Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 116773 January 16, 1997

TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA PAZ
CORDERO-OUYE, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Children begin by loving their parents. After a time they
judge them. Rarely, if ever, do they forgive them.1
Indeed, parenthood is a riddle of no mean proportions
except for its mission. Thus, a mother's concern for her
child's custody is undying — such is a mother's love.
The right of the mother to the custody of her daughter is
the issue in the case at bar.
In this petition for review, Teresita Sagala-Eslao seeks
the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision2 dated
March 25, 1994, which affirmed the trial court's
judgment granting the petition of Maria Paz
Cordero-Ouye to recover the custody of her minor
daughter from her mother-in-law, Teresita Sagala-Eslao.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case
are as follows:
From the evidence, it appears that on June 22, 1984,
petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao
were married;3 after their marriage, the couple stayed
with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband, at
1825, Road 14, Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila; that out of
their marriage, two children were begotten, namely,
Leslie Eslao who was born on February 23, 1986 and
Angelica Eslao who was born on April 20,
1987;4 in the meantime, Leslie was entrusted to the care
and custody of petitioner's mother in Sta. Ana, Pampanga,
while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondent's
house; on August 6, 1990, petitioner's husband Reynaldo
Eslao died;5 petitioner intended to bring Angelica with
her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her
to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent
reasoning out that her son just died and to assuage her
grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at
least compensate for the loss of her late son. In the
meantime, the petitioner returned to her mother's house
in Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to
Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American, who is
an orthodontist practicing in the United States; their
acquaintance blossomed into a meaningful relationship
where on March 18, 1992, the petitioner and Dr. James
Ouye decided to get married; less than ten months
thereafter, or on January 15, 1993, the petitioner
migrated to San Francisco, California, USA, to join her
new husband. At present, the petitioner is a trainee at the
Union Bank in San Francisco, while her husband is a
progressive practitioner of his profession who owns three
cars, a dental clinic and earns US$5,000 a month. On
June 24, 1993, the petitioner returned to the Philippines
to be reunited with her children and bring them to the
United States; the petitioner then informed the
respondent about her desire to take informed the
respondent about her desire to take custody of Angelica
and explained that her present husband, Dr. James Ouye,
expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica
and to provide for their support and education; however,
respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the
child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and
accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica.
Because of the adamant attitude of the respondent, the
petitioner then sought the assistance of a lawyer, Atty.
Mariano de Joya, Jr., who wrote a letter to the respondent
demanding for the return of the custody of Angelica to
her natural mother6 and when the demand remain[ed]
unheeded, the petitioner instituted the present action.7
After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious,
the Court grants the same and let the corresponding writ
issue. As a corollary, respondent Teresita Sagala-Eslao
or anyone acting under her behalf is hereby directed to
cause the immediate transfer of the custody of the minor
Angelica Cordero Eslao, to her natural mother, petitioner
Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the respondent court affirmed in full the
decision of the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition by the minor's paternal
grandmother, contending that the Court of Appeals erred:
I
IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT MARIA
PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, DID NOT ABANDON
MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO, TO THE CARE AND
CUSTODY OF THE PETITIONER TERESITA
SAGALA-ESLAO.
II
IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO COMPELLING
REASON TO SEPARATE MINOR, ANGELICA
ESLAO, FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT MARIA
PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER
TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO.
III
IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER TERESITA
SAGALA-ESLAO, IS FIT TO BE GIVEN THE
CUSTODY OF MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO.
The petition is without merit.
Being interrelated, the issues shall be discussed jointly.
Petitioner argues that she would be deserving to take care
of Angelica; that she had managed to raise 12 children of
her own herself; that she has the financial means to carry
out her plans for Angelica; that she maintains a store
which earns a net income of about P500 a day, she gets
P900 a month as pension for the death of her husband,
she rents out rooms in her house which she owns, for
which she earns a total of P6,000 a month, and that from
her gross income of roughly P21,000, she spends about
P10,000 for the maintenance of her house.
Despite the foregoing, however, and petitioner's "genuine
desire to remain with said child, that would qualify her to
have custody of Angelica," the trial court's disquisition,
in consonance with the provision that the child's welfare
is always the paramount consideration in all questions
concerning his care and custody8 convinced this Court to
decide in favor of private respondent, thus:
On the other hand, the side of the petitioner must also be
presented here. In this case, we see a picture of a real and
natural mother who is —
. . . legitimately, anxiously, and desperately trying to get
back her child in order to fill the void in her heart and
existence. She wants to make up for what she has failed
to do for her boy during the period when she was
financially unable to help him and when she could not
have him in her house because of the objection of the
father. Now that she has her own home and is in a better
financial condition, she wants her child back, and we
repeat that she has not and has never given him up
definitely or with any idea of permanence.9
The petitioner herein is married to an Orthodontist who
has lucrative practice of his profession in San Francisco,
California, USA. The petitioner and her present husband
have a home of their own and they have three cars. The
petitioner's husband is willing to adopt the petitioner's
children. If the children will be with their mother, the
probability is that they will be afforded a bright future.
Contrast this situation with the one prevailing in the
respondent's [grandmother's] house. As admitted by the
respondent, four of the rooms in her house are being
rented to other persons with each room occupied by 4
and 5 persons. Added to these persons are the
respondent's 2 sons, Samuel and Alfredo, and their
respective families (ibid., p. 54) and one can just
visualize the kind of atmosphere pervading thereat. And
to aggravate the situation, the house has only 2 toilets
and 3 faucets. Finally, considering that in all
controversies involving the custody of minors, the
foremost criterion is the physical and moral well being of
the child taking into account the respective resources and
social and moral situations of the contending parties
(Union III vs. Mariano, 101 SCRA 183), the Court is left
with no other recourse but to grant the writ prayed for.10
Petitioner further contends that the respondent court
erred in finding that there was no abandonment
committed by the private respondent; that while judicial
declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed
for the purpose is not her obtaining as mandated in Art.
229 of the Family Code because petitioner failed to
resort to such judicial action, it does not ipso facto follow
that there was in fact no abandonment committed by the
private respondent.
Petitioner also argues that it has been amply
demonstrated during the trial that private respondent had
indeed abandoned Angelica to the care and custody of
the petitioner; that during all the time that Angelica
stayed with petitioner, there were only three instances or
occasions wherein the private respondent saw Angelica;
that private respondent never visited Angelica on
important occasions, such as her birthday, and neither did
the former give her cards or gifts, "not even a single
candy;"11 that while private respondent claims otherwise
and that she visited Angelica "many times" and insists
that she visited Angelica as often as four times a month
and gave her remembrances such as candies and clothes,
she would not even remember when the fourth birthday
of Angelica was.
We are not persuaded by such averments.
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 407,12
we stated, viz:
. . . [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and
obligations which the law grants to parents for the
purpose of the children's physical preservation and
development, as well as the cultivation of their intellect
and the education of their heart and senses.13 As regards
parental authority, "there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty
but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor."14
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and
may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law.15 The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver
of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution.16 When a parent entrusts the custody
of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even
in a document, what is given is merely temporary
custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of
parental authority.17 Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.18
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of
unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to
keep them in their custody and company.19
Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent
entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner,
what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody
and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of
parental authority. For the right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver
of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an
orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by
the courts that "the right of parents to the custody of their
minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public
policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created
by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from
the nature of the parental relationship.20
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from dated
March 25, 1994 being in accordance with law and the
evidence, the same is hereby AFFIRMED and the
petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur