KEYNOTE PRESENTATION

The Globalization of K-pop: Korea‟s Place in the Global

Industry
Oh Ingyu

Abstract

K-Pop is a new buzz word in the global music industry. Korean

pop singers such as TVQX, SNSD, Wonder Girls, and Psy
currently attract unprecedented followers in Asia, Europe, and
North America. The dominant explanation behind this unique
cultural phenomenon rests on the concept of cultural hybridity
or Pop Asianism (i.e., continuation and expansion of Japanese,
Chinese, and Indian subcultures in the global cultural market). I
argue that the globalization of K-Pop involves a much more
complicated process of globalizing- localizing-globalizing musical
content that originates from Europe than what hybridity or Pop
Asianism arguments suggest. Specifically, the rise of K-Pop in
the global music industry involves a new technique of locating
new musical content in Europe or elsewhere, modifying it into
Korean content, and then redistributing it on a global scale.
Furthermore, K-Pop represents an effort to network global talent
pools and social capital in the formerly disconnected music
industry rather than an effort to emulate and slightly modify
Japanese pop culture. As such, within the global music industry,
Korea occupies a structural hole that exists between Western and
East Asian music industries.

Key Words: K-Pop, Music Industry, Globalization,

Structural Hole
Editor‘s Notes: This paper was first published in Korea
Observer, Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn 2013,
pp. 389-409. © 2013 by the Institute of
Korean Studies
Introduction

As the trendy magazine Monocle put it recently: ―The Korean

Wave movement is the biggest soft power success story of the
region, acquiring global — and still growing — adulation over the
1
past decade, with the fevered export of South Korea‘s pop
culture, from music to drama to anime to computer games‖
(Monocle 49, Dec. 2011- Jan. 2012: 48). Particularly, the rise of
K-pop or Korean popular music in the global music scene came
as a coup de main to many music fans, commentators, and
business people in Asia. The Anglo-American or European
domination of the global music industry has rarely faced
challenging competitors from Asia prior to the sudden K-pop
epidemic. Psy‘s ―Gangnam Style,‖ for example, ranked number
one in the world in terms of YouTube click counts, reaching more
than 1.7 billion hits as of July 21, 2013. The second most hits
recorded in YouTube history by Justin Bieber comes in at just
0.9 billion. Before Psy‘s ascendance as a global pop star, other
boy and girl bands from Korea have enthralled a massive number
of young Asian and European fans who rushed to quickly sold
out live concerts and/ or YouTube for instant and free access to
music videos. In countries like China, where YouTube is banned,
young fans relied on alternative social networking service (SNS)
sites for free music videos from Korea. Girls‘ Generation,
Wonder Girls, TVXQ, Big Bang, 2PM, 2NE1, and Rain are
particularly popular among a diverse and long list of young
entertainers from Korea who currently dominate the Asian music
industry (see inter alia, Ho, 2012; Lee, 2012; Lie, 2012; Oh and
Park, 2012; Hübinette, 2012; Hirata, Forthcoming; Iwabuchi,
Forthcoming).

Against this backdrop, many scholars of popular culture and

mass media have tried to theorize K-pop‘s sudden and global
popularity using various perspectives from cultural studies, mass
media theories, and other social science disciplines. The
dominant explanation of the global K-pop phenomenon is the
―hybridity‖ view that advances a liberal argument about Chinese,
Japanese, and Indian cultures as a grand Asian Culture (AC) that
may countervail the dominant Western Culture (WC) as a whole
(Chua, 2004, 2012; Iwabuchi, 2004, Forthcoming). These
authors conclude that the rise of K-pop therefore is only natural,
given the expanding forces of AC vis-à-vis WC. In this sense, K-
pop is not a new cultural force in the global cultural system as
long as it originates from Japan and/or China (i.e., hybrid), both

2
of which have already hybridized their pop culture with the mix
of WC since the 19th century (Iwabuchi, 2004, Forthcoming;
Park, 2006; Hirata, 2008; Ryoo, 2009; Shim, 2011).

On the opposite side of this theoretical spectrum is a

grounded view of K-pop as Korea‘s new export industry that
―denuded and destroyed whatever exists of received (South)
Korean culture and tradition‖ (Lie, 2012: 361). K-pop has
nothing that can be considered ―Korean,‖ as it is a timely,
commercial combination of: (1) the global liberalization of music
markets in Asia and the rest of the world; and (2) the rapid
advancement of digital technologies like YouTube which prefers
to select and feature perfectly photogenic performers from all
over the world, including Korean girl and boy bands. According
to Lie (2012), no other J-Pop groups and their producers could
have imagined this new export opportunity partly due to the lack
of economic need or the lack of technological advancement.
Perhaps even now, J-Pop singers or bands may not be able to
imagine matching Koreans‘ success simply because of the lack of
photogenic appeal that Koreans have demonstrated in their
music videos and on concert stages. In this sense, K-pop is not
Japanese or Chinese, even though it is Asian. Rather, K-pop is
global and more Western than ever.

Despite this enlightening explanation of K-pop‘s global

success, Lie‘s analysis lacks insight into the anatomy of the whole
production process of the export business (i.e., the K-pop
industry). To provide an example, Japanese cars have dominated
the global car market due to several externally crucial and timely
factors. However, exogenous factors are just as important as
endogenous ones. If global factors are significant for an export
industry like automobiles, there is also a need to understand why
automakers such as Toyota created the Just-in-Time System
(JIS) and Kanban. As Lie (2012) succinctly puts it, if SM
Entertainment is ―the single most important‖ factor behind the
global success of K-pop, a meaningful analysis demands an
understanding of the inside organizational dynamics of an
industry dominated by firms like SM.

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 SM Entertainment‘s core business competence was bifurcated
within the organization into: (1) creativity management; and (2)
export management. In one of the extant studies, Oh and Park
(2012) focused on export management, characterized by SM‘s
business focus shifting from B (business) to C (customers) to B
(SM) to B (YouTube). This transformation of SM‘s international
strategy necessitated competent international managers like
Youngmin Kim, SM‘s CEO, who was pivotal in successfully
introducing BoA and TVXQ in Japan. Hailing from Japan
himself, Kim spent his primary, middle, and high school years in
Japan before coming to Korea University for undergraduate
studies. While Soo Man Lee, SM founder and Chairman, has
managed just the creativity management side, Kim has had full
freedom and power to blandish his sword in export matters. The
connection between YouTube and SM, something that Japanese
and Chinese entertainment managers have not sought to utilize,
was first mapped out by Kim, who accidentally discovered the
YouTube icon as it was permanently pre-installed on a Japanese
iPhone first released in 2008.

The story of creativity and export management from SM‘s

perspective therefore adds richness and flesh to the theoretical
skeleton presented by Lie (2012). In this paper, I continue to
present aspects of creativity management with an emphasis on
successful linkages with export management. I first discuss
existing studies of the global music industry to draw an
understanding of the whole business system from K-pop‘s
viewpoint. Through a case study on SM‘s creativity management,
I suggest that the recent rise of the global music industry offers
many structural holes that can be occupied by linking Asian and
Western networks. However, either the tertiusiugens or the
tertiusgaudens in the music industry must be able to identify
audience preferences in each music genre and geographical
segment.

Theorizing the Global Music Industry

The plural usage of ―music industries‖ reflects the diverse

nature of the industry in producing and delivering a variety of

4
different goods and services to music consumers. For example,
the classical music industry, a representative case of ―high
culture‖ in Bourdieu‘s (1984) term, has a widely different system
from that of the K-pop industry, an exemplary case of ―low
culture.‖ While the classical music industry has prestigious
national and international schools that officially train musical
geniuses, the K-pop industry has no such privilege except for
private training camps often labeled as ―slave camps‖ by
antagonistic journalists. Whereas opera is delivered in luxurious
nationally or imperially founded opera houses, K-pop concerts
are performed in sports stadiums or open air stages constructed
overnight.

The sociological understanding of the popular music industry

has often assumed the above class line and elaborated on the
process of top-down control of ―low culture‖ contents using
institutions, organizations, and technologies (Hirsch, 1971;
Peterson and Di Maggio, 1975). According to these cultural
classifications, K-pop belongs to the ―Third World‖ low culture
category emanating from a country unheard of in usual
mainstream cultural (both high and low) discourses in developed
countries. Although Hirsch (1971) correctly predicted the
structural nexus between mass media technologies and new
popular music genres, as evidenced in the case of radios after the
massive success of TVs and the birth of rock and roll music.
However, like other sociological studies of popular music, he
couldn‘t predict that the birth of YouTube and digital music
would usher in a new popular music genre of K-pop. In the
dominant sociological study, artists and recording companies in
the core countries only would invent, develop, produce, and
disseminate popular music.

The picture has changed dramatically since the birth of the

global music industry. The rise of the new Caribbean music genre
is one example, while the spread of J-pop all over Asia was
another. Traditional and national music industries have relied on
discs and magnetic tapes (SPs, LPs, tapes, CDs, MDs, LDs,
DVDs, etc.), which were played on playing devices (e.g. audio
components). These discs and tapes carried price tags, although

5
they were easily pirated all over the world for cheap
dissemination. Unless countries enforced strict copyright rules,
singers and recording companies found it very difficult to garner
any substantial profit out of their music. Free music also existed
through the broadcasting model of music dissemination (Fox and
Wrenn, 2001). Music was aired on radios or television music
channels without fees to the audiences, as long as they listened to
or watched program sponsors‘ commercials. In many countries
where piracy was rampant, appearance on TV programs was one
of the important income sources for artists who had no other
option but to appear on nigh club shows or take a national
concert tour with less secure income guarantees than that of TV
programs.

The ascendance of the global music industry has destroyed

this structure. No longer are music audiences required to
purchase music released by recording companies (or labelers), as
they have full access to free music on the internet, especially
YouTube. Concerts are still organized by production managers
(who either have or do not have recording facilities), although
more and more regular fans prefer to watch them online for free.
Today, the global music industry allows music producers and
distributors to make their fortunes through posting free music on
the Internet without going to radio stations or begging recording
companies to produce and distribute records (Hilderbrand,
2007; Mangold and Faulds, 2009; Elberse, 2010; Oh and Park,
2012). Whereas recording companies owned and managed
copyrights of music they sold, music producers in the global
music industry recruit, train, and own artists in addition to the
copyright of the music sold online.

The establishment of the global music industry has also

destroyed the thick line between ―high‖ and ―low‖ culture on the
one hand, and ―developed‖ and ―developing‖ country cultures on
the other. As the case of Psy illustrates, virtually anyone can post
music content on YouTube and enjoy instant fame overnight.
Unlike what the Birmingham School used to preach, people do
not have to resist mainstream culture by deliberately enjoying
subculture music (Hall and Jefferson, 1993). Subculture music

6
from all over the world is easily searchable and watchable
through streaming technology on YouTube. It is therefore not
uncommon now to find K-pop and other popular music artists
form the developing countries who have previously pursued
classical music careers, because their chance of making fortune
in the popular music industry has tripled and quadrupled due to
the internet.

The success of subculture music on YouTube, or the new

global music industry, depends on the nature of the
organizational ecology created by a specific home country‘s
music industry. K-pop has an industrial ecology that favors a
very high level of individual and group participation in YouTube-
based music production and dissemination based on a new
model of popular music venture capitalism. The three major
music venture capitalists (SM, YG, JYP) in Korea actively recruit
and train future K-pop talent on a continuing basis in order to
create an organizational ecology characterized by a large supply
of musical inputs (composers, lyricists, singers, session bands,
etc.) and a small number of producers (SM, YG, JYP) and
distributors (YouTube). In this syphoning type of industry,
producers, for their capital investment in young individuals and
groups from their early ages, and distributors, for their
monopolistic position, take the largest cut in the form of profits,
whereas the input elements (e.g. singers) gross relatively smaller
share (Oh and Park, 2012).

7
 The question, then, is what makes these producers qua
venture capitalists legitimate in the whole value chain, where

YouTube is the only powerful distributor in the new free digital

music industry? The answer lies in the fact that these big three
K-pop producers have not chosen to rely on a local pool of talents
in Korea for creativity management, but have extended
production networks (or musical/cultural capital) to global
cultural centers in Hollywood and Europe (especially Sweden
and the U.K.). As Table 1 shows, the K-pop music industry
represents a global business project encompassing local
components to regional and global inputs and outputs.

8
 Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that these global music suppliers
occupy the middle point between multinational enterprises
(MNEs), which provide funds to K-pop production by buying
advertising time, and Korean producers who buy some of the K-
pop music originally coming from Sweden (melody), England
(melody, lyrics, percussions), and the U.S. (beats, lyrics).
Performers (mostly Koreans with some Chinese, Japanese,
Southeast Asian, and other talents) occupy the lowest value
bracket on the value chain, whereas MNEs, producers, and
distributors (YouTube) take the largest cut in the global music
industry. As exemplified from this value chain, Korean music
producers have adopted a new globalization strategy that can be
referred to as a ―G-L-G‘‖ strategy, to which this paper now turns.

9
G-L-G‟: K-pop‟s Globalization Strategy

Globalization in the music industry can mean several things.

First and foremost, it can refer to a situation where center music
can dominate the peripheral music markets (music imperialism)
(Black, 1994; During, 1997; Fine, 1997; McChesney, 2001).
Second, it can mean cosmopolitanism, where a diverse type of
center, peripheral, and semi-peripheral music is sold in the
market with sizable groups of fans and ―buffs‖ for each
subculture market (Cho-Han et al., 2003; Iwabuchi, 2004,
Forthcoming; Baek, 2005; Hirata, 2005; Chang, 2006). This is
close to an ideal-typical multicultural music market. Third, it can
allude to a possibility that there is a new global division of labor
in music production and dissemination. In the past, for example,
Japan exported vinyl LPs that contained American popular
music back to the U.S. for their high quality and cheap prices. In
another case, European singers and artists went to New York and
Hollywood to record and release their albums due to the sheer
size of the pop music market in the U.S. In a new global division
of music production, the music products sold in each subculture
market are produced by a new system of global division of labor
that involves European, Asian, and American music talents,
venture capital firms, and distributors (Oh and Park, 2012).

K-pop belongs to the third type of globalization. By definition,

K-pop entails the export of music ―made in Korea‖ to global
consumers, because the domestic music market is drastically
hampered by its trifling size and rampant, albeit diminishing,
piracy. However, before the current K-pop export boom, the
Western network of music producers and distributors did not
spot or recruit Korean musical talents into their production and
distribution systems, although a couple of anecdotal stories
exist.1 Korean popular music was simply not Western at all, as
the traditional trot or kayo songs with pentatonic scales had
dominated East Asian popular music (Lie, 2012). The export of
Korean music on a global scale has begun since the 21st century,
mainly due to: (1) Korea‘s economic ascendance to semi-
periphery in the world system; (2) massive immigration of
Koreans into center countries (Japan, the U.S., Western Europe,

10
etc.); (3) active participation in global cultural industries by the
Korean and overseas Korean population; and (4) most
importantly, participation in the global division of labor in music
manufacturing and distribution.

Like in other global divisions of labor in manufacturing and

distribution, Korean corporations purchase or outsource raw
materials that will be processed in their own factories in Korea.
Finished goods will then be exported to center markets in the
world system, usually with help from center buyers or
distributors. In the 1960s and 1970s, Korean corporations sold
textiles, wigs, and footwear in massive quantities to the U.S. and
Europe. In the 1980s and 1990s, these corporations began
producing cars, ships, steel plates, and electronic goods to be
consumed by center customers. In the 2000s and 2010s, these
same firms are now exporting IT-related communication
hardware and devices, such as smart phones and smart pads,
while newly-established entertainment companies are exporting
popular cultural content called Hallyu products all over the
world.

Despite stark differences in manufacturing and distribution

processes, these industries share a similar structure in the global
division of labor. Korean firms in the semi-periphery of the world
system have to import or outsource raw materials, advanced
technologies, and financial resources from the periphery or the
center. Even raw materials are often controlled by, and therefore
have to be purchased from, the center capitalists. Like the
famous Korean electronics and automobile industries, K-pop
companies must outsource original music scores to Western
(notably Swedish, American, and British) composers. In a similar
vein, the finished K-pop CDs, DVDs, music videos, and MP3
music files must be distributed by center companies (e.g. iTunes,
YouTube, vevo, SONY Music, Universal, EMI, avex, etc.).

Participation in the global division of music production and

distribution (see Table 1) does not necessarily guarantee the
global success of K-pop. From the outset, participation itself is
extremely difficult to begin with, given the domination of

11
European, North American, Central and South American, and
Japanese music producers and distributors. Equally challenging
is sustaining popularity in the global music market. This is why
the entire process of Global (G) → Local (L) → Global‘ (G‘) is
untenable if the ―L‖ component of the global division of labor is
not creative or unique (i.e., product differentiation) enough to
attract producers and distributors, not to mention global fan
groups.

K-pop‘s differentiation strategy to make the ―L‖ process

attractive to a global audience is roughly threefold: (1) numbers;
(2) physique; and (3) voice-dance coordination. Every artistic
expression has archetypes found in either its own traditional art
form or foreign legends (Barthes, 1972; Jung and Hull, 1980).
While the debate about the Korean archetype of K-pop seems
futile, three candidates stand out, namely, Japanese or Chinese
archetypes (i.e., Chinese culture, J-Pop), Korean horse dancers
(i.e., Psy‘s Gangnam Style mirroring an ancient Korean horse
dance), and Western origin (i.e., K-pop came from Michael
Jackson).

Pop Asianism under the theoretical guidance of cultural

hybridity has proposed circular arguments that K-pop came from
Chinese and/or Japanese popular culture that has had significant
impact on the global pop culture (Iwabuchi, 2004, Forthcoming;
Jung, 2011; Shim, 2011). The argument is circular because it
cannot explain why Taiwanese popular music is not globally
popular as much as K-pop is. Nor can it predict when and how
Taiwanese popular music will be globally popular just like K-pop.
The circular argument does not explain the reason why K-pop is
successful because it wrongfully assumes that K-pop is similar to
Chinese or Japanese pop music.

Korean cultural pundits have also advanced similar

functionalist arguments that Psy‘s mega hit, ―Gangnam Style,‖
came from the traditional horse dance found on the murals from
the ancient Shilla dynasty or that Americans enjoy Psy‘s song
because they are ―cowboys‖ who apparently love horses (Kwon,
2012a, 2012b; Ye, 2012; Kim, 2012; Park, 2012). Furthermore,

12
some Americans have argued that K-pop, epitomized by male
musicians dancing and singing simultaneously in groups, came
from Michael Jackson‘s own singing and choreographic styles
(Kim, 2010). All these arguments are also circular because their
logic is based on the absurdity of: (1) Koreans are born horse
dancers and (2) if anyone emulates cowboy dance or Michael
Jackson, he/she will be a global idol. If Koreans are born horse
dancers, why didn‘t American cowboys create the horse dance,
too? If Michael Jackson was the key to K-pop‘s global stardom,
why didn‘t Taiwanese singers mimic Jackson‘s music/dance and
become world stars, too?

This paper is not concerned with musical archetypes for

popular music in general and K-pop in particular. Instead, this
paper centers on a K-pop producer‘s point of view by focusing on
their efforts at differentiating K-pop from other musical genres.
Producers are concerned with singers becoming global stars and
eventually generating high cash returns on initial investments in
those would-be stars over a five- to ten-year period (i.e., K-pop
venture capitalism). At first glance, K-pop‘s product
differentiation lies in the number of singers staged at one time.
Unlike Chinese popular singers, J-Pop bands, or Michael
Jackson, K-pop‘s success initially came from the very large
number of singers and dancers singing and dancing
simultaneously on stage. TVXQ, Girls‘ Generation, Big Bang,
Super Junior, 2PM, Shinee, Beast, and others constitute
archetypal success cases for the K-pop globalization drive
through an attractive ―L.‖ The localization process therefore
includes a special (or Korean) staging formation for boy and girl
bands previously unheard of in other countries. Peculiar only in
K-pop, K-pop music features singer-dancers on stage who
maintain changing dancing formations that quickly change with
strict or perfect synchronization. From the beginning to the end
of a song, singer- dancers take turn in occupying the spotlighted
center stage one by one, as if there were no lead vocal for the
band. Everyone in the band maintains the same vocal and
dancing talent in a synchronized movement, as in the Irish river
dance, although the river dancers don‘t sing at all.

13
 The ―number‖ factor alone, however, is not sufficient. Japan‘s
top girl bands, AKB48, SKE48, and HKT48, feature 48 singers
and dancers at the same time, making them constantly visible on
the Oricon chart. However, they have not had any global success
much akin to that of K-pop girl bands, such as Girls‘ Generation,
which features only nine members. K-pop‘s ―physique‖ factor
therefore must be taken into consideration in its differentiation
strategy. In other words, Girls‘ Generation and Wonder Girls are
at least 10 inches taller than AKB48 or HKT48 members, let
alone the fact that the Korean singers show off much sexier and
sophisticated looks and bodies than their Japanese counterparts.
Japan‘s top male idol group, Arashi, which features five
members, also pale in comparison with the physique of their
male K-pop counterparts. TVXQ, originally featuring five
members, and Shinee, also featuring five members, are at least
10 inches taller than Arashi members. As a result, K-pop music
videos and concerts are much more visually appealing than those
of other Asian (especially, Japanese or Chinese) counterparts.
The emphasis on the physique side of performers simultaneously
implies that K-pop idol groups have different sources of global
attraction from those of African or African-American music
artists. Targeting Asian and Western female fans mostly, K-pop
emphasizes thin, tall, and feminine looks with adolescent or
sometimes very cute facial expressions, regardless of whether
they‘re male or female singers. On the contrary, Caribbean and
African American singers highlight their colonial-style male
attractions with body looks that are not manicured, cosmeticized,
or thoroughly shaved.

Even though Western Caucasian and other ethnic boy and girl
bands may want to choose to rely on the physique factor for their
immediate rise to stardom, they often fall short of fans‘
expectation in terms of dance-singing coordination in large
groups. This is the third feature predominant in globally popular
K-pop idols. The ―L‖ process within the K-pop industry involves
a high level of specific in-house investments provided by
entertainment companies themselves that act like venture capital
firms. The learning process of mastering how to sing and dance
is crucial in the Korean ―L‖ process of the entire global division of

14
labor, as similar learning processes in the training of Korean
archery and golf players are also pivotal. Particularly, the length
of learning period is noticeably long often ranging from five to
ten years. The three major K-pop managing firms, or K-pop
venture capitalist firms, select potential idols through internal
auditions and/ or their K-pop cram schools. Trainees go through
vocal, dancing, language, and theatrical acting lessons for at least
five hours a day in the evening after school. They have to carry
out regular physical fitness trainings as well as take skin and
other beauty therapies. The entire program resembles that of a
total institution, as trainees are sometimes banned from using
cell phones during training (Ho, 2012).

This is why some critics call the learning process very abusive
of the trainees, although K-pop managers defend their programs
by arguing that the K-pop cram school is no different from
college prep schools, exam cram schools, golf school, and other
similar institutions. K-pop managers emphasize the fact that
they pay for all the K-pop education and training, unlike other
cram schools in Korea.2 After the entire period of training, K-pop
idols possess very different skills of singing, dancing, speaking
foreign languages, and acting from their competing singers from
China or Japan. They also look much sexier and trimmed than
their competitors from other countries.

15
 With finished products in the form of global concert tours,
CDs, DVDs, and music videos downloaded or streamlined on the
internet, K-pop companies go abroad to market finished goods
through global distributors. Since CDs and DVDs must be
protected by copyright, all K-pop companies rely on Japanese
distributors for Japanese and other Asian markets. For concert
tours, K-pop companies rely on local concert organizers who are
also label sellers in the specific market. However, income from
these finished goods is not big compared to royalty income from
YouTube and other social media sites (SMS). YouTube is a
revolutionary SMS that has provided unexpected opportunities
to K-pop producers, while J-pop Asia and vevo are latecomer
competitors to YouTube in the global music industry.

K-pop‟s Place in the Global Music Industry

K-pop‘s global ascendance is not a result of its cultural

hybridity that Korea imported from China or Japan. Korean
culture, be that Confucian or hybrid, has never been popular in
Asia, let alone the world. Back in the 1990s, Japanese or Chinese
viewers did not tune in to watch Korean TV dramas or films,
listen to Korean music or attend Korean singers‘ concerts in
Seoul, eat out in a Korean restaurant or cook Korean food at
home, or drink Korean rice wine or soju (i.e., cheap local alcohol
brewed and distilled from sweet potatoes).

The global success of K-pop in the 21st century represents a

unique historical and geographical meaning in the present world
system. First and foremost, Korean singers have obtained a
distinctive physique, either through a long process of evolution
or mutation (or simply through cosmetic surgeries), which was
unimaginable among Koreans up until the 20th century. Second,
the political democratization of Korea has lifted censorship or
bans on both Korean and Western types of popular music,
including the free importation of Japanese popular culture in
Korea. Korean popular cultural content has there- fore been far
more diverse and creative compared to its history under
dictatorship, and is now easily exported to the Japanese market
that has opened up its market to Korean content at the same

16
time Korea did for Japanese cultural content. Third,
technological advancement in the 21st century has allowed for a
primitive form of cosmopolitanism at least in the virtual world,
where fans from all over the world can enjoy global content from
various different countries, including Korea. Without this new
digital technology (or real time streaming and the new social
media), the rise of K-pop as it is recognized today would not have
been possible. Fourth, the advancement of the global capitalist
economy that has successfully opened up Chinese, Indian, Latin
American, and the vast Southeast Asian markets, has allowed for
less biased investments and inputs in the Asian music industry
than before from Western music producers and distributors.

All these factors, however, do not suggest that either Asian or

Korean (or both) cultural content enjoys the same or similar
status in the global popular culture market. The K-pop
phenomenon simply reinforces the world system view where the
global economy, including the cultural market, is more based on
the global division of labor than ever and that K-pop represents a
new cultural content that provides unexpected windfall to
Western and Japanese music producers and distributors by
outsourcing manufacturing of the popular music to Korea.
Unless Korea obtains technologies, capital, and social capital in
the global music industry, it will continue to maintain its semi-
peripheral role of export manufacturing, similar to how Hyundai
and Samsung rest their corporate survival on the continuous
export of finished cars and electronic gadgets to the center
markets.

Conclusion

K-pop in the 2010s has rekindled global scholarly attention on

Hallyu, which at one point has been considered a declining
popular cultural industry. Korean pop singers such as TVQX,
SNSD, Wonder Girls, and Psy are popular among a large number
of consumers in Asia, Europe, and North America. The dominant
explanation behind this unique cultural phenomenon has rested
on the concept of cultural hybridity or Pop Asianism (i.e.,
continuation and expansion of Japanese, Chinese, and Indian

17
subcultures in the global cultural market). In this paper,
however, I argued that the globalization of K-pop involves a
much more complicated process of globalizing-localizing-
globalizing musical content that originated from Europe
compared to what the hybridity or Pop Asianism arguments
suggest. Korea‘s place in the global music industry represents a
new technique of locating already common and popular musical
content in Europe or elsewhere, modifying it into Korean
content, and then redistributing it to the global music market. K-
pop is an effort to network global talent pools and social capital
in the formerly disconnected music industry, rather than an
effort to emulate and slightly modify Japanese pop culture. As
such, in the global music industry, Korea occupies a structural
hole between Western and East Asian music industries.

Notes

1. In 1963 Louis Armstrong performed with an unknown Korean

girl singer, Bok- Hee Yoon, at Walker Hill Hotel, Seoul, in 1963,
and later she was featured in the Ed Sullivan Show (Yoon,
1997). Also, Kim Sisters, three daughters of a legendary Korean
female singer Nan-Yeong Yi, went to Las Vegas with their
American manager, Tom Ball, and eventually appeared on the
Ed Sullivan Show several times (Hankooki.com, July 10, 2008).

2. Based on the interviews with the CEO Youngmin Kim and the
A&R Manger Chris Lee at SM Entertainment on Nov. 13, 2012
and Dec. 20, 2012, respectively.

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Ingyu Oh is Professor of Hallyu Studies at the Research Institute
of Korean Studies, Korea University, Korea. He received his
Ph.D. from the University of Oregon. His recent publications
include ―From B2C to B2B: Selling Korean Pop Music in the Age
of New Social Media‖ (2012) and ―From Nationalistic Diaspora
to Transnational Diaspora: The Evolution of Identity Crisis
among the Korean Japanese‖ (2012). This work was supported
by the National Research Foundation Grant funded by the
Korean Government (MEST) (NRF-2007-361-AL0013).

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