G.R. No.

L-83882 January 24, 1989

IN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner, 

vs.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR PABALAN, DELEO
HERNANDEZ, BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, respondent.

Pelaez, Adriano and Gregorio and Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.

Chavez, Hechanova & Lim Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioner.

Augusto Jose y. Arreza for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

The present controversy originated with a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court on 4 July
1988 seeking the release from detention of herein petitioner.   After manifestation and motion of the
1

Solicitor General of his decision to refrain from filing a return of the writ on behalf of the CID,
respondent Commissioner thru counsel filed the return.  Counsel for the parties were heard in oral
2

argument on 20 July 1988. The parties were allowed to submit marked exhibits, and to file
memoranda.   An internal resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. In
3

its 10 November 1988 resolution, denying the petition for habeas corpus, the Court disposed of the
pending issues of (1) jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized Filipino citizen and (2) validity of
warrantless arrest and detention of the same person.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order dated 24 November
1988.   On 29 November 1988, the Court resolved to deny with finality the aforesaid motion for
4

reconsideration, and further resolved to deny the urgent motion for issuance of a restraining order
dated 28 November 1988.  5

Undaunted, petitioner filed a motion for clarification with prayer for restraining order on 5 December
1988.

Acting on said motion, a temporary restraining order was issued by the Court on 7 December
1988.   Respondent Commissioner filed a motion to lift TRO on 13 December 1988, the basis of
6

which is a summary judgment of deportation against Yu issued by the CID Board of Commissioners
on 2 December 1988.   Petitioner also filed a motion to set case for oral argument on 8 December
7

1988.

In the meantime, an urgent motion for release from arbitrary detention   was filed by petitioner on 13
8

December 1988. A memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release dated 14 December 1988
was filed on 15 December 1988 together with a vigorous opposition to the lifting of the TRO.

The lifting of the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on 7 December 1988 is urgently
sought by respondent Commissioner who was ordered to cease and desist from immediately
deporting petitioner Yu pending the conclusion of hearings before the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
To finally dispose of the case, the Court will likewise rule on petitioner's motion for clarification with
prayer for restraining order dated 5 December 1988,   urgent motion for release from arbitrary
9
detention dated 13 December 1988,   the memorandum in furtherance of said motion for release
10

dated 14 December 1988,   motion to set case for oral argument dated 8 December 1988. 
11 12

Acting on the motion to lift the temporary restraining order (issued on 7 December 1988) dated 9
December 1988,  and the vigorous opposition to lift restraining order dated 15 December 1988,   the
13 14

Court resolved to give petitioner Yu a non-extendible period of three (3) days from notice within
which to explain and prove why he should still be considered a citizen of the Philippines despite his
acquisition and use of a Portuguese passport. 15

Petitioner filed his compliance with the resolution of 15 December 1988 on 20 December
1988   followed by an earnest request for temporary release on 22 December 1988. Respondent
16

filed on 2 January 1989 her comment reiterating her previous motion to lift temporary restraining
order. Petitioner filed a reply thereto on 6 January 1989.

Petitioner's own compliance reveals that he was originally issued a Portuguese passport in
1971,   valid for five (5) years and renewed for the same period upon presentment before the proper
17

Portuguese consular officer. Despite his naturalization as a Philippine citizen on 10 February 1978,
on 21 July 1981, petitioner applied for and was issued Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N.
1517410 by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office
certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986.   While still a citizen of the
18

Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,"   he declared his nationality as Portuguese in
19

commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd.   filed 20

in Hongkong sometime in April 1980.

To the mind of the Court, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation
of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration
Commissioners us, Go Gallano,  express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made
21

known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge,
and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen   resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a
22

renewal of his Portuguese passport   and represented himself as such in official documents even
23

after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese
citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

This Court issued the aforementioned TRO pending hearings with the Board of Special Inquiry, CID.
However, pleadings submitted before this Court after the issuance of said TRO have unequivocally
shown that petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine citizenship. The material facts are not
only established by the pleadings — they are not disputed by petitioner. A rehearing on this point
with the CID would be unnecessary and superfluous. Denial, if any, of due process was obviated
when petitioner was given by the Court the opportunity to show proof of continued Philippine
citizenship, but he has failed.

While normally the question of whether or not a person has renounced his Philippine citizenship
should be heard before a trial court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary
as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look into the facts and satisfy itself on
whether or not petitioner's claim to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.

Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or were to be displayed when required
and suppressed when convenient. This then resolves adverse to the petitioner his motion for
clarification and other motions mentioned in the second paragraph, page 3 of this Decision.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner's motion for release from detention is DENIED.
Respondent's motion to lift the temporary restraining order is GRANTED. This Decision is
immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and

Regalado, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., dissenting

I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition at bar does not meet the traditional
standards of fairness envisioned in the due process clause. Petitioner herein is being effectively
deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a summary procedure and upon pieces of documentary
evidence that, to my mind, are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and
conclusion they were offered.

The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissenting opinion that "(c)onsidering the
serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according to law must be applied," is
appropriate as it has been held that "(i)f, however, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien
claims citizenship and supports the claim by substantial evidence, he is entitled to have his status
finally determined by a judicial, as distinguished from an executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949 citing
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 US 149, 68 Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 US 276, 66 Led 938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a full blown trial under the more rigid rules
of evidence prescribed in court proceedings. And certainly, the review powers being exercised by
this Court in this case fall short of this requirement. Said powers of review cannot be a substitute for
the demands of due process, particularly in the light of the well-recognized principle that this Court is
not a trier of facts.

As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied upon by the majority to be inadequate to
support the conclusion that petitioner has renounced his Filipino citizenship, Renunciation must be
shown by clear and express evidence and not left to inference or implication.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting

I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case to divest a Filipino of his citizenship.

Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr. Willie Yu is far from being the desirable
kind of Filipino we would encourage to stay with us. But precisely for this reason, I believe that a
petition for denaturalization should have been filed and prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of
the shortcut methods we are sustaining in the majority opinion. I must emphasize that the Bill of
Rights, its due process clause, and other restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of government
power find their fullest expression when invoked by non-conforming, rebellious, or undesirable
characters.

Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according to law
must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a Filipino, by all means this Court should not stand in the way
of the respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport him. But where a person pleads with all his might
that he has never formally renounced his citizenship and that he might die if thrown out of the
country, he deserves at the very least a full trial where the reason behind his actions may be
explored and all the facts fully ascertained. The determination that a person (not necessarily Mr. Yu)
has ceased to be a Filipino is so momentous and far-reaching that it should not be left to summary
proceedings.

I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on such informal evidence as that presented

in this case are allowed to rule that a Filipino has "renounced" his citizenship and has, therefore,
become stateless or a citizen of another country (assuming that other country does not reject him
because he formally renounced citizenship therein when he became a Filipino) and to immediately
throw him out of the Philippines.

I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign passport is ipso facto express renunciation
of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport for convenience, employment, or
avoidance of discriminatory visa requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Or he may do so
because he wants to give up his Philippine citizenship. Whatever the reason, it must be ascertained
in a court of law where a full trial is conducted instead of an administrative determination of a most
summary nature.

There are allegedly high government officials who have applied for and been given alien certificates
of registration by our Commission on Immigration and Deportation or who have in the past,
performed acts even more indicative of "express renunciation" than the mere use of a passport or
the signing of a commercial document where a different citizenship has been typed or entered. Are
we ready now to authorize the respondent Commissioner to de-Filipinization them? Can they be
immediately deported for lack of lawful documents to stay here as resident aliens? Can a summary
administrative determination override the voice of hundreds of thousands or even millions of voters
who put them in public office? It is likewise not the function of this Court to be a trier of facts and to
arrive at conclusions in the first instance in citizenship cases.

The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any other Filipino being denaturalized or
otherwise deprived of citizenship, he deserves his full day in court. I . therefore, regretfully dissent on
grounds of due process.

CRUZ, J., concurring

I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption that he
has forfeited his status as a naturalized Filipino by his obtention of a Portuguese passport. Passports
are generally issued by a state only to its nationals. The petitioner has not shown that he comes
under the exception and was granted the Portuguese passport despite his Philippine citizenship.

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine
citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of
citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate
act with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the "commercial
documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.
CORTES, J., dissenting

I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino citizenship in deportation proceedings
does not ipso factodeprive the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) of jurisdiction over
a case, its findings being subject to judicial review.

However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in this case the loss of petitioner's Filipino
citizenship has been established. The evidence on record, consisting of the photocopy of a
memorandum from the Portuguese Consular Office that petitioner applied for and was issued a
Portuguese passport in 1981 and that it expired in 1986 and photocopies of commercial papers
manifesting petitioner's nationality as Portuguese, without authentication by the appropriate
Philippine Consul, to my mind, do not constitute substantial evidence that under the law petitioner
has lost his Filipino citizenship by express renunciation.

I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima facie case of such renunciation.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, C.J., dissenting

I dissent. The treatment given by the majority to the petition at bar does not meet the traditional
standards of fairness envisioned in the due process clause. Petitioner herein is being effectively
deprived of his Filipino citizenship through a summary procedure and upon pieces of documentary
evidence that, to my mind, are not sufficiently substantial and probative for the purpose and
conclusion they were offered.

The observation of Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr. in his dissenting opinion that "(c)onsidering the
serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according to law must be applied," is
appropriate as it has been held that "(i)f, however, in a deportation proceeding, the alleged alien
claims citizenship and supports the claim by substantial evidence, he is entitled to have his status
finally determined by a judicial, as distinguished from an executive, tribunal" (3 Am Jur 2d 949 citing
United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 US 149, 68 Led 221, 44 S Ct 54; Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 US 276, 66 Led 938, 42 S Ct 492). By this, it means a full blown trial under the more rigid rules
of evidence prescribed in court proceedings. And certainly, the review powers being exercised by
this Court in this case fall short of this requirement. Said powers of review cannot be a substitute for
the demands of due process, particularly in the light of the well-recognized principle that this Court is
not a trier of facts.

As adverted to earlier, I find the evidence on record relied upon by the majority to be inadequate to
support the conclusion that petitioner has renounced his Filipino citizenship, Renunciation must be
shown by clear and express evidence and not left to inference or implication.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting

I disagree with the summary procedure employed in this case to divest a Filipino of his citizenship.
Judging from the records available to us, it appears that Mr. Willie Yu is far from being the desirable
kind of Filipino we would encourage to stay with us. But precisely for this reason, I believe that a
petition for denaturalization should have been filed and prosecuted in the proper trial court instead of
the shortcut methods we are sustaining in the majority opinion. I must emphasize that the Bill of
Rights, its due process clause, and other restrictions on the untrammeled exercise of government
power find their fullest expression when invoked by non-conforming, rebellious, or undesirable
characters.

Considering the serious implications of de-Filipinization, the correct procedures according to law
must be applied. If Mr. Yu is no longer a Filipino, by all means this Court should not stand in the way
of the respondent Commissioner's efforts to deport him. But where a person pleads with all his might
that he has never formally renounced his citizenship and that he might die if throw out of the country,
he deserves at the very least a full trial where the reason behind his actions may be explored and all
the facts fully ascertained. The determination that a person (not necessarily Mr. Yu) has ceased to
be a Filipino is so momentous and far-reaching that it should not be left to summary proceedings.

I find it a dangerous precedent if administrative official on such informal evidence as that presented

in this case are allowed to rule that a Filipino has "renounced" his citizenship and has, therefore,
become stateless or a citizen of another country (assuming that other country does not reject him
because he formally renounced citizenship therein when he became a Filipino) and to immediately
throw him out of the Philippines.

I am not prepared to rule that the mere use of a foreign passport is ipso facto express renunciation
of Filipino citizenship. A Filipino may get a foreign passport for convenience, employment, or
avoidance of discriminatory visa requirements but he remains at heart a Filipino. Or he may do so
because he wants to give up his Philippine citizenship. Whatever the reason, it must be ascertained
in a court of law where a full trial is conducted instead of an administrative determination of a most
summary nature.

There are allegedly high government officials who have applied for and been given alien certificates
of registration by our Commission on Immigration and Deportation or who have in the past,
performed acts even more indicative of "express renunciation" than the mere use of a passport or
the signing of a commercial document where a different citizenship has been typed or entered. Are
we ready now to authorize the respondent Commissioner to de-Filipinization them? Can they be
immediately deported for lack of lawful documents to stay here as resident aliens? Can a summary
administrative determination override the voice of hundreds of thousands or even millions of voters
who put them in public office? It is likewise not the function of this Court to be a trier of facts and to
arrive at conclusions in the first instance in citizenship cases.

The moral character of Mr. Yu is beside the point. Like any other Filipino being denaturalized or
otherwise deprived of citizenship, he deserves his full day in court. I . therefore, regretfully dissent on
grounds of due process.

CRUZ, J., concurring

I concur in the result because I believe the petitioner has failed to overcome the presumption that he
has forfeited his status as a naturalized Filipino by his obtention of a Portuguese passport. Passports
are generally issued by a state only to its nationals. The petitioner has not shown that he comes
under the exception and was granted the Portuguese passport despite his Philippine citizenship.

Regretfully, I cannot agree with the finding that the petitioner has expressly renounced his Philippine
citizenship. The evidence on this point is in my view rather meager. Express renunciation of
citizenship as a mode of losing citizenship under Com. Act No. 63 is an unequivocal and deliberate
act with full awareness of its significance and consequences. I do not think the "commercial
documents he signed" suggest such categorical disclaimer.

CORTES, J., dissenting

I agree with the majority in the view that a claim of Filipino citizenship in deportation proceedings
does not ipso factodeprive the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) of jurisdiction over
a case, its findings being subject to judicial review.

However, I am unable to go along with the conclusion that in this case the loss of petitioner's Filipino
citizenship has been established. The evidence on record, consisting of the photocopy of a
memorandum from the Portuguese Consular Office that petitioner applied for and was issued a
Portuguese passport in 1981 and that it expired in 1986 and photocopies of commercial papers
manifesting petitioner's nationality as Portuguese, without authentication by the appropriate
Philippine Consul, to my mind, do not constitute substantial evidence that under the law petitioner
has lost his Filipino citizenship by express renunciation.

I find the CIDs evidence inadequate to create even a prima facie case of such renunciation.

Footnotes

1 Petitioner, Rollo at 2.

2 Rollo at 24 & 29.

3 Resolution of 20 July 1988, Rollo at 47.

4 Rollo at 111.

5 Rollo at 127.

6 Rollo at 136.

7 Rollo at 141.

8 Rollo at 153.

9 Rollo at 136.

10 Rollo at 153.

11 Rollo at 175.

12 Rollo at 166.

13 Rollo at 144.

14 Rollo at 173.
15 Resolution of 15 December 1988. Rollo at 171.

16 Rollo at 187.

17 Compliance, par. 2. p. 5.

18 Rollo at 151.

19 Petitioner's oath of allegiance as a Philippine citizen. Exh. A, Compliance. Rollo at

200.

20 Rollo at 33.

21 25 SCRA 890.

22 In Oh Hek How vs. Republic, 29 SCRA 94, L-27429. August 27, 1969, Mr. Chief
Justice Concepcion speaking for the Court, said: "Section 12 of Commonwealth Act
No. 473 provides, however, that before the naturalization certiorari is issued, the
petitioner shall 'solemnly swear; inter alia, that he renounces 'absolutely and forever
all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate' and particularly to the state
of which he is a 'subject or citizen. The obvious purpose of this requirement is to
divest him of his former nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship, because,
otherwise he would have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two (2) distinct
sovereignties, which our laws do not permit, except that pursuant to Republic Act No.
2639, the acquisition of citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen from one of the
Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce loss
or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship if the law of that country grants the same
privilege to its citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the
Philippines and the foreign country from which citizenship is acquired."

23 A passport is defined as an official document of identity and nationality issued to a

person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries (Philippine Legal
Encyclopedia, 1986 Ed., p. 699). Conformably with the universal concept of a
passport the Philippine Foreign Service Code, Section 136, provides that a Philippine
passport is a document certifying to the Philippine citizenship of the holder in use for
travel purposes.