Alonte v. Savellano JR., 287 SCRA 245 (1998)

5/10/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 287
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 245

Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr.
*
G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998.
BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON.

MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR., NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
*
G.R. No. 131728. March 9, 1998.
BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner,

vs. JUDGE MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO, JR.,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and
JUVIELYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Due

Process; Requisites of due process in criminal
proceedings.—Jurisprudence acknowledges that due
process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require
(a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is
lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon
lawful hearing.
Same; Same; Same; The above constitutional and
jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and
deeply imbedded in our criminal justice system, are
mandatory and indispensable.—The above
constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000017956bfb95947160632003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/99
elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal

justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The
principles find universal acceptance and are tersely
expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural
due process cannot possibly be met without a “law
which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”
Same; Same; Same; There can be no short-cut to
the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not
affording an accused his full day in court.—The
Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of the
deviations from what otherwise should have been the
regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been
directed to present evidence to prove their defenses
nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the
purpose; (2) the parties have not been given the
opportunity to pre-
_______________
* EN BANC.
246
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
sent rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by

respondent Judge for the purpose; and (3) petitioners
have not admitted the act charged in the information
so as to justify any modification in the order of trial.
There can be no short-cut to the legal process, and
there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his
full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the
first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights,
is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be
denied even to the most undeserving.
Same; Same; Desistance; An affidavit of

desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon
in the so-called “private crimes,” is not a ground for
the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has
been instituted.—An affidavit of desistance by itself,
even when construed as a pardon in the so-called
“private crimes,” is not a ground for the dismissal of
the criminal case once the action has been instituted.
The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier
intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight
or probative value, like any other piece of evidence,
would be up to the court for proper evaluation.
Same; Same; Courts; All suitors are entitled to
nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent,
wholly-free, disinterested and unbiased tribunal.—
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge
Savellano from further hearing the case, the Court is
convinced that Judge Savellano should, given the
circumstances, be best excused from the case. Possible
animosity between the personalities here involved
may not all be that unlikely. The pronouncement of
this Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan could
again be said: All suitors are entitled to nothing short
of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free,
disinterested and unbiased tribunal. Second only to
the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty of
doing it in a manner that will not arouse any
suspicion as to the fairness and integrity of the Judge.
It is not enough that a court is impartial, it must also
be perceived as impartial.
PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:
Same; Same; Desistance; The general rule is that

courts look with disfavor upon retractions of
testimonies previously given in court.—Mere
retraction by a witness or by complainant of his or her
testimony does not necessarily vitiate the original
testimony or statement, if credible. The general rule is
that courts look with
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VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 247
disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously

given in court. This rule applies to crimes, offenses as
well as to administrative offenses. The reason is
because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured
from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually through
intimidation or for monetary consideration. Moreover,
there is always the probability that they will later be
repudiated and there would never be an end to
criminal litigation. It would also be a dangerous rule
for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before
courts of justice simply because the witnesses who
had given them later on changed their minds for one
reason or another. This would make solemn trials a
mockery and place the investigation of the truth at
the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Same; Same; Same; There are instances when a
recantation may create serious doubts as to the guilt of
the accused; Only where there exists special
circumstances in the case which when coupled with the
retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the testimony
or statement given, can a retraction be considered and
upheld.—The general rule notwithstanding, the
affidavit should not be peremptorily dismissed as a
useless scrap of paper. There are instances when a
recantation may create serious doubts as to the guilt
of the accused. A retracted statement or testimony
must be subject to scrupulous examination. The
previous statement or testimony and the subsequent
one must be carefully compared and the
circumstances under which each was given and the
reasons and motives for the change carefully
scrutinized. The veracity of each statement or
testimony must be tested by the credibility of the
witness which is left for the judge to decide. In short,

only where there exists special circumstances in the
case which when coupled with the retraction raise
doubts as the truth of the testimony or statement
given, can a retraction be considered and upheld.
Same; Same; Same; The court attaches no
persuasive value to a desistance especially when
executed as an afterthought.—A survey of our
jurisprudence reveals that the same rule has been
applied to affidavits of desistance. An affidavit of
desistance is understood to be a sworn statement
executed by a complainant in a criminal or
administrative case that he or she is discontinuing the
action filed upon his or her complaint for whatever
reason he or she may cite. The court attaches no
persuasive value to a desistance especially when
executed as an afterthought. However, as in
retractions, an
248
affidavit of desistance calls for a reexamination of the

records of the case.
Same; Same; Same; A case is not dismissed upon
mere affidavit of desistance of the complainant,
particularly where there exist special circumstances
that raise doubts as to the reliability of the affidavit.—
In private crimes, an affidavit of desistance filed by a
private complainant is also frowned upon by the
courts. Although such affidavit may deserve a second
look at the case, there is hardly an instance when this
Court upheld it in private crimes and dismissed the
case on the sole basis thereof. Indeed, a case is not
dismissed upon mere affidavit of desistance of the
complainant, particularly where there exist special
circumstances that raise doubts as to the reliability of

the affidavit.
Same; Same; Same; After the case has been filed
in court, any pardon made by the private complainant,
whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand,
cannot extinguish criminal liability.— Article 344 also
provides for the extinction of criminal liability in
private crimes. It mentions two modes: pardon and
marriage, which when validly and timely made, result
in the total extinction of criminal liability of the
offender. The pardon in private crimes must be made
before the institution of the criminal action. In
adultery and concubinage, the pardon may be express
or implied while in seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, the pardon must be express. In
all cases, the pardon must come prior to the
institution of the criminal action. After the case has
been filed in court, any pardon made by the private
complainant, whether by sworn statement or on the
witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal liability.
The only act that extinguishes the penal action and
the penalty that may have been imposed is the
marriage between the offender and the offended
party.
Same; Same; Same; Even the death of the offended
party cannot extinguish the case once it is filed in
court.—Even the death of the offended party cannot
extinguish the case once it is filed in court. If the
offended party dies immediately after filing the
complaint but before the institution of the criminal
action, his death is not a ground to dismiss the case.
Clearly, the will and participation of the offended
party is necessary only to determine whether to file the
complaint or not. Thereafter, the will of the State
prevails.
249
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 249
Same; Same; Same; Article 344 does not include

desistance of the offended party from prosecuting the
case as a ground for extinction of criminal liability
whether total or partial.—Article 344 does not include
desistance of the offended party from prosecuting the
case as a ground for extinction of criminal liability
whether total or partial. Hence, only when the
desistance is grounded on forgiveness and pardon and
is made before the institution of the criminal action,
can it extinguish criminal liability. Desistance, per se,
is not equivalent to pardon.
Same; Same; Same; The rape case is already in
court and it is no longer her right to decide whether or
not the charge should be continued.—In the case at
bar, the “Affidavit of Desistance” of Juvielyn is not an
express pardon of the accused and the crime
committed. Private complainant desisted from
prosecuting the case against the petitioners because
she wished “to start life anew and live normally
again.” She reiterated this reason on the witness
stand. She complained that members of the media
were bothering and harassing her and that she
wanted to go back to her normal life. She never said
that she forgave the petitioners. She did not absolve
them from their culpability. She did not give any
exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about her
rape. She did not say that she consented to petitioner
Alonte’s acts. Moreover, the rape case is already in
court and it is no longer her right to decide whether or
not the charge should be continued.
Same; Same; The proceedings did not conform
with the procedure for trial as provided in the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure.— I agree with the
majority that the November 7, 1997 proceedings could
not have been a trial on the merits. First of all, the
proceedings did not conform with the procedure for
trial as provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. x x x In the case at bar, petitioners were
never instructed to present evidence to prove their

defenses. The parties were never given the
opportunity to present their respective evidence
rebutting the testimony of private complainant. There
was no admission by petitioners of the charge in the
information as to justify a change in the order of trial.
Same; Same; Our criminal rules of procedure
strictly provide the step by step procedure to be
followed by courts in cases punishable by death.—Our
criminal rules of procedure strictly provide the step by
step procedure to be followed by courts in cases
punishable by
250
death. This rule also applies to all other criminal

cases, particularly where the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. The reason for this is to assure
that the State makes no mistake in taking life and
liberty except that of the guilty. Thus: “Judges should
be reminded that each step in the trial process serves
a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of
the accused requires that an accused be given
sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So with
the prosecution as to its evidence. Hence, any
deviation from the regular course of trial should
always take into consideration the rights of all the
parties to the case, whether the prosecution or
defense.”
Same; Same; Evidence; Any evidence which a
party desires to submit for the consideration of the
court must formally be offered by him, otherwise it is
excluded and rejected.—The admission of private
complainant’s affidavit of October 21, 1996 was made
solely in response to respondent judge’s own

questioning. It was this affidavit which respondent
judge used to convict the petitioners. This affidavit,
however, was not marked nor was it formally offered
before the court. The Revised Rules on Evidence
clearly and expressly provide that “[t]he court shall
consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered.” Evidence not formally offered in court will
not be taken into consideration by the court in
disposing of the issues of the case. Any evidence which
a party desires to submit for the consideration of the
court must formally be offered by him, otherwise it is
excluded and rejected.
Same; Same; Where there is a doubt as to the
nature of the criminal proceedings before the court, the
doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused who
must be given the widest latitude of action to prove his
innocence.—Where there is a doubt as to the nature of
the criminal proceedings before the court, this doubt
must be resolved in favor of the accused who must be
given the widest latitude of action to prove his
innocence. It is in petitioners’ favor that the
proceedings of November 7, 1997 be treated as a
hearing on the motion to dismiss, not a trial on the
merits. To rule otherwise will effectively deny
petitioners due process and all the other rights of an
accused under the Bill of Rights and our Rules in
Criminal Procedure.
Same; Same; No opportunity to cross-examine was
afforded petitioners and their counsels such that they
cannot be deemed to have waived said right by
inaction.—Indeed, following respondent judge’s
251
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 251
finding and assuming that the November 7, 1997

hearing was already a trial on the merits, petitioners
were never afforded their right to confront and cross-
examine the witness. The court did not, at the very
least, inquire as to whether the petitioners wanted to
crossexamine private complainant with respect to her
affidavit of October 21, 1996. No opportunity to cross-
examine was afforded petitioners and their counsels
such that they cannot be deemed to have waived said
right by inaction.
PETITION Ex Abudante Ad Cautelam in the

Supreme Court. Certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas
Corpus, Bail, Recusation of Respondent Judge
and for Disciplinary Action Against an RTC
Judge.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Fortun, Narvasa & Salazar for petitioner
Bayani Alonte.
Ramon C. Casano for petitioner
Buenaventura Concepcion.
The Law Firm of Raymundo A. Armovit for
respondent Judge.
VITUG, J.:
Pending before this Court are two separate

petitions, one filed by petitioner Bayani M.
Alonte, docketed G.R. No. 131652, and the other
by petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion,
docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the
decision of respondent Judge Maximo A.
Savellano, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court
(“RTC”), Branch 53, of Manila finding both
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape. The two petitions were
consolidated.
On 05 December 1996, an information for
rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M.
Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna,
and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a

complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The
information contained the following averments;
thus:
“That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas,

Biñan, Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable court, the above named accused, who is the
incumbent mayor of Biñan,
252

Laguna after giving complainant-child drinking water

which made her dizzy and weak, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge with said JUVIELYN PUNONGBAYAN
against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
“That accused Buenaventura ‘Wella’ Concepcion
without having participated as principal or accessory
assisted in the commission of the offense by bringing
said complainant child to the rest house of accused
Bayani ‘Arthur’ Alonte at Sto. Tomas, Biñan, Laguna
and after receiving the amount of P1,000.00 left her
alone with Bayani Alonte who subsequently raped
her. 1
“Contrary to Law.”
The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-

B and assigned by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC
of Biñan, Laguna, presided over by Judge Pablo
B. Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney
Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor (“ACSP”) Leonardo Guiab, Jr., filed
with the Office of the Court Administrator a
Petition for a Change of Venue (docketed
Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have

the case transferred and tried by any of the
Regional Trial Courts in Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for
change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan, assisted by her parents and
counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance,
quoted herein in full, as follows:
AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE
“I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years

of age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus Street,
Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, duly
assisted by private legal counsel and my parents,
after having duly sworn in accordance with law,
depose and say:
“1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case
filed against Mayor Bayani ‘Arthur’ Alonte of Biñan,
Laguna, with the RTCBranch 25 of Biñan, Laguna;
_______________
1 Rollo of G.R. No. 131728, pp. 20-21.
253
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 253

“2. That the case has been pending for some time,
on preliminary issues, specifically, (a) change
of venue, filed with the Supreme Court; (b)
propriety of the appeal to the Court of
Appeals, and after its denial by said court,
brought to the Office of the President, on the
veracity of the findings of the Five-Man
Investigating Panel of the State Prosecutor’s
Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a
holddeparture order filed with the Biñan
Court;
“3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly,

and meanwhile, I have already lost two (2)
semesters of my college residence. And when
the actual trial is held after all the
preliminary issues are finally resolved, I
anticipate a still indefinite suspension of my
schooling to attend the hearings;
“4. That during the entire period since I filed the
case, my family has lived a most abnormal life:
my father and mother had to give up their
jobs; my younger brother, who is in fourth
grade, had to stop his schooling, like myself;
“5. That I do not blame anyone for the long,
judicial process, I simply wish to stop and live
elsewhere with my family, where we can start
life anew, and live normally once again;
“6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my
complaint for rape and the other charge for
child abuse wherein the Five-Man
Investigating Panel of the Office of the State
Prosecutor found a prima facie case although
the information has not been filed, and that I
will not at any time revive this, and related
cases or file new cases, whether, criminal,
civil, and/or administrative, here or anywhere
in the Philippines;
“7. That I likewise realize that the execution of
this Affidavit will put to doubt my credibility
as a witness-complainant;
“8. That this is my final decision reached without
fear or favor, premised on a corresponding
commitment that there will be no reprisals in
whatever form, against members of the police
force or any other official of officer, my
relatives and friends who extended assistance
to me in whatever way, in my search for
justice.
“WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June,

1997, in Quezon City.
“(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN

Complainant
254
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
“Assisted by:
(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
“In the presence of:

(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father

(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
“SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25

day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
“(Sgd) Illegible2
Administering Officer”
On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casano, on

behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition
for change of venue dismissed on the ground
that it had become moot in view of complainant’s
affidavit of desistance. On 22 August 1997,
ACSP Guiab filed his comment on the motion to
dismiss. Guiab asserted that he was not aware
of the desistance of private complainant and
opined that the desistance, in any case, would
not produce any legal effect since it was the
public prosecutor who had direction and control
of the prosecution of the criminal action. He
prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a
Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-
RTC), granting the petition for change of venue.

The Court said:
“These affidavits give specific names, dates, and

methods being used to abort, by coercion or
corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No.
9619-B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors Alonte and
Concepcion to contend that the fear of the petitioner,
her private counsel and her witnesses are too
generalized if not fabricated. Indeed, the probability
that in desisting from pursuing her complaint for
rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to
some
_______________
2 Rollo of G.R. No. 131728, pp. 34-35.
255
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 255

illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent

possible miscarriage of justice is a good excuse to
grant the petition to transfer the venue of Criminal
Case No. 9619-B from Biñan, Laguna to the City of
Manila.
“IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of
Venue from Biñan, Laguna to the City of Manila is
granted. The Executive Judge of RTC Manila is
ordered to raffle Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its
branches. The judge to whom Crim. Case No. 9619-B
shall be raffled shall resolve the petitioner’s Motion to
Resume Proceedings filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of
Biñan, Laguna and determine the voluntariness and
validity of petitioner’s desistance in light of the
opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State
Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab. The branch clerk of court
of Br. XXV of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna is ordered to
personally deliver to the Executive Judge of Manila
the complete records of Crim.

3
Case No. 9619-B upon
receipt of this Resolution.”
On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-

docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159935 by the
Clerk of Court of Manila, was assigned by raffle
to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent
Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan,
through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the
Manila court a “compliance” where she
reiterated “her decision to abide by her Affidavit
of Desistance.”
In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge
Savellano found probable cause for the issuance
of warrants for the arrest of petitioners Alonte
and Concepcion “without prejudice to, and
independent of, this Court’s separate
determination as the trier of facts, of the
voluntariness and validity of the [private
complainant’s] desistance in the light of the
opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief
State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab.”
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily
surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo
of the National Bureau of Investigation (“NBI”),
while Concepcion, in his case, posted the
recommended bail of P150,000.00.
_______________
3 Rollo of G.R. No. 131652, pp. 72-73.
256

ANNOTATED
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were

arraigned and both pleaded “not guilty” to the
charge. The parties manifested that they were

waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith
went on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties
agreed to proceed
4
with the trial of the case on
the merits. According to Alonte, however, Judge
Savellano allowed the prosecution to present
evidence relative only to the question of the
voluntariness
5
and validity of the affidavit of
desistance.
It would appear that immediately following
the arraignment, the prosecution presented
private complainant Juvielyn Punongbayan
followed by her parents. During this hearing,
Punongbayan affirmed the validity and
voluntariness of her affidavit of desistance. She
stated that she had no intention of giving
positive testimony in support of the charges
against Alonte and had no interest in further
prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed:
(i) That she was compelled to desist because of
the harassment she was experiencing from the
media, (ii) that no pressures nor influence were
exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of
desistance, and (iii) that neither she nor her
parents received a single centavo from anybody
to secure the affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn
Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i)
Punongbayan’s parents, who affirmed their
signatures on the affidavit of desistance and
their consent to their daughter’s decision to
desist from the case, and (ii) Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that
the affidavit of desistance was signed by
Punongbayan and her parents in his presence
and that he was satisfied that the same was
executed freely and voluntarily. Finally,
Campomanes manifested that in light of the
decision of private complainant and her parents
not to pursue the case, the State had no further
evidence against the accused to prove the guilt of
the accused. She, then, moved for the “dismissal

of the case” against both Alonte and Concepcion.
_______________
4 Rollo of G.R. No. 131652, p. 42.

5 Rollo, p. 7.
257
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 257

Thereupon, respondent judge 6

said that “the case
was submitted for decision.”
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed
an “Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail.” Assistant
State Prosecutor Campomanes, in a Comment
filed on the same date, stated that the State
interposed “no objection to the granting of bail
and in fact Justice and Equity dictates that it
joins the accused in his prayer for the granting
of bail.”
Respondent judge did not act on the
application for bail. On 17 November 1997,
Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the
Motion for Bail. On even date, ASP
Campomanes filed a Manifestation deeming “it
proper and in accord with justice and fair play to
join the aforestated motion.”
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the
urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th
November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th
December 1997 and 10th December 1997,
petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth
and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution,
respectively, in respect of his application for bail.
None of these motions were acted upon by Judge
Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid

A. Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte
received a notice from the RTC Manila, Branch
53, notifying him of the schedule of
promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of the
decision on the case. The counsel for accused
Concepcion denied having received any notice of
the scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was
called, Atty. Sigfrid Fortun and Atty. Jose
Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could not
attend the promulgation of the decision because
he was suffering from mild hypertension and
was confined at the NBI clinic and that, upon
the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his
counsel would appear not to have been notified
of
_______________
6 TSN, 07 November 1997, p. 70.
258

ANNOTATED
the proceedings. The promulgation,

nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in
absentia; the reading concluded:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding

the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte and
Buenaventura ‘Wella’ Concepcion guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, as
defined and penalized under Article 335(2) in relation
to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, for which each one of them
is hereby sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA or imprisonment for

twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
“In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the
accused Buenaventura ‘Wella’ Concepcion for his
provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and rendered
without any further 7force and effect.
“SO ORDERED.”
On the same day of 18th December 1997,

petitioner Alonte filed a motion for
reconsideration. Without waiting for its
resolution, Alonte filed the instant “Ex
Abundante Ad Cautelam” for “Certiorari,
Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of
respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action
against an RTC Judge.” Petitioner Concepcion
later filed his own petition for certiorari and
mandamus with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in
support of his petition seeking to have the
decision nullified and the case remanded for new
trial; thus:
“The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex
A) without affording the petitioner his Constitutional
right to due process of law (Article III, §1,
Constitution).
when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo in
violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, specifically, in the conduct and
order
_______________
7 Rollo of G.R. No. 131652, pp. 65-66.
259
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 259

of trial (Rule 119) prior to the promulgation of a

judgment (Rule 120; Annex A).
when, in total disregard of the Revised Rules on
Evidence and existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he
rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) on
the basis of two (2) affidavits (Punongbayan’s and
Balbin’s) which were neither marked nor offered into
evidence by the prosecution, nor without giving the
petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the affiants
thereof, again in violation of petitioner’s right to due
process (Article III, §1, Constitution).
when he rendered a Decision in the case a quo
without conducting a trial on the facts which would
establish that complainant was raped by petitioner
(Rule 119, Article III, §1, Constitution), thereby
setting a dangerous precedent where heinous offenses
can result in conviction without trial (then with more
reason that simpler
8
offenses could end up with the
same result).”
On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the

following grounds in support of his own petition;
thus:
“1. The decision of the respondent Judge

rendered in the course of resolving the
prosecution’s motion to dismiss the case
is a patent nullity for having been
rendered without jurisdiction, without
the benefit of a trial and in total
violation of the petitioner’s right to due
process of law.
“2. There had been no valid promulgation of
judgment at least as far as petitioner is
concerned.
“3. The decision had been rendered in gross
violation of the right of the accused to a
fair trial by an impartial and neutral
judge whose actuations and outlook of
the case had been motivated by a sinister
desire to ride on the crest of media hype
that surrounded this case and use this
case as a tool for his ambition for
promotion to a higher court.
“4. The decision is patently contrary to law
and the jurisprudence in so far as it
convicts the petitioner as a principal
even
_______________
8 Rollo of G.R. No. 131652, pp. 13-14.
260

ANNOTATED
though he has been charged only 9

as an
accomplice in the information.”
The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will

disregard, in view of the case milieu, the
prematurity of petitioners’ invocation, i.e., even
before the trial court could resolve Alonte’s
motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by
the somewhat strange way the case has
proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano, after the
waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the
trial of the case did proceed on the merits but
that—
“The two (2) accused did not present any

countervailing evidence during the trial. They did not
take the witness stand to refute or deny under oath
the truth of the contents of the private complainant’s
aforementioned affidavit which she expressly affirmed
and confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their
respective lawyers, they rested and submitted the
case for decision merely on the basis of the private
complainant’s so called ‘desistance’ which, to them,
was sufficient enough for their purposes. They left
everything to 10the socalled ‘desistance’ of the private
complainant.”
According to petitioners, however, there was no

such trial for what was conducted on 07
November 1997, aside from the arraignment of
the accused, was merely a proceeding in
conformity with the resolution of this Court in
Administrative Case No. 97-1-12-RTC to
determine the validity and voluntariness of the
affidavit of desistance executed by
Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been
undue precipitancy in the conduct of the
proceedings. Perhaps the problem could have
well been avoided had not the basic procedures
been, to the Court’s perception, taken lightly.
And in this shortcoming, looking at the records
of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone
to blame.
_______________
9 Rollo of G.R. No. 131728, p. 10.

10 Rollo, p. 64.
261
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 261

Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III,

of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
“(1) No person shall be held to answer for a

criminal offense without due process of
law.
“(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the
right to be heard by himself and counsel,
to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.”
11
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process
in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a)
that the court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it; (b) that
jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the
person of the accused; (c) that the accused is
given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that 12
judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudential
postulates, by now elementary and deeply
imbedded in our own criminal justice system,
are mandatory and indispensable. The principles
find universal acceptance and are tersely
expressed in the oft-quoted statement that
procedural due process cannot possibly be met
without a “law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry13

and renders
judgment only after trial.”
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly
spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of
Court; viz.:
_______________
11 People vs. Dapitan, 197 SCRA 378.

12 At p. 388.
13 Darmouth College vs. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518, citing
Webster.
262

ANNOTATED
“Sec. 3. Order of trial.—The trial shall proceed in the

following order:
“(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to

prove the charge and, in the proper case, the
civil liability.
“(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his
defense, and damages, if any, arising from the
issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
“(c) The parties may then respectively present
rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permits them to present
additional evidence bearing upon the main
issue.
“(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall
be deemed submitted for decision unless the
court directs the parties to argue orally or to
submit memoranda.
“(e) However, when the accused admits the act or
omission charged in the complaint or
information but interposes a lawful defense,
the order of trial may be modified

accordingly.”
14
In Tabao vs. Espina, the Court has underscored
the need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It
reminds that—
“x x x each step in the trial process serves a specific

purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the
constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an
accused requires that an accused be given sufficient
opportunity to present his defense. So, with the
prosecution as to its evidence.
“Hence, any deviation from the regular course of
trial should always take into consideration the rights
of all the parties to the case, whether in the
prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their
discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the
law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial
gavel should not be wielded by one who has 15an
unsound and distorted sense of justice and fairness.
While Judge Savellano has claimed in his

Comment that—
“Petitioners-accused were each represented during

the hearing on 07 November 1997 with their
respective counsel of choice. None of their counsel
interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim
_______________
14 257 SCRA 298.

15 At pp. 305-306.
263
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 263

Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she attested, in

answer to respondent judge’s clarificatory questions,
the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits—one

detailing the rape and the other detailing the
attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was
missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case law is
that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness
‘is a personal one and may be waived.’ ” (emphasis
supplied)—
it should be pointed out, however, that the

existence of the waiver must be positively
demonstrated. The standard of waiver requires
that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be
knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient
awareness of the relevant
16
circumstances and
likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder
of the right should not be so construed as a
waiver of right, and the courts must indulge 17
every reasonable presumption against waiver.
The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few
of the deviations from what otherwise should
have been the regular course of trial: (1)
Petitioners have not been directed to present
evidence to prove their defenses nor have 18
dates
therefor been scheduled for the purpose; (2) the
parties have not been given the opportunity to
present rebutting evidence nor have dates19been
set by respondent Judge for the purpose; and
(3) petitioners have not admitted the act charged
in the Information so as to20 justify any
modification in the order of trial. There can be
no shortcut to the legal process, and there can be
no excuse for not affording an accused his full
day in court. Due process, rightly occupying the
first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of
Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that
cannot be denied even to the most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for
further proceedings. And, since the case would
have to be sent back to the court a quo, this
ponencia has carefully avoided making any
_______________
16 Brady vs. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).

17 Aetna Insurance Co. vs. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389 (1937).
18 Rules of Court, Rule 119, Sec. 3(b).
19 Ibid., Sec. 3(c).
20 Ibid., Sec. 3(e).
264

ANNOTATED
statement or reference that might be

misconstrued as prejudgment or as pre-empting
the trial court in the proper disposition of the
case. The Court likewise deems it appropriate
that all related proceedings therein, including
the petition for bail, should be subject to the
proper disposition of the trial court.
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few
observations on the affidavit of desistance
executed by the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-
Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not
contain any statement that disavows the
veracity of her complaint against petitioners but
merely seeks to “be allowed to withdraw” her
complaint and to discontinue with the case for
varied other reasons.
21
On this subject, the case of
People vs. Junio, should be instructive. The
Court has there explained:
“The appellant’s submission that the execution of an

Affidavit of Desistance by complainant who was
assisted by her mother supported the ‘inherent
incredibility of prosecution’s evidence’ is specious. We
have said in so many cases that retractions are
generally unreliable and are looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable
character of this document is shown by the fact that it

is quite incredible that after going through the process
of having accused-appellant arrested by the police,
positively identifying him as the person who raped
her, enduring the humiliation of a physical
examination of her private parts, and then repeating
her accusations in open court by recounting her
anguish, Maryjane would suddenly turn around and
declare that ‘[a]fter a careful deliberation over the
case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or
warrant criminal prosecution.’
“Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction
is an afterthought which should not be given
probative value. It would be a dangerous rule to reject
the testimony taken before the court of justice simply
because the witness who has given it later on changed
his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will
make a solemn trial a mockery and place the
investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.
Because affidavits of retraction can easily be
_______________
21 237 SCRA 826.
265
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 265

secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually for

monetary consideration, the Court has invariably
regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable.
[Flores vs. People, 211 SCRA 622, citing De Guzman
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 22
184 SCRA 128;
People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.]
The Junio rule is no different from ordinary

criminal cases.
23
For instance, in People vs.
Ballabare, a murder case, the Court has ruled:
“The contention has no merit. To begin with, the

Affidavit executed by eyewitness Tessie Asenita is not
a recantation. To recant a prior statement is to
renounce and withdraw it formally and publicly. [36
WORDS AND PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State,
41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita
did not really recant what she had said during the
trial. She only said she wanted to withdraw her
testimony because her father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr.,
was no longer interested in prosecuting the case
against accusedappellant. Thus, her affidavit stated:
“3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the

complainant therein, was no longer interested to prosecute
the case as manifested in the Sworn Affidavit of Desistance
before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby WITHDRAW
and/or REVOKE my testimony of record to confirm (sic)
with my father’s desire;
“It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has

undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and the
parties simply because an affidavit withdrawing the
testimony is subsequently presented by the defense.
In the first place, any recantation must be tested in a
public trial with sufficient opportunity given to the
party adversely affected by it to cross-examine the
recanting witness. In this case, Tessie Asenita was
not recalled to the witness stand to testify on her
affidavit. Her affidavit is thus hearsay. It was her
husband, Roque Asenita, who was presented and the
matters he testified to did not even bear on the
substance of Tessie’s affidavit. He testified that
accusedappellant was not involved in the perpetration
of the crime.
_______________
22 At p. 834.
23 264 SCRA 350.
266

ANNOTATED
“In the second place, to accept the new evidence

uncritically would be to make a solemn trial a
mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128, 134,
citing People vs. Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For even
assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction,
this circumstance alone does not require the court to
disregard her original testimony. A retraction does
not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. [People
vs. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647.] For this reason, courts
look with disfavor upon retractions because they can
easily be obtained from witnesses usually through
intimidation or for monetary considerations. [People
vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642.] Hence, when confronted
with a situation where a witness recants his
testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the
original testimony solely on the basis of the
recantation. They should determine which testimony
should be given credence through a comparison of the
original testimony and the new testimony, applying
the general rules of evidence. [Reano vs. Court of
Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] 24In this case we think the
trial court correctly ruled.”
It may not be amiss to state that courts have the

inherent power to compel the attendance of any
person to testify in a case pending before it, and
a party is 25
not precluded from invoking that
authority.
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself,
even when construed as a pardon in the so-called
“private crimes,” is not a ground for the
dismissal of the criminal case once the action
has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless,
may, as so earlier intimated, possibly constitute
evidence whose weight or probative value, like
any other piece of evidence, would be up to the

court for proper evaluation. The decision in
Junio went on to hold—
“While ‘[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or

acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if
the offender has been expressly pardoned by the
_______________
24 At pp. 360-361.
25 See Section 5(e), Rule 135, Rules of Court.
267
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 267

above named persons, as the case may be,’ [Third par.

of Art. 344, The Revised Penal Code.] the pardon to
justify the dismissal of the complaint should have
been made prior to the institution of the criminal
action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by
People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in turn is
cited in People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.] Here,
the motion to dismiss to which the affidavit of
desistance is attached was filed after the institution of
the criminal case. And, affiant did not appear to be
serious in ‘signifying (her) intention to refrain from
testifying’ since she still completed her testimony
notwithstanding her earlier affidavit of desistance.
More, the affidavit is suspect considering that while it
was dated ‘April 1992,’ it was only submitted
sometime in August 1992, four (4) months after the
Information was filed before the court a quo on 6 April
1992, perhaps dated as26 such to coincide with the
actual filing of the case.”
27
27
In People vs. Miranda, applying the pertinent
provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code which, in full, states—
“Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,

concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of
lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse.
“The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties,
if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
“The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts
of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon
a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above
named persons, as the case may be.
“In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender
with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him.
The provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and
accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned
crimes.”—
_______________
26 237 SCRA 826, 835.

27 57 Phil. 274.
268

ANNOTATED
the Court said:
“Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted

prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape,
or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint
made by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-
named persons, as the case may be. It does not
prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if the
offended party pardons the offender after the cause
has been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of
said cause. The only act that according to article 344
extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that
may have been imposed is the marriage
28
between the
offender and the offended party.”
29
In People vs. Infante, decided just a little over a
month before Miranda, the Court similarly held:
“In this court, after the case had been submitted, a

motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the appellant
predicated on an affidavit executed by Manuel
Artigas, Jr., in which he pardoned his guilty spouse
for her infidelity. But this attempted pardon cannot
prosper for two reasons. The second paragraph of
article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which is in
question reads: ‘The offended party cannot institute
criminal prosecution without including both the guilty
parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.’ This
provision means that the pardon afforded the
offenders must come before the institution of the
criminal prosecution, and means, further, that both
the offenders must be pardoned by the offended party.
To elucidate further, article 435 of the old Penal Code
provided: ‘The husband may at any time remit the
penalty imposed upon his wife. In such case the
penalty imposed upon the wife’s paramour shall also
be deemed to be remitted.’ These provisions of the old
Penal Code became inoperative after the passage of
Act No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect of
repealing the same. The Revised Penal Code
thereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and
in so doing did not have the effect of reviving any of

its provisions which were not in force. But with the
incorporation of the second paragraph of article 344,
the pardon
_______________
28 At p. 275.
29 57 Phil. 138.
269
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 269

given by the offended party again constitutes a bar to

the prosecution for adultery. Once more, however, it
must be emphasized that this pardon must come
before the institution of the criminal prosecution and
must be for both offenders to be effective— 30
circumstances which do not concur in this case.”
The decisions speak well for themselves, and the

Court need not say more than what it has
heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification
of Judge Savellano from further hearing the
case, the Court is convinced that Judge
Savellano should, given the circumstances, be
best excused from the case. Possible animosity
between the personalities here involved may not
all be that unlikely. The pronouncement of this 31
Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan
could again be said: All suitors are entitled to
nothing short of the cold neutrality of an
independent, wholly-free, disinterested and
unbiased tribunal. Second only to the duty of
rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it
in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion32
as to the fairness and integrity of the Judge. It
is not enough that a court is impartial, it must

also be perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a
simple reminder on the use of proper language
before the courts. While the lawyer in promoting
the cause of his client or defending his rights
might do so with fervor, simple courtesy
demands that it be done within the bounds of
propriety and decency. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions hardly can be
justified nor can have a place in the dignity of
judicial forum. Civility among members of the
legal profession is a treasured tradition that
must at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once
again, that prosecutors are expected not merely
to discharge their duties with the highest degree
of excellence, professionalism and skill but
_______________
30 At pp. 139-140.
31 29 SCRA 165.
32 Gutierrez vs. Santos, 30 May 1961. The excerpt was
quoted in Austria vs. Masaquel, 31 August 1967.
270

ANNOTATED
also to act each time

33
with utmost devotion and
dedication to duty. The Court is hopeful that
the zeal which has been exhibited many times in
the past, although regrettably a disappointment
on few occasions, will not be wanting in the
proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the
foregoing, the Court hereby RULES that—
(a) The submission of the “Affidavit of

Desistance,” executed by Juvie-Lyn Y.
Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having
been filed AFTER the institution of
Criminal Case No. 97159935, DOES
NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of
said criminal case;
(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the
assailed judgment, dated 12 December
1997, convicting petitioners is declared
NULL AND VOID and thereby SET
ASIDE; accordingly, the case is
REMANDED to the trial court for
further proceedings; and
(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr.,
presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, is
ENJOINED from further hearing
Criminal Case No. 97-159935; instead,
the case shall immediately be scheduled
for raffle among the other branches of
that court for proper disposition.
No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.
Melo, Kapunan, Martinez, Quisumbing

and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Narvasa (C.J.), No part: Related to one of
counsel.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo,
Mendoza and Panganiban, JJ., Join in the
separate opinion of Justice Puno.
Puno, J., Please see Separate Opinion.
_______________
33 Section 4 (b), Republic Act No. 6713, entitled Code of

Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees.
271
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 271

SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J.:
The facts are critical and need to be focused.

Petitioners were charged with rape in Criminal
Case No. 159935 which was raffled to Br. 25 of
the RTC of Biñan, Laguna. The charge is
principally based on the following affidavit dated
October 31, 1996 of Ms. Juvie-Lyn
Punongbayan, a 16-year old minor, viz.:
REPLY-AFFIDAVIT
(TUGON SA MGA SALAYSAY NILA MAYOR
BAYANI ALONTE, WELLA CONCEPCION,
RICARDO LACAYAN at JAIME MENDOZA)
Ako si JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN, Filipino,

walang asawa, 16 years old, at kasalukuyang nasa
pangangalaga ng Department of Social Welfare and
Development, matapos makapanumpa ayon sa batas,
ay nagsasaad:
1. Wala pong katotohanan ang lahat nakasaad

sa mga salaysay ni Mayor Bayani Alonte at
Buenaventura “Wella” Concepcion, ng
kanilang mga testigo na sila Ricardo (Ading)
Lacayan y Aguilar at Jaime Bagtas Mendoza.
2. Ang totoo po ay inabuso ako ni Mayor nung
September 12, 1996, katulad nga ng naihayag
ko na sa aking sinumpaang salaysay. Ayon sa
driver ng tricycle na nasakyan ko pagkatapos
ng insidente, hindi lang po ako, kundi marami
pa pong babae ang inabuso ni Mayor. Sabi pa
nga ng driver ay naaawa siya sa akin, at

lumaban daw ako. Tinawagan ko na rin po
ang lahat ng mga babae na naging biktima ni
Mayor; wag silang matakot, lumabas at ilahad
ang pangaabuso ni Mayor.
Ang detalye nung panggagahasa ni Alonte

at ang partisipasyon ni Wella Concepcion
3. Nakalahad po sa sumusunod na talata ang

detalye ng pang-aabuso sa akin ni Mayor. Pinakikita
rin dito kung paano siya nakipagsabwatan kay Wella
Concepcion. Sa pamamagitan nito ay
mapapabulaanan na rin ang mga nakasaad sa
salaysay nila at ng mga testigo nila.
272

ANNOTATED
4. Nakilala ko si Wella Concepcion, dance

instructor, nung bandang last week ng
August 1996. Noon ay naghahanda ako
para sa “Miss Education” beauty contest
sa Perpetual Help College of Laguna.
Doon ako nag-aaral. First year college
ako, at education ang kursong pinili ko.
Ang nasabing contest ay ginanap nung
Sept. 20, 1996. Kapag nagkikita kami ni
Wella para sa ensayo, nagkukuwentuhan
din kami, at nabanggit niya na may
kaibigan siyang bakla na nagdadala ng
babae kay Mayor Alonte. Waway daw ang
pangalan ng bakla. Hindi ko pa kilala si
Waway noon.
5. Nung Sept. 7, niyaya ako ni Wella na
sumali sa dance contest sa “Sang Linggo
NAPO SILA” sa Channel 2, na
itatanghal sa Sept. 11, 1996. Wala na

daw po akong aalalahanin. Siya daw ang
bahala sa costume at transportation.
Pumayag ang nanay ko, dahil wala na
kaming gagastusin. Hindi ko tinanong
kay Wella kung saan galing ang
costume. Akala ko may ipapagamit lang
siya sa akin.
6. Nung Sept. 8, pinakilala ni Wella si
Waway sa akin. Si Waway ang nagturo
sa amin ng sayaw para sa TV contest.
Mula nung araw na yon hanggang Sept.
10 ay nagsanay kami sa bahay ng
kapatid ni Waway sa St. Francis
Subdivision, Biñan, Laguna. Tatlo kami
sa dance group: ako at ang dalawang
lalaki na ipinakilala sa akin ni Waway:
si Melchor at Darius.
7. Nagpunta kami sa studio sa Delta nung
Sept. 11. Bago kami magsayaw, habang
inaayos ni Wella yung damit ko, sinabi
niya na dapat manalo kami dahil si
Mayor Alonte daw ang nagsponsor ng
costume namin. Noon ko lang ito
nalaman. Hindi kami nanalo sa contest,
pero nagkaroon pa rin kami ng premyong
P1,500.00 na pinaghatian namin.
8. Pagkatapos ng contest, at nung
nakapagpalit na ako ng damit, binabalik
ko kay Wella ang costume ko. Sabi niya
iuwi ko daw ito dahil gagamitin ko ito sa
Miss Education contest, sa presentation
ng mga candidates. Mula sa studio,
nagpunta kaming lahat sa isang kainan
sa tapat ng Delta at, pagkatapos namin
kumain, humiwalay yung ibang kasama
namin.
9. Dinala ako ni Wella sa isang department
store at binili niya ako ng sandals. Inikot
niya ako sa lugar na yon at binili niya
ako ng pagkain. Tapos ay sumakay kami

ng bus pauwi sa Laguna. Nung nasa bus
kami, niyaya ako ni Wella na magpunta
sa bahay ni Mayor para magpasalamat
ng personal para sa costume namin.
Pumayag ako at sabi ko kay Wella na
sunduin niya ako sa bahay ng 10:00 a.m.
sa susunod na araw, Sept. 12.
Nakarating ako sa bahay ng 5:00 p.m. ng
araw na yon, Sept. 11.
273
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 273

10. Nung Sept. 12, hinintay ko si Wella ng

10:00 a.m. Nung hindi siya dumating
umalis kami ng Tita ko dahil sinamahan
ko siya sa health center. Sumundo pala
si Wella doon, pero hindi kami nagkita
kasi saglit lang kami doon. Bumalik siya
sa bahay, at doon na kami nagkita.
Tapos ay umalis kami ni Wella papunta
kay Mayor. Tumawid kami ng kalye, at
pumara ako ng tricycle. Pero kahit
marami na akong pinara, ayaw ni Wella
na sumakay doon. Maya-maya, may
tricycle na dumating na hindi naman
pinara ni Wella. Basta huminto na lang
sa harap namin. Doon kami sumakay ni
Wella. Si Wella ang nagturo sa driver
kung saan kami pupunta. Nag-uusap sila
ng driver habang papunta kami kay
Mayor.
11. Bumaba kami sa tapat ng bahay na
bukas ang gate. May swimming pool sa
loob, alam na alam ni Wella ang pasikot-
sikot nang bahay; tuloy-tuloy siya sa loob
at sumunod naman ako. Wala kaming
taong nakita, pero bukas pati yung

pintuan ng bahay. Dinala ako ni Wella
sa sala. Napakaganda ng loob ng bahay.
Mayroong wallpaper na may design na
leaves and flowers; may carpet sa sahig.
May mahabang hagdan patungo sa
dalawang pintuan.
12. Tinanong ko kay Wella kung nasaan si
Mayor. Sabi niya ay nasa munisipyo
daw; darating na daw maya-maya.
Pagkaraan ng mga 15 minutes,
dumating si Mayor na nakasakay sa
green na kotse. Lumabas siya sa
kaliwang pintuan sa harap ng kotse.
Wala siyang kasama.
13. Pumasok si Mayor sa loob ng bahay.
Naghubad siya ng sapatos. Sabi ni
Wella: “Mayor, si Juvie; Juvie si Mayor.”
14. Umupo si Mayor sa tabi ko. Kinamayan
niya ako at sinabi niya: “Hi, I’m Arthur”
sabay hinalikan niya ako sa lips. Hindi
ako naka-react dahil nagulat at
kinabahan ako.
15. Nagmamadaling nagpaalam si Wella.
Kinuha ni Mayor ang wallet sa bulsa sa
likod ng kanyang pantalon. Dumukot
siya ng P1,000 na buo. Inabot niya ito
kay Wella. Patayo na ako pero
hinawakan ni Mayor ang braso ko. Wag
daw akong sasama kay Wella. Sinabi ko
kay Wella na wag niya akong iiwanan,
pero parang wala siyang narinig. Basta
tuloy-tuloy siyang umalis.
16. Nung kami na lang ni Mayor ang natira,
pinainom niya ako ng mineral water.
Uminom ako dahil nauuhaw ako.
Nanlabo ang paningin ko at nanghina
ako.
17. Nawalan ako ng malay. Ang sumunod ko
na lang na natatandaan ay nandoon na
ako sa kwarto. Wala akong damit.

Nakadagan si Mayor sa akin. May
malaking salamin sa pader. Doon ko
nakita na walang kadamit-damit si
Mayor.
274

ANNOTATED
18. Hawak ako ni Mayor sa magkabilang

braso. Pinipisil niya ito kaya nagkaroon
ako ng pasa sa kaliwang braso (at ito ay
nawala lang pagkatapos ng tatlong
araw).
19. Naramdaman ko na pilit na pinasok ni
Mayor ang ari niya sa aking ari.
Nasaktan ako. Nagmakaawa ako.
Umiiyak ako nung sinabi ko sa kanya na
tigilan niya ako; nasasaktan ako; may
anak rin siyang babae. Sabi niya wag
daw akong maingay at iembrace ko na
lang daw siya. Lalo akong umiyak kahit
nandidiri ako sa kanya, at sa ginagawa
niya sa akin. Naghalo ang galit,
pandidiri at takot. Wala akong magawa
kundi magmakaawa. Hindi ko siya
maitulak dahil nanghihina ako,
nakadagan siya sa akin, mataba siya, at
hawak-hawak niya ang braso ko. Pero
kahit nagmamakaawa ako, tinuloy pa
rin niya at pinasok niya ulit ang ari niya
sa aking ari.
20. Maya-maya ay tumigil siya. Tumayo siya
at sabi niya: “ang panty mo, nasa tabi
mo.” Kinuha ko ang panty ko, tumayo
ako at sinuot ko ito. Hinanap ko ang
damit ko, at nakita ko ang walking
shorts, bra at t-shirt ko sa sahig. Pinulot

ko ito at sinuot ko. Habang sinusuot ko,
umiiyak pa rin ako. Pagkatapos kong
magbihis, umupo ako sa mahabang
upuan sa may gilid ng kama.
21. Samantala, pagkatapos sabihin ni Mayor
na nasa tabi ko ang panty ko, nagpunta
siya sa banyo na transparent ang pinto.
Wala siyang suot pagpunta niya doon.
Paglabas niya, nakasuot na siya ng
checkered brief na kulay black and
white. Pumunta siya sa kabilang gilid ng
kama. Kinuha niya ang damit niya na
nakahanger sa pader. Sinuot niya ito.
Lumabas siya ng kuwarto. Hindi
nagtagal ay pumasok siya ulit at sinabi
niya na nandiyan na daw ang sundo ko.
22. Tumayo ako. Sinabi ko na aalis na ako.
Nung papunta na ako sa pintuan,
lumapit si Mayor sa akin. May hawak-
hawak siyang dalawang pirasong
P1,000. Tiniklop niya ito; binaba niya
yung neckline ng t-shirt ko, at pinasok
niya ang pera sa aking bra. Nagalit ako.
Kinuha ko ang pera at tinapon ko ito sa
kanya. Sabi ko hindi ako bayarang
babae. Nagalit siya at pinagbantaan ako.
Sabi niya: “Pag nagsalita ka, alam mo
na kung ano ang mangyayari sa iyo.”
Tiningnan ko siya, at umalis ako pababa.
23. Mayroon tricycle na nakaabang sa labas.
Sumunod si Mayor. Lumapit siya sa
driver at binigyan niya ito ng P100.
Tapos ay umalis na kami.
24. Umiiyak pa rin ako nung nasa tricycle.
Sabi ko sa driver na ginahasa ako ni
Mayor. Sabi niya masuwerte daw ako at
maaga
275
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 275

akong pinauwi dahil yung mga ibang babae daw

na dinadala kay Mayor ay pinauwi ng
madaling-araw o hating-gabi. Minsan, dalawa o
tatlo pa nga daw ang dinadala doon, at yung iba
ay naka-uniform pa. Naaawa daw siya sa akin,
kaya magsumbong daw ako. Nakokonsensiya
daw siya dahil isa siya sa dalawang tricycle
driver na naghahatid ng mga babae doon. Sabi
pa nga niya, babae din daw ang ina niya, kaya
din siya nakokonsensiya. Dinagdag pa niya na
kung may kasiyahan kina Mayor, isang van ng
mga babae ang nandoon. Pagdating namin sa
bahay ng Lola ko, sabi niya bago siya umalis:
“Lumaban ka.”
On December 13, 1996, the private
complainant thru her counsel, Atty. Remedios C.
Balbin and Asst. Chief State Prosecutor
Leonardo Guiab, Jr., of the Department of
Justice petitioned this Court for a change of
venue. They cited as ground the “great danger to
the lives of both the private complainant, the
immediate members of her family, and their
witnesses as they openly defy the principal
accused, Mayor Alonte who is acknowledged as a
powerful political figure and almost an
institution in Biñan, Laguna x x x.”
On March 31, 1997, the private complainant,
thru the then Secretary of Justice, the
Honorable Teofisto Guingona and Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño filed a Manifestation
and Motion for the early resolution of the
petition for change of venue. They submitted the
affidavits of the private complainant, her
counsel Atty. Remedios C. Balbin, Dolores
Mercado-Yambao, Bienvenido Salandanan and
Evelyn Celso to prove their allegation that they
“are exposed to kidnapping, harassment, veiled
threats and tempting offers of bribe money—all

intended to extract an ‘affidavit of desistance’
from the private complainant.” Worth bright
lining are the two (2) affidavits of Atty. Remedios
C. Balbin, counsel for the private complainant,
relating the fantastic amount of P10M bribe
money allegedly offered to her. The first affidavit
dated February 24, 1997 states:
I, Remedios C. Balbin, of legal age, Filipino, married,

with residence at #5 Uranus Street, Congressional
Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, after having duly
sworn in accordance with law, depose and say:
276

ANNOTATED
1. That I am the Private Prosecutor in

Criminal Case No. 9619-B for rape, filed
with the Biñan RTC, Branch 25, entitled
‘People of the Philippines vs. Bayani
Arthur Alonte, et al.;
2. That as Private Prosecutor, it is my
avowed duty to be faithful to the
interests of my client, Ms. Juvie-Lyn
Punongbayan;
3. That on several occasions, I was visited
at my Office at the Quezon City Hall
Compound, by a lawyer who introduced
himself as Atty. Leo C. Romero,
representing the Accused Mayor Bayani
Arthur Alonte;
4. That my calendar at the People’s
Bureau, Quezon City Hall, shows that he
came to see me about eight (8) times, but
we talked only about three (3) times
because I was always busy attending to
the problems of Quezon City’s urban poor

and the landowners of private properties
illegally occupied by them;
5. That in two (2) occasions, Atty. Romero
conveyed to me the message of Mayor
Alonte, namely, to drop the rape case
against him, and that he would give a
consideration of Ten Million Pesos (P10
Million) to be apportioned as follows:
Five Million Pesos (P5M)—for the
Private Complainant
Three Million Pesos (P3M)—for me as
Private Prosecutor
Two Million Pesos (P2M)—for him as the
mediator
6. That I explained to Atty. Romero that
money does not matter at all to the
Complainant and her family even if they
have very modest means; that they want
justice, which means a conviction for the
charge of rape;
7. That I also explained to Atty. Romero
that the money he was offering me was
of no consequence to me because I had
access to the resources of my two (2)
daughters, both of whom are in the
medical field abroad, and of Mr.
Filomeno Balbin, Labor Attache then
assigned in Riyadh;
8. That I told him that I cannot be tempted
with his offer because spiritual
consideration are more important to me
than the material. Also, that I usually
handle cases pro bono (at abunado pa)
where the litigant is in dire need of legal
assistance but cannot afford to pay for
the lawyer’s fees, as in Juvie-Lyn’s case;
9. That I gave Atty. Romero a copy of the
decision of the Supreme Court
promulgated December 10, 1996, entitled
“People of the Philippines vs. Robert

Cloud” (GR No. 119359: Crim. Case No.
Q-9012660) for parricide involving the
death of a 2 1/2 year old boy. I
277
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 277

wrote on page one of the xerox copy of

the decision: ‘To Atty. Leo Romero—so
you will understand,’ and to which I
affixed my signature.
10. That I told him explicitly: ‘we cannot
simplify the entire proceedings. You
advise Mayor Alonte to surrender (one
mitigating circumstance), plead guilty
(another mitigating circumstance), get a
conviction and suffer the corresponding
penalty. Otherwise, we have nothing to
talk about.’
11. That I emphasized that his suggestion
for Mayor Alonte to plead guilty to ‘act of
lasciviousness’ merely was ridiculous;
12. That when the Complainant’s Affidavit
on the offer of Ms. Emily Vasquez for a
valuable consideration in exchange for
an affidavit of desistance in the rape was
exposed by media, Atty. Romero came to
see me and thanked me for not exposing
him in similar fashion. I assured him
that he will not be an exception and that
I was just too busy then to execute an
affidavit on the matter, as I do now;
“13. That I have not received other similar
offers of valuable material consideration
from any other person, whether private
party or government official. However, I
have been separately advised by several

concerned persons that I was placing my
personal safety at great risk. The
victim’s family will have great difficulty
in finding another lawyer to ‘adopt’ them
in the way I did, which gives them
strength to pursue their case with
confidence and the accused Mayor is
aware that I am the obstacle to an out-of
court settlement of the case. Also, that I
had my hands full, as it is, as the Head
of the QC People’s Bureau, Housing
Development Center, and Special Task
Force on Squatting and Resettlement,
and the numerous cases filed by me or
against me, connected with my
performance of official duties, and I
should not add more legal problems
despite my authority to engage in private
law practice.
14. That this affidavit is executed in order to
put on record the attempt to influence me
directly, in exchange for valuable
consideration to drop the rape charge
against Mayor Bayani Arthur Alonte.
February 24, 1997, City of Manila.

SGD. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this
26th day of March, 1997, Metro Manila.
278

ANNOTATED
Community Tax Certificate- 5208733

Date Issue 2-10-97
Quezon City
NOTARY PUBLIC
SGD. JUANITO L. GARCIA
ATTY. JUANITO L. GARCIA
NOTARY PUBLIC
UNTIL Dec. 31, 1997
PTR No. 63-T-033457
ISSUED AT MLA. ON 1-2-97
TAN-161-570-81
Doc. No. 950;
Page No. 170;
Series of 1997.”
In her second Affidavit dated March 26, 1997,

Atty. Balbin declared in no uncertain language
that the bribe offer for private complainant to
make a desistance was increased from
P10,000,000.00 to P20,000,000.00, viz.:
“REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

CITY OF MANILA )s.s.
“A F F I D A V I T
“I, REMEDIOS C. BALBIN, of legal age, Filipino,

married, and with postal address at No. 5 Uranus
Street, Congressional Avenue Subdivision, Quezon
City, after having duly sworn in accordance with law,
depose and say:
“1. That I am the Private Prosecutor in the rape

case filed by the minor Juvie-Lyn
Punongbayan against Mayor Bayani Arthur
Alonte of Biñan, Laguna.
“2. That earlier, I reported to Secretary Teofisto
Guingona, State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño,
Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab,
Jr., and Director Jude Romano of the Witness
Protection Program, the instances of offers of
substantial amounts amounting to several
millions, to my client, to her relatives,
including her maternal grandmother, and to

myself;
279
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 279

“3. That despite the published declaration by the

Department of Justice of its determination to
prosecute those who offered the bribes, new
emissaries of Mayor Alonte persist in making
offers, as follows:
“a. On Thursday, March 6, 1997, at about 3:15

o’clock in the afternoon, Atty. Dionisio S. Daga
came to see me at my office at the People’s
Bureau, Office of the Mayor, of Squatting case
which I filed against his clients;
“b. That after a brief exchange on the status of the
case, he confided to me his real purpose;
“c. That he started off by saying that he was the
legal counsel of the gambling lords of Malabon
for which he gets a monthly retainer of fifteen
thousand pesos (P15,000.00), exclusive of
transportation expenses, etc.;
“d. That he also stated that the network of
gambling lords throughout the country is quite
strong and unified;
“e. That I then asked him: ‘What do you mean—is
Alonte into gambling too? That he is part of
the network you speak of?’
“f. That Atty. Daga did not reply but instead said:
‘they are prepared to double the offer made to
you by Atty. Romero which was published in
the newspapers’ at P10 Million;
“g. That I told him that all the money in the world
will not make me change my position against
my client’s executing a desistance, and that
only Alonte’s voluntary surrender, plea of

guilty in rape, conviction and the imposition of
the corresponding penalty will satisfy the ends
of justice;
“h. That I told him that my client’s case is not
isolated, there being five (5) other minors
similarly placed; and Alonte should be stopped
from doing more harm;
“i. That Atty. Daga then told me in Pilipino ‘if
you do not accede to a desistance, then, they
will be forced to . . . .’.
“j. That because he did not complete his sentence,
I asked him directly: ‘What do you mean?
What do you intend to do? And he replied: Go
on with the case; Buy the Judge.’
“k. That unbelieving, I reacted, saying; ‘but they
have already done so, Judge Francisco at
Biñan suddenly changed his attitude towards
the Prosecution. Perhaps, you are referring to
the next judge when the petition for change of
venue is finally granted?’
280

ANNOTATED
“l. That Atty. Daga did not reply, and he

reiterated that his principals, referring to
them again as ‘gambling lords,’ want a
desistance, after which he excused himself and
left.
“4. That I execute this Affidavit to attest to the

truth of the incident with Atty. Dionisio S.
Daga which occurred in the afternoon of
March 6, 1997, at my Office, stressing herein
my surprise over his daring in making yet
another monetary offer to me in exchange for

my client’s desistance, and my feeling of fear
for the first time since I started ‘handling’ this
case against Alonte;
“5. That despite what I perceived as veiled
threats of Atty. Daga, I will seek justice in
behalf of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, with the
indispensable initiatives, participation and
support of the Department of Justice under
Secretary Teofisto Guingona.
“FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Affiant
Republic of the Philippines)

CITY OF MANILA ) S.S.
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME

this 26th day of March, 1997.
Community Tax Certificate-5208733
Date Issued 2-10-97
Quezon City
Notary Public
SGD. JUANITO L. GARCIA
ATTY. JUANITO L. GARCIA
NOTARY PUBLIC
UNTIL DEC. 31, 1997
PTR. NO. 63-T-033457
ISSUED AT MLA. ON 1-2-97
TAN -161-570-81
Doc. No. 948;

Book No. 190;
Page No. XLIII;
Series of 1997.”
281
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 281
After the alleged bribe money was increased from

P10M to P20M the complexion of the case
changed swiftly.
On June 25, 1997, Atty. Balbin filed a Motion
to Resume Proceedings in Br. 25 of the RTC of
Biñan, Laguna. Attached to the Motion was the
Affidavit of Desistance of the private
complainant which states:
“I, Juvie-Lyn Yambao Punongbayan, 17 years of age,

a resident of No. 5 Uranus Street, Congressional
Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City, duly assisted by
private legal counsel and my parents, after having
duly sworn in accordance with law, depose and say:
“1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case

filed against Mayor Bayani “Arthur” Alonte of
Biñan, Laguna, with the RTCBranch 25 of
Biñan, Laguna;
“2. That the case has been pending for some time,
on preliminary issues, specifically, (a) change
of venue, filed with the Supreme Court; (b)
propriety of the appeal to the Court of
Appeals, and after its denial by said court,
brought to the Office of the President, on the
veracity of the findings of the Five-Man
Investigating Panel of the State Prosecutor’s
Office, and the Secretary of Justice, and (c) a
holddeparture order filed with the Biñan
Court;
“3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly,
and meanwhile, I have already lost two (2)
semesters of my college residence. And when
the actual trial is held after all the
preliminary issues are finally resolved, I
anticipate a still indefinite suspension of my
schooling to attend the hearings;
“4. That during the entire period since I filed the
case, my family has lived a most abnormal life:
my father and mother had to give up their

jobs; my younger brother, who is in fourth
grade, had to stop his schooling, like myself;
“5. That I do not blame anyone for the long,
judicial process; I simply wish to stop and live
elsewhere with my family, where we can start
life anew, and live normally once again;
“6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my
complaint for rape and the other charge for
child abuse wherein the Five-Man
Investigating Panel of the Office of the State
Prosecutor found a prima facie case although
the information has not been filed, and that I
will not at any time revive this, and related
cases or file new cases, whether, criminal, civil
and/or administrative, here or anywhere in
the Philippines;
282

ANNOTATED
“7. That I likewise realize that the execution of

this Affidavit will put to doubt my credibility
as a witness-complainant;
“8. That this is my final decision reached without
fear or favor, premised on a corresponding
commitment that there will be no reprisals in
whatever form, against members of the police
force or any other official or officer, my
relatives and friends who extended assistance
to me in whatever way, in my search for
justice.
“WHEREOF, I affix my signature, this 25th day of

June, 1997, in Quezon City.
SGD. JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Assisted by:

ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN
Private Prosecutor
In the presence of:
SGD. PABLO PUNONGBAYAN

PABLO PUNONGBAYAN
Father
SGD. JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN

JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN
Mother
“SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25

day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.
“SGD. ILLEGIBLE
Administering Officer
RTC Branch 94
Quezon City”
Obviously, the Motion to Resume Proceedings

was intended to get trial court’s approval for the
dismissal of the rape case against the petitioners.
283
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 283

Indeed, three days thereafter or on June 28,

1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casano moved in behalf of
the petitioners to dismiss the petition for change
of venue then pending in this Court citing the
affidavit of desistance of the private
complainant. On August 22, 1997, however,
Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Guiab opposed the
motion. He alleged that he has control of the
prosecution of the rape case and that he was not
aware of the desistance of the private

complainant.
The legal maneuvers to dismiss the rape case
against the petitioners on the basis of the alleged
affidavit of desistance of the private complainant
did not find the favor of this Court. On
September 2, 1997, this Court unanimously
granted the petition for change of venue, ruling
among others, viz.:
xxx
“These affidavits give specific names, dates and
methods being used to abort, by coercion or
corruption, the prosecution of Criminal Case No.
9619-B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors Alonte and
Concepcion to contend that the fear of the petitioner,
her private counsel and her witnesses are too
generalized if not fabricated. Indeed, the probability
that in desisting from pursuing her complaint for
rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to
some illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent
grant the petition to transfer the venue of Criminal
Case No. 9619-B from Biñan, Laguna to the City of
Manila.
“IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of
Venue from Biñan, Laguna to the City of Manila is
granted. The Executive Judge of RTC Manila is
ordered to raffle Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its
branches. The judge to whom Crim. Case No. 9619-B
shall be raffled shall resolve the petitioner’s Motion to
Resume Proceedings filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of
Biñan, Laguna and determine the voluntariness and
validity of petitioner’s desistance in light of the
opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst. Chief State
Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab. The branch clerk of court
of Br. XXV of the RTC of Biñan, Laguna is ordered to
personally deliver to the Executive Judge of Manila
the complete records of Crim. Case No. 9619-B upon
receipt of this Resolution.”
On September 17, 1997, Criminal Case No.

9619-B (redocketed by the Clerk of Court of
Manila as Crim. Case No.
284

ANNOTATED
97-159935) was raffled to Br. 53 of the RTC of

Manila, presided by the respondent judge, the
Honorable Maximo A. Savellano.
On October 9, 1997, the respondent judge
issued warrants of arrest against the petitioners
after a finding of probable cause.
On October 28, 1997, an Administrative
Order of the DOJ was issued empowering First
Assistant City Prosecutor Marilyn R.O.
Campomanes to prosecute the case at bar. Asst.
Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab, Jr., who
opposed the affidavit of desistance was relieved
from the case. The reason given in the
Administrative Order was “. . .in the interest of
public service.” Prosecutor Campomanes was
authorized “to move for its (case) dismissal
1
if the
evidence on record so warrant. . .”
The arraignment of the petitioners took place
on November 7, 1997. The State was represented
by Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes. Petitioner
Alonte was represented by Atty. Jose
Flaminiano and Atty. Sigfrid A. Fortun.
Petitioner Concepcion was represented by Atty.
Ramon C. Casano. Atty. Remedios Balbin who
had previously exposed under oath the threats to
the life of the private complainant and her
witnesses and the repeated attempts 2
to buy
complainant’s desistance was absent.
Petitioners pled not guilty3 to the charge of
rape upon their arraignment. Pre-trial was then
waived by both the prosecution and the defense.

The proceedings continued and Prosecutor
Campomanes presented the private
complainant, Ms. Punongbayan who testified on
her affidavit of desistance. She declared that her
desistance was her “personal”
4
decision with the
consent of her parents. She said she was neither
paid nor pressured to desist. On questions by the
respondent judge,
_______________
1 TSN, November 7, 1997, p. 3.

2 TSN, op. cit., p. 1.
3 Ibid., p. 5.
4 Ibid., p. 40.
285
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 285

however, she affirmed the truth of her affidavit

dated October 31, 1996 that she was raped by
petitioner Alonte. Prosecutor Campomanes
marked and 5offered her affidavit of desistance as
Exhibit “A”. She called on other witnesses to
testify on the voluntariness of the affidavit of
desistance.
6
The 7parents of the complainant—
Pablo and Julie Punongbayan—declared that
they did not receive any monetary consideration
for the desistance of their minor daughter.
Neither were they pressured to give their
consent to the desistance. Fourth Asst.
Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente averred
that the affidavit of desistance was signed and
sworn to before him in the presence of the
complainant’s parents and private counsel, Atty.
Balbin. He said he explained the affidavit to
them and that8 the complainant voluntarily

signed the same.
After their testimonies, Prosecutor
Campomanes made the manifestation that “with
the presentation of our witnesses and the
marking of our documents (sic) we are now
closing the case and that 9
we are praying for the
dismissal of the case.” The respondent10 judge
ruled “the case is submitted for decision.” Atty.
Flaminiano orally prayed that petitioner Alonte
be granted bail and 11
Prosecutor Campomanes
offered no objection.
On November 10, 1997, petitioner Alonte12
filed
an Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail. In her
Comment, Prosecutor
13
Campomanes agreed and
averred, viz.:
_______________
5 Ibid., p. 29.
6 Ibid., pp. 46-55.
7 Ibid., pp. 56-63.
8 Ibid., pp. 64-70.
9 Ibid., p. 70.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Annex “G,” Petition of Alonte.
13 Annex “H,” Petition of Alonte.
286

ANNOTATED
x x x x x x x x x
1. That she received a copy of the Petition for

Bail.
2. That on the hearing of the instant case on

November 7, 1997, the Prosecution presented
its witnesses who vehemently signified their
intention not to further prosecute the case in
Court, and there being no other witnesses to
present, the undersigned is left with no
alternative but to seek the dismissal of the
instant case considering that without the
testimony of said witnesses this case has
nothing to stand on in Court.
3. That for the aforestated reason, the People
interposes no objection to the granting of Bail
and in fact justice and equity dictate that it
joins the accused in his prayer for the granting
of bail in the amount of P150,000 (ONE
HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS).
4. That for the aforementioned bases, the People
hereby manifests its position that the case be
immediately dismissed or at least the accused
be granted bail since the record proves that
there is no more evidence to sustain the
charge against him such that the granting of
bail is proper and in order.
5. That as a general rule, a hearing on the
petition for bail is necessary to prove that the
guilt is not strong but in this particular case
there is no need for hearing since the
prosecution cannot prove its case against the
accused as it has no other evidence or witnesses
to be presented.
On November 17, 1997, petitioner Alonte, thru

counsel, filed an14
Urgent Plea to Resolve the
Motion for Bail. On the same date, Prosecutor
Campomanes manifested that “she deems it
proper and in accord with justice
15
and fair play to
join the aforestated motion.”
On November 25, 1997, December 1, 1997,
December 8, 1997 and December 10, 1997,
petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth,
and Fifth Motion 16
for early resolution of his
16
petition for bail. In all these motions, Atty.
Fortun, counsel of petitioner Alonte, alleged that
copy of the motion “x x x could not be served in
person upon the private prosecutor”
_______________
14 Annex “I,” Petition of Alonte.

15 Annex “J,” Petition of Alonte.
16 Annexes “K,” “K-1,” “L,” and “M,” Petition of Alonte.
287
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 287

(Atty. Balbin)17
in light of the distance between
their offices. He relied on section 13, Rule 11 of
the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The motions
were not resolved by the respondent judge.
On December 18, 1997, the respondent judge
promulgated his Decision convicting the
petitioners and sentencing them to reclusion
perpetua. On whether of the affidavit of
desistance can be a ground for dismissal of the
rape case against the petitioners, the respondent
judge held:
“The first issue to be determined and resolved is the

‘voluntariness and validity of petitioner’s desistance
in the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor
Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab.’ (p. 7,
SC Resolution En Banc, dated September 2, 1997;
[Rollo, p. 253]) It is appropriate to quote again a
portion of the 7page Resolution En Banc of the
highest tribunal, to wit; ‘Indeed, the probability
(exists) that in desisting from pursuing her complaint
for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to
some illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent
grant the petition for change of venue x x x.’ (Rollo, p.

202).
The Court shall narrate the facts leading to the
desistance of the private complainant which are
embodied in the two (2) affidavits of her lawyer, Atty.
Remedios C. Balbin, with whom the private
complainant lives at No. 5 Uranus St., Congressional
Avenue Subdivision, Quezon City. One affidavit is
dated May 24, 1997, (sic) while the other one is dated
March 26, 1997. The said affidavits are attached as
exhibits to the aforementioned Manifestation and
Motion for the Resolution of Petition for Change of
Venue filed by the private complainant Juvie-Lyn Y.
Punongbayan. Exh. “C,” dated May 24, 1997, (Rollo,
pp. 216-219) is hereby quoted as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
It clearly appears in the abovequoted affidavit that
repeated bribe offers from a lawyer representing the
accused Mayor Bayani
_______________
17 The Office of Atty. Fortun is in Makati while the office of Atty.

Balbin is only in Quezon City.
288

Arthur Alonte in the total amount of Ten Million

Pesos (P10,000,000.00) were made to Atty. Balbin,
allocated as follows: (1) Five Million Pesos
(P5,000,000.00) for the private complainant Juvie-Lyn
Y. Punongbayan; (2) Three Million Pesos
(P3,000,000.00) for her (Atty. Balbin); and (3) Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) for the mediator.
In the subsequent affidavit, dated March 26, 1997,
executed by Atty. Remedios C. Balbin (Exh. F, Rollo,
pp. 224-225) she narrated in detail the continuing

veiled threats and the very tempting and escalating
offer to increase the amount of the bribe money offered
to her and the private complainant after her first
affidavit, by doubling the first offer of Ten Million
Pesos (P10,000,000.00) to Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00), in exchange for her client’s
desistance, but also accompanied with veiled threats,
if refused. Said affidavit is quoted, as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
The Court underscores paragraphs (b), (c), (d), (e),
(f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), and (l), particularly paragraphs
(i), (j) and specially paragraph (k) of the above-quoted
affidavit of Atty. Balbin which insinuates that the
presiding Judge of the RTC Biñan, Laguna, had
already been bought, and that accused Alonte, thru
his numerous emissaries, will also buy or bribe ‘the
next judge when the petition for change of venue is
finally granted.’ In view of this insinuation, the
undersigned presiding Judge is very careful in
deciding this case, lest he be placed under suspicion
that he is also receiving blood money that continues to
flow. The Court wants to have internal peace—the
peace which money cannot buy. Money is not
everything. It is said that money is the root of all evil.
The Holy Scriptures also remind judges and jurists:
‘You shall not act dishonestly in rendering judgment.
Show neither partiality to the weak nor deterrence to
the mighty, but judge your fellow men justly.’
(Leviticus 19:15). The Scriptures further say: ‘What
does it profit a man if he gains the whole world but
suffers the loss of his soul?’ (Mt. 16:26) and ‘No one
can serve two (2) masters. x x x You cannot serve God
and mammon.’ (Mt. 6:24, Luke 16:13). It is not out of
place to quote the Holy Scriptures because the
Honorable Supreme Court has been doing so in its
quest for truth and justice. Thus, People vs. Garcia,
209 SCRA 164, 174, the highest tribunal, in ruling
that the flight of an accused is evidence of guilt on his

part, quoted the old Testament, as follows:
289
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 289

“It was written in the literature of Old Testament several

centuries ago that:
‘The wicked man fleeth though no man pursueth, but the
righteous are as bold as a lion.’
(Proverbs, 28:1)”
Subsequently, on June 25, 1997, the private

complainant and her lawyer suddenly somersaulted or
changed their common positions or attitudes in the
prosecution of this case. Evidently, veiled threats and
money had replaced the ‘spiritual consideration’
which earlier, to them were ‘more important than the
material’ to quote Atty. Balbin in her first affidavit
(Rollo, p. 217), and her reply to Atty. Dionisio S. Daga
that ‘all the money in the world will not make me
change my position against my client’s executing a
desistance, and that only Alonte’s voluntary
surrender, plea of guilty to rape, conviction and the
imposition of the corresponding penalty will satisfy
the ends of justice.
On June 26, 1997, the private complainant, thru
her counsel, Atty. Remedios C. Balbin, filed a Motion
to Resume Proceedings, dated June 25, 1997, (Rollo,
pp. 238-244) praying therein that the RTC, Biñan,
Laguna, where this case was still pending, vacate its
Order to Suspend Hearings, to enable it to act on all
incidents including private Complainant’s Affidavit of
Desistance attached thereto. (Rollo, pp. 240-241)
which affidavit of desistance is quoted hereunder as
follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
This Court, as the trier of facts, is tasked by the

highest tribunal to find out if the private complainant,
a minor ‘may have succumbed to some illicit influence
and undue pressure, in order to prevent a possible
miscarriage of justice.’ Evidently, the veiled threats
and acceptance of the bribe money in allocated
amounts which was subsequently raised to the
irresistible amount of at least P20,000,000.00,
compelled, impelled and/or tempted the private
complainant, her father Pablo Punongbayan and her
mother Julie Y. Punongbayan, and her lawyer and
private prosecutor Atty. Remedios C. Balbin, who did
not appear in Court on November 7, 1997, despite
notice, to execute the said ‘Affidavit of Desistance’
which was the ultimate goal of the accused. It is very
obvious that the private complainant, a minor,
‘succumbed to some illicit influence and undue
290

pressure,’ to borrow the language of the Honorable

Supreme Court En Banc. It would be the height of
extreme naivete or gullibility for any normal
individual to conclude otherwise. The Court does not
believe that the private complainant, her lawyer, and
her parents did not receive a single centavo when they
executed and signed the said affidavit of desistance.
The private complainant was definitely lying and/or
somebody taught her to lie when she testified in Court
on November 7, 1997 that she has ‘not received any
single cent.’
This Court cannot close its eyes to the realities in
this case. It cannot play the role of blind, deaf and
dumb or one who has eyes but cannot see or refuses to
see. It cannot live in a world of make believe or let us
say pretend. The ‘Affidavit of Desistance’ executed by
the private complainant assisted by her lawyer and
signed by her parents, was and is undoubtedly,
heavily tainted with acceptance of bribe money which

together with the continuing veiled threats
accompanying the same, invalidated the said
affidavit. The rule of law, and not the roll of money
and threats, should and must prevail.”
On December 19, 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a

Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner assailed
his conviction without due process of law and the
refusal of the respondent judge to dismiss the
case in light of the desistance of the private
complainant. He argued:
x x x x x x x x x
“In People vs. Caruncho, L-57804, January 23,
1984, 127 SCRA 16, the Supreme Court made
ineluctably clear that it is the right of an offended
party to withdraw the further prosecution of a
grievance especially where, as in this case, a personal
offense is the subject thereof:
‘. . .True it is, that in criminal cases society is the ultimate

aggrieved party for which reason the People of the
Philippines is designated as the plaintiff. True it is also that
except as provided in Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
a pardon by the private offended party does not extinguish
criminal liability. And true it is further that the dropping of
criminal cases by the execution of affidavits of desistance by
complainants is not looked with favor. These are Hornbook
doctrines. But what is actually done in our criminal justice
system?” First, there is plea bargaining between the
prosecution and the defense. For instance, murder is charged
but in exchange for a
291
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 291

plea of guilty the charge is reduced to homicide and the

accused is allowed to claim a number of mitigating
circumstances. It is not uncommon for estafa, libel, physical

injuries and even homicide cases to be dismissed because
the complainant has lost interest or alleged that the
complaint was filed as a result of a misunderstanding. A
number of examples can be given and they can fill a book.’
Again, in People vs. Evangelista, L-45089, April 27,

1982, 113 SCRA 713, 720, the Supreme Court further
declared:
‘It may be noted that the crimes in question (forcible

abduction with rape) are among those enumerated in Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code, which crimes cannot be
prosecuted de officio. In other words, the crimes of
abduction and rape are in the nature of private offense,
inasmuch as the law has reposed ‘the right to institute such
proceedings exclusively and successively in the offended
person, her parents, grandparents or guardian’. . .
Accordingly, if after filing the complaint the offended party
in the case at bar decided that she was unable to face the
scandal of public trial, or, if for some private reason she
preferred to suffer the outrage in silence, then, corollary to
her right to institute the proceedings, she should have been
allowed to withdraw her complaint and desist from
prosecuting the case (Emphasis supplied).”
Petitioner Concepcion did not submit any motion

for reconsideration. Without waiting for the
resolution of his motion for reconsideration,
petitioner Alonte repaired to this Court. So did
petitioner Concepcion.
Without doubt, the petitions at bar raise two
(2) fulcrum issues: (1) the correctness of the
ruling of the respondent judge that the desistance
of the complainant is not a ground to dismiss the
rape charge against the petitioners, and (2) the
invalidity of petitioners’ conviction on the ground
of denial of due process.
I agree with the learned disquisition of Mr.
Justice Vitug that we should set aside the
conviction of the petitioners for patent violation
of their right to due process of law. I write this
Separate Opinion to highlight the erroneousness

of the shocking stance of the State Prosecutor
that the rape charge
292

ANNOTATED
should be dismissed in view of the desistance of

the private complainant. But our ruling giving
no effect on the affidavit of desistance should not
be based on the reason that it was procured by
threat or intimidation or any payment of money
as the respondent judge opined in his Decision.
The respondent judge arrived at this conclusion
on the basis of the affidavits of Atty. Balbin, the
counsel of the private complainant. This is
erroneous for Atty. Balbin was never called to
the witness stand to testify on the truth of her
affidavits. Her affidavits therefore are hearsay
evidence and should not have been relied upon
by the respondent judge. The affidavit of
desistance cannot abort the rape charge against
the petitioners on the simple ground that it did
not state that the private complainant-affiant
was not raped by petitioner Alonte. In truth, the
private complainant affirmed her earlier Reply-
Affidavit where she narrated in detail how
petitioner Alonte raped her. Moreover, the rape
charge has been filed in Court and it is not
anymore the absolute privilege of the
complainant to desist from continuing with the
case.
This separate opinion unequivocally
addresses the issue of whether the desistance of
the victim can stop the further prosecution of the
petitioners.
I
In Philippine jurisprudence, desistance has been

equated with recantation or retraction.
To “recant” means to “withdraw
18
or repudiate
formally and publicly” ; “to 19 renounce or
withdraw a prior statement.” To “retract”
means to “take back”; “to retract20
an offer is to
withdraw it before acceptance.” A recantation
usually applies to a
_______________
18 “Recant,” Black’s Law Dictionary, 6th ed. [1990].

19 “Recant,” Words and Phrases, Vol. 36 citing
LlanesSenarillos v. U.S. C.A. Cal. 177 F. 2d, 164, 166.
20 A retraction also is “[i]n law of defamation, a formal
recanting of the defamatory material; in probate practice, a
withdrawal of a renunciation’’ (‘‘Retraction,’’ Black’s Law
Dictionary 6th ed. [1990]).
293
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 293

repudiation by a complainant or a witness,

either for the prosecution or the defense, who 21
has previously given an extrajudicial
22
statement
or testimony in court. Repudiation may 23
be
made in writing, i.e., by sworn statement,
24
or by
testifying on the witness stand.
Mere retraction by a witness or by
complainant of his or her testimony does not
necessarily vitiate the 25
original testimony or
statement, if credible. The general rule is that
courts look with disfavor upon retractions 26
of
testimonies previously
27
given in28 court. This rule
applies to crimes, offenses29
as well as to
administrative offenses. The reason is because
_______________
21 People v. Del Pilar, 188 SCRA 37 [1990]; People v.

Aldeguer, see Del Pilar footnote.
22 People v. Davatos, 229 SCRA 647, 651 [1994]; People v.
De Leon, 245 SCRA 538, 544 [1995]; People v. Joya, 227
SCRA 9, 26-27 [1993].
23 People v. Del Pilar, supra; People v. Joya, supra. People
v. de Leon, supra, People v. Liwag, 225 SCRA 46, 52 [1993].
24 People v. Davatos, supra, at 650; People v. Ubina, 97
Phil. 515 [1955].
25 Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 562, 565 [1994];
People v. Dulay, 217 SCRA 103 [1993].
26 See Reano v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525, 530
[1988] for other citations. A retraction or recantation by a
witness or complainant has often been resorted to as a
ground for new trial. The court has consistently ruled
against the grant of a new trial on the basis of a retraction
by a witness.
27 People v. De Leon, 245 SCRA 538, 546 [1995]; People v.
Detalla, 170 SCRA 522, 529 [1989]; People v. Genilla, 18
SCRA 12, 16 [1966]—all on murder. Alonzo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 552, 562 [1987]—on falsification
of public document. People v. Ibal, 143 SCRA 317, 325 [1986]
—on rape.
28 Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 562 [1994]—a
violation of the Anti-Carnapping Law of 1972; People v.
Romero, 224 SCRA 749 [1993]—on illegal recruitment;
People v. Del Pilar, 188 SCRA 37 [1990]—on violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
29 Celis v. Marquez, 138 SCRA 256, 259 [1985]; Bais v.
Tugaoen, 89 SCRA 101, 109 [1979]; Sotero v. Bautista, 78
SCRA 75, 77 [1977].
294

ANNOTATED
affidavits of retraction can easily be secured

from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually
through intimidation
30
or for monetary
consideration. Moreover, there is always the 31
probability that they will later be repudiated
and there32 would never be an end to criminal
litigation. It would also be a dangerous rule for
courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken
before courts of justice simply because the
witnesses who had given them later on changed
their minds for one reason or another. This
would make solemn trials a mockery and place
the investigation of the33 truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witnesses.
The general rule notwithstanding, the
affidavit should not be peremptorily dismissed
as a useless scrap of paper. There are instances
when a recantation may create serious
34
doubts as
to the guilt of the accused. A retracted
statement or testimony must be subject to
scrupulous examination. The previous statement
or testimony and the subsequent one must be
carefully compared and the circumstances under
which each was given and the reasons and
motives for the change carefully scrutinized. The
veracity of each statement or testimony must be
tested by the credibility of35the witness which is
left for the judge to decide. In short, only where
there exists
_______________
30 People v. Liwag, supra; People v. Joya, supra; Reano v.

Court of Appeals, supra.
31 Lopez v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 565; People v.
Clamor, 198 SCRA 642 [1991]; Reano v. Court of Appeals,
supra, see also United States v. Acacio, 37 Phil. 70, 71 [1917]
—where the defendant made nine (9) conflicting confessions
and statements.
32 Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 135 SCRA 621,
631 [1985]; People v. Pimentel, 118 SCRA 695, 704 [1982];
Reyes v. People, 71 Phil. 598, 599 [1941].
33 People v. Joya, supra, at 26-27; People v. Davatos,

supra, at 651; People v. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550, 556 [1983];
People v. Ubina, 97 Phil. 515, 526 [1955].
34 Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 135 SCRA 620,
631 [1985]; People v. Pimentel, 118 SCRA 695, 704 [1982].
35 With respect to sworn statements—People v. Del Pilar,
188 SCRA 37, 44-45 [1990]; with respect to testimonies in
court—Lopez
295
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 295

special circumstances in the case which when

coupled with the retraction raise doubts as the
truth of the testimony or statement 36given, can a
retraction be considered and upheld.
A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the
same rule 37 has been applied to affidavits of
desistance. An affidavit of desistance is
understood to be a sworn statement executed by
a complainant in a criminal or administrative
case that he or she is discontinuing the action
filed upon his or her complaint for whatever
reason he or she may cite. The court attaches no
persuasive value to a desistance 38
especially when
executed as an afterthought. However, as in
retractions, an affidavit of desistance calls
39
for a
reexamination of the records of the case.
In private crimes, an affidavit of desistance
filed by a private complainant is also frowned
upon by the courts. Although such affidavit may
deserve a second look at the case, there is hardly
an instance when this Court upheld it in private
crimes and dismissed the case on the sole basis
thereof. Indeed, a case is not dismissed upon
mere affidavit of desistance of the complainant,
particularly where there exist special
circumstances that raise 40

doubts as to the
reliability of the affidavit.
Usually in private crimes, an affidavit of
desistance is executed by the private complainant
after pardoning and forgiving the offender. In
this instance, the court treats the affidavit
_______________
v. Court of Appeals, supra, at 565; Reano v. Court of

Appeals, supra, at 530-531; People v. Ubina, supra.
36 Gomez v. Court of Appeals, supra; People v. Pimentel,
supra.
37 People v. Romero, supra, at 757; People v. Junio, 237
SCRA 826, 834 [1994]; People v. Lim, 190 SCRA 706, 715
[1990]; Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra, at
631; People v. Pimentel, supra, at 702-704.
38 People v. Romero, 224 SCRA 749, 757 [1993].
39 Gomez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra; People
v. Pimentel, supra.
40 People v. Junio, supra, at 834; People v. Lor, 132 SCRA
41, 47 [1984]; People v. Avila, 192 SCRA 635, 642-643 [1990].
296

ANNOTATED
41
as an express pardon. It does not ipso facto
dismiss the case but determines the timeliness
and validity thereof.
Private crimes are crimes against chastity
such as adultery and concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. Their
institution, prosecution and extinction are
governed by Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code, viz.:
“Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery,

concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness.—The crimes of adultery and
concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended spouse.
The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties,
if they are both alive, nor in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape, or acts
of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon
a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents,
grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, the
offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-
named persons, as the case may be.
In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of
lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender
with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him.
The provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and
accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned
crimes.”
Private crimes cannot be prosecuted except upon

complaint filed by the offended party. In adultery
and concubinage, the offended party must
implead both the guilty parties and must not
have consented or pardoned the offenders. In
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of
lasciviousness, the complaint must be filed by
the offended party or her parents, grandparents
or guardian. The complainant must not have
expressly pardoned the offender.
_______________
41 People v. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, 166-167 [1981]; People

v. Junio, supra, at 834-835; People v. Avila, supra, at 642-
643; People v. Lor, supra, at 47-48.
297
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 297

Article 344 also provides for the extinction of

criminal liability in private crimes. It mentions
two modes: pardon and marriage, which when
validly and timely made, result in the total 42
extinction of criminal liability of the offender.
The pardon in private crimes must be made 43
before the institution of the criminal action. In
adultery and concubinage, the pardon may be
express or implied while in seduction, abduction,
rape and acts of lasciviousness, the pardon must
be express. In all cases, the pardon must come
prior to the institution of the criminal action.
After the case has been filed in court, any pardon
made by the private complainant, whether by
sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot
extinguish criminal liability. The only act that
extinguishes the penal action and the penalty
that may have been imposed is the marriage 44
between the offender and the offended party.
As this Court declared
45
in the case of Donio-
Teves v. Vamenta, Jr.:
“The term “private crimes” in reference to felonies

which cannot be prosecuted except upon complaint
filed by the aggrieved party, is misleading. Far from
what it implies, it is not only the aggrieved party who
is offended in such crimes but also the State. Every
violation of penal laws results in the disturbance of
public order and safety which the State is committed
to uphold and protect. If the law imposes the condition
that private crimes like adultery shall not be
prosecuted except upon complaint filed by the
offended party, it is, as herein pointed earlier “out of
consideration for the aggrieved party who might
prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through the scandal of a public trial.” Once a
complaint is filed, the will of the offended party is

ascertained and the action proceeds just as in any
other crime. This is shown by the fact that after filing
a complaint, any pardon given by the complainant to
the offender would be unavailing. It is true, the
institution of the
_______________
42 See Article 89, Revised Penal Code.

43 People v. Entes, supra, at 167—on rape; People v. Miranda, 57
Phil. 274 [1932]—qualified seduction.
44 People v. Miranda, supra, at 275.
45 133 SCRA 616, 625 [1984].
298

action in so-called private crimes is at the option of

the aggrieved party. But it is equally true that once
the choice is made manifest, the law will be applied in
full force beyond the control of, and inspite of the
complainant, his death notwithstanding.”
The filing of a complaint in private crimes is

merely a condition precedent to the exercise by
the proper authorities
46
of the power to prosecute
the guilty parties. It is the complaint that
starts the prosecutory proceeding without which
the fiscal and the court 47
cannot exercise
jurisdiction over the case. Once the complaint
is filed, the action proceeds just as in any other
crime.
We follow the postulate that a criminal 48
offense is an outrage to the sovereign state and
the right of prosecution for a crime is one
49
of the
attributes of the sovereign power. Thus,
criminal actions are usually commenced by the
State, through the People of the Philippines, and
the offended
50
party is merely a complaining
witness. In private crimes, however, or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the
offended party assumes a more predominant role
since the right to commence the action or refrain
therefrom, is a matter
51
exclusively within his
power and option. The sovereign state deems it
the wiser policy, in private crimes, to let the
aggrieved party and her family decide whether
to expose to public view the vices, faults 52
and
disgraceful acts occurring in the family. But
once the offended party files the complaint, her
will is ascertained and the action proceeds just
as in any other crime. The decision of the
complainant to undergo the scandal of a public
_______________
46 Valdepeñas v. People, 16 SCRA 871, 876-877 [1966].

47 Id.; People v. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672, 680 [1980]; Pilapil
v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, 660 [1988].
48 People v. Romero, 224 SCRA 749, 757 [1993].
49 United States v. Pablo, 35 Phil. 94, 100 [1916].
50 Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, supra at 661 [1989].
51 Id.
52 United States v. Bautista, 40 Phil. 735, 743 [1920].
299
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 299

trial necessarily
53
connotes the willingness to face
the scandal. The private complainant is deemed
to have shed off her privacy and the crime ceases
to be “private” and becomes “public.” The State,
through the fiscal, takes over the prosecution of
the case and the victim’s change of heart and
mind will not affect the State’s right to vindicate
54
the outrage against the violation of its law.
This is the reason why pardon in crimes of

chastity must come before the institution of the
criminal action. Pardon by the offended party
extinguishes criminal liability when made while
the crime is still “private” and within the control
of the offended party. But once the case is filed
in court, the pardon cannot ipso facto operate to
dismiss the case. After the institution of the
criminal action, any pardon given by the
complainant 55
to the offender would be
unavailing, except of course when the offender
56
validly marries the offended party. The
offended party’s pardon of the offender in a
seduction case after the criminal action had been
57
instituted constitutes no bar to said action. A
pardon given in a rape case after the filing of the
action in court “comes too late to hide 58
the
shameful occurrence from public notice.”
Even the death of the offended party cannot 59
extinguish the case once it is filed in court. If
the offended party dies immediately after filing
the complaint but before the institution of the
criminal action, his60 death is not a ground to
dismiss the case. Clearly, the will and
participation of the offended party
_______________
53 Valdepeñas v. People, supra, at 877.

54 People v. Romero, supra, 754-758.
55 People v. Avila, 192 SCRA 635, 643 [1990].
56 Article 344, Paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code; Laceste
v. Santos, 56 Phil. 472 [1932]; People v. Vicente Mariano, 50
Phil. 587 [1927].
57 People v. Miranda, supra; also cited in Francisco, R.,
Criminal Procedure, Rules 110-127, p. 47 [1996].
58 People v. Lualhati, 171 SCRA 277, 283 [1989].
59 Donio-Teves v. Vamenta, Jr., supra.
60 People v. Ilarde, 125 SCRA 11, 17-18 [1983].
300

ANNOTATED
is necessary only to determine whether to file the

complaint or not. Thereafter, the will of the State
prevails.
Article 344 does not include desistance of the
offended party from prosecuting the case as a
ground for 61extinction 62of criminal liability
whether total or partial. Hence, only when the
desistance is grounded on forgiveness and
pardon and is made before the institution of the
criminal action, can it extinguish criminal
liability. Desistance, per se, is not equivalent to
pardon.
In the case at bar, the “Affidavit of
Desistance” of Juvielyn is not an express pardon
of the accused and the crime committed. Private
complainant desisted from prosecuting the case
against the petitioners because she wished “to
start life anew and live normally again.” She
reiterated this reason on the witness stand. She
complained that members of the media were
bothering and harassing her and that she
wanted to go
_______________
61 Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
“Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal

liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and

as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
2. By service of sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and
all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in
Article 344 of this Code.”
62 Article 94 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
“Art. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability.—Criminal liability

is extinguished partially:
1. By conditional pardon;
2. By commutation of sentence; and
301
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 301

back to her normal life. She never said that she

forgave the petitioners. She did not absolve them
from their culpability. She did not give any
exculpatory fact that would raise doubts about
her rape. She did not say that she consented to
petitioner Alonte’s acts. Moreover, the rape case
is already in court and it is no longer her right to
decide whether or not the charge should 63
be
continued. As we held in Crespo v. Mogul:
xxx
“The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in court any
disposition of the case as to its dismissal or conviction
or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the court. Although the fiscal retains the
direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The court is the
best and sole judge on what to do with the case before
it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to
dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be

addressed to the court who has the option to grant or
deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before
or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records of the investigation.”
II
The next issue is the validity of the conviction of

petitioners. Petitioners contend that they were
convicted without undergoing any trial.
Respondent judge insists otherwise. He claims
that petitioners submitted the case on the merits
and relied principally on the Affidavit of
Desistance. He recounts the events that took
place before the presentation of private
complainant as revealed by the transcripts of
November 7, 1997, viz.:
_______________
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may

earn while he is serving his sentence.”
63 151 SCRA 462, 471 [1987].
302

ANNOTATED
“Prosecutor Campomanes
Your Honor, the complaining
witness/private complainant Juvielyn
Punongbayan is present here in Court, and
a while ago, I was given a copy of her
Affidavit of Desistance, so I would like to
present her in order to attest to the veracity
of her Affidavit of Desistance, your Honor,

and for the Court to her testimony.
Court
We will have a separate trial, this involved
a heinous offense and that there is not even
any plea-bargaining in this case.
Yes, your Honor, I understand that.
Court
So you have to mark now your documentary
evidence in preparation for trial.
Yes, your Honor.
Court
There are many documentary evidence
mentioned by the Supreme Court in its
seven (7) page. . .(may I see the record)
seven (7) page resolution, dated September
2, 1997, and that this case was assigned to
this Court as the trial Judge. This Court
has already arraigned the accused and he
pleaded not guilty, and so the next step is
pre-trial. The Order of the Supreme Court is
to direct this Court not only to determine the
voluntariness but also the validity of the
Affidavit of Desistance mentioned by the
Court which was also brought to the
attention of the Supreme Court.
And to the Department of Justice likewise
your Honor.
Court
And that’s why the Supreme Court instead
of resolving it sent the records to this Court
to determine the voluntariness and the
validity of the Desistance, but they must
bedetermined after trial on the merits.
303
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 303

Your Honor please, representing the people.
Its events now will prove that there is no
more need for the prosecution to go on trial
of this case, considering that the private
complainant herself had already furnished
the Department of Justice a copy of her
Affidavit of Desistance.
Court
What does it say there?
That she is no longer interested in further
prosecuting this case, and that she is now
desisting in going to full blown trial, and
considering your Honor, further, that this is
a private offense, then, the Department of
Justice feels that it can not be more popish
than the Pope.
Court
That is the stand of the Department of
Justice. But the Supreme Court belongs to a
different Department, I am governed by the
Supreme Court, because I am a Judge, I am
not from the Department of Justice.
We are all aware your Honor, that we will
just be prol onging the agony, in fairness to
everybody, considering that we are
representing the people, but we are not
representing only. . .the Department of
Justice is not only representing the
complainant in this case but we are also for
justice to be rendered to the respondent as

well.
Court
I am rendering fair justice to everyone. That
is the sense of this Court. That is the
perception of this Court with respect to the
Supreme Court resolution, in the first place,
that Affidavit does not negate the
commission of the crime. You want us to
dismiss this case when the Affidavit does
not negate the commission of the crime?
That’s why we will be presenting her in
Open Court, your Honor.
Court
Just to affirm that?
304

ANNOTATED
No to prove. . .
Court
What happened . . . how about the
Prosecution Department, they have control
of the prosecution, and the offended party
herself, has not negated the commission of
the crime, is there anything there to show
that she did not . . . that the accused . . . did
not commit the crime charged?
That’s why we will be presenting her in
Court, whatever is not here will be clarified.
Court
So, we will go to a trial on the merits you
present that affidavit, that’s a part of your
evidence.
The people is ready to present that . . . the
complaining witness.
Court
We will have a trial on the merits.
Your Honor please, being a woman, I have
extensively discussed this matter with the
complaining witness and she intimated to
this representation that she can not bear
another day of coming here, with all these
people staring at her with everybody
looking at her as if she is something . . .
Court
On December 13, 1996, petitioner
Punongbayan through private counsel,
Atty. Remedios C. Balbin and the Assistant
State Prosecutor Guiab, Jr. who is not here
both were relieved and changed with a new
lady prosecutor, prayed that the case be
tried by the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
they cited the following grounds: ‘THE
GREAT DANGER TO THE LIVES OF
BOTH PRIVATE COMP LAINANT AND
THE IMMEDIATE MEMBERS OF HER
FAMILY AND THEIR WITNESSES AS
THEY OPENLY IDENTIFIED THE
PRINCIPAL ACCUSED MAYOR ALONTE
WHO IS ACKNOWLEDGED AS A
POWERFUL POLITICAL FIGURE AND
ALMOST AN
305
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 305

INSTITUTION IN BIÑAN, LAGUNA AND

[THE] GREAT DANGERS TO THE LIVES
OF WITNESSES WHO OTHERWISE
WISH TO COME OUT IN THE OPEN AND
TESTIFY ON THE MORAL AND CRIMI-
NAL ACTIVITIES OF BOTH ACCUSED
PERPE-TRATED UPON VERY YOUNG
GIRLS STUDENTS OF BIÑAN, LAGUNA
THAT WILL NOT DO SO IN THE TERMS
OF THE ACCUSED MAYOR” that is why it
was the prayer of the offended party and
the Supreme Court granted the Motion for
Change of Venue, and we are now on a new
venue, where the danger to the lives of the
wit-ness is no longer present, on January 7,
1997, Alonte filed an Opposition thereto,
and on April 23, 1997, the petitioner, the
offended party through the Honorable Sec-
retary of Justice Teofisto Guingona and
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño filed
a Manifestation and Mo-tion for Resolution
of the Petition For Change of Venue.
Attached to the motion of the Honorable
Secretary of Jus-tice Guingona and Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuñowere the
affidavits of the petitioner, her lawyer, Atty.
Remedios Balbin, Dolores Yambao,
Bienvenido Salan-danan and Evelyn Celso
with their contention that the prosecution
witnesses and the private counsel of
petitioner are exposed to kidnapping,
harassment, grave threats and tempting
offers of bribe money, that was the stand of
your department . . . And then later on June
28, 1997 . . . we have to review this case
because this involves public in-terest . . . on
June 23, 1997, Atty. Casano in behalf of the
oppositors, two (2) oppositors, filed a motion
to dismiss the petition for change of venue
in the Supreme Court on the ground that it
has become moot, he alleges that the

petitioner despite the motion to resume the
proceedings in criminal case no. 96-19-B in
said motion, the petitioner informed the
Court that she is desisting . . . informed the
Supreme Court that she is desisting from
proceeding with the case, it is the same
affidavit she prayed that the trial Court, on
her affidavit of desistance . . . Atty. Casano
also submitted to this Court, to the
Supreme Court the manifestation of the
petitioner joining the oppositors’ prayer to
dismiss her petition to a change of venue,
the manifestation was also signed by Atty.
Remedios Balbin as private prosecutor, the
Supreme Court required Assis
306

ANNOTATED
tant Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab

to comment on the motion to dismiss filed
by Atty. Casano which in-volve the same
affidavit that you have just read. On Au-
gust 22, 1997, assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Guiab filed his comment, he
alleged that he is not aware of the
desistance of the petitioner in criminal case
no. 96-19-B, and in said desistance there is
two (2) legal effect, [that] the public
prosecutor has the control and direction of
the prosecution in criminal action, he
prayed for the denial of the Motion to
Dismiss and reiterated his petition for
change of venue, the Supreme Court
granted the change of venue and in
granting the change of venue the highest
tribunal which we are all subordinates,
says: for the re-cord, in their manifestation

and motion for the resolution of petition to a
change of venue the Secretary of Justice
and Chief State Prosecutor submitted
various affidavits in support of their
allegations that prosecution witnesses and
private legal counsel are exposed to
KIDNAPPING, HARASSMENT, GRAVE
THREATS, AND TEMPTING OFFERS OF
BRIBE MONEY all intended to extract an
affidavit of desistance from the private
complainant, this is now the affidavit of
desistance in her affidavit dated December
16, 1996, the petitioner, the offended party,
the herein offended party Juvielyn
Punongbayan alleged etc . . . etc . . . in
support of her petition and then she al-
leged that during the last week of February,
1997, she was visited by one Lourdes
Salaysay, she stated that Mrs. Salaysay
told her that Mrs. Alonte, wife of Mayor
Alonte requested her to settle Alonte’s case,
she was in-formed that Mrs. Alonte was
offering P10,000,000.00, will send her to
school and give her house and send her
parents abroad, Atty. Remedios C. Balbin is
not here now, I am just quoting the
Supreme Court, counsel, pri-vate counsel of
petitioner also executed an affidavit dated
February 1997, quote: the Supreme Court
quote to them: to put on record the
attempting, influence, directly, in ex-change
of valuable consideration, that the Rape
charge against Mayor Bayani Arthur
Alonte, she alleged that in two (2) occasions
Atty. Romero conveyed to me the mes-sage
of Mayor Alonte, namely: to drop the rape
case against him, and that he would give a
consideration of P10,000,000.00 to be
apportioned as follows:
307
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 307

P5,000,000.00, for the private complainant,

your client and the prosecutor
P3,000,000.00 for me, as private prosecutor,
that is what Atty. Balbin said,
P2,000,000.00 for her, the mediator, so
there seems to be a liberal flow of blood
money, that is why the Supreme Court
ordered the Court to determine the validity,
and there is another, dated March 19, 1997.
I have to remind everybody about what
happened, this thing did not come from me,
I am not fabricating anything this comes
from the highest tri-bunal jurat, to whom I
am responsible, another affidavit of Atty.
Balbin, she narrated the continuing
attempts to bribe her and threatened her,
so there were continuing events, they
alleged, the People’s Bureau, Office of the
Mayor of Quezon City, extensively discuss
the squatting case with against his client,
that after a brief exchange on the status of
the case, they confided to me his real
purpose, that it started of by saying he was
the legal counsel of the gambling lords of
Malabon for which he get a monthly
retainer of P15,000.00 exclusive of trans-
portation expenses, but he also stated that
he knows all the network of the gambling
lord throughout the country, which is quite
strong and unified, that I then ask him
“what do you mean?” “Is Alonte into
gambling too, that he is part of the network
you speak of?,” that Atty. Daga did not
reply, but instead said, they are prepared to
dou-ble the offer made to by Atty. Romero
which was pub-lished in the newspaper at
P10,000,000.00, so, its double, double your
money, so its P20,000,000.00, that I told
him, its Atty. Balbin, that all the money in
the world, all the money in the world will

not make me change my po-sition against
my client executing a desistance and that
Alonte’s voluntary surrender, plea of guilty
to rape, con-viction, and the imposition of
the corresponding penalty will satisfy the
ends of justice, but I told him, that my
client’s case is not isolated, there being five
(5) other mi-nors similarly place and
Alonte’s will be stopped from doing more
harm that Atty. Daga, then told me in Fili-
pino if you do not accede to a desistance,
then they will be forced to but because he
did not [complete] the sen-tence I asked him
directly, what do you mean, what do you
intend to do, and he replied, go on with the
case, [buy] the judge, that I am believing,
and I reacted saying,
308

ANNOTATED
but they have already done so, Judge

Francisco at Biñan suddenly change his
attitude towards the prosecution, perhaps
you are referring to the next judge when the
petition for change of venue is finally
granted that Atty. Daga did not reply, and
he reiterated that his principal, referring to
them again as gambling lords, wanted
desistance, after which he excused himself
and left, that I exec ute this affidavit, as
Atty. Balbin attests to the truth of the
incident with Atty. Dionisio Daga which
occurred in the afternoon of March 6, 1997
at my office, stating . . . (JUDGE READING
THE RECORDS OF THE CASE)
Court
Then, the Supreme Court said, these

affidavits, the one attached have specific
names, dates and methods . . . a coercion of
corruption, the prosecution of Criminal
Case No. 96-19-B (JUDGE CONTINUED
READING THE RECORDS OF THE CASE)
that is desisting for pursuing her complaint
for Rape petitioner a minor, they have . . .
illicit, influence and due pressure to prevent
. . . Criminal Case No. 96-19-B to any of its
Branch, just to call the Criminal Case No.
96-19-B shall be raffled, shall result the
petitioner’s motion, to resume proceedings,
filed in Branch 26, in the RTC of Laguna, to
determine the voluntariness and validity of
the petitioner’s desistance in the light of the
position of the public prosecutor, Assistant
Chief Prosecutor Leonardo Guiab . . . I don’t
know what will be the outcome . . . you may
contend that because of that affidavit of the
desistance there is reasonable doubt . . . etc
. . . but still, that will be placing the cart
before the horse . . . you have to go to a
regular trial on the merits . . . because this
is a heinous offense which cannot . . . and
during the pre-trial cannot be subject to a
plea-bargaining, and with respect to its new
law which took effect in 1993, that is a new
one, it was placed to the category of a
heinous offense x x x.
So we go on trial your Honor, and we will
present the complaining witness, and let the
Court decide on the basis of the
complainants testimony . . . private
complainant’s testimony, before this
Honorable Court 6 . . .
xxx
309
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 309

That’s why we are presenting the private
complainant, the principal witness, the
mother who is also a signatory to this
affidavit of desistance, everybody who have
been a part and participant in the making
and preparation of this affidavit of
desistance, they have already signed these
affidavit of desistance.
Court
And we also have the affidavits mentioned
by the Supreme Court, because I was . . . all
of those documents in the determination of
whether that affidavit is valid.
Yes, your Honor.
Court
We . . . the Court cannot close his eyes to the
other affidavits . . . because . . . that’s why
precisely the Supreme Court ordered me to
hear this case.
We understand that your Honor.
Court
There are may conflicting matters to be solve
. . . conflicting matters to be tackled in this
case.
May we present64the private complainant,
your Honor . . .”
The records show that the hearing of November

7, 1997 was set for arraignment of the
65
65
petitioners. After the counsels made their
respective appearances, Prosecutor
Campomanes presented her authority to appear
as prosecutor in lieu of Asst. Chief State
Prosecutor Guiab, Jr. Both petitioners pleaded
not guilty to the charge. Respondent judge then
set the case for pretrial which the parties,
however, waived. The
_______________
64 Comment of Respondent Judge Savellano, pp. 14-23,

citing portions of the TSN of November 7, 1997.
65 Notice of Hearing, Annex “3” to the Comment of
Respondent Judge Savellano.
310

ANNOTATED
proceedings continued and Prosecutor

Campomanes manifested there was no need for
the prosecution to go to trial in view of the
Affidavit of Desistance of the private
complainant. Respondent judge, however,
observed that private complainant did not
negate the commission of the crime in her
Affidavit of Desistance. Respondent judge
expressed his misgivings on the validity of the
Affidavit of Desistance because of the September
2, 1997 Resolution of this Court citing affidavits
where allegations of bribery were made to
extract said affidavit from complainant.
Prosecutor Campomanes then offered to present
the private complainant to attest to the
voluntariness and veracity of her Affidavit of
Desistance. Respondent judge averred whether
the court should proceed to a trial on the merits.
Prosecutor Campomanes declared that they

could go on trial and let the court decide the
merits of the case on the basis of the testimony
of private complainant and the other witnesses.
It was then that private complainant was
presented as a witness.
From the garbled transcripts of the hearing on
November 7, 1997, it is not clear what both
respondent judge and the public prosecutor
intended the proceedings to be. Respondent judge
repeatedly declared that the proceedings before
him was to be a trial on the merits. The public
prosecutor agreed to go to trial, but at the same
time moved to present private complainant and
her witnesses to testify on the voluntariness of
her Affidavit of Desistance. Respondent judge
and the public prosecutor were, obviously, not
tuned in to each other.
I agree with the majority that the November
7, 1997 proceedings could not have been a trial
on the merits. First of all, the proceedings did
not conform with the procedure for trial as
provided in the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Section 3 of Rule 119 provides:
“Sec. 3. Order of Trial.—The trial shall proceed in the

following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove
the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.
311
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 311

(b) The accused may present evidence to

prove his defense, and damages, if any,
arising from the issuance of any
provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The parties may then respectively

present rebutting evidence only, unless
the court, in furtherance of justice,
permits them to present additional
evidence bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case
shall be deemed submitted for decision
unless the court directs the parties to
argue orally or to submit memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the
act or omission charged in the complaint
or information but interposes a lawful
defense, the order of trial may be
modified accordingly.”
In the case at bar, petitioners were never

instructed to present evidence to prove their
defenses. The parties were never given the
opportunity to present their respective evidence
rebutting the testimony of private complainant.
There was no admission by petitioners of the
charge in the information
66
as to justify a change
in the order of trial.
Our criminal rules of procedure strictly
provide the step by step procedure to be followed
67
by courts in cases punishable by death. This
rule also applies to all other criminal cases,
particularly where the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua. The reason for this is to
assure that the State makes no mistake in 68
taking life and liberty except that of the guilty.
Thus:
“Judges should be reminded that each step in the trial

process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of
criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused requires that an
accused be given sufficient opportunity to present his
defense. So with the prosecution as to its evidence.
Hence, any deviation from the regular course of
trial should always take into consideration the rights
of all the parties

69
to the case, whether the prosecution
or defense.”
_______________
66 Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 41.

67 People v. Diaz, 254 SCRA 734, 742 [1996].
68 Id.
69 Tabao v. Espina, 257 SCRA 298, 305 [1996].
312

ANNOTATED
Second, the admission of private complainant’s

affidavit of October 21, 1996 was made solely in
response to
70
respondent judge’s own
questioning. It was this affidavit which
respondent judge used to convict the petitioners.
This affidavit, however, was not marked nor was
it formally offered before the court. The Revised
Rules on Evidence clearly and expressly provide
that “[t]he court shall consider no71 evidence
which has not been formally offered.” Evidence
not formally offered in court will not be taken
into consideration by the court in disposing of
the issues of the case. Any evidence which a
party desires to submit for the consideration of 72
the court must formally be offered 73
by him,
otherwise it is excluded and rejected.
Third, where there is a doubt as to the nature
of the criminal proceedings before the court, this
doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused
who must be given the74 widest latitude of action
to prove his innocence. It is in petitioners’ favor
that the proceedings of November 7, 1997 be
treated as a hearing on the motion to dismiss,
not a trial on the merits. To rule otherwise will
effectively deny petitioners due process and all

the other rights of an accused under the Bill of
Rights and our Rules in Criminal Procedure.
Indeed, following respondent judge’s finding
and assuming that the November 7, 1997
hearing was already a trial on the merits,
petitioners were never afforded their right to
confront and cross-examine the witness. The
court did not, at the very least, inquire as to
whether the petitioners wanted to crossexamine
private complainant with respect to her affidavit
of
_______________
70 TSN of Nov. 7, 1997, pp. 18, 21.

71 Sec. 34, Rule 132 C, Revised Rules on Evidence; Veran
v. Court of Appeals, 157 SCRA 438, 446 [1988].
72 De Castro v. Court of Appeals, 75 Phil. 824, 834 [1946];
see also Francisco, Handbook on Evidence, p. 390 [1984].
73 Martin, Revised Rules on Evidence, pp. 593-594 [1989];
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, vol. 6, p. 124
[1980].
74 See People v. Mahinay, 246 SCRA 451, 459 [1995];
People v. Mamacol, 81 Phil. 543, 545 [1948].
313
VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 313

October 21, 1996. No opportunity to cross-

examine was afforded petitioners and their
counsels such that they cannot be 75
deemed to
have waived said right by inaction.
Submission of affidavit of desistance does not
warrant the dismissal of the criminal case; For
failure of due process, assailed judgment
declared null and void.
Note.—Precipitate dismissal of criminal

cases is tantamount to denying the State due
process. (People vs. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238
[1996])
——o0o——
_______________
75 De la Paz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 154 SCRA 5,

7173 [1987]; People v. Caparas, 102 SCRA 781, 790 [1981];
Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas mg Manggagawang Pilipino,
62 SCRA 258, 263-267 [1975]; also cited in Herrera,
Remedial Law, vol. 4, pp. 343344 [1992].
314
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5/10/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 287

VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 245

BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON.

BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner,

Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Due

elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal

246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr.

sent rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by

Same; Same; Desistance; An affidavit of

PUNO, J., Separate Opinion:

Same; Same; Desistance; The general rule is that

VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 247

Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr.

disfavor upon retractions of testimonies previously

witness which is left for the judge to decide. In short,

248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr.

affidavit of desistance calls for a reexamination of the

circumstances that raise doubts as to the reliability of

VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 249

Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr.

Same; Same; Same; Article 344 does not include

never instructed to present evidence to prove their

250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr.

death. This rule also applies to all other criminal

solely in response to respondent judge’s own

VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 251

Alonte vs. Savellano, Jr.

finding and assuming that the November 7, 1997

PETITION Ex Abudante Ad Cautelam in the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Pending before this Court are two separate

and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a

“That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas,

252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Laguna after giving complainant-child drinking water

The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-

Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have

“I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years

1 Rollo of G.R. No. 131728, pp. 20-21.

VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 253

“3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly,

“WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June,

“(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN

254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

“In the presence of:

“SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25

On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casano, on

RTC), granting the petition for change of venue.

“These affidavits give specific names, dates, and

2 Rollo of G.R. No. 131728, pp. 34-35.

VOL. 287, MARCH 9, 1998 255

illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent

the complete records of Crim.

On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-

3 Rollo of G.R. No. 131652, pp. 72-73.

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS