VOL.

275, JULY 7, 1997 127

People vs. Mejia

 
*
G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and G.R. No. 119407. July 7, 1997.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

GREGORIO MEJIA y VILLAFANIA, EDWIN BENITO,
PEDRO PARAAN, and JOSEPH FABITO, accused-
appellants.

Courts; Consolidations and Joint Trials; Criminal

Proceedings; Criminal cases which are irretrievably linked with
or related to one another, arose out of the same incident, are
founded on the same

_______________

* EN BANC.

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128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

factual milieu, and would be proved by testimonies of the same

witnesses, should be consolidated and jointly tried in one
branch of the court.—Before we go any further, remarks on
some procedural matters are in order. The crimes charged in
the informations filed before the LARON court and CASTILLO
court are irretrievably linked with or related to one another.
They arose out of the same incident, are founded on the same
factual milieu, and would be proved by testimonies of the same
witnesses. The three cases then should have been consolidated
and jointly tried in one branch of the RTC of Dagupan City.
What were jointly tried were only the cases for murder and
frustrated murder.
Same; Same; The purpose or object of consolidation is to
avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse,
prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the
trial court, and save unnecessary cost or expense; in short, the
attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the
parties litigants.—The purpose or object of consolidation is to
avoid multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse,
prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work of the
trial court, and save unnecessary cost or expense; in short, the
attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to
the parties litigants. In Raymundo v. Elipe, we held that that
although consolidation of several cases involving the same
parties and the same subject matter is one addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court, joint hearing becomes a
matter of duty if two or more cases are tried before the same
judge, or even filed with the different branches of the same
court, provided one of such cases has not been partially tried.
Same; Same; Evidence; Presumption of Innocence; Where
two criminal cases which should have been consolidated are
separately tried in different courts, the appellate judicial minds
and mental processes must be kept away from the pitfalls of
forming impressions in light of the totality of the testimonies in
both courts, for the rules of evidence and the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused dictate that the
appeals in the cases before the two trial courts be resolved solely
on the basis of the evidence presented before such courts,
respectively.—This failure to consolidate the three cases at the
trial court level could contribute some difficulty in the
appreciation of the evidence. The principal witnesses of the
parties testified in all the three cases. Yet, the assessment of
their testimony and credibility in the LARON court must not
be influenced by their

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People vs. Mejia

testimonies in the case before the CASTILLO court, and vice

versa. In the LARON court, prosecution witness Catugas was
unclear in some details of the incident, but clear in the
CASTILLO court. Upon the other hand, there were details he
disclosed in one of the courts which were not given in the other
court. The same observation may be had on the testimonies of
the appellants before both courts. As one reads the transcripts
of the testimonies of these witnesses in both cases, it would be
quite difficult to avoid forming impressions in light of the
totality of their testimonies in both courts. Our minds and
mental processes must be kept away from the pitfalls of such
impressions, for the rules on evidence and the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants dictate that
we resolve the appeals in the cases before the LARON court
and the case before the CASTILLO court solely on the basis of
the evidence presented before such courts, respectively.
Criminal Law; Complex Crimes; Qualified Carnapping or
Carnapping in Aggravated Form; Considering the phraseology
of amended Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, the carnapping and the
killing (or the rape) may be considered as a single or indivisible
crime or a special complex crime which, however, is not covered
by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.—Three amendments
have thus been made, viz: (1) the change of the penalty of life
imprisonment to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape,
and (3) the change of the phrase “in the commission of the
carnapping” to “in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof.” The latter makes clear
the intention of the law to make the offense a special complex
crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against
or intimidation of persons. As such, the killing (or the rape)
merely qualifies the crime of carnapping which for lack of
specific nomenclature may be known as qualified carnapping
or carnapping in an aggravated form. In short, considering the
phraseology of the amended Section 14, the carnapping and the
killing (or the rape) may be considered as a single or indivisible
crime or a special complex crime which, however, is not covered
by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Same; Same; Same; Whether it is homicide or murder
which is committed “in the course of carnapping or on the
occasion thereof” makes no difference insofar as the penalty is
concerned—the homicide or murder cannot be treated as a
separate offense, but should only be

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130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Mejia

considered to qualify the crime of carnapping.—Since Section

14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words “IS KILLED,” no distinction
must be made between homicide and murder. Whether it is one
or the other which is committed “in the course of carnapping or
on the occasion thereof” makes no difference insofar as the
penalty is concerned. It follows then that the killing of the
driver, Teofilo Landingin—whether it be homicide or murder—
cannot be treated as a separate offense, but should only be
considered to qualify the crime of carnapping.
Same; Same; Same; The words “IS KILLED” in the last
clause of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended, refers only to
the consummated felony of either murder or homicide, and if
attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is committed, then
it must be deemed to fall under the clause “when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person.”—But do the words “IS KILLED” in
the last clause of Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended,
include the crime of frustrated murder or homicide? Put a little
differently, does murder or homicide in its frustrated stage also
qualify carnapping if it is committed “in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof”? The
answer must be in the negative in light of the use in said
Section 14 of the words “IS KILLED.” The unmistakable
import thereof is that it refers only to the consummated felony
of either murder or homicide. If attempted or frustrated
murder or homicide is committed “in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof,” then
it must be deemed to fall under the clause (of Section 14)
“when the carnapping is committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of any person.”
Same; Constitutional Law; Presumption of Innocence;
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome
the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt
must be established by the prosecution.—Enshrined in the Bill
of Rights is the right of the accused to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved. To overcome the presumption,
nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established
by the prosecution. Save in certain circumstances as where, for
instance, the accused admits the commission of the acts alleged
to constitute a crime but interposes justifying circumstances,
the burden is never shifted to the accused or diminished by the
weakness of his defense. Indeed, unless the prosecution

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VOL. 275, JULY 7, 1997 131

People vs. Mejia

successfully discharges that burden, the accused need not even

offer evidence in his behalf.
Same; Same; Same; In our jurisdiction, accusation is not
synonymous with guilt; if the prosecution fails to discharge the
burden of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, then it is not only the accused’s right to be freed—it is,
even more, the court’s constitutional duty to acquit him.—In our
jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with guilt. The
freedom of the accused is forfeit only if the requisite quantum
of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. This, of course,
requires the most careful scrutiny of the evidence for the State,
both oral and documentary, independent of whatever defense is
offered by the accused. Every circumstance favoring the
accused’s innocence must be duly taken into account. The proof
against the accused must survive the test of reason. Strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The
conscience must be satisfied that on the accused could be laid
the responsibility for the offense charged. If the prosecution
fails to discharge the burden, then it is not only the accused’s
right to be freed; it is, even more, the court’s constitutional
duty to acquit him.
Same; Police Blotters; Entries in the police blotters should
not be given undue significance or probative value, for they are
normally incomplete and inaccurate sometimes from either
partial suggestion or for want of suggestion or inquiries.—
Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court relied heavily on the
entries in the police blotters of the police stations of Sual and
Sta. Barbara. The silence of the entries on what the appellants
had declared in court is not conclusive evidence that they did
not report the incident to the police authorities. They had no
participation in the preparation of the entries. Entries in the
police blotters should not be given undue significance or
probative value, for they are normally incomplete and
inaccurate sometimes from either partial suggestion of for
want of suggestion or inquiries. The entries in question are
sadly wanting in material particulars. At the very most, they
only recorded the impression that the appellants were
“suspects.”
Same; Evidence; Compromise; An offer to pay or the
payment of medical, hospital or other expenses occasioned by an
injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or criminal
liability for the injury.—The LARON court gave credence to the
version of the prosecution and even took the incident as offer of
compromise, which may

132

132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

be considered an implied admission of guilt. Said court

misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. There
is no evidence whatsoever that any of the appellants
authorized his parents to approach Catugas or knew the
matter of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe
the explanation of Catugas that the amount of P80,000
represented the expenses he incurred for his hospitalization
and medical bills, then the offer to reimburse it is not
admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to
the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Dagupan City, Br. 43.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

 
In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the
expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan, several persons on board a passenger
jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked the latter
and a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, thereby inflicting
upon them multiple stab wounds. Landingin was pulled
out from his seat and dumped on the shoulder of the
road. One of the attackers took the wheel of the jeepney
and drove away. Catugas was thrown out to the middle
of the road when the jeepney started to move away.
Landingin died as a consequence of the injuries he
sustained. Catugas survived.
Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio
Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, Joseph Fabito,
Romulo Calimquim, one alias Dennis, Alex Mamaril, one
alias Mondragon, and another unidentified person. Mejia
and Benito were taken into police custody a few hours
after the incident; Paraan, the following day; and Fabito,
five days after. Calimquim was found dead three days
after the incident in ques-

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People vs. Mejia

tion, while the others have remained at large.

1
Three
separate2 criminal complaints for murder, frustrated
murder, and violation of R.A. 3 No. 6539 (Anti
Carnapping Act of 1992, as amended) were filed against
them with the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan.
Despite service on them of subpoenas requiring
submission of counter-affidavits, accused Mejia, Benito,
Paraan, and Fabito did not submit their counter-
affidavits.
On4 9 May 1994, Judge Lilia C. Espanol issued an
order declaring the accused “to have waived their right
to be heard in preliminary investigation”; finding a
prima facie case against the accused; recommending that
they be charged with and prosecuted for the crimes of
murder, frustrated murder, and violation of R.A. No.
6539, as amended; and ordering that the records of the
cases be forwarded to the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor for appropriate action.
 After appropriate proceedings, the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City three
separate informations for murder, frustrated murder,
and violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended, against the aforenamed persons. The
informations were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 94-
00617-D, 94-00619-D, and 94-00620-D, respectively. The
first was later amended. The accusatory portions of the
informations read as follows:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00617-D (as amended)

 
That on or about March 10, 1994, in the evening along the
expressway at barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta.
Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with knives with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation and taking

______________

1 Original Record (OR), Criminal Case No. 94-0617-D, 7.

2 OR, Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D, 10.
3 OR, Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D, 10.
4 OR, Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D, 19; OR Criminal Case No. 94-
00619-D, 17; and OR, Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D, 26.

134

134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

advantage of superior strength, conspiring, confederating and

mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and stab TEOFILO
LANDINGIN inflicting upon him stab wounds which caused
his instant death to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Art. 248 of5 the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659.
  

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00619-D

 
That on or about March 10, 1994, in the evening along the
expressway at barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta.
Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with knives and with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation, and taking advantage of superior strength,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack
and stab VIRGILIO CATUGAS Y CASTAÑEDA inflicting upon
him multiple stab wounds, the accused having then performed
all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime
of Murder as a consequence but which nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused and that is due to the timely and able medical
assistance rendered to said Virgilio Catugas y Castañeda
which prevented his death to his damage and prejudice.
Contrary6 to Art. 248 in relation with Art. 6 of the Revised
Penal Code.

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 94-00620-D

 
That on or about March 10, 1994 in the evening along the
expressway at barangay Ventinilla, Municipality of Sta.
Barbara, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
armed with knives by means of violence against person by
stabbing to death TEOFILO LANDINGIN, owner-driver of a
passenger jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432 with marking
Lovely and thereafter with intent to gain, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another did then

_____________

5 OR, Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D, 1.

6 OR, Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D, 1.

135
 VOL. 275, JULY 7, 1997 135
People vs. Mejia

and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and drive

away said passenger jeep bearing Plate No. APP-432 with
marking Lovely owned and driven by Teofilo Landingin
without the latter’s consent, to the damage and prejudice of his
heirs. 7
Contrary to Republic Act 6539 as amended.

 
The first two were assigned to Branch 44 of the RTC
of Dagupan City presided by Judge Crispin C. Laron
(hereafter, LARON court) and thereafter consolidated
and jointly tried. The third was assigned to Branch 43 of
the said court presided by Judge Silverio Q. Castillo
(hereafter, CASTILLO court).
At their arraignments, Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and
Fabito entered a plea of innocence in each case.

THE CASES IN THE LARON COURT

 
In Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D (Murder) and
Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D (Frustrated Murder) in
the LARON court, the prosecution presented the
following witnesses: Virgilio Catugas, policemen
Dominguillo Gulen and Bernardo Clemente, Dr. Cristito
Garcia, Ma. Nora Landingin, and Dr. Roberto
Valenzuela. Virgilio Catugas was recalled as rebuttal
witness. In their defense, accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan,
and Fabito took the witness stand. They also presented
as additional witnesses Roberto Lambot, Shirley
Lomboy, Conrado Benito, policeman Bernardo Clemente,
and Felicidad Fabito in their evidence in chief and Julia
Paraan as sur-rebuttal witness.
The evidence for the prosecution in these cases may
be summarized as follows:
At around 7:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, Virgilio
Catugas was in front of the CS1 Supermarket in
Dagupan City waiting for a transportation to take him to
his home at Talibaew, Cala-

______________

7 OR, Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D, 1.

136

136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

siao, Pangasinan. Later, a passenger jeepney plying the

Dagupan City—Calasiao route and driven by Teofilo
Landingin arrived. He boarded it and occupied that
portion of the passengers’ seat behind the driver’s seat.
There were already some passengers inside the jeepney,
but they disembarked before the jeepney reached the
boundary of Dagupan City and Calasiao, leaving 8
behind
Landingin, Catugas, and two other passengers.
When the jeepney reached the MacArthur Highway in
San Miguel, Calasiao, nine persons flagged down the
jeepney and boarded it. One of them, whom Catugas
identified to be accused Edwin Benito, sat beside the
driver; the rest took the passenger seats behind the
driver’s seat. Catugas fully recognized Benito because
there was light at the ceiling of the jeepney and at the
“signboard” portion of the jeepney and the latter
sometimes turned his face toward the back where
Catugas was seated. Catugas 9
had further observed
Benito’s face, ears, and eyes.
10
He also recognized accused
Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan.
The nine passengers told Landingin that they were
bound for Pangasinan Village Inn (PVI) in Bued,
Calasiao. But when they reached PVI, one of them said
that his companions did not know where they were
going, and informed Landingin that he would take care
of the fare upon reaching Nansangaan, Sta. Barbara,
Pangasinan. Upon reaching Nansangaan, one of the nine
passengers asked Landingin to drive a little farther.
Later, Mejia asked Catugas whether he was Landingin’s
companion; Catugas answered in the affirmative. Mejia
then announced: “[T]his is a hold-up”; while Benito said:
“[N]obody will be able to be saved his life [sic].” Another
companion of Mejia said: “Proceed.” All of the nine11 drew
their daggers and stabbed Landingin and Catugas.

______________

8 TSN, 20 July 1994, 4; TSN, 22 July 1994, 4-6.

9 Id., 9-13.
10 Id., 16-18.
11 TSN, 20 July 1994, 5-7.

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VOL. 275, JULY 7, 1997 137

People vs. Mejia

 
Landingin died on that same evening. Dr. Cristito
Garcia, who conducted an autopsy on Landingin’s
cadaver, found three stab wounds—two of which were
fatal. According to him, the cause of Landingin’s death
was cardiorespiratory arrest resulting12
from hypovolemic
shock due to internal hemorrhage. Nora Landingin,
wife of Teofilo Landingin, spent P1,500 daily during the
wake of her husband; P12,000 for his burial; and
P16,00013
for the tomb. Nora felt sad because of his
death.
On the other hand, Catugas, who was pushed out of
the jeepney and landed on the road, was brought 14
by
some people to the Villaflor Memorial Hospital. Dr.
Roberto Valenzuela performed on Catugas exploratory
laparatomy debridement and found three multi-
lacerations in the right upper extremities and several
others on the left upper extremities15 which could have
been caused by bladed instruments. Catugas survived
and was confined for seven days. He spent more than
P50,000 for his hospitalization and medical expenses. 16
The hospital billed him in the amount of P44,667.25.
In the same evening of 10 March 1994, while
Policeman Dominguillo Gulen of the Mabini Police
Station, Mabini, Pangasinan, was approaching his
residence at the poblacion in Sual, Pangasinan, on board
a police patrol car, he saw six men walking in front of his
house. When he stopped the car, the men ran away. He
gave chase and caught two of them, namely, accused
Mejia and Benito. Gulen thought that they belonged to
an “akyat-bahay gang.” When asked what they were
doing, the two answered that they were not doing
anything and that they were not robbers. They told
Gulen that they were from Sta. Barbara. Benito even
showed his driver’s license and told Gulen that he did
not commit any crime and

______________

12 Exhibit “F”; OR, Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D, 9; TSN, 9 August

1994, 5-7.
13 TSN, 25 July 1994, 2-3.
14 TSN, 20 July 1994, 9.
15 TSN, 25 July 1994, 7-8.
16 TSN, 20 July 1994, 9.

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138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

that he was willing to go to the police station. Gulen

then brought the two and turned
17
them over to the police
station in Sual, Pangasinan.
Policeman Bernardo Clemente, who was the desk
officer at 1:00 a.m. of 11 March 1994, entered in the
police blotter this turn-over and talked to the two. In the
course of their conversation, Benito reported that they
rode on a jeepney, which was abandoned somewhere in
Sual. Clemente decided to make a follow-up of this
report. With Benito as their guide, Clemente and three
other policemen were able to find the jeepney with the
marking LOVELY in Sitio Nipa, Barangay Baguioen,
Sual, Pangasinan. The jeepney had bloodstains on the
front and back seats. They brought it to the police
station and had the matter recorded in the police blotter.
Clemente then instructed the radio operator to call the
police station of Sta. Barbara and inform it of the turn-
over of Mejia and Benito. At 1:45 a.m. of 11 March 1994,
the PNP elements of Sta. Barbara Police Station came 18
and received the two, as well as the passenger jeepney.
Also on 11 March 1994, at 12:00 noon, some
concerned citizens of Sual apprehended Joseph Fabito in
Sitio Looc, Poblacion Sual, as a murder suspect. He was
turned over to the Sual Police Station. After having been
informed of this arrest, the Sta. Barbara Police Station
took him into its custody. These19
facts were entered in
the Sual Police Station blotter.
The accused admitted to having flagged down and
boarded Landingin’s jeepney that fateful evening of 10
March 1994, but denied having committed the crimes.
They claimed that it was Romulo Calimquim and his
companions who killed Landingin, stabbed Catugas, and
drove away the jeepney. The following is a summary of
their version of the events.
Edwin Benito, a resident of Ventinilla West, Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan, was the driver of the Elf truck of
Lito Lomboy of

_____________

17 TSN, 27 July 1994, 3-9.

18 TSN, 27 July 1994, 12-18.
19 Id., 19-22. Exhibits “E” to “E-2” inclusive.

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VOL. 275, JULY 7, 1997 139

People vs. Mejia

Bued, Calasiao, Pangasinan, which was used in hauling

sand and gravel. His co-accused Mejia, Paraan, and
Fabito were his helpers.
At around 3:00 p.m. of 10 March 1994, after they
completed delivering sand and gravel, the accused
returned the truck and went to the house of Fabito’s
brother-in-law in San Miguel, Calasiao. After two hours
of waiting in vain for the brother-in-law, Paraan
suggested that they go to the house of his future brother-
in-law in Bacayao Norte, Calasiao. After some snacks
they proceeded to the town proper and strolled for a
while. Then, Benito thought that it was time to go home
to Sta. Barbara and suggested that they should. They
proceeded to a waiting shed near the National High
School to wait for a transportation for Sta. Barbara. At
the waiting shed, they saw Romulo Calimquim with
three other companions, who were also waiting for a
transportation for Sta. Barbara. Calimquim then flagged
down an approaching passenger jeepney. He and his
companions boarded it. So did Benito and his
companions. Calimquim
20
sat beside the driver. The rest
took the back seat.
According to Paraan, it was Alex Mamaril, 21
the man
with a “huge body,” who sat beside the driver.
At the junction of the roads leading to the Municipal
Hall of Sta. Barbara and that leading to the national
highway, the man who sat beside the driver (Calimquim,
according to Benito; Mamaril, according to Paraan)
ordered the driver to proceed to the national highway;
the driver did. But after reaching the highway, in
Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, the former ordered the latter to
stop, announced that “this is a hold up,” then stabbed
the driver several times, pulled his body out of 22the
jeepney, took over the wheel, and drove his jeepney. In
the meantime, at the back seat, one of the companions of
Calimquim pointed a knife at Benito; while the others
told Benito’s companions to lie on their belly. It was
when Catugas

_____________

20 TSN, 10 August 1994, 3-10; TSN, 11 August 1994, 4-6.

21 TSN, 17 August 1994; 9-10.
22 TSN, 11 August 1994, 9-15.

140

140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

23
attempted to fight back that he was 24
stabbed. Catugas
was then thrown out of the jeepney.
Benito and his companions were prevented by the
group of Calimquim from alighting from the jeepney.
25
Upon reaching a mountain in Sual, Pangasinan, the
man on the wheel ordered Benito, Mejia, Paraan, and
Fabito to alight from the 26
jeepney.27 The group of
Calimquim pointed knives and a gun at them. Then
suddenly there was a light coming from
28
below. They ran
away from the group of Calimquim. 29
Benito and Mejia were together. Later, a policeman
saw them. The two told the policeman that they are not
“trouble-some persons.” The policeman brought them to
the Police Station of Sual. There, Benito reported what
had happened and accompanied the policemen to the 30
place where the jeepney in question was located.
Afterwards, the two were detained at Sta. Barbara
Police Station. While in detention, they were informed
that Calimquim
31
was killed and his body was found in
Alaminos.
Paraan lost his way. He returned to Sta. Barbara only
on 14 March 1994 and went to the house of Roland, his
brother-in-law, in Bacayao Norte, to ask him to request a
barangay councilman to accompany him to the police
station. It was the barangay captain who accompanied
him the following day to the police station. There, the
police authorities told him that he was among the
assailants of Landingin and that he was the one who
stabbed Catugas in the night of 10 March 1994 and one
of the suspects
32
in the carnapping of the jeepney of
Landingin. Paraan was forthwith placed inside the jail.

______________

23 Id., 11-13; TSN, 10 August 1994, 15-16, 29, 32.

24 TSN, 17 August 1994, 13.
25 TSN, 11 August 1994, 19.
26 TSN, 24 August 1994, 18.
27 TSN, 26 August 1994, 9.
28 Id., 21-22; TSN, 24 August 1994, 18.
29 Id., 19.
30 TSN, 10 August 1994, 23-24.
31 Id., 26.
32 TSN, 11 August 1994, 20-21, 25-26; TSN, 17 August 1994, 4-

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 People vs. Mejia

 
Fabito stayed for awhile in the mountain. At 2:00 a.m.
of 11 March 1994, he was by the seashore. He stayed
there until 6:00 a.m. and inquired from someone the
location of the police station. He went to that station
which happened to be Sual Police Station. There, he
narrated to the policemen what had happened. When a
policeman asked him whether he was the killer, he
answered in the negative. At around 1:00 p.m., he was
brought to the Sta. Barbara Municipal Jail, where he
was detained for three 33
months. Then, he was committed
to the Provincial Jail.
Sometime after Catugas was discharged from the
hospital and was already driving a tricycle, the parents
of the accused met with him and informed him that the
accused told them that they (the accused) did not commit
any wrong. Catugas answered that he had suffered
several wounds and spent much for his hospitalization
and that since the accused were the ones apprehended,
he would just tell a lie so he could recover the amounts
he spent. Catugas then asked P20,000 from each of the
accused, or a total
34
of P80,000, and repeated this demand
five to six times.
The defense, through the testimony of Policemen
Bernardo Clemente, also proved that Romulo Calimquim
died due to a gunshot wound on 13 March 1994 in
Barangay Paitan West, Sual, Pangasinan, as evidenced 35
by Entry No. 4338 of Page 260 of the Police Blotter.
On rebuttal, Catugas insisted that it was accused
Edwin Benito who stabbed Landingin and that accused
Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito were the ones who stabbed
him. He further declared that it was the parents of the
accused who offered to pay him, but he refused because
such an offer 36
could not “be accepted by [his]
conscience.”

______________

5.
33 TSN, 26 August 1994, 11-13.
34 TSN, 2 September 1994, 13-14; TSN, 14 September 1994, 3-5.
35 TSN, 7 September 1994, 4.
 36 TSN, 16 September 1994, 5-7.

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142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

 
The defense then presented Julia Paraan as
surrebuttal witness. She denounced as untrue the
testimony on rebuttal of Catugas that the parents of
accused were the ones who offered to pay him money.
Julia declared that they visited Catugas to ask him
whether it was true that their children committed the
crime. On their first visit, Catugas told them that he
could not yet answer that question; but when they
returned, Catugas told them that they had to pay the
aggregate37
sum of P80,000, or P20,000 per family of the
accused.
The trial court gave full credit to the version of the
prosecution and relied heavily on the identification of
the accused by Catugas, the absence of ulterior motive
on the part of the latter, and the offer of the parents of
the accused to compromise the cases. 38
In its decision dated 17 November 1994, the LARON
court convicted accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and
Fabito of the crime of murder and of frustrated murder,
with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and
nighttime and band as aggravating circumstances.
Accordingly, it sentenced the first three accused to suffer
the penalty of death for the crime of murder; and ten
years and one day of prision mayor to seventeen years,
four months, and one day of reclusion temporal for the
crime of frustrated murder. It credited Paraan with the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, he being
only seventeen years old at the time of the commission of
the crimes charged; and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua for murder, and six years of prision correccional
to ten years and one day of prision mayor for frustrated
murder. The Court also ordered the four accused to pay
the heirs of Teofilo Landingin the amounts of P50,000 as
death indemnity; P16,000 for the cost of the tomb; and
P12,000 for funeral expenses; and to pay Catugas the
amount of P44,687.25 for hospital expenses, plus costs.

______________

37 TSN, 19 September 1994, 3-5.

38 OR, Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D, 99-111; Rollo, G.R. Nos.
118940-41, 35-47.

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People vs. Mejia

II

THE CASE IN THE CASTILLO COURT

 
In Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of the
AntiCarnapping Act) in the CASTILLO Court, the
prosecution presented as its witnesses Virgilio Catugas
and Nora Landingin. The former was recalled as
rebuttal witness. The accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan,
and Fabito took the witness stand and presented as
additional witnesses Conrado Benito and Felicidad
Fabito. Their testimonies were substantially the same as
those they made in the murder and frustrated murder
cases in the LARON court.
Prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas added that after
Landingin was stabbed, he was thrown out of the
jeepney to the shoulder of the road and that one of the
culprits took the wheel
39
of the jeepney, started off its
engine, and drove off. He further declared that while he
was confined at the hospital, the policemen of Sta.
Barbara investigated him, showed him 40pictures of the
suspects, supplied
41
the suspects’ names, and took his
statement. After he was discharged therefrom, he was
able to talk with the father of accused Benito. He told
the father of his hospitalization expenses and asked
P80,000, as a settlement of the case, to be paid by the
parents of the accused on an agreed date; but before that
42
date came, he had already testified against the accused.
Prosecution witness Nora Landingin, widow of Teofilo
Landingin, further testified that her husband owned the
passenger jeepney in question, as evidenced43
by
Certificate of Registration No.44 19253856, and Official
Receipt No.
45
MVRR 91354948. The jeepney was worth
P140,000.

_______________

39 TSN, 10 August 1994, 13-15.

40 TSN, 17 August 1994, 9-10; TSN, 24 August 1994, 21.
41 Exhibit “A,” OR, Crim. Case No. 94-00620-D, 12-13.
42 TSN, 17 August 1994, 15-17.
43 Exhibit “B,” OR, Crim. Case No. 94-00620-D, 100.
44 Exhibit “C,” Id., 99.
45 TSN, 31 August 1994, 4-5, 8.

144

144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

 
The CASTILLO court gave full faith to the testimony
of Virgilio Catugas. It debunked the version of the
defense on account of the following “inculpating
evidence,” which, according to it, bolstered its finding
that the accused were the authors of the crime charged:

1. Accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph Fabito and

Pedro Paraan speak of innocence and fear for their lives during
the ruthless incident, unfortunately they never sustained any
bodily injury on their bodies.
If the intention of Mok Calimquim and company is to hurt
anybody, they could not have concentrated on the persons of
Teofilo Landingin and Virgilio Catugas only but they should
have also inflicted stabbing thrusts against their persons
(accused).
2. They (accused) posited that for fear of their lives they did
not do anything except to passively stay at the back seat of the
jeepney motionless from the place of stabbing incident in Sta.
Barbara, Pangasinan up to the mountains in Sual,
Pangasinan.
Again, if one of the motives of Mok and company is to
carnapp [sic] the passenger jeepney of Teofilo Landingin then
the logical conclusion that can be had in the instant situation
is for the group of Mok to liquidate the driver and all
passengers for that matter, including the four (4) accused to
eliminate the presence of eyewitnesses.
Unfortunately, the four (4) accused joined the group of Mok
in going to Sual, Pangasinan without offering any slight
resistance in the premises.
The natural conclusion that can be derived thereat is that,
Mok and company belonged to the group of the four (4) accused
who were responsible in perpetrating the offense charged.
3. Assuming en gratia argumenti that Mok and company are
the real offenders, why is it that during the long span of travel
from Sta. Barbara to Sual, they never made any attempt to
jump off the passenger jeepney; neither did they show any
positive signs to invite the attention of PNP members stationed
along the long route starting in Dagupan City, Binmaley,
Lingayen, Bugallon, Labrador, Pangasinan.

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People vs. Mejia

4. Accused Gregorio Mejia and Edwin Benito steadfastly

claim innocence of the crime charged. In fact, they averred that
upon reaching Sual, Pangasinan, they reported to the
responding peace officers what happened to them and that
their reports was recorded in the Police Blotter of Sual Station.
The assertion of accused Benito and Mejia is tainted with
absolute falsity and is debunked by the entry in the Police
Blotter of Sual Police Station (Exh. G); the subject certification
negates accused’s statement of innocence. The subject entry
which is contained in the Book of Events of Sual Police Station
belies any complaint/report made by accused Edwin
Benito/Gregorio Mejia that they were kidnapped or deprived of
their liberty with the use of guns and bladed weapons. Upon
the other hand, the Certification squarely bespeaks of the
incarceration/detention of said accused (Mejia and Benito) at
Sual Police Station for they were suspected of having
carnapped the passenger jeepney involved in the above case.
5. With respect to accused Joseph Fabito and Pedro Paraan,
they likewise vehemently denied the accusation lodged against
them. Unfortunately, their conclusion of innocence crumbled
when they joined the group from the crime scene starting in
Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan up to their destination in Sual,
Pangasinan. In fact when they reached Sual, Pangasinan they
scampered and run away to different directions to avoid
apprehension.
Instead of proceeding to the Sual Police Station or making
any report to the nearest authority i.e. Barangay Captain of
the place they decided to escape which they did with impunity.
The records in the Police Blotter of Sual is negatived (sic) of
any entry
46
about the whereabouts of accused Paraan and
Fabito.

The court then convicted accused Gregorio Mejia,

Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito guilty of
the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as
amended. It sentenced the first three accused to death;
and Paraan, to reclusion perpetua on account of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. It also
ordered them to pay the costs.

_____________

46 OR, Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D, 162-164; Rollo, G.R. No.

119407, 30-32.

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146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

III

THE APPEALS AND ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

 
 Although review in cases where the death penalty is
imposed by the trial court47 is automatic pursuant to
Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659, the convicted accused filed
with this Court their notices of appeal from the decision
of the LARON court and of the CASTILLO court on 18
November 1994 and 22 February 1995, respectively.
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D and 94-00619-D
were docketed in this Court as G.R. Nos. 118940-41, and
Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D was docketed as G.R. No.
119407.
On 2 February 1996, after they filed separate
Appellants’ Briefs in G.R. Nos. 118940-41 and in G.R.
No. 119407, the appellants filed a motion for the
consolidation of these cases, which we granted on 27
February 1996.
In their Appellants’ Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41, the
appellants impute upon the trial court the following
errors: (a) in giving full faith and credence to the
unsubstantiated testimony of prosecution witness
Virgilio Catugas relative to the incident in question; (b)
in holding them as the persons who stabbed the jeepney
driver and Virgilio Catugas in the evening of 10 March
1994 despite the fact that clear and convincing evidence
were proffered to point at the real culprits, Romulo
Calimquim and his companions; (c) in rendering a
verdict of conviction notwithstanding the failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
and (d) in convicting them of the crimes charged instead
of the crimes homicide and frustrated homicide—on the
assumption that they are guilty.

_____________

47 An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes,

Amending for that Purpose the Revised Penal Code, as Amended,
Other Special Penal Laws, and for Other Purposes, which took effect
on 31 December 1993 (People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, 234 SCRA 555
[1994]).

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People vs. Mejia
  
Being interrelated, the appellants discussed jointly
these assigned errors. They submit that:

(1) The uncorroborated testimony of Catugas on the

identification of the appellants leaves much to be desired. He
should not be believed, for he could not even remember who
among the appellants were wearing short pants, hat, and shoes
at that time. If policeman Gulen could not even identify in
court appellant Mejia whom he apprehended in the evening of
10 March 1994 and brought to the Sual Police Station, it was
with more reason that Catugas could not have identified the
assailants since it was nighttime. The possibility that Catugas
got confused, if not mentally and physically drained, as a result
of the shocking incident is not far-fetched. There is then a very
strong and compelling reason to believe that Catugas mistook
the appellants as the real hold-uppers.
(2) Catugas told Conrado Benito and Felicidad Fabito that their
children did not commit any wrong, but Catugas “vacillated
and testified falsely against accused-appellants when they
were not able to produce the amount of P20,000.00 each as
earlier demanded from them.” Catugas’ denial of their
testimony is self-serving and cannot overcome the positive
testimony of Conrado and Felicidad.
(3) The actuations of appellants specifically that of Edwin
Benito augurs well with their claim of innocence,” when they
were apprehended. Benito readily showed his driver’s license,
answered questions propounded by policeman Clemente, and
without hesitation he helped or guided the policemen in
locating the jeepney at the place where it was abandoned. He
did not try to hide or conceal anything when he was confronted
about the incident. Moreover, when Benito and Mejia were
picked up by a policeman on that fateful night, they were not
“tainted with blood.”
(4) On the assumption that they are guilty they could only be
liable for homicide and frustrated homicide, since treachery
was not established.

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148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia
  
In their Appellants’ Brief in G.R. No. 119407, they
make the following assignment of errors: (a) the facts
charged in the information do not constitute violation of
the crime of AntiCarnapping Act of 1972, as amended;
(b) The court a quo erred in convicting them of the crime
charged on the basis of surmises and conjecture; and (c)
the court a quo erred in convicting them by relying fully
on the evidence of the prosecution and completely
disregarding the evidence of the defense.
As to the first, the appellants argue that intent to
gain, which is an essential ingredient of the crime of
carnapping, was not proved. They claim that from the
evidence adduced “it is very clear that the incident was
only a hold-up and that the jeepney was taken to Sual as
escape vehicle.”
In support of the second and third assigned errors,
which they discussed jointly, the appellants submit that:
(1) The trial court’s conclusion on their culpability
was based on mere surmises and conjectures and
contradicted by the evidence on the record. The fact
that the group of Calimquim did not hurt any of
the four appellants and that the latter offered no
resistance does not prove appellants’ membership
in Calimquim’s group. That they did not even jump
off the passenger jeepney or show positive signs to
invite the attention of the PNP stationed along the
route from Dagupan City to Sual, it was because of
fear since Calimquim’s group pointed knives at
each of them and ordered them to lie down in
stooping position. The absence of conspiracy was
shown by the fact that in Sual, after they were
released as hostages, they ran in separate
directions and did not join the group of Calimquim.
(2) The entry in the Sual Police Station police
blotter that Benito and Mejia were suspected of
having carnapped the passenger jeepney does not
bind them, for it was made by a police officer and
was contrary to what they had reported.
(3) There is no basis for the conclusion that Paraan
and Fabito had escaped.
149
 VOL. 275, JULY 7, 1997 149
People vs. Mejia

 
(4) The trial court should not have relied on the
testimony of Catugas whose identification of the
appellants was based only on the pictures and on
the information of the policemen. It was impossible
for Catugas to narrate in detail the participation of
each accused, considering that the light in the
jeepney was dim and his principal attention was
concentrated on defending himself.
(5) Appellants’ reporting of the incident disproved
their membership in the group of Calimquim. If
they were members, their natural course would
have been to hide from the authorities. Their
voluntary submission to the police immediately
after the incident should have been given credence
as part of the res gestae.
In the Consolidated Appellee’s Brief, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) urges us to affirm in toto the
challenged decisions for failure of the appellants to show
that the trial court committed error in finding the
prosecution evidence clear, sufficient, and convincing to
convict. Catugas, who made an eyewitness account, had
the opportunity to observe the appellants during the
commission of the crime and had no ill-motive to
implicate the appellants falsely. As to the charge that he
perjured because the appellants were not able to produce
the amount of P80,000 which he allegedly demanded
from them, the same should not be believed. The truth
is, it was the parents of the appellants who approached
Catugas and offered him P80,000 in order that he would
not testify against the appellants. Catugas did not accept
the offer, as it was against his principles to tell a lie.
The OSG also maintains that treachery was duly
proved and, hence, the trial court was correct in
convicting the appellants of murder for the death of
Teofilo Landingin and frustrated murder for stabbing
Virgilio Catugas. Their conviction for violation of the
Anti-Carnapping Act is also proper, since their main
purpose was to get the jeepney and they killed
Landingin in order that they could get it. They presented
no evidence to prove that they ran away with the
jeepney for any lawful purpose.
150

150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

 
In their Consolidated Reply Brief, the appellants try
to show that the identification made by the prosecution
witness Catugas cannot be denominated as clear,
positive, and convincing; for, while it may be true that he
“could have taken glimpse or glance at the faces of all
the accused-appellants, this fact alone is not adequate
and fell short of the required test of ‘positive
identification.’ ” They strongly suggest that Catugas had
ill-motive to testify falsely against them in that he was
not paid the P80,000 he demanded.

IV

THE CRIMES COMMITTED AND THE

ISSUE OF CULPABILITY OF APPELLANTS

 
Before we go any further, remarks on some
procedural matters are in order. The crimes charged in
the informations filed before the LARON court and
CASTILLO court are irretrievably linked with or related
to one another. They arose out of the same incident, are
founded on the same factual milieu, and would be proved
by testimonies of the same witnesses. The three cases
then should have been consolidated and jointly tried in
one branch of the RTC of Dagupan City. What were
jointly tried were only the cases for murder and
frustrated murder. Section 14 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court provides:

SEC. 14. Consolidation of trials of related offenses.—

Charges for offenses founded on the same facts or forming part
of a series of offenses of similar character may be tried jointly
at the court’s discretion.

 
The purpose or object of consolidation is to avoid
multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression or abuse,
prevent delay, clear congested dockets, simplify the work
of the trial court, and save unnecessary cost or expense;
in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense
and vexation to the
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People vs. Mejia

48 49
parties litigants. In Raymundo v. Elipe, we held that
that although consolidation of several cases involving
the same parties and the same subject matter is one
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, joint
hearing becomes a matter of duty if two or more cases
are tried before the same judge, or even filed with the
different branches of the same court, provided one of such
cases has not been partially tried.
We are unable to understand why neither the LARON
court or the CASTILLO court nor any of the parties
caused, or moved for, a consolidation of the case for
violation of the AntiCarnapping Act (which has the
higher docket number) with the cases for murder and
frustrated murder in the LARON court (which have
lower docket numbers). It was only after the filing of
their separate Appellants’ Brief in G.R. Nos. 118940-41
and in G.R. No. 119407 that the appellants moved to
consolidate the latter with the former.
This failure to consolidate the three cases at the trial
court level could contribute some difficulty in the
appreciation of the evidence. The principal witnesses of
the parties testified in all the three cases. Yet, the
assessment of their testimony and credibility in the
LARON court must not be influenced by their
testimonies in the case before the CASTILLO court, and
vice versa. In the LARON court, prosecution witness
Catugas was unclear in some details of the incident, but
clear in the CASTILLO court. Upon the other hand,
there were details he disclosed in one of the courts which
were not given in the other court. The same observation
may be had on the testimonies of the appellants before
both courts. As one reads the transcripts of the
testimonies of these witnesses in both cases, it would be
quite difficult to avoid forming impressions in light of
the totality of their testimonies in both courts. Our
minds and mental processes must be kept away from the
pitfalls of such impressions, for the rules on evidence
and the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor
of the appel-

______________

48 1 C.J.S. Actions §108, 1343; Cojuangco v. Court of Appeals, 203

SCRA 619, 632 [1991].
49 42 SCRA 615, 629 [1971].

152

152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

lants dictate that we resolve the appeals in the cases

before the LARON court and the case before the
CASTILLO court solely on the basis of the evidence
presented before such courts, respectively.
The next preliminary matter to be resolved is whether
the crimes of murder in Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D
and frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D
are absorbed in the violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act
in Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D.
R.A.
50
No. 7659 which took effect on 31 December
1993 is applicable to these cases because the crimes
were committed on 10 March 1994. Section 14 of the
Anti-Carnapping Act was amended by Section 20 of R.A.
No. 7659 and now imposes the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death when the owner, driver, or occupant of
the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof. This Section, as amended, reads in full
as follows:
 SEC. 14. Penalty for Carnapping.—Any person who is found
guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of
this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken,
be punished by imprisonment for not less than fourteen years
and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four
months, when the carnapping is committed without violence or
intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by
imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping
is committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or
occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof. (Italics supplied for emphasis).

In the original Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, the last

clause read as follows:

_____________

50 Supra, note 47.

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People vs. Mejia

and the penalty of life imprisonment to death shall be imposed

when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is
killed in the commission of the carnapping. (stress supplied).

Three amendments have thus been made, viz: (1) the

change of the penalty of life imprisonment to reclusion
perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of
the phrase “in the commission of the carnapping” to “in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof.” The latter makes clear the intention of
the law to make the offense a special complex crime, by
way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons. As such, the killing
(or the rape) merely qualifies the crime of carnapping
which for lack of specific nomenclature may be known as
qualified carnapping or carnapping in an aggravated
form. In short, considering
51
the phraseology of the
amended Section 14, the carnapping and the killing (or
the rape) may be considered as a single or indivisible
crime or a special complex crime which, however, is not
covered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539 uses the words “IS
KILLED,” no distinction must be made between
homicide and murder. Whether it is one or the other
which is committed “in the course of carnapping or on
the occasion thereof” makes no difference insofar as the
penalty is concerned.
It follows then that the killing of the driver, Teofilo
Landingin—whether it be homicide or murder—cannot
be treated as a separate offense, but should only be
considered to qualify the crime of carnapping.

______________

51 As distinguished, for instance, from the phraseology of Section 1

of P.D. No. 1866 on qualified illegal possession of firearm, where
murder or homicide is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm
—the assailant is also liable for murder or homicide in view of the clear
intent of the law to respect and preserve the latter as a distinct offense
under the Revised Penal Code and to increase the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm where such firearm is used in killing a person.
(People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191 [1996]).

154

154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

 
Nonetheless, although there could only be one single
offense of qualified carnapping or carnapping in an
aggravated form, the prosecution had still to prove the
essential requisites of the homicide or murder of
Landingin and that of carnapping. This should have
been another reason for the consolidation of the
carnapping case in the CASTILLO court with the cases
before the LARON court.
 But do the words “IS KILLED” in the last clause of
Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended, include the
crime of frustrated murder or homicide? Put a little
differently, does murder or homicide in its frustrated
stage also qualify carnapping if it is committed “in the
course of the commission of the carnapping or on the
occasion thereof”? The answer must be in the negative in
light of the use in said Section 14 of the words “IS
KILLED.” The unmistakable import thereof is that it
refers only to the consummated felony of either murder
or homicide.
If attempted or frustrated murder or homicide is
committed “in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof,” then it must be
deemed to fall under the clause (of Section 14) “when the
carnapping is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of any person.”
We shall now take up the issue of the culpability of
the appellants.
The evidence adduced by the prosecution has
established beyond reasonable doubt the carnapping of
Teofilo Landingin’s passenger jeepney, which is a motor
vehicle
52
under the definition in Section 2 of R.A. No.
6539. The passenger jeepney was taken, with intent of
gain, from Landingin by means of violence against him
which caused his death and

______________

52 The term “Motor Vehicle” is defined therein as any vehicle

propelled by any power other than muscular power using the public
highways, but excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts, amphibian
trucks, and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run
only on rails or tracks and tractors, trailers and traction engines of all
kinds used exclusively for agricultural purposes.

155

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People vs. Mejia
against a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, who suffered
physical injuries.
But, has the prosecution established with moral
certainty the guilt of the appellants? The LARON and
the CASTILLO courts held that it did.
Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the
accused53 to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. To overcome the presumption, nothing but
proof beyond reasonable
54
doubt must be established by
the prosecution. Save in certain circumstances as
where, for instance, the accused admits the commission
of the acts alleged to constitute a crime but interposes
justifying circumstances, the burden is never shifted to
the accused or diminished by the weakness of his
defense. Indeed, unless the prosecution successfully
discharges that burden, 55
the accused need not even offer
evidence in his behalf.
In our jurisdiction accusation is not synonymous with
guilt. The freedom of the accused is forfeit only if the
requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in
existence. This, of course, requires the most careful
scrutiny of the evidence for the State, both oral and
documentary, independent of whatever defense is offered
by the accused. Every circumstance favoring the
accused’s innocence must be duly taken into account.
The proof against the accused must survive the test of
reason. Strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on
the accused could 56
be laid the responsibility for the
offense charged. If the prosecution fails to discharge the
burden, then it is not only the accused’s right to be freed;
it is,57even more, the court’s constitutional duty to acquit
him.

_____________

53 Sec. 14(2), Article III of the Constitution.

54 Sec. 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court.
55 People v. Garcia, 215 SCRA 349, 358-359 [1992].
56 People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59, 64 [1971]; People v. Aguilar, 222
SCRA 394, 407-408 [1993].
57 People v. Pido, 200 SCRA 45 [1991]; People v. Cordova, 224 SCRA
319, 348 [1993].
 156

156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

 
After a painstaking review of the records and the
transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies
of the witnesses in the cases before the LARON court
and the CASTILLO court, we are not convinced with
moral certainty that the appellants committed the
crimes charged. Reasonable doubt burdens our
conscience; our minds cannot rest easy on a verdict of
conviction.
The prosecution had nine suspects in these cases: the
four appellants and the five others, namely, Romulo
Calimquim, Alex Mamaril, a certain Dennis, a certain
Mondragon, and another described as John Doe. All nine
were forthwith charged with the crimes of murder,
frustrated 58murder,59
and 60carnapping in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3310, 3313, 3311, respectively, of the Municipal
Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, and then 61in the
informations 62
in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-00617-D, and
94-00619-D63 of the LARON court and Criminal Case No.
94-00620-D of the CASTILLO court, respectively.
The theory of the appellants is that they were not
members of the group of Romulo Calimquim. The
prosecution has no proof to prove otherwise; but the
LARON and the CASTILLO courts, through inferences
from certain facts, concluded that the appellants were.
The conclusion is rather tenuous. While the rigorous
cross-examination of the appellants in all these cases
has established close relationship among the appellants
by reason of their residence and work, (Benito, as sand-
andgravel truck driver and Mejia, Fabito, and Paraan as
his keepers), it miserably failed to establish any
relationship between them and the five others headed by
Calimquim. What then looms large in our minds is that
the appellants and the five others happened to be
passengers of Landingin’s

______________
 58 OR, Criminal Case No. 94-00617-D, 7.
59 Id., Criminal Case No. 94-00619-D, 10.
60 Id., Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D, 10.
61 Id., Criminal Case No. 94-00167-D, 1.
62 Id., Criminal Case No. 94-00169-D, 1.
63 Id., Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D, 1.

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People vs. Mejia

jeepney by accident, not by design. If the appellants were

with the five others until Sual, Pangasinan, it was
because they were intimidated and made to lie down on
their bellies inside the jeepney.
Another circumstance further proves that the
appellants did not belong to the group of Calimquim.
Upon arrival in the mountains of Sual, they fled from
the Calimquim group when the first opportunity to do so
came. We find to be absolutely without basis the
statement of the CASTILLO court that the appellants
abandoned Landingin’s jeepney in Sitio Nipa, Baquioen,
Sual, Pangasinan, “upon seeing the arrival of concerned
citizens and members of the Sual Police Station; the
responding peace officers effected the recovery of the
subject jeepney sans the accused/culprits.” No
prosecution witness so testified. In the CASTILLO court,
no policeman was presented as witness for the
prosecution. The evidence presented by both the
prosecution and the defense reveal that after appellants
Benito and Mejia were picked up by Policeman Gulen on
the latter’s suspicion that they were members of an
akyat-bahay gang, they voluntarily informed the police
authorities of the Sual Police Station of what had
happened. It was this information that brought the
policemen to where the subject jeepney was located.
Benito even accompanied the policemen. This resulted in
the recovery of the jeepney by the policemen. Appellant
Paraan also presented himself later to the Police Station
of Sta. Barbara. Appellant Fabito, although apprehended
by concerned citizens of the place to where he had fled,
voluntarily reported what he knew to the police
authorities of Sual and Sta. Barbara.
Unfortunately, the CASTILLO court relied heavily on
the entries in the police blotters of the police stations of
Sual and Sta. Barbara. The silence of the entries on
what the appellants had declared in court is not
conclusive evidence that they did not report the incident
to the police authorities. They had no participation in
the preparation of the entries. Entries in the police
blotters should not be given undue significance or
probative value, for they are normally incomplete and
inaccurate sometimes from either partial suggestion of
for want of
158

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

64
suggestion or inquiries. The entries in question are
sadly wanting in material particulars. At the very most,
they only recorded the impression that the appellants
were “suspects.”
As to the alleged participation of the appellants in the
commission of the crimes, the prosecution had to rely
solely on the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. The totality
of his testimony in the cases before the LARON court
leaves much to be desired. The prosecutor who conducted
the direct examination was unable to propound sensible
questions to elicit clear answers bound to reconstruct
faithfully the events surrounding the commission of the
alleged crimes. This deficiency thus tempted the trial
judge to ask more questions. Despite the latter’s
participation, the testimony of Catugas fails to convince
us that the appellants indeed participated in the
commission of the crimes. On cross-examination in the
LARON court, Catugas categorically admitted that he
did not know the names of the appellants and that he
could recognize only three of the nine accused. Thus:

ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q Now, in paragraph 8 of your statement, you said and
you mentioned the names of the person and I will
 now read:
  “Q How about the true names of the suspect, do you
know them?
  A In fact I do not know, however, based on the
police investigation of Sta. Barbara PNP, they
were, Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Joseph
Fabito, Pedro Paraan, Mok Calimquim, alyas
Dennis, Alex Mamaril, Dennis Abrigo alyas
Mondragon and one unidentified person.”
  can you tell this Court why these persons were
written in your statement?
A Because of the police investigation.
Q So, were it not of the police and the pictures, you
were not able to identify the accused, is that correct?
A I can recognize the others, sir.
Q How many of the nine (9) can you recognize?

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64 People v. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777, 790 [1992].

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People vs. Mejia

A Three (3) of them, sir.

COURT:
Q What do you mean when you said that that you can
recognize three (3) of them?
A I can remember those persons who sat near me.
Q Who of the four (4) accused who sitted [sic] near you?
A The one wearing red T-shirt, the second to the last of
the four accused.
Q So, how were you able to identify these [sic] person
who is [sic] wearing in [sic] red T-shirt?
A I saw his face, sir.
Q How were you able to recognize the last person
 (referring to Edwin Benito)?
65
A He was besides [sic] the driver, Sir.

 
Further indicating the uncertainty of his
identification, he made the following admissions on
cross-examination:

Q Now, you said you recognized the persons who sat

besides [sic] the driver, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Please point to him?
A He was wearing a dark color.
Q Was it a T-shirt or a polo shirt?
A I cannot tell, sir.
Q How about the person sitting in front of you whom
you pointed to this person wearing in red T-shirt?
A I can no longer remember, sir.
Q How about the person next to the one with red t-
shirt, do you remember his shirt?
A I don’t know, sir.
Q How about Gregorio Mejia, do you remember his
clothes?
A I cannot remember, sir.
Q You can’t remember also whether one of these
accused was wearing a hat at that time?
A I cannot remember, sir.

 
In the case before the CASTILLO court, he declared
that he was stabbed by the nine persons. Thus:

_____________

65 TSN, 22 July 1994, 15-17.

160

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

 People vs. Mejia

COURT:
Q Who were involved in stabbing?
A All of them, sir.
Q Who was the assailant and who was stabbed?
A The 9 persons, sir.
Q When you said 9 persons, they were the 9 persons
who participated in the stabbing incident and who
were the victims?
A Me and the driver, sir.
PROS. MARATA:
Q How many times were you stabbed by the nine
persons, four of whom were inside the courtroom?
A From the scar
66
left of my body, there are 22 stabbed
wounds, sir.

Yet, no further questions were asked for him to

convincingly show that the appellants inflicted any of
the stab wounds on his body. Further compounding the
uncertainty and unreliability of Catugas’ testimony, he
candidly admitted on cross-examination that only one
person stabbed him. Thus:

ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q How many times were you stabbed by them?
A Twice, sir.
Q And you cannot recognize the person who stabbed
your?
A I can identify him, sir.
Q How many persons stabbed you then?
67
A Only one (1) person, sir.

 
Upon further questioning by the court, Catugas
declared that six of the nine stabbed him:

COURT:
Q How many stab wounds did you sustain?
A More than twenty (20) stab wounds, sir.
Q A while ago you mentioned there were two (2) initial
stab blows with respect to the other stab blow who
delivered this stab blow?

_____________

66 TSN, 10 August 1994, 11.

67 TSN, 24 August 1994, 14.

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VOL. 275, JULY 7, 1997 161

People vs. Mejia

A His companions and also Gregorio Mejia, sir.

COURT:
  Proceed.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q When you said his companions and Gregorio Mejia
are you referring to the five (5) other persons as the
companions of Gregorio Mejia who participated in
stabbing you?
A I think
68
it is about six (6) of them who stabbed me,
sir.

He could not remember anymore the person who

inflicted the last stab wound, and then declined to point
to anyone of the herein four appellants as the person
who did it. Thus:

COURT:
Q When they stopped stabbing you they did not stab
you anymore?
A They still stabbed me on my right upper arm, sir.
(Witness showing his scar near the shoulder.)
Q You said you were stabbed on your right shoulder,
whostabbed you among these nine (9) persons?
A I could not remember anymore, sir.
Q When you said you cannot remember, you cannot tell
this Court whether it was one among the four (4)
accused in this case who stabbed you on your right
upper arm?
A I could not point the person responsible in stabbing 69
my shoulder because that is the last stab wound, sir.

It would thus be sheer speculation and conjecture to

conclude from Catugas’ testimony in the CASTILLO
court that the appellants had inflicted any of the stab
wounds on Catugas.
Moreover, on question by the trial judge in the
CASTILLO court, Catugas categorically admitted that
none of the appellants participated in the stabbing of
Landingin. Thus:

_____________

68 Id., 15.
69 Id., 9.

162

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

COURT:
  xxx
Q These two persons who participated in stabbing
Teofilo Landingin, can you inform the Court if the
four (4) accused now or these two persons are among
the four (4) accused now?
70
A They are not here, sir.

Finally, Catugas was not entirely free from any ulterior

motive in implicating the appellants. He admitted that
he demanded P80,000 from the parents of the
appellants, but before they could give the money on the
agreed date, he testified against the appellants in the
LARON court. The following exchanges between him
and counsel for the defense before the CASTILLO court
are revealing:

ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q After you were released from the hospital, were you
able to talk with the father of Edwin Benito?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you told them about your expenses in the
hospital, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you demanded from them to pay P40,000.00 is
that correct?
A I was asking P80,000.00 sir.
COURT:
Q Why were you asking the amount of P80,000.00 then?
A Because he pleaded to me, sir.
Q What you are trying to convey to the Court is that
you are settling the case with Edwin Benito the
amount of P80,000.00?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
  Proceed.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q And the parents of Edwin Benito cannot pay that
P80,000.00 because they are poor?

_____________

70 Id., 13.

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VOL. 275, JULY 7, 1997 163

People vs. Mejia

A They will not pay that amount on that date, we have

agreed of another date for them to pay, sir.
COURT:
Q Did the parents of Edwin Benito made a counter
offer?
A That is already their counter proposal, sir.
Q What you want to tell the Honorable Court is that
you agreed to pay you P80,000.00 but he cannot pay
you at that very moment?
A Yes, sir.
COURT:
  Proceed.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q Did you agree for the amount of P80,000.00?
COURT:
  That is the settlement money.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q So, it is clear that if only they have given P80,000.00,
you should not have testified in this case?
A PROSECUTOR MARATA:
  Improper, your honor.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
  As follow-up question, your Honor
COURT:
  Sustained. Hypothetical.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q You said that there was the agreed date, what
happened on the agreed date?
A The date has not yet arrived but I have already
testified, sir.
COURT:
Q When you said you have already testified, you are
referring to your testimony in RTC Branch 44?
71
A Yes, sir.

In the LARON court, efforts were made by the

prosecution to cushion the impact of Catugas’ demand
for payment of P80,000 in consideration of his
exculpatory testimony. It wanted to prove that the
parents of the appellants were in fact the ones who
proposed. But the testimony of Conrado

_____________

71 TSN, 17 August 1994, 15-17.

164

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

Benito, which the prosecution failed to satisfactorily

rebut, is that the parents went to see him to verify
whether their children had indeed committed the crimes;
but Catugas replied that since the appellants were the
ones apprehended, he would just pinpoint them so that
he could recover what he had spent. He then demanded
P80,000, which he equally apportioned among the
parents of the four appellants. Conrado Benito testified
as follows:

Q What did you tell him?

A I told him that our children telling us that they did
not commit any wrong and I told them to tell the
truth and we are not consenting them to whatever
they have done if they have done something wrong.
Q What was the answer of Virgilio Catugas?
A He said, he suffered several wounds and that he
spent so much for his hospitalization, and he said
also that they were the persons who were
apprehended and so, I will just tell a lie for the same
because how could I collect forthe amount I spent if I
will not tell a lie?
COURT:
Q You consider Virgilio Catugas as a liar and you are
not a liar?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q Can you tell this Court what did you tell him about
that expenses?
A I said, “then we can at least help you,” because he is
saying that he suffered several wounds.
Q How much did Virgilio Catugas tell you?
A The last time that we talked, he ask[ed] us to give
P20,000.00 each.
COURT:
Q How many times did he tell you?
72
A For 5 to 6 times because he told us to return to him.

But the parents could not deliver the P20,000 each

was to pay, for they could not afford it. Conrado so
declared, thus:

_____________

72 TSN, 2 September 1994, 13-14.

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VOL. 275, JULY 7, 1997 165

People vs. Mejia

ATTY. TAMINAYA:
Q When Virgilio Catugas told you to give P20,000.00,
can you tell this court if he made mention to the wife
of Teofilo Landingin?
A Because he is collecting from us P20,000.00, he told
us that we would not tell the same to Mrs. Landingin.
Q Were you able to give that P20,000.00?
A No sir, not even a single centavo.
Q Why?
A We cannot pay because 73
even payment for attorney’s
fees, we cannot afford.
The LARON court gave credence to the version of the
prosecution and even took the incident as offer of
compromise, which may be considered an implied
admission of guilt. Said court misapplied
74
Section 27 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. There is no evidence
whatsoever that any of the appellants authorized his
parents to approach Catugas or knew the matter of
payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe the
explanation of Catugas that the amount of P80,000
represented the expenses he incurred for his
hospitalization and medical bills, then the offer to
reimburse it is not admissible in evidence as proof of
criminal liability pursuant to the last paragraph of
Section 27 of Rule 130.

_____________

73 TSN, 2 September 1994, 16-17.

74 The Section reads as follows:
SEC. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible.—In civil cases,
an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and
is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses
(criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be
received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a
plea of guilty to a lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence
against the accused who made the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other
expenses occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence
as proof of civil or criminal liability for the injury.

166

166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Mejia

 
On the whole then we entertain, unavoidably, serious
doubt on the participation of the appellants in the
commission of the crimes charged.
 WHEREFORE, the challenged decisions in Criminal
Case No. 94-00617-D (for Murder) and Criminal Case
No. 94-00619-D (for Frustrated Murder) of Branch 44
and in Criminal Case No. 94-00620-D (violation of Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972) of Branch 43 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City are REVERSED. Accused-
appellants Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan,
and Joseph Fabito are ACQUITTED on the ground that
their guilt therefor has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt or with moral certainty. Their
immediate release from detention is hereby ordered,
unless other lawful and valid grounds for their further
detention exist.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J.), Padilla, Regalado, Romero,

Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco
and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Puno, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., On
leave.

Judgment reversed, accused-appellants acquitted.

Note.—When two or more accused are jointly charged

with any offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the
court orders separate trials for one or more accused.
(Dacanay vs. People, 240 SCRA 490 [1995])
 

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