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JMH
17,1 Ansoff revisited
How Ansoff interfaces with both the planning
and learning schools of thought in strategy
102 Robert Moussetis
Department of Management and Marketing, North Central College,
Naperville, Illinois, USA

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to revisit Igor Ansoff’s work and how it interfaces with the
various schools of strategic management.
Design/methodology/approach – Ansoff’s work of 40 years is reviewed and related to other
schools of thought in strategic management.
Findings – Ansoff’s work is much more comprehensive than the literature suggests. His later work
(after 1990) is largely unnoticed by academics, nevertheless, it is the empirical findings of his
theoretical postulations. Moreover, his work interfaces with virtually all schools of thought in strategic
management.
Research limitations/implications – It will provide a broader view of Ansoff’s work and perhaps
trigger additional research as a result of his later work. Most researchers continue to associate Ansoff
with his early thoughts.
Practical implications – Ansoff’s work has found wide applications in a variety of industries.
His work was mostly with industries that used his propositions in order to better strategies.
Social implications – Ansoff’s later research and empirical findings could provide a launchpad for
re-examining the method by which organizations assess their environment, strategic behaviour, and
internal capability. Therefore, organizations may have an alternative method to develop strategy.
Originality/value – This is the first attempt to provide a historical view of Ansoff’s work and
perhaps his timeliness. The recent economic crisis only further supports Ansoff’s basic position that
companies must create custom strategies to fit their environment, culture, and capabilities.
Keywords Strategic management, Strategic change, Management history, Management theory,
Management strategy, Business history
Paper type Research paper

Introduction
A young scientist, Igor H. Ansoff, published his first article titled “The stability of linear
oscillating systems with constant time lag” published in 1948 in the Journal of Applied
Mechanics. If he only knew, that in 1957, he would publish the “Strategies for
diversification” in the Harvard Business Review later to be followed with the seminal
work on Corporate Strategy published in 1965, thus contributing to the intellectual
domain for a new field in Strategic Management.
In 2002, strategic management lost one of its early thinkers and writers, Igor Ansoff.
Leaving a legacy as one of the founders of the field of strategic management, Ansoff
created a distinctive thinking on strategic management. Surprisingly, however, only his
Journal of Management History early work continues to be referenced. He wrote the influential book Corporate Strategy
Vol. 17 No. 1, 2011
pp. 102-125 in 1965 and after teaching at Carnegie and becoming the founding Dean of the
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1751-1348
Vanderbilt School of Business, Igor Ansoff spent about 15 years in Europe teaching and
DOI 10.1108/17511341111099556 consulting. Subsequently, the US academia “forgot” Ansoff and, continues to cite his
early work. Although his early work was conceptually groundbreaking at the time, his Ansoff revisited
later work, which included empirical evidence, went largely unnoticed in the academia.
Even Ansoff (1998) suggested that his later work was more relevant than his 1965 book.
Moreover, his interests were more in the consulting world, which left the academic
setting with an “Ansoffian” gap. Ansoff was labelled as part of the “planning” school
(Table IV) of thought in the field of strategy. However, his later work strongly suggests
that his ideas are much more comprehensive (Al-Hadramy, 1992; Hatziantoniou, 1986; 103
Jaja, 1989; Lewis, 1989; Salameh, 1987; Mitiku, 1992; van der Velten, 1997; Ansoff and
Sullivan, 1993a, b).
Historically, there are many competing theories in the field of strategy (Barnard,
1938; Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Lindblom, 1959; March and Simon, 1958; Burns and
Stalker, 1961; Emery and Trist, 1965; Mintzberg, 1973; Quinn, 1978) leading to a
diversity of strategy-making typologies (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984; Chaffee, 1985;
Mintzberg, 1978; Nonaka, 1988). Moreover, empirical work (Miller and Cardinal,
1994; Schwenk and Schrader, 1993; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984; Miller and Friesen,
1977, 1983; Shrivastava and Grant, 1985; Wooldridge and Floyd, 1990) has provided a
broad choice of forethoughts with competing schools of strategy.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Ansoff’s work permeates into a larger
domain of strategic management thought than previously suggested (Mintzberg and
Lampel, 1999) and further contributes to the clarification on the debate between the
“planning” and “learning” school in strategy. The planning school (Ansoff, 1991, 1994)
argues that formal planning is beneficial for both stable and unstable environments while
the learning school prefers logical incrementalism, particularly in unstable environments
(Mintzberg, 1991, 1994a, b). Criticism of the planning school failed to consider the factor
of time (Brews and Hunt, 1999). Although some research suggested a weak link between
planning and performance (Boyd, 1991; Pearce et al., 1987), other research was critical of
the design and methodology of early research (Thune and House, 1970; Kudla, 1980),
hence, indicating a much greater link between formal planning (Ansoff, 1991, 1994) than
previously argued (Mintzebrg, 1991, 1994a, b). Such studies (Pearce et al., 1987; Wood and
LaForge, 1979, 1981; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984) utilized refined methodologies and
suggested a stronger link between planning and performance.
This paper will first provide a brief historical background, summary of Ansoff’s
critical concepts relevant to his later research, and finally his permeation with the
schools of thought as illustrated by Mintzberg and Lampel (1999). The scope and range
of this paper will not permit the full development of each school of strategic thought.
Although the foundation of this paper is based on the integrative work by Mintzberg and
Lampel (1999), the author of this paper understands the limitations and potential
difference of opinions relating to the degree and range of attributions of various schools
of thought in strategy. Moreover, the author recognizes that there are many contributors
to the field of strategic management who will not receive adequate examination as a
result of the limited scope of the paper.

Background
Ansoff never fully engaged the academic establishment (Academy of Management
annual meetings); hence, he never developed the intellectual domain (promote his ideas
within the management field) to better illustrate and defend his theoretical and empirical
postulations. Moreover, he was never convinced about “popularizing” his positions
JMH into writings that resonate better with the wider academic world. Therefore, one may
17,1 suggest that Ansoff failed to disseminate his ideas and empirical findings into a wider
academic audience. His engineering and mathematical background was clearly evident
in his approach to writing and teaching. Thus, his 1990 book Implanting Strategic
Management often reads like an engineering book with elaborate systems analysis,
hence, indicating his basic premise of thinking that strategy is complex and, therefore,
104 requires analogous respect and approach.
Historically, Ansoff’s (1957a, b, 1963, 1964, 1965) early research suggested the
evolution of his suppositions which were culminated to the famous Corporate Strategy
book. Based on his writings and postulations, it seems that Ashby (1960), Selznick (1957)
and Simon (1957), and later Burns and Stalker (1961) and Chandler (1962) influenced his
thinking and his preliminary ideas and theories. Ansoff introduced the concept of
balancing “external characteristics of the product-market strategy and internal fit
between strategy and business resources” (Ansoff, 1957a, p. 413), thus paving for the
relationship of strategy and structure (Chandler, 1962), changing environmental
contexts for organizations (Emery and Trist, 1965) and the relationship of organizational
structure and environment (Burns and Stalker, 1961). Although Ansoff has published
empirical findings (Ansoff and Sullivan, 1993a, b), Ansoff failed again to engage the
academic community; it was during this time where Ansoff enjoyed consulting much
more than publishing and spreading his theories and empirical findings.
Ansoff’s intensity about applicable research generated a few followers that entered
the business world instead of pursuing academic careers, hence, by his own “strategic
success” generating the intellectual gap within academia. Nevertheless, his propositions
are infused throughout literature and popular works on key turning points of the
strategy that has given credit to his work. For example, the work by Hamel and Prahalad
(1996, p. xix), clearly indicates the “intellectual debt” owed to Ansoff, Chandler, and
Andrews. For someone who thoroughly understands Ansoff’s work, it is clear that his
work filters throughout Hamel’s and Prahalad’s book. Ansoff’s work is based on
developing an instrument to facilitate top manager’s aspirations to explore and exploit
“future profit potential” hence competing for the future.

Summary of Ansoff’s work[1]

Ansoff’s innovations on strategic management was to provide a methodology for
managers to analyze, systematically, the future and quantify qualitative information;
then establish the managerial behaviour and capability needed to succeed vs the present
managerial behaviour and capability. Tables I-III illustrate his contribution and
innovation to the strategic management field. His work on strategic diagnosis facilitated
the development of an optimal profile for firms to succeed (Table III), which was
empirically tested (Ansoff and Sullivan, 1993a, b).
The following section attempts to provide a general context about Ansoff’s thought
process illustrating the process between external environment changes and a firm’s
capability to adjust with their internal capabilities and corresponding behaviours.

History of managerial challenges

In his attempt to describe the historical context of the change process, Ansoff describes
the features of various eras starting from the Industrial Revolution to the post-industrial
or post-modern era (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990; Ansoff, 1965). His approach to explain
 Ansoff revisited
Production Marketing Entrepreneurship Creativity

Turbulence 1 2 3 4 5
scale
Environmental Repetitive Expanding Changing fast Discontinuous Surprising
turbulence slow incremental predictable unpredictable
incremental 105
Strategic Stable Reactive Anticipatory Entrepreneurial Creative
aggressiveness Based on Incremental Incremental Discontinuous Discontinuous
previous based on based on based on expected based on
cases experience extrapolation futures creativity Table I.
Responsiveness Custodial Production Marketing Strategic seeks Flexible seeks Matching strategic
of capability suppresses adapts to pursues new change novel change aggressiveness and
changes change familiar change responsiveness of
capability with
Source: Ansoff and McDonnell (1990), reused with permission of the Ansoff Family Trust turbulence

Production Marketing Entrepreneurship Creativity

Turbulence 1 2 3 4 5
scale
Environmental Repetitive Expanding Changing fast Discontinuous Surprising
turbulence slow incremental predictable unpredictable
incremental
Strategic Stable Reactive Anticipatory Entrepreneurial Creative
aggressiveness Based on Incremental Incremental Discontinuous Discontinuous
previous based on based on based on expected based on
cases experience extrapolation futures creativity
Responsiveness Custodial Production Marketing Strategic seeks Flexible seeks
of capability suppresses adapts to pursues new change novel change Table II.
changes change familiar change Suboptimal scenario

Production Marketing Entrepreneurship Creativity

Turbulence 1 2 3 4 5
scale
Environmental Repetitive Expanding Changing fast Discontinuous Surprising
turbulence slow incremental predictable unpredictable
incremental
Strategic Stable Reactive Anticipatory Entrepreneurial Creative
aggressiveness Based on Incremental Incremental Discontinuous Discontinuous
previous based on based on based on expected based on
cases experience extrapolation futures creativity
Responsiveness Custodial Production Marketing Strategic seeks Flexible seeks
of capability suppresses adapts to pursues new change novel change Table III.
changes change familiar change Optimal scenario
JMH the managerial characteristics defining firms of the respective time periods formulates
17,1 the context to establish a domain for the change process. For example, his vivid
illustration of the Ford Motor Company being dominated by the production function was
the appropriate managerial function between the years 1900 and 1930 when the
Industrial Revolution was consolidated into mass production. However, once the need of
basic consumer goods was satisfied (i.e. Ford Motor Company and the T-model), the
106 managerial approach moved to a more marketing function. Although Ford Motor
Company dominated the production era, its failure to change in a timely manner allowed
the more marketing-oriented General Motors to ascend to the top of the industry in the
late 1930s. His historical reference continues with his observation of the general
accelerated change, thus a new managerial approach capable of capturing change in a
timely fashion was suggested. The early management periods were dominated by
production first and marketing later where the change process was rather slow and
mostly organic. The post-industrial period though was characterized by an affluent
society with novel demands in a technologically fast-changing environment.
This new context of managerial setting necessitated the change towards the
long-range planning approach. Lastly, he observed that firms increasingly faced rapid
market saturation, global competition, political upheavals, increased government
regulations, frequent industry changes, novel technologies and continuous threat of
substitute industries. Hence, he established a model to help managers quantify
qualitative observations about environmental shifts and provide a change management
tool sensitive to the complexity, rate, novelty and predictability of change. This led to the
strategic success hypothesis (which has been empirically validated) with the
development of turbulence scales and the need for a corresponding managerial
capability and strategic orientation according to the changeability and predictability of
the firm’s environment. This is the historical moment where Ansoff expands his thinking
beyond the formal planning to include a wider set of contingencies; thus, allowing the
managers to better understand and manage the change process as a function of
environmental variability, strategic behaviour (Ansoff, 1987), managerial capability and
behavioural characteristics (i.e. change is often corollary to systemic and/or behavioural
resistance to change). His work on environmental variability as a determinant of strategy
was instrumental in leading effective changes in companies around the world; companies
that utilized his services such as IBM, Northern Telecom, Bayer, Phillips, Banamex, and
the US Navy were among some of the better know organizations. Ansoff’s industry
experience with strategic planning resulted in his basic postulation that includes three
primary dimensions: strategy formulation, management capability and design, and
management of transformational change. Ansoff’s deep understanding of the holistic
approach to strategy led him through a lifetime of improving his basic theoretical
propositions established back in 1965. He developed a plethora of mechanisms and
approaches that organizations found relevant and applicable in real time.
The next section provides a brief overview of the major concepts and approaches he
had developed that facilitate effective change. The concepts selected represent a core
basis on Ansoff’s work and were fundamental in his later research (empirical work using
strategic diagnosis). Moreover, the concepts serve as a foundation of Ansoff’s work on
strategy and change. The attempt of this research effort is to utilize only the concepts of
environment, environmental turbulence, strategic orientation, and strategic diagnosis
since they represent the foundational concepts required to bridge Ansoff’s wider
integration to a broader range of schools of thought; moreover, they also serve as a Ansoff revisited
launch base for future research.

Environment
The use of this term was all inclusive and it was meant to examine economic, political,
sociological, technological, geopolitical, psychological, etc. forces in the area(s) that an
organization chooses to operate. Ansoff postulated the term environment serving 107
organizations (ESO) as any organization that provided goods and/or services to the
environment and consumes resources in the process. The most important contingent
force, which defines the required responses to the environment that determine the
success of an ESO, is the environmental turbulence.
Environmental turbulence is the combined measure of changeability and
predictability of the organization’s environment (complexity, novelty, rapidity of
change, and visibility). Ansoff divided the environment, primarily into two large
categories: historic and discontinuous. In historic environments, decisions about
the future are based on past and present events that can be extrapolated into the future.
Change is incremental, predictable, and visible. In discontinuous environments, the
future is partially visible and predictable; therefore, change is possible by using weak
signals from the environment. Lastly, the future could be completely unpredictable and
invisible; hence, changes are based on building scenarios utilizing weak environmental
signals.
However, there are several authors that have utilized the concept of environmental
turbulence. Scholars have postulated the dependence upon the environment (Aldrich and
Pfeffer, 1976; Child, 1972; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a, b;
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). Furthermore, the research typology has
portrayed environments primarily as stable, uncertain, complex, static, dynamic,
discontinuous, and turbulent (Emery and Trist, 1965; Duncan, 1972; Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967a, b; Post, 1978) and the variability is known as environmental turbulence.
Furthermore, strategy is often determined as a result of environmental turbulence
(Buchholz and Rosenthal, 1995; Carroll, 1994; Drucker, 1980; Marcus, 1993; Peery, 1995;
Post, 1978; Vernon-Wortzel, 1994). In addition, Ansoff was associated with the change
process of mechanistic organizations (Burns and Stalker, 1961); conversely, Ansoff’s
later postulations suggested that he was considering a wider set of variables
(i.e. behavioural, cultural, etc.) hence, rendering his postulations to fit a wider range of
strategic thought. Ansoff’s later work suggested some degree of consistency with the
contingency approach (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Woodward, 1965; Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967a, b; Donaldson, 1995a) that indicates a “fit” between the external vs internal
changes as they relate to organizational performance. Ansoff’s later postulations argued
that organizations should apply a change process that is appropriate to their
environment and internal behaviour and dynamics, thus resisting to subscribe to the
organic evolution in turbulents environments since often there is not time for an “organic
adjustment” and also often new organizations in turbulent settings require formal
planning (Stichcombe, 1965; Sine et al., 2006).

Strategic orientation behaviour

Strategic behaviour leads to different levels of performance (Morrison and Kendall,
1992). However, what type of strategic behaviour produces optimal performance?
JMH The typology developed by Miles and Snow (1978) provided a foundation for other
17,1 scholars of organizational behaviour interested in the relationships between strategy,
structure, and process. The validity and reliability have also been affirmed as usable to
explore organizations and their strategies (Shortel and Zarac, 1990). The typology is also
consistent with theoretical and empirical studies (Ansoff, 1979; Ansoff and Sullivan,
1993a, b; Hambrick, 1983; McDaniel and Kolari, 1987; Tan and Litschert, 1994;
108 Ramaswamy et al., 1994). Moreover, in highly concentrated industries (Porter, 1980;
Segev, 1989; D’Aveni, 1994), the strategic behaviours focusing on low costs and product
differentiation are excellent tools; however, they offered little guidance for industries in
highly entrepreneurial, creative, and innovative settings, which are still in a pre-infancy
stage or have yet to form. The suggestion is that organizations employ a different
organizational response (endogenous-driven behaviour) depending on the
environmental (exogenous-driven process) conditions (contingency), which facilitates
the goal of this research to associate environmental turbulence and strategic behaviour
orientation to performance.

Strategic diagnosis
This is perhaps the most innovative tool Ansoff created both conceptually and
practically. It allows companies to essentially diagnose their optimal future profit
potential. The context of this analysis lays with the rapid technological changes and
sudden industry shifts that generate a challenging strategic setting for most
post-modern organizations. There is a continuous evolution of the “change agenda” with
strategic “fads” intending to provide universal prescriptions to an organization’s future
success with a generally low success rate. For example, total quality of management was
highly successful in Japan but other cultures showed mixed results; reengineering did
not provide a process beyond the reengineered organizations; in benchmarking, firms
were told that following the best practices of the industry will likely make you successful
as well (imagine benchmarking WorldCom, Enron few years back, and other companies
receiving accolades for their exceptional performance or the Thai Government model of
success prior to 1995-1996). In short, there are no universal prescriptions for future
challenges. As a result, Ansoff suggests that there are two key problems:
(1) Each firm must develop the capability to diagnose future challenges,
opportunities, threats, weaknesses, and strengths (Ansoff and McDonnell,
1990; Beam, 2001).
(2) Each firm must consider developing an in-house response mechanism to fit
their needs.

Ansoff’s contribution is a tool to facilitate the “translation” of qualitative data into

quantitative numbers that assist managers in developing a direction. This tool is the
strategic diagnosis (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990), which is a systematic approach to
determining the changes that have to be made to a firm’s strategy and its internal
capability in order to assure the organization’s success in its future environment. This
diagnostic procedure is derived from the strategic success hypothesis and empirical
studies. The purpose is for managers to have tools to effectively encounter the
relentless changes and turbulence of their environment (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990).
Performance is optimal if strategy and capability match the environmental turbulence
(Ansoff and Sullivan, 1993a, b; Pelham, 1999).
 Strategic success hypothesis states that an organization’s performance potential is Ansoff revisited
optimum when the following three conditions are met:
(1) aggressiveness of the organization’s strategic behaviour matches the
turbulence of its environment;
(2) responsiveness of the organization’s capability matches the aggressiveness of
its strategy; and
109
(3) the components of the organization’s capability must be supportive of each other.

Table I summarizes the diagnostic instrument. Table II indicates a sub-optimal

scenario and Table III indicates an optimal scenario for an organization (see tables for
better clarity):
.
Strategic aggressiveness is the strategic orientation of the general management
(reactive, proactive, entrepreneurial, creative, etc.).
.
Responsiveness refers to the functional orientation of the general management
(production, marketing, entrepreneurial, strategic, etc.).

Table I illustrates the basic premise as proposed by Ansoff and McDonnell (1990).
Tables II and III indicate two different scenarios of what potentially may happen in the
market. For example, Table II illustrates a scenario in which the firm’s environment is
discontinuous but the company maintains a strategic orientation that is based on past
information. Hence, Ansoff argues that such a firm will display a strategic gap, which
will correlate with suboptimal performance. This tool has been used successfully to
determine strategic success and failures in largely unpublished (Al-Hadramy, 1992;
Hatziantoniou, 1986; Jaja, 1989; Lewis, 1989; Salameh, 1987; Mitiku, 1992; van der Velten,
1997) and published works (Ansoff and Sullivan, 1993a, b). Those are the empirical
studies post-1990 that define Ansoff in a broader scope and suggest his interface with
other schools of thought (Table IV).

Ansoff’s interface with others schools of thought in strategic management

The background on strategic management has a plethora of work that will be virtually
impossible to adequately develop within the pages of this paper. From developing
individual potential within an organization (Argyris, 1965, 1975, 1985; Argyris and
Schon, 1978) to managing values (Barnard, 1938, 1948) to the pioneering work on
strategy and structures (Chandler, 1962) or the concept of strategy as a policy generator
(Andrews, 1980) or to the development of effective managers (Drucker, 1954, 1964, 1969,
1974), the field of strategy and surrounding disciplines have populated the literature
with an array of theories and prescriptions. In addition, we had research on competitive
advantage within a given industry (Porter, 1980), logical incremenatalism (Quinn, 1980),
hyper competition (D’Aveni, 1994, 1999; D’Aveni et al., 1995), and competing for the
future (Hamel and Prahalad, 1996). Lastly, as indicated earlier, there is the great
debate among various thinkers on the strategy-making process with a variety of
strategy-making classifications (Barnard, 1938; Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984; Chaffee,
1985; Hofer and Schendel, 1978; Lindblom, 1959; March and Simon, 1958; Mintzberg,
1973, 1978; Nonaka, 1988; Quinn, 1978).
The broad divisions of strategic management thinking are the prescriptive school of
thought (or “ought to be”) and the descriptive (or “is”) (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999).
 17,1

110
JMH

Table IV.

and Lampel (1999)

Ansoff with all the
schools of thought as
described by Mintzberg
Design Planning Positioning Entrepreneurial Cognitive
Sources P. Selznick H.I. Ansoff D.E. Schendel and J.A. Schumpeter and H.A. Simon and J.G. March
M.E. Porter A.H. Cole
Base discipline None (architecture as a Some links to planning, Economics None (although early Psychology (cognitive)
metaphor) systems theory, and (industrial writings come from
cybernetics organization) an economists)
military history
Champions Case studies Professional managers, Analytical staff, Popular business press Those with psychological
MBAs, and staff and consulting and individualists bent, pessimists in one
experts “boutiques” wing, and optimists on the
other
Intended message Fit Formalize Analyze Envision Cope or create
Ansoff’s turbulence 1-3 1-3 1-3 4-5 1-5
scale as it applies to Organizations can study Speed of change allows Speed of change is Environments are All levels are possibilities
each school of past problems and time to plan and fast but still with discontinuous and
thought prescribe action respond adequate time to surprising,
respond entrepreneurial approach
is needed
Realized message Think (strategy making as Program (rather than Calculate (rather Centralize (then hope) Worry (being unable to
a case study) formulate) than create or cope in either case)
commit)
School category Prescriptive Prescriptive Prescriptive Descriptive (some Descriptive
prescriptive)
Associated homily “Look Before you Leap” “A stitch in time saves “Nothin’ but the “Take us to your leader” “I’ll see it when I believe it”
time” facts ma’am”
(continued)
 Learning Power Cultural Environmental Configuration
Sources C.E. Lindblom, R.M. March, G.T. Allison, J. Pfeffer, E. Rhenman and M.T. Hannan and A.D. Chandler,
K.E. Weick, C.K. Prahald G.R. Salancik and R.Normann J. Freeman (contingency H. Mintzberg, R.E. Miles,
and G Hamel W.G. Astley theorists) and C.C. Snow
Base discipline None (perhaps some Political science Anthropology Biology History
peripheral links to learning
theory and psychology
and education). Chaos
theory and mathematics
Champions People who like power, People who like the Population Population ecologists Lumbers and integrators
politics, and conspiracy social, the spiritual, and ecologists and in general, change agents.
the collective some organization Configuration (Holland) vs
theorists transformers (USA)
Intended message Learn Promote Coalesce React Integrate and transform
Ansoff’s turbulence Levels 1-3 Levels 1-3 Levels 1-3 Levels 1-3 Levels 1-5
scale Those are the levels where Those are the levels Reaching Organic adaptation is Depending on the
power could experiment where power could be consensus requires subject to adequate time environmental demands,
with new strategic areas used to advance a ample time the organization
and develop new change agenda formulates a
innovative ideas “contingency” plan
Realized message Play (rather than pursue) Hoard (rather than Perpetuate (rather Capitulate (rather than Lump (rather than split,
change) than change) confront) adapt)
School category Descriptive Descriptive Descriptive Descriptive Descriptive and
prescriptive
Associated homily “If you first don’t succeed, “Look out for number “An apple never “It all depends” “To everything there is a
try, try, again” one” falls far from the reason [. . .]”
tree”
Source: Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) with Ansoff inserted
Ansoff revisited

111

Table IV.
JMH The Ansoff school of thought is environment driven; hence, Ansoff believed in “what is”
17,1 since the environment directs your response; but he also proposed a response
mechanism (what ought to be) based on the environment the organization is operating
under. Hence, the value of understanding how Ansoff interfaces with other schools of
thought rests with the premise that Ansoff is much more dynamic and comprehensive
than previously labelled. His strategic diagnosis instrument provides a launch base to
112 accommodate much wider external and internal settings; from stable to highly
turbulent, hence, Ansoff dynamism.
The next section will provide a brief overview of each school of strategy as described
by Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) and integrate how Ansoff’s work interfaces with each
school of thought.

Design school
This is one of the original perspectives, which views strategy as a “fit” between internal
strengths and weaknesses and external threats and opportunities (Chandler, 1962;
Selznick, 1957). It is commonly known in literature as the strengths, weaknesses,
opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis. Case studies were the primary tool to
develop policy and strategy.

Ansoff’s connection
Ansoff suggested precisely the basic premise of the design school since his basic
argument is that external turbulence must be matched by corresponding internal
capability and behaviour to respond. For example, if the environment (external
opportunity) is dominated by marketing, then, internally, the organization must have
the necessary managerial capability to respond (Dobni and Luffman, 2000, 2003).
In Table III, the suggestion is that the optimal scenario is that strategic orientation and
managerial responsiveness are also at level 3. The founder of Apple Computers, Steve
Jobs, became an oddity within his own company in the mid-1980s when the computer
industry moved to a marketing-oriented setting. Mr Jobs wanted to continue with
cutting-edge technologies. On Ansoff’s scale, the environment of Apple Computers had
moved to level 3 (dominated by marketing – price sensitive) while the strategic
orientation of Steve Jobs remain at level 5 (creativity), hence, creating the gap. At the
time, Apple Computers hired the former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Pepsi
(a marketing expert), which made perfect sense since the personal computer market had
moved into a marketing-oriented setting. Moreover, it is not accidental that Steve Jobs
returned to Apple when the company developed a need to move into the cutting
edge of technology again; hence, the fit of Steve Jobs’s strategic aggressiveness and
responsiveness matched the new environmental conditions (i products).
For levels 1-3, Ansoff suggests that a SWOT approach is appropriate considering
that the environmental conditions are changing at a speed with which the firm can cope
adequately. Generally, levels 1-3 are dominated with organizations attempting to
achieve economies of scale (repetition, productivity, and incremental changes to the
product/service) as well as competing on price/marketing appeal. Thus, the SWOT
analysis is an excellent tool for low-level turbulence. Ansoff has labelled levels 1 through
3 as the incremental environment. The principle of “fit” is suggested when using Table I,
which clearly provides a tool to establish the fit between external changes and internal
capabilities. Moreover, the premise of levels 1-3 is the time availability for change,
hence the indication of the case approach to strategy in extrapolative environments Ansoff revisited
(levels 1-3). Lastly, Ansoff suggested that the SWOT analysis is contained within an
industry and cannot be used as a tool to anticipate changes that are external to the
industry. Classically, Ansoff referred to the ever-increasing market share and
production efficiency of companies in the horse carriage industry at the time of the
discovery of the combustion engine; and, how managers fail to see the emergence of a
new technology. Similarly, he talked about the discovery of transistors at the time of 113
vacuum tubes and more recently, the failure of communication companies to move into
wireless technology, thus, maintaining a level 4 or 5 behaviours and capability.
Deservedly so, he predicted that companies such as AT&T or IBM would not survive as
they were unless they developed levels 4 and 5 strategic behaviour and organizational
responsiveness. His prediction of AT&T (break up) and IBM (Microsoft and Lenovo) is
strategically consistent with his forecasts.

Planning school
This is the school of thought that evolved from the early diversification thinking that
was entering the industries in the 1950s. The assumptions were that the external
settings were changing rather slowly, hence, allowing time for the strategic process to be
decomposed into small formal steps. Therefore, the process is more formal than rational
(Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1965).

Ansoff’s connection
This is the attribution given of most authors regarding Ansoff’s work. However, the
scale created by Ansoff has clearly indicated that the environment at turbulence levels 4
and 5 indicates high complexity, high speed of change, and unpredictability (Table I);
hence, a different set of strategic orientation and managerial responsiveness. Moreover,
Ansoff realized that the speed of change will not allow the planning process to take place
in the traditional sense; thus, he had created other tools to facilitate sudden changes in
the environment. For example, the issue management approach and crisis mode are a
couple of Ansoffian tools used in discontinuous settings (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990).
Moreover, he had indicated the translation of emerging weak signals in the firm’s
environment into progressive action, hence, develop the appropriate managerial
capability and strategic orientation. Ansoff spent his latter years concerned with the
environments, which were unpredictable, complex, and discontinuous. His unpublished
book-paper on strategic leadership (Ansoff and Sullivan, 1992) was an attempt to
establish some parameters for the top management in discontinuous environments.
If there is a plenty of time to change (low turbulence 1-2), with corresponding power
structures, managerial climate, competence and capacity, then, a formal approach is
suggested. However, he realized that management must be capable to analyze, cope, and
create as a derivative of the environmental turbulence; hence, the premise that Ansoff is
only part of the planning school of thought is incomplete.

Positioning school
In this view, formalized analysis of industries provides generic positions (Porter, 1980;
D’Aveni et al., 1995). Porter’s view still dominates the strategy texts with the three basic
approaches: standardization, differentiation, and focused strategies along with the five
forces model.
JMH Ansoff’s connection
17,1 The turbulence scale matches up nicely with Porter’s positioning school for levels 1-3.
The changes are generally predictable based on industry analysis. Predictable, hence the
establishment of Porter’s primary three strategies (low cost, differentiation, and focus).
For example, the standardization approach is based on an incrementally expanding
environment, hence the dominant strategic behaviour of managers needed for this
114 setting is incremental experience (diminishing costs, learning curves, and reduction of
cost), and the managerial capability is dominated by the capability of managers to
generate “better” standardization. Correspondingly, the differentiation strategy is a
marketing-based approach (got to let the customer know about our differentiated
product, price, service, etc.). When the environment shifts, though, to highly turbulent
(Ansoff’s scales 4 and 5), Porter’s approach is limited to searching for focused
differentiation. Porter’s approach leaves little room for strategy when industries are at
an infancy or incubation period (biotech industry 15-20 years ago). Ansoff’s instrument
addresses the cost-based environment (usually levels 1 and/or 2) and the differentiated
environment (level 3). The premise of Porter’s approach is based on an existing industry
(hence, levels 1-3) while Ansoff provides additionally a tool for emerging and novel
industries (levels 4 and 5) accommodating highly dynamic and volatile settings
(Chakravarthy, 1997).

Entrepreneurial
This school of thought centered the process on the chief executive. This shifted the
process from steps and design to envisioning (Cole, 1959). Although every organization
has a vision, this school of thought relied on the leader to have the vision and the
capability to implement it. Unlike the planning school, it relied on the leader’s intuition.

Ansoff’s connection
Levels 4 and 5 on the turbulence scale are clearly indicative of Ansoff’s fit to the
Entrepreneurial school of thought. Considering that an entrepreneur is working in
environments ranging from partially predictable to surprising and unpredictable,
Ansoff indicated that the entrepreneurial and/or creative behaviours are the critical
elements in levels of high turbulence (Calantone et al., 2003). Vision, flexibility, and
leadership are the characteristics of a CEO to navigate the turbulent settings. This does
not diminish the importance of a CEO in levels 1-3; however, the incremental nature of
levels 1 through 3 requires a less entrepreneurial approach. Hence, Ansoff’s scale also
provides a process for partially predictable and surprising situations as is the case of the
entrepreneurial environment.

Cognitive school
Strategies are developed in people’s minds. Thus, cognition as information processing,
knowledge structure mapping, and concept attainment facilitate the strategy formation
(March and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1957; March, 1965, 1988).

Ansoff’s connection
The managerial perception of environmental turbulence determines the establishment
of the turbulence intensity. The method used by top management within an organization
to filter the external elements establishes the capability of top management to accurately
measure the intensity of the turbulence. Ansoff indicates that top managers routinely Ansoff revisited
generate their own cognition since they interpret environmental signals differently
(knowledge structure mapping), hence, generating different strategic directions. His
approach also cautioned top management about filtered information rising through the
ranks when attempting to develop accurate perceptions (cognition) of the environmental
turbulence. Ansoff identified the surveillance, mentality, and power filters as elements
that top management must be aware of when gathering information (Ansoff and 115
Sullivan, 1993b). For example, IBM and Microsoft in the early 1980s perceived, very
differently the evolution of computer software, thus, generating different directions.
The environment was the same for both companies but strategic decisions/perceptions
were different (Ansoff and Sullivan, 1993a, b; Burgelman and Grove, 1996).
Metaphorically, the weather was the same; they just decided to dress differently.
Ansoff has strongly indicated that the scales he developed rely largely on the capability
of the top management in an organization to accurately perceive the turbulence in order
to develop the appropriate strategy and capability. It is highly likely for two executives
to view the same environment and arrive at different conclusions.

Learning school
Here, strategies are emergent; strategists are found throughout the organization;
formulation and implementation of strategy intermingle (Lindblom, 1959; Weick, 1979;
Hamel and Prahalad, 1996). This descriptive school of thought challenged earlier
versions of the planning school and within this school of thought people were inclined to
experiment with ambiguity and adaptability, thus, providing an environment conducive
to learning. However, learning requires time and environments characterized with high
turbulence require immediate response; therefore, this school of thought is subject to
time available.

Ansoff’s connection
The learning school is appropriate for levels 1-3 considering that time is the critical
element to mount an effective response. The weak signal (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990)
tool offers a graduated response mechanism where the firm will scan the environment,
identify potential emerging threats, and develop a knowledge base (learning) while the
issue management (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990) approach provides a mechanism to
classify emerging issues according to their urgency and priority, consequently, allowing
top management to generate an effective strategy-response (learn) in a timely manner.

Power school
Strategy is a process that involves bargaining, persuasion, and confrontation among
stakeholders/actors who possess power within the organization. Externally, power over
partners and stakeholders is used to negotiate favourable strategies (Allison, 1971;
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Astley, 1984).

Ansoff’s connection
Highly turbulent environments cannot afford the luxury of politics and posturing within
the organization. High turbulence indicates a rapidly changing environment characterized
by entrepreneurship and creativity, thus the learning school’s basic premise can only find
applications in incremental environments (1-3). Ansoff has indicated that incremental
JMH levels where change is slower could be dominated by politics. If politics are dominant, the
17,1 power structure and process are the critical elements in mounting effective responses. For
example, a highly decentralized company (multinationals) requires a consensual approach
to strategic response. Ansoff dedicated a considerable portion of his work to illustrate the
power domains internally and externally within an organization. Moreover, he analyzed
the aspirations and possible coalitions between external and internal stakeholders.
116 Furthermore, he pointed to the impact of the rules of the game (regulations and legislation)
and the need of organizations to build legitimate strategies as tools to influence the rules of
the game (hence, the importance of power and the political process). In his unpublished
work (1992), he has identified the power sources, structure, and processes in developing
effective tools for managing organizations. The underlying assumption in his unpublished
work along with all of his early 1990s work is that managerial capability and behaviour
must accommodate the demands of the environment. In this case, if a firm is in a highly
turbulent regulatory and/or legislative setting, managers must have the corresponding
capability and behaviour to cope. In this instance, political power, structure, and process
become a critical strategic characteristic as a tool to establish persuasion avenues among
stakeholders (both external and internal) to negotiate the favourable strategies. Moreover,
he suggested modes of managing resistance to change and clearly delineated the
difference between systemic and behavioural resistance. The elements of resistance to
change as a function of time, management response to surprising changes, strategic issue
management, and weak signals are some of the tools employed by Ansoff to counter an
effective response to the variation of power.

Cultural school
This school of thought focuses on common interests and integration. Strategy is a
social process rooted in culture (Rhenman, 1973; Normann, 1977). This school suggests
the dual role of culture; it is notably a strategic change deterrent, but also serves as a
change agent. It became central to strategic thinking as a result of the cultural impact
derived from Japanese style management.

Ansoff’s connection
Ansoff indicated that some organizations, where power is decentralized, the bargaining
process dominates persuasion and development of consensus. Such organizations are
institutions of higher education where dispersed power, bargaining, and consensus are
dominant features. Change is slow and laborious. Such organizations can compete
effectively only in levels of turbulence 1 and/or 2 and perhaps 3. A crisis, though, provides
leadership an opportunity to bypass the bargaining approach and the consensus culture
to take action to “save” the organization (usually).

Environmental school
This school of thought suggests, given the environmental conditions, that an organization
maneuvers accordingly in order to respond effectively (Hannan and Freeman, 1977).
As indicated earlier, environmental variation has an impact on the strategy formulation
(Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Child, 1972; Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967a, b; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). Strategy is often determined as a
result of environmental turbulence (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 1995; Carroll, 1994; Drucker,
1980; Marcus, 1993; Peery, 1995; Post, 1978; Vernon-Wortzel, 1994).
Ansoff’s connection Ansoff revisited
Clearly, this is consistent with Ansoff’s work. The turbulence scale is an instrument
that facilitates top managers to analyze external conditions and maneuver accordingly.
It is very surprising not to see Ansoff associated with this school of thought. This
research was also published in 1993 (Ansoff and Sullivan), however, as indicated at the
beginning of this paper, Ansoff is routinely quoted for his 1965 work only. Ansoff’s
premise has maintained that given the environmental conditions, the firm must 117
establish the appropriate strategic aggressiveness and managerial responsiveness.
Metaphorically, you have to dress for the occasion and the weather.

Configuration school
Lastly, this school of thought is broader and integrative since it considers on one hand
organizations as a collection of attributes and behaviours but also integrates the
suggestions of other schools. For example, the positioning school explores the changes
within an industry; hence, changes are incremental, thus, this represents one
configuration. On the other hand, an entrepreneurial setting suggests a transformative
approach, and therefore, a different configuration. Consequently, the configuration
school provides the more integrative approach (Chandler, 1962; Miles and Snow, 1978;
Mintzebrg, 1979; Miller and Friesen, 1984).

Ansoff’s connection
The strategic diagnosis is precisely a tool that allows firms to configure their strategy
based on their specific external demands (stable to highly turbulent). Tables I-III clearly
indicate the options for firms not only to configure their strategy but also to develop an
optimal posture, again, based on the intensity of the external setting and whether the
firm has the corresponding managerial capability and strategic orientation. Hence,
Ansoff’s approach is about configuring continuously, thus confirming his basic premise
illustrated in his definition of the strategic diagnosis that each firm must consider
developing an in-house response mechanism to fit their needs.

Summary
Table IV summarizing the various schools of thought that represent the main stream in
“strategic thinking”. Table IV has summarized all the main authors in each school, base
disciplines (from where each approach derived), tools used (champions), and the
intended messages. In addition, Table IV indicates how Ansoff’s turbulence scale will
match each school of thought. Identifying the respective turbulence levels suggests
(based on Ansoff) the corresponding strategic orientation and organizational
responsiveness. Therefore, the most critical element in strategic design, perhaps, is
the capability of top management to have an acute knowledge of the complexity of an
organization’s environment, novelty of the challenges, rapidity of change, and degree
of future visibility (Ansoff’s basic elements constructing the turbulence scale).
Furthermore, the overriding theme in the strategy debate is the whether the “planning”
or “learning” approach is more effective.
In addition, Figure 1 shows the basic premise (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999) of the
strategy used in relation to external world vs the internal process. However, this does not
account for a critical factor: time. This is an important distinction in Ansoff’s work that
research has not explored adequately. For example, Figure 1 shows that when
JMH

Unpredictable,
confusing
17,1 Environmental Cognitive
Learning

Power (micro)

External world as…

118 Cultural

Configuration

Comprehensible, Power (macro)

controllable

Positioning
Design Entrepreneurial
Planning
Figure 1.
Rational Natural
Strategy formation
as many processes (from Internal process as …
Mintzberg and Lampel,
Source: Mintzberg et al. (2003). Printed and electronically reproduced
1999)
by permission of Pearson Education, Inc., Upper Saddle River, N.J

the external world is unpredictable and confusing, then the learning school is an
appropriate approach. However, when the environment is fast changing (function of t),
then there is no time for the company to “learn” or engage in lengthy political posturing
and then engage in effective change. A similar argument could be made for the cognitive
and power school of thought. Again, the time factor will determine the degree of
unpredictability and confusion (according to Mintzberg and Lampel) and establish the
required response. Hence, unpredictable environments require a corresponding
managerial aggressiveness and capability (Table II). Figure 2 shows an alternative
approach when considering that levels 1-3 are incremental and with the implication that
there is time to change; while levels 4-5 are characterized as fast paced, unpredictable,
and possess minimal or no time available.

Discussion
Table IV is an indication of Ansoff’s comprehensive approach to strategy
accommodating, potentially, a much wider range of schools of thought in strategy.
In his book Corporate Strategy (1965), Ansoff developed the prescriptions, however, his
later work and book on Implanting Strategic Management (1990) was instrumental in
providing organizations research-based methods to achieve the needed change. The
limitations of pages are restricting this paper to write only selective contributions of
Ansoff; however, he spent his last 30-35 years refining his basic premise as it was
developed in 1965 with concepts such as the diagnostic procedure (Ansoff et al.,
1974), organizational capability (Ansoff, 1978), applied theory of strategic behavior
(1979), strategic myopia (1984), and real-time response (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990;
Ansoff et al., 1980) are among the plethora of tools to facilitate strategy. His holistic
approach to strategy can only be characterized by ubiquity.
 Ansoff revisited
Environmental Environmental

Discontinuous
Entrepreneurial Entrepreneurial
Configuration Configuration
Cognitive Cognitive
External world as…

119

Environmental
Configuration
Incremental

Environmental
Learning
Entrepreneurial
Power
Configuration
Cultural
Cognitive
Positioning
Planning
Figure 2.
Levels 1-3 Levels 4-5 Strategy formation
Stable Creative as many processes
(Ansoff interface)
Internal process as …

The Economist (2008) praises Ansoff as one of the management gurus in a historical
series of strategic experts from Sun Tze and Machiavelli to the modern era. His
contributions to the field of strategy provide the intellectual domain for many strategy
thinkers to follow and espouse some of his basic premises to create not only an academic
discipline but a critical function in the corporate setting. Undeniably, organizations
today have incorporated his original thinking of strategic, operational, and
administrative work. His last major contribution was his 1990 book where he not
only provided the intellectual area but also unpublished empirical results point to a more
holistic and comprehensive work. For example, unpublished empirical results in
banking predicted which banks were underperforming because of the gaps between
environmental demands and internal capability and strategic aggressiveness; those
banks were forced to merge or close down (Lewis, 1989).
Lastly, when studying Ansoff’s work, it is evident after a while that it is a giant puzzle
that requires assembly to see the entire picture and how all the pieces work together. It is
a fairly large puzzle and any attempt to provide an assessment of the holistic picture of
strategic transformation without all the pieces is simply an incomplete attempt and
unjust to Ansoff’s approach and work. Moreover, Ansoff’s lack of any desire to
popularize his writings and provide a foundation to invite researchers and a wider body
of the academia to engage his thinking pushed his writings on the periphery of core
research agenda. Nevertheless, his approach to strategy from a holistic point of view and
the multiple tools provide a contingency approach to strategic solutions for everyone.
There is no universal prescription for success (Ansoff and Sullivan, 1993a, b); hence,
different success behaviours are required at different levels of turbulence.
Future research should continue on utilizing the strategic diagnosis not only to
further validation but also as a tool that facilitates the development of an optimal
strategic posture for future profitability. In addition, research on managerial perception
of environmental turbulence as a guiding post for strategic orientation will shed light
JMH into the psychology of top management as it relates to making decisions. The
17,1 environment (external settings – weather) is the same but top managers choose to follow
different paths of strategy; hence, managerial perception of success differs. Therefore,
additional research on what drives managers to perceive environmental turbulence as
fast or slow remains to be explored. Moreover, additional research is needed that focuses
exclusively on the Ansoff’s work on discontinuous settings (dynamic environments) in
120 order for academics to perceive Ansoff beyond the “planning” school of strategy.

Note
1. To avoid redundancy with references, the summary of Ansoff’s work is based on the
Corporate Strategy (1965) and Implanting Strategic Management (1990) (with McDonnell)
which are the most comprehensive works of Ansoff.

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Further reading
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management readiness: the relationship of environment-organization and performance”,
paper presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meeting, Chicago, IL.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1934), The Theory of Economic Development, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.

Corresponding author
Robert Moussetis can be contacted at: [email protected]

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