04 Spouses Rosales v. Spouses Alfonso, G.R. No. 137792 (2003)
04 Spouses Rosales v. Spouses Alfonso, G.R. No. 137792 (2003)
04 Spouses Rosales v. Spouses Alfonso, G.R. No. 137792 (2003)
THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 137792, August 12, 2003 ]
SPOUSES RICARDO ROSALES AND ERLINDA SIBUG, PETITIONERS,
VS. SPOUSES ALFONSO AND LOURDES SUBA, THE CITY SHERIFF
OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Challenged in the instant petition for review on certiorari are the Resolutions[1] dated
November 25, 1998 and February 26, 1999 of the Court of Appeals dismissing the petition for
certiorari in CA G.R. SP No. 49634, "Spouses Ricardo Rosales and Erlinda Sibug vs. Alfonso
and Lourdes Suba."
On June 13, 1997, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Manila rendered a Decision[2] in Civil
Cases Nos. 94-72303 and 94-72379, the dispositive portion of which reads:
(1) Declaring the Deed of Sale of Exhibit D, G and I, affecting the property in
question, as an equitable mortgage;
(2) Declaring the parties Erlinda Sibug and Ricardo Rosales, within 90 days from
finality of this Decision, to deposit with the Clerk of Court, for payment to the
parties Felicisimo Macaspac and Elena Jiao, the sum of P65,000.00, with interest at
nine (9) percent per annum from September 30, 1982 until payment is made, plus the
sum of P219.76 as reimbursement for real estate taxes;
(3) Directing the parties Felicisimo Macaspac and Elena Jiao, upon the deposit on
their behalf of the amounts specified in the foregoing paragraph, to execute a deed of
reconveyance of the property in question to Erlinda Sibug, married to Ricardo
Rosales, and the Register of Deeds of Manila shall cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 150540 in the name of the Macaspacs (Exh. E) and issue new title in the
name of Sibug;
(4) For non-compliance by Sibug and Rosales of the directive in paragraph (2) of
this dispositive portion, let the property be sold in accordance with the Rules of
Court for the release of the mortgage debt and the issuance of title to the purchaser.
"SO ORDERED."[3]
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The decision became final and executory. Spouses Ricardo and Erlinda Rosales, judgment
debtors and herein petitioners, failed to comply with paragraph 2 quoted above, i.e., to deposit
with the Clerk of Court, within 90 days from finality of the Decision, P65,000.00, etc., to be
paid to Felicisimo Macaspac and Elena Jiao. This prompted Macaspac, as judgment creditor, to
file with the trial court a motion for execution.
Petitioners opposed the motion for being premature, asserting that the decision has not yet
attained finality. On March 5, 1998, they filed a manifestation and motion informing the court
of their difficulty in paying Macaspac as there is no correct computation of the judgment debt.
On February 23, 1998, Macaspac filed a supplemental motion for execution stating that the
amount due him is P243,864.08.
Petitioners failed to pay the amount. On March 25, 1998, the trial court issued a writ of
execution ordering the sale of the property subject of litigation for the satisfaction of the
judgment.
On May 15, 1998, an auction sale of the property was held wherein petitioners participated.
However, the property was sold for P285,000.00 to spouses Alfonso and Lourdes Suba, herein
respondents, being the highest bidders. On July 15, 1998, the trial court issued an order
confirming the sale of the property and directing the sheriff to issue a final deed of sale in their
favor.
On July 28, 1998, Macaspac filed a motion praying for the release to him of the amount of
P176,176.06 from the proceeds of the auction sale, prompting petitioners to file a motion
praying that an independent certified public accountant be appointed to settle the exact amount
due to movant Macaspac.
Meanwhile, on August 3, 1998, the Register of Deeds of Manila issued a new Transfer
Certificate of Title over the subject property in the names of respondents.
On August 18, 1998, respondents filed with the trial court a motion for a writ of possession,
contending that the confirmation of the sale "effectively cut off petitioners' equity of
redemption." Petitioners on the other hand, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated
July 15, 1998 confirming the sale of the property to respondents.
On October 19, 1998, the trial court, acting upon both motions, issued an order (1) granting
respondents' prayer for a writ of possession and (2) denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. The trial court ruled that petitioners have no right to redeem the property since
the case is for judicial foreclosure of mortgage under Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended. Hence, respondents, as purchasers of the property, are entitled to its
possession as a matter of right.
Forthwith, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 49634, alleging that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing a writ of possession to respondents and in denying
their motion for reconsideration of the order dated July 15, 1998 confirming the sale of the
property to said respondents.
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On November 25, 1998, the CA dismissed outright the petition for lack of merit, holding that
there is no right of redemption in case of judicial foreclosure of mortgage. Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was also denied.
In the main, petitioners fault the Appellate Court in applying the rules on judicial foreclosure of
mortgage. They contend that their loan with Macaspac is unsecured, hence, its payment entails
an execution of judgment for money under Section 9 in relation to Section 25, Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,[4] allowing the judgment debtor one (1) year
from the date of registration of the certificate of sale within which to redeem the foreclosed
property.
Respondents, upon the other hand, insist that petitioners are actually questioning the decision of
the trial court dated June 13, 1997 which has long become final and executory; and that the
latter have no right to redeem a mortgaged property which has been judicially foreclosed.
Petitioners' contention lacks merit. The decision of the trial court, which is final and executory,
declared the transaction between petitioners and Macaspac an equitable mortgage. In
Matanguihan vs. Court of Appeals,[5] this Court defined an equitable mortgage as "one which
although lacking in some formality, or form or words, or other requisites demanded by a statute,
nevertheless reveals the intention of the parties to charge real property as security for a debt, and
contains nothing impossible or contrary to law." An equitable mortgage is not different from a
real estate mortgage, and the lien created thereby ought not to be defeated by requiring
compliance with the formalities necessary to the validity of a voluntary real estate mortgage.[6]
Since the parties' transaction is an equitable mortgage and that the trial court ordered its
foreclosure, execution of judgment is governed by Sections 2 and 3, Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, quoted as follows:
SEC. 2. Judgment on foreclosure for payment or sale. - If upon the trial in such
action the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to be true, it shall
ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage debt or obligation,
including interest and other charges as approved by the court, and costs, and shall
render judgment for the sum so found due and order that the same be paid to
the court or to the judgment obligee within a period of not less that ninety (90)
days nor more than one hundred twenty (120) days from the entry of judgment,
and that in default of such payment the property shall be sold at public auction
to satisfy the judgment.
SEC. 3. Sale of mortgaged property, effect. - When the defendant, after being
directed to do so as provided in the next preceding section, fails to pay the amount
of the judgment within the period specified therein, the court, upon motion,
shall order the property to be sold in the manner and under the provisions of Rule
39 and other regulations governing sales of real estate under execution. Such sale
shall not effect the rights of persons holding prior encumbrances upon the property
or a part thereof, and when confirmed by an order of the court, also upon motion, it
shall operate to divest the rights in the property of all the parties to the action
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and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as
may be allowed by law.
x x x."
In Huerta Alba Resort, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[7] we held that the right of redemption is not
recognized in a judicial foreclosure, thus:
xxx
"This is the mortgagor's equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated,
may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period `from the date of
service of the order,' and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be
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before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation,
no redemption can be effected any longer." (Italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
November 25, 1998 and February 26, 1999 in CA G.R. SP No. 49634 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[1]Rollo at 24, 28; penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr. and concurred in by
Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez (now a member of this Court) and Renato C. Dacudao.
[2] By Judge Mario Guarina III (now an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals).
(b) Satisfaction by levy. - If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in
cash, certified bank check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee,
the officer shall levy upon the properties of the judgment obligor of every kind and nature
whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise exempt from execution
giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be levied
upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the
officer shall first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the
personal properties are insufficient to answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment
obligor which has been levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment
and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to
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Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either
real or personal property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ
of attachment.
Sec. 25. Conveyance of real property; certificate thereof given to purchaser and filed with
registry of deeds. - Upon a sale of real property, the officer must give to the purchaser a
certificate of sale containing:
Such certificate must be registered in the registry of deeds of the place where the property is
situated.
[7]G.R. No. 128567, September 1, 2000, 339 SCRA 534, citing Limpin vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R No. L-70987, September 29, 1988, 166 SCRA 87.
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