The U.S. Air Service in World War I Seriesvolume IV Postwar Review
The U.S. Air Service in World War I Seriesvolume IV Postwar Review
The U.S. Air Service in World War I Seriesvolume IV Postwar Review
A ~ KSmuice in
WoKB WaK I
Volume IV
‘+war Review The Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center
Maxwell AFB Alabama
Dr. 1. 8.Holley, Jr. Lt. Gen. James R. Allen Dr. Henry F. Graff
Duke University Superintendent, USAF Columbia University
Academy
Dr. FQreSt C. Pogue
Dr. Robert F. Byrnes Director, Dwight D.
Indiana University Eisenhower Institute for
Historical Research
Lt. Gen. Albert P. Clark
USA F fret.) Mr. Peter 8. Hamilton
General Counsel, USA F
Lt. Gen. Raymond B. Furlong
Commander, Air University
,
viii
Foreword ................................................................ V
Appendixes
A . Tables of Organization .................................................. 507
B. Unit Costs ............................................................. 533
Notes .................................................................... 551
Glossary of Abbreviations ................................................ 563
Index .................................................................... 566
LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS
Gen. Mason M. Patrick ..................................................... 1
Col. Thomas DeWitt Milling .................................................. 4
Curtiss JN-4 trainers ....................................................... 7
DH-4 ..................................................................... 11
Col. Frank P. Lahm ........................................................ 15
Balloon ready for ascension ................................................. 19
Gen. Foulois talks with airmen at the front ..................................... 23
Marshall Ferdinand Foch ................................................... 27
Maj. H.E. Hartney with 1st Lt. A.L. Cunningham ................................ 29
Insignia of the 185th Aero Squadron ......................................... 30
X
Tables of Organization
Army Air Services ......................................................... 508
Corps Air Services ........................................................ 510
Observation Group. Air Service ............................................. 512
Observation Squadron. Air Service ........................................... 514
BalloonWing. Air Service .................................................. 516
xiv
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Volunie IV
Postwar Review
1
Pant I:
Lessons Leanne&
Introduction
Date 1918
From:
To: Col. Gorrell, Office Chief of Air Service
Subject: Information.
1. In accordance with instructions contained in telegram 2 727
TG, from Chief Training Section, Headquarters Air Service,
Tours, the following certificate is submitted.
2. I certify that I have acquired, while in the Air Service, no
information of value.
(Signed)
Reports
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therefore the “muck-raking” that took place did more harm than
good. At the time, the& machines were the best obtainable in
the United States; it was impossible to purchase machines from
abroad; it was therefore a question of making the best use of
the equipment at hand.
When war was declared on Germany programs were drawn
showing what the United States could do towards building and
putting on the battle-front of Europe an Air Service superior in
numbers and efficiency to that of the Allies combined This
program was undoubtedly based on the idea that has always .
seemed to exist in the United States, namely, that money can do
anything. It was evidently supposed that if a sufficient
appropriation was secured from Congress, that no difficulty
would be encountered in building the necessary equipment and
in training pilots. This at the time was an impossibility to those
whcl appreciated the true situation.
The work of drawing up the plans and organization for the Air
Service at the beginning of the war, with the exception of two or
three officers who knew something about aviation conditions, was
turned over entirely to a board of men who had been successful
in civilian life, such as manufacturers, particularly that of
automobiles. This in itself, in my opinion, was a mistake. It is
believed that the services of men who have been successful in
the organization and handling of large business establishments in
civil life can be well utilized in connection with Army work, but as
a ride they should be subordinate to trained officers of the
Army, as conditions enter that can only be met and handled by
men who have gained knowledge and experience by actual
military service.
A publicity campaign was immediately begun and the people
were fed on rash promises, not only as to the number of planes
that could be put on the front, but also the wonderful things
they would do towards winning the war. While this may have
been necessary from a political standpoint in order to obtain the
appropriations asked of Congress, nevertheless it was apparent
that it would do more harm than good in the end.
The programs drawn up for both the training of pilots and the
building of planes were entirely too optimistic. The manufacturers
of planes of course had to bid high on a production basis if they
expected to receive the orders. Considering the matter in the
lighi of our experience obtained in buying planes in the United
States during the previous four or five years, it was apparent
that these programs could not be met. The maximum figures for
the building, establishing and putting in service of the schools
werle employed with a corresponding maximum output in the
minimum of time. This, without considering carefully, the output
6 U.S Air Service
in World War I
Vol. N
the idea in view of using them for revision and selection of pupils
arriving from the States. By this method a pupil who arrived for
any particular phase of work such as pursuit, bombardment or
otherwise, would be sent to the school in question and after
being examined, would remaim there for the length of time
necessary to determine that he was competent before being sent
to the front. This period would probably have varied from one to
three weeks. This unfortunately never had a fair test, as men
were sent over in all stages of training.
The method of training followed in our schools in France was
based on the French system. This method was based on a
system of individual training, the result of which may be seen in
the “French Ace,” rather than teamwork and formation flying.
We never fully appreciated the necessity for training in formation
work until after the Battle of St. Mihiel. Steps were then taken
by the Training Department of the Air Service to change the
course Qf instructiQn in order to institute this new method.
In order to develop pilots of espree and to instill in them the
desire to be constantly “on the job,” regardless of conditions, it
was essential that they receive proper treatment in the schools;
in other words “morale,” one of the biggest factors of success in
the Air Service, had to be maintained. Due to the congestion of
cadets sent over from the States for training, there was much
dissatisfaction. In many cases cadets who were sent to Europe,
because of their high standing on graduation from ground
schools, were still privates when men who had attended school
with them began to arrive as first lieutenants. The mixing of
cadets and officers, who had been at the same ground schools
together, was very detrimental. In other cases, due probably to
the shortage of enlisted personnel, they were required to do
police work and other odd jobs. Under the conditions this may
have been necessary; however it is believed that it would be
better policy to establish a definite status for these men which
ed and followed.
school at Clermont-Ferrand was inspected
the early part of last Spring. The school at
that time was in very poor shape, discipline lax and morale poor.
It is believed that the resulting poor morale in the bombardment.
units at the beginning of the Argonne offensive was due in a
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Air Service Commander, First Army
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Col. Frank P. Lahm, who was 10 years older than Milling, had
entered aviation by way of ballooning, in which his father was
interested. The younger Lahm had learned to fly a balloon in
France and had won the first James Gordon Bennett Interna-
tional Balloon Race, in 1906. The following year he had been as-
signed t o the Aeronautical Division of the Signal Corps, and two Col. Lahrn.
years later he had become the first member of the U.S. Army to
10 US. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. N
-
would have proven of great value in the Second Army. A
machine of this type should be developed at once, capable of
shooting up troops on the ground and of carrying out low
reconnaissance missions. The moral effect of these planes on
front line troops is out of all proportion to the material effect.
Our own troops were greatly harassed by enemy planes flying
over them, though as a matter of fact the casualties were
negligible. On the other hand, the mere presence of our own
planes flying at a low altitude over the front lines produces a
feeling of confidence in the line troops that cannot be'
overestimated.
During the lpst five days before November llth, Second Army
Headquarters was particularly anxious to verify the suspected
withdrawal of the enemy from our front. This was the Air
Service's one most important mission at that time. It could be
accomplished only by low flying reconnaissance and for
unprotected planes this is a mission that can only be
accomplished by the most daring flyers, the ones we could least
afford to lose. A squadron of fast, protected two-seaters would
have proven invaluable on this front.
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4
e.
that each and every Allied nation, and other first-class nations,
will foster and further develop the resources of aerial navigation.
It therefore behooves the United States to do likewise, if we
wish to be prepared for any future military emergency, which,
judging from the trend of tactics at the close of the recent
hostilities, clearly pointed to a greater and more frequent use of
aircraft in offensive and defensive military operations.
127. Policy as to general staff administratio
service administration and operation. As a fir
principles and function of the General Staff, I believe in the
administration, control and operation of the Air Service by the
General Staff, as in the case of all other branches of the military
service.
I do not agree, however, with the way in which General Staff
administration and control was exercised in the early stages of
the development of the Air Service, American Expeditionary
Forces.
uring the first six months of the Air Servi
Regular officers to remove, once and for all from the minds of
the General Staff A.E.F. the impression that the administrative
heads of the Air Service were endeavoring to create a separate
service which would not be in full coordination and under full
control of the General Staff, A.E.F. ,
The steps which have already been taken in Washington, by
the introduction of proposed legislation to create a separate and
independent Air Force for the United States, should be made the
subject of immediate study and action by the General Staff,
A.E.F. if they are to have under consideration the problems of
the future organization of the Air Service.
If the General Staff, A.E.F. is opposed to the policy of an
independent Air Force, its opinion should be voiced without
delay, and it must be voiced in the Halls of Congress, as the
question has already reached that point in the issue.
The General Staff, A.E.F. should have representation, in
Washington at this very date, in order that a full presentation
and discussion of both sides of the question may be had.
Many of the flying officers of the Air Service, A.E.F., who are
enroute or have returned to the United States under orders from the
War Department, are strong advocates of a separate Air Service,
and unless prompt action is taken by the General Staff, A.E.F.
the question will be settled in favor of an independent air force,
without reference to the General Staff, A.E.F.
128b. One of the strongest arguments that has been used in
the past, is the example of Englande’ step in creating an
independent Air Force, by combining their Army and Navy Air
Service under one head, the British Air Ministry. Under the acid
test of field service in war this creation of a separate and
independent Air Force under the British Air Ministry has failed.
The Naval Wing of the British Royal Air Force has practically
carried on its operations independent of the Army Wing. In
addition to the strictly Army Wing, which operated under the
Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies in the Field, we have
witnessed during the past year, the creation and operation of
another Independent Royal Air Force, which operated directly
under the orders of the British Air Ministry, without reference to
or control by the Supreme Military Command in the Field.
The question of the creation of this military force destined for
operation in active service in France, under the direct orders of
the British Air Ministry was considered f6r the first time, in the
early spring of 1918, when it was brought up for discussion
before the Aviation Committee of the Supreme War Council, of
which I was the American representative. I emphatically opposed
before the Committee of the Supreme War Council, the
creation of a military force for active service in France, which
Lessons 27
Learned
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I
i
U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. N
best. A machine should carry Holt flares, one under each wing
tip; navigation lights on the outer struts, and signaling light on
the bottom of the fuselage and least one Michelin parachute
flare. Normally, the Holt landing flares will not be used, but in
the case of forced landings they will be lighted, sufficiently high
above the ground to insure their being burned out by the time
the ground is reached. These should be examined very
frequently and under no circumstances should they be used later
than the date stamped thereon. There is no such a word as
economy in connection with the testing of flares. They should
not be opened until they are actually going to be placed on the
machine. Michelin parachute flares only should be carried. The
Grench parachute flare is a total failure and represents false
economy in the purchase. The signal light beneath the fuselage
must be operated by a tapper key and a permanent switch be
opened interchangeably at will and instan.tly.
Two kinds of airdrome equipment should be recognized, first
that in vogue on the fields of the squadrons operating, which
should be most reliable and, if necessary, elaborate; and
secondly, the emergency landing set, which should be at hand on
these fields but in addition should be placed on every airdrome
day and night in the area so that a pilot lost in a fog may with
safety call and land at any field. The arrangements of the main
fields can be worked out as circumstances require, but it is
essential that a good generating unit be at hand and that the
Lessons 35
Learned
night flyer must have thorough knowledge of the country, of the land-
marks, and must be skilled in the location of possible fields, airdromes,
forests, rivers bad grounds, etc., and when he is first enlisted into the
service of the night squadron, he should spend 2 months mastering the
situation, never feeling satisfied until he knows the country thoroughly.
H e must be instructed in cloud flying but should be warned never to
attempt it unless compelled to do so..If overtaken by a mist or clouds he
should never let the ground get out of sight, If necessary he should make
a forced landing rather than attempt to get home at night through the
mist, unless of course he is flying high and is sure of the weather.
After a pilot becomes.competent, he should practice forced
landings on his own airdrome on moonlight nights, and practice
combat fighting with two seaters with the cooperation of the
searchlights, and as an extra, aim at making forced landings by
means of parachute flares, using the engine if he discovers that
the field sought is liable to cause him to turn over.
The location of instruments and the methods of using them in
the dark should become a matter of second nature to him, so
that this will in no way distract his attention from more
important things. Patrols will often be monotonous in that they
will cover short beats over important points. Enemy night
bombers are certain to follow permanent landmarks, such as
rivers or forests. This means that a pilot on patrol will have to
patiently stay over this spot and await his opportunity and+he
will do well to have patience and not be distracted by
neighboring lights from his particular mission. Pilots should never
attempt to fly under 200 meters at night as the risk involved is
too great and on his first flights he should arrive over his
airdrome at a height of at least 1,000 meters and take his time
coming in. Pilots in all branches of the Air Service have to be
humored to a certain extent but this Is more so in the case of
night pilots. Day flying should be indulged in and should only be
permitted between certain definite hours of daylight. Otherwise,
pilots will never feel that they are off duty and in a short time
will become tired and disgusted with their work, and lose all
their keenness.
The main duty in the operations of night pursuit at the present
time is defensive patrols. These are carefully planned with the
object of intercepting hostile bombers at the point where they
are picked up by the searchlights. Patrols will therefore be
carried out slightly in the rear of line and more particularly over
permanent landmarks. They should not last more than 1-1/2hours
and vary in altitude from 2,000 to 4,000 meters, according to the
situation. It is inadvisable to send patrols up until enemy activity
has been reported by the advanced posts and it is quite possible
36 US.Air Service
in World War I
Vol. IV
~~
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Kirby, who had enlisted in the Army in 1904, had been com-
missioned in the Cavalry in 1913 and detailed to the Aviation
Section of the Signal Corps in 1916. His prewar service had
included flying duty with the 1st Aero Squadron in Mexico.
Later, while attached to the 94th Aero Squadron in France, he
shot down a Fokker, the last enemy plane officiallycredited t o a
pursuit pilots of the U.S. Air Service in World War I. Major Kirby
i assumed command of the 5th Pursuit Group on 1 December
1918, succeeding Capt. Dudley L. Hill, who had been in com-
mand since the group was formed two weeks earlier.
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rear men of a lower patrol, for those men to avoid turning away
or maneuvering wildly. However, it has been proven beyond
question that the defense is to dive under their own formation
and to stay there. If the formation is properly echeloned, the
attack continuing, the next men, becoming the rear two, receive
the fire, and in turn will dive underneath. So long as the enemy
planes stay well above, it is impossible to counterattack
effectively. The leader of the formation attacked will turn into his
own lines, climb, perhaps dive, to shake off the pursuit, and
return with the advantage lessened; for in all pursuit work the
advantage of altitude is everything. The formation thus retains its
unity, differently massed for the moment, but still a mutually,
protective and aggressive unit.
Small formations of Germans, by way of notation, when
attacked from above, sometimes formed a circle, following each
other around, protecting .one another’s tails, and gradually edging
back into their own lines. They thus become a difficult mark, but
were absolutely on the defensive for just so long as the attackers
wished to continue (Toul Sector, May, June).
It is reported that in 2 cases, when attack of this character
was imminent, one or two machines dove back into the German
lines, climbed and returned to harass the allied formation from
above. It would seem that a maneuver of this character would
require too much time in execution to make it valuable as a
practice.
We are still dealing with the action of a single formation
unreinforced by a protective patrol at higher altitude, or guarding
a lower formation engaged in some definite mission requiring
cooperation. It will be observed that the foregoing has been in
character, defensive. Discipline has been emphasized in this
connection. It is as important when attacking and the function of
pursuit being to attack, it becomes all important.
The first pilots of the United States Army in this war were
trained under French instructors. They had at their command
the experience of men who had been long at the front. There
was no word spoken that would lead to any other conclusion i
than that the action was individual in war flying. A protective
patrol was mentioned as remaining above in attack. The leader
opened the attack, but from there on, the individual acted as he
thought best. The American pilots instituted and initiated “gang
fighting.” It may have been in the minds of the French, but no
hint of it as a practice was given, nor in any of the matter
circulated to the pilots by the French were any problems worked
out along these lines. Gang fighting by the test of trial has
proved the most efficient and only form adaptable to the
character of fighting pursuit has met with as the war progressed.
46 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
airplanes far away means preparedness. The advantage to the man who
observes the other formation, who can spot friend or foe by the
silhouette and general look, is not to be taken unawares. He can climb
for combat if below, he can maneuver for perfect position if above. The
surprise element becomes possible for him. Therefore signals are
arranged; for while the patrol leader has the great opportunity to see
what is in the air, it sometimes happens that a pilot of the formation
may catch a speck-a distant plane-before the leader sees it.
Diving past the leader, pointing his plane toward the distant one,
and returning into formation is a common signal, better than
wiggling the wings or shooting a Very pistol, as has been tried,
as it is more positive. In future, the wireless telephone will make
formations of Pursuit planes on the lines inestimably more
efficient. The possibilities the telephone will introduce are without
limit for the development of gang fighting.
The Germans have cooperated between formations by sending
to the line a large “swarm” which on arrival at the center of the
sector to be patrolled will maneuver as follows: “Chains,” or
small formations, will break off and at different altitudes patrol,
the mother formation remaining generally in the same locality.
Attacking or attacked these small formations will lead the
attackers or force the attacked machines toward the main
50 U.S.AirService .
in World War I
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Landis, who had won 10 or more victories while with the Royal
Flying Corps, had become commander of the 25th Squadron on
25 September 1918. The squadron, manned largely by officers
and men who had trained in England, spent the following month
trying to get ready for operations with SE-5’s. The planes and
pilots were slow in arriving, however, and the first flight over the
lines was not made until 10 November, when Landis accom-
panied Major Biddle, the group commander, on “a hunting
expedition in front of Metz.”a Borrowing three pilots, Landis led
an uneventful, four-plane patrol over the lines the following day.
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‘
them off of flying for a week or two. This to my mind is a very
bad mistake, for I honestly believe that the sooner a pilot gets
back into the air after a crash the better it is for him. I have
had actual experience along this
(d) In many training camps fficer under instruction is
made to feel ot like an officer in
the United St is has no effect upon
results, but I am sure that a satisfied and Comfortable pilot will
make a better air man.
(e) One of the greatest faults of our advance training is that
our instructors were not experienced war pilots and did not
know fhe “game.” Many set rules they gave for fighting were
incorrect. A good war pilot is of great value at the advance
training school than he would be at the front.
4. Discipline
(a) The Air Service is entirely different from any branch of
the army and the same should be considered in the required
discipline. Of course the me and should be disciplined as
an infantry company but the must have a different kind of
discipline and a good name s “loyalty.” Loyalty can be
instilled into them by a good commanding officer. What I mean
by loyalty is that the pilo* will do what ever work he is ordered
to do against the enemy when there is a possible chance of
doing it and will at all times attack and destroy the enemy not
because he fears his commanding officer but because of respect
for him. Loyalty will also demand team work among the pitots in
combat.
(b) The best place of disciplining an officer or instilling
loyalty is the mess where the pilots collect, where friendship and
respect for one another is formed. Understand me I do not
mean to say a pilot should be allowed to call his commanding
officer by his first name or such as that but I do mean to say
the iron infantry hand should not be used.
5. Aerial Tactics.
(a) It seems that we had no system at the front, that is to
say we did not keep a consistent patrol on the lines, to work at
the lines clear of the enemy even though they may not destroy
so many machines. They did not seem to know just how to
get the best results with the least possible losses. They did not
use the system of trapping the enemy and out-maneuvering him.
Le&m 59
Learned
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95th Aero Squadron
Aerial combat presents so many unexpected and novel
situations in practice that any attempt to reduce it to a system
of rules seems at first glance to be practically impossible, but at
the same time there are numerous general suggestions which can
be made subject to the changes which must be instantly devised
to suit each new development.
It is no exaggeration to say that three-fourths of the battle lies
in seeing ypur opponent or opponents first and if possible,
making a surprise attack. Under these conditions, everything is
in the favor of the attacking man and his adversary, if he ever
gets into a position to fight at all, is at a tremendous
disadvantage. When getting into position for any attack, and
especially when a pilot thinks he is catching his adversary
unaware, the greatest care must be taken to search minutely for
other enemy planes above or nearby. Often an apparently
Lessons I 63
Learned
-1 7-
The Attack
The leader starts the attack. In favorable circumstances he will
have altitude over the enemy and will dive on the enemy
66 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. N
The Leader
The leader has absolute command of the whole formation. He
is responsible for leading his men on patrol, making decisions as
to when to attack, preventing the formation from being surprised
and having his patrol perform their mission.
Many cases could be cited in which leaders have been called
on to make decisions. It is often times a question of snap
judgement, but as a rule he has a plan of action formulated as
the situation develops. He should be a man of experience who
sees everything that is in the sky. While on patrol over the lines
a good leader is continually scheming and planning to meet
situations which may arise at any time. He considers every
machine in the sky as an enemy until he is close enough to tell
the type. A leader whose formation is surprised is a failure.
Likewise if he engaged in a combat under unfavorable conditions
without sufficient reason he is not a success. He must know
every part of his sector. Before going into the air he should take
note of the wind velocity and direction so as not to be blown
into enemy territory during a fight.
It is the leader’s duty to take advantage of natural conditions
which are favorable for surprise. This includes clouds, mist and
sun.
A formation should be continually S’ing and turning and no
member of the formation should be flying straight at any time. In
order to keep the members of his formation on the move and in
position the leader should fly at a s low a speed as possible and
S and turn continually. Look alive, see everything and jump at
Lessons 67
Learned
conditions.
Upon your arrival a t
and eyes open and obey instructions, be keen to learn. Take
things easy at first and finally you will be a good pursuit pilot. If
you think you know it all and refuse advice and do not do as
told you by flight commander and the older men in the squadron
you will most likely develop into a first class “Daisy Pusher.”
In combat your advantage lies in pressing the attack. Wait
until you can see the man’s head and then spray him with both
guns. If you do this you will get him. If you persist in shooting at
long range you will waste all of your ammunition, accomplish
nothing, and find yourself out of luck when the time comes for
you to save your own skin. Keep after the enemy. Do not give
him a chance to fix his guns or to do anything else. However,
remember attack from the Front and “Watch Your Tail.”
Recommendations
The training schools have not sent men to the front prepared
for their work. They have not been taught to fly formation. They
expect signals from the leader as to when to turn. This should
be instinctive. They have not been taught how to keep in
formation.
The combat instruction given them has been based on the
wrong idea. They have been led to believe that their combat
pnnciples involved individual combat principally whereas individual .
combat is a very rare occurance.
The main trouble with the training appears to be that the
instructors are not men of experience at the front No man can
teach a pursuit pilot who has not been through the mill. The
instructor should be a man who has been at the front as a bona
member of a pursuit squadron and has been in combats and
preferably a man who has been a flight leader as he has already
had the experience of teaching pilots from the training school.
‘The main recommendation would be therefore that a staff of
instructors be formed who know the game from every angle and
68 U.SAir Service
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VOl. Iv
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Fokker Triplane
Especially at dawn is this true, due to condensations of moisture
during night upon the envelope. If the balloon is well in
ascension do not pass over it after attack, through cone of fire
from machine gun emplacements upon ground, but chandel [le]
away, gaining altitude a s rapidly as possible. If the balloon is in
the nest, a s is very likely a t dawn or nightfall, it is advisable to
hug ground a s closely a s possible after attack, zig-zagging and
taking all possible advantage of natural obstacles to enemy fire.
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destruction of the
balloon at the beginning of the day as it is practically impossible
to replace the balloon for the day's observation.
Practically the same plan is followed in dusk straffing; the pilot
leaving just before dusk, arriving at the balloon at dusk attacking
it in its nest and at once returning to his aerodrome by the
quickest possible route. The pilot is enabled to land by light
from the lighting sy Rockets and flares are
fired continually to his airdrome. The
advantages of dusk e protection afforded
the pilot by the darkness albwing him to carry out his mission
unmolested by hostile E.A. and due to the poor visibility, A.A.
and machine gun fire is necessarily inaccurate. At this time of
the day the hostile E.A. usually have returned to their respective
airdromes leaving the air,free for the carrying out of the mission.
The darkness also assists the pilot to make a surprise attack,
the value of which can hardly be over estimated.
In successfully carrying out dawn and dusk balloon straffing
missions the pilot must study his map well before leaving,
carefully working out his route, noting principal water-ways and
land-marks that would be plainly discernable in the darkness and
having firmly fixed this in his nd also the exact location
of the balloon. An accurate c with a radio light face is
absolutely necessary as after attacking a balloon the pilot quite
often is obliged to return to his lines flying just a few feet above
the tree tops; not being able to see the surrounding country he
is obliid to rely absolutely on his compass. The sun can often
be used to follow direction by,'but on the Western Front it is
often concealed for days at a time by thick mist and clouds.
Lessons 75
Learned
propeller. One gun was the common aerial Vickers 7mm. gun
firing service ammunition, every fifth cartridge being a tracer.
The other gun being the 11 mm. Vickers balloon gun firing all
incendiary ammunition. There are rqany instances of our pilots
attacking and firing good bursts into balloons at close range but
failing to burn the balloon due to lack of proper incendiary
ammunition, but since the introduction of the balloon gun no
such cases have been reported. The sights used have been the
ring and bead,b Aldis,' and Revitle seville,d but they are hardly
necessary in attacking balloons due to the large size of
the target and the pilots usually regulated their fire by changing
the direction of the plane as their tracers indicated the necessity
of a change. It is vitally important that the guns be in good
working order and that the ammunition has been carefully
selected, as a jam at the critical moment may mean the failure of
your entire miseion. It is obvious that the pilot should be
thoroughly familiar with the operation of his gun.
Since in attacking a balloon a pilot is required to penetrate
several kilometers into enemy territory; the importance of having
his plane in absolutely perfect running order cannot be too highly
emphasized. If a pilot desires to fail in his mission and perhaps
allow the balloon he was to destroy continue invaluable
observation for the enemy, if he desires to spend the balance of
the war in a prison camp, let him fly a machine aver enemy
territory that is not running properly and the chances are big
that he will never be able to carry out his mission or ever get
back to his own lines. A pilot should thoroughly understand his
machine and know that it is right. The American training schools
have made a grave error in sending pilots to the front, practically
100% of whom had never flown a Spad, taking the valuable time
of the older man a6 well as their own time in familiarizing
themselves with the Spad both in how to fly it and in the
handling of the motor to produce the best results. The motors
furnished the squadron have as a majority been of a very poor
quality and combining this with the fact that many of the pilots
had to familiarize themselves with the Hispano-Suisa motor by
experience and by continued experiments; the efficiency of the
squadron has been impaired and many offers for volunteer
balloon straffing expeditions had to be refused,
shortage of planes. This shortage being produc
being constantly made on the engine.
In all the forms of balloon straffing the balloon was attacked
from above along the top surface from head to tail due to the
hydrogen being in the upper part of the bag. The surest method
of burning the balloon as carried on by our pilots was this:
Diving on the balloon the pilot opened fire at about 100 yards
Lessons 77
Learned
I
with the small gun firing the service ammunition concentrating
the fire so as to produce a hole in the bag (this is easily done
by following the directions of the tracers) allowing the hydrogen
to escape and unite with the oxygen of the air. When at perhaps
50 or 60 yards he would open fire with the balloon gun firing the
incendiaries, these taking greatest effect now since the HO had
united from the hole in the bag and the burning bullet passing
through this mixture easily ignited the bag.
After attacking a balloon and when the pilot is returning home
is when the enemy fire is the heaviest from the machine guns
and “Flaming Onions” (large bails of phosphorous) fired with the
intent of setting the attacking plane on fire. The safety of the
pilot now depends on his ability to maneuver his plane rapidly
and in all directions to frustrate the hostile fire from the ground. Capt. Alfred A. Grant,
Perhaps the most successful maneuver consists of “walking on Commanding Officer,
the rudder” that is, skidding the machine first to left and then to 27th Aero Squadron.
right by pressure on the rudder. A Spad is very easy to skid
and when maneuvered in this manner makes a very difficult
target.
-21-
~~
drive opened and they grew worse as the Huns were pushed
back. Never were we allowed to fly above 600 meters and the
country north, northwest, and west of Verdun is a mass of shell
holes, barbed wired and trenches and forests. Thus a forced
landing instead of being a joke more or less, became a very
serious matter so that when the motor coughed or cut out so
did your heart and when it stopped dead the bottom sort of
dropped out of something inside of you. Fortunately, although
many ships were crashed on these forced landings, very few of
the pilots were hurt.There seems to be but one way of landing
under the conditions met with between the Meuse and the
Argonne and that is to head for the best looking spot you can
reach and “pan cake” down. By pancaking is meant holding the
ship a few feet off the ground as long as possible and getting the
tail well down, thus when you have lost flying speed the plane
drops and does not roll as far as it would after making an
ordinary landing. Only luck will keep you from turning over, but
a pan cake landing helps. An interesting book could be written
on the feelings, thoughts and sensations that come to different
pilots on such occasions.
If you are lucky enough to make a good landing there are
several things to be done and determined: First: What is wrong
80 U.S. Air Service
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with the motor? Can it be fixed easily? What parts are needed
etc? Second: When the machine is fixed will it be possible to
“take-off” from the field you are in or any nearby field? Third:
Will the machine have to be wrecked or salvaged? If this is
necessary all instruments, sights, guns etc, should be removed
and taken back to camp. Fourth: The machine must be guarded
as the world is full of souvenir hunters and a disabled plane with
its insignia, cocards, number and many removable parts is a
choice prize period. Five: Notify Headquarters where the plane
is, the extent of the damage and what in your judgment it is
bast to do.
If a pilot always knows approximately which way the wind is blowing
and what direction is towards enemy territory he has little to
fear from a forced landing; if h e doesn’t know these two things
he is hardly a pilot.
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to prevent them from diving on your tail, and you always find
that upon attacking or being attac enemy airplanes try to
climb above you and gat on your by having two above,
you will not have to worry SO mu t your tail. The average
fight lasts from 2 to 5 minub. When you break off,get into
formation au quickly as possible and prepare for another attack
or move towards home, as the patrol leader deems fit. Always
have some point where you can rmdezvous. (Thii is in case a
pilot loses his formation.) One of the strongest points that all
young pilots should have beaten into their heads (I use the word
beaten because it ia just about what you have to do) is never
leave a formation or attack unless the patrol leader signals you
or leads the attack himself. I can’t emphasize this point too
-24-
A. Aeroplanes.
1. Types. The war has shown that there is no universal or
Lessons a5
Learned
multiple purpose plane, which can be used for pursuit, Caproni biplane.
reconnaissance and bombing work. Each particular work calls for
a different type of plane, specializing either in speed,
maneuverability, climbing ability, carrying capacity, or long
distance range. In order to embody one of these characteristics
in a plane, others must be sacrificed.
2. Construction. Certain planes, such as the Spad for
pursuit, Breguet for bombing, and Salmson for reconnaissance,
are the results of years of experience in designing planes and
combine the maximum factor for safety with best features of
plane performance. These planes have practically become
standard and the principal improvementsto be made lie in the motor,
inasmuch as a greater speed and a higher ceiling are desirable
for all of these planes.
Other planes, like the Handley-Page and Caproni and others
of the night bombing type, are susceptible of considerable
development for long distance and weight-carrying purposes. All
of these multiple-motored planes may be altered to fit the special
purpose desired.
3. Use of Aeroplanes in warfare. The principal and primary
uses of airplanes are for observation, destruction of property,
and attack upon ground troops, and the secondary or defensive
uses are for pursuit and protective purposes. Observation and
bombing were both developed greatly during the present war, the
86 US.Air Senrice
in World War I
Vol. N
factories, etc.
9. Both pilot and observer should be as comfortable as
possible. Four hours of flying is wearisome at the best and the
best work is not done by a wornout man.
C. Why the De Haviland, Liberty Four, is a Poor Airplane for
Day Bombardment.
1. It is not fast at great altitudes with a full load of bombs.
2. For a bombing plane it carries to any altitude an inferior
quantity of bombs.
3. The fuel tank placed between the pilot and observer is
the target of every pursuit plane that attacks it.
4. The fuel tank is unprotected, works by pressure and
explodes when shot up.
5. When a bad landing is made or the plane crashes the
tank leaves its bedding, having nothing to keep it there, and
crushes the pilot against the motor.
6. The pilot and observer are too far apart. Team work is
necessary in a bombing plane and is impossible in this type.
Speaking tubes help some but are not the remedy for this
situation.
7. The observer’s cockpit is too low and the seat and belt
provided are useless for active fighting. Any observ r finds great
&r
difficulty in swinging Twin Lewis guns in the blast a Liberty
tractor.
8. The controls are exposed and liable to be shot away by
even a careful and conservative observer.
9. The arrangements for the throttle and switch are badly
placed. They should be on the same side, thus making it
unnecessary for the pilot to change hands on the stick while
landing.
10. The engine bed is weak.
11. The tail is weak and must be braced. Bracing is never as
reliable as substantial construction in the making.
12. The king posts on the elevator ,are weak and no wires
(on the white ships) run from the king post to the trailing edge
of the elevator.
13. The plane is blind both from the pilot’s and observer’s
standpoint.
14. The Liberty motor is too heavy and powerful for the De
Haviland 4. Anyone who has flown one can tell this by the
vibration of the machine under full power.
15. The rubber connection on the gasoline line running
parallel to the exhaust becomes heated and so works loose. This
causes a flood of gasoline over the exhaust and a resultant plane
burned in the air. Have seen this happen on the ground.
88 U.S. Air Service
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VOl. Iv
Breuget.
E. Flying Personnel.
1. Choice of Fliis. Altho for the most part the fliers have
been proved as excellent material, a certain proportion have
U.S. Air Service
in World War I
Vol. N
demonstratiom.
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4
96 U.S. Air Service
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VOl. IV
Pilots and observers of the 24th Aero Squadron: (I. to r.) Lts. Lawrence
M. Selleck, Roy 0. Kennedy, Raymond P. Dillon, Sidney V. W. Peters,
Walter 0. Lokey, Norman W. Hall, Waldo E. Tuttle, Hendrick M.
Search, Capt. Harry T. Wood, and (sitting) Lt. Sidney B. Wertimer.
Lessons 97
Learned
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-28-
Corps and Division Staffs how the Air Service can be used, and
in many, in fact nearly every case I have found it necessary to
order out over 50% of the missions without being asked to do so
by the divisions, in order that the Air Service be used to its full
capacity.
(b) Infantry. In many cases the infantry did not know how
to place panels, and in many cases used them for dish rags and
shoe cloths. Battalion P.C.'s very seldom communicated with the
planes, and very few knew why they should show their panels
except that it was orders.
In this connection I wish to say that it is a great mistake to
ask for the panels promiscuously. A good observer will pick up
advancing troops without calling for the line and advancing
troops will not show the panels. If possible never ask for the line
more than three times a day, once in the morning, the last thing
in the evening and one time in reserve. If asked for every hour
or six or seven times a day the infantry becomes indifferent, and
often will pay no attention at any time. This is a very important
point, and from my experience in every important offensive in
which the American troops have participated am fully convinced
that by not asking more than three times per day your infantry
liaisons will be 100%more successful.
(c) Artillery. Radio and panel operators need a great deal of
instruction for increasing speed, the length of time wasted has
caused many failures in artillery adjustment.
(d) General. All branches of the line need instruction in
maps and codes. In many cases units never heard of the key
and band code, Lists 1 and 2 (Liaison for all Arms), etc.
(e) All the above faults can be overcome in a great measure
--
102 U.S.Air Service
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VOl. Iv
.
by Liaison Schools at the Airdrome. .constant participation in
manouevers, and talking to Junior Officers.
4. Communications. Too much stress cannot be laid upon the
necessity for keeping up communications from the airdrome to
Corps and Division headquarters. In every case after an advance
telephonic communications break down with the division and
often with the Corps and the only thing left is courier and radio.
Courier messages take often 24 hours for delivery, and then the
wireless is the last resort.
The operators furnished the Air Service are not sufficiently
trained and there are not enough of them. All messages are in
code and excellent operators are required to take them
correctly. In every group I have been it has been necessary to
comb the squadrons for operators, the results have been very
poor. In several cases I have had important messages come in
and when decoded did not make sense, by the time they had
been repeated the requests for work would often be from four to
six hours too late.
In every case Division Commanders, Air Service Liaison
Officers and Group Commanders have failed to make sufficient
use of the Radio, and nearly always failed to take into account
that an average of two hours is necessary to get a message
through. Not enough use has been made of advanced landing
grounds. When communication is bad the surest and quickest
way is dropped messages. This will always work from Groups to
Divisions, but necessitates an advanced field from Division to
Group.
When communications are poor and the Group has been left
behind the use of an advanced and a base field becomes
imperative. This phase of the move has been almost entirely
neglected by the American Air Service. A detailed account of
how relations between Corps, Division, advanced, and rear field
should be coordinated is too long to be gone into in this
statement. It will suffice to say that the Group Commander,
B.I.O. and photo section with a radio outfit should be pushed up
to within 10-15 K.M.from the front, and three individual hangars
erected. All except three ships and three teams remain at the
base field during the night and come up only 30 minutes to an
hour before scheduled missions. This is equally valuable in case
of advance or retreat, and in case of a retreat is the only way to
save much of your material.
The unequal distribution of codes, when changed, has caused
the loss of an entire day's work in more than one case. Codes
have been changed and the Air Service received the new codes
24 hours in advance of line units, consequently the units could
not decipher messages or map references.' This can be obviated
Lessons 103
Learned
I
,
rl -I
104 U.S. Air Service
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VOl. N
uninterrupted labor.
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-30-
Liaison Officers
Ignorance of the use of airplane has marked the attitude of the
line troops toward the Air Service. To counteract this an
114 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
-31-
3
Lessons 117
Learned
-32-
.
1. . . the few practical suggestions that are here submitted
mi&t lessen some of the present difficulties and dangers
encountered in D-H 4 Observation Squadrons serving on the
front:.
2. The first D-H 4 aeroplanes sent to the front were provided
with one oil tank. This supply of oil was not sufficient. The
shortage was done away with by the use of a second tank of
equal size. All new machines coming to the front are so
equipped. It would be a simple matter to make this change, if
the oil tanks and brackets were supplied. These have not been
furnished this Squadron.
3. Because of enemy planes, it is necessary to fly “close
formation” on photographic missions. The upper plane in the
American D-H 4 blinds the Pilot and prevents such formations.
By removing the Norrisb tank an opening can be made over the
Pilot’s head which would give good visibility. If this is done it is
necessary to substitute for the Norris tank the British stream
lined gravity tank, placed under the right or left upper wing,
120 U.S. Air Service
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VOl. IV
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-35-
a p t . Clearton H. Reynolds
C.O., 104th Aero Squadron
Reynolds had been the first pilot assigned to the 91st Aero
Squadron after the squadron’s arrival in France late in 1917. He
had served temporarily in January and February 1918 as com-
mander of the 91st and later as its adjutant. When the 91st had
begun operations at the front in June with Salmson 2 aircraft,
Reynolds had become leader of the squadron’s first flight. Re-
assigned on 26 July, Reynolds had commanded the 104th in the
Battle of St. Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne Campaign.
1. It is my belief from experience, that Infantry Contact work
as performed by an Observation Squadron has not been as
efficient and successful as the needs of the service demands. The
chief difficulty seems to have been in getting line troops to
properly designate their front line when called upon. This may
have been due to faults in the present system, or to lack of
proper training and co-ordination between the line and aviation
units. I would personally like to see the following experiment
tried. Believing that a good pilot desiring to become something
more than a chauffeur for an Observer, can with proper training
do nearly as much observation on infantry contact work. Use an
aeroplane like the Salmson equipped with a high horsepowered
motor of small horizontal surface, and place the pilot’s cockpit
back of the wings to offer greater visibility, and armor the motor,
gas tank, and pilot’s seat with a weight of armor equivalent to
the weight of the Observer, extra guns and ammunition done
away with. This plane should fly very close to the ground. The
pilot would indicate on a map in front of him the position of the
Lessons 123
Learned
, .m-
I Salmon.
-36-
Capt. Clearton H. Reynolds
C.O., 104th Aero Squadron
Recommendations:
1. That the present inefficiencies in Infantry Contact work, due
to inability of observers to get Infantry to respond to signals to
locate their lines and to lack of coordination between the two
arms, can be improved by the use of single-seated planes, lightly
armored, in which the pilot could fly at a low altitude over the
lines with a protection plane above him, and locate friendly
troops without the aid of panels. For this, Capt. Reynolds
suggests a plane of the Salmson type, with high-powered motor
of small horizontal surface, the pilot’s cockpit to be placed back
of the wings for greater visibility.
2. That a squadron of 18 pilots and 18 observers is too large
for Division work and that greater efficiency could be secured by
conforming to the size of squadron used in the French Army.
3. That, in order to improve coordination between observing
machines and protection pursuit planes, a small pursuit squadron
of possibly 15 planes with 10 pilots be attached to each
observation squadron.
-37-
-38-
90th Aero Squadron
1. Air Service Telephone Net. Past experience shows that the
Air Service, like the Infantry and Artillery, should have its own
telephone net connecting all groups and squadrons, chasse,
observation, and bombardment, with the office of the Chief of
Air Service and leading forward from him to the division P.C.’s
where a representative of the Flying Corps should be on duty.
At present, all communication from the front goes over already
congested Infantry and Artillery nets and is thereby rendered
very difficult at best and more often almost impossible.
2. Air Service Liaison Officers. During the last few months of
hostilities, squadrons working with divisions have assigned
observers to act as liaison officers with the division commanders,
whose duties have been to keep the squadron informed on the
situation at all times and to give as many suggestions and as
much help as possible to the unit commander with whom their
squadron was working. This is a practice which should be made
permanent and which, with the direct communication spoken of
in the preceding paragraph, will add appreciably to the results
obtained.
3. Exercises With Infantry. More exercises in which planes and
infantry can work together will tend to remedy several existing
conditions.
Lessons 127
Learned
from enemy planes by their shapes, while the new men who
have never had even that opportunity are often caught unaware,
waiting to identify another plane by its markings.
5. Instructors Men of Experience. As far as possible, it is to
be recommended that instructors in Schools of Observation be
men who have been at the front and seen the conditions as they
actually exist. New observers are continually joining squadrons
absolutely ignorant of the most important points a flier has to
know, where flying over country patrolled by hostile scouts and
protected by hostile A.A. batteries.
6. Testing Plots and Observers. In observation squadrons
working in active sectors, pilots and observers should be teamed
up and only fly together. The pilot should have his own machine
and fly no other, except of course under exceptional conditions.
The reasons are obvious. First, when combats are frequent,
teamwokk between pilot and observer is very essential. If two
mep whohave never flown together are engaged in combat,
neither knows what the other will do or wants to do, while two
men who have continually worked together know each other,
trust each other, know their machine, and usually study their
missions and maps in common so that usually their work and
the work of the whole squadron will be of much greater value
than that of a squadron in which pilots and observers are
continually going out together fot: the first time.
7. Signal Equipment. The gradd of Very pistol signals and Very
pistols has been very poor for many months past. Misfires,
delayed discharges, and failures of the rocket to explode after
leaving the pistol have added greatly to the difficulties of the
observer. In several cases, faulty pistols and hang-fires have
resulted in almost fatal fires in the planes. If possible, improved
pistols and ammunition should be provided even if special
material has to be used for airplane work.
-39-
9lst Aero Squadron
It is natural that months of flying over the lines should teach
valuable lessons and in studying the papers submitted by pilots
and observers on what they have gained by their experiences it
is interesting to note their unanimity on the importance of three
points: Watchfulness, knowledge of one’s sector, and
cooperation. There are other things of importance, too, as what
follows will show, but these three must be the basis of all good
work.
Signaling with pistols.
Lessons 129
Learned
taught them the priceless value of team play, has shown them
in their friends depths of cheerfulness, forgetfulness of self, and
bravery, whose greatness they had never appreciated, and has
. left them an affection for these friends so strong that it will be
always a part of their lives.
-40-
-41-
-42-
ps. The Air Service is now using maps constructed for the
infantry and artillery. Maps made especially for the use of
aviators would greatly simplify many of the difficulties now
encountered in visual and photographic reconnaissance.
Especial attention should be given to the landscape as it
appears from the air. Among a multitude of small villages and
roads it is difficult for an aviator to find his position on the map.
On the contrary there are always many distinctive landmarks
which immediately catch the eye from the air but which cannot
be found readily on the maps now in use.
Water is always distinctive-lakes, rivers, and canals should be
more strongly marked, with particular attention to form and
direction.
Lessons 135
Learned
-43-
1st Lt. Allen T. Bird, Jr.
Flight Commander, 50th Aero Squadron
......................................................
The flight commanders of a squadron should keep in close
touch with the work in their respective flights both of the pilots
and observers as well as the mechanics, also to know each day
the condition of every machine in the flight and to watch the
motors closely.
Finally, whenever necessary to make suggestions or criticisms
to both pilots and observers (observers, more particularly on
their requirements of pilots in working) regarding their methods.
It is needless to say that under the prevailing table of squadron
organization usually such suggestions or criticisms were not
received in the spirit they were given and little heed paid.
In the work of an observation pilot caution and good judgment
should be the primary requisites. As the successful
accomplishment of each mission is due to a great extent upon
the flying ability of the pilot he should at all times maneuver his
machine so that the observer can carry on his work most
effectively.
Before going on a mission it is absolutely essential that pilot
and observer talk over the work to be accomplished and lay
their plans of cooperation accordingly.
Contact Patrol: To successfully accomplish such a mission
there are several vital factors and situations to be considered,
upon which the method to be employed depends. The area to ~
A German antiaircraft gun in action. The photo had been taken by the
gunner’s German comrade, who was later captured.
Flight mechanics use a Ford tractor to pull a Liberty plane off the field for maintenance at the Air Service
Production Center #2, Romorantin, France.
-44-
1st Lt. F. M. McCook
Flight Commander, 50th Aero Squadron
direction and in case of trouble you will find them your greatest
refuge.
The first dive is always the most to be feared-a good
maneuver is to wait until he is just within range and then go up
in a sharp climbing turn. The enemy plan of attack on two
seaters is to take them by surprise. A short burst of tracers by
the observer will often forestall combat.
After an attack or low flying venture, great care should be
taken in the handling of a machine until it is safely landed on the
drome. A ground inspection of a plane after a “job” often causes
cold perspiration. As a last remark, it has been the writer’s
observation that those with the greatest “wind-up,” whether in
training or in service, are the first to go.
-45-
-46-
1st Lt. George S. Clark
Flight Commander, 104th Aero Squadron
1. The best and most successful work will come from the
Observation Squadron in which there is the greatest cooperation
between the entire personnel of the squadron and especially
between the pilots and the observer.
2. In the first place, pilots for this work should have a
minimum of 100 hours of flying experience including at least 25
hours of aerial gunnery (actual time in the air), with fixed gun
both photographic and shooting at targets. After his gunnery
course he should go to a school where he can get some idea of
the kind of work going on at the front, preferably an observer’s
school. In this work he would find that he could work with some
observers a great deal better than with others. In this manner
the teams could be formed and if sent through the rest of their
training together, they would be able to enter their duties at the
Lessons 143
Learned
A number of officers in the 90th Aero Squadron appearing in the photo contributed to the "lessons learned" in the
postwar review. Left to right: Lts. Bertrand Neidecker, Wilbur Kinsley, Alan Lockwood, Merritt 0. White, William
Lowe, John Wallace, H. H. Cowle, Arthur OConnor, Clive Lacy, Norris Pierson (Squadron C.O.), Loren Roher,
Valentine J. Burger, Capt. William G. Schauffler, Jr. (Group C.O.), Lts. Henry Ellis, John Sherrick, Van Hayden,
Arthur W. Parr, George Dorrance (behind Parr), Harold Greist, Horace A. Lake, Henry Borden, Floyd
Hart, Fred Tillman, and Alexander Grier. Bethelainville, France, 11 November 1918.
-47-
It is recommended that:
1. Training of Pilots. Pilots receive 30 hours of preliminary
training of flying alone, followed immediately by 20 hours of aerial
gunnery. Gunnery to consist not so much in the ground work,
but all aerial practice to be emphasized. Single and formation
combat work with camera guns to be chief feature of work.
Pilots to be sent to the front with from 50 to 100 hours flying.
Those' who have been used as instructors and having more than
Class in artillery reglage at
LeValdahon.
Lessons 145
Learned
-48-
watch for enemy chasse for if there are any near they will be
attracted by the rockets, and will attack them if they are near
enough, for they know that when rockets are fired, the observer
is busy watching the ground and his watch for enemy aircraft is
therefore impossible. Try to locate the front lines first; then
verify it by calling for panels with a rocket, thus keeping from
making infantry as well as yourself conspicuous.
Friendly troops can usually be distinguished easily from about
200 meters by the color of their uniform, but weather conditions
and heavily wooded territory at times makes it necessary to fly
as low as 50 metres. When flying as low as this, always try to keep
back of our lines as far as possible to avoid enemy fire from the
ground, but at the same time keeping near enough front lines for the
observer to see panels plainly.
When on contact patrols the enemy archies cause very little
trouble as you are so low and behind our lines they have to fire
laterally and their aim is usually poor. If they come near just
change direction about 45 degrees and altitude without banking
up any. But should they come too near or get you bracketed
then side slip out of them and resume work at some other point
along sector.
Pilot and observer should have utmost confidence in each
other. Try to team up with an observer that you know is
reliable, that is that you don’t mind doing as he tells you to. For
instance, if he should try to tell you to fly over a certain place
within the enemy lines at a very low altitude, and even though
you knew it was extremely dangerous, and thought it wasn’t
necessary, you wouldn’t hesitate a second but would do as he
asked, for you have full confidence in him; knew that he knew
what he wanted, and it was necessary to do as he asks in
order that he may secure the desired information. Just
remember that he knows what he is doing. Knows the danger
and is taking the risk as you, even more, for if he is killed you
can get the plane and yourself back, but if you are killed then
the planes goes down, and therefore he is taking a double risk.
Never depend on your observer to keep your direction, that is
the pilot’s business. The observer’s time is fully occupied in
watching the ground and for enemy aircraft, and is not expected
to keep the direction, so it is up to you, as the pilot, to do this,
for nine times out of ten the observer is so busy that it would
be impossible for him to know whether the plane was flying
north, south, east or west. In order to fully cany out his
,missions he had to have full confidence in the pilot and he
knows he will keep himself oriented.
It is not advisable for the pilot of an observation plane to
strafe enemy troops, transports, etc. His gun is fixed and he
148 U.S. Air Service
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-49-
-50-
work, you are never far in enemy territory, dive down in front of
him or attract his attention in some way or other and then head
him back to our lines when you again take your position of
protection.
Protect the machine that is doing the work at all costs and if
you find that you are not able to ward off the attack by yourself,
close in nearby the leading plane and let him help you.
The success of the mission depends upon you. Do your work
so that the leading plane can accomplish its duties in the least
possible time and with the best results. Be wide awake and fully
aware of the fact that something else is at stake outside of your
own personal safety. Do not encourage a fight but rather seek to
avoid it, for the reports of the enemy [?I infantry planes are
more important than the destruction of enemy aircraft. Remain
constantly on the alert until your return to your own aerodrome
and thereby you have done all in your power to accomplish a
successful mission.
2. Protection for artillery missions. In protection for this
work your machine must be equipped with wireless reels, maps
with target locations, and in fact with all the necessities of a
mission plane. Before leaving the ground arrange a set of signals
with the pilot of the leading plane so that in case of attack you
can easily attract his attention. When in the air take your
position above and to his rear and then look out for trouble.
The thought must always be uppermost in your mind that the
observer in the mission plane is watching his target and the
bursting of shells and consequently is depending almost entirely
upon you for his protection. In this work you are most always
flying at an altitude of several thousand metres and in
consequence the only trouble you will come in contact with, is
anti-aircraft and enemy planes. The best possible way of avoiding
the former is by continually changing your line of flight as in this
way you become a very poor target while in the case of attack
you must at all costs, protect the leading plane. Remember that
the pilot in the machine that is doing the work must keep his
ship in the best possible position to afford his observer a clear
view of the target and even though his action may at certain
times seem a trifle peculiar that is no affair of yours. In case of
attack remember that your observer has guns as well as yourself
and therefore keep your ship in a position so that he can use
his ghns to the best advantage as he is able to d o more efficient
shooting than you. Watch the blind angles of your machine and
if possible never let an enemy plane take advantage of them.
Always remember that the enemy plane knows the location of
your blind angles as well as you know theirs, and therefore you
152 U.S. Air Service
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the other hand a single bullet might hit the camera and cause
the mission to be a failure. Do what is asked and expected
of you. Keep your eyes open wide at all times and remember
that the success of the mission depends upon you and your
ability.
-51-
1st Lt. Robert M. Anderson
Pilot, 50th Aero Squadron
-52-
In flying along the line get in the sun and come with the wind
if possible. Come with the wind preferably because speed is your
best defense against anti-aircraft batteries and machine gun fire
-53-
-54-
-55-
-56-
-57-
-5a-
-59-
1st Lt. John W. S. Gilchrist 1
-60-
-61-
-62-
pilot is, yet I know of only two cases where observers are in
command of squadrons. Only one observer in this squadron has
been promoted while five pilots have been thus honored. In no
case is the table of organization carried out, it seems
unnecessary to prepare such a table unless its requirements are
fulfilled.
VI. Red Tape. I leave this problem for someone wearing stars
to solve.
-63-
1st Lt. Howard T. Fleeson
Observer, 12th Aero Squadron
It is only when pilot and observer have an intimate knowledge
of the terrain over which the attack covers that infantry liaison
can be accurately carried out. The pilot and observer must at all
times keep their sense of direction. This is done by means of the
sun and by the outstanding features on the ground. The
observer's study should be contours, as well as the roads, woods
and rivers which are the necessary points of study in every kind
of aerial observation. Both pilot and observer must know the
exact location of the present line, the objectives of the attack,
the hour of attack and the hour that the objectives should be
reached.
It is best to reach the lines at least 20 minutes before the
advanced positions of the infantry are to be taken, this allows
time for a study of the situation on the ground and in the air. If
the air seems free of enemy aircraft, fly up and down the old
lines once or twice, if you meet with hostile machine gun fire
from the ground, it is obvious that the advance has been held
up. Perhaps it is only local, that is, at one end of the sector you
meet with machine gun fire and at the other end you do not. Fly
further in the next time except at the points where you know
the enemy are. If you meet with no fire from the ground still,
cut in farther at certain points you will no doubt see friendly
troops, if they are the most advanced units they will sometimes
wave their panels before you call for them. In this way you get
an idea where to expect the panels or flares as you have an
approximate idea as to the location of the lines. Before shooting
your six star rocket, take a survey of the sky for hostile aircraft
as it is the most favorable moment of attack for the enemy, as
the observer will be busy watching the ground and the pilot the
course he is flying. It is here that a study of contours is so
174 U.S. Air Service
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will kick his rudder to throw off their aim and when he does this
you are able to get a good shot at the one underneath. For the
one above about all you can do is to pray that he is a poor
shot. Don’t get excited and aim on the nearest first. Shoot in
short burst of five or six shots. On the approach of hostile
aircraft, the observer should fire a short burst at long range so
as to inform the pilot of their proximity; the pilot likewise must
notify the observer of all planes which he deems hostile.
-64-
2d Lt. W. J. Rogers
Observer, 50th Aero Squadron
Rogers was the man who “found” the “Lost Battalion.” During
an advance by the 77th Division on 2 October 1918, six com- 1
panies of the 308th Infantry and two companies of the 306th
Machine Gun Battalion had penetrated the enemy line and had
been surrounded by enemy forces. The 77th had tried for sev-
eral days to break through and reestablish contact but without
success. The battalion had displayed its panels, but the 50th
Aero Squadron, which was working with the 77th Division, had
been unable to spot the panels or other signs of the battalion at
the place accurately reported by the battalion commander in
messages sent by pigeon. Food, ammunition, and other sup-
plies dropped by the 50th Squadron had landed just out of reach
of the Americans, who were hanging on to their position in a
wooded ravine. On the morning of 7 October the 77th and other
American and French units made another effort to reach the
battalion. Flying with 1st Lt. Robert M.Anderson (see Document
51, above), Rogers spotted a panel that morning about 200
yards east of where the airmen had been looking for the bat-
talion. Rogers immediately reported the coordinates by mes-
sage to the 77th Division. The ground attack was successful,
contact with the battalion being reestablished later the same
day.
Lessons 177
Learned
fire another rocket. By this time the line is being shown where I
fired the first rocket. I get up close enough to see the panels
and flares and fly across the sector, putting the line on my map
as I go. Then I’m through.
I did most of this work at 500 meters altitude. When weather
conditions are such as one must fly lower than this altitude, it is
well nigh impossible to do the mission. In open country an
observer can fly along a road, or a small wood, and locate
troops on the ground orienting himself by villages, but in a forest
like the Argonne, when there is a fog or mist, when you lose
sight of the villages on either side, it is like being on the sea.
You must fly by compass. You cannot locate what you see on
your map with any accuracy. The results obtained, therefore, do
not compensate for the risk incurred. A machine gun or a rifle
bullet from the ground, and the resultant forced landing destroys
a machine and kills pilot and observer. The records of this
squadron furnish the unrebutted evidence of this fact.
The manner in which panels are laid by the infantry so as to
take advantage of the sun and contours is of the utmost
importance. When the writer located the famous Lost Battalion
in the Argonne Forest, they had put their panels on the side of
a hill, in, and facing the sun. I could not mistake them.
When panels are put in shell holes, they should be put on the
side and facing the sun. If put in the bottom they look like
water. Panels cannot be seen from the air very easily if the sun
is shining and they are in the shade.
An infantry observer should not strafe, except under favorable
conditions. He is the best trained man in the Air Service, and he
accomplishes but little at this for the risk he is taking. He is too
valuable for such work. However, there are times when he can
take the enemy unaware and inflict many casualties.
When the Americans made their memorable breakthrough
from Grand Pre to Sedan, the writer was observing the
disorderly retreat of the Germans on one occasion. On a road
through a small forest there was much artillery being rushed to
the rear. The pilot, Lt. Anderson and I fired about 800 rounds
on the road before the Germans could realize what was
happening. By the time they had crawled into shell holes and
other hiding places with rifles and machine guns, we were gone.
It would have been suicide to have returned. The French
civilians in a nearby town informed us later that we killed 60
horses and as many men. The good results were due to the
excellent aerial gunnery of the pilot in the first instance and the
fact that we enfiladed the road. We had a very few aerial
combats in our work. I think the DH4 with the Liberty motor
must have been divined by the Germans as a two-seater fighter.
178 U.SAir Service
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-65-
2d Lt. James E. McCurdy
Observer, 50th Aero Squadron
L
. U.S.infantry troops
I advancing over "no-man's
5' land."
-66-
f
U. S. 155-mm artillery guns 1
at Varennes.
-67-
2d Lt. Walter L. Francis
Observer, 90th Aero Squadron
There are but few flying men who will not agree to the
statement that infantry liaison or infantry contact, as it is
probably better known in the American Service, it at once the
most valuable, most dangerous, and most difficult type of air-
plane work. Of course it is only carried on in periods of attack
when our troops are advancing and when lines of communication
from the front to the P.C.’s are very often useless.
Theory says that the Infantry contact plane will fly from 800 to
lo00 meters and that when called upon to do so by prearranged
signals the infantry will show their panels or flares on the ground,
the observer will plot the line of panels thus formed and will
drop a map with the line marked out upon it. Practice, however,
is widely different. First of all the infantry is very busy fighting,
and at 800 to lo00 meters your signals would many times be
unnoticed. Then again a battlefield is covered with debris,
papers, and various things which look like panels from that
altitude. So you find first of all that you must fly lower. Still for
some reason you can only see a panel here and a flare there,
and you see also some figures moving on the ground but you
cannot make out whether they are friend or enemy. Again you
decide to go down a few hundred meters. Now you are flying at
a hundred meters or less, well within the trajectory of the
artillery, and also within range of enemy machine guns, but you
can make out your men and the enemy also. Your signal rockets
also fall nearly to the ground and are seen by the men. Now the
proposition comes down to locating the advanced elements of
your own troops, which in the method of attack now used
against enemy machine guns, will never form a continuous line,
but will merely be groups of men spread out, and advancing
slowly to encircle and put out of action the points of resistance
which are bothering him.
One case is known where an Infantry Liaison mission was
carried out with a thick layer of fog at fifty meters. The team
doing the work flew to the point where the troops should be,
dropped through a layer of cloud and proceeded at that very low
altitude to locate their advanced units with good results.
There is always the enemy scout plane to be kept in mind.
The observer cannot hang over the side and search the ground
as he does in training, but must continually be on the alert
against monoplace attack. A French observer of three and a half
184 U.S.Air Service
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Vol. N
-68-
men on the ground are very difficult to see if they are in shell
holes or immovable.
While observing the advance of the troops I sent by wireless
code the line of the barrage and location of the front lines and
while flying back to the rear I wrote out the dropping messages
and marked on the drop maps the location of troops, barrage
fire (in enemy territory) and any thing observed which would be
of interest to the command. I dropped one copy of these at
Division P.C.and one at Corps P.C.
After landing I immediately reported to the Intelligence Officer,
gave him what infqmation I had, then made a detailed report of
the mission.
All subsequent missions were accomplished in the same
manner, but many difficulties presented themselves which had to
be overcome. The most important difficulty is the presence of
enemy planes. During all missions I had to watch the air for
enemy plan- and have rarely failed to see some every mission.
They endeavor to surprise us which we counteract by keeping
a very careful watch and by always standing up with the
machine guns ready to mount.
I wish to warn all concerned of the importance of this as I
was surprised by four enemy planes diving down through the
clouds when I was sitting down. By the time I had risen and
turned my guns on them they were out of range, having turned
away which showed us that we were saved by the fact that they
were more surprised to see us than we were to see them.
Had they known that we were there we should have been
easy victims as they passed us within 30 meters.
At that time I was wearing a fur lined coat reaching to my
knees, when I arose to get my guns in action the wind blew the
skirt of the coat up between my hands and the guns which
added to my delay and prevented any chance of my getting a
good shot at them.
I have never worn anything but a union suit since that
experience.
As a biplace plane has movable twin machine guns in the rear
it is most effective in an aerial combat while appearing to be
running away; therefore [it] should only fight when the enemy is
aggressive.
When attacked during a mission we have always led the
enemy planes over our territory and when they turned back we
would return and finish the mission or repeat the tactics until
they go home, as we carry more gasoline and can stay longer in
the air.
The second important difficulty is bad weather conditions. Rain
decreases the chances of the infantry answering the signals. To
Lessons 187
Learned
overcome that we must fly low enough to see the man. I had to
fly as low as 30 meters on the afternoon of Sept. 12, 1918, as
the rain was very heavy and large drops. On that instance the
pilot reduced the speed of the engine until we could just fly level
to decrease the chance of the propeller being broken by the
heavy drops of rain. In fact it was split anyhow but we were able
to finish the mission unaware of that.
Fog or ground mist not only prevents seeing men or panels
except when directly over them at low altitude but makes it
exceedingly difficult to keep your location and direction and
nearly impossible to locate them accurately on the map when we
do see them.
To overcome this we fly low over a road or river we know
near as possible to our sector then pick out one land mark
ahead and keep it in sight until we see another. Inasmuch as our
speed is so great that requires selecting landmarks very quickly
in a fog as one may see only a few hundred yards ahead. That
Twin machine guns on a %place plane” of the 166th Aero Squadron. Lts. Linn D. (“Grandpa”) Merrill and
Edward C. (“Red”) Black, Jr. (at the guns) man the aircraft.
188 U.S. Air servick
in World War I
Vol. N
Bad weather conditions make aerial observation exceedingly difficult. The photo shows U.S. troops in action
at Belleau Woods.
Lessons 189
Learned
because of rumors to the effect that the enemy use planes with
the allied identification marks for the above purpose. I do not
believe that is true.
I made a visit to the troops while they were in the front line
and thus was enabled to find their reason for the existing
conditions above mentioned.
The troops do not realize the importance of the command
knowing their exact position and location and progress in combat
and how quickly the plane can get the information to the
command after obtaining it.
This difficulty is overcome on our part as much as possible on
the mission by repeatedly asking for the line and staying over
them as long as possible and in the event that they will not
show panels or flares we go down until we can see them unless
they are in a green forest, in that case it is impossible.
It can be readily seen that if we see troops in an open space
and a forest in advance we cannot tell the command that the
troops that we saw are the first line unless they show panels
indicating it, as we have no manner of knowing if there are more
troops in the woods unless we receive an answer by the Bengal
flares from the woods.
This also meant that we must fly forward until we see the
enemy troops in order to be sure that no more of our troops
are in advance of the last observed. Doing this decreases very
much our chances of getting the information to the command as
the enemy troops shoot at the planes with rifles and machine
guns at a very effective range.
We have conducted school at the Aero Squadron which is
attended by about 200 officers and non-commissioned officers of
the infantry of one Division at one time for the purpose of
instructing them in distinguishing planes, methods of showing the
lines, sending messages to the plane, and the importance of
liaison between the infantry and the contact planes.
The Squadron has sent observers to visit the Infantry Division,
Brigade, Regiment, Battalion P.C.3 and into the front line to find
out what the infantry thinks of our work, what we can do for
them and to instruct them in what our work is, how we do it
and enable them to identify allied planes. This better
understanding will lessen their fear of planes and prevent our
troops from firing at allied planes and machine guns which has
occurred very frequently.
190 U.S. Air Service
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-69-
-70-
2d Lt. H. L. Borden
Observer, 90th Aero Squadron
Observers located the disposition of enemy troops for batteries such as this Coastal Artillery at [Nixenville]
(Meuse). Shown is a 340-mm railway gun in action.
-71-
Having been from April 20th., 1918 to Sept. 15th., 1918, Chief
Instructor in Armament in the School for Observer Gunnery at
Casaux, and having been asked to report in brief, from this
experience in connection with my experience at the front with
the 99th Squadron, the following is submitted:
A waste of time is the result of the method of machine gun
instruction, in an effort to systematize the assembling and
dissembling of machine guns. Because of the different characters
of different persons, it is impossible to achieve uniformity.
Instruction for some is thereby retarded and they must begin
their studies anew when they reach the front.
The French system comprises a complete course in the
rudiments of gunnery, and the need of constant practice, careful
194 U.S. Air Service
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I
Lessons 195
Learned
-72-
-73-
-74-
10th Balloon Co. truck convoy with winches, moving from one position to another.
Lessons 205
Learned
-75-
-76-
Capt. 0.B. Anderson
C.O., 43d Balloon Company
Equipment: Recommend that companies operating against an
enemy be issued light transportation called for in the tables of
organization.
Conditions in this Company required liaisons and
reconnaissance to be made on foot. Demands made on this
Company were in the light of full equipment-therefore,
unreasonable orders were received, about sending reports,
couriers, etc.
-_I-,_ _I_~ _l
l
--s_-
_ l
l
- 1-1 A winch detail for a
captive balloon.
208 U.S. Air Service
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VOl. IV
I
Lessons 209
Learned
-77-
Capt. 0. 8. Anderson
C.O., 43d Balloon Company
-78-
Lt. Col. Warwick Greene
Chief, Executive Section
Air Service, AEF
Coordination Staff
1. The principal duty of the Coordination Staff was as its
name implies to coordinate the activities of the Air Service,
A.E.F. To this end it was empowered
Lessons 21 1
Learned
a.-
Bedding down a balloon.
I
212 U.S. Air Service
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VOl. IV
Executiue Section
1. On or about November 1, 1918, the Executive Section
succeeded to the functions and duties of the Coordination Staff,
except inspection. I do not know why the name Executive
Section was selected.
2. This Section had hardly gotten under way when the
Armistice fundamentally changed all conditions in the A.E.F. This
historical and statistical work of the Section was, at the
suggestion of the undersigned, transferred out of the Section.
This work was then placed in a Historical Section under the
charge of an Assistant Chief of Air Service.
3. Mobilization work being finished, the force which had been
engaged in this work was, upon the recommendation of the
undersigned, transferred out of the Section in order to work
elsewhere on demobilization.
4. The preparation of plans, estimates, programs, and the
follow-up work on the progress of the Air Service automatically
ceased.
5. There remained in the Executive Section property
accountability and the valuation of the assets of the Air Service,
a duty which had been added to the Executive Section after its
formation.
6. With reference to inspection: the undersigned while a
member of the Coordination Staff recommended that an
Inspection Department be organized for the entire Air Service, to
be divided into three branches, namely,
Military-Discipline; morale; administration; smartness; flying,
gunnery and combat efficiency; condition of stations, parks,
messes, sanitation, etc.
Lessons 213
Learned
-79-
-80-
-81-
the German soldiers for obeying orders and turning them in. The
figures which Hindenburg gave, 504,000 leaflets turned in in May,
June and July, were useful to the Propaganda Section because it
enabled us to calculate the percentage. The leaflets turned in
were just 4 percent of the total. Meanwhile the German press
decried soldiers’ and civilians’ belief in the leaflets, together with
the practice of passing these leaflets around in home circles and
in cafes.
4. Since the armistice letters from German officers have
blamed the leaflets as principal cause of the lowering of German
morale; letters from revolutionary leaders in Berlin have asserted
that the common soldiers of the army were relied on because of
the large number of revolutionary letters recently received from
the front; German military critics have publicly blamed a
considerable part of Germany’s downfall on the leaflets. One
officer interviewed by Americans after the armistice, for example,
declared, “I can only talk as a soldier on the front, but there the
effects of propaganda were disastrous and especially so in the
last six months. Even the little Flugblaetter, after you read them
you imagined you read the truth, that our government was lying
to us. I remember one; after I read it, I felt like blowing my
brains out. I never let one of our men read them but it was
difficult, they were everywhere.” This officer referred mainly to
British air propaganda but his testimony applies as well to
American leaflets which had this in common with the British,
they both were confined to statements of bald fact.
In general the present judgment of the Propaganda Section,
G.H.Q., is based on such recent testimony as the above
together with previous prisoner questioning reports, especially by
its own questioners. The reports of Corps and Army questioning
contained many such statements as the following from the report
of the 3rd Corps, October 12-13, obtained from officers of the
40th Infantry of the 28th Division; “The propaganda which your
aviators have dropped over our lines has given us no end of
trouble. . . . A very large number insisted on secreting them on
their persons and when home on leave make it a practice of
reading and distributing them to relatives and friends. . . . In
fact civilians would write to men at the front begging them on
the score of this propaganda to seize the first opportunity to
desert.” Even on the present evidence the judgment of the
Propaganda Section is that the leaflets’ effects, while uneven,
were largely as was intended and that they contributed in
considerable measure to creating that unescapable atmosphere of
defeat with which the German Army was shot through at the
time of the armistice.
Lessons 225
Learned
Fliers' Daring
The Propaganda Officers in the course of their investigations
at the London War Office and at British G.H.Q. learned that the
British Air Service had forbidden their fliers to carry propaganda
on the ground that it was an unwarranted risk. Two British
fliersb had been sentenced by the Germans to hard labor for
carrying propaganda and the German High Command had
proclaimed that they would shoot or hang any aviator caught
carrying propaganda. Therefore every British bus carried a little
card attesting that printed matter could not be carried in the
plane.
In the beginning of October the Austrian Command issued a
new order threatening hanging for captured pilots who carried
propaganda. When this threat was brought to the attention of
one American Squadron (The Third Corps Observers at Souilly)
the Squadron Commander was asked what effect it had had.c He
replied that as a result he had issued orders that the fliers
carrying propaganda should not fly lower than a couple hundred
meters. He added that American Aviators had flown as low as
50 meters over Montfaucon with the leaflets.
In short the American aviators, despite enemy threats and
Allied caution, seemed nwer to have hesitated and rather to
have risen to greater activity because of the greater risk. The
record of the American flier in this respect was communicated in
226 U.S. Air Service
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Vol. Iv
A meteorological balloon to be
released for observation in
' determining speed and
1 direction of wind.
wind driftage rates of paper and distributed the tables to the air
fields. The very first fliers, lacking these tables, made a slight
mistake, with the result that half the leaflets they distributed fell
a good three or four miles back of the American lines. The
average leaflet takes five minutes to fall 1,OOO feet, a bunch
therefore dropped at 6,000 feet in a twenty mile wind will drift ten
miles. On later flights the aviators seemed to have been generally
successful in covering specially designated German Divisions.
The Balloon Wing of the Air Service, which it was planned
was to have carried out the sending of propaganda by free
balloons during the winter, encountered greater technical
difficulties which also were worked out by the Propaganda
Section in conjunction with experiments carried out by the
Meteorological Service of the Signal Corps. . . .
228 U.S. Air Service
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Organization
Based on experiments and experience the following scheme of
organization was worked out for the cooperation of the Air
Service with the Propaganda Section, G-2-D, G.H.Q.:
(a) By airplane. The Chiefs of the Air Service, First and
Second Armies, were made responsible for the distribution of
leaflets by airplane, over areas and at times designated by the
Propaganda Section; leaflets to be distributed, wherever
practicable, on all of the flights for other purposes and where
necessary, on special flights for propaganda purposes primarily.
Reports of distribution were to be made through the B.I.O.,
through the G - ~ s to
, the Propaganda Section, G,H.Q. indications
of areas and priority of distribution were to be made through
Propaganda Liaison Officers with the G-2s of each Army.
(b) By balloon. The Chiefs, Balloon Wings, First and Second
Armies were to be responsible for the distribution of leaflets by
free balloons, operated by the Observation Balloon Companies.
Free balloons and made-up balloon “releases” were to be
furnished the Propaganda Section, together with indications as
to time and areas of use.
(c) The Balloon Wing was also to supply hydrogen gas to
the Independent Mobile Sending Stations of the Propaganda
Section for free balloons.
The above organization was put into effect as regards (a)
about three weeks before the Armistice; as regards (b) it was
never in effect and as regards (c) it was in effect just before the
Armistice.
The Balloon Wing of the First Army, properly enough, took
the stand that gas could be furnished for free balloons only after
the needs of Observation Balloons were met, and more, were
safeguarded by reserves sufficient to cover all emergencies.
Emergencies consisted of Boche planes which came over and
burned up our big observation balloons. Every time a big balloon
was burned two hundred tubes of hydrogen gas vanished which
might otherwise have been used for propaganda. So many
balloons were burned that the balloon sending program never
really got under way. Only in the Second Army, where the
Lessons 229
Learned
shortage was not so great and where the Chiefs of the Air
Service and of the Balloon Wing were convinced believers in the
efficacy of propaganda, were steps taken to inaugurate the
program on a big scale but this effort like many others was
“ruined” by the Armistice.
The free balloons used were the standard British propaganda
balloons, made of chemically treated paper with an oiled silk
neck, to which was attached a “release”, consisting of a fuse and
hangers to which bunches of leaflets were attached. As the fuse
burned down the leaflets fell free and scattered at regular
intervals. The balloon was about nine feet long and required half
a tube of gas. Four pounds of leaflets (about 600 sheets) were
easily carried on the “release.” . . .
It was especially planned to make extensive use of free
balloons during the winter lull in order to reach the civilian
population of Germany, especially of the Rhineland. Experiments
camed on in the United States at the instance of the
Propaganda Section, G.H.Q., and of the Psychological Section,
M.I.D., Washington, had partly succeeded in evolving a large
balloon capable of carrying 10,OOO leaflets to distances of from
300 to 500 miles. Meanwhile the Air Service, S.O.S., A.E.F., had
enlarged its hydrogen gas producing program so as to provide
gas for a really extensive winter campaign.
The balloons actually sent off, aside from those mentioned,
were dispatched from the neighborhood of Verdun by the Mobile
Sending Stations of the Propaganda Section. It is noted that the
French Army made extensive use of balloons and the entire
huge distribution of the British Army throughout the summer and
autumn was accomplished by free balloons. There is no doubt
whatever that next to the airplane the free balloon is the best
medium of distribution.
Conclusions
The airplane was the great weapon of propaganda in the
A.E.F., nine to twelve Aviation Fields handling the leaflets,
averaging in distribution 5,000 to 10,OOO leaflets a day and some
as high as 30,000 a day. The most effective effort was made by
the 3rd Corps Observers at Souilly, the 4th Corps Observers at
Toul, the day bombers at Amanty (later at Maulan), the Army
Observers at Vavincourt and the various Corps Observers at
Rarecourt, Foucaucourt, Remicourt, Beauzee, and Rumont, later
St. Mihiel (the last two, French).
The miserable weather prevailing in October was the great
deterrent to greater distribution. It rained persistently and when
it did not rain, cloud levels were so low as to make flying
impossible. The Armistice caught the Air Fields with great
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i
5. The Norman Wind Vane Sight with the ring back was
furnished as the Lewis sight. It was usually mounted on the right
gun of the set. Some observers preferred the Reille-Soult sight
and same was obtained by the observer of the squadron
whenever possible. Some preferred the simple rifle sight, and
some cases the Norman sight was put on the right gun and the
rifle sight on the left. Such a combination is in my opinion an
excellent one. Tracers were used every third round and it will be
remembered that these in themselves serve as an excellent sight
after the first few rounds fired at the enemy.
6. Synchronizers-The mechanical synchronizer was used on
the Salmson planes for the Vickers. The ease of oiling this cam
box is an excellent feature. In two cases the cam gave
considerable trouble; in one case this was due to uneven wear
on the cam and in the other to improper grinding of the cam
surface. The latter mentioned case should never have passed the
inspector-the facts were that the gun fired and a firing angle of
35 degrees could be obtained but there was practically no over-
travel of the trigger motor plunger due to the fact that the cam
had insufficient throw. The two cases were remedied with new
cam boxes which were obtained in less than three hours:
7. The C.C. synchronizer which is an oil gear was used to fire
the Marlins on the D.H. 4’s. Some trouble was experienced with
it due to the difficulty of keeping the pipe line free from air. Also
the soldered joints at the generator would break to motor
vibration. It was practically impossible to obtain spare parts for
these gears and often it was necessary to obtain a new one in
order to get some part needed.
Lessons 233
Learned
8. The first Salmsons which were supplied to the 1st and 12th
Squadrons were equipped with a Lewis gun on the upper plane.
This was abandoned due to the lack of need of it and to the
tremendous amount of resistance offered to flight.
9. Prior to the change to Salmsons in June the 1st and 12th
squadrons (the 50th Squadron at that time was outfitted) were
equipped with a French type Lewis gun, cal. .303. These proved
highly satisfactory but spare parts were difficult to obtain and the
interchangeability of parts was satisfactory. However very few
breakages occurred. This was Darne Revise Lewis and it is
indeed an exceedingly fine piece of work with a strictly high
class finish.
10. The Salmsons came equipped with the modified ground
type Lewis made by the Savage Arm Co. This gun was modified
in France and as could easily be seen in many cases was very
much abused at this stage. These guns were sent out on the
planes without being tested after having been modified. Orders
were received by the squadrons to turn in all .303 guns and at
the same time a change of stations was effected requiring a
move of 150 miles from the point where these guns were turned
in. This was the latter part of June. The first few days of July
saw some hard air fighting on the Chateau-Thierry front and
untold trouble was experienced with these modified Lewis guns.
This trouble was the most serious that could be brought about
and it was necessary to abandon the use of this gun and go
back to the use of the .303 French Lewis.
11. Then the American Air Type Lewis made also by the
Savage Arm Co., was supplied on all planes. After drilling the
gas port in the barrel to 4.5 mm and the port in the gas
regulator cup to 6 mm. this gun proved fast and satisfactory.
The drilling was done in the squadrons after the guns were sent
to the squadrons with the approval of the Inspection Department
for work over the lines.
12. The performance of the Vickers gun was at all times
satisfactory. Some trouble was experienced with the first
American made copperized link. The performance of the Marlin
was also satisfactory; it proved to be a very fast shooting gun; at
the beginning of its use some trouble was experienced with
double feeds. This was entirely and positively eliminated by the
use of a small attachment which could be made in any machine
shop.
13. The Very pistols supplied gave very poor results on
ejection. It was practically always necessary to use another round
or a stick for this purpose. Several of the main springs required
refiling and retempering. The Very pistol ammunition was
absolutely unsatisfactory due to old age and improper storage
234 U.SAir Service
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Vol. Iv
-83-
2d Lt. R. H. Wessman
Armament Officer, 50th Aero Squadron
cosmoline and the rust, of which there was a great deal at first
and put the guns in first-class shape. The guns were then fired
through and thoroughly tested by me, every gun being shot
several hundred times and perfect performance being required
before remounting on the planes. Having passed this test okay,
another group again dismounted and cleaned thoroughly. After
this they were put back on the planes.
It must be said that the Marlin guns performed excellently,
showing that at some point they had been run in very well, for
they performed better than they did in the states where I have
had some experience at a run in plant. Their condition, due to
exposure from weather conditions, at first was bad but these
improved.
Then the question of the Lewis guns came up. At first it
seemed that not a gun would shoot. In every case it was the
same story; the piston would not come back, showing either too
much friction or not enough gas. The latter was finally decided
on as being the cause, and the problem cleared up when W e
bored strai$ht through the gas chamber nipple through the barrel
with a 4.5 mm drill. After this no trouble was experienced.
By the time the guns were fixed, a good line was obtained
upon the capabilities of the men, and they were each assigned to
a certain number of ships, and they were made responsible for
all. the armament on those ships. They were brought into the
Armory as occasion required.
The C.C. gears presented another problem, for very few
systems were in working order. Many pipe lines were broken, all
of them bent poorly, and leaked everywhere. A sergeant was
dispatched to the First Air Depot, and in the Armory there
picked up all the information he could on the gears and Marlin
guns. On his coming back he ripped out most of the systems,
straightened the pipes, packed the trigger motors, and gradually
got the guns in shape. The work on the gears being completed,
the guns were then shot through the props at the butt and the
sights were harmonized.
By the time the squadron was completely organized, the
armament was in condition for service. Much was learned in the
first operation of the St. Mihiel drive, and from this experience
the present state of organization originated, which may be of
interest.
In the first place, t!ie most important thing developed was the
absolute need to place responsibility and also to arouse the
man’s interest,in his work so that he would take pride in having
the armament on his plane in the best of condition. Those two
factors, the pride in his own plane and his responsibility for
236 U.S. Air Service
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moves. Since the advance, in case there is an advance, will Gen. Mitchell (left) with Maj.
nearly always be through devastated country, there is no chance Joralemon.
to billet squadrons. Therefore, enough tents of the 5 x 8 meter,
wall type, or some similar good type, should be supplied to
house the officers and enlisted men and to furnish necessary
offices and shops. Some type of tent hangar should be devised
intermediate between the present individual tent hangar and the
Bess0nneau.b It should be stronger than the present tent hangar
which often collapses in severe wind storms. Probably a tent
hangar built to accommodate two or three planes of ordinary
size would be most satisfactory.
3. For more nearly permanent installations, the Air Service
should have its own supply of light demountable barracks, and
all hangars of a more permanent type. These hangars might be
of the Bessonneau type although probably they would be more
effective if they were about half the size of a Bessonneau, or
they might be made in the German style of a light wooden
framework with board covering possibly. Some adaptation of the
Adrian Barrackc principle might be satisfactory.
4. Since during great activity, when construction material is
greatly needed, it is practically impossible to get railway
transportation, the supplies of bafracks and hangars should be
stored at some depot within trucking distance of the airdromes.
The construction squadrons should have sufficient motor trucks
to carry the hangar and barrack equipment for an airdrome in a
reasonable number of loads. Experience has shown that
approximately 12 heavy trucks and four light trucks are needed
during the times of great activity. Part of this equipment need
not be assigned directly to construction squadrons, since it is not
often that all the armies are active at the same time. The
transportation could be placed under the equipment officers of
242 U.S. Air Service
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Vol. N
Airplane hauled for repairs to the machine repair shop at the 1st Air Depot.
~ ~~
Lessons 243
Learned
Fuselage repair.
244 U.S. Air Service
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-88-
-89-
Engineering Officer
12th Aero Squadron
Engine repair.
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Wing repair.
cockpit seat. The Liberty steel seat interferes with the free and
unobstructed movement of the observer when he is standing.
Since he naturally stands in the center, it is very evident that a
side seat similar to the Salmson would be a great improvement.
7. I would also recommend that the wings, both upper and
lower be constructed with double ribs particularly between the
first set of struts. The continual vibration and propeller blast
breaks the fabric stitching.
8. Owing to the limited vision for the pilot, particularly to
the front and above, I would recommend that the gravity gas
tank on or in [?I the upper wingsCand to “glass in” the center
section.
Squadrons should be supplied with some convenient means to
heat water arld oil. The large amount of water and oil required
each motor makes it almost impossible to start motor other than
with some method to rapidly heat the above, especially during
cold weather.
In conclusion 1 desire to state, that with the above mentioned
improvements, some which have been made, I firmly believe that
the Liberty Motor has proved to be the best in the Field of
Aviation.
-91-
. .
Generator for Type “Y” set mounted on the fuselage of a DH-4.
256 U.SAir Service
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-94-
their work. If the helmets could have been made to fit each man
they would be more satisfactory and more used:
After having used the radio apparatus under all conditions, we
have from time to time found room for a few improvements; for
instance, when the new plane came to us it had a plug in
connection to the antenna. We changed this so it would have a
direct connection to the antenna at the fairlead, thus saving the
observer time, trouble and preventing many failures. The keys
were moved to suit the operation also.
During our operations with the 42nd Division we’worked on a
long wave length when on Infantry Contact Patrol work. This
necessitated a very long antenna on account of the direct “Y”
set. Invariably the planes returned with either the antenna
7 clipped off or weights lost. When a plane is on this sort of a
*_
-=, mission it must fly low over the tree tops and shrubs and the
- , , long antenna is bound to drag. If the Divisions used.shorter
wave lengths, and this is possible, especially for the Infantry
A corner of the American Contact Patrol work, more of the missions would be successful.
radio set room at the 2d The enlisted personnel of the radio section should be given
AIC.
more training with the French undamped sets. All men should be
operators so that the squadron can have a man on duty all the
time. It has been quite often the case that the men d o not
understand the working of the E-3Bis and E-3Ter radio sets.
After having been both in the Radio Schools in the Service of
Supply and on actual service at the front, I believe that the
instructors in the schools should be radio officers who have had
some experience with the apparatus at the front. This would
bring the actual work into and thus be better for the service.
The constant speed propeller should be highly recommended
for use on DH 4 planes, but before this is possible the mounting
will have to be extended, as it is too close to the fuselage at
present.
The table of organization allowing eight men in the radio
section is quite successful. When a squadron is together with
another squadron in its group, fewer men are needed, but when
at an airdrome alone and away from the group, all men are kept
busy all day.
-95-
-96-
2d Lt. J. G. Belcher
Radio Officer, I Corps Observation Group
Commissioned Personnel: It is suggested that one officer in
charge of Radio in a Group is all the commissioned personnel
necessary. An M.S.E. or sergeant first class would suffice in the
Squadron where the Radio work is limited entirely to the care
and installation of equipment on the planes. This non-
commissioned officer with the proper enlisted personnel could
handle the work with ease and could be made directly
responsible to the Group Radio Officer who in turn would be
responsible to the Group Commander. There is no necessity for
both Group and Squadron Radio Officers.
Enlisted Personnel: At least six first class operators should be
attached to each group. These are necessary to allow the
functioning of the “net” or long wave station, and to operate the
checking-out station, and includes one extra man for
emergencies. Besides these a battery man with an assistant are
necessary.
Equipment: Each group should.be equipped with one long
wave transmitting set, preferably undamped or sustained wave.
This Group has had one for each squadron, which has not been
necessary. The longest distance worked by this Group has been
about forty-five miles but it would be preferable to have a set
with greater range. On several occasions, notably at Chateau-
Thierry and in the Argonne, liaison between the group and the
divisions which it was working with has depended almost entirely
upon Radio and though communication has never failed it has at
times been rendered extremely difficult on account of distance.
This set should be mounted in as light a camion as possible
and should be accompanied by another with a charging outfit
and all facilities for battery work.
Supplies: Supplies have been a problem in Radio work on the
front for one reason. The Supply Parks attached to the Corps
have not carried a large enough or varied enough stock for us
to obtain what we needed promptly.
Lessons 263
Learned
-97-
Maj. F. N. Shumaker
O.I.C.,
Air Service Section
Radio Division, OCSO, AEF
I
/
I
A radio set being
installed in a DH-4. I
Lessons 267
Learned
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-99-
-ioo-
1st Lt. A. M. Wright
Supply Officer, 12th Aero Squadron
1. To improve the supply department, we must have the
cooperation of all departments especially the Air Depots.
2. Supply departments must be allowed to draw supplies on
squadron requisition and not [be] hampered by a Group supply,
as in the past.
3. We must have adequate transportation at the disposal of
the supply department at all times so that we may be able to
transport immediately gasoline, spare motors, wings, etc. As we
never know what the demand may be very far in advance, also
the above items cannot be carried in stock in any quantities.
-101-
0. D. Burwell
Supply Officer, 50th Aero Squadron
A resume of the activities of the 50th Aero Squadron from the
standpoint of supplies and transportation (which are closely
interlinked) has presented a rather complex and serious problem
during the recent operations.
In the first place the difficulties in obtaining spare parts for the
Liberty DH 4 planes considerably handicapped this squadron
274 U.S.Air Service
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I
Lessons 275
Learned
Repair depot for rotary motors, AIC, Wing room of the Aero Supply Depot,
Issoudun. AIC, Issoudun.
!
276 U.S. Air Service
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VOl. Iv
long way toward improving the efficiency of our Air Service. One
of the bad features of procuring supplies in this war has been
the necessity for relying on the French and English Governments
for suitable types of aeroplanes and spare parts. These
governments have felt it necessary to take care of their own Air
Service and the U.S. Air Service thereby received only the
surplus, which has been far insufficient for our needs. A
permanent and sufficient source of supply must be established.
3. The necessity for the best liaison possible between the Air
Service in the U.S. and the Air Service in France has been most
necessary in order to procure sufficient quantities of the essential
and urgently needed equipment. The need of a highly efficient
salvage service is necessary to recover vast amounts of good
material from wrecks and condemned planes.
4. Lastly, the need for qualified experts in each branch of the
Air Service, to be in charge of each department with sufficient
experienced personnel, is vitally important.
-103-
Some change in pace from ordinary duties was afforded by theatrical groups performing in France. Lt.
Arthur J. Coyle, Maj. Ralph Royce, and Maj. Lewis H. Brereton were on hand to greet the Huron sisters.
282 U.S. Air Service
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ODthalmolosical room.
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-106-
Col.William H. Wilmer
C.O., Medical Research Board
Dr. Wilmer, a graduate of the University of Virginia (M.D.,
1885), was professor of opthalomology at Georgetown Univer-
sity. He had been a member of the Medical Reserve Corps since
April 1911 and had entered active service on 1 October 1917.
1. The lesson learned from the present war is the great need
of careful selection of the flyer and skillful, self sacrificing care of
him during training and in combat.
2. For the future the proper facilities for the study [ofl these
problems by men who by training are fitted to do this work.
-107-
-108-
Photographic Section
Air Service, AEF
The importance and value of aerial photography in warfare has
been clearly demonstrated to our army during the last few
months of military activities. This has been made clear in spite of
the fact that photography was certainly not used as fully or as
intelligently as it could have been. The following reasons are
given:
(a) Lack of knowledge in the army at large as to the value of
photography and its uses.
(b) Lack of competent and trained personnel for interpretation
and exploitation of photographs.
(c) Division of responsibility for photography between the Air
Service and Intelligence Section.
In reference to (a) it would seem advisable that all field officers
have a certain knowledge of aerial photography and the role it
____ plays in modern warfare. They should be given illustrated
I
Capt. Fred Place and the staff of the Photographic School, 2d AIC.
-109-
Capt. Ernest Jones
Chief, Information Section
The following observations are presented as a result of
experience in this Section in the Am. E.F. and, previously, in its
counterpart in the United States, by the Chief of the Section
and by his Executive officer, 1st Lieut. J. C. Farrer. These
relate particularly to such an office in the field and do not
a p t . Jones. attempt to cover operations at home. However, all the criticisms
made apply thereto equally well.
The purpose of such a Section is five-fold. Following are these
main divisions, with notes and suggestions under each.
a. To answer general inquiries of organizations in the Air
Service, of other services, of individual officers, who desire
information on the wide variety of subjects connected with
military aeronautics, the Air Service itself, and that of allied and
enemy countries.
Where answers to such questions are not immediately
available, the information should be procured; or, as a last
resort, direct such inquiries to other channels.
An Information Section is competent only to the extent it can
answer all the miscellaneous questions put to it. Its scope, in
practice, should be broad enough to allow for the answering of
almost any question in reason.
It has been the policy of the Section not to refer inquirers to
any other section or branch of the Air Service, or Army, but to
obtain the information desired and furnish it, without ado. The
Section has become, thus, just what its name implies, and has
fulfilled requests on the widest variety of subjects. It could have
done better.
Its usefulness is measured directly by its facilities for securing
information, and making it available. One adverse criticism which
can be made of the Section is the paucity of personnel during
the major portion of its existence.
An Information Section, particularly in the field, should not be
limited in personnel by a table of organization to a definite
Lessons 299
Learned
c. >
HALBERSTADT
in his world.
All reports, statistical or otherwise,' desired by the C.A.S., or
the Chief of Staff, should be obtained through the Information
Section.
Historical work. It is recommended that historical work be not
a part of an Information Section. The sole relation of the latter
to a Historical Section would be that of furnishing, like all other
Sections, what information it could in connection with the
compilation of a history.
Obviously from its scope, the Information Section, as outlihed
above, could furnish a great deal in the way of narrative and
statistics, charts and graphs, but the actual compilation of a
connected history belongs to a Historical Section.
A history is a large enough project to require specialization
and the organization of trained personnel.
-110-
Capt. R. G. Kincaid
Information Officer
Headquarters, Air Service, First Army
ALBATROS D 111
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Lt. Col. Philip A. Carroll
Assistant Chief, Training Section
Air Service, AEF
-117-
r
I
330 U.S. Air Service
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332 U.S. Air Service
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-118-
these and wanted to know what had been done in each instance
to correct the condition. Carroll sent the following memoran-
dum in reply.
-119-
did not rest with the pilots themselves. As soon as they were
told how important, how serious and how valuable their services
and their training was, and as soon as they realized that
everything that was being done at this Center was for their good
and for the attainment of the best results in the cause, and
when it was impressed upon them that team-work was most
essential in this game and that their work was most important
and necessary to any good results that might be attained, their
increase in sense of responsibility and in enthusiasm and morale
was just as striking as the contrast which their previous attitude
had been to that of the men at the front. The result of making
the Student Pilot realize that he is the All-Important thing in the
aviation game, was a vast increase in morale and the generation
of a genuine Esprit de Corps. This was manifested in the
surpassing of all previous records at this Center, both in the
performance of the pilots and of the enlisted personnel, and also
by the quality of the pilots graduated.
The lesson gained from this was: that the success of an Air
Service depends primarily upon the Esprit de Corps of the pilots,
and that this Esprit de Corps must be fostered and that the
preliminary training of all pilots should be carried on with that
predominating idea in view at all times.
\
Leisons 337
Learned
-120-
-121-
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.- --- 1 .
I
-123-
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-125-
2d Lt. M. S. McCullough
O.I.C., Transportation
Third Aviation Instruction Center
The undersigned has found that the majority of the men in the
Air Service, with whom he has come in contact, are young and
practically inexperienced. Their technical knowledge, if any, has
been acquired through study. They may have a general idea of
the work assigned to them but they lack a thorough
understanding of it as a whole. For instance, about 50 percent of
chauffeurs and truck drivers are good men at the steering wheel
but if there is any trouble with the motor they are ignorant of
how to locate said trouble or how to repair it. Thus occurs a
great loss of time and labor.
Of course, these man in time can become first class workers
in whatever work that has been assigned for them to do, but
should it happen that they were assigned to a different line of
work their previous experience would be useless. They would
have to commence at the very beginning again. And, as you
know, efficient mechanics and chauffeurs cannot be made within
a few months.
I believe that if technical schools were established at large
camps, instructed by men thoroughly familiar with the different
branches of work, whereby soldiers and officers could attend
several hours each week, they would be rendered more efficient
and a higher standard obtained.
344 U.S. Air Service
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-126-
Maj. L. H. Byam
Engineering Officer in Charge of Construction
Third Aviation Construction Center
1. The most important lesson that I have learned from the war
is that it is entirely possible to train good soldiers from the
personnel available in the United States within a period of six or
eight months. It is impossible to properly train officers from civil
life in the same period of time. From observation and reports it
appears that the enlisted men at the front displayed qualities
equal to or better than similar troops of other countries. The
Members of Staff, Head- officers both from civil life and from West Point appear to have
quarters, Issoudun: (bottom, been deficient in training suitable to enable them to handle large
1. to r) Capt. W. M. Conant
and Maj. L. H. Byam; (top, 1. bodies of men effectively.
to r.) 1st. Lt. R. H. Merkle 2. In order to have a sufficient number of trained officers
and Capt. H. L. Wingate. ready in event of future wars it would seem absolutely necessary
that a standing army of at least 500,000 troops be maintained in
the United States which would serve as a nucleus from which to
draw trained officers and non-commissioned officers for the
higher grades in event of hostilities. Under the old system in the
United States with a small standing army few officers had
opportunity to handle troops in larger units than companies or
platoons. #en such officers were suddenly placed in command
of regiments, battalions and larger units they lacked sufficient
training to handle them.
-127-
-128-
1st Lt. Richard H. Merkel
O.I.C., Field No. 10
Third Aviation Instruction Center
In my opinion student flyers should receive more military
training to make them better soldiers. Under the present policy
of commissioning cadets before their course of training has been
completed, instructors cannot enforce discipline as rigidly and
easily as if the students under them were on a cadet status. As
C.O. of the 37th Aero Squadron, and later as Adjutant of Field
No. 7, and O.I.C. of Field No. 10, 3rd A.I.C., I have had a
splendid opportunity to follow the flying training of two enlisted
men of the 37th Aero Squadron. I interviewed their instructors
and was informed that they were both exceptional students, and
in every case the Instructors volunteered the information that
they were very much impressed with the respect and courtesy
with which these men regarded them. On the other hand, I have
seen student officers going at some of the less interesting details
of their course in half hearted way, thinking that as officers they
should not be calledupon to perform any of the “ordinary Army
routine”.
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-130-
Capt. Remington Orsinger
Operations Officer
1st Army Observation Group
On February 21st, 1918, I entered the School for Aerial
Observers at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. On November 20th, 1918, I
arrived at the front. Nine months had elapsed from the time I
transferred from the infantry and the time that I arrived on the
front. The &st 4 months were spent in Observation and Aerial
Gunnery Schools in the states. One month was spent in crossing
the Atlantic. The last 4 months were wasted in Aviation School
of the S.O.S. in a useless repetition of the courses followed in
the states.
My case is one of several hundred similar cases. While these
officers were held in the S.O.S., squadrons at the front were
short of observers. The shortage of observers was so great that
in one squadron, the 91st, an Ordnance officer had to be sent
up to do the work of an aerial observer; in another, the 24th,
the Radio officer volunteered for the work and was gladly
accepted.
The point that I want to emphasize is, that even though there
was a shortage of observers at the front, officers who had been
completely trained in the work before leaving the states were
being held in the Aviation Schools of the S.O.S.
Courses of study in the Aviation Instruction Centers for
“Aerial Observation for Artillery” were based on regulations
contained in Confidential Bulletin No. 80, G.H.Q., A.E.F..
This bulletin furnished some valuable information as to the
manner in which aerial observation was used in carrying on an
“Artillery Rdage.” The information was not detailed in many
cases and had to be supplemented and interpreted by the
instructor.
I was at the 2nd Aviation Instruction Center at Tours August
to October. During that time there were no less than five
different instructors in the course on Artillery Observation.
Information was often given by one instructor which was later
contradicted by another instructor. This contradictory instruction
confused many of the students.
348 U S . Air Service
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-131-
-132-
4 Observation Squadrons
4 Balloon Companies
4 Pursuit Groups (each of two pursuit squadrons &
one park)
4 Bombing Squadrons
8 Photo Sections (for the 4 Observation & 4 Bombing
Squadrons)
Total permanent squadrons maintained at full strength-16
Total permanent Photo Sections maintained at full
strength-8
Total permanent Balloon Companies maintained at full
strength-4
Total permanent Parks maintained at full strength-4
Training Cadres:
For 16 Infantry training divisions:
16 Observation Squadrons
16 Photo Sections
16 Balloon Companies
For 4 Cavalry training divisions:
4 Observation Squadrons
4 Photo Sections
4 Balloon Companies
For training of Corps Troops:
4 Observation Squadrons
4 Photo Sections for same
4 Balloon Companies
For training with Coast Defense Training Cadres:
8 Observation Squadrons
8 Photo Sections
8 Balloon Companies
For training in pursuit work
4 Groups, each Group consisting of 2 squadrons & 1
park. Total-8 Pursuit Squadrons
Lessons 351
Learned
Pursuit Squadron:
6 Officers
30 Men
Bombardment Squadron:
8 Officers
30 Men
Park Squadron:
2 Officers
30 Men
Balloon Company:
2 Officers
30 Men
Photo Section:
0 Officers
4 Men
In addition to the foregoing, there will be necessary school
detachments at the various aviation schools which may later be
determined as necessary for the instruction of candidates training
'
as pilots and observers.
While it is realized that it is objectionable to disperse the Air
Service, particularly the pursuit and bombing which are in small
numbers, at the same time it is believed necessary for the Army
as a whole to become acquainted with all forms of the Air
Service, not only observation, but pursuit and bombing as well.
Furthermore it is believed that the pursuit should be where it
can work with observation squadrons and also with bombing
squadrons, consequently at one point in each of the four Corps
Areas there should be:
1 Observation Squadron, with its Photo Section
1 Balloon Company
1 Pursuit Group of two squadrons, with its Park
1 Bombing Squadron, with its Photo Section, all under the
command of an Air Service Officer of suitable rank.
2. Training.. Men to be trained as pilots or observers will be
selected from volunteers who possess the necessary physical and
educational qualifications.
The United States will be divided up into three districts for the
purpose of assigning Air Service candidates to training schools.
1st: The East-With a school at Langley Field, Virginia.
2nd: The Center-With a school in Texas.
3rd The West-With a school in Southern California.
Langley Field at Hampton, Virginia, for the Eastern District,
Ellington Field at Houston, Texas, for the Central District and
Rockwell Field at San Diego, California, for the Western District,
are already built and ready for use. If sufficient space is not
Lessons 353
Learned
each year and lasting through until October 31st of each year.
Balloon personnel should be trained according to the same
general plan as the heavier-than-air personnel, utilizing the
present Balloon Schools. There would be approximately 192
Balloon Observers to train each year. They should be divided
between the three schools at Omaha, Nebraska, Arcadia,
California, and Camp John Wise in Texas. This would give
approximately 64 Officers at each. While the three heavier-than-
air training centers are selected in parts of the United States
where weather conditions in winter are particularly favorable, this
is not true in the case of the Balloon School at Omaha.
However, I believe that past experience has shown that balloon
work can be carried on at Fort Omaha in the winter time. In the
case of balloon training the Severe climate of the northern part
of the United States is much less of a detriment than in the case
of aviation training.
3. Relations with G-2. The British system of handling
information has been in effect in the A.E.F., and we have had
the opportunity of comparing it with the French system. I have
seen this question, first from the view point of the Army Staff
during the time I was assigned to G-3 of the First Army in the
Chateau Thierry, St. Mihiel and Argonne Offensives and later as
Army Air Service Commander of the Second Army during its
operation on the Toul Front. I do not believe the system we
have used is successful as far as its relations with the Air
Service are concerned. When the Staff, particularly the Chief of
Staff and G-3, want information during operations they want it at
once, and have not time to apply for it through G-2. As a
matter of fact, information gathered by the Air Service was
transmitted to G-2 but also directly to G-3, and this was a
necessity. In the same way, when G-3 wanted information
procured by the Air Service, it applied directly to the Air Service
and not to G-2. Our plan calls for reconnaissance missions being
given by G-2, but in order to make it practicable for G-3 or the
Chief of Staff to secure information more quickly, command
airplanes were placed at their disposal. This is simply beating
around the bush.
In some Corps the only missions given by G-2 were
photographic missions, the Group Commander prescribing all
visual reconnaissances on his own initiative or by direction of the
Corps, usually the Corps Chief of Staff.
The argument that information furnished by the Air Service is
not complete and should be carefully weighed and considered
with information from other sources before being acted upon, is
not sound. In fixed warfare in a quiet sector, this plan could be
followed, but not during mobile warfare when conditions are
356 U.S. Air Service
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358 U.S. Air Service
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Col. Thomas DeWitt Milling
Army Air Service Commander, First Army
............................................................
1. All plans for the reorganization of the Air Service should be
correlated with the reorganization of the Army as a whole. The
Air Service is of value to the military establishment only insofar
as it is correlated to the other arms. Ignorance of the functions
of the Air Service, its possibilities and limitations, which has
prevailed on the part of most line officers throughout the war,
has been one of the heaviest tactical handicaps under which the
Air Service has labored. Unless the Air Service problems are
considered by the General Staff as problems of the Army. the
gutf that has hitherto existed between the Air Service and the
remainder of the Army will not be bridged.
2. Since the plan for the reorganization of the Army is not
known, no attempt will be made to base these suggestions upon
that plan. . ..
(I. tor.) Lt. Col. William C. Sherman, Col.
Thomas D. Milling, and Lt. Col. John
P Paegelow.
360 U.S. Air Service
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U S , Bombing SunueJc
Introduction
The reports on lessons learned were only a small part of the
vast collection of material that Gorrell assembled at Tours dur-
ing the first weeks of 1919 for the “History of the Air Service,
AEF,” and General Patrick’s “Final Report.” As this pile of pa-
pers grew day b y day, Gorrell realized that something was lack-
ing. Remembering his days in the Strategical Section and his
plans for a strategical bombing program, Gorrell wanted to find
out what effect aerial bombing had had on the enemy.‘ For that
information, he turned to the Intelligence Section (G-2) of GHQ,
AEF.
Brig. Gen. Dennis E. Nolan, Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, de-
signated Capt. Emery A. Greunke and 1st Lt. L. J. LeTourneau
of the Air Intelligence Section (G-2, A-7) to supervise the work
of obtaining data for the project. The task, Nolan said, was “to
secure as complete and reliable information as possible upon
which the Air Service may base its future bombing plans.’v
The First Army was asked to assign men to report to Greunke.
The acting G-2 of First Army, Capr. Donald S. McWilliams,
noted that the area where much of the bombing had been done
T’ - 4
had formerly been occupied by the First Army but had since
been turned over to the Second Army. McWilliams suggested
that the request for people be sent to Second Army.
When the request was made, Lt. Col. Charles F. Thompson,
Second Army G-2, opposed the assignment of Second Army
personnel to the project. He thought that information concern-
ing the effects of bombing was no longer available. Thompson,
however, was the only officer Greunke met who thought the
investigation doomed to failure. A visit to Trier and Coblenz
satisfied Greunke that the information could be obtained. If
G-2, GHQ, AEF, could not get the German-speaking officers
needed for the investigation, Greunke thought that the project
should be turned over to the Air Service so Air Service per-
sonnel could carry on the investigation.
Noting the difficulty that G-2, GHQ, AEF, had had in trying
to find the large number of German-speaking personnel re-
quired for the job, Nolan suggested to the Air Service that the
Air Service take over the project. Instead, the Air Service de-
tailed officers from various units to work with Greunke. These
included 2d Lt. Richard W. Bonneville, A.S., Ferry Pilot, Orly; 2d
Lt. Arthur A. Coleman, A.S., 22d Aero Squadron; 2d Lt. Otto C.
Epp, A.S., 100th Aero Squadron; 1st Lt. Frank W. Letzig, AS.,
Supply Officer, Third Aviation Instruction Center; 2d Lt. Henry
T. Pratt, A.S., O.I.C., Machinery Department, 667th Aero Squad-
ron; 2d Lt. Fred A. Spitznagle, A.S., Observer, 163d Aero Squad-
ron; and 2d Lt. Robert Steinberger, A.S., Buyer, Procurement
Division, Paris. Four other officers were obtained from other
units of the AEF: 1st Lt. Marcus Thomas Bauch, Q.M.C., a mem-
ber of a bakery company; 1st Lt. Harold J. Hotton, F.A., G-2, Vlll
Corps; 1st Lt. William S. Reid, Inf.; and 2d Lt. Theodore N. Beck-
man, Inf.
Twelve teams were formed, each consisting of one officer and
two enlisted men (a photographer and a chauffeur). The In-
structions given to the teams began as follows:
*
The Allied Air Services have spent millions of dollars in
preparing and executing a plan of bombardment against the
industrial centers of Germany. The opportunity is now af-
forded to investigate just what amount of damage was
caused and the value of this branch of the service in future
wars.
In order to gain this knowledge, a systematic investiga-
tion of the different towns is to be carried out . . . .
Detailed instructions were given as to what was desired. The
information was listed under five headings: (1) General, that is,
U.S.Bombing 365
Survey
the basic facts about each raid-time, name of factory, its pro-
duct, etc.-with each alert being covered, whether or not the
place was bombed; (2)material damage; (3)bombing of rail-
roads, including the length of time that trains were held up; (4)
measures adopted in factories and town; and (5) moral effect.
The teams were to determine which gave the better results, day ;
or night bombing, with regard to both material and moral effect.
Field work was started early in March 1919 and completed by
20 May. The area investigated was roughly west of the Rhine
River and south of a line from Dusseldorf on the Rhine to Mezie-
res on the border between Belgium and France. This area con-
tained all of the targets bombed by U.S. aero squadrons, part of
those bombed by French units, and all of those bombed by the
Independent Force, Royal Air Force, except for a few cities such
as Freiburg, Stuttgart, and Mannheim, on the east side of the
Rhine, to which the American survey teams did not have access.
The teams visited about 140 towns. In more than 40 percent of
these places, they were unable to obtain any information- The four AEF bombing
records either had not been kept or had been destroyed or car- squadrons of World War 1.
ried away by the retreating Germans. In some other places, the
data available was very meager. The team that visited Merzig,for
example, was able to report only the number of raids (l),the
number of bombs (4),and the total damage (22,600marks).
Some places, however, the Americans found excellent records.
At Trier, for instance, they obtained detailed data on 20 raids
and 120 alerts in the period from October 1915 to November
1918. In some cases, records were available only for the latter
part of the war, but in many instances,they covered all raids and
alerts, going back in some cases as far as 1914.The information
obtained was presented in a series of 65 reports (some covering
two or more places) prepared by the various teams.
American operations constituted only a small part of the
bombing that the teams covered in the post-war survey. The
British and French had begun bombing early in the war; the first
U.S. bombing unit, the 96th Aero Squadron, did not begin oper-
ations until 12 June 1918. Individually, as well as collectively,
the British and French flew many more missions and dropped
many more bombs than the Americans did. Further, British and
French units reached out much farther than the Americans in
their bombing raids. While British units based in the vicinity of
Nancy sent planes to cities on the Rhine, to Mannheim (120
miles), Coblenz (130 miles), and Cologne (160 miles), the tar-
gets for American units were all west of Metz and never more
than 60 or 65 miles from the operating base, first at Amantyand
later at Maulan.
r--- . . ..... , I
U.S.Bombing 367
Survey
Reports
-1-
Metz
Railroad Stations
Conflans
The place most often and most heavily attacked by U.S.
bombing squadrons was Conflans, some 15 miles west of Metz.
There, the rail line from Metz to Etain crossed the line from
Charleville to Nancy. From Conflans, a narrow gauge track ran
to Briey and Audun-le-Roman, the latter being another rail
center on the target list for American bombing units.
In the first 3 months of American bombing operations in
France (12 June-11 September 1918), the 96th Aero Squadron,
the only U.S. bombing unit in combat during that time, dis-
370 U.S. Air Service
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Whenever the main track was hit, which happened only once,
traffic was held up for about two hours. All traffic was held up
for 15 minutes to half an hour during every alert which was
given.
One company of pioneers, consisting of about 250 men,
together with 50 or 60 Russian prisoners and approximately 100
French civilian laborers, were kept on hand for repair work.
Conflans was protected by 3 anti-aircraft batteries, and
numerous searchlights, as well as by neighboring pursuit
squadrons such as Richthofen’s Flying Circus during the last part
of the war. As far as admissions were made by employees
at the time of this investigation, very little effect on the efficiency
of the employees was caused by repeated bombardments.
-3-
Dommary-Baroncourt
Pilots and observers of the %th Aero Squadron gathered for a briefing
(above) prior to the bombing mission to Dommary-Baroncourt on 12
June 1918.The lead plane (below)was flown by Major Harry M. Brown,
commanding officer of the squadron.
the other side of the break. This line was repeatedly cut
following Sept. 12, 1918, delaying the regular schedule for 20
days.
Trains were very much retarded by continual bombardments,
there being only one line to Longuyon and also but a single line
to Conflans and Audun-le-Roman.
............................................................
The damage done in the yards did not hold up traffic to any
great extent, repairs being completed in from one-half to one
hour. When the main lines were struck during September, 1918,
traffic was held up for about 20 days, due to the almost
continuous bombardment and the accuracy of the bombing.
During “alerts” all personnel were forced to take refuge in
bombproofs.
A special crew of pioneers, consisting of about 60 men,
together with a few other laborers, were kept on hand at all
times for repair work.
The town was provided with anti-aircraft batteries and
searchlights and numerous bomb-proofs were built near the
station.
U.S.Bombing 373
Survey
-4-
Longu yo n
Longuyon, 14 miles northwest of Dommary-Baroncourt on
the rail line to Charleville, was another of the rail centers at-
tacked by American bombing units. From Longuyon, there was
a main line to Longwy and Luxembourg and a branch line to
Audun-le-Roman. The team that visited Longuyon during the
bombing survey obtained data on 18 raids during the period
from mid-February 1918 until the end of the war. Eight of the 18
attacks were made by U.S. squadrons.
The first three bombing missions sent to Longuyon by the Air
Service, First Army, were failures, the first one, on 26 June, be-
cause of mechanical difficulties, and the other two, cn 28 June
and 5 July, because of weather. On the first successful mission,
on 14 August, the 96th Aero Squadron dispatched nine planes,
including two supernumeraries, from Amanty at 0830.Staying
west of the St. Mihiel salient, the planes flew northward to Ver-
dun before crossing the lines, and after the attack they came out
the same way, thus holding to a minimum the time over enemy-
held territory. One supernumerary turned back at the front.
Three planes, unable to keep up with the formation, dropped
out. Five reached the target. Noting that visibility was good, the
96th Squadron reported that “three bursts were observed on the
tracks in front of the station, balance about station and.among
warehouses.” Three enemy pursuit planes followed the bomb-
ers from Etain to the target and back to the lines. Shots were ex-
changed at long range without damage to the Americans. Two
of the bombers were hit by shrapnel, but all returned home at
1105.
Another mission of nine planes was sent to Longuyon on 18
August, but because of weather all planes turned back before
crossing the lines. Two days later another mission, seven
planes, was dispatched at 1705. All crossed the lines and re-
turned safely at 1920. Because of thick clouds at Longuyon, the
Americans dropped their bombs on railroad tracks at Flabeu-
ville, about 3 miles northwest of the station at Longuyon.
The following day, 21 August, the 96th Squadron dispatched
nine planes to Longuyon at 1000. Six reached the objective.
374 US. Air Service
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-5-
Montmedy
The only other rail target attacked by US. bombers and cov-
ered by the report of the post-war bombing survey was Mont-
medy, a town of some 2,000 people situated about 12 miles
northwest of Longuyon. From Montmedy, on the main rail line
between Nancy and Charleville, a branch line ran northeast to
Virton, Belgium. American bombers attacked only once, on 4
November 1918. With 47 planes airborne, this was one of the
largest missions mounted by the 1st Day Bombardment Group
during the war. Thirty-seven planes reached their objective,
dropping a total of 3,887 kilograms (about 8,500 pounds) of
bombs between 1520 and 1537 hours. Reporting fair visibility,
the crews said they observed bursts on the railroad yards, on a
warehouse, and in the southeastern, southern, and southwest-
ern parts of town. But neither this raid nor any of those by other
units succeeded in disrupting rail traffic at Montmedy, or such
was the information obtained by the team that visited the town
after the war to survey the effects of Allied bombing.
-6-
Mars-la-Tour
Mars-la-Tour, west of Metz, was on the rail line that ran south
from Conflans, through Chambley and Arnaville, to Nancy. It
also was the site of an important German airfield.
The following information was received from the Maire of the
town and an employee of the railroad who was in the town
during the German occupation.
Damage.
Center of two principal tracks on Conflans-Chambley line;
trains held up for two hours.
Telegraph and telephone lines and water main were cut,
resulting in loss of communication for two days.
Aviation field near the town was bombed, all hangars and 13
airplanes being destroyed.
............................................................
Delay of Traffic. The average time required for making repairs
was from 30 minutes to one hour, although at one time when
the main tracks were hit, traffic was held up for two hours.
Special Repair Crews. Russian prisoners and French civilians
were kept on hand for this work.
Protection. The town was provided with 8 anti-aircraft guns as
well as 2 or 3 anti-aircraft guns mounted on autos.
Moral Effect. Loss of sleep during the night resulted in
decreased efficiency.
-7-
Ars, Noveant, Corny, Arnaville, Bayonville,
Gorze, Orny, Rernilly, Courcelles
Information about Allied bombing of the following towns in
the region south of Metz was presented in a single report:
Ars, a small industrial town on the Moselle, about 5 miles from
Metz. The railroad from Metz to Nancy crosses from the right to
the left bank of the Moselle just below Ars.
U.S.Bombing 379
Survey
-8-
RemiII y
In making the survey of the effects of bombing, the American
teams frequently obtained copies of German documents. The
following, which makeup the report on Remilly (Remelach),
were translated by G-2, A-2c (Press and Translations Branch
of the Information Section, Intelligence Division), GHQ, AEF.
-9-
Maizieres
In the great industrial region north of Metz, there were many
towns that provided excellent targets for Allied bombing planes.
One of these was Maizieres, about 7 miles from Metz.
Number of raids: 17
Total damage to town: 62,009.17Marks
-10-
Hagondange
Railroad Station.
1915
April 16 On April 16 at about 930 in the morning
enemy aeroplanes dropped five bombs on
Maizieresc and Hagondange.
One bomb fell on the Maizieres Factories,
two in the vicinity of these factories, one in the
plain and one on the blast furnaces of
Hagondange.
This last bomb fell on the cowpers and
exploded on the last concrete base without
causing any great damage. A few plates of the
cowpers and some mains were damaged.
The work was not stopped.
April 18 On April 18 enemy aeroplanes again bombed
our establishment. Four bombs exploded in the
factory.
1916
March During the night of March 29-30 bombs were
dropped on our factories. Seven of them
exploded. Four of them fell near the central
shops damaging the western facade and
breaking all the windows.
Thirty-nine incendiary bombs were dropped
on our colony during the night of May 17-18.
No damage was caused but they provoked a panic
among the inhabitants of the colony.
July Five bombs were dropped during the night of
July 1-2. One of them fell on the Thomas Steel
Mill, one on the house of the headquarters,
three on the railroad. Some material damage
was caused.
During the night of July 25-26 seven bombs
fell on our establishments. One of them fell on
the Russian prisoner of war camp. One hit the
western portion of the air line leading to the
storage batteries of the blast furnaces. Three
fell right beside the lime-kilns and the mixers,
another on the blast furnace shops and one
between cowper I, blast furnace I and the
storage batteries.
The principal damage caused was the
breaking of all the windows in the
neighborhood including those of the Russian
prisoner’s camp.
386 U.S.Air Service
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Vol. Iv
1918
February Alarm at 9:40 in the evening during the night
of February 19-20. The main gate was damaged
by a bomb. The damage is estimated at about
10,000 marks.
March During the night of March 12-13 at 11:lO a
bomb pierced the tunnel which leads from the
main gate to the offices of the mill.
Three bombs fell in the neighborhood of the
rolling mills near a womens’ rest room which
was almost completely destroyed. There were
no victims.
The bomb which fell to the north of this
/ rmm damaged the canal system which is
situated about 3 meters below the ground. This
caused a stoppage of the blooming until 7
o’clock on the morning of March 15. The
damage done amounts to approximately 30,000
to 50,000 marks.
Damage caused by a 1,600-lb. British bomb.
U.S.Bombing 391
Survey
-11-
Rombas
-13-
Uckange
Number of raids: 6.
Total damage to town: 69,148.57 M
Total damage to factory: 9,463.00 M
Expenditure for protection by town: 6,500.00 M
Expenditure for protection by smelter: 7,650.00 M.
............................................................
Railroad Information
1. The railroad station at Uckange was bombed three times,
U.S.Bombing 395
Survey
-14-
Hayange
Damage in Hayange.
398 U.S. Air Service
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Vol. IV
small searchlights were also used at first, but later, these were
replaced by a few highpowered searchlights located at strategic
points. The balloon barrage, about 45 of them, completely
encircled the plants mentioned above, and were only used as a
protective measure against nightraiders, being hauled in during
the day.
No protective measures were taken by the town itself against
air raids, people generally taking refuge in cellars during an alert.
The morale of the people, as in other towns in the vicinity, was
much effected, especially towards the end, when the raids
became more numerous. Night bombing seems to have been the
most effective here, in fact, comparatively few day raids were
made, and a comparison of the two is practically impossible.
-15-
Thionville
Resume
Results of Bombing on the Town of Thionville
Number of Raids: About 60a
Amount of Claims Filed: 1,672,466Marks
Amount Paid by Insurance Companies on Claims
not Included in Above: 2,000,000Marks
Approximate Amount of Unfiled Claims: 300,000 Marks
............................................................
Results of Bombing on the Karlshutten Steel Works
Number of Raids: 22
Total Material Damage: 85,413.96Marks
Total Indirect Damage: 242,676.35 Marks
Direct Damage Marks
To Buildings and Houses of Factory 76,521.48
To Company Property at Railroad Station 3,055.09
By Anti-aircraft Fire 5,837.39
85,413.96
U.S.Bombing 399
Survey
Indirect Damage
Loss of Production ?
Expenditure for Production 135,766.90
Bonuses Paid Employees 75,555.00
Paid in Insurance Premiums 30,354.45
241,676.35
Results of Bombing on Railroad at Thionville
Number of Raids on Railroad: 61
Total Number of Hours Lost: 321 hrs. 5 min.
Total Damage: 1,552,150 Marks
Bonuses Paid: Over 1,000,000 Marks
Railroad Information
1. Based on numerous interviews with the various chiefs of
the different departments, all of whom are Germans who were
here for the past two to four years. The abstract referring to the
number and duration of alerts was taken from the books of the
machine department; the abstract regarding damage, values, etc.,
was taken from the day book of Herr Kienle, in charge of
construction department. Conflicting stories were told by these
officials but I have endeavored to check these up as much as
possible, and the bulk of the information may be taken as
correct, regardless whether it checks with our observers’ report
or not.
2. Every time an alert sounded, there was a total stoppage
of traffic, until the “all clear” signal was given, this regardless of
whether bombs dropped on Thionville or not. As there are a
great number of tracks around this station,b traffic was delayed
very little, once the “all clear” signal was sounded, as trains were
switched from damaged tracks to others.
3. Due to very heavy traffic, a greatly increased personnel
was used around the railroad station of this town, and this was
further increased when the increasing number of raids began to
lower the morale of the workers. In the summer and autumn of
1918, a total of 4,500 to 5,500 men were employed (including
those working in the stations, shops, R.R. machine works, yards,
etc.) In the summer of 1918, an agitation for an increase of
wages was made, and in August, a so-called “flieger-zulage”C was
given to the men, being an increase in wages of about 50 marks
a month for the workers, and from 60 to 100 marks for the
various officials. Up to the 11th of November, when this increase
was stopped, well over one million marks were spent by the
Imperial German Government as an inducement to work in the
danger zone around Thionville. (Similar agitations were made in
the various towns in the neighborhood, but with one or two
exceptions, these were not successful). A number of Russian
400 U.S. Air Service
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prisoners were also used for repair work, and these were the
men that generally repaired the damage inflicted by bombs.
4. Big damage was done on the 2nd and 3rd of May, 1918.d
when a bomb dropped on the south end of the passenger station
and smashed it, and another killed and seriously wounded about
eight persons near the freight station. However, there seems to
be no doubt that the damage done by a bomb dropped around
2 P.M. on July 16th, 1918, was enormous, in fact exceeding by
far the combined damage of the hundreds of other bombs
dropped here. This bomb dropped on a munition train of some
40 cars, causing shells to explode, setting fire to the freight
station and other buildings in the vicinity, wrecking a string of
horse cars and killing a number of horses (from 40 to 75,
conflicting reports on number) as well as killing and seriously
wounding about a dozen peop1e.e About half of this munition
train was finally cut off and pulled away by the cleverness of a
.
U.S.Bombing 401
Survey
1. Direct Damages
a. By Air Raids on the Carl Foundry. The Carl Foundry was
attacked 22 times by aviators. Altogether 186 bombs were
thrown. 116 were thrown on the foundry area and 70 in the near
.
vicinity. . . The total involved damage is . . . M76,521.46. Killed,
7 persons, wounded about 50 persons. The damage resulting
from the individual attacks were as follows:
Air Raid I. Four bombs thrown. The first bomb fell on the oil
refiner built in masonry about 1 cbm. masonry disturbed. The
second fell on the roof of the machine house 2 and exploded on
an iron purlin without any great damage. Bomb 3 hit the gas
connection of machine house 2; the damage was immediately
repaired. Bomb 4 fell on the roof of casting house and destroyed
a great number of roof tiles.
Air Raid 11. Five bombs thrown; no damage.
Air Raid Ill. One bomb thrown; glass broken.
Air Raid IV. Four bombs thrown. The first bomb fell in the
vicinity of the rope walk on the crushing machine. Damage to
the light and power connections and to the towing-line of the
rope walk; also damage to glass. Bombs 2 to 4, no damage.
Air Raid V. Three bombs thrown. The first bomb fell on the
roof of the crushing machine 4. Little damage to the iron
construction work. About 2,000 roof tile thrown down.
Air Raid VI. Fifteen bombs thrown, no glass damaged.
Air Raid VII. Two bombs thrown. Bomb one fell in the vicinity
of Colonie Terwin. Damages to the glass. The second fell beside
the track of the Carl Gallery railroad; a few signal connections
were torn.
U.S.Bombing 403
Survey
Air Raid XVII. Nine bombs thrown. Three bombs fell in the
vicinity of the stone factory. One manager was fatally wouqded
on the head. Three other bombs fell on the oil container;
damages t o the iron carriers and to two water pipes. One bomb
fell beside the oil container 4; one machinist killed. Two
prisoners wounded. Another bomb fell on the gaspipe over the
furnace house 2, penetrating the latter. The running of the gas
machine was stopped for two days. One bomb hit the house No.
44 Colony Cassion, 2 penetrating the roof; burst in the hay
stored there and blew off most of the roof. The other bombs
caused no damage.
Air Raid XVIII. One bomb thrown to the working buildings.
Demolition of damage of three state trains [?I. Destruction of the
cast-iron windows of the workshop. Damage to the corrugated
sheet-iron roof; great glass damage.
Air Raid XIX. No damage.’
Air Raid XX. Seventeen bombs thrown. Eight bombs thrown
on the construction area of the steel works. No damage. Four
bombs fell in the vicinity of the gallery railroad. Damage to the
high tension conduit. A bomb fell on a house in the vicinity of
the former cement works, in which the guards of the Russians
were lodged. The bomb tore off most of the roof and also
damaged the buildings in the vicinity. The guards had
opportunely taken shelter. The remaining- bombs caused no great -
damage.
Air Raid XXI. Six bombs thrown in the vicinity of the
foundries enclosure. Damage to the fence of the Villa Rochling.
Air Raid XXII. Seven bombs thrown. Damages to the electric
connections of the gallery railroad.
b. By Air Raids on the Diedenhofen and Metz Railroad
Stations. The baggage shed of the Diedenhofen station was set
aflame by the air raid of July 16, 1918 occasioning the loss of
our goods stored there. The damage to the Carl Foundry
amounted to 2,577.21 Marks.
The wagon filled with cement for us was hit at the station
Metz-Sablon in the air raid of May 30 to 31, 1918.h The damage
to the Carl Foundry amounts to 477.98 Marks.
c. By the splinters of the anti-aircraft fire which fell from a
great height the roofs of the houses and the workshops
belonging to the Carl Foundry were damaged during the different
attacks on the city of Diedenhofen. The reparation necessitated
an expenditure altogether of 5,837.39Marks.
!I. Indirect Damage
a. In the Shortage of Production. It is difficult to make an
estimate of the loss caused by the shortage of production. It is
U.S. Bombing 405
Survey
Abstract IP
r
-16-
Luxembourg
Number of Raids: 17
Total amount of damage: 26,845 Marks
-17-
.
The balloon barrages surrounding the town and works . .,
39 balloons in all, each balloon containing 160 cubic meters of
gas. With a new filling, each balloon could go as high as 3,000
meters and always were at an altitude of between 2,000 and
3,000 meters. One filling was sufficient for 10 days to 2 weeks.
Balloons were let up electrically, 6 balloons on one main line.
Balloons were let up at night and pulled down in the morning.
The same territory was also protected by 32 anti-aircraft guns, 2
guns in a position. Each two guns had a personnel of 30 men.
These guns were composed of 7.5, 8.8 and 10.5 calibre, the 10.5
being a marine gun. These guns were capable of 9 shots per
minute and would shoot as high as 6,000 meters. It is, however,
claimed that a great deal of damage was done to the roofs of
factories and private dwellings in the enclosed country by the
pieces of shrapnel and unexploded shells coming down from
Anti-aircraft Guns.
A balloon barrage also surrounded the industrial region in the
Saar Valley.
415
-18-
Esch
Number of Raids: 43
Total Material Damage: 1,348,709.21 [Marks]
Burbach-
Adolph Esch- -
City Emil Dudelage
Factory Factory
Direct Damage 363,050.40 748,879.49 236,779.32
Loss of Production 9,871,690.00
Loss of Salaries 129,223.90
Protection 250,000.00 70,347.94
Bombs 76
Raids 14
Extra Consumption,
raw materials 54,406.00
Foundry at Dudelange.
416 US.Air Service
in World War I
Vol. Iv
-19-
Dudelange
Expenses caused by the attacks of aviators:
I. Building department: (Francs)
1. In 1916 Alarm dispositions 8,373.00
2. During 1916-1917:The first shelters against
attacks by avions were built in order to protect
our workmen, the important buildings and
engines. 110,005.00
3. Damages caused by aerial attacks on the factory
and on the buildings outside. 45,172.46
4. Damage to roofs remaining to be repaired; these
damages were caused by the fire of the defense
guns; they will be repaired as soon as we obtain
necessary materials. 6,600.00
11. Blast-furnaces:
1. Damages caused by charging supplementary coke 27,000.00
2. Supplementary wages 30,000.00
111. Rolling Mills:
Supplementary wages: Plant I 8,428.00
Plant I€ 6,566.00
Adjusting Mill 7,188.00
Coals ' 18,748.00
IV. Steelwork, supplementary wages: 6,300.00
V. Workshop and Foundry, suppl wages: 7,100.00
Total 361,351.46
-20-
Rumelingen and Oettlingen
Number of Raids: 9.
Total Amount of Damage: 1,230 Marks
Total Loss of Production: 3,386 Tons of Iron
Expenditure for Protection: 26,500 Marks
-21-
Differdange
Number of Raids: 39.
Number of Bombs: 395
Total Material Damage: 820,630 Marks
Loss of Production: 16,770 Tons
Expenditure for Protection of City: 51,883.37 francs
Expenditure for Protection of Steel Mills: 450,000 Marks
............................................................
-22-
Rodange
Number of Raids: 9
Total Damage to Town: 20,000 Marks .
Expenditure for Protection: 15,000 Marks
Total Damage to the Ongres-Marihaye Factory: 10,919.90 Marks
March 18, 1918, 1030 P.M. to 11:OO P.M. 5 bombs were
dropped. 2 near RR station, 1 on tracks, and 2 in field. About 20
windows were broken and damage to tracks were repaired in 1%
hours. None killed or wounded.
March 15, 1918, 1030 P.M. to 11:OO P.M. 5 bombs, 3 in field
and 2 in city. Roof of one house was destroyed and another
house was partly destroyed. 2 children wounded.
March 14, 1918, 10:30 A.M. to 11:OO A.M. 5 bombs, 4 in fields
and 1 between RR tracks. Only damage, broken windows.
March 13, 1918, 11:OO P.M. to 11:30 P.M. 3 bombs in city.
Broken windows.
418 U.S. Air Service
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VOl. Iv
Feb. 20, 1918, 11:00 P.M. to 11:30 P.M. 7 bombs, all near RR
station. Destroyed telephone wires and windows.
Feb. 18, 1918, (no hour). 1 bomb in city. Windows destroyed.
Jan. 16, 1918, 10:00 P.M. to 11:OO P.M. 5 bombs in city. 1
house destroyed and windows broken.
Sept. 27, 1917, 9:OO P.M. to 9:30 P.M. 5 bombs, all in fields.
Sept. 25, 1916. Raid during night, lasting half an hour. 6
bombs in city. Windows broken..
-23-
Athus
Number of Raids: 8
Damage to Town: 19,OOO francs
Damage to Athus-Grevegne Works: 400,000 francs
May 26, 1917. Night. Damage to Houses, 3,000 francs.
Jan. 25, 1918. 11:OO P.M. 3 bombs fell; no damage.
Feb 17, 1918. 12:OO P.M. 10 bombs dropped; damage to
houses, 10,000 francs.
March 13, 1918. 11:OO P.M. 1 German soldier killed and 1
wounded; damage to houses, 10,000 francs.
March 21, 1918. 1000 P.M. 4 bombs were dropped; damage to
houses, 2,500 francs.
Dec 27, 1916. 11:OO P.M. 8 bombs dropped, 1 striking freight
house at railroad station; damage to same, 500 francs; no
damage railroad.
May 5, 1917. Midnight. 20 bombs dropped.
Oct 1, 1917. 9:00 P.M. 13 bombs dropped; no records were
kept in this town as to exact dates and material damage or
plans showing where bombs fell.
-24-
Trier
roads were important to its life, and the lines running through
Trier were of strategic importance to Germany and the German
army.
Up the river from Trier, rail lines paralleled the Moselle on
both sides. At Trier there were two stations, one on each side of
the river, the main station being on the east side in the main part
of town. Below the city, the line on the east side crossed the
river at Pfalzel, joining the other line in the yards at Ehrang.
From Ehrang there was a line northeast to Koblenz and an-
other north to Erdorf and Cologne. South of Trier the two lines
were connected by a bridge over the Moselle at Conz (Konz),
just below the confluence with the Saar. The line on the west
side went westward to Luxembourg, the one on the east follow-
ing the Moselle south to Thionville and Metz. From Conz there
also was a rail line up the Saar River to Saarbrucken.
Railway targets in this area were sometimes assigned as ob-
jectives for Allied bombing raids. On other occasions, they were
Aerial view of Trier.
,
420 U.S. Air Service
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Vol. N
I'
foremen were very much of the opinion that the efficiency of the
employers was very much impaired by air raids.
The above information was received from the Manager, E.
Spino, and Chief Engineer, F. Seibert.
Gas Works, Trier
June 22, 1916, 2.20 A.M. One bomb fell alongside of an 8,000
cubic meter gas holder, puncturing it in 72 places and setting it
on fire but by transferring the gas in this holder to a larger
I
holder which they had, they were able to lower it until the
damaged part was under water, thereby putting out the fire and
stopping the leakage of gas.
After all the gas in the holder has been used it was repaired,
taking 4 days during which time it could not be used. Cost to
repair damage was 1,200 Mks.
600 cubic meters estimated as amount of gas lost through
burning and leakage, valued at 600 marks.
Damage to windows and office buildings, 2,200 marks.
Damage from their own anti-aircraft guns 200 marks.
Fixing cellars into bomb proofs cost them 2,000 marks.
No time was lost on account of raids or alarms as plant is
Damaged gas storage tank of automatically operated, boiler and gas furnace being fired by
the Trier Gas Works. automatic stoker.
Above information received from Director Wahl.
H. Laeser & Company
Manufacturers of artificial wool and of which uniforms for
German Army were made.
Employed 250 men and women.
Feb. 19, 1918. Two bombs fell on office building, setting it on
fire and destroying it completely. Building was rebuilt in 9
months at a,cost of 25,300 marks: Work in the factory was not
delayed in the least.
Production for last 3 months of the war was 150,000 kilos of
wool, valued at 500,000 marks.
Were closed 150 hours on account of raids and alarms and
lost through wages for which they received no benefit, 3,000
marks. Production was decreased by 3,000 kilos valued at 10,000
marks.
Considerable damage was done here by anti-aircraft shells
which [was] repaired at a cost of 1,000 marks.
Carried flying raid insurance for which they paid 2,192 marks.
Did not build any bomb proofs but used a wine cellar which
was conveniently located near the factory.
, H. Laeser, his son and foreman, all thought the efficiency of
the employees was very much impaired on account of air raids,
U.S.Bombing 429
Survey
1,500 marks.
Carried flying raid insurance for which they paid in premiums
6,600 Marks.
The officers of the company were very much of the opinion
that the efficiency of the employees was very much impaired by
air raids.
Above information received from Otto Frik, Manager; William
Greunit, Chief Engineer; and August Schaefer, Chief Accountant.
I interviewed every German whose name appears on report,
along with other Germans with whom I have come in contact on
what effect the raids had on the morale of the people and the
opinion was held by everyone that it had a great effect, causing
much sickness and nervous breakdowns.
Dissatisfaction was also found with the military authorities,
claims being made that they were trying to save on ammunition.
I verified these claims by going to the Post Commander where I
found that during several raids batteries had run out of
arhmunition. One German interpreted the dissatisfaction with
the military authorities into meaning that it was a desire of the
Germans in this locality to cease hostilities.
In the opinion of these people, night bombing had the greatest
effect on morale of the population, although day bombing also
had a great effect.
Kurenz
Sept. 13, 1915. 3 bombs also fell in this small city, damaging
property to the extent of 210.40 marks.
Nov. 24, 1916. 3 bombs were dropped in this city, damaging
the property of 47 people on which claims to the extent of 8,436
marks were paid, of which amount 415.86 marks was paid by
Insurance Companies.
August 23, 1918. 17 bombs fell in and around city, damaging
property on which claims to the extent of 6,507.70 marks were
paid (by Insurance Companies, 5,821.40).
Sept. 14, 1918. Several bombs fell in city, damaging property
of 4 people on which claims for 992.50 marks were paid, of
which amount 524 marks was paid by Insurance Companies.
This town is located just across the railroad from Trier and
received their damage when Trier was being bombed.
Olewig'
Feb. 18, 1918. 1 bomb was dropped in this small town as well
as Trier and damaged property of 4 people on which claims of
1,082.21 M. were paid, of which amount 366.71 was paid by
Insurance CQmpanies. 1 woman was killed.
July 7, 1917. Bombs were also dropped on this town as well
432 U.S.Air Service
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VOl. N
-25-
Ehrang
Number of Raids: 9
Total Amount of Damage: 127,225 marks.
Expenditures for Protection: 62,200 marks.
............................................................
Information received from (Burgomeister) Mayor Arend of
Ehrang, taken from the records of that city:
Sept. 13, 1915, Hour unknown. One bomb fell on a
transformer house located between Ehrang and Biewer,. causing
damage to the extent of about 300 marks but did not damage
the lighting system.
Nov. 24, 1916. One bomb fell on house at Pfalzel, completely
destroying it. Amount of damage, 3,000 marks.
July 7, 1917, 1:00 P.M. Several bombs fell in an open field
about 300 yards from the railway station causing no damage
other than breaking windows in the neighborhood. On this same
raid, four bombs were dropped in an open field close to the
water works but did no damage.
: O P.M. One bomb fell close to the Russian
Jan. 27, 1918, 1O
prison camp but did no damage.
U.S.Bombing 433
Survey
-26-
Number of Raids 7
Number of Bombs 29
Total Damage (including 500 marks-
date not known) 61,216.58marks
Expenditures for Protection 17,250.00marks
Amount Paid in Bonuses 152,000.00marks
............................................................
Information received from Burgomeister Mayor Muller of
Karthaus, partially taken from records of that city.
Aug. 9, 1914,Time unknown, One dud and one bomb fell on
west side of railroad in a field. One bomb fell on east side of
railroad-had no record or recollection of any damage being
done.
May 10, 1918, 2:00 A.M. Number of bombs unknown. Fell in
city of Wasserlieach damaging property of one man to the extent
of 50 marks.
June 1, 1918, 800 A.M. Sixteen bombs fell in town along
railroad damaging the property of 22 people on which claims for
a 1,240 mark loss were filed and paid. One boy was killed.
June 4, 1918, 800 A.M. Number of bombs unknown. Several
fell in the city of Conz damaging the property of ten people on
which claims for 1,761.20 marks were filed and paid.
June 7, 1918,800 A.M. Two bombs fell on railroad main line,
four in the railroad shops and several in the town of Merzlich,
damaging the property of 35 people to the extent of 14,949.46
Marks. Two women and three children were killed on this raid.
July 1, 1918, 1000 A.M. Twelve bombs fell in the Moselle
River, one bomb fell on switch line track to Ehrang and four
bombs in the town of Conz, damaging the property of 101
people, claims being filed to the amount of 11,333.38 marks and
paid.
Oct. 11, 1918, Time unknown. Two bombs fell in the town of
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VOl. Iv
-27-
Saarbrucken
Number of Raids: 24
Total Damage: 2,987,650 Marks
Dates of Raids Damage (Marks) Killed Wounded
9 Aug. '15 140,000 13 43
6 Sept. '16 700,000 5 10
16 Sept. '16 8
9/10 Feb '17 40,000 12 3
16 March '17 19,500 1
16/17 June '17 148,000 4
24 Oct. '17 lOl,Ooo 6 7
17 Oct. '17 53,000
5 Dec. '17 153,000 6 9
6 Dec '17 25,000 1 4
5 Feb '18 201,000 17
16 May '18 57,000 11 49
21 May '18 3,500
24 June '18 19,000 1 1
25 June '18 80,000 3 7
26 June '18 16,000
1 July '18 930,000
5 July '18 12,000
17 July '18 181,000
30 July '18 3,500
14/15 Sept '18 2,500
23/24 Oct. '18 1,100
28/29 Oct. '18
29/30 Oct. '18 1,450
Totals 2,887,650 59 162
-28-
Burbach
Number of Raids: 13
Number of Bombs on Factory [Steel Works]: 93
Total Amount of Damage: 488,100 marks
Cost of Protection: 100,OOO marks
A total of 93 bombs were dropped on the Foundry grounds
during the 13 different aerial attacks that took place. In addition,
5 other bombs were dropped in the gardens around the Foundry
..
and in front of one of the officials' buildings. ,
.........................................................................................
U.S.Bombing 439
Survey
-29-
Brebach
(Halburgerhutte Iron 81 Steel Works)
Number of Raids: 5
Total Amount of Damage: 89,256 marks
Cost of Protection: 250,000 marks
Number killed: 10
U.S. Bombing 441
Survey
-30-
Volklingen
Moral Effect
The morale of the workmen was affected to the extent that
when they “went on” again on their next shift, their physical
strength was somewhat reduced and were incapable of working
at their normal capacity, and would try to find some place to
steal a rest.
Night bombing had greater effect upon the morale of the
workmen. During the several raids that took place, some of the
women employees became hysterical and their lack of control
had its effect upon the workmen in the same building.
Night bombing at this plant scored all the effective hits and
the consequent damages.
-31-
Dillingen
Number of Raids: 62”
Number of Alerts: 89
Total Number of Hours Lost: 90 hrs. 27 min.
Total Amount of Damage: 296,881.61 marks
Expenditure for Protection: 150,000 marks
............................................................
U.S.Bombing 445
Survey
-32-
Bous
Bous and Wadgassen (Report 33) are on the Saar, about half-
way between Volkllngen and Dillingen, while Merzig (Report 34)
is farther down the Saar, about midway between Saarbrucken
and Conz.
............................................................
The loss of production [at the Mannesmann Steel Works]
owing to total stoppage of 454 hours [during 301 alerts]
amounted to 9,437.5 tons, or, as stated approximately by the
director of the factory, 7% million marks. The actual damage
resulting from bombs amounted to 8,621 marks.
Protection: In addition to being protected by the Saar Valley
Balloon Barrage, it had several anti-aircraft batteries and
searchlights.
Moral Effect: The men at this factory were not greatly
disturbed but nevertheless found night raids more disquieting
than day raids.
-33-
Wadgassen
No material damage from bombs was recorded at this place.
The loss of production from alerts, however, was estimated at
48,OOO marks for the glass factory of Villeroy & Boch, which was
closed down for a total of 10 hours.
Anti-aircraft dropping on the office of the factory caused
damage to the extent of 3,000 marks.
-34-
Merzig
Number of Raids: 1
Number of Bombs: 4
Total Damage to Town: 22,600 marks
446 U.S.Air Service
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Vol. Iv
-35-
Kreuzwald
The towns covered in this and the following eight reports are
all situated within a radius of less than 40 miles west and south
from Saarbrucken, Kreuzwald (Creutzwald-la-Croix) being
about 14 miles west.
Note: The following information was derived simply from the
memory of some of the office force of the Ste. des Mines de la
Houve, records, etc., not being available.
Number of Raids: 7
Total Damage to Town: 80,000 Marks
Value of Loss of Production at Electric Plant: 10,000 Marks
Expenditures for Protection: 10,000 Marks
-36-
Bouzonville
-37-
St. Avold
St. Avold, about seven miles south of Kreuzwald, is on the rail
line between Metz (via Remilly) and Saarbrucken.
Station
June 15/16, 1917, 9:00 PM-10 PM, 16 bombs.
June 18/19, 1918, 11:30 PM, locomotive destroyed.
July 21/22, 1918, 11:40 PM, 4 bombs.
Aerodrome:
No bombs ever dropped on the aerodrome.
US.Bombing 447
Survey
-38-
Bensdorf
-39-
Dieuze
-40-
Rechicourt
-41-
Heming
-42-
Saarburg-Rieding
double track
destroyed
Sept. 21-22,1918 2:OO am 10 50 meters of two
double tracks
destroyed
Rieding. No. 1471 July 12, 1918
Today at noon (12 o’clock) an attempted aerial attack on the
station at Rieding; about ten bombs of unknown calibre which
fell at a distance of about 150 and 500 m from the railroad area.
The number of aviators could not be ascertained because of the
heavy clouds. [No ?] Damage to the railroad yards. No loss of
personnel.
Reidel
Rieding. August 17,1918
Tonight at 2 o’clock an aerial attack on the station at Rieding.
Eight bombs of unknown calibre thrown. Two of them blinds.
The tracks 20 and 21 were damaged by one bomb for a distance
of about 30 m. The rest of the bombs fell in the vicinity of
Signal 6 about 150 m south of the area. The number of aviators
I
US.Bombing 45 1
Survey
-43-
Sa rralbe
Number of Raids: 1
Total Damage: 8,800 Francs
Expenditure for Protection: 0
The only damage ever done here was to the Chemical Factory
of Solvay & Company on the night of the 22nd of August when
one bomb fell on the roof of the office building, which amounted
to 8,800 francs.
No special forms of defense were set up here with the
exception of one mobile anti-aircraft gun. Employees found refuge
from attacks in natural pits and quarries near at hand.
The workmen never complained over having to work under
exceptional conditions and seemed to go on with their work as
usual. No bonuses were ever paid. Alerts never lasted over
fifteen minutes.
U.S. Air Service
in World War I
Vol. Iv
-44-
St. lngbert
Number of Raids: 2
Number of Bombs: 7
Total loss due to both Raids and Alerts: 400,000 marks
Total loss of production due to both Raids and Alerts:
200,000 tons gun material
600 tons plain steel
600 tons bond steel
Total cost of protection: 20,000 marks
Only two raids were recorded at this place on the factory of
Rumelinger and St. Ingbert Steel Works, at which 2,000 men are
employed, one on August 9, 1915, when 6 bombs were dropped,
again on November 11, 1917, when 1 bomb was dropped.
Officials of the factory stated that at each alert, during which
as a rule 2 hours were lost, the loss in production represented
2,000 marks or, expressed in terms of the product, 600 tons of
plain steel, 600 tons of bond steel, and 200,000 tons of gun
material.
Cement shelters were constructed for the employees at a cost
of 20,000 marks. No netting or false roofing was placed over the
factories.
The efficiency of the employees was lowered only to a
limited extent by the raids.
453
View of the Stumm Bros. factory at Neunkirchen, following the air raid of 17 July 1918.
?
-45-
Neunkirchen
Stumm Bros. Factory
Neunkirchen, on the Blies, about 14 miles northeast of Saar-
brucken, was an industrial city of iron and steel works, which,
along with coal pits in the area, had been owned by the Stumm
family since early in the 19th century.
-46-
Zweibrucken
Zweibrucken, southeast of Neunkircken and about 17 or 18
miles east of Saarbrucken, was an industrial town of some
15,000 people.
Number of Raids: 5
Total Bombs Dropped: 96
Total time lost through alerts and raids: 124 hrs. 18 mina
Total amount of damage: 86,041 marks
Expenditure for Protection: 15,514 marks
Loss in salaries due to alerts: 80,262 marks
............................................................
The city of Zweibrucken was affected with five air raids as
follows:
Aug. 9, 1915. Raid announced at 8.00 A.M. All clear signal
given at 8.10 A.M. Time, 10 min. Total number of bombs
dropped, 38; Cost of damages, 28,468 Marks.
June 4/5, 1917. Raid announced at 11.45 P.M. All clear
signal given at 2.35 A.M. Time, 2% hours; Total number of
bombs dropped, 27; Cost of damages, 16,209 marks.
Dec. 5, 1917. Raid announced at 2.05 P.M. All clear signal
given at 2.43 P.M. Time, 38 minutes. Total number of bombs
dropped, 9; Cost of damages, 13,743 marks.
Feb. 19, 1918. Raid announced at 10.05 A.M. All clear signal
given at 11.00 A.M. Time, 55 minutes. Total number of bombs
dropped, 8; No damages. All bombs dropped on the hills outside
of town.
March 16, 1918. Raid announced at 12.00 M. All clear signal
given at 1.00 P.M. Time, 1 hr. Total number of bombs dropped,
14. Cost of damages, 27,621 marks.
The city had no protection of any kind during the first raid.
Later two batteries of anti-aircraft guns were furnished by the
military authorities, cost of same not known. Search lights, fire
clock and signal bombs and shelters were all bought or built at
an expense of 13,514 marks to the city. Signal bombs and
factory sirens were used announcing air raids. Nearly all business
and shops were closed during air raid announcements.
The railroads were not bombed in this town.
US.Bombing 455
Survey
-47-
Pirmasens
Number of Raids: 4
Total amount of damage: 465,000 mks.
456 US. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
Number Material
Date of Raid Announced of Bombs Damage Killed
Marks
Oct. 30,1917 12.00 noon 9 120,000 1
Feb. 20,1918 12.45 P.M. 7 80,000 2
Feb. 8, 1918 12.18 P.M. 6 %@)o 2
Oct. 30,1918 9.40 P.M. 6 175,000 5
Totals 28 465,000 10
The above figure for material damage represents a total of 791
claims submitted for damage but does not include an almost
equal number of claims which were paid through insurance
companies.
-48-
Kaiserslautern
Kaiserslautern, which then had more than 50,000 people, is
situated between Saarbrucken and Mannheim. Its industries
included large iron and steel works.
Number of Raids: 7
Total Time Lost: 54 hoursa
Total Material Damage: 1,850,000 Marks
Total Loss of Production: 387,990 Marks
............................................................
1. The city of Kaiserslautern was affected with seven air raids,
as follows:
Nov. lst, 1917. Raid announced at 3.05 P.M. All clear signal
given at 3.45 P.M. Time, 40 min. Total number of bombs
dropped, 3. Nobody killed nor injured. Cost of damages, 100
marks.
March 17th, 1918. Raid announced at 12.15 P.M. All clear
signal given at 1.20 P.M. Time, 65 min. Total number of bombs
dropped, 21. Persons killed, 6; injured, 10. Cost of damages,
350,000 marks.
July 2nd, 1918. Raid announced at 12.47 A.M. All clear
signal given at 1.57 A.M. Time, 1 hr. 10 min. Total number of
bombs dropped, 8; nobody killed nor injured.
Cost of damages, 500 marks.
July 7th, 1918. Raid announced at 4.13 P.M. All clear signal
-
U.S. Bombing 457
Survey
The explosion of a 112-Ib. British bomb collapsed the wall of the building in the photo.
-49-
Landau
The targets of the raids mentioned in the following report
were barracks and the railway station at Landau, a town of some
14,000 people, about 25 miles southeast of Kaiserslautern and
about the same distance southwest of Marinheim.
Number of Raids: 3
Number of Bombs: 29
Total Amount of Damage: 310,809.88marks
Date of Time Duration Killed Bombs
Raid Hr-Min Dropped
1918
May 20 11.30 A.M. to
12.30 P.M. 1 3 17
June 30 8.36 A.M. to
9.05 A.M. 29 0 6
June 30 1.12 A.M. to
2.27 A.M. 1 15 0 6
Totals 2 4 4 3 29
460 U.S. Air Service
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-50-
Karlsruhe
-51-
Speyer
About 20 miles north of Karlsruhe, on the left side of the
Rhine, is Speyer, a historic city with a famous 11th-century
cathedral. The only bombing there apparently was by the Bri.
tish on the night of 21/22 July 1918, when the assigned target
for Handley Pages of Squadron 216 of the Independent Air
Force was at Mannheim.a
Number"of Raids: 1
U.S.Bombing 46 1
Survey
Number of Bombs: 5
Total Damage to City: 23,329.22 marks
Total Damage to Railroad 5,952.11 marks
July 22, 1918. Raid lasted from 1:36 A.M to ? Five bombs
were dropped around the station damaging property of 42 people
to the extent of 23,329.22 marks. This was the only raid on this
town. No protection whatsoever was built against air raids.
R. R. Speier. One bomb destroyed a switch track which was
repaired by 15 men in about 6 days at a cost of 2,950 marks.
Traffic was not delayed in the least.
Windows in buildings and several small buildings were damaged
which was repaired at a cost of 3,002.11 marks.
Information obtained from Burgomeister.
-52-
Ludwigshafen
The Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik was regarded by the
British as one of the most important targets for their strategic
bombers. Founded in 1865, the company made aniline dyes and
nitrogen. Its main plant, one of the largest chemical factories in
the world, occupied the northern part of Ludwigshafen, a city of
some 90,000 people, on the left bank of the Rhine, opposite
Mannheim.' A branch plant was situated nearby, at Oppau, just
north of Ludwigshafen.
Resume of Result of Bombing
Number of raids: 22.
Total damage to city and private property: 1,565,230.50M
Damage to military stores: 210,000.00 M
Expenditures for protection: 168,OOO.00 M
Total expenditures paid to dependents of killed and wounded,
including funeral expenses: 1,607,000.00M
Damage to Railroad
Direct damage by bombs: 44,012.91 M
By anti-aircraft: 395.90 M
Expenditure for protection: 25,000.00 M
............................................................
Factories. Although there are numerous factories in this town,
all bombing raids seem to have been concentrated on but one
plant; viz., The Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrick (See below). A
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few of the other plants received only isolated bombs and the
majority of the material damage was caused by anti-aircraft guns.
However, all suffered indirect damage from loss in production,
insurance premiums, cost of bomb proofs, etc. Below are
statements on six of the largest plants in this town and it is
safe to assume that the remainder of the factories-about 28 in
number-also suffered in proportion, but as these are all small
plants employing between 20 and 100 people, it was impossible
to get detailed information. The following covers all the important
plants in town:
1. The Badische Anilin & Soda Fabrick. This plant
manufactured poison-gas-chemicals during the war, and was the
objective for all Allied bombing in this section . . . .The total
grand [of damages], about 6,700,000 marks, shows that
considerable damage was inflicted but the moral effect seems to
have been enormous also. From various conversations with the
chief director, it was this moral effect which also considerably
curtailed production. A total of 13 workmen and 1 soldier were
killed in all raids, and others suffered injuries, but these were all
covered by insurance. However, these deaths also helped to
lower the morale of the workers, which seems to have suffered
considerably.
2. Gebruder Guilene. Also a chemical plant, located in
Mundenheimb (near Ludwigshafen). Only 4 bombs in all dropped
on this plant, and no great material damage was caused. No
...
records were kept regarding production, loss, etc .The morale
of the workers employed here seems to have suffered
considerably also, although not to the extent of the “Badische”
plant.
3. Ludwigshafener Walzmuhle. No bombs fell on this plant, but
as this plant was run on a 24 hour a day working schedule, a
considerable production loss was caused by the various
.
alarms. . . As this plant is concentrated in one five-story
building, a bomb-proof was constructed by simply blocking up a
few of the basement windows, and this, as well as the fact that
the plant was never hit, served to keep up the morale of the
workers.
4. Gebruder Sulzer.
H. Hessenmuller.
Dr. F. Raschig.
A statement from each of these firms regarding bombing
damage shows that very little material damage was caused by
bombs, and the majority of loss was occasioned by anti-aircraft
fire, insurance premiums, and production loss. ... The effect
on morale does not seem to have been very marked, as bombs
were not dropped often enough on these plants.
U S Bombing 463
Survey
Feb. 18, 1918 Raid lasted from 11.25 P.M. to 11.50 P.M. 2 bombs fell on wood
storage of chemical factory.
Mar. 18, 1918 Raid lasted from 12.20 P.M. to 2.00 P.M. 14 bombs were
dropped, 6 people killed and 18 wounded.
Mar. 24, 1918 Raid lasted from 12.20 A.M. to 2.25 A.M. 13 bombs were
dropped, killing 4 people and wounding 13.
Mar. 24, 1918 Raid lasted from 12.45 P.M. to 1.40 P.M. 14 bombs were
dropped, wounding 9 people.
May 22, 1918 Raid lasted from 1.00 A.M. to 1.30 A.M. 26 bombs
were dropped.
May 23, 1918 Raid lasted from 12.00 midnight to 12.45 A.M. 20 bombs were
dropped on chemical factory and around factory.
May 28, 1918 Raids lasted from 12.55 A.M. to 1.45 A.M., 2.25 A.M.
to 2.40 A.M. 6 bombs were dropped in open field
between Freisenheim' and Ludwigshafen.
June 27, 1918 Raid lasted from 1.20 A.M. to 1.45 A.M. 9 bombs were
dropped, the most of which fell in chemical factory.
June 30, 1918 Raid lasted from 1.20 P.M. to 1.50 P.M.
10 bombs were dropped on city and chemical factory, killing 4
people and wounding 4
July 20, 1918 Raid lasted from 12.20 P.M. to 12.50 P.M. 17 bombs were
dropped on the city.
Aug. 15, 1918 2 raids lasted from 11.15 P.M. to 11.30 P.M., 12.45 A.M. to 1.00
A.M. 10 bombs fell in Mundenheim.
Aug. 26, 1918 Raid lasted from 10.50 P.M. to 11.50 P.M. 18 bombs were
dropped on city and chemical factory.
Sept. 7, 1918 Raid lasted from 1.50 A.M. to 2.35 A.M. 21 bombs were
dropped, injuring 1 person.
Sept. 16, 1918 Raids lasted from 2.15 P.M. to 2.45 P.M., 3.05 P.M. to 3.35 P.M.
Only 1 bomb fell in this city, the rest in Mannheim.
Oct. 24, 1918 Raid lasted from 8.40 P.M. to 10.20 P.M. 4 bombs fell on
chemical factory.
Oct. 30, 1918 Raid lasted from 10.00 P.M. to 12.15 A.M. 11 bombs fell in north
part of Mundenheim and in open fields.
Alarms
July 30, 1915 11.00 A.M. to 11.40 A.M.
Jan. 6, 1918 4.30 A.M. to 5.05 A.M. Raid on Mannheim.
Feb. 20, 1918 11.40 P.M. to 12.10 A.M. Raid on Mannheim.
Mar. 17, 1918 12.30 P.M. to 1.10 P.M. Raid on Kaiserslautern.
May 20, 1918 11.15 A.M. to 11.45 A.M.
June 29, 1918 8.40 A.M. to 9.05 A.M.
June 30, 1918 8.40 A.M. to 9.10 A.M.
July 7, 1918 4.30 P.M. to 4.55 P.M.
July 19, 1918 12.40 A.M. to 1.20 A.M.
U.S. Bombing 465
Survey
Damage to R.R.,Ludwigshafen
July 27, 1917 One bomb fell alongside of switch tracks, damaging one R.R. car
traffic was not delayed and damage was repaired at a cost
of 1,434.74 Marks.
Jan. 3, 1918 3 bombs fell in R.R. yards damaging one locomotive and 4
passenger cars, traffic was not delayed and damage was
repaired at a cost of 1,593.42 Marks.
Jan. 6. 1918 1 bomb was dropped in R.R. yards, destroying one
main line track which could not be used for six hours, traffic
was not delayed but switched around damaged.
Damage was repaired at a cost of 805.81 Marks.
Jan. 24, 1918 One bomb fell between Ludwigshafen and Mannheim, damaging
the telephone line which was repaired at a cost of
42.84 Marks.
March 18, 1918 3 bombs fell in R.R. yards at station, damaging one main line
and several pasenger cars; also the telegraph lines.
One main line could not be used for one hour but traffic was
not delayed. Damage was repaired at a cost of 7,201.35 M.
March 24, 1918 4 bombs fell on main line between Ludwigshafen and
Mannheim delaying traffic for 3 hours and hindering work
at the R.R. Rhine harbor for several days, 13 gasoline tank
cars and 10 freight cars were also damaged. Damage was
repaired at a cost of 28,000 Marks.
May 21-22-23- Quite a lot of damage was done to R.R. buildings and rolling
27-28,1918 stock which was repaired at a cost of 4,484.75 M.
June 27, 1918 Damage by anti-aircraft guns, 139.90 Marks.
July 20, 1918 One line over Rhine bridge was not used for 3 weeks because
of changing a girder which had been damaged by a bomb
on a previous raid. Cost to repair damage 450 Marks.
Oct. 23, 1918 Damage by anti-aircraft to building repaired at a cost of 256
Marks.
Expense of shading lights in R.R. yards and buildings,
6,700 Marks.
Installing alarm system in R.R. yards, 2,900 Marks.
Building bomb proofs and making station cellar bomb-
proof, 15,400 Marks.
NO special crews were kept on hand to repair damage by
bombs.
No bonus of any kind was paid to employees.
During the first year of the war, bombing had no great effect
on the morale of the employees but as the raids became more
frequent and the sizes of the bombs larger, the efficiency of the
employees was very much impaired.
During a raid and alarm, all traffic was stopped and in the
opinion of R.R. officials the greatest damage sustained at this
point was from idleness during a raid or alarm.
U.S.Bombing 467
Survey
-53-
Worms
Number of Raids: 3
Total Amount of Damage: 120,300 Marks
The city of Worms was protected against air raids by anti-
aircraft batteries and searchlights. All information on these is in
the hands of the military authorities.
There were 3 raids on the city. . .. First: 6/7 July, 1917, 20
bombs were dropped in the outskirts of the city in the
neighborhood of the prisoner of war camp, damage amounted to
about 300 M. Second 15/16 August, 1918, 2 bombs fell in the
Rhine. Third 28/29 October, 1918, 1 bomb fell between the
junction of two railway tracks, and damaged several cars on a
siding but did not injure the tracks or hold up traffic, material
damage amounted to about 120,000 M.
Railroads. There were 3 different warnings: (1)Danger from
the air (Luftgefahr); (2) Danger of flyers (Fliegergefahr); (3)Flyer
alarm (Fliegerdarm). No. 1 & 2 were merely preparatory, at 3
all trains were stopped by the dispatcher and from a central
switch all electric lights in the station were extinguished. The
passengers in trains went into the tunnels linder the platform
and those in stations to the cellar.
The only bomb which fell near the railroad destroyed 4 freight
cars partially and slightly damaged the track. There was no
congestion for neighboring track was used. Usual yard crew
repaired damage.
Herr Rohmann stated that schedules were badly disrupted due
to these delays. Trains from Ludwigshafen 21 K. distant were
frequently two hours late.
468 U.S. Air Service
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I-
U.S.Bombing 469
Survey
-54-
Maim
Mainz (Mayence), on the Rhine just below the influx of the
Main, was a commercial and manufacturing city of some 100,-
000 people. Furniture, shoes, and sparkling wine were its chief
products. There was some war industry in the city but no great
establishment comparable to the chemical works at Ludwigsha-
fen that could be singled out as major industrial targets for
Allied bombers. The two raids reported by the American survey
Weam were flown by the Independent Air Force, the target for the
first being factories, barracks, and railways, and for the second,
the railway station.
Number of raids: 2
Total time lost: 18 hours, 30 minutes
............................................................
Results of Allied Bombing
The protections of Mainz against air raids, as in the case of
most German cities, were entirely in the hands of the military
authorities and definite information on all points could not be
gotten. It appears that there were sixteen anti-aircraft batteries
around the city, and many searchlights. Further information was
not available. The city government took no special precautionary
measures other than publishing how alarms would be given from
the “Militarische Polizeicentral Telephone” and marking good
cellars to be used as refuges.
There appear to have been only two raids on Mainz, March 9,
.
1918 and Sept. 15, 1918 . . . The raid reported to have taken
place on Oct. 23-24, 1918, i s absolutely denied. (. . . [In] the
...
first raid eleven persons were killed and many wounded.)
The second raid took place during the night and it is asserted
that none were seriously injured nor were buildings damaged; the
greatest injury was done on the Johannes Kirche. No fires
resulted from bombing. Except for splinter marks on walls no
traces of bombing can now be observed.
As far as could be gathered from direct questioning the morale
of the population was not affected by alarms, but from slips in
the conversation and one or two confidential sources it appears
that they were quite worried. The people and authorities were
surprised at the few times the city was bombed, since planes
were almost continually over Mannheim and Frankfurt-a-M. They
470 U.S. Air Service
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VOl. Iv
attribute the sparing of the city either to the fact that it was
known that many Allied officer prisoners were kept in Mainz, or
to the fact that the Allies wished to get possession of the town
intact.
There were not enough raids to compare results of day and
night except that more people were caught in the street during
the day. During alarms all street car traffic and business stopped
in town.
Insurance
Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherungs Akt.-Ges. This was
undoubtedly the largest company dealing in air-raid insurance in
Germany; it is estimated that it had perhaps one-fourth to one-
third of all that type of business in Mainz. Rates:
1/2 M per 1000 M on real estate; 1/3 M extra if offices in
house.
2/3 M per lo00 M on certain retail stores.
1-1/4 M per 1000 M on munition factories.
Herr Harburger estimated that he had collected premiums of
between 50 and 60,000 M for all air raid insurance, during last
year of war (real and personal) in Mainz and surroundings.
Providentia Ins. Co. Estimated that they had 1/10-1/15 of the
air raid insurance policies of Mainz. Premiums on policies
amounted to from 5 to 6,000 M per year.
The remainder of the aicraid insurance business was scattered
among many companies having agents in Mainz, but no one of
these was of great size.
Railroads
On three occasions only were trains held up. July 2, 1918, 4
trains lost a total of 2 hrs. 10 min. Aug 20, 1918, 5 trains lost a
total of 3 hrs. 19 min. Sept. 16, 1918, 13 trains lost a total of 7
hrs. 50 min.
This is the total of trains actually stopped and causing
congestion. No bombs made direct hits on tracks, but from
those which fell near tracks, damage to railway property-glass,
wires, etc.-amounted to 1871.80 M. No tie-up in traffic resulted
from these bombs, nor were special preparations in the way of
crews made in case bombs should strike the tracks.
Factories of Mayence,
All the factories of the City of Mayence were connected with
the central military telephone office so that all had the same
warnings and alarms. The signal Tuftgefahr was preparatory
warning and only on the further notice of Fliegeralarm did work
in the factories stop. The approximate time lost for each factory
U.S.Bombing 471
Survey
Sichel u Cie G. m. b. H.
This is merely a warehouse handling plates, bars and other
rolling mill products. Employees, exclusive office force, 8 to 10
men who handled 4 5 tons a day, valued at from 45,000 M. Loss
due to alerts inconsiderable.
Johann Schmahl, Mainz-Mombach
Personnel: 150, chiefly men.
Product: 32 tons per month of light gauge locomotive bodies
without driving mechanism; wheels for same, 100,OOO M per mo.
Loss about 1-2 tons, &15,000 M, including wages.
Insurance: 1 million M premium 1300 per year. No special
protection.
Verein fur Chem. lndustrie. Chemische Fabrik, Mainz
Personnel: 25 men and women, including 50 prisoners of war.
Product per day: 500 kg. of “dope” for airplane linen, value
10,000 M.
Loss, including wages: 50 kg., value 14,000 M.
Factory was insured but amount not known as policy kept at
main office of the “Verein” in Germany. No special protection,
but the City of Mainz installed the siren used for warning the
suburb of Mombach, in this factory. It was stated that employees
considered alarms a joke.
Munitionsanstalt, Maim
Personnel: 1,000 women, 50 men.
Product: (this was a government arsenal, so no prices for
cartridges can be given) 300,000 small arms cartridges assembled
only in 24 hours.
Pay of employees, basis of 9 hour day:
500 women 5.95
50 men 7.02
400 women 5.95 & bonus of 10 pf hr. extra for night work.
Loss due to alerts: about 6,500 M in wages, 300,000 cartridges.
Herr Hasselmann stated that the plant had about 100 women
on the sick list, due to poor food, nervousness over air alerts,
and other causes.
During alerts the employees went to one of the neighboring
forts. A bomb struck this but appears to have been a “dud”, for
I was assured that the hole made in the ground was barely
noticeable.
No insurance or protection.
474 U.S.Air Service
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-55-
Frankfurt
Frankfurt-am-Main, a commercial and industrial city of more
than 400,000 people, presented a number of good targets for
Allied bombers.
Number of Raids: 9
Number of Bombs: 108
Total Amount of Damage: 1,750,000 Marks
Expenditures for Protection: 75,000 Marks
The city of Frankfurt A.M. at the time investigated was not
occupied by any Allied troops and for that reason there was
nothing to compel the authorities morally or physically to give
any information concerning air raids, so that a report is
necessarily limited to that information given freely in response to
questions.
The city was protected by anti-aircraft guns and searchlights,
but all this information is in the hands of German military
.
authorities . . .
There were nine actual raids, the number of alerts must have
been at least equal to those of the suburb of Hochst which
totaled almost 100.
U.S.Bombing 475
Survey
-56-
Wiesbaden
Number of Raids: 1
Total Amount of Damage: 1,250,000 Marks
Number Killed 14
The city of Wiesbaden is purely a residential place and no
Allied air raids were expected on it, however, as a measure of
safety and for the popular morale one anti-aircraft battery was
located near the city under the direction of the military
authorities at Mainz. Also cellars were marked for protection but
no money was paid by the city for reinforcing them.
During alerts all business in the town stopped but I was
unable to get a list of these alerts or the total length of time
they lasted. From the position of the city with regard to Mainz
and Frankfurt a.m. I think there were probably between 25 and
35 alerts, but it was said that the people were little affected by
planes overhead for they did not expect any bombs to be
dropped.
The one raid took place on October 23, 1918. Serious damage
was caused by only one which fell in Riehlstrasse . . . . The
damage done to certain houses totaled 693,900 M, added to
which was other damage caused by splinters, etc. totaling
556,000 M., the entire damage amounted to about 1,250,000 M.
In this raid, 14 people were killed and 20 more or less seriously
wounded.
As stated above Wiesbaden is not a manufacturing city, there
are no factories nearer than the cemeht mills at Biebrich and the
factories of Mainz.
Railroads. Trains did not stop running during alarms. It was
planned that if an attack actually took place on the station all
trains should stop running, but this never occurred.
When an alarm was given all electric lights were extinguished
and passengers in the station went to the cellars. All those
U.S.Bombing 477
Survey
whose train was in got aboard and pulled out so it was affirmed
practically on time.
No special crews were kept on hand in case rails should be
damaged.
-57-
Coblenz
Targets for Allied raids on Coblenz (Coblence), a city of more
than 50,000 people, situated at the influx of the Moselle into the
Rhine River, were railroads, barracks, and factories.
Number of Raids: 7
Number of Alerts: 37
Time Lost through Raids and Alerts: 36 hrs. 42 min.
Number of bombs recorded: 110
w-7- r
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--IF
482 U.S. Air Service
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raids on the Rhine provinces did help bring the war to and end,
not directly, but it was the means of carrying the war to the
people in power.
............................................................
-58-
Bonn
The only attack on Bonn was made by six D.H.4's of the Inde-
pendent Air Force which, because of bad weather, were diverted
from their assigned target at Cologne.
A report on the results on production of war material in Bonn
of Allied bombing is not very extensive, for the reason that there
are very few factories in town. About ten years or more ago, an
ordinance was passed prohibiting further building of factories
within some five kilometers of the city limits and when asked as
to the factories of Bonn the universal answer is that the principal
factories are at Siegburg and Troisdorfa . . . .
The only raid on the city took place at 3.25 p.m. on October
31, 1918 when 10 bombs were dropped. . . . 25 people were
killed or died of injuries and 37 were injured. No bombs fell in
the neighborhood of any factory.
In the early part of the war there had been anti-aircraft
batteries and searchlights for the protection of the city, but at
the time of the raid there were merely sirens and signal bombs
to warn the population.
The warning was given from Siegburg and Troisdorf and the
sirens sounded from a central switchboard in police
headquarters.
All business and street car traffic was ,suspended during alerts.
A list of the alerts for the town is given on the attached list.
The morale of the population does not appear to have been
affected until after the first raid which was only eleven days
before the Armistice. As may be noted from one of the red
posters, the people would not take shelter during alerts and an
example of what resulted from this lack of caution in Cologne is
given.
Railroads. One bomb on Oct. 31, 1918 fell on the.railroad but
buried itself in the ground between two ties without exploding.
Trains were able to run without interruption and the slight
damage was repaired by the regular yard crew at odd times. No
crews were kept specially to repair damage by bombs.
U.S.Bombing 483
Survey
-59-
T roisdo ti
-.
i
I
-60-
Cologne
Number of Raids: 4
Number of Bombs: 38
Total Amount of Damage: 872,000 marks
Loss of Production: 138,500 marks
Cost of Protection: 10,200 marks
............................................................
U.S. Bombing 485
Survey
There were four actual air raids on Cologne; during the 4th,
only one bomb was dropped and the damage was insignificant. . . .
The 10 bombs dropped during the first raid fell in Deutz, on the
east bank of the river, and a lumber pile was burned. . . . This
was March 25, 1918.
In the second raid, May 18, 1918, carried out in broad
daylight, 43 people were killed and 55 wounded; 38 buildings
damaged. The estimated loss was about 340,000 Mks . . . .
In the third raid, Aug. 22, 1918, 6 people were killed and 10
wounded, 22 buildings damaged; loss 477,000 Mks.
Sept. 16, 1918. None killed or injured, damage to the extent of
55,000 Mks., chiefly windows broken by concussion.
Cologne was protected by anti-aircraft guns, home defence
flight (apparently demanded by the people after the raid on May
18), and searchlights. Concerning these military questions,
information has been asked from Frankfurt and will be forwarded
later. The raid on May 18 was entirely a surprise and after it the
commandant of the defences was dismissed for not being
prepared.
Insurance rates were not raised by bombing, but a special
policy was offered as follows:
2 Mks. per 1,OOO Mks. for Life.
1 Mk. per 1,000 Mks. for Real Estate.
1/2 Mk. per 1,OOO Mks. for Personal Property.
It appears that after the first raid, however, more insurance than
usual was taken out.
The moral effect on the people was rather insignificant. I am
informed that even before May 18, the better classes were
against bombing of the cities of the Allies; after that date the
feeling became more widespread. It seems, however, that the
people were in general quite stoical, the feeling being that
Cologne was a fortified city and the Allies had a right to bomb
it. After the first raid, the people became quite resigned.
The one day raid on Cologne did not do most damage though
more people were killed on account of being in the streets.
There were not enough attacks to warrant a generalization as to
whether day or night raids did most damage. Moral effects, no
difference.
. . . . All work and trade stopped during entire alert. It seems
that Allied Commissions are covering or have covered the entire
subject of the amounts of business done in Cologne and
surroundings; if a part equal to the length of time air alerts were
taken, a fair estimate of the loss in production and business
could be gotten.
Notes on factories making war material shut down during
alerts.b In the first place it may be noted that no bombs were
486 U.S. Air Service
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Duren
the sirens were not sounded, work did not stop, and the
population in general was not warned. At the Alarm signal, all
work stopped, the street cars stopped running and the people
took shelter.
............................................................
-62-
Morhange
men and wounding slightly about six. Repair of tracks lasted until
next morning. Two trains were delayed about 1% hours. These
trains and all the others which arrived later on were switched
around to another track until 8:OO A.M., when tracks were
repaired and trains took up the direct route once more. No
congestion occurred however. Soldiers were employed for the
repair of the tracks. The total damage to the station amounted
to about 90,000 francs, including fourgon and damage to car.
This bombing also lowered the morale of the employees
considerably. Employees living in vicinity of station abandoned
their homes soon after. The morale wgs quite low after July, thus
resulting in an average bonus of 60 marks per month to each
employee for the months of July and August. There are 65
employees at the station. There is one dugout at the station
which was built in 1915.
On Nov. 10, 1918, at 1:30 P.M. and 4:45 P.M., several bombs
were dropped near the railway but no damage was done.
Morhange (City). In 1915, 14 bombs hit the military barracks,
damaging one of them very badly and in 1917, about the month
of August, several bombs fell behind the military hospital, just in
front of the munitions depot, but no damage was done.
On the night of Sept. 3-4, 1918, at 11:30 P.M., the alarm was
given, which was followed immediately by a raid, lasting ten
minutes. Four bombs of large calibre were dropped on the Rue
de la Gare and one direct hit was obtained on a house in the
same street, destroying it completely. Damage amounted to
about 15,000 francs. . . .
Morhange Airdrome. Beginning with the month of July, 1918,
the airdrome has been bombed almost every day and night, and
sometimes twice per day. Most of the bombs fell on the
airdrome (making numerous bomb holes), in vicinity of airdrome,
near the Tuileries (100 meters from airdrome), in the woods,
etc., and a few direct hits were obtained on hangars and
machines. The total number of airplanes destroyed and injured
during the period of the war was 40, about 12 of them being
damaged while landing on account of bomb holes on the
airdrome. These machines were replaced in from one to two
weeks. A total of 5 hangars damaged and one burnt down.
Hangars were repaired at once with the exception of three which
were repaired a few days later by a special crew of Prussian
civilians employed for that purpose. These civilians would go
from one airdrome to another making repairs. Also one anti-
aircraft gun and one machine gun were destroyed.
The morale of the aviators and personnel was affected to a
great extent and hindered considerably the progress of their
US.Bombing 489
Survey
-63-
Buhl Aerodrome
1918
July 8 400 pm-410 10 min. 40-50 bombs dropped.
Aug. 7 4:OO pm-410 10 min. 1 hangar hit; 2 planes damaged; 1 bomb hit
concrete hangar, destroyed 2 planes . . . .
Planes replaced next day."
Aug. 14 1O:OO pm-2:00 am 4 hrs. 100 bombs dropped. Large hangar slightly
damaged; 4 killed.
Aug. 23 7:30 am-7:38 8 min. 14 planes participated; no damage.b
2 hrs. 32 ,, 3, 3, ,, $9 99
Sept. 2 10:00 am-12:00
5:OO pm-5:30 30 min. 3 hangars completely destroyed; 1 killed; 1
wounded.
Sept. 5 930 am-9:45 15 min. 12 planes participated; bombs dropped in field.
Sept. 30 12:30 am-1:30 1 hr. 4 houses in village destroyed by fire. . . . 1
hangar set on fire.
-64-
Airdrome at Boulay
Destruction of Gasoline Depot: 1,000,OOOmarks
Damage to Town: 250,000 marks
Note: Full information on the damage resulting to airplanes
and hangars is unavailable, due to the fact that it was taken
away or destroyed by the retreating Germans.
-65-
Airdrome at Folpersweiler
Thirteen machines were found destroyed, still on the airdrome.
six of these appeared to have been destroyed by the Germans
since the Armistice.
Note: Full information on the damage to airplanes and hangars
was not available, due to the fact that it was taken away or
destroyed by the retreating Germans.
-66-
Airdrome at Friesdorf
Number of Airplanes Destroyed or Damaged: 13
Number of Hangars Damaged 3
Note: Full information on the damage resulting to airplanes
and hangars is unavailable, due to the fact that it was taken
away or destroyed by the retreating Germans.
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF RAIDS P
No. No. MaterialCost of Bonuses Loss of Extra Working
8
of of Damage Protection Paid Production Expenses Hours
City Raids Alerts Marks Marks Marks Marks Marks Lost Killed Wounded Remarks
AthUS 8 ? 419,000 ? 0 ? 0 0 1 1
BenSdOIf 15 ? ? ? 0 0 0 ? ? ? Verylittledamage.Hitraihuaytrackstwice.
Bonn 1 16 ? ? 0 0 0 10-1/2 30 55
hkY ? ? 1,250,OOo ? 0 0 0 ? ? ? OneofmostimportantGermanairdromes.
Aerial photos shows considerable
damage not included in damage given.
Records destroyed.
BOUS ? 301 8,621 ? ? 7,500,000 0 454 ? ? Loss of production, 9437 tons of iron.
BouzonviUe ? ? 0 12,000 0 36o .
m 0 ? 0 0 Loss of production, 900 tons of iron.
Breback 5 ? 69,256 250,000 0 ? 0 ? 10 0
BUhl 7 ? 205,000 100,000 0 0 0 ? 5 1
Burbach 13 ? 486,100 100,000 0 ? 0 ? ? ?
Cobknz 7 37 473,946 319,872 0 0 0 36-l/2 18 87
Cologne 4 20 872,000 10,2iXI 0 138,500 0 18 49 65
Conflans ? ? ? ? ? ? 0 ? ? ? Considerable damage done by US. Sqs.
Co. of 250 men and 100 c i v i l i s kept on
hand to repair damage. AU records
taken by Germans. Town later under
artillery fire.
cow ? ? 71,501 0 0 0 0 ? ? ?
h Y ? ? 2,960 0 0 0 0 ? ? ?
AS ? ? 33,333 1,600 0 0 ? ? ?
Gorze ? ? 24,000 0 0 0 0 ? ? ?
Nweant ? ? 56,000 0 0 0 0 ? ? ?
Redly ? ? 28,sOO 4,800 0 0 0 ? ? ?
BayonviUe ? ? 28,000 0 0 0 0 ? ? ?
AMVille ? ? 46,400 0 0 0 0 ? ? ?
Courcelles ? ? 59,445 184,000 0 0 -0 ? ? ?
Dieuze 14 ? 18,270 ? 0 0 0 ? 3 2
Differdange 39 309 820,630 501.883 0 8,350,000 0 ? ? ? Loss in production, 16,770 tons of iron.
DiUingen 62 89 296,881 150,000 0 ? 0 90-1/2 ? ?
Dommary-Baroncourt ? ? 310,000 ? 0 0 0 ? ? ?
Dudebnge ? ? 41,418 158,599 52,466 ? 365% ? ? ? Extra cost, charging furnaces with
supplementary coke.
Duren 1 3 4 539 453500 0 114,095 0 33 16 18 5;
Ehrans 9 ? 127,225 62,ZCKl 0 7,000 410,000 ? 3 0 Ry. had crew of 100 men at cost of 1000
marks per day. AU others called out during ED
raids received 50% increase in pay. $7
CaF
Esch 43 263 1,348,709 320,347 0 9,871,690 54,406 282 ? ? Extra cost, extra consumption of raw
e E 3.
material.
eh
No.
of
No.Material Cost of
Damage Protection
of
Bonuses Lcss of Extra Working
Paid Production Expenses Hours
pc
City Raids Alerts Marks Marks Marks Marks Marks Lost Killed Wounded Remarks z p
FrieSdOli
Frankfort
? ? 526,000
9 8 9 1,752,000 75,000
? 0
0
0
?
0
0 84
? ? ?
22 56 Information on Frankfort not complete.
s.”Ep
3
Hochstz 0 9 8 0 435.145 2,290 5,848,173 0 a4 0 0 3
a
Hasondam 33 266 ? ? ? ? ? 416-l/2 ? ? Considerable damage done. See detailed 0
report.
Hayam ? ? 9
2m m,794 3
69m 1,283,900 856,625 ? ? ? Extra cost, extra heating and maintenance
of furnaces due to neglect.
Homecourt ? ?
12,000 ? 0 0 0 ? ? ?
Jouef ? ?
%,000 0 0 0 0 ? ? ?
Auboue ? ?
333,333 0 0 ? 0 ? ? ?
Herning l ? 614,800 ? ? 15,360 0 48 ? ?
Kaiserrbutem 7 6 5 1,850,600 10,000 0 387,990 0 45 12 22
Karkruhe ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 164 326 No other data available.
Karthaus
corn
Wasserlich 7 ? 61,216 17,250 152,000 ? 0 ? 7 0
Merzlich
Oberemmel
Kreumald 7 ? 80,000 10,000 0 10,000 0 ? ? ?
Landau 3 ? 310,809 0 0 0 0 ? 3 0
Longuyon 18 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? SeereportonLonguyon.
Ludwigshafen 22 25 2,333,947 2,450,536 0 3,299,198 1,607,000 34 33 53 Extra expense, amount paid to wounded
and dependents of those killed.
Luxembourg 17 ? 26,845 ? 0 0 0 ? ? ?
Hdlerichs 19 ? 699,942 300,ooo 0 0 91,250 ? ? ? Extra cost, Ry. had crew of 50 men who
repaired damage in HoUerich and
Luxembourg.
Maizieres 17 ? 62,009 0 0 0 0 ? ? ?
Mars-la-Tour ? ? =4,000 ? 0 0 0 ? ? ?
Mayence 2 ? 1,871 40,998 0 365,300 0 18-l/2 0 0
MerZig l ? 22,600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Metz 9 2 ? 1,400,718 ? 2,880 ? 1,620,000 98 82 290 Extra cost, Ry. had 450 men to repair
damage. Material damage includes only that
done to Ry. See map of Metz for bombs
dropped in city. Number of hours lost
includes raids only.
Montmedy ? ? 8cwoo ? 0 0 720,000 ? ? ? Extra cost, Ry. had 400 men to repair
damage. Damage does not include Ry. or
city.
Morhange ? ? 1,659,400 ? 1,450 0 0 ? 5 0 ?
Neunkirchen 3 ? 300,000 150,000 0 2,137W 0 250 ? ?
Pirmasens P
(0
0
STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF RAIDS (Cont’d) P
(D
P
No. No.
Material Cost of Bonuses Loss of Extra Working
of of Damage Protection Paid Production Expenses Hours
City Raids Alerts Marks Marks Marks Marks Marks Lost Killed Wounded Remarks
Rdnge
Rombas 33 ? 368,837 391,509 1,162,497 5,495,316 0 ? 0 0
R u m e l i and
9 186 1.230 26,500 0 1,693,000 0 ? ? ?
Oettlingen
Saarbrucken 24 ? 2,987,650 ? 0 ? 0 ? 59 162
Sarralbe 1 ? 7,040 0 0 ? 0 ? 0 0
SaarbUrg 5 ? 70,000 ? ? ? 0 ? ? ?
Riedii 4 ? 27,000 ? ? ? 0 ? ? ?
St. Avold 3 ? 4,800 ? ? 0 0 ? ? ?
St. *I 2 6 see 20,000 0 see 0 ? 0 0 With exception of protection, information
remarks remarks not considered reliable.
SPWm 1 ? 29,281 ? 0 ? 0 ? 0 0
Thionville 61 ? 5,810,029 1,388,120 1,076,555 7,000,000 135,766 321 29 55 Extra expense, consumption of raw
See material (extra). No data on loss of
remarks production but 7,000,000is a low estimate.
Treves 20 120 1,707,376 253,311 1,344,000 1,113,401 2,191,000 76 21 47 Extra expense, special crews. Damage
does not include amount paid by insurance
cost to 864 people.
Troisdorf 0 25 0 174,000 0 974,800 0 19-1/4 0 0
uckange 6 23 78,611 79,650 50,000 ? 0 415-1/2 0 0
VO.2lklii 8 328 1,261,500 457,719 ? 15,550,500 153,844 ? ? ? Extra, faulty products.
Wadgassen ? ? 3,000 ? 0 48,000 0 10 0 0
Wiesbaden 1 30 1,250,000 0 0 0 0 ? 14 20
worn 3 ? 120,300 ? 0 0 0 ? ? ?
Zweibrucken 5 201 86,041 15,514 0 ? 80,262 109-1/4 ? ? Extra cost, loss in salaries due to raids
and alerts.
Total 685 2,570 35,449,190 9,141,049 4,213,371 71,563,723 7,956,751 2,952-1/2 641 1,262
80 citied 53,000,000 home defense flights.
23,425,480 balloon barrages.
85,566,529 Total
Narrative Summary1
............................................................
Material Damage
The material damage, as recorded in 66 of the 140 cities,
amounted to 35,449,190marks but this should not be taken as
all of the damage done in the 66 cities because in some cases
records had been kept of only a part of the damage. For
example, the damage done in Boulay includes only that done to
the city and to the gasoline depot, while aerial photographs show
that considerable damage was done to the airdrome which was
one of the most important German airdromes on that front. A
fair opinion may be formed of the damage done in cities where it
was impossible to obtain an estimate in money by reading the
detailed reports on Longuyon and Hagondange because the
records in these two cities did show the kind of damage done in
each raid.
Then, there are cities such as Karlsruhe, Freibourg, Offenburg,
Stuttgart, and Mannheim on the eastern side of the Rhine which
could not be covered because the German authorities refused to
give the American officers permission to enter them. One of the
American officers was taken to Karlsruhe by a French officer to
obtain permission from the German authorities to carry the
investigation into that city, and although permission was refused,
succeeded in seeing the city mayor who stated that 164 people
had been killed and 326 wounded by bombs.
Cost of Protection
The cost of protection as recorded in 36 cities amounted to
9,141,049marks, which includes the expense of railroads, cities,
and industrial concerns. To this should be added the amounts
expended by individuals, by the military authorities, and the
amounts that will be spent in tearing down shelters and other
protection for which there will be no further use. Many
individuals walled in their windows and built small shelters in
their basements and small retail stores furnished some protection
for their employees. The military authorities probably expended
the largest amount of money for protection. Almost every city of
any importance was protected by anti-aircraft artillery, and some
were protected by balloon barrages and home defence flights.
The Germans had 11 home defence flights of 10 machines each
along the Rhme Valley prior to June 1, 1918,and during the first
part of June increased the number of flights to 17 and the
strength of a flibt to 14 machines. The original cost plus the
expense of maintaining these air units amounted to 53,000,000
496 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
Conclusion
The following points should be considered
First: that the following amount of damage was caused by
bombing:
Direct:
Killed 641
Wounded 1262
marks
Material damage 35,449,190
Cost of Protection 85.566.529
Bonuses Paid 41213;371
Extra costs 7,956,751
Total 133,185,841
Indirect
Loss of Production 71,563,723
Total direct and indirect as
far as has been ascertained 204,749,564
like some other late additions, were not entered into the index.
Consequently, there was nothing to call the researcher’satten-
tion to the presence of the survey as part of “Gorrell’s History,”
which over the years has been the principal source of documen-
tary information about the Air Service, AEF, in World War I.
506 U.S.Air Service
in World War I
Vol. N
507
Appenbix A:
Tubles oc Ongunization
- I
I UNITS
-11 *
m
REMARKS
t
L
a
0
- ~ ~ .~
Brigadier Canaral............. *I
I I
-
3 I f 1 2 Clerks, I telephonist,
10 Total Cornlssimed ....... 131
301
-
8 1510 2 notorcycle riders.
II Field C l e r k s .................. -- , ! 3 1-
,llgl 1 telephonist and 4
general utility.
12
13
Postal & m t s .................
Uloter E l e c t r i c l m s ...........
--35 49
I h l m i n t a i n d by om of the
rquadmm.
kl For Brlg&je Headqur-
ten.
I4 ordnance sergeants............ nl Clerks.
15 Sergeants 1st Class........... 175 207 nJ Nm-flyers. -r
16 Mess sergeant............... .. 15 10 possible these p o s i t i m s
17 sergeants. .................... I44 IQZ w i l l ba f i l l e d by former
18 Corporals... .................
; 245 21 I p i l o t s o r observers *ho
19 Chauffeurs, 1st Class......... 140 90 are unfit by reason of
20 chauffeurs .................... 251 I47 d i s a b i l i t y for service
21 cooks......................... 51 63 f l y i n g but *ho pssess
22 mlers ....................... 30 m the necessary tectnical
23 Privates, 1st Class........... 527 31 I qualifications.
24 Privates ...................... 1067 491 p l wt be a p i l o t and ac-
t i v e flyer.
25 Total E n l i s t e l........... -
2681 11 Size varies w i t h type
m & g r e p t e ................
-
m 12
.nd q u n t i t y of grmnd
troops in the AT.
tl Balloon Officer.
* I A m w i t h pistol.
( 1 A m with rifle.
27 ) r r b u l u u n . rPtor
cars. vDtor
.............
................... 8 96
10 10
L I ~ M............
28 3 19 27 8 161
29 cars. -or. 18 9 3 30
30 WtorcJclOS with s i d c a r s
................... .... 2 P 232
18
53 81
9
P 41 I
30
31 3
ton...........
MOrCJclES
32 TNCb. -53 I 35 I72 &? 21 312
T m b . mtor.3 t0n.F. 1 . 0.
33
standard ....................
TNCIO. W O K Rapalr .......... 4
90 90 90
3 40 20 6 68 68
35 Trucks. mtor. I 1/2 ton
T w k . rator. Lighting
....... I
....... 24 I& 40 96 28 ?a2 x 2
36 6 I 7 7
37 Trucks. -or.
Tw+.
W o
Mor. W i o
..........
.......... 8 8 8
38 6 3 I 10 10
J9 T w b . M o r . Winch .......... 15 15 15
40 ~mb. Mor. T d r ......... I5 15 15
41 TniIers.3 ton ................
T r a l l m 3 . l 112 ton ............ 2 6 78. 39 12 I35 135
42 34 104 48 10 198
43
.
Tidl lers. I ton ................
T r a l l e n Kitchen. Rolling .... 20 182 91 27 Po
m4
2zQ
44 2 20 I5 10 3 30 30
45 Trailers. Rat0............... 8 8 8
46 Trailers. Rldio............... 6 3 1 10 10
47 Tnilers. yhter. Tank .......... I5 15 15
48 Alrpl slras .....................
8 a l l a n S......................
4t9 uo ZB 76 749 149
49 15 15
Pistols.......................
15
50 13 30 I372 248 454 I97 2314 57 I 2929
51 R i f l e s ........................ 18 29* 3240 2554 15% 464 8136 81%
52 Rifles. Autamtic ............. I§ 15 15
9 Uns. w h i n e . M i a i r c r a f t -
n a n t s...................... 90 90 90
54 Urn. w h i n e . S y r r n m i z d.... 8 924 483 158 I578 1578
Urn. &him. Flerible....... 8 I I
55
.8 924
. 4 I58 lla?
.
. .
1 la?
CORPS A I R SERVICES ( * I
6 1 7 1 a 1 9 I 10
Attached
-B
U I ITS a a
I L
a
Y -
.-
a
Y
m
" , *I
- -
L
- Y
*e
m
.........................
I
2 Colonel *I 3 la) I adjutant Inas
3 Lleutemnt Colonel.............. I 0 flyer], I operatla0
4 Mjors...............
Captains........................
........... 1~*3.m
3
l4
I
25
0 officer I p i l o t l , I
for paprolls lnon-
5
6 1st Lieutenants
2nd Lieutenants
.................
.................
*IbP 79
37
I 101
61
flyerl.
I b l Assistant t o opera-
7
8 Chaplain*. ...................... 2 t i o m Officer.
10
Total Camissiaad.........
82'
134
15 12 29
- I I I
-I92
29
( C I I as n g i m n t a l Mr-
geant m j o r and I
for pay-ml lo.
I d I 2 for pay-r~lls and
I1 Ordnance Sergeants.............. 3 I clerk.
I2 Sergeants, 1st Class ............ SI 68 48 I27 183 I f 1 I c l e r k and I for
13 Mess Sergeants.................. 3 5 8 4 pay-rol is.
14 Sergeants....................... S3d 116 48 87 I SB l g l 2 clerks and 2
15 corpora IS....................... $2' 14 ' 81 I57 I 2 161 mtor-cycle riders.
16 Chauffeurs, 1st Class........... $1 31 46 78 70 ( h l m i n t a i d by one of
17 Chauffeurs...................... $3 47 83 I33 I38 the sqdm i n the
18 cooks........................... 2' 19 17 38 33 wing.
19 Buglers.. ....................... *2 8 10 20 m I n ) wm-flyers. Menever
20 privates, 1st Class............. (4' 109 175 288 303 possible these
21 Privates........................ @ 150 355 x)9 5m positicns should be
f i l l e d by former
p i lots or &sewers
22 Total Enlisted............. 24 560 890 I474
-- I 1523
rrho a n unfit, by
23 Aggregate .................. 29 691 932 I€65 2 1715 w o n of disability,
f o r service f l y i n g
~nbdances,Motor...............
24
25 .....................
cars, w o r
Cars, W o r , Light .............. 2 14 6 22 23
I and **lo passess the
necessary technical
26 3 3 3 qua1 itiutiom.
21 rotorcycles, with SiOe-Cars..... 2
mtorcyclcs.....................
34 17 53 55 ( P ) ulrt be a P i l o t
28
29 rucks, Motor, 3 ............ton I 22
3 3
23
4
24
and act lve flyer.
IS1 Size varies with
M Truck, M o r 3 ton, F.W.D.
typc and quantity o f
standard......................
31 T r u c k , rotor, hpir
Trucks, M o r , I 1/2 ton
...........
........ 6
30 30
6
30
6
!yound troops i n the
corps.
32 I
33 Trucks, kctor, Llght ing ......... 28
I
16 45 45 l y l Includes 5 . t r a i l e r r ,
34 T r u c k , Motor, photo
Trucks, Motor, Fadio
............
............ I
I
I
I
I 1.1 A&
water tanks.
with pistol.
35
36
31
TtUks, W o r , Winch
Trucks, Motor, Tender
............
...........
I
5 5
I
5
I ( $ 1 Mmd w i t h r i f l e .
Y) Trailers. 3 ton
Trailers, I 1/2 tar
.................
............. I 12
5 5
13
5
I3
39
40
41
Trailers, I ton .................
Trailers, Kitchen, Rolling ......
I1
21
12
21
I3
27
42
43
Trailers, photo .................
TrnIIers, Fadlo.................
3
I
5 8
I
8
I
I
44 Airplanes.
681
......................
iocns........................
73
I
16 m
I
45 5 5
46 PlStOlS.... .................... 1
I8
I
5
Rifles..........................
210 81 302 2 319
41
48 Rlfles, Autmmtic
~ u m , =him$,
...............
Anti-rircnft'.. .
484 851
5
I353
5
i351
5
49
50 Gms, Whine, Synchmized .....
......... 6h 152
30 30
158
x)
1%
-
51 Guns, Lkhine, Flexible 6h 1%
-
158 158
OBSERVATION GROUP. A I R SERVICE
t P::
cm,
Attrchrd
j
UNITS v o a REMARKS
W Y 0
8
n Y
c
0
L' -
c
Y
0
*m
Lieutenant Colmel .............. la1 Mjutant.
kejors .......................... I b l I Engineer O f f i c e r
6 Captains ........................ and I Radioofficer.
1st Lieutenants...... ........... I *I I c l Acts as Group mra-
2nd Lieutenants ................. - -83 timWficerandflias
-
with Group (brmander.
Total Ccmnissioncd......... 4 I d ) Liaison Officer de-
7
-
3
-I t a i l e d fron the A r -
a m s t e r Elsctricians ............. 15 t i I lery.
9 Ordnance Serghants.............. *3 I f ) Lotorcycle Riders, 3
10
II
Sergsmts, 1st class ............
m s Sergeants..................
*19 I I d are f o r the mtorcy-
cles placed by the
12 sergeants.. ..................... 3 * b5 A i r Service a t the
.....................
1;
I3 Corporals.. 9 63 74 *9 disposal of the
I4 ChwffWrS, 1st Class........... I n 31 31 8. I. 0.
I5 Chauffeurs ...................... I 42 47 lgl sergeant MaJO'.
16 codrt........................... 19 I h l keintained by one o f
17 ELglers......................... *2 6 the Squadrons i n the
18 Privates, 1st Class ............. b2. 15 Group.
19 Privates ........................ (2 ' *27 I i 1 cnpess Officer.
,j I (he chauffeur of t h e
P .............
Total b l i s t e d mbulance.
k l hrpose of t h i s
21 Mgregate .................. 18 I 5 tiaison o f f i c e r is t o
improve the lvlovlcdge
22 mulance, l a t o r
:an, mtor
................
..................... 2 12 14
I
15
of the functioning o f
the A i r Service and
23
24 rrs, M o r , l i g h t .............. 3 3 3 the infantry with
otorc~cles,with Sidb-Cdrs..... 2 2 30 34 33 each othar.
B
26 Dto~ycles............ ......... 3 3 4 LI DraftsMn.
n "cks, m t o r 3 ton ............. I 21 22 23 m l Clerks.
28 rub, lator, Repair........... 6 6 6 n l N n f l y e r s . !M?emver
29 'tucks, m t o r I 112 ton ......... I 21 28 29 possible these mi-
' u k s , mtor, Lighting......... 1 1 I tiQnSshOuld b e f i lld
30
31 ' ~ k s Motor, , photo ............ 1 I 1 by f-r pilots or
32 .rucks, rator, Radio............ I I I ob~arvcrs*ho arc
33 'railers, 3 ton................. 12 12 12 unfit, by mason of
w 'railers, I 1/2 ton ............. I I 9 II 13 dlsabi Iity, f o r ser-
35 'railers, I tm ................. 21 n 21 vice flying, and rrho
36 'railers, Kitchen, R31 I ing...... 3 3 3 possess the naessary
31 'mi lcrs. photo... .............. I I I teclnical qua1 if i c e
38 'railers, W i o................. I I I t ions-
J9 iirplanes.. ..................... n 13 13 0 1 This transportation
40 listols......................... 12
6 31 168 210 2 212 is provided and m i n -
41 t i f l e s .......................... 462 466 4Ea tainsd by the M.T.S.
42 a, Machine, Synchrcmized..... 150 152 I 52 to the A i r Service
43 &#IS, Machine, Flexible......... 150 I52 152 but the A i r Service
wst p k e it at the
disposal of the
6.1.0. for disswnillb
t i o n of the infoma-
t i o n gained by the
Grwp. (Xauffcurs and
mtorcycle riders are
p m i d e d by the A i r
Service. 1% notes f
and q.1
PI hust be p i l d and ac-
t i v e flyer.
q l I i s for the &or
transportation a t t h e
disposal of the
B. I .O.
r l I telephonist.
sl NurDcr of squadrons
d e w u p nunber
and deploynat of di-
visions i n Anny Corps.
* I A n d with pistol.
- $ 1 A n d with r i f l e .
OBSERVATION SQUADRON. A I R SERVICE
-
I I 2 Y 5 1I 6 1I 7 II I 12
I FlIght
c
0-
-c
Y O
*+
a-
W L V
coo REMARKS
a aua
=.CU
-a=
-I--
01
2 Mjor .............................. I
3 Captains ............................ I 3 4
4 1st Lieutenants...... .............. 6d82~.
8 24 25
5 2nd Lieutenants...... .............. * " *2b"
-3p 3 9 12
7
Total Canissioned ............
waster Electricians.. ..............
- -' I 2
*5
-
II 12
=_ - --
% 42
5
I
( e l Armorers.
- 7 - 6) Arned with r i f l e . If
u,
BALLOON UIN6. A I R SERVICE
- 6 7
Lttrchri
-L m
U
a
Ro(uK3
- t
P 0
:
2 iolonel .................................................
Lieutenmt C o l m l
..................................... *I I I ( a ) Radio Officer.
3
4 Uajors .................................................
...............................................
'I
3
I
3
I
3
I f ) wing Headquarters u t i l i z e d t o connand a11 B a l l a n
Groups i n one A i r Brigade.
5
6
7
Captains
1st Lieutenrnts
2nd Lieutenarts
........................................
........................................
02
*I*
18
45
60
a,
46
60
3
60
iD
49
1.1 Armed w i t h pistol.
( ( 1 AM w i t h rlfle.
9
10
rcaster Elect r I c ians
...................................
.........................................
slgssnts, 1st class
36
175 I93
36
5ergeants ..............................................
II Uess Sargeats 15 I5
12
I3 zrporals ..............................................
c l a s ..................................
243
IU
245
147
245
nauffeun .............................................
14 :haffeurs, 1st 138 140 I40
15
m ..................................................
bgkn ................................................
books
249
m
251
51
251
51
................................................
17 30 D
m
18
19
Privates,
'rivates
1st Class
................................... t2
525
1065
527
1067 IW2
21 regngate
:am, m t o r
.........................................
............................................
-- 72 288)
P
23 ibtoreyclss, w i t h side cars
rwh, &tor, 3 ton F.D. w.
............................
................. 53
19
24
a rmooks,
Standard
................................
...................................
m t o q I 112 ton
90
49
a5 rrucks, &tor, Winch
.................................. I5
..................................
..............................
27 rrucooks, &tor, Tender I5
28 rrai Icn, Kitchen, Rol Iing I5
rrai Ian, m t e r Trrk
29
50 Ball- ...............................................
................................................
15
I5
$1
32
'istols
2iflss .................................................
.......................................
a(8
a64
33
-
34
3iflas a n m u t i c
I n s , w h i m , Inti-Aircraft m a t s .................... -
15
90
YLLooll GROUP. A I R SERVICE
- 1 t
I UllfS R W K S
- ...................................................
2
3
ujor
UptalM ................................................
.........................................
1
6
1.1
((1
A n n d with pistol.
A n a d with rifle.
4
5
1st Li.ut.nntS
.........................................
2nd L I . u t r n t S
i 16
-
P
m
9
...............................................
yasr Y r g M t S
srgomts
...............................................
5 5
48
...............................................
II Corporala 81
12
13
Chutfwn, 1st Cl-
Chmffeun -................................
...................................................
46
83
I4
I5
codg
mlen .................................................
.....................................
17
10
M
17 pr1vat.s ................................................
Privates, Iat Class 175
m
18 Totrl RIIstd .....................................
I9 mregate ..........................................
.....................................
1
m
21
C an , Lbtor, 7 Paas
Worwcles, wlth oldccars .............................
.................. 2 I5
P
23
Trucks, W r , 3 ton F. W. 0. Stadad
Tnclu, Lbtor, I 112 ton ................................
.................................... I 1
30
16
5
24
a
Trucks, W o r , winch
Trucks, *or, Tender ...................................
............................... I 5 1 5
z
.................................... I iI x
Trailers, Kitchm Rol Ilng 5
n
2E B.1 lmnr ................................................
T n i l a n , Y t e r Tank
.................................................
R i f l e s ..................................................
29 Pistols
P
31
32
R i f l a , htmatic
Guns, -him,
.......................................
hti-Aln&t ....................
BALLOON COMPANY, A I R SERVICE
I 2 5 2
00
Attachrd'
I un ITS REMARKS
-
2 taptain.. ............................................................
1st LieuteMnts ...................................................... *I Icl. Cbetver.
11. A M with pistol.
3
4 2nd Lieutenants ...................................................... 3e*4 1 0 Armed with r i f l e .
6
Total Cannissioned..............................................
1 I 2 9 Y 5 6 7 8 8 10 II 12
. Attrchrd
. c
.c .c
.
)
c
0
I UNITS
L
a
L
a
L
. .
.. .
0
0
.
w
cn
.
c
I
Hm cu
L0-W
22
- 0
0
.
a
0
.
.
c
a
a
L
f 11
.
. z
REMARKS
.................................... =
. +
. %' L a
L c
2
3
4
Colonel
Lieutenant Colonels
hejon ....................................
*I
.......................
..
I
3
10
i
3
10
....
I I i Adjutant. i Operation o f f i -
i for pay.mlIs
b l i regimental Sergeant mjor
.
.
5 Captains.................................. *3 42 46 3 49 and i f o r pay.rolls
A 1st Lieutemnts........................... I 237 241 9 3 3 ;m :I
7 2nd Lieuterants ........................... Ill I12 i12
Chaplains .................................
8
. . . . 2
2 nutorcycle riders .
Total Ccmmissioned................... 413 12 3 3 427 3 1 I telephonist and 4ge0eml
9
.
4
.
. .
. .
. . . ut i I i t y .
c _
.
42 P i s t o l s................................... II 14 630 6% I74 6 m
43 R i f l e s .................................... 21 I47 I452 1620 1622
44 Guns, hech ine, Synchmnized ............... 2h 4 456 4652 rn
. ................... . 46.2
45 Guns. Whine, Flexible
.
2h 4 495
7
462
.
ARMY OBSERVATIOW GROUP. A I R SERVICE
I I 6 6 7 8 e 1
10 I II 18
Attached
-s
Y
UllfS .
) REMARKS
I w
n
0
f
0
Y
B -
a.
c n Y
-
0
a c
Lieutenant Colonel
Majors
..............
.......................... 3
I
3
Cwtairs ........................
................. I 15
12 14
19 *I
15
IC)
kadio Officer.
Observer acts as group
1st Lieutenmts
Lieutenants ................. 95 31 3 operations officer and f l les
w i t h group C c n m n & r .
m Lbtonycles .....................
Lbtonycles, with side-cars
............
3
21
3
22
4
23
provided and maintaind by
the I* 1 . 5. t o the A. s.
n Trucks, Mtor, 3 ton
28 TNCkS, Motor, Repair ...........
........ I n
6 6
28
6
29
but the A 5. nust p k e it
at the dispddal of the
29
30
Trucks, Lbtor, I 112 ton
Trucks, (btor, Lighting .........
............
I I
I
I
I
a i. 0. for the dis+sni-
nation of tk infornation
31 ’
32
TruckS, mtor, photo
Trucks, Mtor, Radio ............
.................
I
12
1
I2
I
12
gained by the group. Chauf-
feurs and mtorcycle riders
33
34
Trai Iers, 3 ton
Trai Iers, I I12 ton .............
.................
I
n
9 II
27
13
27
are provided by the A. 5.
iS?e notes f and qi.
35
36
Trailers, I ton
Trailers, Photo
......
.................
Trai Iers, Kitchen, FBI I ing 3 3
I
3
I
I F ) wt be a p i l o t and active
flyer n+en necessary and
57
J6 Trailers, Ralie
Airplmes
.................
....................... Ih
1
12
I
13
I
13
practicable.
I q ) I is for the motor trans-
39
40 Pistols
Rifles
.........................
.......................... .....
6
4
16
2 168
462
210
48b
270
489
portat i w a t the dispossi
of the 8. I. 0.
41 [ r i I i s telephonist.
2h IM I52 I52
Guns, L k h i n , Synchmnized
42
43 Guns, Lgchlnc, Flexible ......... 2” I50 152 I52 I* I Armed w i t h pistnl.
I
I 2 8 6 1 r 1 8 8
UNITS REMARKS
2
3 Aggregate................... 30 162 43 I74 2227
F
24 m u ~ a r r a sw t o r ................ I
....................... I I I 3 3
25 an. rotor 2 1 4 1 24 I 27 27
26 Can. W o r Light ................ 9
21 rotorcycles. with r i d b c a r s...... 81
28 kmtorcycles...................... 9
29 Trucks. kmtor. 3 ton............. I 18 63 82 82
30 Trucks. rotor. Repair............ 18 20 20
. 31 lruc*s. mw. I 112 ton.......... 1; w SIS 96
............. ~
32
33
34
35
Trucks. rotor. Mi0
Trailers. 3 ton..................
Trailers. I 1/2 ton ..............
Trailers. I ton ..................
Trailers. Kitchen. Rol I ing.......
I i
I
3
17
10
I
3
36
30
81
9
3
39
48
91
10
I , "3
91
10
36
37 Trailers. Radio.................. 3 3 3
3a Airplanas ........................ 228 229 229
Pistols..........................
Ih
39 10 I5 429 454 1 74 628
so R i f l e s........................... 20 I47 1389 I556 15%
Guns. w h i m . Zynchroni zed......
41
42 Uns. w h i m . Flexible ..........
2h 4
4
474 4
m
4 . .483
IIOHOPUCE PURSUIT CROUP. A I R SERVICE
-
-
I
8 8 6 B
- 10
I s WITS *0 RUIKS
-
-
2 Lid- COIQII .................... *I*
m
U
8
I
-
a
m
a
-
I ( a ) I Adjutant and I -rations
3
4
mjon ................................
C p t a i n s .............................. * 2.I
3 3
II
Officer.
I b ) I €ngineer Officer and I Radio
1st Lieutenants .......................
I1
Officer.
znd Lieutenants .......................
5 27 29
5 55
-58 I f ) LbtorcycIe riders.
- -
I I 19) sergeant MJOT.
7 Total c l r i s s i m d ................ 3 I 3 90 97 102 Ihl Mintainbd by om of tb
s q d a d m n s i n the grarp.
...................
8
9
YIter Elutric
ordmt
iu4
s.nJ.mts ....................
ergcmts, 1st C1.u .................. I"
I I5
66
I5 15
3
68
I 11 canpsss Officer.
Ij) I chauffeur of th a&uIance.
Im) Clerks.
w scrpants ........................
10 67
II 3 3 3 i n ) )(on-flyen. mmwr possible
12 e r p m s ............................. 30 47 tbr positions s t w i d ba fil-
Corporals .............................
x)
I3 (2. 63 65 74 led by foonrar p i l o t s o r
I4 Oruffwrs, 1st Class ................ $2 24 a6 26 obsarven who am unfit, by
I5
16
chuffeur?r ............................
cooks ................................. r: 39
18
41
19
41
19
masm of d l s & l l i t y for ser-
vice flying end who possess tb
17 -1ers ...............................
Privates, 1st Clarr ...................
82 6
El
8 8
95
necessary technical -1
cat iom.
ifi-
Privates ..............................
18 t i (2' 91
I9 2' U I36 I44
-
im I p l YISt be p i l o t and e t i w flyer.
P
21
Total Enlistal ...................
~ ? e g a t e........................
7
10
I l l
I2 I
2 1 4 8 9
5 I 579
-
-
%I9
606
575
-
677
lrl I telephonist.
Annd with pistol.
1s) Armed with r i f l o .
*I-.
cur. mtor
mtor .....................
........................... 8
on.W r . Light ....................
...................:........
mtoreycla with sidcun ........... 3
23
Yllorc)r1a 3
T~UIB. a r . 3 ton .................. 21
-tor.
R\r(o.
. Rap.ir
Trucks. hetor 1 112 ton
.................
.............. m
6
-or.
~ r ~ k a .
3
Radio ..................
.......................
ton
1
12
ton ...................
Tnilon.
T n i l o n . 1 112 10
.......................
T n i l o n . I ton
............
27
3
.......................
T n i l o n . K i t c m . mlling
.............................
T n i Ion. Mio
m
1
...............................
Airplm
................................
Pistols
Ih
6 143
m m n i r d ...........
Rifla 4 463
m. Wine.
.
2’
.
158
WOHOPLACE PURSUIT SQUADRON. A I R SERVICE
-
- I a a 4
I
6 6
Onb F I I I
7 0
- I2
1
UllTS
.
$
Y
m
L
0
0 -
Y
i
- -
I-
-
IC)
6 Total C a n n i s s i m.................. 8 30 I I 31 tained by e of the flights.
_I
Id1 Radio nechanic and aperator.
7
8
9
w t e r Electricians ......................
Oldname Sergeants.......................
Sergeants, 1st class..................... 6
5
22
*I 77 P
l e l Armorers.
I f 1 I Electrician, I f i t t e r
(engine], I f i t t e r I m c h i n i s t l ,
10 Kss serge&stl ........................... I I I rigger, and I radio nechanic
II Sergeants......... ....................... 2 10 -5. 15 and operator.
I2 corporals..... ........................... 5 21 '3. 24 l g l Sergeant mjor.
13 Chauffeurs, 1st class .................... I 8 8 ( h l I Supply Sergeant and I t r r r k -
Chauffeurs ...............................
II :
14 3 13 I3 nester.
15 cook ..................................... 6 Iil Riggers (rated as aviation
16 &glen.. ................................ 2 mechanicians).
17 Privates, 1st Class ...................... 4 29 29 l j l Assistant t r u k m s t e r .
18 Privates ................................. -
I3
-
46 '
9 55 l k l I radio mechanic and oprator,
I f i t t e r lgenshl),and I rigger.
19
20
Total Enlisted......................
&gregate.................. .........
34
-
42
-
I63
I93
I L I I f i t t e r (gcnsrall, and I
f i t t e r lengine).
lm) Clerk.
- -
-
in1 Not-flyers. Whenever p s s i b l e
21 ars, motor.............................. 2 2 2 these positions s h w l d be
22 5rs. motor, l i g h t
wtorcycles with s i h r s
.......................
...............
I
2 2 I 3
I
7
I
7
f i Iled by fotwer p i lots *ho are
unfit, by reason of disability,
23
24 w t o n y c l cs ..............................
r m k s , mtor, 3 ton .....................
I
I 2 6
I
7
I
7
for service f l y i n g and who
possess the necessary technical
z3
26 rmks,mtor, Repair ..................... 2 2 2 qwlificatim.
- 21 Frucks, -or,
r r a i lers, 3 ton
I 112 ton.. ...............
..........................
3
2' 2
2 6 9
4
9
4
la) I G i m e r , I i r s t m t re-
pairer, and 2 radio mechanics.
28
29 rrailers, I 112 ton
rrnllers, I ton
......................
..........................
3
3 2 6
3
9
3
9
I p l Mlst be a p i l o t and active
flyer.
30
31 h i lers, Kitchen, Rolling ............... I I I ( q l I f i t t e r lgenernll, 2 f i t t e r s
32 ti r p l a m
Pistols
................................
..................................
I'
6 I8
7 7
8
8
24
24
25
44
25
63
(engine), and 2 riggers.
i r i 3 w t o r c y c l e riders and I clerk.
33
34 i i f l e s ................................... 3 m 34 icp I49 I49 I s 1 I k e t y l e n e e l d e r , 2 black-
35 hrs, LIYhlne, Syrchrmized .............. 2 2 16 48 52 52 smiths, 2 sailmakers, carpenter,
I i n s t m n t r e p i r e r , 2 rmtor-
cycle riders, and 3 radio
mechanics and operators.
I t 1 I F i t t e r Itumerl, I e l e c t r i -
cian, and 2 f i t t e r s (enginel.
lul Stor-.
Ivl I Coppersmith, I vulcanizer, I
i n s t r m n t repairer, and I
carpenter.
1w1 I instrynmt repairer, I copper-
smith, I carpenter, 2 riggers,
4 f i t t e r s (enginel, I motor-
cycle rider, and 3 f o r general
ut i I ity.
1x1 Acts both as squadrm ordnance
Officer and w h i n e gun
instmtor.
i y l I i s meter t r a i l e r .
1.1 Armed with pistol.
- -- I0 A m w i t h r i f l e .
DAY BOWBARDWENT SOUADRON. A I R SERVICE(A)
+- I
7 un I T S
'8 Y 6 6 7 10 II 12
REMARKS
2
3
4
5
6
Major
Captains
...........................
........................
1st Lieutanants .................
ha Lieutenants.................
Total Comnissimed.........
*IP
I
2V*53d
*P*8*4
I3
5
9
I
14
24
42 !
21
48
--p
-1" 28
la1 Adjutant.
I b ) I Engineer O f f i c e r and 1 Wdio
Officer.
( c I For squadron Cannander. mintained
by one of the f l i g h t s .
Id1 Observers.
( e l Amorers.
.............
7
9
9
10
II
t a s t e r Electricians
Ordnance Sergeants
Sergeants, 1st Class
Mss Sergaants
Sergeants
..............
............
..................
.......................
96'
(2L
6
2
19 I 5
22
( f l I electrician, I f i t t e r lenginel, I
f i t t e r [machinist), I rigger and i
radio mechanic and operator.
l g l Sergeant Major.
( h l I supply Sergeant and I truckmaster.
12 Corporals..... .................. (40 95q 5 24 I i I Riggers (rated as aviation mecha-
I3 Chauffeurs, 1st Class ........... $1 I n i c ians I .
14 Chauffeurs ...................... (4 (3 3 I3 IJ I ASS; stant truckmaster.
15 cooks........................... *I5 I k l 1 radio mchanic and operator, I
16 Buglers. ........................ f i t t e r [general I , I rigger.
17 Privates, 1st Class............. 04' (12' 29 29 [ L ) I f i t t e r (general], and I f i t t e r
18 Privates ........................ 92" (4" 39 45 '
9
. 54 lenginel.
[ml Clerk.
Total Enlisted.............
I
24 102 163 [ n l NaF-flyers. Whenever possible these
positions should be f i l l e d by former
20 Aggregate .................. 25 144 211 p i l o t s and Observers uho are unfit,
19 by reasm o f d i s a b i l i t y , f o r Service
21 cars, Motor ..................... 2 i flying, and who possess the neceb
22 cars, mtor, l i g h t .............. I I sary technical qualifications.
I O I I carpenter, I i n s t m t repairer
23 mtorcyclcs, with si-rs..... 2 2 I 1 3 7
24 mtorcyclcs. .................... I I a d h*o radio mechanics.
a Trucks, mtor, 3 ton.. .......... I 2 2 6 7 l p l mt be a p i l o t and active flyer.
is Trucks, -or, repir........... 2 2 I q ) I f i t t e r igeneratl, 2 f i t t e r s (en-
n Trucks, mtor, I 112 t m........ 3 2 2 6 9 giner and tu) riggers.
a Trailers, 3 ton................. 2y 2 4 I r l 3 notorcycle rider, and I clerk.
29 Trailers, I 112 tm............. 3 3 Is1 I acetylene welder, 2 blacksmiths,
M Trailers, I ton................. 3 2 2 6 E 2 sailmkers, I carpenter, 1 i n s t r l c
31 Trailers, Kitchen, Rolling ...... I l ment repairer, 2 notorcycle riders,
32 Airplanes. ...................... 8 8 24 25 and 3 radio mechanics and operators.
33 Pistols......................... 7 7 13 14 42 I% I t ) I f i t t e r (tbrner), I e l e c t r i c i a n and
R i f l e s.......................... 18 m 34 34 102 I49 2 f i t t e r s (enginel.
Guns, Machine, Synchronized.....
54
35 2 16 16 4a 52 l u l Storenen.
36 Guns, hechine, Flexible......... 2 16 16 4a 52 I V I I coppermith, I vulcanizer, I in-
stnment repairer and I carpenter.
I w l i i n s t m t repairer, I copper-
smith, I carpenter, 2 riggers, 4
f i t t e r s (engine), I notorcycle
rider, and 3 f o r general u t i l i t y .
1x1 Acts both as squadron ordnaree Of-
f i c e r and nuchine gun instructor.
1y1 I i s a t e r t r a i l e r .
i z I operations officer.
I A I The organization o f a nulti-engined
daylight squadron i s the sane as
the organization f o r t h i s squadrm,
except that the rider of obsewers
i s increased by 10 1st Lieutenants
and 12 2nd Lieutenants and the syn-
chronized m h i n e guns are Cbnged
to f l e x i b l e guns. This change i s
also carried into the organization
tables of the higher units.
101 Radio mechanic and operator.
I * ) Anned with pistol.
- -- I 0 Armed with r i f l e .
i
- I
- 3
M Y MUMADMEN1 GROUP. A I R SERVICE
6
-9
a 0
I UNITS REMARKS
-L cO
-4
04
f
0
0
&
f a
g3 n
0 t
a
-2 Lieutarant Colonel ............................
W (0
I
P
I la1 Adjutant.
3 Lbjors ........................................ 3 3 3 l b l I Engineer O f f i c e r a d I
4 Captains..... ................................. 9 I1 II R M i o Officer.
5 1st Lieutemnts ............................... *2' 51 54 I 56 Operat i m s o f f i c e r .
6 2nd Lieutenants ............................... *I ' 81 IZ? 85
CII
Trained as observer. F l l a
8
T o t a l Connlssioned .....................
m t e r Electrlcianr ...........................
- I !44.
15
151
15
I 4 1%
15
w i t h group connnder.
I f 1 M o r q c I e riders.
lgl S a w a n t Lbjor.
l h l Uintained by one of the
9 Ordnance seqeants.......... .................. 3 3 Squdrom i n the group.
10 scqennts, 1st Class.......................... €6 67 I 68 I i I Canpass officer.
II Laas SSrgefAnts.. .............................. 3 3 I j ) I chauffeur f o r antularre.
sergeants... ..................................
3
12 33 33 2 15 50 lrnl Clerhs.
13 CWpOMIS.. ................................... 63 66 9 74 l n l Nm-flyen. Whenever px-
I4 chuuffeun, 1st Class......................... b2 24 26 26 s i b l e these p s i t i o m
15 Chauffeun ....................................
16 Cook.. ....................................... !; 39
18
4
19
42
19
should be f l l l e d ' b y for-
nmr p i l o t s or otservers
17 Buglers....................................... 6 8 8 who are unfit, by reason
18 Privates, 1st C l a s s . . ......................... (2' a7 91 41i of d i s a b i l i t y f o r +crvice
Privates.. ....................................
95
I9 (4 I35 141 5 27 I73 f l y i n g who PQSCSS the
- -- -
necessary technical
P Total Enlisted ......................... 12.
13
463 510 I2 54 576 qua1 ificat iom.
l p ) Wt be a p i l o t and
21
ZZ
& g w t e . .............................
m u l a m e s , M o r.............................
- -
633
-- - €61 13
I
58 732
I
active flyer.
I r l I telephonist.
1.1 A n d w i t h pistol.
23 Cars. W o r ................................... 2 6 8 8 I 0 A n c d with r i f l e .
24 Can, M o r , Light ............................ 3 3 3
25 Ybtorcycles, w i t h sidacars ................... 2 21 23 23
m M O r C y c l e s . . . ................................ 3 3 3
n T r u c k , M o r , 3 t o n.......................... 21 21 21
28
29
Truck, M o r , Repair....... ..................
Trucks, M w , I 112 ton ......................
6 6 6
I 27 28 28
K) Truck, M o r , Lightlng....................... I 1 I
31
32
Truck, M o r , RMlo
Trallers, 3 ton
..........................
............................... I I I
12 I2 12
33 Trailers, I 1/2 ton ........................... I 9 10 10
34 Trailer, I ton ................................
Trai ten, Kitchen, Rol lhig .................... 27 27 n
z5 3 3 3
36 Tmllers, RMlo............................... I I I
37 A i r p l a m ..................................... A m 76
38 Pistols.. ..................................... 2 z55
Rifles ........................................
186 197 x)
39 II 447
Gum, m h i n e , Synchronized.. .................
464 464
40
-
I56 I58 158
Gum. W h i n e , Flexible.......................
41
- -
I% 158
-- 1%
A I R PARK, A I R SERVICE
I a 8 6 8
I UIITS REMARKS
*
8 5 l g l Sergeant *or.
9 Lbss sergeants............................... I l h l 4 engine stores; 4 a l r p l a n stores;
10 sergeants.................................... 9 10 7 general stores, 2 urpnten, 8
I1 Corpora Is.. .................................. t 1- I2 12 general u t i l i t y , 8 mtorcycie
I2 Chuffeurs, 1st Class ........................ II Ii riders, and I blacksmith.
13 Clauffeurs. .................................. 22 22 I l l Rigger.
14 coolo........................................ 4 A I j ) F i t t e r Igenerall.
8 q 10%. .....................................
15
16
17
Privates, 1st Class ..........................
Privates.. ...................................
2
34
54
I,: I k i I rigger and 2 f i t t e r s ~genenl).
11) I carpenter, I clerk, and I oail-
mkr.
I m l Clerks.
18 Total En1 Isted.. ...................... Ill 39 In) Nan-flyers. Whenawr possible thoe
pasitions w i l l be f i l l e d by fornar
19 Aggregate... .......................... 8 II 4 40 165 p i lots and obscwers *ho a n unfit,
by rea~mof dlsabllity, f w s e r -
cars, mot-.................................. I 4 4 vice flying and who possair the
2"
21 M o rc y c l e r, with sidbcars .................. 10 10 10 necessary technical q d l f i c a t i a a .
22 T m k , Motor, 3 ton
Truck, Motor, Rapair
.........................
........................
18 18
2
18
2
lo) 2 engine stores, 2 airplam stores,
3 general stores, 2 wireless stores,
23
24 T r u k , Motor, I if2 ton ..................... 12 I2 12 I plot0 stores, I talioan StolwS,
25 Trailers, 3 ton .............................. I' 3 3 I carpenter, 7 clerks, I gemral
26 Trallen, I 1/2 ta, .......................... 17 17 17 u t i l i t y , and 4 motwcycle riders.
27 Tnilers, I tm ..............................
Trailers, Kltchen, Rolling ...................
10
I
10
I
10
I
Iql I acetylene wlder, 2 carpanten,
5 sailnmkers, and I storumn.
28
29 Pistols ......................................
Rifles................ ....................... 8
106
I5
147
I5
147
IrJ I painter, 8 c a r p e n t e q I I sall-
nakao.
K,
31 Gua, Whine, Sycchmized 1') .............. 4 4 4 Is) Not all- wtmn ark serves
32 Gu-6, mchine, Flexible I * ) .................. 4 4 4 squadrons not equip@ with these.
l y l m t e r trailer.
I*) A m with pistol.
I 0 A m a d with rifle.
UI
Y
PHOTO SECTION. A I R SERVICE
-
- I 4 P
I UNITS REWNS
( b l Chief P l a t e Cedeloper.
Total Cannissioned ............................................ I
( d l I Chief DraftsMn, I Chief P r i n t e r and Enlarger, I Supply Sergeant.
4 Sergeant, ................................................
1st Class Ib (el I Cabinet maker, I Plate Developer, I Draftsman, 3 Printers, I P r i n t Oeveloper,
2 C m r a Repairs and Installation.
5 Sergeants .......................................................... 34
I f ] 2 Draftsnen, 3 P r i n t Developers, 2 Washing and Drying Plates, 4 Washing and
6 Corporals .......................................................... 9. Drying Prints, 2 &torcycle Riders, I P l a t e Dweloper, I Printer.
7 Chauffeur, ...............................................
1st Class I ( * I A l l anned w i t h pistols.
8 Chauffeur ........................................................... 1
Appenbix B: U n i t C o s t s
Estimated Costs
~ ~- ~
Spare Parts
Francs
Unit Price Total
Spares for 97 Breguet B2 Airplanes
with Renault 300 H.P. motors 33,270.58 3,227,266.06
Spares for 49 extra Renault 300
H.P. motors 7,082.41 347.038.09
3,574,304.15
Reduced to U.S.Currency
@ 5.45 $ 655,468.65
The above figures include the
French Government’s 5
percent Commission
.
Appendix B 537
Special Clothing
Francs
Unit Price Total
48 Boots, flying, fur-lined 47.25 2,267.00
48 Coats, pilot, general service 84.00 4,032.00
14 Gloves, flying, fur, 4
finger type 15.75 220.00
14 Gloves, flying, fur, 1
finger type 15.75 220.00
14 Gloves, flying, black leather,
4 finger type, detachable
knit lining 15.75 220.00
15 Gloves, flying, black leather,
1 finger type, detachable
knit lining 15.75 235.75
14 Goggles, type 1, Novial,
yellow glass 24.80 347.20
14 Goggles, type 2,supertough,
white glass 18.75 262.50
14 Goggles, type 2,supertough,
white glass with mask 24.80 347.20
15 Gogglettes #3, white glass 22.65 339.75
48 Hoods knitted 3.60 172.80
26 Helmets, hard leather 29.40 764.40
25 Helmets, soft leather,
fur-lined 24.95 618.75
48 Masks, face, soft leather 8.15 391.20
48 Scarfs, camels hair 6.60 316.80
26 SuitS, flying, one-piece,
fur-lined 136.50 3,549.00
25 Suits, flying, one piece, fur-
lined, electrically heated 215.25 5,381.25
48 Suits, one piece, summer 70.00 3,360.00
23,045.60
5 percent Commission to
French Government 1,152.28
Francs 24,197.88
Reduced to U.S.Currency
@ 5.45 $ 4,439.96
200 percent for replacement Total $ 13,319.88
538 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
Transporrtation Equipment
Unit Price Total
2 Cars Motor $2,500.00 5,000.00
1 Car Motor Light 800.00 800.00
7 Motorcycles with Sidecars 350.00 2,450.00
1 Motorcycle 300.00 300.00
7 Motor Trucks %ton 3,500.00 24,500.00
2 Motor Trucks, repair 6,000.00 12,000.00
9 Motor Trucks 1/2 ton 2,500.00 22,500.00
4 *Trailers %ton 1,025.00 4,100.00
3 Trailers 1-1/2 ton 425.00 1,275.00
9 Trailers 1-ton 400.00 3,600.00
1 Trailer kitchen rolling 600.00 600.00
$ 76,125.00
Replacements for 1 year on
the basis of 5 percent per
month of the cost of the
initial equipment 45,675.00
$121,800.00
Replacement of spares for 1
year on the basis of 2 per-
cent per month of the cost of
equipment 29,232.00
.L
Total $15 1,032.00
Oxygen Apparatus
Unit Price Total
97 Dreyer Oxygen Apparatus
complete with Y
connections and light
pressure tubing $ 150.00 $14,550.00
194 Small oxygen cylinders
with valves 7.24 1,404.56
194 Masks complete with low
pressure hose
connections 2.00 388.00
1Oxygen hand transfer pump 220.00 220.00
60 Large oxygen cylinders 26.55 1,593 .OO
97 Manifold connections 1.65 160.05
$18,315.61
Appendix B 539
Airplane Instruments
Francs
Unit Price Total
97 Sets Technical Instruinents 600.00 58,200.00
5% Commission to French
Government 2,910.00
Francs 61,110.00
Reduced to U.S.Currency
@ 5.45 $11,209.17
Ordnance Equipment
Individual Equipment of a Soldier
81 Belts Pistol model 1912
without ring 1.44 116.64
181 Cans Bacon .19 34.39
181 Cans Condiment .13 23.53
181 Cans Meat .41 74.21
181 Canteens .58 104.98
181 Canteens covers
dismounted .65 117.65
181 Cups .41 74.21
181 Forks .03 5.43
181 Haversacks 3.89 704.09
230 Helmets steel 5.00 1,150.00
81 Holsters Pistol model 1916 1.79 144.99
181 Knives .15 27.15
362 Magazine Pockets web
double 1.06 383.72
162 Magazines extra .50 81.00
181 Mess kits .71 128.51
181 Pack carriers .87 157.45
81 Pistols, caliber 45,
1911 model 14.75 1,194.75
181 Pouches for first aid pocket .18 32.58
181 Spoons .12 21.72
$4,577.02
20 percent for maintenance and
replacements 915.40
Total $5,492.42
540 US.Air Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
Ordnance Equipment
(Squadron Equipment)
24 Axes $ .65 $ 15.60
2 Bxs Cartridges, pistol, ball,
calibre. 45, model 1911,
2000 per box 48.20 %.40
5 Bxs, cartridges, rifle 46.80 234.00
1 Chest, arm repair,
1910 model, complete
with contents 56.23 56.23
1 Kit, pistol cleaning,
model 1912 6.80 6.80
1 Locker, arm for automatic
pistols, calibre .45, model
1911, capacity 50-arms 7.20 7.20
2 Outfits, marking, model of
1910, for stamping metal 5.27 10.54
149 Rifles 19.50 2,905.50
1 Stamp, seal 2.10 2.10
1 Stencils, personnel
equipment, model 1910,
Airplane Company 1.60 1.60
1 Stencil, Ord. Dept. Insigna 1.07 1.07
1 Stencil, outfits 2.33 2.33 '
$3,339.37
Add 20 percent for
maintenance and
replacement 667.87
TOTAL $4,007.24
Armament
Francs
Unit Price Total
101 Vickers Machine Guns 4,590.00 463,590.00
202 Lewis Machine Guns, Air
type 3,987.00 805,374.00
100 Rifles, Reserve Browning 687.00 68,700.00
100 Pistols, Signal 3 5 4 m 20.00 2,000.00
98 Bombs, offensive S & R
mark 5 687.00 67,326.00
100 Fixed machine gun sights
optical 90.00 9,000.00
100 Open ring and bead
sights 5" 40.00 4,000.00
Appendix B 541
Airplane Gasoline
Unit Price Total
886,950 Litres Gasoline, Airplane (18
motors operating an
average of 1-112hours a day
each and using 90 litres
of gasoline per motor per
hour-a total of 2430 litres
per day, or 886,950
litres in 365 days)
54,750 Litres Gasoline, Airplane for
mounting and trying
motors (estimated at 150
litres per day)
941,700Litres
or
248,797 Gallons $0.713 $177,392.26
5% Commission to French
Government 8.869.61
$186.261.87
Appendix B 543
Radio Equipment
Francs
Instruments Unit Price Total Total
18 Sets E8 Avion
Telephone and Tele-
graph complete, for
initial equipment 1,500.00 27,000.00
72 Sets J 3 Avion, Tele-
phone and Telegraph
complete, for replace-
ments (33 % replace-
ments per month) 1,500.00 108,000.00
1 Set E3 bis with ac-
cumulators, for initial
equipment 5,000.00 [?I
Aerial accumulator
accessories complete,
initial equipment 8,500.00
1 Set Accumulator
charging, with acces-
sories initial equip-
ment 4,000.00 4,000.00 147,500.00
Transportation
(a) 2 Trucks, Fiat, initial
equipment 20,000.00 40,000.00
(b) 1 Truck Crochat, initial
equipment 45,000.00 45,OOO.OO
85,oO0.00
Replacements figured
on basis of 5% per
month of initial cost
of equipment 51,000.00 51,000.00
136,000.00
Spares figures on
basis of 2% per
month of total cost
of equipment and
replacements 32,640.00 168,640.00
Workshop
1 Set, machine tools,
tools and testing
bench, initial equip-
ment 10,000.00 1o,OoO.00 1o,OoO.00
326,140.00
544 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
Vol. IV
5% Commission to
French
Government 16,307.00
Francs 342,447.00
Reduced to US.
Currency @ 5.45 $62,834.31
Fiat Truck for mount-
in4 E3 bis set
1 Fiat Truck for mount- ,
ing accumulator
charging set
(b) 1 Crochat Truck for
mounting workshop
and test bench
Gas Masks
Unit Price Total
230 Gas Masks $12.00 $2,760.00
Family Allotments
U.S.Currency
Unit Cost Total
57 Allotments $180.00 $10,260.00
Total
Summary: Rate Per Day for 1 Month
49 Officers $ 8.38 $ 410.62
181 Enlisted Men 1.468 265.70
$ 676.32
Notes
North Africa and in the French at a cost of about 143 “U” sets from the French.
European Theater of $6,000 each. 92. E-1, 88.
Operations in World War 11. c. A demountable building a. Trailing antenna of
82. (2-12, 339. of wooden framing and truss twisted copper wire (No. 28,
a. The group had been construction covered with wire 16-strand)300 meters long,
formed in April 1918, but an mesh and tar paper. with lead weights on the end.
armament officer was not then 87. A-15, 195. 93. N-17, 140.
authorized for group 88. E-1, 87. 94. E-8, 157.
headquarters. In fact, the 89. N-17, 137. a. Special helmets fitted
Tables of Organization of 15 90. E-8, 161. with receivers were provided
September 1917 and of 15 a. The Technical Section for pilots and observers. The
January 1918 showed no concluded that a porcelain or microphone, designed to
armament officers authorized stone insulated plug could not eliminate motor noise, was
below wing level for corps be used satisfactorily in the strapped around the neck so
observation. Ordnance Liberty engine and that plugs as to be in front of the
personnel for corps with mica insulation were mouth, almost touching the
observation groups and required. The best one for the lips, for talking, but could be
squadrons appeared in the Liberty, the Technical Section pushed aside when not in use.
new Tables of Organization believed, was the J.A. Moreau 95. A-15, 234.
that became effective on 8 (J.A.M.); the second best, the a. The Tables of
September 1918. Oleo 75 (Special for Liberty). Organization, 8 September
b. Bureau of Aircraft b. The first three were 1918, authorized a radio
Production, Air Service, U.S. American, the next three officer for observation group
Army, Handbook of Aircraft French. The editor has not headquarters, and a radio
Armament (Washington, been able to identify the other officer and eight enlisted men,
1918), is an excellent guide to two. including a master electrician,
the machine guns and other c. The gravity auxiliary for an observation squadron.
armament of the Air Service. tank was in the upper wing, 96. c-12, 339.
See also Benedict Crowell, center section. The Technical 97. L-3, 91.
America’s Munitions, 1917- Section’s modification of the a. See Vol I, this series.
1918 (Washington, 1919). DH-4 fuel system (see note b b. Ltr, Krumm to Maj.
83. E-8,153. to Document 3, above) Robert Loghry, O.I.C., Radio
a. See note 82a. included the removal of this Base Section, 14 Dec 18, in
84. N-17, 93. tank and the installation of a “Gorrell’s History,” L-3, 90.
85. N-17, 138. pressurized auxiliary tank c. Conclusions of
86. A-15, 86. under the pilot’s seat. American E. F. Radio
a. William Mitchell, 91. M-40, 2. This is from a Conference, in “Gorrell’s
Memoirs of World War I “Report on Radio Training in History,” L-3, 97.
(New York, 1960), p 242. the American E.F.” Hardinge 98. A-15, 160.
b. These demountable was director of radio schools 99. C-12, 342.
hangats, consisting of a frame- at the Second Aviation a. Air Service transporta-
work covered with canvas Instruction Center, as well as tion, previously exempt from
with a canvas drawcurtain at O.I.C.of the Training Section control by Motor Transport
one end, were about 65 feet of the Radio Division. Service (later, Motor
wide and 90 feet long. They a. The United States Transport Corps), came under
were purchased from the purchased 1,471 “Y”sets and MTS jurisdiction in May 1918.
Notes 555
t)e Moselle, opposite the been omitted, is a chart giving extracted (format changed)
town. data on traffic interruptions from a list of 48 raids and
c. Air raid pay. and damages resulting from alerts that appears in the
d. These raids were made 181 air raids or alerts. report.
by No. 55 Squadron of the 16. R-1, Rpt 37. 23. R-1, Rpt 2.
RAF, 11 D.H.43 attacking on a. The format for the 24. R-1, Rpt 59.
the 2d, and 12 on the 3d. data pertaining to 17 raids has a. The figures for
e. Six D.H.4‘s of been changed. “Material Damage Reported”
Squadron 55 and 12 D.H.9’s b. On the southwest side and “Total Damages” are
of Squadron 99, RAF. The of the city of Luxembourg. corrected figures shown on
objective had been the Bosche The report also contains a list the copy in “Gorrell’s
and Daimler works at of the 19 raids on Hollerich History,” R-1, the correction
Stuttgart, with munition works (23 August 1914 to 26 being the addition of the
at Oberndorf as the alternate September 1918). The list amount paid by insurance
target, but because of bad shows 17 people killed and 49 companies (421,456.31 marks)
weather the leader turned and wounded. to the amount of material
bombed Thionville. This attack 17. R-1, n. p. This report, damage reported. The report,
has been characterized as which is not numbered, in the following section which
“one of the most successful of appears just before the first of has been deleted, gives
its kind made by British the reports pertaining to the detailed breakdowns of both
aeroplanes in the war.” H. A. various towns. If numbered, it direct and indirect damages.
Jones, The War in the Air, would bring the total number b. Just east of Trier.
Vol VI (London, 1937), p 140. of reports to 66. c. East of Trier, south of
f. Iron Cross. 18. R-1, Rpt 22. The report, Kurenz.
g. This is a German as printed, contains all of the d. About 3 miles
document translated in G-2, information in the original southeast of Trier.
A-~c,GHQ, AEF. The raid report, but the format has e. South of Trier and just
numbers correspond to those been changed. east of Kernschied.
in the ljst (“Statement of 19. R-1, Rpt 19. f. About 10 miles
.
Damages . .”) which was 20. R-1, Rpt 54. The report northeast of Trier, on the rail
appended and which is printed contains a list of nearly 200 line to Coblenz.
at the end of this document. alerts and raids on blast 25. R-1, Rpt 21.
h. This raid is not listed furnaces at Rurnelingen and a. Just west of Ehrang.
in the report, printed above, Oettlingen between the end of b. North of-Ehrang.
on Metz. Six F.E.2b’s of July 1916 and the end of c. East of the Pfalzel rail
Squadron 100, RAF, bombed October 1918. bridge, in the area between
the Metz-Sablon rail yard on 21. R-1, Rpt 16. the Moselle and the Rumer,
the night of 30/31 May. a. The report lists nearly which flows into the Moselle
i. The document contains 350 alerts and raids, beginning from the south.
no explanation for the use of in May 1916 and running to 26. R-1, Rpt 32.
two amounts, bracketed November 1918, with the a. The cover sheet to the
together, for this attack. number of tons of steel lost report lists these five towns,
j. This abstract from Herr as the result of each. but in different order. All are
Kienle’s day book was 22. R-1, Rpt 49. within less than 4 miles of
translated in G-2, A - ~ c ,GHQ, a. The data concerning Conz. With relationship to
AEF. Abstract I, which has the nine raids has been Conz, they are situated as
558 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
Vol. IV
follows: Karthaus and reference to earlier raids, such b. The report contains
Herzlich, down the Moselle, as those by No. 3 Wing, information on only three
on the right side of the river; RNAS on 24 November and factories.
Wasserlich, up the Moselle, 27 December 1916. 49. R-1, Rpt 34.
on the right side; Oberemmel, 32. R-1, Rpt 6. The report 50. R-1, Rpt 31.
to the south. When Merzlich on b u s lists the total number 51. R-1, Rpt 57.
and Karthaus merged in the of alerts and hours lost a. Jones, The War in the
1940’s, only Karthaus monthly from September 1916 Air, does not mention any
remained as the place name to November 1918. Of the 301 bombing of Speyer. According
for the area. alerts, 80 percent were during to the London Times, Friday,
27. R-1, Rpt 52. 1918. 26 July 1918, the Frankfurter
28. R-1, Rpt 10. 33. R-1, Rpt 63. Zeitung had reported the
a. The 93 bombs (not 34. R-1,RPt 41. bombing of Speyer on Sunday
counting the one that fell in 35. R-1, Rpt 33. night. Speyer is included in
the gardens) were numbered 36. R-1, Rpt 7. the list, published in the
consecutively in the order 37. R-1, Rpt 55. Times on 15 August 1918, of
given in the report. Bomb #79 a. Not on G-2, A-7, places bombed by the
was one of those dropped on GHQ, AEF, list of German Independent Air Force during
2 September 1918. airdromes, 11 November 1918, July. The list of IAF targets in
29. R-1, Rpt 8. in “Gorrell’s History,” M-1. Jones, The War in the Air,
a. It seems possible, and 38. R-1, Rpt 3. Appendix XII, does not give
indeed probable, that the 39. R-1, Rpt 15. the usual details about the
amount given here was the 40. R-1, Rpt 47. execution of the mission of
result of more than one raid. 41. R-1, Rpt 29. 21/22 July 1918 (p 62).
If so, the number of raids (5) a. Shells for 77-mm field 52. R-1,Rpt 36.
would have to be revised. gun. a. The plant often is
30. R-1, Rpt 62. 42. R-1, Rpt 54. referred to as being at
a. This number, evidently a. This and the following Mannheim rather than at
obtained by counting the messages reporting raids on Ludwigshafen.
months in which raids Rieding were translated by b. Just south of
occurred, apparently is wrong. G-2, A-2c, GHQ, AEF. Ludwigshafen.
Wing No. 3, RNAS, for 43. R-1, Rpt 53. c. Between Ludwigshafen
example, bombed Volklingen 44. R-1, Rpt 56. and Oppau.
on 10 and again on 11 45. R-1, Rpt 45. 53. R-1, Rpt 65.
November 1916. 46. R-1, Rpt 66. 54. R-1, Rpt 40.
b. 10th Landstrum a. The report contains a a. The report, in the
Infanterie-Ersatz-Bataillon? list of more than 200 alerts section deleted below, lists 23
c. Omitted. between 14 January 1917 and alerts in the period from 22
31. R-1, Rpt 17. 30 October 1918. May 1918 to 29 October 1918.
a. The report which 47. R-1, Rpt 46. The total, at the end of the
contains a list of the raids and 48. R-1, Rpt 30. listing, for total duration of
alerts (date, time alert started a. The report contains a the 23 alerts is 18 hours and
and ended, total time), covers list of 65 alerts (total time, 45 40 minutes. The figures given
only the period from 1 hours) during which no bombs for the several alerts add to a
February 1918 to the end of were dropped. The earliest of total alert time of 18 hours
the war. It makes no these was on 22 April 1918. and 34 minutes.
Notes 559
55. R-1, Rpt 25. alerts (total of 33 hours and 3 64. R-1, Rpt 5.
a. On the Main, just minutes) from 24 May to 10 65. R-1, Rpt 23.
below Frankfurt. November 1918. 66. R-1, Rpt 20. Friesdorf is
56. R-1, Rpt 64. b. The report contains not on the list of German
57. R-1, Rpt 11. data (deleted below) on five airdromes on 11 November
58. R-1, Rpt 4. factories that were producing 1918, compiled by G-2, A-7,
a. Siegburg and Troisdorf shells, chemicals, metal tubing, GHQ, AEF, in “Gorrell’s
are across the Rhine and etc. History,” M-1.
about 5 or 6 miles to the 62. R-1, Rpt 43.
northeast. See separate report a. Some references to
(#59) on Troisdorf. attacks on airdromes were Statistical Summary
59. R-1, Rpt 60. included, however, in some of 1. R-1, 10.
60. R-1, Rpt 12. the other reports, such as the 2. Included in report on
a. Spencer Grey later one on Mars-la-Tour (#6). Frankfurt (#55).
was a member of the staff of b. About 3 miles south of 3. Included in report on
the Strategical Section of the Morhange. Luxembourg (#22).
Air Service, AEF. Colonel 63. R-1, Rpt 9. 4. Two places covered by
Gorrell, then chief of the a. From the format and the reports, Folpersweiler
section, said that Grey was spacing in the original copy, it (#65)and Rechicourt (#40), do
considered “the world’s is impossible to determine not appear in the above list.
greatest authority on how much of the above
questions dealing with aerial explanation, beginning with
bombardment.” (Gorrell, Early “40-50 bombs,” pertains to 8
Hist. of Strat Sec., in July, and how much to 7 Narrative Summary
“Gorrell’s History,” B-6, 171.) August. 1. R-1, 2. The first page of
b. The report lists 24 b. The ditto marks which the narrative summary,
alerts (total 17 hours and 51 follow apparently apply to the deleted below, contains
minutes) from October 1917 entire next entry (including information about the way the
to November 1918. the phrase concerning the survey was organized and
61. R-1, Rpt 20. results of the bombing), with conducted. That information
a. The report contains a only the figure for the number has been used in the editor’s
list (deleted below) of 35 of planes being changed. introduction to Part 11.
560 U.S.Air Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
Conclusion
1. The survey, of course, was only one of the many factors
bearing upon the development of this and other USAAF bombing
policies.
2. The way in which the survey was cited in the school’s
bombardment manual (see Note 3, below) seems to indicate that
only the narrative summary, rather than the full report, was at
hand. The citation was as follows: Report compiled by G-2,
A.E.F., at request of A.S.A.E.F. Conclusions Re Effects of Allied
Bombing of Germany. Library Air Corps Tactical School.
3. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment Aviation (Langley
Field, 1931), p 12 and n 41, pp 13-15and n 45, and Bibliography;
Air Corps Tactical School, Genesis of Bombardment Aviation,
Preface to Bombardment Text (Maxwell Field, 1938), pp 14-15
and n 44. The Preface was a revision of Section I, “Development
of Bombardment Aviation,” of the text published in 1931.
4. See, for example, Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts,
Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air
Force (ASI, AU, 1971);[Thomas H. Greer,] Historical Study 89,
Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm, 1917-1941
(USAF Hist Div RSI, AU, 1955); I. B. Holly, Jr., Ideas and
Weapons, (New Haven, 1953); and Raymond Richard Flugel,
United States Air Power Doctrine (Norman, Okla, 1965).
5. The document evidently was in the school’s library at
Langley Field when the manual was written early in 1930. The
library was moved with the school to Maxwell Field in 1931, to
the School of Applied Tactics at Orlando during World War 11,
and back to Maxwell Field after the war to form the nucleus for
the new Air University Library. After the USAF Historical
Division moved from Washington to Maxwell Air Force Base in
1949, documents from the Tactical School Library were
transferred to the Historical Division (nowthe Albert F. Simpson
Historical Research Center). The survey report apparently is not
listed in the present catalog of Air University Library.
6. The editor had used “Gorrell’s History” for reference and
research for more than 15 years before be discovered the report
of the bombing survey in July 1974. A notice of the report has
been published more recently in [Timothy K. Nenninger,]
National Archives Microfilm Publication Pamphlet Describing
M990, Gorrell’s History of the American Expeditionary Forces
Air Service, 1917-1919(Washington, 1975).
562 US. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. Iv
Appendices
1. A-12. The tables used in this appendix have been reproduced
photographically from Hist. Div. USA, Unitedstates Army in the World
War, 1917-1919(Wash., 1948),Vol. I, pp389-423. In theTableof
Organization covering Observation Group, Air Service (p. 512), line 13,
column 12 has been changed which obviously is wrong, to
l ~ § 2 h , w h i c hmakes it the same as the authorization for Headquarters,
GHQ, Air Service Reserve. In the Table of Organization covering
Observation Squadron, Air Service (p. 514),line 20, column 10,the
original reference to remarks was “d,” which clearly is wrong. It evidently
should be “z” and has been changed accordingly.
2. 1-24. 166.
Glossany OF
Abbneuiations
A-2 Information Section, Military Information Division
A-2c Press and Translations Branch, Information Section,
Military Information Division
A-7 Air Intelligence Section, Military Information Division
AA Antiaircraft
AC of S Assistant Chief of Staff
AEF American Expeditionary Forces
AFSHRC Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center
AIC Aviation Instruction Center
Akt.-Ges. Aktiengesellschaf t
a.m.; a-M am Main
AM; am ante meridiem
Am EF American Expeditionary Forces
APP appendix
AR Corps d’Armee a moteur Renault
AS Air Service
ASAEF Air Service, American Expeditionary Forces
AS1 Aerospace Studies Institute
AU Air University
BC Battery Commander
BIO Branch Intelligence Officer
BR Bentley Rotary
Brig Brigadier
B.T. Battery-Target
C centimeter(s)
CACS Corps Air Service Commander
Capt Captain
CAS Chief of Air Service
cc (Name given to synchronizing mechanism developed
by Constantinesco and Colley)
CG Commanding General
Chem Chemische
C-in-C Commander-in-Chief
cm centimeter(s)
co - Company
co Commanding Officer
c of s Chief of Staff
Col Colonel
DH De Havilland
DiV Division
Doc document
DSC Distinguished Service Cross
564 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
EA enemy aircraft
EF Expeditionary Forces
F franc(s)
FA Field Artillery; Frankford Arsenal
FE Farman Experimental
Fig figure
FO Field order
Obs Observation
ocso Office of Chief Signal Officer
OIC officer in charge
OPS operations
PI PP page, pages
PC Post of Command
Pf pfennig
PM; pm post meridiem
Pur pursuit
ws Wing
Z of A Zone of Advance
566 U.SAir Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
twin-engine bomber: 30
two-place fighter development: 13,20-21
types by name. See Aircraft types
visibility required: 86,89, 119
Aircraft industry
criticism of: 57
development and expansion: 22,362
Aircraft losses, enemy: 30
Aircraft types
A.E.G.: 303
Albatros: 300,303
A.R.-2: 20
Breguet: 85,88-89,249,370
Caproni: 85,346
De Havilland: 11-12,20,87-88,95, 118-120, 131, 138-139, 177,
230,232,248,251,255,258-260,266,273
Farman: 346
F.F.: 301
Fokker: 59,72-73, 178,302
Halberstadt: 302
Handley-Page: 85
JN-4: 7-8
Nieuport: 20,83-84, 156
Roland: 301,336
Rumpler: 303
Salmson: 20, 85, 108, 124, 131-132, 230, 232-233, 240, 249,
251,258,274
S.E.-5:51
Sopwith Camel: 12,20,28,30
Spad: 20,63, 76-77,85, 132
Airdrops: 175, 176
Airfields
bombing strikes against: 488-491,497
command i 3 control: 15
communications systems, use at: 102
dummies: 34,37
fighter strikes against: 37
landing aids required: 33-34
lighting systems: 28,30-31,33-34,38,74
obstacles removal: 34,38
site locations: 6, 19,37-38,362
unserviceable: 248
Index 569
Antiaircraft weapons
enemy types: 737
tactical dispositions:38
Antwerp: 484
Arcadia, Fla.: 353,355
Archie batteries. See Antiaircraft units
Argonne Forest: 137,155,177
Argonne offensive. See Meuse-Argonneoffensive
Armament
characteristics, ideal: 32
fighter aircraft: 75-76
installation, routine: 234-237
maintenanceand repair: 236-237,240
supply of: 230-234,237-238,240
Armament mechanics:234-235,356
Armament officers: 230-234,240,327
Armies:
air service organization: 14-15
balloon service organization: 200-202
Armies (numbered)
First: 115,190,225-226,228,302,355,363,373
Second: 21,85,106-I 07,217,228,355,364
Third: 213
Arnaville: 367,378-379,492
Ars: 378-379,492
Arthur, Dogan M.: 146-148
Artillery Aerial Observation School, Second: 1
Artillery fire
1
flying through: 2,185
on friendly troops: 178
Artillery fire adjustment and regulation
balloons in: 200-203,206
observation, role jn: 3,99, 101, 107, 113-114,125,143,145,
149-150,154-155,160-162,165,169-170,181,252
radio communication in: 252,254,263-271
training programs: 347-348
typical day’s results: 267
Index 571
Biebrich: 476
Biewer: 432-433
Biggin Hill, England:270
Bingham, Hiram: 308
Bird, Allen T., Jr.: 136-138
Black, Edward C., Jr.: 787
Blankenhorn, Heber: 220-230
Blies River: 453
Boggs, Thomas R.: 277-284
Bois des Sergents: 374
Bolling, Raynal C.: 313
Bolt, William: 162-164
Bomb racks: 32,86-89
Bombing operations
aircraft, number employed: 373,376
against airfields: 488-491,497
against lines of communication:367
air-raid alerts and shelters, enemy: 395, 397, 405, 41 1, 424,
427-430,433-434,436-437,440-441,443-444,447,451,
453-454,457-459,462,464,466-467,470-472,476,479-481,
486,497-498
altitudes for: 88
against bridges: 104-105,379
casualties, estimated: 369,497,500
civilian morale, effect on: 369, 373, 376, 378, 385, 393-396,
398-399,401-402,420,430-431,434-435,437,440-441,
444-445, 448, 453, 462, 464, 466, 469, 472, 481-483, 485-
486,488
clouds, factor in: 373,486
command and control: 14
cost of enemy protection: 495-497,500
critique of: 501-502
day missions: 10
defense measures, enemy: 371-373, 375, 378, 393-394, 397,
401, 405, 411, 415, 425, 431, 433, 436, 445, 451, 454, 457,
467, 469, 472, 474-476, 479, 482-483, 485, 489, 495-496,
499,502
duration of missions; 369,497
574 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
Vol. IV
Cameras: 157-158
Camouflage measures: 293
Camp John Wise: 355
Carburetor jets: 120
Carl Foundry: 402-407
Carroll, Philip A.: 312-319,332-335
Cassady, Thomas G.: 80-83
576 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
.
42d: 100,260
77th: 176
80th: 171
89th: 100
Dommartin-la-Montagne:228
Dommary-Baroncourt:367,370-374,492,503
Dorrance, George: 743
Drugs, caution on use: 289
Dudelange (Dudelingen):412,416,492
Dummy airfields: 34,37
Dunwoody, Halsey: 306
Diiren: 486-487,492
Diisseldorf: 365
Monosoupape: 28,32
protection for: 136
quality and performance:76
standardizing: 6
tests, pre-flight:78-81,95,
129-130,
153,155
England. See Royal Flying Corps; Royal Naval Air Service
Engravingfacilities: 300
Epp, Otto C.: 364
Equipment and accessories:274-276
Esch-sur-Alzette:41 2,415,492,496-498
Essen: 476
Esslinger, E.E.: 248-251
Estes, J. Dickinson: 737
Etain: 368-369
Executive Section: 21 2-214
Exercise, need for: 288
Eypper, George W.: 344-345
alerting: 54-55
grades and ratings: 340-342
jobs, assignment to: 54,60-61
mechanics, improper use: 244
morale and dedication in: 56,60-61, 112,235-236
pilots, relations with: 41, 139-140,316,326
relaxing regulationsfor: 53-54, 139
specialists, assignment of: 139-140
squadron complement:340-342
supervision of: 240,248
training programs: 8-9,315-316,326-328,343,354-355
I
Ground units
balloons, assignmentto: 200,206-209
bombing strikes against: 367,375,500,502-504
command and control from air: 114
commanders’ attitude toward air operations: 171
cooperation and liaison with: 3, 12, 16, 19, 30,32, 99-100, 102,
105-107, 109-111,113-114,121-122, 124-126,149-150,160-
163, 168-171, 174, 178-179, 189, 219, 251-252, 260, 262-
271,303,330-331
enemy strikes against: 45
fighter strikes against: 9-11,21,30,37,40,42,50,69,75,82-83,
147-148, 154, 171, 174, 177, 191-192
friendly aircraft, fire on: 165
ignorance of air operations: 100-101, 107, 113-114, 121-122,
127, 168-171, 182, 188-189,317,321,330,335,359
interchange of personnelwith: 107,114, 127, 168, 171,189
morale effect of air strikes: 21,83 (see also Bombing operations;
Fighter operations)
observation, value to: 93, 178
panel displays by: 101, 123-124, 140, 146, 153-154, 160, 163,
169-171, 173-174, 177-178, 181, 183-184, 189,252
personal services for: 126
relations with: 19,99-100, 104, 108,278
squadrons assignment to: 100, 110, 121, 219-220, 348, 350,
354,358
tactical air support: 3
training exercises with: 171-172, 185, 189,330-331,358
warnings to aircraft: 118-119
Group commanders
authority andfunctions: 104, 110
as corps air service chief: 106
grades for: 92
Index 587
Groups
abolition proposed: 106,172
headquarters functions: 1 10
overlap of functions in: 106
personnel complement: 93
squadron integrity in: 110,112
Groups (numbered)
1st Bombardment:92,367,370,374,376
1 st Pursuit: 10,28-30,73
2d Bombardment:84
3d Observation: 191
5th Pursuit: 42-43
Guard duty, drawbacks caused by: 244
Guilene Brothers: 462
Gunnery training: 3,16,41,93,141-142,144,193-196,
312,329-
330,344-345,353,356
Gutz Armaturwerke: 458
Hagondange (Hagendingen):382-393,493,495
Hall, Melville C.:240
Hall, NormanW.: 96
Hall perimeter test: 287
Hangars
Bessonneautype: 241,243
movable: 97
provision of: 272
Hansell, Haywood S., Jr.: 504
Hardinge, Harlowe: 251 -256
Hartney, Harold E.: 28-29,60,
72
Haussimont: 199
Hayange (Hayingen): 382,396-398,492,496
Hayden, Van: 143
Health education training: 288-289
Heater, Charles L.: 94-96
Heaters, supply to squadrons: 251
588 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
Vol. IV
Heming: 448-449,493
Henry, D.M.: 216
Hessenmuller factory: 462
Hill, Dudley L.: 42
Hills, identifying: 135
Hindenburg, Paul von: 223-224
Htichst: 474-476,493,496-497
Holden, Kenneth M.: 150-153
Hollerich: 412-414,493
Homecourt: 382,392-394,493
Hooper, Thornton D.: 94
Hopkins, Joy: 260-262
Horses, in liaison service: 209
Hospital facilities: 280-282,291
Hotton, Harold J.: 364
Huron Sisters: 287
Hydrogen gas supply: 228-229
.JacobusMine: 388,391
Jaeger test: 290
Jennings, Percy H.: 305-307
Joeuf: 382,392-394,493
Johnson, Davenport: 39-40
Jolly spark plugs: 250
Jones, Charles M.: 53-56
Jones, Ernest: 298-302
590 US.Air Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
Kaiserslautern: 456-459,476,493,498
Karlshuette: 408
Karlshutten Steel Works: 398
Karlsruhe: 460,493,495
Karthaus: 427,435-437,493
Kelly Field: 328
Kennedy, David S.:132-136
Kennedy, Roy 0.:
96
Kernschied: 432
Kilner, Walter G.:31 3,339,31 9-333,339
Kincaid, R.G.: 302-303
Kindley, Field E.: 57-59
Kinsley, Wilbur: 743
Kirby, Maxwell: 42-43
Knox, Walter B.: 56
Knutange: 496
Knuzig: 408,410
Koblenz. See Coblentz
Kohless, Robert A.: 239
Kornheld factory: 471
Konz. See Conz
Kreuzwald: 446-447,493
Kronig, Louis H., Jr.: 341-343
Krurnrn. L.R.: 263
Kurenz: 431
Kurzel. See Courcelles-sur-Nied
Kuter, Laurence S.: 504
Index 591
with ground units: 3, 12, 16, 19, 30, 32, 99-100, 102, 105-107,
109-111, 113-114, 121-122, 124-126,149-150,160-163,168-
171, 174, 178-179, 189, 219, 251-252, 260, 262-271, 303,
330-331
horses in: 249
with informationsections: 299-301
motorcycles in: 209
in observation operations: 40, 121
with observation posts: 40
with ordnance officers: 92
in photographic missions: 296-297
pilots with balloons: 40,203
by staffs and staff officers: 99-100, 181
in training: 345
Lighthouses:31,34
Lighting systems
airfields: 28,30-31,33-34,38,74
electric-generated: 242
Ligny-en-Barrois:295
Lindstrom, G.T.: 157-160
Lingen: 480
Lippman, Walter: 220
Lithographic facilities: 300
Littauer, Kenneth P.: 191
Livingston, J.W.: 185
Lockwood, Alan: 143
Lokey, Walter 0.:
96
Longuyon: 367,371 -376,398,493,495
Longville: 413
Longwy: 373,395
Lorraine sector: 368
Lost Battalion: 176, 175-177
Lothringen Cement Factory: 449
Low, Seth: 28
Lowe, William: 143
Ludwigshafen: 461-467,469,493,497-498,501
Index 593
Machern: 383-384
Machine Gun Battalion, 306th: 176
Machine guns
antiaircraft role: 138
damage to: 239
Lewis: 87,89,92, 118-1 19,232, 233,235-238,356
Marlin: 230,232-237
propellor-synchronized:155,230,232,235,239
tail-mounted: 239
test-firing:71, 115-117, 155,235
Vickers: 71,75-76,230,232-233,239
Machine-shopfacilities: 243,258,328
Magnetos, faulty: 245
Main River: 469
Maintenanceand repair (see also Ground crews)
armaments: 236-237,240
motor vehicles: 213-214
in squadrons: 95
Mainz (Mayence):469-474,476,480,493
Maizieres: 382-383,385,493
Mannesmann Steel Works: 445
Mannheim: 365,456,459-461,463,465-467,469,476,495
Mannstaed 8, Company: 483
Manuals. See Textbooks
Maps
Air Service role in compiling: 349,358
bombing operations, use in: 91-92,504
fighter operations, use in: 74
observation, use in: 126, 142, 146, 150, 166, 177, 183, 186, 188
training in reading: 101, 196,330
March, Peyton C.: 220
Mars-la-Tour: 378,493
594 U.S.Air Service
in World War I
VOl. Iv
Nancy: 365,371,375-376,378-379,448-449,460,487
Naval air service, merger proposed: 25
Naval operations, aircraft role in: 361
Navigation lights: 33
Navigation systems
development: 24,269-270
training in use: 30,330,347
Navy, opposition to air force autonomy: 25
Neidecker, Bertrand: 743
Neunkirchen: 453-454,493
Newsmen
Air Servicie, image of: 4-5, 169-170
bombing, conception of: 90-91
Nicholson, Knox W.: 256-257
Nickel, Willliam: 193-196
Night operations
balloons in: 36
bombing missions: 12,29,37,376,444,464,469,476,484,498,
504
fighter missions: 12, 14,28-38
fighter tactics in: 36-37
observation missions: 12,30,37
patrol missions: 12,35-36
photographic missions: 37
training in: 34-35
Nilvange: 397
Index 597
Nippes: 480
Nixonville: 191
Nolan, Dennis E.: 220,363-364
Noncommissionedofficers as observers and pilots: 94
Non-specialists. See Utility men
Nourrice fuel tank: 119
Nov6ant: 378-379,413,492
Noyes, Stephen H.: 107,120
Oberemmel: 435-437,493
Observation operations: 3,9,69
aircraft overuse in: 113
alertness i 3 caution in: 115, 128-129, 136, 140, 142, 150-154,
157-158, 162-164, 166, 173
alerts, unnecessary: 168
altitudes for: 40, 124, 135, 140, 145, 151, 154-158, 165, 177,
179-180,183,192
artillery fire adjustment and regulation: 3,99,101, 107,113-114,
125, 143, 145, 149-150, 154-155, 160-162, 165, 169-170,
181,252
balloons, role in: 206
cavalry reconnaissancerole: 190-193
clouds, and fog, factors in: 118, 126, 140, 163, 183, 187
combat, avoiding: 115, 149, 151, 186
combat time duration: 195
compass, orientation by: 177
defensive measures: 117-118
direction and route orientation: 146-147, 153, 157-158, 173,
193,330
enemy, locating and identifying: 127, 129, 146-147, 164, 192
fighterescortof:40,64, 123-124, 126, 145, 151, 157, 170
firing techniques: 117, 119, 164, 176
flash-and-sounddetection: 165, 185
formations: 119-120, 130, 145
friendly units, identifying: 147, 165-168, 170, 173-174, 183-186,
188
ground units, value to: 93, 178
infantry contact missions: 108-110, 122-124, 136-137, 140-143,
145-147, 153-156, 163-167, 170, 176-177, 183-185, 188,
190-192,252,260
U S . Air Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
Orny: 378-379,492
Orsinger, Remington: 347-348
Ottange (Oettlingen): 412,494
Ourches: 127
Pancake landing: 79
Panel displays: 101, 123-124, 140, 146, 153-154, 160, 163, 169-
171, 173-174, 177-178, 181, 183-184, 189,252
Pangy: 379
Parachute descents by enemy: 12-13
Parachute flares: 28,33,35,37
Paradise, Robert C.:120-121
Pardee, Azro J.: 290-292
Paris: 300
Park squadrons: 20,97,272
Parks, aircraft: 20,248
Parks, balloon: 202
Parochialism among branches: 310,317
Parr, Athur W.: 743,160-162
Passenger service, Air Service role in developing: 348-349
Patrol operations (see also Observation operations; Fighter opera-
tions)
Patrol operations (see also Fighter operations; Observation opera-
tions): 3,9-10,47,82
altitudes for: 35-36
barrage system: 39-40,64
cooperation with other formations: 48,69
fighter escort of: 30,35-36,39,42,47
improvement, need for: 58-59
night missions: 12,35-36
tactics and maneuvers: 48,65-68
Patrols, ground: 124, 155
Pay and allowances: 52,316,320,334,340-342,361
Index 601
Peltre: 382 9
0
Pinup girls: 375
Pilots (see also Officers)
qualifications: 9
alcoholic beverages, use by: 279-280,289
assignment and replacement: 41, 97, 105, 113, 1 15, 123, 321,
334,354
balloon pilots, training: 14, 17, 196-199,202,355
balloons, liaison with: 40, 203
clothing, proper: 129
clothing, sterlization: 280
coffee, use by: 289
conduct standards: 321,334
dental service for: 282-283
diets, regulating: 2,279,288-289,307
disabled, in administrative posts: 9
discipline and dedication required: 3,8,34,43-46, 58
drugs, caution on use by: 289
exercise, need for: 288
ferry pilots: 248
ground crews, relations with: 41, 139-140,316,326
health education training: 288-289
hindering advancement of: 113, 115
hospital facilities for: 280-282,291
inept, eliminating: 115,323,353
instructors, use as: 58-59,90, 121, 128, 144, 167,304
interchange with ground units: 107, 114, 127, 168, 171, 189
limitations on: 86
morale and dedication required: 51,60,92,287
noncommissionedgrades for: 94
non-flying officers, relations with: 9,60,324-325,334
physical standards and records: 9, 60, 133-134, 278-279, 282,
286,288,290
positioning & comfort in aircraft: 87, 120, 122, 135
psychological warfare, role in: 221-222,225-226,230
rest and recreation required: 54,59-60, 104,279-280,288,321,
324,334
shortages of: 16-17,28-29, 51
solo flight, fear in: 57
tobacco, use by: 280,289
training programs: 5-8, 14, 16-17, 34-35, 41, 46, 53, 57-58, 67,
90,93,95, 122, 136, 141-1 42, 144,340,346-347,352-354
venereal diseases, safeguards against: 280
vision requirements: 34-35, 134
work supervision by: 61
Index 603
Pirmasens: 455456,493
Place, Fred: 296
Plane News: 288
Plattsburgh Barracks: 313
Postal service, Air Service role in developing: 348-349,358
Postes de command. See Command posts
Pratt, Henry T.: 364
Preparedness, need for: 22
Press correspondents. See Newsmen
Press releases: 301
Prever rule test: 290
Pribnow, Harry W.: 258-260
Printing facilities: 300
Prisoners of war
Allied: 470
enemy: 222-224
Russian: 371-372,378,384-385,388,393-395,399-400,403,
432,467
Production, effect of bombingon: 496-497,499-500
Promotion policies: 3,8,59,90,
107,113,139,172,240,317-318,
320-322,325,328-330,333-334,344,361
Propagandacampaigns. See Psychologicalwarfare
PropagandaSection, GHQ: 220-230
Propellors, damage to: 3,20,187,259
Property inspectionand accountability:21 3-214
Prophylactic stations: 280
Psychologicalwarfare
Air Service role in: 221 -222
enemy morale, effect on: 222-224
by France: 226,229
pilots role in: 221-222,225-226,230
by Royal Air Force: 225-226,229
Publicity campaigns: 5
604 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. IV
Rechicourt: 448-449
Reconnaissance operations. See Observation operations; Patrol
operations
Recreation facilities: 54
Redeployment program: 309
Regular Army, strength proposed: 344
Reid, William S.:364
Reinburg, George E.A.: 84-94
Reis, Alvin C.:206-207
Rembercourt: 28
Remelach. See Remilly
Remicourt: 229
Remilly (Remelach): 378-382,447,492
Replacement depots, proposed: 309-310
Reports, reducing number of: 106,218-219,304
Research and development
aircraft: 6,52,361
aviation medicine: 285
communications systems and equipment: 269-270
Royal Air Force: 270
Reserve officers: 361 -362
Reserve units: 15,362
Rest and recreation programs: 54,59-60,
104,279-280,288,321,
324,334
Reveille, excuse from: 54
Reynolds, Clearton H.: 122-124
Rheinische Westfalische Sprengstoff A.G.: 483
Rhine River and Valley: 365,460-461,466-467,477-478,495-496
Rhoads, Robert 8.: 21 8-220
Richard stereoscope: 296
Richthofen, Manfred von: 371
Richtung: 383
606 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
Vol. N
.
Rickenbacker, Edward V.: 2
Rieding (Reding): 449-451,494
Rifles, issue to airmen: 356
Roads, identifying: 135
Roberts, James S.: 144-145
Rocket signals: 153-154, 163, 165-167, 170, 173-174, 176-177,
183,185,190
Rockwell Field: 352-353
Rodange: 412,417-418,493
Roechlingen Brothers Steel Works: 442-443
Roer River: 486
Rogers, Lee M.: 244-245
Rogers, W.J.: 175-178
Rohrbach River: 452
Rohrer, Loren: 743
Rombas (Rombach): 382,387,392,493
Romorantin: 131,139,271 275~
Roplingen: 383
Royal Air Force
air supremacy, policy on: 22
autonomy adopted: 26
bombing operations: 365, 367-368, 398, 460, 467, 469, 476,
482,484,486,501
hospital facilities in: 282
Independent Air Force operation: 26-27
photography by: 293-294
physical standards and records: 279
psychological warfare by: 225-226,229
research and development by: 270
training by: 9-10, 17,329
Royal Naval Air Service: 484
Royaumeix: 199
Royce, Ralph: 287
Rudder systems: 120,135
Index 607
Rumelingen (Rumelange):412,416-417,497
Rumelinger & St. lngbert Steel Works: 453
Rumont: 229
Runners. See Courier service
Saar River and Valley: 368, 415, 438-419, 437-439, 445, 452,
496-497
SaarbrUcken: 398, 419, 437-438, 445, 447, 449, 451-454, 456,
476,494
Saarburg (Sarrebourg): 379,381,447-451,487,494
Sablon: 368,413
Sain, James E.: 166-167
St. Avoid: 447,494
St. Ingbert: 452-453,494
St. Juvin: 138
St. Maixent: 312
St. Mihiel offensive: 8-10,44, 47, 78, 90, 100, 141, 157-158, 219,
228-229,235,242,294,355,365,367,370-371,373,379
Ste. des Mines de la Houve: 446
Salvage operations: 95,277
Salvage squadrons, proposed: 97
San Diego: 353,358
Sanringen: 381
Sarralbe (Saaralben): 451,494
Savage Arms Company: 233
Schauffler, William: 743
Schmahl factory: 472
Scholtz, E.: 225
Schools
aviation medicine: 285-287
command and staff: 361
contract: 346
foreign, attendance at: 17
608 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
Vol. IV
general: 14
location: 352-353,358,362
training cadres: 16
Search, Hendrick M.: 96
Searchlights
in bombardment defense: 394, 398, 401, 425, 454, 457, 467,
474-475,482-483,485,496
coordination with air operations: 28,30-31,35-38
Seats, aircraft: 86,89,251,274
Security measures: 37
Sedan: 155,177
Selleck, Lawrence M.: 96
Service squadrons: 17,97
Seyen: 421
Sherman, William C.:
359
Sherrick, John: 743
Shock absorbers, defective: 248-249
Short-wave radio: 257-258
Shumaker, F.N.: 263-269
Shuss, Pressley B.: 185-189
Sichel & Company: 472
Siegburg: 482
Sierck: 409
Sights
Aldis: 76,231
bombing: 88-89
illuminated: 32
Norman: 195,232
Reille-Soult: 76, 195,232
ring-and-bead: 76,92,231
Signal Corps, role in air communications: 268-269
Signal officers: 181
Signal flares and pistols: 124, 238-239
Signaling lights: 33-34
Index 609
Vadenay: 197
Valleys, identifying: 135
Index 615
Wadgassen: 445,494
Wallace, John: 743
Walsh, R.L.: 14
War correspondents. See Newsmen
War Department, autonomous air force, policy on: 25
War Office (British): 225
Warehouses: 331
Wasserlich: 435-437,493
Water supply: 242,272
Waterways, identifying: 74, 134
Weapons. See Armament
Weather, effect of: 20,30,104,229-230
on balloons: 72
on bombing operations: 373,386,420
on fighter missions:69
on fire adjustment: 270
616 U.S. Air Service
in World War I
VOl. N