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The Lawyer's Digest: Supreme Court Judgments

passed in September 2020
A summary of Judgments passed by the Supreme Court in September, 2020.

Supreme Court Lawyers Digest

Samith Subhro Prokas Sahil Abhinav

,  ,  , 
Sagaranahalli Mukherjee Tagotra Hansaraman

Published on : 17 Nov, 2020 , 11:29 am

The Lawyer's Digest is a collection of concise summaries of all the judgments passed by the
Supreme Court of India over the course of a month.
Topics have been sub-divided into areas of law including arbitration, criminal law, consumer
law, service and administrative law, etc. for ease of reading.

Here are the summaries of judgments passed in September 2020.

Arbitration

In Government of India v. Vedanta Limited and Others, a three judge Bench held as follows:

1. The time period for ling a petition for enforcement of the foreign award would be three
years and governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act 1963

2. There was a difference between the seat court exercising its powers of setting aside an
award under Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law and an enforcement court exercising
its powers of refusal to enforce under Article V of the New York Convention

3. While the seat court will judge the award on the basis of public policy prevailing in the
seat court (curial law), the enforcing court will apply public policy as prevalent within the
latter’s territorial jurisdiction, unin uenced by the former court’s observations.

4. Para 76.4 of Reliance (2014) 7 SCC 603 was obiter.

The Bench further reiterated that there could be four laws governing an arbitration: law
governing the contract, law governing the arbitration agreement, curial law and lex fori.
[Key Words: BALCO v. Kaiser (2012) 9 SCC 552, public policy, limitation period, substantive
law of arbitration agreement, Sumitomo, New York Convention, Production Sharing
Contract, comity of nations, curial law, Renusagar 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644] [Coram: S. Abdul
Nazeer, J., Indu Malhotra, J., Aniruddha Bose, J.]

In Balasore Alloys Limited v. Medima LLC, following Olympus Superstructures (1999) 5

SCC 651, the Court held that when there are two different arbitration clauses in two
related agreements between the same parties, the Court ought to harmonise both the
clauses and the parties should get the disputes resolved under the main agreement. [Key
Words: ICC Tribunal, anti-arbitration injunction, Sections 11(6) and 11(12)(a) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996] [Coram: S.A. Bobde, CJI., A.S. Bopanna, J., V.
Ramasubramanian, J.]

Criminal Law
In Anwar Ali v. Himachal Pradesh, the Supreme Court held that where the Trial Court has
appreciated all evidence on record and there was no perversity, the High Court could not
intervene and reverse an order of acquittal. The Court, relying on Suresh Chandra Bahri
1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 held that if motive is proved in the case of murder, it would supply a
link in the chain of circumstantial evidence. The absence of the same is not a ground for
acquittal. However, the Court noted that the absence of motive in a case depending on
circumstantial evidence is a factor which weighs in favour of the accused. [Key Words:
Reversal of acquittal, grounds for interference] [Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R. Subhash
Reddy, J.,M.R. Shah J.]

In Abhilasha v. Parkash & Ors., the Court stated that a Hindu unmarried daughter was
entitled to claim maintenance from her father under Section 125, CrPC only till she attains
majority. She is entitled to maintenance as a major only if she can she plead and prove that
she is unable to maintain herself. [Key Words: Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions and
Maintenance Act 1956, Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986]
[Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R. Subash Reddy, J., M. R. Shah, J.]

In Jeet Ram v. The Narcotics Control Bureau, Chandigarh, while dismissing the appeal
against the order of the High Court where the latter disagreed with the Trial Court’s
acquittal of the accused-appellant, the Bench held that it is always open for the appellate
court to re-appreciate evidence on which the acquittal was founded and further that
appellate courts were vested with the powers to review and come to their own conclusion.
The Bench further held that when an accused offers false answers under Section 313, CrPC,
the same could be used against him and the onus was on him to explain the possession of
narcotics. It was found that the accused-appellant had physical control over charas and that
he had the knowledge of its presence and character. [Key Words: Sections 30, 50, 54 of
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985] [Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R.
Subhash Reddy, J., M.R. Shah, J.]

In Jugut Ram v. The State of Chhattisgarh, the Court altered the conviction from Section
302, IPC to Section 304, Part II IPC on the ground that a lathi was a common item carried by
a villager in India and “linked to his identity” and that the fact that “it is also capable of being
used as a weapon of assault, does not make it a weapon of assault simpliciter”. It held that in
the facts before it where there was an assault on the head, it was a question of fact as to
whether there was an intention to cause death or only knowledge that death was likely to
occur. It held that the acts did not amount to murder as the accused-appellant was also
injured in the process and the ght plainly erupted in the heat of the moment. [Key Words:
Virsa Singh v. The State of Punjab 1958 SCR 1495, premeditation] [Coram: R.F. Nariman, J.,
Navin Sinha, J., Indira Banerjee, J.]

In Neetu Kumar Nagaich v. The State of Rajasthan and Others, the Bench noted that while
the closure report noted the death as a homicidal death, it could not ascertain the offenders.
This was despite the fact that the State had earlier repeatedly stated that the death was
accidental. Holding that the entire investigation and the closure report lacked bona des,
the Supreme Court noted that justice required a de novo investigation to sustain society’s
con dence in rule of law. Thus, the closure report was set aside and a de novo investigation
directed “to be headed by a senior police of cer of the State consisting of ef cient
personnel well conversant with use of modern investigation technology also” and that “..no
of cer who was part of the investigating team leading to the closure report shall be part of
the team conducting de novo investigation”. [Key Words: NLU Jodhpur, student, murder,
inquest proceedings, Sections 173(8) and 174 CrPC, fair investigation, Article 21, de novo
investigation] [Coram: R.F. Nariman, J., Navin Sinha, J., Indira Banerjee, J.]

In Stalin v. State represented by the Inspector of Police, the challenge was to the
conviction of the Appellant in an offence under Section 302, IPC. Notice was issued on a
limited point as to whether the accused had been rightly convicted under Section 302, or
whether he ought to have been convicted for any lesser offence, viz. Section 304, Part II,
IPC. Although the Court held that there is no hard and fast rule that cases of single injury
cannot attract Section 302, IPC, in the facts of the present case, the accused was sitting with
his friends in a beer party, and in a scuf e arising in the heat of passion, he stabbed the
deceased with a knife. The Court ultimately held that the offence would fall under Section
304, Part I, IPC, and not under Part II thereof. [Key words: Culpable homicide not amounting
to murder] [Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R. Subhash Reddy, J., M.R. Shah, J.]

In Maheshwar Tigga v. Jharkhand, the Court held that in the absence of positive evidence
regarding the age of the prosecutrix, the possibility of her being above the age of eighteen
cannot be ruled out and that the bene t of doubt must be given to the appellant. The Court
also reiterated that circumstances not put to an accused under Section 313, CrPC cannot be
used against him and must be excluded from consideration. The Court also held that a delay
of 4 years in lodging an FIR, 7 days prior to the appellant solemnizing his marriage with
another woman raised doubts about the truth and veracity of allegations. The Court also
held that for Section 90, IPC to apply, the misconception of fact has to be temporally
proximate to the occurrence and cannot be spread over 4 years. Relying on Dhruvaram
Murlidhar AIR 2019 SC 327, the Court held that where the accused and the prosecutrix
engaged in physical relations but could not marry due to the fact of belonging to different
castes, the accused could not be punished for rape. [Key Words: Sections 323, 342, 376 IPC,
313 CRPC] [Coram: RF Nariman, J., Navin Sinha, J., Indira Banerjee, J.]

In Ashoo Surendranath Tewari v. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, EOW, CBI, the
Appellant was discharged from the penal offences pertaining to the diversion of funds. This
was done relying on the principle laid down in para 38 of Radheshyam Kejriwal (2011) 3
SCC 581 that in case of exoneration, however, on merits where the allegation is found to be
not sustainable at all and the person held innocent, criminal prosecution on the same set of
facts and circumstances cannot be allowed to continue, the underlying principle being the
higher standard of proof in criminal cases. [Key words: threshold of evidence, sanction for
prosecution] [Coram: R.F. Nariman, J., Navin Sinha, J., Indira Banerjee, J.]

In Satish @ Sabbe v. Uttar Pradesh, the Court held that the length of the sentence or the
gravity of the original crime cannot be the sole basis for refusing premature release and that
the assessment regarding predilection to commit a crime on release must be based on
antecedents, the conduct of prisoner in jail, and not merely on age and apprehensions of the
victims and witnesses. [Key Words: Grounds for refusing premature release] [Coram: NV
Ramana, J., Surya Kant. J., Hrishikesh Roy, J.]

In Rizwan Khan v. State of Chattisgarh, the challenge was to the Appellant’s conviction of 5
years RI and Rs. 25,000 ne for the offence under Section 20(b)(ii)(B) of the Narcotic Drugs
and Psycotropic Substances Act, having been found in possession of 20 kg of ganja. The
Court held that there was no law that the evidence of the police of cials, unless supported
by independent evidence, is to be discarded. In terms of Pradeep Kumar (2018) 13 SCC 808,
and Surinder Kumar (2020) 2 SCC 563, it is clear that the testimony of the of cial witness
cannot be rejected on the ground on non-corroboration by an independent witness,
particularly when the police witnesses are found to be reliable and trustworthy. The
conviction of the Appellant was, therefore, upheld. [Key words: Police witness, Independent
Witness, NDPS Act] [Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R. Subhash Reddy, J., M.R. Shah, J.]

In M/s Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Prasad Vassudev Keni, Etc. Etc., the
proceedings arose out of two criminal complaints led by the Appellants against the
Respondents under Sections 340 and 195 of the CrPC in respect of offences alleged under
Sections 191 and 192 of the IPC. The Court reinstated the complaints in their original form
so that they are proceeded with, following the drill of Sections 195 and 340, CrPC. A
question further arose whether the “forging” of the debit notes can be said to attract the
provisions of these Sections. It was held that even if all the averments made in the two
complaints were put aside (which clearly attract the provisions of Sections 191 and 192,
IPC), and only the debit notes that are said to have been “created” by the Respondents are
seen, it is clear that the debit notes were not “false documents” under Section 464 of the
IPC, inasmuch they had not been made with the intention of causing it to be believed that
they were made by or under the authority of some other person. Since this basic ingredient
of forgery itself was not made out, none of the sections that were sought to be relied upon
in Chapter XVIII of the IPC was held even prima facie attracted. [Key words: Forged debit
notes, false evidence, private complaints] [Coram: R.F. Nariman, J., Navin Sinha, J.]

In Ilangovan v. State of Tamil Nadu, the Appellant / accused challenged the judgment of the
Madras High Court whereby his appeal was partly allowed and his conviction was under
Section 302, IPC was modi ed into one under Section 304, Part II and the sentence was
reduced to ve years RI, instead of the earlier life imprisonment. The Appellant argued that
conviction based merely upon the testimonies of the relatives of the deceased was
erroneous and that he ought to have been granted bene t of doubt. Relying on Sudhakar v.
State (2018) 5 SCC 435, the Court rejected this argument. The second argument that the
bene t of doubt extended to his co-accused ought to have been extended to him as well was
also rejected on the basis of the ratio is Yanob Shaikh (2013) 6 SCC 428. Accordingly, the
judgment of the High Court was upheld [Key words: testimonies of the relatives of
deceased, nature and quality of evidence] [Coram: N.V. Ramana, J., S. Abdul Nazeer, J., Surya
Kant, J.]

In Subed Ali v. Assam, the Supreme Court, relying on Ramaswami Ayyangar (1976) 3 SCC
779, held that a person need not be actively involved in the physical activity of assault to be
convicted on the ground of common intention and that if the evidence displays a pre-
arranged plan and acting in concert, common intention can be inferred. [Key Words:
Common Intention] [Coram: RF Nariman, J., Navin Sinha, J., Indira Banerjee]

In National Alliance for People’s Movements v. Maharashtra, the Court held that the relief
of interim bail to undertrial and convicted prisoners due to COVID-19 is not a statutory
right but merely a humanitarian consideration and thus could not be availed as a matter of
right. The Court further held that the categorization of prisoners by High Power
Committees on the basis of the nature of the crime and length of punishment was not
arbitrary or unconstitutional. [Key Words: Bail for prisoners due to Covid] [Coram: SA
Bobde, J., AS Bopanna, J., V Ramasubramanian]
In Kaushik Chatterjee v. Haryana, in a transfer petition sought on the ground of lack of
territorial jurisdiction, the Court held that the difference between the jurisdiction of a
Court in civil and criminal cases is twofold:

1. The stage at which an objection as to jurisdiction can be raised is regulated in civil

proceedings by Section 21, CPC while there is no corresponding provisions in the CrPC.

2. In civil proceedings, a plaint can be returned under Order VII Rule 10 CPC at any stage of
the proceedings while in criminal proceedings, a limited power is available to a magistrate
under Section 201, CrPC to return a complaint. The power is limited in the sense that it is
available before taking cognizance and that the power is limited only to complaints and does
not include a police report.

The Court also held that if a magistrate not empowered by law to try an offender wrongly
tries him, such proceedings shall be void under Section 461 and such proceedings will not be
saved by Section 462. Relying on Sabir Ali AIR 1964 SC 1673 the Court held that Section
26(a) of CrPC is subject to other provisions of the Code. The Court concluded that
territorial jurisdiction must be established by evidence and that it cannot allow a transfer
petition even before evidence is marshalled.

[Key Words: Ss. 406, 408, 420, 120-B IPC, Territorial Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases, Ss. 461,
462 CrPC] [Coram: V Ramasubramanian, J.]

Constitutional Law

In Kerala v. RDS Project Ltd., the Supreme Court held that where a State Government
accepted the report of an Expert Committee on whether certain measures had to be taken
to repair a bridge, the State Government Committee cannot be said to have behaved
arbitrarily. [Key Words: Article 14, Arbitrariness] [Coram: RF Nariman, J., Navin Sinha, J.,
Indira Banerjee, J.]

Service Law and Administrative Law

In Madhya Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas, the Supreme Court held that a work-charged employee
who has been paid off a work-charged/contingency fund would be a permanent employee
but would not ipso facto enjoy the status of a regular employee. Therefore, the Court held
that his son was not entitled to compassionate appointment. Relying on Ram Naresh Rawat
(2017) 3 SCC 436, the Court held that the status of permanent employee would entitle one
only to a minimum of the pay-scale without any increments and not the bene ts of a regular
employee. [Key Words: Compassionate Appointment, Permanent and Regular employment]
[Coram: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J., Aniruddha Bose, J., Krishna Murari, J.]

In Rajasthan State Board Transport Corporation & Ors. v. Goverdhan Lal Soni & Anr.,
certain surplus employees of the closed Rajasthan Agro Industries Corporation were
absorbed in to the RSRTC. A procedure was laid down for the employees who wanted to opt
for the CPF Scheme, or the GPF and Pension Scheme. The Respondent opted for the
Pension Scheme. It was held that the Respondent having opted for pension, Regulation 43
of the Pension Regulations, 1989 read with Noti cation dated 12.02.1997 became
applicable. The Respondent was covered by the CPF Scheme in his erstwhile State
employment (where the employer deposits matching contribution). It was held that in terms
of Clause 11(b), the employee’s contribution shall go to the GPF account, and the employer’s
proportion to the Pension Fund. Nothing more was required to be done, and once the same
is done, it was the statutory obligation of the appellant to credit both the aforesaid
amounts, and calculate the pension after retirement accordingly. Thus, the claim of pension
by the Respondent was upheld. [Key words: Contributory Pension Scheme] [Coram: Ashok
Bhushan, J., K.M. Joseph, J.]

In Pravin Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., the challenge was to the order of dismissal of the
Appellant on charges of corruption and extra constitutional conduct while being employed
as a paramilitary of cer. Relying on BC Chaturvedi (1995) 6 SCC 749, it was re-emphasized
that the Constitutional Courts while exercising their powers of judicial review would not
assume the role of an appellate authority. It was held that the High Court was, thus, rightly
concerned more about the competence of the enquiry of cer and adherence to natural
justice, rather than verifying the appellant’s guilt through documents and statements.
Interestingly, the argument that the Enquiry Of cer (EO) putting his own questions to the
prosecution witness amounted to prosecutor becoming the judge, was rejected on the
ground that under Section 165, Evidence Act, the Judges have the power to ask any
question to any witness, and strict rules of evidence being inapplicable to disciplinary
proceedings, direct questioning by EO is often necessary to discover the truth. [Key words:
Scope of judicial review, disciplinary proceedings, fair trial, proportionality of punishment]
[Coram: N.V. Ramana, J., S. Abdul Nazeer, J., Surya Kant, J.].

Practice and Procedure

In a petition seeking the transfer of a divorce petition, the Court in Neetu Yadav v. Sachin
Yadav held that merely because the respondent’s brother was photographed with judicial
of cers at a public event, it did not cause any reason to believe that there was real likelihood
of bias and denied the transfer petition. [Key Words: Judicial Bias] [Coram: V.
Ramasubramanian]

Taxation

In Union of India v. GS Chatha Rice Mills, the Court held that with the publication of gazette
noti cations in the digital mode, the precise time of publication in the electronic mode is
signi cant and that noti cation 5/2019 issued under Section 8A of the Customs Tariff Act
1975 would not operate before it was published online. Therefore, the Court held that this
noti cation would not apply to transactions where the bill of entry was presented prior to
the publication of said noti cation. [Key Words: Delegated Legislation, Publication of
Noti cation in Gazette, Customs Tariff] [Coram: DY Chandrachud, Indu Malhotra, KM
Joseph]

In M/s L.R. Brothers Indo Flora Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, the Appellant
challenged the customs duty levied upon it on the sale of cut owers within the Domestic
Tariff Area (DTA). The Court held that on a combined reading of the Noti cation dated
18.05.2001 with the conditions laid down in the EXIM policy, it was clear that the ful lment
of the conditions prescribed therein were a condition precedent to become eligible to make
DTA sales. Resultantly, if goods were cleared in DTA sales in breach of the said conditions,
customs duty would be leviable, as if such goods were imported goods. [Key words : Section
28, Customs Act, 1962, Customs Duty] [Coram: A.M. Khanwilkar, J., Dinesh Maheshwari, J.]

In The Designated Authority & Ors. v. M/s The Andhra Petrochemicals Ltd., the challenge
was to three orders of the Telangana High Court relating to the question of imposition of
anti-dumping duty. Andhra Petro applied to the Central Government, seeking imposition of
anti-dumping duty on imports of normal Butanol or N-butyl alcohol originating in and
exported into India from Saudi Arabia. This application resulted in the initiation of an
investigation by the Designated Authority (D.A.) into the import of the subject articles from
Saudi Arabia. Setting aside the said orders, it was held that Section 9A of the Customs Tariff
Act clearly discloses an intent that investigations should be completed within pre-
determined time limits and the levy itself cannot be more than ve years, which may, after
due review in accordance with the prescribed procedure, before the expiry of the said
period, be extended by another period not more than ve years. These timelines are crucial
and the D.A. was duty bound to follow them. [Key words: Anti-dumping Duty, Investigation
by Designated Authority] [Coram: Arun Mishra, J., Vineet Saran, J., S. Ravindra Bhat, J.]

In Bangalore Club v. The Commissioner of Wealth Tax & Anr., the short question was
whether Bangalore Club was liable to pay wealth tax under the Wealth Tax Act. A sub
question was concerned the meaning of the expression “association of persons” in Section
21AA of the Act. It was held that Bangalore Club was a social club, whose objects make it
clear that persons who are banded together do not band together for any business purpose
or commercial purpose in order to make income or pro ts, as similarly set out in Cricket
Club of India v. Bombay Labour Union (1969) 1 SCR 600, referred to with approval in
Calcutta Club Ltd. (2019) 13 SCALE 474. The Court further held that Bangalore Club is an
association of persons and not the creation, by a person who is otherwise assessable, of one
among a large number of associations of persons without de ning the shares of the
members so as to escape tax liability. [Key words : Bangalore Club, Wealth Tax] [Coram: R.F.
Nariman, J., Navin Sinha, J., Indira Banerjee, J.]

In National Co-Operative Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Income Tax,

Delhi-V, the Supreme Court made a signi cant ruling in regard to intra-governmental
commercial disputes. Expressing its angst at nally deciding a 44-year old dispute, tt
observed that:

1. One of the main impediments of the two-tiered structure embedded in the

Administrative Mechanism for Resolution of CPSEs disputes (conceptualised to replace the
Permanent Machinery of Arbitration) was that the bureaucrats are reluctant to accept
responsibility of taking such decisions, due to the apprehension that their decision may be
called into question unnecessarily due to which there might be post-retirement
consequences.

2. Thus, it might be appropriate to have a committee of legal experts presided by a retired

Judge to give their “imprimatur” to the settlement so that the bureaucracy feels
indemni ed.

3. Mediation is an ef cient remedy and the subject matter of the Court’s angst was the lack
of mediation inter se the government authorities or government departments. It was noted
that India was a signatory to the Singapore Convention on Mediation.

4. The petition rate of the Revenue before the Supreme Court was 87.8%. To reduce the
number, it will be fruitful if the Central Public Sector Enterprises and the Revenue promote
a vibrant system of Advance Ruling.

5. The average rate of disposal of AAR applications was supposed to be 6 months but in
practice, it was about 4 years.

6. It was recommended to the GoI to consider the ef cacy of the advance tax ruling system
and make it more comprehensive as a tool for settlement of disputes rather than battling it
through different tiers. A council for Advance Tax Ruling based on the Swedish model and
New Zealand system may be a possible way forward.

7. In order to decide whether a particular source is business income, the notion of what is
the business activity has to be looked at, the activity having a “set purpose”. Further, the “…
fact that the appellant-Corporation does not carry on business activity for pro t motive is
not material as pro t making is not an essential ingredient on account of self-imposed and
innate restriction arising from the very statute which creates the appellant-Corporation
and the very purpose for which the appellant-Corporation has been set up”.

8. Further, the “…scheme of the IT Act requires the determination of ‘real income’ on the
basis of ordinary commercial principles of accountancy. To determine the ‘real income’,
permissible expenses are required to be set off” and that “every application of income
towards business objective of the appellant-Corporation is a business expenditure and
nothing else”.

[Key Word: Sections 37(1), 56, 245N(a) of the Income Tax Act 1961, National Cooperative
Development Corporation Act, capital receipt, real pro ts, commercial accountancy, docket
explosion, High Powered Committee, Electronics Corporation of India (2011) 332 ITR 58
(SC), certi cate cases, 126th Law Commission Report on “Government and Public Sector
Undertaking Litigation Policy and Strategies, National Litigation Policy, bureaucracy, AAR in
Sweden, USA, OECD countries, Direct Taxes Enquiry Committee, Authority for Advance
Ruling, Wanchoo Committee] [Coram: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J., Indu Malhotra, J.]

Land Revenue

In Shridhar C. Shetty v. The Addl. Collector and Competent Authority & Ors., the appellant
was aggrieved by the order of the High Court af rming the demand dated 15.10.2005 for
Rs. 51,97,196/ plus interest, penalty and recovery expenses as arrears of land revenue. The
demand was raised consequent to the failure of the appellant to handover seven tenements
to government nominees as required under the conditions of exemption granted under
Sections 20 and 21 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Setting aside the
impugned order, it was held that the demand for the market value of the remaining seven
tenements, falling outside the purview of the Act, cannot be construed as money due to the
Government so as to vest in it the nature of an arrears of land revenue recoverable under
Section 265 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. [Key words: Government
Nominees, recovery of market value] [Coram: R.F. Nariman, J., Navin Sinha, J.]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy

In Union of India v. Association of Uni ed Telecom Service Providers of India Etc. Etc.,
three issues arose. The rst was whether spectrum can be subjected to proceedings under
the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code. The Court directed NCLT to decide the said question
and held that it being a jurisdictional question, requires to be decided at the outset. The
second was whether in case of sharing, how the payment is to be made by the Telecom
Service Provider (TSP). It was held that Shared operator TSPs cannot be saddled with the
liability to pay the past dues of AGR of licensees that have shared the spectrum with the
original licensees. The third was whether in case of trading, how the liability of the seller and
buyer is to be determined. It was held that the seller's dues prior to the concluding of the
agreement/spectrum trading shall not be upon the buyer. [Key words: Spectrum, Telecom
Service Provider, DoT] [Coram: Arun Mishra, J., S. Abdul Nazeer, J., M.R. Shah, J.]

In The Karad Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Swwapnil Bhingaedevay & Ors., it was held
that if all the factors that need to be taken into account for determining whether or not the
corporate debtor can be kept running as a going concern. If they have been placed before
the Committee of Creditors, and the CoC has taken a conscious decision to approve the
resolution plan, then the NCLT will have to switch over to the hands off mode. On challenge
to the advertisement issued by the Resolution Professional on the ground of non-
conformity with Regulation 36A of IBBI Regulations, 2016, it was held that the said
Regulation was inserted only w.e.f. 06.02.2018 and was amended only on 03.07.2018.
Therefore, at the relevant time, the Regulation did not mandate the publication of invitation
of Resolution Plans, and hence, not required. [Key words: Commercial wisdom of CoC,
Challenge to Resolution Plan] [Coram: S.A. Bobde, CJI, A.S. Bopanna, J., V.
Ramasubramanian, J.]

In Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. v. Rajeev Anand & Ors., it was held in order to determine
the existence of a loan, documents evidencing an outstanding loan amount; a
supplementary af davit dated 03.08.2018; and the admission made in the counter af davit
that was made in the rst round of litigation, can by no means be described as a ‘document’
in an earlier petition that could not be relied upon. The ‘document’ was not a pleading by the
appellant – it was a counter af davit by the corporate debtor in which a clear admission of
the debt being outstanding was made, and therefore, could have been relied upon [Key
words: Admission of loan, NCLT] [Coram: R.F. Nariman, J., Navin Sinha, J., Indira Banerjee, J.]

Education

In Rakesh Kumar Agarwalla v. NLSIU, the Court, relying on Dr Preeti Srivastava (1999) 7
SCC 120 held that the norms of admissions have a direct impact on the standards of
education while discussing the powers of the Academic Council and Executive Council of
NLSIU and therefore, the actions of the Executive Council without consulting the Academic
Council to have not been in accordance with the provisions of the NLSIU Act. The Court
rejected NLSIU’s argument that the doctrine of necessity was applicable due to the ongoing
pandemic and that NLSIU was therefore enabled to conduct alternate entrance tests. The
Court noted that the UGC, the body to maintain educational standards in the country had
asked universities to modify their academic calendar for the new academic year. The Court
also held that NLAT was not transparent and that the short notice and technological
requirements violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, NLSIU was
directed to rejoin the CLAT consortium and conduct its admission pursuant to CLAT and not
NLAT. [Key Words: Setting aside of NLAT, CLAT Consortium, Law admissions] [Coram:
Ashok Bhushan, J., R. Subhash Reddy, J., MR Shah, J.]

In Shreyas Sinha v. The West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences & Ors., the
Appellant had sought admission to the ve-year law course offered by NUJS on the basis of
a 2019 amendment in the WBNUJS Act, which inter alia provided for reservation of seats
for students domiciled in the State of West Bengal to the extent of at least 30% of the total
intake. Rejecting the appeal, it was held that since the reservation policy of 30% seats was
not available on the date when the admission process was initiated, the decision of the
University to provide reservation from the next Academic Year cannot be said to be
contradictory to the provisions of the Amending Act. The Act is silent in respect of
Academic Year in which the bene t of reservation is to be given. The candidates have
already applied and given an option for admission in the various National Law Universities
before the coming into force of the Amending Act. Therefore, the University extended the
bene t of the reservation from the next Academic Session, which decision was upheld [Key
words: Prospective nature of Amendment]. [Coram: L. Nageswara Rao, J., Hemant Gupta, J.,
S. Ravindra Bhat, J.]

Motor Vehicles Law

In Beli Ram v. Rajinder Kumar, the Supreme Court held that the owner of a vehicle is
required to ensure that his driver carries a valid driving license and may not af x liability on
the insurance company by claiming that he had checked the validity of license at the time of
granting employment to his driver. Thus, the Court held that in such cases, the insurance
company would not be liable where the driver has not renewed his driving license. [Key
Words: reasonable care standard] [Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J., Aniruddha Bose, J., Krishna
Murari, J.]

In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Somwati & Ors., the challenge was by the Insurance
companies to the compensation awarded in favour of the Claimants under the heads of ‘loss
of consortium’, and ‘loss of love and affection’. Relying inter alia on Satinder Kaur (2020) SCC
Online 410, and Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680, it was reiterated that ‘loss of love and
affection’ is comprehended in ‘loss of consortium’, and hence, there was no justi cation to
award compensation towards ‘loss of love and affection’ as a separate head. On the question
of consortium, it was held that the mandate in Satinder Kaur is that apart from spousal
consortium, parental and lial consortium is payable. Therefore, the award of compensation
under the head of Consortium was upheld. [Key Words: Compensation, S. 166, Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988] [Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R. Subhash Reddy, J.]

In Lalan D. @ Lal & Anr. v. The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., the Bench awarded a sum
of INR 7,00,000 as lumpsum, composite amount for medical attendant charges and future
medical treatment to the victim’s family who was a construction worker. It was held that
going by the victim’s profession and his physical state after the accident, “conclusion has to
be inevitable that he required and still requires caregiver round the clock and round the
year to remain barely functional. Judging by the stratum of the society he comes from, it
would be irrational to expect that he would have been in a position to directly engage a
caregiver after his accident. It would not be an unreasonable assumption that his family
members must have had to t into that role. They could perform the role of caregiver only
by diverting their own time from any form of gainful employment which could have
generated some income.” [Key Words: Pranay Sethi, paralysis, permanent disability,
informal sector] [Coram: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J., Ajay Rastogi, J., Aniruddha Bose, J.]
In Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar and Others, the Bench reiterated that in assessing
motor vehicle compensation claims, the Courts’ duty was to place the victim in as near a
position as s/he was in before the accident, with other compensatory directions for loss of
amenities and other payments. This was “just compensation”. Cautioning against a
stereotypical and myopic approach, the Bench urged courts to be realistic. It observed that
as a “typist/data entry operator, full functioning of his hands was essential to his livelihood.
The extent of his permanent disablement was assessed at 89%; however, the High Court
halved it to 45% on an entirely wrong application of some ‘proportionate’ principle, which
was illogical and is unsupportable in law”. It noted that what had to be examined was the
“impact of the injury upon the income generating capacity of the victim” and there could not
be a blind arithmetic formula. [Key Words: Pranay Sethi, data entry operator, Article 21,
informal sector] [Coram: L. Nageswara Rao, J., Krishna Murari, J., S. Ravindra Bhat, J.]

Stamp Duty

In M/s MSD Real Estate LLP v. The Collector of Stamps & Anr., it was held that the facility
to deposit the penalty for not paying the stamp duty could not be cured by depositing post-
dated cheques and the appellant/subsequent purchaser was liable to deposit the penalty
amount (outstanding against the property and subject matter of the concerned gift deed).
[Key Words: de ciency in stamp duty, gift deed, Madhya Pradesh Public Premises Eviction
Act, HC Dhanda Trust] [Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R. Subhash Reddy, J., M.R. Shah, J.]

In Trustees of HC Dhanda Trust v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors, the Bench held that the
purpose of penalty was generally deterrence and not retribution. When a discretion was
vested in a public authority, such public authority should exercise such discretion
reasonably and not oppressively. It further noted that the responsibility to exercise the
discretion reasonably law more in cases where the discretion was unfettered. In the facts
before it, it held that imposition of the harshest penalty i.e. ten times of the duty or de cient
portion thereof could not be based on mere factum of evasion of duty but the reason had to
account for more, like fraud or deceit in order to deprive the Revenue or undue enrichment.
[Key Word: Sections 331 and 332 of the Indian Succession Act 1925, Sections 33, 35(a), 38,
39(1)(b) and 40(1)(b) of the Indian Stamp Act 1899, deed of assent, gift deed, administrative
discretion, “an amount not exceeding ten times”] [Coram: Ashok Bhushan, J., R. Subhash
Reddy, J., M.R. Shah, J.]

Miscellaneous
In Sarika v. Administrator, Mahakaleshwar Mandir Committee, Ujjain (M.P) & Ors., the
issue concerned monitoring the compliance of the judgment of the Court dated 02.05.2018
in Civil Appeal No. 4676/2018 qua erosion of Shivalinga in Shri Mahakaleshwar Temple at
Ujjain. After taking into account the suggestions of the Expert Committee, it was directed
that that the Expert Committee shall visit the temple and submit a report by 15th
December, 2020, as to the steps to be taken to prevent deterioration of Shivlinga and the
steps to be taken to preserve the temple structure, including Chandranageshwar Temple. It
was also directed to do a yearly survey and submit a report to the Court. A slew of other
speci c measures were also laid down in Para 9 of the Judgment. [Coram: Arun Mishra, J.,
B.R. Gavai, J., Krishna Murari, J.]

In R. Poornima & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., the only prayer in the Writ Petition
considered by the Court was as regards the entitlement of the Petitioners to be considered
for appointment as Judges of the Madras High Court by virtue of having put in 18 years,
cumulatively as an Advocate and a District Judge. Holding that P. Ramakrishna Raju (2014)
12 SCC 1 had no application in the facts, and on a careful consideration of Dheeraj Mor
(2018) 4 SCC 619, as also the Reference dated 19.02.2020, it was held that the queue to
which a person is assigned, depends upon his status on the date of consideration. If a person
is an advocate on the date of consideration, he can take his place only in the queue meant
for members of the Bar. Similarly, if a person is a judicial of cer on the date of consideration,
he shall take his chance only in the queue meant for service candidates. Hopping on and
hopping off from one queue to the other, is not permissible. [Key words: Appointment to the
High Court, clubbing of experience] [Coram: S.A. Bobde, CJI, A.S. Bopanna, J., V.
Ramasubramanian, J.]

Supreme Court of India Supreme Court Judgments

Supreme Court Lawyers Digest

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