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THIRD DIVISION

SKANFIL MARITIME G.R. No. 227655

SERVICES, INC., and/or
CROWN Present:
SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC.,
and/or JOSE MARIO C. LEONEN, J., Chairperson,
BUNAG, PERLAS-BERNABE, S.A.J,*
Petitioners, LOPEZ, M.,
LOPEZ, J., and
KHO, JR., JJ.

- versus -

ALMARIO M. CENTENO, Promulgated:

Respondent. April 27, 2 0 22
x --------------------------------- -- ------------ - --- ~~'S)t.-~9!.\\ ___ __________________ x

DECISION

LOPEZ, M., J.:

The Court resolves the petition by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Cou1t, where Skanfil Maritin,e Services, Inc., (Skanfil), Crown
Shipmanagement, Inc., and Jose Mario C. Bunag/ ·' question the Court of
Appeals' (CA) Decision 1 dated July 27, 2016, and Resolution 2 dated October
14, 2016, in CA-G.R. SP No . 144697. The assailed CA issuances awarded

Designated addit ional Member in lieu of Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Jav ier pe1· Rafne dated Ju ly
8, 2020 .
Alty . Jose Mario C. Bufiag in some p:JSls of the r-7//0.
Ro!lu, pp. 15-33. Penned by now Su1Jre1ne Couri Asc.,ociaxe Justi ce Amy C. Lazaro-Javier, ·w ith the
concurrence of Associate Justices Ce li a C. L1 brea-Leagng0 an d l\flelch or Q.C. ScJJ ang.
Id . at 35.
Decision 2 G.R. No. 227655

permanent disability benefits and damages 3 in favor of Almario M. Centeno

(Almario).

In March 2013, Skanfil, on behalf of its foreign principal Crown

Shipmanagement, Inc., hired Almario as a mess person on board MIV"DIMF'
POS TOPAS. On September 26, 2013, Almario fell from a seven-step ladder
while performing the job. Almario lost consciousness and profusely bled at
the back of the head. The crew administered first aid and brought Almario to
a hospital in Japan. Thereat, Almario underwent an x-ray and a computed
tomography scan. Almario was diagnosed with a blunt head injury, blunt back
injury, lacerated scalp wound, and brain concussion. On October 2, 2013,
Almario was repatriated to the Philippines. 4

Skanfil referred Almario to the company-designated physicians, Dr.

Hiyasmine Mangubat (Dr. Mangubat), Dr. Karen Frances Hao-Quan (Dr.
Hao-Quan), Dr. Robert D. Lim, and Dr. Edwin Agsoay of the Marine Medical
Services. The physicians assessed Almario's injury as "SIP Suturing of
Lacerated Wound on the Scalp, Fracture S3; Mild L3 - L4 Disc Bulge."
Almario was also referred to, and treated by Dr. William Chuasuan, Jr. (Dr.
Chuasuan), an orthopedic surgeon, and Dr. Wilson G. Sumpio (Dr. Sumpio),
a neurosurgeon. During the periodic medical evaluations, Dr. Hao-Quan
observed Almario's recurring pain in the lower hip area. The company doctor
recommended that Almario continue with the rehabilitation and medications.
Almario was also advised to return for another test and re-evaluation later. 5
Meantime, Dr. Hao-Quan issued an interim assessment of Grade 8 - loss of
2/3 lifting power of the trunk. 6 After weeks of treatment and rehabilitation,
Dr. Chuasuan cleared Almario orthopedic-wise, and subsequently, by Dr.
Sumpio from a neurosurgery standpoint. On February 7, 2014, Almario
returned to the company designated physician, where Dr. Hao-Quan finally
observed Almario's "functional trunk and hips range motion." The company
doctor also noted that Almario has no further subjective complaints. On even
date, Almario signed a Certificate of Fitness for Work, stating that Almario
was "fit for duty." 7 Dr. Hao-Quan also signed the certificate as a witness. 8

Unconvinced, Almario consulted Dr. Manuel Fidel M. Magtira (Dr.

Magtira) from the Department of Orthopedic Surgery and Traumatology at
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Medical Center. Dr. Magtira declared
that Almario lost pre-injury capacity and is permanently unfit to resume sea
duties. On July 14, 2014, Almario filed a complaint against Skanfil for
pennanent disability benefits. 9

In add ition to US$125,000.00 as permanent di sability benefits, the C A awarded Almario with
f>30 ,000.00 , as moral damages , PS0 ,000.00 . as exemplary damages and attorney's fees .
Rollo, pp . 17-18.
Id. at 172- 181. See Medical Reports, Ann exes "F," "G," ·'G- 1." '' H," " I," " J," " K." " L," " M," and "N."
Id . at 181. See Medical Report Annex "N ."
Id. at 21 1. See Medical Report Annex " Q-3 .'"
Id.
Id. at 225 -226.

I
Decision 3 G.R. No. 227655

Decision of the Labor Arbiter

On July 31, 2015, the Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed Almario's

complaint for lack of merit. The LA noted that Almario's claim is premature.
Almario failed to observe the mandatory third doctor appointment rule, given
the conflicting findings of the company-designated physicians and Almario's
physician of choice. The LA explained that Dr. Magtira's medical report could
not be considered as an accurate assessment of Almario's illness since
Almario was only examined once on June 16, 2014, or almost eight months
after Almario's repatriation, and was unsupported by diagnostic tests and
procedures. 10 The LA found the results of the medical examinations
conducted by the company-designated physicians more credible and
plausible. The LA noted that the company-designated physicians properly
conducted Almario' s medical examinations and had personal knowledge of
the medical condition since they closely monitored and checked Almario's
progress, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint

against the respondents is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. 11 (Emphases supplied.)

Ruling of the NLRC

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in its

Decision 12 dated November 16, 2015 in NLRC NCR Case No. (M) 07-08710-
14 and NLRC LAC No. (OFW-M) 09-000786-15 affirmed the LA's findings.
The NLRC stressed that the company-designated physicians were more
qualified to assess Almario's medical condition and fitness to work since they
possess personal knowledge of Almario's actual condition. Also, the
company-designated physicians thoroughly examined and treated Almario
from the time of the repatriation until Almario was cleared by both the
neurosurgeon and the orthopedic surgeon. As opposed to Dr. Magtira, the
company-designated physicians were better positioned to give a more
accurate prognosis of Almario's injury. 13 The NLRC also ruled that Almario's
claim of compensability under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
must be rejected. The CBA titled "ITF and Bremer Bereederungsgesellschaft
mbH & Co. KG," which Almario submitted before the LA, does not indicate
that it applied to the crew of M/ V "DIM.I'' POS TOPAS. 14 Almario sought
reconsideration but was denied.

10
Id. at 218-222; and 226-227.
11
Id . at 222.
12
Id. at 224-233. Penned by Comissioner Dolores M. Peralta-Beley, with the concurrence of Presiding
Commissioner Grace E. Maniquez-Tan and Commissioner Mercedes R. Posada-Lacap.
13
Id . at 23 1-232.
14
Id. at 232. The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered , complainant's Appeal is DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the Decision of Labor Arbiter Augusto L. Villanueva dated July 31 , 2015 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. (Id. Emphases in the original.)
Decision 4 G .R. No. 227655

Findings of the CA

Almario elevated the case to the CA, insisting that the NLRC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the LA's decision based on doubtful,
vague, and highly questionable assessments of the company-designated
physicians. Almario averred that one of the company-designated physicians,
Dr. Ramon Antonio Sarmiento (Dr. Sarmiento), a rehabilitation medicine
specialist, declared that Almario was unfit to work and was advised to
continue the therapy even after three months of initial physical therapy. 15

On July 27, 2016, the CA reversed the findings of the NLRC and the
LA. The CA gave credence to Almario's claim that Dr. Sarmiento was a
company-designated physician. Dr. Sanniento issued an "unfit to work"
certification eight days after Dr. Hao-Quan issued the I 0 th and Final Report.
Based on Dr. Sarmiento's recommendations, Almario should continue the
physical therapy sessions. 16 Consequently, there were no final and definitive
assessments from the company-designated physicians.

Further, Dr. Sarmiento's assessment should prevail since it was the

more recent declaration. The medical assessment of a third doctor was
unnecessary because there were no inconsistencies between the findings of
Dr. Sarmiento as a company-designated physician and Dr. Magtira as
Almario's chosen physician. Almario's disability should be considered total
and pennanent because the company-designated physicians did not issue a
definitive assessment within the prescribed period. The CA awarded
permanent total disability benefits based on the CBA, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees:

ACCORDINGLY , the petition is GRANTED and the Decision

dated November 16, 2015 and Resolution dated Dect'mber 28. 2015.
NULLIFIED. Private respondents Skanfil Maritime Servi~es, Inc ..
CROWN SHIPMANAGEMENT[,] INC., and JOSE MA RIO BUNAG are
ordered to jointly and solidarily pay petitioner:

1. US$125 ,000.00, as permanent disability benefits;

2. [P]30,000.00, as moral damages;
".
.) [f>J50,000.00 , as exemplary damages; and
4. 10% of the total judgment award, as attorney' s fees.

SO ORDERED. 17 (Emphases in the original. )

Unsuccessful at a reconsiderati l)n, Skanfil eievated the case to the

Court. Skanfil claims that Dr. Sarmiento is not a company-designated
physician. Thus, the CA erred in reversing the fa ctual findings of the NLRC
and the LA based on the m~dii::al ,;ertification issued by Dr. Sarmiento.
Frniher, the company-designated physic ians, Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim, did

15
Id. at 94-9 5.
16
id. ctt 23-24.
17
Id. at 32 .
Decision 5 G.R. No. 227655

not refer Almario to Dr. Sarmiento. 18 The CA also erred in awarding disability
benefits under an alleged CBA because Skanfil was not a paiiy to the alleged
CBA. The CBA was between ITF and Bremer Bereederungsgesellschaft mbH
& Co. KG. Besides, Almario failed to prove that the CBA applies in the case. 19

In a comment, 20 Almario insists that the company-designated physician

never declared a "fit to work" assessment. The 10 th and Final Report was
vague on whether Almario could resume the work as a seafarer. 21 Almario's
clearance from the 01ihopedic ' s standpoint is unclear whether Almario can
resume the duties as a mess person which entails strenuous work.22 Almario
maintains that even after the report was issued, Dr. Sarmiento found him unfit
to work and was advised to continue the physical therapy after three months
of initial physical therapy. Since there was no definite assessment of
Almario's fitness to work from the company-designated physicians, Almario
is deemed totally and permanently disabled. The CA correctly ruled that there
is no need to refer the case to a third doctor because there were no
inconsistencies with the findings of Dr. Saimiento and Dr. Magtira. Moreover,
the Certificate of Fitness for Work is a quitclaim and should not be considered
binding. Almario, as a seafarer, is in no position to agree or certify on medical
matters. 23

In its reply, 24 Skanfil countered that it was able to prove that Dr.
Sarmiento is not a company-designated physician. Skanfil asse1is that the 10 th
and Final Report issued by Dr. Hao-Quan is a final and definitive assessment
of Almario's fitness. The neurosurgeon and the orthopedic surgeon who
rendered medical services for Almario's specific illness/injury are expected
to keep within their bounds, and to the illness that was referred to them for
treatment.

ISSUES

The issues may be summarized as follows:

1) Whether Almario is entitled to permanent total disability benefits,

moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees; and

2) Whether the CBA provision awarding a higher amount of

disability benefits is applicable

18 Id. at 48-49.
19
Id. at 56-58 .
20
Id. at 243 -264.
21
Id . at 254.
22
Id . at 255.
23
Id. at 258.
24
Id. at 267-277.

r
Decision 6 G.R. No. 227655

RULING

Prefatorily, the Corni stresses that the CA may review NLRC decisions
only through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack, or excess
of jurisdiction. The review is limited to whether the NLRC acted arbitrarily,
whimsically, or capriciously, and does not entail looking into the correctness
of the judgment on the merits. Necessarily, when the case is elevated to the
Court through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the
contentious issue would be a question of law whether the NLRC acted with
grave abuse of discretion in rendering its judgment. 25 In essence, the Comi is
tasked to determine whether the CA correctly found grave abuse of discretion
when the NLRC ruled that Almario was not entitled to the claim for permanent
disability benefits.

The Court finds the petition pmily meritorious.

The company-
designated physicians failed to
issue a valid medical assessment
within 120 days from Almario's
repatriation. Consequently,
Almario's disability is
considered permanent and total.

The seafarer's entitlement to disability benefits is governed by the law,

the pai1ies' contracts, and the medical findings. 26 Under Section 20 (A) of the
20 IO Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard
Employment Contract (2010 POEA-SEC), the employer must compensate the
seafarer for work-related injuries and illnesses subject to conditions. The
seafarer must timely report to the company-designated physician upon
repatriation. In contrast, the company-designated physician must detern-1ine
whether the seafarer is fit to work, or the degree of disability has been
evaluated. The 2010 POEA-SEC also provides the conflict resolution
mechanism if the seafarer disagrees with the findings of the company-
designated physicians:

SEC. 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS

A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS

The iiabilities of tl~e e rnployer when 1hc seafarer suffers work-

related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follow<;:

xxxx

25 Riingen v. Western Uniun Fir:ancia/ Sen ·ic:,.1· r Hong /{ong ) Limited. Philippines Rep1·ese11/utiw· ( )jji'ce.
G.R. No. 252716, March 3, ::'02 :. < :-,,t,'}c ;,';,~: ibt '1 1 :-· ._j udiciary .gov.phith,' bookshelt/showdocs/l /6749 1>
26 Razonable v. Maersk -Filipinas Cn·w,11~:- inc, rJ .R. No. 24 !674. June- l 0. 2020.
< https://el ibrary.judiciary .gov .p!1, :iicbo,, k::hci f/docmc nth/.1 un /2020/ I >

r
Decision 7 G.R. No. 227655

3. In addition to tk: ahc,ve o bligation of the employer to provide

medical attention, the seafarer shall also receive sickness allowance from
his employer in an amount equivalent to his basic wage computed from the
time he signed off until he is declc: 1·ecJ f°i' co \Vork or the degree of disability
has been assessed by the company-designated physician. The period within
which the seafarer shall be ent.itled to his sickness allowance shall be made
on a regular basis. but not less than once a month.

xxxx

For this purpose, the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-

employment medical examination by a company-designated physician
within three working days upo!l his return except when he is physically
incapacitated to do so, in which case, a written notice to the agency within
the same period is deemed as compliance. In the course of the treatment, the
seafarer shall also report regularly to the company-designated physician
specifically on the dates as prescribed by the company-designated physician
and agreed to by the seafarer. failure of the seafarer to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to
claim the above benefits.

If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment,

a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer.
The third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both pmiies.

xxxx

6. In case of permanent total or partial di sab ility of the seafarer

caused by either injury or illness the seafarer shall be compensated in
accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Section 32 of his
Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall
be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the
time the illness or disease was contracted.

xxxx

In Elburg Shipmanagemen.t Phil., Inc. v. Ouioge, Jr ., 27 the Court

summarized the rules on the prescribed period for the company-designated
physician to issue a final medical assessment and the consequence for failure
to observe these periods:

1. The company-designated physician must issue a final medical

assessment on the seafarer"::- disability grading within a period of 120
days from the time the ;;e;.tfare;· r~p·Jrted to him ;

2. If the company-designated physician fails to give his assessment v-.1ithin

the period of 1'.W days, 'Aithout :my justifiabie reason, then the seafarer's
disability becomes peti11m,cn~ anc total;

3. If the company-designated phvs1cian fai ls to give hi:; assessment within

the period of 120 d21_;-':"o \\j:;·, :. 0 ueicient _justification (e.g., seafarer
required further medicc.d t:·eatrrn.:r1l o;- seafarer was uncooperative), then
the period of diagnosis rn1 G !re::mncnl ~hall be extended to 240 days. The

27
765 .Phil. 341 (2015).

J
Decision 8 G.R. No . 227655

employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician

has sufficient justification to extend the period; and

4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment

within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability
becomes permanent and total , regardless of any justification.28

In Pastrana v. Bahia Shipping Services, 29 the Court clarified that the

120 days must be reckoned "from the date of the seafarer's repatriation." 30

In Razonable v. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Jnc.,3 1 the Court reiterated

that the medical assessment must be final, conclusive, and definite. The
assessment must clearly state whether the seafarer is fit to work, or the exact
disability rating, or whether such illness is work-related and without any
further condition or treatment. It should no longer require any further action
on the part of the company-designated physician, and it is issued by the
company-designated physician after he or she has exhausted all possible
treatment options within the periods allowed by law. 32 In Ampo-on v. Reinier
Pacific International Shipping, Inc., 33 the Court held that a medical
assessment that is not complete and definite must be ignored. The seafarer has
nothing to contest in the absence of a final and valid medical assessment. The
conflict resolution mechanism of referring the findings of the company-
designated physician to the seafarer' s physician of choice is unnecessary. 34

Here, Almario was medically repatriated on October 2, 2013, and

submitted for post-medical examination by the company-designated
physicians. Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim initially examined Almario, 35 and
referred him to other specialists to address the specific concerns. Almario was
referred to Dr. Sumpio (neurosurgeon), and Dr. Chuasuan ( orthopedic
surgeon), because Almario sustained head and back injuries. 36 The specialists
treated Almario, prescribed medications, and assisted in the rehabilitation.
Following the cases of Elburg and Pastrana, the company-designated
physicians must issue a final and valid medical assessment within 120 days
reckoned from October 2, 2013, or the date when Almario was repatriated.
The company-designated physicians had until January 30, 2014, to issue the
assessment unless there was a justifiable reason to extend the period.
Otherwise, Almario's disability must be deemed permanent and total.

28
£Iburg Shipmanagement Phils., Inc. v. Quioge, Jr. , id . at 362-363.
29
G.R. No. 2274 19, June I 0, 2020,
<https://elibrary.jud iciary.gov.ph/thebookshe lf/docmonth / J un/2020/ I>
JO
Razonable v. Maersk-Filipinos Crewing, Inc., G.R. No. 241674, June I 0, 2020,
<https ://elibrary.j udiciary .gov .ph/thebookshelf/docmonth/ Jun/2020/ I>
JI
G.R. No. 241674, June 10, 2020,
< https: //e library.j udiciary.gov .ph/thebookshelf/docmonth/ J un/2020/ I>
32
Razonable v. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing, Inc., id.
33
G.R. No. 2406 14, June 10, 2019,
<https ://el ibrary .judiciary .gov .ph/thebookshel f/docmonth/ J un/2019/ I>
34
Ampo-on v. Reinier Pacific International Shipping, In c., G.R. No. 240614, June 10, 2019, id.
35
Rollo, pp. 170- 172 . See Annexes "E," "E- 1," and " F."
36
Id. at 209-2 10. See Annexes "Q-1 ," and "Q-2."

I
Decision 9 G.R. No. 227655

The 10 th and Final Report was issued on February 7, 2014, or eight days
beyond the prescribed period. However, the company-designated physicians
failed to justify why the assessment must be issued beyond 120 days . Senior
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F.
Leonen aptly observed that the company-designated physicians failed to
explain in detail the progress of Almario's treatment and approximate
recovery period warranting further medical treatment beyond the 120-day
prescribed period. Thus, the 10 th and Final Repmi beyond 120 days is
unjustified. Following Elburg, Almario's disability is deemed permanent and
total upon the lapse of 120 days. Article 198 (c) ( 1) of the Labor Code becomes
operative: 37

Article 198. Permanent Total Disability. x x x

xxxx

(c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and

permanent:

(1) Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than

one hundred twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in
the Rules;

Moreover, the 10 th and Final Report is not final and valid medical
assessment. It did not categorically state that Almario is fit to work. The report
states:

This is a follow-up report on [Mess person] Almario M. Centeno

who was initially seen here at Marine Medical Services on October 8,
2013[,] and was diagnosed to have S/P Suturing of Lacerated Wound on the
Scalp; Fracture, 3rd Sacrum; Mild L3 - L4 Disc Bulge.

He was previously cleared by the Neurosurgeon.

He was seen by the Orthopedic Surgeon today.

Patient has no subjective complaints at present.

There is note of functional trunk and hips range of motion.

The specialist opines that patient is now cleared orthopedic wise

effective as of February 7, 2014.

He was advised proper hack mechanics to prevent/minimize

recurrence of his back pain.

Enclosed are the comments of the specialists.

37 Ampo-on v. Reinier Pacific lmernational Shipping, Inc., G. R. No. 240614 , June I 0, 2019,
<https: //elibrary.judiciary.gov .ph/thebookshelf/docmonth /J un/2019/ I >

I
Decision IO G.R. No. 227655

Final Diagnosis - S/P Suturing of Lacerated Wound on the Scalp.

Fracture, Jfd Sacrum
Mild L3 - L4 Disc Bulge

Very Truly Yours,

(Sgd.)
Karen Frances Hao-Quan, M.D.
Asst. Medical Coordinator3 8

10 th and Final Report

As can be gleaned from the report, the company-designated physician

did not categorically state that Almario was fit to work after the treatment.
Instead, it contains advice for "proper back mechanics to prevent/minimize
recurrence ofhis back pain," which suggests that Almario's back pain was not
fully resolved. Generic statements on Almario' s condition, such as"[ A !maria]
was previously cleared' and "patient is now cleared orthopedic wise," did not
make the assessment definitive.

In Lemoncito v. BSM Crew Service Centre Philippines, Jnc., 39 a medical

assessment stating that the "petitioner's blood pressure is adequately
controlled with medications," and ''patient is now cleared cardiac wise," is
considered too generic and equivocal on whether the seafarer has a clean bill
of health. A medical assessment that does not reflect the true extent of the
seafarer's sickness or injury and their capacity to resume work is incomplete
and indefinite. 40 This type of assessment must be ignored and set aside. 41

Moreover, the Certificate of Fitness for Work is not conclusive on

Almario's state of health. The certificate was executed by Almario, a seafarer
who has no expertise in the medical field. The certificate stating that Almario
is "fit for duty" should have been executed by the company-designated
physician. Dr. Hao-Quan's signature on the certificate was in capacity as a
witness, and not as a doctor. The certificate is reproduced as follows:

CERTIFICATE OF FITNESS FOR WORK

I, Almario M. Centeno, for myself and my heirs, do hereby release

Skanfil Maritime Svs. , Inc. of all actions, claims, demands, etc., in
connection with being released on this date as fit for duty.

In recognizing this Certificate of Fitness for Work, I hold x x x

Skanfil Maritime Svs., Inc. free from all liabilities as consequence
thereof.

38
Rollo, p. 208.
39
G.R No. 247409, February 3, 2020.
<https: //el ibrary .judiciary .gov. ph/thebookshe Iti'docmonth/ Feb/2020/ l >
40
See Ampo-on v. Reinier Pac{fic International Shipping, In c., G.R. No . 2406 14, June I 0, 2019,
<https :/ /el ibrary.judiciary.gov .ph/thebookshe lf/docmonth /J un/2019/ l >
41
See Ampo-on v. Reinier Pacific International Shipping, Inc., id.

I
Decision 11 G.R. No. 227655

Finally, I hereby declare that this Certificate of Fitness for Work

may be pleaded in bar [of] any proceedings of the law that may be taken
by any government agency, and I do promise to defend the right of x x x
Skanfil Maritime Svs., Inc. x x x in connection with this Certificate of
Fitness for Work.

Witness my hand this 7th day of February 2014 in the City of

Manila, Philippines.

(Sgd.)
Almario M. Centeno
Name of Vessel: Pos Topas
Nature of Illness or Injury:
S/P Suturing of Lacerated Wound on Scalp;
Fracture, 3 rd Sacrum; Mild L3 - L4 Disc Bulge

Date of Fit to Work: February 7, 2014

(Sgd.)
Witness: Karen Frances Hao-Quan, M.D, Marine Medical Services

[Ako], Almario M. Centeno, [ay nagsasaad na ang bahagi ng

salaysay naito ay aking nabasa at ang nasabi ay naipaliwanag sa akin
sa salitang aking naintindihan. Ito pa rin ay katunayan na ang aking
pagsangayon sa nasabi ay aking sarili at kusang kagustuhan, at hindi
bunga ng anumang pangako, pagkukunwari o pagpilit ng sunumang may
kinalaman sa mga nasasaad na usapin].

[Katunayan, aking nilagdaan ang pagpapahayag nitomg ika- 7 ng

Pebrero 2014 sa] Manila.

(Sgd.)
Almario M. Centeno 42

Verily, the 10 th and Final Report and the Certificate of Fitness for Work
are not final and valid assessments. They are incomplete and not definitive of
Almario's state of health and capacity to resume work. Most importantly, they
were issued beyond the prescribed period. Consequently, Almario's disability
is considered pennanent and total. Almario was not even required to refer the
company-designated physician's findings to his chosen physician because
there is no medical assessment to contest. Thus, it is unnecessary to discuss
whether Dr. Sarmiento was among the company-designated physicians, and
talk about the value of Dr. Sarmiento's medical findings.

The amount of disability

benefits based on the
CBA is applicable.

42
Rollo, p. 211. See Annex "Q-3 ."
Decision !2 G.R . No. 227655

The CA found that the C}L\ provisions are applicable:

As for petitioner' s co \'ern g~ u1,der the CBA between "ITF and

Bremer Bereederungsgesellschaft rnbH & Co . KG[,]" the same is
undisputed. The Occurrence RepGrt dated Septernher 27, 2013 pertaining to
petitioner' s injury on board was written, signed, and submitted by Capt. M .
Maiiynenko of M/V POS TOPAS using the header, "BBG-
Bereederungsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG[,]" the party representing private
respondents in their CBA with the lseafarer] concerned, including
petitioner. 43 xx x. (Citation om1tted.)

xxxx

Skanfil argues that it is not a patty to the CBA, and is not bound by its
provisions. The CBA is between ITF and Bremer Bereederungsgesellschaft
mbH & Co. KG. The Court is unconvinced. The CA categorically found that
Skanfil and Crown Shipmanagement, Inc. are represented by Bremer
Bereederungsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG in the CBA vvith the seafarers, but
Skanfil did not deny this finding. Skanfil did not address the CA's observation
that the captain of M/V POS TOPAS used the header of BBG-
Bereederungsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG, and whether the captain merely
erred in using the header. The use of the header belies Skinfil' s claim that the
CBA does not bind it.

The awards for moral and

exemplary damages
should be deleted, but the
attorney's fees should be
retained.

In Chan v. Magsaysay Corporation, 44 the Court explained the nature of

moral and exemplary damages:
Morni damages are awarded as compensati on for acrnal injury
suffered and not as a penalty. The award is proper when the employer's
action was attended by bad faith or fraud , oppressive lo labor, or done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Bad faith is not
simply bad judgment or negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obiiquity and conscious doing of wrong. It means a breach of a known
duty through some motive or interest or ill \vill that partakes of the nature
of fraud.

Exemplary damages , on the other hand are impused not to enrich

one party or impoverish ancither bu t to serve as a deterrent against or as a
negative incentive t0 curh socialiy deleterio us actions, and may only be
awarded in addition to the mor,1L temperate, liquid2.ted or compensatory
damages. In contracts and quasi-comrncts, the cowi m ay award exemplary

43
id . ;:it 27
G. R. No. 2 '.39055 , March ! I, 2020,
< https: //el ibra1-y .j uci ic iary .gov .ph/tl1cb0(>kohc: l/ducrnonth / l'vlai /2020/ I>
Decision 'I ,) G.R. No. 227655

damages if the defendan~ :-:.c ted ir: a wanton, fraudulent, reckless,

oppressive, or malevolent rnanner, 4 " (C itaLions omitted.)

Here, the CA awarded morai darn ages because of the alleged refusal of
Skanfil to pay the disability benefo.s despi te Dr. Sarmiento's certification that
Almario is unfit for work. However, it is insufficient to conclude whether
Skanfil 's actions are tainted with bad faith that would partake the nature of
fraud. Here, Skanfil never evaded its liability of providing medical attention.
Almario was referred to a neurosurgeon and an orthopedic surgeon to address
his medical condition. What is clear here is a difference of opinion on the
status of Almario's medical condition and Skanfil's failure to issue a timely
and valid medical assessment. fn tr.e absence of substantial evidence showing
malice or bad faith in refusing the seafarer' s claim for disability benefits,
moral and exemplary damages should not be awarded.46

However, the award of attorney's fees is proper. Article 2208 (8) of the
Civil Code provides that attorney ' s fees may be recovered "[i]n actions for
indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws." 47

Following Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 48 a legal interest of (6%) per

annum is imposed on the total monetary awards until complete payment.

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition is DENIED. The Court of

Appeals' Decision dated July 27, 2016, and Resolution dated October 14,
2016, in CA - G.R. SP No. 144697 are AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION. Skanfil Maritime Services, Inc. , Crown
Shipmanagement, Inc., and Jose Mario C. Bunag are jointly and solidarily
liable to pay Almario M. Centeno the following am~:mnts:

1. US$125,000.00 as permanent total disability benefits; and

2. 10% of the total judgment award as attorney ' s fees

The awards for moral and exemplary damages are DELETED. The
total monetary awards shall earn legal interest at (6%) per annum from the
finaiity of this Decision until complete payment.

SO ORDERED.

45
Chan v. Magsaysay Corporation_ 1d .
46
Chan v. Magsaysay Corporation, id.
~7
See Pc1s1or v. Bibby Sh ippin.e Pi1ihpp ini!3, !,1c.. G.R. No. ':!:3 8842, November I9, '.2018,
<https://ei ibraryjudiciary.g0v.phitl! ek<.1k'si-wifi'ciocmonth/Nov/20 18/ I>
48
716 Phil. 267 (2013).
 G.R. No. 227655

\1/E CONCUR:

/\ ssociate Justice
C hairperson

ESTELA M.~Rut~ERNABE JHOSEmOPEZ

Senior Associate Justice Associate Justice

~o~ Associate Justice

ATTESTATIO N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been rea ched in
consulta"tion before the case was assigned to the wTiter i ) f the opinion of the
Court's Division.

As soc iate Justice

Chairperson

CER TIFI CA TION

Pursuant ro Section 13 , Article VIJJ of the Constitution, and the

Division Chairper::-01/s .Attest8tion, r ce r1.i fy that the con cl us ions ir, the ab1..r c
. . I·!::td.,neen reac l1e~d.i:~ cons:..111::tion
D)ec1s1on 1 • 1 ,
oetore '
tilt: •
case \vas ass1gne. d h.1 t l1e
w r iter of the cminiwi 0f the Co;;rf :;; i)i\· isi on.
I