G.R. No. 208566.

 November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA, JOSE M. VILLEGAS, JR., JOSE L.
GONZALEZ, REUBEN M. ABANTE, and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL
TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT, and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, respondents.

G.R. No. 208493. November 19, 2013

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA,
petitioner, vs. HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SENATE
PRESIDENT, and HONORABLE FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.

G.R. No. 209251. November 19, 2013

PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque, Former Provincial
Board Member-Province of Marinduque, petitioner, vs. PRESIDENT BENIGNO
SIMEON C. AQUINO III** and SECRETARY FLORENCIO “BUTCH” ABAD,
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

TOPIC: Governing Constitutional Principles - Separation of Powers and the Exercise of

Executive Power
NATURE: SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
SC DECISION: Petitions are partly granted.

(History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines nasa last page po if not yet familiar
with the history pork barrel po)
FACTS:
 “Pork Barrel” is political parlance of American-English origin. “Pork Barrel” refers to an
appropriation of government spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
primarily to bring money to a representative’s district. Some scholars on the subject
further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations. In the Philippines, “Pork
Barrel” has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of
the Legislature, although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference
to certain funds of the Executive.

 The present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown
that the term’s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund. Malampaya Funds was created as
a special fund under Section 8 of PD 910, issued by then President Marcos. It is to help
intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration,
exploitation, and development of Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan (Malampaya
Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project). While Presidential Social Fund was created under
Section 12, Title IV of PD 1869 issued also by Pres Marcos. It is a special funding facility
managed and administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the
President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under
the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.

 Former Marikina City Representative Candazo said that “the kickbacks were ‘SOP’
among legislators and ranged from a low 19% to a high 52% of the cost of each project.
 A few days later, the tale of the money trail became the banner story of the Philippine
Daily Inquirer issue of Aug 13, 1996, accompanied by an illustration of a roasted pig.”
“The publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative allocations
of certain lawmakers, including P3.6B for a Congressman, sparked public outrage.”

 In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in
the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional but the petition was dismissed. In 2013, NBI
began its investigation. Whistle-blowers declared that Janet Napoles had swindled
billions of pesos from public officers for ghost projects.

 COA audit reported that at least P900M from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya
project has gone into a dummy account. Thereafter, several petitions were lodged before
the Court similarly seeking that the “Pork Barrel System” be declared unconstitutional.

 Petitioners define the term “Pork Barrel System” as the “collusion between the
Legislative and Executive branches of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds
in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to determine its distribution as
political largesse. They state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised of two kinds of
discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently
known as the PDAF; and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel,
specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD 910 and the Presidential Social Fund under
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993. They submit that it “wrecks the assignment of
responsibilities between the political branches” as it is designed to allow individual
legislators to interfere “way past the time it should have ceased” or, particularly, “after the
GAA is passed.”

 Respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated
since the President maintains “ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA” and
that he “retains the final discretion to reject” the legislators’ proposals.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of
constitutional provision on separation of powers (YES)

RULING:
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three
fundamental powers of government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936), it means that the “Constitution has blocked out
with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the
judicial departments of the government.” To the legislative branch of government, through
Congress, belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through
the President, belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government,
through the Court, belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers
have been, by constitutional design, ordained in this respect, “[e]ach department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within
its own sphere.” Thus, “the legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to
make or execute the law.” The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of
autonomy and independence stem from the notion that the powers of government must be
divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one branch; the division, it is hoped,
would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry. To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches
of government that are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective
mandates. Lack of independence would result in the inability of one branch of government to
check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or others.

The Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross
over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is
properly the domain of the Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that
“Congress enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the
President. Thereafter, Congress, “in the exercise of its own judgment and
wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in
accordance with an appropriation made by law.” Upon approval and passage of the GAA,
Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive’s role
of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries
between them, Congress must “not concern itself with details for implementation by the
Executive.” The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where
the Court held that “from the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law
that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation
or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional.” It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to
“any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress may still exercise its
oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the Constitution itself
allows. But it must be made clear that Congress’ role must be confined to mere oversight.
Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft of
any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or
assumption of executive functions.

Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project

identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of
congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume
duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the
foregoing, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in —
as Guingona, Jr. puts it — “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including
“the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and
the “regulation and release of funds” in violation of the separation of powers principle

The Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto,
informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases
of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That
such informal practices do exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the
years has not been substantially disputed here.

Towards this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned
the conduct of legislator identification on the guise that the same is merely recommendatory
and, as such, respondents’ reliance on the same falters altogether.

Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through
formal measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government
agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of what the Constitution has vested as
its own.
History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines:
o Pre-Martial Law (1922-1972)
Act 3044, or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered as the earliest form of
“Congressional Pork Barrel” in the Philippines. Sec3 provides that the sums
appropriated for certain public works projects” shall be distributed subject to the
approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of
Representatives.” “The committee from each House may also authorize one of
its members to approve the distribution made by the Secretary of Commerce and
Communications.” Also, in the area of fund realignment, the same section provides
that the said secretary, “with the approval of said joint committee, or of the authorized
members thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended
portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder.”

o Martial Law (1972-1986)

Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) called the “Support for Local Development Projects”
(SLDP) under the article on “National Aid to Local Government Units.”

o Post Martial Law (1986-1992)

After the revolution it was revived in the form of the “Mindanao Development Fund”
and the “Visayas Development Fund” which were created with lump-sum
appropriations of P480 Million and P240 Million, respectively. In Luzon, “Countrywide
Development Fund” (CDF) was created. CDF funds were, with the approval of the
President, to be released directly to the implementing agencies but “subject to the
submission of the required list of projects and activities.”

o Ramos Administration (1992-1998)

The release of CDF funds was to be made upon the submission of the list of projects
and activities identified by, among others, individual legislators. An allocation for the
Vice-President was allocated. In addition, DBM was directed to submit reports to the
Senate Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the
releases made from the funds.

In 1997, Congress and VP was directed to submit to DBM list of 50% projects. The
list shall be published by DBM and shall be the basis of DBM for the release of funds.
In 1998, the publication was no longer required.

It was reported that during this administration, there were reports about
Congressional Insertions (CIs). It formed part of the budgets of executive
departments, they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor.
Lawmakers, Finance, DBM, and budget officials knew about this.

o Estrada Administration (1999-2001)

CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs,
namely, the “Food Security Program Fund,” the “Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program
Fund,” and the “Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,” all of which
contained a special provision requiring “prior consultation” with the Members of
Congress for the release of the funds.
 In 2000, Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) appeared in GAA. Prior
consultation with the Representative of the District is required prior released of funds.

o Arroyo Administration (2001-2010)

PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special
provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or
local government unit concerned, without further qualifications.

In 2005, PDAF Article provided that it shall be used to fund priority programs and
projects and shall be released directly to implementing agencies. PDAF Articles from
2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts allocated for the
individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification of
PDAF projects to be funded.

o Present Administration (2010 to present)

In 2011, express amounts were included for the VP, representatives, and senators. In
2012 and 2013, PDAF Article stated that it would be still the individual legislator who
would choose and identify the project from the list. In 2013, PDAF Article allowed
LGUs as implementing agencies. Legislators were also allowed to identify
projects/program outside of his district as long concurred by the legislator of the
district.