People v. Judge

G.R. No.
L-66469 July 29, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and ALFREDO
QUIJANO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BERNARDO SALAS (In his capacity as Presiding
Judge of RTC, Cebu, Branch VIII), MARIO ABONG,
ALFREDO DE LEON, ERIWADWIN MONTEBON, ROMEO
DE GUZMAN, & EDUARDO MABUHAY, respondents.
Basilio E. Duaban for accused.
CRUZ, J.:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu but before he could be
arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the
prosecution.1 As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended
information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he
pleaded not guilty.2 Trial commenced, but while it was in
progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first
information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city
court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release;
and so he escaped.3 The respondent judge, learning later of
the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered
Abong's re-arrest.4 But he was gone. Nonetheless, the
prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance
with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in
absentia under certain circumstances.5 The respondent
judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all
proceedings until the return of the accused.6 The order of the
trial court is now before us on certiorari and mandamus.7
The judge erred. He did not see the woods for the trees. He
mistakenly allowed himself to be tethered by the literal
reading of the rule when he should have viewed it from the
broader perspective of its intendment.
The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section
19, of the 1973 Constitution, reading in full as follows:
Section 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to he informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding
the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified.
The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of
criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely
deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because
of the defendant's escape. The old case of People v.
Avanceña 8 required his presence at certain stages of the
trial which as a result, had to be discontinued as long as the
defendant had not re-appeared or remained at large. As his
right to be present at these stages was then held not
waivable even by his escape, such escape thus operated to
the fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities,
insofar as the trial could not proceed as long as he had not
been recaptured.
The doctrine laid down in that case has been modified by
Section 19, which now allows trial in absentia, Now, the
prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued
prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only
that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified
of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified.
The respondent judge was probably still thinking of the old
doctrine when he ruled that trial in absentia of the escapee
could not be held because he could not be duly notified
under Section 19. He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed
to have waived such notice precisely because he has
escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to
appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal
justification. In the past, his escape "rewarded" him by
postponing all further proceedings against him and in effect
ultimately absolving him of the charge he was facing. Under
the present rule, his escape will, legally speaking, operate to
Ms disadvantage by preventing him from attending his trial,
which will continue even in his absence and most likely
result in his conviction.
The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived
except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to
present witnesses who will Identify the accused.9 Under
Section 19, the defendant's escape will be considered a
waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him
of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing
with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice.
The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear
unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself
beyond the pale, and protection, of the law.
Trial in absentia was not allowed in Borja v.
Mendoza 10 because it was held notwithstanding that the
accused had not been previously arraigned. His subsequent
conviction was properly set aside. But in the instant case,
since all the requisites are present, there is absolutely no
reason why the respondent judge should refuse to try the
accused, who had already been arraigned at the time he
was released on the illegal bail bond. Abong should be
prepared to bear the consequences of his escape, including
forfeiture of the right to be notified of the subsequent
proceedings and of the right to adduce evidence on his
behalf and refute the evidence of the prosecution, not to
mention a possible or even probable conviction.
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this
is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the
intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in
"the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth," which is
not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we must
look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law,
seeking to discover, by our own lights, the reason and the
rhyme for its enactment. That we may properly apply it
according to its ends, we need and must use not only
learning but also vision.
The trial judge is directed to investigate the lawyer who
assisted Mario Abong in securing bail from the city court of
Cebu on the basis of the withdrawn information for homicide
and to report to us the result of his investigation within sixty
days.
WHEREFORE, the order of the trial court dated December
22, 1983, denying the motion for the trial in absentia of the
accused is set aside. The respondent judge is directed to
continue hearing the case against the respondent Mario
Abong in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it
is terminated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera and Paras, JJ.,
concur.

People vs. Salas
Facts:
Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI
Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated
on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an
amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to
which he pleaded not guilty. Trial commenced, but while it was in
progress, the prisoner, escaped. The judge, learning later of the
trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's
rearrest. Abong, however, was gone. Nonetheless (Judge Bernardo
Salas), the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in
accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in
absentia under certain circumstances. the judge denied the motion,
however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the
accused. The order of the trial court is before the Supreme Court
on certiorari and mandamus.
Issue: Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his

escape.
Held:
Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In

all criminal prosecution, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustified." The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition
of criminal cases, trial of which could in
the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely
abandoned, because of the defendant's escape.
The old case of People v. Avanceña (32 OG 713) required his
presence at certain stages of the trial which as a
result, had to be discontinued as long as the defendant had not
reappeared or remained at large.
As his right tobe present at these stages was then held not waivable
even by his escape, such escape thus operated to the
fugitive's advantage, and in mockery of the authorities, insofar as
the trial could not proceed as long as he had
not been recaptured. The doctrine laid down in that case has been
modified by Section 19, which now allows
trial in absentia,
Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued

prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a)
he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and
c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Thus, the right to be present
at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where
the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the
accused. Under Section 19, the defendant's escape will be
considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to
notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from
continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due
notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear
unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the
pale, and protection, of the law.
Doctrine:
their escape should have been considered a waiver of their right
to be present at their trial, and the inability of the court to notify
them of the subsequent hearings did not prevent it from continuing
with their trial. They were to be deemed to have received
notice. The same fact of their escape made their failure to appear
unjustified because they have, by escaping, placed themselves
beyond the pale and protection of the law.

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G.R. No.

L-66469 July 29, 1986

Issue: Whether Abong may be tried in absentia, in light of his

Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution provides that "In

Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued

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