Property relations between husband and wife (2 nd part) – Articles 74 to 148 of

the Family Code

ANTONIO A. S. VALDEZ vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 102,

QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-VALDEZ
G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996

VITUG, J.

FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5
children.  Valdez filed a petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their
marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code, which was granted hence,
marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological incapacity. 
Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3
siblings are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the

procedure for the liquidation of common property in “unions without marriage”. 
During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a joint affidavit expressing
desire to stay with their father. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

RULING:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause
thereof, the property relations of the parties are governed by the rules on co-
ownership.  Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts.  A party who did not participate in
the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto
jointly if said party’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family. 

SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑOvs. SUSAN YEE CARIÑO

G.R. No. 132529 February 2, 2001

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:

In 1969, SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2

children with her. In 1992, SPO4 Carino contacted a second marrtiage with Susan
Yee-Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4 Carino is already
bedridden and he was under the care of Yee- Carino. In 1992, he died 13 days after
his marriage to Yee-Carino.

Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4 Carino. Nicdao
was able to claim a total of P140,000, while Yee was able to collect a total of
P21,000. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against
Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the amount of P140,000. Yee admitted that her
marriage to SPO4 Carino was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage
between SPO4 and Nicdao, but the said marriage between SPO4 and Nicdao is null
and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local
civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous
marriage during SPO4’s funeral.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim

presumptive legitimes.

RULING:

Yes. The marriage between SPO4 and Nicdao is null and void due to the
absence of a valid marriage license. The marriage between SPO4 and Yee is
likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized without the judicial
declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Art 40
of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring void such
previous marriage. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other
than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity.
 CIRILA ARCABA vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE BATOCAEL,
SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA, LUZELLI C.
TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A. COMILLE,
BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE
G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001

MENDOZA, J.

FACTS:

Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered
owners of Lot No. 437-A located at Balintawak St. and Rizal Avenue in Dipolog
City, Zamboanga del Norte in January 1956. Zosima died in 1980 hence Francisco
and his mother in law executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with waiver of
rights, where the latter waived her share consisting of ¼ of the property in favor of
Francisco. Since Francisco do not have any children to take care of him after his
retirement, he asked Leticia, his niece, Leticia’s cousin, Luzviminda and Cirila
Arcaba, the petitioner, who was then a widow and took care of Francisco’s house
as well as the store inside.

According to Leticia, Francisco and Cirila were lovers since they slept in the
same room. On the other hand, Erlinda Tabancura, another niece of Francisco
claimed that the latter told her that Cirila was his mistress. However, Cirila
defended herself that she was a mere helper who could enter the master’s bedroom
when Francisco asked her to and that Francisco was too old for her. She denied
having sexual intercourse with Francisco. When the nieces got married, Cirila who
was then 34 year-old widow started working for Francisco who was 75 year old
widower. The latter did not pay him any wages as house helper though her family
was provided with food and lodging. Francisco’s health deteriorated and became
bedridden.
 Tabancura testified that Francisco’s only source of income was the rentals from
his lot near the public streets. In January 1991, a few months before Francisco
died, he executed a “Deed of Donation Inter Vivos” where he ceded a portion of
Lot 437-A composed of 150 sq m., together with his house to Cirila who accepted
the same. The larger portion of 268 sq m. was left under his name. This was made
in consideration of the 10 year of faithful services of the petitioner. Atty Lacaya
notarized the deed and was later registered by Cirila as its absolute owner. In
October 1991, Francisco died and in 1993, the lot received by Cirila had a market
value of P57,105 and assessed value of P28,550. The decedent’s nephews and
nieces and his heirs by intestate succession alleged that Cirila was the common-law
wife of Francisco.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of donation inter vivos executed by Francisco in

Arcaba’s favor was valid.

RULING:

The court in this case considered a sufficient proof of common law relationship
wherein donation is not valid. The conclusion was based on the testimony of
Tabancura and certain documents bearing the signature of “Cirila Comille” such as
application for business permit, sanitary permit and the death certificate of
Francisco. Also, the fact that Cirila did not demand her wages is an indication that
she was not simply a caregiver –employee.

Furthermore, cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when

one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex at the very
least, cohabitation is a public assumption of men and women holding themselves
out to the public as such. Hence, the deed of donation by Francisco in favor of
Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
 EUSTAQUIO MALLILIN, JR. vs. MA. ELVIRA CASTILLO
G.R. No. 136803 June 16, 2000

MENDOZA, J.

FACTS:

Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma. Elvira Castillo were claimed to be both married
and with children but separated from their respective spouses and cohabited in
1979 while respective marriages still subsist. They established Superfreight
Customs Brokerage Corporation during their union of which petitioner was the
President and Chairman and respondent as Vice President and Treasurer. They
likewise acquired real and personal properties which were registered solely in
respondent’s name. Due to irreconcilable conflict, the couple separated in 1992.
Petitioner then demanded his share from respondent in the subject properties but
the latter refused alleging that said properties had been registered solely in her
name. Furthermore, respondent denied that she and petitioner lived as husband and
wife because they were still legally married at the time of cohabitation.
 Petitioner filed complaint for partition of co-ownership shares while
respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. Trial court dismissed the former
and granted the latter.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not petitioner can validly claim his share in the acquired properties
registered under the name of the respondent considering they both have subsisting
relationship when they started living together.

RULING:

The Court ruled that trial court erred that parties who are not capacitated to
marry each other and were living together could not have owned properties in
common. Under Article 148, if the parties are incapacitated to marry each other,
properties acquired by them through their joint contribution, property or industry,
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their contributions which, in
the absence of proof to the contrary, is presumed to be equal. Hence, there is co-
ownership even though the couples in union are not capacitated to marry each
other.

Furthermore, when CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint for partition on

grounds of due process and equity, his right to prove ownership over the claimed
properties was denied. Such dismissal is unjustified since both ends may be served
by simply excluding from the action for partition the properties registered in the
name of Steelhouse Realty and Eloisa Castillo, not parties in the case.
 IMELDA RELUCIO vs. ANGELINA MEJIA LOPEZ
G.R. No. 138497 January 16, 2002

PARDO, J.

FACTS:

Angelina Lopez and Alberto Lopez were married. Alberto Lopez however
abandoned them and left their four children; he also has maintained an illicit affiar
and cohabited with petitioner Imelda Relucio. Alberto and Relusio amassed a
fortune, In order to avoid defendant Lopez obligations as a father and husband, he
excluded Angelina Lopez and the four children from benefitting from the conjugal
properties. He placed substantial portions of these conjugal properties in the name
of petitioner Relucio.

On September 15, 1993, herein private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a
petition for appointment as sole administratix of conjugal properties. Then, a
Motion to Dismiss the Petition was filed by herein petitioner on the ground that
private respondent has no cause of action against her.

Private respondent Angelina Mejia Lopez (plaintiff below) filed a petition for
appointment of sole adminastrix of the conjugal properties of the spouses Lopez. In
Appeal there was a decision denying the petition. On June 26, 1996, petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on April 6, 1996, the Court of
Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration hence this case.

ISSUES:

Whether respondent's petition for appointment as sole administratrix of the

conjugal property, accounting, etc. against her husband Alberto J. Lopez
established a cause of action against petitioner, and whether petitioner's inclusion
as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a complete adjudication of the
controversy
RULING:

Nowhere in the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against petitioner.
Respondent's causes of action were all against her husband. The administration of
the property of the marriage is entirely between them, to the exclusion of all other
persons. The Supreme court grants this petition.

THELMA A. JADER-MANALO vs. NORMA FERNANDEZ C. CAMAISA

and EDILBERTO CAMAISA
G.R. No. 147978 January 23, 2002

KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:

Thelma A. Jader-Manalo (petitioner) allegedly came across an advertisement

placed by respondents regarding the sale of a ten-door apartment in Makati and
Taytay, Rizal in the April 1992 issue of the Bulletin Today newspaper. In a
complaint filed against with the Regional Trial Court, Jader-Manalo stated that she
was interested in buying the two properties and negotiated for the purchase through
Mr. Proseso Ereno (real-state broker).
 The petitioner then met with the vendors (respondent-spouses) and expressed a
definite offer to buy the properties in the presence of the real estate broker.
Edilberto then agreed upon the purchase price of P1.5 M and P2.1M to be paid on
installment basis for the Taytay and Makati properties, respectively. When
petitioner pointed out the conjugal nature of the properties, Edilberto assured her of
his wife’s conformity and consent to the sale. A formal typewritten Contracts to
Sell were thereafter prepared by the petitioner, and checks were delivered.
Edilberto’s wife Norma asked to meet with herein petitioner to discuss some
provisions of the contract, and some changes were noted which were to be
incorporated to the contract. Petitioner was then surprised when respondent
spouses informer her that they were backing out of the agreement and needed “spot
cash” for the full amount of reconsideration. Petitioner then reminded the spouses
that the contracts to sell were already perfected and Norma’s refusal to sign would
cause undue prejudice. Norma’s refusal to sign prompted the petitioner to file a
complaint for specific performance and damages against the respondent spouses in
the RTC Makati.

The trial court rendered a summary judgment dismissing the complaint under
Article 124 of the Family Code which states that the court cannot intervene to
authorize the transaction in the absence of the wife’s consent. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal by the trial court and explained that the
properties in question were conjugal properties and thus requires the consent of
both of the spouses to effect such sale. The petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals erred when it failed to consider that the contract of sale is consensual and
is perfected by the mere consent of the parties.

ISSUE:

Whether or not raised in this case whether or not the husband may validly
dispose of a conjugal property without the wife’s written consent.

RULING:
 No. The properties of the contracts in this case were conjugal. Hence, for the
contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both the husband and wife must
concur. Being merely aware of a transaction is not consent.

It must be noted that Article 124 of the Family Code is only resorted to in
cases where the spouse does not give consent is incapacitated. The petitioner failed
to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to
the contracts. The Court does not find error in the decisions of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals.

HONORIO L. CARLOS vs.MANUEL T. ABELARDO

G.R. No. 146504      April 9, 2002
KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS:

When petitioner inquired from the spouses in July 1991 as to the status of the
amount the loaned to them, the latter acknowledged their obligation but pleaded
that they were not yet in a position to make a definite settlement of the same.
Thereafter, respondent expressed violent resistance to petitioner’s inquiries on the
amount to the extent of making various death threats against petitioner.

On August 24, 1994, petitioner made a formal demand for the payment of the
amount of US$25,000.00 but the spouses failed to comply with their obligation.
Thus, on October 13, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of a sum of
money and damages against respondent and his wife before the Regional Trial
Court. In the complaint, petitioner asked for the payment of the US$25,000.00 or
P625,000.00, its equivalent in Philippine currency plus legal interest from date of
extra-judicial demand.5 Petitioner likewise claimed moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and costs of suit from respondent.

As they were separated in fact for more than a year prior to the filing of the
complaint, respondent and his wife filed separate answers. Maria Theresa Carlos-
Abelardo admitted securing a loan together with her husband, from petitioner. She
claimed, however, that said loan was payable on a staggered basis so she was
surprised when petitioner demanded immediate payment of the full amount. In his
separate Answer, respondent admitted receiving the amount of US$25,000.00 that
the said US$25,000.00 was never intended as loan of defendant. It was his share of
income on contracts obtained by defendant.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the loan is chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

RULING:
 The loan is the liability of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Article 121 of
the Family Code:
Article 121. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
xxx
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by one of them with the
consent of the other;

(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the

consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited;

If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing

liabilities, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties.
xxx
While respondent did not and refused to sign the acknowledgment executed
and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the
family because it was used to purchase the house and lot which became the
conjugal home of respondent and his family. Hence, notwithstanding the alleged
lack of consent of respondent, under Art. 21 of the Family Code, he shall be
solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.
 Jacinto Saguid vs. HON. Court of Appeals, THE regional trial court,
BRANCH 94, BOAC, MARINDUQUE AND GINA S. REY
G.R. No. 150611 June 10, 2003

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.

FACTS:
Seventeen year-old Gina S. Rey, was married but separated de facto from
her husband. Where she met Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque sometime in July 1987.
The two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a house built on a lot owned by
Jacinto’s father. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel while
Gina worked as a fish dealer but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan.
In 1996, they decided to separate and end up their 9 year cohabitation. Gina
filed a complaint for the partition and recovery of personal property with
receivership against Jacinto. She prayed that she be declared the sole owner of
these personal properties and that the amount of P70,000 for her contribution to the
construction of their house be reimbursed to her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there are actual contributions from the parties?

RULING:
 Yes. It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry each
other because the former was validly married to another man at the time of her
cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime is governed by Article 148 of
the Family Code which applies to bigamous marriages, adulterous relationship,
relationships where both man and a woman who are married to another person, and
multiple alliances of the same marriage man. Under this regime, only the
properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution is required.

In the case at bar, the controversy centers on the house and personal
properties of the parties. Gina alleged in her complaint that she has contributed
P70,000 for the completion of their house. However, nowhere in her testimony did
she specify the extent of her contribution.

While there is no question that both parties contributed in their joint account
deposit, however there is no sufficient proof of the exact amount of their respective
shares therein. Pursuant to this Article 148 of the Family Code, in the absence of
proof of extent of the parties’ respective contribution, their share shall be presumed
to be equal.

Thus Gina is declared co-owner of Jacinto house.

HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES vs. Spouses CIPRIANO MIJARES

and FLORENTINA MIJARES
G.R. No. 143826 August 28, 2003

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
FACTS:

Vicente Reyes married Ignacia Aguilar, but they had been separated de facto in
1974. One of their conjugal properties is a lot and an apartment. The said lot was
registered in the name of both the spouses. Reyes filed a petition for administration
and appointment of guardian with the MTC. In the said petition, he misrepresented
that his wife, Ignacia, died on March 12, 1982 and that he and their minor children
were her only heirs.

The court appointed Vicente as the guardian of their minor children and
subsequently authorized Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia. 1983 when the
respondent spouses Cipriano and Florentina Mijares bought the lot for P110,000.
As a consequence of which, the certificate of the title in the name of Vicente and
Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes was cancelled and a new title was issued in the name of
respondent-spouses.

Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia instituted a complaint for

annulment of sale against respondent and Vicente was included as one of the
defendants. In their answer, respondents claimed that they are purchasers in good
faith and that the sale was valid because the same was duly approved by the court.
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the sale of
the lot void with respect to the share of Ignacia.

A motion for modification of the decision was filed by Ignacia praying that the
sale be declared void in its entirety and that the respondents be ordered to
reimburse the rentals collected on the apartments. The trial court granted the
motion for modification. Both Ignacia and respondent-spouses appealed to the
Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and was substituted by her
compulsory heirs. The appellate court reverse the decision of the court a quo,
ruling that, notwithstanding the absence of Ignacia’s consent to the sale, the same
must be held in valid in favor of respondent-spouses because they were innocent
purchasers for value.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the status of the sale of lot to the respondent-spouses voidable or
be annulled in its entirety

RULING:

Yes. Pursuant to the forgoing provisions of Article 166 and 173 of the Civil
Code, the husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal property without
the consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable.

ELNA MERCADO-FEHR vs. BRUNO FEHR

G. R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003

PUNO, J.

FACTS:

In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna Mercado (Elna)

moved in to Bruno Fehr's (Bruno) residence and lived with him. During the time
they lived together, they purchased Suite 204, at LCG Condominium on
installment. They got married in 1985.
In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of their
conjugal properties. The properties were divided into three, between Elna and
Bruno, and their children. The custody of children was awarded to Elna, being the
innocent spouse. Accordingly, Elna is directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204
LCG Condominium because it was declared to have been the exclusive property of
Bruno Fehr, acquired prior his marriage.

Elna filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. The court held in an
order that Art. 147 of the Family Code should apply, being the marriage void ab
initio. However, the court reminded Elna of the previous agreement in dividing of
properties and/or proceeds from the sale thereof proportionately among them. It
also affirmed of the previous ruling regarding the Suite 204. Elna filed special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals. The CA in its
Decision dismissed the petition for review for lack of merit. 

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Suite 204 of LGC Condominium is the exclusive property of
Bruno Fehr.

RULING:

No. SC held that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common property of

Elna and Bruno and the property regime of the parties should be divided in
accordance with the law on co-ownership. Suite 204 was acquired during the
parties’ cohabitation. Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said
property should be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Article 147 applies in this case because (1) Elna and Bruno are capacitated to
marry each other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3)
their marriage is void under Article 36. All these elements are present in the case at
bar. 

The trial court also erred in its judgment in regards the settlement of the
common properties of Elna and Bruno. The three-way partition only applies to
voidable marriages and to void marriages under Article 40 of the Family Code.

ALFREDO CHING and ENCARNACION CHING vs. THE HON. COURT

OF APPEALS and ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 124642 February 23, 2004
CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS:

The Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of

P9,000,000 from the Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). As an added security for
the said loan, Alfredo Ching, together with Emilio Tadeo and Chung Kiat Hua,
executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding them to jointly and severally
guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing to the ABC. The
PBMCI defaulted in the payment of all its loans.

Hence, the ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of
preliminary attachment. Citing as one of the grounds for the writ was the fraud
defendants employed in incurring the obligations by representing themselves as
having the financial capacity to pay the loan when in fact they did not have such
capacity. In the meantime, on July 26, 1983, the deputy sheriff of the trial court
levied on attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in the name of
Alfredo Ching.

On November 16, 1993, Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted by her husband

Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment. She alleged
inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired
by her and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds after the
Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974.

ISSUE:

Is the conjugal partnership liable for the payment of the liability?

RULING:

Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired
during the marriage are presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband, or to the wife.
 For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to
the husband alone there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the
spouses. Certainly, to make a conjugal partnership responsible for a liability that
should appertain alone to one of the spouses is to frustrate the objective of the New
Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the solidarity and well being of the
family as a unit. The husband, therefore, is denied the power to assume
unnecessary and unwarranted risks to the financial stability of the conjugal
partnership.

In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership
of the petitioners was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a
continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the private respondent for and
in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was between the private respondent and
the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No presumption can be inferred
from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be
benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit
redounded to the conjugal partnership.

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, it is enough that
the benefit to the family is apparent at the time of the signing of the contract. From
the very nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from
the loan facility or services to be rendered to the business or profession of the
husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not
succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the
family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. In this case, the petitioner-husband acted
merely as a surety for the loan contracted by the PBMCI from the private
respondent. Hence, the petition is granted.
 MILAGROS JOAQUINO a.k.a. MILAGROS J. REYES v. LOURDES
REYES, MERCEDES, MANUEL, MIRIAM and RODOLFO JR. -- all
surnamed REYES
G.R. NO. 154645 July 13, 2004

PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

Lourdes Reyes is the widow of Rodolfo Reyes who died on September

12,1981. Lourdes and Rodolfo married in 1947 in manila and have four (4)
children whose name are Mercedes, Manuel, Miriam and Rodolfo Jr. Rodolfo in
the course of their marriage, had illicit relations with Milagros Joaquino with
whom he also had three (3) children whose name are Jose Romillo, Imelda May
and Charina. Rodolfo and Milagros decided to buy a house and lot which executed
in the name Milagros. Lourdes alleges that the funds used to purchase this property
were conjugal funds and earnings of the deceased. Aside from the house, Rodolfo
allegedly “put into custody” some of the couple’s conjugal properties under the
care of his paramour. These properties include his earnings and retirement benefits
from working as the Vice president and Comptroller of Warner Barnes and
Company and two cars.

Lourdes prayed that the properties be declared conjugal, that Milagros

surrenders the possessions thereof, and that damages be awarded.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the properties in question pertain to the conjugal partnership of
gains.

RULING:

Yes. Under Article 145 of the Family Code stated that a conjugal partnership of
gains is created upon marriage end lasts until the legal union is dissolved by death,
annulment, legal separation or judicial separation of property. Conjugal properties
are by law owned in common by the husband and wife. As to what constitutes such
properties are laid out in Article 153 of the Code, stated that (1) that which is
acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses; (2)
that which is obtained by the industry, or work, or salary of the spouses, or of
either of them; (3) the fruits, rents, or interest received or due during the marriage,
coming from the common property or from the exclusive property of each spouse.

Under Article 160 of the Family Code, all properties of the marriage, unless
proven to pertain to the husband or the wife exclusively, are presumed to belong to
the conjugal property of gains. For the rebuttable presumption to arise, however,
the properties must first be proven to have been acquired during the existence of
the marriage.

Hence, the property belong to the conjugal partnership of gains and that the
petitioner paramour shall not be co-owners with the married deceased.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and LUCY VERA CRUZ vs. LUCY CALDERON
G.R. NO. 160748 July 14, 2004

YNARES – SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:

Lucy Calderon and Avelino Belisario were married and bought a parcel of land
from Avelino’s aunt. Accordingly, the transfer certificate of title was issued in the
name of Avelino married to Lucy Calderon. The spouses separated and Lucy
resided with her children. Afterwards, Avelino sold the property to petitioner
spouses Antonio and Lucy Vera Cruz. The Vera Cru spouses registered the sale
and transfer certificate title was issued in their name. When Avelino died, his wife,
respondent Lucy Calderon, discovered that their conjugal property had been sold
by her husband without her knowledge and consent and that her signature on the
Deed of Sale had been forged. Hence, he filed a complaint against the petitioners
for annulment of Deed of Absolute Sale with the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners were purchasers in good faith.

RULING:

Yes. Under the circumstances of the case, they are entitled to claim the status of
innocent purchasers for value. They exercised the necessary diligence in
ascertaining the credentials of the seller, the registered owner himself, Avelino
Belisario, Jr.

We cannot charge said appellants with negligence since, at the time of the sale to
them, the land was registered in the name of the vendor and the tax declaration was
also issued in the latters name. It was also clearly indicated at the back of the
transfer certificate of title that Avelino acquired ownership over the said land by
virtue of the Deed of Sale. Even appellee confirmed that they bought the property.
There is no annotation, defect or flaw in the title that would have aroused any
suspicion as to its authenticity. Such being the case, appellants had the right to rely
on what appeared on the face of the certificate of title.
 SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR. and VENIDA M. VALDEZ vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES GABRIEL FABELLA and
FRANCISCA FABELLA
G.R. No. 132424 May 2, 2006

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner spouses filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against respondent

spouses before the MTC. The complaint alleges that sometime in November 1992,
by virtue of a sales contract, petitioner spouses acquired a residential lot and
respondent spouses, without any color of title whatsoever occupied the said lot by
building their house in the same thereby depriving the former rightful possession
thereof. A formal demand to vacate the premises was sent on July 12, 1994 but it
was ignored. Respondent spouses contend that the complaint failed to state that
petitioner had prior physical possession of the property in dispute and in the
alternative, claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they possess the
same for more than thirty years.

The MTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners and ordered

respondents to vacate the property. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the decision of
the MTC.

On a petition for review, the Court of Appeals reverse and set aside the decision
of the RTC on the ground that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful
detainer because they failed to show that they had given the private respondents the
right to occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private respondents’
possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added
that the allegations in the complaint lack jurisdictional elements of forcible entry,
which requires an allegation of prior material possession. Hence, MTC has no
jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the allegations of the complaint made out a case for unlawful
detainer and MTC has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING:

 No. The three kinds of actions available to recover possession of real property
are comprises forcible entry and unlawful detainer.  In forcible entry, one is
deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation,
strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession of the defendant
is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de
facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right
to possess.

The jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the
proper MTC. Both actions must be brought within one year from the date of actual
entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in
case of unlawful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical
possession.
It is the nature of defendant’s entry into the land which determines the cause of
action, whether it is forcible entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry is illegal, then
the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible entry. If, however, the
entry is legal but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful
detainer.
 In the case at bar, the allegations in petitioner spouses’ complaint did not
contain any averment of fact that would substantiate their claim that they permitted
or tolerated the occupation of the property by respondents. The complaint contains
only bare allegations that “respondents without any color of title whatsoever
occupies the land in question by building their house in the said land thereby
depriving petitioners the possession thereof.”

The failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of

unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC had no jurisdiction
over the case.

ARTURO R. ABALOS vs. DR. GALICANO MACATANGAY, JR.

G.R. No. 155043             September 30, 2004

TINGA, J.

FACTS:

Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel of land
with improvements.  Arturo made a Receipt and Memorandum of Agreement in
favor of Macatangay, binding himself to sell to latter the subject property and not
to offer the same to any other party within 30 days from date. Full payment would
also be effected as soon as possession of the property shall have been turned over
to Macatangay. Macatangay gave an earnest money amounting to P5,000.00 to be
deducted from the purchase price of P1,300,000.00 in favor of the spouses.
 Subsequently, Arturo and Esther had a marital squabble brewing at that time
and Macatangay, to protect his interest, made an annotation in the title of the
property. He then sent a letter informing them of his readiness to pay the full
amount of the purchase price. Esther, through her SPA, executed in favor of
Macatangay, a Contract to sell the property to the extent of her conjugal interest for
the sum of P650,000 less the sum already received by her and Arturo. She agreed
to surrender the property to Macatangay within 20 days along with the deed of
absolute sale upon full payment, while he promised to pay the balance of the
purchase price for P1, 290,000.00 after being placed in possession of the property.
Macatangay informed them that he was ready to pay the amount in full. The couple
failed to deliver the property so he sued the spouses.

RTC dismissed the complaint, because the SPA could not have authorized
Arturo to sell the property to Macatangay as it was falsified. CA reversed the
decision, ruling the SPA in favor of Arturo, assuming it was void, cannot affect the
transaction between Esther and Macatangay. On the other hand, the CA considered
the RMOA executed by Arturo valid to effect the sale of his conjugal share in the
property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale of property is valid.

RULING:

No. Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of the
Family Code. There being no indication that they have adopted a different property
regime, their property relations would automatically be governed by the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains.

The subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the marriage of the
spouses forms part of their conjugal partnership. Under the Civil Code, the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. This right is clearly
granted to him by law. More, the husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not
entitled as of right to joint administration.
 SPOUSES BERNARDO BUENAVENTURA and CONSOLACION
JOAQUIN, et.al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et.al.
G.R. No. 126376 November 20, 2003

CARPIO, J.

FACTS:

Defendant spouses Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana Landrito are the parents of
plaintiffs Consolacion, Nora, Emma and Natividad as well as of defendants Fidel,
Tomas, Artemio, Clarita, Felicitas, Fe, and Gavino, all surnamed JOAQUIN. The
married Joaquin children are joined in this action by their respective spouses.
Sought to be declared null and void ab initio are certain deeds of sale covering 6
parcels of land executed by defendant parents Leonardo Joaquin and Feliciana
Landrito in favor of their co-defendant children and the corresponding certificates
of title issued in their names. In seeking the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid
deeds of sale and certificates of title, plaintiffs, in their complaint, aver that the
purported sale of the properties in litis was the result of a deliberate conspiracy
designed to unjustly deprive the rest of the compulsory heirs (plaintiffs herein) of
their legitime.

ISSUE:

Whether Petitioners have a legal interest over the properties subject of the Deeds
of Sale.

RULING:

Petitioners do not have any legal interest over the properties subject of the
Deeds of Sale. As the appellate court stated, petitioners’ right to their parents’
properties is merely inchoate and vests only upon their parents’ death. While still
living, the parents of petitioners are free to dispose of their properties. In their
overzealousness to safeguard their future legitime, petitioners forget that
theoretically, the sale of the lots to their siblings does not affect the value of their
parents’ estate. While the sale of the lots reduced the estate, cash of equivalent
value replaced the lots taken from the estate.

SALVADOR VS CA (c/o Toni)

G.R. NO. 165420 June 30, 2005
CONCEPCION R. AINZA
vs.
SPOUSES ANTONIO PADUA and EUGENIA PADUA

FACTS:

Concepcion alleged that respondent-spouses Eugenia and Antonio owned a lot

with an unfinished residential house sometime in April 1987, she bought one-half
of an undivided portion of the property from her daughter, Eugenia and the latter’s
husband, Antonio, for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). No Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed to evidence the transaction, but cash payment was
received by the respondents, and ownership was transferred to Concepcion through
physical delivery to her attorney-in-fact and daughter. Concepcion authorized
Natividad and the latter’s husband to occupy the premises, and make
improvements on the unfinished building.
 Thereafter, Concepcion alleged that without her consent, respondents caused the
subdivision of the property into three portions and registered it in their names in
violation of the restrictions annotated at the back of the title. The Regional Trial
Court rendered judgment in favor of Concepcion. On appeal by the respondents,
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court, and declared the sale
null and void. Hence this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the contract in the sale of the real property is legal and binding.

RULING:

Yes. It is a voidable contract. According to Art. 1390 of the Civil Code, among
the voidable contracts are "[T]hose where one of the parties is incapable of giving
consent to the contract." (Par. 1.) In the instant case Gimena had no capacity to
give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even
to the husband alone but to both spouses.

Even assuming that the ten (10)-year prescriptive period under Art. 173 should
apply, Antonio is still barred from instituting an action to annul the sale because
since April 1987, more than ten (10) years had already lapsed without any such
action being filed.

In sum, the sale of the conjugal property by Eugenia without the consent of her
husband is voidable. It is binding unless annulled. Antonio failed to exercise his
right to ask for the annulment within the prescribed period, hence, he is now barred
from questioning the validity of the sale between his wife and Concepcion.
 FRANCISCO L. GONZALES vs. ERMINDA F. GONZALES
G.R. No. 159521 December 16, 2005

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.

FACTS:

Francisco Gonzales, the petitioner and Erminda Gonzales, respondent, started

living as husband and wife March 1988. After two years, they got married and
from this union, four children were born, namely: Carlo Manuel, Maria Andres,
Maria Angelica and Marco Manuel. On October 1992, respondent filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court for annulment of marriage with prayer for
support pendente lite, alleging the psychological incapacity of petitioner this
causing his failure to comply with the obligations of marriage. She claims that her
husband physically hurts her for no justifiable reason, humiliates and embarrass
her, denies her love, sexual comfort and loyalty.

During their marriage they acquired properties and hoping the marriage to be
declared null, for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership gains as she was the
one who manages the business. Evidence at the trial showed that the petitioner
used to beat respondent without justifiable reasons and humiliating and
embarrassing her in presence of people and their children. The court declared the
marriage as null and void ab initio.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, Francisco exclusively own the properties existing during their
marriage.

RULING:
 No. The marriage of Francisco and Erminda is declared null and void
consequently; their property relation shall be governed by the provisions of Article
147. These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations
between spouses shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1)
when a man and woman capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and
woman live together under a void marriage.

Under this property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties

during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have
been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in
equal shares. Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the
cohabitation of the parties have been acquired through their joint efforts, work or
industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO

G.R. No. 153802 March 11, 2005

TINGA, J.

FACTS:

Respondent Miguela C. Dailo (Miguela) and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. (Marcelino)

were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, the spouses purchased a
house and lot in San Pablo City, registered in the name of Marcelino to the
exclusion of his wife.
 In 1993, through a grant of Special Power of Attorney to Lilibeth Gesmundo,
Marcelino obtained a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank,
secured by the property in San Pablo. Gesmundo also executed a Real Estate
Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner without the
knowledge and consent of respondent. The loan matured and remained outstanding
which led to the foreclosure of the mortgage. In 1993, Marcelino died.

Respondent found out later about the mortgage and claimed that she had no
knowledge of it. She further claims that the property was conjugal in nature and so
she consequently filed for the Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of
Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Damages against petitioner. In the
latter’s Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive property of
the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. The Court of appeals favored Miguela. Hence this
petition.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the mortgage entered into by respondent’s husband without her
knowledge was valid.

RULING:

The court held that the property relations of respondent and her late husband
shall be governed, foremost, by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the
Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In
case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code provisions on
partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter.

Marcelino and Miguela Dailo were married before the effectivity of the Family
Code. In the absence of a marriage settlement, their properties were governed by
the system of Conjugal Partnership of gains, which was made also made applicable
after the effectivity of the Code.
 Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written
consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal
property shall be void.

The Court ruled that the mortgage entered into by Marcelino without his wife’s
consent and, thus, was void. As to the issue of liability of the property for the
obligation obtained by Marcelino, the court held that for failure to present clear
proof that the said obligation redounded to the benefit of the family which under
Article 121 of the Family Code, the subject property could not be held liable.

Spouses JOSEPHINE MENDOZA GO & HENRY GOvs.LEONARDO

YAMANE
G.R. No. 160762             May 3, 2006
PANGANIBAN, CJ.

FACTS:

In the civil case “Florence Pucay De Gomez, Elsie Pucay Kiwas and Muriel
Pucay Yamane v. Cypress Corporation”, Atty. Guillermo F. De Guzman was the
counsel who handled the plaintiffs in the said case. In order to satisfy the lien for
attorney's fees, a parcel of land, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane
(wife of Leonardo Yamane), was scheduled to be sold at public auction on August
11, 1981. Spouses Josephine and Henry Go, herein petitioners, were awarded the
said land as the highest bidders in the auction. Respondent Leonardo Yamane filed
a complaint for annulment and cancellation of Sale to petitioners, invoking a third-
party claim. Respondent contended that the land was a conjugal property and could
not be held responsible for the personal obligations of Muriel and the two other
Pucays. RTC ruled against respondent, reasoning that the subject parcel of land
was the paraphernal property of the late Muriel Pucay Yamane -- spouse of
respondent -- and was not their conjugal property.

The Court of Appeals ruled otherwise, saying that the property acquired during
marriage is presumed to be conjugal unless the exclusive funds of one spouse are
shown to have been used for the purpose.  The property was acquired by couple
from a certain Eugene Pucay during their marriage and, therefore, was a conjugal
property.

ISSUE:
Whether the subject property is conjugal or paraphernal.

RULING:

Yes. The Court upheld the Court of Appeals decision that the said property
is conjugal. The property was purchased before the Family Code took effect.
Hence, the issue should be resolved the governing provisions of the New Civil
Code wherein, Article 160 provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively
to the husband or the wife.

As to the responsibility of the then established conjugal property, the contract

or transaction between Atty. De Guzman and the Pucay sisters appear[s] to have
been incurred for the exclusive interest of the latter. Muriel was acting privately for
her exclusive interest when she joined her two sisters in hiring the services of Atty.
De Guzman to handle a case for them. Accordingly, whatever expenses were
incurred by Muriel in the litigation for her and her sisters' private and exclusive
interests, are her exclusive responsibility and certainly cannot be charged against
the contested conjugal property.

SPOUSES CLARO and NIDA BAUTISTA vs. BERLINDA F. SILVA,

Represented by HERMES J. DORADO, in his capacity as Attorney-In-Fact
G.R. No. 157434             September 19, 2006

AUSTRIA – MARTINEZ,J.

FACTS:

Pedro M. Silva, for himself and as attorney-in-fact of his wife Berlina F. Silva,
thru a Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed on November 18, 1987 by
Berlina F. Silva in his favor, signed and executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the
said parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. B-37189 in favor of
defendants-spouses Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista. The signature appearing on
the Special Power of Attorney (SPA) as that of Berlina Silva is a forgery, and that
consequently the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Pedro in favor of Spouses
Bautista is not authorized by Berlina. The RTC rendered judgment declaring the
deed of sale null and void and ordering defendants to reconvey the property.
Spouses Bautista filed an appeal. The petition fails for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not petitioners are buyers for value in good faith is a question.

RULING:

No. The SPA being a forgery, it did not vest in Pedro any authority to alienate
the subject property without the consent of respondent. Absent such marital
consent, the deed of sale was a nullity. Petitioners knew that Berlina was in
Germany at the time they were buying the property and the SPA relied upon by
petitioners has a defective notarial acknowledgment. The SPA was a mere
photocopy and we are not convinced that there ever was an original copy of said
SPA as it was only this photocopy that was testified to by petitioner Nida Bautista
and offered into evidence by her counsel.  As admitted to by petitioner Nida
Bautista, upon inspection of the photocopy of the SPA, they gave Pedro an
advanced payment of Php55,000.00; this signifies that, without further
investigation on the SPA, petitioners had agreed to buy the subject property from
Pedro.

IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA

BUENAVENTURA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER
 G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were

married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in
Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the
house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds to
purchase a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at a cost of P528,000 and the
construction of a house amounting to P2.3 million. The Antipolo property was
registered in the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller. Due to
incompatibilities and respondent’s alleged womanizing and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated.

On September 26,1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties

before the RTC of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It also decreed the
separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title
during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it
was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that
respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in
violation of Section 7, Article XII (on hereditary succession) of the Constitution.

The respondent elevated to the CA, which reversed the RTC decision. It held
that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo
property and not acquisition or transfer of ownership. It ordered the respondent
(Elena) to reimburse the Petitioner (Helmut) the amount of P528,000 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of P2.3 million for the construction of the
house situated therein.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

RULING:

No. Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement. There is an express

prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines. Art. XII Sec 7 of the
1987 Constitutions provides….”save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

In the case at bar, respondent Helmut Muller, willingly and knowingly bought
the property despite a Constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that
Constitutional prohibition, he put the property under the name of his Filipino wife.
He tried to do indirectly what the fundamental law bars him to do directly. With
this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent Helmut Muller cannot seek
reimbursement on the ground of equity.

Hence, it has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.
 JOHN ABING vs. JULIET WAEYAN
G.R. No. 146294 July 31, 2006

GARCIA, J.

FACTS:

In 1986, John Abing and Juliet Waeyan cohabited as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage and bought a 2-storey residential house. In December 1991,
Juliet left for Korea and worked there, sending money to John which the latter
deposited in their joint account. In 1992, their house was renovated and to it was
annexed a structure which housed a sari-sari store.

In 1994, Juliet returned. In 1995, they decided to partition their properties as

their relationship soured. They executed a Memorandum of Agreement.
Unfortunately, the document was left unsigned by the parties although signed by
the witnesses thereto. Under their unsigned agreement, John shall leave the
dwelling with Juliet paying him the amount of P428,870.00 representing John’s
share in all their properties. Juliet paid John the sum of P232,397.66 by way of
partial payment of his share, with the balance of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet
in twelve monthly installments. Juliet, however, failed to make good the balance.
John demanded Juliet to vacate the annex structure. Juliet refused, prompting John
to file an ejectment suit against her. John alleged that he alone spent for the
construction of the annex structure with his own funds and through the money he
borrowed from his relatives. He added that the tax declaration for the structure was
under his name.
ISSUE:

Whether or not John Abing exclusively owns the property subject of the suit.

RULING:

No. Other than John’s bare allegation that he alone, through his own funds and
money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of the annex
structure, evidence wants to support such naked claim. Art. 147. When a man and a
woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property
acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived
together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or
industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article,
a party who did not participate in the acquisition by another party of any property
shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household. The law is clear. In the absence of proof to the contrary, any property
acquired by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed
to have been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal
shares.
Their property relationship is governed by the rules on co-ownership. And
under this regime, they owned their properties in common “in equal shares.” Being
herself a co-owner, Juliet may not be ejected from the structure in question. She is
as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John. Juliet’s failure to
pay John the balance of the latter’s share in their common properties could at best
give rise to an action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of the said
agreement and not for ejectment.
PAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
AND NICOLAS CAPISTRANO
G.R. No. 125283 February 10, 2006

TINGA, J.

FACTS:

On September 10, 1982, Capistrano executed a Special Power of Attorney

authorizing Cruz to mortgage the subject lot in favor of Associated Bank (the
Bank) as security for the latter’s loan accommodation. Cruz obtained a loan in the
amount of P500,000.00 from the Bank. Thus, he executed a Real Estate Mortgage
over the subject lot in favor of the Bank.
 Consequently, the Bank executed a Cancellation of Real Estate Mortgage. Cruz
then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject lot in favor of Pan Pacific,
attaching thereto the previous Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Capistrano in
favor of Cruz. Unknowingly to Cruz, Capistrano filed a Revocation of Special
Power of Attorney with the Register of Deeds of Manila and even requested that
the transaction between Cruz and Pan Pacific shall be withheld. Capistrano filed
the precursory complaint. Pan Pacific was allowed to intervene in the proceedings
and joined Cruz in resisting the complaint insofar as the first cause of action on the
subject lot is concerned. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of
Capistrano.

Pan Pacific and the Cruz spouses contended that Capistrano failed to
present clear and convincing evidence to overturn the presumption of regularity
of public documents like the documents in question. Pan Pacific, however, filed the
instant Petition solely concerning the first cause of action in the Amended
Complaint. Pan Pacific contends that the genuineness and due execution of the
Deed of Absolute Sale and Marital Consent cannot be overridden by the self-
serving testimony of Capistrano. It points out that Capistrano cannot contest the
sale of the subject lot to Cruz, as the sale had already been consummated.

Capistrano posits in his Memorandum that Pan Pacific is not an innocent

purchaser for value and in good faith as Cruz was never the registered owner of the
subject lot. Pan Pacific was bound at its peril to investigate the right of Cruz to
transfer the property to it.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Pan Pacific is entitled fully on the subject lot despite the balance
remaining due by Cruz to Capistrano.

RULING:

Yes. Since Cruz had a balance of P132,061.00 owing to Capistrano as of the

date of the deed of sale, the latter could not have possibly executed the deed. This
From the existence of Cruz’s outstanding balance, the non-existence of the deed of
sale does not necessarily follow. Indeed, a vendor may agree to a deed of absolute
sale even before full payment of the purchase price. Article 1478 of the Civil
Code states that "the parties may stipulate that ownership in the thing shall not
pass to the purchaser until he has fully paid the price." A sensu contrario, the
parties may likewise stipulate that the ownership of the property may pass even if
the purchaser has not fully paid the price.
The courts below also assigned an adverse connotation to Cruz’s impleading
of the Capistrano spouses as party-defendants in the action against the Bank to
enjoin the foreclosure of the mortgage on the subject lot. Cruz’s move is congruent
with both his strong desire to protect his interest in the subject lot and the reality
that there was an existing deed of sale in his favor. Precisely, his interest in the lot
is borne out and had arisen from the deed of sale. As purchaser of the lot, he had to
avert the foreclosure of the mortgage thereon. And to ensure against the dismissal
of the action for failure to join a real party-in-interest, he had to implead
Capistrano in whose name the title to the subject lot was registered still.

With respect to whatever balance Cruz may still owe to Capistrano, the Court
believes that this is not a concern of Pan Pacific as the latter is not a party to the
Deed of Absolute Sale between Capistrano and Cruz. But of course, Pan Pacific
should enjoy full entitlement to the subject lot as it was sold to him by Cruz who
earlier had acquired title thereto absolutely and unconditionally by virtue of the
Deed of Absolute Sale. Cruz had the right to sell the subject lotto Pan Pacific in
1988, as he in fact did.

DOLORES PINTIANO-ANNO vs. ALBERT ANNO (deceased) and

PATENIO SUANDING
 G.R. NO. 163743 January 27, 2006
PUNO,J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno and respondent Albert Anno (spouses Anno)

were married.  They acquired a 4-hectare public, unregistered, virgin, agricultural
land in Lamut, Becket, La Trinidad, Benguet.  Petitioner contends that she and her
spouse had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land; that they both worked on the land, and, that they
also hired a caretaker to oversee it. Petitioner contends that without her knowledge,
respondent Albert executed two documents of transfer covering the subject land.
Respondent Albert waived and quitclaimed in favor of petitioner's first cousin,
respondent Patenio Suanding, his rights over a portion of the subject land.

Petitioner alleged that the subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of
spouses Anno. Albert represented to him that the land was his exclusive property
as the land was part of his inheritance and he had been in possession thereof prior
to his marriage to petitioner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject land is a conjugal property of spouses Anno.

RULING:

No. Petitioner's evidence failed to prove that the subject land belongs to the
conjugal partnership of spouses Anno. It is a basic rule in evidence that he who
alleges the affirmative of an issue has the burden of proof. The plaintiff must
produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, relying on the strength of his own
evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant's.  The subject land is the
exclusive property of respondent Albert Anno which he could validly dispose of
without the consent of his wife.

DAVID V. PELAYO and LORENZA* B. PELAYO vs. MELKI E. PEREZ

G.R. NO. 141323 June 8, 2005

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.

FACTS:

David Pelayo (Pelayo), by a Deed of Absolute Sale, conveyed to Melki Perez

(Perez) two parcels of agricultural land (the lots) situated in Panabo, Davao.
Loreza Pelayo, wife of Pelayo, and another one whose signature is illegible
witnessed the execution of the deed. Lorenza however, signed only on the third
page in the space provided for witnesses on account of which Perez’ application
for registration of the deed with the Office of the Register of Deeds in Tagum,
Davao, was denied.

Perez, thereupon asked Lorenza to sign on the first and second pages of the deed
but she refused, hence, the instant complaint for specific performance against her
and her husband, Pelayo (defendants). The defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint. The questioned deed, having been executed on January 10, 1988, the
defendants claimed that Perez had at least up to September 10, 1988, within which
to register the same, but as they failed to , it is not valid, and therefore,
unenforceable. The RTC dismissed the case. The CA remanded the case back to
the lower court. Defendant Pelayo now claimed that as the lots were occupied
illegally by some persons against whom they filed an ejectment case, they and
Perez, who is their friend and known at the time as an activitist/leftist, hence feared
by many; just made it appear in the deed that the lots were sold to him to frighten
said illegal occupants, with the intentional omission of Lorenza’s signature, so that
the deed could not be registered, and that the deed being simulated and bereft of
consideration is void/inexistent.

Perez countered that the lots were given to him by defendant Pelayo in
consideration of his services as his attorney-in-fact to make the necessary
representation and negotiation with the illegal occupants-defendants in the
ejectment suit, and that after his relationship with defendant Pelayo became sour,
the latter sent a letter to the Register of Deeds of Tagum requesting him not to
entertain any transaction concerning the lots title to which was entrusted to Perez
who misplaced and could not locate it. Defendant Pelayo also claimed that the
deed was without his wife’s consent, hence it is null and void. The RTC ruled that
the deed was null and void, while the CA ruled that the deed was valid.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the deed of sale was null and void for lack of marital consent.

RULING:

Yes. The Court agreed with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing
here signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed
to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.

JOSEFINA C. FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS &

CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and ROBERTO V. ALEJO, Sheriff IV,
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 142
 G.R. No. 151967 February 16, 2005

CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS:

Josefina Castillo was twenty four years old when she and Eduardo Francisco
got married in January 1983. Eduardo was then employed as Vice President in a
Private Corporation. Josefina acquired two parcels of land where Imus Bank
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Josefina, married to Eduardo.

An affidavit of waiver was executed by Eduardo where he declared that prior to

his marriage with Josefina, the latter purchased the land with her own savings and
that he waived whatever claims he had over the property. When Josefina
mortgaged the property for a loan, Eduardo affixed his marital conformity to the
deed. In 1990, Eduardo who was then a General Manager, bought bags of cement
from the defendant but failed to pay the same. The latter filed a complaint for
recovery and the trial court rendered judgment against Eduardo. The court then
issued a writ of execution and the sheriff issued a notice of levy on execution over
the alleged property of Josefina for the recovery of the balance of the amount due
under the decision of the trial court. Petitioner filed a third party claim over the 2
parcels of land in which she claimed as her paraphernal property.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property is the conjugal property of Josefina and
Eduardo.

RULING:

The Court ruled that petitioner failed to prove that she acquired the property
with her personal funds before her cohabitation with Eduardo and that she was the
sole owner. The Deed of Absolute Sale on record showed it was issued after her
marriage. Their case falls under Article 148 and since they got married before the
Family Code, the provision, pursuant to Art 256, can be applied retroactively if it
does not prejudice vested rights. Petitioner likewise failed that she had any vested
right. Where the parties are in a void marriage due to a legal impediment that
invalidates such marriage, Art 148 should be applied. In the absence of proof that
the wife/husband has actually contributed money, property, or industry to the
properties acquired during such union the presumption of co-ownership will not
arise. The petition was denied for lack of merit. The decision of CA that the
property was conjugal was affirmed.

SPOUSES RENATO and FLORINDA DELA CRUZ vs. SPOUSES GIL and
LEONILA SEGOVIA
G.R. No. 149801 June 26, 2008

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.

FACTS:

Sometime in July 1985, Florindala wanted to purchase the Lot 503and 505
located in Sta Mesa Manila for P180,000.00. Short of fund, she asked her sister
Leonila to take the Lot 503 for P80,000. But Leonila with only P36,000 hard
earned savings, Florinda advancedher P64,000 for the full payment of the said lot.
It was only on September 1991, did these sisters entered a payment scheme
agreement. However, Florinda filed with RTC on March 1996, a complaint
annulling said agreement on the ground, among others that since her husband,
Renato did not sign, it is void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not subject Agreement is void absent the husband’ssignature.

RULING:

No. The absence of Renato’s signature in the agreement bears little significance
to its validity. Art 124 of the FC provides that the administration of the conjugal
partnership is now a joint undertaking of the husband and the wife, in the event
that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. However, the power of administration does not include
the power to dispose or encumber property belonging to the conjugal partnership.
It requires the witten consent of the other spouse.
 WALTER VILLANUEVA AND AURORA VILLANUEVA vs.
FLORENTINO CHIONG AND ELISERA CHIONG
G.R. No. 159889 June 5, 2008

QUISUMBING, J.

FACTS:

Florentino and Elisera Chiong were married in 1960 but have separated in fact
since 1975. During their marriage, they acquired a lot situated in Dipolog City.
Sometime in 1985, Florentino sold one-half western portion of the lot to petitioners
for P8,000 payable in installments. Florentino allowed petitioners to occupy and
build a store, shop and house on the said lot. Shortly after the last installment
payment, petitioners demanded the execution of a deed of sale in their favor,
however, Elisera refused to sign. Elisera then filed a complaint for quietitng of title
while the spouses Villanueva filed for a complaint for specific performance.
Florentino executed the Deed of Abolsolute sale but was annulled by the Regional
Trial Court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the lot and remove all
improvements therein.

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s decision. The petitioners contend that the RTC and CA erred in declaring
the deed of sale executed by Florentino Chiong in favor as null and void and void
as well as holding that the lot in question is conjugal property.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the subject lot is an exclusive property of Florentino or

a conjugal property of the respondents.

2. Whether or not the sale by Florentino is valid without the consent of

his wife, Elisera.
RULINGS:

1. NO. Florentino’s contention that the property relations between him

and his wife Elisera dissolved because of his separation in fact from
her is without merit. Under Article 178 of the Civil Code, the
separation in fact between husband and wife without juidical approval
shall not affect the conjugal partnership. Thus, the lot retains its
conjugal nature.

2. YES. In Villaranda v. Villaranda, the Supreme Court held that without

the wife’s consent, the husband’s alienation or encumbrance of the
conjugal property prior to the effectivity of the Family Code is not void
but merely voidable. Article 166 of the same code necessitates both of
the spouses’ consent for the sale to be valid. Citing Heirs of Ignacia
Aguilar-Reyes v. Mirajes, it was held that the alienation must be
annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the share of the wife in
the conjugal property is concerned.

LOREA DE UGALDE vs. JON DE YSASI

G.R. No. 130623 February 29, 2008

CARPIO, J.

FACTS:

Lorea De Ugalde and Jon De Ysasi got married both before the church and a
judge where they were blessed with a child. During the said occasions the couple
did not execute any ante-nuptial agreement. Sometime in 1957, the couple decided
to separate and the respondent contracted another marriage to Victoria Eleanor
Smith.

The petitioner filed for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
on the allegation that the respondent and Smith had been acquiring and disposing
the real and personal properties to the petitioner’s prejudice as the lawful wife.
Further, the petitioner alleged that she had been defrauded of the total gains of their
conjugal properties. The respondent contended that both of them already entered in
an agreement to dissolve their conjugal partnership. Pursuant to this, an Amicable
Settlement was filed before the CFI of Negros which was approved by the said
court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Trial Court’s Decision which
dismissed the action for dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains?

RULING:

No. Since, the marriage of the couples in this case was in February 15, 1951,
Civil Code is the applicable law in this instance. Under Article 175, the conjugal
partnership of gains ceases during the following circumstances to wit:

1. Upon the death of the other spouse

2. When there is a degree of legal separation
3. When the marriage is annulled
4. In the case of judicial separation of property under Art. 191

The finality of the Amicable Settlement approving the parties’ separation of

property resulted in the termination of the conjugal partnership gains in accordance
with Art.175 of the Civil Code. Hence when the trial Court decided on the petition
for the said dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains (S.P. No.3330) The
conjugal partnership between petitioner and respondent was already dissolved. The
amicable settlement had become final between the parties when it was approved by
CFI on June 6, 1961. Its approval resulted in the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains between the petitioner and respondent on even date.
 METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST CO. vs. NICHOLSON PASCUAL
a.k.a. NELSON PASCUAL
G.R. No. 163744 February 29, 2008

VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS:

Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia Nevalga got married on 1985.

During the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito and belen Sering a 250-
square meter lot in with an apartment standing thereon. On the year of 2994,
Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Nelson under Article 36 of the Family
Code. RTC declared the marriage null and void. Also, it ordered the dissolution
and liquidation of the ex-spouses conjugal partnership of gains. The spouses
weren’t able to liquidate their conjugal partnership even after the declaration of
their legal separation.

Sometime in 1997, Florencia with Norberto and Elvira Oliveros obtained a

loan from petitioner, Metrobank secured the obligation several Real Estate
Mortgage(REM) on their properties including one involving the lot bought from
Sering and showed a waiver made in favor of Florencia, covering the conjugal
properties with her ex-husband, but did not incidentally include the lot in question.

When Florencia and Oliveros failed to pay their loan due, Metrobank
initiated foreclosure proceedings and caused the publication of auction sale on 3
issues of the REM’s. Nicholson filed a complaint to declare the nullity of the
mortgage of the disputed property alleging that the property, which is conjugal was
mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank in its answer: Alleged that the lot
registered in the name of Florencia was paraphernalia. Metrobank also asserted
having approved the mortgage in good faith. Florencia was declared in default for
failure to file an answer within the period. RTC declared the REM invalid and
Metrobank mortgage was in bad faith on the account of negligence. The CA
affirmed the RTC decision then appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage between the respondents

dissolved the regime of community of property of the spouses?

RULING:

No. The declaration of nullity of marriage does not automatically result in a

regime of complete separation when it is shown that there was no liquidation of the
conjugal assets. While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson and Florencia
severed their martial bond and dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of
the properties acquired before such declaration continues to subsist as conjugal
properties until and after the liquidation and partition of the partnership.