ETHICS NOTES

TO DO
Finish Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism; Finish GIbbard

DEFINITIONS

MISCELLANEOUS
Euthrypo Dilemma: This asks us what the relationship between obligation and God’s commands is. Either our
obligation derives from the fact God commands us to do something. In this case, it seems God could command
us to do something that, to us, appears utterly reprehensible. However, if God commands us to do something
because it ought to be obligatory, whether or not an action is obligatory is dependent on something external
to God.

Internalism vs Externalism: The distinction between internalism and externalism about moral reasoning is that
internalism holds that moral reasons are intrinsically motivating, whilst externalism denies this, arguing that
the motivating force of moral judgements are ultimately rooted in desires or preferences. Consequently, the
internalist holds if I judge ‘X is right’, I must have a pro tanto reason to X, whereas the externalist contends we
can have moral psychopaths, individuals who can judge that X is right whilst feeling not in the slightest way
inclined to do X.

VIRTUE ETHICS
ARISTOTLE (TRANS.; ED. IRWIN, TERENCE ). NICOMACHEAN ETHICS . 2ND ED. INDIANAPOLIS ,
CAMBRIDGE: HACKETT PUBLISHING , 1999 (EBOOK) (OR OTHER EDITIONS CITED IN KEY HISTORICAL
READINGS, ABOVE).
BOOK 1, CHAPTER 7; 2.1-6; 6.1; 6.12-13; 10.7-8.
ANNAS, JULIA “VIRTUE ETHICS”, IN COPP, DAVID (ED.). THE O XFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY .
NEW YORK; OXFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2006, 515-536 ( THE 2007 EDITION IS AVAILABLE
AS AN EBOOK).
FOOT, PHILIPPA .
. (EBOOK).
REPRINTED IN CRISP , ROGER, AND MICHAEL SLOTE (ED.). VIRTUE ETHICS . OXFORD: OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1997, 163-177, AS ARE HURSTHOUSE , MCDOWELL, ANSCOMBE . HURSTHOUSE ,
ROSALIND. “VIRTUE THEORY AND ABORTION.” PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS
20.3 (1991): 223-46 ( EJOURNAL). MCDOWELL, JOHN,
( EJOURNAL ).
HURKA, THOMAS. VIRTUE, VICE, AND VALUE. OXFORD: OXFORD UP, 2001 (CHAPTER 8)
(EBOOK).
ANSCOMBE , ELIZABETH , “M ODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY”, PHILOSOPHY 1 JANUARY 1958,
VOL.33(124), PP.1-19. (EJOURNAL).
HARMAN, GILBERT. “M ORAL PHILOSOPHY M EETS SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: VIRTUE ETHICS AND THE
FUNDAMENTAL ATTRIBUTION ERROR.” PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 99 (1999): 315-
31 (EJOURNAL).
AUDI, ROBERT. “ACTING FROM VIRTUE.” MIND 104.415 (1995): 449-71 ( EJOURNAL). SWANTON,
CHRISTINE . VIRTUE ETHICS: A PLURALISTIC VIEW . OXFORD; NEW YORK: OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2005 (CHAPTER 11) ( EBOOK).
JOHNSON, ROBERT, “VIRTUE AND RIGHT.” ETHICS 113.4 (2003): 810-34 ( EJOURNAL).
CRISP , ROGER. “A THIRD M ETHOD OF ETHICS?” PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH
90.2 (2015): 257-73 ( EJOURNAL).

Definitions

Eudaimonia: A specific kind of flourishing, only attainable by rational beings. Eudaimonia is an objective
measure of well being, irrespective of subjective preferences except insofar as an observer can see how it is
beneficial for an individual to have those preferences satisfied. To be in the state of Eudaimonia is to be in a
state that others will admire. It is what a parent would will for their child.

Virtue Ethics: Virtue ethics is a tradition in moral theory that emphasises the character of an agent and argues
that we should make reference to the dispositions or virtues that a given action exhibits when deciding
whether or not to perform it.

What is Virtue Ethics?

What are the main advantages of Virtue Ethics?

 Moral Development and Growth: VE can adequately address how children acquire rational desires
and actions and addresses how they can learn.
 Holistic: Recognises that we have both rational and desiderative parts of our nature, and that a well-
lived life, and right action, satisfy both aspects. It does not require us to be Moral Saints, nor does it
ask that we be pleasure seeking hedonists.
 Guilt: Addresses, and recognises, the significance of guilt (and also grief).
 Non-Gameable: Virtue Ethics is analogous to the distinction between ‘spirit’ and ‘letter’ of the law in
banking regulation. By making character central, it removes cases of cheating.

What are the main criticisms?

What is the historical background to Virtue Ethics?

What is an example of Virtue Ethics in practice?

How does Virtue Ethics instructs us?

 Hursthouse argues that virtue ethics instructs us by providing ‘v-rules’ – each virtue has a
corresponding instruction, and each vice a prohibition. Right action is ‘what a virtuous agent would
characteristically do in the circumstances’. (Problem – does this make VE satisficing/ non action
guiding. Either a virtuous agent is someone perfectly virtuous in which case it is not very satisfactory,
or it is someone who is satisfactorily virtuous in which case I can rest on my laurels.)
 Slote argues that an action is right iff it exhibits a virtuous motive.
 Swanton has a target hitting account – an action is right if it is overall virtuous.
MORAL MOTIVATION AND KANT

MORAL UNIVERSALIZABILITY AND KANT

KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE M ETAPHYSICS OF M ORALS (SEE EDITIONS ABOVE), TO END OF SECT. 2.

HILL, THOMAS, “KANTIAN NORMATIVE ETHICS” IN THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ETHICAL THEORY .
NEW YORK; OXFORD: OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2006, 480-514 ( EBOOK).
KANT ON THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS 

Kant believes that happiness should be pursued (there is an imperative to do so) but its pursuit is constrained
by the need to respect the dignity of others.  

HOW KANTIAN ETHICS WORKS IN PRACTICE 

To apply Kantian ethics: 

Identify the Maxim behind your action – in condition C, do X to attain E from motive M.   IF the maxim is
contradictory if universal law, reject action. IF maxim cannot be willed as universal law, reject action. 

Hill rejects fudging the maxim behind the action as not in the spirit of Kantian ethics. Decisions are ultimately
made out of respect for the value of rationality (formula of humanity) – so adding in irrational caveats/ wilfully
misapplying isn’t in the spirit of Kantian ethics.  Kantian ethics generates imperatives to do actions
when not doing it is contradictory. This is problematic, because there can be 101 ways of not doing something. 

Counterargument: ‘But I’m a racist bigot, and I am not willing for everyone to work for racial
equality. Therefore, isn’t it morally right for me to be racist?’. Ultimately the maxim is underpinned by the
value of rationality. It is arbitrary and irrational to prioritise one race against another. Therefore, it contradicts
with the thing (rationality) that gives the maxim any value in the first place. 

Counterargument: ‘I want to play tennis on a Tuesday. Not everyone can play tennis on a Tuesday. Therefore,
isn’t it morally  impermissible  for me to play tennis?” Hills rejoinder is that the maxim test is underpinned by
what we can rationally endorse. My preference for Tuesday is arbitrary – there’s no rational basis for it, so I
can’t consider it something rationally endorsable – i.e. it can’t make a maxim. 

Counterargument: The Universal Law does not appear able to capture the ‘wrongness’ of wrong things.  What
is wrong with slavery, is not adequately explained by it is impossible for everyone to act on the maxim of a
would-be slave-owner – it’s that it is just bad. 

The central addition Hill’s emphasis places is that maxims, duty etc. are all secondary expressions of the
value of rationality. They are valued only in so far as they are rational. This paramount importance is
demonstrated in the below example – the contingent possibility of acting on a maxim threatening your
existence as a rational agent trumps any irrational inclination not to help others you may have.  ‘As a rational
person, you necessarily value your existence as a rational agent over inclination-based preferences’. 

 “From self-interest I will always refuse to help others in need except when they have a right to my aid, even
though I could easily help without significant harm to myself or others.” Presumably, you can consistently
conceive a world in which everyone adopts and acts on this maxim. If everyone did so, however, and you
should fall into dire need, by your policy others would help you only if you could demand help as a matter of
justice (your rights). This, in most cases, would be contrary to your self-interest, and, by hypothesis, your
purpose in adopting your maxim was to advance your self-interest. So willing that everyone adopt and act on
your maxim would be willing a situation incompatible with your aim in adopting your maxim. You cannot
rationally will both, and so, it seems, you would be wrong to act on your maxim. 

O”NEILL, ONORA , “KANTIAN ETHICS”, IN PETER SINGER (ED.), A COMPANION TO ETHICS . OXFORD:
BLACKWELL, 1993 ( EBOOK) 175-185.

DRIVER, JULIA . ETHICS: THE FUNDAMENTALS . M ALDEN, M ASSACHUSETTS: BLACKWELL PUBLISHING ,

2007 (EBOOK). (CHAPTER 5).

KORSGAARD, CHRISTINE M. CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDS. CAMBRIDGE, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY

PRESS, 1996 (EBOOK) (CHAPTERS 1 AND 3).
 Historical context: Kant wrote in response to Pantheismusstreit.
 SAPJ is normally only justified in application to phenomenal experience. However, categorical
imperatives must be synthetic (informative; amplificatory) a priori (necessary) judgements.
 We think freedom to ourselves in the noumenal – as uncaused causes – when we act in
representation of a law. It’s not knowable (out the bounds of experience). Motivates TI in the
Antinomies.
 Remember – the Groundwork is aimed at setting out the principles, not at proving their legitimacy.
This he does in the Critique of Practical Reason.
 Duty = doing something because it is your duty – taking duty as the law.
 Contradiction in Conception: Ask yourself whether, if the action which you propose should take place
by a law of nature of which you yourself were a part you could regard it as possible through your will.
 Good will is the only ultimate source of value. And it is our capacity for rational choice – two are
equivalent – G428-429. ‘Rational nature exists as an end in itself’ is proveable by transcendental
argument.
 Perfect duties – have to do them; imperfect duties – contingent on inclination to how we choose to
exercise them. (Metaphysics of Value)
 Categorical Imperative; Formula of Humanity; Formula of the Kingdom of Ends; Formula of the
Unviersal Law; Formula of the Universal Law of Nature.
o Really it is best thought of as three – there is the will (FUL/ CI), the end (FH) and the totality
of ends (FKE)
 We can encompass some of the vagueness in the FKE – so a lawmaker would generate X result, but
they also would not rationally choose to focus on an idiosyncratic situation.
 Motivation by CI through (1) rational will must be a free will and (2) a free will must be under moral
law. (1) is demonstrated by autonomy – power to choose, lack of irrational desires; and also by
transcendental necessity – we must think of ourselves as free as else all our actions are internally
contradictory.
 In Critique of Practical Reason, Kant shows how we can be motivated to think of ourselves as free.
  Transcendental necessity of the idea of a God – ‘reason cannot objectively decide whether it is by
universal laws of nature without a wise Author presiding over nature, or wehter only on the
assumption of such an author.’

Chapter 3

 FUL: Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal law
 Different interpretations of contradiction
o Logical contradiction – logical impossibility (Dietrichson, Kemp and Wood)
 I feel unlikely – not an analytic truth
 Supported by the false promising example; Unsupported by duties that are perfect
(so not intended for contradiction in will) but logically consistent – e.g. if I have a
child that is ginger, I will kill it.
o Telelogical contradiction – natural purpose/ systemic harmony
o Practical Contradiction – would be self-defeating

MACKIE, JOHN L. ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG . HARMONDSWORTH , PENGUIN, 1977
(CHAPTER 4).

WINCH, PETER. “THE UNIVERSALIZABILITY OF M ORAL JUDGEMENTS .” MONIST 49.2 (1965): 196-214
(EJOURNAL). (REPRINTED IN HIS ETHICS AND ACTION. LONDON: ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL, 1972,
151-170.)
Winch argues that there is a personal element in moral decision-making. Some think it is relevant that I am a
particular person making the decision, but moral theories (e.g. Kantianism, Utilitarianism) neglect this.

Disproof of the Consistency Justification for Universalisation: They imagine that if it is right for person A, it
must be right for person B, given circumstances are not relevantly different – they take it that ‘ ethics is a sort
of calculus of action’ where ‘actions are considered as events only contingently attached to particular agents’.
Who the person is, is irrelevant. Sidgwick justifies this on the grounds of consistency – if I say it is right to do X
in that situation, my judgement about that should not change when there is no relevant difference between
the people in that situation. However, Winch argues that though this may be the case, it does not entail a
further claim – that ‘other people too, if they are to judge rightly, must make the same judgements I have
made’. Consistency does not entail universalisation.

Proof for the Relevance of ‘Who I am’ or Particularity: To press the case for particularity, Winch uses an
example of Billy Budd. In Billy Budd, Captain Vere has a moral dilemma. Claggart has incensed Billy to such an
extent that he hits him and dies. Marital law states that Billy must die, though Captain Vere’s compassion
conflicts with this (the outcome does not feel fair). Both of these demands are displayed with ‘genuine moral
feeling’ – Vere feels himself caught between ‘oughts’. What Vere decides to do, does not, Winch argues
‘logically commit him to accepting as a corollary ‘and anyone else in a situation like this ought to do the same’.
Though Vere chooses to execute, he can recognise that someone else may choose otherwise, and that his
decision to execute (to follow that ought) does not exonerate him from the force of the ‘ought’ of his
conscience, nor make their moral demands any less compelling (this is why he is in a genuine moral dilemma).
For the Captain, this was the right thing to do – but he could recognise that for, say Mahatma Gandhi, this
would not be the right thing to do. Thus, in deciding, we find out things about ourselves – what is morally
possible for us to do, what we can permit.

It cannot be argued that this is a form of moral relativism, as it is not the case that Vere’s thinking it is the right
thing for him to do makes it the right thing for him to do. Rather, it is given Vere’s character and outlook, for
Vere, it is the right thing to do – deciding is in part informative in finding out what we ought to do, because it is
because one decides what one should do. But it does not entail deciding makes my decision right – I could not
treat the decision with the appropriate moral weight (as in the example of a commander who applies moral
law mechanically), or with completely wrongheaded ideas of right and wrong (I kill Billy Budd because I believe
‘B’s’ are morally repugnant).

LOCKE, DON. “THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL INTERESTS.” THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 90.4
(1981): 531-59 ( EJOURNAL).

WILLIAMS, BERNARD. ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY. CAMBRIDGE , MASS., HARVARD
UNIVERSITY PRESS. CHAPTER 4.

MACKIE, JOHN L. “THE THREE STAGES OF UNIVERSALIZATION” IN PERSONS AND VALUES. VOL 2 OF
SELECTED PAPERS, OXFORD: CLARENDON , 1985, 170-183.
Mackie describes three forms of universalizability with different thicknesses. Each has a logical thesis and a
substantive theiss associated but not entailed with it. Universalizability only works if we can identify a relation
of relevant similarity between cases.

Universalizability Form 1: Universalizability in its most basic form (with no stipulation about the relation of
relevant similarity) has an advantage of ruling out some kinds of egoism – though it may be the case that ‘one
should seek their own interest’ (no definite article) it is not the case that ‘everyone should seek the interest of
Gareth Bale’ (definite article, so is not universalizable). This would allow, for instance ‘everyone should support
boot-shaped countries’ (as long as boot-shaped was not a means for surreptitiously introducing a preference
for Italy – i.e. would also provide grounds for supporting a reunified Korea) but not ‘everyone should support
Italy’. However, this basic universalizability is not necessary as shown by the case of the ascetic. The ascetic
holds that he will not demand more from others than he demands from himself. So it is a view with a definite
article (me). But it does appear to be moral. Moreover, as a form of universalizability, it doesn’t have any
substantive moral content.

Universalizability Form 1.2: A more substantive form of universalizability interprets it as a kind of fairness. It
translates the lack of definite articles into a prescription that people do not treat others in a way that privileges
themselves on ‘definite’ grounds. It is a demand that ‘a man … be contented with so much liberty against other
men, as he would allow other men against himself’. However, this still allows massive amounts of unfairness
on non-definite grounds. Anything can be admitted as a qualitative difference – so it licenses discrimination on
racial, gender, religious grounds and so on. It still hasn’t declared qualitative differences as irrelevant.
Moreover, framing something without definite articles does not mean that it is the right thing to do. Bernard
Shaw commented on the Golden Rule that ‘Do not do unto others as you would have that they should do unto
to you. Their tastes may not be the same.’ Even framing it absent definite articles, you still privilege your own
distinctive preferences, values and ideas – it still allows me to prescribe that ‘no one should eat rice pudding’.

Universalizability Form 2:
To decide whether some maxim … is really universalizable, imagine yourself in the other man’s place and ask
whether you can then accept it as a directive guiding the behaviour of others towards you. This extends the
extent of universalizability to argue that it should hold despite differences in social status/ mental or physical
abilities and so forth. It argues that those cases are relevantly similar, and so the maxim has to hold in that
case.

Mackie discusses three different levels or forms of universalisation. He argues that none of them ‘impose a
rational constraint on patterns of action or defensible patterns of behaviour’.

Counterargument Mackie: Moral judgements are, I claim, universalizable in only one sense, namely that they
entail identical judgements about all cases identical in their universal properties. There is, however, as Mackie
sees, a progression in the use we make of this single logical property as we develop our theory of moral
reasoning. (Hare)

WIGGINS, DAVID, “UNIVERSALIZABILITY , IMPARTIALITY, TRUTH”, IN NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH: E SSAYS IN

THE PHILOSOPHY OF V ALUE . 3 RD ED. OXFORD: CLARENDON , 1998.

SIDGWICK, HENRY. THE METHODS OF ETHICS . 7TH ED. LONDON: MACMILLAN, 1962, PP. XIX, 209-10,
379-80 (THE 1877 EDITION IS AVAILABLE AS AN EBOOK).
Page XiX

 Two kinds of freedom in Kant – freedom that is realised only when we do right, when reason triumphs
over inclination, and freedom that is realised equally when we choose to do wrong.
 Argues that a Rational Egoist can adopt the Kantian FUL comprehensibly.

Page 209 – 210

 Though universalisation is a necessary condition, it is not a sufficient one – I hold that a volition which
does stand it [the FUL] may after all be wrong. This is because I conceive that all could sincerely will
the maxims on which they act to be universally adopted: while at the same time we continually find
such persons in thoroughly conscientious disagreement (However, Kant would say they cannot
rationally will the maxim be universally adopted, because there must be an exception)
 We cannot judge an action to be right for A and wrong for B, unless we can find in the nature or
circumstnaces of the two some difference which we can regard as a reasonable ground for difference
in their duties … we cannot admit … unexplained variation.

Page 379 – 380

 The more we extend our knowledge of man and his environment, the more we realise the vast variety
of human nature and circumstances … the less disposed we are to believe that there is any definite
code of absolute rules, applicable to all human beings without exception.
 Universal rules aren’t useful for particular decisions. However, whatever action any of us judges to be
right for himself, he implicitly judges to be right for all similar persons in similar circumstances. – if a
kind of conduct that is right or wrong for me is not right or wrong for someone else, it must be on the
ground of some difference between the two cases, other than the fact that I and he are different
persons.
 Basically, we need a mid point. We can’t have clunky universal laws, but we can have generalisations
from particular instances.
HARE, RICHARD MERVYN, MORAL THINKING : ITS LEVELS, M ETHOD, AND POINT . OXFORD: CLARENDON,
1981 (EBOOK) (CHAPTER 5-7).
Summary: We can have universalizability if we understand universailisability to be in X situation do Y, where
X is exhaustive enough to include all non-actual properties.

Hare presses for a kind of utilitarian universalizability, but with a particularist caveat. We prescribe universally
– when I say X is right, I say you should X. But we prescribe for a set of circumstances – e.g. I say Fred should
give to the homeless person, what I mean is Fred (who I know about his economic situation) should give to
that homeless person (who I know is not Jack the Ripper). I prescribe universally, but for a caveated set of
settings. To say do X, I have to know what Xing is like for that person. I cannot say about what Fred should do,
or how to treat Fred, unless I have sufficient knowledge of what that experience is like for Fred. This means,
when we prescribe universally, we have to identify enough so that we have the others preferences I disagree
with this move – it seems you can then Arrow-Debreut it to any individual specific feature. It makes it no
longer a moral theory, so much as a moral description. Moreover, we need higher level theorising to identify
when we can and cannot identify that specific feature.

Hare rejects the argument from universalizability that Sidgwick provides – that if we are to not arbitrarily
privilege our present over future selves (which is something that we do not do), we cannot arbitrarily privilege
the self that is me now over others who are my contemporaries. The response to this is that we do, somewhat,
arbitrarily privilege the present self – we have a discount rate on our preferences. Hare argues that we have to
consider lifetime preference satisfaction

Problem with Identification Universalizability: What do we do when cases conflict? When my strong
preference that Holly give me socks were, if I knew what it would be ‘like to be her’ completely, would instead
be a weak preference that Holly retain her socks. Hare argues that we resolve this as we do when we internally
have conflicting preferences – we weigh them up in favour of the stronger.

Moral judgements are universalizable only in the sense that they entail identical judgements about all cases
identical in their universal properties. And this kind of universalizability I justified because at that point, the
only distinctions that can be made are ones of actuality – and that violates Leibniz’s two gloves argument – if
all relational properties are the same there is no logical grounds for drawing a distinction.

MORAL REALISM AND ANTI-REALISM

TO DO: WIggins

What is Moral Realism?

A theory about the metaphysical status of moral claims – that they both exist and are real.

What is it contrasted to?

Error theory – statements about right and wrong are truth apt, but are always incorrect because there is no
such thing as right or wrong. Expressivism – statements about right and wrong are not truth-apt, but are
instead variants of prescriptivism (Hare) or Boo-Hurrah theory (Ayer).

Robust Realists or Platonists : Shuffer-Landeau characterises the realist position through the idea of the
stance-inependence of moral reality. The truth values of moral facts are not true by virtue of the agreement of
a kind of specific perspective – they do not rely on any single individuals endorsement. Enoch: Robust Realism
– a no bjectivist, non-error theoretical, cognitivst position, stating some normative judgements are objectively
non-vacuously true, and that some are irreducibly normative. This version of realism is ontologically
committed to the idea of objects that are moral values or facts. (THIS IS THE ALPHA VERSION OF REALISM)

What is moral non-cognitivism?

Non-cognitivism is the denial that moral facts and truths have meaning or content. It’s analogous to
coherentism in epistemology. The standards for evaluating between different non-cognitive sets of moral
beliefs can only be coherence, but ultimately there are no objective truth values of given beliefs, and hence no
anchoring into the real world of right and wrong.

Why should we favour moral cognitivism?

Phenomenological Experience: Moral non-cognitivism can’t make sense of our phenomenological experience
of making moral pronouncements. In our normal experience, we accept concept such as moral mistakes, and
we feel we are in a search for truth or the right outcome when we try to determine what we ought to do. We
treat moral arguments (deduction, logical laws, moral premises) in the same way that we treat ordinary
arguments. It can’t make sense of how we ask ourselves what we ought to do.

Frege’s Abyss: Premise 1: Meaning must be identical both when something is asserted, and when it is not. This
is necessary if we are to have logical validity. Premise 2: Moral arguments do appear to have logical validity or
not (they use disjunctions, negations and so forth). Premise 3: When we assert something, our attitude
towards it changes. Premise 4: If moral arguments are merely attitudes, or expressions of attitudes, their
meanings ought to change as we assert them. Yet we cannot have both Premise 1 and Premise 4.

Non-Motivating Moral Judgements: If non-cognitivism is true, and moral judgements are taken to only be
expressions of attitudes, there is no way of making sense of non-motivating moral judgements. If moral
judgements are simply expressions of attitudes, we cannot make a claim that X is wrong whilst not having an
attitude towards X. Thus, moral apathy is impossible under non-cognitivist accounts.

Coherentism accounts of Moral Error: Non-cognitivism can only understand moral error in terms of conflicts
between beliefs – all it can mean is having attitudes that do not fit together. But it makes it impossible for us to
choose between equally coherent theories. Moreover, even the appeal to coherence is an appeal to a
normative notion, which the non-cognitivist is committed to denying. By contrast, cognitivism can account for
moral error simply as some beliefs being false.

Irreducible Normativity: Discussion of ethical norms – for example ‘wearing masks is good’ ultimately reduces
down to something normative. For if I want to explain what ‘wearing masks is good’ means, as a non-
cognitivist, I may make reference to how ‘Fred has a positive attitude to masks’. This involves a normative
notion (of positive) – positive simply is the idea that such a thing should exist. It does not seem likely that we
will ever be able to construct an explanation in wholly naturalistic terms.

What is Blackburn and Timmons quasi-realism? Why does it fail?

Blackburn and Timmons quasi-realism argues that the reason naïve non-cognitivism (simply the assertion that
moral statements lack meaning) fails is because work is done by the concept of moral truth, which, the
cognitivists have claimed, can only be made sense of in their framework. Hence, Blackburn and Timmons
attempt to adduce a notion of moral truth to their anti-realism, so that non-cognitivism can ‘have its cake and
eat it’ – have the work done by moral truth, without relying on metaphysical or ontological commitments. The
moral truth they construct is via deflationary theory – arguing that affirming truth is providing evidence that it
is endorsed. However, ultimately (like the worry with non-foundationalist accounts of justification), it is not
anchored – there is nothing to distinguish between incompatible outlooks, and no way of distinguishing
between different ways of deciding which truth ought to be endorsed.

Robust Realism – Why should we accept it?

Nothing short of a fairly strong metaethical realism will vindicate our taking morality seriously. Morality
dictates that we ought to stand our ground in some instances. Unless morality is something that is some sense
out there, in the world, it does not make sense for how people are willing to fight, die and sacrifice for their
beliefs. WHY. Moreover, if we are to make sense of how we deliberate about morality, moral facts must exist.
This justifies why we ought to believe in moral facts on analogous grounds to mathematical reasoning. Just as
we are justified in believing that sets or electrons exist due to their explanatory indispensability, Enoch thinks
an analogous move can be done for moral realism, that deliberative indispensability, as much as explanatory
indispensability can ground an ontological commitment that moral facts exist.

Robust Realism – Why should we reject it?

Queer Metaphysics – one argument against robust realism argues that it is committed to queer or
unacceptable metaphysics. It requires us to posit an alien or strange type of entity. Enoch’s response is to
argue that we can accept these queer metaphysics in light of the positive reasons we have to accept robust
realism.

What is Queer Metaphysics?

This is Mackie’s ontological thesis that ‘there are no objective values’ – that ‘there do not exist entities or
relations of a certain [moral] kind’ (Mackie, 2000, p.13). He identifies a distinction between factual and
conceptual analysis – we can analyse the concept of morality, where the terms are used, without moving any
closer to information about what morality actually is (analogously to how we can discuss colours, and analyse
the terms yet move no closer to an understanding the concept, as with Jackson’s Mary). Our focus on the
conceptual aspect has led us to neglect to notice the systematic factual errors we make when talking about the
moral. However, there is a factual error taking place – contra Hare, it is not the case that the world where
everything is subjective, and there is no moral right or wrong, and the world where there is an objective truth
underlying it are different – in one there is something that falsifies the beliefs, makes them mistaken, but in
the other there is not. Mackie contends that there ‘are certain kinds of value statements which undoubtedly
can be true or false even if, in the sense I intend, there are no objective values’.

MacIntyre Point – There is something to be said for explaining intractable moral disagreement as a result of
our language and argument all being a ‘hangover’ from the belief in God/ prior to emotivist philosophy.
However, MacIntyre suggests that we could reconstruct our arguments using Aristotelian thinking.

Epistemic Obligations and Debate – If we engage in epistemic discussion, it seems that we recognise certain
epistemic obligations. So it could be argued that arguing for moral realism is incoherent.

Street and Evolution: Premise 1: Selection pressures in evolution has created a tendency for us to value
certain things. These tendencies have significantly contributed to the form our value judgements have
subsequently taken. Had evolutionary pressures been different, our value systems would have taken a
different form.

Premise 2: If Moral Realism exists than either:

Option 1: Moral realism is related to evolutionary pressures. If option 1, the relation could be
‘tracking’ – judgements from evolution are true judgements, because true judgements increased our
chances of survival. But, according to Street, this seems unlikely – why would making a true moral
judgement help a creature survive? There is no reason to think truth necessarily helps something
 survive – and if it is costly to gain information to know the truth, it can be positively detrimental to
survival. If you adopt Option 1, you argue ‘we make true moral judgements’ because true moral
judgements help us evolutionary. You argue this over ‘our moral judgements help us evolutionary
because we evolved them to be that way’. It’s more complex, and you have to justify it as a scientific
hypothesis OR

Option 2: Moral realism is not related to evolutionary pressures. What this means is that evolutionary
pressures have no effect on how we discern moral truth – the evaluative pressures they push us in are
distinct to evaluative truth. Given Premise 1, it is most likely that we are wrong about a lot of
evaluative judgements because there is no reason to think that what we value due to selection
pressures is morally right.

CONSEQUENTIALISM