G.R. No. 225595 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v.

ROLANDO
SOLAR Y DUMBRIQUE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 225595, August 06, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. ROLANDO SOLAR Y

DUMBRIQUE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by the accused-appellant Rolando Solar

y Dumbrique (Rolando) assailing the Decision2 dated January 13, 2015 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05757, which affirmed the Judgment 3 dated
September 3, 2012 of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 202 in
Criminal Case No. 08-0616 finding Rolando guilty beyond reasonable doubt, but
downgrading the crime from Murder to Homicide.

The Facts

An Information was filed against Rolando and Mark Kenneth Solar (Mark Kenneth)
for the murder of Joseph Capinig y Mato (Joseph), the accusatory portion of which
reads:

That on or about the 9th day of March 2008, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding each
other, without justifiable motive, with intent to kill and with treachery and abuse of
superior strength, did then and there knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon one JOSEPH CAPINIG y MATO, by then and
there hitting and beating his head with a baseball bat, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal injury which caused his death.

The killing of the aforesaid victim is qualified by the circumstances of treachery and
abuse of superior strength.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During the arraignment, Rolando pleaded not guilty while Mark Kenneth remained at
large and hence was not brought to the RTC's jurisdiction.5

The prosecution presented an eyewitness, namely private complainant Ma. Theresa

Capinig (Ma. Theresa), the wife of Joseph. The prosecution also presented Dr.
Voltaire Nulud (Dr. Nulud), the doctor who conducted the medical examination on
Joseph.

The version of the prosecution, as summarized by the CA, is as follows:

Ma. Theresa testified that on March 9, 2008, at around 2:00 a.m., she decided to
follow her husband who left the house to get his cellphone from Rolando. Along the
way, she saw Rolando and Mark Kenneth hit Joseph with a baseball bat on his nape.
When Joseph fell down, the two simultaneously ganged up on him. She then shouted
for help and the assailants ran away. Immediately, Joseph was rushed to the
hospital but was pronounced "dead on arrival." According to Dr. Nulud, the death
resulted from traumatic injuries on the brain caused by a blunt force applied on the
head of the victim. The postmortem examination revealed two external injuries on
the frontal region or in the forehead, which was a contusion, and a healing abrasion
on the left infra scapular region. Also, there was a subdural and subarachnoidal
hemorrhage on the cerebral hemisphere of the brain or "doon xxx sa dalawang lobes
ng brain ng victim."6

On the other hand, the version of the defense, as also summarized by CA, is as
follows:

Rolando denied the accusation and claimed that he was attending a wake on the
night of March 8, 2008, from 11:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m. the following day. Joseph
was also there drinking and playing cara y cruz with his group. After a while, Joseph
approached him and offered to pawn a cellphone in exchange of cash. However, he
refused because he also needed money. On his way home, he met Joseph who,
upon seeing him, drew out a kitchen knife and tried to stab him thrice. Fortunately,
he was not hit and he immediately ran away.7

Pre-trial and trial thereafter ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, in its Judgment 8 dated September 3, 2012, the RTC
convicted Rolando of the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of the said
Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Rolando Solar [y]
Dumbrique GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of MURDER defined and
penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accordingly, said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased victim, Joseph Capinig, the
amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.

xxxx

SO ORDERED.9

The RTC found the testimony of Ma. Theresa, the sole eyewitness of the prosecution,
to be clear, positive, categorical, and credible to establish Rolando's guilt for the
crime charged. The RTC also held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
present in the killing of Joseph, and hence, the crime committed by Rolando was
Murder.

Aggrieved, Rolando appealed to the CA. In his Brief, 10 he stated that the prosecution
failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt by failing to prove his identity as
the perpetrator, and that there was lack of evidence to support a finding of
conspiracy among the accused. He argued that since Ma. Theresa testified that it
was Mark Kenneth who inflicted the fatal blow on the victim, a finding of conspiracy
was necessary to convict him and there were no facts available to support such
conclusion. Thus, Rolando prayed for his acquittal.

Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision11 dated January 13, 2015, the CA modified the RTC's
conviction of Rolando.

Similar to the findings of the RTC, the CA found Ma. Theresa's testimony credible
and sufficient to establish the identity and culpability of Rolando. The CA also held
that conspiracy may be deduced from the conspirators' conduct before, during and
after the commission of the crime indicative of a joint purpose, concerted action and
community of interests — that the facts of the present case reveal such concerted
action to achieve the purpose of killing Joseph. 12

Nevertheless, the CA downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide, holding that
the Information did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing
how treachery attended the killing.13

The CA also modified the award of damages to be paid to the heirs of Joseph. The
CA ordered Rolando to pay the heirs of Joseph the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as temperate damages. 14

Hence, the instant appeal.

Issue

For resolution of the Court are the following issues submitted by Rolando:

(1) Whether the CA erred in convicting Rolando despite the prosecution's failure to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;

(2) Whether the CA erred in convicting Rolando despite the prosecution's failure to
prove that conspiracy exists.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious. The Court affirms the conviction of Rolando, not for the
crime of Homicide as held by the CA, but for the crime of Murder as found by the
RTC.

Whether  the  prosecution  proved  

Rolando's guilt beyond reasonable  
 doubt  

In questioning his conviction, Rolando reiterates the arguments he raised in the CA,
namely that: (1) the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Ma. Theresa, was insufficient
to convict him because of her failure to positively identify him as the perpetrator of
the crime; (2) the testimony of Ma. Theresa was marred with material and
substantial inconsistencies; and (3) Ma. Theresa was a biased witness and her
testimony was tainted with improper motive.15

The arguments deserve scant consideration.

It is well-settled that in the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and

substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn
the factual findings of the trial court.16 Thus, when the case pivots on the issue of
the credibility of the witnesses, the findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great
weight and respect as they are afforded the unique opportunity to ascertain the
demeanor and sincerity of witnesses during trial. 17 Here, after examining the records
of this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to vacate the RTC's appreciation of the
evidence, which was affirmed in toto by the CA.

Further, and as pointed out by the CA, Ma. Theresa was able to positively identify
Rolando as one of the perpetrators of the crime. She was only five meters away
from the scene when it happened, and she knew Rolando since he was a childhood
friend of her siblings.18 That part of her testimony in which she said that she initially
did not see who attacked her husband because it was dark referred to Mark
Kenneth, not Rolando.19 Thus, there is no merit in Rolando's contention that the
prosecution failed to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the crime.

There is also no merit in Rolando's contention that Ma. Theresa's testimony should
not be given credence for being marred with inconsistencies. Rolando avers:

In her direct testimony, Theresa was adamant that she saw accused Mark Kenneth
hit her husband with a baseball bat. However, during the continuation of her
testimony, she admitted that it was dark and she cannot see the face of the
assailant. Moreover, she claimed that her husband was mauled by both the accused
when the latter was already down on the ground. It should be noted, however, that
when she was asked again what happened, she readily recounted that when she
arrived at the scene, she saw her husband being hit by accused Mark Kenneth and
when Joseph fell, she shouted for help and the assailants ran away, altogether
omitting the part where both accused ganged up on Joseph. 20

The supposed inconsistencies pointed out by Rolando were sufficiently explained by

the prosecution. For one, Ma. Theresa already clarified that she did not recognize
Mark Kenneth initially as she did not know him, and she was only able to identify
him through the help of the barangay official who helped her.21 Her initial testimony
that "she saw Mark Kenneth hit her husband" was her narrating to the court of what
she saw: Rolando was in front of her husband while the other person — later
identified as Mark Kenneth — attacked her husband from behind. 22 The other
supposed inconsistency, if at all to be considered one in the first place, changes little
to the conclusion reached in this case. The essence of Ma. Theresa's testimony never
changed, in that she repeatedly claimed that she saw her husband being attacked by
assailants who only stopped when she shouted for help. The supposed
"inconsistency" — on whether it was both Rolando and Mark Kenneth, or only the
latter, who was/were attacking her husband — does not change the essence of her
testimony and, in fact, even strengthens her credibility. The Court stresses that
slight contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the credibility of the
witnesses, as these may be considered as badges of truth rather than indicia of bad
faith; they tend to prove that their testimonies have not been rehearsed; nor are
such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for no person has perfect
faculties of senses or recall.23

In any event, Rolando does not deny that he had an encounter with Joseph on the
date and at the place in question. The only difference between his version and that
of the prosecution's is that he claims that it was Joseph who attacked him first but
that he was able to run away.24 The Court follows the established doctrine that as
between a positive and credible testimony by an eyewitness, on the one hand, and a
hollow denial, on the other, the former generally prevails over the latter. 25 Coupled
with the fact that the findings of the trial courts necessarily carry great weight and
respect, the Court therefore upholds the credibility of Ma. Theresa's testimony and
declares it sufficient to establish the guilt of Rolando beyond reasonable doubt.

Finally, the Court affirms the findings of both the RTC and the CA that Rolando failed
to prove any ill motive on the part of Ma. Theresa to implicate him. There is no
evidence on record, apart from the empty imputations of ill motive by Rolando, that
shows that Ma. Theresa was motivated by an improper motive to implicate Rolando
for the crime. Thus, as the Court held in People v. De Leon:26

The credibility of the prosecution witnesses is not affected by their relationship with
the deceased. The fact that witness Chito is the son of the victim while Annaluz's
mother-in-law is the second cousin of the wife of the victim is of no consequence
since mere relationship with the victim does not necessarily tarnish the testimony of
a witness. When there is no showing of improper motive on the part of the witness
in testifying against the accused, her relationship with the victim does not render
her testimony less worthy of full faith and credence. In fact, relationship itself
could even strengthen credibility in a particular case, for it is highly
unnatural for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than
the actual culprit. The earnest desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not
served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence to blame
one who is innocent of the crime.27 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To repeat, the testimony of Ma. Theresa deserves full faith and credit. It is thus
sufficient to establish the guilt of Rolando beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the CA erred in finding  

that conspiracy existed between  
Rolando and Mark Kenneth  

Rolando also questions his conviction on the ground that the RTC and the CA erred
in finding him to have acted in conspiracy with Mark Kenneth. He avers that the
evidence on record reveals that it was Mark Kenneth who delivered the fatal blow,
and thus he should be acquitted of the crime charged.

The contention is erroneous.

It is well-established that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.28 Conspiracy is the unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a crime.
There is conspiracy if at the time of the commission of the offense, the acts of two
or more accused show that they were animated by the same criminal purpose and
were united in their execution, or where the acts of the malefactors indicate a
concurrence of sentiments, a joint purpose and a concerted action. 29

While it is true that the elements of conspiracy must be proved by the same kind of
proof — proof beyond reasonable doubt — necessary to establish the physical acts
constituting the crime itself,30 this is not to say that direct proof of such conspiracy is
always required. The existence of conspiracy need not, at all times, be established
by direct evidence. Nor is it necessary to prove prior agreement between the
accused to commit the crime charged.31 Indeed, conspiracy is very rarely proved by
direct evidence of an explicit agreement to commit the crime. Thus, the rule is
well-settled that conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, where such
conduct reasonably shows community of criminal purpose or design. 32

In the present case, both the RTC and CA correctly inferred from the collective acts
of the assailants that conspiracy exists despite the absence of direct evidence to the
effect. As the CA correctly held:

x x x In this case, implied conspiracy between the accused can be deduced from the
mode and manner in which they perpetrated the killing. First, Rolando and Mark
Kenneth were together at the crime scene. Second, Rolando mauled the victim after
Mark Kenneth hit him with a baseball bat. Third, as soon as they achieved their
common purpose, both accused fled together. All these acts point to the conclusion
that the accused conspired to commit the crime.33

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as
co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active
participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of
the conspiracy because in contemplation of the law the act of one is the act of
all.34 In this case, it is therefore inconsequential whether Rolando delivered a fatal
blow or not.

On the issue of sufficiency of the

Information

In the assailed Decision, while the CA affirmed the RTC's finding that Rolando indeed
killed Joseph, it downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide for failure of the
Information to sufficiently state the particular facts establishing the existence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery. The CA reasoned:

Here, the averments of the information to the effect that the two accused "with
intent to kill and with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon
one JOSEPH CAPINIG y MATO, by then and there hitting and beating his head with a
baseball bat, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injury which directly caused
his death" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how
treachery attended the killing. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring
the killing of a person by hitting his head with a baseball bat, without more, did not
show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk
to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the
baseball bat as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other
instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term
treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone,
was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of fact. In short, the
particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant
circumstance in murder were missing from the information.35 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied; italics in the original)

While neither of the parties questioned the above finding of the CA in this appeal,
the Court nevertheless addresses the same considering that:

x x x in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and
the reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed
judgment, or even reverse the trial court's decision based on grounds other than
those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records,
revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper
provision of the penal law.36

Accordingly, the Court deems it proper to review and discuss the relevant
disquisition by the CA despite the issue not being one of those raised in the appeal.

In reaching its conclusion, the CA adhered to the ruling in the case of People v.
Valdez,37 (Valdez) where the Court held:

Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any

of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its
execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant
circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed.
Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or
qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety
generates the actual need for the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances
or particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate
the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to
defend himself.

It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information. x x x

xxxx

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with
intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength did x x x assault, attack and employ personal violence
upon" the victims "by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting
[them]" on various parts of their bodies "which [were] the direct and
immediate cause of [their] death[s]" did not sufficiently set forth the facts
and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the
killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person
by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the
crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the
defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to
kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the
same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a
sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a
conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts
and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in
murder were missing from the informations.

To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must
specify in the information the details of the crime and any circumstance
that aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient
factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause
of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It
emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to
which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the
body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged
and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and
with the requirements of plain justice, for, as the Court fittingly said in United
States v. Lim San:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no
way aids him in a defense on the merits x x x. That to which his attention
should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most
interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a
crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform
the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set
forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of
procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime
which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the
caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that
pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the
crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his
full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It
is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights.
The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts
alleged in the manner alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime named
murder." If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law
determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It
is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is
named. (Emphasis supplied [in the original])

A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability

is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that
tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in the
ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense
proved. In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part
of those constituting the latter.38

A review of jurisprudence reveals that the ruling enunciated in Valdez was

subsequently reiterated in the cases of People v. Dasmariñas39 (Dasmariñas)
and People v. Delector40 (Delector).

On the other hand, there is a separate line of cases in which an allegation in the
Information that the killing was attended "with treachery" is already sufficient to
inform the accused that he was being charged with Murder instead of simply
Homicide. In People v. Batin,41 (Batin) for instance, the accusatory portion of the
Information filed against the accused therein stated that:

x x x the x x x accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually

helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill, with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and with
evident premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting him with a
handgun, hitting him on the right side of his stomach, thereby inflicting upon him
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his
untimely death.42 (Emphasis supplied)

The accused in Batin specifically claimed in his appeal that the foregoing charge did
not allege the specific treacherous acts of the accused and that the phrase "with
treachery" was a mere conclusion of law.43 The accused thus argued that the
Information failed to satisfy the test of sufficiency of Information as provided in
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. 44 In ruling against the accused's
contention, the Court in Batin stated:

We hold that the allegation of treachery in the Information is sufficient.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases wherein we found the allegation of treachery
sufficient without any further explanation as to the circumstances surrounding it.
Here are some of the cases:

In People v. Lab-eo, Wilson Lab-eo was indicted for murder under the following
Information:

That on or about October 21, 1996, at the Barangay Hall, Poblacion, Tadian,
Mountain Province, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with intent to kill and with the use of a sharp knife, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, strike and stab Segundina
Cay-no with a well-honed and pointed knife and thereby inflicting a mortal stab
wound upon the victim as reflected in that medico-legal certificate, to wit:

Stab wound infrascapular area left, penetrating with massive hemathorax, which
caused the death of the victim thereafter.

That the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery,

abuse of superior strength and craft attended the commission of the
offense.
The accused in this case argued that the Information above, while captioned as
"Murder," only charged him with homicide as written. This Court found nothing
wrong with the Information, and ruled that the Information sufficiently charged the
accused with murder, not even considering the absence of an explanation of the
treachery stated therein, thus:

The fact that the qualifying circumstances were recited in the second paragraph and
not in the first paragraph of the Information, as commonly done, is a matter of form
or style for which the prosecution should not be faulted. That the Provincial
Prosecutor decided to write the Information differently did not impair its sufficiency.
Nothing in the law prohibits the prosecutor from adopting such a form or style. As
long as the requirements of the law are observed, the Information will pass judicial
scrutiny.

xxxx

The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common

understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
properly. The rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
Information in order not to violate the accused's constitutional right to be properly
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose is to
allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding surprises during the
trial. Significantly, the appellant never claimed that he was deprived of his right to
be fully apprised of the nature of the charges against him because of the style or
form adopted in the Information.

This Court went on to affirm the conviction of the accused therein with murder
qualified by treachery.

The allegation in the Information of treachery as a qualifying circumstance was

similarly assailed in People v. Opuran, wherein the charge was as follows:

Criminal Case No. 4693

That on or about November 19, 1998, at nighttime, at Km. 1, South Road,

Municipality of Catbalogan, Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, with deliberate intent to kill
and treachery, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack,
assault and stab Demetrio Patrimonio, Jr., with the use of a bladed weapon (5" long
from tip to handle with scabbard), thereby inflicting upon the victim fatal stab
wounds on the back of his body, which wounds resulted to his instantaneous death.

All contrary to law, and with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery.

This Court again rejected the argument of the defense by finding the allegation of
treachery sufficient, and later on finding the accused therein guilty of murder
qualified by treachery:

We do not find merit in appellant's contention that he cannot be convicted of murder

for the death of Demetrio, Jr. because treachery was not alleged with "specificity" as
a qualifying circumstance in the information. Such contention is belied by the
information itself, which alleged: "All contrary to law, and with the attendant
qualifying circumstance of treachery." In any event, even after the recent
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying circumstances need not
be preceded by descriptive words such as qualifying or qualified by to properly
qualify an offense.

Finally, the following constitutes the Information in People v. Bajar:

That on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening,
at sitio Mohon, Barangay Mambayaan, Municipality of Balingasag, Province of
Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, then armed with a sharp bolo, with
intent to kill, and with evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one [85-year-old] Aquilio Tiwanak,
accused's father-in-law, hitting him on the different parts of his body, which caused
his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Aquilio Tiwanak
in such amounts as may be allowed by law.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage of superior strength,

disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his age, habitual intoxication
and relationship attended the commission of the crime.

CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation [to] Article 14,
paragraph 3 and 15, and Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.

Like in the previous two cases, this Court found the Information to have sufficiently
alleged treachery as a qualifying circumstance. Evidentiary facts need not be alleged
in the information because these are matters of defense. Informations need only
state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the
trial.45 (Emphasis supplied)

In short, there are currently two different views on how the qualifying circumstance
of treachery should be alleged. On the one hand is the view that it is sufficient that
the Information alleges that the act be committed "with treachery." The second view
requires that the acts constituting treachery — or the acts which directly and
specially insured the execution of the crime, without risk to the offending party
arising from the defense which the offended party might make — should be
specifically alleged and described in the Information.

The CA, in the assailed Decision in this case, took the second view and held that the
Information did not specifically allege the acts constituting treachery. As a result, it
downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide.

The Court, however, reverses the ruling of the CA. The Court thus convicts Rolando
for Murder instead of Homicide.

Rolando has waived his right to  

question   the   defects   in  
 
the
Information filed against him  

The Court notes that the right to question the defects in an Information is not
absolute. In fact, defects in an Information with regard to its form may be waived by
the accused. For instance, in People v. Palarca,46 the accused was charged with rape,
but the Information filed against him failed to specify that he had carnal knowledge
of the victim through force or intimidation. When it reached the Court, it held that
the accused therein may still be validly convicted of the crime despite the
insufficiency of the Information, ratiocinating thus:

In any event, accused-appellant failed to interpose any objection to the presentation

by the prosecution of evidence which tended to prove that he committed the rape by
force and intimidation. While generally an accused cannot be convicted of an offense
that is not clearly charged in the complaint or information, this rule is not without
exception. The right to assail the sufficiency of the information or the admission of
evidence may be waived by the accused-appellant. In People v. Lopez, we held
that an information which lacks certain essential allegations may still
sustain a conviction when the accused fails to object to its sufficiency
during the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent evidence
presented therein. Thus —

[F]ailure to object was thus a waiver of the constitutional right to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. It is competent for a
person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action
which would be invalid if taken against his will. (1 ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 31-32 [1983 ed.]). This Court has, on more than one
occasion, recognized waivers of constitutional rights, e.g., the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures (People v. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221
[1936]; Viuda de Gracia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 [1938]); the right to counsel and to
remain silent (People v. Royo, 114 SCRA 304 [1982]); the right to be heard (Abriol
v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 [1949]; People v. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957 [1980]); and the
right to bail (People v. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 [1991]).47 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Similarly, in the case of People v. Razonable,48 the Court held that if an Information

is defective, such that it fails to sufficiently inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, then it is the accused's duty to enforce his right
through the procedural rules created by the Court for its proper enforcement. The
Court explained:

The rationale of the rule, which is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, should guide our decision. To claim this substantive right
protected by no less than the Bill of Rights, the accused is duty bound to follow our
procedural rules which were laid down to assure an orderly administration of
justice. Firstly, it behooved the accused to raise the issue of a defective
information, on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the
prescribed form, in a motion to quash said information or a motion for bill
of particulars. An accused who fails to take this seasonable step will be
deemed to have waived the defect in said information. The only defects in
an information that are not deemed waived are where no offense is
charged, lack of jurisdiction of the offense charged, extinction of the
offense or penalty and double jeopardy. Corollarily, we have ruled that
objections as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for
the first time on appeal. In the case at bar, appellant did not raise either in a motion
to quash or a motion for bill of particulars the defect in the Information regarding
the indefiniteness of the allegation on the date of the commission of the
offense.49 (Emphasis supplied)
To recall, in the present case, Rolando did not question the supposed insufficiency of
the Information filed against him through either a motion to quash or motion for bill
of particulars. He voluntarily entered his plea during the arraignment and proceeded
with the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any of the waivable defects in the
Information, including the supposed lack of particularity in the description of the
attendant circumstances. In other words, Rolando is deemed to have understood the
acts imputed against him by the Information. The CA therefore erred in modifying
Rolando's conviction in the way that it did when he had effectively waived the right
to question his conviction on that ground.

It is for this reason that the Court modifies Rolando's conviction from Homicide to
Murder — he failed to question the sufficiency of the Information by availing any of
the remedies provided under the procedural rules, namely: either by filing a motion
to quash for failure of the Information to conform substantially to the prescribed
form,50 or by filing a motion for bill of particulars. 51 Again, he is deemed to have
waived any of the waivable defects in the Information filed against him.

Insufficiency of Informations  
that    merely    mention   or  
enumerate    the    attending  
circumstances  

Despite the foregoing, the Court hereby establishes a policy, for the guidance of the
Bench and the Bar, on how the qualifying circumstance of treachery — and other
qualifying, aggravating, and attendant circumstances similar to it — should be
properly alleged in an Information.

The Court stresses that the starting point of every criminal prosecution is that the
accused has the constitutional right to be presumed innocent. 52 Further to this, the
courts, in arriving at their decisions, are instructed by no less than the Constitution
to bear in mind that no person should be deprived of life or liberty without due
process of law.53 An essential component of the right to due process in criminal
proceedings is the right of the accused to be sufficiently informed, in writing, of the
cause of the accusation against him.54 The rationale behind the requirement of
sufficiently informing the accused in writing of the cause of the accusation against
him was explained as early as 1904 in the case of United States v. Karelsen:55

The object of this written accusation was —

First. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against
him as well enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself of
his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for
the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it
may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one
should be had. (United States vs. Cruikshank, 92 U.S., 542.) In order that this
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated; not conclusions of
law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these must be set forth in
the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff and
defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime
charged. For example, if a malicious intent is a necessary ingredient of the
particular offense, then malice must be alleged. In other words, the prosecution will
not be permitted to prove, under proper objection, a single material fact unless the
same is duly set forth by proper allegation in his complaint. Proof or evidence of
material facts is rendered admissible at the trial by reason of their having been duly
alleged in the complaint. (Rex vs. Aspinwall, 2 Q.B.D., 56; Bradlaugh vs. Queen, 3
Q.B.D., 607.)

xxxx

There is a general opinion that a greater degree of certainty is required in criminal

pleading than in civil. This is not the rule. The same rules of certainty apply both to
complaints in criminal prosecutions and petitions or demands in civil cases. Under
both systems[,] every necessary fact must be alleged with certainty to a common
intent. Allegations of "certainty to a common intent" mean that the facts
must be set out in ordinary and concise language, in such a form that
persons of common understanding may know what is meant.56 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

This right to be informed of the cause of the accusation, in turn, is implemented

through Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which provide:

SECTION 8. Designation of the Offense. — The complaint or information shall state

the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If
there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or
subsection of the statute punishing it.

SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be
stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

It is thus fundamental that every element of which the offense is composed must be
alleged in the Information. No Information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. 57 The test in
determining whether the information validly charges an offense is whether the
material facts alleged in the complaint or information will establish the essential
elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. In this examination,
matters aliunde are not considered.58 To repeat, the purpose of the law in requiring
this is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense, as he is presumed to
have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. 59

In addition, the Court remains mindful of the fact that the State possesses vast
powers and has immense resources at its disposal. Indeed, as the Court held
in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, 60 the individual citizen is but a speck of particle or
molecule vis-a-vis the vast and overwhelming powers of government and his only
guarantee against oppression and tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the
Bill of Rights which shield him in times of need. 61
In the particular context of criminal prosecutions, therefore, it is the State which
bears the burden of sufficiently informing the accused of the accusations against
him so as to enable him to properly prepare his defense.

With the foregoing principles in mind, the Court thus agrees with the ruling
enunciated in Valdez, as subsequently reiterated
in Dasmariñas and Delector. Consequently, the Court holds that it is
insufficient for prosecutors to indicate in an Information that the act
supposedly committed by the accused was done "with treachery" or "with
abuse of superior strength" or "with evident premeditation" without
specifically describing the acts done by the accused that made any or all of
such circumstances present. Borrowing the words of the Court in Dasmariñas, "to
merely state in the information that treachery was attendant is not enough because
the usage of such term is not a factual averment but a conclusion of law." 62

An information alleging that treachery exists, to be sufficient, must therefore have

factual averments on how the person charged had deliberately employed means,
methods or forms in the execution of the act that tended directly and specially to
insure its execution without risk to the accused arising from the defense that the
victim might make.63 The Information must so state such means, methods or forms
in a manner that would enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense was intended to be charged.64

In this connection, the Court takes this opportunity to remind prosecutors of the
crucial role they play in the justice system. Prosecutors are, in the words of Mr.
Justice George Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United States:

x x x the representative[s] not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a

sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation
to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.65

Indeed, prosecutors perform the unique function, essential in the maintenance of

the rule of law and peace and order, of ensuring that those who violate the law are
brought to justice. The right of the State to prosecute, however, is not absolute. The
Bill of Rights precisely "defines the limits beyond which lie unsanctioned state
actions"66 and reserves certain areas for "the individual as constitutionally protected
spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at
will."67 The prosecutors — through whom this right of the State to prosecute is
exercised — therefore do not have a blanket grant of authority to disregard the
rights of citizens under the Constitution. 68

Therefore, prosecutors should bear in mind that in performing their functions, the
constitutionally enshrined right of the accused to be informed of the cause of the
accusation against him remains primordial. To this end, prosecutors
are instructed to state with sufficient particularity not just the acts complained
of or the acts constituting the offense, but also the aggravating circumstances,
whether qualifying or generic, as well as any other attendant
circumstances, that would impact the penalty to be imposed on the accused
should a verdict of conviction be reached.

Moreover, prosecutors are enjoined to strictly implement the mandate of,

and ensure compliance with Section 8 (a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure69 to attach to the Informations they will be filing in
courts their resolutions finding probable cause against the accused.

Finally, trial courts are likewise enjoined to ensure that the accused is

furnished a copy of the said resolutions finding probable cause against the
accused. The trial court, on its own initiative, shall thus order the production of the
records of the preliminary investigation in accordance with Section 8 (b), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 70

These requirements are imposed to ensure that the accused is sufficiently apprised
of the acts and circumstances with which he is being charged, with the end in view
of respecting or fulfilling his right to be informed of the cause of the accusation
against him.

In sum, the Court, continually cognizant of its power and mandate to promulgate
rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,71 hereby lays down the following
guidelines for the guidance of the Bench and the Bar:

1. Any Information which alleges that a qualifying or aggravating circumstance

— in which the law uses a broad term to embrace various situations in which
it may exist, such as but are not limited to (1) treachery; (2) abuse of
superior strength; (3) evident premeditation; (4) cruelty — is present, must
state the ultimate facts relative to such circumstance. Otherwise, the
Information may be subject to a motion to quash under Section 3 (e)
(i.e., that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form), Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, or a motion for a bill of particulars
under the parameters set by said Rules.

Failure of the accused to avail any of the said remedies constitutes a waiver
of his right to question the defective statement of the aggravating or
qualifying circumstance in the Information, and consequently, the same may
be appreciated against him if proven during trial.

Alternatively, prosecutors may sufficiently aver the ultimate facts relative to a

qualifying or aggravating circumstance by referencing the pertinent portions
of the resolution finding probable cause against the accused, which resolution
should be attached to the Information in accordance with the second
guideline below.

2. Prosecutors must ensure compliance with Section 8 (a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure that mandates the attachment to the
Information the resolution finding probable cause against the accused. Trial
courts must ensure that the accused is furnished a copy of this Decision prior
to the arraignment.
3. Cases which have attained finality prior to the promulgation of this Decision
will remain final by virtue of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
4. For cases which are still pending before the trial court, the prosecution, when
still able, may file a motion to amend the Information pursuant to the
prevailing Rules72 in order to properly allege the aggravating or qualifying
circumstance pursuant to this Decision.
5. For cases in which a judgment or decision has already been rendered by the
trial court and is still pending appeal, the case shall be judged by the
appellate court depending on whether the accused has already waived his
 right to question the defective statement of the aggravating or qualifying
circumstance in the Information, (i.e., whether he previously filed either a
motion to quash under Section 3(e), Rule 117, or a motion for a bill of
particulars) pursuant to this Decision.

In view of the foregoing, the Court thus reverses the assailed Decision of the CA.

Considering the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta,73 the civil indemnity, moral

damages, and exemplary damages awarded in the questioned Decision is hereby
modified to P75,000.00 each. Temperate damages in the amount of P50,000.00 is
likewise awarded to the heirs of Joseph.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby ADOPTS the findings of fact

in the attached Decision dated January 13, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 05757, and finds the accused-appellant Rolando Solar y Dumbrique
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. He is thus sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Joseph
Capinig y Mato SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as civil
indemnity, SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as moral
damages, SEVENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) as exemplary
damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as temperate
damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of

Justice, as well as to the Head/Chief of the National Prosecution Service, the Office
of the Solicitor General, the Public Attorney's Office, the Philippine National Police,
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the National Bureau of Investigation, and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. Likewise,
the Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to DISSEMINATE copies of this
Decision to all trial courts, including the Court of Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C.J., I dissent.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, Peralta, A. Reyes, Jr., Hernando, Carandang,
Lazaro-Javier, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., I join dissent of C.J. Bersamin.
Jardeleza, J., no part.
Gesmundo, J., Please see separate concurring opinion.
J. Reyes, Jr., J., on leave.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on August 6, 2019 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was
received by this Office on November 12, 2019 at 11:05 a.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

1
See Notice of Appeal dated February 5, 2015, rollo, pp. 10-11.

2
 Id. at 3-9. Penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez with Associate Justices Noel
G. Tijam (Retired Member of the Court) and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez concurring.

3
 CA rollo, pp. 20-25. Penned by Judge Elizabeth Yu Guray.

4
Rollo, p. 3, note 1 of the CA Decision.

5
 Id. at 4.

6
 Id.

7
 Id.

8
 Supra note 3.

9
 CA rollo, p. 25.

10
 Id. at 43-57.

11
 Supra note 2.

12
Rollo, p. 6-7.

13
 Id. at 7.

14
 Id. at 8-9.

15
 CA rollo, pp. 50-54.

16
People v. Gerola, 813 Phil. 1055, 1063-1064 (2017).

17
People v. Aguilar, 565 Phil. 233, 247 (2007).

18
Rollo, p. 5.

19
 Id. at 5-6.
20
 CA rollo, p. 52.

21
 Id. at 60.

22
 Id.

23
Kummer v. People, 717 Phil. 670, 678 (2013).

24
 CA rollo, p. 88.

25
People v. Piosang, 710 Phil. 519, 527 (2013).

26
 402 Phil. 851 (2001).

27
 Id. at 868.

28
Siton v. Court of Appeals, 281 Phil. 536, 543 (1991).

29
People v. Aquino, 390 Phil. 1176, 1184-1185 (2000).

30
People v. Degoma, 284-A Phil. 736, 742 (1992).

31
 Id.

32
 Id.

33
Rollo, pp. 6-7.

34
People v. Peralta, 134 Phil. 703, 718 (1968).

35
Rollo, p. 7-8.

36
Ramos v. People, 803 Phil. 775, 783 (2017).

37
 679 Phil. 279 (2012).

38
 Id. at 292-296.

39
 G.R. No. 203986, October 4, 2017, 842 SCRA 39.

40
 G.R. No. 200026, October 4, 2017, 841 SCRA 647.

41
 564 Phil. 249 (2007).

42
 Id. at 252-253.

43
 Id. at 266-267.

44
 Id. at 267.

45
 Id. at 268-271.
46
 432 Phil. 500 (2002).

47
 Id. at 509.

48
 386 Phil. 771 (2000).

49
 Id. at 780.

50
 RULES OF COURT (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure), Rule 117, Sec. 3 (e).

51
 RULES OF COURT (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure), Rule 116, Sec. 9.

52
 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2). "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved x x x."

53
 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 1.

54
 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14 (2).

55
 3 Phil. 223 (1904).

56
 Id. at 226-228.

57
Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil. 712, 719 (2003).

58
 Id.

59
 Id.

60
 379 Phil. 165 (2000).

61
 Id. at 185.

62
 Supra note 39 at 42.

63
 Id. at 61.

64
 Id.

65
Suarez v. Platon, 69 Phil. 556, 564-565 (1940), citing Mr. Justice George
Sutherland in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); 69 United States
Law Review 309 (June, 1935, No. 6).

66
Allado v. Diokno, 302 Phil. 213, 237 (1994).

67
Salonga v. Paño, 219 Phil. 402, 429 (1985).

68
 See Allado v. Diokno, supra note 66 at 238.

69
 SECTION 8. Records. — (a) Records supporting the information or complaint. An
information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and
counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, together with the other
supporting evidence and the resolution on the case.

70
 SECTION 8. Records. — x x x

(b) Record of preliminary investigation. — The record of the preliminary

investigation, whether conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of
the record of the case. However, the court, on its own initiative or on motion of any
party, may order the production of the record or any of its part when necessary in
the resolution of the case or any incident therein, or when it is to be introduced as
an evidence in the case by the requesting party.

71
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5).

72
 RULES OF COURT (Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure), Rule 110, Sec. 14 and
Rule 117, Sec. 4.

73
People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016).

DISSENT

BERSAMIN, C.J.:

The Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated its decision dated January 13, 2015 1 in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 05757 affirming the judgment of conviction of the accused-appellant
rendered on September 3, 2012 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202, in
Las Piñas City2 but downgraded the crime from murder to homicide on the ground
that the information did not allege murder.

Today, the Court affirms the finding of guilty but reverses the CA's downgrading of
the offense, and finds the accused-appellant guilty of murder as found by the RTC
on the basis that he had waived his right to assail the defects of the information filed
against him and under which he had been arraigned.

I respectfully DISSENT.

I maintain that the CA correctly downgraded the offense from murder to homicide
considering that the information did not charge murder, but only homicide. I insist
that the accused-appellant could not be held guilty of murder if the information
denied him due notice of what he was being charged with.

The information alleged as follows:

That on or about the 9th day of March 2008, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding each
other, without justifiable motive, with intent to kill and with treachery and abuse of
superior strength, did then and there knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon one JOSEPH CAPINIG y MATO, by then and
there hitting and beating his head with a baseball bat, thereby inflicting upon the
latter mortal injury which caused his death.

The killing of the aforesaid victim is qualified by the circumstances of

treachery and abuse of superior strength.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

As can be seen, the information tersely averred that "[t]he killing of the aforesaid
victim is qualified by the circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength."
Such averment did not state any facts that described or set forth the
acts constitutive of treachery and abuse of superior strength, the attendant
circumstances that would have qualified the killing to murder. Such acts would have
told him how he had mounted the lethal attack that led to the killing of the victim. It
was to such terse information that the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his
arraignment.

In my view, the CA correctly opined thusly:

Here, the averments of the information to the effect that the two accused "with
intent to kill and with treachery and abuse of superior strength, did then and there
knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon
one JOSEPH CAPINIG y MATO, by then and there hitting and beating his head with a
baseball bat, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal injury which directly caused
his death" did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how
treachery attended the killing. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring
the killing of a person by hitting his head with a baseball bat, without more, did not
show how the execution of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk
to the accused from the defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the
baseball bat as an instrument to kill was not per se treachery, for there are other
instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term
treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone,
was nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of fact. In short, the
particular acts and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant
circumstance[s] in murder were missing from the information.4

In People v. Valdez,5 a ruling that the CA cited to buttress its foregoing opinion, the
Court emphatically held:

Treachery is the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of any

of the crimes against persons which tend to directly and specially insure its
execution, without risk to the offending party arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. It encompasses a wide variety of actions and attendant
circumstances, the appreciation of which is particular to a crime committed.
Corollarily, the defense against the appreciation of a circumstance as aggravating or
qualifying is also varied and dependent on each particular instance. Such variety
generates the actual need for the State to specifically aver the factual circumstances
or particular acts that constitute the criminal conduct or that qualify or aggravate
the liability for the crime in the interest of affording the accused sufficient notice to
defend himself.
It cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information.

...

The averments of the informations to the effect that the two accused "with
intent to kill, qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of
superior strength did . . . assault, attack and employ personal violence
upon" the victims "by then and there shooting [them] with a gun, hitting
[them]" on various parts of their bodies "which [were] the direct and
immediate cause of [their] death[s]" did not sufficiently set forth the facts
and circumstances describing how treachery attended each of the
killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the killing of a person
by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution of the
crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the
defense that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to
kill was not per se treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the
same lethal purpose. Nor did the use of the term treachery constitute a
sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was nothing but a
conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts
and circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in
murder were missing from the informations.

To discharge its burden of informing him of the charge, the State must
specify in the information the details of the crime and any circumstance
that aggravates his liability for the crime. The requirement of sufficient
factual averments is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause
of the charge against him in order to enable him to prepare his defense. It
emanates from the presumption of innocence in his favor, pursuant to
which he is always presumed to have no independent knowledge of the
details of the crime he is being charged with. To have the facts stated in the
body of the information determine the crime of which he stands charged
and for which he must be tried thoroughly accords with common sense and
with the requirements of plain justice, for, as the Court fittingly said in United
States v. Lim San:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the
accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no
way aids him in a defense on the merits. . . . . That to which his attention
should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most
interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a
crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform
the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set
forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of
procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime
which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the
caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that
pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the
crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his
full and complete defense he need not know the name of the crime at all. It
is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial rights.
The real and important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts
alleged in the manner alleged?" not "Did you commit a crime named
murder." If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law
determines what the name of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. It
is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is
named. . . . . (emphasis supplied [by the original])

A practical consequence of the non-allegation of a detail that aggravates his liability

is to prohibit the introduction or consideration against the accused of evidence that
tends to establish that detail. The allegations in the information are controlling in the
ultimate analysis. Thus, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged included in the offense
proved. In that regard, an offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
information, constitute the latter; an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part
of those constituting the latter.

The majority opinion, written for the Court by Justice Caguioa, explains in
justification of the reversal of the CA that:

x x x, Rolando did not question the supposed insufficiency of the Information filed
against him through either a motion to quash or motion for bill of particulars. He
voluntarily entered his plea during the arraignment and proceeded with the trial.
Thus, he is deemed to have waived any of the waivable defects in the Information,
including the supposed lack of particularity in the description of the attendant
circumstances. In other words, Rolando is deemed to have understood the acts
imputed against him by the Information. The CA therefore erred in modifying
Rolando's conviction in the way that it did when he had effectively waived the right
to question his conviction on that ground.

It is for this reason that the Court modifies Rolando's conviction from Homicide to
Murder – he failed to question the sufficiency of the Information by availing any of
the remedies provided under the procedural rules, namely: either by filing a motion
to quash for failure of the Information to conform substantially to the prescribed
form, or by filing a motion for bill of particulars. Again, he is deemed to have waived
any of the waivable defects in the Information filed against him.

I submit that the foregoing explanation is far from persuasive.

The right of every accused to know from the information the charge to which he

pleads and for which he stands to be tried, and upon which he is to be held
criminally liable is a precious and fundamental one that is constitutionally
guaranteed. The right, which should be respected by all means, should not be
casually taken away or be easily denied only because he did not assail the
information prior to arraignment and plea, as the majority opinion has found.

Therein lay the fallacy of the majority opinion. In the first place, the accused-
appellant had no duty or obligation to remind the State by motion to quash on what
charge he should be made to answer to. Indeed, if he was legally and genuinely
presumed not to know of any act or omission that would soon be alleged against
him, he could not even be expected to speak at all or be heard from. To insist
otherwise was to annul the formidable presumption of his innocence. In the second
place, he must be fully informed of every act or omission that could render him
criminally liable because fully informing him thereof was of the essence of due
process of law. He could not properly prepare his defense without being thereby fully
informed. In the third place, the omission from the information of the acts
constituting treachery and abuse of superiority did not emanate from him; hence,
that the information actually filed against him did not fully or adequately inform him
of his supposed crime should never be blamed on him.

If the State, not him, ought to know what crime he committed, and should tell him
so, then the Court as the bastion of fairness and constitutionalism should desist from
treating so slightly his right to be informed. This is why the Court has fashioned Rule
110 of the Rules of Court as the means of respecting the right to be informed,
providing therein as follows:

Section 8. Designation of the offense.– The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. (8a)

Section 9. Cause of the accusation. – The acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as
its qualifying and aggravating circumstance and for the court to pronounce
judgment. (9a)

I urge, therefore, that the Court must enforce the rules. Let us always hold the right
of every accused to be informed of the charge brought against him in the highest
esteem. If we cannot enforce the rules we have designed to enforce constitutionally
guaranteed rights for the protection of the accused, let us stop fashioning them.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote TO AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals

downgrading the offense from murder to homicide.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 3-9; penned by Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez, with Associate Justice
Noel G. Tijam (later a Member of the Court, but since retired) and Associate Justice
Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez concurring.

2
 CA rollo, pp. 20-25; penned by Judge Elizabeth Yu Guray.

3
Rollo, p. 3.

4
 Id. at 7.

5
 G.R. No. 175602, January 18, 2012, 679 Phil 279-296.
 C O N C U R R I N G   O P I N I O N

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

I concur. Despite the failure of the Information in this case to sufficiently state the
qualifying circumstance of Treachery in accordance with the form prescribed by the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the same must nevertheless be appreciated against
accused-appellant Rolando Solar y Dumbrique (Solar) for his failure to assail such
defect. As such, his conviction for Murder must be upheld.

To recount, Section 6, Rule 110 of the present Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that "[a] complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense
was committed."1 In this relation, Section 9 of the same Rule states that "[t]he
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated
in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in
the statute  but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment."2 According to case law, the failure to comply with this requirement
subjects the Information to a motion to quash, and the test is whether or not the
Information properly states the ultimate facts constitutive of the offense: 3

Under the Constitution, a person who stands charged of a criminal offense has the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
Rules of Court, in implementing the right, specifically require that the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense, including the qualifying and
aggravating circumstances, must be stated in ordinary and concise language, not
necessarily in the language used in the statute, but in terms sufficient to enable a
person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged and the
attendant qualifying and aggravating circumstances present, so that the accused can
properly defend himself and the court can pronounce judgment. To broaden the
scope of the right, the Rules authorize the quashal, upon motion of the
accused, of an Information that fails to allege the acts constituting the
offense. Jurisprudence has laid down the fundamental test in appreciating a motion
to quash an Information grounded on the insufficiency of the facts alleged therein.
We stated in People v. Romualdez [581 Phil. 462, 479 (2008)] that:

The determinative test in appreciating a motion to quash x x x is the sufficiency of

the averments in the information, that is, whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by law
without considering matters aliunde. As Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires, the information only needs to state the ultimate facts; the
evidentiary and other details can be provided during the trial.4
The failure to sufficiently state the ultimate facts constitutive of the offense subjects
the Information to a motion to quash grounded on Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure:

Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or

information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

The Information is subject to quashal because it cannot be discerned therefrom if

there is an offense or what particular offense is being charged, hence, violative of
the accused's constitutional right to be informed. Because of this constitutional
violation, Section 9 of the same Rule further provides that the failure to assert this
ground – similar to the grounds in Section 3 (b), (g), and (i) – would not be deemed
as a waiver to assert the same:

Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure
of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i)
of Section 3 of this Rule.

However, the ground to quash an Information under Section 3 (a), Rule 117 (i.e.,
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense) is different from the ground
provided for under Section 3 (e), Rule 117 (i.e., that it does not conform
substantially to the prescribed form). This latter ground is subject to a waiver as it is
not one of those grounds specifically provided for under Section 9 of the same Rule.

An Information which contains ultimate facts constitutive of the offense but states
the qualifying or aggravating circumstance not in accordance with the prescribed
form is only subject to quashal under Section 3 (e), Rule 117. As illustrated in this
case, an Information which only states the term "Treachery", without the material
averments relative thereto, is formally defective because a person of common
understanding is not presumed to know the technical import of the same. As held
in People v. Delector:5

[T]he Court cannot uphold the judgments of the [Court of Appeals (CA)] and the
[Regional Trial Court (RTC)] and convict the accused for murder. A reading of the
information indicates that murder had not been charged against him. The allegation
of the information that:
x x x the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one VICENTE DELECTOR alias TINGTING with the use of a firearm
(revolver), which the accused had conveniently provided himself for the purpose,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds on the different parts of his body,
which caused the untimely death of said Vicente Delector.

did not sufficiently aver acts constituting either or both treachery and evident
premeditation. The usage of the terms treachery and evident premeditation, without
anything more, did not suffice[,] considering that such terms were in the nature of
conclusions of law, not factual averments.

xxxx

Treachery, which the CA and the RTC ruled to be attendant, always included basic
constitutive elements whose existence could not be assumed. Yet, the information
nowhere made any factual averment about the accused having deliberately
employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the act – setting forth such
means, methods or forms in a manner that would enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense was intended to be charged – that tended
directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the accused arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. To reiterate what was earlier
indicated, it was not enough for the information to merely state treachery as
attendant because the term was not a factual averment but a conclusion of law. 6

Hence, while an Information may convey an offense, the defective statement of a

qualifying (or aggravating) circumstance still subjects the same to quashal under
Section 3 (e), Rule 117. To reiterate, this latter ground, if not timely raised by the
accused, may be deemed waived. Also, to remedy this defect, an accused may opt
to move for a bill of particulars under Section 9, Rule 116. 7

In this case, notwithstanding the Information's non-statement of the material

averments relative thereto, Solar's failure to avail of these remedies means that he
had fully understood the import of the term "Treachery." Thus, it cannot be said that
his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him has
been transgressed; and consequently, his conviction for the crime of Murder must be
upheld.

To note, this situation should be distinguished from a situation wherein the

Information completely lacks any allegation of Treachery. In this latter
instance, when there is a total absence of any allegation of the
qualifying/aggravating circumstance – and not a mere defect  – then such
qualifying/aggravating circumstance shall not be appreciated against the accused,
regardless of whether or not the same is later proven during trial; this must be so
otherwise, the accused would be caught completely off guard in utter defiance of his
constitutional right to be informed.

In view of the above, I therefore agree with the ponencia's affirmance of Solar's

conviction for the crime of Murder, including the guidelines therein adopted to
heretofore implement the ponencia's disposition.

Endnotes:
1
 Emphases supplied.

2
 Emphases and underscoring supplied.

3
 See Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 619 Phil. 306 (2009).

4
 Id. at 316; emphases and underscoring supplied.

5
 G.R. No. 200026, October 4, 2017, 841 SCRA 647.

6
 Id. at 658-663.

7
 Section 9. Bill of particulars. — The accused may, before arraignment, move for a
bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion
shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details
desired.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

GESMUNDO, J.:

This Appeal1 seeks the reversal and setting aside of the January 13, 2015
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05757. The CA affirmed
with modification the September 3, 2012 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Piñas City, Branch 202 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 08-0616 finding Ronaldo
Solar y Dumbrique (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder. However, the CA downgraded the conviction to Homicide due to the
insufficient allegation in the Information of the qualifying circumstances.

An Information was filed against appellant and a certain Mark Kenneth Solar (Mark
Kenneth) for the killing of Joseph Capinig y Mato (Capinig) before the RTC. The
accusatory portion reads:

That on or about the 9th day of March 2008, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating together and both of them mutually helping and aiding each
other, without justifiable motive, with intent to kill and with treachery and abuse
of superior strength, did then and there knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use personal violence upon one JOSEPH CAPINIG y MATO, by
then and there hitting and beating his head with a baseball bat, thereby inflicting
upon the later mortal injury which caused his death.

The killing of the aforesaid victim is qualified by the circumstances of treachery

and abuse of superior strength.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4 (emphases supplied)

During arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty," while Mark Kenneth remained at
large.

Thereafter trial ensued.

In its September 3, 2012 Decision, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. It held that the testimony of the
prosecution's witness was clear, positive, categorical and credible to establish that
appellant did, indeed, kill Capinig with treachery. It gave credence to the
prosecution's evidence that appellant and Mark Kenneth hit Capinig's nape with a
baseball bat and, when Capinig fell down, simultaneously ganged upon him.

Appellant assails the RTC decision arguing that the prosecution failed to prove there
was conspiracy between him and Mark Kenneth, and its evidence wanting to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In its January 13, 2015 Decision, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC
Decision. It held that the prosecution witness sufficiently established the identity and
culpability of appellant in the killing of Capinig. It also stated that there was a
concerted action between appellant and Mark Kenneth, hence, conspiracy was
present.

However, the CA, relying on People v. Valdez, et al.,5 downgraded the crime from
Murder to Homicide because the Information did not sufficiently set forth the facts
and circumstances describing how treachery attended the killing.

The ponencia explained that there are conflicting jurisprudence regarding the issue

of whether the allegation of aggravating circumstances in the Information must be
described with specificity.6 It concluded that appellant had waived his right to
question the defects in the Information filed against him, including the supposed
lack of particularity in description of the attendant circumstances. Thus, appellant is
deemed to have understood the acts imputed against him in the Information and the
CA erred in modifying appellant's conviction.7 Consequently, appellant should be
convicted of the crime of Murder, instead of Homicide.

Nevertheless, the ponencia provided a procedure, for the guidance of the Bench and

the Bar, that the attendant circumstances should be properly alleged in the
Information.8 From the promulgation of the Decision, any Information, which alleges
a qualifying or aggravating circumstance, must contain factual averments that would
enable a person of common understanding to know the acts he supposedly
committed; otherwise, the circumstances would not be appreciated even though
these are subsequently proved in trial by the prosecution.

I concur with the ponencia.

Conflicting    jurisprudence
as to the specificity  of the
allegation of the attendant
circumstances

The Information filed against appellant simply stated that the killing of Capinig was
"qualified by the circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength."
Evidently, it did not contain factual allegations particularly describing the qualifying
or aggravating circumstances. Jurisprudence provides opposing decisions as to the
sufficiency of Information when the attendant circumstances are not described with
specificity.

The first set of cases – People v. Valdez,9People v. Dasmariñas,10 and People v.

Delector11 – states that when the Information does not sufficiently set forth the facts
and circumstances describing how the qualifying or aggravating circumstance of the
crime was committed, the accused cannot be convicted of the graver crime, such as
Murder. These cases essentially explain that the sole use of the term of an
aggravating circumstance, such as treachery, without any particular act or
circumstance, is nothing but a conclusion of law and not an averment of fact. 12

These cases further underscore that the requirement of sufficient factual averments
is meant to inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in
order to enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of
innocence in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no
independent knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged of. 13

I concurred in People v. Dasmariñas and People v. Delector that the accused therein

could not be convicted of Murder, only of Homicide, not because of the lack of
specific factual recitals in the Information on the qualifying circumstance, but for the
reason that the prosecution failed to prove the two elements of treachery, namely:
(1) that the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or herself, or retaliate; and (2) that the means of execution was
deliberately or consciously adopted, that is, the means, methods or forms of
execution must be shown to have been deliberated upon or consciously adopted by
the offender.14 In those cases, the element – that the means of execution was
consciously adopted – was not proven and was not even discussed by the CA
Decisions therein. In People v. Delector, the OSG even conceded that treachery was
not proven by the prosecution, hence, the accused therein only committed the crime
of Homicide.

On the other hand, the second set of cases – People v. Batin,15People v. Lab-
eo,16People v. Opuran,17 and People v. Bajar18 – states that the allegation of a
qualifying or aggravating circumstance, such as treachery, in the Information
without any further explanation is sufficient. These cases chiefly explain that the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, even after its amendment, do not require that
qualifying circumstances be preceded by descriptive words to properly qualify an
offense.

These cases also underscored that merely stating the qualifying or aggravating
circumstance in the Information is sufficient because evidentiary facts need not be
alleged in the Information as these are matters of defense. They emphasize that
Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be
proved during trial.19

The doctrine in the second set of cases was reiterated in People v. Asilan,20 to wit:

Asilan also claims that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of accusation against him was infringed when he was convicted for Murder, since the
manner by which he carried out the killing with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was not alleged in the Information against him. Thus, he asserts, he was
effectively only charged with Homicide.
This Court does not find merit in Asilan's contention that he cannot be convicted of
murder because his acts of treachery were not alleged with specificity in the
Information. x x x

xxxx

This Court held that "[u]nder Section 6, the Information is sufficient if it contains the
full name of the accused, the designation of the offense given by the statute, the
acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the
approximate date, and the place of the offense." The Information herein
complied with these conditions. Contrary to Asilan's contention, the
qualifying circumstance of "treachery" was specifically alleged in the
Information. "The rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly
pleaded in the Information in order not to violate the accused's
constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him." Asilan never claimed that he was deprived of his right to
be fully apprised of the nature of the charges against him due to the insufficiency of
the Information.

This Court completely agrees with the Court of Appeals' pronouncement that "since
treachery was correctly alleged in the Information and duly established by the
prosecution, x x x [Asilan]'s conviction for the crime of murder is
proper."21 (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, in the second set of cases, it was not required that the qualifying or
aggravating circumstance be alleged with specificity. Notably, in the subsequent
case of People v. Feliciano, Jr., et al.,22 the inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks
and/or other forms of disguise" in the Information does not violate the constitutional
rights of the accused. Although concealment of identity was referred to as the
aggravating circumstance, it was sufficiently stated by alleging disguise. "The
inclusion of disguise in the [I]nformation was, therefore, enough to sufficiently
apprise the accused that in the commission of the offense they were being charged
with, they tried to conceal their identity." 23

Similarly, in People v. Mercado,24 although the aggravating circumstance was "use of

fire," it was not stated in the Information; rather, the phrase "causing third degree
burns" was indicated. The Court ruled that it was a sufficient allegation of the
aggravating circumstance, to wit:

A reading of the afore-quoted portion of the Information readily reveals that while
the "use of fire" was not explicitly mentioned as a qualifying circumstance, the
Information nevertheless narrate with sufficiency that Mercado was being accused of
"causing x x x third degree burns [against the victims] which directly caused their
instantaneous death." It escapes the mind of the Court how one could be accused of
"causing x x x third degree burns" without necessarily saying that he or she used
fire in the process.25

The  Information  may   still

sufficiently     inform       the
accused  even  though    the
details   of    the    attendant
circumstance are not stated
therein
The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. Thus, Section 14(2), Article III of
the Constitution states:

Section 14. x x x

xxxx

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (emphasis supplied)

This right is reiterated under the Section 1(b), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure:

Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be entitled to the following rights:

xxxx

(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

I believe that the doctrine laid down in the second set of cases, wherein the
Information need not particularly describe the facts and circumstances constituting
the attendant circumstance, does not contravene the aforementioned right of the
accused and is still good case law.

The former Rules of Criminal Procedure did not require qualifying and aggravating
circumstances to be alleged in the Complaint or Information. According to
jurisprudence, aggravating circumstances proven by the evidence, although not
alleged in the Information, may be taken into account as such. Qualifying
circumstances not alleged but proven are considered aggravating. However, this is
no longer true.26

With the advent of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, qualifying and
aggravating circumstances must now be alleged in the Information. However, the
question remains: whether it is sufficient to merely allege the attendant
circumstance or should the circumstance be described with particularity?

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the
requirement on the sufficiency of the Complaint or Information, viz.:

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information is

sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given
by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission
of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.
When an offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be
included in the complaint or information. (emphasis supplied)

Under Section 6, the Information is sufficient if it contains: (1) the full name of the
accused, (2) the designation of the offense given by the statute, (3) the acts or
omissions constituting the offense, (4) the name of the offended party, (5) the
approximate date, and (6) the place of the offense.27 Thus, once all these allegations
are contained in the Information, then it adequately informs the accused of the
charges against him.

On the other hand, Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 state that:

Section 8. Designation of the offense. — The complaint or information shall state the
designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions
constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to
the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.

Section 9. Cause of the accusation. — The acts or omissions complained of as

constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances
must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. (emphases
supplied)

In People v. Aquino,28 the Court explained how Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 require
the allegation of the attendant circumstances in the Information, as follows:

We therefore reiterate that Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 merely require that

the Information allege, specify or enumerate the attendant circumstances
mentioned in the law to qualify the offense. These circumstances need not be
preceded by the words "aggravating/qualifying," "qualifying," or "qualified by" to be
considered as qualifying circumstances. It is sufficient that these circumstances be
specified in the Information to apprise the accused of the charges against him to
enable him to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises during the
trial. When the prosecution specifically alleges in the Information the
circumstances mentioned in the law as qualifying the crime, and succeeds
in proving them beyond reasonable doubt, the Court is constrained to
impose the higher penalty mandated by law. This includes the death penalty in
proper cases.29 (emphases and underscoring supplied)

Section 6 states that the allegations must be contained in the Information so that it
sufficiently informs the accused of the charges against him. In determining whether
an Information is sufficient, Section 6 must be strictly complied with. In contrast,
Sections 8 and 9 provide how the designation of the offense and the cause of the
accusation should be indicated in the Information. With respect to the qualifying or
aggravating circumstance, it is sufficient to allege, specify or enumerate this
circumstance, as mentioned in the law, to qualify the offense. When these are
alleged in the Information, the court is constrained to impose the higher penalty
mandated by law. In effect, Sections 8 and 9 also guide the court in its judgment of
whether to impose the higher penalty due to the existence of the qualifying or
aggravating circumstance.
A plain reading of the present Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shows that it is
not required that there be an expanded allegation, including facts and details, of the
attendant circumstances. Rather, as long as the qualifying or aggravating
circumstance, e.g., as enumerated in Articles 14 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
is alleged, specified, or enumerated therein, then it is sufficient allegation in the
Information and the accused is properly informed of the charge against him or her.

An Information need only state the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not
the finer details of why and how the crime was committed. 30 Thus, an allegation of
ultimate fact of treachery or abuse of superior strength is sufficient. It is not
required that evidentiary facts, such as the facts and circumstances that would
explain the qualifying or aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of
superior strength, also be contained in the Information. Indeed, these particular
facts and circumstances regarding the attendant circumstances are matters of
evidence that must be threshed out in the full-blown hearing. 31 To restate the rule,
an Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense, not
the finer details of why and how the illegal acts alleged amounted to undue injury or
damage — matters that are appropriate for the trial. 32

It is often difficult to say what is matter of evidence, as distinguished from fact,

necessary to be stated in order to render the Information sufficiently certain in
identifying the offense. As a general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished from
facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be averred. 33

Further, it is a well-settled rule that the test is whether the crime is sufficiently
described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with
reasonable certainty, of the offense charged. The raison d'etre of the rule is to
enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. Another purpose is to enable
accused, if found guilty, to plead his conviction in a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense. The use of derivatives or synonyms or allegations of basic
facts constituting the offense charged is sufficient.34

Records attached to the

Information sufficiently
inform the accused

Likewise, I believe that even though an Information shall only state the qualifying or
aggravating circumstance, without the explanatory facts and circumstances, the
accused is still sufficiently informed of the charges against him. Section 7(a), Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,35 states:

SEC. 7. Records. —

(a) Records supporting the information or complaint. — An information or complaint

filed in court shall be supported by the affidavits and counter-affidavits of the
parties and their witnesses, together with the other supporting evidence
and the resolution on the case. (emphasis supplied)

Verily, when an Information is filed in court, it is required that the affidavits,

counter-affidavits, other supporting evidence, and the resolution of the case be
attached therewith. Thus, aside from the Information itself, an accused is further
apprised of the details of the charges against him based on affidavits, evidence, and
the resolution attached to the Information. The importance of the attachments to
the Information filed in court was discussed in Lim, Sr., et al. v. Judge Felix, et
al.,36 to wit:

x x x By itself the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the

report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stereographic notes (if any), and all
other supporting documents behind the Prosecutor's certification which are
material in assisting the Judge to make his determination [of probable
cause].37 (emphasis supplied)

Among the documents attached to the Information, the resolution of the prosecutor
explains the facts and circumstances of the charges against the accused, including
those referring to the qualifying or aggravating circumstances. According to Section
4, Rule 112, the prosecutor prepares a resolution when he or she finds probable
cause to hold respondent for trial. On the other hand, the 2008 Revised Manual for
Prosecutors38(Manual) states the contents of a resolution, viz.:

e. Contents of the Body of the Resolution

In general, the body of resolution should contain:

1. A brief summary of the facts of the case;

2. A concise statement of the issues involved;

3. Applicable laws and jurisprudence; and

4. The findings, including an enumeration of all the documentary evidence submitted

by the parties and recommendations of the investigating prosecutor.

All material details that should be found in the information prepared by the
Investigating Prosecutor shall be stated in the resolution. 39 (emphasis
supplied)

Thus, if the Information states qualifying or aggravating circumstances, then the

prosecutor's resolution should contain all the material details regarding those
circumstances. Further, the Manual states that a copy of the prosecutor's resolution
should be furnished to the parties or to their counsel, as the case may be, to wit:

g. Parties Who Need to be Furnished with a Copy of the Resolution

The complete names and addresses of the complainant and the respondent shall be
set out at the end of the resolution after the signature of the investigating
prosecutor and the head of the Prosecutor's Office concerned under the phrase:
"Copy furnished;"

If the parties are represented by counsel and the latter's appearance is entered
formally in the record, the counsel, not the party, shall be given a copy of the
resolution.

Likewise, the Manual states that it is only upon the service of the copy of the
resolution to the parties or their counsel that the said resolution is promulgated, as
follows:
N. PROMULGATION OF THE RESOLUTION; MODES OF SERVICE

The resolution shall be promulgated by furnishing the parties or their

counsel a copy thereof by:

1. Personal service by process servers, law enforcement or barangay personnel; or

2. Registered mail with return card to the parties. 40 (emphasis supplied)

Thus, when an Information is filed in court, together with the affidavits, counter-
affidavits, other evidence and the prosecutor's resolution, the accused or his counsel
already has a copy of the prosecutor's resolution. When the Information states a
qualifying or aggravating circumstance, the accused can simply refer to and review
the prosecutor's resolution to determine the specific facts and circumstances
surrounding the qualifying or aggravating circumstance. Thus, he is adequately
informed of the charges against him.

Manifestly, the counsel of the accused, who receives the copy of the resolution, has
the duty to explain to the client the import of the contents of the prosecutor's
resolution, including the details with respect to the attendant circumstances. The
accused or the counsel cannot raise as a defense that the Information did not
describe with particularity the qualifying or aggravating circumstance because it is
already explained in the prosecutor's resolution, a copy of which is furnished them.
Hence, the accused cannot invoke that his right to be sufficiently informed of the
charges against him is violated by the State.

The right to be informed

during arraignment

It must also be emphasized that the right to be informed of the accusations does not
end upon filing of the Information. Rather, said right is fully realized upon the
arraignment of the accused.

Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right
of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of
freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at
the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized
against him. As an indispensable requirement of due process, an arraignment cannot
be regarded lightly or brushed aside peremptorily. Otherwise, absence of
arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedings before the trial court. 41

Constitutional due process demands that the accused in a criminal case be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The rationale behind this
constitutional guarantee are: First, to furnish the accused with the description of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; second, to avail himself
of his conviction or acquittal, for protection against a further prosecution for the
same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. In
fulfillment of the aforesaid constitutional guarantee, Rule 116, Section 1(a) of the
Rules of Court mandates that an accused be arraigned in open court and asked to
enter a plea of guilty or not guilty of the crime charged. 42
Consequently, arraignment is the formal process by which an accused is informed of
the charges against him, including alleged qualifying or aggravating circumstances.
During arraignment held in open court, the accused shall be furnished a copy of the
Complaint or Information and it may be read in a language or dialect known to
him.43 At that moment, the accused is given an opportunity to clarify any unclear
matter in the charges against him. The defense counsel must ensure that his client
understands the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and any unclear matter
must be thoroughly explained to him. Thus, if the accused wants an explanation as
to the qualifying or aggravating circumstance, arraignment is the proper venue to
properly clarify such matter. Indeed, the defense counsel must ensure that his client
is sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusations so that the latter can enter a
proper plea.

To reiterate, the right to be informed of the charges against the accused is not
concluded upon the filing of the Information. It continues until the accused is
formally arraigned. At that point, the defense counsel, as well as the prosecutor and
the court, must ensure that the accused has understood the charges, including any
aggravating or qualifying circumstance stated therein. If there are any unclear
matters, these must be clarified to the accused so that a proper plea may be
entered. Failure to raise any objection as to the sufficiency of the Information upon
entering a plea during arraignment constitutes as a waiver to assail said
Information.44

Procedure for prosecutors

Nevertheless, I concur with the procedure set forth in the  ponencia. While the
current Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure allow the allegation of qualifying or
aggravating circumstance without setting forth the facts and circumstances
surrounding it, the general terms of the provisions of Rule 110 create different
interpretations that may confuse the Bench, the Bar and the public.

As discussed earlier, the first set of cases requires a strict reading of the Rules,
wherein the qualifying or aggravating circumstance is particularly explained, to
sufficiently inform the accused of the allegations against him. On the other hand, the
second set of cases does not require the extended details in alleging the qualifying
or aggravating circumstance because these are evidentiary facts, matters of
defense, which must be threshed out in a full-blown trial.

To finally settle the conflicting interpretations, I believe that the Court must
conclusively choose only one interpretation of the general terms provided by the
Rules of Court to be applicable in the future. Thus, I agree with the ponencia that, as
a matter of procedure, strict and literal adherence to Rule 110 as to the specificity in
the allegations of the qualifying or aggravating circumstance should be followed.

The prosecutors must be guided that the accused should be fully informed of the
accusations against him, including any aggravating or qualifying circumstance. Thus,
the only definite method would be to describe with particularity the said
circumstance in the Information. Although the material details of the
aggravating or qualifying circumstance were already discussed in the
prosecutor's resolution, it is sound practice when dealing with the
constitutional rights, specifically, the right of an accused to be informed of
the charges against him, to allege in the Information the details concerning
the qualifying or aggravating circumstance. It must be underscored that the
Court has the constitutional power to promulgate rules regarding the protection and
enforcement of the constitutional rights, 45 which includes the rights of the accused.

As pointed out earlier, the requirement of sufficient factual averments is meant to

inform the accused of the nature and cause of the charge against him in order to
enable him to prepare his defense. It emanates from the presumption of innocence
in his favor, pursuant to which he is always presumed to have no independent
knowledge of the details of the crime he is being charged with. Thus, the facts
stated in the body of the Information should determine the crime of which he stands
charged and for which he must be tried. The [I]nformation must sufficiently give him
knowledge of what he had allegedly committed because he was presumed innocent
and unaware of the illegal acts imputed against him. 46

By requiring the prosecutors to specifically state the details of the aggravating or

qualifying circumstance in the Information, the accused will readily and be fully
informed of the accusations against him. I believe this to be more practical and a
safer approach to respect the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the
allegations against him and to expedite court proceedings under the Rules of Court.

The  procedure    set

forth is prospective
in application

Likewise, I concur with the ponencia that the procedure set forth shall apply only to
pending and future criminal cases. In other words, the procedure shall be
prospective in application.

Past criminal cases, where the Information does not specifically elaborate the
qualifying or aggravating circumstance, cannot benefit from this procedure. Section
9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed
to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b),
(g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied)

As early as U.S. v. Sarabia,47 the Court has emphasized that an accused may not
escape punishment when he was given every opportunity to be informed of the
nature of the charge, viz.:

In fact, the law of criminal procedure is wisely planned so as to give to a defendant

who is not advised as to the charge against him every opportunity to secure
additional information in this regard. But it was never intended that a defendant who
had been given these opportunities might neglect them and after a fair trial and a
conviction supported by abundant testimony, say, as a means of escaping a
deserved punishment, that he had never been informed of the nature of the charge
against him.48

In People v. Almendral,49 the Court emphasizes that failure to raise the issue of

defective Information, either through a motion to quash or a motion for bill of
particulars, constitutes as a waiver to the said defect, to wit:
Moreover, appellant failed to raise the issue of the defective information before the
trial court through a motion for bill of particulars or motion to quash the information.
Such failure to object to the allegation in the information as to the time of
commission of the rapes before appellant pleaded not guilty thereto amounted to a
waiver of the defect in the information. Objections as to matters of form or
substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. 50

Similarly, in People v. Palarca,51 the Court explains that the right to assail the
sufficiency of the Information may be waived by the accused by his failure to
object, viz.:

x x x While generally an accused cannot be convicted of an offense that is not

clearly charged in the complaint or information, this rule is not without exception.
The right to assail the sufficiency of the information or the admission of evidence
may be waived by the accused-appellant. In People v. Lopez, we held that an
information which lacks certain essential allegations may still sustain a conviction
when the accused fails to object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the deficiency
was cured by competent evidence presented therein. Thus —

[F]ailure to object was thus a waiver of the constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation. It is competent for a person to waive a right
guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action which would be invalid if
taken against his will. x x x52

Accordingly, when the accused fails to object to the defect in the sufficiency of the
Information, such as in the case at bench, he waives the right to question such
defect. Hence, the Information, which may have a deficiency in certain allegations,
shall still sustain a conviction because of the lack of objections. Consequently, past
criminal cases, which judgments have already become final and executory, cannot
benefit from the proposed procedure of the ponencia because any defect in the
Information, specifically in the allegation of qualifying or aggravating circumstance,
is cured by the lack of objections as to the sufficiency of the Information at the
earliest possible opportunity.

WHEREFORE, I vote to AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATION the January 13, 2015

Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05757, that Ronaldo
Solar y Dumbrique is GUILTY of the crime of Murder.

Endnotes:

1
Rollo, pp. 10-11.

2
 Id. at 3-9.

3
 CA rollo, pp. 20-25.

4
Rollo, p. 3.

5
 679 Phil. 279 (2012).

6
Ponencia, pp. 7-14.
7
 Id. at 15.

8
 Id. at 16.

9
 Supra note 5.

10
 G.R. No. 203986, October 4, 2017, 842 SCRA 39.

11
 G.R. No. 200026, October 4, 2017, 841 SCRA 647.

12
Ponencia, pp. 9-10.

13
 Id. at 10.

14
People v. Kalipayan, G.R. No. 229829, January 22, 2018.

15
 564 Phil. 249 (2007).

16
 424 Phil. 482 (2002).

17
 469 Phil. 698 (2004).

18
 460 Phil. 683 (2003).

19
People v. Batin, supra note 15, at 271.

20
 685 Phil. 633 (2012).

21
 Id. at 649-650.

22
 734 Phil. 499 (2014).

23
 Id. at 521.

24
 G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018.

25
 Id.

26
 HERRERA, Remedial Law IV, 2007 Ed., p. 104.

27
 See People v. Asilan, supra note 20, at 649-650.

28
 435 Phil. 417 (2002).

29
 Id. at 426.

30
People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), et al., 769 Phil. 378, 391 (2015).

31
 See Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 324 Phil. 151, 172 (1996).

32
Go v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 619 Phil. 306, 317 (2009).
33
 HERRERA, Remedial Law IV, 2007 Ed., p. 96.

34
Lazarte, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 600 Phil. 475, 491-492 (2009).

35
 Amendment of Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, (August 30, 2005).

36
 272 Phil. 122 (1991).

37
 Id. at 133, citing People v. Judge Inting, et al., 265 Phil. 817, 821 (1990).

38
 The Manual for Prosecutors was recently amended in 2017; however, since the
crime in the case at bench occurred in 2008, then the 2008 Manual for Prosecutors
shall apply.

39
 Part IV.II.J.3.e, 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, p. 97.

40
 Part IV.II.N, 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors, p. 102.

41
Taglay v. Judge Daray, et al., 693 Phil. 45, 57-58 (2012).

42
People v. Monteron, 428 Phil. 401, 406 (2002).

43
 See Section 1(a) of Rule 116.

44
 See Herrera v. Court of Appeals, et al., 427 Phil. 577, 587-588 (2002).

45
 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5.

46
People v. Petalino, G.R. No. 213222, September 24, 2018.

47
 4 Phil. 566 (1905).

48
 Id. at 569.

49
 477 Phil. 521 (2004).

50
 Id. at 536.

51
 432 Phil. 500 (2002).

52
 Id. at 509.