PRESIDENT’S COLLEGE

CARIBBEAN ADVANCE PROFICIENCY EXAMINATION PROGRAMME

YEAR OF ASSESSMENT: 2020-2021
COURSE: Public Law
Law Unit: 1
Tutor: Mr. Kevin Morgan; LL’B, LEC.

COURSE OUTLINE
Module 2 of 3
Principles of Public Law
The doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty and its demise
A.V. Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 10th
ed. (1982), Chap. 1.
“The principle of parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than
this, namely, that Parliament [defined as the Queen, the House of Lords and
the House of Commons acting together] … has, under the English constitution,
the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or
body is recognized by the law as having a right to override or set aside the
legislation of Parliament.
To explain this principle Dicey also said that Parliament could do everything
but ‘make a woman a man and a man a woman.”

1. Generally, we have taken parliamentary sovereignty to mean the following:

a. Acts of Parliament.
Acts of Parliament must be obeyed in courts. Courts only have the power
to interpret and administer the laws of parliament. They cannot review
Acts of Parliament.

b. Internal proceedings of parliament.

Parliament has control over its internal proceedings. Courts will be
reluctant to review the process or internal proceedings of parliament to
see if they conformed with the manner and form requirements imposed.
Attorney General -v- Raphael Trotman, No. 216 -W of 2012

Bahamas District of the Methodist Church v Symonette [2000] 5 LRC 196,

(2000) 59 WIR 1.
In the Commonwealth, one of the first important cases illustrating the demise
of parliamentary sovereignty was Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe.
Facts: There was a Bribery Tribunal set up and the respondent had been
convicted under it. he argued that the Tribunal was not lawfully appointed
because it had been set up by an ordinary Act of Parliament of Ceylon,
whereas, since it was inconsistent with the provisions in the Constitution
concerning judicial appointments, a special majority was required under the
Constitution.
There was an argument that Parliament of Ceylon was sovereign and that the
courts must regard official copies of its Acts as conclusive of their validity. This
was rejected. A Bill for the alteration of the Constitution should have endorsed
a certificate from the Speaker that it had obtained the requisite Parliamentary
majority for amendment. The constitution provided that the certificate was
conclusive evidence that the stipulated majority had been obtained.
There was no such certificate on a Ceylon Act establishing tribunals for trying
bribery charges. The members of the tribunals were to be appointed by the GG
on the advice of the Minister of Justice and not the usual way of appointing
judicial officers. Therefore it amounted to an amendment of the constitution.
Held: that the Act did not have a certificate and was therefore invalid.
Jaundoo v. The Attorney General of Guyana (1968) 12 WIR 221
Per Stoby, C at 226:
“Before the advent of a written constitution the legislature of colonial British
Guiana was supreme; true, its supremacy was not absolute in the sense in
which the United Kingdom Parliament is absolute. A colonial government’s
legislation was subject to the supervision of the Secretary of State who could
withhold his assent if the proposed law infringed certain canons of justice or
policy. But within the limits of these restrictions the legislature could introduce
laws which were severe or even revolutionary. Colonial politicians accustomed
through reading and association to the moderation of English politicians, and
Guyanese lawyers trained in England and engrained in the common law of
England which had spread its roots throughout the British Commonwealth,
recognised the greatness of a system which protected the democratic rights of
peoples. No attempt was ever made to alter or restrict the fundamental
principles of British jurisprudence. Even when Roman-Dutch law was the
common law of Guyana judges trained in British institutions were engrafting
and introducing bit by bit the canons of English common law.
When internal self-government was introduced, and when independence was
achieved, all those safeguards which had protected colonial peoples from
oppression were engrafted into the Constitution and called fundamental rights.
By inserting them into the Constitution the result which flowed was that
Parliament became subject to the Constitution. It was supreme and yet not
supreme, Parliament can alter the Constitution in the manner prescribed by
the Constitution, but until it is altered no legislation can be enacted which
infringes a fundamental right.
PRESIDENT’S COLLEGE
CARIBBEAN ADVANCE PROFICIENCY EXAMINATION PROGRAMME
YEAR OF ASSESSMENT: 2020-2021
COURSE: Public Law
Law Unit: 1
Tutor: Mr. Kevin Morgan; LL’B, LEC.

COURSE OUTLINE
Module 2 of 3
Principles of Public Law
The concept of supremacy
1. Supremacy generally entails the following:
a. Acts of Parliament Ranked lower than the constitution. The
constitution is the highest authority. Acts of Parliament must conform
with constitution.
b. Entrenchment Parliament must follow special procedures for
amending the constitution if it wishes enact legislation that infringes
the constitution. It is supreme and not yet supreme. Parliament can
alter the constitution in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.
c. Judicial review. Court is the institution with the authority to resolve
conflicts about the constitutionality of governmental action.

Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 Per Marshall J., at 176 - 180

“The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other
acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to
the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written Constitutions
are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power in its own nature
illimitable.
Certainly, all those who have framed written Constitutions contemplate them
as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
consequently the theory of every such government must be that an act of the
Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written Constitution and is
consequently to be considered by this Court as one of the fundamental
principles of our society. It is not, therefore, to be lost sight of in the further
consideration of this subject.
If an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void, does it,
notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the Courts and oblige them to give it effect?
Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative
as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in
theory, and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on.
It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity,
expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the
Courts must decide on the operation of each. [5 U.S. 178]
So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the
Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either decide
that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably
to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of
these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial
duty.”
Notwithstanding supremacy, it has been said that parliament has control over
its internal proceedings. And apart from cases of inconsistency with the
constitution, the duty of the courts is to administer Acts of Parliament, not to
question them. The courts should avoid interfering in the legislative process
(Symonnette).