CASES

ALANO v. MAGUD-LOGMAO
April 7, 2014 | Peralta, J.

DOCTRINE: A human person is not a property, nor even his body while he is still alive. But under
certain conditions allowed by law, he may donate part of his body, like blood or an organ, for medical
or scientific reason.

SUMMARY: Arnelito Logmao, then 18 years old, was brought to the East Avenue Medical Center
(EAMC) by two sidewalk vendors, who allegedly saw the former fall from the overpass near Farmers’
Market. The patient’s data sheet identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso of Bonifacio Avenue,
Mandaluyong. However, the clinical abstract of EAMC stated that the patient is Angelito [Logmao].
Logmao’s condition progressively deteriorated and subsequently, he was transferred to the National
Kidney Institute (NKI) because of lack of equipment at EAMC. At the NKI, the name Angelito
[Logmao] was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso. On March 3, 1988, Dr. Alano issued to Dr. Ona a
Memorandum that the Dept. of Surgery has exerted all reasonable efforts to locate the relatives of
Lugmoso such as appeal through the radios and television, and through police and other government
agencies and that the NBI [Medico-Legal] Section has been notified and is aware of the case. If these
have been complied with in accordance with RA 349 as amended, and PD 856, authority is given to
the Department of Surgery to retrieve and remove the kidneys, pancreas, liver and heart of deceased
patient and to transplant his organs to any compatible patient. Subsequently, the removal and
transplantation of the organs of Lugmoso took place. On March 11, 1988, NKI issued a press release
announcing its successful double organ transplantation. Aida Doromal, a cousin of plaintiff heard the
news on TV and informed plaintiff of the report. Plaintiff filed a complaint for damages against the NKI
doctors & personnel and against the funeral house. SC said that no negligence can be imputed to Dr.
Alano because he employed reasonable means to disseminate notices intended to reach Logmao’s
relatives. This is evidenced by the memorandam that Dr. Alano issued as well as the fact that doctors
and personnel of NKI disseminated notices of Logmao’s death to the media and sought the
assistance of the police even before Dr. Alano issued the memorandum. Also, prior to performing the
procedure for retrieval of the Logmao’s internal organs, the doctors concerned also sought the
opinion and approval of the Medico-Legal of NBI. Also, the internal organs of Logmao were only
removed after he had been pronounced brain dead.

FACTS

1. In the evening of March 1, 1988, Arnelito Logmao, then eighteen (18) years old, was brought
to the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) in Quezon City by two sidewalk vendors, who
allegedly saw the former fall from the overpass near the Farmers’ Market in Cubao, Quezon
City. The patient’s data sheet identified the patient as Angelito Lugmoso of Boni Avenue,
Mandaluyong. However, the clinical abstract prepared by Dr. Paterno F. Cabrera, the surgical
resident on-duty at the Emergency Room of EAMC, stated that the patient is Angelito
[Logmao].
2. [Logmao] developed generalized seizures that the condition of [Logmao] progressively
deteriorated; that admission to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU) and mechanical ventilator support
became necessary, but there was no vacancy at the ICU and all the ventilator units were being
used by other patients.
3. A resident physician of NKI, who was rotating at EAMC, suggested that [Logmao] be
transferred to NKI; and that after arrangements were made, [Logmao] was transferred to NKI
at 10:10 in the morning.
4. At the NKI, the name Angelito [Logmao] was recorded as Angelito Lugmoso. Lugmoso was
immediately attended to and given the necessary medical treatment. As Lugmoso had no
relatives around, Jennifer B. Misa, Transplant Coordinator, was asked to locate his family by
enlisting police and media assistance.
5. Dr. Ona requested the Laboratory Section to examination, so that should Lugmoso die despite
the necessary medical care and management and he would be found to be a suitable organ
donor and his family would consent to organ donation, the organs thus donated could be
detached and transplanted promptly to any compatible beneficiary.
6. Misa verified on the same day, March 2, 1988, from EAMC the identity of Lugmoso and, upon
her request, she was furnished by EAMC a copy of the patient’s date sheet which bears the
name Angelito Lugmoso, with address at Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong. She then contacted
 several radio and television stations to request for air time for the purpose of locating the
family.
7. Certifications were issued by Channel 4, ABS-CBN and GMA attesting that the request made
by the NKI on March 2, 1988 to air its appeal to locate the family and relatives of Angelito
Lugmoso of Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong was accommodated. A Certification was likewise
issued by Police Station No. 5, Eastern Police District, Mandaluyong attesting to the fact that
on March 2, 1988, at about 6:00 p.m., Jennifer Misa requested for assistance to immediately
locate the family and relatives of Angelito Lugmoso.
8. On March 3, 1988, at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, Dr. Ona was informed that Lugmoso
had been pronounced brain dead.
9. As the extensive search for the relatives of Lugmoso yielded no positive result and time being
of the essence in the success of organ transplantation, Dr. Ona requested Dr. Filoteo A. Alano,
Executive Director of NKI, to authorize the removal of specific organs from the body of
Lugmoso for transplantation purposes. Dr. Ona likewise instructed Dr. Rose Marie Rosete-
Liquete to secure permission for the planned organ retrieval and transplantation from the
Medico-Legal Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), on the assumption that the
incident which lead to the brain injury and death of Lugmoso was a medico legal case.
10. Dr. Alano issued a memorandum stating that Department has exerted all reasonable efforts to
locate the relatives or next of kin of the said deceased patient such as appeal through the
radios and television as well as through police and other government agencies and that the
NBI [Medico-Legal] Section has been notified and is aware of the case. That if these have
been complied with in accordance with law, the Department is given authority for the removal
and transplantation of the organs.
11. The NKI issued a press release announcing its successful double organ transplantation. Aida
Doromal, a cousin of plaintiff, heard the news aired on television and informed plaintiff about
the report. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a complaint for damages.
12. TRIAL COURT FIRST DECISION: a. Finding only Dr. Filoteo Alano liable for damages to
plaintiff and dismissing the complaint against the other defendants for lack of legal basis.
13. CA DECISION: a. Affirmed RTC’s decision

ISSUES:

1. WoN petitioner was negligent in authorizing the removal or retrieval of the internal organs of
respondent's son who had been declared brain dead – NO.
2. WoN there was sufficiency of time allowed for notices to reach the realtives of the deceased –
YES.

RULING:

The petition is GRANTED. The complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED. So ordered.

RATIO:
1. Dr. Alano employed reasonable means to disseminate notices intended to reach the relatives
of the deceased.
a. A careful reading of the memorandum shows that petitioner instructed his subordinates
to "make certain" that "all reasonable efforts" are exerted to locate the patient's next of
kin, even enumerating ways in which to ensure that notices of the death of the patient
would reach said relatives.
b. It also clearly stated that permission or authorization to retrieve and remove the internal
organs of the deceased was being given ONLY IF the provisions of the applicable law
had been complied with.
c. Such instructions reveal that petitioner acted prudently by directing his subordinates to
exhaust all reasonable means of locating the relatives of the deceased. He could not
have made his directives any clearer. He even specifically mentioned that permission is
only being granted IF the Department of Surgery has complied with all the requirements
of the law.
2. If respondent failed to immediately receive notice of her son's death because the notices did
not properly state the name or identity of the deceased, fault cannot be given to petitioner.
a. The trial and appellate courts found that it was the EAMC, who had the opportunity to
ascertain the name of the deceased, who recorded the wrong information regarding the
deceased's identity to NKI.
 b. NKI could not have obtained the information about his name from the patient, because
as found by the lower courts, the deceased was already unconscious by the time he
was brought to the NKI.
DREAM VILLAGE v. BCDA
24 July 2013 | Reyes, J.

DOCTRINE: (1) Properties of public dominion are not susceptible to acquisition by prescription; (2)
Ownership of a land registered under a Torrens title cannot be lost by prescription or adverse
possession.

SUMMARY: RA 7227 created BCDA. Sec 8 provides that BCDA will be provided from sales proceeds
or transfers of lots in 9 military camps in Metro Manila, including 723 ha. of Fort Bonifacio. It expressly
authorized the President of the Philippines "to sell the lands… declared alienable and disposable
pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of government properties,"
specifically to raise capital for the BCDA. Titles to the camps were transferred to the BCDA for this
purpose, and TCT No. 61524 (disputed lot is part of 61524) was cancelled by TCT Nos. 23888,
23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, now in the name of the BCDA. Dream Village,
representing 2,000 families who are occupants of a lot in Western Bicutan, filed a complaint before
the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) charging the BCDA of wrongfully
asserting title to Dream Village and subjecting its members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest
and tensions among the residents. They claim that they have been occupying the area for 30 years.
COSLAP ruled in favor of Dream Village. BCDA claims that COSLAP has no jurisdiction and
continues to assert its title over the land. The issue is whether or not BCDA owns the land. The Court
ruled in favor of BCDA, stating that (1) Dream Village was outside the area declared in Proclamation
Nos. 2476 and 172 as alienable and disposable; (2) the lot is considered as a property of public
dominion and therefore not susceptible to acquisition by prescription; (3) Ownership of a land
registered under a Torrens title cannot be lost by prescription or adverse possession; (4) The subject
property having been expressly reserved for a specific public purpose, the COSLAP cannot exercise
jurisdiction over the complaint of the Dream Village settlers.

FACTS

1. 1906: Hacienda de Maricaban is registered under OCT 291.

2. American colonial period: Govt of USA bought Maricaban to be converted into the military
reservation known as Fort William McKinley (McKinley). Transfer Certificate Title (CTC) no.
192 was issued to cancel OCT 291.
3. 30 hectares of Maricaban was transferred to the Manila Railroad Company (MRC) for which,
TCT nos. 1218 (for MRC) and 1219 (USA) cancelled TCT 192.
4. January 1914: TCT no. 1219 was replaced by TCT no. 1688.
5. September 1914: TCT no. 1688 was cancelled and replaced by TCT no. 2288
6. 1956: USA ceded McKinley to the Republic of the Philippines (RPh) and, TCT No. 2288 was
cancelled and replaced by TCT 61524 in the name of RPh.
7. 1957: President Garcia issued Proc. 423, withdrawing from sale or settlement the tracts of land
within Mckinley, now renamed Fort Bonifacio, and reserving them for military purposes.
8. 1986: President Marcos issued Proc. 2476 declaring certain portions of Fort Bonifacio
alienable and disposable; allowing the sale to the settlers of home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower
Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan.
9. 1987: President. Aquino issued Proc. 172 amending Proc. 2476 by limiting to the areas in
Western Bicutan open for disposition
10. 1992: RA 7227 was passed creating BCDA. Sec 8 of RA 7227 provides that the capital of the
BCDA will be provided from sales proceeds or transfers of lots in 9 military camps in Metro
Manila, including 723 ha. of Fort Bonifacio. It expressly authorized the President of the
Philippines "to sell the lands… declared alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of
existing laws and regulations governing sales of government properties," specifically to raise
capital for the BCDA. Titles to the camps were transferred to the BCDA for this purpose, and
TCT No. 61524 was cancelled by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and
23891, now in the name of the BCDA.
11. Dream Village filed a complaint before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village and subjecting its
members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions among the residents. They
claim that they have been occupying the area for 30 years "in the concept of owners
continuously, exclusively and notoriously for several years," and have built their houses of
 sturdy materials thereon and introduced paved roads, drainage and recreational and religious
facilities. Dream Village, asserts that the lot is not among those transferred to the BCDA under
R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent applications by the occupants should be processed by the
Land Management Bureau (LMB).
12. 2000: Dream Village filed an amended petition seeking for the following relief:
a. To declare the subject property as alienable and disposable by virtue of applicable laws;
b. Declaring the land presently being occupied by petitioner as within the coverage of
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 and outside the claim of AFPRSBS INDUSTRIAL
PARK COMPLEX and/or BASES CONVERSION DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.
c. ORDERING the LMB to process the application of the assoc. members for the purchase
of their respective lots under the provisions of Acts Nos. 274 and 730.
13. BCDA questioned the jurisdiction of the COSLAP while asserting its title pursuant to RA 7227.
14. COSLAP wrote to DENR requesting survey, and the final report of the verification survey
stated that “3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream Village Neighborhood
Association, Inc. is outside Lot-1, Swo13-000298 and inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot 13,
Swo-00-0001302 with an actual area of 78,466 square meters. Likewise, the area actually is
outside Swo-00-0001302 of BCDA” 20.
15. 2004 MR: BCDA questioned the survey result as it was conducted without its representatives.
It also claims that there is no basis for the COSLAP’s finding that the members of Dream
Village were in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner, because
not only is the property not among those declared alienable and disposable, but it is a titled
patrimonial property of the State. COSLAP denied the MR.
16. CA ruled that the dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the COSLAP because of the land’s
history of private ownership and because it is registered under an indefeasible Torrens title
and that Proclamation No. 172 covers only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 in Western
Bicutan, whereas Dream Village occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302,
which also belongs to the BCDA. 22.
17. 2010: CA denied Dream Village’s MR.

ISSUES

1. WON in annulling the resolution of COSLAP in COSLAP case no. 99500, CA decided the case
in a manner not consistent with law and applicable decisions of the SC; - NO
2. WON the CA erred in ruling that COSLAP had no jurisdiction over the controversy between the
parties herein – NO
3. WON BCDA holds title to Fort Bonifacio- YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

RATIO

1. Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. BCDA has ruled that BCDA has title and
ownership over Fort Bonifacio and such case is essentially not much different from this case.
There, 20,000 families were long-time residents occupying 98 ha. of Fort Bonifacio in Makati
City, who vainly sought to avert their eviction and the demolition of their houses by the BCDA
upon a claim that the land was owned by the USA under TCT No. 2288.
2. Dream Village sits on the abandoned C-5 Road, which lies outside the area declared in Proc.
2476 and 172 as alienable and disposable.
3. While property of the State or any of its subdivisions patrimonial in character may be the object
of prescription, those "intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth" are considered property of public dominion and therefore not susceptible to acquisition
by prescription. The purpose of the law can be tied to either "public service" or "the
development of national wealth" under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands
remain property of the public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and disposable.
4. Ownership of a land registered under a Torrens title cannot be lost by prescription or adverse
possession. Sec. 47, P.D. No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly provides that
no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.
5. The subject property having been expressly reserved for a specific public purpose, the
COSLAP cannot exercise jurisdiction over the complaint of the Dream Village settlers. Under
 Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP’s duty would have been to refer the conflict to another
tribunal or agency of government in view of the serious ramifications of the disputed claims. A
review of the history of the COSLAP will readily clarify that its jurisdiction is limited to disputes
over public lands not reserved or declared for a public use or purpose.

LAUREL v. ABROGAR
January 13, 2009 | G.R. No. 155076

DOCTRINE: “Personal property” may include those things intangible. In the Revised Penal Code,
however, “personal property” must be considered in tandem with the word “take” in the law. For a
thing to be the subject of “taking” it must have physical or material existence and susceptible of
occupation; There is “taking” of personal property, and theft is consummated when the offender
unlawfully acquires possession of personal property even if It is clear by these reasons that the
subject of theft must be a physical thing.

SUMMARY: Luis Marcos, representative of Baynet Co Ltd. stole international long-distance calls
belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale (ISR). Lower court held that
Information does not contain material allegations charging petitioner with theft of personal property
since international long-distance calls and the business of providing telecommunication or telephone
services are not personal properties. PLDT insists that it should be considered as personal property,
astThe enumeration of real properties in Article 415 of the Civil Code is exclusive such that all those
not included therein are personal properties. Court ruled that any personal property, tangible or
intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation could be the object of theft.
Consequently, any property, which is not included in the enumeration of real properties under the
Civil Code and capable of appropriation, can be the subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code.
Also, Articles 517 and 518 of the Penal Code secure the right of the ownership of electric current
through acts of subtraction. And the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various
equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDT's telephone system, through which petitioner is
able to resell or re-route international long-distance calls using respondent PLDT's facilities
constitutes all three acts of subtraction. The business of providing telecommunication or telephone
service is likewise personal property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code. Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law),
hence, could be object of theft.

FACTS

1. On or about September 10-19, 1999, Luis Marcos, representative of Baynet Co Ltd. stole
international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by conducting International Simple Resale
(ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines,
cables, antenae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic
exchange facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business
from PLDT.
2. Court held that the Information does not contain material allegations charging petitioner with
theft of personal property since international long distance calls and the business of providing
telecommunication or telephone services are not personal properties under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code.
3. PLDT further insists that the Revised Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the
Civil Code's definition of real and personal property. The enumeration of real properties in
Article 415 of the Civil Code is exclusive such that all those not included therein are personal
properties.
4. Since Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code used the words "personal property" without
qualification, it follows that all "personal properties" as understood in the context of the Civil
Code, may be the subject of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. PLDT alleges
that the international calls and business of providing telecommunication or telephone service
are personal properties capable of appropriation and can be objects of theft.
5. PLDT also argues that "taking" in relation to theft under the Revised Penal Code does not
require "asportation," the sole requisite being that the object should be capable of
"appropriation." The element of "taking" referred to in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code
means the act of depriving another of the possession and dominion of a movable coupled with
the intention, at the time of the "taking," of withholding it with the character of permanency.
There must be intent to appropriate, which means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing.
 Thus, the term "personal properties" under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code is not limited
to only personal properties which are "susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger
quantity and of being transported from place to place."
6. According to respondent, the "international phone calls" which are "electric currents or sets of
electric impulses transmitted through a medium, and carry a pattern representing the human
voice to a receiver," are personal properties, which may be subject of theft. Article 416(3) of
the Civil Code deems "forces of nature" (which includes electricity) which are brought under
the control by science, are personal property.
7. Petitioner claims that the analogy between generated electricity and telephone calls is
misplaced. PLDT does not produce or generate telephone calls. It only provides the facilities or
services for the transmission and switching of the calls. He also insists that "business" is not
personal property. It is not the "business" that is protected but the "right to carry on a
business." This right is what is considered as property. Since the services of PLDT cannot be
considered as "property," the same may not be subject of theft.
8. According to the OSG, prosecution under Republic Act (RA) No. 8484 or the Access Device
Regulations Act of 1998 and RA 8792 or the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 does not
preclude prosecution under the Revised Penal Code for the crime of theft. The latter embraces
unauthorized appropriation or use of PLDT's international calls, service and business, for
personal profit or gain, to the prejudice of PLDT as owner thereof. The charge of theft as
alleged in the Information should be taken in relation to RA 8484 because it is the elements,
and not the designation of the crime, that control.

ISSUES

Whether or not the international long distance calls/ business of PLDT is a personal property, which
can be the subject of theft. (YES)

HELD

1. The elements of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
a. that there be taking of personal property;
b. that said property belongs to another;
c. that the taking be done with intent to gain;
d. that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
e. that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things.
2. Prior to the passage of the Revised Penal, the definition of the term "personal property" in the
penal code provision on theft had been established in Philippine jurisprudence.
a. It consistently ruled that any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or
incorporeal, capable of appropriation could be the object of theft. Consequently, any
property, which is not included in the enumeration of real properties under the Civil
Code and capable of appropriation, can be the subject of theft under the Revised Penal
Code.
b. The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal
code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which
is defined as "carrying away."
3. As early as 1910, the Court declared in Genato that ownership over electricity (which an
international long distance call consists of), as well as telephone service, is protected by the
provisions on theft of the Penal Code.
4. Articles 517 and 518 of the Penal Code secure the right of the ownership of electric current.
The acts of "subtraction" include:
a. tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used for generating,
containing, conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service;
b. tapping or otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire,
meter, or other apparatus; and
c. using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which one may fraudulently
obtain any current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone service.
d. In the instant case, the act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various
equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDT's telephone system, through which
petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent
PLDT's facilities constitutes all three acts of subtraction mentioned above.
 5. The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is likewise personal
property which can be the object of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.
Business may be appropriated under Section 2 of Act No. 3952 (Bulk Sales Law), hence, could
be object of theft.
a. Also, following the ruling in Strochecker v. Ramirez, business should also be classified
as personal property. Since it is not included in the exclusive enumeration of real
properties under Article 415, it is therefore personal property.
6. As can be clearly gleaned from the above disquisitions, petitioner's acts constitute theft of
respondent PLDT's business and service, committed by means of the unlawful use of the
latter's facilities. In this regard, the Amended Information inaccurately describes the offense by
making it appear that what petitioner took were the international long distance telephone calls,
rather than respondent PLDT's business.
7. In the assailed Decision, it was conceded that in making the international phone calls, the
human voice is converted into electrical impulses or electric current, which are transmitted to
the party called. A telephone call, therefore, is electrical energy. It was also held in the assailed
Decision that intangible property such as electrical energy is capable of appropriation because
it may be taken and carried away. Electricity is personal property under Article 416 (3) of the
Civil Code, which enumerates "forces of nature which are brought under control by science."
8. Indeed, while it may be conceded that "international long distance calls," the matter alleged to
be stolen in the instant case, take the form of electrical energy, it cannot be said that such
international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT since the latter
could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure
and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim
that such telephone calls were taken without its consent. It is the use of these communications
facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful
taking of the telephone services and business.
9. Therefore, the business of providing telecommunication and the telephone service are
personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, and the act of engaging in ISR
is an act of "subtraction" penalized under said article.
10. However, the Amended Information describes the thing taken as, "international long distance
calls," and only later mentions "stealing the business from PLDT" as the manner by which the
gain was derived by the accused.
11. In order to correct this inaccuracy of description, this case must be remanded to the trial court
and the prosecution directed to amend the Amended Information, to clearly state that the
property subject of the theft are the services and business of respondent PLDT.

URIETA VDA. DE AGUILAR v. ALFARO

July 5, 2010 | Del Castillo, J.

DOCTRINE: It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the
person in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership to the
land described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership
of the property including possession.

SUMMARY: Ignacio was issued an OCT for his land in Mindoro. He allowed his sister-in-law,
Anastacia, to occupy the southern part of the lot. When Ignacio died, his heirs, including his wife,
Ederlina asked Ederlina to vacate but they refused. So Asuncion filed a case for accion publiciana
praying that the respondents be ordered to vacate the lot. Respondents however claim that based on
a Kasulatan sa Bilihan, Ignacio and Asuncion sold the southern part of the lot to them. The RTC
decided in favor of Asuncion while the CA reversed the RTC’s decision. The issue is, who has better
right of possession in a recovery of possession case. The SC ruled that the registered owner armed
with a torrens title (Asuncion) has a better right of possession.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Asuncion filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Damages before the
RTC of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Her husband, Ignacio Aguilar was issued Oct P-9354
over a 606sqm lot (Lot 83) in Occidental Mindoro. Prior to the issuance of the OCT, Ignacio
allowed his sister-in-law, Anastacia, mother of respondent, Ederlina, to construct a house on
the southern portion of the lot and stay there temporarily.
 2. Ignacio died in 1994 and his heirs decided to partition the land. Asucion thus asked Ederlina to
vacate the lot but they didn't.
3. So Asuncion filed a case for accion publiciana praying that the respondents be ordered to
vacate the lot.
4. Respondents asserted that Ignacio and Asuncion sold the southern part of the lot to them on
April 17, 1973 which is evidenced by a Kasulatan sa Bilihan which has the signatures of
Asuncion and Ignacio. Asuncion denies having signed the Kasulatan and claims that it was
forged.
5. The RTC ordered the respondents to vacate the lot and denied their claim for reconveyance.
6. The CA reversed the RTC decision and said that the Kasulatan is valid since it is a notarized
document and is presumed to be authentic and duly executed.
7. Hence this appeal.

ISSUE/s:

1. Who has better right of possession in a recovery of possession case? – The registered owner
armed with a torrens title (Asuncion)

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June
7, 2004 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the September 21, 1998 Decision of Regional Trial
Court, Branch 46, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, insofar as it orders the respondents to vacate the
premises is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

RATIO:

1. Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independently of title. The objective of the plaintiffs in an accion publiciana is to recover
possession only, not ownership. But if the parties raise the issue of ownership, the court may
pass upon it. this adjudication, however, is not final and binding. It is only for the purpose of
resolving the issue of possession.
2. It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title to property in favor of the person
in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership to the
land described therein. It is also settled that the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property including possession.
3. In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the holder of a Torrens title over the
entire property. Respondents have only their notarized but unregistered Kasulatan sa Bilihan
to support their claim of ownership. Thus, even if respondents’ proof of ownership has in its
favor a juris tantum presumption of authenticity and due execution, the same cannot prevail
over petitioner’s Torrens title.
4. The torrens system was adopted in the country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility
once the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
5. The following details cast doubt on the genuineness of the Kasulatan.
a. The date of its execution unbelievably coincides with the date the buyer, Anastacia,
died;
b. Despite its alleged execution on April 17, 1973, respondents brought up the Kasulatan
only when petitioner asked them to vacate the disputed premises. Prior thereto, they
neither asserted their rights thereunder nor registered the same with the proper Registry
of Deeds;
c. The lawyer who notarized the Kasulatan sa Bilihan, as well as the witnesses thereto,
was not presented in court; and,
d. The District Land Officer who signed OCT No. P9354 by authority of the President is a
public officer who has in his favor the presumption of regularity in issuing said title.
6. Furthermore, a torrens certificate of title cannot be the subject of a collateral attack which was
what happened in this case. It was a collateral attack because it is an attack incidental to their
quest to defend their possession of the property in an accion publiciana case and not in a
direct action.
7. Also, the lower courts cannot pass upon or grant respondents’ counterclaim for lack of
jurisdiction. Since what the respondents’ applied for was a permissive counterclaim, they
should’ve pais the docket fees. However, no proof was given to prove that these were paid. It
 has been our consistent ruling that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the full amount of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a
trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action.
8. The ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining who between the parties has a
better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the
issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties to file an action for the
determination of the issue of ownership where the validity of the Kasulatan sa Bilihan and of
OCT No. P9354 can be properly threshed out.

GO v. LOOYUKO
July 1, 2013 | Mendoza, J.

DOCTRINE: The Court has consistently upheld the registered owners’ superior right to possess the
property in unlawful detainer cases. It is an age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens Title over
a land is entitled to its possession.

SUMMARY: Looyuko and Jimmy Go are partners in Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery wherein William Go
(brother of Jimmy) is the Chief of Staff. William was allowed to occupy a townhouse by Looyuko.
Looyuko demanded William to vacate the townhouse but Jimmy claimed that the townhouse was
bought using funds from Noah’s Ark and, hence, part of the property of the partnership which is why
William refused to vacate the property. Looyuko presented the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in
his name as well as the demand letter while William presented the partnership agreements, the
contract to sell of the subject property to Noah’s Ark, and the cash voucher evidencing payment for
the acquisition of the property. The issue is WON Looyuko is the real owner of the property. Court
ruled that Looyuko is the real owner of the property.

FACTS

1. Alberto T. Looyuko (Looyuko) and Jimmy Go, brother of petitioner William Go (William) were
partners in a business called Noah’s Ark Group of Companies (Noah’s Ark).
2. William was appointed Chief of Staff of Noah’s Ark Sugar Refinery and was allowed by
Looyuko to occupy the townhouse in Gilmore Townhomes.
3. In a letter, Looyuko demanded that William vacate the townhouse.
4. Jimmy claimed that the townhouse was bought using funds from Noah’s Ark and, hence, part
of the property of the partnership which is why William refused to vacate the property.
5. Looyuko filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against William before the MeTC.
a. Looyuko adduced as evidence the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in his name as
well as the demand letter. He alleged that William’s occupation was merely by
tolerance, on the understanding that he should vacate the property upon demand.
b. On the other hand, William presented the partnership agreements, the contract to sell of
the subject property to Noah’s Ark, and the cash voucher evidencing payment for the
acquisition of the property. c. MeTC rendered a decision in favor of Looyuko stating that
he had the right to the possession of the said townhouse as its registered owner.
William then appealed to the QC RTC.
6. William filed a motion to suspend proceedings in the unlawful detainer case because a
complaint for specific performance against Looyuko had been filed by Jimmy before the Pasig
RTC to establish his alleged right as a co-owner. (Now, there are 2 proceedings, MeTC
appealed to QC RTC for unlawful detainer and this, the one in RTC Pasig for specific
performance)
7. QC RTC ruled in favor of William and deferred the proceedings in the unlawful detainer case to
await the outcome of the civil case before the Pasig RTC and also denied Looyuko’s two
motions for execution.
8. The CA, however, reversed the QC RTC orders and directed the immediate execution of the
MTC Decision.
9. QC RTC issued a decision in the action for unlawful detainer, reversing the findings of the
MTC and ruling in favor of William saying that the property was purchased in the name of
Noah’s Ark and that Looyuko held the title for purpose of expediency only. The QC RTC gave
credence to documents executed by Jimmy stating that William’s authority to occupy the
disputed property was part of his privilege as Chief of Staff of Noah’s Ark.
10. CA ruled in favor of Looyuko and held that the issue of possession could be resolved without
ruling on the claim of ownership. The CA stated that the TCT presented by Looyuko
 unequivocally showed that he owned the property and, as a consequence of ownership, he
was entitled to its possession. It ruled that the validity of Looyuko’s title could be assailed
through a direct proceeding but not in an action for ejectment. William filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA.

ISSUE

1. WON Looyuko is the real owner of the property? YES

2. WON prior physical possession is necessary in an action for unlawful detainer? NO
3. WON the ejectment case can proceed without resolving the issue of ownership? YES, BUT
this case falls under the exception

HELD:

Looyuko is the real owner of the property:

1. Looyuko has a TCT, which is an evidence of indefeasible title over the property, and thus, he is
entitled to possession of the property as a matter of right. The partnership agreements and
other documentary evidence presented by Go are not enough to offset Looyuko’s right as
registered owner.
2. The Court has consistently upheld the registered owners’ superior right to possess the
property in unlawful detainer cases.10 It is an age-old rule that the person who has a Torrens
Title over a land is entitled to its possession.
3. But this ruling on ownership is merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice the action
filed by Jimmy Go, claiming shares in the title over the property.
4. The registered owner’s superior right to possess the property in unlawful detainer cases has
been consistently held by the Court.

Prior physical possession is not necessary in an action for unlawful detainer

Nowhere does it appear in Section 1 of Rule 70 1 of the Rules of Court that, in an action for unlawful
detainer, the plaintiff be in prior physical possession of the property. Thus, it has been held that prior
physical possession by the plaintiff is not an indispensable requirement in an unlawful detainer case
brought by a vendee or other person against whom the possession of any land is unlawfully withheld
after the expiration or termination of a right to hold possession.

The ejectment case can proceed without resolving the issue of ownership

1. The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of
the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties.
a. EXCEPTION: When the defendant, however, raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue
of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.
2. The Court agrees with William Go that the issue of ownership should be ruled upon
considering that such has been raised and it appears that it is inextricably linked to the
question of possession. It is linked to the question of possession, because William Go
allegedly had usufructuary right over the townhouse as a privilege of being Chief of Staff of
Noah’s Ark, which, according to Jimmy Go, is the real owner of the property.

NENITA QUALITY FOODS CORP. v. GALABO

January 30, 2013 | Brion, J.

DOCTRINE: Ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated by the
concept of ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case.
1
Sec. 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.—Subject to the provision of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of
the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person
against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in
the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or
persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material possession,
and not possession flowing out of ownership; these are different legal concepts for which the law
provides different remedies for recovery of possession. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it “is
not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.”

SUMMARY: The dispute in this case relates to the possession of a parcel of land described as Lot
No. 102, the former Arakaki Plantation in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City with an area of 6,074 sq.m.
Respondents are the heirs of Donato Galabo. In 1948, Donato obtained Lot No. 722, Cad-102.
Donato and the respondents assumed that Lot No. 722 included Lot No. 102, per the original survey
of 1916 to 1920. On the other hand, Nenita Quality Foods Corp. (NQFC) claims that they bought the
lot already from Santos and so demanded the petitioners to vacate the lot. When conciliation failed,
respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages. The MTCC dismissed the respondents
claim and said that NQFC has rightful possession over the property. RTC denied the appeal of the
respondents. The CA reversed RTC’s decision, granted the respondent’s petition and ordered NQFC
to vacate Lot No. 102. The issue in this case is WON NQFC had been in prior physical possession of
Lot No. 102. The SC ruled in the negative. This is because in forcible entry suits, possession only
refers to actual possession and not legal possession (having title over the land).

FACTS

1. The dispute in the case relates to the possession of a parcel of land described as Lot No. 102,
the former Arakaki Plantation in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City with an area of 6,074 sq.m.
2. Respondents are the heirs of Donato Galabo. In 1948, Donato obtained Lot No. 722, Cad-102,
a portion of the Arakaki Plantation owned by National Abaca and Other Fibers Corporation.
Donato and the respondents assumed that Lot No. 722 included Lot No. 102, per the original
survey of 1916 to 1920.
3. When the Board of Liquidators (BOL) took over the administration of the Arakaki Plantation in
the 1950s, it had Lot No. 722 resurveyed. Allegedly, the resurvey did not include Lot No. 102;
thus, when Donato acquired Transfer Certificate of Title, Lot No. 102 was not included. The
respondents, however, continued to possess, occupy and cultivate Lot No. 102.
4. When Nenita Quality Foods Corp. (NQFC) opened its business in Marapangi, Toril, Davao City
in the late 1950s, it allegedly offered to buy Lot No. 102. Donato declined.
5. Later on, the respondents received a letter from Santos Nantin demanding that they vacate Lot
No. 102. Santos claimed ownership of this lot per the Deed of Transfer of Rights which the
respondents and their mother allegedly executed in Santos’ favor.
6. The respondents maintained that they had been occupying Lot No. 102, even the BOL
recognized them as long-time occupant and awardee of the property. To perfect their title, the
respondents applied for free patent over Lot No. 102
7. NQFC’s workers, with armed policemen entered by force Lot No. 102 to fence it. The
respondents reported the entry.
8. Respondents received a letter from NQFC’s counsel demanding that he remove the house
from Lot No. 102. NQFC subsequently removed the existing fence and cut down various trees
that the respondents had planted on the property.
9. When conciliation failed, the respondents filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages
before the MTCC alleging that:
a. they had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102; and
b. NQFC deprived them of possession through force, intimidation, strategy, threats and
stealth.
10. Ruling of MTCC: dismissed the respondents’ complaint, ruling that the evidence presented and
the BIL’s findings established NQFC’s rightful possession over the property.
11. Ruling of RTC: denied the appeal. It held that:
a. the respondents failed to perfect whatever right they might have had over Lot No. 102;
and
b. they are estopped from asserting any right over Lot No. 102 since they sold it to Santos
in 1972. RTC also resolved the question of ownership, explaining that the NQFC’s
possession of Lot No. 102 was anchored on a Deed of Absolute Sale, while that of the
respondents was based merely on the allegation of possession and occupation by
Donato, and not on any title
12. CA: reversed RTC’s decision, granted the respondent’s petition and ordered NQFC to vacate
Lot No. 102.
 a. Donato’s failure to perfect his title over Lot No. 102 should not weigh against the
respondents as the issue in a forcible entry case is one of possession de facto and not
of possession de jure; and
b. NQFC’s ownership of Lot No. 102 is beside the point as ownership is beyond the
purview of an ejectment case. The CA, however, denied the respondents’ prayer for
moral damages and attorney’s fees, and rejected the other issues raised for being
irrelevant.
13. NQFC maintains that the Bureau of Lands would not have granted Santos’ free patent
application had he not been in possession of Lot No. 102 because continued occupation and
cultivation of the property is a requirement for such grant under the Public Land Act.
14. Respondents deny ever meeting Santos and they maintain that their continued possession and
occupation of Lot No. 102 belie this supposed sale. Even granting that this sale occurred,
Santos could still not have acquired any right over Lot No. 102 for as of 1980, the land was still
in the name of the Republic.
15. Respondents also claim that their open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and adverse
possession of Lot No. 102 for three decades, coupled by a claim of ownership, gave them
vested right or interest over the property

ISSUE

WON NQFC had been in prior physical possession of Lot No. 102. – NO.

RULING

WHEREFORE, in light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the petition and the resolution of the
Court of Appeals in is hereby AFFIRMED.

RATIO
1. First, we dwell on the reliance on the BOL letters and Certification and the CA’s alleged
disregard of NQFC’s evidence.
2. To prove prior physical possession of Lot No. 102, NQFC presented the Deed of Transfer,
Santos’ OCT, the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the Order of the Bureau of Lands approving
Santos’ free patent application. In presenting these pieces of evidence, NQFC is apparently
mistaken as it might have equated possession that is at issue as an attribute of ownership to
actual possession. The latter type of possession is, however, different from and has different
legal implications than the former. While the presented documents may bear weight and may
be material in contests over ownership of Lot No. 102, they do not per se show NQFC’s actual
possession of this property.
3. Ownership carries the right of possession, but the possession contemplated by the concept of
ownership is not exactly the same as the possession in issue in a forcible entry case.
Possession in forcible entry suits refers only to possession de facto, or actual or material
possession, and not possession flowing out of ownership;
4. The word “possession” in forcible entry suits refers to nothing more than prior physical
possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure or legal possession in the sense
contemplated in civil law. Title is not the issue, and the absence of it “is not a ground for the
courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case.”
5. Thus, in a forcible entry case, “a party who can prove prior possession can recover such
possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his possession,
if he has in his favor prior possession in time, he has the security that entitles him to remain on
the property until a person with a better right lawfully ejects him.” He cannot be ejected by
force, violence or terror―not even by its owners.
6. We agree with the respondents that instead of squarely addressing the issue of possession
and presenting evidence showing that NQFC or Santos had been in actual possession of Lot
No. 102, the former merely narrated how it acquired ownership of Lot No. 102 and presented
documents to this effect. Its allegation that Santos occupied Lot No. 102 in 1972 is
uncorroborated. Even the tax declarations under Santos’ name are hardly of weight.
7. Under this provision, for a forcible entry suit to prosper, the plaintiff must allege and prove: (1)
prior physical possession of the property; and (2) unlawful deprivation of it by the defendant
through force, intimidation, strategy, threat or stealth. As in any civil case, the burden of proof
lies with the complainants (the respondents in this case) who must establish their case by
preponderance of evidence. In the present case, the respondents sufficiently alleged and
proved the required elements.
 8. NQFC invokes the principle of tacking of possession, that is, when it bought Lot No. 102 from
Santos on December 29, 2000, its possession is, by operation of law, tacked to that of Santos
and even earlier when Donato acquired Lot No. 102 in 1948.
9. NQFC’s reliance on this principle is misplaced. True, the law allows a present possessor to
tack his possession to of his predecessor-in-interest to be deemed in possession of the
property for the period required by law. Possession in this regard, however, pertains to
possession de jure and the tacking is made for the purpose of completing the time required for
acquiring or losing ownership through prescription. We reiterate―possession in forcible entry
suits refers to nothing more than physical possession, not legal possession.

SUPAPO v. DE JESUS
Apr. 20, 2015 | Brion, J. | Accion Publiciana

DOCTRINE: Jurisprudence has held that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription
or adverse possession.

SUMMARY: Petitioner spouses filed first a criminal action against defendants for unlawfully
occupying a house within the former’s land without their knowledge or consent. This was dismissed
because the law that punished them – Anti-Squatting Law – was repealed. Petitioners then filed for
accion publiciana to recover the possession of their land. Respondents were alleging that they were
in continuous possession of the land, and that the action had already prescribed. The SC held that
the petitioner spouses were in the right because they held a certificate of title registered under the
Torrens system. Because of this, actions to recover possession and to claim rights over the land will
never prescribe.

FACTS

1. Spouses Supapo filed a case to compel respondents to vacate a piece of land in Novaliches,
Quezon City, which was covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT).
2. The assessed value of the land is Php 39,980.00 as shown in tax declarations.
3. The petitioner spouses did not reside in the lot but they visited it once or twice a year. In one of
their visits, they were surprised to see that two houses were built therein without their
knowledge or permission. One house was occupied by spouses De Jesus, and one by,
Macario.
4. Petitioners then filed a criminal case for allegedly violating the AntiSquatting Law, and the RTC
found defendants guilty, and ordered them to vacate the premises. A law was then passed
repealing the Anti-Squatting law so the case was dismissed while it was on appeal.
5. The petitioner spouses moved for execution of the respondent’s civil liability, praying that they
vacate the lot. RTC granted this.
6. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the CA and the appellate court granted it on the
ground that with the repeal of the law that penalized them, both criminal and civil liabilities
were extinguished. Despite this, the CA said that this does not mean that people have
unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own. In cases where there is a violation
of property rights, the CA said that they can file a proper action for recovery of possession.
7. Because of this, petitioner spouses filed a complaint for action publiciana.
8. MeTC dismissed the case, so respondents filed for certiorari.
9. RTC granted it and said that action has prescribed and that accion publiciana is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.
10. The CA dismissed the appeal of petitioner spouses and said that the action should have been
filed in the RTC and that period for filing has prescribed.
11. Hence, the petitioner spouses brought the case to the SC.

ISSUES

1. W/N MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction over the case? – YES

2. W/N action has prescribed? – NO
3. W/N complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata? - NO

RULING

The petition is meritorious. We hold that:

 a. the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;
b. the cause of action has not prescribed; and (3) the complaint is not barred by res
judicata.

RATIO

Accion Publiciana and why MeTC has jurisdiction

1. Accion Publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of
realty independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year
from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the
realty.
2. The present case was filed for the recovery of possession but they based their better right of
possession on a claim of ownership.
3. Objective of accion publiciana is to recover possession ONLY, not ownership. However, where
the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass on the issue to determine who
between the parties has the right to possess the property.
4. The adjudication is not conclusive on the issue of ownership, but only for resolving the issue of
possession. This adjudication on ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving the title to property.
5. Under BP 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over action involving title to or possession of real
property is plenary but R.A. No. 7691 divested a portion of this jurisdiction and granted the
MeTC and the MTC the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed
value of the property does not exceed Php 20,000, OR Php 50,000 if the property is within
METRO MANILA.
6. Jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now determined by
its assessed value - fair market value multiplied by assessment level; and synonymous to
taxable value.
7. This value must be alleged to determine jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is determined by the material
allegations of the complaint, type of relief prayed for, and the law in effect when action is filed,
irrespective of whether plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims therein.
8. In the case, clearly, the property is in Metro Manila, and the value is less than Php 39,980 as
proven by tax declarations. Therefore, jurisdiction is with the MeTC.

Cause of action has not prescribed

1. Respondents argue that accion publiciana has prescribed for being filed out of time. They tried
to invoke Art. 555 of the Civil Code which states that a possessor may lose possession by
possession of another if the new possession has lasted over one year. But the real right of
possession is not lost until after 10 years.
2. Petitioners filed the action in 2008, more than 10 years after the certificate to file action was
issue in 1992.
3. They concede that petitioner spouses hold a TCT over the property.
4. Petitioner spouses argue that their cause of action is imprescriptible because it is registered
under the Torrens system.
5. Petitioners are correct - respondents cannot depend on their allegation that they have been in
actual, public, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession of the land; and that they were in good
faith.
6. Jurisprudence has held that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
7. Naturally, the person holding the Torrens Title as the owner is also the one entitled to
possession.
8. Bishop v. CA: The lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time
as long as long as possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, regardless of the length
of that possession.
9. By recognizing the imprescriptibility of the TCT, the Court recognizes the value of the Torrens
system in ensuring the stability of real estate transactions and integrity of land registration.
10. Laches cannot be applied as well because it was not alleged and there was a clear intent from
the petitioners to exercise their right over the land.

Action not barred by prior judgment

 1. Under the concept of bar by prior judgment, one of the requisites is that, “There must be
between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
2. First, there is no identity of parties because the first was a criminal complaint and was
prosecuted in the name of People of the Philippines, while the second one was filed in the
name of herein petitioners.
3. There was no identity of subject matter because the criminal action is for prosecuting a crime
while accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the property.
4. There is no identity in cases of action because the criminal case sought to protect
governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute, while the present
action is to protect proprietary interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute.

NPC v. MANALASTAS
January 27, 2016 | Peralta, J. | Just Compensation

DOCTRINE: The just compensation due to the landowners amounts to an effective forbearance on
the part of the State – a proper subject of interest computed form the time the property was taken
until the full amount of just compensation is paid – in order to eradicate the issue of the constant
variability of the value of the currency over time.

SUMMARY: NPC is a government owned and controlled corporation involved in the development of
hydro-electric generation of power. NPC installed transmission lines in the property of Manalastas,
without their consent and without inititating the proper expropriation proceedings. This installation
prevented Manalastas from using the property, and thus demanded the removal of transmission lines
or to pay the fair market value at P800.00. The RTC ruled in favor of Manalastas and required
payment by NPC of P800.00 as just compensation. NPC appealed and alleged that the fair market
value at the time of taking is P170.00 and thus, should not have included the inflation rate. The Court
ruled that inflation rate should not have been included in determining the just compensation. In lieu of
the variability of the value of the currency, inflation is accounted for in the payment of interests and
through the award of exemplary damages. Moreover, the Court also ruled that determination of just
compensation is a judicial function, that the parties should not take the interpretation of the law into
their own hands. NPC is also not estopped, since in does not run against the Republic.

FACTS

1. NPC, a government-owned and controlled corporation involved in the development of hydro-

electric generation of power and production of electricity, and the construction, operation and
maintenance of power plants, transmission lines, power stations and substations, among
others, constructed a 230 KV transmission line for the Naga-Tiwi line and a 69 KV
transmission line for the Naga-Tinambac line on Manalastas’ parcel of land covered by TCT
No. 26263, affecting an area of 26, 919 square meters.
2. NPC entered said land without the knowledge or consent of Manalastas, without properly
initiating expropriation proceedings, and without any compensation to Manalastas –
landowners.
3. Because of said transmission lines, Manalastas alleged that they could no longer use their
land as part of a subdivision project as originally intended, which ultimately caused financial
loss to their family.
4. Manalastas demanded the removal of the power lines an its accessories and payment of
damages, or in the alternative, payment of the fair market value of the affected areas totaling
26,000 square meteres of Manalastas’ land at P800.00 per square meter.
5. NPC argued that the RTC erred in factoring the devaluation of the peso in the computation of
the fair market value of Manalastas’ land. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment. Hence this
petition.

ISSUES

1. WoN the inflation rate of the Philippine Peso should be included in determining just
compensation – NO
2. WoN the parties can determine just compensation – NO
3. WoN the government is estopped – NO
4. WoN awarding of damages is proper - YES
RULING

The petition is granted. NPC is liable to pay just compensation at the rate of Php 170.00 per square
meter. And is likewise ordered to pay exemplary damages.

RATIO:

1. The bone of the contention in this case is the inclusion of the inflation rate of the Philippine
Peso in determining the just compensation due to Manalastas. None of the parties contest the
finding that the fair market value of the property at the time of taking was Php 170.00 per
square meter.
2. Secretary of DPWH v. Spouses Tecson, “just compensation is the value of the property at the
time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation”
3. The constitutional limitation of “just compensation is considered to be the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual an ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair value of the
property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell, if fixed at the time of the
actual taking by the government
4. The just compensation due to the landowners amounts to an effective forbearance on the part
of the State – a proper subject of interest computed form the time the property was taken until
the full amount of just compensation is paid – in order to eradicate the issue of the constant
variability of the value of the currency over time.
5. This allowance of interest on the amount found to be the value of the property as of the time of
the taking computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should help eliminate
the issue of the constant inflation of the value of the currency over time.
6. The foregoing clearly dictates that valuation of the land for purposes of determining just
compensation should not include the inflation rate of the Philippine Peso because the delay in
payment of the price of expropriated land is sufficiently recompensed through payment of
interest on the market value of the land as of the time of taking from the landowner.
7. As to the second issue: It is the courts, not the litigants, who decide on the proper
interpretation or application of the law and, thus, only the courts may determine the rightful
compensation in accordance witht eh law and evidence presented by the parties.
8. As to the third issue: Republic v. Bacas, “granting that the persons representing the
government were negligent, the doctrine of estoppel cannot be taken against the Republic.”
9. Lastly, in addition to the award for interests, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that
“exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public
good” and Article 2208 of the same code states that attorney’s fees may be awarded by the
court in cases where such would be just and equitable.
10. Additional compensation in the form of exemplary damages and attorney’s fees should
likewise be awarded as a consequence of the government agency’s illegal occupation of the
owner’s property for a very long time, resulting in pecuniary loss to the owner.
11. Indeed, government agencies should be admonished and made to realize that its negligence
and inaction in failing to commence the proper expropriation proceedings before taking private
property, as provided for by law, cannot be countenanced by the court.
12. To recapitulate, the formula for determination of just compensation to landowners does not
include the factor for inflation rate, as inflation is properly accounted for through payment of
interest on the amount due to the landowner, and through the award of exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees in cases where there was irregularity in the taking of property.

ARAMBULO v. NOLASCO
March 26, 2014 | Perez, J. | Requirement of consent in sale of co-owned property

DOCTRINE: Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share
but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. That part which ideally belongs
to them, or their mental portion, may be disposed of as they please, independent of the decision of
their co-owners. Therefore, Genaro cannot be ordered to sell their portion of the coowned properties.

SUMMARY: Raul Arambulo and Iraida Nolasco are co-owners of 2 parcels of land. When Iraida died,
she was succeeded by her husband Genaro and her son, Jeremy. Raul and other co-owners wanted
to sell the 2 parcels of land so they asked the consent of Genaro. Genaro refused to authorize the
sale. Because of this, Raul and the others filed a petition for relief against Genaro. The RTC was in
favor of Raul’s side because when Genaro withheld consent, it became prejudicial to the interest of
other co-owners. Meanwhile, the CA sided with Genaro stating that the respondents had full
ownership of their undivided shares.

The SC decided that Genaro and Jeremy cannot be compelled to give their consent because they are
merely exercising their individual ownership rights. Sale of a coowner does not affect the other co-
owners who did not consent to the sale. Hence, one can dispose their undivided share without the
consent of other co-owners.

FACTS

1. Raul Arambulo and Teresita Dela Cruz, along with their mother, and siblings (important person
is Iraida Arambulo Nolasco) are co-owners of 2 parcels of land.
2. When Iraida passed away, she was succeeded by her husband, responded Genaro Nolasco
and their children (including respondent Jeremy Spencer Nolasco).
3. The siblings filed a petition for relief against the respondents because all of the other owners
have authorized the petitioners to sell their shares and that the respondents are withholding
their consent on their shares.
4. Raul and others were asserting that one of the two subject properties has an area of 122
square meters and if they decide to partition, instead of selling the same, their share would be
reduced to a measly 30-square meter lot each. The other property was testified to as
measuring only 111 square meters.
5. According to the Genaro, they were not aware of the intention to sell because they were not
part of the negotiation regarding the disposition of the property.
6. The RTC ruled in favor of the Raul and ordered Genaro to give their consent because
withholding such is prejudicial to the common interest of the co-owners. Genaro filed an
appeal.
7. The CA granted their appeal and said that the respondents had full ownership of their
undivided interest in the subject properties. Raul was not able to show that it was prejudicial to
other co-owners. Therefore, they cannot be compelled.
8. Hence, the instant petition was filed for the reversal of the CA’ decision.

ISSUE/s:

W/N Genaro can be compelled by the court to give their consent to the sale of their shares in the co-
owned properties - NO

RULING:

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED without prejudice to the filing of an
action for partition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 76449 is AFFIRMED.

RATIO:
1. Article 493 dictates that each one of the parties herein as co-owners with full ownership of their
parts can sell their fully owned part. The sale by Raul of their parts shall not affect the full
ownership by Genaro of the part that belongs to them. The part of Raul shall be that which
may be apportioned to them in the division upon the termination of the co- ownership. With the
full ownership of the Genaro remaining unaffected by Raul’s sale of their parts, the nature of
the property, as co-owned, likewise stays.
2. There is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing belongs to different
persons and each co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and of its fruits and benefits.
3. Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but
not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. This is because the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would
correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.
4. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-
owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. Only the rights of the co-
owner seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. That part
which ideally belongs to them, or their mental portion, may be disposed of as they please,
independent of the decision of their co-owners. Therefore, Genaro cannot be ordered to sell
their portion of the co-owned properties.
 5. There is no common interest that would be prejudiced because Genaro and Jeremy merely
asserted their individual ownership rights. Best thing for Raul and the others to do is bring a
suit for partition which is a mode of extinguishing co-ownership.

PANGANIBAN v. OAMIL
22 January 2008| Ynares-Santiago, J. | Co-ownership. Vendee obtains same rights as his co-
owner

DOCTRINE: In a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different

persons. During the existence of the co-ownership, no individual can claim title to any definite portion
of the community property until partition. And prior to partition, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or
abstract proportionate share. Before partition, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his
undivided interest in the common property. The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or mortgage this
undivided interest, except as to purely personal rights. The effect of any such transfer is limited to the
portion which may be awarded to him upon partition.

SUMMARY: Partenio and the petitioners are heirs to the deceased wife’s property located in
Olongapo. The property is divided into the portion facing the 21st st and the other facing Canda St.
As the husband, Partenio is entitled to half of the property while the other half to the petitioners who
are the children (but Partenio is also entitled to 1/6 of this portion). Partenio sold his undivided interest
to Oamil who is the respondent and who filed the complaint for specific performance in RTC, praying
that Partenio should execute a final deed of sale in her name. The Trial Court in Oamil’s case ruled
against Partenio and ordered Partenio to execute the deed of sale. The trial court, however, did not
mention which portion will be awarded to Oamil. This became final and executory. But the writ was
served upon the city assessor of Olongapo who caused the transfer of the tax declaration covering
the 21st portion to Oamil. The petitioners now contend this decision, because a special civil action
partitioning the property is still pending in court. They filed a petition for relief, claiming that they are
indispensable parties. They’re implying that since they coown the property which was sold to Oamil,
they have a right to intervene and question the decision that awared Oamil the property. The SC said
that since the Romabuas and Paternio co-own the property, Paternio can give or dispose of his
undivided share( before the partion) as he wishes but the transfer will be limited to what he get after
the partition. In this case, Paternio
sold to Oamil this undivided share which will have to be limited to whatever is awarded to him.
Unfortunately, what was awarded to Oamil was done before the partitioning of the property. What was
really given to Paternio was the Canda st property and not the 21st property. The SC said that since
Oamil is Paternio’s successor-in-onterest because of the sale, Oamil can only get what Paternio gets,
not beyond or not more of that. So what Oamil is entitled to or should have been awarded to her was
the Canda property. The SC finally held that the Special Civil action is to be followed, which means
Oamil gets the Canda property.

FACTS

1. Oamil filed a ocmplaint for specific performance with damages in the RTC Olongapo, praying
that Partenio Rombaua be ordered to execute a final deed of sale over the parcel of land.
a. This land was the subject of a prior Agreement to Sell executed by and between them
(Oamil and Partenio)
b. Land is 204.5 square meters in Olongapo city
c. What is claimed by Oamil to be Partenio’s conjugal share. The Romabuas (The
petitioners) and Partenio’s father are acknowledged co-owners of the property
i. ½ to Partenio as his conjugal share
ii. 1/6 each of the remaining half to petitioners and Partenio
iii. So basically (not explained in the case pero since magulo siya), the land
belonged to Partenio’s parents. Partenio and the petitioners are the children.
When the mom died, half of it went to Partenio as his conjugal share, the other
half, hati-hati sila magkakapatid including Partenio. So Partenio got ½ of the
property plus 1/6 of the other half.
2. Two portions of the subject property are in contention
a. The 204.5 square meters facing the 21st street
b. And the 204.5 square meters facing Canda street
3. Partenio was declared in default because he failed to file an answer. Trial Court decided
against Partenio and ordered Partenio to execute the deed of absolute sale in favor of Oamil.
 But! The trial court didn’t specify which portion (whether it’s the one facing 21st street or Canda
street) was Partenio’s conjugal share. a. This decision became final and executory. The writ
was served upon the City of Assessor who caused the transfer of the tax declaration covering
the 21st portion to Oamil
4. The Romabuas (petitioners) filed a verified petition for relief claiming:
a. Partenio’s conjugal share is being litigated in a judicial partition proceeding (Special
Civil Action No. 340-0-86) which is still pending so the trial court cannot render a
decision disposing a definite area
b. They were unjustly deprived of the opportunity to protect and defend their interest
because they are indispensable parties and yet not impleaed
5. TC denied the petition for relief because the Civil case 140-0-93 (the one that awarded Oamil
the land) became final and executory.
6. The petitioners, Rombauas, moved for reconsideration, saying that they are indispensable
parties because they co-own the land by virtue of succession to the rights of their deceased
mother.
7. Not really related sa topic pero just in case: A guy named Sotero Gan filed a Complaint in
Intervention. He’s claiming to be the actual and rightful owner of Paternio’s conjugal share. He
is now seeking the dismissal of Civil case 140-0-93
a. This was denied by the court because Gan filed late. Eventually denied by the SC also.
8. Petitioners are now here before the court with the issue of whether they can intervene in the
proceedings of Civil case no 140-0-93 to protect their rights as co owners of the property

ISSUE:

W/N Petitioners can intervene – YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Said court is moreover ordered to abide by the
pronouncement in Special Civil Action No 340-086

RATIO

1. In a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons.

During the existence of the co-ownership, no individual can claim title to any definite portion of
the community property until partition. And prior to partition, all that the co-owner has is an
ideal or abstract proportionate share. Before partition, every co-owner has the absolute
ownership of his undivided interest in the common property. The co-owner is free to alienate,
assign or mortgage this undivided interest, except as to purely personal rights. The effect of
any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon partition.
2. Under Art 497 of the CC, in the event fp partition, assignees of one or more of the co-owners
may take part in the division of the thing owned in common and object to its being effected
without their concurrence. But they cannot impugn any partition already executed, unless there
has been fraud or in case it was made notwithstanding a formal opposition.
3. In this case, the Special Civil action determines what Partenio and, ultimately, Oamil, is entitled
to. Since Oamil is Partenio’s successor-ininterest, Oamil cannot acquire any superior right in
the property than what Partenio is entitled to. In a contract of sale, what the vendee obtains by
virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner. The vendee merely
steps into the shoes of the vendor as coowner.
4. Oamil knew that when they executed the Agreement to Sell, the property she was purchasing
was conjugal property owned in common by Partenio and the heirs of his deceased wife.
a. Yet, she did not exercise the rights given to her in Art 497 of the civil code. Oamil
unconditionally agreed to its temporary abatement instead of intervening. She chose to
sit back and wait.
b. Consequently, the decision in the Special Civil action of the division of the property may
no longer be impugned by her.
c. Thus, the Civil Case cannot award to her the 21st portion since the Special civil action
awarded Canda st to Partenio.
i. The Special Civil action became final and executory, and should put an end to
the co-ownership between Partenio and the heirs of his wife.
 5. Partenio, heir to the Canda st portion, could have transferred to Oamil only that part and not
the 21st porton. Although Partenio is free to transfer his undivided interest in the common
property, the transfer is limited only to that portion awarded to him.
6. The Petitioners do have a right to intervene, since the portion that Partenio had sold and that
Oamil is claiming belongs to them. Partenio is entitled to the Canda portion and not the 21st
portion.

EXTRAORDINARY DEVT. v. SAMSON

2014 October 13 | J. Perez | 738 SCRA 147

DOCTRINE: Article 493 of the Civil Code recognizes the absolute right of a coowner to freely dispose
of his pro indiviso (for an undivided part) share as well as the fruits and other benefits arising from
that share, independently of the other coowners. Even if the property is undivided, it is well-settled
doctrine that a coowner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. In such case, EDC only takes
the place of Juan’s heirs and becomes a co-owner of the subject property and acquires a
proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.

SUMMARY: (Lolo) Apolonio owned a property in Rizal covering an area of 29,748sq. m. which was
inherited by Juan and Irenea. When Juan and Irenea died, their heirs became co-owners of the
subject property. With the consent of Irenea’s heirs, Juan’s heirs executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in
favor of EDC covering the subject property. Irenea’s heirs filed a complaint for the Annulment of
Contract and Reconveyance of Possession with Damages. The issue in this case is WON the Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by Juan’s heirs is valid notwithstanding the lack of consent from Irenea
heirs. The Court held that it is still valid but only with respect to the rights of the heirs of Juan (1/2 of
the property).

FACTS:

1. On April 16, 2002, the heirs of Juan, without the consent of the respondents (heirs of Irenea),
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of petitioner Extraordinary Development
Corporation (EDC) covering the subject property for Php2,974,800.00.
2. Prior to the sale, Irenea heirs learned about the contract to sell between Juan heirs and EDC.
Thus, Irenea heirs wrote to EDC informing it of the existence of a co-ownership over the
subject property to which EDC replied that they will look into it and asked Irenea heirs to
further establish their claims.
3. EDC was able to cause the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale and transfer the Tax
Declaration over the subject property in its name which prompted Irenea heirs to file the
Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Tax Declaration and Reconveyance of Possession
with Damages.
4. In its answer, EDC claimed that it is a buyer in good faith because it honestly believed that
Juan heirs are the only heirs of Apolonio. Juan heirs asserted that Irenea heirs were aware of
and were parties to the contract to sell entered into by them and EDC.

RTC RULING:

The RTC ruled in favor of Irenea heirs and ordered that:

a. the Deed of Absolute Sale covering the subject property be declared null and void to the
extent of one half of the property sold or 14,874 sq. m.
b. Tax declaration in the name of EDC be declared null and void and that it be reinstated
in the name of the heirs of Apolonio and Maria
 c. EDC should vacate, surrender, and reconvey ownership and possession of the parcel of
land of the Deed of Absolute Sale to repondents or the heirs of Apolonio or that they be
reinstated to one half of the property sold or 14,874 sq. m.
d. EDC should pay damages.

The trial court found that Irenea heirs and the Juan heirs are co-owners of the subject property; that
at the time of sale, the heirs of Juan did not have the right to sell the one half share of the heirs of
Irenea; that the sale did not bind the heirs of Irenea; that there was fraud in the execution of the Deed
of Absolute Sale when the heirs of Juan failed to disclose to EDC that one half of the property sold is
owned by respondents; and that EDC was not a buyer in good faith because it knew that respondents
were co-owners of the subject property because Herminia (Irenea heir) informed EDC of such fact
through a letter.

EDC appealed to CA.

CA RULING:

The CA partially granted the appeal.

a. Juan heirs were ORDERED to return to EDC the amount of P1,487,400.00 or one-half
of the purchase price as stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale;
b. The Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the [EDC] is valid only to the extent of one-half of
the subject property or 14,874 square meters, but not as to the other half of 14,874
square meters which is co-owned by Irenea heirs;
c. The Provincial Assessor of Rizal is hereby ORDERED to CANCEL Tax Declaration in
the name of [EDC] and to ISSUE a new one in the names of co-owners [EDC] (one-half
of the subject property) and [Irenea heirs] (the other half); and
d. The award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees in the amount
of P100,000.00 each is hereby DELETED.

The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents were able to establish their coownership over one-half of
the subject property. The appellate court pointed out that the heirs of Juan categorically admitted in
their Answer, as well as during the hearing the existence of co-ownership. The appellate court
agreed with the trial court’s finding that the heirs of Juan, as co-owners, could only alienate or convey
to EDC their one-half portion of the subject property which may be allotted to them in the division
upon the termination of the co-ownership. Thus, the sale will affect only their share but not those of
the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. The appellate court disputed the submission of
EDC that whatever admissions made by the heirs of Juan regarding the ownership of the subject
property is effective only insofar as they are concerned but such do not bind or affect the defenses it
raised. The appellate court declared that the execution by the heirs of Juan of the Deed of Absolute
Sale over the subject property which they do not exclusively own but is admittedly co-owned by them
together with respondents, was valid only to the extent of the former’s undivided one-half share
thereof, as they had no title or interest to transfer the other one-half portion which pertains to the
appellees without the latter’s consent. EDC’s invocation of it being a buyer in good faith was not
considered by the appellate court because the subject property is an unregistered land and the
defense of having purchased the property in good faith may be availed of only where registered land
is involved and the buyer had relied in good faith on the clear title of the registered owner.

However, the appellate court reversed the ruling of the trial court that the Deed of Absolute Sale is
null and void. According to the appellate court, the same is valid with respect to the transfer of the
rights of the co-owners-sellers heirs of Juan over the one-half portion or 14,874 square meters of the
subject property, thereby
making EDC a co-owner thereof. Consequently, the appellate court ordered the heirs of Ballesteros
to return to EDC the amount of P1,487,400.00 or one-half of the purchase price of P2,974,800.00.

EDC appealed to the SC.

ISSUES

1. WON Irenea heirs were able to establish co-ownership over one-half of the subject property –
YES
2. WON the Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of EDC is valid – YES, but only with respect
to the rights of Juan heirs over the subject property (which is ½)
RULING

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 31 July 2009 and
Resolution dated 22 January 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 91358 is AFFIRMED
in toto.

RATIO

Establishing co-ownership

1. Irenea heirs were able to convincingly establish their co-ownership over onehalf of the subject
property. Herminia (Irenea heir) testified during the direct examination that she is indeed an
heir and such testimony was admitted by the opposing counsel. Moreover, several documents
were presented as evidence of successional rights such as baptismal certificate, death
certificate of Irenea, birth certifcate of Irenea’s children, etc.
2. Juan heirs also admitted in their Answer acknowledging Irenea heirs as coowners of said
parcel of land. Juan also testified on this. Well-settled is the rule that a judicial admission
conclusively binds the party making it.
3. EDC avers that said judicial admission should not bind it because it was an innocent purchaser
in good faith. The CA said which the SC affirmed:

In a contract of sale, it is essential that the seller is the owner of the property he is
selling. Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the principal obligation of a seller is to
transfer the ownership of the property sold. Also, Article 1459 of the Civil Code
provides that the thing must be licit and the vendor must have a right to transfer the
ownership thereof at the time it is delivered. The execution by appellants Ballesteros
of the Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property which they do not exclusively
own but is admittedly co-owned by them together with the [respondents], was valid
only to the extent of the former’s undivided one-half share thereof, as they had no title
or interest to transfer the other one-half portion which pertains to the [respondents]
without the latter’s consent. It is an established principle that no one can give what
one does not have – nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what
one owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the
seller can transfer legally. Thus, since appellant EDC’s rights over the subject
property originated from sellers-appellants Ballesteros, said corporation merely
stepped into the shoes of its sellers and cannot have a better right than what its sellers
have. Indeed, a spring cannot rise higher than its source.

Validity of deed of absolute sale

1. Having established respondents’ co-ownership rights over the subject property, we find no
error in the appellate court’s ruling sustaining the validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale but
only with respect to the rights of the heirs of Juan over one-half of the property.

Article 493 of the Civil Code recognizes the absolute right of a co-owner to freely dispose
of his pro indiviso (for an undivided part) share as well as the fruits and other benefits
arising from that share, independently of the other co-owners, thus:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it,
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights
are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the
division upon the termination of the co-ownership.

2. Citing Spouses Del Campo vs. Court of Appeals, the SC expounded on the rights of a co-
owner vis-à-vis the vendee:

The mere fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the
hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding
force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. Salome’s
 right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in
accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-
indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another
person in its enjoyment.

We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a
particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners.
However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a
physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-
owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale
between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights
as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given
under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as
coowner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.

3. We are also in full accord with the appellate court’s order for the heirs of Juan to return
one-half of the purchase price to EDC. There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly
retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.30
Therefore, it is correct for the Court of Appeals to order the heirs of Juan to return the
amount of P1,487,400.00, representing one-half of the purchase price to prevent unjust
enrichment at the expense of EDC.

MACTAN CEBU INTL AIRPORT v. HEIRS OF IJORDN

January 11, 2016 | Bersamin, J. | Co-ownership: Sale Without Authority

DOCTRINE: Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person could contract in the name of
another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a right to represent him.

The sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the transferee
gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.

SUMMARY: Julian Cuizon executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale of the subject
lot to CAA which is the predecessor-in-interest of MCIAA. Since then MCIAA remained in
material, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the subject lot. Respondent heirs
herein however claim that by virtue of the result of a Cadastra Case, such lot was co-owned by
them and in fact such ownership was supported with a Torrens Title. MCIAA raised estoppel by
laches and acquisitive prescription. The RTC and subsequently the CA, ruled as valid the sale of
Julian but only as to his 1/22 share in the subject lot.

The SC affirmed. No person could contract in the name of another without being authorized.
Julian’s sale can only bind him and not the other co-owners because such sale was without their
consent. Hence, what MCIAA could receive is only that what Julian could give, 1/22 of the subject
lot. The Deed had no legal effect as to the shares of the respondent Heirs.

FACTS:

1. Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale (Deed)
covering Lot No. 4539 (Subject Lot) situated in the Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu
City) in favor of the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA).
2. The CAA was the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu International Airport
Authority (MCIAA).
3. Since then until the present, MCIAA remained in material, continuous, uninterrupted and
adverse possession of the subject lot through the CAA.
4. The subject lot was transferred and conveyed to MCIAA by virtue of Republic Act No.
6958.
5. Respondents herein are the Heirs of Gavina Ijordan (Heirs). They caused the judicial
reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering the subject lot.
6. According to respondent Heirs, they co-own the lot and they had not sold their shares in
such. They insist that they had not authorized Julian to sell their shares to MCIAA’s
predecessor-in-interest.
 7. MCIAA sued them for their cancellation of title in the RTC alleging that their certificate of
title conferred no right in favor of the respondents because:
a. The lot had already been sold to the Government in 1957
b. The subject lot had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of MCIAA’s
predecssors.
c. By virtue of the Deed, respondents came under the legal obligation to surrender the
certificate of title.
8. MCIAA’s sole witness is its legal assistant, Romeo Cueva, who testified and presented
documents pertaining to the subject lot: Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale and Tax
Delcaration No. 00387 and that the subject lot was utilized as part of the expansion of the
Mactan Export Processing Zone Authority I.
9. The respondent Heirs moved to dismiss the complaint upon the Demurrer to Evidence
contending that the documents of MCIAA had no probative value.
10. The respondent Heirs also cited Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provided
that “when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itsleft.” They argued that what MCIAA
submitted was a mere photocopy of the Deed.
11. The respondent Heirs also argued that even assuming that the Deed was a true
reproduction of the original, the sale was unenforceable against them because it was only
Julian who had executed the same without obtaining their consent or authority as his
coheirs.
12. The RTC:
a. dismissed MCIAA’s complaint insofar as it pertained to the shares of the
respondent Hairs in Lot NO. 4539 (subject lot)
b. but recognized as valid the sale as to the 1/22 share of Julian.
13. The RTC herein clarified that although it was made to appear in the Deed that vendor
Julian was the only heir of the late Pedrio Cuizon, the very same Deed showed that the
subject lot was also covered by Cadastral Case No. 20.
14. The RTC opined that having known that the subject lot had been covered by the decree
issued long before the sale took place, the more appropriate thing that MCIAA or its
representatives should have done was to check the decreed owners of the lot (respondent
Heirs herein), instead of merely relying on the tax declaration issued in the name of Pedro
Cuizon and on the statement of Julian.
15. The RTC added that that even assuming that MCIAA had held the material possession of
the subject lot, the respondents had remained the registered owners of Lot.
16. MCIAA raised it to the CA with the main contention that the respondent Heirs should be
barred by laches or estoppel because they knew of the continuous possession of MCIAA
but did not act on such. The CA however, affirmed the RTC.

ISSUE/S

1. WoN the subject lot was validly conveyed in its entirety to petitioner Julian – NO
2. WoN the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects the co-owners who did not consent
to such - NO

RULING

The Court denies the petition for review and affirs the decision of the CA. Plaintiff MCIAA is
hereby declared the owner of 1/22 share of Lot No. 4539.

RATIO

1. The conveyance by Julian of the entire property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the
respondent Heirs for lack of their consent and authority in his favor. As such, the Deed had
no legal effect as to their shares in the property.
2. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that no person could contract in the name of
another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a right to represent
him; the contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, is unenforceable, unless it is ratified,
expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is
revoked by the other contracting party.
 3. But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with respect to his
share of 1/22 of the entire property consisting of 546 square meters by virtue of its being a
voluntary disposition of property on his part.
4. As ruled in Torres, Jr. v. Lapinid: even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the
sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not
consent to the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only
his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in
the partition of the thing owned in common.
5. On the minor issue of estoppel: MCIAA’s assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the
respondents’ contrary claim of ownership of their shares in the subject lot is bereft of
substance. The doctrine of estoppel applied only to those who were parties to the contract
and their privies or successors-in-interest.
6. Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the contract that was declared to be
null and void with respect to their share, for there was nothing for them to ratify. Verily, the
Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect on the rights of the respondents in the
subject lot.
7. On the minor issue of acquisitive prescription: MCIAA’s contention on acquisitive
prescription in its favor must fail. Aside from the absence of the satisfactory showing of
MCIAA’s supposed possession of the subject lot, no acquisitive prescription could arise in
view of the indefeasibility of the respondents’ Torrens title.
8. Under the Torrens System, no adverse possession could deprive the registered owners of
their title by prescription.

CABRERA v. YSAAC
November 19, 2014 | Leonen, J. | Co-Ownership

DOCTRINE: A co-owner could enter into a contract to sell a definite portion of the property. But,
such contract is still subject to the suspensive condition of the partition of the property, and that
the other co-owners agree that the part subject of the contract to sell vests in favor of the co-
owner’s buyer. Hence, the co-owner’s consent is an important factor for the sale to ripen.

SUMMARY: Henry and Juan entered into a contract of sale wherein Juan agreed to buy the
property he was leasing, alongside with the adjoining lands, for a total of 439 sqm (who had
Espirity and Borbe families as lesees). Although full payment will be made in two years, Juan was
able to provide an initial downpayment.

1992, Juan attempted to pay Henry but was not able to do so as he was out of town in both
instances, and that his wife did not accept payments on his behalf. It was later claimed by Juan
that Henry had to decrease the area of the object land for purposes that it be used for the
barangay walkway, to which he agreed to.

1994, through their counsels, Juan was informed that the sale was rescinded due to his “failure to
pay in the agreed period.” With settlement attempts proving to be unsuccessful, they sought relief
in the RTC, who ruled that the contract was indeed validly rescinded.

Upon appeal to the CA, it was ruled that such sale was not validly rescinded, among others, due
to the improper enforcement of such rescission, that is, through a letter, instead of a notarized
document.

This case was brought to the SC then, who affirmed the CA ruling and even added that the
contract was not a valid contract of sale, it being done by Henry, who is merely a co-owner of the
property. Being so, he is not supposed to sell it without the consent of his co-owners, which in
this case, had no evidence to be proven.

FACTS:

1. The heirs of Luis and Matilde Ysaac co-owned a 5,517 sqm parcel of land located in Naga,
with respondent Henry as one of the co-owners.
2. Henry leased out portions to several lessees, to which one petitioner Juan Cabrera leased
a portion (95sqm) beginning 1986.
 3. On May 1990, Henry needed money and offered to sell the 95sqm piece of land to Juan,
who expressed his sentiment as to the property being too small as there was no parking.
4. Henry addressed the concern by offering two adjoining lands that were being leased by
the Borbe and Espiritu family (combined area: 439 sqm). He warned Juan that such sale
though, will only proceed if the two families agreed. Juan accepted this offer.
5. The agreed price was 250php/sqm, to which Juan accepted. However, he explained to
Henry that he can only pay in full after his retirement in June 1992. Henry agreed but
demanded for an initial payment of Php 1,500.00, which was paid.
6. In the onset, both Borba and Espiritu families considered purchasing the properties that
they were leasing. However, in this case it was mentioned that they were no longer
interested in making such purchase.
7. With Mamerta Espiritu making an initial deposit of Php 6,100, Juan offered to reimburse
the same. Henry issued a receipt. Php 3,100 was reimbursed to Mamerta and in turn, she
gave to Juan the receipts issued to her by Henry.
8. June 1992, Juan tried to pay the balance of the purchase to Henry, who was at that time in
the US. He tried coursing it through Henry’s wife but she didn’t accept the payment.
9. Sept 1993, Henry allegedly approached Juan to reduce toe area of the land subject of
their transaction, as part of it will be made into a barangay walkway, and that another part
was being occupied by people who were difficult to eject. Juan agreed, with Henry
allegedly shouldering the costs for the resurvey of the land
10. Resurvey showed that the area now covered by their transaction is 321 sqm.
11. Juan intened to show the sketch plan and pay his balance on that day, but Henry was
again, out of town. This time, he’s in Manila. And again, his wife refused to receive
payment.
12. September 1994, Atty. Luis (Henry’s counsel) wrote a letter to Atty. Leoncio (Juan’s
counsel) informing him of the rescission of the contract of sale as Juan failed to pay the
balance of the purchase price between May 1990 and May 1992
13. The payments made (1,500 and the 6,100) were going to be applied as payment for
overdue of his rent. Moreso, the letter also denied the allegation that Henry agreed to
shoulder the costs of resurveying the property
14. With hopes to settle the matter, he met with Henry with his uncle. However, Henry said he
could no longer sell the property as the new administrator was his brother, Franklin.
15. Sept 1995, a civil case was filed by Juan, ter him no being able to enforce the contract of
sale. Henry prayed for dismissal.
16. Prior to the case being heard in the RTC, the Heirs of Luis and MAtilde Ysaac, under the
administration of Franklin, sold the property to the local govt of Naga for use for a project
for the urban poor.
17. During trial, Borbe family expressed that they were never amenable to the sale of the
property to begin with. The Borbes even bought the property from the urban poor program
after it was sold to Naga by Franklin et al.
18. RTC ruled that such contract of sale was indeed rescinded upon the failure of Juan to pay
the balance in the agreed period. Aggrieved, Juan appealed.
19. CA affirmed the RTC decision as far as the fact that there was a perfected contract of sale.
A Co-owner may sell a definite portion of the property. But, CA likewise ruled that the sale
was not validly rescinded, it should’ve been done through a judicial/notarial act, not
through a letter.
20. With the CA also ruling that Henry return the total amount Juan paid to him (Php 10,600),
among others, this present petition was filed. (irrelevant but in case Atty. asks, there was
an issue with the filing of the first petition to the SC, as it was made prematurely: a Motion
for Rerconsideration was not yet filed with the CA. But this was already fixed by the filing
of such pleading later on)

ISSUE

WoN there was a valid contract of sale? – NO

RULING

SC denied the petition.

RATIO:
 1. As defiend by the Civil Code, a contract is the meeting of the minds between two persons
whereby one binds himself, with respect to another, to give something or to render some
service. A valid contract has three requisites: consent, object, and cause.
2. A sale is a special contract—the seller obligates himself to deliver a determinate thing and
to transfer its ownership to the buyer. In turn, the buyer pays for a price certain in money
or its equivalent.
3. The object of a valid sale contract is that it must be owned by the seller. If the seller is not
the owner, the seller must be authorized by the owner to sell it.
4. Specific rules attach when the seller co-owns the object of the contract. Sale of a portion
of the property is considered an alteration of the thing owned in common.
5. Under the CC, such disposition requires the unanimous consent of the co-owners.
However, the rules also allow a co-owner to alienate his or her part in the co-ownership.
6. If the alienation preceds the partition, the co-owner cannot sell a definite portion of the
land without consent from his co-owners. He or she could only sell the undivided interest
of the co-owned property.
7. As summarized by Lopez v. Ilustre, “if he is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of
land, he has a right to sell and convey an undivided half, but he has no right to divide the
lot into two parts, and convey the whole of one part by metes and bounds.”
8. The undivided interest of a co-owner is also referred to as the “ideal or abstract quota” or
“proportionate share.” On the other hand, the definite portion of the land refers to specific
metes and bounds of a co-owned property.
9. Prior to partition, a sale of a definite portion of common property requires the consent of all
co-owners because it operates to partition the land with respect to the co-owner selling his
or her share. The co-owner or seller is already marking which portion should redound to
his or her autonomous ownership upon future partition.
10. The object in this case is a co-owned parcel of land, as evidenced by the title, under the
names of: Matilde, Priscilla, Walter, Henry, Elizabeth, Norma, Luis, George, Franklin,
Marison, Helen, Erlinda, and Maridel.
11. The rules allow for Henry to sell his undivided interest in co-ownership, but this was not
the object of the sale. (the object in this sale: definite portion)
12. Accordingly, Henry has no right to sell or alienate a concrete or specific or determinate
part of the thing owned in common, because his right over thei thing is represented by
quoita or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
13. Moreso, there was no showing that respondent was authorized by his coowners to sell the
portion of land occupied by Juan, the Espiritu family, or the Borbe family. Without consent
of his co-owners, Henry could not sell a definite portion of the co-owned property.
14. Henry had no right to define a 95-sqm parcel, a 439-sqm, and a 321-sqm parcel, for
purposes of selling the same.
15. There was no evidence at all of consent to sell from the co-owners. When petitioner
approached respondent in 1995, he suddenly referred him to Franklin, the administrator.
This act basically purports the absence of consent from the co-owners.
16. At best, the agreement between petitioner and respondent is a contract to sell, not a
contract of sale. A contract to sell is a promise to sell an object, subject to suspensive
conditions. Without fulfillment of these suspensive conditions, the sale does not operate to
determine the obligation of the seller to deliver the object.
17. A co-owner could enter into a contract to sell a definite portion of the property. But, such
contract is still subject to the suspensive condition of the partiion of the property, and that
the other co-owners agree that the part subject of the contract to sell vests in favor of the
co-owner’s buyer. Hence, the co-owner’s consent is an important factor for the sale to
ripen.

VALDES v. RTC July 31, 1996

DOCTRINE: The Family Code provides different property relations and ways to liquidate properties on different
kinds of marriages (valid, voidable, void, legal, and common-law relationship). Here, Article 147 applies.

SUMMARY: Antonio and Consuelo were married. Antonio sought to declare their marriage null and void due to
psychological incapacity under Article 36. RTC declared their marriage null and void and directed them to start
liquidating their common properties pursuant to Article 147 and in line with Articles 50, 51, and 52. Consuelo
wanted to clarify this decision because she assailed that there is no procedure for unions without marriage
under the Family Code. Antonio also submitted that only Articles 50, 51, and 52 should be controlling. The
issue in this case was WoN Article 147 applies to void marriages due to psychological incapacity. SC held yes.
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148. Article 50 (1st par) relates only to voidable marriages
and to void marriages under Article 40.

FACTS:

1. Antonio and Consuelo were married and had 5 children.

2. Antonio sought a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code
(psychological incapacity)
3. RTC: Marriage is null and void. Decision: "WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
a. "(1) The marriage of petitioner Antonio Valdes and respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes is
hereby declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of their mutual
psychological incapacity to comply with their essential marital obligations;
b. "(2) The three older children, Carlos Enrique III, Antonio Quintin and Angela Rosario shall
choose which parent they would want to stay with. "Stella Eloisa and Joaquin Pedro shall be
placed in the custody of their mother, herein respondent Consuelo Gomez-Valdes. "The
petitioner and respondent shall have visitation rights over the children who are in the custody of
the other.
c. "(3) The petitioner and respondent are directed to start proceedings on the liquidation of their
common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the
provisions of Articles 50, 51 and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this
decision.
4. Consuelo wanted to clarify the last part of the decision. (3) She asserted that the Family Code has no
procedure for liquidation of property in ‘unions without marriage’.
5. RTC clarified that in Article 147. It is presumed that the properties were obtained through their joint
efforts, thus owned in equal shares. The coownership provisions in the Family Code govern co-owned
properties. "Considering that this Court has already declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent as null and void ab initio, pursuant to Art. 147, the property regime of petitioner and
respondent shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
6. Antonio moved for reconsideration. He submits that Articles 50, 51, and 52 should be controlling. Article
147 doesn’t apply to void marriage due to psychological incapacity. Assuming Article 147 applies, it
should be read with Article 129.

ISSUE/s:

WoN Article 147 applies to void marriages due to psychological incapacity – YES

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the questioned orders, dated 05 May 1995 and 30 October 1995, of the trial court are
AFFIRMED. No costs.

RATIO:

1. SC held that the trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of
Article 147 or Article 148.
2. Under Article 147, the parties were capacitated to marry each other. Under this property regime,
property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the rules on
equal coownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts.
3. Article 50 (1st par) relates only to voidable marriages and to void marriages under Article 40. Thus, the
Family Code provides different property relations and ways to liquidate properties on different kinds of
marriages (valid, voidable, void, legal, and common-law relationship). Here, Article 147 applies.

UY v. LACSAMANA August 19, 2015

DOCTRINE: Properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the
contrary.

SUMMARY: Subjects of this case are parcels of land adjacent to each other wherein a split level house was
constructed. Said property was sold by Rosca to Spouses Lacsamana without the consent of Uy who claims to
be Rosca’s lawful husband. Uy filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against
Rosca, and spouses Lacsamana because the property was, as Uy claims it to be, conjugal in nature and sold
without his marital consent. Rosca, on the other hand, claims to have purchased the property using her
paraphernal funds and she was never married to Uy as the celebration of their marriage was not consummated
because of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony and that they were unable to secure a
marriage contract. The issue is WoN the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca without Uy’s consent, in favor of
Spouses Lacsamana valid. The SC ruled in the affirmative. Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was
legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code – co-
ownership of properties is presumed unless there is proof to the contrary. Rosca was able to prove that the
property is not co-owned but is paraphernal: a) LRC Resolution recognized Rosca as sole registered owner of
the property, b) Deed of Sale with Spouses Manuel, where Uy stood as a mere witness, and c) in the loan
application of Rosca, affidavit of ownership stated that Rosca married to Luis Uy (married to – merely
descriptive of Rosca’s status at the time the property was registered in her name because it should have been
in the names of Luis Uy and Petra Rosca if it were conjugal).

FACTS:
1. Luis Uy (Uy) filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents with Damages against Petra
Rosca (Rosca), and spouses Jose Lacsamana and Rosaura Mendoza (Spouses Lacsamana). Subject
of this case is a parcel of land in Barrio Alangilan, Batangas City, containing an area of 484 square
meters.
2. Uy alleged that he was the lawful husband of Rosca; that they lived together as husband and wife from
1944 until 1973; and that they had 8 children.
3. Uy claims that he and Rosca purchased a 484 square meter residential land for a consideration of
P1,936 evidenced by a Deed of Sale from spouses Anastacio Manuel and Mariquita de Villa (Spouses
Manuel). The spouses Manuel's OCT No. 0-2840 was cancelled and TCT No. T24660 was issued in
the name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy."
4. Uy and Rosca allegedly purchased, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, another residential land
from the spouses Felix Contreras and Maxima de Guzman (Spouses Contreras) adjacent to the one
they bought from Spouses Manuel. Thereafter, a split level house was built on the land bought from
Spouses Manuel.
5. Uy further alleged that Rosca, in gross and evident bad faith, executed and signed a false and
simulated Deed of Sale on the 484 m2 land, together with the house erected thereon, for a
consideration of P80,000 in favor of Spouses Lacsamana.
6. Uy prayed that:
a. the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca in favor of Spouses Lacsamana be declared null and void
with respect to his rights, interest, and ownership;
b. Spouses Lacsamana be directed to pay, jointly and severally, to Uy the amounts of P100,000 as
moral damages, P10,000 as attorney's fees, P2,000 as expenses incident to litigation, plus
costs of suit;
c. upon declaration of the nullity of the Deed of Sale, the Register of Deeds of Batangas City and
the City Assessor be directed to register Uy as the sole owner of the real properties;
d. if Spouses Lacsamana are found by the court to be buyers in good faith, Rosca be ordered to
turn over to Uy the entire proceeds of sale of the properties and be adjudged to pay the
damages; and
e. the sum of P600,000 taken by Rosca from Uy be collated into the mass of the conjugal
partnership properties.
7. Rosca denied the allegations of Uy and claimed that she lawfully acquired the subject real properties
using her paraphernal funds and she was never married to Uy and prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit.
8. Spouses Lacsamana also filed their Answer with Counterclaim stating that they were buyers in good
faith and for value and that they relied on the Torrens title which stated that Rosca was the owner of the
subject property.
9. Uy questioned the registrability of the Deed of Sale before the Office of the Register of Deeds which
elevated the matter, on consulta, with the Land Registration Commission (LRC) because of an affidavit
subsequently filed by Uy contesting the sale and alleging, among others, that the property was conjugal
in nature and sold without his marital consent.
10. LRC decided in favor of registration stating that since the property in question was registered in
Rosca's name, it is an indication that the property belonged to Rosca, as her paraphernal property.
11. Uy died and been substituted by his daughters Lydia Uy Velasquez (Lydia) and Shirley Uy Macaraig
(Shirley) who were presented as witnesses by Uy, as well as Rosca.
a. Lydia testified that the Uy family lived in the house built on the land acquired by Uy and Rosca.
She alleged that the house existed until it was demolished by Buena's agent sometime in 2006.
Lydia also stated that the funds used to construct the family dwelling came from Uy's business.
Shirley corroborated the testimony of Lydia on all material points.
b. Rosca testified that sometime before or during World War II, she and Uy cohabited and
attempted to formalize their marital union with a marriage ceremony. However, the celebration
was not consummated because of the bombings which occurred on the day of the ceremony.
Also, they were unable to secure a marriage contract.
12. Rosca alleged that Uy had an affair with another woman and sired children with her which led to their
physical separation before the year 1973. In 1976, Rosca obtained a real estate loan in the amount of
P50,000 from Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC) using the house and lot as collateral. In support of
this loan, Rosca executed an Affidavit of Ownership stating that (1) she was the lawful and sole owner
of the 484 square meter land, together with the building erected thereon, and (2) the land was
 registered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" in TCT No. T-
24660 was merely a description of her status.
13. Spouses Lacsamana sold the property to Corazon Buena (Buena) who substituted both Spouses
Lacsamana and Rosca.
14. Before the resolution of the case, Shirley and Lydia filed a Motion for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order. They claimed that Buena entered the property and caused the
construction of structures without any court order. Consequently, the RTC issued an Order 2007
granting the preliminary injunction.
15. Thereafter, the case was submitted for resolution.
16. The RTC found that:
a. there was no valid marriage between Uy and Rosca;
b. the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca over the house and lot in favor of Spouses Lacsamana
was valid; and
c. both parties were not entitled to their respective claims for damages.
17. CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The appellate court found that respondents were able to
overthrow the presumption of marriage and that the subject property was Rosca's paraphernal
property. The appellate court also upheld the validity of the sale.
18. Uy then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution.
Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUES:

WoN the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca without Uy’s consent, in favor of Spouses Lacsamana valid - YES

RULING:

In sum, we find that the Deed of Sale, executed by Rosca on her paraphernal property in favor of Spouses
Lacsamana, is valid.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 14 September 2011 and Resolution
dated 1 March 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93786.

RATIO:

1. The validity of the sale of the property by Rosca alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a
valid marriage. There is a presumption established in our Rules "that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage."Semper praesumitur
pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage. However, this presumption may be contradicted by a
party and overcome by other evidence.
2. Uy failed to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca a. Uy was not able to present
any copy of the marriage certificate which he could have sourced from his own personal records, the
solemnizing officer, or the municipal office where the marriage allegedly took place. b. Since Uy failed
to discharge the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be
governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together were not
incapacitated from getting married. c. The provision states that properties acquired during cohabitation
are presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary.
3. Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned but is paraphernal. Thus, she had
every right to sell the same even without Uy's consent.
a. LRC Resolution recognized Rosca as sole registered owner of the property
b. the Deed of Sale between Spouses Manuel and Rosca covering the 484 square meter land, Uy
served as a mere witness to Rosca's purchase of the land as evidenced by his signature under
"signed in the presence of." This could only mean that Uy admitted the paraphernal nature of
Rosca's ownership over the property
c. in the Affidavit of Ownership executed by Rosca in support of her real estate loan application
with PBC, Rosca stated that she was the sole and lawful owner of the subject property and that
the land was registered under her name and that the phrase "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G.
Uy" in TCT No. T-24660 was merely a description of her status d. the title to the property in the
name of "Petra Rosca, married to Luis G. Uy" was notice to the world, including her heirs and
successors-in-interest, that such belonged to Rosca as her paraphernal property. The words
"married to" were merely descriptive of Rosca's status at the time the property was registered in
her name. Otherwise, if the property was conjugal, the title to the property should have been in
the names of Luis Uy and Petra Rosca.
4. Uy further contends that the Deed of Sale executed by Rosca is not valid for being simulated or
fictitious for lack of consideration. Uy states that no proof was presented by Spouses Lacsamana to
show that they actually paid P80,000 to Rosca for the purchase of the property or even if there was
consideration, such was unreasonably low and unconscionable. Thus, Spouses Lacsamana and Buena
cannot be considered as buyers in good faith.
 a. Uy did not present any proof to show that Rosca did not receive any consideration for the sale.
Neither did he submit any evidence, whether documentary or testimonial, showing the fair
market value of the property at the time of the sale to prove that the purchase price was
unreasonably low or unconscionable. It was even mentioned by the appellate court that
"appellants failed to prove that on April 18, 1979, the property might have been worth millions of
pesos." Thus, Uy's allegations lack sufficient substantiation.

POSSESSION

Frondarina v. Malazarte G.R. No. 148423, December 6, 2006

1. YU v. PACLEB, January 24, 2007

2. MANANTAN V. SOMERA April 7, 2009
3. VALDEZ v. CA May 2, 2006
4. DULNUAN. v. METROBANK July 8, 2015
5. ENDAYA V. VILLAOS January 27, 2016

Usufructuary rights

6. NHA v. CA April 13, 2005

7. HEMEDES v. CA October 9, 1999

Accession

8. Automat Realty v. Dela Cruz October 1, 2014

9. NHA V. BAELLO 7 August 2013
10. VITUG v. DE JESUS September 23, 2003
11. DEP-ED v. CASIBANG January 27, 2016
12. CITY MAYOR OF PARANAQUE CITY vs. EBIO June 23, 2010
13. VILLASI v. GARCIA January 15, 2014
14. SULO v. NAYONG FILIPINO 20 January 2009

Easement

15. Bogo-Medellin Milling Co. v. CA July 31, 2003

16. NPC v. TIANGCO February 6, 2007
17. SPOUSES CABAHUG v. NPC (ARIELLE) January 30, 2013
18. Fernando v. St. Scholastica’s College (Jolina) March 12, 2013

Nuisance

19. VELASCO V. MERALCO (MAYUMI) August 6, 1971

20. POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD v. CA (Armand) March 11, 1991
21. ESTATE OF FRANCISCO v. CA (IYA) July 25, 1991
22. Republic v Marcopper (Lij) July 10, 2000
23. CRUZ v. PANDACAN (PERRAL) Jan, 11, 2016
24. REYES v. VALENTIN (Megan) Feb. 11, 2015

Occupation
 25. DOMALSIN v. VALENCIANO (PAT) January 25, 2006
26. FOCULAN v OCIAL (Mica) June 17, 2015

Intellectual creation

27. Pearl&Dean vs Shoemart Inc. (Cristelle) August 15, 2003

28. ECOLE DE CUISINE v. RENAUD COINTREAU (CLARK) June 5, 2013
29. ABS-CBN v. GOZON (Ella) March 11, 2015

Donation

30. Moreño-Lentfer v. Wolff (EMAR) 10 November 2004

31. CALANASAN VS. DOLORITO (Sarmiento) November 25, 2013
32. DOLAR v. BRGY. LUBLUB (SEE) November 18, 2005
33. ARANAS v. MERCADO (Siapno) January 15, 2014
34. Homeowners Association of Talayan Villge, Inc. vx. J.M. TUASON & CO (Mel) November 10, 2015

Registry of eeds

35. VENCILAO v. CA (Paul) Apr. 1, ’98

36. ALMIROL v. REGISTER OF DEEDS (Eliel) March 20, 1968
37. HEIRS OF DOMINGO v. RAMAS (CHIQUI) December 15, 2010
38. Aldover v. CA (Rica) 23 September 2013

Quieting of title

39. GREEN ACRES VS. CABRAL (Nikki V) 05 June 2013

40. ROBLES v. CA (JP) March 14, 2000
41. CALACALA v. REPUBLIC (HENRY) July 28, 2005
42. AZNAR v. AYING (Salve) May 16, 2005
43. REPUBLIC v. MANGOTARA (Lorena) July 7, 2010

Acquisitive or extinctive prescription

44. Calicdan v. Cendana (Celaje) G.R. No. 155080 | February 5, 2004

45. REPUBLIC v. CORTEZ (Ram) February 5, 2014
46. REPUBLIC V CHING (Nicolin) October 20, 2010
47. PANGASINAN v. DISONGLO (JOSEF) July, 1, 2015
48. ANDRES v. STA. LUCIA REALTY (Mark) August 24, 2015

Airspace

49. NPC V. IBRAHIM (CASTRO) 29 June 2007

50. PREYSLER, JR. v. CA (KC) July 11, 2006
51. National Power Corporation v. Tiangco (Paolo) February 6, 2007

Mineral land

52. MINERS ASSOCIATION v. FACTORAN (DANNAH) 16 January, 1995

53. REPUBLIC v. ROSEMOOR MINING (Cyria) March 30, 2004
54. League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENR (Gueco) April 11, 2013

Subdivision – condominium

55. BIANA v. GIMENEZ (Megan) Sept. 9, 2005

56. SOUTH PACHEM DEVELOPMENT, INC. V. CA (MAYUMI) December 16, 2004
57. GATCHALIAN v ANGELES (Armand) November 27, 2013
58. MARIA LUISA PARK ASSOCIATION v. ALMENDRAS (IYA) June 5, 2009
59. UBFHAI v (Lij) February 7, 2007

Special Economic Zone

60. Es83.tate of Salud v. Phil Export Processing Zone (PERRAL) Jan, 16, 2001
61. CITY OF LAPU-LAPU v. PEZA (PAT) November 26, 2014

Reclamation

62. CHAVEZ v. PEA (MICA) Jul. 9, 2002

 63. Chavez vs. NHA (Cristelle) August 15, 2007

Ancestral land domain

64. CRUZ v. SECRETARY OF DENR (MAIN OPINION) December 6, 2000

65. PEZA v. Carantes (Ella) June 23, 2010
66. LAMSIS v. DONG- E (EMAR) 20 October 2010

Water

67. AMISTOSO vs. ONG (Elach) June 29, 1984

68. COLLADO v. CA (Karen) October 4, 2002

Trademark – tradeline

69. Asia Brewery Inc. v. CA (REINE) July 5, 1993

70. Coffee Partners Inc. v. San Francisco Coffee (Steph) March 3, 2010
71. CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE VS. PEOPLE (ARIELLE) November 11, 2013
72. Societe vs. Dy (Leonardo) Aug. 9, 2010