OISD STD - 106

First Edition, November 1988

Amended edition, August, 1999
Revised Edition October 2010

FOR RESTRICTED CIRCULATION

PRESSURE RELIEF & DISPOSAL SYSTEM

OISD - STANDARD - 106

First Edition, November 1988
Amended edition, August, 1999
Revised Edition October 2010

Oil Industry Safety Directorate

Government of India
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas
Website: www.oisd.gov.in

I
 OISD - 106
First Edition, November 1988
Amended edition, August, 1999
Revised Edition October 2010

FOR RESTRICTEDCIRCULATION

PRESSURE RELIEF & DISPOSAL SYSTEM

Prepared By:

FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEE ON
PRESSURE RELIEF & DISPOSAL SYSTEM

OIL INDUSTRY SAFETY DIRECTORATE

7th Floor, New Delhi House
27, Barakhamba Road
New Delhi-110001
Website: www.oisd.gov.in

II
 NOTE

OISD publications are prepared for use in the oil and gas
industry under the administrative control of Ministry of
Petroleum and Natural Gas and shall not be reproduced or copied
and loaned or exhibited to others without written consent from
OISD.

Though every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy

and reliability of the data contained in these documents, OISD
hereby expressly disclaims any liability or responsibility for loss
or damage resulting from their use.

These documents are intended to supplement rather than

replace the prevailing statutory requirements.

III
 FOREWORD

The oil industry in India is nearly 100 years old. As such a

variety of practices have been in vogue because of
collaboration/association with different foreign companies and
governments. Standardisation in design philosophies, operating and
maintenance practices at national level was hardly in existence. This
coupled with feed back from some serious accidents that occurred in
the recent past in India and abroad, emphasised the need for the
industry to review the existing state of art in designing, operating and
maintaining oil and gas installations.

With this in view, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas

in 1986 constituted a Safety Council in 1986, assisted by the Oil
Industry Safety Directorate (OISD), staffed from within the industry
in formulating and implementing a series of self-regulatory measures
aimed at removing obsolescence, standardising and upgrading the
existing standards to ensure safer operations. Accordingly OISD
constituted a number of functional committees comprising of experts
nominated from the industry to draw up standards and guidelines on
various subjects.

The present document was prepared, by the Functional

Committee on ‘Process Design and Operating Philosophies’. This
document is based on the accumulated knowledge and experience of
industry members and the various national and international codes
and practices. It is hoped that the provision of this document, if
implemented objectively shall go a long way to improve the safety
and reduce accidents in the oil and gas industry. Suggestions are
invited from the users for further improvement in the standard after it
is put into practice. Suggestions for amendments to this document
shall be addressed to:

The Co-ordinator,
Functional Committee
‘Pressure Relief & Disposal System’
Oil Industry Safety Directorate
7th Floor, New Delhi House
27, Barakhamba Road
New Delhi
Website: www.oisd.gov.in

IV
 FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEE
(SECOND EDITION, OCTOBER 2010)

S.No. Name Organisation Position in

Committee
____________________________________________________________________
1 Shri S.S. Sunderajan BPCL-MR Leader
2 Shri V. N. Satheesan ESSAR Oil Ltd Member
3 Shri M.K. Sinha Technip KTI Member
4 Shri Gangadin Gautam, EIL Member
5 Shri A.G. Gupta RIL Member
6 Shri V.S. Agashe HPCL-VR Member
7 Shri U.K. Bhowmick, IOCL-C HSE, Ref., Member
8 Shri K. Santhanam IOCL-Pipelines Member
9 Shri S.K. Malhotra, ONGC, Hazira Member
10 Shri B.K. Das, BRPL Member
11 Shri P.K. Das NRL Member
12 Shri Avijeet Saha, HPCL-VR Member
13 Shri Shamsher Singh OISD Member
14 Shri Neeraj Bagai OISD Member-
Coordinator

In addition to the above, several other experts from industry contributed in the
preparation, review and finalisation of this document.

V
 FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEE
(FIRST EDITION, AUGUST 1999)

S.No. Name Designation & Position in

Organisation Committee
1. Shri W.D. Lande Dy. Gen. Mgr. Member
HPCL Leader

2. Shri V.S. Save Ch. Manager, Member

HPCL

3. Shri G. Raghunathan Ch. Manager, Member

HPCL

4. Shri S.V. Puthli Sr. Manager, Member

HPCL

5. Shri N. Lal Dy. Gen. Mgr., Member

ONGC

6. Shri N.N. Gogoi Dy. Gen. Mgr., Member

OIL

7. Shri M.A. Sreekumar Sr. Manager, Member

CRL

8. Shri A. Vardarajan Sr. Manager, Member

MRL

9. Shri B.K. Trehan Addl. Director, Member,

OISD Co-ordinator

In addition to the above, several other experts from industry contributed in the
preparation, review and finalisation of this document.

VI
 PRESSURE RELIEF & DISPOSAL SYSTEM

CONTENTS

Section no. Item

1.0 Introduction
2.0 Scope
3.0 Definitions
4.0 Need For Relieving Systems
5.0 Pressure Relieving/Safety Devices
5.1 Reclosing Type Safety/Pressure Relief Valves
5.1.1 Conventional
5.1.2 Balanced Pressure Relief Valves
5.1.3 Pilot-Operated Relief Valves
5.2 Non-Reclosing Pressure Relief Valve
5.2.1 Rupture Disk Valve
5.2.2 Pin-Actuated Device
5.3 Emergency Depressurisation Valves
5.4 Surge Relief Valves
5.5 Set Pressure Of Relief Valves
6.0 Installation Of Safety Devices
6.1 General
6.2 Multiple Valves
6.3 Spare Safety Valves
7.0 Calculation of Relieving Loads
7.1 Individual Loads
7.2 Grouping of Relieving Loads
7.2.1 Plant-Wise
7.2.2 Complex-Wise
7.3 Reduction of Flare Load
8.0 Disposal System
8.1 Atmospheric Discharge
8.2 Closed Disposal System
8.3 Design of Closed Disposal System
8.3.1 Gathering Network
8.3.2 Unit Isolation Valves
8.3.3 Unit Knock-Out Drum
8.3.4 Cryogenic Discharges
8.3.5 Main Flare Header
8.3.6 Main Flare Knock-Out Drum
8.3.7 Seal Drums

VII
8.3.8 Flare Stack
8.3.9 Flaring of H2S Streams
8.3.10 Pilot Igniters
8.3.11 Standby Flare
8.3.12 Flare Gas Recovery Systems
8.4 Disposal Of Heavy Liquids And Non-Condensable Vapours
8.4.1 General
8.4.2 Cold And Heavy Hydrocarbon Discharge
8.4.3 Hot And Heavy Hydrocarbons Discharges
8.4.4 Thermal Relief Discharges
8.4.5 Discharge From Relief Valves Of Pumps
8.5 Disposal Of Toxic/ Corrosive Fluids
8.5.1 General
8.5.2 Design Considerations
9.0 Vapour Depressurising
9.1 Runaway Reactions
9.2 Exposure To Fire
9.3 Disposal Of Depressurised Material
10.0 Safety/Relief Valve Data Sheet
11.0 Relief System Record
12.0 References
13.0 Attachments:
Table -1 Toxic/Corrosive Chemicals

Annexure -I Pressure Relief Valves Data Sheet

Annexure -II Safety Relief Valve Record
Annexure -III High Integrity Pressure Protection System
Annexure-IV Types Of Pressure Relieving / Safety Devices

Figure- 1 Water Seal Drum

Figure- 2 Blowdown Drum Combined With Close Drain System
Figure- 3 Quench Drum
Figure- 4 Scrubbing Unit

VIII
1.0 INTRODUCTION Accumulation can be expressed in pressure
units or as a percentage of MAWP or design
The Pressure Relief and Disposal System is a pressure.
key safety area in the hydrocarbon processing
industries. Latest editions of API-520 on “Design 2. Back pressure:
and Installation of Pressure Relieving System in
Back pressure is the increase in pressure at the
Refineries” and API-521 on “Guideline for outlet of a pressure relief valve as a result of
Pressure - Relieving and Depressurising Systems” the pressure in the discharge system. This is
are well recognised documents and widely used in the sum of superimposed and built-up back
the petroleum industry all over the world and these pressures.
guidelines are also applicable to petroleum
installations in India. However, certain provisions 3. Blow down:
of these guidelines are modified to conform to
Indian climatic conditions, local practices and Blow down is the difference between set
statutory requirements, and supplement with the pressure and closing pressure of a pressure
relief valve, expressed as a percentage of set
provisions which are not addressed specifically in
pressure or in pressure units.
these guidelines and are in practice through other
statutory rules and regulations such as Static & 4. Built-up back pressure:
Mobile Pressure Vessels (unfired) Rules (SMPV),
1981. Built-up back pressure is the increase in
pressure at the outlet of a pressure relief valve
2.0 SCOPE that develops as a result of flow after the
pressure relief valve opens.
The standard covers relieving devices and their
discharge systems of vessels and equipment in the 5. Burst pressure of a rupture disk:
exploration & production installations and related
The burst pressure of a rupture disk at the
oil & gas processing plants, refineries, specified temperature is the value of the
petrochemical plants and storage & handling upstream static pressure minus the value of the
locations, which are designed for a maximum downstream static pressure just prior to when
allowable working pressure of more than 1 the disk bursts.
Kg/Cm2g. This standard does not cover pressure
vessels used for transportation of petroleum 6. Cold differential test pressure(CDTP):
products. The intent of the present standard is to
highlight the areas of concern specific to Indian The cold differential test pressure is the
environment and requirements. This document pressure at which a pressure relief valve is
adjusted to open at the test stand.
does not dilute the safety requirements of
prevailing Offshore Safety Standard such as API- 7. Design pressure:
14C, 521, IEC 61508 etc.
The design pressure of the vessel along with
3.0 DEFINITIONS the design temperature is used to determine the
minimum required thickness or physical
For the purpose of this standard the following characteristic of each vessel component as
definitions shall apply: determined by the vessel design rules. It can
1. Accumulation: be used in place of Maximum allowable
working pressure (MAWP) in all cases where
Accumulation is the pressure increase over the MAWP has not been established. The design
maximum allowable working pressure pressure is equal to or less than the MAWP.
(MAWP) of the vessel allowed during
discharge through a pressure relief device. 8. Flare
Flare is a mean of safely disposing off gases
through the use of combustion. With elevated

9
 flare, the combustion is carried out at the top automatically open during emergency or
of a pipe or stack where the burner and igniter abnormal conditions to prevent a rise of
are located. A Ground flare is similarly internal fluid pressure in excess of specified
equipped except that combustion is carried out design value and automatically reclose and
at/ near ground level. prevent the flow of fluid.

9. High Integrity Pressure Protection System 15. Reclosing type Relief Valve:
(HIPPS)
A pressure relief valve; which monitors pressure in
High Integrity Pressure protection System a system and automatically recloses after opening
and discharging an initial volume of high pressure
(HIPPS) is a Safety Instrumented System
fluid.
(SIS) that is designed to provide overpressure
protection that is at least equivalent in
16. Relief valve:
reliability to a mechanical relief device.
Relief Valve is a spring loaded pressure relief
10. Maximum allowable working pressure valve actuated by the static pressure upstream
(MAWP): of the valve. The relief valve opens in
proportion to the pressure increase over the set
The maximum operating working pressure is
pressure. A relief valve is used primarily with
the maximum gauge pressure permissible at
incompressible fluids.
the top of the completed vessel in its operating
position for a designated temperature. The
17. Safety valve:
MAWP is based on the calculations for each
element in a vessel using normal thickness,
Safety valve is a spring loaded pressure relief
exclusive of additional metal thickness
valve actuated by the static pressure upstream
allowed for corrosion and loadings other than
of the valve and characterized by rapid
pressure. Normally the MAWP is the basis for
opening or pop action. A safety valve is used
pressure setting of the pressure relief devices
primarily with compressible fluids.
that protect the vessel.

11. Non- Reclosing type Relief Valve: 18. Safety relief valve:

A pressure relief valve; which once activated to Safety relief valve is a spring loaded pressure
discharge pressure in a system, do not relief valve that is used either as a safety or
automatically close. relief depending on the application.

12. Operating pressure: 19. Set pressure:

The maximum operating pressure is the The set pressure is the inlet gauge pressure at
maximum pressure expected during normal which the relief device is set to open under
system operation. service conditions.

13. Overpressure: 20. Shall

Overpressure is the pressure increase over the Indicates provisions that are mandatory in
set pressure of the relieving device allowed to nature.
achieve rated flow. Overpressure is expressed
in pressure units or as a percentage of set 21. Should
pressure.
Indicates that the provisions are
14. Pressure Relief Valve: recommendatory as per good engineering
practices.
It is a generic term applied to relief valves,
safety valves and safety relief valves. A
pressure relief valve is designed to

10
22. Superimposed back pressure: i) Reclosing type Safety/Pressure Relief
valves
Superimposed back pressure is the static a. Conventional
pressure that exists at the outlet of a pressure b. Balanced Pressure relief valves
relief device at the time the device is required c. Pilot-operated relief valves
to operate.

23. Surge Relief Valve: ii) Non Reclosing type Safety/Pressure

Relief Valves,
It is the quick responding pressure relief valve a. Rupture disk Device
provided to maintain the pressure so as not to b. Pin-actuated device
exceed the pre-set value (because of
overpressure in pipeline due to surge effect) by iii) Surge Relief Valves and
providing immediate relief of the excess iv) Emergency depressurisation Valves.
pressures from the line to the relieving system.
Details for different type of pressure relieving
4.0 NEED FOR RELIEVING SYSTEM
devices is given in Annexure IV.
The relieving of pressure from a process
system arises from a number of reasons as
5.2 SET PRESSURE OF RELIEF VALVES:
below:
Relief valves shall be set at 110% of the
i) To ensure a system is not allowed to
normal operating pressure to allow a
pressurise beyond its maximum allowable
reasonable margin so that the valves do not
working pressure, in order to avoid possible
open frequently with minor process upsets.
failure of the weakest part of the system.
The difference between the set pressure and
ii) For precautionary relieving of pressure from the normal operating pressure should not be
the system called as depressurisation. This is less than 2 Kg/CM2. This aspect shall be
applicable for high pressure and or high considered for selecting the design pressure
inventory systems which need to be of the equipment. The set pressure of various
depressurised during an emergency. Relief Valves shall be fixed based on criteria
given below:
iii) In the case of a fire, the maximum allowable
yield stress of the metal reduces significantly a) Pilot operated valves
due to increased temperature. Relieving Pilot operated valves shall be used:
pressure under these situations allows the
actual stresses to be reduced below the i) Where the margin between set
lowered maximum allowable stresses thereby pressure and maximum operating
pressure is less than 10% of the
preventing failure.
maximum operating pressure (as low
iv) To take care of thermal expansions when a as 5% is judged to be acceptable).
pipeline or equipment containing a liquid is ii) When the built-up backpressure is
blocked in and subsequently heated. expected to exceed 50 per cent of the
v) To protect the pipeline against surge pressure, set pressure.
a surge relief valve is provided. b) Surge relief valve:
i) Liquid Pipelines
5.0 PRESSURE RELIEVING / SAFETY
DEVICES The set pressure of the surge relief valve
in Liquid Pipelines and the required
There are basically four type of safety devices capacity needed to be relieved through
used for relieving pressure in a system. These surge relief valve shall be determined by
are: carrying out a surge analysis for
different probable scenarios under which

11
 a surge shall occur in the pipeline. The temperature versus stress to rupture and
set pressure shall be decided in such a applied generally to vessels with wall
way that the relieving pressure of the thickness of approximately 1 inch or more.
surge relief valve does not exceed 110% Vessels with thinner walls generally require a
of maximum operating pressure of the higher depressurising rate.
pipeline.
6.0 INSTALLATION OF SAFETY DEVICES
ii) Gas Pipelines
6.1 GENERAL
The set pressure of the surge relief valve
in Gas Pipelines to protect it from over
Relieving devices shall be installed directly
pressure shall be decided in order not to
on the equipment they are protecting or on
exceed the following limits:
the connected pipeline. However there shall
i. Set pressure shall be equal to 104% not be any valve in the piping between vessel
of maximum allowable operating and point where safety valve s installed on
pressure for a system with pipe/ the pipeline. These devices are best installed
pipeline components operating over on the top of vessels or at high points so as to
72% of the Specified Minimum Yield minimise and simplify the inlet piping.
Strength (SMYS). Following guidelines shall apply:
ii. Set pressure shall be 110% of (a) Inlet piping shall be adequately sized so
maximum allowable operating as to limit pressure drop between vessel
pressure for a system with pipe/ and safety valve to 3% of the set
pipeline components operating at or pressure on the inlet side.
below 72% of the Specified
Minimum Yield Strength (SMYS) (b) The discharge side including the header
other than in low pressure shall be sized so as to contain total back
distribution systems: pressure within permissible limits
depending upon the type of safety valve.
iii. For low pressure distribution systems,
the set pressure shall be a pressure (c) Inlet and outlet of a safety valve shall
that would otherwise cause unsafe not be less than the nominal sizes of
operation of any connected piping, inlet/outlet flanges respectively of the
equipment and discharge system. safety valve.
Rupture disc (d) Inlet and outlet (if pressure relieving
device is discharging to a closed system)
When rupture disc is used, the bursting
piping shall be free draining away from
pressure of the rupture disc and safety
the safety valve.
valve set pressure shall be kept at same
nominal value A pressure gauge/bleeder (e) The discharge line shall join the header
between rupture disc and relief valve from top and preferably at an angle of
helps to indicate the health of the rupture 45o to avoid high pressure drop.
disc.
(f) In vessels where there are chances of
c) Emergency Depressurising Valves: liquid carryover along with vapour in
the form of froth, mist, etc., the inlet line
For sizing of Emergency Depressurising
to safety valve and the outlet line from
Valves, generally involves reducing the
safety valve to the unit knock-
equipment pressure from initial conditions to a
out/Blowdown drum shall be sized
level equivalent to 50% of vessel design
based on two-phase flow.
pressure within approximately 15 minutes.
This criterion is based on the vessel wall
6.2 MULTIPLE RELIEF VALVES

12
 Multiple relief valves are required for hydro- A detailed examination of the service
carbon processing services, if the total conditions of the system shall be done and if
relieving capacity required cannot be the conditions are very critical, only then
provided in a single valve. Installation of spare safety valves shall be installed. Single
multiple relief valves allows staggered set isolation valve upstream and downstream of
points for each valve as recommended by API each safety valve shall be provided in such a
& ASME. When the required relieving case. Isolation valves on the inlet and outlet
capacity is provided in more than one of each safety valve shall be installed with
pressure-relieving device, only one device some provision for keeping the isolation
shall be set at the maximum allowable valves in open position with appropriate
working pressure, and the additional safety locking device. These isolation valves shall
valve shall be set at higher pressures. In no be installed with their stem pointing
case set pressure shall be higher than 105% of downwards or horizontal to avoid the
the maximum allowable operating pressure. possibility of a valve remaining stuck closed
If, however, the pressure relieving devices are in case the stem becomes free.
used for protection against fire or other
sources of external heat, the additional With the inclusion of isolation valves the
devices can be set at a pressure not exceeding number of flanges and total piping in the
121% of the maximum allowable operating system increase and thus, increased
pressure. possibility of leakages, inadvertent inclusion
of blinds and inadvertent closing of isolation
Multiple relief valves with staggered set valves on both the safety valves. Chances of
pressures are as such recommended to slip blinds remaining in position during
increase life of the valves and minimise construction and testing of the system are
leakage through the valves. A small leak due more when there is more number of flanges.
to operating pressure reaching above the set Therefore, spare safety valves shall not be
pressure will cause greater leakage in large installed unless absolutely necessary or are
valves. This, apart from leakage, also leads required by a statutory authority. In case it is
to chatter and reduced life of valves. provided, there shall be a written down
procedure of checking of such a system
6.3 SPARE SAFETY VALVES before start up

Spare safety valves are often installed to 7.0 CALCULATION OF RELIEVING

facilitate testing and maintenance of one LOADS
safety valve while the other is on line. As per 7.1 INDIVIDUAL LOADS
Static and Mobile Pressure Vessels (unfired)
Rules, 1981, every pressure vessel used for While determining individual relieving loads,
storage of compressed gases including following key points shall be considered:
liquefied petroleum gases shall be provided (a) Every piece of equipment that can
with two or more pressure relieving devices. generate a vapour or liquid load under any
These are also used for continuity of contingency must be recognised after
operation in case of safety valve does not doing a detailed analysis. No load shall be
reseat after popping. Isolation valves for a left unconsidered as being small.
single safety valve are provided to facilitate (b) A pressure relief valve handling a liquid at
maintenance if safety valve is designed for vapour equilibrium or a mixed-phase fluid
fire case, heat exchanger tube rupture case or will produce flashing with vapour
thermal expansion case. The spare safety generation as the fluid moves through the
valve. This will reduce the effective mass
valve should be kept isolated by closing the
flow capacity of the valve and must be
inlet valve.

13
 taken into account. The latest edition of reliable power supply, the failure of one cooling
API-521, shall be referred to for water system shall call for grouping the relieving
estimating the loads of safety valves under loads from only those plants which are served by
such conditions. this cooling water system.
(c) While calculating the load for a safety
valve under fire condition, following key It is important that a complete analysis of various
points shall be considered: contingencies that shall occur in the complex be
(i) No credit shall be taken for the done and their overall effect recognised very
insulation provided on the vessel. carefully while estimating the relieving loads for
(ii) No credit shall be taken for safety the entire complex.
devices such as shutdown switches,
solenoid valves, etc, as such devices 7.3 Reduction of flare load:
shall be assumed to fail in the case of a
fire. If, on the other hand, a positive High Integrity Pressure Protection System
action of safety device (e.g. emergency (HIPPS) shall be considered in design of pressure
steam into heater coils) will add to the relieving system along with mechanical relief
relief load, it would be assumed to system for over pressure protection while going
function. for De-bottlenecking of existing flare systems due
to following:
7.2 GROUPING OF RELIEVING LOADS

Additional load on existing flare system due
7.2.1 Plant-wise to:

The individual loads estimated as above shall be • Expansion/ up gradation of the existing
grouped together for various contingencies in units
order to design the relieving system components • Connecting atmospheric relief valves to
downstream of the safety valves. A table listing flare for existing units
such loads shall be prepared for each plant or • Addition of new process units
facility in the complex considering various
Excessive relief device back pressure
contingencies. From this table the governing load
Excessive vessel accumulation/ over pressure

High flare thermal radiation levels
for the plant is based on the contingency which

High flare noise levels
gives the maximum load. HIPPS shall be applied for vessels that require
external heat input (fractionation Columns),
7.2.2 Complex-wise reactor vessels (Hydro-treaters) where crash
cooling or isolation of feed is required to prevent
In a big complex, where a number of individual runway reaction, columns where rapid
plants and facilities are connected to a common depressurisation is required in case of run away
relief system, the relieving load for the entire reactions (eg hydro-cracker and hydro-treaters) to
complex has to be estimated considering the simultaneously reduce pressure and remove heat,
relieving loads for individual plant or facilities as as safety valve will be ineffective.
mentioned earlier. Grouping of the individual
plant loads shall be done very judiciously based on While finalising the HIPPS, designer shall
ensure that the MAWP of the vessel is greater
the utility system design of the complex.
than the highest pressure that can be
reasonably expected to be achieved by the
For example, if a common cooling water system system. A detailed analysis of credible over
serves a number of plants, the relieving loads from pressure scenarios shall be conducted before
all such plants shall be added together in case of deciding on use of HIPPS. Refer Annexure-III
cooling water failure. for brief write up on HIPPS.

If, however, there are more than one cooling water 8.0 DISPOSAL SYSTEM
system in the complex each fed by independent

14
 The purpose of a disposal system is to (c) The vent of relief valve shall discharge at a
channelize the relieved gas or liquid to a safe minimum elevation of 3 meters above grade
location where it does not pose any hazard to or the tallest structure, within a radius of 15
human life, property or to the environment. meters, whichever is higher.
In some situations, the relieved vapours can (d) Individual vents shall have a drain hole of
safely be discharged to atmosphere directly. 1/2” at the low point in the vent line. The
The choice of an appropriate disposal system drain connection shall be piped to a safe
will depend on the nature of relieved fluid location.
and other local conditions.
(e) If the relieved vapours produce excessive
8.1 ATMOSPHERIC DISCHARGE noise at the nearest operating structure, the
vent line shall be provided with acoustic
The decision to discharge relieved vapours to insulation. Silencers shall not be used as they
atmosphere requires careful attention to are likely to block the outlet due to fouling,
ensure that disposal can be accomplished etc.
without creating a potential hazard or causing
other problems, such as the formation of 8.2 CLOSED DISPOSAL SYSTEM
flammable mixture at grade level or on
elevated structures, exposure of personnel to All hydrocarbons, toxic vapour and liquid
toxic vapours or corrosive chemicals, ignition releases shall be discharged through a closed
of relieved stream at the point of emission, disposal system like flare, vent scrubber,
excessive noise levels and air pollution. incinerator or a blowdown drum as the case shall
be. The primary function of a flare or incinerator
No hydrocarbon and other toxic releases shall is to convert flammable, toxic or corrosive
be discharged to atmosphere directly. vapours to less objectionable compounds by
However, in certain situation like marketing combustion.
installations, LPG bottling plants and other
remotely located installations where Toxic vapours like SO2, phenol, chlorine, etc.
hydrocarbons are stored and handled and no which cannot be converted to less objectionable
flare or other closed disposal systems are compounds by combustion shall be disposed off
feasible, the relieved vapours can be through a vent scrubber using caustic soda, water
discharged to atmosphere. In such case or other suitable agents as the case shall be. Refer
following key points shall be considered Section 8.5 for details of scrubbers.
while routing PSV discharge to atmosphere:
8.3 DESIGN OF CLOSED DISPOSAL
(a) The individual relief valve vent shall SYSTEM
discharge to atmosphere in upward direction,
so sized that minimum exit velocity of 150 Once the various combinations of loads have been
meter/sec would be obtained. The maximum defined for all pertinent contingencies and the
velocity shall not exceed 0.5 mach. If corresponding allowable back pressure has been
feasible, snuffing steam shall be connected to determined for all relief valves, selection and
the vents. Under these conditions, the air design of various components of the disposal
entrainment rate is very high and the released system can proceed as below:
gases will then be diluted to below their
lower flammable limit. 8.3.1 Gathering Network
(b) A single common vent shall not be used for
several relief valves because this results in a Individual relief valve discharges and other vents
discharge velocity much less than the shall be combined and piped to a flare or a vent
designed discharge velocity when only one scrubber as the case shall be. All laterals and
safety valve is operating. headers shall be free draining away from the safety

15
valves towards a knock-out drum with a minimum Wherever the discharge from a unit is expected to
slope of 1 in 500. All laterals shall join the header contain appreciable quantities of liquids, especially
from top. Flare header shall be continuously corrosive, fouling and congealing in nature, a
purged from any convenient location to avoid air Knock-out (K.O) drum of suitable size must be
ingress in to the system. Fuel gas, inert gas and installed at the battery limit of each such unit with
nitrogen are commonly used as purge material. flare line sloping towards the K.O. drum. Unit
Steam shall not be used as a purge material K.O. drum is required if the layout of the units is
because it condenses in the system and create such that it is not feasible to have a continuous
vacuum. Purge gas velocity shall be between 0.05 sloping of the flare header(s) towards the main
ft/sec. to 0.1 ft/sec. as measured at the flare stack flare K.O drum. The liquid collected in these
for flare systems having gas seals at the flare stack drums shall be drained/ pumped to a suitable
tip. disposal system like a closed blowdown drum or
slop system and not to open drains, while the
The network shall have adequate expansion loops vapours are led to the flare header.
to account for the temperature range of the
released material. Where probability of viscous These drums shall be sized to separate particles of
material carry over along with relief valve release 300 - 600 micron size and designed to hold the
exists, ` adequate design considerations shall be liquid discharge expected for 5 - 10 minutes from
taken to avoid solidification in the downstream a single contingency. Gravity draining of liquid
pipelines e.g. the lines shall be heat traced. from these drums to the unit closed blowdown
drum etc. shall be preferred. Alternatively, two
8.3.2 Unit Isolation Valves pumps each sized to empty out the drum hold up in
20-30minutes shall be provided. These pumps
Large complexes have many units feeding to a shall start/stop automatically at high/low level in
common flare system. Since units must be the drum respectively and shall have provision for
isolated from rest of the complex for maintenance, emergency power backup or alternate drive.
isolation valves with blinds at the battery limits of
units shall be provided. These isolation valves These drums shall also be provided with High and
shall be installed with their stems pointing low level alarms and level indicator in the
downwards so as to minimise the chances of respective control rooms. If a congealing type of
accidental closure. liquid is likely to be handled, these drums shall be
heat traced or provided with steam coils.
Strict procedures should be in place that will
prohibit inadvertent closing of isolation valves in 8.3.4 Cryogenic Discharges
relief piping. These procedures should require that
Cold liquid and vapour discharges pose additional
the opening and closing of the valves be done by
problems of metallurgy. Such releases shall be
authorized person.
handled separately before they join the main flare
header. Liquid discharges at sub-zero temperature
An updated list should be kept for all isolation
shall be piped to a separate drum provided with
valves located in relief piping system which could
suitable vaporizing system. Care shall be taken
isolate relief valves. Documentation of the
that the heating medium, usually steam, does not
required position and reason for the lock or seal
get frozen by the extreme cold. If it is not feasible
should be provided. Periodic inspection of
to vaporize/heat the cold discharged material, the
isolation valves located in relief piping should be
entire flare piping design shall be of suitable
made which verify the position of the valves and
material compatible with the service conditions.
the condition of locking or sealing device.
Under such situations it is more economical to
segregate cryogenic discharges from the main flare
8.3.3 Unit Knock-out Drum header.

16
8.3.5 Main Flare Header In addition to the unit K.O drums, a main flare
K.O. drum shall be installed close to the flare
The main flare header collects the material stack. This takes care of any liquids condensed
relieved through safety valves for safe discharge to due to atmospheric cooling of the headers.
the flare stack for combustion. If unit K.O. drums
are provided the flare headers downstream need be Horizontal and vertical drums are both acceptable.
sized only for vapour flow. If there is substantial Due to high vapour flow rates, split flow
difference between the allowable back pressures of horizontal drums are usually economical. The
different safety valves, separate flare headers shall drums shall be sized to separate out liquid droplets
be provided for high pressure and low pressure of 300-600 microns size. Heavy entrainment of
streams. The flare header shall be so sized that the liquid shall lead to fire balls from the flare stack
back pressure at the outlet of any safety valve does falling on the grade which can lead to serious
not exceed the maximum permissible value. consequences. The K.O. drums should be sized
to provide liquid hold up of 20-30 minutes.
The flare header shall not have any pocket and Two pumps, one running and one standby shall be
shall be free draining towards the nearest K.O. provided to pump out the liquid collected in the
drum. A slope of 1 in 500 is normally K.O drum to a safe location. Pump capacity shall
recommended. No check valves shall be permitted be such that the liquid hold up can be emptied out
in the flare header system. in 20-30 minutes. Provision of emergency drive
(steam turbine or alternate source of power) shall
If the liquids to be handled include oil with a be given so that these pumps can be operated
relatively high pour point, provision shall be made during the failure of normal power supply. The
to avoid solidification in the system. Likewise, the pumps shall be designed to start automatically on
introduction of high viscosity oils shall require high liquid level and stop on low level. It shall
protection against low ambient temperatures, also be possible to start/stop these pumps from
particularly on instrument leads. Use of heat remote control room.
tracing is recommended under such situations. These drums also shall be provided with High and
H2S is corrosive and if handled together with the low level alarms and level indicator in the
main flare header, it will lead to corrosion of the respective control rooms. Gas detectors
header. It shall have a separate flare header of (Hydrocarbon, H2S etc) shall be provided for
material suitable to handle acid gases. detection of any leak near flare K.O. Drum and
connected pumps.
Sizing of flare headers is usually done on pressure
drop considerations. However, a check shall be Selection of internals for the K.O. drum shall be
made to ensure that the maximum velocity in the given a careful consideration. Internals that shall
header is 0.5 mach i.e. below the sonic velocity. clog or otherwise foul up shall not be used.
In many situations, the emergency discharge is at Vortex breakers shall be used in the liquid outlet
high temperatures, and flare header runs many lines. Adequate arrangements shall be made to
hundred meters. This results in the loss of flare handle congealing liquids. Heating coils in the
gas temperature due to heat loss to metal and K.O. drum, tracing of liquid lines with steam or
surroundings. In order to estimate the total electric tracers shall be considered. Under these
pressure drop in the flare header, the total header circumstances, K.O. drums shall be sized for a
length shall be divided in to a number of small min. design pressure of 3.5 Kg/cm2g.
sections say 100 meters or so and pressure drop in
each such section shall be estimated taking in to
account the change in vapour density in each
section.
8.3.7 Seal drums
8.3.6 Main Flare Knock-out Drum

17
Seal Drums together with provision for purging skim off any oil that get accumulated in water seal
and the installation of flare seals provide adequate drum.
protection against flash back from the flare tip. Intermittent bubbling through the seal dip leg
Seal drums integral with flare stack are commonly sometimes causes problems of flame pulsation or
used. Otherwise these vertical drums shall be low frequency flare noise. The normal seal drum
mounted as close to the flare stack as possible. design includes a serrated edge at the base of the
dip leg to allow progressively larger opening for
Refer fig.1 for details of a typical seal drum. gas flow as the pressure and flow increase.
Some use flame arrestors in the flare header close
to the stack to guard against any flash back. Such In cold places where there is possibility of freezing
devices are likely to get blocked or fouled up of water in the water seal drum, a steam coil shall
resulting in higher back pressures in the flare be provided in the drum to keep water warmed up.
header. Sometimes they shall completely block A level gauge and high and low level alarm also
the header. Also their inspection is very difficult. shall be provided on the seal Drum. Effluent water
For these reason, flame arrestors shall not be used from water seals must be routed to ETP/safe
in the flare system. means of disposal, considering possible hazards
arising from liquid or vapour hydrocarbons or
The seal drum shall have a cross sectional area at toxic materials that shall be entrained or dissolved
least equal to 4 times the inlet pipe cross sectional in the water.
area and be designed for 3.5 Kg/CM2g as
minimum. The inlet pipe shall drop vertically 8.3.8 Flare Stack
down for at least 3 meters above the water level to
avoid ingress of air in to the system due to vacuum Flare stack are usually elevated structures designed
created when hot vapours cool off. In the event of to burn out flammable vapours safely so as to
a flash back, a 3 meter slug of water is pressed cause minimal damage to environment, population
back in to the vertical inlet piping thus preventing and property. Such flare stacks are usually
an explosion from propagating further upstream. associated with a certain amount of smoke, noise
Enough water must be stored in the vessel so that and glare which are considered to be public
seal does not break under such conditions. This nuisances.
might necessitate an increase of the drum dia.
Maximum allowable back pressure in the header Of late, ground, box or enclosed flares have
will decide the maximum submergence of inlet become popular to minimise public nuisance
pipe under the seal. A minimum seal of 100 mm is problems. These flares are, however, complex
recommended. As a standard design practice, pieces of heavily instrumented equipment. These
maximum seal height shall not exceed 300 mm. shall be used to burn off completely only the
normal flaring loads which are usually small.
Water shall be continuously added to the seal drum These shall not be used as means of disposal of
and the overflow shall be automatic through a emergency loads. The box flare load shall never
liquid seal leg. As a minimum, the leg height shall exceed its rated capacity during emergency. These
be equal to 1.75 times the maximum expected must always be backed up by elevated stacks
operating pressure (not design pressure). The which automatically take over the emergency
vertical down flow section of the water outlet line loads. The switching of loads between the
from the drum is sized for maximum velocity of elevated and box flares shall be accomplished by
0.12 m/s to allow entrained gases to disengage. means of appropriate water seals.
The seal loop shall be sized for the normal water
flow of 6.0 m3/hr. All lines connecting K.O. Smokeless flaring shall be achieved by proper
drums, seal drums and the flare stack shall be free selection of flare tips and use of steam or air.
of pockets. The seal leg shall be provided with a Smokeless flaring shall conform to measurement
1½” siphon breaker. Provision shall be made to through Ringler charts (typically Ringler 1).

18
Flare stack diameter is usually based on maximum The H2S flare system should consist of a
allowable velocity which shall be considered as segregated header routed up the side of a
0.2 Mach for normal loads and 0.5 Mach for short conventional elevated flare stack sharing the same
time emergency loads. Flare stacks shall also be structure, Flare elevations must be sufficient to
provided with gas seals to prevent flash back and meet atmospheric pollution and ground level
cutdown the purge gas rates. concentration requirements for the sulphur dioxide
produced. A flashback protection is required for
The stack height shall be based on the maximum H2S flaring systems and usually a continuous gas
allowable radiation level as per the latest available purge is given. For H2S flare K.O. drum shall be
edition of API 521 at the nearest location which installed close to the flare stack and designed as
can be ground level or other elevated structures per requirement given in 8.3.6 for main flare
For our country, where solar radiation is knock out drum. The flare stack shall be located at
comparatively much higher (about 300 BTU/hr.
a safe distance from plant and storage area and
ft2), the radiation level as given in latest edition of
API-521, shall be considered inclusive of solar also from public roads and property as stipulated
radiation. While calculating the height of the flare in OISD STD-118 on “Layout for Oil & Gas
stack for ensuring ground level radiation, no credit Installations” for separation distances.
for attenuation of radiation while passing through
the atmosphere shall be taken and air shall be 8.3.10 Pilot Igniters
considered to be a transparent gas for this purpose.
To ensure ignition of flare gases, continuous pilots
In some situations (for example cold flaring), with a means of remote ignition are recommended
ground level concentrations of flare gas will for all flares. The most commonly used type of
govern the height of stack. All the applicable igniters is the flame-front propagation type, which
pollution standards shall be followed while use a spark from a remote location to ignite a
finalising the height of flare stack. flammable mixture. Igniters control panel shall be
located away from the base of elevated flares. The
The flare stack shall be located at a minimum igniter panel shall be sufficiently away from flare
distance of 90 meters from plant and storage area stack and shall be provided with a canopy to
and also from public roads and property as protect men and equipment from liquid spill or
stipulated in OISD STD-118 on “Layout for Oil & thermal radiation.
Gas Installations” for separation distances. When
two or more flares are provided, the separation 8.3.11 Standby Flare
distance between them must be checked for
allowable radiation consideration as mentioned Various units, storage and handling facilities of a
above. complex shall be connected to a single flare. It
must be recognised that flare stack and the
It is necessary to have sterile area around the flare associated auxiliaries do require some inspection
stack, free of grass and other vegetation growth to and maintenance, for which these may not be
avoid any fire hazard by falling of burning available. If all the process units, storage, handling
material from the stack. No permanent structure/ and other facilities which are connected to the flare
shelter shall be allowed in this area. system are not shutdown together and some
facilities are operative, a standby flare with
The flare area shall be adequately covered with appropriate isolation devices shall be provided.
Fire Water network in line with OISD STD 116 Alternatively, the entire load from a complex shall
requirement. be suitably distributed among two or more flares
so that each one of them can be inspected/ repaired
8.3.9 Flaring of H2S streams during partial shutdown of the complex.
Continuous releases of concentrated H2S streams
shall be segregated in a separate flare system to
limit the extent of fouling and plugging problems. 8.3.12 Flare Gas Recovery Systems

19
 go fully open upon a higher-than-normal
Environmental and economic considerations have header pressure, high-oxygen content, or
resulted in the use of flare gas recovery systems to when the compressors are unloaded or
capture and compress flare gases for other uses. shutdown.
Many times the recovered flare gas is treated and 9) The flare gas recovery system shall not be
routed to the refinery fuel gas system. Depending installed within 90 m radius of flare stack.
upon flare gas composition, recovered gas can 10) The possibility of significant liquid in flare
have other uses. systems is usually quite high. Liquid-
Considering the criticality of flare gas recovery knockout vessels shall be provided for the
system in the refinery operation, it shall be compressors with automatic shut down of
installed after careful review and design shall the compressors on high suction-drum
ensure the following: levels.
11) Flare-gas-recovery systems operate over
1) The flare gas recovery system shall be wide ranges, usually within very narrow
designed as a side stream from the flare header suction pressure bands. The flare-gas-
and Main flare gas flow shall not be through recovery compressors shall be equipped with
any compressor knock out or suction piping. several stages of un-loaders and a
This is compressor-recycle valve. Suction pressure
to ensure that flare gases have clear flow is maintained by pressure control of a
path available all the time. recycle valve, with additional loading and
2) Flare gas recovery systems shall be located unloading of the compressors when limits of
on the Main-flare header downstream of all valve opening or closing or suction pressure
unit header tie-ins. The location of flare gas are reached. Usually, the controls are set up
recovery system shall be such that header to sequentially load and unload the
pressure does not vary substantially at this compressors.
point with load.
3) Locations upstream of process unit tie-ins 8.4 DISPOSAL OF HEAVY LIQUIDS AND
shall be carefully considered to rule out any NON-CONDENSABLE VAPOURS
potential of back-flow and high-oxygen
concentrations. 8.4.1 General
4) The tie-in line to the flare gas recovery
system shall come off the top of the flare
If a unit has a sizable amount of relieving load
line to minimize the possibility of liquid
entrance. consisting of heavy and fouling type of liquids and
5) The protection for back flow of air from the non-condensable vapours, it is desirable to have
flare into the compressors at low flare-gas separate disposal system dedicated to such safety
loads shall be considered. Oxygen content of valves which discharge liquids and/or non-
the flare gas stream shall be measured and condensable vapours. In addition to the provision
interlock shall be provided to shut down the of section 8.1 on “Atmospheric Discharge” or the
flare gas compressors if potentially provision of Section 8.3 on design of “Closed
dangerous conditions exist. Disposal System”, as the case may be, the
6) The gases which are not compatible with the following guidelines shall apply for disposal under
flare gas-treating systems or ultimate
these situations:
destinations must be routed directly to flare
stack bypassing the flare gas recovery
system. 8.4.2 Cold and Heavy Hydrocarbon Discharge
7) Protection against back flow of air from the
flare into the flare-gas recovery system shall Heavy Hydrocarbons which are not expected to
be provided. Provision to detect reverse flow vaporize at atmospheric pressures and operating
and automatically shut down the flare gas temperatures must be discharged through a closed
recovery system shall be provided. system to a blowdown drum. If the hydrocarbons
8) If a control valve must be used in the flare are highly viscous or would solidify at ambient
line to regulate flare-gas recovery system temperatures, the piping, valves, etc. in the system
suction pressure, the control valve shall be
shall be heat traced. The blowdown drum shall be
of a fail-open design and be interlocked to

20
sized to hold the largest liquid relief for 5-10 operating liquid-full. For these cases, relief rate
minutes. The liquid from the drum can be pumped calculation and TRV size checking are
to slop system. The design criteria for pumps and recommended. TRV provided on cooling water
the instrument details shall be similar to that return line from water coolers shall be ¾” X1”
mentioned under 8.3.3 on “Unit Knock-out with its discharge open to atomosphere.
Drums”. The blowdown drum shall be connected Usually any location on a pipe or equipment is
to flare. A steam coil and temperature indicator suitable for installing a TRV limited by suitable
shall be provided in the drum, if the liquid discharge route. A TRV shall be located on a pipe
discharged is heavy and congealing type. This rather than on the equipment if both belong to the
relief blowdown drum can be combined with the same blocked in system and at the lowest elevation
closed drain system of the units. Under these /platforms for ease of maintenance.
situations, the drum shall be located underground TRVs shall be relieved to closed blowdown vessel
and vented to atmosphere with a steam purge. See in process units and in closed/open blowdown
fig.-2. system in offsite & lines used for water service. A
TRV discharge can be connected to a vessel where
8.4.3 Hot and Heavy Hydrocarbons Discharges the particular liquid is stored.

Heavy hydrocarbons, which, because of high 8.4.5 Discharge from Relief Valves of Pumps
temperatures, might be expected to evolve a large
amount of vapour, shall be discharged to a quench Discharge of liquids from safety/relief valves on
drum. Such a system with relevant details is the discharges of pumps shall be returned to the
depicted in figure-3. The quench drum is a suction line or suction vessel from which the pump
vertical vessel fitted with baffles and is connected takes suction.
by means of a conical transition to flare header.
The hot hydrocarbon material is fed in to the drum 8.5 DISPOSAL OF TOXIC/ CORROSIVE
below the baffles. Suitable quenching medium FLUIDS
like water or gas oil etc. is sprayed at the top of 8.5.1 General
baffles under temperature control. The cooled
hydrocarbon liquid along with the quench material If the relieved fluids which are to be
is drawn from the bottom of the drum and discharged are of toxic or corrosive nature
disposed off to sewer. and does not burn effectively in a flare, such
The uncondensed vapours along with any steam fluids shall be disposed off after scrubbing/
formed, passes up the quench drum to flare header. neutralising thoroughly.
The vapour line from the drum to the flare shall be
sized properly to take care of any steam formed. Such disposal systems typically use a
neutralising agent either as a large pool or
8.4.4 Thermal Relief Discharges spray in contact tower. The type of relieved
material involved and the choice of
When piping, vessels and exchangers are isolated scrubbing/ neutralising agent and disposal
with cold liquids blocked within and are system shall be considered from case to case.
subsequently heated by heat tracing or other means Table-1 gives a list of some typical relieved
of heat input, hydraulic expansion takes place materials along with the type of disposal
which can cause serious failures. In most systems, system.
a thermal relief valve (TRV) usually of ¾ x 1”
nominal size shall be used to take care of this 8.5.2 Design Considerations
phenomenon, even though it is commonly
oversized. Two general applications where TRVs From metallurgy considerations to handle
are larger than ¾ x 1” valves are long pipelines of corrosive materials and to reduce the load on
large diameter in uninsulated, above ground scrubbing system, the discharge of toxic and
installations and large vessels or exchangers corrosive chemicals shall be piped separately

21
 from other hydrocarbon discharges. The temperature of equipment in depressurisation
system capacity shall take care of the largest loop shall be taken into account for proper
release of the toxic materials. metallurgy.

(a) Neutralisation in Pool Off gases containing oxygen from vessels

shall not be routed to flare. Instead it should
In a scrubbing system consisting of a pool of be connected to nearby heater/ incinerator.
appropriate liquid, the discharged vapours Example bitumen blowing Unit.
will pass in to the liquid pool through a well
designed sparger supported at the bottom of 9.2 EXPOSURE TO FIRE
liquid pool. The liquid level in the pool When a vessel under pressure is exposed to
containing neutralising agent shall always be fire, the metal temperature can reach a level
maintained. Whenever the liquid strength at which stress rupture of the vessel could
gets exhausted after a release, the liquid shall occur, even though the pressure does not go
be replaced. beyond the relief valve set pressure.
Emergency depressurising systems are
(b) Neutralisation in a Spray Tower recommended for rapidly removing vapours
from vessels exposed to a fire. A typical
The disposal system will consist of a spray vapour-depressurising system shall reduce the
tower instead of a pool. Such a tower is pressure in the vessel to 50% of the design
provided with baffles. The pressure in 15 minutes. Following three
scrubbing/neutralising liquid is circulated effects shall be considered while estimating
from the bottom of the tower to the top by the amount of vapours to be handled by the
means of a pump. Any vapour released in to emergency depressurising system:
the spray tower will react with circulating
liquid before getting released to flare/ — Vapours generated from liquid by heat
atmosphere. See figure-4 for a typical spray input from fire.
tower. Design shall ensure its continuous
— A change in density of internal vapour due
operation in any contingency.
to reduction on pressure.
9.0 VAPOUR DEPRESSURISING — Liquid flash due to pressure reduction,
when the system contains liquids at its
The vapours from hydrocarbon emergency saturation temperature.
depressurising system shall be routed to the
closed disposal system as described in 9.3 DISPOSAL OF DEPRESSURISED
Section 8.0. MATERIAL

9.1 RUNAWAY REACTIONS The vapours from hydrocarbon emergency

depressurising system shall be routed to the
In some processes like hydro-cracking, closed disposal system as described in
reforming and oxidation process there is a Section 8.0.
likelihood of a runaway reaction leading to
sudden rise in system pressure and/or 10.0 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE DATA SHEET
temperature. In such situations emergency
depressurising systems are recommended to It is important that all the relevant process
be used in addition to relief valves. The data for the pressure relieving devices be
depressurising system drops the system furnished in the form of a standard data sheet.
pressure rapidly through a pressure control A sample sheet of Safety/Relief valve data
valve. Such discharges shall be lead to the sheet is given as Annexure-I
closed disposal system like flare etc. Design 11.0 RELIEF SYSTEM RECORD

22
 A record of all the relief valves and the other
components of the relief system e.g. headers, 1. API 520. Recommended Practice for the
pump, vessels, etc. shall be kept This record Design and Installation of Pressure-Relieving
shall be reviewed before undertaking any Systems in Refineries,
modifications in the plant facilities which are
2. API 521. Guide for Pressure-Relieving and
likely to increase the relieving load from the
Depressuring System
plant. Such a review of the relief system is
important when increasing the plant capacity, 3. Static and Mobile Pressure Vessels (unfired)
major changes in operating conditions or Rules
addition of some equipment for better energy 4. OISD-118, Layout of Petroleum Installations.
recovery or other considerations are being
planned. From safety considerations, it is 5. Paper on High Integrity Pressure Protection
imperative that sizing calculations for Systems (HIPPS) Published in Chemical
pressure relieving and disposal devices shall Engineering Progress, November 2000
be made a part of permanent plant record. A 6. Instrument Engineers Handbook Volume 3
sample sheet showing the record of a safety
7. ASME B31.4 (Pipeline transportation system
valve is given here as Annexure-II. Records
for liquid hydrocarbon and other liquids)
for other components of the relief system
shall also be made on similar lines. 8. ASME B31.8 (Gas transmission &
distribution piping system)

12.0 REFERENCES

23
 Table - 1

TOXIC/ CORROSIVE CHEMICALS

Relieved Material Scrubbing/Neutralising Agent Type of Treatment

1. Sulphur Oxides Soln. of lime or soda ash Scrubbing

2. Ammonia Water Absorption in pool of water

3. Chlorine Soln. of soda ash or lime Absorption in large pool of alkali.

4. Phenols Alkaline water (pH=8.5) Scrubbing

5. Furfural Water Scrubbing

6. Glycols Water Absorption in pool of water

7. Nitrogen Oxides Soln. of caustic soda Scrubbing

8. Sulpholane Water Scrubbing

9. Amines Water Scrubbing

10. MEK Water Scrubbing

24
 ANNEXURE-I

-
SAFETY VALVE PROCESS DATA SHEET
Rev. No.
Page of
PROJECT CLIENT
UNIT JOB NO. UNIT NO.
TAG NO.
SERVICE
LOCATION
FLUID
FLUID STATE @ SV INLET

OPERATING TEMPERATURE DEGC

RELIEVING TEMPERATURE DEGC

OPERATING PRESSURE KG/CM2 G

SET PRESSURE KG/CM2G

MAXIMUM BACK PRESSURE KG/CM2G

BACK PRESSURE CONSTANT/ VARIABLE

% OVER PRESSURE
BASIS OF SELECTION
VALVE DISCHARGE TO
DATA AT SV INLET
REQUIRED DISCHARGE CAPACITY
LIQUID
VAPOUR/GAS
LIQUID PROPERTIES @ REL. TEMP.
DENSITY KG/M3
VISCOSITY CP
GAS AND VAPOUR PROPERTIES
MOLECULAR
WEIGHT
COMPRESSIBILITY FACTOR
CP/CV
FOR GAS FILLED VESSEL UNDER FIRE

VESSEL SURFACE AREA M2

VESSEL WALL TEMPERATURE DEG C

CORROSIVE
CONSTITUENTS
NOTE NO.
NOTES

Prepared Reviewed
Date Purpose Approved By
Rev.No. By By

25
 ANNEXURE II

TAG NO._______________________

SAFETY RELIEF VALVE RECORD

Vessels or Equipment Protected___________________________________________________

CODE: ASME POWER BOILER/ASME UNFIRED PRESSURE VESSELS/API RP 520

Operating PR___________________Relieving PR_____________Accumulation____________

Design PR:_____________________
Constant Back Pressure__________________Variable Back Pressure______________(MAX)
Spring Set Pressure___________________Valve Type: Conventional/Bellows_____________
Fluid_______________________(Vapour/Liquid) sp.gr./Mol.Wt_________________________
Latent Heat__________________Temp-Operating___________________Relieving________
Special Requirements__________________________________________________________

BASIS FOR SIZING

CONDITION REQD.CAPACITY CONDITION REQD.CAPACITY

Fire _______________ Power Failure _______________
Block Outlet _______________ Cooling Water Loss _______________
Tube Failure _______________ Reflux Loss _______________
Control Failure _______________ Liquid Expansion _______________

REQUIRED AREA

As Per API 520:...............................................................................................................................

Area of Valve Selected....................................................................................................................

26
 ANNEXURE III

High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS)

High Integrity Pressure Protection System (HIPPS) is a Safety Instrumented System (SIS) that is designed to
provide overpressure protection that is at least equivalent in reliability to a mechanical relief device. HIPPS
involve an arrangement of instruments, final control elements (eg Valves, Switches etc) and logic solvers
configured in the manner designed to avoid over pressurising incidents by removing the source of
overpressure or reducing the probability of an over pressure contingency to such a low level that it is no
longer considered to be credible case. With appropriate levels of redundancy, HIPPS shall be designed to
achieve a level of availability equal to or greater than a mechanical relief device.

HIPPS shall be considered in design of pressure relieving system along with mechanical relief system for over
pressure protection to:

1) Eliminate a particular overpressure scenario from the flare design basis.

2) Eliminate the need for a particular relief device,
3) Provide system overpressure protection where a relief device is ineffective,
4) Reduce probability that several relief devices will have to operate simultaneously, thereby allowing
for reduction in the size of the disposal system,
5) Reduce the demand rate on relief device consequently reducing the risk.
6) Reduce risk for high risk process units (eg those involving toxic materials).
7) To achieve high level of protection in some cases where it can be used in concert with relief device.

While finalising incorporation of HIPPS, following shall also be considered:

1) The cost of ownership and routine testing of HIPPS versus routine pressure relieving device
maintenance.
2) Careful analysis shall also be made of the response of the process to the operation of the HIPPS.
3) The inadvertent operation of HIPPS can sometimes lead to major shut down and thus incur the
hazards associated with the shutdown and subsequent start ups.

Once HIPPS design configuration is finalised, it shall be analysed to verify that the specified components and
arrangements will meet the safety integrity level (SIL) requirement.

27
 ANNEXURE IV
TYPES OF PRESSURE RELIEVING / SAFETY DEVICES

1. RECLOSING TYPE SAFETY/PRESSURE RELIEF VALVES

1.1. Conventional

Conventional pressure relief valve is a spring loaded pressure relief valve whose operational
characteristics are directly affected by changes in the back pressure. These safety/relief valves are
susceptible to both superimposed and built-up back pressure and are not recommended when the total
back pressure exceeds 10% of the set pressure

1.2. Balanced Pressure relief valves

Balanced pressure relief valve is a spring loaded pressure relief valve that incorporates bellows or other
means for minimizing the effect of back pressure on the operational characteristics of the valve.
Balanced Bellow valves are not susceptible to back pressure and can be used for back pressure up to 50%
of set pressure.

1.3. Pilot-operated relief valves

A pilot operated pressure relief valve is a pressure relief valve in which the major relieving device or
main valve is combined with and controlled by a self actuated auxiliary pressure relief valve (pilot). In
pilot-operated safety valves, the main safety valve opens through a pilot valve

These relief valves essentially employ a self actuated auxiliary (pilot) pressure relief valve to control
main pressure relieving device (main valve) which results in keeping system operating pressure within
5% of set pressure without the danger of increased seat leakage in the main valve. Pilots are generally
designed with a separate control for set pressure and blow-down. Valves can be set to open fully at the
set pressure and close with very short blow down. Modulating designs are available to take care of minor
overpressure conditions without fully opening main valve to limit fluid loss and shock. Pilot operated
valves result in lower valve sizes and reduced costs.

Pilot operated valves are provided with filters to protect against foreign matter and are used for relatively
clean service (non-plugging, non-freezing).

2. NON-RECLOSING PRESSURE RELIEF VALVE:

2.1. Rupture disk Device:

Rupture disk Valve is a non-reclosing pressure relief device actuated by static differential pressure
between inlet and outlet of the device and designed to function by bursting of the disc. Ruptures Discs
are thin metal diaphragms held between flanges and are designed to burst at the set pressure. Once
burst, these are not reusable and have to be replaced. Their set pressure cannot be tested without
destroying them. After the test, the rupture disc has to be replaced but there is no guarantee that the
second rupture disc will burst at the same pressure. This is a major disadvantage of rupture disc,
especially when the bursting pressure is low. For these reasons, rupture discs alone shall not be used.
However, they shall be used between the vessel and a relief/safety valve for fluid of highly corrosive,
congealing or fouling nature and also vacuum systems. Prolonged exposure of safety valve directly to
such conditions can cause damage to valve components. Another area where rupture discs shall be
installed at the safety valve on top of column/ vessels operating under vacuum where leakage across

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 safety valve can lead to pressurization of column/ vessel. Suitable mechanism shall be provided to
monitor the pressure across rupture disk to identify its bursting.

2.2. Pin-actuated Device:

A non-reclosing pressure relief device actuated by static pressure and designed to function by
buckling or breaking of the pin, which holds a piston or a plug in place. Upon buckling or breaking of
the pin, the piston or plug instantly moves to full open position.

3. EMERGENCY DEPRESSURISATION VALVES

When metal temperature is increased above the specific design temperature due to fire or exothermic
or runaway reactions, the metal temperature can reach a level at which stress rupture can occur. This
is possible even though the system pressure does not exceed the maximum allowable accumulation.
Emergency depressurisation valves are provided in high pressure systems to quickly depressurise the
system during operational emergencies. These valves do not have specific set point and are part of
shut down logic. These valves can also be operated from control room/ local operating panel
manually. (Examples: Dump Valves in Hydro cracker, DHDS etc).

4. SURGE RELIEF VALVES:

The liquid pipelines can be subjected to surge pressures, when there is a sudden change in the velocity
of the moving fluid. This surge pressure can create a major disaster if the rate of change is too rapid.

Some of the eventualities which shall lead to creation of surge pressure in a liquid pipeline are:

- rapid closure of a manual or motor/ hydraulic/ pneumatic actuated valve

- closure of an emergency shut down valve
- stopping of a pump
- Combination of above

In order to protect the pipeline against surge pressure, a surge relief valve shall be provided which
responds quickly at the time of pressure surge.

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