Case Digest in Evidence (Remedial Law) : Silot vs. de La Rosa Gregorio Silot, Jr. vs. Estrella de La Rosa

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Case Digest in Evidence (Remedial Law): Silot vs.

De la Rosa
GREGORIO SILOT, JR. vs. ESTRELLA DE LA ROSA

[G.R. No. 159240. February 4, 2008]

FACTS:
- Petitioner Silot and respondent de la Rosa entered into a contract for the construction of
a dormitory-apartment building.
- They expressly agreed that Silot shall supply the labor and de la Rosa shall pay 33% of
the total value of the materials purchased for the project.
- Upon turnover of the completed structure, the total cost of materials actually purchased
was P2,504,469.65, 33% of which is P826,474.98.
- Silot required de la Rosa to pay a total of P1,018,000.00, or P191,525.02 more than the
amount due.
- Through her son-in-law, de la Rosa confronted Silot about the overpayment but the latter
refused to return the overpayment.
- After her repeated demands fell on deaf ears, de la Rosa filed a suit against Silot. Silot,
in retaliation, sued de la Rosa for insufficient payment, claiming that he was supposed to
receive P1,281,872.404 but was only paid P1,008,000.00, thus still leaving a balance of
P273,872.40.
- During trial, however, Atty. San Jose, counsel for Silot, dispensed with the testimony of
Ariel Goingo, a witness for de la Rosa.
- Atty. San Jose admitted Goingo's proposed testimony to the effect that in consideration
of the 33% as mentioned in the contract, all the material supplies during the making of
the additional works mentioned were already accounted for;
- that Silot was paid for all works that were performed as well as all materials supplied;
that the total sum was P2,504,469.65, so that 33% of which is only P826,474.98;
- that de la Rosa paid the amount of P1,018,000.00; hence, there was an excess payment
of P191,525.02; and that de la Rosa never received any demand from nor was she
confronted by Silot regarding an alleged balance.

Consequently, after trial, the RTC ruled in favor of de la Rosa and ordered Silot to return the
overpaid amount. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether the admission by Atty. San Jose, counsel of petitioner Silot, constituted judicial
admission of respondent's evidence.

HELD:
Yes.
- Moreover, well-entrenched is the rule that the client is bound by the mistakes arising
from negligence of his own counsel.
- The only exception to this rule is, as the Court of Appeals itself cited in its decision, when
the negligence is so gross that the client is deprived of his day in court.
In our considered view, however, that exception does not find any application in this case. As
the records would plainly show, Silot was not deprived of his day in court. Also, as the appellate
court observed, he could have introduced evidence, testimonial or otherwise, in order to
controvert or correct the admission made by his counsel. Said the appellate court:

…As gleaned from the records, defendant-appellant Silot was not deprived of his day in court.
He was given every opportunity to be heard through his pleadings and manifestations. He was
also presented in open court to testify. As quoted earlier, Atty. Terbio, counsel for plaintiff-
appellee de la Rosa, even repeatedly asked Atty. San Jose, defendant-appellant Silot's counsel,
if he would admit the purpose for which the witness Ariel Goingo will testify to dispense with his
testimony, and Atty. San Jose repeatedly answered that "We will admit that." And when
asked by the judge if he will admit it, he answered that they will admit P2,504,000.00.

More importantly, Silot's counsel clearly made admissions of the content of the testimony of
witness Goingo, whose presentation was dispensed with. In People v. Hernandez, we held that
admissions made for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some facts are in the nature of
judicial admissions, to wit:

A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution and defense counsel during trial in
open court is automatically reduced into writing and contained in the official transcript of
the proceedings had in court. The conformity of the accused in the form of his signature
affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that: "[…] an attorney who is employed to
manage a party's conduct of a lawsuit […] has prima facie authority to make relevant
admissions by pleadings, by oral or written stipulation, […] which unless allowed to be
withdrawn are conclusive." (Italics supplied.) In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently those of
counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client.
When such admissions are made […] for the purpose of dispensing with proof of some fact, […]
they bind the client, whether made during, or even after, the trial.

Worth stressing, in this connection, judicial admissions do not require proof and may not be
contradicted in the absence of a prior showing that the admissions had been made through
palpable mistake.

Furthermore, in the case of Toh v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized the consequence of
admitting and dispensing with the testimony of the proposed witness, thus:

The Court sees no cogent reason why the said witness should be examined any further since
his testimony as summarized in the offer made by counsel was expressly admitted by opposing
counsel. With the said admission, the testimony of said witness is uncontroverted and even
admitted as fact by opposing counsel.…

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