding of the mission, commander’s intent, and concept of operations.
Most MEB operations are executed at the battalion level and below. However, some operations may
require a MEB level rehearsal. The MEB conducts the brigade combined arms rehearsal, sustainment
rehearsal, and ISR and fire support rehearsals (when assigned an AO) after subordinate battalions or base
and base cluster commanders have had an opportunity to issue their OPORDs. These rehearsals ensure that
subordinate plans are synchronized with those of other units and that subordinate commanders understand
the intent of the higher headquarters. Usually, the MEB commander, DCO, XO, primary staff, and
subordinate battalion commanders and their S-3s attend the rehearsals. Based upon the type of operation,
the commander can modify the audience such as the brigade attachments. (See FM 6-0 for a detailed
discussion on rehearsals.)
4-59. The MEB must establish and disseminate clear, concise rules of engagement (ROE) and rules of
interaction (ROI) before deploying to the AO. Back briefs and rehearsals help ensure everyone understands
the ROE since small-unit leaders and individual Soldiers must make ROE decisions promptly and
independently. For a discussion of the rules in ROE, see FM 3-07.
4-60. The ROI embody the human dimension of stability operations. They lay the foundation for
successful relationships with the numerous factions and individuals that play critical roles in these
operations. The ROI encompass an array of interpersonal communication skills such as persuasion and
negotiation. These skills are the tools the individual Soldier needs to deal with the nontraditional threats
that are prevalent in stability operations. Examples of such threats are political friction, unfamiliar cultures,
and conflicting ideologies. In turn, ROI enhance the Soldier’s survivability in such situations. The ROI are
based on the applicable ROE for a certain operation. The ROI must be tailored to the specific regions,
cultures, and populations affected by the operation. Like ROE, the ROI can be effective only if they are
thoroughly rehearsed and understood by every Soldier in the unit.
4-61. Key preparation activities (see FM 6-0) include—
z Assessment—monitor and evaluate preparations.
z Reconnaissance operations.
z Security operations.
z Protection.
z Revising and refining the plan.
z Coordination and liaison.
z Rehearsals.
z Task organizing.
z Training.
z Movement.
z Preoperations checks and inspections.
z Logistic preparations.
z Integrating new Soldiers and units.
EXECUTE
4-62. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and
using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. It focuses
on concerted action to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The Army’s operational concept emphasizes
executing operations at a tempo enemies cannot match by acting or reacting faster than they can adapt. To
achieve this type of flexibility, commanders use mission command to focus subordinate commanders’
initiative. Subordinates exercising initiative within the commander’s intent can significantly increase
tempo; however, they also may desynchronize the unit’s warfighting functions. This may reduce
commanders’ ability to mass the effects of combat power. Even relatively minor, planned actions by
command post cells affect other cells’ areas of expertise, affecting the operation’s overall synchronization.
4-63. Collaborative synchronization—enabled and expected by mission command—uses individual
initiative to achieve resynchronization continuously. Subordinates’ successes may offer opportunities
within the concept or develop advantages that make a new concept practical. In either case, the
commander’s intent keeps the force acceptably focused and synchronized. Subordinates need not wait for
top-down synchronization. Mission command is especially appropriate for operations in which stability
operations predominate. It allows subordinates to exploit information about enemies, adversaries, events,
and trends without direction from higher echelons.
4-64. During execution, the current operations cell strives to keep the warfighting functions synchronized
and balanced between individual initiative and synchronized activities as the situation changes. The current
operations cell follows and provides its own level of collaborative synchronization. To assist commanders
in massing the effects of combat power at decisive times and places, the current operations cell considers
the following outcomes when making synchronization decisions or allowing others’ collaborative
synchronization to proceed:
z Combined arms integration.
ASSESS
4-71. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly about
the enemy and progress of an operation. Assessment occurs during planning, preparation, and execution.
Initial assessments are made during planning and continually updated. Assessment involves monitoring and
evaluating the OE and the progress of operations using MOEs and MOPs. Continuous assessment involves
situational understanding, monitoring, and evaluating. (See FM 6-0.) (See FMI 5-01 for TTPs to assess
operations and for a discussion of monitoring and evaluation.)
4-72. The running estimate is a staff section’s continuous assessment of current and future operations to
determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if future
operations are supportable (FM 3-0). The running estimate format parallels the steps of the MDMP and
serves as the primary tool for recording a staff section’s assessments, analyses, and recommendations.
4-73. The commander and staff assess the progress of the operation, new information, and changes in
conditions to revise plans. On-site assessments are essential to validate IPB, assess subordinates
understanding of orders, progress, preparations, and combat readiness. The MEB anticipated branches and
sequels, initially formulated during the planning stage, are assessed and updated for possible execution.
The staff can make adjustment of the plan within their area of expertise.
4-74. Assessment precedes and guides every activity in the operations process and concludes each
operation or phase of an operation. It involves a comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events, using
MOPs and MOEs to judge progress toward success. It entails two distinct tasks—continuously monitoring
the situation and progress of the operation towards the commander’s desired end state, and evaluating the
operation against measures of effectiveness and performance as defined below:
z A measure of performance is a criterion used to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring
task accomplishment (JP 3-0). MOPs answer the question, “Was the task or action performed as
the commander intended?” MOPs confirm or deny that we have done things right.
z A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability,
or OE that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or
creation of an effect (JP 3-0). MOEs focus on the results or consequences of friendly actions
taken. They answer the question, “Are we doing the right things, or are additional or alternative
actions required?”
OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
PLAN
4-75. The MEB plans to support division and BCT offensive operations; routine support may include
MANSPT operations and support area operations. They also may plan limited MEB controlled offensive
operations (such as counter or spoiling attacks) as part of defending while conducting support area
operations. (See chapter 6.)
4-76. The MEB follows the doctrine in FM 3-90 when conducting limited offensive tasks within their
assigned AO and is familiar with how the BCT conducts offensive operations to plan MEB support. The
MEB never attacks or conducts offensive operations as a brigade.
PREPARE
4-77. During offensive operations, the initial focus of the MEB is typically on movement and maneuver
and then on support to protection and selected sustainment based on the intent and priorities of the
supported forces. The MEB may conduct reconnaissance with their task-organized units or capabilities as
part of MANSPT operations to support the BCTs offensive actions. The MEB may also conduct or support
movement corridor operations to support troop movement and logistics preparations.
4-78. The MEB can form TFs or company teams to support the offensive operations of its supported
headquarters. These organizations may be attached or placed OPCON to BCTs, or employed by the MEB
to complement or reinforce all maneuver forces across the higher headquarters’ AO. The units under MEB
control can be more easily reallocated or massed where and when needed to meet higher headquarters
directed requirements than units attached to BCTs. Deciding the best command and support relationships
for the specific situation can be a challenge. The fluid nature of offensive operations may require
adjustments to the initial task organization. Due to the difficulty of linkup and integration, any changes in
task organization are best made at conclusion of a battle or at the end of a phase of an operation.
4-79. Detached elements from the MEB must link up and integrate into supported maneuver forces combat
formations. The MEB conducts preoperations checks inspections to ensure readiness before the detachment
of these elements. These detached MEB forces participate in the supported forces’ rehearsals.
4-80. The MEB apportions its resources across the various operations to best meet the supported
commander’s intent. The MEB also allocates resources across the warfighting functions within an
operation. For example, the MEB will—
z Allocate resources to provide protection during movement.
z Enhance the supported BCT’s mobility within the movement and maneuver warfighting
function.
EXECUTE
4-81. The MEB executes MANSPT operations to support the maneuver commander’s intent. The MEB
conducts support area operations in the division/EAD support area. When required, the MEB conducts
consequence management operations or stability operations in support of forces conducting the offense.
4-82. The MEB assesses the offensive operations and anticipates changes in task organization, priorities,
and balances resource allocation between its operations to support the decisive operation.
ASSESS
4-83. The MEB continually assesses these areas—the balance of effort between mobility and survivability;
if shaping operations are setting the intended conditions; and the balance between supporting division and
corps offensive operations and its responsibilities within the MEB’s AO
DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
PLAN
4-84. The MEB plans to support division and BCT defensive operations. Routine support may include
MANSPT operations, support area operations, and consequence management operations. They also may
plan limited MEB controlled defensive operations as part of the conduct of support area operations or
when defending themselves. (See chapter 6.)
4-85. The MEB follows the doctrine in FM 3-90 when conducting defensive tasks and is familiar with how
BCTs conduct defensive operations to plan MEB support.
PREPARE
4-86. If the MEB is supporting a division-level defense, the MEB’s focus is on defensive operations within
its AO as discussed in chapter 6 of this manual. It is also prepared to provide task-organized assets to
support BCTs in their defensive preparations.
4-87. During defensive operations, the initial focus of the MEB is typically on protection and then on
support to movement and maneuver and selected sustainment based on the intent and priorities of the
supported forces. The MEB may conduct reconnaissance operations to support the defense. The MEB
prepares to execute consequence management and ADC. Depending on the situation, the MEB will
continually improve defensive positions within its AO or relocate some or all of its activities if required by
the higher headquarters defensive plans.
EXECUTE
4-88. The MEB executes defensive operations to achieve the supported commander’s intent. The MEB
provides support to the division/EAD defensive operations and conducts support area operations when
assigned an AO.
4-89. When required, the MEB executes consequence management operations and ADC in support of the
supported division or corps conducting the defense.
ASSESS
4-90. The MEB continually assesses its effort to support the defensive efforts of its supported division or
corps. This includes these areas:
z When to commit the MEB reserve.
z The balance of effort between support to movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.
z The balance of effort between self-defense and mission support.
4-91. Each staff section updates the running estimate to ensure the latest information is available for the
commander to support decisionmaking.
similar but the environment is different (domestic versus foreign). The specialized capabilities of the MEB
to conduct stability operations apply to civil support operations, primarily for tasks 1 and 2. (See chapter
8.) However, the MEB supports the lead civil authority for civil support operations. A civil authority is in
the lead for civil support operations while the TF or joint task for (hence MEB) supports the lead civil
authority.
4-95. The MEB uses Army or joint planning procedures for civil support but must be able to participate
and integrate its planning with other U.S. national, state, or local organization’s planning procedures as
discussed in the next section. Soldiers receive their orders in an Army format, but they must be consistent
with the overall shared objectives for the response. They are aligned with the specific guidance other on-
the-ground responders of other civilian and military organizations are receiving. Soldiers exercise
individual initiative to establish and maintain communication at all levels. Based upon the type of support
provided, MEB leaders, staff and Soldiers need to be familiar (to varying degrees) with the terminology,
doctrine, and procedures used by first responders to ensure effective integration of Army personnel and
equipment to ensure that citizens affected by the disaster receive the best care and service possible.
4-96. When the MEB conducts civil support operations, a lead federal or state governmental agency has
the overall responsibility depending on the MEB’s status as a Title 10 or Title 32 organization.
z If the MEB is a state asset, it reports to its state National Guard chain of command.
z If the MEB is a Federal title 10 asset (Regular Army), it reports to its federal chain of command.
Note: The military chain of command is not violated while the MEB supports the lead federal
agency in order to assist citizens affected by a disaster.
4-97. MEB leaders and staff may help support the emergency preparedness planning conducted at the
national, state, or local level. The MEB may conduct contingency planning, crisis response planning, or
deliberate planning. MEB leaders and staff must understand two documents from the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS):
z The National level civil disaster and emergency response doctrine contained within the NIMS.
z NRF documents located at the following web sites:
www.nimsonline.com
www.dhs.gov/nrp
Note: All military, civil agencies, and organizations are directed to follow this doctrine. MEB
leaders must understand the doctrine in JP 3-28.
4-98. The NRF organizational structure includes emergency support function annexes. There are currently
fifteen emergency support function annexes. (See www.fema.gov/nrf for list, scope, and coordinators.) The
emergency support functions are used to help identify who has what type of resources to provide as part of
a disaster response.
4-99. Joint doctrine states that disaster response is conducted in five phases: shaping, staging, deployment,
conducting civil support operations, and transition. The role of the military is most intense in the shaping
by conducting civil support operations phases, decreasing steadily as the operation moves into the recovery
and restoration stages. Although each civil support mission is different, the visualization process, military
decision-making process, and troop leading procedures still apply and correlate with those contained
within joint doctrine, the NIMS, and the NRF. Army MOPs and MOEs can be used to help develop NIMS
objectives.
4-100. Possible considerations for MEB civil support planning include—
z Assistance with interorganizational planning.
z Assistance with initial needs assessment.
z Logistics support for civil authorities.
z Sustainment in a damaged austere environment.
PREPARE
4-102. Commanders should prepare for civil support operations by understanding the appropriate laws,
policies, and directives that govern the military during response and planning and preparing with the
agencies and organizations they will support before an incident. There may be little or no time to prepare
for a specific civil support mission. When possible, the commander helps develop contingency plans and
SOPs for potential natural and manmade disasters. The MEB may plan, receive units, and deploy within
hours. It is possible that the MEB would link up with units on site during execution as they arrive from
across a state or region.
4-103. Based on METT-TC factors, training before deployment in support of civil operations aids in
preparing for and executing the necessary tasks. Many stability operations tasks correlate with civil support
tasks. When possible, the MEB leaders and staff train with civil authorities.
4-104. Notification for civil support operations employment usually requires rapid reaction to an
emergency, but sometimes may allow for deliberate preparation. After notification, the MEB commander
and staff leverage the C2 system to coordinate and synchronize their operations with civilian authorities.
4-105. The deployment may be within a state or anywhere within the United States or its territories. The
MEB should develop SOPs for the various methods and locations of deployment. Based on METT-TC, the
MEB task organizes to conduct civil support operations. The MEB may deploy its TAC CP with additional
staff augmentation as an EECP to provide on-site assessment and an immediate C2 presence. Whether the
civil support mission warrants the entire MEB or one or more TFs from the MEB, affects deployment. The
MEB task organization may change periodically as the need for particular services and support changes.
MEB involved in civil support operations normally will be task-organized with CBRN, engineer, medical,
MP, PA, and potentially units from other Services as well. Throughout the coordination effort, it is
important for the commander and staff to understand and inform interagency personnel of the MEB’s
capabilities and limitations.
4-106. Due to nonhabitual supporting relationships and dissimilar equipment, the MEB and the lead
governmental organization must ensure that there is close coordination in all areas. The MEB may
collocate its headquarters with the lead agency to improve coordination. The MEB’s headquarters may be
established in tactical equipment or fixed facilities. By using liaison teams, the commander and staff work
closely with interagency and other military elements.
4-107. A defense coordinating officer and assigned staff may not suffice for a complex disaster. When
required, the MEB headquarters can control capabilities that the lead authority requires from the
Department of Defense (DOD). Depending on the complexity of the operation, some staff augmentation
may be required. The previously existing task organization of the MEB may require reinforcement with
additional functional units to accomplish assigned missions. The MEB commander task organizes available
assets for the mission and requests reinforcement as necessary.
4-108. The MEB C2 headquarters can employ most capabilities that the lead agency requires from the
DOD. Depending on the complexity of the operation, some staff augmentation may be required.
4-109. All MEB leaders must understand the complex environment in which the brigade conducts its
mission. The MEB must integrate its activities into the planning effort of the supported civilian agency,
understand support requirements, and be aware of the supported agency’s capabilities and limitations. This
leader understanding creates an atmosphere that permits shared communications and forges a unified effort
between elements. Integrating the MEB C2 system into the C2 systems of the lead governmental agency
and local first responders may be a challenge. The extent to which the MEB C2 system is able to integrate
into the supported agency C2 system depends upon the communications/network compatibility/capability
of the supported agency.
4-110. Often times an agency possesses data that, in its present form, creates compatibility issues with the
MEB’s format and the COP. It is incumbent upon the MEB to facilitate the exchange of information with
the lead agency. During planning and execution, the MEB can deploy LNOs to the lead agency. The
network centric environment of the MEB serves as the conduit for rapidly communicating information,
while either stationary or while moving en route to the geographical site for support operations.
4-111. When the MEB works closely with an agency, the problem sets can be complex and diverse. Both
the MEB and the agency must leverage their skill sets and resources to better inform leaders and maximize
its greatest potential when preparing to conduct a civil support operation. By eliminating redundancies and
identifying shortfalls in corresponding capabilities, the MEB creates the conditions for a unified effort. The
MEB must always protect its information, leverage its ISR capabilities and the communications network to
enhance situational awareness, and verify the lead governmental agencies capability to fuse data. There are
several key points preparing for civil support operations.
EXECUTE
4-112. The MEB will do what is required to accomplish its mission during the conduct of civil support
operations even though task organizations may need to be changed. The MEB will execute support area
operations for the brigade and may do so for others. The MEB may not be assigned an AO. The brigade
will execute consequence management in addition to other required civil support.
4-113. Executing civil support operations must occur within the guidelines laid out by the lead civil
agency. When requested and within the legal limits of federal and state law, the MEB may leverage
attached/OPCON ISR assets and network by positioning sensors, robotics, or forces in a manner that
provides rapid and accurate data flow to lead governmental agencies, which enables them to assess the
situation and the status of objectives. The civil agency may require an adjustment to the plan and the MEB
must be ready to modify its ongoing operations. The information processes the MEB has in place, because
of its communication network, will allow for rapid dissemination of potential issues to the lead agency for
resolution.
4-114. When executing civil support operations, MEB leaders and staff must—
z Be familiar with the incident command system (ICS) and be able to follow unified command
system procedures for the integration and implementation of each system.
z Know how the systems integrate and support the incident.
z Be familiar with the overall operation of the two command systems and be able to assist in
implementing the unified command system if needed.
z Know how to develop an Incident Action Plan and identify assets available for controlling
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and hazardous material events.
z Coordinate these activities with the on-scene incident commander.
z Be familiar with steps to take to assist in planning operational goals and objectives that are to be
followed on site in cooperation with the on-scene incident commander.
z Know how to interface with and integrate requisite emergency support services and resources
among the emergency operations center (EOC) management and the incident or unified
command on-scene incident management team.
z Be familiar with the coordination functions and procedures that are to be conducted by and with
the EOC in support of on-scene emergency response activities.
4-115. The tasks of Soldiers are similar to many of the tasks in stability operations. In most cases, they do
not need to have as much knowledge of the ICS.
4-116. While civil support operations vary greatly in every mission, the MEB can expect events to follow
a pattern of planning, preparation, response, and recovery. If civil support is provided concurrently with
homeland defense, then the MEB must be prepared to transition to support the offensive and defensive
operations of other military forces. Planning was discussed above. Transition is the last phase in joint
doctrine and is discussed below.
PREPARATION
4-117. MEB preparation for disaster response depends upon priority of other missions. If the MEB is a
regular Army Title 10 unit, then mission priorities may dictate minimal planning and preparation for civil
support operations. On the other hand, a National Guard MEB may have enough time to plan and prepare
for civil support operation with other civil and military organizations.
4-118. Preparation implements approved plans and relevant agreements to increase readiness through a
variety of tasks. Such tasks may include, but are not limited to—
z Develop common SOPs and TTP with expected supported and supporting elements.
z Task organize to fill any gaps in duties and responsibilities.
z Train personnel and leaders on nonmilitary terminology and procedures used in support of civil
authorities (such as the incident command system).
z Obtain (through training) the proper credentials for key personnel.
z Exercise and refine plans with military and civilian counterparts.
z Obtain the proper equipment to provide the required capability.
z Develop, request, and maintain logistics packages for follow-on resupply and maintenance of all
classes of supplies in support of extended operations.
z Prepare and maintain medical records for all personnel to ensure that they are up to date.
z Ensure that all communications equipment, communications security, and controlled
cryptographic items are serviceable and ready to deploy.
RESPONSE
4-119. As part of a response, the MEB’s subordinate units and/or liaison teams enter the affected area and
make contact with relief organizations. They relay pertinent information about the effort of these
organizations up through their military chain of command. The military chain of command relays this
information to the lead civil authority. Planning for the operation, staging command posts into the area,
establishing security, deploying the MEB’s subordinate units, and initiating contact with supported
activities and other parts of the relief force occur during this phase of operations.
4-120. The commander considers leading with liaison teams and urgent relief assets, such as debris
clearance, law enforcement, search and rescue, food, and water. The lead unit’s C2 system gives the MEB
units robust early ability to communicate and coordinate with each other and those organization with which
the C2 INFOSYSs are compatible. Further, MEB units’ ability to reconnoiter and gather information
makes them useful in the initial efforts by civil and other authorities to establish SA and control of the area
and oversee critical actions.
RECOVERY
4-121. Once the MEB civil support operation is underway, recovery begins. With initial working
relationship between all organizations in place, the MEB maintains steady progress in relieving the
situation throughout this phase of operations. The MEB’s work includes coordination with its higher
headquarters, supported groups, and other relief forces and daily allocation of its own assets to recovery
tasks.
4-122. The MEB task organization is likely to change periodically as the need for particular services and
support changes. Security, maintenance, effective employment of resources, and Soldier support all need
continuing attention. The brigade surgeon advises and assists the MEB commander in counteracting the
psychological effects of disaster relief work and exposure to human suffering on the MEB’s Soldiers
throughout the operation.
RESTORATION
4-123. Restoration is the return of normality to the area. In most cases, the MEB disengages before
restoration begins. The Federal Emergency Management Agency is in charge of restoration operations for
civil support.
4-124. Civil support operations end in different ways. Crises may be resolved or the MEB may hand off a
continuing civil support operation to a replacement unit, a relief agency, a police force, or other civil
authority. Missions of short duration or narrow scope may end with the completion of the assigned task.
ASSESS
4-125. The MEB C2 system is essential to support the interagency overall assessment. The MEB’s
network centric environment provides for a robust exchange of information. A common problem that both
the MEB and a nonmilitary agency may encounter is information overload or a different perception on how
an operation is progressing. Commanders share the COP with their civil agency counterpart and their
interpretation of the situation in order to ensure a unified effort. Liaison should occur to demonstrate this
capability and verify the method in which information sharing will occur.
4-126. The MEB leverages its C2 system capabilities and supports a degraded or destroyed civilian
C2/communications system. The MEB brings its mobile network and augments and/or replaces a
devastated civil infrastructure. Most first responders’ communications are wireless using tower-based
repeating which are powered by the grid. In the case of hurricane Katrina in 2005, the storm rendered all
municipal communications inoperative. In such a case, the MEB augments local law enforcement,
emergency medical, fire services, and other first responder’s communications with the Battle Command
Network to restore vital services to the AO.
TRAINING ATTACHMENTS
4-133. Because the MEB has few organic units, there is a high-frequency requirement to train attached
units and small teams and occasionally augmentation of staff expertise to understand the units or
capabilities it will be receiving, plan for their integration, and C2 their use and sustainment within the
MEB. The MEB staff must also be trained to properly conduct operations employing the capabilities
provided by these attachments. The MEB staff may also require augmentation to accomplish nonstandard
missions. Successful MANSPT operations depend on the ability of the MEB to integrate functionally
organized units, task organizes them as needed, and employ them during the conduct of full spectrum
operations. The MEB must train to request and leverage pooled Army and joint capabilities as necessary.
4-134. The MEB provides training to assigned, attached, and OPCON units on the MEB SOPs, MANSPT
operations, and security and defense TTPs. Units within the MEB’s AO that are attached or TACON for
security will be trained on security TTPs and incorporated into MEB defensive plans.
PLANNING
4-135. The MEB optimizes the employment of assigned, attached, OPCON, or TACON Army forces and
joint, interagency, and multinational assets by ensuring the respective staffs integrate plans and operations.
MEB staff procedures must include continuous communications with the augmentation formations to
ensure that they understand the commander’s intent. Unity of command, planning, and standardized
communications procedures are essential to successfully execute battle command. The MEB must plan
how it will integrate Army forces and joint, interagency, and multinational assets into its C2 system, share
a COP, and achieve high levels of shared SA.
4-136. The networking interfaces between the MEB and the integration of Army or joint, interagency,
and multinational units requires coordination with gaining units and configuration management controls.
The MEB requires established legacy waveforms SINCGARS, EPLRS, high frequency and ultra high
frequency, COMSEC keying, and signal operating instructions requirements to maintain voice networks.
Internet protocol routing and server interoperability requires a coordinated network configuration
management to ensure the passage of information between the different networks. The use of the
communication elements must be coordinated between the MEB and its attached, OPCON, TACON, and
supported elements.
4-137. In addition, logistical and personnel issues must be coordinated between the MEB and its attached
elements. Sources of personnel and materiel resupply must be understood and considered in planning for
the conduct of MEB operations by all elements under its control.
SUSTAINMENT OF ATTACHED UNITS
4-138. The MEB provides selected sustainment to attached units. It is not required doctrinally to provide
sustainment support to units that are OPCON or TACON to the brigade although special arrangement can
be made. As discussed in chapter 2, the MEB BSB generally lacks the capability to provide sustainment
support to anything beyond the organic elements of the MEB—the brigade HHC, the MEB signal
company, and the BSB HHD, and distribution and support maintenance companies. While it may provide
limited and selected support to some attachments, as a rule attachments must bring their own sustainment
support with them. For example, a combat engineer battalion attached to a MEB should have a supporting
FSC that will be attached to the MEB BSB. Joint, interagency, and multinational elements likewise should
bring their own support capabilities with them when they are attached to the MEB. Otherwise, the
headquarters directing the attachment of joint, interagency, and multinational elements to the MEB, or their
support by the MEB, will have to provide additional Army sustainment assets to the MEB. The MEB staff
will integrate its organic and attached sustainment assets to support brigade operations.
4-139. In any MEB operational plan, sources of sustainment must be determined for and understood by
the MEB and all attached, OPCON, or TACON elements in order to ensure successful MEB operations.
4-140. If properly resourced, the MEB could provide support for—
z Other U.S. joint forces.
z Multinational or HN government agencies.
This chapter introduces the Army definitions for maneuver support operations and
movement corridor. It discusses the integration of key protection, movement and
maneuver, and sustainment tasks and the continuous integration of these major areas
of MANSPT operations. It discusses how to think differently about combined arms
operations to support movement and maneuver and apply key aspects of protection to
movement as part of maneuver support operations. The MEB was designed with a
staff that is optimized to conduct MANSPT operations. The integration of MANSPT
operations is typically a continuous process. This chapter discusses the fundamentals
of MANSPT operations and looks at the typical tasks associated with MANSPT
operations. See FM 3-90 and other appropriate manuals for further discussion of
tasks associated with movement and maneuver. For further discussion of selected
sustainment tasks, see FM 3-19.1, FM 3-34, and, and FM 3-34.400.
FUNDAMENTALS
FRAMEWORK
5-1. Maneuver support operations integrate the complementary and reinforcing capabilities of key
protection, movement and maneuver, and sustainment functions, tasks, and systems to enhance
freedom of action. An overview of MANSPT operations was provided in chapter 1 and its primary
subordinate tasks were identified in chapter 2. This chapter further develops the discussion of what
maneuver support operations are and how they may be implemented. The following is a framework to
think systematically about MANSPT operations.
5-2. MANSPT operations integrate the complementary and reinforcing capabilities of key functions,
tasks, organizations, and systems organic to and task organized to the MEB within the primary warfighting
functions included in the definition above and synchronizes them across all of the Army warfighting
functions. A lesser focus is applied to sustainment and intelligence warfighting functions with selected
application within the fires and C2 warfighting functions. MANSPT actions occur throughout the
operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess).
5-3. Rather than the independent performance of functional tasks, MANSPT operations are usually
combined arms activities. Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous application of units to
achieve an effect greater than if each was used separately or sequentially. Many units may conduct specific
tasks that complement or reinforce protection, movement and maneuver, or sustainment. However, when
MEB units perform these tasks in an integrated fashion, it is viewed as MANSPT operations rather than a
branch function operation or task. It is often more efficient and more effective when all members of the
supporting units provide the creative thinking to identify tasks best performed by task-organized
subordinate headquarters to increase the teamwork, synergy, and efficient use of forces. For example, a
similar task common for many units is conduct reconnaissance. When multiple task-organized MEB units
perform these similar reconnaissance tasks as a team to complement protection, movement and maneuver,
or sustainment, they may be conducting MANSPT operations. This teamwork reduces security
requirements, economizes use of manpower and equipment, improves operational security (OPSEC),
improves ISR integration, and increases the combat power of the formation performing the tasks.
5-4. The MEB integrates task-organized organizations and units, capabilities, tasks, and systems to
conduct MANSPT operations. CBRN, engineer, and MP units constitute the core body of MEB units that
contribute to MANSPT operations. If required support can be performed by a single branch pure unit, then
the MEB would assign a pure functional battalion or company a branch task and purpose rather than a
MANSPT task and purpose. To view the nested efforts; the MEB would conduct MANSPT operations
while a subordinate functional pure battalion or company would conduct a branch task. If METT-TC
determines that required support can be performed better by integrating branch pure units, then the MEB
may create a battalion TF or company team and assign them a MANSPT operations task and purpose. The
TF or company team may still perform some purely functional tasks.
5-5. MANSPT operations can shape the OE and help protect the force. MEB mobility and
countermobility support can modify the physical environment, and help dominate terrain. MEB protection
support can protect the force and physical assets. The MEB conducts MANSPT operations to support the
higher headquarters and its assigned units.
PROTECTION
5-6. An overview of protection was provided in chapter 1. Joint doctrine defines protection as preventive
measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources,
facilities, and critical information. Protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect
against accidents, weather, or disease (JP 5-0). Protection is an overarching concept that is inherent to
command within all military operations. The Army includes protecting personnel (combatants and
noncombatants) within the protection warfighting function. (See FM 3-0.)
5-7. Unable to challenge the United States in conventional combat, adversaries seek to frustrate
operations by resorting to asymmetric means, weapons, or tactics. Protection counters these threats. The
MEB uses counterintelligence and threat assessments to decrease the vulnerability of friendly forces.
Dispersion during movement helps reduce losses from enemy fires and asymmetric actors. Camouflage
discipline, local security, and field fortifications do the same. Protection of electronic links and nodes is
vital to protecting information, information systems, and Soldiers.
5-8. All support and functional brigades provide needed protection support. Although it does take a unit
with a robust staff to integrate all the protection efforts, no single brigade can best integrate or own
protection. Protection may a significant commitment of resources that can limit a formation’s freedom of
action if not integrated deliberately.
5-9. Some protection tasks are GMETs for all units. Units normally do not need augmentation to perform
these GMET tasks. For unit self-protection, the MEB must be proficient on the GMET of Protect the Force
and these supporting tasks:
z Conduct Area Security.
z Employ Survivability Measures.
z Employ CBRNE Protection Measures.
z Employ Air Defense Measures.
z Conduct Personnel Recovery Operations.
5-10. When resourced and tasked, the MEB can best integrate, provide combined arms augmentation, or
support these tasks included in the protection warfighting function:
z AMD (coordination).
z Operational area security.
z Antiterrorism.
z Survivability.
z CBRN operations.
z EOD.
5-11. The MEB will provide some support of the protection warfighting function tasks to forces located
within the MEB’s assigned AO:
z AMD.
z Fratricide avoidance.
z Operational area security.
z Survivability.
z CBRN operations.
z EOD.
5-12. Most units can generally conduct the other tasks included in the protection warfighting function with
minimal support:
z Personnel recovery.
z Information protection.
z Fratricide avoidance.
z Antiterrorism.
z Force health protection (FHP).
z Safety.
z Operations security.
5-13. Some protection warfighting function tasks frequently require support or augmentation from the
MEB or another support or functional brigade. The MEB coordinates the integration of key protection
tasks with the higher headquarters protection staff, cells, or directorates. The MEB may conduct all
protection tasks for themselves. Table 5-1 shows the protection tasks that may be performed or coordinated
by the MEB for others during MANSPT operations or support area operations.
Table 5-1. MEB protection support
Protection tasks During MANSPT operations During support area operations
AMD Coordination Coordination
Personnel recovery X
Information protection
Fratricide avoidance Coordination
Operational area security X X
Antiterrorism X X
Survivability X X
Force health protection Coordination
CBRN operations X X
Safety
Operations security
EOD X X
Personnel Recovery
5-15. The MEB staff has no unique capabilities to conduct this protection task but could support a unit
personnel recovery mission with the MEB’s assigned, attached, or OPCON units. Personnel recovery is
one task the MEB performs when assigned an AO. (See FMI 3-0.1.) The Army defines personnel recovery
as the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and
reintegration of isolated personnel (JP 3-50).
movement planning and preparation requirements, combat loads, movement techniques and formations,
and on using HN or civilian support. Some of those factors include—
z Likelihood of threat interference or contact.
z Weapons and munitions mix and configuration.
z Proximity to field trains or resupply capability.
z Terrain and weather effects.
z Access to other route or maneuver options.
z Specific characteristics of the transported capability or cargo.
z Movement control measures.
z Civil considerations.
Antiterrorism
5-18. Antiterrorism is the defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property
to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. (JP
3-07.2) (See JP 1-02 and FM 3-07.) Terrorism may well be the most likely threat that Army forces will
face when conducting stability operations and civil support operations. Commanders have an inherent
responsibility for conducting antiterrorism measures to provide for the security of the command.
5-19. Antiterrorism support from the MEB could include assisting in unit and installation threat and
vulnerability assessments, establishing special reaction teams and protective services, establishing civil-
military partnerships for WMD crisis and consequence management, supporting survivability operations,
ADC, and security of key locations and personnel.
Survivability Operations
5-20. Survivability operations are the development and construction of protective positions, such as earth
berms, dug-in positions, overhead protection, and countersurveillance means, to reduce the effectiveness of
enemy weapons systems. (FM 3-34.) Key tasks also include protecting against enemy hazards in the AO
conducting related security operations, and conducting actions to control pollution and hazardous
materials. The MEB engineer operations cell and engineer units may conduct survivability operations in
their AO or as part of MANSPT operations. Other cells and units (to include the CBRNE cell and CBRN
units) may also participate in survivability operations. (See FM 5-103.)
3-0). Maneuver is the means by which commanders mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise,
shock, and momentum. (See FM 3-0.) When a unit maneuvers, it moves and fires which provides an
inherent level of protection. Any other move may be referred to as movement, categorized as tactical
ground movement, air movement, and administrative movement. These movements require deliberate
effort to apply protection.
5-24. As highlighted in chapter 1, movement and maneuver is an Army element of combat power and a
warfighting function. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems
that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. Direct fire is inherent in
maneuver, as in close combat. (See FM 3-0.) The integration and synchronization of MANSPT-related
tasks shape the environment to provide mobility and countermobility, provide or enhance other movement
and maneuver tasks, and expand the freedom of action of friendly forces while denying it to the enemy.
MANSPT operations directly enable the movement and maneuver warfighting function. The movement
and maneuver warfighting function does not include administrative movements of personnel and materiel.
These movements fall under the sustainment warfighting function.
SUSTAINMENT
5-25. Sustainment is an Army element of combat power and a warfighting function (FM 3-0 and FM 4-0).
Several key tasks performed by the MEB are aligned under sustainment in FM 7-15. The support to the
sustainment warfighting function provided by the MEB is primarily through its focus on tasks associated
with general engineering support and internment and resettlement operations.
5-27. The MEB is in essence a C2 organization that represents the C2 function. For this reason, when
functional brigades, such as MP or engineer, provide functional forces to the MEB, we can say that they
are providing complementary capabilities because they are supporting the C2 warfighting function
represented by the MEB headquarters. (See figure 5-2, page 5-8.)
5-28. The composition of the MEB headquarters staffed with CBRN, engineer, MP, fire support,
intelligence, and aviation expertise makes it uniquely capable among other support or functional brigades
when integrating these capabilities. The significant level of expertise resident in the CBRN, engineer, and
MP functional areas enable a level of detail and precision in all facets of the operations process (prepare,
plan, execute, assess) not possible in the BCTs or the functional brigades without augmentation. The MEB
staff is trained and organized to facilitate MANSPT operations.
5-29. Typically, MANSPT operations at division and above are best conducted by the MEB rather than
other potential headquarters because the MEB has the highest concentration of staff capabilities required
for its integration and synchronization. Another formation may be tasked with conducting MANSPT
operations if deliberately augmented with functional expertise from across the required functional units
required for the specific purpose of providing freedom of action for a supported force.
5-30. Determining whether the MEB will provide complementary or reinforcing capabilities to the force
supports decisionmaking and serves as a point of departure when task-organizing formations or
recommending command and support relationships. The complementary and reinforcing character of the
capabilities that the MEB typically provides permits the scalable expansion of key tasks and functions
along a range or continuum of functional capability. (See figure 5-3.) This is significant because some
warfighting functions do not maintain the same character as operations transition along the full spectrum
operations among the levels of military action (strategic, operational, tactical) or as resources are applied to
solve the tactical problem. The protection and movement and maneuver warfighting functions provide
good examples of this.
5-31. Typically, the MEB simultaneously reinforces maneuver with mobility operations or tasks while
complementing the movement with protection coordination. The MEB staff continually analyzes and
examines how specific functions are affected as they expand along a capability scale to meet the changing
requirements of the OE. Consequently, the MEB adjusts it mission profile, task organization, and C2
arrangement to accommodate those scalable effects.
FREEDOM OF ACTION
5-32. An overview of freedom of action is provided in chapter 1. Freedom of action allows the commander
to seize, retain, and exploit operational initiative. Army forces gain and preserve freedom of action, reduce
vulnerability, and exploit success through maneuver. (See FM 3-0.) Freedom of action includes the ability
of commanders to exercise their wills to complete the mission, achieve the objective, affect movement, or
to protect the force. MANSPT operations enhance maneuver and help protect forces that typically do not
conduct maneuver. This contributes to enhancing freedom of action for the force.
5-33. The MEB increases freedom of action by shaping the OE, providing protection, and reducing
impediments to operations. MANSPT operations deny the enemy freedom of action. Some MANSPT
efforts set conditions, some are preemptive, and some are in response to the OE. Regardless of when they
occur, MANSPT operations enhance the freedom of action of the commander.
5-34. MANSPT operations enhance freedom of action for the supported commander similarly to the
sustainment warfighting function that provides support and services to ensure freedom of action. MANSPT
operations are multifunctional and typically performed throughout all types of operations. The MEB
primarily conducts mobility and countermobility operations to enhance freedom of maneuver. The brigade
also primarily performs protection support coordination, movement corridor operations, and selected
sustainment operations to enhance freedom of movement.
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
PLAN
5-38. The integration of MANSPT operations is continuous and must be included in offense, defense,
stability, or civil support operations. Using the operation process and MDMP, the MEB staff conducts
mission analysis to determine the company level (two levels down) tasks. The staff then continuously
integrates the tasks to plan combined arms MANSPT operations. The staff determines how these tasks can
best be grouped. The staff may determine that some tasks are best performed by functionally pure units.
The staff would then propose TF or company team formations and assign tasks to them or to functional
unit headquarters. The TFs or company teams would execute most grouped tasks using combined arms
formations but may also perform some functionally pure tasks. The staff may be asked to recommend the
command or support relationship between the MEB forces or functional units and the supported
headquarters. The staff continually assesses to update required tasks, integration, and changes to the task
organization. The staff also synchronizes the MANSPT effort within all the warfighting functions at the
brigade and with higher and supported headquarters. MANPST operations synchronization matrix can be
used to integrate complementary and reinforcing efforts within and across the warfighting functions.
5-39. The MEB normally conducts combined arms shaping and sustaining operations or tasks.
Occasionally the MEB may conduct the decisive operation or task for a higher headquarters. The purpose
of the operation or task would define whether to think of the effort as shaping or sustaining. For example
emplacing an obstacle to deny an enemy freedom of maneuver against a BCT conducting an attack would
be a shaping operation. Emplacing the same obstacle as part of a base entry control point to protect a guard
tower would be viewed as a protection task. The building of the same obstacle may be a general
engineering and considered as a sustainment task.
5-40. Planners should use these maneuver support planning considerations:
z Integrate operations, task, and new units.
z Integrate with supported headquarters.
z Analyze when to transfer efforts to functional organizations.
z Analyze when to form combined arms TFs and company teams.
z Phase task organization of attachments and detachments; ensure sustainment.
z Deliberately apply protection to movement.
z Balance support area operations efforts and MANSPT operations.
z Reach back to augment expertise.
z Mitigate the effects of the complex environment.
PREPARE
5-44. Once a task organization has been approved, the staff can issue a warning order to the subordinate
MEB units to allow them to reorganize and synchronize movement and rehearsals with supported
headquarters.
5-45. The MEB must orient assigned units to understand how they contribute to MANSPT operations and
how they operate as part of MANSPT combined arms teams. There will be cases where MEB units provide
purely functional support.
5-46. The MEB forms TFs and company teams as necessary to accomplish its missions. The MEB must
build mutual trust quickly with units that have been task-organized to them and verify that all formations
are combat ready.
5-47. When units from the MEB are required to support other units, the MEB may provide battalion TFs,
company teams, or functional units to the BCT. The gaining unit integrates and synchronizes task
organization of these resources (if the command and support relationship allows that) until the mission is
completed. The provided resources will then be returned to the MEB or tasked to provide mission support
in another AO.
5-48. The MEB will conduct key rehearsals. When assigned an AO or conducting the tasks associated with
a movement corridor, rehearsals may include—fires, commitment of the MEB reserve, or commitment of a
TCF.
EXECUTE
5-49. The MEB is a multifunctional combined arms headquarters that accepts and provides C2 to units that
conduct MANSPT operations across the higher headquarters AO in support of other units or within its
assigned AO, and in support of the higher headquarters. It assists its higher headquarters to conduct the
integration of MANSPT operations. It also supports operational movement and maneuver of units during
deployment.
5-50. Although the MEB may frequently attach and detach more units than other support brigades, it must
also continually provides integrated and synchronized services like the other support brigades. The MEB
must not be viewed as an intermediate force pool/force provider.
5-51. The MEB provides C2 over key mobility areas within its AO or as tasked to support within a BCT’s
AO. Based on reconnaissance, topographical, and terrain analysis, the MEB validates and further develops
the supported headquarters modified combined obstacle overlay in its assigned AO. When necessary to
ensure the mobility of the force, the MEB directs necessary actions to eliminate, neutralize, or reduce
physical and potential inhibitors to friendly movement and maneuver. The MEB develops information
requirements essential to maintaining a maneuver-focused situational awareness that contributes to the
commander’s COP. This focused awareness enables the acceleration of friendly maneuver decisions and
the prevention of enemy countermobility efforts.
5-52. Based on an analysis of METT-TC and commander’s guidance from the higher headquarters, the
MEB will tailor forces for MANSPT operations, structure support assignments and forces, and provide
support from within its task organization to the remainder of the force. The MEB has a wide array of
capabilities with which to defeat enemy threats in its assigned AO. These capabilities consist of direct fires
of assigned, attached, OPCON, or TACON forces and the ability to leverage Army and joint lethal and
nonlethal precision fire assets, Army and joint aviation assets. (See FM 3-90.)
ASSESS
5-53. The MEB must continually assess the OE to predict and detect impediment to operations and adjust
MANSPT operations to mitigate impediments. It must assess the progress and effectiveness all MEB
operations to shift resources across those operations as required. It must assess the effects of MANSPT
operations on enemy freedom of action and the freedom of action provided for the echelon headquarters
that it is supporting.
5-54. The staff can use the measures from FM 7-15 where tasks exist. Other MANSPT operations tasks are
still being developed at this time and units may need to initially develop specific MOPs or MOEs to
address some of the MANSPT operations tasks.
PROTECTION
5-55. The MEB performs key supporting tasks as a part of the task-perform protection. These key
supporting tasks are highlighted below.
measures predominate for the MEB and include the following principles: avoidance of CBRN hazards;
protection of personnel and equipment from unavoidable CBRN hazards; and decontamination. An
effective CBRN defense deters belligerent threats and attacks by minimizing vulnerabilities, protecting
friendly forces, and maintaining an operational tempo that complicates targeting. By denying or countering
any advantages that the enemy may accrue from using CBRN weapons, Army forces and their
multinational partners significantly deter their use. (See FM 3-11.)
5-58. CBRN passive defense measures include: CBRN reconnaissance and surveillance, CBRN asset
support to WMD-elimination operations as required, CBRN warning and reporting, CBRN hazard
modeling and prediction, CBRN protection for personnel, equipment, and installations, and CBRN
decontamination. CBRN CM includes activities to plan, prepare, respond, and recover from intentional or
accidental incidents involving CBRN hazards. The MEB also may have CBRN units capable of providing
large area obscuration in its task organization to support friendly forces.
organically provide during their movement and receive little support from maneuver units to provide
additional required security. Units owning an AO may provide additional security support to units moving
through or present in their AOs to include the ability to provide fires. Several tasks and TTPs can be
integrated within an AO to set conditions to help secure individual unit movement, to include—
z Support to situational understanding.
z Conduct tactical maneuver (performed by the AO owner or maneuver security forces).
z Conduct route and convoy security operations.
z Conduct antiterrorism activities.
z Conduct CBRNE operations.
z Conduct survivability operations.
z Hand off security responsibility when crossing AO borders or at nearest secure
area/facility/base.
z Integrate fires.
z Coordinate logistics support.
z Conduct tactical troop movement.
z Employ combat patrols.
z Conduct counter ambush actions.
z Employ obscurants.
z Provide tactical overwatch.
5-68. The MEB routinely controls the enablers and has the staff necessary to establish a movement
corridor and integrate operations within it. Chapter 6 discusses MEB support to movement within the
assigned support AO. This paragraph discusses support to movement beyond the MEB’s initially assigned
support area by using the technique of movement corridors. There are several techniques the MEB may use
to support movement beyond their assigned support area. Where an MSR passes from the MEB support
area AO through division controlled unassigned area directly into a BCT AO the division could designate
an AO around the MSR and assign it to the MEB as part of the support area. The MEB could create a
movement corridor from the MEB’s original AO to the BCT AO. In this case, the MEB would be
responsible for all actions within the movement corridor. The division would provide the required ISR and
fires support. The MEB would coordinate with the higher headquarters and unit conducting the movement
to provide the required MANSPT operations. The MEB would transfer responsibility for units moving
along the corridor to the BCT at their boundary. The BCT could extend the movement corridor within their
AO to their BSA or to their other boundary if the MSR passes through the AO. MEB support to movement
that does not move on an MSR could also be provided within a movement corridor. A movement corridor
that does not use an established MSR may require additional ISR and other MANSPT effort to set
conditions. The MEB can perform the key supporting tasks discussed below to conduct movement corridor
operations.
the protected force. (See FM 3-90.) The MEB may be tasked to enhance convoy security operations
through the technique of creating and supporting a movement corridor.
5-71. Route (including highway, pipeline, rail, and water) security operations protect lines of
communications and friendly forces moving along them. Units conduct route security missions to prevent
enemy ground forces from moving into direct fire range of the protected route. Route security operations
are defensive in nature and terrain-oriented. (See FM 3-90.)
EMPLOYMENT EXAMPLE
5-75. One example of an MEB establishing and conducting operations in a movement corridor is shown in
figure 5-4. In this example, the MEB AO and the BCT AO are connected by MSR BLACK. Based on
METT-TC, the division needs to secure movement between the brigade AOs and has tasked the MEB to
expand its existing AO to include an area that runs about 4 kilometers on each side of the MSR and
establish a movement corridor. The MEB is required to conduct reconnaissance, clear, and secure the new
area; support the sustainment brigade to establish the convoy support center (CSC) and conduct movement
regulation and traffic control; and to maintain the MSR in its expanded AO. Due to the complexity of the
requirement, the MEB has assigned the mission to an MP TF (shown with its headquarters in the CSC), but
retained control of the movement corridor as part of its AO. The MEB has developed an initial ISR plan.
The TF MP conduct police engagement to leverage HN or multinational police assets to enhance security.
The brigade has also established traffic control points along the MSR, an air corridor, and air control points
(ACPs) in conjunction with the division headquarters and the BCT to regulate ground traffic and control
rotary wing and UAS traffic between the MEB and BCT airfields. The ACP near the CSC supports air
traffic to and from the CSC and respond to the named area of interest (NAI) in the built up area. The MEB
develops an initial fires plan for convoy and CSC security and defense with target reference points (TRPs)
as shown in figure 5-4.
SUSTAINMENT
5-76. The MEB performs supporting tasks as a part of the task of conduct sustainment. These supporting
tasks are reflected in the internment/resettlement and engineer construction support tasks.
EMPLOYMENT EXAMPLE
5-83. One example of an MEB performing sustainment is shown in figure 5-5. In this example the tactical
assembly area (TAA) from the division support area was included in the AO assigned to an MEB is shown
in detail. (See figure 6-1, page 6-19, for a broader discussion of the MEB AO.) The example includes
primarily examples of general engineering and I/R support. In this example, the MEB is required to
construct and C2 the DHA within the TAA. This includes the internal structure of the DHA, the security
fence and measures, the road connecting it to MSR ORANGE, and an improved rotary wing landing zone
(LZ). The MEB creates an MP TF that is task-organized with an MP team (that includes an MP I/R
company and a transportation section to allow for initial movement of personnel to the DHA) and an
engineer construction company. The MEB has assigned the TAA to the MP TF and they have designated
subordinate areas for their subordinate elements to occupy while the DHA is being constructed. Once the
DHA is constructed, the MEB will change the task organization and the MP battalion will assign the DHA
mission to the MP I/R company. The task organization may then change to include MI and/or CA
capabilities.
The MEB must plan, prepare, execute, and assess support area operations. This
chapter includes a discussion of base security and defense operations within the
higher headquarters support area assigned to the MEB as an AO. The other units
operating with the MEB AO must understand this doctrine to protect, secure, and
defend themselves; to support other units when needed; and to operate within the
support area. This FM will not discuss the detailed procedures for base security and
defense or the detailed standards for base construction. (See FM 3-34.400 and the
Joint Contingency Operations Base [JCOB] Protection Handbook.) Further
information on defense within an AO can be found in FM 3-90. Information on
defensive operations conducted by the MEB and its subordinate elements can be
found in FM 3-90. Further information on movement and base/base cluster defense
can be found in FM 63-2 and FMI 4-93.41.
FUNDAMENTALS
6-1. The MEB is staffed to control terrain and should be assigned an AO. The MEB conducts support
area operations within the echelon support area to assist the supported headquarters to retain freedom of
action within areas not assigned to maneuver units. When conducting support area operations, the MEB is
in the defense regardless of the form of maneuver or the major operation of the higher echelon. Defensive
doctrine, tasks, and TTPs provide a clear framework to conduct area security and defense. The MEB uses
the defensive tactics in FM 3-90 as a construct on how to think about, structure and conduct defensive
operations in the support area. The challenge for the MEB is integrating the actions of and providing for
units of varying defensive capabilities operating under multiple chains of command and focused on their
primary missions as they occupy terrain inside the echelon support area assigned to the MEB.
DEFINITIONS
6-2. To understand the fundamentals of support area operations, the staff of the MEB must first
understand the terms and their definitions, and the fundamental principles common to support areas—
z Area damage control is the measures taken before, during, or after hostile action or natural or
manmade disasters to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects. (JP 3-10)
z Base is locality from which operations are projected or supported; an area or locality containing
installations which provide logistic or other support; home airfield or home carrier. (JP 1-02)
See FM 3-90 for guidance on protecting military bases.
z Base camp is an evolving military facility that supports military operations of a deployed unit
and provides the necessary support and services for sustained operations. Base camps consist of
intermediate staging bases and forward operating bases.
z Base cluster, in base defense operations, is a collection of bases, geographically grouped for
mutual protection and ease of C2. (JP 3-10) See FM 3-90.
z Base cluster operations center is a C2 facility that serves as the base cluster commander’s focal
point for defense and security of the base cluster. (JP 3-10) See FM 3-90.
z Base defense is the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or
reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, to ensure that the maximum
capacity of its facilities is available to U.S. forces. (JP 1-02). See FM 3-90.
z Base defense operations center is a C2 facility established by the base commander to serve as
the focal point for base security and defense. It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and
controls all base defense efforts. (JP 3-10) See FM 3-90.
z Base defense force (BDF) is a security element established to provide local security to a base. It
normally consists of the combined security assets provided by each unit on the base toward the
ongoing security requirement of the base. The mission is to deter, resist, or destroy enemy level
I force attacking the base. (See FM 3-90.) It may include a quick reaction force to reinforce the
guard force in the event of a level I or level II attack.
z Mobile security force is a dedicated security force designed to defeat level I and II threats on a
base and/or base cluster. (JP 3-10) The mobile security force “shapes” the fight with level III
threats until a TCF arrives.
z Base cluster defense force is all of the BDFs within the base cluster or a designated response
force. The base cluster commander directs the employment of BDFs or response force to counter
level II threats. See FM 3-90.
z Base defense reaction forces are forces comprised of personnel or elements of units assigned to
a specific base with the responsibility to rapidly bolster base defenses or react to an unforeseen
threat. (See FM 3-90)
z Response force is a mobile force with appropriate fire support designated, usually by the area
commander, to deal with level II threats in the rear area. (JP 3-10). It usually consists of MP
forces supported by available fire support and Army aviation assets. Other possible response
force options include engineer units, chemical units, transiting combat elements, elements of the
reserve, or host nation assets. See FM 3-90.
z Reserve is a portion of a body of troops which is kept to the rear or withheld from action at the
beginning of an engagement, in order to be available for a decisive movement; (See FM 3-90.)
members of the military services who are not in active service but who are subject to call to
active duty; portion of an appropriation or contract authorization held or set aside for future
operations or contingencies and, in respect to which, administrative authorization to incur
commitments or obligations has been withheld. (JP 1-02)
z Support area specific surface area designated by the echelon commander to facilitate the
positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control
tactical forces. (FM 3-0.1)
z Tactical combat force is a combat unit, with appropriate supporting assets that is assigned the
mission of defeating level III threats. (JP 3-10) See FM 3-90.
PRINCIPLES
6-3. There are fundamental principles that are common to all support areas. Support areas may be
designated by any Army echelon or by operational necessity but are usually associated with organizations
that are capable of synchronizing and integrating continuing activities necessary to control terrain. A joint
force would designate a JSA. See JP 3-10 for discussion of joint security area, joint security coordinator,
and joint security coordination center. For each echelon, the support area is annotated with the echelon
size, such as a brigade support area or a division support area. The use of the Army term AO applies when
an Army unit is assigned responsibility for the JSA.
6-4. Support area operations are conducted by the MEB and tenants to prevent or minimize interference
with C2 and support operations, provide unimpeded movement of friendly forces, to provide protection,
operations to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces or defeat threats, and provide ADC. Key functions
performed in the support area include terrain management, movement, protection (security and defense),
and sustainment. The support area may provide critical infrastructure and secondary C2 nodes. In this
chapter, sustainment will only be discussed with respect to sustaining the MEB. Support area operations as
discussed in this chapter do not include the mission support operations conducted by tenants within the
support area.
6-5. Support areas achieve economy of force by having properly staffed headquarters control terrain so
combat forces can conduct battles and engagements in other AOs. The MEB conducts battles and
engagements within the support area when needed to defend. At division level, the assigned support area
headquarters perform similarly to the previous Army division level organization, the rear operations center
(ROC). However, the previous ROC supply/logistics/sustainment functions are the responsibility of the
sustainment brigade. ROCs or rear area operations centers will continue to be used at EAD.
6-6. When a division support area is designated, the MEB may be given responsibility for it. In this case
the division support area becomes the MEB’s AO. The MEB commander conducts operations within the
AO for the echelon headquarters it is supporting in a similar fashion to what a BCT does within its AO.
The higher headquarters/echelon remains responsible for all unassigned areas within its AO that are not
assigned to subordinate units. If the supported echelon has more than one MEB assigned, then the support
area may be split into two or more AOs, one for each MEB. At times, a single MEB may be required to C2
two noncontiguous AOs and conduct split-based operations for a short period of time, but this is not the
desired situation. The MEB designates and controls its own BSA.
6-7. All units in the support area will be assigned to an established base, will be directed to establish a
base, command a base/base cluster, or will establish their own perimeter security and provide mutual
support to a base cluster. The assignment or direction may be by the higher headquarters or the MEB.
RESPONSIBILITIES
6-8. Assignment of an AO (see FM 3-0) includes the authority to perform the following:
z Terrain management.
z Intelligence collection.
z CA activities.
z Air and ground movement control.
z Clearance of fires.
z Security.
6-9. The following tasks must also be performed by commanders assigned AOs for units located in or
transiting their AO:
z Integrate ISR.
z Protection.
z Base/base cluster defense.
z Liaison and coordination.
z Information engagement.
z Infrastructure development.
z Integrate HN support.
z ADC.
6-10. Support area operations include ADC. The higher headquarters is responsible for ADC and delegates
this responsibility to the AO commander. (See chapter 7.) Incident response, consequence management,
and ADC follow established battle drills and SOP. These drills allow effective action against fear, panic,
and confusion that follows an attack.
6-11. Units within an AO have responsibility for unit self defense and should be integrated into the area
security plan, base defense plan, and base cluster defense plan. See FM 3-90.
6-12. The MEB commander may designate subordinate AOs and base and base cluster commanders. Units
may establish their own defensive perimeters or be assigned to operate within an established base. The
MEB commander can group units with their own defensive perimeters or established bases into a base
cluster for mutual support. The higher headquarter or the MEB commander will designate the senior
commander as the base or base cluster commander who will establish a base defense operation center
(BDOC) or base cluster operations center (BCOC) to C2 the operations among the bases close to each
other. The BDOC or BCOC will be staffed and equipped from units within the base or cluster. Unless the
AO or base/base cluster commander has assets to secure and defend the AO or base, and staff and equip the
BDOC or BCOC, the AO or base/base cluster commander may task other tenant units to support these
collective tasks. The base/base cluster commanders will submit requests for other support to conduct
support area operations to the MEB commander. The MEB commander provides the support or coordinates
for it.
6-13. When a higher headquarters assigns the MEB an AO it also may assign them the authority to C2 or
task units operating within the AO. This is essential for unity of command and effort. The higher
headquarters or the MEB commander may designate base/base cluster commanders. The MEB commander,
normally by order of the echelon commander, will typically have TACON of all units within the AO for
security and defense and specified broader TACON over base/base cluster commanders within the AO
(this could include aspect of protection, security, defense, movement control or terrain management). The
base/base cluster commanders have TACON over their tenant and transient units unless the higher
headquarters orders otherwise. The tenant or transient units may be tasked to support security, AT/FP,
defense, guard, and response force requirements within the limits of their capability. The conduct of these
operations will challenge all units to closely assess the troops-to-tasks, and other mission priorities. Each
unit commander in the support area will have to decide on acceptable risk as they apportion effort between
security and defensive tasks and conduct their primary mission. The MEB commander will designate a
minimum level of effort that each unit must provide to security and defensive tasks. The higher headquarter
may establish a TACON relationship of other forces to the MEB. The AO commanders, subordinate AO
commanders, base cluster commanders, or base commanders ensure unity of effort regardless of C2
relationships. This requires coordinated, integrated, and synchronized planning, preparation, execution, and
assessment.
6-14. The MEB commander’s operations center establishes communications and coordinates directly with
higher headquarters, the subordinate AO commanders, base cluster commanders and base commanders.
The AO commander will provide C2 for AO collective efforts and support individual unit’s tactical
operations in the AO.
6-15. The MEB commander determines the support mission, commander’s intent, task and responsibilities,
and issues the order(s) for movement, protection, area security, and defense, as does each individual base
commander. If the MEB is responsible for a base located outside the support area, it may need to conduct
split-based operations for a short period of time.
6-16. Each base has a BDOC to maintain SA and make timely decisions, coordinate base defense, C2
counter strikes, and coordinate incident and consequence management. The AO commander and base/base
cluster commanders designate base defense force, base cluster defense force, base defense reaction forces,
mobile security force, response force, TCF, and a reserve as needed. Depending on the threat assessment,
the MEB may form a TCF from assigned, attached, or OPCON units to handle a less mobile threat level III.
If the threat assessment indicates a continually present more mobile or armored force, then the MEB should
be assigned a maneuver TCF to defeat this threat. The AO, base/base cluster commanders should use
liaison teams to coordinate operations. The higher level commander may direct the base cluster, base or
tenant unit provide a liaison member.
6-17. Following an attack, the AO commander and his headquarters may assist the higher echelon
commander to C2 the mission support of the units in the support area if their chain of command or C2
assets are disrupted. This assistance would be temporary until the higher headquarters reestablishes the
chain of command or C2 assets or the unit completes reorganization.
CONSIDERATIONS
PLAN
6-18. The MEB plans for support area operations within an assigned support area or within the MEB
support area. The AO responsibilities of the MEB require it to plan decisive, shaping, and sustaining
operations within the AO. It must integrate numerous units and headquarters elements to conduct support
area operations. Even if the MEB is not assigned an AO, it still must plan support area operations to
operate its own BSA.
6-19. The higher headquarters order should define the C2 and support requirements within the AO and
give the MEB commander clear authority to alleviate the MEB commander from having to request or
negotiate with units for their compliance/adherence/support. Within this authority and that inherent in
being assigned the AO, the MEB commander directs, tasks, provides oversight of tenants and transient
units within the AO. The MEB must be able to have positive control of all tactical actions and movements
within the AO. Other support and functional brigades within the support AO provide necessary support to
the MEB for the conduct of support area operations within the support AO. The rest of this chapter will
focus on the MEB designated as the support area commander.
6-20. When the OE or particular missions require a high degree of certainty and order, compliance, or
centralization, the MEB may exercise detailed command. Examples are in terrain management with the
positioning and design of bases. This is often needed for base inherent defensibility and clustering of bases
for mutual support and employment of base and base cluster response forces and the MEB reserve.
Detailed fire plans, security plans, defense plans, and ADC plans require a more prescriptive OPORD.
Some units that are tenants within the MEB’s AO will not have the staff to conduct detailed IPB and
defense planning and preparation needed to execute a decentralized mission command type operation. This
requires the MEB to conduct operations in a level of detail not normally done by other brigades.
6-21. The MEB develops plans to support its operations. When it has been given an AO it must also
integrate the actions of tenant units to include base/base cluster commanders. Responsibilities may include
protection, ISR, security, defense, movement control, fires, air support, AMD, CM, incident response, and
ADC. The brigade coordinates decentralized execution by its assigned units and base/base cluster
commanders. It integrates the actions of tenant units to include base/base cluster commander. The MEB
may also need to coordinate ADC support to functional brigades, the sustainment brigade and/or the theater
sustainment command. The brigade reviews and coordinates the supporting base/base cluster defense plans
and develops plans to employ the TCF and/or reserve, fires, and coordinates for HN, joint, interagency, and
multinational assets.
6-22. The MEB coordinates with the higher headquarters to establish priorities, develop plans, and decide
when and where to accept risk in the AO. The MEB can use several levels of vulnerability assessments and
the composite risk management process discussed in FM 5-19. Plan for contractor and HN worker security.
6-23. During fluid offensive operations with advancing BCT AOs, the higher headquarters may be
tempted to assign a support area to the MEB that exceeds their ability to see/control/secure/defend it. The
higher headquarters would need to provide the MEB with additional task organization to include ISR
support, additional security forces, or additional fires and other forces. The increased span of control might
be excessive for the MEB and require the higher headquarters to deal with more unassigned area within its
larger AO, commit a second MEB or another unit that is capable of providing C2 for another portion of
those unassigned areas if that is feasible, or accept risk in another fashion.
6-24. The MEB usually will command one of the bases within the support area and may designate the BSB
commander or an assigned battalion size unit as the base commander. The MEB may assign subordinate
unit boundaries within the AO.
6-25. The MEB may use several boards or working groups during planning and execution. For example,
the protection working group’s multifunctional members ensures all aspects of protection are considered,
assessed, and incorporated.
6-26. The MEB may perform CA activities within their AO. Commanders use CA activities to mitigate
how the military presence affects the populace and vice versa. Conduct CA activities is a task under the C2
warfighting function (FM 3-0). The MEB CA staff works with assigned CA forces, higher headquarter CA
staff, the division CA battalion and if required the corps level CA brigade to develop civil considerations
assessments and plan CA operations. CA units can establish liaison with civilian organization to enhance
relationships and integrate their efforts as much as possible with MEB operations.
6-27. Although the MEB was not designed to be a maneuver headquarters, some of its subunits must be
capable of maneuver and enabled with capabilities to enhance their freedom of maneuver when required.
The MEB may be assigned a maneuver unit as a TCF (designed to combat level III threats) or may
potentially form a response force short of a TCF from other attached or OPCON units such as combat
engineers or MP units. The MEB would control the maneuver of the TCF or response force as they employ
maneuver and fires to defeat threats. The discussion of maneuver in this chapter is within this limited
context. The MEB will initially fight any size threat operating in the AO and must plan to employ all fires,
Army aviation, and close air support (CAS). The MEB select targets and plans where to locate and use
counterfire radars to determine points of origin and predicted impact location of enemy indirect fires. The
MEB develops the intelligence requirements to commit the base response force, MEB AO response force,
TCF, and/or MEB reserve.
PREPARE
6-28. During initial entry, the designated base commanders may prepare their individual bases according
to standards directed by the MEB. If the support area is established in an initially secure area, then
contractors alone or assisted by military units may construct the bases. A technique may be to have the
MEB construct “turn-key” bases within their AO. “Turn-key” would include planning, designing, siting,
constructing, and securing against level II or III threats as required. This is similar to the effort performed
to construct Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo. This required the efforts of the 94th Engineer Battalion (Combat
Heavy), 1st Engineer Brigade of the 1st Armored Division, United States Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) and contractors to accomplish the mission. There may be situations in which the MEB takes
control of bases that are not constructed to acceptable standards and must redesign and renovate them.
6-29. The MEB can conduct MANSPT operations to prepare the support AO defensive plan and prepare
for ADC. This includes mobility, countermobility, and survivability; obstacles; structures; and
antiterrorism. The MEB will conduct initial reconnaissance of their AO to verify intelligence preparation of
the battlefield (IBP). The proper location selection, design, construction, and manning of bases/base
clusters can help to reduce the need for a maneuver TCF.
6-30. The MEB will establish SOPs to ensure protection, security, defense, and the ability to perform ADC
within their AO. These SOPs allow the MEB to use more mission command orders. The MEB will ensure
the base security and defense forces are trained, rehearsed, and ready. Important rehearsals include
commitment of base response forces, commitment of cluster response forces, commitment of the MEB
reserve, and fire plan rehearsals.
EXECUTE
6-31. The MEB conducts support area operations within the assigned support AO. The MEB staff will
ensure close, continuous coordination with the higher headquarters staff and AO tenant and transient units
to ensure security, protection, movement, continuous support, and defense. The MEB will aggressively
execute detection, early warning, and rapid response to threats and coordinate responsive ADC to minimize
effects.
6-32. The MEB will synchronize security operations, integrate ISR, and develop the COP and share it will
all units in the AO. The MEB will C2 the collective defense within the AO. The MEB may direct and
employ transiting combat forces with the approval of higher headquarters. The MEB will defeat level III
threats or conduct battle handoff to other combat forces.
ASSESS
6-33. The MEB must fuse the assessments from the commander, staff, subordinates, supporting units and
tenant units to monitor and evaluate the current situation and progress. The MEB conducts base threat and
vulnerability assessments. Key areas the staff assesses include security, base defense preparations, and
ADC preparations. The staff can use MOEs and MOPs from FM 7-15 to help it develop METT-TC
measures for the assigned support area and required detailed tasks.
TERRAIN MANAGEMENT
6-34. The higher headquarters may position a number of other support brigades, functional brigades, and
smaller units, various higher headquarters, contractors, and joint, interagency, and multinational
organizations within the MEB support AO. Regardless of commander’s ranks or size of units, the MEB
commander has some C2 responsibilities over those in his or her AO. The MEB commander retains final
approval authority for the exact placement of units and facilities within its AO, unless placement is directed
by the MEB’s higher headquarters. The commander must deconflict operations, control movement, and
prevent fratricide. The MEB conducts many of the functions previously conducted by the division rear
command post. The MEB has the authority to C2 tactical operations within the AO through subordinate
commanders and the base/base cluster commanders.
6-35. Terrain management involves allocating terrain by establishing AOs and other control measures, by
specifying unit locations, and by de-conflicting activities that are not complementary or that may interfere
with operations. For example, indirect fire assets should not be located where their fires could interdict an
active air corridor. It includes grouping units into bases and designating base clusters as necessary for
common defense. A technique is for the MEB to designate subordinate TF AOs to increase the ability of
unit leaders to develop improved relationship with local officials. Terrain management should facilitate
current and future operations. Poor terrain management can result in congestion, interruption of tactical
traffic patterns, and degradation of support operations. The failure to follow basic rules of coordination can
cause disruption and create combat identification hazards. Good terrain management will enhance
operations. This section establishes procedures for terrain management in the MEB support AO. Refer to
FM 3-90 for more doctrinal guidance.
6-36. Having an AO assigned both restricts and facilitates the movement of units and the use of fires. It
restricts units not assigned responsibility for the AO from moving through the AO without coordination. It
also restricts outside units from firing into or allowing the effects of its fires to affect the AO. Both of these
restrictions can be relaxed through coordination with the owning unit. It facilitates the movement and fires
of the unit assigned responsibility for, or owning, the AO. In selected situations, subordinate AOs may be
created to facilitate the movement of sustainment convoys or maneuver forces through the support AO.
The MEB can conduct movement corridor operations as discussed in chapter 5.
6-37. Within its support AO, the MEB conducts the tactical coordination and integration of land and air
units while employing firepower and maneuvering forces for positional advantage in relation to the enemy.
Beyond the inherent responsibilities for adjacent unit coordination, the area operations section within the
MEB deconflicts terrain coordination issues by collaborating with adjacent, passing, and supported units to
reduce the likelihood of combat identification errors, trafficability problems, and to enhance situational
understanding, security, and defense. Airspace management is also planned, coordinated, and monitored
from the airspace management cell in the area operations section. Firepower integration and coordination,
to include fires from rotary wing aircraft, is conducted by the MEB fire support element (FSE) through the
targeting process to detect, decide, deliver, and assess targets and affects supporting mission requirements.
S-3 PROCEDURES
6-38. The MEB S-3 functions as the overall terrain manager for the brigade and assigns and reassigns AOs
based on mission requirements to subordinate units. The brigade manages and is responsible for any terrain
in its AO not assigned to a subordinate unit. Within the MEB the area operations section serves as primary
terrain manager for the brigade and reports directly to the S-3. The S-3 is responsible for overall AO
surveillance and reconnaissance plans and integrates subordinate unit and base plans.
6-39. The MEB performs a detailed IPB for their AO and shares it with all tenants. The detailed terrain
analysis is key to MEB terrain management. The MEB must consider the defensibility of the terrain and
primary units missions when constructing new bases and assigning units to existing bases. The MEB
considers the military aspect of terrain and other applicable aspects. (See the JCOB Protection Handbook
and FM 5-103.) The MEB S-3 will engage the entire staff, particularly the S-2, the engineer, the provost
marshal (PM), and the CBRN officer when analyzing factors essential to assigning territory and locating
bases and facilities within its AO. These factors include—
z Locating bases on the best defensible terrain. The S-2, S-3, terrain analysis team, engineer, and
maneuver commander (if a TCF is assigned) collaborate on this effort. This will significantly
reduce the resources need to effectively defend them.
z Locating the sustainment brigade (if in the AO) with access to transportation infrastructure.
z Constructing a base defense can be viewed as constructing a strong point (360-degree defense).
z Identifying and coordinating with the area operations section for unit-specific terrain
requirements that may require engineer preparation.
z Assisting the S-3 in analyzing terrain for placement of units.
z Assisting in coordination of assembly areas or other facilities in the MEB AO for incoming
units.
z Assisting the intelligence section in the IPB process that supports the terrain management effort.
z Conducting engineer reconnaissance to facilitate terrain use and trafficability.
z Assessing facilities and bases and making recommendation on repair or upgrade.
z Designing and planning construction and security features of bases and facilities.
Note. Infrastructure development applies to all fixed and permanent installations, fabrications, or
facilities that support and control military forces. Infrastructure development focuses on facility
security modifications and includes ADC and repairs.
6-44. The MEB CBRN officer considers the vulnerability of facilities and supplies to CBRN attack and
recommends locations and tasks to mitigate enemy effects. Potential decontamination sites and procedures
are developed.
6-45. The MEB PM assists in AO vulnerability assessments and security requirement (the MEB may
designate the senior MP as PM). The PM recommends allocation of assessment to protect critical facilities
and high value targets.
6-51. The MEB and base commanders use observation posts and patrols to gain intelligence and improve
security. Base/base cluster commanders have an inherent responsibility to gather information and share
intelligence with the MEB. Surveillance is inherent and continuous in all security operations.
6-52. Counterreconnaissance is also inherent in all security operations. It is the sum of all actions taken to
counter the enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts. The focus is to deny the enemy information and
destroy or repel enemy reconnaissance elements. Security forces operate either offensively or defensively
when executing counterreconnaissance.
6-53. Counterintelligence is the information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage,
other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments
or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (JP 2-0)
(See FM 3-13.) The Marine Corps defines counterintelligence as the active and passive measures intended
to deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and neutralize hostile
intelligence collection, and to deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and intentions. The MEB S-2
will coordinate all CI measures and operations with the counterintelligence coordinating authority of the
higher headquarters. (See FM 34-60.)
MOVEMENT CONTROL
6-54. Movement control includes the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo
movements over lines of communications personnel (the definition was shortened; the complete definition
is printed in the glossary). Maintaining movement control, keeping LOCs open, managing reception and
transshipment points, and obtaining host nation support are critical to movement control within a unit’s
AO. FM 4-01.30 discusses movement planning and control measures.
6-55. The MEB commander controls movement throughout the assigned AO unless the movement is
conducted on MSRs or alternate supply routes (ASRs) designated by higher headquarters. The MEB
provides movement coordination and regulation on these MRSs and ASRs. Units may not move through
the AO without clearance from the MEB. The MEB designates, maintains, secures, and controls movement
along the routes within the AO unless the higher headquarters directs otherwise. The sustainment brigade
or higher headquarters assist the MEB in the conduct of movement control. Most routine movement control
is handled by the unit conducting the movement or the supporting headquarters. The MEB must assert
control when security conditions require it and stop, reroute, or delay movement even if coordinated or
approved by others.
6-56. The echelon that designates the support AO must provide clear guidance on the roles and
responsibilities for movement control, protection, and defense of forces moving through the AO or
originating in the support area AO that move into other AOs. Active participation with higher headquarters
planners will help to ensure proper guidance is provided. The MEB has responsibility for movement
control, protection, and defense within its support AO, and may have a role within the higher headquarters
AO as it conducts MANSPT operations for other units/forces. The higher headquarters, through its
movement control battalion and movement control teams (MCTs), has primary responsibility for
movement control within the larger AO. The convoy commander has primary responsibility for convoy
protection, security, and defense. The MEB may be assigned TACON (JP 3-10 uses TACON in joint
security area operations [JSAO]) while units are moving within the AO.
6-57. When a unit wants to move within the AO, it coordinates with the BDOC/BCOC. The BDOC/BCOC
will coordinate with the MEB to obtain movement support: intelligence updates, additional security, fires,
MANSPT operations, and final approval. When the unit plans to leave the support AO, the MEB will
coordinate with the supporting MCT as required to obtain movement clearance for use of the MSRs/ASRs.
The base/base cluster commander adjusts perimeter security after a unit loads out for movement or
integrates a new unit into existing plans to ensure a comprehensive security posture.
6-58. When a unit moves through the support AO, it coordinates with the supporting MCT and the MEB.
The MEB will provide needed support as it does for convoys originating within the support AO.
6-59. The division/EAD assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3) or assistant chief of staff, logistics (G-4)
or their supporting sustainment brigade may establish control points and measures such as the first
destination reporting points, a periodic movement control board (MCB) or the sustainment brigade
mobility branch, to control the movement of forces into the division/EAD AO in a predictable or deliberate
manner. The MEB may want to consider placing an LNO at the higher headquarters movement control
board. The responsible MCT coordinates all sustainment movement into and out of the MEB AO. The
MEB area operations section may have reporting, regulating, or response force responsibilities to major
movements and convoys in coordination with the responsible provost marshal’s office and DTO while
supporting division/EAD movement priorities. For major movements the MEB may establish a movement
control board to coordinate with higher headquarters G-4, movement control staffs, the sustainment
brigade, convoy commanders, and AO owners that the movement will transit.
6-60. The MEB staff plans and conducts the required MANSPT operations to support movement. The
CBRN officer determines likely areas for enemy use of CBRN, and designates decontamination sites for
restoring contaminated units. The CBRN officer also coordinates with task-organized CBRN assets to
position chemical detection sensors and to establish the corresponding process for receiving, validating,
and disseminating chemical alerts, precautions, and downwind messages to subordinate, adjacent, and
higher units. The engineer coordinates mobility support, monitoring route status and directing required
route maintenance. The EOD staff, in coordination with the engineer and S-2, monitors and conducts trend
analysis within the support AO. The MP coordinates traffic control. He directs required MP security. The
S-6 ensures that the required codes, loads, administrative data, and procedures for accessing dedicated
communication nets or networked systems are current, available, operational and packaged for
dissemination by the operations section to organic, tenant or passing units. He coordinates with subordinate
electronic warfare officers to ensure that electronic counter measure devices and equipment are properly
installed, tested, and deconflicted with noncomplementary devices of similar purpose within the support
AO.
scheme of maneuver for defensive operations to remain between the base and the enemy and
conduct battle handover as appropriate. The value of terrain occupied by the security force lies
in the protection it provides to the base.
z Perform continuous reconnaissance. Security is active. The security force performs
continuous, aggressive reconnaissance to gain all possible information about the enemy and
terrain. Surveillance and patrolling required in security use the same techniques as in
reconnaissance.
z Provide early and accurate warning. Early warning of enemy activity provides the main body
commander the time and information needed to retain the tactical initiative and to choose the
time and place to concentrate against the enemy. Ground scouts are positioned to provide long-
range observation of expected enemy avenues of approach and are reinforced with electronic
surveillance devices and aerial platforms when available. Flexibility and depth are built into the
surveillance plan.
z Provide reaction time and maneuver space. The security force operates as far from the main
body as possible, consistent with the factors of METT-TC. This distance provides the reaction
time and maneuver space required by the MEB commander. It fights, as necessary, to ensure
adequate time and space for the brigade commander to maneuver and concentrate forces to meet
the enemy.
z Maintain enemy contact. Once contact is made with the enemy, the security force keeps
contact to protect the brigade. The security force uses redundant surveillance methods, direct
and indirect fires, freedom of maneuver, and depth to achieve continuous contact.
6-66. There are five primary types of security–screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. The
MEB would not be assigned a screen, guard or cover mission by a higher headquarters, but can use all
except guard and cover as part of their conduct of support AO security operations.
6-67. A screen unit is tasked to maintain surveillance; provide early warning to the main body/base; or
impede, destroy, and harass enemy reconnaissance without becoming decisively engaged. Depending on
the screening unit’s capabilities, they may be able to impede and harass the enemy force with indirect and
or direct fires. A screen may be static or moving. Any subordinate element that can maneuver can be given
a screening mission. The assigned maneuver unit should be trained on these doctrinal tasks. The engineer
and MP units may need training to perform these security missions.
6-68. Area security is a form of security that includes reconnaissance and security of designated personnel,
airfields, unit convoys, facilities, MSRs, LOCs, equipment, and critical points. An area security force
neutralizes or defeats enemy operations in a specified area. It screens, reconnoiters attacks, defends, and
delays as necessary to accomplish the mission. The MEB conducts area security to deny the enemy the
ability to influence friendly actions in a designated area or to deny the enemy use of an area for his own
purposes. Area security often entails route security, convoy security, and checkpoint operations.
6-69. Local security consists of low-level security operations conducted near a unit to prevent surprise by
enemy forces. All units of the MEB are capable of, and required to, conduct local security operations as an
inherent part of self-protection and mission assurance measures.
6-70. Other security operations include—
z Area and high value asset (HVA) security.
z Route security.
z Convoy security.
6-71. Area and HVA security is a form of security that includes reconnaissance and security of designated
personnel, airfields, unit convoys, facilities, MSRs, LOCs, and other critical points. An area security force
neutralizes or defeats enemy operations in a specified area. It screens, reconnoiters attacks, defends, and
delays as necessary to accomplish the mission. The MEB performs area security missions to prevent the
enemy from influencing friendly actions in a designated area, or to deny the enemy use of an area for its
own purposes. Area security often entails route security, convoy security, and checkpoint operations. The
MEB support AO security operations will involve both these forms of security.
6-72. The MEB conducts route security missions to prevent enemy ground maneuver forces or
unconventional forces from coming within direct fire range of the protected route. MP or reconnaissance
units execute this mission as part of battlefield circulation and may require augmentation during small scale
contingency or major combat operations (MCOs) conflicts. A route security force operates on and to the
flanks of a designated route. Route security operations are defensive in nature and, unlike guard operations,
are terrain oriented. A route security force prevents an enemy force from impeding, harassing, containing,
seizing, or destroying traffic along the route.
6-73. The MEB conducts convoy security operations when insufficient friendly forces are available to
continuously secure LOCs in an AO. They also may be conducted in conjunction with route security
operations. A convoy security force operates to the front, flanks, and rear of a convoy element moving
along a designated route. Convoy security operations are offensive in nature and orient on the force being
protected. A convoy security mission has certain critical tasks that guide planning and execution. (See
FM 3-90.)
6-81. To employ the reserve the MEB must be able to “see” the threat, assess information, and
employ/control fires. The MEB may need air surveillance assets to look at NAIs and targeted areas of
interest not under routine surveillance by base/base clusters or units in C2 of movement corridors. The
MEB must plan and coordinate responsive fires when bases or convoys are attacked.
SECURITY AREA
6-87. Typically each base/base cluster has a boundary established beyond their perimeter to at least direct
fire range (may be 3 to 5 kilometers) to execute their fire plans and within their ability to control; this is
their security area. The MEB is responsible for the security of unassigned area within the MEB AO and
may use it for the same purpose as a forward security area in a defense in depth. This security area should
be wide enough to preclude enemy use of mortars and allow adequate time to detect enemy threats and
engage with direct fire weapons. This security area provides early warning and reaction time, denies enemy
reconnaissance efforts, and protects the bases. The MEB could divide the area around the bases into
subordinate AOs and have each base commander provide a security force within their AOs. Commanders
give their security force its boundaries to define its area, or control measures as part of the overall ISR
plan. Within this security area responsible units conduct ISR and engage enemy forces. The commander
clearly defines the objective of the security area. OPORDs state the tasks of the security force(s) in terms
of time required or expected to maintain security, expected results, disengagement criteria, withdrawal
criteria, and follow-on tasks. The OPORD identifies specific avenues of approach and NAIs the security
force(s) must cover.
6-88. Early warnings of pending enemy actions ensure the commander time to react to any threat. The S-2
analyzes likely routes and methods the enemy could use to conduct reconnaissance. He templates likely
locations and activities of enemy observation posts (OPs), patrols (mounted and dismounted), and other
reconnaissance assets. NAIs are established at these locations to focus counterreconnaissance activities.
Security forces use OPs, combat outposts, patrols, sensors, target acquisition radars, and aerial surveillance
to locate high potential targets, and to confirm or deny the CCIR. This is a vital step in disrupting the
enemy's plan and getting inside his decision.
DEFENSE IN DEPTH
6-89. The support AO can be viewed as a defense in depth. The depth extends from the range of the
threat’s indirect weapons, to the individual Soldier’s response to threats inside the perimeter. The MEB
commander can mass combat power at any of the bases or direct the response forces, reserve, or TCF to
fight from one of the bases. The commander plans fires throughout the support area up to the maximum
range of available weapons. He may place portable obstacles around critical locations within the AO or
base perimeters during periods of reduced visibility to disrupt the enemy’s plan based on visual
reconnaissance and add depth to the defense.
6-90. The bases formed into base clusters provide mutual support to each other. The MEB can coordinate
mutual support between bases and between base clusters. This provides a series of integrated defensive
positions that adds to defense in depth.
STRONG POINT
6-91. In hostile fire areas, most bases are planned, prepared, and executed as modified strong points since
their focus is not primarily anti-armor. Normally the modified strong point must defeat antipersonnel, car
or truck bombs, and indirect fires. If the base is designated a strong point, then the MEB has sited and
planned it based on a detailed analysis of the terrain to best use its defensive potential. A strong point is a
heavily fortified battle position (BP) tied into a natural obstacle or restrictive terrain, to create an anchor for
the defense. Any base can be viewed as a strong point with an engagement area around it, but would not be
called a strong point. A strong point implies retention of terrain for the purpose of controlling key terrain
and/or blocking, fixing, or canalizing enemy forces. Defending units require permission from the higher
headquarters to withdraw from a strong point. Strong points are prepared for all-around defense. Strong
points require extensive engineer effort and resources. All unit assets within the strongpoint require
fortified positions. Also, extensive protective and tactical obstacles are required to provide an all-around
defense. A strong point usually requires one full day of engineer effort by an engineer force equal in size to
that of the force defending the strong point. Before assigning a strong point mission, the commander
considers the following:
z Loss of survivability and countermobility effort to other areas within the defense.
z Potential for the defending force to be encircled or isolated by the attacking enemy.
z Availability of sufficient time and resources to construct the position.
COMBAT OUTPOSTS
6-92. A combat outpost is a reinforced OP capable of conducting limited combat operations. While the
factors of METT-TC determine the size, location, and number of combat outposts established by a unit, a
reinforced platoon typically occupies a combat outpost. Both mounted and dismounted forces can employ
combat outposts. Combat outposts are usually located far enough in front of the protected force to preclude
enemy ground reconnaissance elements from observing the actions of the protected force. Considerations
for employing combat outposts—
z Allow security forces to be employed in restrictive terrain that precludes mounted security
forces from covering the area.
z Can be used when smaller OPs are in danger of being overrun by enemy forces infiltrating into
and through the security area.
z Enable a commander to extend the depth of his security area.
z Should not seriously deplete the strength of the main body.
6-93. Forces manning combat outposts can conduct aggressive patrolling, engage and destroy enemy
reconnaissance elements, and engage the enemy main body before their extraction. The commander should
plan to extract his forces from the combat outpost before the enemy has the opportunity to overrun them.
AREA OF OPERATIONS
6-94. If the MEB commander does not assign units an AO, then the MEB is responsible for terrain
management, security, clearance of fires, and coordination of maneuver within the entire AO. The MEB
can designate subordinate AO. This gives subordinates freedom of maneuver and fire planning within a
specific area.
6-95. Major avenues of approach should be defended within a single AO. AOs require continuous
coordination with bordering units for security and to maintain a coherent defense. During base defense
preparations, the commander and staff use confirmation brief, back briefs, inspections, supervision, and
rehearsals to ensure base defenses are coordinated, and that unacceptable gaps do not develop.
PENETRATIONS
6-96. The MEB must develop plans to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces in the support AO. This is
accomplished in the security area and within the bases when there is a penetration. Each base commander
or unit assigned an AO is responsible for identifying enemy forces. Enemy threats may originate within the
support area or be a larger element that penetrates the security area or a base perimeter.
6-97. If a base is threatened with a penetration, the MEB commander may take several actions in order of
priority:
z Allocate immediate priority of all available indirect fires, including attack aviation or CAS, to
the threatened unit. This is the most rapid and responsive means of increasing the combat power
of the threatened unit.
z Direct and/or reposition adjacent units to engage enemy forces that are attacking the threatened
unit. This may not be possible if adjacent units are already decisively engaged.
z Commit the TCF (if available) to defeat the level III threat.
z Commit the reserve to reinforce the threatened unit.
z Commit the reserve to block, contain, or destroy the penetrating enemy force.
6-98. The MEB or base commander can use the following steps to counter a penetration:
z Maintain contact with the penetrating enemy force. Security area forces may be able to delay
the penetrating force, with which to maintain contact. The commander seeks to determine the
penetrating enemy force’s size, composition, direction of attack, and rate of movement. Forces
in contact must also adjust indirect fires and CAS against the enemy to disrupt, delay, or divert
his attack.
z Take immediate actions to hold the shoulders of the penetration. This may require changing
task organization, adjusting adjacent boundaries and tasks, executing situational or reserve
obstacles, or shifting priority of fires.
z Move threatened units. Based on the enemy’s direction of attack, units may need to move
away from the penetration. These movements must be controlled to ensure they do not interfere
with counterattack plans or movements of combat forces.
z Determine where and how to engage the penetrating enemy force. Based on the enemy’s
size, composition, and direction of attack, the commander selects the best location to engage the
enemy. The reserve may counterattack into the enemy’s flank, or it may establish a defensive
position in depth to defeat or block the enemy. The staff establishes control measures for the
reserve’s attack. The reserve can use an engagement area or objective to orient itself to a
specific location to engage the enemy. A BP can be used to position the reserve along defensible
terrain. When the situation is vague or the enemy has multiple avenues of approach, the
commander may establish an AO for the reserve. This requires the reserve to locate, and move
to intercept and engage the enemy anywhere in the assigned AO. The commander and staff
develop a concept of fires and consider required adjustments to fire support coordination
measures (FSCMs). They also decide on the commitment of directed, reserve, or situational
obstacles to support the action. Traffic control is especially critical. Sufficient routes must be
designated for the reserve to use, and provisions such as the use of MPs and combat engineers
must be taken to ensure those routes remain clear.
z Issue an order. If the operation is not well controlled, the situation could easily deteriorate into
a total force failure. Orders must be developed quickly and issued clearly, concisely, and calmly.
z Plan effectively. A simple, well thought-out plan, developed during the initial planning process,
greatly improves the ability of subordinates to react effectively.
6-99. The MEB commander must keep his higher headquarters informed of any enemy penetrations and
the base commanders must keep the MEB commander informed. The higher headquarters or MEB
commander might reinforce the base commander with additional fires, attack aviation, security forces, or
maneuver forces. Normally, in the case of a base penetration, the commander positions with the response
force or reserve due to the criticality of the counterattack.
COUNTERATTACK
6-100. The MEB and base commanders use counterattacks to destroy an enemy within the AO or base
perimeter. The units seek to slow the rate of penetration, weaken the enemy, and reduce his maneuver
options, momentum, and initiative, then counterattack with all available force. Timing is critical to a
counterattack. Assuring the mobility of the counterattacking force is critical.
6-101. Ideally, the response force or reserve must be given warning time to prepare and maneuver. A
quick verbal WARNO or monitoring the command net or security forces net can give the response force or
reserve some warning and allow them to begin immediate movement toward their attack position to begin a
counterattack. The response force or reserve would issue situation reports and oral fragmentary orders on
the move. Planning and preparation to a battle drill standard are needed. Within the support area, a
successful defense is the defeat of enemy forces within the security area or the main battle area (MBA), if
designated.
FIRES
6-102. The MEB must plan for both Army and joint fires: indirect fires, attack aviation, and CAS. The
best results are normally obtained when a ground or aerial observer has eyes on the target to call for and
adjust fire. The commander of the AO where the munitions will impact must approve those fires.
Commanders commit a ground force to ensure and confirm that all enemy forces are defeated.
AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
6-103. The MEB is staffed to conduct AC2 to synchronize use of airspace and enhance C2 of forces using
airspace. (See FM 3-52 and JP 3-52.) The MEB manages the airspace over its assigned AO to include
identification, coordination, integration, and regulation of airspace users. The MEB coordinates with the
higher headquarters AC2 staff, the joint air operations center, or the theater airspace control authority as
required to deconflict and integrate use of airspace within the MEB AO. The airspace management section
has digital connectivity to theater level with the tactical airspace integration system. When assigned an AO,
the MEB commander approves, disapproves, or denies airspace combat operations. Fires and airspace use
is deconflicted in the FC. The MEB can use control measures such as a UAS holding area, base defense
zone, restricted operations area, and restricted operations zone. Key tasks may include coordinating UAS
brigade level operations and coordinating Army aviation support.
EMPLOYMENT EXAMPLE
6-106. An example of MEB conduct of support area operations is shown in figure 6-1. In this example,
the division support area was assigned to the MEB as AO BILL. Based on the templated company team
(TM) mechanized armor threat, the division task organized an OPCON TCF to the MEB. The MEB located
them in an area within the base closest to the templated threat. The division established TACON for the
aviation and sustainment brigade to the MEB. The MEB designated the aviation brigade and chemical
battalion commanders as base commanders. The sustainment brigade designated one of its battalion
commanders as a base commander. The MEB designated the sustainment brigade as base cluster
commander and established TACON for the MEB MP company TM assigned to a small base within the
sustainment brigade’s boundary. The division located its headquarters in a base commanded by the aviation
brigade. The MEB also established TACON for the MEB MP company located within the aviation
brigade’s base. The MEB created a unit boundary, an MP battalion TF, an engineer battalion TF, and
assigned them each about half of the AO. The division TAA has a proposed DHA and LZ to be developed
later. (See chapter 5.) The MEB established a proposed movement corridor from the sustainment brigade to
division unassigned area along MSR WHITE. Within the proposed movement corridor, the MEB
established an air corridor and ACPs to their current AO boundary. The MEB prepared ISR and fires plans
and designated NAIs and TRPs.
EMPLOYMENT EXAMPLE
6-108. One example of MEB performing ADC is shown in figure 6-2. In this example, the BCT area
from the movement corridor employment example (figure 5-1, page 5-7) is shown in more detail. An
enemy rocket attack destroyed the bridge on MSR BLACK and produced a CBRN incident with a
corresponding downwind prediction. The BCT requested ADC support from the division to allow the BCT
to focus their capabilities on an expected enemy attack on their base. The MEB task organized and
prepared a chemical battalion TF which included the chemical battalion, an engineer construction
company, a bridging company, and two MP companies. The division detached the TF from the MEB and
placed it in DS to the BCT. The BCT created a new unit boundary and placed the TF within it to allow the
BCT to mass their organic capabilities on the expected ground attack. The TF is required to conduct area
security, highway regulation, decontamination, construction of ASR INDIGO, and emplacement of a
bridge upstream from the contaminated and destroyed bridge.
The MEB is capable of conducting many of the missions that may be associated with
consequence management operations. It has the most complete multifunctional staff
of any Army brigade with the staff skills needed to C2 consequence management
operations. The MEB is designed to integrate many of the types of units that have the
greatest applicability in support to consequence management (CBRN, engineer,
EOD, and MP). Other brigade units are optimized for specific consequence
management functions but the MEB has the broadest consequence management
capabilities and the training to integrate them. The MEB may be the ideal type of
brigade for certain consequence management incidents because of its capability to C2
an AO and perform other related requirements. The brigade is trained to C2 airspace
and interface with others that control airspace. This is particularly important in large-
scale disasters with DOD aviation support. The MEB can conduct consequence
management depending on the nature of the incident and its task organization. The
MEB may be called upon to function as the on-site DOD or Army headquarters or
complement or support another headquarters such as a JTF or the CBRNE
Operational Headquarters to respond to specific consequence management missions.
The MEB can provide ADC as part of support area (see chapter 6) or MANSPT
operations (see chapter 5) performed in support of its higher headquarters and
assigned units. For further guidance on consequence management refer to Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction (CJCSI) 3125.01, CJCSI 3214.01A, JP 3-07.6, JP 3-
28, JP 3-40, JP 3-41, FM 3-11.21 (FM 3-21), FM 3-07, FM 3-90, and FMI 3-90.10.
FUNDAMENTALS
7-1. Consequence management involves actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and
manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or
terrorist incidents (JP 3-28). JP 3-41 contains doctrine on chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and
high-yield explosives consequence management.
7-2. This manual discusses consequence management operations in support of full spectrum operations.
With applicability in both domestic and foreign operations, consequence management is focused on DHS
and Department of State (DOS) related actions. Although ADC is distinct from consequence management,
it is included in the discussion here given the numerous similarities between it and consequence
management. ADC is focused on DOD related actions and typically has a tactical connotation unlike
consequence management which focuses on actions taken during or after an event, ADC also includes
actions taken before an event. For domestic crisis management or crisis response, see the National doctrine
in the NIMS, and NRF.
7-3. Land power includes the ability to address the consequences of catastrophic events—both natural
and manmade—to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services. Consequence management
could be a joint military operation generally conducted under the operational theme of limited intervention.
(See FM 3-0.) Consequence management operations can also be conducted under foreign humanitarian
assistance. (See JP 3-0.)
7-4. There is currently no consistent use of the term consequence management in Army doctrine. This
manual provides a framework for the MEB to understand how to view consequence management in
support of full spectrum operations.
7-5. Consequence management supports domestic civil authorities, foreign civil authorities, or military
authorities. Consequence management operations support foreign civil authorities or military authorities
when conducted in support of stability operations. Consequence management in support of stability
operations may be referred to in some publications as Foreign Consequence Management (FCM).
Consequence management operations support domestic civil authorities when conducted in support of civil
support operations. Consequence management operations support military authorities when conducted in
support of offensive or defensive operations. Army commanders that are assigned AOs use ADC to
respond to incidents. ADC has similar tasks as consequence management. ADC may be conducted as part
of support area operations or MANSPT operations. ADC could support joint and multinational forces.
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS
7-12. Technical operations are activated to address aspects of CBRNE materials when encountered in
consequence management operations. Technical operations may occur before the operation to support the
crisis management response and continue to support the consequence management response. Technical
operations include actions to identify, assess, dismantle, transfer, dispose of, or decontaminate personnel
and property exposed to explosive ordnance or weapons of mass destruction. The lead federal agency for
technical operations depends on the material involved and the location of the incident. (See JP 3-41.)
7-13. This manual takes an inclusive view of consequence management to conduct the response to a broad
range of incidents. Where consequence management is performed and who the designated lead is define
the different categories of consequence management and whether it is considered to be ADC rather than
consequence management. The MEB can conduct consequence management or ADC in support of each of
these operations for the responsible authority, to include—
z Stability operations with DOS or DOD for lead for foreign civil authorities. (See FM 3-07.)
z Civil support operations and domestic support operations with a DHS, Department of Justice, or
DOD lead for domestic civil authorities.
z CBRNE consequence management operations with a DOD lead for civil or military authorities.
(See JP 3-41.)
z ADC with an AO commander lead for military units. (See FM 3-90.)
7-14. The nature of consequence management environment is often complicated by the following factors:
z Interagency coordination.
z Overwhelming scope of consequences.
z Large number and types organizations providing support.
z Complex C2 arrangements.
z Rapidly changing situations.
z Uncertainty and conflicting information.
z A loss of hope by many.
7-15. Consequence management activities manage the problems and consequences and mitigate, contain,
and reduce the effects of the incident or attack. Most of these purposes apply equally to ADC. The purpose
of consequence management includes—
z Preventing, limiting, or containing consequences.
z Assessing consequences.
z Coordinating responses.
z Protecting public health and safety.
z Maintaining or restoring essential services.
z Providing emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals.
z Eliminating or alleviating human suffering.
z Alleviating damage, loss and hardship.
7-16. The first priority in civil support operations is to save lives. In the aftermath of a manmade or natural
disaster, the first military forces to arrive focus on rescue, evacuation, and consequence management. (See
FM 3-0.) Essential services and priorities are defined by the supported agency. DOD consequence
management support is typically provided to a lead agency.
7-17. Domestic or foreign governments have primary responsibility to plan, prepare, prevent, and to
manage crises and coordinate consequence management responses. Geographic combatant commanders
(GCCs) have consequence management responsibility for support to U.S. forces and on U.S. controlled
installations.
7-18. For consequence management as part of civil support operations, State governments are responsible
and have the authority to respond and the Federal Government provides assistance. DHS is the “Primary
Agency” for consequence management during civil support operations.
7-19. Military support for consequence management during civil support operations will be provided
through Commander, United States Northern Command; Commander, United States Southern Command;
or Commander, United States Pacific Command depending upon the location of the incident.
7-20. The Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS) in the J-3, Joint Staff serves as the action agent for
the Assistant Secretary of Defense-Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs who has the
executive agent responsibility delegated by the Secretary of Defense. The JDOMS plans for and
coordinates the DOD civil support mission and is the primary DOD contact for all federal departments and
agencies during DOD involvement in most domestic civil support operations.
7-21. For consequence management during stability operations the DOS is normally the federal agency
with lead responsibility although in some cases it may be the DOD. U.S. military support to consequence
management operations during stability operations normally will be provided to the foreign government
through the GCC within whose AOR the incident occurs. (See FM 3-07.) FCM includes—
z Support to DOS on U.S. installations such as embassies.
z FHA operations in support of foreign governments or people.
z CBRNE consequence management.
7-22. The MEB can conduct the consequence management operations supporting tasks outlined in chapter
2 and shown in the left column of table 7-1 as part of consequence management operations. This table
shows what key tasks may be performed during stability, civil support, and ADC operations.
Table 7-1. MEB consequence management operations tasks relationships to other
operations
Stability Operations Civil Support Operations ADC Operations
Respond to CBRNE
X X X
incident
Provide support to law
X X
enforcement
Conduct post incident
X X X
response operations
7-23. ADC may also include key additional tasks that are not necessarily performed as a part of
consequence management operations. These include but are not limited to—
z Overcome barriers, obstacles, and mines.
z Provide illumination.
z Provide general engineering support.
z Provide high-value site security.
z Identify local resources, facility.
z Conduct personnel recovery operations.
z Conduct AT activities.
z Conduct survivability operations.
z Conduct CBRNE operations.
z Conduct consolidation and reorganization activities.
z Respond after an enemy attack.
z Conduct recovery (often an Air Force term for what an air base does after an attack).
z Assess and repair battlefield damage assessment and repair.
7-24. Consequence management operations can be categorized several ways; by location where they occur,
what they provide, after what type incident, and for whom they provide support. Location may be foreign
or domestic. In both locations, consequence management may occur on U.S. government controlled
installations and directly support U.S. forces. The types of incidents are disasters and catastrophes. Causes
of incidents are natural, manmade, or terrorist. In this manual “man-made or terrorist incidents” include
hostile actions against military forces that require consequence management or ADC. The types of military
response for consequence management include C2, resources, equipment, supplies/sustainment, services,
and advice to decisionmakers. (See FM 3-07.)
CONSIDERATIONS
PLAN
7-25. All Army units develop incident response plans to prevent, mitigate, or limit consequences, contain
consequences, coordinate responses, and reestablish operations. Consequence management is often
provided in a complex environment characterized by uncertainty, multiple service providers, unclear roles
and responsibilities, and the potentially overwhelming nature of catastrophic consequences. If requested,
the MEB could participate in pre-incident planning to support military units or civil authorities. Local civil
authorities may have a prepared plan for some incidents but may be quickly overwhelmed with a major
incident and request support. The MEB would then conduct parallel and collaborative planning with the
lead agency to modify a plan and create new incident response plans. See FM 3-90 for ADC planning
guidance. See FM 3-11.21 for planning guidance for CBRN consequence management.
7-26. In emergency preparedness planning, the DHS plans for manmade and natural disasters and incident
and executes the plans as civil support operations. See the NIMS and NRF for essential services Army
forces provide in response to disaster.
7-27. While the MEB may be the lead DOD unit on-site, it will typically be in support of another military
or civilian organization. The MEB coordinates all planning with whoever is in the lead to determine
required support. The MEB considers support functions that may be required during consequence
management to include communications, transportation, engineering, maintenance, medical, and public
affairs.
7-28. The MEB will typically develop plans for all of the potential consequence management operations
that the MEB is projected to participate in. Anticipate those operations that may require MEB support as a
C2 headquarters. Plan sequential responses; initial, subsequent, follow-on, and transition to other
authorities. Develop a plan that defines the conditions when additional functional headquarters should be
requested to C2 functional requirements that overload the span of control or expertise of the MEB. Military
OPLANs/OPORDs currently use Annex T-Consequence Management (CM). (See FM 5-0.) Much of the
C2 information, except combat operations in chapter 6, titled conduct support area operations, applies to
the MEB’s conduct of consequence management. Task organization of subordinates, terrain management,
and assignment of AOs are similar.
7-29. The MEB must assess the probable requirements for medical assets required to respond to given
consequence management incidents. Ideally, the command or support relationship of the medical assets to
the MEB would be determined before deployment, but changes in their requirement may only become
evident as certain incidents occur.
7-30. The MEB task organizes subordinates, conducts terrain management, and assigns AOs in much the
same manner as it does during the conduct of support area operations. (See chapter 5.)
7-31. The MEB conduct of risk management in consequence management is more important due to the
uncertainty, complexity, and unfamiliarity of the OE during most incidents. Besides the standard risk
management process, the MEB may consider the following:
z Detailed IPB continually updated with input from the on-scene command post, first responders,
and MEB ISR plan.
z Risk assessment of all phases of the operation from any required deployment, through
execution, to any redeployment.
z Both natural and manmade incidents often have follow-on incidents that can complicate the
operation and affect the initial risk assessment.
PREPARE
7-32. Form, train, and rehearse crisis response teams to include medical, CA, CBRN, engineer, EOD, MP,
damage assessment, fire, search and rescue and other capabilities. Prepare equipment and supplies for
deployment or stage response equipment and supplies.
7-33. MEB elements may be deployed in anticipation of an incident if there is sufficient warning. When
authorized, quickly deploy to the incident location and establish contact with the on-site lead. Continue to
support crisis planning, and potentially support protection and security efforts, or pre-positioning of
resources.
7-34. Based on guidance from the higher headquarters that will be supported and mission analysis, project
necessary task organization or augmentation to include units, technical experts, specialized equipment, and
supplies. Conduct rehearsals of known or probable support tasks.
7-35. Continue mission analysis and conduct or request ISR operations to develop SA and SU. Share your
COP with the supported headquarters/agency.
7-36. Conduct survivability operations before an incident to reduce the probability of damage and
minimize its effects. Vulnerability assessment can be conducted on fixed locations and a risk assessment
supported by CRM can help to identify potential preemptive or preparatory actions.
EXECUTE
7-37. All Army units execute consequence management (or ADC) within their ability. Commanders
assigned AOs provide ADC for those units located within their AO. AO commanders take actions to
maintain and restore essential services, C2 capabilities, and mission support. Actions are taken to manage
and mitigate the effects of incidents.
7-38. Commanders act quickly to control events. Acting faster than the situation deteriorates can change
the dynamics of a crisis. (See the discussion of tempo in FM 3-0.) The capability to act quickly helps
prevent, contain, or recover from incidents.
7-39. Domestically, first responders should establish a local command post at the incident location.
Determining on-site who is in charge of various response efforts may be a challenge as response grows for
a large incident. Coordinate and integrate all support with the on-site command post, commander, or
manager.
7-40. Continually update and share your COP with the lead agency. The MEB may employ capabilities to
support the lead agency’s COP and SA. Quickly adjust efforts based on changing situations and new
priorities. This also supports risk management.
7-41. Coordinate all information operations with the supported agency. The media can have a significant
impact on public support, legitimacy of local authorities, views of our military, and changes in priority of
effort.
7-42. Decide when to hand off to functional brigades/other units or civil authorities (foreign or domestic)
and when to request additional support or release assets no longer required. Initial or follow-on support
requirements could include C2 and support to movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment
support.
ASSESS
7-43. Before an incident, assess measures that could prevent, limit, or contain consequences. Assess
readiness to respond. Assess MEB sustainment requirements before deployment.
7-44. After an incident, conduct an initial assessment of the consequences (immediate and long-term) and
provide advice on response measures. Assess needs and the organizations capabilities and resources to
respond. UAS can assist in aerial damage assessment (ADA) and MEB technical experts can assess beyond
most units’ capabilities. Assess the requests for assistance. Continually asses if additional forces or
resources are required to meet approved levels of support. Be aware of unintended mission creep.
7-45. Assess response efforts using MOEs and MOPs as in any operation.
EMPLOYMENT EXAMPLE
7-49. One example of an MEB conducting consequence management within CONUS is shown in
figure 7-1, page 7-8. In this example, a plane has crashed into a major industrial site and mass casualties
have resulted; a CBRNE incident has occurred with downwind prediction that affects a built up area and
state Highway 5, and there is an environmental hazard of runoff into the river that provides water to a built
up area downstream. This example could also be viewed as civil support operations as part of full spectrum
operations. The local officials responded but were overwhelmed. The state governor declared a state of
emergency, directed the state emergency management agency (SEMA) to take over incident command,
management and response, and requested support from a neighboring state. That state has an ARNG MEB
ready to respond to the mission based upon an existing support agreement.
7-50. The ARNG MEB immediately deploys the DCO with an ECCP to collocate with the SEMA on-site
command post while the rest of the MEB mobilizes and moves to the incident site. The MEB is task
organized with one engineer battalion, two MP battalions, a CA battalion, two chemical battalions, and one
mechanized infantry battalion. The SEMA also put their state medical battalion, Chinook squadron, local
and state search and rescue teams, and a volunteer local construction company OPCON to the MEB. The
SEMA assigned the MEB an area to control and in which they will conduct the operations. The key tasks
include conducting risk management, responding to CBRNE incident, providing support to law
enforcement, conducting post incident response, conducting MANSPT operations; improving movement,
and supporting area security in and around the industrial site. Finally, they are to conduct sustainment
support operations (general engineering to construct a berm to control surface runoff) and other critical
requirements that may be identified.
The specialized organization and training focus of the MEB make it an important
contributor to stability operations. The MEB may be required to conduct some
stability operations for its supported echelon within an assigned AO while concurrent
MCO are occurring in the larger AO of the headquarters they are supporting. In this
case the MEB would effectively perform in an economy of force role in one area with
the relative weight of the effort on stability operations as other units focus the relative
weight of their effort on combat operations in another area. The MEB may be
required to conduct stability operations simultaneously with support area operations,
consequence management operations, and MANSPT operations. (See FM 3-0, and
FM 3-07 for additional information on stability operations.)
OVERVIEW
8-1. Stability operations is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and
activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to
maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (JP 3-0). Stability operations can be
conducted in support of an HN or interim government or as part of an occupation when no government
exists. Stability operations involve both coercive and constructive military actions. They help to establish a
safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability
operations can also help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions and support the
transition to legitimate local governance. Army stability operations will take place in continuous,
simultaneous combinations with offensive and defensive operations. The mission determines the relative
weight among these elements. (See FM 3-0.)
8-4. The MEB and its subordinate elements may support HN or other civilian agencies. When the HN or
other agencies cannot provide basic government functions, MEB forces may be required to do so directly.
The MEB conducts both coercive and constructive actions. The brigade has the capability to C2 many of
the types of units needed to establish and maintain stability. The MEB establishes fusion cells to integrate
intelligence from all organizations. It assesses requirements and conducts operations integrated and
synchronized with others to shape the civil conditions. The MEB interacts with the populace and civil
authorities and conducts MANSPT operations to provide full freedom of movement for friendly forces
while denying it to the enemy. The MEB’s organic staff is best suited to conduct civil security, civil
control, and restore essential services. They can use reachback or staff augmentation to better conduct
these tasks. See FM 3-07 for a discussion of essential stability tasks, subordinate stability tasks, and
supporting information engagement tasks. The MEB may be called upon to conduct any of their key tasks
in the conduct of stability operations.
8-5. Many stability operations require Soldiers to interact with the populace in the AO often for
prolonged periods of time to a greater extent than in offensive and defensive operations. NGOs may be
assisting some efforts or conducting parallel efforts. There can be a large range of small unit technical or
constructive tasks along several lines of operation that the commander must integrate and synchronize.
This makes the environment complex and suited to the MEB staff capabilities and probable task
organization of CBRN, EOD, and engineer units, especially if major offensive or defensive operations are
not required in the MEB AO, or are small enough to be conducted by the MEB with a task organized
maneuver battalion.
Civil Security
8-6. The MEB provides major capabilities through MANSPT operations to establish civil security, and
could conduct support area operations. The objective is to provide a safe and secure environment to create
conditions for political, economic, and humanitarian activities to succeed. Civil security involves
protecting individuals, infrastructure, and institutions from external and internal threats. Ideally, Army
forces defeat external threats posed by enemy forces that can attack population centers. Simultaneously,
they assist HN police and security elements as the HN maintains internal security against criminals and
small, hostile groups. In some situations, there is no adequate HN capability for civil security and Army
forces may provide most of it while developing HN capabilities. Civil security is required for the other
stability tasks to be effective. The MEB may be required to secure and account for conventional or CBRNE
weapons and materials before appropriate EOD or technical escort units render safe if required/disposal/or
preparation/transport for subsequent disposition. Responsibility is transferred to competent and legitimate
local authorities when they can perform the task. Stability subordinate tasks may include—
z Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other agreements.
z Determine disposition of constitution and national armed and intelligence services.
z Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
z Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
z Support identification programs.
z Protect reconstruction and stabilization personnel and facilities.
z Clear unexploded ordnance.
8-7. MEB key supporting tasks may include coordinating interface/liaison between U.S. military forces
and local authorities/NGOs, conducting area security operations, planning HN police building operations,
and planning security operations.
Civil Control
8-8. The MEB provides major capabilities through MANSPT operations to establish civil control. The
objectives of civil control are to establish civil administration and provide for social reconciliation. Civil
control regulates selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups. This control reduces risk to
individuals or groups and promotes security. Civil control channels the population’s activities to allow the
establishment of security and essential services. Civil control may be required while coexisting with a
military force conducting operations. The MEB may use MP, engineer, CBRN, CA units, or a combat force
to impose martial law, impose curfews, conduct information engagement, or close borders. Stability
subordinate tasks may include—
z Establish public order and safety.
z Establish interim criminal justice system.
z Support law enforcement and police reform.
z Support judicial reform.
z Support property dispute resolution processes.
z Support legal system reform.
z Support human rights initiatives.
z Support corrections reform.
z Support war crimes courts and tribunals.
z Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.
8-9. MEB key supporting tasks may include planning populace and resource control operations, advising
commanders of obligation to civilian population, providing EOD support to weapons storage site
inspection, planning civil disturbance operations, and a variety of MP tasks.
Support to Governance
8-12. The MEB has no special capabilities to support governance. The short-term objective may be to
establish a military government, support an interim or HN government and to create an environment
conducive to stable governance. The objective is to support legitimate authorities, assess formal and
informal power arrangements, encourage dialogue among leaders, and work with local leaders in
coordination with interagency objectives. The MEB can help establish conditions that enable interagency
and HN actions to succeed. This could include providing military governance on a temporary basis to
include societal control functions that include regulation of public activity, rule of law, taxation,
maintenance of security, and essential services, and normalizing means of succession of power. The MEB
could establish security and control, conduct MANSPT operations, and conduct information engagement to
provide a foundation for transitioning authority to other government or intergovernmental agencies and
eventually to the HN. Stability subordinate tasks may include—
z Support transitional administrations.
z Support development of local governance.
z Support anticorruption initiatives.
z Support elections.
8-24. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces focus affect civilians in
order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting stable peace. As commanders and their staffs
frame an operation, they determine an appropriate combination of stability mechanisms to contend with the
civil population and civil considerations required for successful operations. The situation may require a
combination of defeat (dislocation, isolation, destruction, and disintegration) and stability mechanisms.
This sets in motion the process that will ultimately create the conditions that define the desired end state.
(See FM 3-0.) The four stability mechanisms are—
z Compel.
z Control.
z Influence.
z Support.
8-25. CA operations are fundamental to executing stability tasks. CA operations are those activities that
establish and maintain relations among U.S. military forces, HN, NGOs, DOS agencies, other U.S.
governmental agencies, and the civilian populace. CA units provide commanders with the means to shape
their OE with regard to these significant factors and to synchronize their actions with those of the military
force. Additionally, CA units perform important liaison functions between the military force and the local
civil authorities, international organizations, and NGOs. The MEB plans CA operations nested within the
use of stability mechanisms to attain conditions. (See FM 3-05.40.)
8-26. Planning considerations and necessary interagency coordination for stability operations are discussed
in FM 3-0. The stages of stability operations and the necessary interaction with other agencies are further
discussed in detail in FM 3-07. Within its AO the MEB must—
z Understand the drivers of conflict.
z Coordinate actions with other agencies.
z Enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of the HN.
z Empower at the lowest feasible levels.
z Project a credible force.
z Act decisively to prevent escalation.
z Apply force selectively and discriminately.
z Provide essential support to the largest number of people with focus on the most vulnerable.
z Collaborate on measures of effectiveness.
z Hand over to civilian agencies as soon as possible.
z Conduct all operations in as transparent a manner as possible.
z Be flexible and adaptable.
8-27. Army tactical tasks for stability are those tasks that must be performed to establish or maintain order
when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing these tasks can help secure a lasting peace and
facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces. (See FM 3-0 and FM 3-07.)
8-28. Stability operations require the absence of major threats to friendly forces and the populace. The
MEB must plan to secure critical infrastructure and populated areas, and provide essential services to
minimize and relieve civilian suffering. Plan to minimize the effects of combat on the populace. As civil
security is established, the force returns territory to civil authorities’ control, as they are prepared to accept
control. Transitions to civil authority require the coordination and integration of civilian organizations and
military efforts. Unified action is crucial.
8-29. To ensure a unified effort, MEB commanders and their staff coordinate plans and actions with their
higher headquarters and adjacent units, and with government and NGOs present in the AO. Use of liaison
officers is vital for this requirement. The MEB may work with a variety of organizations and CA will be
critical to the success of its operations. (JP 3-57, JP 3-57.1, FM 3-05.40, and FM 3-05.401 contain doctrine
CA.)
8-30. The MEB augments its communications abilities to effect long-range communications, access to
civilian telephones and data links, and proper liaison with necessary organizations. Commanders and their
staff consider equipment compatibility, data encryption, information sharing, and security measures when
working with SOF, joint forces, and multinational forces.
8-31. Stability operations involve numerous legal, religious, and cultural issues. The MEB Chaplain, CA,
brigade judge advocate (BJA), and psychological operations (PSYOP) staff will play key roles in the
planning and execution of stability operations in these areas. All staff members must incorporate these
considerations in their planning and running estimates as they apply to each staff section. Legal
implications will be largely the staff focus of the BJA and the religious and culture implications will
typically be the focus of the Chaplain, CA officer, and PSYOP officer.
8-32. Stability operations are normally long-term endeavors requiring the commitment of forces and
resources to achieve a lasting success. To account for this, the commander must develop a vision for the
operation from initiation to the desired end state. The commander must guard against a tendency to expand
the stated mission in an effort to accomplish more than is appropriate. The commander and staff should not
expand their mission unless the accomplishment of additional tasks is critical to accomplishing the stated
mission and achieving the desired end state.
8-33. Commanders and their staff analyze the current political and socioeconomic situation in the AO, the
friendly situation, and the higher headquarters’ order to determine the MEB’s mission and requirements.
Developing and articulating a desired end state in terms of the military and political socioeconomic
conditions that have the greatest potential for lasting stability in the area is a commander’s responsibility.
For commanders of the MEB, much of this guidance will typically be provided by a higher headquarters.
Commanders and their staff determine the required sequence of tasks and objectives that must be
accomplished to meet the end state. The most critical tasks that normally provide at least a temporary
suspension of violence, suffering, and chaos are undertaken immediately. These often include actions that
separate the warring factions, restore basic security, and provide immediate relief to suffering people.
Other critical actions include moving into the AO and the establishment of a base of operation and
sustainment base for the MEB. As the immediate situation stabilizes, follow-on actions are taken to restore
order, assist local governments, assist in repairing infrastructure, remove weapons, disarm factions, and
enforce specified military aspects of political agreements. The commander and staff assign objectives and
AOs to subordinate forces. They allocate forces and establish control measures for subordinate forces to
accomplish their missions.
8-34. To maintain focus during this type of long-term operation, it is vital that commanders and their staff
develop a concept of the operation that establishes objectives and time lines that meet the desired end state.
The concept should cover the entire duration of the operation from deployment to the end state, defining
how the MEB will accomplish its assigned mission. Fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and subsequent
OPORDs are used to control execution of each phase of operation and various missions as required.
Fires
8-37. Although fire support planning for stability operations is the same as for traditional MCO, there will
likely be additional limitations or restrictions on the use of certain indirect fire assets. The ROE and
munitions restrictions may be established to decrease fratricide and prevent collateral damage.
8-38. MEB commanders integrate fire support into their tactical plans in accordance with the ROE, and
any restrictions imposed within the AO (such as no-fire or restrictive fire areas, presence of
noncombatants). Special considerations include—
z Procedures for the rapid clearance of fires (more complex due to avoidance of collateral damage
and fratricide of noncombatants).
z Close communication and coordination with host country officials.
Information Engagement
8-39. Information engagement in stability operations is critical to inform U.S. and friendly audiences and
to influence foreign audiences. (See FM 3-0 and FM 3-07.) Successful information engagement helps to
give MEB commanders the ability to affect the perception of the local population, belligerent factions, and
local leaders, and to accomplish their missions. The MEB may have PSYOP, CA, and PA elements
attached, OPCON, or otherwise operating in support of the MEB. As the staff coordinates and
synchronizes their employment, they must consider the ROE, the order from higher headquarters, and the
commander’s intent. If these elements are operating in the MEB AO, the MEB could be responsible for
providing security for them. Sources of information used by the MEB include—
z Neutral parties.
z Former warring factions.
z Civilian populace.
z Other agencies working in the AO.
z Media and information passed from organic and nonorganic assets.
8-40. The MEB commander must be aware of theater of operations positions and interests and the effects
of events on the perceptions of Soldiers, opponents, and the population in general. The commander must
understand the positions of and information environments created by—
z Neutral parties.
z Warring or formerly warring factions.
z The population and its major segments.
z Other agencies working in the AO.
z Media.
z Information gathered by elements of the MEB.
Sustainment
8-41. The MEB’s ability to sustain itself in the AO depends on theater maturity, the sustainment structure,
and the time flow of forces. Refugees, an inadequate infrastructure, and demands by the HN and
multinational partners can make logistical support complex. Engineering support plays a critical role in
delivering sustainment by enhancing its capabilities. General principles to consider when planning
sustainment for stability operations include—
z Ability to implement logistical support in any stability operations area.
z Ability of the MEB to provide its own support.
z Ability of higher headquarters to provide support.
z Availability of local supplies, facilities, utilities, services, and transportation support systems by
contract or local purchase.
z Availability of local facilities such as LOCs, ports, airfields, and communications systems.
z Local capabilities for self-support to facilitate the eventual transfer of responsibilities to the
supported nation for development or improvement.
z Availability of resources.
8-42. The primary sustainment challenges of stability operations are to anticipate needs and to integrate
assigned units and sources of supply into the operation. Informational needs include—
z Resources available in the AO.
z Status of critical supply items and repair jobs.
z Nature and condition of the infrastructure.
Contracting
8-46. Contracting can be an effective force multiplier and should be used to augment existing sustainment
capabilities. Weak logistical infrastructures in the AO may make it necessary to contract some supplies and
services. If he knows that contracting may be required, the MEB commander obtains guidance from higher
headquarters concerning contracting during the initial planning stages. Hostilities can cause interruptions in
the delivery of any contracted services, such as food and water. For this reason, the MEB must be prepared
to sustain itself, attached forces, supporting forces, and the local populace for limited periods of time. A
good plan anticipates large consumption rates of supplies in classes I, III, IV, and VIII and provides for
reserve stockage of nonperishables. The MEB S-4 and the engineer coordinator are typically the members
of the MEB staff to coordinate contracting efforts.
PREPARE
8-47. The MEB may conduct stability operations in its own AO or in support of other AOs within the
larger AO of the unit it is supporting. When deploying from home station the typical sequence for an MEB
committed to conducting stability operations will generally follow this sequence—
z Deploy and move into the AO.
z Conduct stability operations.
z Terminate operations and redeploy.
EXECUTE
coordinated small-scale operations over great distances quickly and securely. Subordinate units may
conduct a wide range of tasks to support the stability subordinate tasks including, but not limited to,—
z Battalion level and below offensive tasks such as attacks, search and attack, and ambushes.
z Defensive tasks such as area defense.
z Cordon and search operations.
z Humanitarian assistance.
z Environmental assistance which may include environmental clean-up or environmental services.
z Security operations such as area security or convoy escort missions.
z Reconnaissance operations.
z Controlling civil disturbances.
8-59. Due to the multiple and unique demands of these operations, MEB forces must remain responsive
and flexible. Task organization of units may change many times during the course of the operation. The
MEB must ensure adequate support for its subordinate units and take active measures to create the
conditions for its subordinates to succeed. The MEB focuses the majority of its efforts towards
coordinating and supporting subordinate’s actions, assigning subordinate objectives and responsibilities
that support the concept of operations, and controlling all efforts to ensure they are working towards the
brigade’s overall objectives.
ASSESS
8-64. The MEB must continually assess the OE to maintain SU. Running estimates are continuously
updated to ensure the commander is provided with accurate data and staff assessments to make necessary
decisions. Assessing stability operations requires a long-range horizon, coordinated short-term goals, and
great flexibility to include “out of the box” thinking. The MEB must consider their assessments and
variances from planning goals and variances from the assessments provided by supported civil authorities.
The MEB has the ability to assess infrastructure, security requirements, mobility requirements, HN police
capabilities, I/R requirements, general engineering requirements, and CBRNE materials. (See FM 3-07 and
FM 7-15 for possible MOEs and MOPs related to stability operations.)
8-65. The MEB CA staff can provide detailed on the ground assessments to validate IPB and assess
progress. Every Soldier must be trained and able to collect and report information of value. (See FM 3-07
for information on the role of CA in stability operations.
SUSTAINMENT
8-71. With its organic BSB the MEB has the baseline ability to integrate its sustainment in austere and
undeveloped areas. This baseline ability allows it to rapidly accept other augmentation to include additional
sustainment organizations.
COMMUNICATIONS
8-72. With its organic signal network support company the MEB can communicate with most
organizations. With augmentation, it can interface with and support civil communications. The MEB uses
its organic liaison teams to affect interagency coordination.
EMPLOYMENT EXAMPLE
8-76. One example of an MEB conducting stability operations is shown in figure 8-2. In this example, the
MEB is assigned AO Smith primarily to conduct stability operations within. The stability operations
require the MEB to establish civil security, civil control, and restore essential services. The MEB is task-
organized with a chemical, engineer, and MP battalion, and a CA and EOD company. Based on METT-TC,
the MEB creates three battalion TFs task-organized based on the primary tasks within their assigned
boundaries. The MP TF has responsibility for the MSR RED and construction of ASR BLUE to improve
movement within the AO and bypass the built up area. Attachments to the MP TF include an engineer
company and a CA team and it has detached a company and a platoon. The chemical battalion TF has
TIC/TIM concerns and responsibility for the smaller built up area. Attachments to the chemical battalion
TF include an MP platoon, and a CA team. The engineer TF has responsibility for the largest built up area,
general engineering support to the BSB, and the largest area of demand to restore essential services.
Attachments to the engineer TF include an MP company and a CA team and it has detached a company.
The MEB and CA headquarters are collocated within the largest built up area to coordinate with and assist
the regional civil authority. The MEB locates the BSA within a partially destroyed existing base near the
built up area due to sources of local supplies and access to the road connecting to MSR RED.
PLANNING
9-1. The sustainment warfighting function is defined as the related tasks and systems that provide support
and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (FM 3-0).
Sustainment encompasses the sub-functions of logistics, personnel services, AHS support, and I/R
operations required to maintain operations for mission accomplishment. Logistics is the science of
planning, preparing, executing, and assessing movement and maintenance of forces. Personnel services are
those sustaining functions related to Soldier’s welfare, readiness, and quality of life. AHS support consists
of all measures taken by commanders, leaders, individual Service members, and the military health system
to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental and physical well-being of Service members.
9-2. The MEB staff synchronizes operations across all six warfighting functions to generate and maintain
combat power. It plans tactical logistics. The sustainment warfighting function is synchronized with the
higher echelon staff and supporting sustainment brigade. An MCT supporting the AO and other
sustainment brigade assets may be located in the MEB brigade area. If required, the MEB will coordinate
directly with the contracting support brigade (CSB) for contingency contacting. (See FM 100-10-2)
9-3. The MEB S-4, S-1, MEB brigade surgeon, and chaplain are the principal sustainment planners in the
MEB. The BSB is the principal sustainment executer. Logistics synchronization for the brigade is done
between the primary staff sections and the BSB support operations section. The MEB commander
designates who will oversee logistics synchronization for the brigade. Traditionally this has been the XO.
However, the MEB commander may elect to use the DCO for that mission while the executive officer
focuses on other staff planning, integration, and synchronization functions in the main CP. The MEB
obtains the logistics preparation of the theater information/products from the supporting sustainment
brigade and the higher echelon headquarters concept of operations and integrates this with their IPB. The
S-4, S-1, and BSB support operations officer maintain a continuous sustainment estimate during all
operations. They use the logistics estimate to determine sustainment capabilities, anticipate support
requirements, identify and resolve shortfalls, and develop support plans. They integrate into all planning
what is needed to develop and synchronize sustainment with maneuver and fire plans. Sustainment
commanders and planners must thoroughly understand the mission, tactical plans, and the MEB
commander's intent.
PLANNING OVERVIEW
9-6. Logistics planners must understand the MEB’s current and projected sustainment capabilities. They
use information collected from personnel and logistics reports and operational reports to determine the
personnel, equipment, and supply status of each unit within the MEB. They consider the disposition and
condition of all supporting sustainment units and individual unit-level capabilities. They analyze this data
and the current situation to determine the MEB’s logistical capabilities and limitations.
9-7. Logistics planners must anticipate and understand support requirements of a tactical plan or COA.
The S-1, S-4, and the BSB commander/BSB support operations officer analyze all COAs and
modifications to current plans. They assess their sustainment feasibility, identify support requirements, and
determine requirements for synchronization. The S-1 and S-4, like the commander, must visualize how the
battle will unfold to determine critical requirements for each sustainment function. They logically consider
the requirements for each sustainment function during the operational phases of before (prior to
commitment), during (commitment to battle), and after (future missions). They analyze each COA/plan and
consider the following:
z Type and duration of the operation.
z Task organization, tasks, and sustainment requirements of subordinate forces.
z Medical and maintenance profile of units to be assigned or attached.
z Ramifications of tactical operations such as gap (river) crossings, tactical pauses, long
movements, preparatory fires, or defenses.
z Need for special equipment, supplies, or service.
z Requirements to separate, disassemble, configure, uncrate, or transload supplies above normal
requirements.
z Requirements for reconstitution.
z Required varieties and quantities of all classes of supplies (especially class III, V, and IX).
z Requirements for support of reconnaissance forces, security operations, or deception efforts.
z Need for class IV/V obstacle material.
them to available capabilities. They identify potential shortfalls then take or recommend actions to
eliminate or reduce their effect on the operation.
9-11. When a logistics shortfall is identified, the S-1, S-4, MEB surgeon, chaplain, and BSB support
operations officer take every action available to eliminate or reduce its effect. They must understand its
potential impact on the force, the risk it presents to mission accomplishment, its duration, and which
requirement exceeded the unit’s capabilities. They analyze the shortfall to determine its cause such as battle
losses, supply availability, resource availability (equipment, man-hours), or distribution shortfall. They
consider the following actions to resolve a shortfall:
z Shifting supplies or assets by phase of the operation.
z Requesting support or additional assets from higher headquarters.
z Using alternative distribution methods.
z Considering the use of host nation support.
z Considering pre-positioning supplies or attaching additional sustainment capabilities to
subordinate forces.
z Modifying the COA or plan.
9-12. Based on the logistics estimate, the S-4, MEB surgeon, chaplain, and BSB support operations officer
develop support plans. The overall sustainment plan is briefly described in the concept of support. The
concept of support provides all commanders and staffs a general understanding of the commander’s
priorities and how the operation will be logistically supported. Detailed sustainment plans are outlined in a
logistics annex to the MEB’s OPORD or as part of a FRAGO. BSB commanders also issue an OPORD to
all units under their control. BSB commanders in conjunction with the S-4 and executive officer closely
monitor the implementation of the sustainment plan. They adjust sustainment operations, or shift resources
to account for changing situations, changes in priorities (such as shifting the main effort) or to replace lost
sustainment capabilities.
9-13. The MEB staff plans for sustainment of a frequently changing task organization with augmentation
from other Army, joint, interagency, and multinational forces. Attachments to the MEB should arrive with
their appropriate sustainment capability. When a company, team, or detachment is attached to the MEB,
the S-4 integrates their sustainment augmentation pieces into the MEB support system. The S-4 must
clearly state who will provide medical, maintenance, and recovery services, and provide support for class
III, V, and IX supplies. When receiving attachments, sustainment planners require some basic information
from the sending unit’s S-4 to anticipate how to develop a synchronized concept of support. When the unit
is detached, the MEB assists forwarding any on-hand supplies or equipment to the gaining unit. Some
considerations are—
z Number and type of vehicles, personnel by specialty, and weapons systems.
z Current status and/or strength.
z Organic medical and maintenance capabilities.
z When attachment is effective and for how long.
z What support assets are coming with each attachment to the MEB.
z When and where linkup will occur, and who is responsible for linkup.
OPERATIONS
LOGISTICS
9-14. Logistics is primarily the responsibility of the MEB S-4 and provided primarily by the MEB’s
organic BSB. Logistics includes maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution,
contracting and general engineering. General engineering and I/R are primarily planned by the S-3 staff
and not discussed in this chapter. Field services will be discussed further and include mortuary affairs,
shower, laundry and light textile repair, and water purification. Contracting is discussed in greater detail
since much of this information is new or emerging doctrine.
FIELD SERVICES
9-15. The MEB is dependent on augmentation for collection, processing and evacuation. A mortuary
affairs team from the theater sustainment brigade provides mortuary services support to the MEB. The
team operates from the BSA and is responsible for processing remains. The team has no transportation
capabilities and coordinates with the support operations officer for evacuation back to the theater mortuary
evacuation point. Internal to the MEB, handling teams are pre-designated at the unit level. It is the unit’s
responsibility to evacuate remains to the BSA.
9-16. There is no organic laundry or bath capability in the MEB. Support must be coordinated with the
sustainment brigade.
9-17. The BSB has the organic capability to produce, store and transport purified water to meet the MEB’s
support requirements.
Overview
9-18. Acquisition, logistic, and technology (ALT) support consists of a myriad of unique support functions
on the modern battlefield to include rapid equipment fielding support, technical equipment support,
prepositioned stock support, and contracting support. Most of this ALT support is conducted through two
colonel (O-6) level (United States Army Materiel Command [USAMC]) units—the Army field support
brigade (AFSB) and the CSB. AFSB and CSB ALT support to the MEB will normally be executed in a GS
manner under the C2 of the theater sustainment command (TSC) or expeditionary support command
(ESC).
z System support contracts are prearranged contracts by the USAMC LCMCs and separate ASA
(ALT) PEO and project manager offices. Supported systems include, but are not limited to,
newly fielded weapon systems, C2 infrastructure, such as the ABCS and STAMIS, and
communications equipment. System contractors, made up of U.S. citizens, provide support in
garrison and may deploy with the force to both training and real-world operations. They may
provide either temporary support during the initial fielding of a system, called interim contracted
support, or long-term support for selected materiel systems, often referred to as contractor
logistic support. The MEB does not normally have a significant role to play in planning or
coordinating system support contracts other than coordinating and executing support of system
support contract related personnel.
9-25. For the MEB, the major challenge is ensuring theater support and external contract support
(primarily LOGCAP related support) actions are properly incorporated and synchronized with the overall
MEB support effort. It is imperative the MEB S-4 and its BSB support operations officer (SPO) work
closely work with the TSC/ESC SPO, the ARFOR G-4, the CSB and the supporting Team LOGCAP-
Forward. It is also important to understand that MEBs do not have any dedicated contingency
contracting officers on their staff and that this support will be provided on a GS basis through the
supporting CSB. Because of these new modular force contracting support arrangements, it is imperative the
MEB S-4 and BSB SPO staff be trained on their roles in the operational contract support planning and
execution process as described below:
z Contract planning. The sustainment brigade must to be prepared to develop “acquisition
ready” requirement packets for submission to the supporting contracting activity. The packets
must include a detailed performance work statement (PWS) (sometimes referred to as a
statement of work [SOW]) for service requirements or detail item description(s)/capability for a
commodity requirement. In addition to the PWS, packets must include an independent cost
estimate for the item or service required along with an O-6 level and resource manager staff
approved DA Form 3953, (Purchase Request and Equipment). Depending upon local ARFOR
or joint force command policies, certain items or specific dollar amount requests may require
formal acquisition review board packet review.
z Contract management. One of the most important MEB staff tasks is to nominate and track
contract officer representatives (CORs) (sometimes referred to as contract officer technical
representatives [COTRs]) for every service contract and a receiving official for all supply
contracts. Quality COR and receiving official support is key to ensuring contractors provide the
service or item according to the contract. The MEB must also manage funding for each contract
and request funds in advance of depletion of current funds or all contract work will stop until
adequate funds are available.
z Contract close out. The MEB is responsible for completing receiving reports, certifying that
contracted goods or services were received by the Army, and submitting the receiving report to
the contracting officer so the contract can be closed out and the contractor paid.
PERSONNEL SERVICES
9-26. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and
sustain personnel. Personnel services are an integral part of unit readiness. The MEB S-1 is the staff officer
responsible for personnel services. MEB capabilities include human resources support, legal support, and
religious support.
9-27. Human resources (HR) support is an important component of sustainment. The MEB S-1 is
responsible for providing or coordinating the operational and tactical level HR support that sustains the
combat potential of the force, and the morale and welfare of Soldiers.
9-28. HR activities are divided into three categories—manning the force, personnel services, and personnel
support. During the early phases of operations, HR support for the MEB focuses on the critical tasks of
strength management, casualty operations, and replacement operations. Other HR key tasks will be
completed via reachback operations or as the situation allows.
Personnel Support
9-35. The third element of HR is personnel support. It includes postal operations management; morale,
welfare, and recreation; and community support. The MEB has no unique capabilities in these areas.
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
9-36. The MEB has no special financial management capability. The MEB S-1 coordinates for support
from mobile finance teams. Finance organizations provide support to the MEB units and individual
Soldiers on an area basis. During deployments, mobile teams from corps-level finance organizations
provide support to forward units. A finance battalion typically supports a division, with detachments
providing financial management services as required.
LEGAL SUPPORT
9-37. The brigade legal section (BLS) provides and supervises legal support to MEB C2, sustainment, and
support operations. The BLS provides and coordinates all legal support for the MEB. Paralegal Soldiers in
the MEB and subordinate battalions provide paraprofessional and ministerial support for legal actions. The
U.S. Army Trial Judiciary and U.S. Army Trial Defense Service are independent organizations that provide
military judge and trial defense services to the MEB.
RELIGIOUS SUPPORT
9-38. The MEB chaplain is the staff officer responsible for implementing the commander’s religious
support program. Included in this program are worship opportunities; administration of sacraments; rites
and ordinances; pastoral care and counseling; religious education; ministry to casualties to include support
of combat operational stress reaction casualty treatment; and development and management of the unit
ministry team (UMT). The chaplain advises the commander and staff on matters of morals, morale as
affected by religion, the impact of local religion on the military mission, and the ethical impact of
command decisions. The UMT is composed of a chaplain and one enlisted chaplain assistant. The chaplain
assistant is an active member of the NCO support channel. The assistant assesses the Soldiers and other
authorized personnel’s well being that can affect the unit’s fighting spirit. (See AR 165-1 and FM 1-05.)
z Monitoring medical regulating and patient tracking operations for MEB personnel. (See
FM 4-02.2.)
z Determining MEB training requirements for first aid and for maintaining wellness of the
command.
z Ensuring field medical records are maintained on each Soldier assigned to the TSC at their
primary care medical treatment facility per AR 40-66 and FM 4-02.4.
z Establishing, in coordination with the chain of command, and promulgating a plan to ensure
individual informed consent is established before administering investigational new drugs as
described in Executive Order 13139.
z Recommending disposition instructions for captured enemy medical supplies and equipment.
(Refer to FM 4-02 for additional information on the Geneva Conventions).
z Submitting to higher headquarters those recommendations on medical problems/conditions that
require research and development.
z Coordinating, and synchronizing—
Health education and combat lifesaver training for the MEB.
Mass casualty plan developed by the S-3.
Medical care of EPWs, detainees, and civilians in the MEB’s operations area.
Treatment of sick, injured, or wounded Soldiers.
z Performing medical evacuation, including use of both the Army’s dedicated MEDEVAC
platforms (air and ground).
z Coordinating medical logistics including class VIII resupply, blood management, and medical
maintenance.
z Creating health-related reports and battlefield statistics.
z Collecting and analyzing operational data for on-the-spot adjustments in the medical support
structure and for use in postoperations combat and materiel development studies.
z Providing Army Health System support for stability and civil support operations.
Health Threat
9-45. The health threat to Soldiers comes from enemy action and environmental situations. Effective and
timely FHP initiatives are essential factors in sustaining combat power during continuous operations. The
MEB's first line of protection is the use of preventive medicine measures and the units' field sanitation
teams. For additional support, the MEB's subordinate units coordinate through their medical treatment team
or the BSS for PVNTMED and COSC support. The PVNTMED and mental health elements from the
MEDBDE provide DS as required that includes—
z Preventive medicine advice and consultation in the areas of disease and nonbattle injury,
environmental sanitation, epidemiology, entomology, medical surveillance, limited sanitary
engineering services, and pest management. See FM 4-02.17 for definitive information on
PVNTMED.
z Training and advice in the promotion of positive combat and operational stress behaviors; the
mental health element can provide early identification, handling, and management of
misconduct stress behavior and Soldiers with combat and operational stress reactions. It assists
and counsels personnel with personal, behavioral, or psychological problems and may refer
suspected neuropsychiatric cases for evaluation. (See FM 4-02.51, FM 6-22.5 and FM 22-51 for
definitive information on COSC.)
Since there is no predecessor and little awareness of the MEB structure, this appendix
provides the organizational and manning charts for the organic elements of the MEB
as described in chapter 2. The manning charts for the MEB headquarters company,
BSB, and NSC are based upon unit reference sheet decisions concerning duty title or
position, rank, and military occupational skill (MOS).
Note. There are differences between these generic unit manning charts and the specific manning
provided to each MEB in their TOE or MTOE. This information is provided to give a general
understanding of the breadth and depth of manning for this new unit. Use this web site to see
TOEs, MTOEs, and TDAs: <https://webtaads.belvoir.army.mil/usafmsa/>.
INTRODUCTION
A-1. The manning charts found in this appendix relate directly to the organizational charts in chapter 2.
Chapter 2 provides additional details on the structures of all organic MEB organizations. Note the 01C00
MOS coding that specifies certain positions as being reserved for only CBRN, engineer, or MP personnel.
MEB HHC
A-2. Tables A-1 through A-21, pages A-1 through A-7, are MEB HHC manning charts.
DISTRIBUTION COMPANY
A-5. Tables A-44 through A-53 and pages A-12 through A-15 are distribution company manning charts.
MEB commanders organize their C2 systems discussed in chapter 3 into CPs for
optimum use (to include their staffing, layouts, and INFOSYS) based on the factors
of METT-TC. This appendix provides solutions for the MEB CPs and provides
examples of potential CP layouts using cells and staff sections. See FM 3-90, FMI
5-0.1, and FM 6-0 for additional possibilities and a discussion of how to optimize CP
performance.
COMMAND POST
B-1. The MEB commander considers effectiveness and survivability factors when organizing CPs. (See
FMI 5-0.1.) Normally, the MEB will establish a main CP and may also choose to establish a TAC CP.
Additionally, the brigade may use command groups (away from the main or TAC CPs) or an early-entry
command post (ECCP) as ad hoc or temporary CPs. (See chapter 2.) The MEB commander may choose to
use the staff sections, S1 through S6, align with the modular division or supported headquarters cell or
directorate organization, or use a mix of staff sections and cell as shown in the example below. FMI 5-0.1
should be the primary reference for considerations in establishing MEB CPs. It provides doctrine for the
overall function of each functional and integrating cell. It also describes the roles, functions, and
relationships between each type of CP. FMI 5-01 discusses the cells within a CP as functional cells
(intelligence; movement and maneuver; fire support; protection; sustainment; and command, control,
communications, and computer operations) and integrating cells (current operations, future operations, and
plans). Any staff member and C2 capability augmentation to the MEB must be integrated into the various
CPs.
B-2. CPs help commanders control operations by coordinating and synchronizing the warfighting
functions. Activities common to all CPs include—
z Maintaining running estimates and the common operating picture. (See FMI 5-0.1.)
z Integrating the information superiority contributors—the Army information tasks, ISR,
knowledge management, and information management. (See FM 3-0.)
z Developing and disseminating orders. (See FM 5-0.)
z Controlling operations. (See FMI 5-0.1.)
z Assessing operations. (See FMI 5-0.1.)
z Coordinating with higher, lower, and adjacent units.
z Administering the CP to include—
Displacing.
Providing security.
Organizing for operations
Maintaining continuity of operations.
B-3. In most instances, both the TAC CP and main CP must be operational to support C2 over extended
distances. If the MEB is only conducting operations in the support AO then they might be able to operate
with only the main CP and have the TAC CP or BSB CP prepared as an alternate CP to make the C2
system more survivable. All CP initial locations and subsequent locations must be integrated into the
MEB’s communication plan to ensure continuous connectivity is maintained. Only the main CP is
discussed in more detail here.
B-4. The main CP is the commander’s principal C2 facility. It is positioned to maintain communications
with subordinate units and control MEB operations. Considerations for positioning the main CP include—
z Where the enemy can least affect the main CP operations.
z Where the main CP can achieve the best communications (digital and voice).
z Where the main CP can control operations best.
B-5. When assigned an AO, the MEB main CP can locate in and control one of the bases. If the MEB is
located in another unit’s AO then that unit will locate the MEB CP. Staffs develop a plan that addresses
each CPs initial and subsequent position.
CP EQUIPMENT
B-6. See the MTOE for each MEB. The major equipment used to establish the CPs is the standard
integrated command post system (SICPS). SICPS is the CP facility systems to support digitized units.
SICPS provides the flexibility, commonality, and operational capabilities needed to enhance unit mobility
and integrate ABCS and associated communication and networking equipment. SICPS can serve as a
stand-alone CP facility or as an integrated element in a larger CP facility.
B-7. The SICPS has seven CP variants (not all will be organic to the MEB headquarters, some may come
from augmentation units), including tracked and wheeled vehicle mounted vans, tents, and hard shelters.
The MEB collocates staff sections and supporting communications systems to facilitate both face-to-face
interaction and digital data exchange. The BSB CP is not shown in the MEB CP examples because they
normally would not be collocated with the MEB main CP. The NSC CP is also not shown in the examples.
B-8. The CP's physical setup must facilitate communication and analysis of information, as well as
accommodate computer hardwire requirements. Within the CP, information is processed at two locations—
individual workstations and the combat information center (CIC). The focus of the individual workstation
is the individual automated system and the specific warfighting function it supports. At the individual
workstations, staff members input and monitor data within their sphere of responsibility. They also
accesses data posted to web pages and shared files by other staff sections in the LAN and wide area
network to carry out their warfighting function and duties. The focus of the CIC is integrated battle
monitoring and decisionmaking. It is a special location within the CP for the display of information. The
CIC is the central area for viewing information in order for commanders and their staff to maintain SU.
The large screen display (LSD) accomplishes this, and is the only area in the CP where all key automated
system data can be viewed simultaneously. It is therefore the place where battlefield vision is supported
best. Commanders use the CIC to illustrate their guidance and with their staff's assistance, to develop and
maintain the COP.
B-9. CICs vary by unit MTOE. However, the typical CIC has two LSDs, each capable of displaying nine
sub-screens. Each sub-screen can display the COP and can be configured in various ways to best support
the commander’s information display preferences. The more sub-screens used, the lower the resolution of
the image. For this reason, each LSD screen should use no more than four sub-screens.
B-10. The CP examples show the MEB C2 system organized in seven SICPS tents. It also displays
vehicles/shelters with some of the C2 INFOSYS positioned both inside and outside of the tents. The MEB
also uses a large number of items not discussed here to establish the CPs. Some of these include barrier
materials, access control facilities, generators, lights, heaters, and cables. The MEB could establish some
CPs in fixed facilities if available and desirable.
B-13. Figure B-2, page B-4, highlights the TAC CP and a recommended option for its layout using its
single SICPS. In this option, the DCO has a position in the TAC CP. A combat service support automated
information system interface (CAISI) bridge is necessary for the TAC CP.
B-14. Figure B-3 highlights the current operations cell #1, the SICPS location identified for the MEB
commander and DCO when they are at the main CP and includes a portion of the complete operations cell
(primarily the plans section). A position is also allocated for the DCO in the TAC CP (figure B-2). In this
option, the XO has a position in the current operations cell #1. The LSD in this cell is one of two in the
headquarters.
B-15. Figure B-4, page B-6, highlights the remainder of the current operations cell not shown in figure B-
3. Included in this SICPS are the engineer operations cell, CBRNE operations cell, MP operations cell,
civil-military plans and operations, plans section, and the liaison teams.
B-16. Figure B-5 highlights the area operations section. This is where the second LSD is positioned in this
example to facilitate the responsibilities associated with conducting support area operations.
B-17. Figure B-6, page B-8, highlights the intelligence cell. It includes not only the intelligence cell but
also other staff (the public affairs section, brigade legal section, and brigade unit ministry team) that has
been included in the lower half of this SICPS but may need to be positioned in a different SICPS if there is
room.
B-18. Figure B-7 highlights the fires cell. This SICPS includes the fires cell, airspace management section,
geospatial portion of the engineer operations cell, brigade surgeon section and medical treatment team (the
surgeon section and medical treatment team should usually be in the sustainment cell if there is room for
them). Note the three shelters that are linked to this SICPS.
B-19. Figure B-8, page B-10, highlights the sustainment cell. This SCIPS includes the personnel section
and the logistics section. The CAISI bridge for the main CP is located in this SICPS.
B-20. Figure B-9 highlights the command, control, communication, and computer operations cell and the
communications section. Note the two shelters that are linked to this SICPS.
B-21. Figure B-10, page B-12, highlights the company headquarters tent. This tent will typically be located
in proximity to the main CP. This tent is not a SICPS.
IS is the advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability
to do the same. Information systems are the equipment and facilities that collect,
process, store, display, and disseminate information. This includes computers—
hardware and software—and communications as well as policies and procedures for
their use (FM 3-0). The MEB is equipped with portions of the ABCS to help give it
significant advantages in collecting technical information, and distributing
information and intelligence rapidly. The ABCS enables commanders to rapidly gain
reliable information and therefore, achieve information dominance in their OE. The
ABCS satisfies two critical battle C2 requirements—interoperability and SA. ABCS
employs networks that are interoperable with theater, joint, and combined C2
systems.
MEB C2 SYSTEMS
C-1. The ABCS consists of 10 battlefield automated systems, which comprise the core for ABCS and
provide the capabilities that support the Military personnel’s mission needs. Each system aids in planning,
coordinating, and executing operations by providing access to a horizontally integrated C2 network and
passing of information it.
C-2. The ABCS 6.4 provides a net-centric data management capability on a dedicated server. This ABCS
version differs from earlier versions due to the incorporation of the centralized information server. The
addition of the ABCS information server (AIS) to the tactical operations center (TOC) structure enables
horizontal information exchange. Also, the AIS employs a publish and subscribe server methodology. The
AIS helps the ten ABCS systems interoperate as one thus, ABCS is called a system-of- systems
C-3. The MEB may use seven current primary C2 systems. These systems are linked to the global C2
system—Army (GCCS-A), creating seamless connectivity from brigades to corps. Five systems correspond
to five battlefield functional areas—maneuver, fire support, AMD, intelligence and electronic warfare
(IEW), and battle command sustainment support. The functional staff sections and units assigned to the
MEB will have a range of other automated systems; some will stand alone and other must be integrated
into the MEB C2 system.
C-4. Current C2 systems include—
z Maneuver control system (MCS)–usually found in the S-3 section.
z Advanced field artillery tactical data system (AFATDS)–usually found in the fires section.
z Air and missile defense workstation (AMDWS)–usually found in the area denial artillery
munitions (ADAM) section.
z Distribute Command Ground System —Army (DCGS-A)–usually found in the S-2 section.
z Battle command sustainment support system (BCS3)–usually found in the S4 section.
z Force XXI battle command brigade and below (FBCB2).
z Command post of the future (CPOF).
running estimate of evolving logistics situations, including an assessment of current combat power that is
essential for Military personnel to assess their units’ capabilities to complete their mission. The BCS3
integrates the logistics common picture as well as in-transit visibility, enabling the Military personnel to
view material in the logistics pipeline. Ultimately, BCS3 will be able to provide automated future combat
power assessments, (such as projecting changes in asset status in 24-, 48-, and 72-hour representations).
SUPPORTING C2 SYSTEMS
DIGITAL TOPOGRAPHIC SUPPORT SYSTEM
C-15. The digital topographic support system (DTSS) provides automated support for terrain mapping and
analysis, and creation of topographic products within the timeframes required by today’s Army. DTSS
provides S-3 engineer sections with the capability for geospatial data generation, collection, and
management; geospatial information processing, presentation, and analysis; and engineer survey and map
reproductions for C2 terrain visualization. DTSS manages the digital topographic database for ABCS. It
can also create annotated image maps from scanned or digital imagery.
EW electronic warfare
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below
FC fires cell
FCM Foreign Consequence Management
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP force health protection
FM field manual
FMI field manual interim
FMV full motion video
FP protection
FRAGO fragmentary order
FS fire support
FSC forward support company
FSCM fire support coordination measure
FSCOORD fire support coordinator
FSE fire support element
FSMT Forward support medical evacuation team
FSO fire support officer
G-1 assistant chief of staff, personnel
G-2 assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3 assistant chief of staff, operations
G-4 assistant chief of staff, logistics
G-5 assistant chief of staff, plans
G-6 assistant chief of staff, communication
G-7 assistant chief of staff, information engagement
G-9 assistant chief of staff, civil affairs
GCC geographical combatant commander
GCCS-A Global Command and Control System – Army
GCS ground control station
GMET general misson essential task
GRT ground receiver terminal
GS general support
HBCT heavy brigade combat team
HHC headquarters and headquarters company
HHD headquarters and headquarters detachment
HLS Homeland Security
HN host nation
HQDA Headquarters, Department of the Army
HR human resources
HSS health service support
SGT sergeant
SICPS Standard Integrated Command Post System
SID standard installation and division personnel reporting system
SIF strategic internment facility
SINCGARS single-channel ground and airborne radio
SIPR SIPRNET secure internet protocol router network
SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SMC support maintenance company
SOF special operations forces
SOP standing operating procedure
SOW statement of work
SPC specialist
SPO support operations officer
SRC special reporting code
SSG staff sergeant
STAMIS Standard Army Management Information System
STE secure terminal equipment
SU situational understanding
TAA tactical assembly area
TAC tactical
TAC CP tactical command post
TACON tactical control
TACSAT tactical satellite
TAIS Tactical Airspace Integration System
TBMCS Theater Battle Management Core System
TCF tactical combat force
TDA table of distribution and allowance
TF task force
TI tactical Internet
TIC toxic industrial chemical
TIF theater internment facility
TIFRC theater internment facility reconciliation center
TIM toxic industrial material
TLP troop-leading procedure
TM team
TO theater of operations
TOC tactical operations center
TOE table of organization and equipment
TRADOC United States Army Training and Doctrine Command
TRP target reference point
SECTION II – TERMS
antiterrorism
(DOD) Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist
acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. (JP 3-07.2) See
FM 3-07.
area damage control
(DOD, NATO) Measures taken before, during, or after hostile action or natural or manmade disasters
to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects. (JP 3-10) See FM 3-07.
area of influence
(DOD, NATO) A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing
operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control.
(JP 1-02)
area of interest
(DOD) That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto,
and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also
includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP
2-03)
area of operations
(DOD) An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas
of operations do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but
should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their
forces. (JP 3-0)
area security
A form of security operation conducted to protect friendly forces, installation routes, and actions
within a specific area. (FM 3-90)
assessment
(Army) The continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation, particularly the enemy, and
progress of an operation. (FM 3-0)
base
(DOD) 1. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. 2. An area or locality
containing installations which provide logistic or other support. 3. Home airfield or home carrier. (JP
1-02)
base cluster
(DOD) In base defense operations, a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection
and ease of command and control. (JP 3-10)
base cluster operations center
(DOD) A command and control facility that serves as the base cluster commander’s focal point for
defense and security of the base cluster. (JP 3-10)
base defense
(DOD) The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the
effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, to ensure that the maximum capacity of its
facilities is available to United States forces. (JP 1-02)
base defense operations center
(DOD) A command and control facility, with responsibilities similar to a base cluster operations
center, established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense. It
plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts. (JP 3-10)
base defense reaction forces
Forces comprised of personnel or elements of units assigned to a specific base with the responsibility
to rapidly bolster base defenses or react to an unforeseen threat. (FM 3-90)
battle command
The art and science of understanding, visualizing, directing, leading, and assessing forces to impose
the commander’s will on a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy. Battle command applies leadership
to translate decisions into actions—by synchronizing forces and warfighting functions in time, space,
and purpose—to accomplish missions. (FM 3-0)
brigade special troops battalion
A subordinate unit to a brigade combat team that provides command and control to the engineer,
military intelligence, network support (signal), and headquarters companies. Found only in the heavy
and infantry brigade combat teams.
combat power
(DOD, NATO) The total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation
can apply against the opponent at a given time. (JP 1-02) (Army) The total means of destructive,
constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit/formation can apply at a given time.
Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action. (FM 3-0)
combined arms
(Army) The synchronized and simultaneous application of the elements of combat power to achieve an
effect greater than if each element were used separately or sequentially. (FM 3-0) (Marine Corps) 1.
The full integration of combat arms in such a way that to counteract one, the enemy must become
more vulnerable to another. 2. The tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by a force to integrate
firepower and mobility to produce a desired effect upon the enemy.
command
(DOD) The authority that a commander in the Armed Forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by
virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using
available resources for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and
controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes responsibility
for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. 2. An order given by a commander;
that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. See
FM 6-0. 3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual. See FM
6-0. (JP 1)
command and control
(DOD) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed
through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures
employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations
in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1) (Army) The exercise of authority and direction by a
properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.
Commanders perform command and control functions through a command and control system.
(FM 6-0)
command and control system
(Army) The arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures, and equipment and
facilities essential for the commander to conduct operations. (FM 6-0)
command group
The commander and selected staff members who accompany commanders and enable them to exercise
command and control away from a command post. (FMI 5-0.1)
command post
(DOD, NATO) A unit’s or subunit’s headquarters where the commander and the staff perform their
activities. [Note: the Army definition ends here.] In combat, a unit’s or subunit’s headquarters is often
divided into echelons; the echelon in which the unit or subunit commander is located or from which
such commander operates is called a command post. (JP 1-02) See FM 6-0.
commander’s intent
(DOD) A concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state. It may also
include the commander’s assessment of the adversary commander’s intent and an assessment of where
and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. (JP 3-0) (Army) A clear, concise statement of
what the force must do and the conditions the force must establish with respect to the enemy, terrain,
and civil considerations that represent the desired end state. (FM 3-0)
consequence management
(DOD) Actions taken to maintain or restore essential services and manage and mitigate problems
resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. (JP 3-28)
control
(DOD) 1. Authority that may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the
activities of subordinate or other organizations. (JP 1-02) See FM 3-0. 2. In mapping, charting, and
photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of marks or objects on the Earth or on a map or a
photograph, whose positions or elevations (or both) have been or will be determined. (JP 1-02) See
FM 3-25.26. 3. Physical or psychological pressures exerted with the intent to assure that an agent or
group will respond as directed. (JP 1-02) 4. An indicator governing the distribution and use of
documents, information, or material. Such indicators are the subject of intelligence community
agreement and are specially defined in appropriate regulations. [Note: see AAP-6.] (JP 1-02) See FM
2-0. (Army) 1. In the context of command and control, the regulation of forces and warfighting
functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. (FM 3-0) 2. A tactical
mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to
prevent its use by an enemy. (FM 3-90) 3. Action taken that eliminates a hazard or reduces the risk
from that hazard. Part of the third step in risk management. (FM 5-19) 4. In the context of stability
mechanisms, to impose civil order. (FM 3-0)
counterintelligence
Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence
activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements
thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. [Note: see AAP-
6.] (JP 2-0) See FM 3-13. (Marine Corps) The active and passive measures intended to deny the
enemy valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and neutralize hostile intelligence
collection, and to deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and intentions.
defense support of civil authorities
Civil support provided under the auspices of the National Response Plan. (JP 3-28)
force health protection
(DOD) Measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well-being of Service
member. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the
force from health hazards. (JP 4-02)
force projection
(DOD) The ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or
another theater in response to requirements for military operations. (JP 5-0) See FM 3-0.
full spectrum operations
The Army’s operational concept: Army forces combine offensive, defensive, and stability or civil
support operations simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to seize, retain, and exploit
the initiative, accepting prudent risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results. They employ
synchronized action—lethal and nonlethal—proportional to the mission and informed by a thorough
understanding of all variables of the operational environment. Mission command that conveys intent
and an appreciation of all aspects of the situation guides the adaptive use of Army forces. (FM 3-0)
information superiority
(DOD) The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.
(JP 3-13) See FM 3-0.
information system
(DOD) The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components for the collection,
processing, storage, transmission, display, dissemination, and disposition of information. [Note: see
AAP-6.] (JP 3-13) (Army) The equipment and facilities that collect, process, store, display, and
disseminate information. This includes computers—hardware and software—and communications, as
well as policies and procedures for their use. (FM 3-0)
initiative (individual)
The willingness to act in the absence of orders when existing orders no longer fit the situation or when
unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. (FM 3-0)
major operation
(DOD) A series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a
single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives
in an operational area. These actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with
a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. For noncombat operations, a reference to
the relative size and scope of a military operation. (JP 3-0) See FM 3-0.
maneuver
(DOD) 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the
enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of
war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements.
4. Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to
achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 3-0)
*maneuver support operations
Integrate the complementary and reinforcing capabilities of key protection, movement and maneuver,
and sustainment functions, tasks, and systems to enhance freedom of action.
measure of effectiveness
(DOD) A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment
that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an
effect. (JP 3-0)
measure of performance
(DOD) A criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (JP 3-0)
mission
(DOD) 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the
reason therefor. See FM 5-0. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a
duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. See FM 5-0. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to
accomplish one particular task. See FM 3-04.111. [Note: see AAP-6.] (JP 1-02)
mission command
The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission orders.
Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined
initiative, acting aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission within the commander’s
intent. (FM 3-0)
mission orders
A technique for developing orders that emphasizes to subordinates the results to be attained, not how
they are to achieve them. It provides maximum freedom of action in determining how to best
accomplish the assigned missions. (FM 3-0)
mobile security force
A dedicated security force designed to defeat level I and II threats on a base and/or base cluster. (JP 3-
10)
movement and maneuver warfghting function
See warfighting function.
movement control
(DOD, NATO) 1. The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements
over lines of communications. 2. An organization responsible for the planning, routing, scheduling,
and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. [Note: the Army
definition adds “Organizations responsible for these functions are movement control teams, movement
control centers, and movement control activities.”] (JP 3-10)
*movement corridor
A designated area established to protect and enable ground movement along a route.
mobile security force
A dedicated security force designed to defeat level I and II threats on a base and/or base cluster. (JP
3-10)
mutual support
(DOD, NATO) That support which units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned
tasks, their positions relative to each other and to the enemy, and inherent capabilities. (JP 3-31) See
FM 3-90.
operational environment
(DOD) A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of
military forces and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 3-0)
operational theme
The character of the dominant major operation being conducted at any time within a land force
commander’s area of operations. The operational theme helps convey the nature of the major operation
to the force to facilitate common understanding of how the commander broadly intends to operate.
(FM 3-0)
personnel recovery
The sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and
reintegration of isolated personnel. (JP 3-50)
protection warfighting function
See warfighting function.
reorganization
Action taken to shift internal resources within a degraded unit to increase its level of combat
effectiveness. (FM 100-9)
reserve
(DOD) 1. Portion of a body of troops which is kept to the rear or withheld from action at the beginning
of an engagement, in order to be available for a decisive movement. See FM 3-90. 2. Members of the
Military Services who are not in active service but who are subject to call to active duty. 3. Portion of
an appropriation or contract authorization held or set aside for future operations or contingencies and,
in respect to which, administrative authorization to incur commitments or obligations has been
withheld. (JP 1-02)
response force
(DOD) A mobile force with appropriate fire support designated, usually by the area commander, to
deal with level II threats in the rear area. (JP 3-10)
route reconnaissance
(Army/Marine Corps) A directed effort to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all
terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. [Note: see AAP-6.]
(FM 3-90)
running estimate
A staff section’s continuous assessment of current and future operations to determine if the current
operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if future operations are supportable.
(FM 3-0)
sensitive site
A geographically limited area with special diplomatic, informational, military, or economic sensitivity
to the United States government. (JP 3-31)
sensitive site exploitation
A related series of activities inside a captured sensitive site to exploit personnel documents, electronic
data, and material captured at the site, while neutralizing any threat posed by the site or its contents.
(JP 3-31)
situational obstacle
An obstacle that a unit plans and possibly prepares prior to starting an operation, but does not execute
unless specific criteria are met. It provides the commander flexibility for emplacing tactical obstacles
based on battlefield development. (FM 90-7)
situational understanding
The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationships
among the mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking. (FM 3-0)
stability operations
(DOD) An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted
outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or
reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency
infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (JP 3-0) See FM 3-0.
strong point
(DOD, NATO) A key point in a defensive position, usually strongly fortified and heavily armed with
automatic weapons, around which other positions are grouped for its protection. (Army) A heavily
fortified battle position tied to a natural or reinforcing obstacle to create an anchor for the defense or to
deny the enemy decisive or key terrain. (FM 3-90)
support area
Is a specific surface area designated by the echelon commander to facilitate the positioning,
employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control tactical forces.
(FM 3-0.1)
survivability operations
The development and construction of protective positions, such as earth berms, dug-in positions,
overhead protection, and countersurveillance means, to reduce the effectiveness of enemy weapon
systems. (FM 3-34)
sustainment
The provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until
successful mission accomplishment. (JP 3-0)
sustainment warfighting function
See warfighting function.
tactical combat force
A combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets that is assigned the
mission of defeating level III threats. (JP 3-10) See FM 3-90.
task organizing
(DOD) The act of designing an operating force, support staff, or logistics package of specific size and
composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task-organizing the
force include, but are not limited to: training, experience, equipage, sustainability, operating
environment, enemy threat, and mobility. (JP 3-05) (Army) The act of designing an operating force,
support staff, or logistics package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission.
Characteristics to examine when task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to: training,
equipage, sustainability, operating environment, enemy threat, and mobility. For Army forces, it
includes allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and
support relationships. (FM 3-0)
unified action
(DOD) The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and
nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)
unmanned aircraft system
That system whose components include the necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an
unmanned aircraft. (JP 1-02)
warfighting function
A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes), united by a common
purpose, that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. The six warfighting
functions are: a. command and control – the related tasks and systems that support commanders in
exercising authority and direction; b. fires – the related tasks and systems that provide collective and
coordinated Army indirect fires, joint fires, and command and control warfare, including nonlethal
fires, through the targeting process; c. intelligence – the related tasks and systems that facilitate
understanding of the operational enviironment, enemy, terrain, and civil considerations; d. movement
and maneuver – the related tasks and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in
relation to the enemy. Direct fire is inherenet in maneuver, as is close combat; e. protection – the
related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat
power; f. sustainment – the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure
freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. (FM 3-0)
SOURCES USED
The following sources are either quoted or paraphrased in this publication.
ARMY PUBLICATIONS
FM 4-02.4, Medical Platoon Leaders' Handbook Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 24 August
2001.
FM 4-02.12, Health Service Support in Corps and Echelons Above Corps, 2 February 2004.
FM 4-02.17, Preventive Medicine Services, 28 August 2000.
FM 4-02.21, Division And Brigade Surgeons' Handbook (Digitized) Tactics, Techniques, And
Procedures, 15 November 2000.
FM 4-02.51, Combat and Operational Stress Control, 6 July 2006.
FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, 20 January 2005.
FM 5-19, Composite Risk Management, 21 August 2006.
FM 5-103, Survivability, 10 June 1985.
FM 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces, 11 August 2003.
FM 6-20, Fire Support in the Airland Battle, 17 May 1988.
FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process, 8 May 1996.
FM 6-22, Army Leadership, 12 October 2006.
FM 6-22.5, Combat Stress, 23 June 2000.
FM 7-0, Training for Full Spectrum Operations, 12 December 2008.
FM 7-1, Battle Focused Training, 15 September 2003.
FM 7-15, The Army Universal Task List, 31 August 2003.
FM 8-55, Planning for Health Service Support, 9 September 1994.
FM 22-51, Leaders' Manual for Combat Stress Control, 29 September 1994.
FM 34-10, Division Intelligence and Electronics Warfare Operations, 25 November 1986.
FM 34-60, Counterintelligence, 3 October 1995.
FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, 8 July 1994.
FM 63-2, Division Support Command, Armored, Infantry, and Mechanized Infantry Divisions, 20 May
1991.
FM 71-100, Division Operations, 28 August 1996.
FM 90-7, Combined Arms Obstacle Integration, 29 September 1994.
FM 100-8, The Army in Multinational Operations, 24 November 1997.
FM 100-9, Reconstitution, 13 January 1992.
FM 100-10-2, Contracting Support on the Battlefield, 4 August 1999.
FMI 3-0.1, The Modular Force, 28 January 2008.
FMI 3-90.10, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives Operational
Headquarters, 24 January 2008.
FMI 4-93.41, Army Field Support Brigade Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures, 22 February 2007.
FMI 5-0.1, The Operations Process, 31 March 2006.
JOINT PUBLICATIONS
JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 14 May 2007.
JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001.
JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, 22 June 2007.
JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, 22 March 2007.
JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 17 September 2006.
JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, 17 December 2003.
JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, 14 April 2006.
JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, 15
August 2001.
JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization
Coordination during Joint Operations Vol I, 17 March 2006.
JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, 1 August 2006.
JP 3-10.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense, 23 July 1996.
JP 3-13, Information Operations, 13 February 2006.
JP 3-28, Civil Support, 14 September 2007.
JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, 23 March 2004.
JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, 16 February 2007.
JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, 12 February 2007.
JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, 7 May 2007.
JP 3-40, Joint Doctrine for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction, 8 July 2004.
JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence
Management, 2 October 2006.
JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, 5 January 2007.
JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, 30 August 2004.
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, 8 July 2008.
JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, 14 April 2003.
JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006.
MULTI-SERVICE PUBLICATIONS
FM 1-02, Operational Terms and Graphics, 21 September 2004.
FM 3-11.21, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Operations, 1 April 2008.
FM 3-34.170, Engineer Reconnaissance, 25 March 2008.
FM 3-90.12, Combined Arms Gap-Crossing Operations, 1 July 2008.
FM 3-100.4, Environmental Considerations in Military Operations, 15 June 2000.
FM 4-30.16, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Explosive Ordnance Disposal in a
Joint Environment, 27 October 2005.
DOCUMENTS NEEDED
These documents must be available to the intended users of this publication.
DA Form 1156, Casualty Feeder Card.
DA Form 3953, Purchase Request and Commitment.
DA Forms are available on the APD web site (www.apd.army.mil).
Executive Order 13139, Improving Health Protection of Military Personnel Participating in
Particular Military Operations, 30 September 1999.
READINGS RECOMMENDED
These readings contain relevant supplemental information.
A E O
antiterrorism, 5-5 elements of combat power, 1-7 operational area security, 5-4,
area damage control, 6-1, 6-3, 5-15, 6-11
F
6-19, 6-20, 7-1, 7-2 operational theme, 1-6, 14
force health protection, 8-10, 9-
B 10 operational variables, 1-2, 1-3
battle command, 3-1 freedom of action, 1-8, 1-10, 5- P
battle drill, 3-8 9 protection, 1-9
brigade special troops I R
battalion, x information management, 3-7 reinforcing capabilities, 1-8, 5-6
C information superiority, 3-7 risk, 3-3, 7-5
combat power, 1-7, 4-12 K S
combined arms, 1-7, 1-8, 6-14 knowledge management, 3-7 spectrum of conflict, 1-6
command, 3-1
M succession of command, 3-7
command and control, 3-3, 8-
15 main command post, 3-6 support area, ix, 5-15
command group, 3-4, 3-5 maneuver support, 5-10 support area operations, 2-2, 6-
maneuver support operations, 1, 8-15
command post, 3-5, 3-6
viii, 1-8, 2-2, 5-1, 5-6, 8-15 survivability, 7-6
complementary capabilities, 1-
8 maneuver support operations, sustainment, 1-10, 5-6, 5-17, 5-
5-10 18, 8-9, 8-15, 9-1, 9-4
consequence management, 5-
14, 7-1 mission command, 3-2, 4-12 T
consequence management mission variables, 1-2, 1-4, 4-6 tactical command post, 3-5
operations, 2-2 mobility operations, 5-13, 5-16 task organizing, 1-8
consequence management movement and maneuver, 1-9,
operations, 7-1 1-10, 5-5 W
control, 3-1 movement corridor, ix warfighting function, 1-7, 1-8,
1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 4-2, 9-1
countermobility operations, 5-
14, 5-16
Official:
JOYCE E. MORROW
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0903607
DISTRIBUTION:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with the
initial distribution number (IDN) 115993, requirements for FM 3-90.31.
PIN: 085322-000