A War of Their Own
A War of Their Own
A War of Their Own
Bombers over
the Southwest Pacific
MATTHEW K. RODMAN
Captain, USAF
April 2005
Air University Library Cataloging Data
Rodman, Matthew K.
A war of their own : bombers over the Southwest Pacific / Matthew K. Rodman
p. ; cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-58566-135-X
1. World War, 1939 –1945 —Aerial operations, American. 2. United States. Army
Air Forces. Air Force, 5th. 3. Military doctrine—United States—History. I. Title.
940.544/973––dc22
Disclaimer
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air
Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public
release: distribution unlimited.
ii
For Uncle Phil
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Contents
Chapter Page
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
v
CONTENTS
Illustrations
Figure Page
vi
CONTENTS
Photo Page
vii
CONTENTS
Photo Page
Table
viii
Foreword
ix
FOREWORD
victory will go to the team that can best adapt its resources to
stop the enemy. Captain Rodman’s great effort convinces us that
it is our legacy to maintain and even enhance that ability.
x
About
the Author
xi
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Preface
xiii
PREFACE
xiv
Acknowledgments
xv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Obviously, since I now fly bombers for a living, this book has
become much more personal. My time as a “Bat” in the 9th
Bomb Squadron has been nothing short of phenomenal.
Although not happy about what motivated the deployments,
I’ve been proud to be part of America’s response to 9/11 and
will always be thankful to Col Eldon Woodie for having the
faith in me and a handful of other new guys when it came time
to go out the door and off to war. I have no doubt that I experi-
enced the highlight of my career under his leadership on that
first trip to the desert. Thanks also to squadron commanders
Lt Col Robert Gass and Lt Col Robert Maness for ably carrying
on the best traditions of the 9th—and for letting me play my
small part. There are too many Bats to thank individually; just
know that I’m proud to have shared the squadron with all of
you. Shape, Roadkill, Rotorhead, Crew 13: that means you too.
Of course, a few fellow history buffs have made my time in the
9th even more enjoyable. Thanks to Maj Michael “Pugs” Pugsley,
Maj Tony “Rivet” White, Maj Allen “Stump” Wilson—and even
Reapers Capt Dave “SARDOT” Marten, Capt Dave “Fodre”
Pafford, and Capt Todd “Eddie” Moenster—for talking about
history or touring sites whenever we had the chance. Stump,
Rivet, and Pugs—a special thank-you for lending your time,
editing skills, and historical perspectives to the completion of
this book.
Of course, none of this would have been possible without
friends and family. Jeff, Dan, and Harv: it seems that we’ve
been friends forever, yet I can’t wait to get back to Austin for
some more Mexican food and football! Thanks for being such
good friends for so long. Thank you Stephanie not only for
being one of my best friends, but also for helping me complete
research both at Maxwell and from a distance. Chuck, thanks
for being a great family friend and for always talking about air-
planes with me, even as a kid. Paul, I also thank you for feed-
ing the airplane habit as our careers have progressed. Many
thanks go to all of my friends at Hyde Park and Aldersgate
United Methodist churches for shining a light on the path,
walking it with me, and making the way just a little bit
straighter. For my family that has traveled the road ahead of
me, I thank you for your influence. Great-Grandparents Phillips,
xvi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
xvii
Chapter 1
The story of Fifth Air Force and the US Army Air Forces (AAF)
in general begins well before the outbreak of World War II. The
interwar years offer a record of doctrinal struggle, divergent
ideas, and aspirations. The AAF that entered World War II in
1941 was no stranger to battle, but this conflict was among
the Army, Air Corps, and War Department.
Before the war, bombardment and attack aviation were very
distinct entities. In the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), the lines
would blur. Fifth Air Force under Gen George C. Kenney was
a “hodgepodge” air force in an unanticipated environment and
often lacked the option of using either attack or bombardment
aviation. The tools in-theater had to meet the mission at hand.
Kenney used equipment and doctrine without concern for their
bomber or attack origins.
The Army Air Corps’ search for identity during the interwar
years hinged on doctrine. Prewar air officers had no intention of
fighting the next war on the enemy’s terms—and little inten-
tion of doing so on the US Army’s terms either. In the 1920s and
1930s, the Air Corps was keenly aware that defining doctrine
would prove critical not only to its performance in future wars,
but also to its identity as a fighting force. A small cadre of offi-
cers shaped interwar doctrine, always keeping independence
in mind. The struggle to create this doctrine within an Army
establishment left an indelible mark on the ideas that followed
the AAF into the war. This battle occurred both in public and
in private. Airpower advocates, staff organizations, professional
military schools, and limited Depression-era budgets all played
a role in the creation of an air doctrine before America’s entry
into World War II.
Airpower in the 1920s was heralded by a small but influen-
tial group of military leaders and theorists. Born before World
War I, military aviation learned to crawl over the trench-lined
battlefields of “the war to end all wars.” The critical question
after that war involved the direction aviation would take. The
1
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
2
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
3
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
4
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
For the Army, attack aviation was the purest form of aerial
support, with results most evident on the battlefield. An Army
ground commander could expect low-flying aircraft to pummel
5
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
6
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
Despite the strides made in the years before the war, attack
aviation languished somewhat at ACTS in the 1930s: “The
theory of attack objectives and tactics remained virtually what
it was when Captain Kenney wrote the text in the late ’20’s.”14
Regardless of the disparaging attitude toward attack, it stayed
on the books. Because the Army considered it important, it was
important to ACTS.
The Army saw ACTS as simply another one of its many
schools. If it had perceived the school for what it was—the
training ground for almost all of the important and influential
leaders in the Air Corps—the Army may have been more con-
cerned with the growing cadre of big-bomber advocates. In spite
of the scant time dedicated to the topic, strategic bombard-
ment planted a seed in the minds of many ACTS graduates.
But since the senior service did not see the rising tide and
since it controlled all official doctrine and budgets in the first
place, the machinery of the Army was not overly concerned.
The textbooks that ACTS published yearly for all of its classes
became standards of doctrine and employment. Published in
1926 for the Air Service Tactical School, while Kenney was a
student there, Bombardment became the first major work to
define the bomber’s mission. In it, heretofore random musings
would find the first hints of doctrinal foundation. With it, the
rift between the Army and its Air Corps grew a bit wider. Fur-
thermore, the cult of the bomber began to push aside internal
competition within the Air Corps itself.
As early as 1926 the Tactical School took the view that bombardment
constituted the basic arm of an air force. This assumption was rejected
by the Office of the Chief of Air Corps, on the ground that the situation
would determine which arm was basic. When the issue at stake was
air supremacy, pursuit must be regarded as basic. OCAC opposed the
designation of any one branch as basic, but contended that if any were
to be so designated, it should be pursuit. This, however, was the last
occasion on record when any authoritative Air Corps statement recog-
nized pursuit as basic. There was increasing emphasis upon the of-
fensive principle in war, especially in air war, and the bomber pushed
to the fore as the chief offensive air weapon.15
7
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
8
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
bomb is ideal for other types of cruisers, airplane carriers, fuel and sup-
ply ships. Submarines and destroyers may be destroyed and sunk with
300-pound bombs. These sizes of bombs are chosen because, in any
given case, a single hit by one of them, either directly on or within a
reasonable distance of the target, will almost surely render that ship
hors de combat.18
9
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
10
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
11
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
On the one hand, the bomber had become the machine prom-
ised by air leadership; on the other, it still had to provide ground
support for the Army. The effort to maintain this balance be-
came critical as the Air Corps began to field the tactical and
strategic bombers that would enter the war. With capable
medium bombers and light attack aircraft starting to roll off
the production line, the Air Corps saw the potential to divorce
its strategic bombers from direct support of the Army.
Assuring the bomber’s ability to actually deliver its payload
at extraordinary distances and return safely—on its own—rep-
resented a formidable obstacle. Since the Air Corps cared more
about the success of the bomber—and, therefore, the Air Corps’
claim to independence—less effort went into the development of
complementary fighter aircraft. Before long, the idea of bomber
invincibility became a set of blinders for the Air Corps: “In-
structors had also begun to endorse the theory of bomber in-
vincibility. The 1931 version of Bombardment guardedly ex-
pressed this theory in the statement that bombers could operate
. . . with or without support of other aviation. Bomber defense
against hostile pursuit was based on the mutually supporting
fire of machine guns of airplanes flown in close formation.”29
12
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
The AAF would pay dearly for this concept in World War II. The
time preceding the arrival of adequate fighter support, espe-
cially in Europe, became the bloodiest in Air Force history be-
cause formations of bombers could seldom defend themselves
as adequately as envisioned against determined attacks.30
Midway through the 1930s, the Army softened its stance
somewhat, but the official message of ground primacy remained
clear. The WDGS felt the occasional need to reiterate its position
by “putting the Air Corps in its place”:
As far as the General Staff was concerned the primary function of the
air force still was support of ground operations. In brief, “Air opera-
tions, like many other military operations, are governed by the same
fundamental principles that have governed warfare in the past,” and
consequently, “Air Forces constitute a highly mobile and powerful ele-
ment which conducts the operations required for carrying out the
Army mission.”31
This ongoing battle between the Army and the Air Corps flared
up occasionally, but General Pratt was essentially correct.
Most Air Corps officers came much closer to subscribing to the
teachings of ACTS than to the tenets of official Army doctrine.
Most of the officers at ACTS and throughout the Air Corps
believed in the doctrine of strategic bombardment because in
it lay the Air Corps’ best chance for independence. If they
could only scrape enough money out of the defense budgets,
air leaders believed it simply a matter of time before technol-
ogy caught up to doctrine. “Instructors were convinced that
the extreme accuracy required for knocking out small targets
could be achieved with the improved planes and bombsights . . .
13
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
[and] that air power should be employed against small vital tar-
gets during the initial phase of hostilities, because only in this
way could a long costly surface war be avoided.”33 The Air Corps
theoretically offered this unique capability. Through bombard-
ment it could exert an inordinate amount of pressure on critical
targets beyond the Army’s reach—indeed, before soldiers could
set foot on enemy territory. Even if Airmen couldn’t win a war by
themselves, the Air Corps believed they could shape and dra-
matically shorten the battle. Billy Mitchell wrote, “As air power
can hit at a distance, after it controls the air and vanquishes
the opposing air power, it will be able to fly anywhere over the
hostile country. The menace will be so great that either a state
will hesitate to go to war, or, having engaged in war, will make
the contest much sharper, more decisive, and more quickly
finished.”34
But the strategic bomber would not take the starring role in
the Pacific. Fifth Air Force fought in an area that could scarcely
have been further removed from the European battlefield and its
vital centers. Even the biggest of bombers couldn’t reach Japan
from Australia or New Guinea—not to mention the fact that Fifth
Air Force wouldn’t have had enough of them to begin with.
Ironically, the demands of the Army and the consequent de-
velopment of attack and smaller bombardment aircraft proved
critical to ensuring that the Fifth had a fighting chance in the
SWPA. Especially in the early battle for New Guinea, where
Japanese airdromes and their lines of supply were strategic tar-
gets, these aircraft and their tactics offered a perfect fit.
By the time of the publication of Air Corps Field Manual
(ACFM) 1-10, Tactics and Techniques of Air Attack (1940), the
split between the Army and the Air Corps had become even
wider. Although neither gave much ground regarding its ex-
pectations of airpower, the field manual clarified both strate-
gic and tactical missions by spelling out the means and ends
of light bombardment and attack aviation more clearly than
ever before. Furthermore, the growing reality of war forced the
military establishment away from theory and into serious con-
cern over a military picture that was becoming increasingly
clear—and increasingly frightening. By the mid-1930s, bombers
like the B-17 began to roll off the production lines and into
14
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
service. Attack aircraft did not garner nearly that sort of an-
ticipation, but the arrival of the A-20 more than met the re-
quirements of ACFM 1-10. That aircraft boasted “high speed,
moderate size, maneuverability, provision for loads of various
types of fire, and . . . provision for some defensive fire forward
to cover low altitude attack approaches.”35 The field manual not
only defined the requirements for aircraft, but also dealt with
their employment. It far surpassed the generalities and untested
theorems of the early ACTS texts and was now firmly rooted in
real planes and capabilities. The A-20—a functional attack air-
craft that easily doubled as a light bomber platform—met the
requirements of both the Army and Air Corps.
Whereas Bombardment advocated high-altitude attacks on
ships, ACFM 1-10 came much closer to the practices actually
used in the SWPA: “Naval objectives free to maneuver are
bombed from the lowest altitude consistent with bombing ac-
curacy and proper security measures. Obviously, the lower the
bombing altitude, the smaller the opportunity of the vessel to
avoid the bombs by maneuver.”36 This, however, remained a
point of contention. Through the 1930s, most of the Air Corps
preferred high-altitude bombardment, but proper high-altitude
employment against ships required large formations of bombers.
If Kenney had been predisposed to maintain this tactic, he would
have found himself hard pressed to do so in the SWPA, if for
no other reason than the limited number of heavy bombers.
The inability to form adequate flights of bombers negated the
tactic of bracketing a surface target within a bombing pattern
to prevent its maneuver and ensure the best odds of a hit.
ACFM 1-10 also defined the methods of attack against smaller
targets: “Minimum altitude attacks with fragmentation bombs,
machine guns, and toxic chemicals are effective against expedi-
tionary forces.”37 These more vulnerable targets included the
“softer” island airdromes all over the Southwest Pacific—pre-
cisely the job for which attack aviation had been designed. It
was no mistake, then, that Kenney most often used light-attack
and medium-bombardment aircraft against these targets. Fur-
thermore, one should note that he did not perceive the lack of
strategic bombers as a showstopper in the early SWPA, seeking
15
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
16
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
Notes
1. Mitchell was certainly not alone, but he had the greatest influence upon
American air leaders in the interwar years.
17
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
18
PREWAR DOCTRINE AND TACTICS
19
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Chapter 2
The SWPA was not the battlefield for which the prewar AAF
had prepared itself. Geographically, the Southwest Pacific was
immense, extending from the Philippines to Australia, north to
south, and from the Solomon Islands to Java, east to west. Be-
fore the war ended, Fifth Air Force would press another 1,000
nautical miles (nm) north to attack the Japanese mainland. If
one considers Darwin, Australia, the lower center of the SWPA,
the eastern edge lay 1,300 nm away, the western edge 1,650
nm, and the northern edge of the Philippines 2,000 nm. By com-
parison, Eighth Air Force’s distance from London to Berlin was
only about 600 miles (fig. 1).
Japan’s industry—hence, its defense—relied on the import
of raw materials to the home islands. This otherwise powerful
21
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
22
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
brought with them. For the AAF, Europe was a perfect proving
ground for their ideas. For this reason, as well as the Europe
First policy, other theaters that did not lend themselves to a
strategic air war had to make do with whatever was left after
the European theater attained full strength.
Far removed from Europe, the command structure in the
SWPA was most assuredly Army-centric. General MacArthur
did not have high regard for his air forces, especially after their
poor performance in the wake of Japan’s initial attacks. Thus,
he was less than inclined to allow airpower a starring role in
his theater. Additionally, a tight coterie of Army officers sur-
rounded MacArthur, creating a barrier between the commander
and anyone outside the inner circle. These staffers routinely
denied AAF officers access and filtered all plans and policies sub-
mitted to the general. They were “a group of loyal and deferen-
tial—critics said sycophantic—subordinates who served as his
key staff officers and assistants throughout the war. . . . The as-
cendancy of ‘the Bataan gang’ was never challenged.”1
The AAF had not endeared itself either to the Army or
MacArthur early on in the Southwest Pacific. It had suffered a
sound defeat in the Philippines and proved almost totally inef-
fective against Japanese shipping targets in the first nine
months of the war—a less than stellar performance. General
Kenney’s assignment to the Southwest Pacific came in direct
response to this situation. In the interim, MacArthur and his
staff developed an almost inherent distrust of the AAF, and ca-
reer Army officers positioned themselves to run the air war:
MacArthur didn’t know anything about airpower—he was not satisfied
with what the Air Force had done for him so far. His first knowledge,
really, was when we got clobbered at Clark Field [Philippines] when the
Japs came in there and busted everything up. And they hadn’t done
much for him ever since then. So he was kind of off the Air Force. Then
his staff—there were two or three guys on the staff that had done a little
flying, you know in a training plane with some pilot in the back seat, and
so they knew all about aviation. They liked to write the orders and they
had been writing the orders. . . . Writing operations orders right down to
detail. Prescribing sizes of bombs and altitudes and all the rest of this
stuff. They didn’t like the Air Force. . . . We were told to go out and do
our flying and shut up. They would build the airdromes as they saw fit.
They would furnish the supplies. They would do all this stuff.2
23
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
24
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
25
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
LUZON
NAUTICAL MILES
MINDANAO
NEW
BORNEO IRELAND
NEW
CELEBES BRITAIN RABAUL
NEW GUINEA SO
LO
MO
BUNA N IS
JAVA LA
ND
PORT MORESBY
S
TIMOR
DARWIN
AUSTRALIA
26
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
27
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
28
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
29
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
30
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
31
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
4,000 feet
2,000 feet
20-second bomb run
32
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
2,000 feet
200–250 mph
200–250 mph
33
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
The B-17s, whose long range worked to their benefit, did the
job but had to compensate in other areas. For one, they flew
largely at night and used diversionary attacks from higher al-
titudes. After all, a single lumbering B-17 just a few hundred
feet above the water made an easy target for antiaircraft fire.
Fifth Air Force could not afford to lose bombers or their crews
34
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
35
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
Yes. I had done some skipping there on land and then had decided—
that—that thing wasn’t quite right, and unless you had a time fuse on
the bomb because, otherwise, the bomb went off just underneath where
the airplane was. So I put the time fuse on there. But for attacking a
land target that didn’t turn out so well, because the bomb proceeded to
bury itself and then all you got was a cloud of dirt coming up when it
went off. So—but on the water, you see, that was just right.25
36
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
37
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
38
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
The truth of the matter is that the first real skip bombing in
the SWPA occurred in the fall of 1942. The 63d BS had been
training for this mission along with the more conventional low-
altitude bomb runs since Major Benn became its commander
on 24 August 1942. The method developed by the squadron
did not attack at mast height and did not aim to place bombs
directly into the hulls of ships—it was true skip bombing:
The bombs would fall anywhere from 60 to 100 feet short of the vessel,
skip into the air, and hit 60 to 100 feet beyond. If perfect, the bomb
would hit the side of the boat [ship] and sink it. At that time, I would
fly directly over the ship, retaining my same airspeed and altitude
[200–220 mph, 200–250 ft.]. With the 4- to 5-second delay fuze in the
bomb, I had time to get away while the bombs sank by the side of the
ship. The explosion underwater often broke the ship in half, and it
created almost immediate fire and explosions.35
39
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
40
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
“I may have had a lot of plans and ideas,” Kenney said later, “but that
attack crystallized one of them, the determination to clear the enemy
off our lawn so we could go across the street and play in his yard.”37
Since the end of World War I, Air Corps theory dictated the
destruction of enemy airpower on the ground and en masse.
To this end, Kenney made a conscious decision to target
Japanese airdromes, the key to the enemy’s chance for air su-
periority; indeed, this mission became a specialty of Fifth Air
Force. Kenney’s tactics relied on the creation of attack aircraft
that were little more than flying gunships. A-20s in particular
had been designed to conduct ground attack in direct support
of troops, but neither the A-20 nor the B-25 had sufficient for-
ward firepower in their original configurations.
Paul “Pappy” Gunn, one of Kenney’s most important lieu-
tenants, essentially redesigned the medium bombers and light
attack aircraft in the SWPA, giving them the forward firepower
that transformed these planes into strafing machines. Strafing
tactics became an integral part of Fifth Air Force’s repertoire.
The secret of forward firepower lay in replacing prewar glass
noses armed with only a single .30- or .50-caliber gun with
metal or painted-over noses that incorporated multiple .50-
caliber machine guns:
Pappy . . . managed to get hold of some 50-caliber machine guns, de-
signed a package mount of four of them, and[,] by rebuilding the entire
nose of an A-20[,] had installed them. He tested the installation him-
self by conducting a one man raid at treetop level on a Jap airdrome
on the north coast of New Guinea [July 1942]. He had done a good job,
too. A couple of Jap airplanes that had just landed had gone up in
smoke, a gasoline dump was left ablaze, and from all the explosions
after Pappy had finished his strafing run, it looked as though he had
also hit an ammunition dump.38
41
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
Wrecked A-20A with modified nose. (AAF photo from Jim Mesko, A-20 Havoc in
Action [Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1983], 19.)
42
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
Pappy Gunn reported that firing the guns had popped some rivets, but
that could be cured with longer blast tubes and stiffer mounts. Kenney
thought the plane looked nose-heavy, and asked Gunn about the cen-
ter of gravity. Pappy’s lined face was impassive: “Oh, the C.G. Hell, we
threw that away to lighten the ship.”
Kenney returned about ten days later, and since the aircraft was still
nose-heavy, it was decided to move the gun packages on each side of
the fuselage back about three feet. They were still popping rivets even
though the fuselage had been stiffened with steel plates, so felt was put
between the plates and the skin to soak up the shock. However, the felt
dried hard after it was wet and the vibration was tremendous. Sponge
rubber was the answer. Every time the troublesome bottom guns were
fired the door that folded up behind the nosewheel fell off, so Kenney set-
tled for the four nose guns, the two on each side, and wanted the top tur-
ret guns fixed so they could be locked to fire forward. He told Gunn to fire
twenty thousand rounds through the installation and if the plane was still
holding together he would put together a squadron.39
Early modification of B-25. (AAF photo from Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelli-
gence, US Army Air Forces, “First Hand Accounts Make Minimum Altitude Bombing
Lessons More Specific,” Impact! 1, no. 3 [June 1943]: 44.)
B-25s in the SWPA had their tail guns and belly turrets re-
moved. After all, the use of low-level tactics eliminated the need
to defend against fighter attacks from below. In addition, any
crew member riding in a belly turret during a raid literally put
43
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
44
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
45
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
46
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
47
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
throughout the war: “We tried incendiary bombs; and they were
pretty good against the type of structure they had in those
places. Their huts are very inflammable [sic] and burn up in a
hurry.”49 Deciding whether or not to use incendiaries became
a matter of matching weapon to target—grass huts and ex-
posed fuel dumps called for such weapons.
Their construction was simple. The “ ‘Kenney Cocktail’ . . .
was a standard M-47 100-pound bomb loaded with white
phosphorus which, when it burst, flung out streamers of
burning incendiary material in all directions for 150 feet [fig. 7].
Its effect upon man and machine was deadly.”50 Even before
the end of 1942, “the Beast,” as Radio Tokyo dubbed Kenney
and his air force, would give the Japanese in the Southwest
Pacific more cause for concern.
48
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
49
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
command. Bringing with him sharp officers and a keen eye for
discerning their talents, Kenney demonstrated his ability to
“think out of the box.” His years as an attack aviator in a
strategically minded Air Corps taught him resourcefulness
and open-mindedness. But perhaps his greatest gift was im-
pressing upon his Airmen the need to be just as creative as
he—and giving them the freedom to do so.
During those first months, Fifth Air Force battled to estab-
lish the offensive, keep the enemy out of the sky, and start the
long process of cutting his vulnerable lines of supply on the
open ocean. Since the AAF had paid very little real attention to
the possibility of battle in the Pacific, Fifth Air Force had to
create its own way of war—and write its own book.
Notes
1. Ronald H. Spector, Eagle against the Sun: The American War with
Japan (New York: Free Press, 1985), 146.
2. Gen George C. Kenney, interview by Col Marvin M. Stanley, 25 Janu-
ary 1967, transcript, 21–22, AFHRA, K 239.0512-747.
3. Spector, Eagle against the Sun, 227.
4. Herman S. Wolk, “George C. Kenney: The Great Innovator,” in Makers
of the United States Air Force, ed. John L. Frisbee (1987; repr., Washington,
DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996), 139–40.
5. Edward Jablonski, Airwar, vol. 2, Tragic Victories (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1971), 13.
6. Lt Col Timothy D. Gann, Fifth Air Force Light and Medium Bomber
Operations during 1942 and 1943: Building the Doctrine and Forces That
Triumphed in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid (Maxwell
AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 30.
7. Steve Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers: The Illustrated Story of Kenney’s
Fifth Air Force (New York: Doubleday, 1977), 8.
8. Air Corps Tactical School, Attack Aviation (Langley Field, VA: ACTS,
1930), 66.
9. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Destroyer
to Battle Wagon: They Can Be and Are Hit,” Impact! 1, no. 1 (April 1943): 8.
10. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in
World War II, vol. 5 (1947; repr., Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 196–97. Mori-
son claims that Navy dive-bombers were responsible for the sinking.
11. Capt William J. Bohnaker, interview, 29 April 1942, transcript, 6,
AFHRA, 142.052.
12. Gann, Fifth Air Force, 3.
13. Bohnaker, interview, 10.
50
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
14. Interestingly, one prewar idea proved very accurate in the SWPA. B-17s
were virtually invincible against fragile Japanese fighters: “The first two
B-17-E’s we sent out were attacked by fifteen Zero fighters. They immediately
started the old trick of coming in and setting on our tail, firing a burst and
dropping off. As you know, the B-17-E’s have twin .50’s in the tail and of the
fifteen Zeros that tried this manoeuver, the two B-17-E’s shot down eleven.”
Ibid., 9. This also helps to explain why B-17s became so valuable in the lone
long-range reconnaissance role throughout the war in the Pacific.
15. James T. Murphy with A. B. Feuer, Skip Bombing (Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers, 1993), 22.
16. Kenney, interview, 7.
17. Murphy, Skip Bombing, 8.
18. Col John Davies, interview, 23 November 1942, transcript, 13,
AFHRA, 142.052.
19. Murphy, Skip Bombing, 30.
20. Ibid., 23–27.
21. Ibid., 42.
22. Headquarters V Bomber Command, Office of the Intelligence Officer,
“Target Report No. 9, Attacks on Rabaul—Lakunai—Vunakanau, 8/10/42
to 20/11/42,” 1942, 8, AFHRA, 732.3331-9.
23. Murphy, Skip Bombing, 68.
24. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Mast-
head Attacks against Shipping,” Air Force General Information Bulletin 13
(July 1943): 22.
25. Kenney, interview, 7–8.
26. Gann, Fifth Air Force, 9. Also described in Max Hastings, Bomber
Command (New York: Dial Press/J. Wade, 1979), 17.
27. Dave Birrell, “Sgt. (Pilot) Albert Stanley Prince: The First of the Ten
Thousand,” 2004, http://www.lancastermuseum.ca/prince.html; and Royal
Air Force, “Royal Air Force Bomber Command 60th Anniversary: Bristol Blen-
heim,” 2002, http://www.raf.mod.uk/bombercommand/aircraft/blenheim.
html (accessed 21 September 2004).
28. Henry Harley Arnold, Global Mission (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1949), 230–31.
29. Training Circular no. 46, Minimum Altitude Attack of Naval Objec-
tives, 25 July 1942, 1.
30. Reprinted in Gann, Fifth Air Force, 9.
31. George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the
Pacific War (1949; repr., Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987),
105.
32. The terms mast height and masthead were used interchangeably
during World War II. I use mast height in this study.
33. “Masthead Attacks against Shipping,” 20.
34. Ibid.
35. Murphy, Skip Bombing, 24.
36. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 105.
51
DECEMBER 1941–NOVEMBER 1942
37. Capt Donald Hough and Capt Elliott Arnold, Big Distance (New York:
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945), 49.
38. George C. Kenney, The Saga of Pappy Gunn (New York: Duell, Sloan
and Pearce, 1959), 48.
39. Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers, 50–51.
40. Davies, interview, 15.
41. Kenney, interview, 8.
42. Al Behrens [of the 822d BS, 38th BG], “Secret Weapon,” in B-25
Mitchell at War, ed. Jerry Scutts (London: Ian Allan, 1983), 51.
43. Maj Richard L. Watson Jr., Air Action in the Papuan Campaign, 21
July 1942 to 23 January 1943, AAF Historical Study no. 17, 1944, 45,
AFHRA.
44. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 93.
45. Air Corps Tactical School, Attack Aviation, 39.
46. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 94.
47. Davies, interview, 6.
48. In General Kenney Reports, Kenney talked about the reaction of the
theater commander: “General MacArthur wanted to know all about the para-
chute frag-bomb attack on the Buna airdrome. I told him of the success and
that I was so sure that it had proved the value of the bomb, I had radioed
Arnold for 125,000 of them. In the meantime, we had started converting our
regular fragmentation bombs to parafrags. That afternoon the General
awarded me a Purple Heart [sic] for meritorious service in developing the
bomb and utilizing it successfully for the first time in warfare” (98).
49. Davies, interview, 10.
50. Jablonski, Airwar, vol. 2, Tragic Victories, 12. For using such weapons,
the text goes on to say that “by the end of 1942 Kenney’s name was known
in Tokyo, whose radio referred to him as ‘the Beast’ and one of the ‘gangster
leaders of a gang of gangsters from a gangster-ridden country’ ” (12–13).
51. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 106.
52
Chapter 3
53
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
bombs and over 4,000 incendiary bombs into and around the
town of Rabaul and its military facilities.1 The vulnerability of the
less-than-hardened targets prompted the use of the large num-
ber of incendiaries. This attack foreshadowed Fifth Air Force’s
city bombing on the island of Formosa and the “fire raids” con-
ducted later in the war by the B-29s of Twentieth Air Force
against cities on the Japanese home islands.
Also in February, the 43d BG attacked the Vanakanau air-
drome near Rabaul with incendiaries and fragmentation bombs.
The strike was part of the ongoing campaign to establish air
superiority by hitting the center of enemy airpower and its sup-
port infrastructure: “It took them three days to repair the run-
way. We did return immediately with seven airplanes to drop
daisy cutters on both ends of the field. Many fires were started
off the northeast end of the runway. The fires became visible
for over 100 miles.”2
Working in coordination with the incendiaries, the crude frag-
mentation bombs known as daisy cutters began to play a larger
role in the war. Such locally modified bombs proved especially ef-
fective against exposed targets like troops, planes, and ma-
chinery. By 1943 the 63d BS and 64th BS (43d BG) had begun
to use them regularly: “The 500-pound bombs were wrapped
with wire and the fuze was set for instantaneous explosion. The
package was the most positive method we had to ensure de-
struction of everything within a hundred yards. . . . The bombs
really did damage [against parked planes on 1 January 1943], as
there were a number of explosions following our bomb impacts.”3
Before Allied forces claimed Buna in January 1943, daisy cut-
ters helped clear out enemy troops. These weapons were ideally
suited for use against soldiers and their light machines. Thou-
sands of fragments from each bomb ripped apart anything ex-
posed within a 100 yards of impact. These attacks represented
not just harassment but full-fledged assault: “The first tactic em-
ployed was the air bombardment of the enemy defense. Bombs
wrapped with wire (‘daisy cutters’) were dropped continuously for
over twenty-four hours,”4 ripping through the soft defensive lines
(and even softer defenders) with ease.
As big bombers tore up the jungles of New Guinea, improve-
ments to medium and light bombers continued. The ability to
54
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
Figure 9. Cutaway view of the B-25G. (Reprinted from North American Avi-
ation, “Train Dispatcher,” Saturday Evening Post, 4 November 1944, 107.)
55
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
off and shoot again.”5 Making its appearance at the same time
low-level tactics really began to find favor in the SWPA, the
cannon held great promise despite limited application: “Both
the cannon in this airplane and the minimum altitude bomb-
ing, furnish us with weapons with which I believe we can make
a decisive turn in the war against the enemy. We have the means
in our hands if we can get enough people educated to the use
of them to take advantage.”6
Fifth Air Force also made significant improvements to de-
fensive firepower between November 1942 and March 1943.
Like the B-25, the B-26 was designed as a medium bomber,
but unlike the B-25, the B-26 primarily remained in that role.
Because the B-26 had no belly turrets—which had been re-
moved from the B-25s to accommodate the low-level mission—
the underside of the B-26 became its greatest vulnerability.
The Japanese were quick to discover and exploit this weak-
ness:
The Jap finally resolved on the idea of coming in at one o’clock and
below, where we had no protection whatsoever. The only tactics to use
against that was to turn into the Zero, and use the .30 calibre gun that
sticks out of the nose, and that worked fairly well—because, when you
banked up to turn into the Zero, your turret could get on him then and
usually hit him. But, then they started in on having a decoy. They would
send two Zeros up front and when one Jap would turn in, and we would
turn into him, the other one would rake us from the bottom. So, to
counteract that, we put in two ball sockets in the nose and made three
guns altogether in the nose. That worked out fairly well, and we knocked
down quite a few of them that way.7
56
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
The challenge did not lie in adding extra firepower to the big
bombers—that proved relatively easy—but in coping with de-
pleted numbers and uncommon targets. Prewar planning had
counted on high-altitude bombers to attack shipping. Despite
the 43d BG’s early success in its attempts at low-altitude and
skip-bombing attacks on ships, official Fifth Air Force doctrine
maintained higher-altitude tactics for its heavy bombers:
Single ships at anchor. The best altitude for horizontal bombing is ap-
proximately 8000–10,000 ft. Bombardment aircraft should fly an ap-
proach course of approximately 30 [degrees] to the fore-and-aft line of
the ship, and drop a stick of eight bombs. . . .
Highly manuevverable [sic] shipping targets. . . . Past experience shows
clearly that the ineffectiveness of B-17 type aircraft bombing attacks
on fast moving enemy shipping has been due largely to the small num-
ber of aircraft bombing one objective. . . . From experience gained in
other theatres (given a greater number of bombers) . . . the bombing
run must be made at from 8000–10,000 feet (underscore in original).9
57
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
58
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
59
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
60
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
61
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
B-25 to make a masthead run with only one gun in the nose, and the
top turret hoping to get in a shot now and then. The first B-25 run on
the convoy was made at 1100 feet. One B-25 crashed into the sea, two
were holed, two had their turret canopies shot away, and they were
forced to jettison their bombs. This demonstration of the potency of Nip
AA caused later runs by B-25s to average over 4300 feet. B-26s averaged
8400 feet for their runs throughout the entire action.21
B-25s drop bombs from 5,300 feet against January Lae convoy. (Reprinted from
Air Evaluation Board, Southwest Pacific Area, “Battle of the Bismarck Sea and De-
velopment of Masthead Attacks,” 1 July 1945, 3, Air Force Historical Research Agency,
Maxwell AFB, AL.)
62
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
This dramatic hit, however, was the only kill of that first at-
tack: “Thus, while 28 heavy bombers had unleashed over 50
tons of bombs, they had sunk but one ship.”23 The second B-17
attack of the day proved more effective. Together, the four
squadrons of the 43d BG claimed five ships. Although trained
in low-level tactics, these B-17s were reticent to use the tactic
without the cover of night and thus attacked from medium al-
titude:
Flying in loose formation, they reached the target area and the first
three planes stayed together. . . . Crossing the ships diagonally the three
Fortresses dropped their bombs, and Scott’s string of four neatly caught
his target, three striking amidship near the funnel and the fourth
63
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
falling in the water. Staley’s first three hit the water, but the fourth landed
on the deck near the bow. Denault’s first hit the stern and the other
three exploded in a row less than forty feet away. The big transport was
lost in a vast puff of smoke and boiling spray, followed by a series of
internal explosions.24
The next day, 3 March, brought the convoy into the range of
all of the bombers. That night, B-25 and A-20 crews prepared
to put practice into action: “Colonel Strickland [3d BG com-
mander] assembled the airmen of his 90th and 89th Squadrons.
He told them he planned to hit the Japanese convoy with skip
bombs in the morning. ‘However, we’re only asking for volun-
teers. Nobody has to fly on a skip bomb [mast-height] run if he
doesn’t want to.’ Nobody declined.”26 Before attacking the con-
voy, A-20s, B-25s, and Australian Beauforts—British-made
light attack aircraft—flew against all Japanese airdromes tasked
with air defense of the convoy: “Twelve B-25’s of the 38th Bomb
Group and twenty light bombers of the Australian 9th Opera-
tional Group suddenly zoomed in at low level over Lae Harbor,
their bellies loaded with frag clusters and napalms. The abrupt
arrival of low-level enemy planes completely surprised the Lae
garrison. Not a man was in his antiaircraft gunpit and not a
single fighter plane was in the air to meet the aerial in-
vaders.”27
Knocking out these airdromes helped establish local air su-
periority and afforded significant freedom of action to the convoy
64
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
65
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
Cargo vessel under attack from 6,000 feet. (AAF photo from Assistant Chief of Air
Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Battle of the Bismarck Sea,” Impact! 1, no.
2 [May 1943]: 5.)
66
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
67
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
68
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
69
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
Cargo vessel under attack at mast height. (AAF photo from “Battle of the Bismarck
Sea,” Impact! 1, no. 2 [May 1943]: 8.)
70
Table. Bomb strikes during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea
MEDIUM ALTITUDE
63 B-17 2 21 50 x 1,000 6 12
22 A-20 1 5 10 x 250 2 10
10 x 500
MASTHEAD ALTITUDE
89 A-20 1 12 20 x 500 12 60
7 56 137 48 35
Adapted from Air Evaluation Board, Southwest Pacific Area, “Battle of the Bismarck Sea and Development
of Masthead Attacks,” 1 July 1945, 47, Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, AL.
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
Notes
1. George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pa-
cific War (1949; repr., Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 192.
2. James T. Murphy with A. B. Feuer, Skip Bombing (Westport, CT:
Praeger Publishers, 1993), 95.
3. Ibid., 81.
4. Ibid., 84.
5. Brig Gen Howard C. Davidson, interview, 26 February 1943, tran-
script, 1, AFHRA, 142.052.
6. Ibid., 3–4.
7. Maj Dill Ellis, interview, 22 May 1943, transcript, 4, AFHRA, 142.052.
8. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 182.
9. Fifth Air Force, “B-17 and B-24 Bombing Attacks—Shipping,” Tactical
Bulletin, no. 1 (20 February 1943): n.p., Bolling AFB, Washington, DC, file
A7474 (index 0479).
72
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
73
NOVEMBER 1942–MARCH 1943
74
Chapter 4
MINDANAO 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
NAUTICAL MILES
NEW
IRELAND
Balikpapan (But, Dagua, and
Babo Borum Airfields) Bismarck Rabaul
CELEBES Wewak Sea
Cape Gloucester
NEW GUINEA
Marilinan NEW
BRITAIN
Dobodura
Port Moresby
TIMOR
AUSTRALIA
75
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
76
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
77
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
78
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
100-pound parademo bomb with nose fuse and tail-mounted chute. (Reprinted
from Headquarters Fifth Air Force, “Ordnance Technical Report Number 7: Fuze,
Bomb, Nose, S-1 Four to Five Second Delay,” 1945, 9.)
79
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
The big cannon boomed, the B-25 shuddered, and the Japanese plane
burst into smoking wreckage. A second shell exploded among a group
of about fifteen Japanese.14
80
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
81
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
82
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
83
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
84
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
85
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
Figure 11. Matching tactic to target. (Reprinted from Assistant Chief of Air
Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Masthead Attacks against Ship-
ping,” Air Force General Information Bulletin 13 [July 1943]: 23.)
1943 the use of medium bombers and light attack aircraft led
to the semiautonomous resurrection of mast-height bombing
and direct hull penetration. After the Battle of the Bismarck
Sea, these lessons were finally solidified into low-altitude brack-
eting—the amalgamation of skip bombing and mast-height at-
tacks.
Bracketing sought to perform both a skip-bombing and mast-
height attack simultaneously. The pilot toggled the first bomb
short of the aiming point so that it would skip to the vessel, or,
if he misjudged the aiming point, the bomb would penetrate the
86
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
87
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
88
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
getting to Lae. While the low-altitude boys were shooting up the barges,
the escorting P-38 fighters had bagged nineteen Jap aircraft. The week’s
work had cost us one B-25, and two P-38s had been damaged.
The hunt continued, and during the following ten days the Japs had
another 125 to 150 barges destroyed or out of action. The kids were
beginning to complain, however, that the Nip was not replacing his
barges fast enough to keep them supplied with targets.31
Attack aviation is an integral part of any Air Force. For ground support it
plays a distinctive role, a role which no other type of aviation can usurp.
But low altitude operations are not limited only to ground support. It has
a definite and destructive part to play in any aerial offensive. At low al-
titude, attack aviation has no rival for engine efficiency, speed and ma-
neuverability, devastating strafing power, accurate placing of parachute
fragmentation bombs, and elusion of radar detection. Hence, attack
aviation provides terrific striking power with maximum safety.33
89
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
90
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
Fifth Air Force scored an almost total victory that day, be-
ginning five days of domination. This first, most important low-
altitude strike encountered ideal conditions: as General Kenney
related, the Japanese airplanes were crowded together and in
the process of assembling for their own attack. The exposed
assets—bomb-laden airplanes, ground crews, fuel drums, and
so forth—proved easy targets for the parafrags and .50-caliber
gunfire, exactly the type of attack for which the modified B-25
was created. During the first day’s action, about 30 B-25s
armed with parafrags and machine guns destroyed an esti-
mated 120 aircraft at three separate airdromes: “We found out
that the Japs referred to the attack as ‘the Black Day of Au-
gust 17th’ and that they had lost over 150 aircraft, with prac-
tically all the flight crews and around three hundred more
ground personnel killed. All our P-38s and strafers returned to
their home airdromes.”38
Without the element of surprise, the following days could
not compare to 17 August, but they were deadly to the Japanese
nevertheless. On 18 August, about 50 B-25s escorted by al-
most 100 P-38s attacked the Wewak area, setting ablaze three
1,500-ton ships and sinking several barges in the harbor.
Using the same tactics as they did the day before, Fifth Air
Force planes destroyed approximately 80 Japanese aircraft on
the ground and in the air (about 65 of them destroyed by B-25s)
at the cost of two B-25s and one P-38. On 20 August, about
25 B-24s substituted for the B-25s, and their 45 P-38 escorts
destroyed 20 enemy fighters, with one B-24 shot down. On 21
August, the final day of the attack, 20 B-25s and 60 P-38s
went in again, the former destroying 35 enemy planes on the
ground, and the latter claiming another 35.39 These attacks
“resulted in a total of 309 enemy aircraft destroyed or crippled
(208 on the ground and 81 in combat [sic]), with a loss of only
10 allied planes.”40 Even in the unlikely event that these fig-
ures are off by as much as 25 percent, the results are still
91
Line-abreast, staggered-altitude B-25s strafing Wewak area. (AAF photo from
Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Battle of the Bismarck
Sea,” Impact! 2, no. 2 [February 1944]: 29.)
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
Notes
1. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, “Standing Operating
Procedure for Attack Aviation in Close Support: Southwest Pacific Area,”
1943, 16, Air Force History Support Office, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC,
file no. 710.4501.
2. Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, 1943, 10.
3. Ibid., 12.
4. Steve Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers: The Illustrated Story of Kenney’s
Fifth Air Force (New York: Doubleday, 1977), 64.
5. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in
World War II, vol. 4, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July
1944 (1950; repr., Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 161.
6. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, “Standing Operating
Procedure,” 9.
7. Craven and Cate, Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, 157.
93
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
94
MARCH 1943–AUGUST 1943
Attack Group were actually part of the 3d Bomb Group. The two units were
one and the same.
25. Ibid., 3.
26. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Mini-
mum Altitude Attacks,” 6.
27. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Mast-
head Attacks against Shipping,” Air Force General Information Bulletin 13
(July 1943): 23.
28. Headquarters Advanced Echelon, Fifth Air Force, Office of the A-2,
“Effective Attack on Japanese Barges,” 13 July 1943, Bolling AFB, Wash-
ington, DC, file A7491 (index 0389).
29. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Mini-
mum Altitude Attacks,” 6.
30. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Japanese
Barges,” Informational Intelligence Summary 43, no. 41 (20 August 1943): 2–3.
31. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 275.
32. In fact, because of their inferior range, the prewar A-20s did not par-
ticipate in the attacks on Wewak.
33. Third Attack Group, “Exchange of Information,” 9–10.
34. Lt Col Timothy D. Gann, Fifth Air Force Light and Medium Bomber
Operations during 1942 and 1943: Building the Doctrine and Forces That
Triumphed in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid (Maxwell
AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 24.
35. Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers, 91.
36. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Naval Analysis Division, In-
terrogations of Japanese Officials, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Government Print-
ing Office, 1946), 407.
37. Kenney, General Kenney Reports, 277.
38. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “De-
struction of Enemy Planes at Wewak,” Informational Intelligence Summary
43, no. 43 (10 September 1943): 2; and Kenney, General Kenney Reports,
278.
39. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “De-
struction of Enemy Planes,” 2; and Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence,
US Army Air Forces, “309 Planes Destroyed on Wewak Fields in Five Days,”
Impact! 1, no. 7 (October 1943): 2–3.
40. Jack H. Bozung, ed., The 5th over the Southwest Pacific (Los Angeles:
AAF Publications Company, n.d.), 4.
95
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Chapter 5
97
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
The period from August 1943 to June 1944 was one of refine-
ment since Fifth Air Force had already adopted most of the
theater-specific tactics it needed in the SWPA (e.g., mast-height
attacks, airdrome raids, strafing, and so forth). During the year
and a half that transpired between the first Wewak raids and the
shift to the Philippines, the Fifth emphasized logistical and tacti-
cal fortification rather than innovation.
The successful attacks on the Wewak airdromes established
the capability of Fifth Air Force over enemy airfields just as the
Battle of the Bismarck Sea had established American domi-
nance over the enemy’s sea-lanes. Kenney’s air force was be-
coming MacArthur’s weapon of choice. Naval power in the
Southwest Pacific under MacArthur’s command played only a
limited role in New Guinea, and his ground troops had to fight
bitterly for every inch of jungle terrain. Only the air forces of-
fered unique freedom of movement and an increasingly perva-
sive mastery of their own element.
By the time of the attacks on Wewak, operations involving the
air arm were common in New Guinea: “Land operations were
planned in conjunction with the Wewak Raid but not until two
weeks afterward and in an area well to the south [Lae/Nadzab].
By detaching air campaigns from the ground effort, Kenney and
Whitehead elevated air power to a position of ‘greatest among
equals’ in the SWPA. MacArthur affirmed the preeminence of
the Fifth Air Force when he declared that ‘the purpose of his
surface operations was to advance his bomb line.’”1
Since logistics remained a limiting factor in the Southwest
Pacific, Kenney operated with just a fraction of the planes and
personnel he needed—he had only “one light, three medium
and three heavy bomb groups” at his disposal.2 The number of
groups grew in 1944, but Fifth Air Force continued to com-
pensate for the small number of bombers with specialized tac-
tics and weapons.
The 75 mm cannon still provoked disagreement in the SWPA.
Throughout the war, opinions about the cannon-equipped B-25
shifted back and forth. Although the 75 mm shells did little
damage to most shipping, at least one report claims that they
worked well against smaller land targets:
98
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
We found that the cannon was more precise than a bomb for some tar-
gets, particularly bridges. The supply roads over the hills were only
two-lane dirt tracks for most of the way, but occasionally they had to
cross a small ravine or stream. A small bridge between 25 and 50ft
long is not a very big target when you’re making a sighting run from
more than a mile away at treetop height of 50–70ft, but the 75mm gave
us the opportunity of getting off anything from 3–10 rounds before we
were too close in. Then we would start .50 cal strafing, winding up by
toggling out whatever bombs we carried.3
99
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
100
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
101
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
Smoke and fire protect Rabaul Harbor raid. (AAF photo from Edward Jablonski,
Airwar, vol. 3, Outraged Skies [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971], 35.)
102
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
103
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
bomber formations fly harmless patterns over the field.] The fourth day
the planes came again. They circled over the ridge in formation. They
stayed there for their fifteen minutes. But they didn’t go off on any mis-
sion. They opened their bombay [sic] doors suddenly and from the low
altitude of four thousand feet they dropped sixty-four one-thousand-
pound bombs. Thirty-two tons of explosives on an area three hundred
yards long and seventy-five yards wide. And then the infantry attacked.
When they reached the ridge they waited. Not a shot was fired at them.
They clambered onto the ridge. There were one hundred dead Japs
sprawled on the ground. There were seventy-five more who were alive,
but they were motionless, stunned.13
104
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
Figure 13. Airdrome attack with covered flanks. (Reprinted from Assis-
tant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Tactics of Medium
Bombardment Units [Southwest Pacific Area],” Informational Intelligence
Summary 43, no. 51 [30 November 1943]: 3.)
105
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
Machine guns on an A-20G. (AAF photo from Jim Mesko, A-20 Havoc in Action
[Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1983], 44.)
the demonstration it was the consensus of Tom and the 312th ob-
servers, as well as Pappy Gunn (though reluctantly) that the spirit of
the A-20 was willing but the body (frame) was unable to accommodate
the tremendous recoil vibrations of such an arsenal.16
106
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
taken for granted. They were a skill that demanded not only
practice, but also careful execution. The closing months of the
New Guinea campaign would pale in comparison to the up-
coming battles. Fifth Air Force would have to renew its focus
on the procedures of low-altitude tactics.
Less affected were low-altitude attacks against shipping. Fifth
Air Force was close to converting to or receiving every B-25
and A-20 in the strafer/commerce-destroyer configuration in
late 1943. As in the months following the Battle of the Bis-
marck Sea, late 1943/early 1944 became a period of tactical
solidification. These tactics effectively closed New Guinea to
resupply and essentially sealed its fate: “The Nips could not at-
tempt any movement of major shipping into the area for we
had established an air blockade over the place. . . . The air
force can establish a complete blockade of an area which must
depend for its supplies by sea which, of course, is the case on
practically every Jap base in the area.”18
Typically, Fifth Air Force medium bombers and light attack-
ers approached shipping targets in two-plane elements, which
allowed maximum maneuverability during the attack. They
flew between and around ships, waiting for the opportunity to
strike. Staying out of a ship’s weapons range, the attacking
planes resembled stalking wolves.
Turning into a target, the planes opened up with heavy
machine-gun fire to disable a ship’s defenses. One plane lined
up for a bomb release while the other covered with machine-
gun fire. Three-plane elements were used occasionally but not
often. Despite additional firepower, “a three-plane element
cannot make a quick, sharp turn to the right or left and, there-
fore, has very limited maneuverability. . . . In the two-plane ele-
ment, on the other hand, each aircraft can, if necessary, make
a full turn.”19
The two-plane elements proved especially effective against
warships (fig. 14). Because of these ships’ heavier firepower,
the aircraft used a bow or stern approach, which effectively re-
duced the number of hull-penetrating hits since the narrow
aspect offered a smaller target. But by attacking a heavily de-
fended warship from the front or rear instead of the broadside,
the planes minimized the amount of antiaircraft fire brought
107
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
108
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
109
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
Figure 15. Diversionary feints. (Reprinted from Assistant Chief of Air Staff, In-
telligence, US Army Air Forces, “Minimum Altitude Attacks on Japanese Ship-
ping,” Informational Intelligence Summary 43, no. 54 [20 December 1943]: 4.)
110
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
111
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
C-47s deliver paratroops to Nadzab under the cover of an A-20 smoke screen.
(AAF photo from Edward Jablonski, Airwar, vol. 3, Outraged Skies [Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1971], 29.)
112
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
113
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
114
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
115
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
116
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
Notes
1. Lt Col Timothy D. Gann, Fifth Air Force Light and Medium Bomber Opera-
tions during 1942 and 1943: Building the Doctrine and Forces That Triumphed
in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air
University Press, 1993), 31.
2. Steve Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers: The Illustrated Story of Kenney’s
Fifth Air Force (New York: Doubleday, 1977), 109.
3. Al Behrens, “Secret Weapon,” in B-25 Mitchell at War, ed. Jerry Scutts
(London: Ian Allan, 1983), 51.
4. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “A Bulls-
eye by Cannon Packing B-25,” Impact! 2, no. 3 (March 1944): 31.
5. Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers, 205.
6. Gen George C. Kenney to Gen H. H. Arnold, letter, 6 November 1943, 6,
AFHRA, 706.311.
7. Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers, 154.
8. Ibid., 206.
9. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Kenney
Cocktails,” Impact! 2, no. 1 (January 1944): 10.
10. Kenney to Arnold, letter, 1.
11. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Ken-
ney Cocktails,” 10.
12. Headquarters V Bomber Command, Office of the Ordnance Officer,
“First Phase Recommendations on Bomb Loading for Various Primary Tar-
gets,” 18 April 1944, 1, AFHRA, 732.804-1.
13. Capt Donald Hough and Capt Elliott Arnold, Big Distance (New York:
Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945), 142–45.
14. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Tactics
of Medium Bombardment Units (Southwest Pacific Area),” Informational In-
telligence Summary 43, no. 51 (30 November 1943): 3.
15. Jim Mesko, A-20 Havoc in Action (Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal
Publications, 1983), 42.
16. Russell L. Sturzebecker, The Roarin’ 20’s: A History of the 312th Bom-
bardment Group, U.S. Army Air Force, World War II (West Chester, PA: Sturze-
becker, 1976), 83–84.
17. Capt Rignal W. Baldwin, interview, 28 September 1944, transcript, 2,
AFHRA, 706.609.
18. “Interview with Lt Colonel Harold Brown, 5 November 1943,” Infor-
mational Intelligence Summary 43, no. 50 (20 November 1943): 15 –17.
19. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Mini-
mum Altitude Attacks on Japanese Shipping,” Informational Intelligence
Summary 43, no. 53 (20 December 1943): 4.
20. Ibid.
117
AUGUST 1943 – JUNE 1944
21. Ibid.
22. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces,
“Medium Bomber Attacks against Shipping (China Theater),” Informational
Intelligence Summary 43, no. 54 (30 December 1943): 11.
23. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Our
Bombs Whittle Down Jap Shipping,” Impact! 2, no. 3 (March 1944): 26. The
US Strategic Bombing Survey confirms these results, but for November and
December combined—not just December.
24. V Bomber Command, “Intelligence Report of Operations, September
3–16 1943, Lae Area,” 1, AFHRA, 732.307-1.
25. Ibid., 1–20.
26. Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers, 113.
27. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Flying
Claws Close on Japs,” Impact! 1, no. 9 (December 1943): 2.
28. Kenney to Arnold, letter, 2.
29. Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers, 159.
30. George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the
Pacific War (1949; repr., Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987),
380.
31. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Hol-
landia,” Impact! 2, no. 5 (May 1944): 22.
32. Ibid., 23.
33. Col Rinsuka Kaneko, interview by Cdr T. H. Moorer, in United States
Strategic Bombing Survey, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, vol. 2 (Wash-
ington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), 407.
118
Chapter 6
The first priority of the battle for New Guinea, which lasted
over two-and-a-half years, was the establishment and mainte-
nance of air superiority. Isolation of the battlefield became the
second priority. Although Fifth Air Force aircraft hit a few strate-
gic targets during the campaign, the battle was essentially a tac-
tical one. The move to the Philippine Islands and on toward
Japan opened the scope of war for the Fifth. Strategic targets
such as the industrial complexes on Formosa now lay within
bomber range. Combined with a new set of tactical targets and
challenges, the last year of the war was an appropriate finale for
the Fifth (fig. 16).
The battle for the Philippines and Formosa, almost out of
necessity, utilized old tactics and weapons in a new campaign
with new rules. Fifth Air Force saw formidable convoys for the
first time since the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Airdrome raids
remained much the same, but a substantial interdiction cam-
paign would have to supplement the ground-support mission. In
many ways, the campaign sparked a new spirit of innovation and
highlighted a pressing need to revitalize older tactics.
The debate over the cannon-equipped B-25 had raged almost
as long as the war itself. By the end of 1944, the machine gun
had finally prevailed over the cannon: “The B-25Hs were being
turned in. The cannon in the nose, despite the efforts of our ord-
nance and engineering departments, caused too much vibration.
In their stead, we were getting planes with twelve fixed forward
firing fifties [B-25Js].”1 The cannon had met with some success,
but Fifth Air Force preferred forward-firing .50-caliber guns. Air-
crews valued the volume of fire offered by these machine guns
more than the precision of the cannon. Three to five hits by the
relatively small 75 mm shell in a typical run could not compare
to the hail of bullets that destroyed a lightly armored target and
kept all enemy gunners ducking for cover. The cannon proved
very successful elsewhere in the world but never truly caught on
in the Southwest Pacific.
119
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
JAPAN
Okinawa
Kiirun
Amoy
FORMOSA
Takao
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
NAUTICAL MILES
LUZON
Clark Airdrome
Manila PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS
Ormoc Bay
MINDANAO
BORNEO
CELEBES
Ceram
NEW GUINEA
120
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
A-26 Invader. (AAF photo from Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air
Forces, “An Airscoop for Mr. Ripley,” Impact! 2, no. 6 [June 1944]: 36.)
121
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
Figure 17. Multiple armament packages for the A-26. (Reprinted from As-
sistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “An Airscoop for Mr.
Ripley,” Impact! 2, no. 6 [June 1944]: 37.)
122
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
Fuse timing was not the only issue. Released below 60 feet, the
small parafrags didn’t have time to achieve proper impact angles
before striking the ground. In addition to giving the attacking air-
craft time to escape its own weapons effects, the small parachute
was designed to change the weapon’s impact angle so that the
fuse striker plate hit at an almost perpendicular angle. Anything
less, and the parafrag could easily malfunction.
123
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
124
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
125
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
Figure 18. Parademo: bent fins stop vane, prevent arming. (Reprinted
from Headquarters Fifth Air Force, “Ordnance Technical Report Number 6:
Parachute Demolition Bombs, Fourth Report,” 1945, 6.)
126
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
127
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
500-pound parademo with nose fuse, two adapter plates, and four chutes.
(Reprinted from Headquarters Fifth Air Force, “Parachute Demolition Bombs, Fourth Re-
port,” 1945, 9.)
128
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
129
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
130
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
Figure 19. Strikes on Formosa. (Reprinted from Brig Gen J. V. Crabb, Fifth
Air Force Air War against Japan: September 1942–August 1945 [n.p.: 1946],
plate 6.)
Kenney’s forces moved into Okinawa, but by then it was too late
to have any great effect upon the outcome of the war.
Herein lies perhaps one of the great ironies of World War II.
Just as Fifth Air Force and the rest of the Far East Air Forces
found themselves on the verge of opening a truly strategic cam-
paign, the AAF denied them the opportunity in favor of Twenti-
eth Air Force. After years of slogging out a tactical war, fighting
to protect Australia and its neighbors from the Japanese by
virtue of nonstrategic missions, Fifth Air Force saw the heavy
bombers given to a new numbered air force well outside of its ju-
risdiction. Most public and Air Force attention on the Pacific air
war now focused squarely on the strategic missions of the B-29s.
131
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
B-32 Dominator. (AAF photo from Steve Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers [New York: Dou-
bleday, 1977], 288.)
Regardless of the B-29 decision, Fifth Air Force fought the re-
mainder of the war with distinction. With the invasion of the
Philippines, low-altitude work again took center stage. The
Philippines campaign tied Fifth Air Force’s bombers closely to the
ground offensive:
They just paralyzed all movement on all the roads, and there wasn’t a lo-
comotive in the Philippines that was running; they were all full of holes.
They blew up railroad tracks and destroyed bridges. The armored
crowd—of course, their particular target for a while was Yamashita’s ar-
mored division, which we didn’t want to get moving around, because an
armored division is a nuisance to have fiddling around with your ad-
vance—and their armored division never moved. It was stopped right
where it parked.18
132
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
133
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
After the attacks on Clark, Fifth Air Force turned its attention
to Formosa: “The first Heavy strike on FORMOSA by the 5th Air
Force was carried out on the 22nd [of January 1945] when 21
Liberators of the 22nd Bomb Group bombed HEITO Airbase at
1245/I dropping 105 half-tonners at assembly area scoring
approx 69 hits. At least 6 large fires were started with black and
red smoke to 7000 feet and huge explosions were caused.”24
High-altitude heavy bombers carried out many of the attacks on
Formosa’s industrial capability, but low-level bombers accom-
panied them on a fair number of coordinated raids. Low-level
attackers had performed a similar role months before on the
island of Ceram. The fact that Fifth Air Force also targeted air-
craft on Formosa accounted for the marked decrease in the
enemy air garrison’s strength on the island: “A steady decrease
[in aircraft strength] was due mainly to the continuous daily
attacks from the PHILIPPINES based landplanes on bases in
FORMOSA.”25 The low-level attacks also destroyed Formosa’s
rail system and shipping.
134
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
135
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
136
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
137
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
138
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
enemy shipping was reported off Hong Kong on April 5 the B-25s left Lin-
gayen, followed thirty minutes later by Colonel Ellis with his three A-20s.
. . . While his wingmen attacked the escorts, Ellis sank a cargo ship in
shallow water, and one of the escorts was dead in the water and the other
was damaged before the A-20s went home. When Kenney heard the story
he didn’t know whether to reprimand Ellis or decorate him.33
Generally, the tactics were the same as they had been for the
past two years: “The strike force is divided into two waves of 12
airplanes each. The second wave will take off 15–20 minutes
after the first wave. Thus, the first wave can search and locate
the convoy, saving the second wave vital gas supply and in-
creasing its potential time over the target.”34 Like the goal of the
medium-altitude attacks during the Battle of the Bismarck Sea,
the first wave killed what it could and dispersed the rest for
easier dispatch: “If this primary run is effective, the vessels will
usually be dispersed, confused, damaged or straggling—an easy
prey to a methodical follow-up attack on single ships.”35
Within a matter of months, the Fifth had effectively cut off the
area around Formosa to shipping: “By the end of January, large
ships could only come to KIIRUN, and coast traffic around
FORMOSA was limited to very small craft moving at night.
TAKAO was completely closed to large ships. . . . The attacks on
small boats plying between the PESCADORES and FORMOSA
Area at night were very severe.”36
Fifth Air Force encountered vital targets all along the Japa-
nese supply system. Essentially, Kenney had the opportunity to
attack the source, route, and destination of supply within a few
months of each other. Thus, the Fifth launched coordinated
assaults against the Netherlands East Indies that focused on the
Japanese source of supply. Oil, metals, refineries, rubber, and so
forth all lay within about a 1,000-mile radius at the southern
end of Japanese control. Although Kenney could not attack with
either the frequency or volume he would have liked (hence his
pleadings for the B-29), Fifth Air Force kept the islands under
constant pressure.
Fifth (and Fourteenth) Air Force attacks on Formosa, a major
Japanese industrial and airdrome center, aimed to eliminate the
kamikaze threat to the American Navy and destroy industries
such as the sugarcane refineries, capable of producing large
quantities of fuel for the Japanese. Again, the Fifth chose to use
139
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
B-25 attacking Japanese warship, Amoy area. (AAF photo from Edward Jablonski,
Airwar, vol. 3, Outraged Skies [Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971], 39.)
140
National Air and Space Museum
Parafrags and .50-caliber casings fall toward Mitsubishi Ki-21 “Sally” bomber,
Boerce Island
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
USAF photo
By the summer of 1945, Fifth Air Force had helped cut Japan
off from most of its supply and external industrial system. The
final year of the air war proved that Kenney’s air force was as
willing and capable as any to conduct a strategic campaign.
Staging out of newly captured Okinawa, the Fifth began to press
home limited attacks against Japan itself. It had taken nearly
four years, but Kenney’s planes had reached Japan.
The final months of World War II were both a challenge and an
affirmation for Fifth Air Force. No one guaranteed that the tac-
tics created or adapted in the battle for New Guinea would work
outside that small piece of the war. In essence, the Fifth found a
totally different war when it left New Guinea. The final push for
Japan became a far more dynamic battle than the one for New
Guinea: ground support was faster paced, naval convoys were
bigger, and the opportunity to conduct major strategic strikes
appeared for the first time. The transition was difficult and had
142
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
cost lives, but Fifth Air Force met the challenge with the same
adaptability that had seen it through the earlier campaigns.
Notes
1. John C. Hanna and William R. Witherell, eds., Warpath: The Story of the
345th Bombardment Group in World War II (San Angelo, TX: Newsfoto Publish-
ing Co., 1946), 44.
2. Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces
in World War II, vol. 5, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to Au-
gust 1945 (1948; new imprint, Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History,
1983), 336.
3. 19th Historical Unit, “Napalm,” 1945, 1, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC,
file A7491 (index 0434).
4. Brig Gen J. V. Crabb, Fifth Air Force Air War against Japan: September
1942–August 1945 (n.p.: 1946), 26.
5. Russell L. Sturzebecker, The Roarin’ 20’s: A History of the 312th Bom-
bardment Group, U.S. Army Air Force, World War II (West Chester, PA: Sturze-
becker, 1976), 174.
6. V Bomber Command, “A-2 Periodic Reports,” report no. 21, 21 January
1945, 2, AFHRA, 732.606 1–25 Jan 1945.
7. 19th Historical Unit, “Napalm,” 1.
8. Headquarters Fifth Air Force, “Ordnance Technical Report Number 6:
Parachute Demolition Bombs, Fourth Report,” 1945, 1, Bolling AFB, Washing-
ton, DC, file A7491 (index 0066).
9. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Jap Opin-
ion of AAF Bombing Tactics,” Informational Intelligence Summary 44, no. 26 (20
August 1944): 3.
10. Ibid., 4.
11. Headquarters Fifth Air Force, “Ordnance Technical Report Number 7:
Fuze, Bomb, Nose, S-1 Four-to-Five Second Delay,” 1945, 5, Bolling AFB,
Washington, DC, file A7491 (index 0101).
12. Headquarters Fifth Air Force, “Ordnance Technical Report Number
6,” 9.
13. V Bomber Command, “A-2 Periodic Reports,” report no. 151, 31 May
1945, 3, AFHRA, 732.606 16–31 May 1945.
14. V Bomber Command, “A-2 Periodic Reports,” report no. 22, 22 January
1945, 2, AFHRA, 732.606 1–25 Jan 1945.
15. V Bomber Command, “A-2 Periodic Reports,” report no. 15, 15 January
1945, 3, AFHRA, 732.606 1–25 Jan 1945.
16. V Bomber Command, “A-2 Periodic Reports,” report no. 91, 1 April
1945, 3, AFHRA, 732.606 1–15 Apr 1945.
17. George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pa-
cific War (1949; repr., Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987), 342.
18. Gen George C. Kenney, interview by Col Marvin M. Stanley, 25 January
1967, transcript, 36, AFHRA, K239.0512-747.
143
JUNE 1944 – SEPTEMBER 1945
19. V Bomber Command, “A-2 Periodic Reports,” report no. 77, 18 March
1945, 4, AFHRA, 732.606 16–31 Mar 1945.
20. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “FEAF in
the Philippines Campaign,” Impact! 3, no. 3 (March 1945): 45.
21. Crabb, Fifth Air Force Air War, 24.
22. Steve Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers: The Illustrated Story of Kenney’s Fifth
Air Force (New York: Doubleday, 1977), 250.
23. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “FEAF in
the Philippines Campaign,” 46.
24. V Bomber Command, “A-2 Periodic Reports,” report no. 23, 23 January
1945, 1, AFHRA, 732.606 1–25 Jan 1945.
25. Rear Adm Shigetada Horuichi, interview by Capt Teller Steadman, 30
October 1945, in United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Interrogations of
Japanese Officials, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1946), 196.
26. Capt Rignal W. Baldwin, interview, 28 September 1944, transcript, 3,
AFHRA, 706.609.
27. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Pacific
Milestones,” Impact! 3, no. 4 (April 1945): 35.
28. Samuel Eliot Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in
World War II, vol. 7 (1947; repr., Boston: Little, Brown, 1984), 352.
29. Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers, 232.
30. Ibid., 276.
31. Bill Goodrich, “Have Guns, Will Travel,” in B-25 Mitchell at War, ed.
Jerry Scutts (London: Ian Allan, 1983), 87.
32. V Bomber Command, “A-2 Periodic Reports,” report no. 89, 30 March
1945, 2, AFHRA, 732.606 16–31 Mar 1945.
33. Birdsall, Flying Buccaneers, 279.
34. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “The 5th
Air Force Keeps Davy Jones Busy,” Impact! 3, no. 6 (June 1945): 9.
35. Ibid.
36. Horuichi, interview, 196.
37. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence, US Army Air Forces, “Formosa,”
Impact! 3, no. 8 (August 1945): 40.
144
Epilogue
145
EPILOGUE
146
EPILOGUE
147
EPILOGUE
148
EPILOGUE
149
EPILOGUE
Notes
1. Quoted in Herman S. Wolk, “George C. Kenney: The Great Innovator,”
in Makers of the United States Air Force, ed. John L. Frisbee (1987; repr.,
Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1996), 145.
2. Military Analysis Division, United States Strategic Bombing Survey,
The Fifth Air Force in the War against Japan (Washington, DC: Government
Printing Office, 1947), 3.
3. Quoted in Lt Col Timothy D. Gann, Fifth Air Force Light and Medium
Bomber Operations during 1942 and 1943: Building the Doctrine and Forces
That Triumphed in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid
(Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 30.
150
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159
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160
Index
161
INDEX
Air War Plans Division, 16, 26 cannon, 75 mm, 55, 79, 81, 98–99
Air War Plans Division, Plan 1 (AWPD-1), Ceram, island of, 134
26 Chennault, Claire, 9
antiaircraft artillery, fire, etc., 6, 8 –9, 27, Clark Field, Philippines, 23, 133
34, 45–47, 49, 59, 64–67, 82, 90, 101, close air support, 132
104, 106 –9, 111, 138, 140 Cold War, 130, 149
antishipping, 8, 28, 31, 39–40, 58, control of the air, 9, 11, 41
60–61, 75, 84, 104, 135, 137, 145
Army, 1–7, 10–17, 22–23, 37, 41–43, 46, daisy cutter, 49, 54
66, 86, 89–90, 92–93, 97, 105, 108, Darwin, Australia, 21
110, 121–22, 130, 146, 148–49 Dobodura airdrome, New Guinea, 77
Army Air Forces (AAF), 1–2, 5, 13, 17, doctrine, 1–19, 22, 25, 28, 31, 35, 39–40,
21–25, 31, 41–43, 50, 66, 70, 76 –77, 53, 57, 77, 89, 145, 147–48
85, 92, 102, 106, 109–10, 112, 121, Douhet, Giulio, 2
130 –32, 140, 145, 147–48
Eglin Army Airfield, Florida, 37–39, 85
Arnold, Henry “Hap,” 24, 36 –37, 39, 44,
Eighth Air Force, 21, 148
47, 83, 85, 129–30
atomic weapons, 149 Europe, 10, 13, 17, 22–25, 76, 129–30,
attack aviation, 1, 3–7, 9–11, 14 –16, 24, 145, 148–49
31, 38, 89 European theater, 23, 126, 147
Australia, 14, 21–22, 25 –27, 29, 31, 42, Europe First policy, 22–23
49, 78, 81, 83, 131 Far East Air Forces, 26, 116, 131
Axis, 16 FDR [Franklin Delano Roosevelt], 16
Babo, New Guinea, 78 Fifth Air Force, 139
Balikpapan, Borneo, 81 Fifth Bomber Command, 27, 35, 47, 93,
barge hunt, 88 111, 130, 135
Battle of the Bismarck Sea, 53, 58, 61–63, First Provisional Air Brigade, 2
66, 68 –72, 75, 79, 82–84, 86 – 89, 92, flexibility, 12, 16–17, 25, 77, 125,
98, 104, 107, 111, 113 – 14, 119, 147–48
135 – 36, 139, 145 – 46 Formosa, 54, 103, 119, 122, 129–31,
Benn, William, 31, 38 –39 134–36, 139, 146
Biak Island, 103, 116 forward firepower, 41–42, 44, 60–61, 72
bombing through overcast (BTO), 127 Fourteenth Air Force, 139
bombs, 8–10, 15, 23, 27–30, 32–39, Fourth Air Army, 89–90, 93, 146
44–49, 54, 57, 60–69, 71, 77–78, fuses, 36–37, 39–40, 44, 46, 66, 79–80,
80–82, 84–85, 88 –91, 99 –102, 104, 82, 101–2, 123–25, 128
109, 111–13, 115, 121, 123–24,
126–29, 133–34, 136, 138, 149 George, Harold, 1, 6, 16, 35
fragmentation, 9, 15, 47, 54, 82, 89, Germany, 17, 24, 36, 148
111–12, 115 Germany First policy, 17
incendiary, 47–48, 53–54, 77, 82, 90, ground support, 4–5, 10, 12–13, 16, 41,
100 –101, 121, 129 89, 99, 103 –5, 110, 113, 119, 121,
parachute demolition/fragmentation 132, 142, 148
(parademo/parafrag), 44 – 47, 49, Gunn, Paul “Pappy,” 41–43, 45, 59,
78–80, 89–91, 102–3, 111–13, 116, 79–80, 82–84, 105–6
123 –28, 133 –34, 136, 141, 146
Hall, Don, 79, 90
bracketing, 15, 61, 72, 86 – 88 Hansell, Haywood, 16
Broome, Australia, 81 Hawaii, 22, 57
Buna, New Guinea, 24, 28, 45, 47, 49, Headquarters Advanced Echelon (AD-
54, 90 VON), 77
162
INDEX
163
INDEX
164
A War of Their Own
Bombers over the Southwest Pacific
Chief Editor
Marvin Bassett
Copy Editor
Mary J. Moore
Illustrations
L. Susan Fair
Daniel M. Armstrong
Composition and
Prepress Production
Vivian D. O’Neal
Print Preparation
Joan Hickey
Distribution
Diane Clark