Visayan Stevedore &

Transportation Company
vs.Workmen’s Compensation
Commission
No. L-26657. September 12, 1974. *

VISAYAN STEVEDORE & TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, petitioner, vs. WORKMEN’S

COMPENSATION COMMISSION and JULIETA S. LABIYO, respondents.
Workmen’s Compensation; When an employee dies while on duty burden of proof to show that
death was not work-connected shifts to the employer.—What is not denied, and this is crucial insofar as
the compensability of Eduardo Labiyo’s death is concerned, is that when death came to the deceased he
was in active duty as an engineer-employee of the petitioner. This being the case, the need to pinpoint the
cause of his death as work-connected in order to render it compensable assumes very little importance. “It
is to be presumed, under section 44 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended,
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*
 FIRST DIVISION.

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Visayan Stevedore &
Transportation Company vs.
Workmen’s Compensation
Commission
that the employee’s death, supervening at the time of his employment, either arose out of, or was at
least aggravated by said employment. With this legal presumption the burden of proof shifts to the
employer, and the employee is relieved of the burden to show causation.
Same; Opinion of doctor cannot prevail over presumption of law in workmen’s compensation cases.
—The mere opinion of doctors presented by petitioner as evidence cannot prevail over the presumption
established by law that injury is compensable.
Same; Reason for Court’s liberal attitude in sustaining compensability of death of a ship’s
crewmember that proceeds when employee undertakes to satisfy, in the course of employment, certain
human wants, like eating, sleeping, etc.—The liberal attitude displayed by this Court in considering as
compensable the death by heart attack of an off-duty employee helping in the loading operation of a
vessel, or the disappearance of an off-duty crew member of a vessel who had no choice but to be in the
vessel during the voyage, or the death by drowning of an employee whose duty was to watch over and
take charge of a barge in the absence of the patron, proceeds from an awareness of the fact that when an
employee undertakes to satisfy, in the course of employment, certain human wants, i.e., eating, freshening
up, sleeping and the like, “and something takes place that may cause injury, harm or death to the
employee or laborer, it is fair and logical that the happening be considered as one occurring in the course
of employment for under the circumstances it cannot be mishap that occurred because the employee acted
beyond his duty or outside the course of employment, which is not so in the case at bar. For aside from
the conclusion arrived at by the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy that “bangungot” was the
cause of Eduardo Labiyo’s death, there was hardly anything else that would disconnect the deceased’s
death from his employment.

APPEAL from a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
     Efrain B. Treñas for petitioners.
     P.C. Villavieja & D.C. Arellano for respondent Commission.
     Amado B. Atol for respondent Julieta S. Labiyo.

MAKALINTAL, C.J.,:

Appeal from the decision of the Workmen’s Compensation

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Visayan Stevedore &
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Commission requiring petitioner Visayan Stevedore & Transportation Company to pay
respondent Julieta S. Labiyo compensation benefits, burial expenses and costs in connection with
the death of her husband Eduardo Labiyo.
The deceased, employed as engineer by Visayan Stevedore & Transportation Company with a
monthly salary of P235.00 was part of a 3-man crew of the tugboat “M/T DILIS.” His main duty
consisted in his starting the engine and seeing to it that it functioned properly during the voyage,
with the actual navigation of the tugboat being the responsibility of his 2 other companions, the
“patron” who controlled the wheel and a helper (timonel) who operated the rudder. According to
Federico Sespene, “patron” of the tugboat when the deceased died,
“x x x from February 10 to 17 (1964) they were given orders to tow barges to the ship and load it with
cargoes. They also had to shift or bring barges to drydock at the company’s compound in Iloilo. Aside
from that, their other work was to bring the barges from Jordan to Iloilo City, from the terminal to the
middle of Guimaras Strait or to bring workers, food and checkers to the ship and back. As a consequence
of this work, they were compelled to stay in the tugboat. On that fatal day of February 17 (1964), they had
received various orders. And at about 4 a.m. of the same day, they were towing barges from the Shell
wharf to Tabangao, and while they were navigating, Eduardo Labiyo visibly tired and in active duty
asked for permission to take a rest. When the tugboat reached Tabangao, witness Sespeno was ordered by
Orleans to start towing the barge, but when Sespeno called Labiyo to start the engine, there was no
answer from Labiyo. The Quartermaster was the one who responded instead and was the one ordered to
wake up Labiyo, who at the time was already dead. It was about 6:30 o’clock in the morning of February
17, 1964. x x x”
A subsequent autopsy of the deceased’s remains conducted by Dr. Raymundo L. Torres, the
assistant medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City Police Department, traced the cause of Eduardo
Labiyo’s death to “bangungot.” The autopsy report reads:
“AUTOPSY FINDINGS

HEAD AND NECK—No apparent external lesion was found.

THORAX—No apparent lesion was found.
ABDOMEN—No apparent external lesion was found. Stomach was full.
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Visayan Stevedore &
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Workmen’s Compensation
Commission
UPPER AND LOWER EXTREMITES—No apparent external lesion was found.
CAUSE OF DEATH - BANGUNGUT.
(Sgd.)—RAYMUNDO L. TORRES
Asst. Med. Legal Officer”
On March 16, 1964 respondent Julieta Labiyo, the widow, filed a claim for compensation with
the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. VII, Iloilo City. After appropriate proceedings,
the acting referee of the Workmen’s Compensation Unit in Iloilo City dismissed the case upon a
finding that “the cause of death of Eduardo Labiyo did not arise out of and was aggravated by the
nature of his employment.” Upon review this decision was set aside by the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission in a decision dated June 16, 1966, ordering at the same time the
petitioner to pay compensation benefits, burial expenses and costs. Petitioner thereafter moved to
reconsider but the Commission, in a resolution en banc dated August 30, 1966, denied the
motion.
The decision appealed from states:
“x x x, there is no question that Eduardo Labiyo, together with the Patron and Quartermaster were at work
twenty-four (24) hours a day. That although they could rest and sleep for sometime still they were always
ready to be called to duty anytime, for busy or not busy they remained in the tugboat, the premises of
their employment subject to call anytime. That the nature of their work had prevented them from leaving
the tugboat. It must also be remembered that from February 10 to 17, 1964, the three (3) complement of
the ‘M/T DILIS’ were busy at work. Evidence supports the finding that about 4 o’clock in the morning of
February 17, 1964, Engineer Labiyo requested permission to sleep for a while and which request had
been granted. And it appears that about 6:30 o’clock of the same morning, when he was being awakened
for duty he was already found cold and lifeless in his bunk lying on his back dressed in his maong pants
and white T/shirt. The theory of the Medico-Legal Officer who autopsied his body was that the cause was
due to ‘bangungot.’ To this view we cannot subscribe. In the first place we have already learned that there
is no such thing as ‘bangungot;’ that is, at least as of this moment, the term has not as yet been clearly
explained, particularly its cause and effect. This Commission, after considering the evidence and the
facts, is of the view that Eduardo Labiyo must have died due to over fatigue or over exertion. Or that
there must have been heart failure due to
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some factors. Our view is supported by the fact that Labiyo asked permission to sleep at an early hour in
the morning of February 17. Why he asked permission to sleep must have been due to the fact that he was
actually very tired and exhausted due to the continuous performance of their work from February 10 to
17. If work was not heavy that morning or previous to it, and that the complement was already resting,
there was no necessity for the deceased to plead for sleep. Moreover, the allegation that his stomach was
full of food cannot be given weight because at 4:00 a.m. any meal taken in the evening however late it
may have been was already digested.”
Petitioner now assails the Commission’s finding that Eduardo Labiyo “must have died due to
over fatigue or over exertion,” arguing that said conclusion is not at all supported by the result of
the autopsy which traced the cause of the deceased’s death to “bangungot.” In taking issue with
the Commission’s conclusion, it is pointed out, first, that the deceased could not have over
exerted himself since he was not performing any physical or manual labor previous to his death;
and second, that the nature of the deceased’s work crave him more than ample time to rest and
sleep.
We do not think that the main point pressed by petitioner, namely, that death caused by
“bangungot” is not compensable, is at all decisive in the case at bar. What is not denied, and this
is crucial insofar as the compensability of Eduardo Labiyo’s death is concerned, is that when
death came to the deceased he was in active duty as an engineer-employee of the petitioner. This
being the case, the need to pinpoint the cause of his death as work—connected in order to render
it compensable assumes very little importance. “(It) is to be presumed, under section 44 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, that the employee’s death, supervening at the time
of his employment, either arose out of, or was at least aggravated by said employment. With this
legal presumption the burden of proof shifts to the employer, and the employee is relieved of the
burden to show causation. x x x The mere opinion of doctors presented by petitioner as evidence
cannot prevail over the presumption established by law.” (Abana vs. Quisumbing, 22 SCRA
1278, 1282)
The liberal attitute displayed by this Court in considering as compensable the death by heart
attack of an off-duty employee helping in the loading operation of a vessel (William Lines, Inc.
vs. Saftopal, 42 SCRA 48), or the disappearance of an off-duty
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Visayan Stevedore &
Transportation Company vs.
Workmen’s Compensation
Commission
crew member of a vessel who has no choice but to be in the vessel during the voyage (Aboitiz
Shipping Corporation vs. Pepito, 18 SCRA 1028), or the death by drowning of an employee
whose duty was to watch over and take charge of a barge in the absence of the patron (Luzon
Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 10 SCRA 207), proceeds from
an awareness of the fact that when an employee undertakes to satisfy, in the course of
employment, certain human wants, i.e. eating, freshening up, sleeping and the like, “and
something takes place that may cause injury, harm or death to the employee or laborer, it is fair
and logical that the happening be considered as one occurring in the course of employment for
under the circumstances it cannot be undertaken in any other way” (Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc.
vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, supra), unless it can be clearly shown that the
mishap occurred because the employee acted beyond his duty or outside the course of
employment, which is not so in the case at bar. For aside from the conclusion arrived at by the
medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy that “bangungot” was the cause of Eduardo
Labiyo’s death,  there was hardly anything else that would disconnect the deceased’s death from
*
his employment. In other words, petitioner had not proved that death was not and could not be
caused or aggravated by the deceased’s work as engineer who, at the time of his death, was
practically on 24-hour continuous duty.
The petitioner’s reliance on the case of Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. vs. Dayao, et al., 105 Phil.
525, particularly that portion of the decision which reads:
“That Antonio Dayao died of heart failure is not disputed. The point of controversy is: what caused such
failure? Was it—as the petitioner Company claims—a natural disease locally called ‘bangungot’ where
the victim dies in his sleep allegedly due to bad dreams or nightmares? If this be the case then the death is
not compensable. Or, was it—as maintained by the respondents—the
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*
 Regarding the probative value of said autopsy findings to establish the cause of the deceased’s death, it is noticeable
that the medico-legal officer who performed the autopsy failed to testify at all despite notice.

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overexertion or undue fatigue their deceased father suffered in helping lift, carry and transfer from one
place to another the heavy household effects belonging to Mr. Karning or Cummins? If this be the cause
then the death is compensable.”
is misplaced to justify its claim of non-liability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. The
aforequoted portion of the decision was evidently intended merely to emphasize that in said case
the theory that “bangungot” could have caused the deceased’s death appeared to be tenuous,
there being competent contrary evidence that excessive exertion and physical strain accounted
for the deceased’s heart failure. In fact, in the very same case doubt was expressed as to the
soundness of the theory that “bangungot” by itself can be the cause of death, thus:
“Although the enlightening points xxx brought out about the dreaded disease are worthy of note, still the
inescapable conclusion is that ‘bangungot’ is still a theoretical disease—whose remote and immediate
cause, pathology and cure have not as yet been accurately determined and scientifically established and
confirmed. Whether it is a natural phenomenon that by itself can destroy or snuff the life out of a human
being is still a question to which medical science has yet to give a more definite and conclusive answer.
That ‘bangungot’ is still veiled in its own mystery is openly admitted by Dr. Santa Cruz who, on the
witness stand, declared that ‘until now, the real cause of bangungot is not known and that its pathology
cannot be found in any textbook on medicine.”
The decision under review is affirmed, with costs against the petitioner.
     Castro, Teehankee,  Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ, concur.
     Makasiar, J., did not take part.
Decision affirmed.
Notes.—The requirement that to be compensable the death must occur while the worker is
performing some work in the course or arising out of his employment requires three things to
concur: the injury must be received during the period covered by the employment, the worker
must be shown to have been injured at the time and place where the performance of his work
requires him to be, and the worker must have been
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Vda. de Valera vs. Ofilada
doing something in pursuance of his work. (A.L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 12 SCRA 27).
Under the Workmen’s Compensation Law at present the laborer is relieved from the burden
of proving causation once the injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment.
(Agustin vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, 12 SCRA 55).
Where it appears that the death of one worker and the illness of another was due to food
poisoning, outside of working hours, but the nature of their work was such that they were
expected to remain in their employer’s premises or fishpond for about a month, such death or
illness is compensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. (Del Rosario vs. Del Rosario, 6
SCRA 1051).

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