Pimentel v.

LEB
G.R. No. 230642/G.R. No. 242954. September 10, 2019
Facts:

Prompted by clamors for the improvement of the system of legal education on account of the poor
performance of law students and law schools in the bar examinations,2 the Congress, on December 23,
1993, passed into law R.A. No. 7662 .

R.A. No. 7662 created the LEB, an executive agency which was made separate from the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), but attached thereto solely for budgetary purposes and
administrative support.3 The Chairman and regular members of the LEB are to be appointed by the
President for a term of five years, without reappointment, from a list of at least three nominees
prepared, with prior authorization from the Court, by the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

Acting pursuant to its authority to prescribe the minimum standards for law schools, the LEB issued
Memorandum Order No. 1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011) providing for the Policies and
Standards of Legal Education and Manual of Regulation for Law Schools.

Among the orders issued by the LEB was Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-
2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the minimum standards for law admission" under Section 7(e)
of R.A. No. 7662.

The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve the quality of legal education by requiring
all those seeking admission to the basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school
admission test, known as the PhiLSAT.10

The PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications and language
proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning.11 It was designed to measure the
academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law.12 Exempted from the PhiLSAT
requirement were honor graduates who were granted professional civil service eligibility and who are
enrolling within two years from their college graduation.

Petitioners argue that the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law necessarily includes the power to do things related to the practice of law, including the power to
prescribe the requirements for admission to the study of law. In support, they point to Sections 698 and
16,99 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. They contend that the Congress cannot create an administrative
body, like the LEB, that exercises this rule-making power of the Court. They emphasize that the LEB
belongs to the Executive department, and, as such, is not linked or accountable to the Court nor placed
under the Court's regulation and supervision.

Petitioners maintain that the Court exercises authority over the legal profession which includes the
admission to the practice of law, to the continuing requirements for and discipline of lawyers.
According to them, the rule-making power of the Court is plenary in all cases regarding the admission
to and supervision of the practice of law. They argue that the Court's power to admit members to the
practice of law extends to admission to legal education because the latter is a preparatory process to the
application for admission to the legal profession, which "residual power" of the Court can be inferred
from Sections 5101 and 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. They also emphasize that under Sections 1102
and 2103 of Rule 138-A, non-lawyers are allowed to have limited practice of law and are held to answer
by the Court under the same rules on privileged communication and standard of conduct pursuant to
Sections 3104 and 4105 of Rule 138-A.

Issue:
Who has jurisdiction over legal education?

Ruling:

Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education. Neither the history of the Philippine
legal education nor the Rules of Court invoked by petitioners support their argument. The supervision
and regulation of legal education is an Executive function.

1. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently exercised by the
political departments

2. DECS Order No. 27-1989 was the precursor of R.A. No. 7662
"Legal education" was defined in DECS Order No. 27-1989 as an educational program including a
clinical program appropriate and essential in the understanding and application of law and the
administration of justice. It is professional education after completion of a required pre-legal education
at the college level. For state colleges and universities, the operation of their law schools was to depend
on their respective charters, and for private colleges and universities, by the rules and regulations
issued by the DECS. Nevertheless, it was made clear under DECS Order No. 27-1989 that the
administration of a law school shall be governed primarily by the law school's own policies and the
provisions thereof apply only suppletorily.145

Likewise, in generally permissive terms, DECS Order No. 27-1989 prescribed the preferred
qualifications and functions of a law dean, as well as the preferred qualifications, conditions of
employment and teaching load of law faculty members. It also prescribed the general inclusions to the
law curriculum, but gave the law schools the prerogative to design its own curriculum. The DECS also
drew a model law curriculum, thus, revising the 122-unit curriculum prescribed in 1946 by the Office of
Private Education, as well as the 134-unit curriculum prescribed in 1963. The law schools were also
given the option to maintain a legal aid clinic as part of its law curriculum. It also prescribed the need
for law schools to have relevant library resources. Applicants for a law course are required to comply
with the specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the Court.

3. Legal education is a mere composite of the educational system

First, it assumes that the Court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal education
as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate the admission to the practice of law. This
assumption, apart from being manifestly contrary to the above-recounted history of legal education in
the Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon itself a
power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. For the Court to void R.A. No. 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal
education and place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners suggest, is to demonstrate
a highly improper form of judicial activism.

4. Court's exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the study of law.
The Constitution lays down the powers which the Court can exercise. Among these is the power to
promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law.

The rule-making power of the Supreme Court had been uniformly granted under the 1935, the 1973
and the 1987 Constitutions. The complexion of the rule-making power, however, changes with the
promulgation of these organic laws.

This power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and admission to the
practice of law is in fact zealously guarded by the Court.

The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover
the study of law.

5. The Court exercises judicial power only

The Rules of Court do not intend nor provide for direct and actual Court regulation over legal
education. At most, the Rules of Court are reflective of the inevitable relationship between legal
education and the admissions to the bar.

6. The Rules of Court do not support the argument that the Court directly and actually regulates legal
education

The Revised Law Student Practice Rule is primordially intended to ensure access to justice of the
marginalized sectors and to regulate the law student practitioner's limited practice of law pursuant to
the Court's power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the Integrated
Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged.

In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student practitioner, what the
Court regulates and supervises is not legal education, but the appearance and conduct of a law student before any
trial court, tribunal, board, or officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic - an activity rightfully falling
under the definition of practice of law. Inasmuch as the law student is permitted to act for the legal clinic
and thereby to practice law, it is but proper that the Court exercise regulation and supervision over the
law student practitioner. Necessarily, the Court has the power to allow their appearance and plead
their case, and hereafter, to regulate their actions.

In all, the Rules of Court do not support petitioners' argument that the Court regulates and supervises
legal education. To reiterate, the Rules of Court are directed not towards legal education or law
schools, but towards applicants for admission to the bar and applicants for admission to the bar
examinations - consistent with the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the
practice of law, the same being fundamentally a judicial function.

Having, thus, established that the regulation and supervision of legal education do not fall within the
competence of the Court and is, instead, a power exercised by the political departments.
-Ramil A. Escaso