VOL.

358, MAY 24, 2001 199

Paña vs. Buyser

*
G.R. No. 130144. May 24, 2001.

MELECIA PAÑA and EMMANUEL TIGUMAN, petitioners, vs.

JUDGE FLORIPINAS C. BUYSER, Presiding Judge, Branch 30,
RTC, Surigao del Norte and Surigao City, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and the HEIRS OF JOSE JUANITE, SR. and JOSE
JUANITE, JR., respondents.
*
G.R. Nos. 130502-03. May 24, 2001.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

EMMANUEL TIGUMAN, MELECIA PAÑA, ROBERT BAYAN,
JOHN DOE, and EFREN PAÑA (Acquitted), accused.
EMMANUEL TIGUMAN and MELECIA PAÑA, accused-
appellants.

Criminal Procedure; Evidence; It is settled that the right to present

evidence is reserved to the State no less than to the accused; Rules of
evidence permit the use of considerable discretion by the trial courts in the
admission of rebuttal evidence.—Appellants, however, assail the admission
of the testimony of Pomoy, Jr. as rebuttal witness on the ground that the
prosecution had already rested its case. This is misleading, because in the
order of trial set by the rules, the parties may present rebuttal evidence. It is
settled that the right to present evidence is reserved to the State no less than
to the accused. The rules of evidence permit the use of considerable
discretion by the trial courts in the admission of rebuttal evidence. It cannot
be said that the trial court abused its discretion in this respect, where the
defendant is not taken by surprise and is not prevented from introducing
evidence in sur-rebuttal.
Same; Same; Alibi; Appellant’s alibi is self-serving and his bare denial
is a negative declaration which deserves no consideration and cannot
prevail over the affirmative testimony which was corroborated by further
evidence.—Appellant Tiguman’s alibi is worthless in the face of his positive
identification by prosecution witnesses who have no motive to wrongly
accuse him of such ignominious crime. His alibi is self-serving and his bare
denial is a negative declaration which deserves no consideration and cannot
prevail over the affirmative testimony which was corroborated by further
evidence.

________________
 * EN BANC.

200

200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paña vs. Buyser

Same; Same; Witnesses; Testimonies of prosecution witnesses are given

weight and credence absent proof of ill will, or motive, to testify against the
accused.—Testimonies of prosecution witnesses are given weight and
credence absent proof of ill will, or motive, to testify against the accused.
Prosecution witnesses, Andy Acebedo, Elena Siaboc, Gemma Bacor are not
maliciously motivated to testify against appellant Paña. The latter herself
testified that there exists no misunderstanding between her and the witnesses
mentioned.
Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstance; Dwelling; Dwelling, or
morada, is aggravating when crime is committed in the dwelling of the
offended party and the latter has not given provocation.—Dwelling is also
aggravating considering that the assailants were in the sanctity of their own
home—which is perhaps the last bulwark of their safety. An Unsuspecting
knock on the door betrayed that trust of peace in the family who were only
conversing. Dwelling, or morada, is aggravating when crime is committed
in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given
provocation. Provocation in dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended
party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the commission of the crime. No
such provocation concurs herein.
Same; Same; Conspiracy; As long as the acquittal of a co-conspirator
does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, one defendant may be
found guilty of the offense.—Though conspiracy is a joint act, there is
nothing irregular if the supposed co-conspirator is acquitted and others
convicted. Generally, conspiracy is only a means by which a crime is
committed as the mere act of conspiring is not by itself punishable. Hence, it
does not follow that one person alone cannot be convicted when there is
conspiracy. As long as the acquittal of a co-conspirator does not remove the
basis of a charge of conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the
offense.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Surigao City, Br. 30.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
     Dollfuss R. Go & Associates Law Office for E. Tiguman and
Paña.
     Noel Catre for heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.

201

VOL. 358, MAY 24, 2001 201

 Paña vs. Buyser

BUENA, J.:

For a simple land dispute, father and son were sprayed with bullets
right in their own house by some goons for hire. The culprits were
Jose Bilboro Pomoy, Jr.,. alias “Robert Bayan,” accused-appellants
Emmanuel Tiguman, a.k.a. “Manny,” and Melecia Paña, alias
“Meling,” and a certain John Doe. Pomoy pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense of homicide. Appellants Tiguman and Paña, who were
convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the trial court, filed
with this Court a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, docketed as
G.R. No. 130144, imputing grave abuse of discretion to the lower
court in convicting them. Since their conviction is on automatic
review due to the penalty imposed, docketed as G.R. Nos. 130502- 1
03, this Court treated their petition for certiorari as an appeal.
On December 10, 1993, Jose Juanite, Sr. and his son Jose Juanite,
Jr. were in their residence in San Pedro, Alegria, Surigao del Norte
conversing with members of their family. When someone knocked
on the door, ten-year old Teotimo Questo, Jr. opened it. Upon
opening the door, a man suddenly burst in and fired at Jose Juanite,
Sr. His son, Jose Juanite, Jr., rushed towards the door to close it but
he was shot from the window by another man. The gunshot wounds
sustained by both father and son caused their instantaneous deaths.
This incident led to the filing of two (2) criminal informations for
murder against appellant Tiguman, accused
2
Pomoy, Jr. and one John
Doe. Subsequently, the informations were amended to in-

______________________

1Supreme Court Resolution dated September 8, 1997; See Rollo of G.R. 130144.
2The separate information reads:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4232

“That at 6:30 o’clock in the evening of December 10, 1993 at San Pedro, Alegria, Surigao del
Norte, Philippines, the above named accused with full freedom, intelligence and criminal intent
to kill, conniving, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and feloni-ously shoot with a long arm JOSE JUANITE,
JR. just immediately

202

202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paña vs. Buyser

clude spouses Efren and appellant Paña, as principals by

inducement.

_____________________
 after he had closed the door, by Robert Bayan who was stationed at the window
while Manny Tiguman was yet behind the front door and John Doe was outside the
house as guard and armed with a long arm, thus hitting Jose Juanite, Jr. thereby
inflicting the following injuries upon him to wit:

a. Penetrating wound 2 cm diameter at posterior axillary area with smooth

edges, (+) powder burns
b. Penetrating wound 1 cm diameter at upper third right arm with smooth edges
c. Triangular wound about 7 cm x 7 cm x 8 cm (base) at anterior axillary area,
serrated edges, (+) powder burns piercing toward wounds a & b
d. Penetrating wound about 0.7 cm at posterolateral right upper third arm thru
& thru to 1.5 cm diameter wound piercing only the skin.”

which resulted to his untimely instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs by
way of actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages in the total amount to be
established during trial.
“Accused Efren Paña and Melecia Paña alias Meling Paña are included as accused in this
case for being the mastermind and therefore principal by inducement because on Dec 8, 1993 at
11:00 o’clock in the evening they were the ones who proposed to Manny Tiguman, Robert
Bayan and two companions that Jose Juanite be killed for a prize.
“Contrary to law with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and the aggravating
circumstance of superior strength, dwelling, nighttime crime committed with armed men to
insure impunity, evident premeditation and for a price, reward or promise. “Surigao City,
December 27, 1993.”

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4233

“That on or about December 10, 1993 at 6:30 o’clock in the evening more or less at Brgy.
San Pedro, Municipality of Alegria, Province of Surigao del Norte, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused with full freedom, intelligence,
and criminal intent to kill, conniving, con-

203

VOL. 358, MAY 24, 2001 203

Paña vs. Buyser

Upon arraignment appellants Tiguman and the spouses Paña pleaded

not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial ensued.
Pomoy, Jr. was arrested only after the prosecution has rested its
case. When he was arraigned, he initially pleaded not guilty to the
separate charges of murder. Later however, his motion to plead
guilty to the lesser offense of homicide was granted for which he
was convicted. The trial court issued an order sentencing Pomoy, Jr.
to suffer for each case the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months
3
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
medium, as maximum.
After trial, judgment was rendered by the lower court convicting
appellant Tiguman, as principal by direct participation, and appellant
Paña, as principal by inducement, for the crime of murder and
sentenced each of them to death. However, the trial court acquitted
appellant Paña’s husband Efren Paña for insufficiency of

_____________________

spiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, criminally, feloniously shoot with his sidearm JOSE JUANITE, SR. by accused
Manny Tiguman while accused Robert Bayan stationed himself by the window and John Doe
was outside the house of said Jose Juanite, acting as guard, thereby hitting the latter on his face
and chest thus causing his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs by way
of actual, moral, compensatory and exemplary damages.
“Accused Efren Paña and Melecia Paña alias Meling Paña are included as accused in this
case for being the mastermind and therefore principal by inducement because on Dec 8, 1993 at
11:00 o’clock in the evening they were the ones who proposed to Manny Tiguman, Robert
Bayan and two companions that Jose Juanite be killed for a prize.
“Contrary to law with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and superior strength and the
aggravating circumstances that the crime was committed in the dwelling of offended party,
nighttime which facilitate the commission of the crime, with aid of armed men who insured
impunity, that the crime was committed in consideration of a price, reward or promise and
evident premeditation. “Surigao City, December 27, 1993. (records, p. 1)”

3 RTC Joint Judgment [Branch 30, Surigao City] dated November 14, 1996 penned
by Judge Melchor M. Libarnes, records, pp. 306-307.

204

204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paña vs. Buyser

evidence.
4
The dispositive portion of the court a quo’s decision
reads:

“WHEREFORE, finding the accused Emmanuel (Manny) Tiguman and

Melecia Paña GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in both cases as principals
[Emmanuel (Manny) Tiguman, by direct participation; Melecia Paña, by
inducement] in the crimes of MURDER qualified by treachery, defined and
penalized in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
6 of Republic Act No. 7659, and after considering against them the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, dwelling and price or
reward, this Court hereby imposes upon each one of the said accused the
penalty of DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION in each of these cases; and,
to pay the costs.
“The accused Emmanuel (Manny) Tiguman and Melecia Paña are hereby
ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of Jose Juanite, Sr. and
Jose Juanite, Jr., respectively in the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos, for the death of each of the aforenamed deceased; actual damages in
the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150,000.00) pesos; and, moral
damages of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos, for both
deceased.
“Pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated
January 20, 1992, the bail bond posted for the provisional liberty of the
accused Melecia Paña is hereby ordered CANCELLED and said accused
shall be placed in confinement, pending resolution of her automatic appeal.
“Let the records of these cases be transmitted to the Supreme Court for
automatic review.
“Relative to the accused Efren Paña, he is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of Murder, charged in each of the herein informations, for
insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond, therefore, posted for his
provisional liberty is hereby ordered RELEASED.
“In regard to the accused John Doe, let Criminal Case No. 4232 be
ARCHIVED, subject to be revived as soon as said accused is identified and
apprehended.
“SO ORDERED.”

____________________

4 RTC Decision [Branch 30, Surigao City] dated July 9, 1997 penned by Judge
Floripinas C. Buyser, records, pp. 434-459, pp. 458-459.

205

VOL. 358, MAY 24, 2001 205

Paña vs. Buyser

Sought for before us is the reversal of the foregoing decision on the

5
grounds that the trial court committed errors—

“1. when it convicted the appellants in the absence of evidence

that would prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
“2. when it admitted the testimony of accused Jose Bilboro
Pomoy, Jr. alias Robert Bayan as evidence in chief during
the rebuttal stage of the trial;
“3. when it ignored the evidence for the defense which has
clearly wrecked that of the prosecution’s, just like the Walls
of Jericho;
“4. when it imposed the death penalty without authority of law.

After a careful and thorough perusal of the evidence on record, the

court is convinced that the prosecution had discharged its burden by
proving appellants’ guilt with the requisite quantum of6 evidence in
criminal cases which is proof beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no doubt as to appellant Tiguman’s direct participation.
He was the principal triggerman who shot Jose Juanite, Sr. to death
since he was positively identified by Maria Elena Juanite who was
present at the scene when the shooting happened. According to
Maria Elena, who is the daughter and sister of the victims, at around
6:30 in the evening of December 10, 1993, when knocks on the door
were heard, her brother Juanite, Jr. requested the young Questo, Jr.
to open the door. Upon opening the door, appellant Tiguman went
inside and shot Juanite, Sr. without warning. When her brother Jose
Juanite, Jr. rushed to close the door, Pomoy, Jr., who was positioned
outside the house of the Juanites, fired at Jose, Jr. from the window.
 Moreover, appellant Tiguman’s participation in the killing was
affirmed in open court by no less than his co-accused Pomoy, Jr.
who pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of homicide. According to the

___________________

5 Rollo, pp. 93-94.

6 Rule 133, Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt.—In a criminal case, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

206

206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paña vs. Buyser

latter, he was an informer of appellant Tiguman. He also testified

how appellant Paña solicited
7
appellant Tiguman, a scout ranger of
the Philippine Army, to kill the Juanites for some monetary
consideration. The plan to kill was hatched in the house of the Paña
spouses in their presence. Pomoy, Jr. described in detail that the plan
to kill the victims was on account of a land dispute and that money
was paid by appellant Paña to appellant Tiguman to accomplish the
task. The killing was facilitated with the aid of two (2) ojther men
unknown to him but were known to appellant Tiguman. After killing
the victims, Pomoy, Jr. left the place and settled in Parañaque, Metro
8
Manila upon the advice of appellant Tiguman. Pomoy, Jr. narrated
their evil design to the minutest detail, facts which could not have
been known except only to the parties and their co-conspirators. All
the more this lends credence to the truth that appellants were indeed
the culprits behind the fatal shooting.
Appellants, however, assail the admission of the testimony of
Pomoy, Jr. as rebuttal witness on the ground that the prosecution had
already rested its case. This is misleading, because in the order of
9
trial set by the rules, the parties may present rebuttal evidence. It is
settled that the right to present evidence is reserved to the

__________________

7 TSN, July 9, 1996, p. 6.

8 Records, pp. 311-314.
9 Rule 119, Section 3. Order of trial.—The trial shall proceed in the following
order:

(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper
case, the civil liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any,
arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case.
 (c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the
court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue.
(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for
decision unless the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit
memoranda.
(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial
may be modified accordingly.

207

VOL. 358, MAY 24, 2001 207

Paña vs. Buyser

10
State no less than to the accused. The rules of evidence permit the
use of considerable discretion by the trial courts in the admission of
rebuttal evidence. It cannot be said that the trial court abused its
discretion in this respect, where the defendant is not taken by
surprise and 11
is not prevented from introducing evidence in
surrebuttal.
In any case, assuming that the testimonies of prosecution witness
Maria Elena Juanite and rebuttal witness Pomoy, Jr., are
inadmissible in evidence, the culpability of appellant Tiguman was
clearly established by the positive identification of other prosecution
witnesses.
Testifying for the prosecution, the 10-year old Questo, Jr., was
actually present with the Juanites at the time the shooting happened.
He testified that prior to the shooting, he saw appellants Tiguman,
Pomoy, Jr. and an unidentified person on December 10, 1993,
between 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening, in the waiting shed of Purok 5,
Barangay San Pedro, Alegria, Surigao del Norte, carrying a sack
from where the muzzles of firearms were protruding. The young
boy, on the witness stand declared and positively identified appellant
Tiguman as the person who suddenly shot Juanite, Sr. in the latter’s
12
house. Another prosecution witness, Arturo Balesteros, testified
that moments after he heard gunshots coming from the residence of
the Juanites, he saw Manny Tiguman pass by, coming from the
direction of the Juanite house.
Against such overwhelming evidence, appellant Tiguman could
only offer denial and alibi as his defenses which are inherently weak
13
and unreliable. He claims that at the time of the incident on that
fatal night, he was in Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City,
which is a neighboring city of the province of Surigao del Norte.
Appellant Tiguman’s
14
alibi is worthless in the face of his positive
identification by prosecution witnesses who have no mo-

__________________________

10 People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947).

11 United States vs. Razon and Tayag, 37 Phil. 856 (1918).
 12 TSN, January 18, 1995, p. 42.
13 People vs. Cortes, 226 SCRA 91 (1993).
14 People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 (1995); People vs. Lozano, 296 SCRA 403
(1998).

208

208 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paña vs. Buyser

tive to wrongly accuse him of such ignominious crime. His alibi is

self-serving and his bare denial is a negative declaration which
deserves no consideration and cannot prevail over the affirmative
15
testimony which was corroborated by further evidence. Another
prosecution witness, Graciano Madelo, a driver in the ricemill of a
certain engineer in the locality, testified that appellant Tiguman was
present in Alegria, Surigao del Norte on the day the Juanites were
killed. In fact, Madelo was tasked by Manny Tiguman to drive for
him to pick up Pomoy, Jr. and their unidentified companion. These
threads of events form a chain of circumstantial evidence which
when taken together, clearly established the presence of appellant
Tiguman in the crime scene. The record is bereft of evidence that
these witnesses were motivated by ill considerations and intent,
16
hence their testimony is given full probative value.
The other appellant, “Meling” Paña, was convicted below as
principal by inducement. Prosecution evidence showed that
appellant Paña had motive to kill the Juanites because of a land
dispute. It appears that spouses Juanites filed an agrarian case
against Efren Paña, husband of accused-appellant who was acquitted
17
in said case, together with other people. When judgment was
rendered in favor of spouses Juanite, the spouses Paña harbored a
grudge against the Juanites. Prosecution witness Anita Sanchez, wife
of Macario Sanchez, who was one of the respondents in the DARAB
case, testified that appellant Paña went to her house several times for
financial assistance in order to “liquidate” Jose Juanite, Sr. Sanchez
subsequently learned that the Juanites were shot to death.
The domestic helper of the Juanites, Elena Siaboc, testified that
appellant Paña requested from her pictures of the victims which she
obliged by giving them to appellant Paña. This shows that the killing
of the Juanites was conceived by appellant Paña. Since

_____________________

15 People vs. Ranido, 351 Phil. 610; 288 SCRA 369 (1998).
16 People vs. Merza, 238 SCRA 283 (1994); People vs. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624
(1995); People vs. Hubilla, Jr., 252 SCRA 471 (1996).
17 The other respondents in the agrarian case were Edilberto Romero, Felisa
Mercado, Macario Sanchez, and Pio Yonson (Department of Agrarian Reform
Decision dated October 28, 1993, records, pp. 513-516).

209
 VOL. 358, MAY 24, 2001 209
Paña vs. Buyser

appellant Tiguman could not have known the victims, a picture was
necessary to identify the targets.
Andy Acebedo, neighbor of spouses Paña likewise testified in
court that on December 8, 1993 he saw Pomoy, Jr., accused-
appellant Tiguman, pass by and proceed to the house of the Pañas.
When he followed them, he overheard accused-appellant Paña
telling accused-appellant Tiguman, Pomoy, Jr., and two persons
unknown to him, to kill Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jr.
Prosecution witness Gemma Bacor, whose house is located just
across the house of the Juanites, testified that on that fateful night,
while watching television, she heard gunfire. She opened the door of
her house and saw two persons in the street carrying firearms. Bacor
further testified that on January 2, 1994, the Paña spouses invited her
to their residence and asked her to execute an affidavit to the effect
that what she saw on that night were only children and not adults.
Such invitation to execute a misleading statement is an indicia of
guilt to silence a living witness to their horrible deed, and perpetrate
an injustice to the poor victims of their greed.
Testimonies of prosecution witnesses are given weight and
credence absent proof of ill will, or motive, to testify against the
accused. Prosecution witnesses, Andy Acebedo, Elena Siaboc,
Gemma Bacor are not maliciously motivated to testify against
appellant Paña. The latter herself testified that there exists no
misunderstanding between her and the witnesses mentioned.
In this case, no reason appears for the Court to disregard the trial
court’s assessments, to wit:

“In summary, insofar as the accused Melecia Paña is concerned, there is

proof beyond reasonable doubt that, as a result of the adverse DARAB
decision dated October 28, 1993, motive exists on the part of said accused to
cause the killing of Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.; that, on November
25, 1993, the accused Melecia Paña procured pictures of the said victims
from prosecution witness Elena Siaboc; that, in the evening of December 8,
1993, the accused Melecia Paña, Emmanuel (Manny) Tiguman, Jose
Bilboro Pomoy, Jr. a.k.a. Robert Bayan, and a certain Glen and Nonoy met
in the Paña residence and there, they planned the killing of the Juanites,
during which occasion the accused Melecia Paña instructed Manny
Tiguman and Robert Bayan, thus: ‘That is all, ha? You will kill Jose Juanite,
Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.’; that the

210

210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paña vs. Buyser

accused Melecia Paña handed the money to Manny Tiguman, saying: ‘Here
is the money. This is one-half of the total price, “bahala na nimo”(it is up to
you)’; and that, on January 2, 1994, the accused Melecia Paña and her
husband, Efren Paña, invited prosecution witness Gemma Bacor to the
former’s residence and there, the Paña spouses convinced the latter to
execute an affidavit that would declare that the persons, whom Gemma
Bacor saw passing by her residence in the evening of December 10, 1993,
after she heard gunshots, were children and not adults, contrary to what
Gemma Bacor had actually seen.
“From the facts thus proven, there is no doubt that the accused Melecia
Paña induced her co-accused Emmanuel [Manny] Tiguman and Jose
Bilboro Pomoy, Jr. (Robert Bayan) to kill Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite,
Jr. in the evening of December 10, 1993, at San Pedro, Alegria, Surigao del
18
Norte.”

The trial court ruled that the crime committed was murder after
finding that the killings were attended by treachery, evident
premeditation, dwelling and price or reward. Only one aggravating
circumstance is enough to qualify the killing to murder, the rest
constitute generic aggravating circumstances. We agree with the trial
court that treachery was proven since the “attack was sudden,
unexpected, without warning, and without giving the victims an
opportunity to defend themselves or repel the aggression, as in fact
the deceased did not sense any danger that they would be shot by the
assailants
19
as there was no grudge and misunderstanding between
them.” Dwelling is also aggravating considering that the assailants
were in the sanctity of their own home—which is perhaps the last
bulwark of their safety. An unsuspecting knock on the door betrayed
that trust of peace in the family who were only conversing.
Dwelling, or morada, is aggravating when crime is committed in the
20
dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given
21
provocation. Provocation in dwelling must be: (a) given by the
offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the com-

_______________________

18 RTC Decision, p. 25; rollo, pp. 43-68.

19 Ibid., p. 13.
20 People vs. Riglos, G.R. No. 134763, September 4, 2000, 339 SCRA 562, En
Banc—per curiam.
21 People vs. Caisip, 290 SCRA 451 (1998), People vs. Feliciano, 326 Phil. 719;
256 SCRA 706 (1996).

211

VOL. 358, MAY 24, 2001 211

Paña vs. Buyser

22
mission of the crime. No such provocation concurs herein. With
respect to evident premeditation, the hiring of Tiguman to kill the
victims for a price, providing the victims’ picture and the meeting to
carry out the killing provide more than sufficient evidence to
appreciate the same. As to the circumstance of price or reward, it
can only be appreciated against appellant Tiguman since it was he
who committed the felonious act for money. The same evidence on
price established conspiracy 23between the appellants. Consequently
the act of one is the act of all.
The fact that the husband of appellant Paña, one of the alleged
conspirators or inducers in the killing, was acquitted of the charges
does not put to doubt appellant’s culpability. Though conspiracy is a
joint act, there is nothing irregular if the supposed co-conspirator is
acquitted and others convicted. Generally, conspiracy is only a
means by which a crime is committed as the mere act of conspiring
is not by itself punishable, Hence, it does not follow that one person
alone cannot be convicted when there is conspiracy. As long as the
acquittal of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of
24
conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.
Murder committed 25
in 1993 is penalized with reclusion temporal
maximum to death. Under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code,
when only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission
of the act, the maximum period shall be imposed, and whatever may
be the number and nature of the aggravating circumstances, the
courts may not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law
in its maximum period. Considering however, the proscription in the
1987 Constitution on the imposition of death penalty as well as the
non-retroactive application of the restored death penalty, the trial
court erred in imposing on appellants Tiguman and Paña the death
penalty. The crimes in this case were

___________________

22 People vs. Rios, G.R. No. 132632, June 19, 2000, 333 SCRA 823.
23 People vs. Ordoño, G.R. No 132154, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 673.
24 People vs. Arlalejo, G.R. No. 127841, June 16, 2000, 333 SCRA 604, citing US
vs. Remegio, 37 Phil. 599 (1918).
25 People vs. Mindanao, G.R. No. 123095, July 6, 2000, 335 SCRA 2000.

212

212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Paña vs. Buyser

committed prior to 26the restoration of the Death Penalty Law on

December 31, 1993.
With respect to the monetary awards, the civil indemnity of
P50,000.00 awarded to each of the heirs of the two victims, as well
as the additional P50,000.00 as moral damages each, are proper. The
civil indemnity is automatically granted to the offended party or his
heirs in the case of death, without need of further evidence other
than the fact of the commission27 of the crime and the accused-
appellants’ culpability therefor. On the actual damages of
P150,000.00 awarded28 by the court a quo, the same lack evidentiary
basis on the records. No receipt or any document was presented in
support thereof. Nonetheless, the amount of P15,000.00 as temperate
29
damages would suffice in lieu of the unproven burial expenses. In
addition to such monetary awards, P50,000.00 as exemplary
 damages should have also 30 been granted considering the presence of
aggravating circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that each appellant is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of two counts each of Reclusion Perpetua, and
are ordered to SOLIDARILY pay each of the heirs of the victims the
civil indemnity of P50,000.00, another P50,000.00 each as moral
damages, an additional P50,000.00 per victim as exemplary
damages, and P15,000.00 each as temperate damages.

____________________

26 Effectivity of Death Penalty Law (R.A. 7659) December 31, 1993; People vs.
Medina, 300 SCRA 98 (1998), citing People vs. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994).
27 People vs. Pedroso, G.R. No. 125128, July 19, 2000, 336 SCRA 163.
28 People vs. Sanchez, 308 SCRA 264 (1999).
29 People vs. De la Tongga, G.R. No. 133246, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 687 citing
Article 2224 of the Civil Code that temperate damages may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the
nature of the case, be proved with certainty.
30 People vs. Rios, G.R. No. 132632, June 19, 2000, 333 SCRA 823; People vs.
Tañeza, G.R. No. 121668, June 20, 2000, 334 SCRA 30.

213

VOL. 358, MAY 24, 2001 213

People vs. Geraban

SO ORDERED.

          Davide, Jr., (C.J.), Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr.
and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
     Bellosillo, Melo and Kapunan, JJ., On leave.

Judgment affirmed with modification.

Note.—Once conspiracy is proven the act of one is the act of all.

(People vs. Marcelino, 316 SCRA 104 [1999])

——o0o——

© Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.