EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-65366. November 9, 1983.]

JOSE B.L. REYES, in behalf of the ANTI-BASES COALITION (ABC) ,

petitioner, vs. RAMON BAGATSING, as Mayor of the City of Manila ,
respondent.

Lorenzo M. Tañada, Jose W. Diokno and Haydee B. Yorac for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND

PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY; LIBERTY TO DISCUSS AND MEET WITHOUT CENSORSHIP
UNLESS THERE IS CLEAR DANGER OF A SUBSTANTIVE EVIL. — Free speech, like free
press, may be identi ed with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public concern without censorship or punishment. There is to be then no previous
restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there
be a "clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to
prevent." Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded
the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; INSEPARABLE RIGHTS THE LIMITATION OF WHICH IS
SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL EXAMINATION. — In Thomas v. Collins, 323 US 516 (1945), the
American Supreme Court held that it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights
to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the
rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government for redress
of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case,
therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of the right, the judiciary is
called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole
justi cation for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, of other
legitimate public interest (Cf. Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US 147 (1939).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIOTOUS CONDUCT MUST BE AVOIDED IN THE EXERCISE OF
THESE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. — What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One
may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the
cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or
assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The
utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned
in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422, "It is rather to be expected
that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest
against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is
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 always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievances and the
more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the
leaders over their irresponsible followers." It bears repeating that for the constitutional
right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be
avoided. To give free rein to one's destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to
make a mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual liberty its our scheme of
values.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO VALID OBJECTION EXISTS ON THE CHOICE OF PLACE FOR
THE MARCH AND RALLY, PROCUREMENT OF LICENSE FOR USE OF PUBLIC STREETS
NOT AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL ABRIDGEMENT OF ONE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT. —
There can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed
march and rally starting from a public park that is the Luneta. Neither can there be any
valid objection to the use of the streets to the gates of the US Embassy, hardly two
blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved any lurking
doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila should
grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically
declared: "Our conclusion nds support in the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs.
State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569. . . ." The Supreme Court of the United States, in
its decision (1941) penned by Chief Justice Hughes a rming the judgment of the State
Supreme Court, held that "a statute requiring persons using the public streets for a
parade or procession to procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is
not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech
and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing
authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance, to a consideration of the time, place, and
manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience
and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with
arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, . . . , " 80 Phil, at 78.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO PUBLIC PARKS AND STREETS;
PURPOSE OF APPLICANT DETERMINATIVE OF THE USE THEREOF. — It is settled law
that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of
access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an
individual or a group. If it were, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory
access, giving rise to an equal protection question. The principle under American
doctrines was given utterance by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: "The question, if
the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the
auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations
of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of
speech which the Constitution protects" (De Jorge v. Oregon, 299 US 353, 364 (1937).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; LICENSING AUTHORITIES ARE NOT INVESTED WITH
ARBITRARY DISCRETION TO ISSUE OR REFUSE LICENSE. — There could he danger to
public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by turbulence. That would
deprive it of its peaceful character. Even then, only the guilty parties should be held
accountable. It is true that the licensing o cial, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of
discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. White prudence
requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what
may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption —
especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a speci c public place — is that the
permit must he for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the
language of Justice Roberta, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be
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 "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place."
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NON-EXISTENCE IN CASE AT BAR A CLEAR AND PRESENT
DANGER TO JUSTIFY A DENIAL OF A PERMIT. — While the general rule is that a permit
should recognize the right of the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of
their choice, another place may be designated by the licensing authority if it be shown
that there is a clear and present danger of a substantive evil if no such change were
made. In the Navarro and the Pagkakaisa decisions, G.R. No. L-31687, February 26,
1970 and G.R. No. 60294, April 30, 1982, this Court was persuaded that the clear and
present danger test was satis ed. The present situation is quite different. Hence the
decision reached by the Court. The mere assertion that subversives may in ltrate the
ranks of the demonstrators does not suffice.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REFUSAL OR MODIFICATION OF APPLICATION FOR
PERMIT SUBJECT TO CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TEST. — The applicants for a
permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public
place where and the time when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such
application should be led well ahead in time to enable the public o cial concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant
but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or
modi cation that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent sad grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPECT AND DEFERENCE ACCORDED TO THESE PREFERRED
RIGHTS. — Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with other intellectual freedom,
are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly
stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so than on the other departments — rests
the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such
preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with
what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes "as the sovereign prerogative
of judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales
of justice on the side of suds rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF ORDINANCE 7295 NEED NOT BE PASSED
UPON. — The issue of the applicability of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila
prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a radius of ve
hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery; and for other purposes which
nds support in Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations need not
be passed upon. There was no showing that the distance between the chancery and the
embassy gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is
satis ed, it does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. The
validity of his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued
that a case of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right
of peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the
distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND

PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY; DOCTRINE OF PRIMICIAS vz. FUGOSO. — The Chief Justice's
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 opinion of the Court rea rms the doctrine of Primicias vs. Fugoso, 80 Phil. 71 that "the
right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and
guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries" and that the city or town
mayors are not conferred "the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the
discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places
where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER RULE, THE SOLE
JUSTIFICATION FOR A LIMITATION ON THE EXERCISE THEREOF. — The procedure for
the securing of such permits for peaceable assembly is succinctly set forth in
paragraph 8 of the Court's opinion, with the injunction that "the presumption must be to
incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do,
precedence and primacy." The exception of the clear and present danger rule, which
alone would warrant a limitation of these fundamental rights is therein restated in
paragraph 1, thus: "The sole justi cation for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so
fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health, or any other legitimate public interest."
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BEFORE DENIAL OF PERMIT, LICENSING AUTHORITY MUST
SHOW EXISTENCE OF REASONABLE GROUND TO BELIEVE THAT THE DANGER
APPREHENDED IS IMMINENT. — The burden to show the existence of grave and
imminent danger that would justify adverse action on the application lies on the mayor
as the licensing authority. There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or
conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger. As stated in the
Court's Resolution of October 25, 1983, which granted the mandatory injunction as
prayed for, "It is essential for the validity of a denial of a permit which amounts to a
previous restraint or censorship that the licensing authority does not rely solely on his
own appraisal of what public welfare, peace or safety may require. To justify such a
limitation, there must be proof of such weight and su ciency to satisfy the clear and
present danger test. The possibility that subversives may in ltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators is not enough."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ASSEMBLY LEADERS SHOULD TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES
TO ENSURE PEACEFUL MARCH AND ASSEMBLY; ISOLATED ACTS OF DISTURBANCE
SHOULD NOT CHARACTERIZE ASSEMBLY AS TUMULTUOUS. — The leaders of the
peaceable assembly should take all the necessary measure" to ensure a peaceful much
and assembly and to avoid the possibility of in ltrators and troublemakers disrupting
the same, concommitantly with the duty of the police to extend protection to the
participants "staying at a discreet distance, but ever ready and alert to perform their
duty." But should any disorderly conduct or incidents occur, whether provoked or
otherwise, it is well to recall former Chief Justice Ricardo Paras` injunction in his
concurring opinion in Fugoso, citing the 1907 case of U.S. vs. Apurado, 7 Phil. 422, 426,
per Carson, J. that such instances of "disorderly conduct by individual members of a
crowd (be not seized) as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and
tumultuous rising against the authorities" and render illusory the right of peaceful
assembly.
PLANA, J., separate opinion:
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY; THE ORDINANCE BEING UNCONSTITUTIONAL CANNOT BE
VALIDLY INVOKED, THE DISTANCE OF THE CHANCERY FROM THE SITUS OF THE
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 RALLY BEING IMMATERIAL. — In my view, without saying that the Ordinance is
obnoxious per se to the constitution, it cannot be validly invoked whenever its
application would collide with a constitutionally guaranteed right such as freedom of
assembly and/or expression, as in the case at bar, regardless of whether the chancery
of any foreign embassy is beyond or within 500 feet from the situs of the rally or
demonstration.

DECISION

FERNANDO , C.J : p

This Court, in this case of rst impression, at least as to some aspects, is called
upon to delineate the boundaries of the protected area of the cognate rights to free
speech and peaceable assembly, 1 against an alleged intrusion by respondent Mayor
Ramon Bagatsing. Petitioner, retired Justice J.B.L. Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Bases
Coalition, sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful march and rally on
October 26, 1983 from 2:00 to 5:00 in the afternoon, starting from the Luneta, a public
park, to the gates of the United States Embassy, hardly two blocks away. Once there,
and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held. 2 During the
course of the oral argument, 3 it was stated that after the delivery of two brief
speeches, a petition based on the resolution adopted on the last day by the
International Conference for General Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All
Foreign Military Bases held in Manila, would be presented to a representative of the
Embassy or any of its personnel who may be there so that it may be delivered to the
United States Ambassador. The march would be attended by the local and foreign
participants of such conference. There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in
the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary
steps would be taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally." 4
The ling of this suit for mandamus with alternative prayer for writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction on October 20, 1983 was due to the fact that as of that date,
petitioner had not been informed of any action taken on his request on behalf of the
organization to hold a rally. On October 25, 1983, the answer of respondent Mayor was
led on his behalf by Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo G. Montenegro. 5 It turned out
that on October 19, such permit was denied. Petitioner was unaware of such a fact as
the denial was sent by ordinary mail. The reason for refusing a permit was due to
"police intelligence reports which strongly militate against the advisability of issuing
such permit at this time and at the place applied for." 6 To be more speci c, reference
was made to "persistent intelligence reports a rm[ing] the plans of
subversive/criminal elements to in ltrate and/or disrupt any assembly or
congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend." 7 Respondent
Mayor suggested, however, in accordance with the recommendation of the police
authorities, that "a permit may be issued for the rally if it is to be held at the Rizal
Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety of the participants themselves
and the general public may be ensured." 8
The oral argument was heard on October 25, 1983, the very same day the answer
was led. The Court then deliberated on the matter. That same afternoon, a minute
resolution was issued by the Court granting the mandatory injunction prayed for on the
ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of a
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 substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit. On this point, the Court was
unanimous, but there was a dissent by Justice Aquino on the ground that the holding of
a rally in front of the US Embassy would be violative of Ordinance No. 7295 of the City
of Manila. The last sentence of such minute resolution reads: "This resolution is without
prejudice to a more extended opinion." 9 Hence this detailed exposition of the Court's
stand on the matter.
1. It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to protect the exercise of the
cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a
permit. The Constitution is quite explicit: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition
the Government for redress of grievances." 1 0 Free speech, like free press, may be
identi ed with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern
without censorship or punishment. 1 1 There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, 1 2 prosecution for
sedition, 1 3 or action for damages, 1 4 or contempt proceedings 1 5 unless there be a
"clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent." 1 6
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for
consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. 1 7 It is entitled to be
accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied,
except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. 1 8 Even prior to the
1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary
consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech.
1 9 To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the
American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, 2 0 it was not by accident or coincidence
that the rights to freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single
guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are
inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise
of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged
governmental actuation. The sole justi cation for a limitation on the exercise of this
right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a
character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health, or any other legitimate public interest. 2 1
2. Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and
peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of Justice
Frankfurter: "It must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of Rights was the child of
the Enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an
appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in
order to avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of
communication that the guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But
utterance in a context of violence can lose its signi cance as an appeal to reason and
become part of an instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered
by the Constitution." 2 2 What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the
utterance, whether verbal or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be
remembered that this right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the
opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of
opinion. For if the peaceful means of communication cannot be availed of, resort to
non-peaceful means may be the only alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the
expression of dissent. It means more than just the right to be heard of the person who
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 feels aggrieved or who is dissatis ed with things as they are. Its value may lie in the
fact that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a
true ferment of ideas. There are, of course, well-de ned limits. What is guaranteed is
peaceable assembly. One may not advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less
preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent. The Constitution frowns on disorder or
tumult attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of
violence to be avoided. The utmost calm though is not required. As pointed out in an
early Philippine case, penned in 1907 to be precise, United States v. Apurado: 2 3 "It is
rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the
people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such
occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the greater the
grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule, will be the
disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers." 2 4 It bears
repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct, injury to
property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to one's destructive
urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high estate occupied
by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
3. There can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as the place where the
peace rally would start. The Philippines is committed to the view expressed in the
plurality opinion, of 1939 vintage, of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO: 2 5 "Whenever the
title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use
of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use
of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United
States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions
may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance
with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or
denied." 2 6 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v. Fugoso. 2 7
Primicias made explicit what was implicit in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 2 8 a 1915
decision, where this Court categorically a rmed that plazas or parks and streets are
outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza Soledad of
plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such plaza "being a promenade for public
use," 2 9 which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve. To repeat, there can
be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the proposed march and rally
starting from a public park that is the Luneta.
4. Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the
gates of the US Embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas Boulevard. Primicias v.
Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then Mayor
Fugoso of the City of Manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at Plaza
Miranda in Quiapo, this Court categorically declared: "Our conclusion nds support in
the decision in the case of Willis Cox vs. State of New Hampshire, 312 U.S., 569. In that
case, the statute of New Hampshire P. L. chap. 145, section 2, providing that `no parade
or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special
license therefor shall first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing
committee,' was construed by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire as not conferring
upon the licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held
valid. And the Supreme Court of the United States, in its decision (1941) penned by
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 Chief Justice Hughes a rming the judgment of the State Supreme Court, held that `a
statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure
a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional
abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the
statute is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in
the issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time, place, and manner of the parade
or procession, with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an
opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to
issue or refuse license, . . .'" 3 0 Nor should the point made by Chief Justice Hughes in a
subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored. "Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the
Constitution, imply the existence of an organized society maintaining public order
without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses. The
authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety and
convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been regarded as
inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of safeguarding the good
order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on the streets of cities is
the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need. Where a restriction of
the use of highways in that relation is desired to promote the public convenience in the
interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right
which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection." 3 1
5. There is a novel aspect to this case. If the rally were con ned to Luneta, no
question, as noted, would have arisen. So, too, if the march would end at another park.
As previously mentioned though, there would be a short program upon reaching the
public space between the two gates of the United States Embassy at Roxas Boulevard.
That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the resolution
adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition. The Philippines is a
signatory of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961. It was
concurred in by the then Philippine Senate on May 3, 1965 and the instrument of
rati cation was signed by the President on October 11, 1965, and was thereafter
deposited with the Secretary General of the United Nations on November 15. As of that
date then, it was binding on the Philippines. The second paragraph of its Article 22
reads: "2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take appropriate steps to
protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any
disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity." 3 2 The
Constitution "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land, . . ." 3 3 To the extent that the Vienna Convention is a restatement of
the generally accepted principles of international law, it should be a part of the law of
the land. 3 4 That being the case, if there were a clear and present danger of any
intrusion or damage, or disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment of its
dignity, there would be a justi cation for the denial of the permit insofar as the terminal
point would be the Embassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on Ordinance No.
7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of ve hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or
chancery; and for other purposes. Unless the ordinance is nulli ed, or declared ultra
vires, its invocation as a defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of the
primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free speech and peaceable assembly.
Even if shown then to be applicable, that question still confronts this Court.
6. There is merit to the observation that except as to the novel aspects of a
litigation, the judgment must be con ned within the limits of previous decisions. The
law declared on past occasions is, on the whole, a safe guide. So it has been here.
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 Hence, as noted, on the afternoon of the hearing, October 25, 1983, this Court issued
the minute resolution granting the mandatory injunction allowing the proposed march
and rally scheduled for the next day. That conclusion was inevitable in the absence of a
clear and present danger of a substantive evil to a legitimate public interest. There was
no justi cation then to deny the exercise of the constitutional rights of free speech and
peaceable assembly. These rights are assured by our Constitution and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 3 5 The participants to such assembly, composed
primarily of those in attendance at the International Conference for General
Disarmament, World Peace and the Removal of All Foreign Military Bases would start
from the Luneta, proceeding through Roxas Boulevard to the gates of the United States
Embassy located at the same street. To repeat, it is settled law that as to public places,
especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom of access. Nor is their use
dependent on who is the applicant for the permit, whether an individual or a group. If it
were, then the freedom of access becomes discriminatory access, giving rise to an
equal protection question. The principle under American doctrines was given utterance
by Chief Justice Hughes in these words: "The question, if the rights of free speech and
peaceable assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the
meeting is held but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but
whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the
Constitution protects." 3 6 There could be danger to public peace and safety if such a
gathering were marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character.
Even then, only the guilty parties should be held accountable. It is true that the licensing
o cial, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or
not a permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence
requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what
m a y probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption —
especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a speci c public place — is that the
permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the
language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be
"abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." 3 7
7. In fairness to respondent Mayor, he acted on the belief that Navarro v.
Villegas 3 8 and Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PMP) v. Bagatsing, 3 9 called
for application. While the general rule is that a permit should recognize the right of the
applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of their choice, another place may be
designated by the licensing authority if it be shown that there is a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil if no such change were made. In the Navarro and the
Pagkakaisa decisions, this Court was persuaded that the clear and present danger test
was satis ed. The present situation is quite different. Hence the decision reached by
the Court. The mere assertion that subversives may in ltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators does not su ce. Not that it should be overlooked. There was in this
case, however, the assurance of General Narciso Cabrera, Superintendent, Western
Police District, Metropolitan Police Force, that the police force is in a position to cope
with such emergency should it arise. That is to comply with its duty to extend
protection to the participants of such peaceable assembly. Also from him came the
commendable admission that there were at least ve previous demonstrations at the
Bayview Hotel Area and Plaza Ferguson in front of the United States Embassy where no
untoward event occurred. It was made clear by petitioner, through counsel, that no act
offensive to the dignity of the United States Mission in the Philippines would take place
and that, as mentioned at the outset of this opinion, "all the necessary steps would be
taken by it `to ensure a peaceful march and rally.'" 4 0 Assistant Solicitor General
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 Montenegro expressed the view that the presence of policemen may in itself be a
provocation. It is a su cient answer that they should stay at a discreet distance, but
ever ready and alert to cope with any contingency. There is no need to repeat what was
pointed out by Chief Justice Hughes in Cox that precisely, it is the duty of the city
authorities to provide the proper police protection to those exercising their right to
peaceable assembly and freedom of expression.
8. By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time
when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the
one entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be led well
ahead in time to enable the public o cial concerned to appraise whether there may be
valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It
is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modi cation that the clear and present
danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is
such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard
on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have
recourse to the proper judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along
with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional
values. It cannot be too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so than on
the other departments — rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect
for and deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase
can, of course, dispense with what has been so felicitiously termed by Justice Holmes
"as the sovereign prerogative of judgment." Nonetheless, the presumption must be to
incline the weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do
precedence and primacy. Clearly then, to the extent that there may be inconsistencies
between this resolution and that of Navarro v. Villegas, that case is pro tanto modi ed.
So it was made clear in the original resolution of October 25, 1983.
9. Respondent Mayor posed the issue of the applicability of Ordinance No.
7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding or staging of rallies or
demonstrations within a radius of ve hundred (500) feet from any foreign mission or
chancery; and for other purposes. It is to be admitted that it nds support in the
previously quoted Article 22 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There
was no showing, however, that the distance between the chancery and the embassy
gate is less than 500 feet. Even if it could be shown that such a condition is satis ed, it
does not follow that respondent Mayor could legally act the way he did. The validity of
his denial of the permit sought could still be challenged. It could be argued that a case
of unconstitutional application of such ordinance to the exercise of the right of
peaceable assembly presents itself. As in this case there was no proof that the
distance is less than 500 feet, the need to pass on that issue was obviated. Should it
come, then the quali cation and observation of Justices Makasiar and Plana certainly
cannot be summarily brushed aside. The high estate accorded the rights to free speech
and peaceable assembly demands nothing less.
10. Ordinarily, the remedy in cases of this character is to set aside the denial
or the modi cation of the permit sought and order the respondent o cial to grant it.
Nonetheless, as there was urgency in this case, the proposed march and rally being
scheduled for the next day after the hearing, this Court, in the exercise of its conceded
authority, granted the mandatory injunction in the resolution of October 25, 1983. It
may be noted that the peaceful character of the peace march and rally on October 26
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 was not marred by any untoward incident. So it has been in other assemblies held
elsewhere. It is quite reassuring such that both on the part of the national government
and the citizens, reason and moderation have prevailed. That is as it should be.
WHEREFORE, the mandatory injunction prayed for is granted. No costs.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Escolin, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Abad Santos, J., to add anything to the learned opinion of the Chief Justice is like
bringing coal to Newcastle. I just want to state for the record that I voted for the
issuance ex-parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction.
De Castro, J., is on sick leave.

Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR , J., concurring:

With the justi cation that in case of con ict, the Philippine Constitution —
particularly the Bill of Rights — should prevail over the Vienna Convention.
AQUINO , J., dissenting:

Voted to dismiss the petition on the ground that the holding of the rally in front of
the US Embassy violates Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

The Chief Justice's opinion of the Court rea rms the doctrine of Primicias vs.
Fugoso 1 that "the right to freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition
the government for redress of grievances are fundamental personal rights of the
people recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries" and
that the city or town mayors are not conferred "the power to refuse to grant the permit,
but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or
public places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held."
The most recent graphic demonstration of what this great right of peaceful assembly
and petition for redress of grievances could accomplish was the civil rights march on
Washington twenty years ago under the late assassinated black leader Martin Luther
King, Jr. (whose birthday has now been declared an American national holiday) which
"subpoenaed the conscience of the nation," and awakened the conscience of millions of
previously indifferent Americans and eventually (after many disorders and riots yet to
come) was to put an end to segregation and discrimination against the American
Negro.
T h e procedure for the securing of such permits for peaceable assembly is
succinctly set forth in the summary given by the Chief Justice in paragraph 8 of the
Court's opinion, with the injunction that "the presumption must be to incline the weight
of the scales of justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do, precedence and
primacy." The exception of the clear and present danger rule, which alone would warrant
a limitation of these fundamental rights, is therein restated in paragraph 1, thus: "The
sole justi cation for a limitation on the exercise of this right, so fundamental to the
maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and
imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other
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 legitimate public interest."
It bears emphasis that the burden to show the existence of grave and imminent
danger that would justify adverse action on the application lies on the mayor as
licensing authority. There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or
conjectural, proof of the existence of such clear and present danger. As stated in our
Resolution of October 25, 1983, which granted the mandatory injunction as prayed for,
"It is essential for the validity of a denial of a permit which amounts to a previous
restraint or censorship that the licensing authority does not rely solely on his own
appraisal of what public welfare, peace or safety may require. To justify such a
limitation, there must be proof of such weight and su ciency to satisfy the clear and
present danger test. The possibility that subversives may in ltrate the ranks of the
demonstrators is not enough." As stated by Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion
in Whitney vs. California 2
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to
free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free
speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free
speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger
apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the
evil to be prevented is a serious one . . .

"Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not
fear political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty . . .
"Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these
functions essential (for) effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is
relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so
stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively
trivial harm to a society . . . The fact that speech is likely to result in some
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression.
There must be the probability of serious injury to the state. Among freemen, the
deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crimes are education and
punishment for violations of the law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech
and assembly." (Emphasis supplied)
The Court's opinion underscores that the exercise of the right is not to be
"abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place" (paragraph 6), and
that "it is the duty of the city authorities to provide the proper police protection to those
exercising their right to peaceable assembly and freedom of expression," (at page 14)
The U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncement in Hague vs. Committee for Industrial
Organization 3 cited in Fugoso is worth repeating:
". . .Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
The privilege of a citizen . . . to use the streets and parks for communication of
views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general
comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it
must not, in the guise of regulation be abridged or denied.
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 "We think the court below was right in holding the ordinance quoted in Note 1 void
upon its face. It does not make comfort or convenience in the use of streets or
parks the standard of o cial action. It enables the Director of Safety to refuse a
permit on his mere opinion that such refusal will prevent `riots, disturbances or
disorderly assemblage.' It can thus, as the record discloses, be made the
instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs
for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly `prevent' such eventualities.
But uncontrolled o cial suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute
for the duty to maintain order in connection with the exercise of the right."
(Emphasis supplied)

Needless to say, the leaders of the peaceable assembly should take all the
necessary measures to ensure a peaceful march and assembly and to avoid the
possibility of in ltrators and troublemakers disrupting the same, concommitantly with
the duty of the police to extend protection to the participants "staying at a discreet
distance, but ever ready and alert to perform their duty." But should any disorderly
conduct or incidents occur, whether provoked or otherwise, it is well to recall former
Chief Justice Ricardo Paras' injunction in his concurring opinion in Fugoso, citing the
1907 case of U.S. vs. Apurado, 4 that such instances of "disorderly conduct by
individual members of a crowd (be not seized) as an excuse to characterize the
assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities" and render
illusory the right of peaceable assembly, thus:
"It is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public
assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of
excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the
less perfect, as a rule, will the disciplinary control of the leaders over their
irresponsible followers. But if the prosecution be permitted to seize upon every
instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an
excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultous rising against
the authorities, then the right to assemble ,and to petition for redress of
grievances would become a delusion and snare and the attempt to exercise it on
the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all
those who took part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the
purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the
prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such
occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished therefor."
(Emphasis supplied)

As it turned out, the demonstration was held on October 26, 1983 peaceably and
without any untoward event or evil result, as pledged by the organizers (like at least ve
previous peaceful demonstrations in the area). However, even if there had been any
incidents of disorder, this would in no way show the Court's mandatory injunction to
have been wrongfully issued. The salutary desire on the part of respondent to prevent
disorder cannot be pursued by the unjusti ed denial and suppression of the people's
basic rights, which would thereby turn out to be mere paper rights.
PLANA, J., concurring:

On the whole, I concur in the learned views of the distinguished Chief Justice. I
would like however to voice a reservation regarding Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of
Manila which has been invoked by the respondent.
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 The main opinion yields the implication that a rally or demonstration made within
500 feet from the chancery of a foreign embassy would be banned for coming within
the terms of the prohibition of the cited Ordinance which was adopted, so it is said,
precisely to implement a treaty obligation of the Philippines under the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
In my view, without saying that the Ordinance is obnoxious per se to the
constitution, it cannot be validly invoked whenever its application would collide with a
constitutionally guaranteed right such as freedom of assembly and/or expression, as in
the case at bar, regardless of whether the chancery of any foreign embassy is beyond
or within 500 feet from the situs of the rally or demonstration.
Footnotes

1. Section 9, Article IV of the Constitution.

2. Petition, par. 4.

3. Petitioner was represented by Professor Haydee Yorac of the College of Law, University
of the Philippines, assisted by former Senator Jose W. Diokno. Respondent was
represented by Assistant Solicitor General Montenegro.
4. Petition, 2.

5. He was assisted by Solicitor Roberto A. Abad.

6. Answer of Respondent, 2, Annex 1.

7. Ibid, Annex 1-A.

8. Ibid, Annex 1.
9. Minute resolution dated October 25, 1983, 4.

10. Article IV, Section 9 of the Constitution.

11. Cf. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940). Justice Malcolm identi ed freedom of
expression with the right to a full discussion of public affairs." (U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil.
731, 740 [1918]). Justice Laurel was partial to the ringing words of John Milton, "the
liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties."
(Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 81 [1939]). Justice Johnson spoke of freedom of expression in
terms of "a full and free discussion of all affairs of public interest." For him then, free
speech includes complete liberty to "comment upon the administration of Government
as well as the conduct of public men." (U.S. v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 58, 62 [1922]). When it is
remembered further that "time has upset many fighting faiths" there is likely to be a more
widespread acceptance of the view of Justice Holmes "that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas, - that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only
ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out." (Abrams v. United States, 250
US 616, 630 [1919]).
12. U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918); Quisumbing v. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510 (1935).

13. People v. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265 (1939); Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152 (1957 U.S.
v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 58 (1922).
14. Yap v. Boltron, 100 Phil. 324 (1956).

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 15. P); People v. Castelo H. Abaya, 114 Phil. 892 (1962); Bridges v. California, 314 US 252
(1941); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 US 331 (1946); Craig v. Harney, 331 US 367 (1947);
Woods v. Georgia, 370 US 375 (1962).

16. Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-27833, April 18, 1969, 27 SCRA 835, 857.
17. Cf. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Cf. United States v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918).

20. 323 US 516 (1945).

21. Cf. Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US 147 (1939).

22. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 US
287, 293 (1940).

23. 7 Phil. 422.

24. Ibid, 426.

25. 307 US 495.

26. Ibid, 515.

27. 80 Phil. 71 (1948).

28. 30 Phil. 602.

29. Ibid, 606.

30. 80 Phil. at 78.

31. 312 US at 524.

32. Cf. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 2nd ed., 339-341.

33. Article II, Section 3 reads in full: "The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of
national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations.".

34. The Philippines can rightfully take credit for the acceptance, as early as 1951, of the
binding force of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights even if the rights and
freedoms therein declared are considered by other jurisdictions as merely a statement of
aspirations and not law until translated into the appropriate covenants. In the following
cases decided in 1951, Mejoff v. Director of Prisons, 90 Phil. 70; Borovsky v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 107; Chirskoff v. Commissioner of Immigration,
90 Phil. 256; Andreu v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. 347, the Supreme Court
applied the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

35. According to its Article 19: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers." The rst paragraph of Article 20 reads: "Everyone has the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly and association.".

36. De Jorge v. Oregon, 299 US 353, 364 (1937).

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 37. Schneider v. Irvington, 308 US 147, 163 (1939).
38. G.R. No. L-31687, February 26, 1970, 31 SCRA 731. Two justices dissented, Justice,
later Chief Justice, Castro and the present Chief Justice, then a Justice.

39. G.R. No. 60294, April 30, 1982.

40. Opinion citing par. 4 of Petition.

TEEHANKEE, J. , concurring:

1. 80 Phil. 1.
2. 71 U.S. Law ed., 1105-1107.

3. 307 U.S. 496, 515, 83 Law ed., 1423.

4. 7 Phil. 422, 426, per Carson, J.

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