B.

Requirements for the Practice of Law

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this court,
and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those admitted to the
Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.

The President requested the views of the court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven members
of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the
President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371 which is
an Act to fix the passing marks for bar examinations from nineteen hundred and forty-six up to and
including nineteen Hundred and fifty-five, embodying substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill.

Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is
contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate preparation for the
practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers were
still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. To avoid injustice to
individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether
or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to revise
their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if
declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not.

ISSUE

Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

HELD

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered
from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in
the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as
other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional

responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and
only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That
congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on admission to the bar
(since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated are
considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title
of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1,
the entire law is void.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

B. Requirements for the Practice of Law

Cayetano vs. Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

Rule 138, 138-A, 139-A, 139-B of the Rules of Court

RULE 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar,
or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission
as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of
good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. — Citizens of
the United States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine
Bar, in active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may,
upon satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such
practice after taking the following oath of office:

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law

in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic
of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders
of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful
suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will
conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission who,
being Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United
States or in any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or
Territory of the United States, and who can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced
at least five years in any of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they
have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without
examination.

Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than
those referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination,
satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary
of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or
school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the
court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the
following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law,
commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor
and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless
he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the
study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university
or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the
course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the
following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history
and economics.

Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file with the
clerk of the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days
before the beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall
also file within the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced
within sections 3 and 4 they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to practice,
satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional
standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence,
and citizenship.

Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the
clerk of the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten
(10) days before the beginning of the examination.

Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of
this rule, shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social
Legislation; Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations,
and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil
Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings
and Conveyancing).

Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking the
examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall
be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each
examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone.

Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be
difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such
examinee to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed
to be used.

The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the
substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the
examination papers. No oral examination shall be given.

Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall
take place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the
chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day:
Political and International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day:
Civil Law (morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law
(afternoon); Fourth day: Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises
(afternoon).

Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar

examiners to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of
the Supreme Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for
one year, and eight members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one
year. The names of the members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official
reports.

Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the
committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall
they give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other
provision of this rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure
against him, and further disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the
discretion of the court.

Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his
examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the
examination shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social
Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and
International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and
Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.

Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than February 15th
after the examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report
on the result of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed
with the clerk and may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the
report.

Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar
examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show
the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes
as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall
certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects
under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular
subject.
Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant who has passed the
required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take
and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.

Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of
the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon
its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate
shall be his authority to practice.

Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys
admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his
certificate.

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution
and obey the laws of the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and
such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only
as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial
officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets
of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except
from him or with his knowledge and approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or

proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless
of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law
permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of
law.

Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to

represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize
him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in
a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such
order as justice requires. An attorneys wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed,
unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has
misbehaved in his official transactions.

Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. — An
attorney who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue
representing his client on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the
appellate court.

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in
any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all
matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their
client's litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to

have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a
view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered,
and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as
expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its
conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in
his hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this
section shall not be a bar to a criminal prosecution.

Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an
action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the
client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of
substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in
place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract
between client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was
without justifiable cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation
stipulated in the contract. However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the
case to protect his rights. For the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon
all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment,
rendered in the case wherein his services had been retained by the client.

Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of

the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The
Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not
practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.

Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings
in Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance
shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full
statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and
statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the facts involved and make such
order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the
facts warrant.

Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or

suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable
notice to answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard
by himself or counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation,
the court may proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an attorney to render professional
aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute
and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends
of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to
render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.

Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to availability of funds as may be

provided by the law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de
oficio to be compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule.
Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor
more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos
(P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital
offenses; (4) Five Hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.

Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any official or
other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the
Philippines shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in
which said government has an interest direct or indirect.

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may
conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose,
or with the aid an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid
of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the
bar.

Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member
of the bar or give professional advice to clients.

Section 36. Amicus Curiae. — Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to
appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.
Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers
of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful
fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client,
from and after the time when he shall have the caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be
entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall
have the caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse paty; and he
shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to
enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

RULE 139-A

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Section 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
"Integrated Bar of the Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear or may
hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

Section 2. Purposes. — The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall be to elevate the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

Section 3. Regions. — The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of the Integrated Bar, to
wit:

(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva
Vizcaya, and Quirino.

(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga,
Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales;

(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City;

(d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque,

Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal;

(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur,

Catanduanes, Masbate, and Sorsogon;

(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte,
Northern Samar, Samar, and Southern Leyte;

(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros
Occidental, Negros Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor.

(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan Del Sur,
Bukidnon, Camiguin, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Misamis Oriental,
Surigao del Norte, and Surigao del Sur; and
 (i) Western Mindanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces
of Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu,
Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.

In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors shall, with the approval of
the Supreme Court, determine the Region to which the said province shall belong.

Section 4. Chapters. — A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in every province.
Except as hereinbelow provided, every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is
geographically situated.

A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political subdivisions or areas;

(a) The sub-province of Aurora;

(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;

(c) Quezon City;

(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;

(e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;

(f) Cebu City; and

(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the
absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than
one Chapter.

Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed
by the Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this
Rule notwithstanding.

Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on matters and problems of
common concern.

Section 5. House of Delegates. — The Integrated Bar shall have a House of Delegates of not more
than one hundred twenty members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as
may be according to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least
one Delegate. On or before December 31, 1974, and every four years thereafter, the Board of
Governors shall make an apportionment of Delegates.

The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of
the House and shall end on the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next
succeeding annual convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two terms.

The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during
the month of April of each year for the election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports
including the annual report of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such other business as may
be referred to it by the Board, and the consideration of such additional matters as may be requested
in writing by at least twenty Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be called by the Board
of Governors to consider only such matters as the Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates
who have registered for a convention, whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do
business.

Section 6. Board of Governors. — The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors.
Nine Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the
representation basis of one Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list
of nominees submitted by the Delegates from the Region, provided that not more than one nominee
shall come from any Chapter. The President and the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the
Governors from outside of themselves as provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become
members of the Board.

The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and
until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for
more than two terms.

The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and such time and place as it
shall designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business.
Special meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the Board.

Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate
Canons of Professional Responsibility for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the
Canons may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the
Board of Governors.

The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry
out the purposes of the Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.

Section 7. Officers. — The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President
who shall be chosen by the Governors immediately after the latter's election, either from among
themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five Governors.
Each of the regional members of the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region which he
represents.

The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date
of their election and until their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President
shall automatically become the President for the next succeeding full term. The Presidency shall
rotate from year to year among all the nine Regions in such order or rotation as the Board of
Governors shall prescribe. No person shall be President or Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar for more than one term.

The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as
may be required by the Board of Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Board, and to hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said officers
and employees need not be members of the Integrated Bar.

Section 8. Vacancies. — In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall be
performed by the Executive Vice President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of
the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of
the term of the office thus vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or disability of
both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting
President to hold office until the next succeeding election or during the period of disability.

The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of
Officers of the Integrated Bar shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or
position is for a fixed period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the
unexpired term.

Section 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as
the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare
Fund for disabled members of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Section 11. Voluntary termination of membership; re-instatement. — A member may terminate his

membership by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall
immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a
member and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys. Reinstatement may
be made by the Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of
Governors and approved by the Court.

Section 12. Grievance procedures. — The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for
grievance procedures for the enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of
the Integrated Bar, but no action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal
of his name from the Roll of Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the Supreme
Court.

Section 13. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar shall be strictly non-political, and every activity
tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No
lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election of appointment to any
position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts
appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof.

Section 14. Positions honorary. — Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the

Supreme Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall
receive any compensation, allowance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any
service rendered therein or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the discharge
of his functions.

Section 15. Fiscal matters. — The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated
Bar and shall have the power to make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause
proper Books of Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that
the proper audit is made of all accounts of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof.
Section 16. Journal. — The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of
the Integrated Bar, free copies of which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.

Section 17. Voluntary Bar associations. — All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may
hereafter be formed may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes
therewith.

Section 18. Amendments. — This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or
upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.

Section 19. Organizational period. — The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local
Chapters and toward this end shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all
Judges throughout the Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on Saturday,
February 17, 1973. In every case, the Commission shall cause proper notice of the date, time and
place of the meeting called to organize a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose,
including the election of a President, a Vice President, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and five Directors.

The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion the same among all the
Chapters as nearly as may be in proportion to the number of their respective members, but each
Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. The President of each Chapter shall concurrently be its
Delegate to the House of Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, except where the
Chapter is entitled to have more than one Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall also be a
Delegate.

The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect additional as well as alternate
Delegates.

The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the
Purpose of electing a Board of Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and
forthwith meet to elect the Officers of the Integrated Bar. The Officers so chosen shall immediately
assume their respective positions.

Section 20. Effectivity. — This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.

RULE 139-B

Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys

Section 1. How Instituted. — Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys
may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts
complained of and shall be supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the
facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.

The IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the Supreme Court or by a
Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and prosecute proper charges
against erring attorneys including those in the government service.

Six (6) copies of the verified complaint shall be filed with the Secretary of the IBP or the Secretary of
any of its chapter who shall forthwith transmit the same to the IBP Board of Governors for
assignment to an investigator.
 A. PROCEEDINGS IN THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

Section 2. National Grievance Investigators. — The Board of Governors shall appoint from among
IBP members an Investigator or, when special circumstances so warrant, a panel of three (3)
investigators to investigate the complaint. All Investigators shall take an oath of office in the form
prescribed by the Board of Governors. A copy of the Investigator's appointment and oath shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court.

An Investigator may be disqualified by reason of relationship within the fourth degree of

consanguinity of affinity to any of the parties of their counsel, pecuniary interest, personal bias, or his
having acted as counsel to his acting as such Investigator. Where the Investigator does not
disqualify himself, a party may appeal to the IBP Board of Governors, which by majority vote of the
members present, there being a quorum, may order his disqualification.

Any Investigator may also be removed for cause, after due hearing, by the vote of at least six (6)
members of the IBP Board of Governors. The decision of the Board of Governors in all cases of
disqualification or removal shall be final.

Section 3. Duties of the National Grievance Investigator. — The National Grievance Investigators
shall investigate all complaints against members of the Integrated Bar referred to them by the IBP
Board of Governors.

Section 4. Chapter assistance to complainant. — The proper IBP Chapter may assist the
complainant(s) in the preparation and filing of his complaint(s).

Section 5. Service or dismissal. — If the complaint appears to be meritorious, the Investigator shall
direct that a copy thereof be served upon the respondent, requiring him to answer the same within
fifteen (15) days from the date of service. If the complaint does not merit action, or if the answer
shows to the satisfaction of the Investigator that the complaint is not meritorious, the same may be
dismissed by the Board of Governors upon his recommendation. A copy of the resolution of
dismissal shall be furnished the complainant and the Supreme Court which may review the
case motu propio or upon timely appeal of the complainant filed within 15 days from notice of the
dismissal of the complainant.

No investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement,

compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same, unless the Supreme Court motu propio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors, determines that there is no compelling reason to continue with the disbarment or
suspension proceedings against the respondent. (Amendment pursuant to Supreme Court
Resolution dated May 27, 1993 re Bar Matter 356).

Section 6. Verification and service of answer. — The answer shall be verified. The original and five
(5) legible copies of the answer shall be filed with the Investigator, with proof of service of a copy
thereof on the complainant or his counsel.

Section 7. Administrative counsel. — The IBP Board of Governors shall appoint a suitable member
of the Integrated Bar as counsel to assist the complainant of the respondent during the investigation
in case of need for such assistance.

Section 8. Investigation. — Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to answer, the
Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of the case. He shall have
the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The respondent shall be given full opportunity
to defend himself, to present witnesses on his behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel.
However, if upon reasonable notice, the respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall
proceed ex parte.

The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of its
commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon prior application.

Willful failure or refusal to obey a subpoena or any other lawful order issued by the Investigator shall
be dealt with as for indirect contempt of court. The corresponding charge shall be filed by the
Investigator before the IBP Board of Governors which shall require the alleged contemnor to show
cause within ten (10) days from notice. The IBP Board of Governors may thereafter conduct
hearings, if necessary, in accordance with the procedure set forth in this Rule for hearings before the
Investigator. Such hearing shall as far as practicable be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
commencement. Thereafter, the IBP Board of Governors shall within a like period of fifteen (15) days
issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations, which shall forthwith be
transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action and if warranted, the imposition of penalty.

Section 9. Depositions. — Depositions may be taken in accordance with the Rules of Court with
leave of the investigator(s).

Within the Philippines, depositions may be taken before any member of the Board of Governors, the
President of any Chapter, or any officer authorized by law to administer oaths.

Depositions may be taken outside the Philippines before diplomatic or consular representative of the
Philippine Government or before any person agreed upon by the parties or designated by the Board
of Governors.

Any suitable member of the Integrated Bar in the place where a deposition shall be taken may be
designated by the Investigator to assist the complainant or the respondent in taking a deposition.

Section 10. Report of Investigator. — Not later than thirty (30) days from the termination of the
investigation, the Investigator shall submit a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations to the IBP Board of Governors, together with the stenographic notes and the
transcript thereof, and all the evidence presented during the investigation. The submission of the
report need not await the transcription of the stenographic notes, it being sufficient that the report
reproduce substantially from the Investigator's personal notes any relevant and pertinent
testimonies.

Section 11. Defects. — No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or the

Investigator's Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of Governors, upon
considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or may result in a miscarriage of
justice, in which event the Board shall take such remedial action as the circumstances may warrant,
including invalidation of the entire proceedings.

Section 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors
upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The
decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period
 not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the submittal of
the Investigator's Report.

b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

c) If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by it is

less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it shall issue a
decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case shall be deemed
terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other interested party filed with the
Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of the Board's resolution, the Supreme
Court orders otherwise.

d) Notice of the resolution or decision of the Board shall be given to all parties through their
counsel. A copy of the same shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court.

B. PROCEEDINGS IN THE SUPREME COURT

Section 13. Supreme Court Investigation. — In proceedings initiated motu propio by the Supreme

Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer
the case for investigation to the Solicitor-General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a
lower court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6
to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the
Supreme Court.

Section 14. Report of the Solicitor General of other Court-designated Investigator. — Based upon
the evidence adduced at the investigation, the Solicitor General or other Investigator designated by
the Supreme Court shall submit to the Supreme Court a report containing his findings of fact and
recommendations for the final action of the Supreme Court.

C. COMMON PROVISIONS

Section 15. Suspension of attorney by Supreme Court. — After receipt of respondent's answer or

lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu propio, or at the instance of the IBP Board of
Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigator, may suspend an attorney from the practice
of his profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the pendency of the
investigation until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court.

Section 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court. 1 — The
Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in Rule 138, Section 27 2, until further action of the Supreme Court in the case.

Section 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings in
Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full
statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and
statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or
extend the suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.
Section 18. Confidentiality. — Proceedings against attorneys shall be private and confidential.
However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions in other cases.

Section 19. Expenses. — All reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in relation to disciplinary
and disbarment proceedings are lawfull charges for which the parties may be taxed as costs.

Section 20. Effectivity and Transitory Provision. — This Rule shall take effect June 1, 1988 and shall
supersede the present Rule 139 entitled "DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS". All
cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in
this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been substantially completed.

Footnotes

1 This section and the following Section 17 sepersede Section 9 of Rule 139.

2 The text of Rule 138, Section 27 reads: "SEC. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by the
Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
form his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or
for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

Ferdinand A. Cruz vs. Judge Priscilla Mijares G.R. No. 154464 (Sept. 11, 2008)

586 Phil. 433

NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing the Resolutions
dated May 10, 2002[1] and July 31, 2002[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 108, Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff
Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party litigant, and the refusal of the
public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself
from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this
Court.

The antecedents:
On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to
enter his appearance for and on his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108,
Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of
Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on
Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[3] that a non-lawyer may appear
before any court and conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to

secure a written permission from the Court Administrator before he could
be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley
Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead
of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging
that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed.
Judge Mijares then remarked, "Hay naku, masama `yung marunong pa
sa Huwes. Ok?" and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and
calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to

Inhibit,[4] praying for the voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion
alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the
conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of
Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an
uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the
belief that justice will not be served.[5]

In an Order[6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for
inhibition stating that throwing tenuous allegations of partiality based on
the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition,
considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration[7] of the said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. [8] In the
same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to
submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to
satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, his appearance was denied.

In a motion for reconsideration,[9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his

appearance was not Rule 138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended
that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different
circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking
Rule 138-A, in an Order[10] dated July 31, 2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant
petition and assigns the following errors:

I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND

ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF
THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTER'S BEHALF, IN CIVIL
CASE NO. 01-0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE
RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF NON-
LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;

II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE
THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION
IS PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLE'S FAITH AND CONFIDENCE
TO THE COURTS.
The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary
writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent court acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge
refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.

This Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus

and injunction is not exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs
and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however,
to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court where
the application therefor will be directed.[11] A becoming regard of the
judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed with the Court of
Appeals.[12] The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional
cases and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.
[13]
Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section
34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, the Court takes
cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is cautioned not
to continue his practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under
Rule 65 when the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of
Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who make a mockery of the judicial
hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns before us.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34

and Rule 138-A is necessary.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. - A law student who has

successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law
curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical
legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear
without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before
any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients
accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized by this

rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited
by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or
other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for and
in behalf of the legal clinic.
The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself
and on his behalf because of his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In
denying petitioner's appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the
fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which
eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record
that he is enrolled in a recognized school's clinical legal education program
and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was
Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the

peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent
or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney.
In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be
conceded that the contention of the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the
right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party.
The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with
the aid of an attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or
by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may
personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement
to the termination of the litigation.[14] Considering that a party personally
conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and
procedure as those qualified to practice law,[15] petitioner, not being a
lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his
own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can
personally conduct the litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then
be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right to
represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law
student and must, therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law
Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of
the petitioner's claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for
conditions when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule
allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by
virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal
Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In
fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer
may appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through
Rule 138-A.
It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an
accused to be heard by himself and counsel,[16] this Court has held that
during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived.[17] The rationale for
this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado,[18] where we declared that
"even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may
be convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to
establish his innocence."

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein.
The solicitous concern that the Constitution accords the accused in a
criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party
litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyer's assistance,
effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the
chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and
impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself.
Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue

of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear as an agent or a friend of
a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior
courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to
represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge

committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is no valid
ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor
during the pre-trial when she said: "Hay naku, masama `yung marunong
pa sa Huwes. Ok?" Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the
respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness
and prejudice, causing petitioner's and his co-plaintiff's loss of faith and
confidence in the respondent's impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an

administrative case[19] against the respondent for violation of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15,
2002. We now adopt the Court's findings of fact in the administrative case
and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and
prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from
participating in a particular trial,[20] as voluntary inhibition is primarily a
matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge.
The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her
rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case
before her.[21] Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed

Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City
are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City
is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil
Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Tinga*, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr.*, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

*
 Designated additional members in lieu of Associate Justices Consuelo
Ynares-Santiago and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez per Special Order No. 517
dated August 27, 2008.

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 34-35.

[2]
 Id. at 43-45.

[3]
 Section 31-Rule 138. By whom litigation conducted. - In the court of
justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the
aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the
aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

[4]
 Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, rollo, pp. 29-30.

[5]
 Rollo, p. 30.

[6]
 Id. at 31.

[7]
 Annex "D" of the Petition, id. at 32-33.

[8]
 Rollo, pp. 34-35.

[9]
 Annex "F" of the Petition, id. at 36-42.

[10]
 Annex "G" of the Petition, id. at 43-45.

[11]
 People v. Cuaresma, G.R. No. 67787, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA 415, 423-
424.

[12]
 Liga ng mga Barangay National v. City Mayor of Manila, 465 Phil.
529, 543 (2004).

[13]
 Cruz v. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007, 522 SCRA 382,
386; United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip, G.R. No. 163858, June 28, 2005, 461
SCRA 574, 593; Ark Travel Express, Inc. v. Abrogar, 457 Phil. 189, 202
(2003).

[14]
 Santos v. Lacurom, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1823, August 28, 2006, 499 SCRA
639, 648-649.

[15]
 Maderada v. Mediodea, 459 Phil. 701, 716-717 (2003).
[16]
 CONSTITUTION, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).

[17]
 Flores v. Ruiz, 179 Phil. 351, 355 (1979).

[18]
 86 Phil. 752 (1950).

[19]
 Ferdinand Cruz v. Judge Priscilla Mijares, OCA IPI No. 02-1452-RTJ,

[20]
 People v. Ong, G.R. Nos. 162130-39, May 5, 2006, 489 SCRA 679, 688.

[21]
 Abrajano v. Heirs of Augusto F. Salas, Jr., G.R. No. 158895, February
16, 2006, 482 SCRA 476, 487

Lawyer’s Oath

I, _________________, do solemnly swear

That I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines,

I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein;

I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court;

I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or
give aid nor consent to the same;

I will delay no man for money or malice,

And will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion,

With all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients;

And I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion.

So help me God.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7662

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN THE LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR THE
PURPOSE, A LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Legal Education Reform Act of 1993."

Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the
standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-
solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to impress on them
the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and indispensable partner of
the Bench in the administration of justice and to develop social competence.

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system,
require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal
apprenticeship and continuing legal education.

Section 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. - (a) Legal education in the
Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:

(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;

(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of
the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;

(3) to train persons for leadership;

(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the
improvement of its administration, the legal system and legal institutions in the light
of the historical and contemporary development of law in the Philippines and in other
countries.

(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:

(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various fields and
of legal institutions;

(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate and
apply the law effectively, as well as to allowthem to have a holistic approach to legal
problems and issues;

(3) to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving and decision-
making, and to develop their ability to deal with recognized legal problems of the
present and the future;
 (4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful employment
or sufficient as a foundation for future training beyond the basic professional degree,
and to develop in them the desire and capacity for continuing study and self-
improvement;

(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession; and

(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their profession
and to fully adhere to its ethical norms.

Section 4. Legal Education Board; Creation and Composition. - To carry out the purpose of this Act,
there is hereby created the Legal Education Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board, attached
solely for budgetary purposes and administrative support to the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports.

The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall preferably be a former justice of the
Supreme Court or Court of Appeals, and the following as regular members: a representative of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP); a representative of the Philippine Association of Law Schools
(PALS); a representative from the ranks of active law practitioners; and, a representative from the
law students' sector. The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, or his
representative, shall be an ex officio member of the Board.

With the exception of the representative of the law students' sector, the Chairman and regular
members of the Board must be natural-born citizen of the Philippines and members of the Philippine
Bar, who have been engaged for at least ten (10) years in the practice of law, as well as in the
teaching of law in a duly authorized or recognized law school.

Section 5. Term of Office; Compensation. - The Chairman and regular members of the Board shall
be appointed by the President for a term of five (5) years without reappointment from a list of at least
three (3) nominees prepared, with prior authorization from the Supreme Court, by the Judicial and
Bar Council, for every position or vacancy, and no such appointment shall need confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Of those first appointed, the Chairman and the representative of the
IBP shall hold office for five (5) years, the representatives of the PALS and the PALP, for three (3)
years; and the representative from the ranks of active law practitioners and the representative of the
law students' sector, for one (1) year, without reappointment. Appointments to any vacancy shall be
only for the unexpire portion of the term of the predecessor.

The Chairman and regular members of the Board shall have the same salary and rank as the
Chairman and members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions: Provided, That their
salaries shall not be diminished during their term of office.

Section 6. Office and Staff Support. - The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall
provide the necessary office and staff support to the Board, with a principal office to be located in
Metropolitan Manila.

The Board may appoint such other officers and employees it may deem necessary in the
performanceof its powers and functions.

Section 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the
Board shall havethe following powers and functions:
 (a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with the
provisions of this Act;

(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions as
herein enumerated;

(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others,
the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other
facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;

(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and
compensation of faculty members;

(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements for
admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses of
study as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the different levels of
accreditation status;

(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law
student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal
assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may
decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall
prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such
internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.

(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide
for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as
the Board may deem necessary; and

(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary for
the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.

Section 8. Accreditation of Law Schools. - Educational institutions may not operate a law school
unless accredited by the Board. Accreditation of law schools may be granted only to educational
institutions recognized by the Government.

Section 9. Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The Board may withdraw or downgrade

the accreditation status of a law school if it fails to maintain the standards set for its accreditation
status.

Section 10. Effectivity of Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The withdrawal or

downgrading of accreditation status shall be effetive after the lapse ofthe semester or trimester
following the receipt by the school of the notice of withdrawal or downgrading unless, in the
meantime, the school meets and/or upgrades the standards or corrects the deficiencies upon which
the withdrawal or downgrading of the accreditation status is based.

Section 11. Legal Education Fund. - There is hereby created a special endowment fund, to be
known as the Legal Education Fund, which shall be under the control of the Board, and administered
as a separate fund by the Social Security System (SSS) which shall invest the same with due and
prudent regard to its solvency, safety and liquidity.

The Legal Education Fund shall be established out of, and maintained from, the amounts
appropriated pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 13 hereof, and from sixty percent (60%) of the
privilege tax paid by every lawyer effective Fiscal Year 1994; and from such donations, legacies,
grant-in-aid and other forms of contributions received by the Board for the purposes of this Act.

Being a special endowment fund, only the interests earned on the Legal Education Fund shall be
used exclusively for the purposes of this Act, including support for faculty development grants,
professorial chairs, library improvements and similar programs for the advancement of law teaching
and education in accredited law schools.

The Fund shall also be used for the operation of the Board. For this purpose, an amount not
exceeding ten percent (10%) of the interest on the Fund shall be utilized.

The Board, in consultation with the SSS, shall issue the necessary rules and regulations for the
collection, administration and utilization of the Fund.

Section 12. Coverage. - The provisions of this Act shall apply to all schools and colleges of law
which are presently under the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.
Hereafter, said supervision shall be transferred to the Board. Law schools and colleges which shall
be established following the approval of this Act shall likewise be covered.

Section 13. Appropriation. - The amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) is hereby authorized
to be charged against the current year's appropriation of the Contingent Fund for the initial expenses
of the Board.

To form part of the Legal Education Fund, there shall be appropriated annually, under the budget of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00)
for a period of ten (10) years effective Fiscal Year 1994.

Section 14. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or the
application thereof to any person, circumstance or transaction is held invalid, the validity of the
remaining provisions of this Act and the applicability of such provisions to other persons,
circumstances and transactions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 15. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executie orders, rules and regulations, issuances
or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act is hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Section 16. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of
its publication in the Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: 23 December 1993.

G.R. No. 242954, September 10, 2019

FRANCIS JOSE LEAN L. ABAYATA, GRETCHENM. VASQUEZ, SHEENAH S.

ILUSTRISMO, RALPH LOUIE SALAÑO, AIREEN MONICA B. GUZMAN, DELFINO
ODIAS, DARYL DELA CRUZ, CLAIRE SUICO, AIVIE S. PESCADERO, NIÑA
CHRISTINE DELA PAZ, SHEMARK K. QUENIAHAN, AL JAY T. MEJOS, ROCELLYN
L. DAÑO,* MICHAEL ADOLFO, RONALD A. ATIG, LYNNETTE C. LUMAYAG, MARY
CHRIS LAGERA, TIMOTHY B. FRANCISCO, SHEILA MARIE C. DANDAN,
MADELINE C. DELA PEÑA, DARLIN R. VILLAMOR, LORENZANA L. LLORICO, AND
JAN IVAN M. SANTAMARIA, PETITIONERS, v. HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRPERSON, EMERSON B. AQUENDE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

On the principal grounds of encroachment upon the rule-making power of the Court
concerning the practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom and violation
of a law school aspirant's right to education, these consolidated Petitions for Prohibition
(G.R. No. 230642) and Certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 242954) under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court assail as unconstitutional Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7662, 1 or the Legal
Education Reform Act of 1993, which created the Legal Education Board (LEB). On the
same principal grounds, these petitions also particularly seek to declare as
unconstitutional the LEB issuances establishing and implementing the nationwide law
school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhiLSAT.

The Antecedents

Prompted by clamors for the improvement of the system of legal education on account
of the poor performance of law students and law schools in the bar examinations, 2 the
Congress, on December 23, 1993, passed into law R.A. No. 7662 with the following
policy statement:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift
the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy,
counselling, problem-solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of the
legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal
profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of
justice and to develop social competence.

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education
system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools,
and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.
R.A. No. 7662 identifies the general and specific objectives of legal education in this
manner:
SEC. 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. -

(a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:

(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;

(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
(3) to train persons for leadership;
(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the improvement of its
 administration, the legal system and legal institutions in the light of the historical and
contemporary development of law in the Philippines and in other countries.

(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:

(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various fields and of legal
institutions;
(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate and apply the
law effectively, as well as to allow them to have a holistic approach to legal problems and
Issues;
(3) to prepare law students for advocacy, [counseling], problem-solving and decision-making,
and to develop their ability to deal with recognized legal problems of the present and the
future;
(4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful employment or
sufficient as a foundation for future training beyond the basic professional degree, and to
develop in them the desire and capacity for continuing study and self improvement;
(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession; and
(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their profession and to fully
adhere to its ethical norms.
For these purposes, R.A. No. 7662 created the LEB, an executive agency which was
made separate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS), but
attached thereto solely for budgetary purposes and administrative support. 3 The
Chairman and regular members of the LEB are to be appointed by the President for a
term of five years, without reappointment, from a list of at least three nominees
prepared, with prior authorization from the Court, by the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC).4

Section 7 of R.A. No. 7662 enumerates the powers and functions of the LEB as follows:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act,
the Board shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with
the provisions of this Act;

(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions
as herein enumerated;

(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among
others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the
library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning;

(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and
compensation to faculty members;
(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements
for admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses
of study as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the different levels
of accreditation status;

(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a
law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or
legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the
Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose,
the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of
the Bar[;]

(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may
provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for
such duration as the Board may deem necessary; and

(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary
for the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.
On the matter of accreditation of law schools, R.A. No. 7662 further elaborates:
SEC. 8. Accreditation of Law Schools. - Educational institutions may not operate a law
school unless accredited by the Board. Accreditation of law schools may be granted only
to educational institutions recognized by the Government.

SEC. 9. Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The [LEB] may withdraw or

downgrade the accreditation status of a law school if it fails to maintain the standards
set for its accreditation status.

SEC. 10. Effectivity of Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The withdrawal or

downgrading of accreditation status shall be effective after the lapse of the semester or
trimester following the receipt by the school of the notice of withdrawal or downgrading
unless, in the meantime, the school meets and/or upgrades the standards or corrects
the deficiencies upon which the withdrawal or downgrading of the accreditation status is
based.
Bar Matter No. 979-B
Re: Legal Education

In July 2001, the Court's Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM),
through its Chairperson, Justice Jose C. Vitug, noted several objectionable provisions of
R.A. No. 7662 which "go beyond the ambit of education of aspiring lawyers and into the
sphere of education of persons duly licensed to practice the law profession." 5

In particular, the CLEBM observed:

x x x [U]nder the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662], the State "shall
x x x require apprenticeship and continuing legal education." The concept of continuing
legal education encompasses education not only of law students but also of members of
the legal profession. [This] implies that the [LEB] shall have jurisdiction over the
education of persons who have finished the law course and are already licensed to
practice law[, in violation of the Supreme Court's power over the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines].

x x x Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education increasing

"awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived
and oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place in the law
that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of ·law as they perform the task
of educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution
also provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules on
"legal assistance to the underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A. No. 7662]
might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power.

x x x [Section 7(e) giving the LEB the power to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission and Section 7(h) giving the LEB the power to adopt a system of continuing
legal education and for this purpose, the LEB may provide for the mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB may
deem necessary] encroach upon the Supreme Court's powers under Section 5,
paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Aside from its power over the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, the Supreme Court is constitutionally mandated to promulgate
rules concerning admission to the practice of law.6
While the CLEBM saw the need for the LEB to oversee the system of legal education, it
cautioned that the law's objectionable provisions, for reasons above-cited, must be
removed.7

Relative to the foregoing observations, the CLEBM proposed the following amendments
to R.A. No. 7662:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift
the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy,
counseling, problem-solving, and decision-making; to infuse in them the ethics of the
legal profession; to impress upon them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal
profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of
justice; and, to develop socially-committed lawyers with integrity and competence.

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education
system, require proper selection of law students, provide for legal apprenticeship, and
maintain quality among law schools.

xxxx

SEC. 3. General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education. x x x

xxxx

2.) to increase awareness among law students of the needs of the poor, deprived and
oppressed sectors of society;

xxxx

SEC. 7. Power and functions. - x x x

(a) to regulate the legal education system in accordance with its powers and functions
herein enumerated;

(b) to establish standards of accreditation for law schools, consistent with academic
freedom and pursuant to the declaration of policy set forth in Section 2 hereof;

(c) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

(d) to prescribe minimum standards for admission to law schools including a system of
law aptitude examination;

(e) to provide for minimum qualifications for faculty members of law schools;

(f) to prescribe guidelines for law practice internship which the law schools may
establish as part of the curriculum; and

(g) to perform such other administrative functions as may be necessary for the

attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.8 (Underscoring supplied)

xxxx
In a Resolution9 dated September 4, 2001, the Court approved the CLEBM's explanatory
note and draft amendments to R.A. No. 7662. The Senate and the House of
Representatives were formally furnished with a copy of said Resolution. This,
notwithstanding, R.A. No. 7662 remained unaltered.

LEB Issuances

In 2003, the Court issued a resolution authorizing the JBC to commence the nomination
process for the members of the LEB. In 2009, the LEB was constituted with the
appointment of Retired Court of Appeals Justice Hilarion L. Aquino as the first
Chairperson and followed by the appointment of LEB members, namely, Dean Eulogia
M. Cueva, Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr., Dean Venicio S. Flores and Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) Director Felizardo Y. Francisco. Despite the passage of the enabling
law in 1993, the LEB became fully operational only in June 2010.

Acting pursuant to its authority to prescribe the minimum standards for law schools, the
LEB issued Memorandum Order No. 1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011) providing for
the Policies and Standards of Legal Education and Manual of Regulation for Law
Schools.

Since then, the LEB had issued several orders, circulars, resolutions, and other
issuances which are made available through their website:

A. Orders

Number Title/Subject
LEBMO No. Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law Program
2
LEBMO No. Policies, Standards and, Guidelines for the Accreditation of Law Schools to Offer
3-2016 and Operate Refresher Courses
LEBMO No. Supplemental to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016
4-2016
LEBMO No. Guidelines for the [Prerequisite] Subjects in the Basic Law Courses
5-2016
LEBMO No. Reportorial Requirements for Law Schools
6-2016
LEBMO No. Policies and Regulations for the Administration of a Nationwide Uniform Law
7-2016 School Admission Test for Applicants to the Basic Law Courses in All Law
Schools in the Country
LEBMO No. Policies, Guidelines and Procedures Governing Increases in Tuition and Other
8-2016 School Fees, and, Introduction of New Fees by Higher, Education Institutions for
the Law Program
LEBMO No. Policies and Guidelines on the Conferment of Honorary Doctor of Laws Degrees
9-2017
LEBMO No. Guidelines on the Adoption of Academic/School Calendar
10-2017
LEBMO No. Additional Transition Provisions to [LEBMO] No. 7, Series of 2016, on PhiLSAT
11-2017
LEBMO No. LEB Service/Transaction Fees
12-2018
LEBMO No. Guidelines
13-2018   in the Conduct of Summer Classes
LEBMO No. Policy and Regulations in Offering Elective Subjects
14-2018
LEBMO No. Validation of the Licenses of, and the Law Curriculum/Curricula for the Basic Law
15-2018 Courses in use by Law Schools and Graduate Schools of Law
LEBMO No. Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the Academic Law Libraries of Law Schools
16-2018
LEBMO No. Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum Academic Requirement of Master of
17-2018 Laws Degree for Deans and Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law Schools
LEBMO No. Guidelines on Cancellation or Suspension of Classes in All Law Schools
18-2018
LEBMO No. Migration of the Basic Law Course to Juris Doctor
19-2018
LEBMO No. Discretionary Admission in the AY 2019-2020 of Examinees Who Rated Below
20-2019 the Cut-off/Passing Score but Not Less than 45% in the Philippine Law School
Admission Test Administered on April 7, 2019

B. Memorandum Circulars
 Number Title/Subject
LEBMC New Regulatory Issuances
No. 1
LEBMC Submission of Schedule of Tuition and Other School Fees
No. 2
LEBMC Submission of Law School Information Report
No. 3
LEBMC Reminder to Submit Duly Accomplished LSIR Form
No. 4
LEBMC Offering of the Refresher Course for AY 2017-2018
No. 5
LEBMC Applications for LEB Certification Numbers
No. 6
LEBMC Application of Transitory Provision Under [LEBMO] No. 7 Series of 2017 and
No. 7 [LEBMO] No. 11, Series of 2017 in the Admission of Freshmen Law Students in
Basic Law Courses in Academic Year 2017-2018
LEBMC Guidelines for Compliance with the Reportorial Requirements Under [LEBMO] No.
No. 8 7, Series of 2016 for Purposes of the Academic Year 2017-2018
LEBMC Observance of Law Day and Philippine National Law Week
No. 9
LEBMC September 21, 2017 Suspension of Classes
No. 10
LEBMC Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2016-
No. 11 2017
LEBMC Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2017-
No. 12 2018
LEBMC Legal Research Seminar of the Philippine Group of Law Librarians on April 4-6,
No. 13 2018
LEBMC CSC Memorandum Circular No. 22, s.2016
No. 14
LEBMC Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the Academic Year 2018-
No. 15 2019
LEBMC Clarification to [LEBMO] No. 3, Series of 2016
No. 16
LEBMC Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the
No. 17 Academic Year 2018-2019
LEBMC PHILSAT Eligibility Requirement for Freshmen in the Academic Year 2018-2019
No. 18
LEBMC Guidelines for the Limited Conditional Admission/Enrollment in the 1st Semester of
No. 19 the Academic Year 2018-2019 Allowed for Those Who Have Not Taken the
PhiLSAT
LEBMC Updated List of Law Schools Authorized to Offer the Refresher Course in the
No. 20 Academic Year 2018-2019
LEBMC Adjustments/Corrections to the Requirements for Law Schools to be Qualified to
No. 21 Conditionally Admit/Enroll Freshmen Law Students in AY 2018-2019
LEBMC Advisory on who should take the September 23, 2018 PhiLSAT
No. 22
LEBMC Collection of the PhiLSAT Certificate of Eligibility/Exemption by Law Schools
No. 23 from Applicants for Admission
LEBMC Observance of the Philippine National Law Week
No. 24
LEBMC Competition Law
No. 25
LEBMC Scholarship Opportunity for Graduate Studies for Law Deans, Faculty Members and
No. 26 Law Graduates with the 2020-2021 Philippine Fulbright Graduate Student Program
LEBMC Advisory on April 7, 2019 PhiLSAT and Conditional [Enrollment] for Incoming
No. 27 Freshmen/1st Year Law Students
LEBMC April 25-26, 2019 Competition Law Training Program
No. 28
LEBMC Detailed Guidelines for Conditional Enrollment Permit Application
No. 29
LEBMC Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in AY 2019-2020
No. 30
LEBMC Law Schools Authorized to Offer Refresher Course in AY 2019-2020
No. 31
LEBMC Reminders concerning Conditionally Enrolled Freshmen Law Students in AY 2019-
No. 40 2020

C. Resolutions and Other Issuances

Number Title/Subject
Resolution No. 16 Reportorial Requirement for Law Schools with Small Students Population
Resolution No.7, Declaring a 3-Year Moratorium in the Opening of New Law Schools
Series of 2010
Resolution No. 8, Administrative Sanctions
Series of 2010
Resolution No. A Resolution Providing for Supplementary Rules to the Provisions of
2011-21 LEBMO No. 1 in regard to Curriculum and Degrees Ad Eundem
Resolution No. A Resolution Eliminating the Requirement of Special, Orders for Graduates
2012-02 of the Basic Law Degrees and Graduate Law Degrees and Replacing them
with a Per Law School Certification Approved by the Legal Education
Board
Resolution No. Ethical Standards of Conduct for Law Professors
2013-01
Resolution No. Prescribing Rules on the Ll.M. Staggered Compliance Schedule and the
2014-02 Exemption from the Ll.M. Requirement
Resolution No. Prescribing the Policy and Rules in the Establishment of a Legal Aid Clinic
2015-08 in Law Schools
Order Annual Law Publication Requirements
Chairman Restorative Justice to be Added as Elective Subject
Memorandum

The PhiLSAT under LEBMO No. 7-2016, LEBMO No. 11-2017, LEBMC No. 18-
2018, and related issuances

As above-enumerated, among the orders issued by the LEB was Memorandum Order

No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-2016) pursuant to its power to "prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission" under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.

The policy and rationale of LEBMO No. 7-2016 is to improve the quality of legal
education by requiring all those seeking admission to the basic law course to take and
pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test, known as the PhiLSAT. 10

The PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee's communications

and language proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning. 11 It was
designed to measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of
law.12 Exempted from the PhiLSAT requirement were honor graduates who were
granted professional civil service eligibility and who are enrolling within two years from
their college graduation. 13

Synthesizing, the key provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 are as follows:

(1) The policy and rationale of requiring PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal
education. The PhiLSAT shall be administered under the control and supervision of the
LEB;14

(2) The PhiLSAT is an aptitude test that measures the academic potential of the
examinee to pursue the study of law;15

(3) A qualified examinee is either a graduate of a four-year bachelor's degree;

expecting to graduate with a four-year bachelor's degree at the end of the academic
year when the PhiLSAT was administered; or a graduate from foreign higher education
institutions with a degree equivalent to a four-year bachelor's degree. There is no limit
as to the number of times a qualified examinee may take the PhiLSAT; 16

(4) The LEB may designate an independent third-party testing administrator; 17

(5) The PhiLSAT shall be administered at least once a year, on or before April 16, in
testing centers;18

(6) The testing fee shall not exceed the amount of P1,500.00 per examination; 19

(7) The cut-off or passing score shall be 55% correct answers, or such percentile score
as may be prescribed by the LEB; 20

(8) Those who passed shall be issued a Certificate of Eligibility while those who failed
shall be issued a Certificate of Grade;21

(9) Passing the PhiLSAT is required for admission to any law school. No applicant shall
be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law course leading to a
degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he has passed the PhiLSAT
taken within two years before the start of the study; 22

(10) Honor graduates granted professional civil service eligibility who are enrolling
within two years from college graduation are exempted from taking and passing the
PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to the basic law course; 23

(11) Law schools, in the exercise of academic freedom, can prescribe additional
requirements for admission;24

(12) Law schools shall submit to LEB reports of first year students admitted and
enrolled, and their PhiLSAT scores, as well as the subjects enrolled and the final grades
received by every first year student; 25

(13) Beginning academic year 2018-2019, the general average requirement (not less
than 80% or 2.5) for admission to basic law course under Section 23 of LEBMO No. 1-
2011 is removed;26

(14) In academic year 2017-2018, the PhiLSAT passing score shall not be enforced and
the law schools shall have the discretion to admit in the basic law course, applicants
who scored less than 55% in the PhiLSAT, provided that the law dean shall submit a
justification for the admission and the required report; 27 and

(15) Law schools, in violation of LEBMO No. 7-2016, shall be administratively

sanctioned as prescribed in Section 3228 of LEBMO No. 2-201329 and/or fined up to
P10,000.00.30
Effective for the academic year 2017 to 2018, no applicant to law school was allowed
admission without having taken and passed the PhiLSAT. The first PhiLSAT examination
was held on April 16, 2017 in seven pilot sites: Baguio City, Metro Manila, Legazpi City,
Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and Cagayan de Oro. A total of 6,575 out of 8,074
examinees passed the first-ever PhiLSAT. For the first PhiLSAT, the passing grade was
adjusted by the LEB from 55% to 45% by way of consideration.
Since the PhiLSAT was implemented for the first time and considering further that there
were applicants who failed to take the PhiLSAT because of the inclement weather last
April 16, 2017, the LEB issued Memorandum Order No. 11, Series of 2017 (LEBMO No.
11-2017).

Under LEBMO No. 11-2017, those who failed to take the first PhiLSAT were allowed to
be admitted to law schools for the first semester of academic year 2017 to 2018 for
justifiable or meritorious reasons and conditioned under the following terms:
2. Conditions - x x x

a. The student shall take the next scheduled PhiLSAT;

b. If the student fails to take the next scheduled PhiLSAT for any reason, his/her
conditional admission in the law school shall be automatically revoked and barred from
enrolling in the following semester;

c. If the student takes the next scheduled PhiLSAT but scores below the passing or cut-
off score, his/her conditional admission shall also be revoked and barred from enrolling
in the following semester, unless the law school expressly admits him/her in the
exercise of the discretion given under Section/Paragraph 14 of LEBMO No. 7, Series of
2016, subject to the requirements of the same provision;

d. The student whose conditional admission and enrol[l]ment is subsequently revoked

shall not be entitled to the reversal of the school fees assessed and/or refund of the
school fees paid; and

e. The student shall execute under oath, and file with his/her application for a Permit
for Conditional Admission/Enrol[l]ment, an UNDERTAKING expressly agreeing to the
foregoing conditions.31
The conditional admission and enrollment under LEBMO No. 11-2017 and the transitory
provision provided in LEBMO No. 7-2016 were subsequently clarified by the LEB
through its Memorandum Circular No. 7, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 7-2017).

On September 24, 2017 and April 8, 2018, the second and third PhiLSATs were
respectively held.

On October 26, 2017, the LEB issued a Memorandum reminding law schools, law
students, and other interested persons that the passing of the PhiLSAT is required to be
eligible for admission/enrollment in the basic law course for academic year 2017 to
2018. It was also therein clarified that the discretion given to law schools to admit
those who failed the PhiLSAT during the initial year of implementation is only up to the
second semester of academic year 2017-2018.

Because of the confusion as to whether conditional admission for academic year 2018
to 2019 may still be allowed, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 18, Series of
2018 (LEBMC No. 18-2018). Under LEBMC No. 18-2018, it was clarified that the
conditional admission was permitted only in academic year 2017 to 2018 as part of the
transition adjustments in the initial year of the PhiLSAT implementation. As such, by
virtue of LEBMC No. 18-2018, the conditional admission of students previously allowed
under LEBMO No. 11-2017 was discontinued.
Nevertheless, on July 25, 2018, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of
2018 (LEBMC No. 19-2018) allowing limited conditional admission/enrollment in the
first semester of academic year 2018 to 2019 for those applicants who have never
previously taken the PhiLSAT. Those who have taken the PhiLSAT and scored below the
cut-off score were disqualified. In addition, only those law schools with a passing rate of
not less than 25%, are updated in the reportorial requirement and signified its intention
to conditionally admit applicants were allowed to do so. The limited enrollment was
subject to the condition that the admitted student shall take and pass the next PhiLSAT
on September 23, 2018, otherwise the conditional enrollment shall be nullified. Non-
compliance with said circular was considered a violation of the minimum standards for
the law program for which law schools may be administratively penalized.

The fourth PhiLSAT then pushed through on September 23, 2018.

The Petitions

Days before the scheduled conduct of the first-ever PhiLSAT on April 16, 2017,
petitioners Oscar B. Pimentel (Pimentel), Errol B. Comafay (Comafay), Rene B. Gorospe
(Gorospe), Edwin R. Sandoval (Sandoval), Victoria B. Loanzon (Loanzon), Elgin Michael
C. Perez (Perez), Arnold E. Cacho (Cacho), Al Conrad B. Espaldon (Espaldon) and Ed
Vincent S. Albano (Albano) [as citizens, lawyers, taxpayers and law professors], with
their co-petitioners Leighton R. Siazon (Siazon), Arianne C. Artugue (Artugue), Clarabel
Anne R. Lacsina (Lacsina) and Kristine Jane R. Liu (Liu) [as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers], Alyanna Mari C. Buenviaje (Buenviaje) and Iana Patricia Dula T. Nicolas
(Nicolas) [as citizens intending to take up law] and Irene A. Tolentino (Tolentino) and
Aurea I. Gruyal (Gruyal) [as citizens and taxpayers] filed their Petition for
Prohibition,32 docketed as G.R. No. 230642, principally seeking that R.A. No. 7662 be
declared unconstitutional and that the creation of the LEB be invalidated together with
all its issuances, most especially the PhiLSAT, for encroaching upon the rule-making
power of the Court concerning admissions to the practice of law; 33 They prayed for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to prevent the LEB from conducting the
PhiLSAT.

Respondents-in-intervention Attys. Anthony D. Bengzon (Bengzon), Ferdinand M. Negre

(Negre), Michael Z. Untalan (Untalan), Jonathan Q. Perez (Perez), Samantha Wesley K.
Rosales (Rosales), Erika M. Alfonso (Alfonso), Krys Valen O. Martinez (Martinez), Ryan
Ceazar P. Romano (Romano), and Kenneth C. Varona (Varona) [as citizens and
lawyers] moved to intervene and prayed for the dismissal of the Petition for
Prohibition.34

On February 12, 2018, petitioners-in-intervention April D. Caballero (Caballero), Jerey

C. Castardo (Castardo), MC Wellroe P. Bringas (Bringas), Rhuffy D. Federe (Federe) and
Conrad Theodore A. Matutino (Matutino) [as graduates of four-year college course and
applicants as first year law students], St. Thomas More School of Law and Business,
Inc., [as an educational stock corporation] and Rodolfo C. Rapista (Rapista), Judy Marie
Rapista-Tan (Rapista-Tan), Lynnart Walford A. Tan (Tan), Ian M. Enterina (Enterina)
and Neil John Villarico (Villarico) [as citizens and law professors] intervened and joined
the Petition for Prohibition of Pimentel, et al., seeking to declare R.A. No. 7662 and the
PhiLSAT as unconstitutional. 35
Thereafter, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 242954, was
filed by petitioners Francis Jose Lean iL. Abayata (Abayata), Gretchen M. Vasquez
(Vasquez), Sheenah S. Ilustrismo (Ilustrismo), Ralph Louie Salaño (Solaño), Aireen
Monica B. Guzman (Guzman) and Delfino Odias (Odias) [as law students who failed to
pass the PhiLSAT], Daryl Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), Claire Suico (Suico), Aivie S. Pescadero
(Pescadero), Niña Christine Dela Paz (Dela Paz), Shemark K. Queniahan (Queniahan),
Al Jay T. Mejos (Mejos), Rocellyn L. Daño (Daño), Michael Adolfo (Adolfo), Ronald A.
Atig (Atig), Lynette C. Lumayag (Lumayag), Mary Chris Lagera (Lagera), Timothy B.
Francisco (Francisco), Sheila Marie C. Dandan (Dandan), Madeline C. Dela Peña (Dela
Peña), Darlin R. Villamor (Villamor), Lorenzana Llorico (Llorico) and Jan Ivan M.
Santamaria (Santamaria) [as current law students who failed to take the PhiLSAT]
seeking to invalidate R.A. No. 7662 or, in the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional
the PhiLSAT. They also sought the issuance of a TRO to defer the holding of the
aptitude test.36

These Petitions were later on consolidated by the Court and oral arguments thereon
were held on March 5, 2019.

Temporary Restraining Order

On March 12, 2019, the Court issued a TRO37 enjoining the LEB from implementing
LEBMC No. 18-2018 and, thus, allowing those who have not taken the PhiLSAT prior to
the academic year 2018 to 2019, or who have taken the PhiLSAT, but did not pass, or
who are honor graduates in college with no PhiLSAT Exemption Certificate, or honor
graduates with expired PhiLSAT Exemption Certificates to conditionally enroll as
incoming freshmen law students for the academic year 2019 to 2020 under the same
terms as LEBMO No. 11-2017.

Subsequently, the LEB issued Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 2019 (LEBMC No.
27-2019) stating that the PhiLSAT scheduled on April 7, 2019 will proceed and
reiterated the requirements that must be complied with for the conditional enrollment
for the academic year 2019 to 2020.

The Parties' Arguments

In G.R. No. 230642

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT are offensive
to the Court's power to regulate and supervise the legal profession pursuant to Section
5(5), Article VIII38 of the Constitution and that the Congress cannot create an
administrative office that exercises the Court's power over the practice of law. They
also argue that R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC additional functions to vet nominees for the
LEB in violation of Section 8(5), Article VIII 39 of the Constitution.

In their Memorandum, petitioners also question the constitutionality of the LEB's

powers under Section 7(c)40 and 7(e)41 to prescribe the qualifications and compensation
of faculty members and Section 7(h)42 on the LEB's power to adopt a system of
continuing legal education as being repugnant to the Court's rule-making power
concerning the practice of law. They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic
freedom of law schools and the right to education.

Petitioners-in-intervention meanwhile contend that the PhiLSAT violats the right to

liberty and pursuit of happiness of the student-applicants. They posit that the PhiLSAT
violates the equal protection clause as it is an arbitrary form of classification not based
on substantial distinctions. They also argue that the PhiLSAT violates the right of all
citizens to quality and accessible education, violates academic freedom, and is an unfair
academic requirement. It is also their position that the PhiLSAT violates due process as
it interferes with the right of every person to select a profession or course of study.
They also argue that R.A. No. 7662 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers.

In G.R. No. 242954

Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 argue that certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies
either under the expanded or traditional jurisdiction of the Court. They also invoke the
doctrine of transcendental importance.

Substantively, they contend that R.A. No. 7662, specifically Section 3(a)(2) 43 on the
objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal
profession, Section 7(e) on law admission, 7(g) 44 on law practice internship, and 7(h)
on adopting a system of continuing legal education, and the declaration of policy on
continuing legal education45 infringe upon the power of the Court to regulate admission
to the practice of law. They profess that they are not against the conduct of law school
admission test per se, only that the LEB cannot impose the PhiLSAT as the power to do
so allegedly belongs to the Court.46

It is also their contention that the PhiLSAT violates academic freedom as it interferes
with the law school's exercise of freedom to choose who to admit. According to them,
the LEB cannot issue penal regulations, and the consequent forfeiture of school fees
and the ban on enrollment for those who failed to pass the PhiLSAT violate due process.

The Comments

Procedurally, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing the LEB, argues
that certiorari and prohibition are not proper to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No.
7662 either under the traditional or expanded concept of judicial power. For the OSG,
R.A. No. 7662 was enacted pursuant to the State's power to regulate all educational
institutions, and as such, there could be no grave abuse of discretion. It also claims
that the Congress is an indispensable party to the petitions.

Substantively, the OSG contends that the Court's power to regulate admission to the
practice of law does not include regulation of legal education. It also defends Section
7(e) on the LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for law admission as referring
to admission to law schools; Section 7(g) on the LEB's power to establish a law practice
internship as pertaining to the law school curriculum which is within the power of the
LEB to regulate; and 7(h) on the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal
education as being limited to the training of lawyer-professors. 47 Anent the argument
that R.A. No. 7662 gives the JBC additional functions not assigned to it by the Court,
the OSG points out that the Court had actually authorized the JBC to process the
applications for membership to the LEB making this a non-issue.
In defending the validity of the PhiLSAT, the OSG advances the argument that the
PhiLSAT is the minimum standard for entrance to law schools prescribed by the LEB
pursuant to the State's power to regulate education. The OSG urges that the PhiLSAT is
no different from the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) which the Court already
upheld as a valid exercise of police power in the seminal case of Tablarin v. Gutierrez.48

It is also the position of the OSG that neither the PhiLSAT nor the provisions of R.A. No.
7662 violate academic freedom because the standards for entrance to law school, the
standards for accreditation, the prescribed qualifications of faculty members, and the
prescribed basic curricula are fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements.

For their part, respondents in-intervention contend that R.A. No. 7662 enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality and that the study of law is different from the practice
of law.

In its Comment to the Petition-in-Intervention, the OSG dismisses as speculative the

argument that the PhiLSAT is anti-poor, and adds that the Court has no competence to
rule on whether the PhiLSAT is an unfair or unreasonable requirement, it being a
question of policy.

Respondents-in-intervention, for their part, argue that the right of the citizens to
accessible education means that the State shall make quality education accessible only
to those qualified enough, as determined by fair, reasonable, and equitable admission
and academic requirements. They dispute the claimed intrusion on academic freedom
as law schools are not prevented from selecting who to admit among applicants who
have passed the PhiLSAT. They stress that the right to education is not absolute and
may be regulated by the State, citing Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas.49

By way of Reply, petitioners-in-intervention emphasize that the doctrine in Tablarin50 is

inapplicable as medical schools are not the same as law schools. They further aver that
the decline in enrollment as a result of the implementation of the PhiLSAT is not
speculative.51

The Issues

After a careful consideration of the issues raised by the parties in their pleadings and
refined during the oral arguments, the issues for resolution are synthesized as follows:
I. Procedural Issues:

A. Remedies of certiorari and prohibition; and

B. Requisites of judicial review and the scope of the Court's review in the instant
petitions.

II. Substantive Issues:

A. Jurisdiction over legal education;

 B. Supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power;
1. Reasonable supervision and regulation

2. Institutional academic freedom

3. Right to education

C. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the Court's jurisdiction over the
practice of law; and

D. LEB's powers under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the academic freedom of law schools
and the right to education.

The Rulings of the Court

I.
Procedural Issues

A.
Remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition

The propriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition is assailed on the ground that
R.A. No. 7662 is a legislative act and not a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
function. In any case, respondents argue that the issues herein presented involve
purely political questions beyond the ambit of judicial review.

The Court finds that petitioners availed of the proper remedies.

The 193552 and 197353 Constitutions mention, but did not define, "judicial power." In
contrast, the 1987 Constitution lettered what judicial power is and even "expanded" its
scope.

As constitutionally defined under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987

Constitution,54 judicial power is no longer limited to the Court's duty to' settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, or the
power of adjudication, but also includes, the duty to determine whether or not there
has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. This innovation under the
1987 Constitution later on became known as the Court's traditional jurisdiction and
expanded jurisdiction, respectively.55

The expanded scope of judicial review mentions "grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction" to harbinger the exercise of judicial review; while
petitions for certiorari56 and prohibition57 speak of "lack or excess of jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." Petitions
for certiorari and prohibition as it is understood under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court are
traditionally regarded as supervisory writs used as a means by superior or appellate
courts, in the exercise of their supervisory jurisdiction, to keep subordinate courts
within the bounds of their jurisdictions. As such, writs of certiorari and prohibition
correct only errors of jurisdiction of judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. 58

However, considering the commonality of the ground of "grave abuse of discretion," a

Rule 65 petition, as a procedural vehicle to invoke the Court's expanded jurisdiction,
has been allowed.59 After all, there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done
contrary to the Constitution, the law I or jurisprudence, or is executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will, or personal bias. 60 In Spouses Imbong
v. Ochoa, Jr.,61 the Court emphasized that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are
appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues.

That it is a legislative act which is being assailed is likewise not a ground to deny the
present petitions.

For one, the 1987 Constitution enumerates under Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII, 62 the
Court's irreducible powers which expressly; include the power of judicial review, or.the
power to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation.

For another, the Court's expanded jurisdiction, when invoked, permits a review of acts
not only by a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. "Any branch or
instrumentality of the Government" necessarily includes the Legislative and the
Executive, even if they are not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions.63 As such, the Court may review and/or prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts
of legislative and executive officials, there being no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.64

The power of judicial review over congressional action, in particular, was affirmed
in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,65 wherein the Court held:
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial
review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona, Jr., this Court ruled
that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether
the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or grave
abuse of discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.
In Tañada v. Angara, where petitioners sought to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate
on the ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition raised a
justiciable controversy and that when an action of the legislative branch is alleged
to have seriously infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but
in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda, [this
Court] declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives withdrawing
the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman as a member of the
House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution.
In Coseteng v. Mitra, it held that the resolution of whether the House representation in
the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional representation of the
political parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to
judicial review. In Daza v. Singson, it held that the act of the House of Representatives
in removing - the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is subject to judicial
review. In Tañada v. Cuenco, it held that although under the Constitution, the
legislative power is vested exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from
the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress.
In Angara v. Electoral Commission, it exercised its power of judicial review to determine
which between the Electoral Commission and the National Assembly had jurisdiction
over an electoral dispute concerning members of the latter. (Internal citations omitted;
emphases supplied)
This was reiterated in Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council,66 as follows:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation;
board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set
right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the
latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application
is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise

constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of
legislative and executive officials. (Internal citation omitted; emphasis supplied)
Consistently, in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) v. Quezon City,67 the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition were regarded as proper vehicles to assail the
constitutionality of curfew ordinances, and in Agcaoili v. Fariñas,68 to question the
contempt powers of the Congress in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of
legislation.

The consistency in the Court's rulings as to the propriety of the writs of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions, but also to correct, undo, or restrain any act of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the legislative and the executive, propels the Court to
treat the instant petitions in the same manner.

B.
Requisites for Judicial Review

The power of judicial review is tritely defined as the power to review the
constitutionality of the actions of the other branches of the government. 69 For a proper
exercise of its power of review in constitutional litigation, certain requisites must be
satisfied: (1) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.70

These requisites are effective limitations on the Court's exercise of its power of review
because judicial review in constitutional cases is quintessentially deferential, owing to
the great respect that each co-equal branch of the Government affords to the other.

Of these four requisites, the first two, being the most: essential, 71 deserve an extended
discussion in the instant case.
1. Actual Case or Controversy

Fundamental in the exercise of judicial power, whether under the traditional or

expanded setting, is the presence of an actual case or controversy. 72 An actual case or
controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights and an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The case must not be moot or academic,
or based on extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of
justice.

To be justiciable, the controversy must be definite and concrete, touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must be shown from the pleadings
that there is an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a
denial thereof on the other. There must be an actual and substantial controversy and
not merely a theoretical question or issue. Further, the actual and substantial
controversy must admit specific relief through a conclusive decree and must not merely
generate an advisory opinion based on hypothetical or conjectural state of facts. 73

Closely associated with the requirement of an actual or justiciable case or controversy

is the ripening seeds for adjudication. Ripeness for adjudication has a two-fold
aspect: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to
the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. The first aspect requires that
the issue must be purely legal and that the regulation subject of the case is a "final
agency action." The second aspect requires that the effects of the regulation must have
been felt by the challenging parties in a concrete way. 74

To stress, a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the challenged

governmental act has a direct and existing adverse effect on the individual challenging
it.75 While a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to a
constitutional interest may provide basis for a constitutional challenge, it is
nevertheless still required that there are sufficient facts to enable the Court to
intelligently adjudicate the issues.76

In this regard, the Court's pronouncement in Philippine Association of Colleges and

Universities (PACU) v. Secretary of Education 77 deserves reiteration:
It should be understandable, then, that this Court should be doubly reluctant
to consider petitioner's demand for avoidance of the law aforesaid,
[e]specially where, as respondents assert, petitioners suffered no wrong - nor
allege any - from the enforcement of the criticized statute.
It must be evident to any one that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is
one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of human judgment, will shrink from
exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and
official oath decline the responsibility. x x x

When a law has been long treated as constitutional and important rights have become
dependent thereon, the Court may refuse to consider an attack on its validity. x x x

As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the
extent that, it is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the parties concerned. x x x
xxxx

It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of

sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it is not sufficient that he has
merely a general [interest] to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of
executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or [has an] interest
common to all members of the public. x x x

Courts will not pass upon the constitutionality of a law upon the complaint of one who
fails to show that he ii1 injured by its operation. x x x

The power of courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interests of
litigants require the use of that judicial authority for their protection against actual
interference, a hypothetical threat being insufficient. x x x

Bona fide suit. - Judicial power is limited to the decision of actual cases and
controversies. The authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incidental to the
decision of such cases where conflicting claims under the Constitution and under a
legislative act assailed as contrary to the Constitution are raised. It is legitimate only in
the last resort, and as necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital
controversy between litigants. x x x
xxxx

An action, like this, is brought for a positive purpose, nay, to obtain actual and
positive relief. x x x Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions
to satisfy scholarly interest therein, however intellectually solid the problem
may be. This is [e]specially true where the issues "reach constitutional
dimensions, for then there comes into play regard for the court's duty to avoid
decision of constitutional issues unless avoidance becomes evasion." x x x
(Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
Ultimately, whether an actual case is present or not is determinative of whether the
Court's hand should be stayed when there is no adversarial setting and when the
prerogatives of the co-equal branches of the Government should instead be respected.

As ruled in Republic v. Roque: 78

A perusal of private respondents' petition for declaratory relief would show that they
have failed to demonstrate how they are left to sustain or are in immediate danger to
sustain some direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the assailed provisions of
RA 9372. Not far removed from the factual milieu in the Southern Hemisphere cases,
private respondents only assert general interests as citizens, and taxpayers and
infractions which the government could prospectively commit if the enforcement of the
said law would remain untrammelled. As their petition would disclose, private
respondents' fear of prosecution was solely based on remarks of certain government
officials which were addressed to the general public. They, however, failed to show
how these remarks tended towards any prosecutorial or governmental action
geared towards the implementation of RA 9372 against them. In other words,
t ere was no particular, real or imminent threat to any of them. As held
in Southern Hemisphere:
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory
relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the
present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility
is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step
in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. (Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Concededly, the Court had exercised the power of judicial review by the mere
enactment of a law or approval of a challenged action when such is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre:79
First, on prematurity. According to the Dissent, when "the conduct has not yet occurred
and the challenged construction has not yet been adopted by the agency charged with
administering the administrative order, the determination of the scope and
constitutionality of the executive action in advance of its immediate adverse effect
involves too remote and abstract an inquiry for the proper exercise of judicial function."

This is a rather novel theory - that people should await the implementing evil to befall
on them before they can question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional. Be it
remembered that the real issue here is whether the Constitution and the law are
contravened by Section 4 of AO 372, not whether they are violated by the acts
implementing it. In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that
when an act of the legislative department is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the mere
enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the
dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes
the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court x x x, it becomes a legal issue which
the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.

xxxx

As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in
matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of
Energy:
x x x Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also
the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit
imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not
only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void.
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the
laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied)
In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa,80 the Court took cognizance of the petitions despite
posing a facial challenge against the entire law as the petitions seriously alleged that
fundamental rights have been violated by the assailed legislation:
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and
that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law
and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary
measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an
action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to
settle the dispute.

xxxx

Facial Challenge

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject
petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a
speech regulating measure.

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.
These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to
peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After
all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful
assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they
are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction; the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld
the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded
its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying
reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this
Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law
not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the
framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with
its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged

that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred
petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional
scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual
case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government,
acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the
Filipino people. (Internal citations omitted; emphases supplied) 81
Likewise in Belgica v. Ochoa,82 the Court held that the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is satisfied by the antagonistic positions taken by the parties:
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic
positions of the parties on the constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the
questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged
funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization-such as the 2013 GAA for the
PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the
Presidential Social Fund - are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an
immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of
these public funds.
1(a). Scope of Judicial Review

To determine whether petitioners presented an actual case or controversy, or have

seriously alleged that R.A. No. 7662 suffers from constitutional infirmities to trigger the
Court's power of judicial review, resort must necessarily be had to the pleadings filed.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 allege that R.A. No. 7662 and the LEB issuances relative
to the admission and practice of law encroach upon the powers of the Court. 83 It is their
position that the powers given to the LEB are directly related to the Court's powers. 84 In
particular, they argue that the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal
education under Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 falls within the authority of the
Court.85 In their Memorandum, they additionally argue that the LEB's powers to
prescribe the qualifications and compensation of faculty members under Section 7(c)
and 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662, Sections 50-51 of LEBMO No. 1, and Resolution No. 2014-02
intrude into the Court's rule-making power relative to the practice of law. 86 They also
argue that the PhiLSAT violates the academic freedom of law schools and the right to
education.87 It is their contention that the LEB is without power to impose
sanctions.88 They also question the authority of the LEB Chairperson and Members to
act in a hold-over capacity.89

For their part, petitioners-in-intervention allege that the PhiLSAT requirement resulted
to a reduced number of law student enrollees for St. Thomas More School of Law and
Business, Inc. and constrained said law school to admit only students who passed the
PhiLSAT which is against their policy of admitting students based on values. 90 Their co-
petitioners are students who either applied for law school, failed to pass the PhiLSAT,
or, were conditionally enrolled. Thus, they argue that Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 and
the PhiLSAT violate the law school's academic freedom.

Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 allege that they are current law students who failed to
pass and/or take the PhiLSAT, and who are therefore threatened with the revocation of
their conditional enrollment and stands to be barred from enrolling. Twelve of the 23
petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 were not allowed to enroll for failure to pass and/or take
the PhiLSAT.

It is their argument that the LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to
prescribe minimum standards for law admission, Section 7(g) to establish a law practice
internship, Section 7(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education, and Section
3(a)(2) on the stated objective of legal education to increase awareness among
members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed
sectors of society usurp the Court's rule-making powers concerning admission to the
practice of law.91 In addition, they argue that the PhiLSAT issuances violate academic
freedom, and that the LEB is not authorized to revoke conditional enrollment nor is it
authorized to forfeit school fees and impose a ban enrollment which are penal sanctions
violative of the due process clause. They also argue that the classification of students to
those who have passed or failed the PhiLSAT for purposes of admission to law school is
repugnant to the equal protection clause.

The petitions therefore raise an actual controversy insofar as they allege that R.A. No.
7662, specifically Section 2, paragraph 2, Section 3(a)(2), Section 7(c), (e), (g), and
(h) of R.A. No. 7662 infringe upon the Court's power to promulgate rules concerning
the practice of law and upon institutional academic freedom and the right to quality
education. Necessarily, a review of the LEB issuances when pertinent to these assailed
provisions of R.A. No. 7662 shall also be undertaken.

2. Legal Standing

Inextricably linked with the actual case or controversy requirement is that the party
presenting the justiciable issue must have the standing to mount a challenge to the
governmental act.

By jurisprudence, standing requir.es a personal and substantial interest in the case

such that the petitioner has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the
violation of its rights,92 thus:
Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." To possess legal standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct
injury guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy and, in effect, assures "that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions." 93 (Emphasis
supplied)
The rule on standing admits of recognized exceptions: the over breadth doctrine,
taxpayer suits, third-party standing and the doctrine of transcendental importance. 94

Petitioners-in-intervention Caballero, Castardo, Bringas, Federe and Matutino, being

graduates of a four-year college course and applicants as first year law students, as
well as petitioners Abayata, Vasquez, Ilustrismo, Salaño, Guzman and Odias, as law
students who failed to pass the PhiLSAT and were denied admission to law school for
the academic year 2018 to 2019, and petitioners Dela Cruz, Suico, Pescadero, Dela Paz,
Queniahan, Mejos, Daño, Adolfo, Atig, Lumayag, Lagera, Francisco, Dandan, Dela Peña,
Villamor, Llorico and Santamaria, being law students who were conditionally enrolled,
possess the requisite standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 7(e) of R.A.
No. 7662 and the implementing LEB issuances, as they were, in fact, required to take
the PhiLSAT, or to comply with the terms of the conditional enrollment and failing
which, were denied admission as regular students to law school.

Petitioner-in-intervention St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., likewise
sufficiently alleges injury that it has sustained in the form of reduced number of
enrollees due to the PhiLSAT requirement and the curtailment of its discretion on who
to admit in its law school. Under the specific and concrete facts available in this case,
these petitioners have demonstrated that they were, or tend to be directly and
substantially, injured.

Meanwhile, petitioners Pimentel, Comafay, Gorospe, Sandoval, Loanzon, Perez, Cacho,

Espaldon, Albano, Siazon, Artugue, Lacsina, Liu, Buenviaje, Nicolas, Tolentino, and
Gruyal; and petitioners-in intervention Rapista, Rapista-Tan, Tan, Enterina and Villarico
commonly anchor their standing to challenge R.A. No. 7662 and the PhiLSAT as
citizens.

Standing as a citizen has been upheld by this Court in cases where a petitioner is able
to craft an issue of transcendental importance or when paramount public interest is
involved.95

Legal standing may be extended to petitioners for having raised a "constitutional issue
of critical significance."96 Without a doubt, the delineation of the Court's rule-making
power vis-a-vis the supervision and regulation of legal education and the determination
of the reach of the State's supervisory and regulatory power in the context of the
guarantees of academic freedom and the right to education are novel issues with far--
reaching implications that deserve the Court's immediate attention. In taking
cognizance of the instant petitions, the Court is merely exercising its power to
promulgate rules towards the end that constitutional rights are protected and
enforced.97

Now, to the core substantive issues.

II.
Substantive Issues

A.
Jurisdiction Over Legal Education

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law necessarily includes the power to do
things related to the practice of law, including the power to prescribe the requirements
for admission to the study of law. In support, they point to Sections 6 98 and 16,99 Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. They contend that the Congress cannot create an
administrative body, like the LEB, that exercises this rule-making power of the Court.
They emphasize that the LEB belongs to the Executive department, and, as such, is not
linked or accountable to the Court nor placed under the Court's regulation and
supervision.

For their part, petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 maintain that the Court exercises
authority over the legal profession which includes the admission to the practice of law,
to the continuing requirements for and discipline of lawyers. 100 According to them, the
rule-making power of the Court is plenary in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law. They argue that the Court's power to admit members
to the practice of law extends to admission to legal education because the latter is a
preparatory process to the application for admission to the legal profession, which
"residual power" of the Court can be inferred from Sections 5 101 and 6, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court. They also emphasize that under Sections 1 102 and 2103 of Rule 138-A,
non-lawyers are allowed to have limited practice of law and are held to answer by the
Court under the same rules on privileged communication and standard of conduct
pursuant to Sections 3104 and 4105 of Rule 138-A.106

Contrary to petitioner's claims, the Court has no primary and direct jurisdiction over
legal education. Neither the history of the Philippine legal education nor the Rules of
Court invoked by petitioners support their argument. The supervision and regulation of
legal education is an Executive function.

1. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and

consistently exercised by the political departments

Legal education in the Philippines was institutionalized in 1734, with the establishment
of the Faculty of Civil Law in the University of Santo Tomas with Spanish as the medium
of instruction. Its curriculum was identical to that adopted during the time in the
universities in Europe107 and included subjects on Civil Law, Canon Law, ecclesiastical
discipline and elements of Natural Law. 108

In 1901, Act No. 74 was passed centralizing the public school system, and establishing
the Department of Public Instruction headed by the General Superintendent. 109 The
archipelago was then divided into school divisions and districts for effective
management of the school system. It was through Act No. 74 that a Trade
School110 and a Normal School111 in Manila and a School of Agriculture in Negros were
established.112

In 1908, the legislature approved Act No. 1870 which created the University of the
Philippines (UP). However, English law courses were not offered until 1910 when the
Educational Department Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA),
through the efforts of Justice George Malcolm, offered law courses in the English
language. In 1911, UP adopted these classes by formally establishing its College of
Law,113 with its first graduates being students who studied at YMCA. 114 The curriculum
adopted by the UP College of Law became the model of the legal education curriculum
of the other law schools in the country. 115

Private schools were formally regulated in 1917 with the passage of Act No.
2706116 which made obligatory the recognition and inspection of private schools and
colleges by the Secretary of Public Instruction, so as to maintain a standard of
efficiency in all private schools and colleges 117 in the country. As such, the Secretary of
Public Instruction was authorized to inspect schools and colleges to determine efficiency
of instruction and to make necessary regulations. Likewise, under Act No. 2706, the
Secretary of Public Instruction was specifically authorized to prepare and publish, from
time to time, in pamphlet form, the minimum standards required of law schools and
other schools giving instruction of a technical or professional character. 118

In 1924, a survey of the Philippine education and of all educational institutions, facilities
and agencies was conducted through Act No. 3162, which created the Board of
Educational Survey. Among the factual findings of the survey was that schools at that
time were allowed to operate with almost no supervision at all. This led to the
conclusion that a great majority of schools from primary grade to the university are
money-making devices of persons who organize and administer them. Thus, it was
recommended that some board of control be· organized under legislative control to
supervise their administration.119 It was further recommended that legislation be
enacted to prohibit the opening of any school without the permission of the Secretary of
Public Instruction. The grant of the permission was, in turn, predicated upon a showing
that the school is compliant with the proper standards as to the physical structure,
library and laboratory facilities, ratio of student to teacher and the qualifications of the
teachers.120

Consistent with these statutory precursors, the 1935 Constitution expressed in no

uncertain terms that "[a]ll educational institutions shall be under the supervision and
subject to regulation by the State."121

This was followed by several other statutes such as the Commonwealth Act No.
578122 which vests upon teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision
of public or duly-recognized private schools, colleges and universities the status of
"persons in authority" and Republic Act No. 139123 which created the Board of
Textbooks, mandating all public schools to use only the books approved by the Board
and allowing all private schools to use textbooks of their choice, provided it is not
against the law or public policy or offensive to dignity. 124

In 1947, the Department of Instruction was changed to the Department of

Education.125 During this period, the regulation and supervision of public and private
schools belonged to the Bureau of Public and Private Schools. The regulation of law
schools in particular was undertaken by the Bureau of Private Schools through a special
consultant who acted as a supervisor of the law schools and as a national coordinator of
the law deans.126

The Department of Education, through its Bureau of Private Schools, issued a Manual of
Instructions for Private Schools which contained the rules and regulations pertaining to
the qualifications of the faculty and deans, faculty load and library holdings of private
learning institutions.127 Meantime, a Board of National Education was created 128 with the
task of formulating, implementing and enforcing general educational policies and
coordinating the offerings and functions of all educational institutions. The Board of
National Education was later renamed as the National Board of Education. 129 In 1972,
the Department of Education became the Department of Education and Culture, 130 and
was later on renamed as the. Ministry of Education and Culture in 1978. 131

Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution remained consistent in mandating that all educational
institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State. 132

With the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang 232133 (B.P. Blg. 232) or the Education Act
of 1982, the regulatory rules on both formal and non formal systems in public and
private schools in all levels 6f the entire educational system were codified. The National
Board of Education was abolished, and instead, a Ministry of Education, Culture and
Sports (MECS) was organized to supervise and regulate educational institutions. Part
and parcel of the MECS' authority to supervise and regulate educational institutions is
its authority to recognize or accredit educational institutions of all levels. 134

Accordingly, the MECS was given the authority over public and private institutions of
higher education, as well as degree-granting programs, in all post-secondary public and
private educational institutions.135 In particular, a Board of Higher Education136 was
established as an advisory body to the Minister of Education, Culture and Sports with
the functions of making policy recommendations on the planning and management of
the integrated system of higher education and recommending steps to improve the
governance of the higher education system. Apart from the Board of Higher Education,
a Bureau of Higher Education was also established to formulate and evaluate programs
and educational standards for higher education137 and to assist the Board of Higher
Education. Law schools were placed, under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Higher
Education.138

The MECS later became the DECS in 1987 under Executive Order No. 117 139 (E.O. No.
117). Nevertheless, the power of the MECS to supervise all educational institutions
remained unchanged.140

The Administrative Code141 also states that it shall be the State that shall protect and
promote the right of all citizens to quality education at all levels, and shall take
appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all; and that the DECS shall be
primarily responsible for the formulation, planning, implementation, and coordination of
the policies, plans, programs and projects in the areas of formal and non-formal
education. The Administrative Code also empowered the Board of Higher Education to
create technical panels of experts in the various disciplines including law, to undertake
curricula development.142 As will be discussed hereunder, the 1987 Constitution
crystallized the power of the State to supervise and regulate all educational
institutions.143

2. DECS Order No. 27-1989 was the precursor of R.A. No. 7662

Pursuant to its mandate under B.P. Blg. 232, the DECS promulgated DECS Order No.
27, Series of 1989 (DECS Order No. 27-1989),144 in close coordination with the
Philippine Association of Law Schools, the Philippine Association of Law Professors and
the Bureau of Higher Education. DECS Order No. 27-1989 specifically outlined the
policies and standards for legal education, and superseded all existing policies and
standards related to legal education. These policies were made applicable beginning
school year 1989 to 1990.
"Legal education" was defined in DECS Order No. 27-1989 as an educational program
including a clinical program appropriate and essential in the understanding and
application of law and the administration of justice. It is professional education after
completion of a required pre-legal education at the college level. For state colleges and
universities, the operation of their law schools was to depend on their respective
charters, and for private colleges and universities, by the rules and regulations issued
by the DECS. Nevertheless, it was made clear under DECS Order No. 27-1989 that the
administration of a law school shall be governed primarily by the law school's own
policies and the provisions thereof apply only suppletorily. 145

Likewise, in generally permissive terms, DECS Order No. 27-1989 prescribed the
preferred qualifications and functions of a law dean, as well as the preferred
qualifications, conditions of employment and teaching load of law faculty members. It
also prescribed the general inclusions to the law curriculum, but gave the law schools
the prerogative to design its own curriculum. The DECS also drew a model law
curriculum, thus, revising the 122-unit curriculum prescribed in 1946 by the Office of
Private Education, as well as the 134-unit curriculum prescribed in 1963. The law
schools were also given the option to maintain a legal aid clinic as part of its law
curriculum. It also prescribed the need for law schools to have relevant library
resources. Applicants for a law course are required to comply with the specific
requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the Court.

Such was the state of the regulation of legal education until the enactment of R.A. No.
7662 in 1993. In 1994, R.A. No. 7722146 was passed creating the Commission on Higher
Education (CHED) tasked to supervise tertiary degree programs. Except for the
regulation and supervision of law schools which was to be undertaken by the LEB under
R.A. No. 7662, the structure of DECS as embodied in E.O. No. 117 remained practically
unchanged.

Due to the fact that R.A. No. 7662 was yet to be implemented with the organization of
the LEB, the CHED, meanwhile, assumed the function of supervising and regulating law
schools. For this purpose, the CHED constituted a Technical Panel for Legal Education
which came up with a Revised Policies and Standards for Legal Education, which,
however, was unpublished.

3. Legal education 1s a mere composite of the educational system

As recounted, the historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects

the consistent exercise by the political departments of the power to supervise and
regulate all levels and areas of education, including legal education.

Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is

perhaps unique because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is
not reason in itself to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory
and supervisory powers of the political branches.

Notwithstanding, petitioners maintain that legal education, owing to its specialized

"legal" nature and being preparatory to the practice of law, should fall within the
regulation and supervision of the Court itself. Petitioners in G.R. No. 242954 went as far
as professing that they are not against the creation of an administrative body that will
supervise and regulate law schools, only that such body should be placed under the
Court's supervision and control.

Two principal reasons militate against such proposition:

First, it assumes that the Court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate
legal education as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate the admission to
the practice of law. This assumption, apart from being manifestly contrary to the
above-recounted history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise devoid of legal
anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not,
arrogate upon itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to void R.A. No. 7662 and
thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and place it under its
supervision and control, as what petitioners suggest, is to demonstrate a highly
improper form of judicial activism.

4. Court's exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the
study of law

The Constitution lays down the powers which the Court can exercise. Among these is
the power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law.

The rule-making power of the Supreme Court had been uniformly granted under the
1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. The complexion of the rule-making power,
however, changes with the promulgation of these organic laws.

Under the 1935 Constitution, existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure were
repealed and were instead converted as the Rules of Court which the Court can alter
and modify. The Congress, on the other hand, was given the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules on pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law promulgated by the Court. 147

This power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and
admission to the practice of law is in fact zealously guarded by the Court.

Thus, in Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,148 the Court asserted its "exclusive"

and constitutional power with respect to the admission to the practice of law and when
the act falls within the term "practice of law," the Rules of Court govern. 149

In In Re: Petition of A.E. Garcia,150 the Court withheld from the executive the power to
modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law as the
prerogative to promulgate rules for admission to the practice of law belongs to the
Court and the power to repeal, alter, or supplement such rules is reserved only to the
Congress.

Even then, the character of the power of the Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement
the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the
practice of law under the 1935 Constitution was held not to be absolute and that any
law passed by the Congress on the matter is merely permissive, being that the power
concerning admission to the practice of law is primarily a judicial function.

The 1973 Constitution is no less certain in reiterating the Court's power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts and the admission to
the practice of law. As observed in Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice,151 the 1973
Constitution further strengthened the independence of the judiciary by giving it the
additional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar. 152

The ultimate power to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar remains to be with the
Court under the 1973 Constitution even when the power of the Batasang Pambansa to
pass laws of permissive and corrective character repealing, altering, or supplementing
such rules was retained.

The 1987 Constitution departed from the 1935 and the 1973 organic laws in the sense
that it took away from the Congress the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law,
and the integration of the Bar and therefore vests exclusively and beyond doubt, the
power to promulgate such rules to the Court, thereby supporting a "stronger and more
independent judiciary."153

While the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions "textualized a power-sharing scheme" between
the legislature and the Court in the enactment of judicial rules, 154 the 1987 Constitution
"textually altered the power-sharing scheme" by deleting the Congress' subsidiary and
corrective power.155

Accordingly, the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar has been interpreted
as vesting upon the Court the authority to define the practice of law, 156 to determine
who will be admitted to the practice of law, 157 to hold in contempt any person found to
be engaged in unauthorized practice of law,158 and to exercise corollory disciplinary
authority over members of the Bar.159

The act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating lawyers in the practice of
law is a judicial function because it requires "(1) previously established rules and
principles; (2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles."160

Petitioners readily acknowledge that legal education or the study of law is not the
practice of law, the former being merely preparatory to the latter. In fact, the practice
of law has a settled jurisprudential meaning:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social
proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law corporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy
and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as the preparation
and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by
the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions.

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed
outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and
the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no
direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience
with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an
intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so
far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of
the work of the lawyer which involved appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the
heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. 161 (Internal citations
omitted)
The definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged
as to cover the study of law.

5. The Court exercises judicial power only

Section 12, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he Members of
the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions." The Court exercises
judicial power only and should not assume any duty alien to its judicial functions, the
basic postulate being the separation of powers. As early as Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay
Transportation Co.,162 the Court already stressed:
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of
power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is
exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of
constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any other department of the
government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powers
expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court
and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or
to perform any trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected
with the administering of judicial functions. (Emphases supplied)
Neither may the regulation and supervision of legal education be justified as an exercise
of the Court's "residual" power. A power is residual if it does not belong to either of the
two co-equal branches and which the remaining branch can, thus, exercise consistent
with its functions. Regulation and supervision of legal education is primarily exercised
by the Legislative and implemented by the Executive, thus, it cannot be claimed by the
judiciary.

It is with studied restraint that the Court abstains from exercising a power that is not
strictly judicial, or that which is not expressly granted to it by the Constitution. 163 This
judicial abstention is neither avoidance nor dereliction - there is simply no basis for the
Court to supervise and regulate legal education.

Court supervision over legal education is nevertheless urged164 to the same extent as
the Court administers, supervises and controls the Philippine Judicial Academy
(PHILJA).165 The parallelism is mislaid because the PHILJA is intended for judicial
education.166 It particularly serves as the "training school for justices, judges, court
personnel, lawyers and aspirants to judicial posts."167 Court supervision over judicial
education is but consistent with the Court's power of supervision over all courts and the
personnel thereof.168

Still, petitioners insist that the Court actually regulated legal education through
Sections 5, 6, and 16 of Rule 138 and Sections 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Rule 138-A of the 1997
Rules of Court. On the contrary, the Rules of Court do not intend nor provide for direct
and actual Court regulation over legal education. At most, the Rules of Court are
reflective of the inevitable relationship between legal education and the admissions to
the bar.

6. The Rules of Court do not support the argument that the Court directly and
actually regulates legal education

While the power of the Court to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice
of law exists under the 1935 Constitution and reiterated under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions, the Court has not promulgated any rule that directly and actually
regulates legal education.

Instead, the 1964 Rules of Court concerned only the practice of law, admission to the
bar, admission to the bar examination, bar examinations, and the duties, rights and
conduct of attorneys. The 1997 Rules of Court is no different as it contained only the
rules on attorneys and admission to the bar under Rule 138, the law student practice
rule under Rule 138-A, the integrated bar in Rule 139-A and disbarment and discipline
of attorneys in Rule 139-B.169

In the exercise of its power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law, the Court has prescribed the subjects covered by, as well as the
qualifications of candidates to the bar examinations. Only those bar examination
candidates who are found to have obtained a passing grade are admitted to the bar and
licensed to practice law.170 The regulation of the admission to the practice of law goes
hand in hand with the commitment of the Court and the members of the Philippine Bar
to maintain a high standard for the legal profession. To ensure that the legal profession
is maintained at a high standard, only those who are known to be honest, possess good
moral character, and show proficiency in and knowledge of the law by the standard set
by the Court by passing the bar examinations honestly and in the regular and usual
manner are admitted to the practice of law.171

Thus, under the 1997 Rules of Court, admission to the bar requires: (1) furnishing
satisfactory proof of educational, moral, and other qualifications; (2) passing the bar
examinations;172 and (3) taking the; lawyer's oath,173 signing the roll of attorneys and
receiving from the clerk of court a certificate of the license to practice. 174 An applicant
for admission to the bar must have these qualifications: (1) must be a citizen of the
Philippines; (2) must at least be 21 years of age; (3) must be of good moral character;
(4) must be a resident of the Philippines; (5) must produce satisfactory evidence of
good moral character; and (6) no charges against the applicant, involving moral
turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines. 175 It is beyond
argument that these are the requisites and qualifications for admission to the practice
of law and not for admission to the study of law.

In turn, to be admitted to the bar examinations, an applicant must first meet the core
academic qualifications prescribed under the Rules of Court.

6(a). Sections 5, 6, and 16, Rule 138

Section 5 provides that the applicant should have studied law for four years and have
successfully completed all the prescribed courses. This section was amended by Bar
Matter No. 1153,176 to require applicants to "successfully [complete] all the prescribed
courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent, in a law school or
university officially recognized by the Philippine Government, or by the proper authority
in foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted." Bar Matter No. 1153 further
provides that a Filipino citizen who is a graduate of a foreign law school shall be allowed
to take the bar examinations only upon the submission to the Court of the required
certifications.

In addition to the core courses of civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law,
public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical
jurisprudence, taxation, and legal ethics, Section 5 was further amended by A.M. No.
19-03-24-SC or the Revised Law Student Practice Rule dated June 25, 2019 to include
Clinical Legal Education as a core course that must be completed by an applicant to the
bar examinations.

Notably, Section 5, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is not directed to law
schools, but to those who would like to take the bar examinations and enumerates the
academic competencies required of them. The Court does not impose upon law schools
what courses to teach, or the degree to grant, but prescribes only the core academic
courses which it finds essential for an applicant to be admitted to the bar. Law schools
enjoy the autonomy to teach or not to teach these courses. In fact, the Court even
extends recognition to a degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent obtained abroad
or that granted by a foreign law school for purposes of qualifying to take the Philippine
Bar Examinations, subject only to the submission of the required certifications. Section
5 could not therefore be interpreted as an exercise of the Court's regulatory or
supervisory power over legal education since, for obvious reasons, its reach could not
have possibly be extended to legal education in foreign jurisdictions.

In similar fashion, Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court requires that an applicant
to the bar examinations must have completed a four-year high school course and a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. Again, this requirement is imposed upon the
applicant to the bar examinations and not to law schools. These requirements are
merely consistent with the nature of a law degree granted in the Philippines which is a
professional, as well as a post-baccalaureate degree.

It is a reality that the Rules of Court, in prescribing the qualifications in order to take
the bar examinations, had placed a considerable constraint on the courses offered by
law schools. Adjustments in the curriculum, for instance, is a compromise which law
schools apparently are willing to take in order to elevate its chances of graduating
future bar examinees. It is in this regard that the relationship between legal education
and admissions to the bar becomes unmistakable. This, however, does not mean that
the Court has or exercises jurisdiction over legal education. Compliance by law schools
with the prescribed core courses is but a recognition of the Court's exclusive jurisdiction
over admissions to the practice of law - that no person shall be allowed to take the bar
examinations and thereafter, be admitted to the Philippine Bar without having taken
and completed the required core courses.

Section 16, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, on the other hand, provides that those who
fail the bar examinations for three or more times must take a refresher course.
Similarly, this is a requirement imposed upon the applicant. The Court does not impose
that a law school should absolutely include in its curriculum a refresher course.

6(b). Revised Law Student Practice Rule

Neither does Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC on
law student practice manifest the Court's exercise of supervision or regulation over
legal education. The three-fold rationale of the law student practice rule is as follows:
1. [T]o ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or
inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional
competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act [as] counsels on their own;

2. [T]o provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to
protect itself from any potential vicarious liability' arising from some culpable action by
their law students; and

3. [T]o ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to
practice a particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a
license, as required by law.177
Consistently, the Revised Law Student Practice Rule is primordially intended to ensure
access to justice of the marginalized sectors and to regulate the law student
practitioner's limited practice of law pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules
on pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the Integrated Bar, and legal
assistance to the underprivileged.

In allowing the law student and in governing the conduct of the law student
practitioner, what the Court regulates and supervises is not legal education, but the
appearance and conduct of a law student before any trial court, tribunal, board, or
officer, to represent indigent clients of the legal clinic - an activity rightfully falling
under the definition of practice of law. Inasmuch as the law student is permitted to act
for the legal clinic and thereby to practice law, it is but proper that the Court exercise
regulation and supervision over the law student practitioner. Necessarily, the Court has
the power to allow their appearance and plead their case, and hereafter, to regulate
their actions.

In all, the Rules of Court do not support petitioners' argument that the Court regulates
and supervises legal education. To reiterate, the Rules of Court are directed not
towards legal education or law schools, but towards applicants for admission to the bar
and applicants for admission to the bar examinations - consistent with the Court's
power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law, the same being
fundamentally a judicial function.

Having, thus, established that the regulation and supervision of legal education do not
fall within the competence of the Court and is, instead, a power exercised by the
political departments, the Court now proceeds to determine the extent of such police
power in relation to legal education.

B.
Reasonable Supervision and Regulation of Legal Education as an Exercise of
Police Power

The term police power was first used178 in jurisprudence in 1824 in Gibbons v.
Ogden179 where the U.S. Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Marshall, held that the
regulation of navigation by steamboat operators for· purposes of interstate commerce
was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress, thus, negating state laws
interfering with the exercise of that power. Likewise often cited is Commonwealth v.
Alger180 which defined police power as "the power vested in legislature by the
[C]onstitution, to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
[C]onstitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
Commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."

Closer to home, early Philippine jurisprudence pertain to police power as the power to
promote the general welfare and public interest; 181 to enact such laws in relation to
persons and property as may promote public health, public morals, public safety and
the general welfare of each inhabitant; 182 to preserve public order and to prevent
offenses against the state and to establish for the intercourse of [citizens] those rules of
good manners and good neighborhood calculated to prevent conflict of rights. 183

In Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel [Operators] Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of

Manila,184 the nature and scope of police power was reaffirmed as embracing the power
to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people. It is negatively defined as the authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare185 and the State's inherent power to prohibit all that is hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society, 186 and flows from the recognition that salus
populi est suprema lex.187 It is described as the most essential, insistent and
illimitable188 of the powers of the State. It is co-existent with the concept of the State
and is the very foundation and one of its cornerstones, 189 and therefore even precedes
the written Constitution.

1. Enactment of education laws is an exercise of police power

The State has a "high responsibility for [the] education of its citizens" 190 and has an
interest in prescribing regulations to promote the education, and consequently, the
general welfare of the people.191 The regulation or administration of educational
institutions, especially on the tertiary level, is invested with public interest. 192 Thus, the
enactment of education laws, implementing rules and regulations and issuances of
government agencies is an exercise of the State's police power. 193

As a professional educational program, legal education properly falls within the

supervisory and regulatory competency of the State. The legislative history of the
Philippine legal educational system earlier recounted evinces that the State, through
statutes enacted by the Congress and administrative regulations issued by the
Executive, consistently exercises police power over legal education.

The exercise of such police power, however, is not absolute.

2. Supervisory and regulatory exercise, not control

The 1935194 and 1973195 Constitutions plainly provide that all educational institutions

shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State. These reflect in
express terms the police power already inherently possessed by the State. Making
express an already inherent power is not a superfluous exercise, but is rather
consequential in case of conflict between express powers. As elucidated in Philippine
Association of Colleges and Universities:196
In this connection we do not share the belief that [now Article XIV, Section 4(1)] has
added new power to what the State inherently possesses by virtue of the police power.
An express power is necessarily more extensive than a mere implied power. For
instance, if there is conflict between an express individual right and the express power
to control private education it cannot off-hand be said that the latter must yield to the
former - conflict of two express powers. But if the power to control education is merely
implied from the police power, it is feasible to uphold the express individual right[.] x x
x
The 1987 Constitution under Section 4(1), Article XIV, even when expressly recognizing
the complementary roles played by the public and private schools in education,
reiterated that these educational institutions are subject to State supervision and
regulation, thus:
SEC. 4.(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private
institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision
and regulation of all educational institutions. (Emphasis supplied)
As much as possible, the words of the Constitution are understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. 197

As worded, the Constitution recognizes that the role of public and private schools in
education is complementary in relation to each other, and primordial in relation to the
State as the latter is only empowered to supervise and regulate. The exercise of police
power in relation to education must be compliant with the normative content of Section
4(1), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution. 198 The exercise of police power over
education must merely be supervisory and regulatory.

The State's supervisory and regulatory power is an auxiliary power in relation to

educational institutions, be it a basic, secondary or higher education. This must
necessarily be so since the right and duty to educate, being part and parcel of youth-
rearing, do not inure to the State at the first instance. Rather, it belongs essentially and
naturally to the parents,199 which right and duty they surrender by delegation to the
educational institutions. As held in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)
v. Quezon City,200 the right and duty of parents to rear their children being a natural
and primary right connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing
of their children. The responsibility to educate lies with the parents and guardians as an
inherent right,201 over which the State assumes a supportive role. 202 Withholding from
the State the unqualified power to control education also serves a practical purpose - it
allows for a degree of flexibility and diversity essential to the very reason of education
to rear socially responsible and morally upright youth and to enable them, also, to
come in contact with challenging ideas.

In this sense, when the Constitution gives the State supervisory power, it is understood
that what it enjoys is a supportive power, that is, the power of oversight 203 over all
educational institutions. It includes the authority to check, but not to interfere.

In addition to supervision, educational institutions are likewise made subject to State

regulation. Dispensing a regulatory function means imposing requirements, setting
conditions, prescribing restrictions, and ensuring compliance. In this regard, the
political departments are vested with ample authority to set minimum standards to be
met by all educational institutions.204

Starkly withheld from the State is the power to control educational institutions.
Consequently, in no way should supervision and regulation be equated to State control.
It is interesting to note that even when a suggestion had been made during the drafting
of the 1935 Constitution that educational institutions should be made "subject to the
laws of the State," the proponent of the amendment had no totalitarian
intentions,205 and the proposal was not meant to curtail the liberty of teaching, 206 thus:
I think it only insures the efficient functioning of educational work and does not limit
liberty of administrators of schools. The gentleman will notice that my amendment does
not tend to curtail which he used in asking the question [sic]. I want the power of
the State to be supervisory as supervision in educational parlance should be of
the constructive type in the matter of help rather than obstruction. 207 (Emphasis
supplied)
3. Reasonable exercise

To be valid, the supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police

power must be reasonable and not repugnant to the Constitution. 208

As held in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.,209 the exercise of police power, in order
to be valid, must be compliant with substantive due process:
[T]he State, x x x may be considered as having properly exercised [its] police power
only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise[;] and (2) the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method. (Emphases supplied)
In Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon,210 the Court held that:
Notwithstanding its. extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations.
For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or
unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. (Emphasis supplied)
Obviating any inference that the power to regulate means the power to control, the
1987 Constitution added the word "reasonable" before the phrase supervision and
regulation.

The import of the word "reasonable" was elaborated in Council of Teachers,211 as

follows:
x x x Section 4(1) was a provision added by the Framers to crystallize the State's
recognition of the importance of the role that the private sector plays in the quality of
the Philippine education system. Despite this recognition, the Framers added the
second portion of Section 4[1] to emphasize that the State, in the exercise of its police
power, still possesses the power of supervision over private schools. The Framers were
explicit, however, that this supervision refers to external governance, as opposed
to internal governance which was reserved to the respective school boards, thus:
Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the addition of the word
"reasonable" before the phrase "supervision and regulation"; two, the addition of the
word "quality" before the word "education"; three, the change of the wordings in the
1973 Constitution referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be relevant
to the goals of national development, to the present expression of "relevant to the
needs of the people and society"; and four, the explanation of the meaning of the
expression "integrated system of education" by defining the same as the recognition
and strengthening of the complementary roles of public and private educational
institutions as separate but integral parts of the total Philippine educational system.

When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external

governance of educational institutions, particularly private educational institutions
as distinguished from the internal governance by their respective boards of directors or
trustees and their administrative officials. Even without a provision on external
governance, the State would still have the inherent right to regulate educational
institutions through the exercise of its police power. We have thought it advisable to
restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it necessary to
add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our Supreme Court in a
decision in the case of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. The
Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court
said, and I quote:
It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides
for control of education by the State.

The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate means
power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to
prove that State control of private education was intended by organic law.
The addition, therefore, of the word 'reasonable' is meant to underscore the
sense of the committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State
supervision and regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer only
to the power of the State to provide regulations and to see to it that these
regulations are duly followed and implemented. It does not include the right to
manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the right to
dominate. (Emphases in the original; underscoring supplied)
The addition of the word "reasonable" did not change the texture of police power that
the State exercises over education. It merely emphasized that State supervision and
regulation of legal education cannot amount to control.

4. Academic freedom

Fundamental in constitutional construction is that the Constitution is to be interpreted

as a whole, and that all provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought
into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the purposes of the Constitution. 212

Accordingly, the reasonable supervision and regulation clause is not a stand-alone

provision, but must be read in conjunction with the other Constitutional provisions
relating to education which include, in particular, the clause on academic freedom.

Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.
This guarantee is not peculiar to the 1987 Constitution. A similar· provision was found
in the 1973 Constitution providing that: "All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy
academic freedom."213 Both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions provide for a broader
scope of academic freedom compared to the 1935 Constitution which limits the
guarantee of academic freedom only to universities of higher learning established by
the State.214

In fact, academic freedom is not a novel concept. This can be traced to the freedom of
intellectual inquiry championed by Socrates, lost and replaced by thought control during
the time of Inquisition, until the movement back to intellectual liberty beginning the
16th century, most particularly flourishing in German universities. 215

Academic freedom has traditionally been associated as a narrow aspect of the broader
area of freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press. It has been identified
with the individual autonomy of educators to "investigate, pursue, [and] discuss free
from internal and external interference or pressure."216 Thus, academic freedom of
faculty members, professors, researchers, or administrators is defended based on the
freedom of speech and press.217

Academic freedom is enjoyed not only by members of the faculty, but also by the
students themselves, as affirmed in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong:218
x x x. After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version which was none
too different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as
found in Article XIV, Section 5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to whether and what
aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S.
Azcuna explained: "Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand
the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the
courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom."

More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of
the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,'
do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna
replied: "Not only that, it also includes x x x" Gascon finished off the broken thought,
"the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."
Jurisprudence has so far understood academic freedom of the students as the latter's
right to enjoy in school the guarantees of the Bill of Rights. For instance, in Villar v.
Technological Institute of the Philippines219 and in Non v. Dames II,220 it was held that
academic standards cannot be used to discriminate against students who exercise their
rights to peaceable assembly and free speech, in Malabanan v. Ramento,221 it was ruled
that the punishment must be commensurate with the offense, and in Guzman v.
National University,222 which affirmed the student's right to due process.

Apart from the academic freedom of teachers and students, the academic freedom of
the institution itself is recognized and constitutionally guaranteed.

The landmark case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology223 elucidates how academic freedom is enjoyed by institutions of higher
learning:
[I]t is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the
recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed
of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to
attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly
when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide
sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This
constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent. Former President
Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine Political Law, is
similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the
university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university
professor." He cited the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of the University of
Dijon, France, President of the conference of rectors and vice-chancellors of European
universities: "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which sometimes tends to be
obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the collective liberty of an
organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of the individual members
within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even necessarily connected. In
considering the problems of academic freedom one must distinguish, therefore,
between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body, and the freedom of the
individual university teacher." Also: To clarify further the distinction between the
freedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he says: The personal
aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher - recognized and
effectively guaranteed by society - to seek and express the truth as he personally sees
it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen. Thus the status of
the individual university teacher is at least as important, in considering academic
freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong and through which they
disseminate their learning. (Internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied)
Garcia also enumerated the internal conditions for institutional academic freedom, that
is, the academic staff should have de facto control over: (a) the admission and
examination of students; (b) the curricula for courses of study; (c) the appointment
and tenure of office of academic staff; and (d) the allocation of income among the
different categories of expenditure. 224

Reference was also made to the influential language of Justice Frankfurter's concurring
opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,225 describing it as the "business of the university"
to provide a conducive atmosphere for speculation, experimentation, and creation
where the four essential freedoms of the university prevail: the right of the university
to determine for itself on academic grounds (a) who may teach; (b) what may be
taught; (c) how it shall be taught; and (d) who may be admitted to study.

4(a). State's supervisory and regulatory power over legal education in relation
to academic freedom

The rule is that institutions of higher learning enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself
who may teach; what may be taught, how it shall be taught and who to admit, being
part of their academic freedom. The State, in the exercise of its reasonable supervision
and regulation over education, can only impose minimum regulations.

At its most elementary, the power to supervise and regulate shall not be construed as
stifling academic freedom in institutions of higher learning. This must necessarily be so
since institutions of higher learning are not mere walls within which to teach; rather, it
is a place where research, experiment, critical thinking, and exchanges are secured.
Any form of State control, even at its most benign and disguised as regulatory, cannot
therefore derogate the academic freedom guaranteed to higher educational institutions.
In fact, this non-intrusive relation between the State and higher educational institutions
is maintained even when the Constitution itself prescribes certain educational "thrusts"
or directions.226

This attitude of non-interference is not lost in jurisprudence. To cite an example, due

regard for institutional academic freedom versus State interference was recognized
in Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,227 the commendable purpose of the Philippine
Regulation Commission of ensuring the integrity of the examination notwithstanding:
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the
academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot interfere
with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best
enable their enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a full-
[f]ledged public accountant. Unless the means or methods of instruction are
clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review
schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, in University of the Philippines v. Civil Service Commission,228 the Court
upheld the university's academic freedom to choose who should teach and held that the
Civil Service Commission had no authority to dictate to the university the outright
dismissal of its personnel. Nothing short of marked arbitrariness, 229 or grave abuse of
discretion230 on the part of the schools, or overriding public welfare 231 can therefore
justify State interference with the academic judgment of higher educational institutions.
As held in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,232 "[a]s corporate entities,
educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to
establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls
or pressure."

5. Right to education

Apart from the perspective of academic freedom, the reasonable supervision and
regulation clause is also to be viewed together with the right to education. The 1987
Constitution speaks quite elaborately on the right to education. Section 1, Article XIV
provides:
SEC. 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education
at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to all.
The normative elements of the general right to education under Section 1, Article XIV,
are (1) to protect and promote quality education; and (2) to take appropriate steps
towards making such quality education accessible.

"Quality" education is statutorily defined as the appropriateness, relevance and

excellence of the education given to meet the needs and aspirations of the individual
and society.233

In order to protect and promote quality education, the political departments are vested
with the ample authority to set minimum standards to be met by all educational
institutions. This authority should be exercised within the parameters of reasonable
supervision and regulation. As elucidated in Council of Teachers:234
While the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality education, the
determination of what constitutes quality education is best left with the
political departments who have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and
resources to determine the same. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission again are very instructive:
Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before "education" to
send appropriate signals to the government that, in the exercise of its
supervisory and regulatory powers, it should first set satisfactory minimum
requirements in all areas curriculum, faculty, internal administration, library,
laboratory class and other facilities, et cetera, and it should see to it that
satisfactory minimum requirements are met by all educational institutions,
both public and private.

When we speak of quality education we have in mind such matters, among

others, as curriculum development, development of learning resources and
instructional materials, upgrading of library and laboratory facilities,
innovations in educational technology and teaching methodologies,
improvement of research quality, and others. Here and in many other provisions
on education, the principal focus of attention and concern is the students. I would like
to say that in my view there is a slogan when we speak of quality of education that I
feel we should be aware of, which is, "Better than ever is not enough." In other words,
even if the quality of education is good now, we should attempt to keep on improving
it. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the other hand, "accessible" education means equal opportunities to education
regardless of social and economic differences. The phrase "shall take appropriate steps"
signifies that the State may adopt varied approaches in the delivery of education that
are relevant and responsive to the needs of the people and the society. This is why,
towards this end, the State shall:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of education
relevant to the needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high
school levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children, elementary
 education is compulsory for all children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs, subsidies,
and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both public and
private schools, especially to the underprivileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-
learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that respond
to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics,
vocational efficiency, and other skills.235 (Emphases supplied)
The deliberations of the framers in this regard are instructive:
MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize
is that education should be equally accessible to all regardless of social and
economic differences. So we go into the issue of providing opportunities to
such an education, recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who come
from the poorer social classes because of their inability to continue education. 236 x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
And further, as follows:
This is why when we speak of education as a right, it means very clearly that
education should be accessible to all, regardless of social and economic
differences, meaning, educational opportunities should be provided through a
system of free education, at least, up to the secondary level. And recognizing
the limits of our financial resources, tertiary education should still be afforded
and provided availability to those who are poor and. deserving. That is why
when we say that education is a right, it imposes a correlative duty on the part of the
State to provide it to the citizens. Making it a right shows that education is recognized
as an important function of the State. Education is not merely a social service to be
provided by the State. The proposed provision recognizes that a right to education is a
right to acquire a decent standard of living, and that, therefore, the State cannot
deprive anyone of this right in the same manner that the right to life, the right to
liberty and property cannot be taken away without due process of law. 237 (Emphasis
supplied)
The element of accessibility under the Constitution, thus, pertains to both the
elimination of discrimination especially against disadvantaged groups and to the
financial duty of the State for, after all, the right to education is part and parcel of
social justice. The objective is to make quality education accessible by appropriate
means.

Apart from the Constitution, the right to education is also recognized in international
human rights law under various instruments to which the Philippines is a state
signatory and to which it is concomitantly bound.

For instance, Article 13(2)238 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes; the right to receive an education with the
following interrelated and essential features: (a) availability; (b) accessibility; (c)
acceptability; and (d) adaptability. 239

In particular, accessibility is understood as giving everyone, without discrimination,

access to educational institutions and programs. Accessibility has three overlapping
dimensions:
(1) Non-discrimination - education must be accessible to all, especially the most vulnerable
groups, in law and fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited grounds x x x;
(2) Physical accessibility - education has to be within safe physical reach, either by attendance at
some reasonably convenient geographic location ([e.g.] a neighborhood school) or [via]
modern technology ([e.g.] access to a "distance learning" programme); [and]
(3) Economic accessibility - education has to be affordable to all. This dimension of accessibility
is subject to the differential wording of [A]rticle 13(2) in relation to primary, secondary and
higher education: whereas primary education shall be available "free to all", States parties are
required to progressively introduce free secondary and higher education[.]240
Pertinent to higher education, the elements of quality and accessibility should also be
present as the Constitution provides that these elements should be protected and
promoted in all educational institutions.

Nevertheless, the right to receive higher education is not absolute.

5(a). Right to education is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission

and academic requirements

Article 26(1)241 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that "[t]echnical
and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall
be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit[,]" while the ICESCR provides that
"[h]igher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by
every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free
education[.]"242 Thus, higher education is not to be generally available, but accessible
only on the basis of capacity.243 The capacity of individuals should be assessed by
reference to all their relevant expertise and experience. 244

The right to receive higher education must further be read in conjunction with the right
of every citizen to select a profession or course of study guaranteed under the
Constitution. In this regard, the provisions of the 1987 Constitution under Section 5(3),
Article XIV are more exacting:
SEC. 5. x x x

xxxx

(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
There is uniformity in jurisprudence holding that the authority to set the admission and
academic requirements used to assess the merit and capacity of the individual to be
admitted and retained in higher educational institutions lie with the institutions
themselves in the exercise of their academic freedom.

In Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,245 the Court ruled:

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary
proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary
upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather
than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to
freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue
their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are,
to the established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by the
academic institution.

"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the
admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right x x x extends as well to
parents x x x as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools."

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student
discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded
as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its
very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic
groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the
panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of "right to
education" forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that
is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school. (Citation in the
original omitted; emphases supplied)
In Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines,246 the Court similarly held:
xxxx

2. What cannot be stressed too sufficiently is that among the most important social,
economic, and cultural rights is the right to education not only in the elementary and
high school grades but also on the college level. The constitutional provision as to the
State maintaining "a system of free public elementary education and, in areas where
finances permit, establish and maintain a system of free public education" up to the
high school level does not per se exclude the exercise of that right in colleges and
universities. It is only at the most a reflection of the lack of sufficient funds for such a
duty to be obligatory in the case of students in the colleges and universities. As far as
the right itself is concerned, not the effectiveness of the exercise of such right
because of the lack of funds, Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights provides: "Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free,
at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall
be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally
available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of
merit."

3. It is quite clear that while the right to college education is included in the

social economic, and cultural rights, it is equally manifest that the obligation
imposed on the State is not categorical, the phrase used being "generally
available" and higher education, while being "equally accessible to all should
be on the basis of merit." To that extent, therefore, there is justification for
excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked
academic deficiency.
4. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes
the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances
failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however,
that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate
against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly
and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus
prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. (Emphases
supplied)
Likewise, in Calawag:247
Lastly, the right to education invoked by Calawag cannot be made the basis for issuing
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. In Department of Education, Culture and
Sports v. San Diego, we held that the right to education is not absolute. Section 5(e),
Article XIV of the Constitution provides that "[e]very citizen has a right to select a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements." The thesis requirement and the compliance with the
procedures leading to it, are part of the reasonable academic requirements a
person desiring to complete a course of study would have to comply
with. (Citation in the original omitted; emphasis supplied)
The deliberations of the framers on the qualifications to the right to education are also
illuminating:
MR. NOLLEDO: Thank you, Madam President. Before I ask questions directed to the
chairman and members of the committee, I would like to warmly congratulate them for
a job well-done. The committee report to my mind, Madam President, is excellent and I
hope it will not, in the course of amendments, suffer from adulteration. With respect to
page 1, lines 12-13: "Education is the right of every citizen of the Philippines," I agree
with this statement, but when we talk of the right, I understand from the chairman that
it is compellable and from Commissioner Guingona, that it is enforceable in
court. Suppose a student of a private school is not allowed to enroll by reason
of misconduct or that his stay in the school is considered by the administration
of that school to be undesirable, does he have a right to enforce his right to
education under this situation?

MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, the right to education, like any other right, is
not absolute. As a matter of fact, Article XXVI of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, when it acknowledges the right to education, also qualifies it when at the end of
the provision, it say, "on the basis of merit." Therefore, the student may be subject
to certain reasonable requirements regarding admission and retention and this
is so provided in the draft Constitution. We admit even of discrimination. We have
accepted this in the Philippines, and I suppose in the United States there are schools
that can refuse admission to boys because they are supposed to be exclusively
for girls. And there are schools that may refuse admission to girls because
they are exclusively for boys. There may even be discrimination to accept a
student who has a contagious disease on the ground that it would affect the
welfare of the other students. What I mean is that there could be reasonable
qualifications, limitations or restrictions to this right, Madam President.

MR. GASCON: May I add, Madam President.

MR. NOLLEDO: Yes, the Commissioner may.

MR. GASCON: When we speak of education as a right, what we would like to emphasize
is that education should be equally accessible to all regardless of social and economic
differences. So we go into the issue of providing opportunities to such an education,
recognizing that there are limitations imposed on those who come from the poorer
social classes because of their inability to continue education.

However, in the same light, this right to education is subject to the right of

educational institutions to admit students upon certain conditions such as
ability to pay the required entrance examination fee and maintaining a
respectable school record. When we speak of this right of schools as far as
maintaining a certain degree or quality of students, these conditions must be
reasonable and should not be used just to impose certain unfair situations on
the students.

MR. GUINGONA: Madam President, may I add.

There is already established jurisprudence about this. In the United States, in the case
of [Lesser] v. Board of Education of New York City, 239, NYS 2d 776, the court held
that the refusal of a school to admit a student who had an average of less than 85
percent which is the requirement for that school was lawful.

In the Philippines, we have the case of Padriguilan [sic] v. Manila Central

University where refusal to retain the student was because of the alleged deficiency in a
major subject and this was upheld by our Supreme Court. There is also the case
of Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, wherein Garcia, a woman, tried to continue
studying in this school of theology.248 (Citation in the original omitted; emphases
supplied)
Extant from the foregoing is that while there is a right to quality higher education, such
right is principally subject to the broad academic freedom of higher educational
institutions to impose fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. Plainly stated, the right to receive education is not and should not be
taken to mean as a right to be admitted to educational institutions.

With the basic postulates that jurisdiction over legal education belongs primarily and
directly to the political departments, and that the exercise of such police power must be
in the context of reasonable supervision and regulation, and must be consistent with
academic freedom and the right to education, the Court now proceeds to address
whether the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 7662 and the corresponding LEB issuances
fall within, the constitutionally-permissible supervision and regulation of legal
education.

C.
LEB's Powers Under R.A. No. 7662 vis-a-vis the Court's Jurisdiction Under
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution

1. Section 3(a)(2) on increasing awareness among members of the legal

profession

One of the general objectives of legal education under Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662
is to "increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of
the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.]" This objective is reiterated by
the LEB in LEBMO No. 1-2011, Section 7, Article II, as follows:
SEC. 7. (Section 3 of the law) General and Specific Objectives of Legal Education.

a) Legal education m the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:

xxxx

(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of

the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The plain language of Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No.
1-2011 are clear and need no further interpretation. This provision goes beyond the
scope of R.A. No. 7662, i.e., improvement of the quality of legal education, and, instead
delves into the training of those who are already members of the bar. Likewise, this
objective is a direct encroachment on the power of the Court to promulgate rules
concerning the practice of law and legal assistance to the underprivileged and should,
thus, be voided on this ground. As aptly observed by the CLEBM and which the Court
had approved:
In the same vein Section 3 provides as one of the objectives of legal education
increasing "awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived and oppressed sectors of the society." Such objective should not find a place
in the law that primarily aims to upgrade the standard of schools of law as they perform
the task of educating aspiring lawyers. Section 5, paragraph 5 of Article VIII of the
Constitution also provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules on "legal assistance to the underprivileged" and hence, implementation of [R.A.
No. 7662] might give rise to infringement of a constitutionally mandated power. 249
2. Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal apprenticeship and law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the bar

Towards the end of uplifting the standards of legal education, Section 2, par. 2 of R.A.
No. 7662 mandates the State to (1) undertake appropriate reforms in the legal
education system; (2) require proper selection of law students; (3) maintain quality
among law schools; and (4) require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal
education.

Pursuant to this policy, Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 grants LEB the power to establish
a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar examinations:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x x

xxxx

(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar,
which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office
or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that
the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this
purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and
the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new
member of the Bar.
This power is mirrored in Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011:
SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving
the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the

Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law
office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific
period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12)months. For
this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation
and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new
member of the Bar[.]
It is clear from the plain text of Section 7(g) that another requirement, i.e., completion
of a law internship program, is imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This
requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate
rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto.

The jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar
examinations belongs to the Court. In fact, under the whereas clauses of the Revised
Law Student Practice Rule, the Court now requires the completion of clinical legal
education courses, which may be undertaken either in a law clinic or through an
externship, as a prerequisite to take the bar examinations, thus:
Whereas, to produce practice-ready lawyers, the completion of clinical legal education
courses must be a prerequisite to take the bar examinations as provided in Section 5 of
Rule 138.
Under Section 7(g), the power of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of
legal education, but now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar
examinations, and consequently, admissions to the bar. This is a direct encroachment
upon the Court's exclusive authority to promulgate rules concerning admissions to the
bar and should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.

Further, and as will be discussed hereunder, the LEB exercised this power in a manner
that forces upon law schools the establishment of a legal apprenticeship program or a
legal aid clinic, in violation of the schools' right to determine for themselves their
respective curricula.

3. Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(h) on continuing legal education of

practicing lawyers

Petitioners in G.R. No. 230642 argue that the power given to the LEB to adopt a system
of continuing legal education implies that the LEB exercises jurisdiction not only over
the legal education of those seeking to become lawyers, but also over those who are
already lawyers which is a function exclusively belonging to the Court. 250 Respondent,
on the other hand, maintains that the LEB's power to adopt a system of continuing legal
education is different from the mandatory continuing legal education required of all
members of the bar.251 Respondent explains that the continuing legal education under
R.A. No. 7662 is limited to the training of lawyer-professors and not to the practice of
the legal profession.252
The questioned power of the LEB to adopt a system of continuing legal education
appears in Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policies. - x x x

xxxx

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education
system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools,
and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.

xxxx

SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x

xxxx

(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the [LEB]
may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as the [LEB] may deem necessary; x x x
(Emphases supplied)
This power is likewise reflected in Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, as follows:
SEC. 11. (Section 7 of the law) Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving
the objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board
may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary[.] x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
By its plain language, the clause "continuing legal education" under Section 2, par. 2,
and Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 unduly give the LEB the power to supervise the legal
education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is
authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and
for such duration as the LEB deems, necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court's
power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education
of "lawyer-professors" as teaching of law is practice of law. The mandatory continuing
legal education of the members of the bar is, in fact, covered by B.M. No. 850 or the
Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) dated August 22, 2000 which
requires members of the bar, not otherwise exempt, from completing, every three
years, at least 36 hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE
Committee directly supervised by the Court.

As noted by the CLEBM:

Thus, under the declaration of policies in Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662], the State "shall
undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require the proper
selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools and require
apprenticeship and continuing legal education["]. The concept of continuing legal
education encompasses education not only of law students but also of members of the
legal profession. Its inclusion in the declaration of policies implies that the [LEB] shall
have jurisdiction over the education of persons who have finished the law course and
are already licensed to practice law. Viewed in the light of Section 5, paragraph 5 of
Article VIII of the Constitution that vests the Supreme Court with powers over the
Integrated . Bar of the Philippines, said portion of Section 2 of [R.A. No. 7662] risks a
declaration of constitutional infirmity. 253 (Underscoring supplied)
4. Section 7(e) on minimum standards for law admission and the PhiLSAT
issuances

Of the several powers of the LEB under R.A. No. 7662, its power to prescribe minimum
standards for law admission under Section 7(e) received the strongest objection from
the petitioners. Section 7(e), provides:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x

xxxx

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications

and compensation of faculty members; (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners argue that the power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission
belongs to the Court pursuant to its rule-making power concerning the admission to the
practice of law; Thus, Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 which gives the LEB the power to
prescribe the minimum standards for law admission is allegedly unconstitutional as it
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. Necessarily, according to the petitioners,
the PhiLSAT which was imposed by the LEB pursuant to Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 is
likewise void.

The Court finds no constitutional conflict between its rule-making power and the power
of the LEB to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of
R.A. No. 7662. Consequently, the PhiLSAT, which intends to regulate admission to law
schools, cannot be voided on this ground.

4(a). LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for "law admission"

pertain to admission to legal education and not to the practice of law

Much of the protestation against the LEB's exercise of the power to prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission stems from the interpretation extended to the
phrase "law admission." For petitioners, "law admission" pertains to the practice of law,
the power over which belongs exclusively to the Court.

The statutory context and the intent of the legislators do not permit such interpretation.

Basic is the rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part must be read together with
the other parts, to the end that the general intent of the law is given primacy. 254 As
such, a law's clauses and phrases cannot be interpreted as isolated expressions nor
read in truncated parts, but must be considered to form a harmonious whole. 255

Accordingly, the LEB's power under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission should be read with the State policy behind the
enactment of R.A. No. 7662 which is fundamentally to uplift the standards of legal
education and the law's thrust to undertake reforms in the legal education system.
Construing the LEH's power to prescribe the standards for law admission together with
the LEB's other powers to administer, supervise, and accredit law schools, leads to the
logical interpretation that the law circumscribes the LEB's power to prescribe admission
requirements only to those seeking enrollment to a school or college of law and not to
the practice of law.

Reference may also be made to DECS Order No. 27-1989, as the immediate precursor
of R.A. No. 7662, as to what is sought to be regulated when the law speaks of "law
admission" requirements.

Section 1, Article VIII of DECS Order No. 27-1989 is clear that the admission
requirement pertains to enrollment in a law course, or law school, or legal education,
thus:
Article VIII
Admission, Residence and Other Requirements

SEC. 1. No applicant shall be enrolled in the law course unless he complies
with specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education
and the Supreme Court of the Philippines, for which purpose he must present to
the registrar the necessary credentials before the end of the enrollment period.
(Emphases supplied)
This contemporary interpretation suffice in itself to hold that the phrase "law admission"
pertains to admission to the study of law or to legal education, and not to the practice
of law. Further support is nevertheless offered by the exchanges during the Senate
interpellations, wherein it was assumed that the phrase "minimum standards for law
admission" refers to the requirements that the student must fulfill before being
admitted to law school. This assumption was not corrected by the bill's sponsor. 256

4(b). Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 is reasonable supervision and regulation

Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662, insofar as it gives the LEB the power to prescribe the
minimum standards for law admission is faithful to the reasonable supervision and
regulation clause. It merely authorizes the LEB to prescribe minimum requirements not
amounting to control.

Emphatically, the law allows the LEB to prescribe only the minimum standards and it
did not, in any way, impose that the minimum standard for law admission should be by
way of an exclusionary and qualifying exam nor did it prevent law schools from
imposing their respective admission requirements.

Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, the minimum standards for admission to law schools
as implemented by the LEB are: (1) completion of a four-year high school course; and
(2) completion of a course for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. 257 Again, these
requirements are but consistent with the nature of the law course in the Philippines as
being both a professional and post-baccalaureate education.

As the facts disclose, however, the LEB later on introduced the PhiLSAT as an additional
prerequisite for admission to law school.

4(c). Pursuant to Section 7(e), LEB is authorized to administer an aptitude

test as a minimum standard for law admission

Evident from the Senate deliberations that, in prescribing the minimum standards for
law admission, an aptitude test may be administered by the LEB although such is not
made mandatory under the law. Thus:
Senator Tolentino: x x x

I will proceed to another point, Mr. President. I have taught law for more than 25 years
in private schools and in the University of the Philippines as well. There is one thing I
have noticed in all these years of teaching and that is, many students in the law school
are not prepared or apt by inclination or by ability to become lawyers. I see that the
objectives of the legal education that are provided for in this bill do not provide for
some mechanism of choosing people who should take up the law course.

As it is now, because of our democratic principles, anybody who wants to become a

lawyer, who can afford the tuition fee, or who has the required preparatory course, can
be admitted into the law school. And yet, while studying law, many of these students -
I would say there are about 30 or 40 percent of students in private schools - should not
be taking up law but some other course because, simply, they do not have the
inclination, they do not have the aptitude or the ability to become lawyers.

Can that be provided for in this bill, Madam Sponsor? Would it contravene really our
principles of democracy where everybody should be free to take the course that he
wants to take? Or should the State be able to determine who should be able or who
should be allowed to take a particular course, in this case of law?

Senator Shahani: Mr. President, there are those aptitude tests which are being
taken when the student is in high school to somehow guide the guidance
councilors [sic] into the aptitude of the students. But the talent or the
penchant for the legal profession is not one of those subjects specifically
measured. I think what is measured really is who is, more or less, talented for
an academic education as against a vocational education. But maybe, a new
test will have to be designed to really test the aptitude of those who would
like to enter the law school. x x x

Senator Tolentino: x x x

Many parents want to see their children become lawyers. But they do not consider the
aptitude of these children, and they waste money and time in making these children
take up law when they really are not suited to the law course. My real concern is
whether by legislation, we can provide for selection of those who should be
allowed to take up law, and not everybody would be allowed to take up law. x
xx

xxxx

Senator Shahani: Mr. President, of course, the right to education is a

constitutional right, and I think one cannot just categorically deny a student -
especially if he is bright - entrance to a law school. I think I would stand by
what I had previously said that an aptitude examination will have to be
specially designed. It is not in existence yet. x x x258 (Emphases supplied)
This matter was amplified in second reading:
Senator Angara: x x x

Senator Tolentino asked why there is an omission on the requirements for admission to
law school. I think [Senator Shahani] has already answered that, that the [LEB] may
prescribe an aptitude test for that purpose. Just as in other jurisdictions, they
prescribe a law admission test for prospective students of law. I think the
board may very well decide to prescribe such a test, although it is not
mandatory under this bill.259 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The lawmakers, therefore, recognized and intended that the LEB be vested with
authority to administer an aptitude test as a minimum standard for law admission. The
presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law and
one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose
of the law.260 This presumption has not been successfully challenged by petitioners.

It also bears to note that the introduction of a law aptitude examination was actually
supported by the Court when it approved the CLEBM's proposed amendment to Section
7(e), as follows:
SEC. 6. Section 7 of the same law is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 7. Power and Functions. - x x x

xxxx

d). to prescribe minimum standards for ADMISSION TO LAW SCHOOLS INCLUDING A

SYSTEM OF LAW APTITUDE EXAMINATION x x x[.]" (Underscoring supplied)
And further in Bar Matter No. 1161261 when the Court referred to the LEB the conduct of
a proposed law entrance examination.

4(d). PhiLSAT, as an aptitude exam, is reasonably related to the improvement

of legal education

Having settled that the LEB has the power to administer an aptitude test, the next issue
to be resolved is whether the exercise of such power, through the PhiLSAT, was
reasonable.

Indeed, an administrative regulation is susceptible to attack for unreasonableness.

In Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,262 the Court held:
It is an [axiom] in administrative law that administrative authorities should
not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To
be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to
secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to
be invalid. (Emphasis supplied)
To determine whether the PhiLSAT constitutes a valid exercise of police power, the
same test of reasonableness, i.e., the concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful
means, is employed. Petitioners argue that the PhiLSAT is unreasonable because: it is
not a conclusive proof of the student's aptitude; 263 it entails unreasonable examination
and travel expenses and burdensome documentary requirements; 264 applying for
PhiLSAT exemption is inconvenient;265 it is redundant to existing law school entrance
exams;266 and it is not supported by scientific study. 267

Unfortunately, these grounds are not only conclusions of fact which beg the
presentation of competent evidence, but also necessarily go into the wisdom of the
PhiLSAT which the Court cannot inquire into. The Court's pronouncement as to the
reasonableness of the PhiLSAT based on the grounds propounded by petitioners would
be an excursion into the policy behind the examinations - a function which is
administrative rather than judicial.

Petitioners also argue that there is no reasonable relation between improving the
quality of legal education and regulating access thereto. The Court does not agree.

The subject of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education. It is indubitable
that the State has an interest in prescribing regulations promoting education and
thereby protecting the common good. Improvement of the quality of legal education,
thus, falls squarely within the scope of police power. The PhiLSAT, as an aptitude test,
was the means to protect this interest.

4(e). Tablarin sustained the conduct of an admission test as a legitimate

exercise of the State's regulatory power

Moreover, by case law, the Court already upheld the validity of administering an
aptitude test as a reasonable police power measure in the context of admission
standards into institutions of higher learning.

In Tablarin, the Court upheld not only the constitutionality of Section 5(a) of R.A. No.
2382, or the Medical Act of 1959, which gave the Board of Medical Education (BME) the
power to prescribe requirements for admission to medical schools, but also MECS Order
No. 52, Series of 1985 (MECS Order No. 52-1985) issued by the BME which prescribed
NMAT.

Using the rational basis test, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the NMAT as
follows:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a
condition for admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of
the health and safety of the general community, on the other hand. This
question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the
practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. That the
power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate
admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.
Thus, legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice
medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been
recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of
minimum medical educational requirements - i.e., the completion of prescribed courses
in a recognized medical school - for admission to the medical profession, has also been
sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. What we
have before us in the instant case is closely related; the regulation of access to
medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the
rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical
quality of the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted
to the student body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity
in the process of admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of
limiting admission to those who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for
medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The need to maintain, and
the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional; schools in general,
and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like

the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the
selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the
quality of medical education, in the country." Given the widespread use today of
such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America
the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other countries with
far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the
failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are
entitled to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to
recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of
incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies
and minds for disease or trauma.268 (Emphases supplied)
The Court reached its conclusion that NMAT is a valid exercise of police power because
the method employed, i.e., regulation of admissions to medical education is reasonably
related to the subject, i.e., the protection of the public by ensuring that only those
qualified are eventually allowed to practice medicine.

The necessity of State intervention to ensure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by those unqualified to take care of the life and health of patients was
likewise the reason why the Court in Department of Education, Culture and Sports v.
San Diego269 upheld the "three-flunk" rule in NMAT:
We see no reason why the rationale in the [TabIarin] case cannot apply to the case at
bar. The issue raised in both cases is the academic preparation of the applicant. This
may be gauged at least initially by the admission test and, indeed with more reliability,
by the three-flunk rule. The latter cannot be regarded any less valid than the
former in the regulation of the medical profession.

There is no need to redefine here the police power of the State. Suffice it to repeat that
the power is validly exercised if (a) the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object
sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

In other words, the proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a
lawful subject and a lawful method.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the
police power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure
that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom
patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the

purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is
intended to insulate the medical schools and ultimately the medical profession
from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. (Emphases supplied)
Tablarin recognized that State intervention was necessary, and therefore was allowed,
because of the need to meet the goal of promoting public health and safety.

In similar vein, the avowed purpose of the PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal
education by evaluating and screening applicants to law school. As elucidated, the State
has an interest in improving the quality of legal education for the protection of the
community at-large, and requiring an entrance test is reasonably related to that
interest. In other words, the State has the power and the prerogative to impose a
standardized test prior to entering law school, in the same manner and extent that the
State can do so in medical school when it prescribed the NMAT.

In all, the Court finds no constitutional conflict between the Court's rule-making power
concerning admissions to the practice of law and on the LEB's power to prescribe
minimum standards for law admission under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662.

Further, pursuant to its power under Section 7(e), the Court affirms the LEB's authority
to initiate and administer an aptitude test, such as the PhiLSAT, as a minimum standard
for law admission. Thus, the PhiLSAT, insofar as it functions as an aptitude exam that
measures the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law to the end
that the quality of legal education is improved is not per se unconstitutional.

However, there are certain provisions of the PhiLSAT that render its operation
exclusionary, restrictive, and qualifying which is contrary to its design as an aptitude
exam meant to be used as a tool that should only help and guide law schools in
gauging the aptness of its applicants for the study of law. These provisions effectively
and absolutely exclude applicants who failed to pass the PhiLSAT from taking up a
course in legal education, thereby restricting and qualifying admissions to law schools.
As will be demonstrated, these provisions of the PhiLSAT are unconstitutional for being
manifestly violative of the law schools' exercise of academic freedom, specifically the
autonomy to determine for itself who it shall allow to be admitted to its law program.

D.
LEB's Powers vis-a-vis Institutional Academic Freedom and the Right to
Education

1. PhiLSAT

Paragraphs 7, 9, 11, and 15 of LEBMO No. 7-2016, provide:

xxxx

7. Passing Score - The cut-off or passing score for the PhiLSAT shall be FIFTY-
FIVE PERCENT (55%) correct answers, or such percentile score as may be
prescribed by the LEB.

xxxx

9. Admission Requirement - All college graduates or graduating students

applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to pass the
PhiLSAT as a requirement for admission to any law school in the
Philippines. Upon the effectivity of this memorandum order, no applicant shall be
admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses leading
to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has
passed the PhiLSAT taken within 2 years before the start of studies for the
basic law course and presents a valid [Certificate of Eligibility] as proof
thereof.

xxxx

11. Institutional Admission Requirements - The PhiLSAT shall be without prejudice

to the right of a law school in the exercise of its academic freedom to
prescribe or impose additional requirements for admission, such as but not
limited to:

a. A score in the PhiLSAT higher than the cut-off or passing score set by the LEB;

b. Additional or supplemental admission tests to measure the competencies and/or

personality of the applicant; and

c. Personal interview of the applicant.

xxxx

15. Sanctions - Law schools violating this Memorandum Order shall [be] imposed
the administrative sanctions prescribed in Section 32 of LEBMO No. 2, Series of
2013 and/or fine of up to Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for each infraction.
(Emphases supplied)
Without doubt, the above provisions exclude and disqualify those examinees who fail to
reach the prescribed passing score from being admitted to any law school in the
Philippines. In mandating that only applicants who scored at least 55% correct answers
shall be admitted to any· law school, the PhiLSAT actually usurps the right and duty of
the law school to determine for itself the criteria for the admission of students and
thereafter, to apply such criteria on a case-by-case basis. It also mandates law schools
to absolutely reject applicants with a grade lower than the prescribed cut-off score and
those with expired PhiLSAT eligibility. The token regard for institutional academic
freedom comes into play, if at all, only after the applicants had been "pre-selected"
without the school's participation. The right of the institutions then are constricted only
in providing "additional" admission requirements, admitting of the interpretation that
the preference of the school itself is merely secondary or supplemental to that of the
State which is antithetical to the very principle of reasonable supervision and
regulation.

The law schools are left with absolutely no discretion to choose its students at the first
instance and in accordance with its own policies, but are dictated to surrender such
discretion in favor of a State-determined pool of applicants, under pain of
administrative sanctions and/or payment of fines. Mandating law schools to reject
applicants who failed to reach the prescribed PhiLSAT passing score or those with
expired PhiLSAT eligibility transfers complete control over admission policies from the
law schools to the LEB. As Garcia tritely emphasized: "[c]olleges and universities should
[not] be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or
reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly
higher category."270

1(a). Comparison of PhiLSAT with NMAT and LSAT

Respondent urges the Court to treat the PhiLSAT in the same manner that the Court
treated the NMAT in Tablarin. Petitioners oppose on the ground that the PhiLSAT and
the NMAT are different because there is a Constitutional body, i.e., the Court, tasked to
regulate the practice of law while there is none with respect to the practice of medicine.

The Court treats the PhiLSAT differently from the NMAT for the fundamental reason that
these aptitude exams operate differently.

For one, how these exams allow the schools to treat the scores therein obtained is
different.

While both exams seem to prescribe a "cut-off" score, the NMAT score is evaluated by
the medical schools in relation to their own cut-off scores. Unlike the PhiLSAT score, the
NMAT score is not the sole determining factor on whether or not an examinee may be
admitted to medical school. The NMAT score is only meant to be one of the bases for
evaluating applicants for admission to a college of medicine.

Medical schools further enjoy the discretion to determine how much weight should be
assigned to an NMAT score relative to the schools' own admissions policy. Different
medical schools may therefore set varying acceptable NMAT scores. Different medical
schools may likewise assign different values to the NMAT score. This allows medical
schools to consider the NMAT score along with the other credentials of the applicant.
The NMAT score does not constrain medical schools to accept pre-selected applicants; it
merely provides for a tool to evaluate all applicants.

Obtaining a low NMAT percentile score will not immediately and absolutely disqualify an
applicant from being admitted to medical school. Obtaining a high NMAT percentile
score only increases an applicant's options for medical schools. Taking the NMAT, thus,
expands the applicant's options for medical schools; it does not limit them.

For another, medical schools are not subjected to sanctions in case they decide to
admit an applicant pursuant to their own admissions policy. In fact, at some
point,271 there was even no prescribed cut-off percentile score for the NMAT, and
instead it was stressed that a student may enroll in any school, college or university
upon meeting the latter's specific requirements and reasonable regulations. 272 Also, the
issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission to a college of medicine had been
transferred to. the medical schools, thus, rightfully giving the responsibility for and
accountability of determining eligibility of students for admission to the medical
program to the schools concerned.273

Similar to the NMAT, the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is only one of the several
criteria for evaluation for law school admission. It is just one of the methods that law
schools may use to differentiate applicants for law school. The American Bar Association
actually allows a law school to use an admission test other than the LSAT and it does
not dictate the. particular weight that a law school should give to the results of the
LSAT in deciding whether to admit an applicant. 274

In contrast, the PhiLSAT score itself determines whether an applicant may be admitted
to law school or not, the PhiLSAT being strictly a pass or fail exam. It excludes those
who failed to reach the prescribed cut-off score from being admitted to any law school.
It qualifies admission to law school not otherwise imposed by the schools themselves.
The PhiLSAT, as presently crafted, employs a totalitarian scheme in terms of student
admissions. This leaves the consequent actions of the applicant-student and the school
solely dependent upon the results of the PhiLSAT.

1(b). Balancing State interest with institutional academic freedom

Thus far, it is settled that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, is
reasonably related to the State's unimpeachable interest in improving the quality of
legal education. This aptitude test, however, should not be exclusionary, restrictive, or
qualifying as to encroach upon institutional academic freedom. Moreover, in the
exercise of their academic freedom to choose who to admit, the law schools should be
left with the discretion to determine for themselves how much weight should the results
of the PhiLSAT carry in relation to their individual admission policies. At all times, it is
understood that the school's exercise of such academic discretion should not be gravely
abused, arbitrary, whimsical, or discriminatory.

With the conclusion that the PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, passes
the test of reasonableness, there is no rea on to strike down the PhiLSAT in its entirety.
Instead, the Court takes a calibrated approach and partially nullifies LEBMO No. 7-2016
insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT and the taking thereof
within two years as a prerequisite for admission to any law school which, on its face,
run directly counter to institutional academic freedom. The rest of LEBMO No. 7-2016,
being free from any taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect,
especially in view of the separability clause 275 therein contained.

1(c). PhiLSAT and the right to education

Anent the argument that the PhiLSAT transgresses petitioners' right to education and
their right to select a profession or course of study, suffice to state that the PhiLSAT is
a minimum admission standard that is rationally related to the interest of the State to
improve the quality of legal education and, accordingly, to protect the general
community. The constitutionality of the PhiLSAT, therefore, cannot be voided on the
ground that it violates the right to education as stated under Section 1, Article XIV of
the Constitution. The Court's pronouncement in Tablarin276 again resonates with
significance:
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more,
petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact
clash with that provision. On the contrary, we may note - x x x - that the statute and
the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality
education" at the level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to
Section 5(3) of Article XIV, as one must, one cannot but note that the latter phrase of
Section 1 is not to be read with absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to
take appropriate steps to make quality education "accessible to all" who might for any
number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school, but rather merely to make
such education accessible to all who qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements."
2. Other LEB issuances on law admission

Apart from the PhiLSAT, the LEB also imposed additional requirements for admission to
law schools under LEBMO No. 1-2011, specifically:
Article III
Prerequisites and Program Specification

SEC. 15. Prerequisites to admission to Law School. - x x x

xxxx

Where the applicant for admission into a law school is a graduate of a foreign institution
or school following a different course and progression of studies, the matter shall be
referred to the Board that shall determine the eligibility of the candidate for
admission to law school.

SEC. 16. Board Prerequisites for Admission to the Ll.B. or J.D. Program. - The Board
shall apply Section 6 of Rule 138 in the following wise: An applicant for admission to
the Ll.B. or J.D. program of studies must be a graduate of a bachelor's degree and
must have earned at least eighteen (18) units in English, six (6) units in
Mathematics, and eighteen (18) units of social science subjects.

SEC. 17. Board Prerequisites for Admission to Graduate Programs in Law. - Without

prejudice to other requirements that graduate schools may lay down, no applicant
shall be admitted for the Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent master's degree
in law or juridical science, without an Ll.B. or a J.D. degree. Admission of non-
Members of the Philippine Bar to the master's degree shall be a matter of academic
freedom vested in the graduate school of law. The candidate for the doctorate degree in
juridical science, or doctorate in civil law or equivalent doctorate degree must have
completed a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) or equivalent degree.

Graduate degree programs in law shall have no bearing on membership or non-

membership in the Philippine Bar.277 (Emphases supplied)
Further, LEBMO No. 1-2011, Article V, provides:
xxxx

SEC. 23. No student who has obtained a general average below 2.5 or 80 in the college
course required for admission to legal studies may be admitted to law school.
Exceptions may be made by the Dean in exceptionally meritorious cases, after having
informed the Board.278
These provisions similarly encroach upon the law school's freedom to determine for
itself its admission policies. With regard to foreign students, a law school is completely
bereft of the right to determine for itself whether to accept such foreign student or not,
as the determination thereof now belongs to the LEB.

Similarly, the requirement that an applicant obtain a specific number of units in English,
Mathematics, and Social Science subjects affects a law school's admission policies
leaving the latter totally without discretion to admit applicants who are deficient in
these subjects or to allow such applicant to complete these requirements at a later
time. This requirement also effectively extends the jurisdiction of the LEB to the courses
and units to be taken by the applicant in his or her pre-law course. Moreover, such
requirement is not to be found under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court as this
section simply requires only the following from an applicant to the bar exams:
SEC. 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted
unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that,
before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an
authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed
therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following
subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english,
spanish, history and economics.
Likewise, in imposing that only those with a basic degree in law may be admitted to
graduate programs in law encroaches upon the law school's right to determine who
may be admitted. For instance, this requirement effectively nullifies the option of
admitting non-law graduates on the basis of relevant professional experience that a law
school, pursuant to its own admissions policy, may otherwise have considered.

The required general weighted average in the college course suffers the same infirmity
and would have been struck down had ·it not been expressly repealed by the LEB
because of the PhiLSAT.279

3. Section 7(c) and 7(e) on the minimum qualifications of faculty members

The LEB is also empowered under Section 7(c) to set the standards of accreditation
taking into account, among others, the "qualifications of the members of the faculty"
and under Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 to prescribe "minimum qualifications and
compensation of faculty members[.]"

Relative to the power to prescribe the minimum qualifications of faculty members, LEB
prescribes under LEBMO No. 1-2011 the following:
[PART I]
Article V
Instructional Standards

SEC. 20. The law school shall be headed by a properly qualified dean, maintain a
corps of professors drawn from the ranks of leading and acknowledged
practitioners as well as academics and legal scholars or experts in juridical
science[.] x x x

xxxx
 PART III
QUALIFICATIONS AND CURRICULUM

Article I
Faculty Qualifications

SEC. 50. The members of the faculty of a law school should, at the very least,
possess a L1.B. or a J.D. degree and should be members of the Philippine Bar.
In the exercise of academic freedom, the law school may also ask specialists in various
fields of law with other qualifications, provided that they possess relevant doctoral
degrees, to teach specific subjects.

Within a period of five (5) years of the promulgation of the present order,
members of the faculty of schools of law shall commence their studies in
graduate schools of law.

Where a law school offers the J.D. curriculum, a qualified Ll.B. graduate who is a
member of the Philippine Bar may be admitted to teach in the J.D. course and may
wish to consider the privilege granted under Section 56 hereof.

SEC. 51. The dean should have, aside from complying with the requirements
above, at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or a master's degree in a
related field, and should have been a Member of the Bar for at least 5 years
prior to his appointment as dean.

SEC. 52. The dean of a graduate school of law should possess at least a

doctorate degree in law and should be an acknowledged authority in law, as
evidenced by publications and membership in learned societies and
organizations; members of the faculty of a graduate school of law should
possess at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or the relevant master's or
doctor's degrees in related fields.

Aside from the foregoing, retired justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals may serve as deans of schools of law,
provided that they have had teaching experience as professors of law and provided
further that, with the approval of the Legal Education Board, a graduate school of
law may accredit their experience in the collegiate appellate courts and the judgments
they have penned towards the degree [ad eundem] of Master of Laws.280 (Emphases
supplied)
Thus, under LEBMO No. 1-2011, a law faculty member must have an Ll.B or J.D. degree
and must, within a period of five years from the promulgation of LEBMO No. 1-2011, or
from June 14, 2011 to June 14, 2016, commence studies in graduate school of law.

The mandatory character of the requirement of a master's degree is underscored by the

LEB in its Resolution No. 2014-02, a "sequel rule" to Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1-2011,
which provides that:
xxxx
1. Members of the law faculty are required to be holders of the degree of
Master of Laws. It is the responsibility of the law deans to observe and
implement this rule.

2. The law faculty of all law schools shall have the following percentage of holders
of the master of laws degree:

2.1. School Year- 2017-2018-20%

2.2. School Year- 2018-2019 - 40%
2.3. School Year- 2019-2020-60%
2.4. School Year- 2020-2021-80%

3. In computing the percentage, those who are exempted from the rule shall be
included.

4. Exempted from this requirement of a master's degree in law are the following:

The Incumbent or Retired Members of the:

3.1. Supreme Court;

3.2. Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals;
3.3. Secretary of Justice and Under-Secretaries of Justice, Ombudsman, Deputy
Ombudsmen, Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitors General
3.4. Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission who teach Labor
Laws;
3.5. Regional Trial Court Judges;
3.6. DOJ State and Regional State Prosecutors and Senior Ombudsman Prosecutors who
teach Criminal Law and/or Criminal Procedure;
3.7. Members of Congress who are lawyers who teach Political Law, Administrative
Law, Election Law, Law on Public Officers and other related subjects;
3.8. Members of Constitutional Commissions who are Lawyers;
3.9. Heads of bureaus who are lawyers who teach the law subjects which their
respective bureaus are implementing;
3.10. Ambassadors, Ministers and other [D]iplomatic Officers who are lawyers who
teach International Law or related subjects;
3.11. Those who have been teaching their subjects for 10 years or more upon
recommendation of their deans; and
3.12. Other lawyers who are considered by the Board to be experts in any field of law
provided they teach the subjects of their expertise.
 5. The following are the sanctions for non-compliance with the foregoing
rules:

4.1. If a law school is non-compliant with these rules for the first time beginning School
Year 2017-2018, the Board shall downgrade its Recognition status to Permit
status;
4.2. If a law school under a Permit status should remain non compliant with these rules in
succeeding school years, the Board shall downgrade the Permit status to Phase-
Out status;
4.3. If a law school which is under Phase-Out status remains non compliant with these
rules in succeeding school years, the Board shall order its closure to take effect at
the end of the school year.

6.
7. If a law school under sanction shall become compliant, its Recognition status
shall be restored. (Emphases supplied)

xxxx
And under LEBMO No. 2:
SEC. 31. Unfitness to Continue Operating a Law Program. A law school which is
operated below quality standards of a law school is unfit to continue operating a
law program.

xxxx

2) A law school is substandard if the result of the inspection and evaluation of the law
school and its facilities by members of the Board or its staff shows that the law school
has serious deficiencies including a weak faculty as indicated, among others, by the
fact that most of the members are neophytes in the teaching of law[.] x x x

xxxx

SEC. 32. The imposable administrative sanctions are the following:

a) Termination of the law program (closing the law school);

b) Phase-out of the law program;
c) Provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and putting the law program
of the substandard law school under Permit Status.
This master of laws degree requirement is reiterated in LEBMO No. 17, Series of
2018 (Supplemental Regulations on the Minimum Academic Requirement of Master of
Laws Degree for Deans and Law Professors/Lecturers/Instructors in Law Schools), as
follows:
xxxx

B) For Members of the Law Faculty

SEC. 6. For purposes of determining compliance with the minimum academic

requirement of a Ll.M. degree for the members of the law faculty in law schools
required under Section 50 of LEBMO No. 1, Series of 2011 and Resolution No. 2014-02,
the required percentage of holders of Ll.M. shall be computed based on the aggregate
units of all courses/subjects offered during the semester by the law school.

SEC. 7. Within thirty (30) days upon completion the effectivity this of this memorandum
[sic], the President of the HEI and the Dean of each law school shall jointly submit to
the LEB separate certification of the total teaching assignments/load for the
1st Semester and 2nd Semester of the Academic Year 2017-2018 in the
prescribed matrix form containing the names of every faculty member, his/her
highest academic law degree, qualification for , exemption from the Ll.M.
requirement, if applicable, courses/subjects assigned to teach, and academic
weight of each course/subject, and a disclosure whether or not the law school
is compliant with the prescribed percentage of Ll.M. holders for faculty
members. Thereafter, the same certification shall be submitted for every regular
semester not later than 45 days from the start of the semester.

xxxx

SEC. 12. Law schools failing to meet the prescribed percentage of its faculty
members required to have Ll.M. degrees shall be imposed the appropriate
administrative sanction specified under Resolution No. 2014-02. (Emphases
supplied)
To be sure, under its supervisory and regulatory power, the LEB can prescribe the
minimum qualifications of faculty members. This much was affirmed by the Court when
it approved the CLEBM's proposal to revise the powers of LEB under R.A. No. 7662, but
nevertheless retaining the LEB's power to "provide for minimum qualifications for
faculty members of law schools." As worded, the assailed clauses of Section 7(c) and
7(e) insofar as they give LEB the power to prescribe the minimum qualifications of
faculty members are in tune with the reasonable supervision and regulation clause and
do not infringe upon the academic freedom of law schools.

Moreover, this minimum qualification can be a master of laws degree. In University of

the East v. Pepanio,281 the Court held that the requirement of a masteral degree, albeit
for tertiary education teachers, is not unreasonable. Thus:
The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not
unreasonable. The operation of educational institutions involves public
interest. The government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in
possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed
to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human
activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well
from ill prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or
technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or to
possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment. (Emphasis
supplied)
This was reiterated in Son v. University of Santo Tomas,282 as follows:
As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate
program professor's field of instruction has been in place, through DECS Order 92
(series of 1992, August 10, 1992) or the Revised Manual of Regulations for Private
Schools. Article IX, Section 44, paragraph [1(a)] thereof provides that college faculty
members must have a master's degree in their field of instruction as a minimum
qualification for teaching in a private educational institution and acquiring regular status
therein.

DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in the exercise of its
[rule]-making power as provided for under Section 70 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 232,
otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982. As such, it has the force and effect of
law. In University of the East v. Pepanio, the requirement of a masteral degree for
tertiary education teachers was held to be not unreasonable but rather in accord with
the public interest.

xxxx

From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents,
for maintaining professors without the mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners,
agreeing to be employed despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary qualifications.
Petitioners cannot therefore insist to be employed by UST since they still do not possess
the required master's degrees; the fact that UST continues to hire and maintain
professors without the necessary master's degrees is not a ground for claiming illegal
dismissal, or even reinstatement. As far as the law is concerned, respondents are in
violation of the CHED regulations for continuing the practice of hiring unqualified
teaching personnel; but the law cam1ot come to the aid of petitioners on this sole
ground. As between the parties herein, they are in pari delicto.

xxxx

The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the undergraduate teacher's field of

instruction has been cemented in DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners and
respondents have been violating it. The fact that government has not cracked down on
violators, or that it chose not to strictly implement the provision, does not erase the
violations committed by erring educational institutions, including the parties herein; it
simply means that government will not punish these violations for the meantime. The
parties cannot escape its concomitant effects, nonetheless. And if respondents knew the
overwhelming importance of the said provision and the public interest involved - as
they now fiercely advocate to their favor - they should have complied with the same as
soon as it was promulgated.

xxxx

In addition, the Court already held in Herrera-Manaoisi v. St. Scholastica's College that

-
Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual, Manaois still cannot legally
acquire a permanent status of employment. Private educational institutions must still
supplementarily refer to the prevailing standards, qualifications, and conditions set by
the appropriate government agencies (presently the Department of Education, the
Commission on Higher Education, and the Teclmical Education and Skills Development
Authority). This limitation on the right of private schools, colleges, and universities to
select and determine the employment status of their academic personnel has been
imposed by the state in view of the public interest nature of educational institutions, so
as to ensure the quality and competency of our schools and educators. (Internal
citations omitted)
Thus, the masteral degree required of law faculty members and dean, and the doctoral
degree required of a dean of a graduate school of law are, in fact, minimum reasonable
requirements. However, it is the manner by which the LEB had exercised this power
through its various issuances that prove to be unreasonable.

On this point, the amicus curiae, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, while admitting that the
masteral degree requirement is a "laudable aim" of the LEB, nevertheless adds that the
LEB-imposed period of compliance is unreasonable given the logistical and financial
obstacles:
The masteral degree requirement is a laudable aim of LEB, but the possibility of
meeting the LEB period of compliance is unreasonable and unrealistic in the light of
logistical and financial considerations confronting the deans and professors, including
the few law schools offering graduate degrees in law.

To illustrate, to the best of my knowledge there are no more than six (6) graduate
schools of law around the country to service potential applicants. Those who have opted
for graduate studies in law find it very costly to fly to the venue. While one or two
programs may have been delivered outside the provider's home school venue to reach
out to graduate students outside the urban centers, pedagogical standards are often
compromised in the conduct of the modules. This is even aggravated by the fact that
very few applicants can afford to go into full-time graduate studies considering that
most deans and professors of law are in law practice. Perhaps, LEB should work in
consultation with PALS in designing a cost-effective but efficient delivery system of any
graduate program in law, [especially] for deans and law professors. 283
Further, the mandatory character of the master of laws degree requirement, under pain
of downgrading, phase-out and closure of the law school, is in sharp contrast with the
previous requirement under DECS Order No. 27-1989 which merely prefer faculty
members who are holders of a graduate law degree, or its equivalent. The LEB's
authority to review the strength or weakness of the faculty on the basis of experience
or length of time devoted to teaching violates an institution's right to set its own faculty
standards. The LEB also imposed strict reportorial requirements that infringe on the
institution's right to select its teachers which, for instance, may be based on expertise
even with little teaching experience. Moreover, in case a faculty member seeks to be
exempted, he or she must prove to the LEB, and not to the concerned institution, that
he or she is an expert in the field, thus, usurping the freedom of the institution to
evaluate the qualifications of its own teachers on an individual basis.

Also, while the LEB requires of faculty members and deans to obtain a master of laws
degree before they are allowed to teach and administer a law school, respectively, it is
ironic that the LEB, under Resolution No. 2019-406, in fact considers the basic law
degrees of Ll.B. or J.D. as already equivalent to a doctorate degree in other non-law
academic disciplines for purposes of "appointment/promotion, ranking, and
compensation."

In this connection, the LEB also prescribes who may or may not be considered as full-
time faculty, the classification of the members of their faculty, as well as the faculty
load, including the regulation of work hours, all in violation of the academic freedom of
law schools. LEBMO No. 2 provides:
SEC. 33. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. There are two general kinds of faculty
members, the full-time and part-time faculty members.

a) A full-time faculty member is one:

1) Who possesses the minimum qualification of a member of the faculty as prescribed in

Sections 50 and 51 of LEBMO No. 1;

2) Who devotes not less than eight (8) hours of work for the law school;

3) Who has no other occupation elsewhere requiring regular hours of work, except when
permitted by the higher education institution of which the law school is a part; and

4) Who is not teaching full-time in any other higher education institution.

b) A part-time faculty member is one who does not meet the qualifications of a full-time
professor as enumerated in the preceding number.

SEC. 34. Faculty Classification and Ranking. Members of the faculty may be classified,
in the discretion of the higher education institution of which the law school is a part,
according to academic proceeding, training and scholarship into Professor, Associate
Professor, Assistant Professor, and Instructor.

Part-time members of the faculty may be classified as Lecturers, Assistant Professorial

Lecturers, Associate Professorial Lecturers and Professorial Lecturers. The law schools
shall devise their scheme of classification and promotion not inconsistent with
these rules.

SEC. 35. Faculty Load. Generally, no member of the faculty should teach more
than 3 consecutive hours in any subject nor should he or she be loaded with
subjects requiring more than three preparations or three different subjects
(no matter the number of units per subject) in a day.

However, under exceptionally meritorious circumstances, the law deans may allow
members of the faculty to teach 4 hours a day provided that there is a break of 30
minutes between the first 2 and the last 2 hours. (Emphases supplied)
The LEB is also allowed to revoke permits or recognitions given to law schools when the
LEB deems that there is gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of
professors or instructors under Section 41.2(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, thus:
SEC. 412. Permits or recognitions may be revoked, or recognitions reverted to permit
status for just causes including but not limited to:

a) fraud or deceit committed by the institution in connection with its application to the
Board;

b) the unauthorized operation of a school of law or a branch or an extension of a law

school;
c) mismanagement or gross inefficiency in the operation of a law school;

d) gross incompetence on the part of the dean and the corps of professors or
instructors;

e) violation of approved standards governing institutional operations, announcements

and advertisements;

f) transfer of the school of law to a site or location detrimental to the interests of the
students and inimical to the fruitful and promising study of law;

g) repeated failure of discipline on the part of the student body; and

h) other grounds for the closure of schools and academic institutions as provided for in
the rules and regulations of the Commission on Higher Education. 284 (Emphasis
supplied)
In this regard, the LEB is actually assessing the teaching performance of faculty
members and when such is determined by the LEB as constituting gross incompetence,
the LEB may mete out penalties, thus, usurping the law school's right to determine for
itself the competence of its faculty members.

4. Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal apprenticeship and legal

internship

While the clause "legal apprenticeship" under Section 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on
legal internship, as plainly worded, cannot immediately be interpreted as encroaching
upon institutional academic freedom, the manner by which LEB exercised this power
through several of its issuances undoubtedly show that the LEB controls and dictates
upon law schools how such apprenticeship and internship programs should be
undertaken.

Pursuant to its power under Section 7(g), the LEB passed Resolution No. 2015-
08 (Prescribing the Policy and Rules in the Establishment of a Legal Aid Clinic in Law
Schools) wherein it classified legal aid clinics into three types: (1) a legal aid clinic
which is an outreach project of a law school; (2) a legal aid clinic which entitles the
participating student to curricular credits; and (3) a legal aid clinic that entitles the
participating student to avail of the privileges under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.

Pertinent to the third type, the LEB requires the law schools to comply with the
following rules:
xxxx

b) Implementing Rules

(1) A LAC should be established by the law school.

(2) The law school should formulate its Clinical Legal Education Program and submit it to
the Legal Education board for its assessment and evaluation.
(3) If Legal Education Board finds the Clinical Legal Education Program to be proper and
in order it shall endorse it to the Supreme Court for its approval.

(4) Once approved by the Supreme Court, fourth (4th) year law students in that law school
enrolled in it shall be allowed to practice law on a limited manner pursuant to the provisions
of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
Further, Section 24(c), Article IV of LEBMO No. 2 prescribes the activities that should be
included in the law school's apprenticeship program, as follows:
Article IV
Law School: Administrative Matters and Opening of Branches or Extension Classes

SEC. 24. Administrative Matters.

xxxx

c) Apprenticeship Program. The apprenticeship program should be closely supervised by

the Dean or a member of the faculty assigned by the Dean to do the task. The
apprenticeship program should at least include any of the following activities:

1) Preparation of legal documents

2) Interviewing clients
3) Courtroom observation and participation
4) Observation and assistance in police investigations, inquests and preliminary investigations
5) Legal counseling
6) Legal assistance to detention prisoners
7) For working students, participation in the legal work of the legal section or office of the
employer-entity x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Relatedly, Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, provides:
Article IV
Grading System

SEC. 59. Grading System. - The law school, in the exercise of academic freedom, shall
devise its own grading system provided that on the first day of classes, the students
are apprised of the grading system and provided further that the following are
observed:

xxxx

(d) When apprenticeship is required and the student does not complete the mandated
number of apprenticeship hours, or the person supervising the apprenticeship program
deems the performance of the student unsatisfactory, the dean shall require of the
student such number of hours more in apprenticeship as will fulfill the purposes of the
apprenticeship program.285 (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions unduly interfere with the discretion of a law school regarding its
curriculum, particularly its apprenticeship program. Plainly, these issuances are beyond
mere supervision and regulation.

III.
Conclusion

In general, R.A. No. 7662, as a law meant to uplift the quality of legal education, does
not encroach upon the Court's jurisdiction to promulgate rules under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the Constitution. It is well-within the jurisdiction of the State, as an
exercise of its inherent police power, to lay down laws relative to legal education, the
same being imbued with public interest.

While the Court is undoubtedly an interested stakeholder in legal education, it cannot

assume jurisdiction where it has none. Instead, in judicial humility, the Court affirms
that the supervision and regulation of legal education is a political exercise, where
judges are nevertheless still allowed to participate not as an independent branch of
government, but as part of the sovereign people.

Nevertheless, inasmuch as the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged is settled as belonging exclusively to the Court, certain provisions and
clauses of R.A. No. 7662 which, by its plain language and meaning, go beyond legal
education and intrude upon the Court's exclusive jurisdiction suffer from patent
unconstitutionality and should therefore be struck down.

Moreover, the exercise of the power to supervise and regulate legal education is
circumscribed by the normative contents of the Constitution itself, that is, it must be
reasonably exercised. Reasonable exercise means that it should not amount to control
and that it respects the Constitutionallyguaranteed institutional academic freedom and
the citizen's right to quality and accessible education. Transgression of these limitations
renders the power and the exercise thereof unconstitutional.

Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe
minimum standards for law admission. The PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude
test to guide law schools in measuring the applicants' aptness for legal education along
with such other admissions policy that the law school may consider, is such minimum
standard.

However, the PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant's

aptitude for law school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools
who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the PhiLSAT
is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design
mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates
institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional.
In striking down these objectionable clauses in the PhiLSAT, the State's inherent power
to protect public interest by improving legal education is neither emasculated nor
compromised. Rather, the institutional academic freedom of law schools to determine
for itself who to admit pursuant to their respective admissions policies is merely
protected. In turn, the recognition of academic discretion comes with the inherent
limitation that its exercise should not be whimsical, arbitrary, or gravely abused.

In similar vein, certain LEB issuances which exceed the powers granted under its
charter should be nullified for being ultra vires.

As in all levels and areas of education, the improvement of legal education indeed
deserves serious attention. The parties are at a consensus that legal education should
be made relevant and progressive. Reforms for a more responsive legal education are
constantly introduced and are evolving. The PhiLSAT, for instance, is not a perfect
initiative. Through time and a better cooperation between the LEB and the law schools
in the Philippines, a standardized and acceptable law admission examination may be
configured. The flaws which the Court assessed to be unconstitutional are meanwhile
removed, thereby still allowing the PhiLSAT to develop into maturity. It is, thus,
strongly urged that recommendations on how to improve legal education, including
tools for screening entrants to law school, reached possibly through consultative
summits, be taken in careful consideration in further issuances or legislations.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.

The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.

The Court further declares:

As CONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the
power to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account,
among others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty without
encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning; and

2. Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the
power to prescribe the minimum requirements for admission to legal education
and minimum qualifications of faculty members without encroaching upon the
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:

1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing legal
education" as an aspect of legal education which is made subject to Executive
supervision and control;

2. Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the
objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal
profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;

3. Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as
it gives the Legal Education Board the power to establish a law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the Bar; and
 4. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as
it gives the Legal Education Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory
continuing legal education and to provide for the mandatory attendance of
practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as it may deem
necessary.

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:

1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and
qualifying admissions to law schools in violation of the institutional academic
freedom on who to admit, particularly:
a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college
graduates or graduating students applying for admission to the basic law
course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for
admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no applicant shall
be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses
leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless
he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two years before the start of
studies for the basic law course;

b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT as a

prerequisite for admission to law schools; Accordingly, the temporary
restraining order issued on March 12, 2019 enjoining the Legal Education
Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-2018 is made PERMANENT. The
regular admission of students who were conditionally admitted and
enrolled is left to the discretion of the law schools in the exercise of their
academic freedom; and

c. Sections 15, 16, and 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications
and classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law
in violation of institutional academic freedom on who may teach, particularly:
a. Sections 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

b. Resolution No. 2014-02;

c. Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2;

d. LEBMO No. 17-2018; and

3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on
the establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in
violation of institutional academic freedom on what to teach, particularly:

e. Resolution No. 2015-08;

 f. Section 24(c) of LEBMO No. 2; and

g. Section 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.

SO ORDERED.

Bersamin, C. J., I join the separate dissenting and concurring opinion of J. Leonen.
Carpio, Carandang, Inting, and Zalameda, JJ., concur.
Peralta, J., no part.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., Please see separate concurring opinion.
Leonen, J., See separate dissenting and concurring opinion.
Jardeleza, J., Please see separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Caguioa, J., Please see separate concurring.
A. Reyes, Jr., J., Please see my concurring opinion.
Gesmundo, J., Please separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
Hernando, J., on official business.
Lazaro-Javier, J., Please see concurring and dissenting opinion.

NOTICE OF JUDGMENT

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that on September 10, 2019 a Decision, copy attached herewith, was
rendered by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled cases, the original of which was
received by this Office on November 29, 2019 at 3:40 p.m.

Very truly yours,

(SGD) EDGAR O. ARICHETA

Clerk of Court

Endnotes:

*
 Also referred to as "Jocelyn L. Daño" in some parts of the rollo.

1
 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR THE
PURPOSE, A LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

2
See In Re: Legal Education, B.M. No. 979-B, September 4, 2001 (Resolution).

3
 Republic Act No. 7662, Sec. 4.
4
 Id. at Sec. 5.

5
In Re: Legal Education, B.M. No. 979-B, supra note 2.

6
 Id.

7
 Id.

8
 Id.

9
 Id.

10
 LEBMO No. 7-2016, par. 1.

11
Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. I, p. 216.

12
 LEBMO No. 7-2016, supra, par. 2.

13
 Id. at par. 10.

14
 Id. at par. 1.

15
 Id. at par. 2.

16
 Id. at par. 3.

17
 Id. at par. 4.

18
 Id. at par. 5.

19
 Id. at par. 6.

20
 Id. at par. 7.

21
 Id. at par. 8.

22
 Id. at par. 9.

23
 Id. at par. 10.

24
 Id. at par. 11.

25
 Id. at par. 12.

26
 Id. at par. 13.

27
 Id. at par. 14.

28
 Sec. 32. The imposable administrative sanctions are the following:   
 
a) Termination of the law program (closing the law school);
b) Phase-out of the law program; and
c) Provisional cancellation of the Government Recognition and putting the law program of the
substandard law school under Permit Status.

29
 Additional Rules in the Operation of the Law Program.

30
 LEBMO No. 7-2016, par. 15.

31
 LEBMO No. 11-2017, par. 2.

32
Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. I, pp. 6-22.

33
 Id. at 8-11.

34
 Id. at 38-59.

35
 Id. at 289-320.

36
Rollo (G.R. No. 242954), Vol. I, pp. 3-39.

37
Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. III, pp. 1309-1311.

38
 Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following power:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar which, however, may be
repealed, altered, or supplemental by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall provide
a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.

39
 Sec. 8. x x x

(5) The [Judicial and Bar] Council shall have the principal function of recommending
appointees to the Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign to it.

40
 Republic Act No. 7622, Sec. 7. Powers and Functions. - x x x

xxxx

(c) [T]o set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among
others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty,
the library and other facilities, without enroaching upon the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning[.] (Emphasis supplied)
41
 Sec. 7. (e) [T]o prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum
qualifications and compensation of faculty members[.] (Emphasis supplied)

42
 Sec. 7. (h) [T]o adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose,
the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary[.] (Emphases
supplied)

43
 Sec. 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. - (a) Legal education in the
Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:

xxxx

(2) [T]o increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of
the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society[.] (Emphasis supplied)

44
 Sec. 7. (g) [T]o establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the
Bar which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law
office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific
period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For
this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation
and the specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new
member of the Bar[.] (Emphasis supplied)

45
 Sec. 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift
the standards of legal education in order to prepare law students for advocacy,
counselling, problem solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the ethics of the
legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal
profession as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of
justice and to develop social competence.

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education
system, require proper selection of law students, maintain quality among law schools,
arid require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education. (Emphasis
supplied)

46
Rollo (G.R. No. 242954), Vol. I, p. 29.

47
 Id. at 86-87.

48
 236 Phil. 768 (1987).

49
 716 Phil. 208 (2013).

50
Tablarin v. Gutierrez, supra.

51
 In support, petitioners-in-intervention attached to their Partial Compliance and
Motion, certifications issued by St. Thomas More School of Law and Business, Inc., St.
Mary's College of Tagum, Inc. College of Law, and Western Leyte College School of Law
tending to show a decrease in the number of enrollees from academic year 2017 to
2018 to academic year 2018 to 2019. They also attached a Summary of Enrollment (of
44 out of the 126 law schools) furnished by the Philippine Association of Law Schools
which tend to show that 37 out of the 44 law schools experienced a decrease in
enrollment. (Rollo [G.R. No. 242954], Vol. III, pp. 1463-1477).

52
 Art. VIII, Sec. 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law.

53
 Art. X, Sec. 1. The Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law. The Batasang Pambansa shall have the
power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, but may
not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section five
hereof.

54
 Sec. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in the Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

55
See Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 883, 909-910
(2003).

56
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 1, provides:

Sec. 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasijudicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.

57
 Id. at Sec. 2. Petition for Prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

58
Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. (AMCOW) v. GCC Approved
Medical Centers Association, Inc., 802 Phil. 116, 136 (2016).
59
 Id. at 139.

60
Ocampo v. Enriquez, 798 Phil. 227, 294 (2016).

61
 732 Phil. 1, 121 (2014).

62
 Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.

63
Araullo v. Aquino III, 737 Phil. 457, 531 (2014), citing Holy Spirit Homewoners
Association, Inc. v. Defensor, 529 Phil. 573, 587 (2006).

64
Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, supra.

65
 Supra note 55, at 891-892.

66
 757 Phil. 534, 544 (2015).

67
 G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017, 835 SCRA 350.

68
 G.R. No. 232395, July 3, 2018.

69
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 73 (2009). See also Angara v. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936), where the Court held that the Court's duty
under the Constitution is "to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantees to them."

70
Garcia v. Executive Secretary, id., citing Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives, supra note 55, at 892.

71
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 646 Phil.
452, 471 (2010).

72
Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc., (AMCOW), v. GCC Approved
Medical Centers Association, Inc., supra note 58, at 140.

73
Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. Commission on Elections, 499
Phil. 281, 304-305 (2005).

74
De Borja v. Pinalakas na Ugnayan ng Maliliit na Mangingisda ng Luzon, Mindanao at
Visayas, G.R. Nos. 185320 and 185348, April 19, 2017, 823 SCRA 550, 571-572.
75
ABAKADA Guro Partylist v. Purisima, 584 Phil. 246, 266 (2008).

76
De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, 629 Phil. 629, 686-687 (2010), citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113-118 (1976)
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/424/1/> and Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138-148 (1974)
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/419/102/> (visited May 31, 2019).

77
 97 Phil. 806, 809-811 (1955).

78
 718 Phil. 294, 305-306 (2013).

79
 391 Phil. 84, 106-108 (2000).

80
 Supra note 61.

81
 Id. at 124-126.

82
 721 Phil. 416, 520 (2013).

83
Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, p. 11.

84
 Id. at 15.

85
 Id. at 17.

86
Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 3, pp. 1370-1371.

87
 Id. at 1375-1380.

88
 Id. at 1381.

89
 Id. at 1382.
90
Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, p. 304.

91
Rollo (G.R. No. 242954), Vol. 1, p. 22.

92
BAYAN v. Zamora, 396 Phil. 623, 646 (2000) and Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 316 Phil.
652, 695-696 (1995).

93
The Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor
and Employment, G.R. No. 202275, July 17, 2018.

94
Private Hospitals, Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 234448,
November 6, 2018.

95
See Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 392 Phil. 618, 634 (2000).
96
Funa v. Villar, 686 Phil. 571, 585 (2012).

97
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5), supra note 38.

98
 Sec. 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be
admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of
Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission
thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed
therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as
major or field of concentration: political science, logic, [E]nglish, [S]panish, history and
economics.

99
 Sec. 16. Failing candidates to take review course. - Candidates who have failed the
bar examinations for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination
unless they show to the satisfaction of the court that they have enrolled in and passed
regular fourthyear review classes as well as attended a pre-bar review course in a
recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this
rule shall certify under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and
passed the subjects under the same conditions as ordinary students and the ratings
obtained by them in the particular subject.

100
Rollo (G.R. No. 242954), Vol. 1, p. 18.

101
 Sec. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. - All applicants for admission
other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted
to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four
years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses [Bachelor of Laws] in a law
school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education.
The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or
school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be
required by the court.

No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be
admitted to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the
following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil
law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law,
political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal
ethics.

102
 Sec. 1. Conditions for student practice. - A law student who has successfully
completed his 3rd year of the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled
in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved by the Supreme
Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case
before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted
by the legal clinic of the law school.

103
 Sec. 2. Appearance. - The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule,
shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs,
memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising attorney for
and in behalf of the legal clinic.

104
 Sec. 3. Privileged communications. - The Rules safeguarding privileged
communications between attorney and client shall apply to similar communications
made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.

105
 Sec. 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. - The law student shall comply with
the standards of professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an
attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice may be a ground for
disciplinary action.

106
 Supra note 91.

107
 Faculty of Civil Law (1734)
(visited April 1, 2019).

108
 Cortes, Irene R. (1994), ESSAYS ON LEGAL EDUCATION, Quezon City: University of
the Philippines, Law Center.

109
 The implementation of this Act created a heavy shortage of teachers so the
Philippine Commission authorized the Secretary of Public Instruction to bring to the
Philippines 600 teachers from the United States known as the "Thomasites."

110
 Philippine College of Arts and Trade, now known as the Technological University of
the Philippines.

111
 Philippine Normal School, now known as the Philippine Normal University.

112
 Act No. 74, Sec. 18.

113
 University of the Philippines College of Law law.upd.edu.ph/about-the-college
(visited April 1, 2019).

114
 ESSAYS ON LEGAL EDUCATION, supra note 108.

115
 Id.

116
 AN ACT MAKING THE INSPECTION AND RECOGNITION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND
COLLEGES OBLIGATORY FOR THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES, March 10, 1917.

117
 Act No. 2706, Sec. 2. For the purposes of this Act, a private school or college shall
be any private institution for teaching managed by private individuals or corporations,
which is not subject to the authority and regulations of the Bureau of Education, and
which offers courses of primary, intermediate, or secondary instruction, or superior
courses in technical, professional, or special schools, for which diplomas are to be
granted or degrees conferred.
118
 Id. at Sec. 6. The Secretary of Public Instruction shall from time to time prepare and
publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of primary, intermediate,
and high schools and colleges granting the degrees of bachelor of arts, bachelor of
science, or any other academic degrees. He shall also from time to time prepare and
publish in pamphlet form the minimum standards required of law, medical, dental,
phannaceutical, engineering, and agricultural schools or colleges and other special
schools giving instruction of a technical or professional character.

119
 Cited in Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education,
supra note 77, at 812.

120
 Id.

121
 CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. XIII, Sec. 5, provides:

Sec. 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to
regulation by the State. The Government shall establish and maintain a complete and
adequate system of public education, and shall provide at least free public primary
instruction, and citizenship training to adult citizens. All schools shall aim to develop
moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and vocational efficiency, and to
teach the duties of citizenship. Optional religious instruction shall be maintained in the
public schools as now authorized by law. Universities established by the State shall
enjoy academic freedom. The State shall create scholarships in arts, science, and
letters for specially gifted citizens.

122
 Enacted on June 8, 1940.

123
 Approved on June 14, 1947. Repealed by Republic Act No. 8047 or the BOOK
PUBLISHING INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT ACT.

124
 Republic Act No. 139, Sec. 1. Sec. one of Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and
fifty-seven, as amended by Acts Numbered Thirty-one hundred and eighty-five, Thirty-
four hundred and two, and Thirty-seven hundred and seventy-two, is further amended
to read as follows:

Sec. 1. A board is hereby created which shall be known as the Board on Textbooks and
shall have charge of the selection and approval of textbooks to be used in the public
schools. The textbooks selected and approved shall be used for a period of at least six
years from the date of their adoption.

The textbooks to be used in the private schools recognized or authorized by the

Government shall be submitted to the Board which shall have the power to prohibit the
use of any of said textbooks which it may find to be against the law or to offend the
dignity and honor of the Government and people of the Philippines, or which it may find
to be against the general policies of the Government, or which it may deem
pedagogically unsuitable.

Decisions of the Board on Textbooks shall be subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Instruction upon the recommendation of the National Council of Education.
125
 Executive Order No. 94 (1947).

126
 Magsalin, M. Jr. (2003), The State of Philippine Legal Education Revisited, Arellano
Law and Policy Review, 4(1), 38 56 (visited May 31, 2019).

127
 Id. at 39.

128
 Republic Act No. 1124, AN ACT CREATING A BOARD OF NATIONAL EDUCATION
CHARGED WITH THE DUTY OF FORMULATING GENERAL EDUCATION POLICIES AND
DIRECTING THE EDUCATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE NATION, June 16, 1954. Later on
amended by Republic Act No. 4372 on June 19, 1965.

129
 Presidential Decree No. 1 (1972).

130
 Under Proclamation No. 1081 (1972).

131
 Under Presidential Decree No. 1397 (1978).

132
 CONSTITUTION (1973) Art. XV, Sec. 8(1), provides:

1. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of, and subject
to regulation by, the State. The State shall establish and maintain a
complete, adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to goals
of national development.

133
 Approved on September 11, 1982.

134
 Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, Part III, Chapter 3, Sec. 27, provides:

Sec. 27. Recognition of Schools. - The educational operations of schools shall be subject

to their prior authorization of the government, and shall be affected by recognition. In
the case of government operated schools, whether local, regional, or national,
recognition of educational programs and/or operations shall be deemed granted
simultaneously with establishment.

In all other cases the rules and regulations governing recognition shall be prescribed
and enforced by the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports defining therein who are
qualified to apply, providing for a permit system, stating the conditions for the grant of
recognition and for its cancellation and withdrawal, and providing for related matters.

135
 Id. at Part IV, Chapter 1, Sec. 54. Declaration of Policy. - The administration of the
education system and, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution, the supervision
and regulation of educational institutions are hereby vested in the Ministry of Education,
Culture and Sports, without prejudice to the provisions of the charter of any state
college and university.

136
 Id. at Chapter 2, Sec. 59. Declaration of Policy. - Higher education will be granted
towards the provision of better quality education, the development of middle and high-
level manpower, and the intensification of research and extension services. The main
thrust of higher education is to achieve equity, efficiency, and high quality in the
institutions of higher learning both public and private, so that together they will provide
a complete set of program offerings that meet both national and regional development
needs.

137
 Id. at Sec. 65. Bureau of Higher Education. - The Bureau of Higher Education shall
perform the following functions:

1. Develop, formulate and evaluate programs, projects and educational

standards for a higher education;

2. Provide staff assistance to the Board of Higher Education in its policy

formulation and advisory functions;

3. Provide technical assistance to encourage institutional development

programs and projects;

4. Compile, analyze and evaluate data on higher education; and

5. Perform other functions provided for by law.

138
 The State of Philippine Legal Education Revisited, supra note 126.

139
 Reorganization of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports, Prescribing its
Powers and Functions and for other purposes, Executive Order No. 117 (1987), Sec. 27,
provides:

Sec. 27. Change of Nomenclatures. - In the event of the adoption of a new Constitution

which provides for a presidential form of government, the Ministry shall be called
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the titles Minister, Deputy Minister,
and Assistant Minister shall be changed to Secretary, Undersecretary and Assistant
Secretary, respectively.

140
 Id. at Sec. 4. Mandate. - The Ministry shall be primarily responsible for the
formulation, planning, implementation and coordination of the policies, plans, programs
and projects in the areas of formal and non-formal education at all levels, supervise all
education institutions, both public and private, and provide for the establishment and
maintenance of a complete, adequate and integrated system of education relevant to
the goals of national development.

141
 Book IV, Title VI, Chapter 1, Sec. 1.

142
 Id. at Chapter 4, Sec. 10.

143
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. XIV, Sec. 4(1). The State recognizes the complementary
roles of public and private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise
reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.

144
 Approved on March 30, 1989.
145
 Art. III. Organization and Administration.

xxxx

Sec. 2. The administration of a law school shall be governed primarily by its own
policies. The provisions under this Article shall only be suppletory in character.

146
 AN ACT CREATING THE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION or THE HIGHER
EDUCATION ACT OF 1994.

147
 Art. VIII, Sec. 13, provides:

Sec. 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.
Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to
the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have
the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

148
 105 Phil. 173 (1959).

149
 Id. at 176.

150
 112 Phil. 884 (1961).

151
 361 Phil. 73, 88 (1999), as cited in Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August
15, 2017, 837 SCRA 160.

152
 Art. X, Sec. 5(5), provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may
be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights.

153
Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice, supra.

154
Baguio Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Judge Cabato-
Cortes, 627 Phil. 543, 548 (2010).

155
 Id. at 549.
156
Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, supra note 148, at 176.

157
In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534, 546 (1954).

158
People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968 (1958).

159
 Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court, Branch 81, Romblon,
Romblon, 613 Phil. 1, 23 (2009), citing Zaldivar v. Gonzales, 248 Phil. 542, 555 (1988).

160
In Re: Cunanan, supra, at 545.

161
Cayetano v. Monsod, 278 Phil. 235, 242-243 (1991).

162
 57 Phil. 600, 605 (1932).

163
 Id.

164
See Amicus Brief of Dean Sedfrey Candelaria, rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 4, pp.
1657-1677.

165
 Republic Act No. 8557 or AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADE
Y, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

166
 Id. at Sec. 3. The PHILJA shall serve as a training school for justices, judges, court
personnel, lawyers and aspirants to judicial posts. For this purpose, it shall provide and
implement a curriculum for judicial education and shall conduct seminars, workshops
and other training programs designed to upgrade their legal knowledge, moral fitness,
probity, efficiency, and capability. It shall perform such other functions and duties as
may be necessary in carrying out its mandate.

167
 Id.

168
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art.VIII, Sec. 6.
169
 As amended by Supreme Court Resolutions dated May 20, 1968 and February 13,
1992.

170
In Re: Parazo, 82 Phil. 230, 242 (1948).

171
 Id.

172
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec. 9. Examination; subjects. - Applicants, not
otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule, shall be subjected to
examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation;
Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations,
and Public Officers); International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law
(Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises (in Pleading and Conveyancing).
xxxx

Sec. 11. Annual examination. - Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines
shall take place manually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be
designated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be
distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law (morning) and Labor
and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Taxation
(afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth
day: Remedial Law (morning) and Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).

xxxx

Sec. 14. Passing average. - In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed
his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 percent
in all subjects, without falling below 50 percent in any subject. In determining the
average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the following relative weights:
Civil Law, 15 percent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 percent; Mercantile Law, 15
percent; Criminal Law, 10 percent; Political and International Law, 15 percent;
Taxation, 10 percent; Remedial Law, 20 percent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5
percent.

173
 Sec. 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. - An applicant who has passed
the required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to
the bar, shall take and subscribe before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of
office.

Sec. 18. Certificate. - The Supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a
member of the bar for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be
entered to that effect upon its records, and that a certificate of such record be given to
him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his authority to practice.

174
 Sec. 19. Attorney's roll. - The clerk of the Supreme Court shall keep a roll of all
attorneys admitted to practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when
he receives his certificate.
175
 Sec. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-
one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and
that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines.

176
Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations
through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9, 2010.

177
In Re: Need that Law Student Practicing Under Rule 138-A be Actually Supervised
During Trial, Bar Matter No. 730, June 13, 1997
https://www.lawphil.net/courts/bm/bm_730_1997.html (visited September 3, 2019).

178
Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415, 427 (1968).
179
 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (visited May 31, 2019).

180
 7 Cush. 53, 85 (1851) (visited May 31, 2019).

181
Morfe v. Mutuc, supra note 178, citing United States v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85, 94
(1910).

182
 Id., citing United States v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218, 225 (1915).

183
 Id., citing United States v. Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245, 254 (1915).

184
 127 Phil. 306 (1967).

185
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 246 Phil. 393, 398 (1988).

186
Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708 (1919); Acebedo Optical
Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 385 Phil. 956, 986 (2000).

187
JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, 93 (1996).

188
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1163 (1957).

189
United States v. Gomez Jesus, supra.

190
Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v.
Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018, citing Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972) https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/406/205/ (visited
May 31, 2019).

191
 Id.

192
Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education, 408 Phil. 483, 495,
(2001).
193
Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v.
Secretary of Education, supra.

194
 Art. XIII, Sec. 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and
subject to regulation by the State.

195
 Art. XV, Sec. 8(1). All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of, and
subject to regulation by, the State. The State shall establish and maintain a complete;
adequate, and integrated system of education relevant to the goals of national
development.

196
Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) v. Secretary of Education,
supra note 77, at 819.

197
 Supra note 195.
198
 Sec. 4.(1) The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and private
institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and
regulation of all educational institutions.

199
 Sec. 12, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the
rights of parents in the rearing of their children:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and
primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)

200
 Supra note 67.

201
See Pierce v. Society of Sisters (268 U.S. 510, 535 [1925]), where the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized that "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children
by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only."
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/268/510/> (visited May 30, 2019).

Nevertheless, a shift of responsibility from the parent to the State is observed in the
light of the compulsory education laws. (Brooke Wilkins [2005], Should Public Education
be a Federal Fundamental Right?, Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal,
2005[2], 261-290) <https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/elj/vol2005/iss2/8/> (visited
May 30, 2019).

202
See Art. 13, Sec. 3 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights which provides that:

Sec. 3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children
schools, other than,those established by the public authorities x x x.
<https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx> (visited May 30,
2019).

203
 As a legal concept, supervision is usually understood in relation with the concept of
control. Thus, in Bito-onon v. Yap Fernandez (403 Phil. 693, 702-703 [2011]), the
Court held that "[s]upervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of
mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority over
such body. [Officer] in control [lays] down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are
not followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officers merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done to
conform to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of
the act."
204
Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v.
Secretary of Education, supra note 190.

205
 Bernas, Joaquin G. (1958), State "Supervision" and "Regulation" of Private
Schools, Philippine Studies, 6(3) 295-314 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/42719389>
(visited May 30, 2019).

206
 Id. at 303.

207
 Id.

208
The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., 557
Phil. 121, 140. (2007).

209
 568 Phil. 658, 702 (2008).

210
 246 Phil. 393, 399 (1988).

211
 Supra note 190.

212
Civil Liberties Union v. The Executive Secretary, 272 Phil. 147, 162 (1991).

213
 Article XV, Sec. 8(2).

214
 CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. 13, Sec. 5, provides:

Sec. 5. x x x "Universities established by the State shall enjoy academic freedom." x x

x

215
Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, 294 Phil. 654, 672 (1993).

216
 Id. at 672-673.

217
 As notoriously stated in Keyishian v. Board of Regents (385 U.S. 589, 603 [1967]),
"academic freedom x x x is x x x a special concern of the First Amendment, which does
not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom."
<https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/385/589/> (visited May 31, 2019).

218
Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, supra note 215, at 674.

219
 220 Phil. 379 (1985).

220
 264 Phil. 98 (1990).

221
 214 Phil. 319 (1984).

222
 226 Phil. 596 (1986).

223
 160-A Phil. 929, 943-944 (1975).
224
 Id. at 944.

225
 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) <https:/supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/354/234/>
(visited May 31, 2019).

226
 To illustrate, Art. XIV, Sec. 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution prescribes that all
educational institutions "shall inculcate patriotism and nationalism, foster love of
humanity, respect for human rights, appreciation of the role of national heroes in the
historical development of the country, teach the rights and duties of citizenship,
strengthen ethical and spiritual values, develop moral character and personal discipline,
encourage critical and creative thinking, broaden scientific and technological
knowledge, and promote vocational efficiency." These are understood as mere
guidelines for the State.

227
 243 Phil. 993, 1006 (1988).

228
 408 Phil. 132 (2001).

229
See concurring opinion of Justice Teehankee in Garcia v. The Faculty and Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 223, at 949.

230
Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas, supra note 49, at 216.

231
Garcia v. The Faculty and Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra
note 223, at 943.

232
 Supra note 215, at 661.

233
 Republic Act No. 9155 (2001) or the GOVERNANCE OF BASIC EDUCATION ACT OF
2001.

234
Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v.
Secretary of Education, supra note 190.
235
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. XIV, Sec. 2(1), (2), (3), (4) and (5).

236
 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 58 (August 29, 1986).

237
 Id. at 53.

238
 Art. 13(2). The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to
achieving the full realization of this right:

(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all;

(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational
secondary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every
appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;
(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by
every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free
education;

(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for

those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary
education; [and]

(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an
adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of
teaching staff shall be continuously improved. Supra note 202.

239
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The
Right to Education (Art. 13). (Twenty-first Session, December 8, 1999)
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838c22.html> (visited May 31, 2019).

240
 Id.

241
 Art. 26(1). Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in
the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.
Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of
merit.<https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/> (visited May 31,
2019).

242
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; supra note 202, at
Art. 13(2)(c).

243
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 13: The
Right to Education (Art. 13), supra note 239.

244
 Id.

245
 Supra note 215, at 675-676.
246
 Supra note 219, at 383-384.

247
Calawag v. University of the Philippines Visayas, supra note 49, at 217.

248
 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 236.

249
 B.M. No. 979-B, supra note 2.

250
Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, p. 17.

251
 Id. at 100.

252
 Id. at 101.

253
 B.M. No. 979-B, supra note 2.
254
Land Bank of the Philippines v. AMS Farming Corporation, 590 Phil. 170, 203 (2008).

255
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Urgello, 549 Phil. 302, 322 (2007).

256
 I RECORD, SENATE 9th CONGRESS 2ND SESSION 458 (August 24, 1993).

Senator Tolentino: Thank you, Mr. President.

Now, here is one question on which I would like to be enlightened. The Council here
may provide for the minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications
to faculty members. I assume that this law admission means admission to the college
of law of the student. x x x x

I assume that minimum standards for law admission here refers [sic] to the
requirements that the student must fulfill before being admitted to the law school. x x x

257
Section 15. Prerequisites to Admission to Law School. - Section 6, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court prescribes: "No applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be
admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of
Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission
thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed
therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as
major or field of concentration: political science, logic, English, Spanish, history and
economics." (Underscoring supplied)

258
 I RECORD, SENATE 9th CONGRESS 2ND SESSION, supra note 256, at 456-457.

259
 Id. at 711 (September 22, 1993).

260
Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) v. The Secretary of Budget and
Management, 686 Phil. 357, 372-373 (2012).

261
 Re: Proposed Reforms in the Bar Examinations.

262
 Supra note 227, at 1005.

263
Rollo (G.R. No. 230642 ), Vo1. 1, p. 305.

264
 Id. at 305 and 1567-1568.

265
 Id. at 1564.

266
 Id. at 1569.

267
 Id. at 1582.

268
Tablarin v. Gutierrez, supra note 48, at 782-784.
269
 259 Phil. 1016, 1021-1022 (1989).

270
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note
223, at 945.

271
See Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 6 (1996)
<https://ched.gov.ph/cmo-6-s-1996/> (visited May 31, 2019).

272
 Id.

273
See CHED Memorandum Order No. 03 (2003) <https://ched.gov.ph/cmo-3-s-2003-
2/>  (visited September 3, 2019).

274
 The American Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law
Schools 2018 to 2019 provide:

Standard 503. ADMISSION TEST

A law school shall require each applicant for admission as a first-year J.D. degree
student to take a valid and reliable admission test to assist the school and the applicant
in assessing the applicant's capability of satisfactorily completing the school's program
of legal education. In making admissions decisions, a law school shall use the test
results in a manner that is consistent with the current guidelines regarding proper use
of the test results provided by the agency that developed the test.

Interpretation 503-1

A law school that uses an admission test other than the Law School Admission Test
sponsored by the Law School Admission Council shall demonstrate that such other test
is a valid and reliable test to assist the school in assessing an applicant's capability to
satisfactorily complete the school's program of legal education.

Interpretation 503-2

This Standard does not prescribe the particular weight that a law school should give to
an applicant's' admission test score in deciding whether to admit or deny admission to
the applicant.

Interpretation 503-3

(a) It is not a violation of this Standard for a law school to admit no more than 10% of
an entering class without requiring the LSAT from:
(1) Students in an undergraduate program of the same institution as the J.D. program;
and/or

(2) Students seeking the J.D. degree in combination with a degree in a different
discipline.
(b) Applicants admitted under subsection (a) must meet the following conditions:
(1) Scored at or above the 85th percentile on the ACT or SAT for purposes of subsection
(a)(1), or for purposes of subsection (a)(2), scored at or above the 85th percentile on
the GRE or GMAT; and

(2) Ranked in the top 10% of their undergraduate class through six semesters of
academic work, or achieved a cumulative GPA of 3.5 or above through six semesters of
academic work.
<https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/St
andards/2018-2019ABAStandardsforApprovalofLawSchools/2018-2019-aba-standards-
chapter5.pdf> (visited May 31, 2019).

275
 16. Separability Clause - If any part or provision of this memorandum order is
declared invalid or unconstitutional, all other provisions shall remain valid and effective.

276
Tablarin v. Gutierrez, supra note 48, at 779.

277
Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. 1, pp. 119-120.

278
 Id. at 123.

279
 LEBMO No. 7-2016, provides:

xxxx

13. General Average - Beginning in Academic/School Year 2018-2019, the requirement

of a general average of not less than eighty percent (80%) or 2.5 for admission in the
basic law course under Section 23 of [LEBMO No. 1-2011] shall be withdrawn and
removed.

280
 Supra note 277, at 123 and 136-137.

281
 702 Phil. 191, 201 (2013).

282
 G.R. No. 211273, April 18, 2018.

283
Amicus Brief of Dean Sedfrey Candelaria, supra note 164, at 1674.
284
 Supra note 277, at 133.

285
 Supra note 277, at 191-192.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

I concur in the result,1 but I tender this opinion to briefly explain my reasons as to why
the provisions of Legal Education Board (LEB) Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of
20162 (LEBMO No. 7-2016) that mandatorily require the passing of the Philippine Law
School Admission Test (PhiLSAT) as a pre-requisite for admission to any law school
violate institutional academic freedom and hence, unconstitutional.

Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that "[a]cademic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."3 According to case
law; "[t]his institutional academic freedom includes the right of the school or college to
decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term
'academic freedom' encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic
grounds: (1) [w]ho may teach, (2) [w]hat may be taught, (3) [h]ow it shall be taught,
and (4) [w]ho may be admitted to study."4 This fourth freedom of law schools to
determine "who may be admitted to study" is at the core of the present controversy
involving the PhiLSAT.

The PhiLSAT is essentially a standardized aptitude test measuring the examinees'

communications and language proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and
quantitative reasoning.5 It is designed to measure the academic potential of the
examinee to pursue the study of law. 6 One of the essential provisions of LEBMO No. 7-
20.16 is paragraph 9, which states that passing the PhiLSAT is required for admission
to any law school in the Philippines, and that no applicant shall be admitted for
enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses leading to a degree of either
Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within two
(2) years before the start of the study. The PhiLSAT has a passing score of 55%. 7 To
concretize the mandatory nature of the PhiLSAT, paragraph 15 of LEBMO No. 7-2016
provides that law schools that violate the issuance shall be administratively sanctioned
and/or fined in the amount of up to P10,000.00 for each infraction. The administrative
sanctions direly encompass: (a) termination of the law program (closing the law
school); (b) phasing out of the law program; and (c) provisional cancellation of the
Government Recognition and putting the law program of the substandard law school
under Permit Status.8 As the PhiLSAT is a requirement mandatorily imposed by LEBMO
No. 7-2016, non-compliance therewith would result into these potential consequences.

Compliance with the PhiLSAT effectively means a surrender of the law schools'
academic freedom to determine who to admit to their institutions for study. This is
because the PhiLSAT operates as a sifting mechanism that narrows down the pool of
potential candidates from which law schools may then select their future students. With
the grave administrative sanctions imposed for non-compliance, the surrender of this
facet of academic freedom is clearly compulsory, because failing to subscribe to the
PhiLSAT requirement is tantamount to the law school risking its complete closure or the
phasing out of its law program. This effectively results in the complete control -
not mere supervision - of the State over a significant aspect of the institutions'
academic freedom.

Notably, the core legal basis for the PhiLSAT is derived from Section 7 (e) of Republic
Act No. 76629 which empowers the LEB "to prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission x x x." On a broader scale, Section 7 (b) of the same law empowers the LEB
"to supervise the law schools in the country x x x." This is a specific iteration of Section
4 (1), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "[t]he State x x x shall
exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational
institutions."10"Reasonable supervision," as the Framers intended, meant only
"external" and not "internal" governance; as such, it is meant to exclude the
right to manage, dictate, overrule, prohibit, and dominate. 11

As elucidated in the fairly recent case of Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and
Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education:12

The Framers were explicit, however, that this supervision refers to  external
governance, as opposed to internal governance which was reserved to the
respective school boards, thus:
Madam President, Section 2(b) introduces four changes: one, the addition of the word
"reasonable" before the phrase "supervision and regulation"; two, the addition of the
word "quality" before the word "education"; three, the change of the wordings in the
1973 Constitution referring to a system of education, requiring the same to be relevant
to the goals of national development, to the present expression of "relevant to the
needs of the people and society"; and four, the explanation of the meaning of the
expression "integrated system of education" by defining the same as the recognition
and strengthening of the complementary roles of public and private
educational institutions as separate but integral parts of the total Philippine
educational system.

When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external

governance of educational institutions, particularly private educational institutions
as distinguished from the internal governance by their respective boards of directors or
trustees and their administrative officials. Even without a provision on external
governance, the State would still have the inherent right to regulate educational
institutions through the exercise of its police power. We have thought it advisable to
restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the State provided in the 1935 and
1973 Constitutions with the addition of the word "reasonable." We found it necessary to
add the word "reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our Supreme Court in a
decision in the case of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. The
Secretary of Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court
said, and I quote:
It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides
for control of education by the State.

The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate means
power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to
prove that State control of private education was intended by organic law.
The addition, therefore, of the word "reasonable" is meant to underscore the
sense of the committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State
supervision and regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer only
to the power of the State to provide regulations and to see to it that these
regulations are duly followed and implemented. It does not include the right
to manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the
right to dominate.13 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria (Dean Candelaria) in his Amicus Brief,
"[w]hen [the] LEB took over the functions of the [Commission on Higher Education
(CHED)] in relation to law schools, it is safe to presume that the scope of power of
[the] LEB should be no more than what [the] CHED had traditionally exercised over law
schools."14 As to what he insinuates as "reasonable supervision" over institutions of
higher learning, the State may, through the appropriate agency, determine the: (a)
minimum unit requirements for a specific academic program; (b) general education
distribution requirements; and (c) specific professional subjects as may be stipulated by
the various licensing entities.15 These activities may ostensibly fall under the category
of "external governance" and hence, "reasonable supervision," as compared to a
mandatory, exclusively State crafted aptitude test which not only operates as a
predetermination of the schools' potential candidates for admission but also brandishes
the total closure of the institution or phasing out of the academic program as
punishment for noncompliance. The latter is, to my mind, a form of State domination
that translates to "internal governance" and hence, the exercise of the State's control
over academic freedom. As earlier intimated, this strays from the intent of the Framers
of our Constitution.

While the more intricate contours of "academic freedom" have yet to be charted in our
jurisprudence as compared to other individual liberties, Dean Candelaria, in his Amicus
Brief, also broached the idea that academic freedom is an aspect of the freedom of
expression, and hence, any regulation thereof is subject to strict scrutiny. 16 The tie
between academic freedom and freedom of expression has yet to be definitively settled
in our jurisprudence, Neve1iheless, there is ostensible merit in this theory since an
institution of higher learning may be treated as the embodiment of the composite rights
of its individual educators, and ultimately, an educational method of instruction is a
form of communication. Learning necessarily connotes an exchange of ideas. The
transmission of knowledge does not happen in a vacuum but within a framework that
the school autonomously determines - subject only to reasonable State regulation - a
cognate part of which is who it deems fit for its instruction. As Associate Justice Marvic
M.V.F. Leonen eloquently stated in his Separate Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,
academic discussions and other forms of scholarship are manifestations and extensions
of an individual's thoughts and beliefs.17 Academic freedom is anchored on the
recognition that academic institutions perform a social function, and its business is
conducted for the common good; that is, it is a necessary tool for critical inquiry of
truth and its free exposition. Thus, the guarantee of academic freedom is
complementary to the freedom of expression and the freedom of the mind.18

The theoretical transposition of the concept of freedom of expression/ freedom of the

mind to institutional academic freedom would greatly impact the dynamic of how this
Court would henceforth deal with regulations affecting institutions of higher learning
because, as mentioned, the test to be applied would be strict scrutiny. 19 "Strict scrutiny
entails that the presumed law or policy must be justified by a compelling state or
government interest, that such law or policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve that
goal or interest, and that the law or policy must be the least restrictive means for
achieving that interest."20

In this case, while the policy of the State to "uplift the standards of legal
education"21 may be characterized as a compelling State interest, the means of
achieving this goal, through the PhiLSAT, together with its mandatory and exclusionary
features as above-discussed, do not appear to be narrowly tailored or the least
restrictive means for achieving this interest. There is no concrete showing why the
implementation of a standardized but optional State aptitude exam, which schools may
freely adopt in their discretion as a tool for their own determination of who to admit
(such as the National Medical Aptitude Test for medical schools or the Law School
Admission Test in the United States of America), would be less of a "sifting" measure
than a mandatory and exclusively State-determined one (such as the PhiLSAT). This is
especially so since, as conceded by LEB Chairperson Emerson B. Aquende during the
oral arguments in this case, there is no statistical basis 22 to show the propensity of the
PhiLSAT to improve the quality of legal education. Furthermore, no other study or
evaluation regarding the viability of the PhiLSAT was shown to this effect. It is true that
in a general sense, the PhiLSAT operates as a basic aptitude exam which seeks to test
skills that have rational connection to the field of law, i.e., communications and
language proficiency, critical thinking, and verbal and quantitative reasoning. However,
because the test was solely crafted by the LEB, it completely excludes the law schools'
input and participation, and worse, even puts their very existence in jeopardy should
there be non-subservience. Verily, an absolutist approach in any facet of academic
freedom would not only result in an overly restrictive State regulation, it would also be
practically counterproductive because law schools, being at the forefront, are the
quintessential stakeholders to the mission of improving legal education. Again, by
constitutional fiat, the State's role is limited to reasonable supervision, not control. For
these reasons, the provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 on the PhiLSAT clearly transgress
institutional academic freedom.

Accordingly, I concur in the result.

Endnotes:

1
 See fallo of the ponencia, pp. 101-103.

2
 "POLICIES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF A NATIONWIDE
UNIFORM LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION TEST FOR APPLICANTS TO THE BASIC LAW
COURSES IN ALL LAW SCHOOLS IN THE COUNTRY," issued on December 29, 2016.

3
 Emphases supplied.
4
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 455-456 (2000);
emphases and underscoring supplied.

5
Rollo (G.R. No. 230642), Vol. I, p. 216.

6
 See LEBMO No. 7-2016, paragraph 2.

7
 See LEBMO No. 7-2016, paragraph 14.

8
 See LEBMO No. 2-2013, "LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD MEMORANDUM ORDER No. 2:
ADDITIONAL RULES IN THE OPERATION OF THE LAW PROGRAM" (June 1, 2014),
Section 32.

9
 Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR
THE PURPOSE A LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," otherwise
known as the "LEGAL EDUCATION REFORM ACT OF 1993," approved on December 23,
1993.

10
 Emphasis and underscoring supplied.

11
 See Amicus Brief dated March 27, 2019 of Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, p. 5;
emphasis and underscoring supplied.

12
 See G.R. Nos. 216930, 217451, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218123 and 218465,
October 9, 2018.

13
 See id.

14
 See Amicus Brief, p. 12.

15
 Id. at 7.

16
 Id. at 12-13.

17
 See Justice Leonen's Separate Dissenting and Concurring Opinion.

18
 See id.

19
 Strict scrutiny applies to "laws dealing with freedom of the mind." It is also "used
today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race
as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection." (See White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 462-463
[2009].)

20
Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., 602 Phil. 625, 663 (2009);
underscoring supplied.

21
 See Republic Act No. 7662, Section 2.

22
 See TSN, March 5, 2019, pp. 171-182.

SEPARATE DISSENTING AND CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:

The provisions permitting the imposition of the Philippine Law School Admission Test, as
well as the entire concept of the Legal Education Board, are unconstitutional for
intruding on the academic freedom of law schools and the universities and colleges to
which they belong. The State has no business in deciding and substituting its judgment
for the academic institutions. Any government attempt to dictate upon universities the
qualifications of their studentry or interfere with their curriculum undermines the
school's academic freedom.
Institutions of learning perform a vital function in nurturing and sharpening the people's
understanding and intellect. They ensure an educated and thriving citizenry on whom a
nation's civilization and life depend. Education leads to an economically productive
populace through learned skill. More importantly, it gears the people toward thinking
more prudently and critically.

Without educational institutions, our country will inevitably approach a shallow and
dismal future. Thus, the State has a paramount interest in guaranteeing that they
flourish and function robustly. Part and parcel of this guarantee is to allow them to
freely determine for themselves their "aims and objectives and how best to attain
them."1

One (1) of the four (4) essential academic freedoms is the academic institutions' right
to determine who they will admit to study. In ascertaining who to admit in their
institutions, law schools should be given autonomy in establishing their own policies,
including the examination that they will employ.

The Philippine Law School Admission Test is an unwarranted intrusion into this essential
freedom. The government's imposition of a passing score as a bar to admission violates
the educational institutions' academic freedom to determine who to admit to study. The
existence of the Legal Education Board, on the other hand, interferes with the right of
academic institutions with respect to how to teach and who to teach.

Academic freedom, as enshrined in our present Constitution, guarantees the

fundamental protection to academic institutions. Article XIV, Section 5(2) states that
"[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning."

This provision is equivalent to its precursor, Article XV, Section 8(2) of the 1973
Constitution, which stated that "[a]ll institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic
freedom." This, in turn, was an expansion of its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution
which limited the grant 'of academic freedom to state-established universities. Article
XIII, Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution stated:
SECTION 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to
regulation by the State; The Government shall establish and maintain a complete and
adequate system of public education, and shall provide at least free public primary
instruction, and citizenship training to adult citizens. All schools shall aim to develop
moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and vocational efficiency, and to
teach the duties of citizenship. Optional religious instruction shall be maintained in the
public schools as now authorized by law. Universities established by the State shall
enjoy academic freedom. The· State shall create scholarships in arts, science, and
letters for specially gifted citizens.
From this, the 1973 Constitution provided a broader protection by giving the same
guarantee to private educational institutions.2

The nature and scope of academic freedom was first discussed at length in the 1975
case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology.3 This
Court recognized academic freedom as an institutional facet, and not solely confined to
individual academic freedom or the right of faculty members to pursue their studies
without fear of reprisal. In interpreting the import of the constitutional provision, this
Court said:
For it is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the
recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed
of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them.
It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending
to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose,
nullify its intent. Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines,
in his Philippine Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right
of academic freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from the
academic freedom of a university professor."4 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Garcia concerned a Petition for Mandamus filed by Epicharis Garcia, a woman, to
compel the Loyola School of Theology to allow her to continue her studies in the
seminary. In dismissing the Petition, this Court upheld the discretion of educational
institutions to choose who may be admitted to study. 5Garcia referred to the four (4)
essential freedoms as the parameters of academic freedom:
Justice Frankfurter, with his extensive background in legal education as a former
Professor of the Harvard Law School, referred to what he called the business of a
university and the four essential freedoms in the following language: "It is the business
of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the four essential
freedoms' of a university - to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach,
what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study."6 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Justice Claudio Teehankee's concurring opinion in Garcia is also instructive. He
recognized that courts have neither the competence nor the inclination to decide who
shall be admitted to an educational institution. Instead, they will only overturn the
judgment of academic institutions after an exhaustion of administrative remedies and
upon showing of arbitrariness on the school's part. He explained:

Only after exhaustion of administrative remedies and when there is marked

arbitrariness, will the courts interfere with the academic judgment of the school faculty
and the proper authorities as to the competence and fitness of an applicant for
enrollment or to continue taking up graduate studies in a graduate school. The courts
simply do not have the competence nor inclination to constitute themselves as
Admission Committees of the universities and institutions of higher learning and to
substitute their judgment for that of the regularly constituted Admission Committees of
such educational institutions. Were the courts to do so, they would conceivably be
swamped with petitions for admission from the thousands refused admission every
year, and next the thousands who flunked and were dropped would also be petitioning
the courts for a judicial review of their grades. 7

Following the ruling in Garcia, this Court in Tangonan v. Paño8 reiterated that it cannot
compel academic institutions to admit students who fail to meet standard policies and
qualifications. To rule otherwise, it held, would violate the institution's discretion on the
admission and enrollment of students as a major component of academic freedom:
[S]till petitioner would want Us to compel respondent school to enroll her despite her
failure to meet the standard policies and qualifications set by the school. To grant such
relief would be doing violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by the respondent
school enshrined under Article XV, Section 8, Par. 2 of our Constitution which mandates
"that all institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom." This institutional
academic freedom includes not only the freedom of professionally qualified persons to
inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they see it in the field of their
competence subject to no control or authority except of rational methods by which
truths and conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines, but also the right
of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them - the grant being to institutions of higher learning - free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint.9

In San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals,10 this Court likewise ruled that a student's
failure to comply with academic standards justifies the institution's refusal to admit him
or her.

An institution's discretion in determining who to admit extends to its decision on who to

dismiss. In Ateneo De Manila University v. Capulong,11 this Court upheld the
institution's discretion to dismiss erring students. It reiterated that schools have the
right to establish academic and disciplinary standards, and in failing to comply with
these standards, a student can be validly dismissed:
Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary
proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a
school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While
under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of
study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to
graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution.

For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the
admission, discipline and promotion of students. . . .

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the
successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing student
discipline." Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing university-
student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded
as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its
very survival.12 (Citations omitted)
In Licup v. University of San Carlos,13 the petitioners were students who had been
denied readmission to the university after a chaotic assembly that resulted in violations
of the university handbook rules. They were also found to have academic deficiencies.
In upholding the university's decision, this Court held that the students were not
deprived of due process during the investigation, and that their serious breach of
discipline and failure to maintain the academic standard forfeited their contractual right
to continue studying in the university.14 This Court ruled similarly in Alcuaz v. Philippine
School of Business Administration,15Magtibay v. Garcia,16University of San Agustin v.
Court of Appeals,17 and Spouses Go v. Colegio de San Juan de Letran.18
In Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,19 this Court further amplified the
scope of academic freedom when it upheld the institution's right to discipline its
students. It pronounced:
Section 5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of
the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain
them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term
"academic freedom" encompasses the freedom to determine for itself on academic
grounds:
(1) Who may teach,
(2) What may be taught,
(3) How it shall be taught, and
(4) Who may be admitted to study.
The right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third
freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly cannot function in an
atmosphere of anarchy.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution

requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational
program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such
rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty,
and property.

Moreover, the school has an interest in teaching the student discipline, a necessary, if
not indispensable, value in any field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school
teaches discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student likewise finds basis in
the freedom "what to teach."20 (Citations omitted)
An academic institution's right to discipline its students was held applicable even to
students' activities outside campus premises. In Angeles v. Sison,21 this Court ruled that
the school's power over its students does not absolutely cease when they set foot
outside the school premises. Moreover, the students' conduct, if directly affecting the
school's good order and welfare, may be subject to its discipline:
A college, or any school for that matter, has a dual responsibility to its students. One is
to provide opportunities for learning and the other is to help them grow and develop
into mature, responsible, effective and worthy citizens of the community. Discipline is
one of the means to carry out the second responsibility.

Thus, there can be no doubt that the establishment of an educational institution

requires rules and regulations necessary for the maintenance of an orderly educational
program and the creation of an educational environment conducive to learning. Such
rules and regulations are equally necessary for the protection of the students, faculty,
and property. The power of school officials to investigate, an adjunct of its power to
suspend or expel, is a necessary corollary to the enforcement of such rules and
regulations and the maintenance of a safe and orderly educational environment
conducive to learning.

....

Common sense dictates that the school retains its power to compel its students in or
off-campus to a norm of conduct compatible with their standing as members of the
academic community. Hence, when as in the case at bar, the misconduct complained of
directly affects the suitability of the alleged violators as students, there is no reason
why the school cannot impose the same disciplinary action as when the act took place
inside the campus.22
In the more recent case of Cudia v. Superintendent of the Philippine Military
Academy,23 this Court reiterated that a school's right to discipline its students is part of
the third essential freedom. There, this Court upheld the Philippine Military Academy's
enforcement of its internal rules pursuant to its academic freedom. The petitioner in
Cudia was a graduating honor student who was dismissed for violating the institution's
Honor Code. Affirming the dismissal, this Court ruled that the academy enjoys
academic· freedom to impose disciplinary measures and punishment as it deems fit:
The schools' power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic
freedom and that "the establishment of rules governing university-student relations,
particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely
to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival." As a
Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without water."
Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the school's disciplinary power assure its
right to survive and continue operating. In this regard, the Court has always recognized
the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to
dismiss or expel, on students who violate disciplinary rules. 24 (Citations omitted)
Nevertheless, in Villar v. Technological Institute of the Philippines,25 this Court clarified
that the discretion of educational institutions is not absolute as to impinge on the
students' constitutional rights. In Villar, the petitioners took part in an assembly and
were subsequently denied admission by the university, which claimed that the students
flunked. In finding that some of the petitioners did not violate the school's academic
standards, this Court ruled that while the institution can deny admission to students
with academic deficiencies, the academic freedom it enjoys cannot be used to
discriminate against qualified students who exercise their constitutional rights. 26 This
Court held:
The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to
set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice
for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be
followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who
exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so,
then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the
equal protection clause being disregarded.27
Similarly, in Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.,28 this Court ruled
against the university's refusal to admit the petitioner as its, student. Explaining that
"academic freedom has never been meant to be an unabridged license[,]" it held that
the university cannot hide behind the shroud of academic freedom to act arbitrarily in
dismissing a student.29Malabanan v. Ramento,30Arreza v. Gregorio Araneta
University,31Guzman v. National University,32Non v. Dames II33 were ruled in the same
vein.

An academic institution's discretion applies not only to the admission and dismissal of
its students, but also to its decision to confer academic recognition. In Morales v. Board
of Regents,34 the petitioner was a University of the Philippines student who questioned
the university's decision not to grant her the academic distinction of cum laude due to a
contested grade computation. In upholding this decision, this Court emphasized that
"the wide sphere of autonomy given to universities in the exercise of academic freedom
extends to the right to confer academic honors." It held:
[The] exercise of academic freedom grants the University the exclusive discretion to
determine to whom among Its graduates it shall confer academic recognition, based on
its established standards. And the courts may not interfere with such exercise of
discretion unless there is a clear showing that the University has arbitrarily and
capriciously exercised its judgment. Unlike the UP Board of Regents that has the
competence and expertise in granting honors to graduating students of the University,
courts do not have the competence to constitute themselves as an Honor's Committee
and substitute their judgment for that of the University officials. 35
Nevertheless, this Court has affirmed in the past the State's power to intrude-in very
limited circumstances-into the admission process of schools imbued with public interest.
Specifically, students applying to medical schools have to take and pass a state-
sponsored examination as a condition to their admission.

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez,36 the petitioners questioned the constitutionality of the National

Medical Admission Test, a uniform admission test required by the Board of Medical
Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement. 37 They sought
to declare as unconstitutional portions of Republic Act No. 2382 and Ministry of
Education, Culture, and Sports Order No. 52-1985, which require "the taking and
passing of the [National Medical Admission Test] as a condition for securing certificates
of eligibility for admission."38 The order characterizes the test as an aptitude
examination that aims to upgrade "the selection of applicants for admission into the
medical schools and . . . to improve the quality of medical education in the country." 39

In denying the Petition, this Court ruled that the requirement of taking and passing the
National Medical Admission Test was a valid exercise of police power. It found the
objectives cited in the order to be valid. It also found a reasonable relation between
prescribing the test as a condition for admission to medical schools and securing the
health and safety of the general public. 40

Tablarin characterized state-sponsored admission tests as an exercise of police power

that advanced legitimate interests.

This was further elaborated in Department of Education, Culture, and Sports v. San
Diego,41 the issue of which also revolved around the National Medical Admission Test. In
that case, the petitioners were students who questioned the three-flunk rule, which
states that students may only take the exam thrice, and are barred from taking it again
after three (3) successive failures.42 They argued that this limitation violates their
constitutional right to academic freedom and education.

The trial court first ruled in favor of petitioners, finding that the three flunk rule was an
arbitrary exercise of police power.43 However, this Court reversed its decision and,
reiterating its pronouncements in Tablarin, found the National Medical Admission Test
to be a valid exercise of police power:
The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily
entrust their lives and health.
The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of
the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the
medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not
qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a

constitutional right to be a doctor. This is true of any other calling in which the public
interest is involved; and the closer the link, the longer the bridge to one's ambition. The
State has the responsibility to harness its human resources and to see to it that they
are not dissipated or, no less worse, not used at all. These resources must be applied in
a manner that will best promote the common good while also giving the individual a
sense of satisfaction.

A person cannot insist on being a physician if he will be a menace to his patients. If one
who wants to be a lawyer may prove better as a plumber, he should be so advised and
adviced (sic). Of course, he may not be forced to be a plumber, but on the other hand
he may not force his entry into the bar. By the same token, a student who has
demonstrated promise as a pianist cannot be shunted aside to take a course in nursing,
however appropriate this career may be for others.

The right to quality education invoked by the private respondent is not absolute. The
Constitution also provides that "every citizen has the right to choose a profession or
course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements."

The private respondent must yield to the challenged rule and give way to those better
prepared. Where even those who have qualified may still not be accommodated in our
already crowded medical schools, there is all the more reason to bar those who, like
him, have been tested and found wanting.

The contention that the challenged rule violates the equal protection clause is not well-
taken. A law does not have to operate with equal force on all persons or things to be
conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.

There can be no question that a substantial distinction exists between medical students
and other students who are not subjected to the National Medical Admission Test and
the three-flunk rule. The medical profession directly affects the very lives of the people,
unlike other careers which, for this reason, do not require more vigilant regulation. The
accountant, for example, while belonging to an equally respectable profession, does not
hold the same delicate responsibility as that of the physician and so need not be
similarly treated.44 (Citation omitted)
Department of Education, Culture, and Sports highlighted the special character of the
medical profession, which justifies the three-flunk rule in the National Medical
Admission Test in force at that time. As the medical profession "directly affects the very
lives of the people,"45 this Court found that the three-flunk rule was valid insofar as it
seeks to admit only those who are academically qualified to study in a medical school.

Tablarin and Department of Education, Culture, and Sports both resolved issues on the

right to quality education and the right to choose a profession vis-a-vis the State's
power to regulate admission to schools through a uniform aptitude test. In both cases,
this Court found that administering the National Medical Admission Test was a
reasonable exercise of police power.

However, it should be remembered that the parties in these cases were student-
applicants who asserted their right to the course of study of their own choosing. The
issue of institutional academic freedom in relation to a standardized test imposed by
the State was not discussed. The medical schools covered by the order that
institutionalizes the National Medical Admission Test have not asserted their exclusive
right to determine who may be admitted to their institutions pursuant to their academic
freedom.

Reyes v. Court of Appeals46 comes close. There, students of the' University of the

Philippines College of Medicine questioned the National Medical Admission Test's cut-off
grade for admission, which was prescribed by the college faculty but was not approved
by the University Council. The faculty, for its part, asserted institutional academic
freedom in arguing that it had the power to determine the admission requirements of
the college. However, this Court found that this power was vested in the University
Council, not the faculty:
Under the UP Charter, the power to fix admission requirements is vested in the
University Council of the autonomous campus which is composed of the President of the
University of the Philippines and of all instructors holding the rank of professor,
associate professor or assistant professor (Section 9, Act 1870). Consequently, the UC
alone has the right to protest against any unauthorized exercise of its power.
Petitioners cannot impugn these BOR directives on the ground of academic freedom
inasmuch as their rights as university teachers remain unaffected. 47
Reyes, therefore, resolved an issue that was not so much a question of whether the
State violated institutional academic freedom, but whether it was the proper academic
unit that asserted this freedom.

The crucial question before this Court now is whether the state-sponsored Philippine
Law School Admission Test, in its current configuration, violates institutional academic
freedom.

I agree with the majority that it does.

As found by the majority, the Philippine Law School Admission Test, unlike the National
Medical Admission Test, violates institutional academic freedom 48 insofar as it prescribes
a passing score that must be followed by law schools. 49 Failure to reach the passing
score will disqualify the examinee from admission to any Philippine law school. This is
because a Certificate of Eligibility is necessary for enrollment as a first year law
student.50 Respondent Legal Education Board, which administers the test, only allows
law schools to impose additional requirements for admission, but passing the test is still
mandatory.51 The failure of law schools to abide by these requirements exposes them to
administrative sanctions.52

In contrast, failure to achieve a certain score in the National Medical Admission Test no
longer disqualifies an examinee from applying to all medical schools. For one, test
scores are reported with a corresponding percentile rank that ranges from 1 to 99+. It
"indicates the percentage of [National Medical Admission Test] examinees who have
[test] scores the same as or lower than the examinee." 53 This percentile rank is
evaluated by the medical schools against the cut-off grade that they themselves
determine.54 Hence, the percentile rank cut-off is only a "minimum score that qualifies
an examinee as a bonafide applicant for admission into his/her preferred medical
school."55 The test score only determines the available medical schools where a person
may apply; the higher the score, the more options the applicant has.

Thus, I agree with the majority's characterization that the Philippine Law School
Admission Test employs a "totalitarian scheme"56 that leaves the actions of law schools
entirely dependent on the test results. 57 It usurps the right of law schools to determine
the admission requirements for its would-be students-ultimately infringing on the
institutional academic freedom they possess, as guaranteed by the Constitution.

II

However, the majority ruled that the Philippine Law School Admission Test is
unconstitutional only insofar as it is a mandatory requirement for the law schools'
admissions processes.

I disagree. The Philippine Law School Admission Test-or, for that matter, any national
admission test-even if not made mandatory, still infringes on academic freedom.

Academic freedom as a constitutional right should be interpreted with the

understanding that this guarantee lies within the broader sphere of the Bill of Rights.

Academic discussions and other forms of scholarship are manifestations and extensions
of an individual's thoughts and beliefs. Thus, academic freedom is constitutionally
granted to students, faculty, and academic institutions alike:
Notwithstanding the increasingly broad reach of academic freedom and the current
emphasis on the essentiality of autonomy for academic institutions, the freedom of
individual faculty members against control of thought or utterance from either within or
without the employing institutions remains the core of the matter. If this freedom
exists and reasonably adequate academic administration and methods of faculty
selection prevail, intellectual interchange and pursuit of knowledge are secured. A
substantial degree of institutional autonomy is both a usual prerequisite and a normal
consequence of such a state of affairs. . . . Hence the main concern over developing
and maintaining academic freedom in this country has focused upon encouragement
and protection of the freedom of the faculty member. 58 (Emphasis supplied)
Academic freedom is anchored on the recognition that academic institutions perform a
social function and its business is conducted for the common good; that is, it is a
necessary tool for critical inquiry of truth and its free exposition. The guarantee of
academic freedom is complementary to freedom of expression and of the mind.

Thus, to foster an environment of critical discussion and inquiry, the faculty must be
given a degree of independence from their employers, and universities must have a
degree of independence from the State.59 This constitutional protection guaranteed for
the students, faculty, and institutions is not merely a job-related concern or an
institutional interest; rather, it "promotes First Amendment values of general concern to
all citizens m a democracy."60

As eloquently discussed by then Justice Felix Makasiar in his dissenting opinion

in Garcia, blows against academic freedom inevitably strike at the core of freedom of
expression:
The cardinal article of faith of our democratic civilization is the preservation and
enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality. It was Mr. Justice
Frankfurter himself who emphasized that man's "inviolate character" should be
"protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel
of his person", so that the individual can fully develop himself and achieve complete
fulfillment. His freedom to seek his own happiness would mean nothing if the same
were not given sanctuary "against the assaults of opportunism, the expediency of the
passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments and the scorn and derision of those
who have no patience with general principles".

. . . This individual freedom and right to happiness should be recognized and respected
not only by the State but also by enterprises authorized by the State to operate; for as
Laski stressed: "Without freedom of the mind . . . a man has no protection in our social
order. He may speak wrongly or foolishly, . . . Yet a denial of his right . . . is a denial of
his happiness. Thereby he becomes an instrument of other people's ends, not himself
an end".

As Justice Holmes pronounced, "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market; and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out".

The human mind is by nature an inquiring mind, whether of the very young or of the
very old or in-between; for freedom of speech in the words of John Milton is the "liberty
to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience above all liberties."

What is involved here is not merely academic freedom of the higher institutions of
learning as guaranteed by Section 8(2) of Article [X]V of the 1973 Constitution. The
issue here strikes at the broader freedom of expression of the individual - the very core
of human liberty.

Even if the term "academic freedom" were to be limited to institutions of higher

learning - which to the mind of Dr. Vicente Sinco, an eminent authority in Constitutional
Law, is the right of the university as an institution, not the academic freedom of the
university professor - the term "institutions of higher learning" contained in the
aforecited provision of our New Constitution comprehends not only the faculty and the
college administrators but also the members of the student body. While it is true that
the university professor may have the initiative and resourcefulness to pursue his own
research and formulate his conclusions concerning the problem of his own science or
subject, the motivation therefor may be provoked by questions addressed to him by his
students. In this respect, the student - specially a graduate student - must not be
restrained from raising questions or from challenging the validity of dogmas, whether
theological or not. The true scholar never avoids, but on the contrary welcomes and
encourages, such searching questions even if the same will have the tendency to
uncover his own ignorance. It is not the happiness and self-fulfillment of the professor
alone that are guaranteed. The happiness and full development of the curious intellect
of the student are protected by the narrow guarantee of academic freedom and more
so by the broader right of free expression, which includes free speech and press, and
academic freedom.61 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Academic freedom is intertwined with intellectual liberty. It is inseparable from one's
freedom of thought, speech, expression, and the press.62 Thus, the institutions' and
individuals' right to pursue learning must be "free from internal and external
interference or pressure."63

In American jurisprudence, the protection of academic freedom has been identified as a

subset of the First Amendment.64 In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,65 the U.S. Supreme
Court tied the First Amendment values of critical inquiry and search for truth to the
autonomy of academic institutions and its faculty from the State's intrusion:
No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who
guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in
our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of
education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be
made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will
stagnate and die.66
Freedom of expression is a cognate of academic freedom. Hence, the zealous protection
accorded to freedom of expression must necessarily be reflected in the level of
protection that covers academic freedom. Any form of State intrusion against academic
freedom must be treated suspect.

Central to the resolution of this case is the freedom of academic institutions,

particularly law schools, to determine who may be admitted to study. As part of their
academic self-government, law schools are given the discretion to come up with an
autonomous decision on their admission policies, including the examination they will
administer. A state-sponsored examination like the Philippine Law School Admission
Test, which tends to control the internal affairs of academic institutions, runs afoul of
that essential freedom.

Moreover, according to the majority, "[t]he subject of the [Philippine Law School
Admission Test] is to improve the quality of legal education." 67 Thus, under the State's
police power, the imposition of the test is justified by the State's interest to improve the
quality of legal education.68

I view that the thesis that changing the admissions policy will improve the quality of
law schools is non-sequitur.

The standards for choosing who to admit are entirely different from the standards for
maintaining or ensuring the quality of instruction. The process of admitting students is
unrelated to the quality of the law school. Even if it were indeed related, respondent
Legal Education Board has done no specific study to justify the administration of the
Philippine Law School Admission Test. Test makers even admit that admission tests do
not measure "smartness."69 It is not an accurate barometer of merit, but only a
measure of correlation between the exam scores and the students' first-year
grades.70 At best, respondent Legal Education Board relied on anecdotal evidence,
which, in academic circles, is the worst way to justify policy. The Philippine Law School
Admission Test is, therefore, arbitrary.

A closer look shows that the Philippine Law School Admission Test does not merely
recommend, but dictates on law schools who are qualified to be admitted. By
prescribing a passing score and predetermining who may enroll in law schools, the
State forces its judgment on the institutions, when it has no business doing so. Any
governmental attempt to dictate upon schools the composition of their studentry
undermines their institutional academic freedom.71

Moreover, the final basis of the administration of the Philippine Law School Admission
Test, regardless of whether there have been consultants, will always rest on the
government-appointed members of respondent Legal Education Board. Yet, as this case
shows, the Chair of the Board may not have the postgraduate academic, teaching, or
college or university administrator credentials. Being government appointees, its
members are prone to influences by their appointing power, consequently undermining
the academe's most significant roles: to inquire into the truth, to powerfully
disseminate this truth, and to speak this truth to power.

In the United States, admission to law schools is usually preceded by taking a

standardized aptitude examination called the Law School Admission Test. While it may
seem similar to our own test, important distinctions must be made. First, the U.S. Law
School Admission Test is not a state-sponsored exam. It is administered by the Law
School Admission Council, a private nonprofit that promotes "quality, access, and equity
in law and education[.]"72 Hence, the Law School Admission Test is a mere creation of
law schools.73

In some cases, an aspiring student may even be accepted to a law school without
taking the test.74 Thus, unlike in the Philippines, the adherence of U.S. law schools to
the Law School Admission Test is purely voluntary. The test results may be used merely
as one (1) of the many criteria for admission, which a law school may determine for
itself.75 The Law School Admission Test is designed merely as a tool to help law schools
make sound admission decisions.76

The Philippine Law School Admission Test, by contrast, undermines the critical function
of law schools to provide pieces of truth that may ripen into critique of government. The
State's intrusion, whatever form it may be, stifles the ability of the academic institution
to be critical. This Court should remain ever so vigilant on any infraction of the
Constitution disguised with good intentions.

Law schools are the principal institutions that have the space to analyze, deconstruct,
and even critique our laws and jurisprudence. They not only teach doctrine, but
examine its fundamentals.

The kind of freedom of expression contained in academic freedom is different from

political expression. Within political or creative spaces, freedom of expression takes an
almost unqualified immunity. Any thought, whether or not it is hated by the dominant,
finds protection without regard to its slant or falsity. In the sphere of political debate,
falsehoods are platforms for testing reason and providing opportunities to publicly
advocate what is true persuasively.
On the other hand, within the academe, falsities in method and content are deliberately
rooted out, exposed, and marginalized so that the public debate is enriched, whether
among the institution's students or the world beyond its walls. Academic freedom is the
constitutional canon that protects this space from politics. It is the freedom that assures
academic intellectual debate without fear of any governmental intervention of any kind,
be it coercive or suggestive.

Government-sponsored standardized admission tests infringe on this freedom without

reason.

III

Due process is guaranteed under our Constitution. Its Article III, Section 1 states:
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law[.]
The due process clause is commonly referred to as the "right to be let alone" from the
State's interference.77 The essence of due process is the freedom from arbitrariness.
In Morfe v. Mutuc:78
"There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a
standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due
process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation
of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out
and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer
oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of
reasonableness. Correctly has it been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty 'to those strivings for
justice' and judges the act of officialdom of whatever branch 'in the light of reason
drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and
political thought.' It is not a narrow or 'technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances,' decisions based on such a clause requiring
a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles of our society.' Questions of
due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or
phrases."79 (Citation omitted)
Due process is the protection of the sphere of individual autonomy. It aims to "prevent
arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals."80 Thus, it imposes a burden on the government to observe two (2)
separate limits: (1) procedural and (2) substantive due process. In White Light
Corporation v. City of Manila:81
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related
but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and "substantive due
process". Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must
follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process
concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it
makes an intrusion into the private sphere. Examples range from the form of notice
given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd
situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper formalities are followed.
Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process
clause. It inquires whether the government has sufficient justification for depriving a
person of life, liberty, or property.

The question of substantive due process, more so than most other fields of law, has
reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded acceptance of
fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now
confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it can be upheld. The vitality
though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with
which it has been utilized to achieve a liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends
should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process
clause has acquired potency because of the sophisticated methodology that has
emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application. 82 (Citations
omitted)
Substantive due process answers the question of whether "the government has an
adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property." 83 To pass this
test, the State must provide a sufficient justification for enforcing a governmental
regulation.84

While the State's intrusion is not absolutely proscribed, due process requires that the
intrusion on an individual's right to life, liberty, and property is neither arbitrary nor
unreasonable.85 In Ichong v. Hernandez:86
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power, Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public
welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient
foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a
capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the
means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These
are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and
the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be
said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any
democratic society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would
be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and
anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there
is due process of law[.]87
When governmental action is checked against the due process requirement under the
Constitution - particularly substantive due process - it must be shown that such action
was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. Respondent failed to show this.

The creation of the Philippine Law School Admission Test was not based on scientific
research. The State has not given any justification for the propriety of conducting the
examination, other than it being copied from the Law School Admission Test
administered in the United States. The Chairperson of respondent Legal Education
Board, during the oral arguments, admitted to this:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, next. Was there a study conducted by the LEB prior to imposing the national test
relating to the correlation of passing the test and passing the bar? Because according to
you the declaration of policy states, to improve the quality of the bar. Or was this
anecdotal in nature? And if there is a test, a scientific study, will you be able to provide
the Court? Was there a study done prior to imposing the national exam in an
exclusionary character prior to giving the test?

....

DEAN AQUENDE:
We have none, Your Honor, but we relied on the LSAT study, Your Honor, in the United
States.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes, the LSAT study conducted by the United States. We are a different country and
you are saying that you looked at a different culture so what they did in India, in
America, in Canada, maybe even in Japan but not Filipinos, and the Filipinos have
particular needs in our archipelago. Certainly, Tagum is different from Siargao, different
from Baguio City, different from Cebu, so, you are saying that the LEB imposed this
without, isn't this arbitrary, Chair?

DEAN AQUENDE:
We looked at, Your Honor, at the result or the correlation result of the law school
qualifying test administered by the CEM and in that particular study, the correlation is
that the . . . (interrupted)

....

JUSTICE LEONEN:
You said that it was correlation, what was the degree of confidence?

DEAN AQUENDE:
I do not have right now.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes, probably you can provide us with a copy.

DEAN AQUENDE:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Because in order not to be a grave abuse of discretion, it must be reasonable.

DEAN AQUENDE:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Considering, Chair, that this affects a freedom and a primordial freedom at that,
freedom of expression, academic freedom, the way we teach our, as Justice Andy Reyes
pointed out, the way we teach law to our citizens and therefore, to me, the level of
scrutiny should not be cursory. The level of scrutiny must be deep and I would think it
would apply strict scrutiny in this regard. Therefore, if there was no study that
supported it, then perhaps, may be stricken down as unreasonable and therefore, a
grave abuse of discretion . . . .

....

JUSTICE LEONEN:
. . . . the English proficiency that you mentioned, what are your statistics on that?

DEAN AQUENDE:
The . . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
That law schools are admitting law students that do not have English proficiency . . . .

DEAN AQUENDE:
That ties up, Your Honor, with the public interest that we are looking at and that
is . . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Yes, yes, what are your statistics on that?

DEAN AQUENDE:
. . . . and that is the weigh stage . . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
What are your numbers?

DEAN AQUENDE:
Actually, Your Honor, it's the weigh stage of the human capital resulting problem . . . .
(interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
I'm not asking about the concept.

DEAN AQUENDE:
. . . . in the bar examination, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
What are your numbers?

DEAN AQUENDE:
It's the bar examination, Your Honor, that seventy-five percent (75%) of all the . . . .
(interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
You see all the examinations?
DEAN AQUENDE:
Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
You mean to say, those that flunked the exams is because of English?

DEAN AQUENDE:
No, Your Honor, but that is the competency . . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In other words, in looking at the law schools, you made a claim that the English
proficiency of undergraduates going into law schools is deteriorating, correct? And
because you are an academic body, you should have a scientific study to back yourself
up? Can you submit that to the Court? Have you made that study?

DEAN AQUENDE:
Which particular . . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
You cannot operate to supervise academic institutions deep in science on the basis of
anecdotal references. That would be unreasonable. That is grave abuse of discretion.

DEAN AQUENDE:
No. Your Honor, please, if the question is . . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
You said it was English proficiency, logic, correct? That's why you imposed this exam.
By the way, Chair, how many law schools are there?

DEAN AQUENDE:
One hundred twenty-two (122) law schools, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Have you taught in all those environments?

DEAN AQUENDE:
None, not, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, have you taught in more than five law schools?

DEAN AQUENDE:
No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
How many law schools have you taught in?

DEAN AQUENDE:
Just two (2), Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Just two (2), and you make a conclusion based on your experience in two (2) law
schools multiplied by the number of experiences of all your members of the Board with
120? Shouldn't you have done a scientific study on English proficiency of incoming first
year of law schools at the very least before you put in this policy so that it becomes
reasonable for us?

DEAN AQUENDE:
Well, we looked at the LSAT correlation, Your Honor. 88
Respondent Legal Education Board has not conducted any scientific and empirical study
prior to its decision to impose a national standardized test for the admission of students
in law schools. All that it has as basis is the study for the Law School Admission Test of
the United States. There was no showing of how this foreign experience is applicable, or
even relevant, to the Philippine context. For lack of any substantial basis, the
administration of the Philippine Law School Admission Test is arbitrary.

Moreover, the Philippine Law School Admission Test transgresses due process for being
unreasonable. At the core of this test is the enforcement of a written exam that
supposedly sifts and sets apart individuals who are likely to survive law school. The
exclusionary result is based on a single criterion-if the applicants pass the written
exam, they are deemed qualified. There is no other basis used for the evaluation of
applicants. Through the Philippine Law School Admission Test, the government imposes
a single determinant to ascertain who can pursue legal education. This is insufficient to
hurdle the requirement of due process. Reasonableness demands that a multi-varying
approach is used in evaluating law school applicants.

American jurisprudence sheds more light on this. In Grutter v. Bollinger,89 the U.S.

Supreme Court upheld the University of Michigan Law School's use of an applicant's
race as among the criteria in its admission policy. It agreed with the use of race as a
factor in its admission decisions, as it serves a "compelling interest in attaining a
diverse student body."90

In Grutter, the law school's admission policy sought to admit more students from
disadvantaged backgrounds, not to meet a desired quota for diversity, but to enroll a
"critical mass" of minority students. Its concept of critical mass is anchored on the
important educational benefits that flow from having a diverse studentry. The law
school used race as one (1) of the criteria in its admission policy to avoid a monolithic
student demographic that is typically admitted by traditional admissions processes.

In upholding the policy, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the law school's educational
judgment that diversity is essential to its educational mission must be respected, and
that universities must be given' a degree of deference when it comes to academic
decisions:
In announcing the principle of student body diversity as a compelling state interest,
Justice Powell invoked our cases recognizing a constitutional dimension, grounded in
the First Amendment, of educational autonomy: "The freedom of a university to make
its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its student body." From this
premise, Justice Powell reasoned that by claiming "the right to select those students
who will contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas,'" a university "seek[s] to
achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission." Our
conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a diverse student body is
informed by our view that attaining a diverse student body is at the heart of the Law
School's proper institutional mission, and that "good faith" on the part of a university is
"presumed" absent "a showing to the contrary." 91 (Citations omitted)
In Grutter, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a holistic evaluation of an applicant by
considering several factors such as academic ability, talents, experiences, including
other information through a personal statement, letters of recommendation, together
with the applicant's undergraduate grade point average, Law School Admission Test
score, and other "soft variables," including the applicant's racial and ethnic status. In
effect, the law school affords an individualized consideration to all applicants regardless
of race. There is no policy of automatic acceptance or rejection based on a single
variable.

In this case, by enforcing an arbitrary and unreasonable measure in the law schools'
admission process, the government violates the applicants' right to due process.

The choice of pursuing an education is within the ambit of one's right to life and liberty.
Liberty includes the "right to exist and the right to be free· from arbitrary restraint or
servitude."92 It embraces the right of individuals, to enjoy the faculties they are
endowed with such as the right to live, right to be married, right to choose a profession,
and the right to pursue an education.93 In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.:94
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed
[by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not merely freedom from
bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home
and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no
doubt that the meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed. 95
In my concurring opinion in Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City:96
Speaking of life and its protection does not merely entail ensuring biological
subsistence. It is not just a proscription against killing. Likewise, speaking of liberty and
its protection does not merely involve a lack of physical restraint. The objects of the
constitutional protection of due process are better understood dynamically and from a
frame of consummate human dignity. They are likewise better understood integrally,
operating in a synergistic frame that serves to secure a person's integrity.

"Life, liberty and property" is akin to the United Nations' formulation of "life, liberty,
and security of person" and the American formulation of "life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness." As the American Declaration of Independence postulates, they are
"unalienable rights" for which "[g]overnments are instituted among men" in order that
they may be secured. Securing them denotes pursuing and obtaining them, as much as
it denotes preserving them. The formulation is, thus, an aspirational declaration, not
merely operating on factual gives but enabling the pursuit of ideals.

"Life," then, is more appropriately understood as the fullness of human potential: not
merely organic, physiological existence, but consummate self-actualization, enabled
and effected not only by freedom from bodily restraint but by facilitating an
empowering existence. "Life and liberty," placed in the context of a constitutional
aspiration, it then becomes the duty of the government to facilitate this empowering
existence. This is not an inventively novel understanding but one that has been at the
bedrock of our social and political conceptions.97 (Citations omitted)
Ultimately, the right to life is intertwined with the right to pursue an education. Right to
life, after all, is not merely the right to exist, but the right to achieve the "fullness of
human potential[.]"98 This is real in attaining a degree of one's own choice. Education
does not only enhance and sharpen intellect, but also opens up better opportunities. It
improves the quality of life. When a person obtains a degree, there is economic and
social mobility. Thus, when the State interferes and prevents an individual from
accessing education, it impliedly infringes on the right to life and liberty.

In the same vein, imposing an arbitrary and unreasonable governmentsponsored

standardized test violates the right to property. Applicants, forced to take the
mandatory examination, are likewise required to pay testing fees. This means
additional financial cost that acts as another unnecessary obstacle to aspiring law
students.

Yet, more than the financial barrier, going through the bureaucracy of studying for,
applying for, and actually taking the test also entails opportunity cost. This includes,
among others, the foregone time, prospects, and other possibilities that could have
been realized.99 These additional costs only serve as exclusionary measures that
unreasonably weed out those who simply cannot afford them.

Thus, the Philippine Law School Admission Test must be struck down for infringing on
the rights to life, liberty, andproperty without due process of law.

IV

Moreover, standardized tests as a measure of merit should be taken with a grain of

salt. A meritocratic method based on these tests does not necessarily mean that the
most qualified students are admitted. 100 For one, meritocracy was originally a term of
abuse, used to describe a "ludicrously unequal state." 101 Rather than measure fairness,
it disproportionately benefits those who are well-off. 102 For another, entrance tests have
historically been skewed in favor of elite applicants who have significant advantage and
access to better education, resources, and wealth. 103

As Stanford Law professor Richard Banks concluded:

Differential access to achievement-related resources may occur at the level of a child's
family, school, or neighborhood.

The relative achievement formulation of socioeconomic status would encompass family

characteristics such as parental income, education, occupation, and wealth. A variety of
studies have demonstrated positive relationships between early academic achievement
and parental income, education, and occupation.104 (Citations omitted)
Merit is a manifestation of elitism. Meritocracy opposes democratization and opportunity
for all.105

Even if national standardized tests were non-exclusionary, and were designed only to
guide law schools, harm still persists in their mandatory character. Obviously, they
entail both financial and opportunity cost for the applicant. An admission exam like the
Philippine Law School Admission Test presents another financial barrier for an applicant.

This Court cannot ignore the greater disparity that prevails among income classes,
ethnicities, and even geographical differences. The cost of taking the Philippine Law
School Admission Test creates an additional burden and prevents applicants from the
middle to low-income strata from pursuing legal education. The test morphs into a
selective mechanism that unduly favors the wealthy. Even if the results of the exams
are nonexclusionary, the costs virtually make the exam itself exclusionary.

Moreover, students with low scores in the national test, which was created without the
participation of true academics who understand test metrics, will consider themselves
inferior. Because the results are ranked, the test creates a stigma on those who
received low scores and excludes them. A national standardized exam, even as a non-
exclusionary list, when state-sponsored, creates an unnecessary hierarchy.

Besides, that a law school is producing good lawyers does not automatically mean that
it is a good law school. On the contrary, having a standardized national admission exam
hides the defects and inadequacies of a law school. Students who ranked high in the
Philippine Law School Admission Test, but went on to study in a school that may not
exactly have good standards of education, may still likely pass the bar examinations.
This is because students who topped the Philippine Law School Admission Test are not a
random sample. Right at the start, they have already enjoyed a good foundation of
education and a conducive environment to excel, equipped with the advantage of
financial resources.106

Thus, the Philippine Law School Admission Test effectively screens applicants not on the
basis of merit alone, but on the resources they possess. Through it, law schools are
encouraged to work with better-equipped students. They are incentivized in catering to
the elite in our society.

Ironically, we incentivize sloth among law schools.

Justice Clarence Thomas' (Justice Thomas) dissent in Grutter is likewise illuminating.

Proposing that law schools must end their reliance on the Law School Admission Test,
he suggested adopting different methods of admission "such as accepting all students
who meet minimum qualifications,"107 instead of betting on the highest scores.

Justice Thomas questioned whether standardized admission tests are reliable in

predicting the success of applicants in law school. He does not believe that the test
serves any real educational significance, but is only used to admit high scorers. The
test, he notes, translates to selectivity-a marker of elitism:
[T]here is much to be said for the view that the use of tests and other measures to
"predict" academic performance is a poor substitute for a system that gives every
applicant a chance to prove he can succeed in the study of law. The rallying cry that in
the absence of racial discrimination in admissions there would be a true meritocracy
ignores the fact that the entire process is poisoned by numerous exceptions to
"merit."108
Here in the Philippines, our education system's obsession with examination-based
meritocracy must be tempered, not further celebrated. Legal education must not be an
exclusive good for the elite. There must be a conscious move to eliminate the socio-
economic barriers that cement this elitism. The Philippine Law School Admission Test
does the exact opposite by reinforcing a faulty method that does not necessarily admit
the most qualified students, but only favors the economically privileged.

National standardized admission tests reward this blind and corrosive meritocracy.
Crudely rewarding merit without understanding its context undermines the
constitutional goal of achieving social justice. Rewarding merit alone or privileging it
results in more inequality.

There has never been a level playing field in basic, secondary, and tertiary education.
In the first place, not all poor and rural students who enter basic education make it to
college. Fewer still are those that finish their college degrees. Most of the poor rural
students will not rank high in a national standardized test due to limited access to
resources in their communities. This does not mean, however, that they are so mentally
deficient that they will not make it in law school. Rather, the national standardized test
will most likely exclude them because they will be put in the proverbial back of the line.

Those from privileged families, by contrast, are more likely to grow up in an

environment that nurtures cognitive development. 109 They have likely received social
and cultural capital that propel them to do better in school. 110 Chances are they
attended good schools staffed with competent teachers and professionals, learning with
other privileged students.111

The inevitably low ranking of poor students adds to their burden. In the meantime, rich,
privileged students will, as usual, get better chances. This situation only perpetuates
the status quo, ultimately putting meritocracy as a barrier to the principle of equality. 112

On its surface, the contemporary idea of meritocracy is appealing because "it carries
with it the idea of moving beyond where you start in life, of creative flourishing and
fairness."113 But this understanding is a myth, as our system rewards through wealth
and it increases inequality. 114 Financially privileged students are way ahead of those
who have much less, and any merit-based system will only serve to further highlight
this privilege:
In this intergenerational relay race, children born to wealthy parents start at or near
the finish line, while children born into poverty start behind everyone else. Those who
are born close to the finish line do not need any merit to get ahead. They already are
ahead, The poorest of the poor, however, need to traverse the entire distance to get to
the finish line on the basis of merit alone. In this sense, meritocracy strictly applies only
to the poorest of the poor; everyone else has at least some advantage of inheritance
that places them ahead at the start of the race.

In comparing the effects of inheritance and individual merit on life outcomes, the
effects of inheritance come first, then the effects of individual merit follow-not the other
way around.115
An educational system that rewards on the basis of loosely defined merits assumes an
equality of educational opportunity. 116 It fails to recognize that the most privileged in
society are provided with much greater opportunities to succeed and fewer chances to
fail compared with those from less privileged backgrounds. 117

All these privileges that are attached to a person simply by the circumstances of his or
her birth snowball within an educational system that hides behind the sanitized concept
of meritocracy. In truth, such concept only widens the existing economic, social, and
cultural inequality.

It is, thus, inaccurate to use the results of a standardized test as proxies for measuring
the capability of students to do well in law school. The competitive and individualistic
meritocracy that standardized tests espouse rests on the neoliberal assumption that
hard work and effort alone will result in success. It is, however, almost deliberately
blind to the reality that the starting line for success is unequal, and the path toward it
more challenging for those disfavored by the system. In reality, a national standardized
test only rewards crude meritocracy. Meritocracy, then, disguises prejudice.

In this case, the majority declared unconstitutional several provisions of the Legal
Education Reform Act and Memorandum Orders of respondent Legal Education Board.
However, it essentially retained the Philippine Law School Admission Test. It ruled that
Section 7(e) of the Legal Education Reform Act118 is faithful to the reasonable
supervision and regulation clause under the Constitution. It found that the provision
only empowers respondent Legal Education Board to prescribe minimum requirements,
which does not equate to control.119

Section 7(e) of the Legal Education Reform Act states:

SECTION 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this
Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:

....

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and
compensation of faculty members[.]
The majority concludes that while the State may administer the Philippine Law School
Admission Test, it should not be imposed on law schools as a mandatory part of their
admission process.120 Relying on Tablarin, it sustained admission tests as a legitimate
exercise of the State's regulatory power. 121

I find that the majority's pronouncements readily allow unwarranted State incursion on
academic freedom.

An educational institution's right to determine who to admit as its students is an

integral part of its institutional academic freedom. It is absolute. Any form of State
intrusion into an educational institution's admission policies, no matter how benign,
should be rejected.

In this regard, I view that Tablarin and Department of Education, Culture, and

Sports122 should be overturned. Just like the Philippine Law School Admission Test, the
National Medical Admission Test, and any kind of government-sponsored standardized
admission test-mandatory or not-should be rejected for infringing on academic
freedom.

The State cannot sponsor an admission exam under the guise of prescribing minimum
qualifications when, right from the start, it already excludes those who cannot pay to
take the test.

Ultimately, the results of the Philippine Law School Admission Test will affect the
schools' admission decisions. To recapitulate, its mandatory character means that if an
applicant fails, he or she is disqualified from enrolling in any law school, even when a
law school determines that the unsuccessful examinee should be admitted as its
student. Removing its mandatory character, but retaining the test nonetheless,
perpetuates the stigma that attaches to an applicant who passes but scores low relative
to other examinees. Thus, the power of respondent Legal Education Board to implement
the Philippine Law School Admission Test, even as a minimum requirement for
admission, is already a demonstration of State control over the law schools.

The academic institutions' right to determine who they will admit to study remains
among their four (4) essential freedoms. In ascertaining who to admit, law schools
must have autonomy in establishing their own policies, including the examination that
they will employ.

The Philippine Law School Admission Test presents an unwarranted intrusion into this
essential freedom. The government's imposition of a passing score as a bar to
admission is a violation of the institutions' academic freedom.

The rationale of this decision in relation to the significance of academic freedom in our
jurisdiction also applies to the entire concept of the Legal Education Board.

The teaching of law as an academic degree is protected by Article XIV, Section

5(2)123 of the Constitution, which also relates to Article III, Section 4 124 under the Bill of
Rights. On the other hand, the requirements for a license to practice law is broadly
covered by Article XIV, Section 5(3)125 of the Constitution, and more specifically as a
power granted to this Court under Article VIII, Section 5(5). 126

The regulation on the teaching of law as an academic degree is different from the
regulation on the practice of law as a profession. The former is an aspect of higher
education leading to a degree, while the latter may require a degree, yet the degree
alone does not qualify one to practice law.

Quality legal education should be guaranteed by the faculty and administration of a law
school. A law school, on the other hand, may be part of a university or college. Thus,
the law school is accountable to its academic councils for its approaches to teaching,
qualifications and promotion of its professors, as well as the full contents of its
curriculum.

The broad and ambiguous rubric of police power should not be an excuse to provide
government oversight on purely academic matters, or even· academic matters that
appear to be administrative issues. Academic supervision cannot be done by a
statutorily appointed Legal Education Board restricting the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning which offer what amounts to a postgraduate degree.
Legal education cannot be supervised in the way institutions offering pre-school or basic
elementary education are supervised. The entire concept of the Legal Education Board-
appointed public officials interfering with law schools' academic freedoms as if the
appointment from an elective official gives them the academic expertise-is precisely
what Article XIV, Section 5(2) of the Constitution proscribes.

The entire Legal Education Reform Act clearly violates the Constitution. It is, therefore,
surprising that the majority is unwilling to strike it down. It is likewise astounding that
the majority seems to put its trust on the evolution of law as an academic discipline to
political appointees.

There are better ways to ensure the quality of legal education, none of which involves a
super body similar to the Legal Education Board. While it appears to be a mere
guidance for law schools, the State's infringement on academic freedom through the
Philippine Law School Admission Test has far-reaching implications.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the Petitions. The entire Republic Act No. 7662, or
the Legal Education Reform Act, is unconstitutional.

Endnotes:

1
Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929,
943 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

2
 J. Makasiar, Dissenting Opinion in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 951 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

3
 160-A Phil. 929 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

4
 Id. at 943.

5
 The institutional academic freedom reflected in Garcia was reiterated in the later case
of University of the Philippines v. Ayson, 257 Phil. 580, 584-585 (1989) [Per J. Bidin,
En Banc], where this Court held that the abolition of the UP College Baguio High School
as a decision of the UP Board of Regents is within its exercise of academic freedom.
Thus, as an "institution of higher learning enjoying academic freedom, the UP cannot be
compelled to provide for secondary education."

6
Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929,
944 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

7
 J. Teehankee, Concurring Opinion in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, 160-A Phil. 929, 949 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

8
 221 Phil. 601 (1985) [Per J. Cuevas, Second Division].

9
 Id. at 611-612.

10
 274 Phil. 414 (1991) [Per J. Medialdea, First Division].

11
 294 Phil. 654 (1993) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
12
 Id. at 675.

13
 258-A Phil. 417 (1989) [Per J. Gancayco, First Division].

14
 Id. at 423-424.

15
 244 Phil. 8 (1988) [Per J. Paras, Second Division].

16
 205 Phil. 307 (1983) [Per J. Escolin, Second Division].

17
 300 Phil. 819 (1994) [Per J. Nocon, Second Division].

18
 697 Phil. 31 (2012) [Per J. Brion, Second Division].

19
 401 Phil. 431 (2000) [Per J. Kapunan, First Division].

20
 Id. at 455-456.

21
 197 Phil. 713 (1982) [Per J. Fernandez, Second Division].

22
 Id. at 724-726.

23
 754 Phil. 590 (2015) [Per J. Peralta, En Banc].

24
 Id. at 655-656.

25
 220 Phil. 379 (1985) [Per C.J. Fernando, En Banc].

26
 Id. at 384.

27
 Id.

28
 298 Phil. 382 (1993) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc].

29
 Id. at 387-388.

30
 214 Phil. 319 (1984) [Per C.J. Fernando, En Banc].

31
 221 Phil. 470 (1985) [Per C.J. Fernando, En Banc].

32
 226 Phil. 596 (1986) [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].

33
 264 Phil. 98 (1990) [Per J. Cortes, En Banc].

34
 487 Phil. 449 (2004) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division].

35
 Id. at 474.

36
 236 Phil. 768 (1987) [Per J. Feliciano, En Banc].
37
 Id. at 774.

38
 Id.

39
 Id. at 776-777.

40
 Id. at 782.

41
 259 Phil. 1016 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

42
 Id. at 1018.

43
 Id. at 1019.

44
 Id. at 1021-1023.

45
 Id. at 1023.

46
 272 Phil. 241 (1991) [Per J. Medialdea, En Banc].

47
 Id. at 254.

48
 Ponencia, p. 85.

49
 Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No.7 (2016), par. 7.

50
 Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No. 7 (2016), par. 9.

51
 Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No.7 (2016), par. 11.

52
 Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No.7 (2016), par. 15.

53
 Center for Educational Measurement, Inc., National Medical Admission Test Bulletin of
Information (2019), available at <https://cem-
inc.org.ph/nmat/files/upload/BOI_NMAT_Regular2019_web.pdf> (last accessed on
September 9, 2019).

54
 Commission on Higher Education Memorandum Order No. 03 (2003) delegates the
determination of the National Medical Admission Test cut-off score to the respective
medical schools. Available at <https://ched.gov.ph/cmo-3-s-2003-2/> (last visited on
September 9, 2019).

55
 Center for Educational Measurement, Inc., National Medical Admission Test Bulletin of
Information, 6 (2019), available at <https://www.cem-inc.org.ph/National Medical
Admission Test/files/upload/BOI_National Medical Admission Test_Summer_2019.pdf>
(last accessed on September 9, 2019).

56
 Ponencia, p. 87.

57
 Id.
58
 Ralph F. Fuchs, Academic Freedom: Its Basic Philosophy, Function and History, 28
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 431, 433 (1963), available at
<https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2963&context=lcp>
(last visited on September 9, 2019).

59
 David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic
Freedom under the First Amendment, 53 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 227,
230 (1990), available at <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=4057&context=lcp> (last visited on September 9, 2019).

60
 Id.

61
 J. Makasiar, Dissenting Opinion in Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Technology, 160-A Phil. 929, 954-956 (1975) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

62
Ateneo De Manila University v. Capulong, 292 Phil. 654, 672-673 [Per J. Romero, En
Banc].

63
 Id. at 673.

64
 See J. Douglas, Dissenting Opinion in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485
(1952), where the U.S. Supreme Court first mentioned academic freedom as a
constitutional right. In Adler, Justice Douglas stated that "[t]he Constitution guarantees
freedom of though and expression to everyone in our society. All are entitled to it; and
none needs it more than the teacher. The public school is in most respects the cradle of
our democracy . . . the impact of this kind of censorship in the public school system
illustrates the high purpose of the First Amendment in freeing speech and thought from
censorship; See also J. Frankfurter, Dissenting Opinion in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344
U.S. 183 (1952).

65
 354 U.S. 234 (1957).

66
 Id. at 251.
67
 Ponencia, p. 81.

68
 Id.

69
 LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MERITOCRACY 17-18 (2016).

70
 Id.

71
 David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional" Academic
Freedom under the First Amendment, 53 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 227,
272 (1990), available at <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=4057&context=lcp> (last visited on September 9, 2019).

72
 Law School Admission Council, About the Law School Admission Council, available at
<https://www.Isac.org/about> (last accessed on September 9, 2019).
73
 Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Destruction of the Holistic Approach to Admissions: The
Pernicions Effects of Rankings, 81 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 322, 323 (2006). Available
at <http://ilj.law.indiana.edu/articles/81/81_1_Johnson.pdf> (last visited on
September 9, 2019).

74
 The Princeton Review, ABA Accredited Law School, available at
<https://www.princetonreview.com/law-school-advice/law-school-accreditation> (last
accessed August 27, 2019).

75
 See Michelle J. Anderson, Legal Education Reform, Diversity, and Access to Justice,
61RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 1014 (2009). Available at
<https://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1169&context=cl_pubs>
(last visited on September 9, 2019). Even the Law School Admissions Council, which
administers the LSAT, cautions law schools against over-reliance on LSAT scores in the
admissions process.

76
 Id.

77
See Morfe v. Mutuc, 130 Phil. 415 (1968) [Per J. Fernando, En Banc].

78
 Id.

79
 Id. at 432-433.

80
White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 596 Phil. 444, 461 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En
Banc].

81
 596 Phil. 444 (2009) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

82
 Id. at 461-462.

83
City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 311 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

84
 Id.

85
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1166 (1957) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].

86
 101 Phil. 1155 (1957) [Per J. Labrador, En Banc].

87
 Id. at 1165.

88
 TSN dated March 5, 2019, pp. 171-179.

89
 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

90
 Id. at 329.

91
City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 316 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].
92
 Id.

93
 Id.

94
 495 Phil. 289 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc].

95
City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 495 Phil. 289, 317 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc] citing
Roth v. Board of Regents, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

96
 815 Phil. 1067 (2017) [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].

97
 Id. at 1142-1143.

98
 Id.

99
Racelis v. Spouses Javier, G.R. No. 189609, January 29, 2018,
<http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63801> [Per J. Leonen,
Third Division].

100
 Id.

101
 Jo Littler, Meritocracy: the great delusion that ingrains inequality, THE GUARDIAN,
March 20, 2017, available at
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/20/meritocracy-inequality-
theresa-may-donald-trump> (last accessed on September 9, 2019).

102
 Id.

103
 Elise S. Brezis, The Effects of Elite Recruitment on Social Cohesion and Economic
Development 3 (2010), available at <https://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/46837524.pdf>
(last visited on September 9, 2019); and R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and
Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N. C. L. REV. 1061,
1062 (2001), available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=301300&download=yes> (last  visited on September 9, 2019).
104
 R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial Outcomes: Defending Class-Based
College Admissions, 79 N. C. L. REV. 1061 (2001), available at
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=283711> (last visited on
September 9, 2019).

105
 Elise S. Brezis, The Effects of Elite Recruitment on Social Cohesion and Economic
Development, 7 (2010), available at <https://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/46837524.pdf>
(last visited on September 9, 2019).

106
 Elise S. Brezis, The Effects of Elite Recruitment on Social Cohesion and Economic
Development 3 (2010). Available at <https://www.oecd.org/dev/pgd/46837524.pdf>
(last visited on September 9, 2019); R. Richard Banks, Meritocratic Values and Racial
Outcomes: Defending Class-Based College Admissions, 79 N. C. L. Rev. 1062 (2001).
Available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=301300&download=yes> (last visited on September 9, 2019).
107
 J. Thomas, Dissenting Opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 361 (2003).

108
 Id. at 367-368.

109
 Id. at 107.

110
 Id.

111
 Id.

112
 Hannah Arendt, The Crisis in Education (1954)
<http://www.digitalcounterrevolution.co.uk/2016/hannah-arendt-the-crisis-in-
education-full-text/> (last accessed September 12, 2019).

113
 Jo Littler, Meritocracy: the great delusion that ingrains inequality, THE GUARDIAN,
March 20, 2017,
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/20/meritocracy-inequality-
theresa-maydonald-trump> (last accessed on September 9, 2019).

114
 Id.

115
 STEPHEN MCNAMEE AND ROBERT K. MILLER, JR., THE MERITOCRACY MYTH 49
(2004).

116
 Id. at 102.

117
 Id.

118
 Republic Act No. 7662 (1993).

119
 Ponencia, p. 77.

120
 Id. at 78.
121
 Id. at 81-84.

122
 259 Phil. 1016 (1989) [Per J. Cruz, En Banc].

123
 CONST., art. XIV, sec. 5(2) provides:

SECTION 5.  . . .

....

(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

124
 CONST., art. III, sec. 4 provides:

SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or

of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.

125
 CONST., art. XIV, sec. 5(3) provides:

SECTION 5.  . . .

....

(3) Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.

126
 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5(5) provides:

SECTION 5.  . . .

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

JARDELEZA, J.:

Petitioners in the present consolidated cases 1 seek the Court's issuance of a writ of
prohibition and a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order to keep
the Legal Education Board (herein after referred to as the "LEB Law") from holding the
Nationwide Uniform Law School Admission Test (PhilSAT) for, among others, its
violation of academic freedom. They also ultimately pray that Republic Act No.
7662,2 the LEB Law be stricken down as unconstitutional, for its encroachment on the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in promulgating rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law, as provided for in Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987
Constitution.

I concur with the ponencia insofar as it holds that the Court has no jurisdiction over
legal education.3 Both statutory history and legislative intent contemplate a separation
between legal education and the law profession; and the regulation and supervision of
legal education, including admissions thereto, fall within the scope of the State's police
power. However, and for reasons I shall hereinafter set out, I must dissent from the
majority's ruling to partially nullify Legal Education Board Memorandum Order (LEBMO)
No. 7-2015 "insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the PhiLSAT x x x as a
pre-requisite for admission to any law school which, on its face, run directly counter to
institutional academic freedom."4

With respect, I submit that: (I) the invocation of academic freedom as a ground for the
partial nullification of the challenged LEBMO is misplaced; (II) the provision by the
State of a standardized exclusionary exam for purposes of admission to a law school is
a valid exercise of police power; and (III) the resolution of the challenge against the
State regulation's reasonableness involve underlying questions of fact which cannot be
resolved by this Court at the first instance.

My above reservation is heightened by my own research which yields a conclusion

different from the conclusion of fact reached by the ponencia5 that the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) upheld in Tablarin v. Gutierrez6 does not have a cut-off or
passing score requirement. As I shall also hereinafter show, the NMAT is no different
from the PhiLSAT insofar as it also employs an exclusionary (or, in the words of
the ponencia, "totalitarian") scheme in terms of student admissions. 7 I see no reason
why both tests should merit different treatment.

My survey of its venerable history and application in Philippine jurisprudence convince

me that the concept of academic freedom has different applications, depending on the
character of the party invoking it as a right. And, in instances when academic freedom
has been invoked as a personal right-that is, one in favor of individuals (whether an
educator or a student), the same has been always been inextricably linked (or
discussed in relation) to said individual's broader freedom of expression.

The concept of academic freedom began in medieval Europe, where it was used as to
protect universities as a community of scholars against ecclesiastical and political
intrusion. It was then carried over to Latin America, where it was used to create
sanctuaries out of universities for people who were under political
persecution.8 Academic freedom thereafter developed as a legal right consisting of
three key concepts: (1) the philosophy of intellectual freedom for teachers and
scholars; (2) the idea of autonomy for the university as a community of scholars; and
(3) the guarantee of free expression in the Constitution. 9

Similarly, the conceptualization of academic freedom in the United States (U.S.) is that
it exists to protect scholarship in higher education from untoward political intrusions,
mainly through allowing universities to enjoy autonomy over policies of
education.10 Furthermore, while it is conceded to overlap with civic free speech,
academic freedom is delineated from the former by limiting it as professional speech
within higher education, rather than the rights of expression granted to citizens against
broader governmental interference.11

The first mention of academic freedom in a U.S. Supreme Court case came with the
promulgation of Adler v. Board of Education of the City of New York.12 This case
involved a New York State statute13 which required public employees to take loyalty
oaths as a condition for their continued employment, and effectively banned state
employees from belonging to "subversive groups" under pains of termination. Although
the statute was upheld by the Court as a valid exercise of police power, 14 Justice
William Douglas,15 in his key Dissenting Opinion, couched the discourse of academic
freedom within the context of freedom of thought and expression. He opined:
x x x The Constitution guarantees freedom of thought and expression to everyone in
our society. All are entitled to it, and none needs it more than the teacher.

The public school is, in most respects, the cradle of our democracy. The increasing role
of the public school is seized upon by proponents of the type of legislation represented
by New York's Feinberg law as proof of the importance and need for keeping the school
free of "subversive influences." But that is to misconceive the effect of this type of
legislation. Indeed, the impact of this kind of censorship on the public-school system
illustrates the high purpose of the First Amendment in freeing speech and thought from
censorship.

xxxx

The very threat of such a procedure is certain to raise havoc with academic
freedom. Youthful indiscretions, mistaken causes, misguided enthusiasms-all long
forgotten-become the ghosts of a harrowing present. Any organization committed to a
liberal cause, any group organized to revolt against an (sic) hysterical trend, any
committee launched to sponsor an unpopular program, becomes suspect. These are the
organizations into which Communists often infiltrate. Their presence infects the whole,
even though the project was not conceived in sin. A teacher caught in that mesh is
almost certain to stand condemned. Fearing condemnation, she will tend to
shrink from any association that stirs controversy. In that manner, freedom of
expression will be stifled.16 (Emphasis supplied.)
In the same year, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the case of Wieman v.
Updegraff,17 where it struck down as unconstitutional a "loyalty oath" statute 18 required
of state employees, including the faculty and staff of Oklahoma Agricultural and
Mechanical College, which had the effect of excluding persons from state employment
solely on the basis of membership in organizations tagged as "subversive," regardless
of their knowledge of the activities and purposes of said organizations. 19

Justice Hugo Black, in his Concurring Opinion in Wieman, explained that test oaths were
notorious tools of tyranny that inevitably stifle freedom of expression and freedom of
the press, and is counter to the crucial uncompromising interpretation of the Bill of
Rights.20 In support, Justice Felix Frankfurter cautioned that statutes that
unwarrantedly inhibit the free spirit of teachers will create a chilling effect on that spirit,
which is what teachers "ought to especially cultivate and practice." He added that such
"fundamental principles of liberty" inevitably go into the nature of the role that teachers
play in any given democratic society, and that these freedoms of thought and
expression importantly bear on the teachers' capacity to encourage open-mindedness
and critical inquiry in the people.21

Four years after Adler and Wieman,22 the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Sweezy v.
New Hampshire23 gave a landmark pronouncement in its recognition and acceptance of
academic freedom and its grounding in the Constitution. This case involved a New
Hampshire statute, pursuant to which Paul Sweezy (Sweezy), then a professor at the
University of New Hampshire, was interrogated by the New Hampshire Attorney General
about his suspected affiliations with communism. Sweezy refused to answer a number
of questions about his lectures in class, on the ground that they were unrelated to the
purpose of the investigation and that the questions infringed upon an area protected by
the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Sweezy's favor and, echoing
Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Wieman, held that academic inquiries must
be left "as unfettered as possible" where "political power must abstain from intrusion
into this activity of freedom."24

Two years after Sweezy, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Barenblatt v. United
States,25 a case involving alleged infringement of First Amendment rights, 26 had
occasion to qualify the liberal approach on academic freedom. Speaking through Justice
John Marshall Harlan, the Court moderated the safeguarding of academic freedom, and
held that it was not immune to warranted interrogation by the legislature, to wit:
x x x Of course, broadly viewed, inquiries cannot be made into the teaching that is
pursued· in any of our , educational institutions. When academic teaching - freedom
and its corollary, learning-freedom, so essential to the well-being of the Nation, are
claimed, this Court will always be on the alert against intrusion by Congress into this
constitutionally protected domain. But this does not mean that the Congress is
precluded from interrogating a witness merely because he is a teacher. An educational
institution is not a constitutional sanctuary from inquiry into matters that may
otherwise be within the constitutional legislative domain merely for the reason that
inquiry is made of someone within its walls. 27
Finally, in the 1967 case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents,28 the Supreme Court
overturned its decision in Adler, and extended First Amendment protection to academic
freedom. Keyishian involved faculty members and a non-teaching employee of the
State University of New York whose employment contracts were terminated or not
renewed when they refused (or failed) to submit a "Feinberg Certificate" 29 required
under Section 3021 of the New York Education Law. Under such document, the
individual certifies that he is not a Communist and that he has never advocated or been
a member of a group which advocated forceful overthrow of the Government. 30 In
striking down the statute as unconstitutional, the Supreme Court, citing Shelton v.
Tucker,31 held that though the governmental purpose may have been legitimate and
substantial, that purpose could not be undertaken too broadly as to "stifle fundamental
personal liberties."32

In the Philippines, the term "academic freedom" first appeared in the 1935 Constitution,
under Article XIV, Section 5, as a liberty to be enjoyed by state universities:
Sec. 5. All educational institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to
regulation by the State. The Government shall establish and maintain a complete and
adequate system of public education, and shall provide at least free public primary
instruction, and citizenship training to adult citizens. All schools shall aim to develop
moral character, personal discipline, civic conscience, and vocational efficiency, and to
teach the duties of citizenship. Optional religious instruction shall be maintained in the
public schools as now authorized by law. Universities established by the State shall
enjoy academic freedom. The State shall create scholarships in arts, science, and
letters for specially gifted citizens. (Emphasis supplied.)
It was restated in the 1973 Constitution in Article XV, Section 8(2) and. was expanded
in application to cover both private and public institutions of higher learning, to wit:
Sec. 8. x x x

xxxx

(2) All institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom. (Emphasis

supplied.)
The above provision on academic freedom as a constitutional right was further refined
and developed through its amendment in the 1987 Constitution in Article XIV, Section
5(2):
Sec. 5. x x x

xxxx

(2) Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning.

(Emphasis supplied.)
This amendment in the academic freedom clause was explained as a categorical shift
from the previous conception that academic freedom was solely institutional in nature,
to be enjoyed only by the institutions themselves, to the present belief that said grant
is given not only to the institutions themselves, but to the individual stakeholders
(teachers, researchers and students) within said institution as well. 33

Among others, the critical import of academic freedom has been seen in the dynamics
of Philippine national life, where it became a necessary tool used by faculty members
and students of an institution to "re-examine existing knowledge and reweigh the
prevailing values so dearly cherished by the majority." 34 During the period of Martial
Law, for instance, especially during the. rise of student activism during the First Quarter
Stonn, universities served as refuge for those who were politically targeted by the
ruling regime, under the protection of the academic freedom that the universities
enjoyed. The nature of academic freedom as a right has been seen as a furtherance of
the right to freedom of expression, that is, faculty members and students, as
stakeholders of the institutions of higher learning, enjoy the freedom of expression
even if they are within the university. 35 The general perception, in fact, appears to be
that academic freedom is not only enshrined in the Constitution, but is part and parcel
of one's freedom of expression.36

In the case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of

Theology,37 the Court, in discussing the concept of academic freedom, held:
2. Nor is this all. There is, as previously noted, the recognition in the Constitution of
institutions of higher learning enjoying academic freedom. It is more often: identified
with the right of a faculty member to pursue his . studies in his particular specialty and
thereafter to make known or publish the result of his endeavors without fear that
retribution would be visited on him in the event that his conclusions are found
distasteful or objectionable to the powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or
academic establishments. For the sociologist, Robert Mciver it is "a right claimed by the
accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his findings and to
communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any interference, molestation,
or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to some constituted
authority within or beyond the institution." As for the educator and philosopher Sidney
Hook, this is his version: "What is academic freedom? Briefly put, it is the freedom of
professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish and teach the truth as they
see it in the field of their competence. It is subject to no control or authority except the
control or authority of the rational methods by which truths or conclusions are sought
and established in these disciplines."

3. That is only one aspect though. Such a view does not comprehend fully the scope of
academic freedom recognized by the Constitution. For it is to be noted that the
reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It
would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It
decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls
for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice
of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner
or in a gradging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent.
Former President Vicente G. Sinco of the University of the Philippines, in his Philippine
Political Law, is similarly of the view that it "definitely grants the right of academic
freedom to the university as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom
of a university professor." He cited the following from Dr. Marcel Bouchard, Rector of
the University of Dijon, France, President of the conference of rectors and vice-
chancellors of European universities: "It is a well-established fact, and yet one which
sometimes tends to be obscured in discussions of the problems of freedom, that the
collective liberty of an organization is by no means the same thing as the freedom of
the individual members within it; in fact, the two kinds of freedom are not even
necessarily connected. In considering the problems of academic freedom one must
distinguish, therefore, between the autonomy of the university, as a corporate body,
and the freedom of the individual university teacher." Also: "To clarify further the
distinction between the freedom of the university and that of the individual scholar, he
says: The personal aspect of freedom consists in the right of each university teacher-
recognized and effectively guaranteed by society-to seek and express the truth as he
personally sees it, both in his academic work and in his capacity as a private citizen.
Thus the status of the individual university teacher is at least as important, in
considering academic freedom, as the status of the institutions to which they belong
and through which they disseminate their learning." x x x 38 (Underscoring supplied.)
Garcia and subsequent cases would show the Court's attempts to outline the distinction
between academic freedom as a right enjoyed by the educational institution, 39 or its
individual stakeholders such as the teacher/researcher/educator 40 or student.41

In this case, and save for petitioner-intervenor St. Thomas More School of Law and
Business (St. Thomas More), all petitioners appear to be individual educators and
students: There is no assertion (much less proof) from any of them that the challenged
LEB Law, in general, and the imposition of the PhiLSAT passing requirement, in
particular, infringes on their personal rights to freedom of expression. This, to my mind,
is precisely the reason why the ponencia itself focused on the concept of academic
freedom as enjoyed by an educational institution, specifically, the "freedom of law
schools to determine for itself who may be admitted to legal education x x x." 42
On this score, I have examined the petition-in-intervention filed by St. Thomas More,
which raised the following causes of action and arguments:
(1) The imposition of the PHILSAT passing requirement would inevitably lead to a
decrease in law student enrollees which will, in turn, "result to an increase in tuition
fees x x x to recover lost revenue x x x" and "in effect puts law schools away from the
reach of the poor students in the provinces;" 43

(2) The imposition of the PHILSAT passing requirement "arbitrarily encroaches on the
academic freedom of the Dean of St. Thomas More to choose its students" on the basis
of "values, character, sense of honesty, ethics, and sense of service to others and to
society;"44

(3) The imposition of the PHILSAT passing requirement is unfair and unreasonable; 45

(4) The LEB Law clearly provides that the intent was to improve legal education, not
regulate access thereto;46

(5) The ruling of the Court in Tablarin v. Judge Gutierrez47 sustaining the

constitutionality of the National Medical Admissions Test (NMAT) is inapplicable; 48 and

(6) The LEB Law is an undue delegation of legislative power. 49

Of the six foregoing issues, only one (issue No.2) textually references the concept of
academic freedom. Indeed, the freedom to determine who may be admitted to study is
among the "four essential freedoms" accorded an educational institution. This freedom,
however, is by no means absolute; it must be balanced with important state interests
"which cannot also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority." 50 It is
beyond cavil that the State has an interest in prescribing regulations to promote the
education and the general welfare of the people.51

In this case, the ponencia itself declares that "the PhiLSAT, when administered as an

aptitude test, is reasonably related to the State's unimpeachable interest in improving
the quality of legal education."52 I find that, in addition to the avowed policy to improve
legal education, the provision of the PhiLSAT Passing Requirement may also serve to
discourage the proliferation of the "great evil" sought to be corrected by the "permit
system."53 As the ponencia cites, Act No. 3162, back in 1924, created the Board of
Educational Survey which made "factual findings" that "a great majority of schools from
primary grade to the university; are moneymaking devices of persons who organize and
administer them."54 Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, in his report to the Legal Education
Summit on July 31, 2019, representing the Legal Education Board Charter Cluster,
admitted to the continued existence of "non-performing" law schools. Thus, it is my
view that the Court should carefully weigh casting in stone a rule leaving to a law
school the unbridled discretion to determine for itself the PhilSAT passing score for
purposes of admission to legal education. In fact, I would argue that the provision of
minimum standards (such as a minimum PhiLSAT passing score) for admission to law
schools is, in principle, no different from the provision of standards on matters such as
the maximum rates of tuition fee increases 55 the location and construction of school
buildings, the adequacy of library, laboratory and classroom facilities, the maximum
number of students per teacher, and qualifications of teachers, among others. Such
standards, which are also police power measures instituted in furtherance of the public
interest, arguably have some effect on an educational institution's "essential freedoms."

II

While the ponencia would hold that the PhiLSAT, as an aptitude test, passes the test of
reasonableness, it declares the challenged LEB Law issuance unreasonable to the extent
that it is exclusionary, that is, it provides a cut-off score which effectively forces law
schools, under pain of administrative sanctions, to choose students only from a
"[s]tate-determined pool of applicants x x x."56

I disagree.

There is nothing constitutionally abhorrent with the provision by the State of a

standardized exclusionary exam. This has long been settled in the case of Tablarin v.
Gutierrez.57 There, the Court upheld the taking and passing of the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as a national prerequisite for admission to all medical schools in
the Philippines since academic year 1986-1987, pursuant to the Republic Act No. 2382,
otherwise known as the "Medical Act of 1959," and under Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS) Order No. 52 series of 1985:
x x x MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the rationale of
regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of the
graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those
who exhibit in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for
medical practice. The need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high
standards in our professional schools in general, and medical schools in particular, in
the current stage of our social and economic development, are widely known.

We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like

the NMAT as a means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the
selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the
quality of medical education in the country." Given the widespread use today of
such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United States of America
(the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT] and quite probably in other countries with
far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account the
failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled
to hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end
of legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the
protection of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence
and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for
disease or trauma. (Emphasis supplied.)
Furthermore, contrary to the ponencia's findings, I do not see any difference in how the
NMAT and the PhiLSAT are meant to (or even actually) operate.58 Both are, in fact,
exclusionary exams. Permit me to explain.

Under Department of Education (DepEd) Department Order (DO) No. 52, Series of
1985, the NMAT, as a uniform admission test, was required to be "successfully hurdled
by all college graduates seeking admission into medical schools in the Philippines,
beginning the school year 1986-1987." Although the same DO provides that the NMAT
rating of an applicant will be considered "with other admission requirements" as basis
for the issuance of a Certificate of Eligibility, it also provides that no such Certificate will
be issued without the required NMAT qualification (that is, meeting the cut-off score-
which shall be determined by the Board of Medical Education on a yearly basis). That
the NMAT, similar to the PhiLSAT, was meant to be exclusionary in nature is
clear from DepEd DO No. 11, issued subsequently in 1987, which provides that
the cut-off score of 45th percentile shall he followed for the December 6, 1987
and April 24, 1988 NMAT examinations.

In fact, this exclusionary nature appears to subsist to this day. Memorandum Order No.
18, Series of 201659 issued by the Commission on Higher Education 60 provides, to wit:
17.3 Minimum Standards for Admission

Applicants seeking admission to the medical education program must have the following
qualifications:

a. Holder of at least a baccalaureate degree;

b. Must have taken the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) not more than
two (2) years from the time of admission, with a percentile score
equivalent to or higher than that currently prescribed by the school or
the [CHED], whichever is higher;

c. The applicant shall submit the following documents to the medical schools:

•xxx

•xxx

• Certified true copy of NMAT score

17.4 Certificate of Eligibility for Admission to Medical School

a. On the basis of foregoing documents, the medical school is responsible for

and accountable for the issuance of the Certificate of Eligibility for Admission to
medical school.

b. x x x

c. Likewise, it is also the responsibility of the medical school to verify

the authenticity of the NMAT score against the master list provided by the
recognized testing center.

17.5 NMAT Score cut off

a. An NMAT score cut-off of at least 40th percentile will be implemented by

all higher educational institutions offering medical program.

b. Medical schools are hereby required to declare their NMAT cut-off score as part
of their Annual Report (electronic and hard copy) to be submitted to CHED.
 x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Thus, even under the present rule, students who fail to get an NMAT score of
40th percentile (or the declared cut-off score of their chosen medical school, whichever
is higher) will not be issued a Certificate of Eligibility and therefore cannot be admitted
to medical school. Clearly, the NMAT is no different from the PhiLSAT insofar as it also
employs an exclusionary (or, in the words of the ponencia, "totalitarian") scheme in
terms of student admissions.61 I therefore see no reason why both tests should merit
different treatment. The principle behind this Court's ruling in Tablarin should be
applied here.

III

The other allegations against the LEB Law, in general, and the PhiLSAT passing
requirement, in particular, seem to be challenges against its reasonableness as a police
power measure. What is "reasonable," however, is not subject to exact definition or
scientific formulation. There is no all-embracing test of reasonableness; 62 its
determination rests upon human judgment as applied to the facts and circumstances of
each particular case.63

The consolidated petitions all sought direct recourse with this Court. As We have most
recently reaffirmed in Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and
Communications,64 direct resort to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of
questions of law:
x x x Save for the single specific instance provided by the Constitution under Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution, cases the resolution of which depends on the
determination of questions of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court
because we are not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either by structure or
rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the
primary functions of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison
d'etre behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a constitutional filtering
mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks
assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed
aside by an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional
dimension of the issue or cause raised. 65 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)
I submit that the Court should refrain from resolving the challenges against the
reasonableness of the LEB Law (and related issuances) at this time. Taking issue at
reasonableness, equity or fairness of a state action, in a vacuum and divorced from the
factual circumstances that suffer the same, would mean that this Court will have to
adjudicate (in my view, wrongly) based on conjectures and unsupported
presuppositions. As it appears, this Court will be settling controversies based on
unsupported allegations66 or, worse, grounds not even pleaded or raised by the
parties.67 Allegations and counter-allegations against the constitutionality and/or
reasonableness of a challenged state action need to be proven in evidence, otherwise
they may be no more than uncorroborated rhetoric.

Given this fact-based nature of the question of reasonableness of an exercise of police

power, the present questions pertaining to the propriety or validity of the PhiLSAT
should be dismissed at this point and given its turn in a trial, where the equipped lower
court may first resolve questions of fact, such as whether the PhiLSAT as administered
by the LEB meets the careful design that our legislators intended.

Mere invocation of a constitutional right, in this case academic freedom, does not
excuse the parties so invoking from actually proving their case through evidence. This
is chiefly true in a petition that seeks the invalidation of a law that enjoys the
presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving one's cause through evidence
must rise against the bar that gives the challenged law default constitutionality. As We
held in the case of Ermita-Malate Hotel and Moiel Operators Association, Inc. v. City
Mayor of Manila,68 citing O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.:69
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the
necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is
void on its [face,] which is not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better
expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,
where the American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly
summed up the matter thus:
"The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police
power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the [specific] method of
regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of
law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of
legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail
in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the
statute."

No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court
deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of [facts], the
presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance
set aside.70 (Emphasis supplied.)
The tall order, therefore, to overturn the constitutional presumption in favor of a law
must be through a conclusive "factual foundation," the absence of which must
inevitably result in the upholding of the constitutionality of the challenged law.

Until the decisive factual questions are determined in the context of a trial, this Court
should refrain from making an effective pronouncement as to the validity or invalidity of
the PhiLSAT. The wide-ranging consequences of the issues raised in these petitions,
when decided, all the more call for prudence and constitutionally-intended restraint
until all the factual components that bear on these issues are ascertained and
definitively settled. The Philippine legal education and the legal profession are worthy of
no less.

Finally, to strike down a legislative act on the basis of unalleged or unestablished

factual conclusions that essentially came nowhere near their burdens of proof is the
height of disservice to the causes these parties before Us sought to protect, whether
that be a student's right to education, a law school's institutional academic freedom or
the State's duty to supervise and regulate education that is invested with public
interest.
This Court will serve no other end but expediency in insisting to deem ripe the
unquestionably paramount but undoubtedly premature question of whether an
examination that fundamentally seeks to improve the state of the country's legal
education is succeeding or failing on its promise.

For all the foregoing reasons, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Endnotes:

1
Abayata, et al. v. Hon. Salvador Medialdea, et al. (G.R. No. 242954) and Pimentel, et
al. v. Legal Education Board (G.R. No. 230642).

2
 Otherwise known as the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993, hereinafter referred to
as "LEB Law"

3
Ponencia, pp. 37-53.

4
Id. at 88.

5
Id. at 86.

6
 G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987, 152 SCRA 730.

7
Ponencia, p. 87.

8
 Pacifico Agabin, Academic Freedom and the Larger Community, Philippine Law
Journal, Vol. 52, 336, 336 (1977) Phil. L.J. 336, 336 (1977).

9
 Enrique M. Fernando, Academic Freedom as a Constitutional Right, Philippine Law
Journal, Vol. 52, 289, 290 (1977); citing Fuchs, Academic Freedom - Its basic
Philosophy, Function and History, in BAADE (ed.).
10
 J. Peter Byrne, Constitutional Academic Freedom After Grutter: Getting Real about
the "Four Freedoms" of a University, Georgetown University Law Center, 77 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 929-953 (2006).

11
Id. at 930.

12
 342 U.S. 485 (1952).

13
Id. at 498. The Civil Service Law of New York, Section 12(a) thereof made ineligible
for employment in any public school any member of any organization advocating the
overthrow of the Government by force, violence or any unlawful means.

14
Id. at 493. According to the Court:

A teacher works in a sensitive area in a school room. There he shapes the attitude of
young minds towards the society in which they live. In this, the state has a vital
concern. It must preserve the integrity of the schools. That the school authorities have
the right and the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their
fitness to maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society, cannot be
doubted. One's associates, past and present, as well as one's conduct, may properly be
considered in determining fitness and loyalty. From time immemorial, one's reputation
has been determined in part by the company he keeps. In the employment of officials
and teachers of the school system, the state may very properly inquire into the
company they keep, and we know of no rule, constitutional or otherwise, that prevents
the state, when determining the fitness and loyalty of such persons, from considering
the organizations and persons with whom they associate.

If, under the procedure set up in the New York law, a person is found to be unfit and is
disqualified from employment in the public school system because of membership in a
listed organization, he is not thereby denied the right of free speech and assembly. His
freedom of choice between membership in the organization and employment in the
school system might be limited, but not his freedom of speech or assembly, except in
the remote sense that limitation is inherent in every choice. Certainly such limitation is
not one the state may not make in the exercise of its police power. to protect the
schools from pollution and thereby to defend its own existence.

15
 As concurred in by Justice Black.

16
Supra note 12 at 508-509 (1952).

17
 344 U.S. 183 (1952).

18
 The Oklahoma Stat. Ann, 1950, Tit. 51, Section 37.1-37.9 required each state officer
and employee, as a condition of his employment, to take a "loyalty oath" stating, inter
alia, that he is not, and has not been for the preceding five years, a member of any
organization listed by the Attorney General of the U.S. as "communist front" or
"subversive."

19
Wieman v. Upegraff, 344 U.S. 485, 193 (1952); The Court, in the main, found a
violation of the Due Process Clause ("Indiscriminate classification of innocent with
knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power.") and held that the
Government's efforts at countering threats of subversion must not be at the expense of
democratic freedoms.

20
Id. Justice Hugo elucidated thus:

Governments need and have ample power to punish treasonable acts. But it does not
follow that they must have a further power to punish thought and speech, as
distinguished from acts. Our own free society should never forget that laws which
stigmatize and penalize thought and speech of the unorthodox have a way of reaching,
ensnaring and silencing many more people than at first intended. We must
have freedom of speech for all or we will, in the long run, have it for none but the
cringing and the craven. And I cannot too often repeat my belief that the right to speak
on matters of public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost. (Italics
supplied.)
21
Wieman v. Upegraff, supra note 19 at 196; Justice Frankfurter explained:

To regard teachers-in our entire educational system, from the primary grades to the
university-as the priests of our democracy is therefore not to indulge in hyperbole. It is
the special task of teachers to foster those habits of open-mindedness and critical
inquiry which alone make for responsible citizens, who, in turn, make possible an
enlightened and effective public opinion. Teachers must fulfill their function by precept
and practice, by the very atmosphere which they generate; they must be exemplars of
open-mindedness and free inquiry. They cannot carry out their noble task if the
conditions for the practice of a responsible and critical mind are denied to them. They
must have the freedom of responsible inquiry, by thought and action, into the meaning
of social and economic ideas, into the checkered history of social and economic dogma.
They must be free to sift evanescent doctrine, qualified by time and circumstance, from
that restless, enduring process of extending the bounds of understanding and wisdom,
to assure which the freedoms of thought, of speech, of inquiry, of worship are
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States against infraction by national or
State government. (Italics supplied.)

22
Supra note 12.

23
 354 U.S. 234, 262 (1957).

24
Id. at 262-263, Justice Frankfurter's opinion further added:

x x x This means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life of a

university. It matters little whether such intervention occurs avowedly or through action
that inevitably tends to check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities at once
so fragile and so indispensable for fruitful academic labor. x x x

To further emphasize the nature and design of a university and the import of its
academic freedom as rooted in freedom of expression and thought, Justice Frankfurter
quoted a statement from a conference of senior scholars from the University of Cape
Town and the University of the Witwatersrand, to wit:
"In a university, knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A university
ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or any
sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal
being the ideal of Socrates-'to follow the argument where it leads.' This implies the
right to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and
hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an immutable doctrine is repugnant to
the spirit of a university. The concern of its scholars is not merely to add and revise
facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever examining and modifying the
framework itself.

Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and
experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge. A
sense of freedom is also necessary for creative work in the arts which, equally with
scientific research, is the concern of the university.

It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to

speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail 'the
four essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to
study. (Emphasis supplied.)"
25
 360 U.S. 109 (1959).

26
 Id. at 114-115, 130. Here, petitioner, a former graduate student and teaching fellow
at the University of Michigan, refused to answer questions posed to him in an
investigation being conducted by a Congressional Subcommittee into alleged
Communist infiltration into the field of education. For his refusal, he was fined and
sentenced to imprisonment for six months. The Court, after balancing the competing
public and private interests involved, found that petitioner's claim that the
"investigation was aimed not at the revolutionary aspects, but at the theoretical
classroom discussion of communism x x x rests on a too constricted view of the nature
of the investigatory process, and is not supported by a fair assessment of the record x x
x."

27
Id. at 113.

28
 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

29
Id. at 595-596; taken from the Feinberg Law which required the measure.

30
Id.

31
Keyishan v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of NY, id. at 602; citing Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479; United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Sup. 362, 372 (1943).

32
Id. Affirming the significance of academic freedom, and it rationalized:

"x x x The greater the importance of safeguarding the community from incitements to
the overthrow of our institutions by force and violence, the more imperative is the need
to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free press and free
assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if
desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic,
the very foundation of constitutional government." (De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
365 [1937])

Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of

transcendent value to all of us, and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools." The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection." (Keyishan v. Board of Regents of Univ. of State of NY,
supra note 28 at 603. Underscoring supplied.)

33
 Delegate Adolf Azcuna's explanation, in sponsoring said amendment, as cited in
Pacifico Agabin's Comparative Developments in the Law of Academic Freedom,
Philippine Law Journal, Vol. 64, 139-140 (1989):
MR. AZCUNA: In the 1973 Constitution, this freedom is given to the institution itself. All
institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom. So, with this proposal, we
will provide academic freedom in the institutions-enjoyed by students, by the teachers,
by the researchers and we will not freeze the meaning and the limits of this freedom.
Since academic freedom is a dynamic concept and we want to expand the frontiers of
freedom, especially in education, therefore we will leave it to the courts to develop
further the parameters of academic freedom. We just say that it shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning.
34
Supra note 8 at 338.

35
Id. at 339, citing Emerson & Haber, Academic Freedom of the Faculty Member as
Citizen, 28 Law and Contemp. Prob. 525 (1968); Dean Pacifico Agabin posited:
Expression if it is to be free, is not limited to the trivial and the inconsequential. It may
strike deep at our most cherished beliefs or speak up for the most unorthodox
doctrines. Expression cannot be subjected to prior censorship for fear of serious injury
or controversy.

xxxx

This does not mean that freedom of expression is confined to the four walls of the
classroom. This would be a very parochial view of free speech. The spirit of free inquiry
cannot be cut off, like a water tap, once the student steps out of his classes. It is
therefore important that the University encourage discussion and debate outside the
classroom, for an atmosphere and ferment in the academic community at large may be
more meaningful to the student than freedom of discussions within the confines of the
class.
36
 Agabin's Comparative Developments in the Law of Academic Freedom, supra note 1;
see also Onofre D. Corpuz's Academic Freedom and Higher Education: The Philippine
Setting, Vol. 52, 1977, at 273.

37
 G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277. This case involved a
mandamus proceeding where the student prayed that the Faculty Admission Committee
of the Loyola School of Theology be ordered to allow her to continue pursuing her
Master of Arts in Theology. The Court, in the name of academic freedom, would go on
to uphold the school's "wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of
students."

38
Id. at 283-284.

39
 The Court in Garcia; iterated the "four essential freedoms" of a university to
determine for itself on academic grounds (I) who may teach, (2) what may be taught,
(3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be admitted to study, and ultimately found
that the Faculty Admission Committee had sufficient grounds to deny the student's
admission. Id. at 293.

40
 In the case of Montemayor v. Araneta University Foundation, G.R. No. L-44251, May
31, 1977, 77 SCRA 321, 327, the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Fernando,
quoted Robert MacIver, and echoed the Sweezy definition of academic freedom as a
right claimed by the accredited educator, as teacher and as investigator, to interpret his
findings and to communicate his conclusions without being subjected to any
interference, molestation or penalization because these conclusions are unacceptable to
some constituted authority within or beyond the institution.

41
 The Court's holding in Garcia, was subject of a strong dissent from Justice Felix
Makasiar who argued that academic freedom, although at the time textually granted
only to the academic institutions, should be deemed to have been granted to the
students themselves as well, as the students constitute part of the institution itself,
without whom the institution can neither exist nor operate. According to Justice
Makasiar:
What is involved here is not merely academic freedom of the higher institutions of
learning as guaranteed by Section 8(2) of Article [V] of the 1973 Constitution. The
issue here strikes at the broader freedom of expression of the individual - the very core
of human liberty.

Even if the term "academic freedom" were to be limited to institutions of higher

learning which to the mind of Dr. Vicente Sinco, an eminent authority in Constitutional
Law, is the right of the university as an institution, not the academic freedom of the
university professor (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 1962 ed., 489)-the term "institutions of
higher learning" contained in the aforecited provision of our New Constitution
comprehends not only the faculty and the college administrators but also the members
of the student body. While it is true that the university professor may have the initiative
and resourcefulness to pursue his own research and formulate his conclusions
concerning the problem of his own science or subject, the motivation therefor may be
provoked by questions addressed to him by his students. In this respect, the student-
specially a graduate student-must not be restrained from raising questions or from
challenging the validity of dogmas whether theological or not. The true scholar never
avoids, but on the contrary welcomes and encourages, such searching questions even if
the same will have the tendency to uncover his own ignorance. It is not the happiness
and self-fulfillment of the professor alone that are guaranteed. The happiness and full
development of the curious intellect of the student are protected by the narrow
guarantee of academic freedom and more so by the broader right of free expression,
which includes free speech and press, and academic freedom. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.) Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology, supra note 37 at 295.
42
Ponencia, pp. 59-64, 71.

43
Rollo, p. 304. G.R. No. 230642 Vol. I.

44
Id. at 304-305.

45
Id. at 305-306.

46
Id. at 307.

47
Supra note 6.

48
Rollo, p. 309. G.R. No. 230642 Vol. I.
49
 Id. at 310-313.

50
 Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17, 2000, 343 SCRA 377,
390.

51
Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines, et al. v.
Secretary of Education, G.R. No. 216930, October 9, 2018.

52
Ponencia , p. 88.

53
 See Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97
Phil. 806, 812-813 (1955), a case involving challenges to Act No. 2706, as amended by
Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 which provides for a "previous permit
system" before a school or any other educational institution can operate. There, the
Court, quoting a report commissioned by the Philippine Legislature at the time, upheld
the challenged Acts as a valid exercise of police power to correct a "great evil," thus:
x x x An unprejudiced consideration of the fact presented under the caption Private
Adventure Schools leads but to one conclusion, viz.: the great majority of them from
primary grade to university are money-making devices for the profit of those who
organize and administer them. The people whose children and youth attend them are
not getting what they pay for. It is obvious that the system constitutes a great evil.
That it should be permitted to exist with almost no supervision is indefensible. x x x
54
Ponencia , p. 39.

55
 For example, Republic Act No. 6139, otherwise known as An Act To Regulate Tuition
And Other School Fees Of Private Educational Institution, Providing For The Settlement
Of Controversies Thereon And For Other Purposes. See also Lina, Jr. v. Carino. G.R. No.
100127, April 23, 1993, 221 SCRA 515, where this Court sustained the legal authority
of respondent DECS Secretary to set maximum permissible rates or levels of tuition and
other school fees and to issue guidelines for the imposition and collection thereof.

56
Ponencia, p. 85.

57
Supra note 6.
58
Ponencia, p. 86.

59
 Also known as the Policies, Standards and Guidelines for the Doctor of Medicine
(M.D.) Program.

60
 Which now regulates the study of medicine, among others, pursuant to Republic Act
No. 7722, otherwise known the Higher Education Act of 1994.

61
Ponencia, p. 87.

62
Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, G.R. No. 158793, June 8, 2006,
490 SCRA 318, citing City of Raleigh v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 165 S.E.2d 745
(1969).

63
Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, supra, citing Board of Zoning
Appeals of Decatur v. Decatur, Ind. Co. of Jehovah's Witnesses, 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954)
Cited in Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of J. Jardeleza in Zabal v. Duterte, G.R. No.
238467, February 12, 2019.

64
 G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019.

65
 Id.

66
 Including, for example, that of PhiLSAT being pro-elite and anti-poor, or the converse
but equally unverified arguments that PhiLSAT is sound and properly designed to
measure the necessary aptitude of prospective law students.

67
 Including, for example, the power of the LEB to prescribe the qualifications and
classifications of faculty members and deans of graduate schools of law.

68
 G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.

69
 282 U.S. 251 (1931).

70
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila,
supra note 68 at 857.

SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION

CAGUIOA,  J.:

I concur with the ponencia. I write this opinion only to further expand on the points
raised therein, with emphasis on the primordial issue of academic freedom.

The Scope of the Court's Review

The ponencia declares as constitutional the power of the Legal Education Board (LEB) to

set the standards of accreditation for law schools, minimum qualifications of law school
faculty members, and the minimum requirements for admission to legal education,
granted under Sections 7(c) and 7(e) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7662. 1

In turn, the ponencia declares as unconstitutional for encroaching upon the Court's

rule-making powers the powers of the LEB to establish a law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the Bar examinations,2 and to adopt a system of continuing legal
education for lawyers.3 The ponencia also declares as unconstitutional for being ultra
vires a number of resolutions, memoranda, and circulars issued by the LEB for violating
the law schools' academic freedom.

I agree with the scope and extent of the Court's disposition in the instant case, as
indeed, the Court is not limited only to the issue of the requirement of Philippine Law
School Admission Test (PhiLSAT). Apart from the reasons already stated in
the ponencia, I note that the petitioners, particularly those in G.R. No. 230642,
questioned the entire law, not just the provision empowering the LEB to impose
standards for admission into law schools. Moreover, the substantive issues in this case
had been expanded in the Advisory for the oral arguments, to cover the following:

3. Whether or not R.A. No. 7662 violates the academic freedom of law
schools, specifically:

a. Section 7(c) which empowers the LEB to set the standards of

accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size
of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library
and other facilities[;]

b. Section 7(e) which empowers the LEB to prescribe minimum standards

for law admission;

c. Section 7(e) which empowers the LEB to prescribe minimum

qualifications and compensation of faculty members[;]

d. Section 7(f) which empowers the LEB to prescribe the basic curricula
for the course of study; and

4. Whether or not R.A. No. 7662 is a valid police power measure. 4

Clearly, the issues now before the Court go beyond the PhiLSAT. As there are other
pressing concerns about the operations of the LEB-vis-a-vis academic freedom,
the ponencia was correct in looking into the LEB's issuances and rulings beyond those
covering the PhiLSAT. Stated otherwise, the Court is called upon to look at the entirety
of R.A. 7662, as well as the issuances of the LEB, and to test their validity on the basis
of the primordial issue of whether they violate the academic freedom of law schools: an
exercise the Court is actually called upon to do given that there are no factual issues
involved.

While it is true that, on the surface, the issue on the validity of the PhiLSAT is the
centerpiece of the instant petitions, a deeper understanding of the issues raised herein,
as well as the discussions that arose from the oral arguments, readily reveals that at
the heart of the instant controversy is the constitutionality of the LEB's powers under
R.A. 7662 and the reasonableness of the exercise of such powers, as measured
through the yardstick of academic freedom.

It must not be lost on the Court that the exercise by the LEB of its powers under the
aforesaid law, including its exercise of control over the law schools' operations, the
qualifications of the deans and professors, and especially the curriculum, are even more
intrusive and invasive than the PhiLSAT, which only deals with admission to law school.
Therefore, it would be a wasted opportunity for the Court to adopt a short-sighted
approach and shirk away from delving into the constitutionality of the other powers and
acts of the LEB, especially considering that, as extensively shown herein, the LEB's
exercise of these powers is punctuated by blatant violations of academic freedom. The
Court's ruling in Pimentel Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre5 teaches:
x x x By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any
other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is
enough to awaken judicial duty. x x x

xxxx

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a
coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the
laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute becomes the duty and the
responsibility of the courts.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
I submit that the Court not only has the opportunity but, in fact, the duty to settle the
disputes given the serious allegations of infringement of the Constitution. The Court
should thus not foster lingering or recurring litigation as this case already presents the
opportune time to rule on the constitutionality of the LEB's statutory powers and how
the LEB exercises the same. Hence, I maintain that the Court's disposition of the
instant case should not be unduly restricted to only the question of the PhiLSAT's
constitutionality.

For ease of reference, quoted below are the functions and powers of the LEB under R.A.
7662:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act,
the Board shall have the following powers and functions:

a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with
the provisions of this Act[;]

b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions
as herein enumerated;

c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among
others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the
library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning;

d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and
compensation of faculty members;

f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements for
admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses of
study as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the different levels of
accreditation status;

g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law
student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or
legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the
Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose,
the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of
the Bar;

h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may
provide for the mandatory attendance of practising lawyers in such courses and for
such duration as the Board may deem necessary; and

i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary
for the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act.
Much like the ponencia, I have undertaken the same exercise of evaluating, through the
lens of academic freedom, the powers of the LEB and how the same are and have
been exercised. As a result, I have identified several other LEB issuances beyond
those identified by the ponencia which are arbitrary and unreasonable, and thus null
and void.

A. Issues on Academic Freedom

The guarantee of academic freedom is enshrined in Section 5(2), Article XIV of the
Constitution, which states that: "[a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions
of higher learning." This institutional academic freedom includes "the right of the school
or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free
from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare
calls for some restraint."7 The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic
freedom" are: 1) who may teach; 2) what may be taught; 3) how it shall be taught;
and 4) who may be admitted to study.8

Nevertheless, the Constitution also recognizes the State's power to regulate educational
institutions. Section 4(1), Article XIV of the Constitution provides that: "[t]he State
recognizes the complementary roles of public and private institutions in the educational
system and shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational
institutions." As gleaned from the quoted provision, the State's power to regulate is
subject to the requirement of reasonableness.

The limitation on the State's power to regulate was introduced in the 1987 Constitution.
Under the 1973 Constitution, it only states that "[a]ll educational institutions shall be
under the supervision of, and subject to regulation by, the State." 9 The framers of the
current Constitution saw the need to add the word "reasonable" before the phrase
"supervision and regulation" in order to qualify the State's power over educational
institutions. This is extant from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on
August 29, 1986:
MR. GUINGONA. x x x

xxxx

When we speak of State supervision and regulation, we refer to the external

governance of educational institutions, particularly private educational
institutions as distinguished from the internal governance by their respective
boards of directors or trustees and their administrative officials. Even without a
provision on external governance, the State would still have the inherent right to
regulate educational institutions through the exercise of its police power. We have
thought it advisable to restate the supervisory and regulatory functions of the
State provided in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions with the addition of the
word "reasonable." We found it necessary to add the word
"reasonable" because of an obiter dictum of our Supreme Court in a decision in the
case of Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities vs. The Secretary of
Education and the Board of Textbooks in 1955. In that case, the court said, and I
quote:
It is enough to point out that local educators and writers think the Constitution provides
for control of education by the State.

The Solicitor General cites many authorities to show that the power to regulate means
power to control, and quotes from the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention to
prove that State control of private education was intended by organic law.
The addition, therefore, of the word "reasonable" is meant to underscore the
sense of the committee, that when the Constitution speaks of State
supervision and regulation, it does not in any way mean control. We refer only
to the power of the State to provide regulations and to see to it that these
regulations are duly followed and implemented. It does not include the right
to manage, dictate, overrule and prohibit. Therefore, it does not include the
right to dominate.

xxxx

Delegate Clemente, chairman of the 1973 Constitutional Convention's Committee on

Education, has this to say about supervision and regulation, and I quote:
While we are agreed that we need some kind of supervision and regulation by the
State, there seems to be a prevailing notion among some sectors in education
that there is too much interference of the State in the management of private
education. If that is true, we need some kind of re-examination of this function of the
State to supervise and regulate education because we are all agreed that there must be
some kind of diversity, as well as flexibility, in the management of private education.
(Minutes of the November 27, 1971 meeting of the Committee on Education of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, pages 10 and 11.)10 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Further, the Constitutional Commission deliberations on September 9, 1986 also
discuss:
MR. MAAMBONG. What I am trying to say is that we have bogged down in this
discussion because we do not see how we can reconcile a concept of state regulation
and supervision with the concept of academic freedom.

MR. GASCON. When we speak of state regulation and supervision, that does not

mean dictation, because we have already defined what education is. Hence, in the
pursuit of knowledge in schools we should provide the educational institution as much
academic freedom as it needs. When we speak of regulation, we speak of
guidelines and others. We do not believe that the State has any right to
impose its ideas on the educational institution because that would already be
a violation of their constitutional rights.

There is no conflict between our perspectives. When we speak of regulations,

we speak of providing guidelines and cooperation in as far as defining
curricula, et cetera, but that does not give any mandate to the State to impose
its ideas on the educational institution. That is what academic freedom is all
about.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In sum, "reasonable supervision and regulation" by the State over educational
institutions does not include the power to control, manage, dictate, overrule,
prohibit, and dominate.

As applied to the instant case, in order to determine whether the LEB's functions violate
the academic freedom of law schools, it must be ascertained whether the LEB's
discharge of its functions is reasonable.

However, a review of the issuances of the LEB (i.e., memorandum orders,

memorandum circulars and resolutions), of which this Court can take judicial
notice,12 and in which there are no factual questions, reveals that the LEB has gone
beyond its powers of reasonable supervision and regulation of the law schools. Dean
Sedfrey M. Candelaria (Dean Candelaria), as amicus curiae for this case, expressed a
similar view in his Amicus Brief "[i]t is my considered view that a number of LEB
issuances may have overstepped the limits of its jurisdiction, powers and functions. The
problem areas have been on the power to prescribe minimum standards for (a) law
admission; (b) qualification and compensation of faculty members; and, (c) basic
curriculum."13

I accordingly discuss these LEB issuances in relation to the essential freedoms inherent
in academic freedom:

i. Who may teach

As already explained, the Constitution protects the right of institutions of higher

learning to academic freedom,14 the first aspect of which is the right to determine "who
may teach"15 and to fix "the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff." 16 This
aspect protects an institution's right to select and to assemble a roster of faculty
members that best suits its academic aims, objectives and standards, subject only to
minimal state interference when some overwhelming public interest calls for the
exercise of reasonable supervision and never repressive or dictatorial control. 17 The
power to select educators is not some esoteric concept, but involves an institution's
freedom to: determine the eligibility of faculty members and other academic staff;
categorize their positions and ranks; evaluate their performance; establish quality and
retention standards; determine work load and work hours; determine, subject to
applicable labor laws, the appropriate compensation and benefits to be given; and
choose the facilities that will be made available for their use.

R.A. 7662 purportedly empowers the LEB to prescribe minimum qualifications and

compensation of faculty members, to wit:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act,
the Board shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among
others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the
library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning;

xxxx

e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and

compensation of faculty members[.] (Underscoring supplied)
In the exercise of this power, however, the LEB has grossly violated the academic
freedom of law schools by going beyond reasonable supervision and regulation in
their issuances. To illustrate:

First. In the guise of accreditation, the LEB has gravely abused its minimal supervisorial
authority by requiring as part of an institution's application for a permit 18 to operate: a)
"a copy of the roster of its administrative officials, including the members of the Board
of Trustees or Directors,"19 b) "a roster of its faculty members for the proposed law
school, x x x [including] the academic credentials and personal data sheets of the dean
and of the faculty members,"20 c) "the present library holdings for law as well as the
name and qualifications of the law librarian"21 and, quite ridiculously, d) "pictures of[,
among others, the] dean's office, and faculty lounge of the law school."22 Under LEB
Memorandum Order No. 1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011), the application for a
permit to operate may be denied upon evaluation and ocular inspection, 23 if the LEB
finds that the law program is "substandard in the quality of its operation[,] x x x when
surrounding circumstances make it very difficult for it to form a suitable faculty or for
any valid and weighty reasons, the proposed law school could not possibly deliver
quality legal education."24

The foregoing grounds for denial of an application to operate under LEBMO No. 1-2011
are not only vague and arbitrary but worse, blatantly violative of an institution's
academic freedom. By insisting that it can review 1) the "suitability" of the faculty and
personnel through the submission of their academic credentials and personal data
sheets, and 2) the "quality" of a school's operations through an evaluation of an
institution's library holdings and faculty facilities, the LEB has unreasonably
interfered with an institution's right to select its faculty and staff and to
determine the facilities and benefits that will be made available for their use.

Second. Again in the guise of accreditation, the LEB overreached its mandate anew by
authorizing itself to interview25 the dean and faculty members of schools applying for
recognition status26 in order for it to determine whether "its students are prepared for
the last year of the law curriculum, and that the professors who are to teach review
subjects are prepared for the last year of the law course." 27 This requirement is so
unreasonable that if an institution undergoing accreditation is found deficient,
recognition may be denied and the law school may be closed. 28

LEB Memorandum Order No.2, Series of 2013 (LEBMONo. 2-2013) likewise provides
that law schools that have a "weak faculty,"29 "inadequate library research
facilities,"30 "no faculty syllabus,"31 "no moot court room,"32 and "no faculty lounge,"33 as
determined by the LEB, shall be considered "substandard," 34 and shall be "unfit to
continue operating a law program."35

The LEB's supposed authority to review 1) an individual faculty member's ability to

teach and 2) the strength or weakness of the faculty as a whole, is not only
presumptuous but is a gross violation of an institution's right to set academic standards
and procedures for evaluating the qualifications and performance of its own educators.

Third. In gross violation of an institution's right to select "who may teach," the LEB has
also imposed the requirement that the members of the faculty, in addition to their
respective law degrees and Bar memberships, must likewise possess Masters of Law
degrees (LLM). LEBMO No. 1-2011 pertinently provides:
Section 50. The members of the faculty of a law school should, at the very least,
possess a Ll.B. or a J.D. degree and should be members of the Philippine Bar. In the
exercise of academic freedom, the law school may also ask specialists in various fields
of law with other qualifications, provided that they possess relevant doctoral degrees,
to teach specific subjects.

Within a period of five (5) years of the promulgation of the present order, members of
the faculty of schools of law shall commence their studies in graduate schools of law.

Where a law school offers the J.D. curriculum, a qualified Ll.B. graduate who is a
member of the Philippine Bar may be admitted to teach in the J.D. course and may
wish to consider the privilege granted under Section 56 hereof. (Underscoring supplied)
LEB Resolution No. 2014-02 and LEB Memorandum Order No. 17, Series of 2018
(LEBMO No. 17-2018), which implement the foregoing provision, mandate that law
schools comply with the following percentages and schedules, under pain of
downgrading, phase-out, and eventual closure. LEB Resolution No. 2014-02
provides:
2. The law faculty of all law schools shall have the following percentage of holders of
the master oflaws degree:
2.1. School Year - 2017-2018 - 20%
2.2. School Year - 2018-2019 - 40%
2.3. School Year - 2019-2020 - 60%
2.4. School Year - 2020-2021 - 80%
In computing the percentage, those who are exempted from the rule shall be included.

3. Exempted from this requirement of a master's degree in law are the following:

The Incumbent or Retired Members of the:

3.1 Supreme Court;

3.2 Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals;
3.3 Secretary of Justice and Under-Secretaries of Justice, Ombudsman, Deputy Ombudsmen,
Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitors General;
3.4 Commissioners of the National Labor Relations Commission who teach Labor Laws;
3.5 Regional Trial Court Judges;
3.6 DOJ State and Regional State Prosecutors and Senior Ombudsman Prosecutors who teach
Criminal Law and/or Criminal Procedure;
3.7 Members of Congress who are lawyers who teach Political Law, Administrative Law,
 Election Law, Law on Public Officers and other related subjects;
3.8 Members of Constitutional Commissions who are Lawyers;
3.9 Heads of bureaus who are lawyers who teach the law subjects which their respective
bureaus are implementing;
3.10 Ambassadors, Ministers and other diplomatic Officers who are lawyers who teach
International Law or related subjects;
3.11 Those who have been teaching their subjects for 10 years or more upon recommendation of
their deans; and
3.12 Other lawyers who are considered by the Board to be experts in any field of law provided
they teach the subjects of their expertise. (Underscoring supplied)
To ensure compliance with the foregoing, LEBMO No. 17-2018 imposes strict reportorial
requirements, including the regular submission of various certifications and even the
faculty members' LLM diplomas.36

The foregoing requirements impose unreasonable burdens on incumbent and potential

faculty members and unduly infringe on an institution's right to select the legal experts
and practitioners that will educate its students and further its academic aspirations.
More importantly, the requirement is arbitrary and miserably fails to take into account
the distinct nature of the legal profession, i.e., that legal expertise is not necessarily
developed or acquired only through further studies but also (or more so) through
constant and continuous law practice in various specialized fields.

Under the foregoing rule, a seasoned law practitioner with 10 or 20 years of experience
from an established law firm will not be qualified to teach in a law school without an
LLM, unless he or she is able to prove to the LEB (not to the institution) that he or she
is an expert in the subject he or she seeks to teach. This does not only prejudice the
institution, but more so the law student who is, by LEB fiat, senselessly deprived of the
opportunity to learn from the wisdom of experience. The significance of actual law
practice vis-a-vis law study is highlighted by the fact that a minimum number of years
in the former is required as a qualification for appointment as a judge. 37 In contrast, an
LLM degree is not even required for members of the Court.

The LEB also failed to consider that 1) LLM programs impose onerous financial/time
constraints and opportunity costs on incumbent or potential faculty members, 2) few
schools in the Philippines offer LLM programs, and 3) LLM programs abroad teaching
foreign laws do not necessarily augment legal expertise, knowledge, and experience in
Philippine law. As Dean Candelaria accurately noted in his Amicus Brief, "[t]he
mandatory requirement of graduate degrees in law for deans and faculty members
under LEB policies, while laudable and ideal, may not be easily realizable in light of the
practical difficulties in accessing and maintaining enrollment m graduate
programs."38 Upon being asked during the oral arguments to expound on this matter,
Dean Candelaria elucidated as follows:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CAGUIOA:
Okay, on page seven (7) of your Brief, you mentioned that the master's requirement
while laudable, may not be easily realizable in light of the practical difficulties in
accessing and maintaining enrollment in graduate programs. Can you inform the Court
exactly what [these] practical difficulties are?
DEAN CANDELARIA:
Your Honor, I teach at least in two (2) schools where there is graduate degree being
offered, the Ateneo and San Beda Graduate School of Law with the consortium with the
academy, and I have seen the difficulties in particular, for instance, for sitting deans or
faculty members, to appropriate the time to actually access the centers for learning,
because we don't have as much presence, perhaps, in the Visayas or Mindan[a]o. And
of course, we have to ad[a]pt now, because some schools now are going out there, like
Ateneo De Naga, has actually requested on-site the offerings. So, difficulties really
abound insofar as remote areas are concerned. Manila is not so much problematic, for
those who teach in Manila. But for those who would have to fly, from Samar, I know I
have a student from Samar, from Mindanao, who would tranche a weekend curriculum,
let's say at San Beda . . .

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CAGUIOA:

So, in other words, Dean, what you are saying is that, as an example, the physical
location or the topography of the area is such that, insisting on this requirement would
be a grave prejudice to these other law schools because they cannot, in fact, access
further higher learning to comply with the requirements of [the] LEB.

DEAN CANDELARIA:
At this stage, Your Honor, as the lack of institutions is really evident, I think we may
have to work on this progressively in the near future. With the cooperation of the
Bench, the Bar, the Association of Law Schools, and also the Philippine Association of
Law Professors, to be able to achieve that goal.39
Undoubtedly, the LEB overreaches its authority in requiring an LLM as a "minimum
qualification." In imposing the foregoing requirement, the LEB arbitrarily
usurped an institution's academic authority to gauge and to evaluate the
qualifications of its educators on an individual basis, and hastily reduced the
pool of expertise available for selection - to the detriment of the institution,
the faculty, the students, and the profession as a whole.

Fourth. The same observations may be made about the qualifications imposed on deans
of law schools and graduate law schools, who are required to possess a Master's or
Doctorate Degree, respectively. LEBMO No. 1-2011 states:
Section 51. The dean should have, aside from complying with the requirements
above, at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.) degree or a master's degree in a related field,
and should have been a Member of the Bar for at least 5 years prior to his appointment
as dean.

Section 52. The dean of a graduate school of law should possess at least a doctorate
degree in law and should be an acknowledged authority in law, as evidenced by
publications and membership in learned societies and organizations; members of the
faculty of a graduate school of law should possess at least a Master of Laws (Ll.M.)
degree or the relevant master's or doctor's degrees in related fields.

Aside from the foregoing, retired justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals may serve as deans of schools of law,
provided that they have had teaching experience as professors of law and provided
further that, with the approval of the Legal Education Board, a graduate school of law
may accredit their experience in the collegiate appellate courts and the judgments they
have penned towards the degree ad eundem of Master of Laws. (Underscoring supplied)
The unreasonableness of the foregoing provisions is exemplified by the fact that deans
are primarily "school administrators." While certainly, many legal luminaries have
occupied, and currently occupy, the position of dean, there is no justifiable reason to
absolutely require (rather than encourage or recommend) an LLM (for law deans) and
Doctorate Degree (for graduate law deans), when the same would not necessarily
improve the management or administration of a law institution. On the other hand, if
legal scholarship and authority were to be made the standard, it is peculiar
that even a retired Member of the Court would prove unfit, unless otherwise
approved by the members of the LEB.

Notably, the members of the LEB - while seeing it fit to impose arbitrary requirements
to gauge the suitability of faculty members, and to evaluate the strength or weakness
of the faculty as a whole - are themselves not subjected to the same educational
qualifications. As pointed out by Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the oral
arguments:
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Excuse me, for a moment, you are requiring from all Deans, which you supervise, [and]
law professors that they have an advanced degree, yet the LEB does not have an
advanced degree, how do you explain this?

[MR.] AQUENDE:
Your Honor, the justification or the rationale that was prepared by the previous Board
because it was not approved during our term, the previous Board looked into the
function of the LEB and which is not academic in nature, Your Honor.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:
And in LEB, maybe, even perhaps, you should take care first that the LEB members are
all, at minimum, have masteral degrees from reputable law schools here or abroad or a
doctoral degree for that matter before you apply it to your constituents, but my point
is, isn't that unreasonable x x x

xxxx

x x x that you require deans to take an advance[d] degree x x x

xxxx

In other words, you imposed an educational requirement on law schools and certainly
according to our jurisprudence, who to teach is an academic matter? It is a mission of a
school and it is protected by academic freedom on the basis of your LLB or JD degrees?

[MR.] AQUENDE:
Yes, Your Honor. The point, Your Honor, is that the fact that the members of the LEB
[do] not have x x x higher degrees [is] because the law does not require it. However,
that does not mean that we could not x x x
xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:
If the law does not require it, it doesn't mean that anything you do will be reasonable.
You have to actually prove to us because, again, from my point of view, the degree of
judicial scrutiny of any interference On academic freedom x x x the degree of Scrutiny
should be very tight. So again, my point is, perhaps you can address the reasonability
of the requirement, etcetera x x x40
Fifth. Finally, the LEB impairs institutional academic freedom by categorizing faculty
members and interfering with faculty load, as follows:
Section 33. Full-time and Part-time Faculty. There are two general kinds of faculty
members, the full-time and part-time faculty members.

a) A full-time faculty member is one:

1) Who possesses the minimum qualification of a

member of the faculty as prescribed in Sections 50
and 51 of LEBMO NO. 1;
2) Who devotes not less than eight (8) hours of work
for the law school;
3) Who has no other occupation elsewhere requiring
regular hours of work, except when permitted by the
higher education institution of which the law school
is a part; and
4) Who is not teaching full-time in any other higher
education institution.
b) A part-time faculty member is one who
does not meet the qualifications of a
full-time professor as enumerated in the
preceding number.

Section 34. Faculty Classification and Ranking. Members of the faculty may be

classified, in the discretion of the higher education institution of which the law school is
a part, according to academic proceeding, training and scholarship into Professor,
Associate Professor, Assistant Professor, and Instructor.

Part-time members of the faculty may be classified as Lecturers, Assistant Professorial

Lecturers, Associate Professorial Lecturers and Professorial Lecturers. The law schools
shall devise their scheme of classification and promotion not inconsistent with these
rules.

Section 35. Faculty Load. Generally, no member of the faculty should teach more
than 3 consecutive hours in any subject nor should he or she be loaded with subjects
requiring more than three preparations or three different subjects (no matter the
number of units per subject) in a day.
However, under exceptionally meritorious circumstances, the law deans may allow
members of the faculty to teach 4 hours a day provided that there is a break of 30
minutes between the first 2 and the last 2 hours.41 (Underscoringsupplied)
The foregoing provisions unequivocally show that the LEB has not only overreached its
authority to set minimum qualifications for faculty members, it has arbitrarily
dabbled in the internal affairs of law schools, including the grant of faculty
positions and titles, the regulation of work hours and occupations, and the
assignment of work load. While presumably imposed for the benefit of the students
and the professor, the imposition of the foregoing is better left to the individual
institution which would be in a better position to determine the needs and capacities of
its students and its faculty.

To reiterate, academic institutions are free to select their faculty, to fix their
qualifications, to evaluate their performance, and to determine their ranks, positions,
and teaching loads. The LEB's purported power to prescribe minimum qualifications and
compensation of faculty members should be construed to cover only minimal state
interference when some important public interest calls for the exercise of reasonable
supervision. It does not include a blanket authority to impose trivial rules as it
sees fit. In the exercise of the LEB's purported power to supervise law schools,
it has engaged in the unreasonable and invalid regulation, control, and
micromanagement of law schools. The LEB has become, for lack of a better
word, a tyrant.

ii. What may be taught

The second aspect of academic freedom involves the right of institutions of higher
learning to determine "what may be taught," 42i.e., to design the curricula (what courses
to offer, when to offer them, and in what sequence) and to craft the appropriate syllabi
(course description, coverage; content, and requirements).

The importance of this right cannot be overemphasized. An academic institution should

be given the necessary independence to identify, design and establish the courses and
subjects that it deems crucial to a student's personal and professional development and
what it believes will best reflect and inculcate its fundamental academic values.
Protecting an institution's right to select various fields of study and to design the
corresponding curricula and syllabi fosters critical thinking, diversity, innovation, and
growth, encourages the free exchange of ideas, and protects the youth from
potential indoctrination by the State.

Similar to the right of an academic institution to determine who may teach therefore,
the Constitution likewise safeguards its right to determine what to teach and how to
teach, free from undue interference "except when there is an overriding public welfare
which would call for some restraint." 43

While R.A. 7662 empowers the LEB to prescribe "the basic curricula for the course of
study aligned to the requirements for admission to the Bar, law practice and social
consciousness,"44it does not grant the LEB unbridled authority to impose
unreasonable requirements m contravention of an academic institution's
fundamental right to determine what to teach and how to go about it.
A review of LEB's various memoranda evinces no other conclusion than that it has
grossly overstepped this authority, as shown below:

LEBMO No. 1-2011 requires institutions 1) to submit its curriculum for evaluation and
approval as a requirement for accreditation, 45 2) to comply with the minimum unit
requirements for each legal education, course, i.e., Bachelor of Laws (LLB) (152 units),
Juris Doctor (JD) (168 units), LLM (36 units) and Doctor of Juridical Science (SID) or
Doctor of Civil Law (DCL) (60 units), 46 3) to follow a specific and highly inflexible
mode1l curricula,47 and 4) to comply with the course names, prescribed number of
units, number of hours, course descriptions, and prerequisites. 48

In LEBMO No. 2-2013, the LEB unequivocally stated that "in the exercise of its
regulatory authority, [it may] void the graduation of any law student and/or impose
appropriate sanctions on any law school that has not complied with the curricular
requirements, as well as policy and standards required by the Board." 49

A perusal of the mandatory model curricula unmistakably shows that the LEB has gone
far beyond the mere prescription of a "basic curricula." For instance, all the following
subjects as specifically described in the course descriptions, in the corresponding
number of units, during the semester indicated. This is illustrated by the mandatory
first year courses of a JD degree, as follows:
First Year50

1st SEMESTER 2nd SEMESTER

COURSE UNIT COURSE UNIT
Introduction to Law 1 Obligations and Contracts 5
Persons and Family Relations 4 Constitutional Law II 3
Constitutional Law I 3 Criminal Law II 4
Criminal Law I 3 Legal Technique and Logic 2
Statutory Construction 2 Legal Writing 2
Philosophy of Law 2 Basic Legal Ethics 3
Legal Research and Thesis Writing 2
Legal Profession 1
TOTAL 18 TOTAL 19
In relation thereto, Section 58.2 of the same issuance particularly describes each
course, the required units and hours per week, and even the manner by which each
class should be conducted. Sample course descriptions' of the first year courses of JD
degree are shown below:
COURSE NAME/NUMBER
OF UNITS/CONTACT COURSE DESCRIPTION
HOURS/ PREREQUISITES
First Year - First Semester
INTRODUCTION TO LAW A general course given to freshmen, providing for an overview
Cases, recitations and lectures; of the various aspects of the concept of law, with emphasis on
1 hour a week; the relationship between law, jurisprudence, equity, courts,
1 unit society and public policy, presented through selected provisions
of law, cases and other materials depicting settled principles
and current developments, both local and international,
including a review of the evolution of the Philippine legal
system.
PERSONS AND FAMILY A basic course on the law of persons and the family which first
RELATIONS views the effect and application of laws, to examine the legal
Cases, recitations and lectures; norms affecting civil personality, marriage, property relations
4 hours a week; between husband and wife, legal separation, the matrimonial
4 units regimes of absolute community, conjugal partnership of gains,
and complete separation of property; paternity and filiation,
ad[o]ption, guardianship, support, parental authority, surnames,
absence and emancipation, including the rules of procedure
relative to the foregoing.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I A survey and evaluation of basic principles dealing with the
Cases, recitations and lectures; structure of the Philippine Government.
3 hours a week;
3 units
CRIMINAL LAW I A detailed examination into the characteristics of criminal law,
Cases, recitations and lectures; the nature of felonies, stages of execution, circumstances
3 hours a week; affecting criminal liability, persons criminally liable[,] the
3 units extent and extinction of criminal liability as well as the
understanding of penalties m criminal law, their nature and
theories, classes, crimes, habitual delinquency, juvenile
delinquency, the Indeterminate Sentence Law and the Probation
Law. The course covers Articles 1-113 of the Revised Penal
Code and related laws.
STATUTORY A course that explores the use and force of statutes and the
CONSTRUCTION principles and methods of their construction and interpretation.
Cases, recitations and lectures;
2 hours a week;
2 units
PHILOSOPY OF LAW A study of the historical roots of law from Roman times, the
2 hours a week; schools of legal thought that spurred its growth and
2 units development, and the primordial purpose of law and legal
education.
LEGAL RESEARCH AND The course will introduce structures to the methodology of legal
THESIS WRITING research and the preparation of legal opinions, memoranda, or
Lectures, reading and practical expository or critical paper on any subject approved by the
work; faculty member teaching it.
2 hours a week;
2 units
LEGAL PROFESSION The history and development of the legal profession in the
Cases, recitations and lectures Philippines, its current problems, goals, and role in society.
1 hour a week; Also covered are the methodologies in the preparation of J.D.
1 unit thesis
First Year - Second Semester
OBLIGATIONS AND An in-depth study of the nature, kinds and effect of obligations
CONTRACTS and their extinguishment[,] contracts m general, their requisites,
Cases, recitations and lectures; form and interpretation[,] defective contracts, quasi contracts,
5 hours a week; natural obligations, and estoppel.
5 units
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II A comprehensive study of the Constitution, the bill of rights
Cases, recitations and lectures; and judicial review of the acts affecting them.
3 hours a week;
3 units
CRIMINAL LAW II A comprehensive appraisal of specific felonies penalized in
Cases, recitations and lectures; Book II of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, their nature,
4 hours a week; elements and corresponding penalties.
4 units
LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND A course on the methods of reasoning, syllogisms, arguments
LOGIC and expositions, deductions, the truth table demonstrating
Recitations and lectures; invalidity and inconsistency of arguments. It also includes the
2 hours a week; logical organization of legal language and logical testing of
2 units judicial reasoning.
LEGAL WRITING An introduction to legal writing techniques; it involves applied
Lectures, reading and practical legal bibliography, case digesting and reporting analysis, legal
work; reasoning and preparation of legal opinions or memoranda.
2 hours a week;
2 units
BASIC LEGAL ETHICS A course that focuses on the canons of legal ethics involving
Cases, recitations and lectures; the duties and responsibilities of the lawyer with respect to the
3 hours a week; public or society, the bar or legal profession, the courts and the
3 units client.
The LEB mandate that law schools offer specifically described subjects during a specific
semester is a manifest violation of academic freedom, both individual and
institutional.51 It does not only deprive the faculty member of his or her academic right
to design the coverage of the course and to conduct classes as he or she sees fit, but
also unreasonably usurps the academic institution's right to decide for itself 1) the
subjects law students must take (core subjects) and the subjects law students may opt
to take (non-core subjects/electives); 2) the coverage and content of each subject; and
3) the sequence by which the subjects should be taken.
The abuse of power does not end there.

The LEB has not only taken it upon itself to require subjects such as Agrarian Law and
Social Legislation,52Special Issues in International Law,53 and Human Rights
Law,54 which are subjects of special interest or specialization that law schools may have
only previously offered as electives, it has also usurped the institution's right to design
and develop its own electives. Significantly, LEBMO No. 1-2011 provides a list of
"suggested" electives,55 including but not limited to the following:
SUGGESTED ELECTIVES (DESCRIPTION)

xxxx

JURIS DOCTOR (J.D.) PROGRAM

ADMIRALTY
The course covers the history or the genesis of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, up to
the advent of the contentious Hague Rules of 1924, Hague Visby Rules of 1968 and
Hamburg Rules of 1978, including aspects of bills of lading, charter parties, collision,
salvage, towage, pilotage, and the Ship Mortgage Act. (2 units)

ADVANCED TAXATION
A seminar designed for students who are seriously considering tax practice. It examines
the procedural requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. This includes a detailed look
at the audit process from the examination of a return, and ending with a consideration
of the questions surrounding the choice of a forum when litigation is appropriate. It also
exposes students to some of the intellectual rigors of a high level tax practice.
(Prerequisites: Taxation I and Taxation II) (2 units)

APPELLATE PRACTICE AND BRIEF MAKING

The course is designed to provide students with the skills necessary to successfully
litigate appeals before the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court. Emphasis will be
placed on practical training including appellate procedure, oral and written presentation
and methodology. Brief writing and other aspects of modern appellate practice are also
covered. (2 units)

ARBITRATION LAWS
A study of the Philippine laws on Arbitration, the ICC Rules on Arbitration, the
Conventions on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the
settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. (2
units)

BANKING LAW I (GENERAL BANKING)

The course covers the study of the rules and regulations governing banks and non-bank
financial intermediaries, including the New Central Bank Act, the General Banking Law
of 2000, and Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars, rules and regulations. (2 units)

BANKING LAWS II (INVESTMENT BANKING)

A study of the Finance Company Act, the Investment House Law and the Investment
Company Act, and related Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and Securities and Exchange
Commission regulations. (1 unit)
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS LAW
This elective course aims to introduce the students to the legal framework of protection
for children and the psycho-social dimensions of handling children's rights cases. The
Convention on the Rights of the Child is used to provide the background on an
international level. The course is divided further into specific clusters of rights of
children in relation to Philippine laws, issuances, rules of court and jurisprudence. In
each cluster the legal and psycho-social issues affecting certain groups of children
(sexually and physically abused children in conflict with the law, child laborers, children
in situations of armed conflict, trafficked children, displaced and refugee children,
indigenous children, etc. . .) are discussed in order to understand in a holistic manner
the plight of children within the legal system. The methods used in teaching the course
include lectures, workshop exercises and mock trial. Students will also be exposed to
actual case handling. (2 units)

CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION I AND II

Supervised student practice under Rule 138-A (Law Student Practice Rule) of the Rules
of Court including conference with clients, preparation of pleadings and motions,
appearance in court, handling of trial, preparation of memorandum. The course will
include the use of video equipments and computers to enhance training in direct and
cross-examination techniques. (4 units)

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTIONS

An introduction to the collective bargaining process, negotiations, mediation, and
arbitration as experienced in both the private and government sectors, with emphasis
on practice. (2 units)56
While suggesting electives may be acceptable and even commendable, LEB
Memorandum Order No. 14, Series of 2018 (LEBMO No. 14-2018) has 1)
atrociously prohibited law schools from offering elective subjects not falling within the
LEB's "suggested" list of electives, without prior LEB approval 57 and 2) penalized the
same with fines, and threats of downgrading, phase out, and/or eventual closure. 58 This
is grave abuse of the power to prescribe "basic curricula."

Further, and as equally appalling, the LEB now mandates a prescribed sequence, again
under pain of downgrading, phase-out, and eventual closure, 59 by which subjects must
be taken. LEBMO No. 2-2013 provides:
Section 4. Advanced Subjects and Back Subjects. As a general rule, a student shall
not be permitted to take any advanced subject until he has satisfactorily passed the
prerequisite subject or subjects.
In relation thereto, LEB Memorandum Order No. 5, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 5-2016)
dictates "what subjects need to be taken and passed by students in the basic law
courses before being allowed to take the advanced subjects" 60 as follows:
PRE-REQUISITE
ADVANCED SUBJECT(S)
SUBJECT(S)
Administrative and Election Laws or Administrative Law, Law on Constitutional Law I
Public Officers and Election Law
Agency, Trust and Partnership Obligations and Contracts
Civil Law Review I Persons and Family Relations
 Property
Succession
Civil Law Review II Civil Law Review I
Civil Procedure Persons and Family Relations
Obligations and Contracts
Commercial Law Review Agency, Trust and
Partnership
Transportation
Credit Transaction
Corporation Law
Negotiable Instruments Law
Insurance
Constitutional Law Review Constitutional Law I
Constitutional Law II
Criminal Law Review Criminal Law I
Criminal Law II
Credit Transaction Obligations and Contracts
Criminal Law II Criminal Law I
Criminal Procedure Criminal Law I
Criminal Law II
Evidence Criminal Procedure
Civil Procedure
Human Rights Law Constitutional Law II
Insurance Obligations and Contracts
Labor Law II Labor Law I
Labor Law Review Labor Law I
Labor Law II
Legal Forms Obligations and Contracts
Property
Sales
Credit Transactions
Negotiable Instruments Law
Agency, Trust and
Partnership
Land Titles and Deeds
Criminal Procedure
Civil Procedure
Legal Counseling and Social Responsibility Basic Legal Ethics
Problem Areas in Legal
Ethics
 Criminal Procedure
Civil Procedure
Evidence
Legal Medicine Criminal Law II
Obligations and Contracts Persons and Family Relations
Practice Court I Criminal Procedure
Civil Procedure
Evidence
Special Proceedings
Legal Forms
Practice Court II Practice Court I
Problem Areas in Legal Ethics Basic Legal Ethics
Property Obligations and Contracts
Remedial Law Review I Criminal Procedure
Civil Procedure
Evidence
Special Proceedings
Remedial Law Review II Remedial Law Review I
Sales Obligations and Contracts
Special Proceedings Succession
Succession Persons and Family Relations
Property
Taxation I Constitutional Law I
Taxation II Persons and Family Property
Taxation I
Succession
Torts and Damages Obligations and Contracts
Transportation Obligations and Contracts
The foregoing cannot, in any way, be construed as falling within the' LEB's power to
prescribe basic curricula. The basis for delineating "pre requisites" vis-a-vis "advanced
subjects" is not only arbitrary, it is fundamentally flawed. To illustrate:

1) Persons and Family Relations has been made a pre-requisite for Obligations and Contracts,
while Persons and Family Property and Succession have been made pre-requisites
for Taxation II,61 even though knowledge of the aforementioned "pre-requisite" may not
necessarily be essential for studying the corresponding "advanced subject;"
2) Persons and Family Relations, Property, and Succession have been made pre-requisites
to Civil Law Review I and Civil Law Review II, but curiously, Obligations and Contracts was
not made a pre requisite for either of the Civil Law Review subjects;62
3) Agency, Trust and Partnerships has been made a pre-requisite for Commercial Law
Review,63 even though it has traditionally been treated as a Civil Law subject in the Bar; and
4) Legal Forms (a mere 2-unit subject) has been arbitrarily assigned 9 pre-requisites
while Practice Court (which is not even a Bar subject) has been assigned 5 pre-requisites.64

The inflexibility of the mandate has also, as Dean Candelaria explained, "led to
implementation problems affecting student tenure, faculty assignments, tuition rates,
among others."65 Upon being asked to elaborate, he further elucidated on this matter
during the oral arguments, to wit:
DEAN CANDELARIA:
x x x [O]n student tenure, there had been changes in recent years, whereby they add
or split courses. I'll give you an example concretely. When I took Administrative Law, it
was offered with Public Corporation, I think it was also with Election Law, and Public
Officers. That has been the experience for a long time. In more recent times, there had
been splits by the Legal Education Board, and the problem that students who have
taken it, or who are about to take it for instance, would be displaced in terms of the
ladder of courses that they will take. So, we've had students who have had tenure
problems, because they have to take one which, at that time, was actually not offered
so, there is an administrative problem imputing the number of units, that's one
concrete problem. On faculty for instance, the assignment, there have been changes
when it comes to faculty assignments and I think the problem with many law schools
also, is hiring. Faculty members who may have to teach new courses also that are now
being required by the Legal Education Board. I think for instance, Environmental Law. I
know Environmental Law is booming in this country, there is a roster of lawyers right
now who have gone into Environmental Law. But there are other subjects, of course,
that are being introduced that may really be not, I think, easily taught by incumbent
faculty members. And the last one is tuition rates. When you start tampering
with the number of units, in a law school operation, and recommending
changes, it will affect tuition rates for many law schools. At least those who
are reliant on private tuition.66 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While the Court does not pass upon questions regarding the wisdom of the
LEB's prescribed curriculum, the Court is duty-bound to uphold an educational
institution's right to determine and evaluate the propriety of assigning pre-
requisites as an aspect of its right to determine what to teach and how to do
so.

If only to highlight the gross and patent abuse by the LEB of its power to prescribe
the basic curricula, it bears emphasis that the Commission on Higher Education (CHED),
which was empowered to set "(a) minimum unit requirements for specific academic
programs; (b) general education distribution requirements as may be determined by
the Commission; and (c) specific professional subjects as may be stipulated by the
various licensing entities,"67subject to an educational institution's academic right to
"curricular freedom,"68 has only seen fit to recommend sample curricula and sample
syllabi to meet a minimum set of desired program outcomes. For instance, CHED
Memorandum Order No. 041-17,69 which prescribes the Standards and Guidelines for
Journalism majors, states:
Per Section 13 of RA 7722, the higher education institution shall exercise academic
freedom in its curricular offerings but must comply with the minimum requirements for
specific academic programs, the general education distribution requirements and the
specific professional courses.

Section 3. The Articles that follow set minimum standards and other requirements and
prescriptions that all HEIs must adopt. These standards are expressed as a minimum
set of desired program outcomes, as enumerated under Article IV, Section 6. The
CHED designed the curricula to attain such outcomes. These curricula are shown in
Article V, Section 9 as sample curricula. The numbers of units for these curricula are
herein prescribed as the "minimum unit requirement" pursuant to Section 13 of RA
7722. In designing the curricula, the CHED employed a curriculum map for each
program, samples of which are shown in Article V, Section 10.

Using an outcomes-based approach, the CHED also determined the appropriate

curriculum delivery methods shown in Article V, Section 11. The sample course
syllabus given in Article V, Section 12 shows some of these methods.

xxxx

Section 4. In recognition of the HEIs' vision, mission and contexts under which
they operate, the HEIs may design curricula suited to their own needs.
However, the HEIs must demonstrate that the same leads to the attainment of
the required minimum set of outcomes. In the same vein, they have latitude in
terms of curriculum delivery and in specifying and deploying human and
physical resources as long as they attain the program outcomes and satisfy
program educational objectives. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Similarly worded provisions appear in the Standards and Guidelines for degrees in
Computer Engineering,70 Political Science,71 Communications,72 Business
Administration,73 Statistics,74 Education,75 among others.

In contrast with the curricular flexibility provided by the CHED, the LEB did not
merely prescribe minimum unit requirements, desired program outcomes, or a sample
curricula. The LEB gravely abused its authority and violated the law schools' curricular
freedom when it imposed the abovedescribed curriculum, usurped the lawschools'
right to determine appropriate pre-requisites and prohibited law schools from
designing their own electives.

Clearly, the right to formulate the curriculum belongs to the educational institutions,
subject to reasonable guidelines that may be provided by the State. On the dangers of
having the State actually prescribe what may be taught in educational institutions of
higher learning, the Constitutional Commissioners had this to say:
FR. BERNAS. What I am concerned about, and I am sure the committee is
concerned about also, is the danger always of the State prescribing subjects. I
recall that when the sponsor was the dean of Arts and Sciences in La Salle, his
association of private school deans was precisely fighting the various prescriptions
imposed by the State - that the schools must teach this, must teach that. Are we
opening that up here?

MR. VILLACORTA. The Commissioner is right in describing these as guidelines. This is

not to say that there will be specific subjects that will embody these principles on a one
to-one correspondence. In other words, we are not saying that there should be a
subject called nationalism or ecology. That was what we were fighting against in the
Association of Philippine Colleges of Arts and Sciences. The government always came
up with what they called thrusts, and therefore the corresponding subjects imposed on
schools that are supposed to embody these thrusts. So, we had current issues. It was a
course that was required on the tertiary level. Then there was a time when they
required subjects that dealt with green revolution; and then agrarian reform. Taxation
is in fact still a required course. We are not thinking in those terms. These are merely
guidelines.

FR. BERNAS. In other words, while the State will give the goals and guidelines,
as it were, how these are to be attained is to be determined by the institution
by virtue of its academic freedom.

MR. VILLACORTA. That is right, Mr. Presiding Officer. I invite, of course, my fellow
members in the committee who might have some reservations on the points I raised.

FR. BERNAS. But I guess what I am trying to point out is: Are we really serious about
academic freedom?

MR. VILLACORTA. Definitely, we are. Would the Commissioner have certain misgivings
about the way we defined it?

FR. BERNAS. I would, if the committee goes beyond mere guidelines, because if
we allow the State to start dictating what subjects should be taught and how
these would be taught, I think it would be very harmful for the educational
system. Usually, legislation is done by legislators who are not educators and who know
very little about education. Perhaps education should be left largely to educators, with
certain supervision, and so forth.

MR. VILLACORTA. Excuse me, Mr. Presiding Officer, if I may interject. I am sure the
Honorable Bernas, being very much experienced in education, is aware of the fact that
there is this great need to develop certain priority concerns in the molding of our
youths' mind and behavior. For example, love of country is something that is very
lacking in our society and I wonder if the Honorable Bernas would have any reservation
against giving emphasis to nationalism.

FR. BERNAS. I have nothing against motherhood concepts, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. VILLACORTA. But this is always the dilemma of educators. To what extent do we
give freedom as to the subject matter and manner of teaching versus certain
imperatives of national development? In the last dispensation, we found a lopsided
importance given to so-called national development which turned out to be just serving
the interest of the leadership. The other members of the committee are fully aware of
the dangers inherent in the State spelling out the priorities in education, but at the
same time, we cannot overlook the fact that there are certain areas which must be
emphasized in a developing society. Of course, we would wish that we shall not always
be a developing society bereft of economic development as well as national unity. But
we like the advise of the Honorable Bernas, as well as our colleagues in the
Commission, on how we can constitutionalize certain priorities in educational
development as well as curricular development without infringing necessarily on the
goals of academic freedom. Moreover, jurisprudence accords academic freedom only to
institutions of higher learning.

FR. BERNAS. So, I am quite satisfied that these are guidelines.76 (Emphasis and

underscoring supplied)
In sum, the LEB's authority to prescribe the "basic curricula" is limited by the
Constitutional right of law schools to academic freedom and to the due process
standard of reasonableness. When the LEB (or any branch of government for that
matter) interferes with Constitutional rights and freedoms and overreaches its
authority, as it has done in this case, it is the Court's Constitutional duty to make it
tow the line.

iii. How to teach

As regards the aspect of academic freedom on how to teach, several issuances of the
LEB readily reveal that, over the years, the LEB has exercised considerable power
in controlling, and not merely recommending or supervising, the manner by which legal
education institutions and law school professors conduct the teaching of law courses.

To cite a concrete example of how the LEB interferes with the law schools' right to
determine the manner of instruction, the LEB issued LEBMO No. 1-2011, which, as
earlier discussed, introduced policies and standards of legal education and provided for
a manual of regulations for law schools. The said LEBMO is riddled with various
rules, regulations, and restrictions that go into the manner by which law
schools teach their students.

For instance, according to Section 18(a) of LEBMO No. 1-2011, with respect to the LLB
curriculum, the LEB requires law schools to complete the teaching of all subjects in the
LLB curriculum within the entire semester as prescribed by the model curriculum
provided in the LEBMO. Law schools are prohibited from completing the curriculum
in modular fashion, i.e., completing the subject by a class held continuously for a
number of days, although satisfying the required number of hours. Evidently, the
manner by which the law schools implement its curriculum is restricted.

The said provision also prohibits distance education, unless otherwise provided for by
the LEB. For instance, if a law school professor wishes to conduct class through a video
teleconference when he/she is, temporarily outside of the country, because LEBMO No.
1-2011 prohibits distance education unless approved by the LEB, the professor cannot
do so. Clearly, this illustrates how the LEB interferes with the professors' prerogative to
determine what methods they will employ in teaching their respective classes.

Further, under Section 18(c), the LEB imposes the total number of credits that shall be
awarded to a student pursuing his/her LLM, as well as the specific number of units to be
credited upon a successful defense before a Panel of Oral Examiners. The said provision
also dictates upon the law school the specific type of output that a student must submit
in a non-thesis master's program. Similarly, under Section 18(d), the issuance not only
determines the minimum academic credits as regards the degree of SID or DCL; even
the specific number of pages of a doctoral dissertation is imposed, i.e., 200 pages. In
fact, under Section 20 of the same issuance, legal education institutions are mandated
to utilize internet access and to put up a Moot Court room in the process of teaching
their students.
With respect to assessing the respective faculties of the law schools, under Section 41.2
of the issuance, the LEB is allowed to revoke the permits or recognitions given to legal
education institutions when the LEB deems that there is gross incompetence on the part
of the dean and the corps of professors or instructors. Simply stated, under the
issuance, the LEB is permitted to assess the teaching performance of law school faculty
members and mete out penalties in line with such assessment. The evaluation of the
performance and competence of faculty members is part and parcel of a law school's
right to determine its own manner of instruction. Worse, the said issuance is silent
as to how the LEB gauges gross incompetence.

As discussed earlier, under Section 58 of LEBMO No. 1-2011, the LEB prescribes course
specifications, wherein the names of the courses, the number of units per course, the
number of hours to be spent per week, and the various methods of instruction that
must be utilized are dictated upon the legal education institution and the law school
professors who teach the various courses indicated therein.

As a glaring example, under Section 58.1 of the aforesaid issuance, on the course
of Persons and Family Relations in the LLB program, the instructor is specifically
required to conduct "[c]ases, recitations and lectures" for 4 hours a week. For Legal
Technique and Logic, on the other hand, the teaching methods prescribed are limited to
"[r]ecitations and lectures" only, for 2 hours per week. Does this mean that professors
who teach Persons and Family Relations and Legal Technique and Logic are
discouraged, or worse, prohibited, to require group work or group presentations in their
respective classes, considering that these methods of instruction were not included in
the course specifications? That seems to be the case, based on a reading of the said
issuance.

To stress, as clearly illustrated in the foregoing examples, the LEB, through LEBMO No.
1-2011, dictates with much particularity and, therefore, unduly restricts the
method of teaching that may be adopted by the law school professors. This does not
merely encroach on the academic freedom of the legal education institutions as to how
to teach; the academic freedom of the faculty members themselves is directly infringed.

It must equally be stressed that the imposition of the course specifications provided
under LEBMO No. 1-2011 is not merely recommendatory. It is mandatory in nature,
considering that under Section 58 of the issuance, the law schools may provide their
own course descriptions only when the same are not provided under the issuance and if
in conformity with the subject titles stated in the model curricula provided in the
issuance.

Astonishingly, under Section 59 of LEBMO No. 1-2011, the LEB even imposes specific
rules and regulations on the manner by which the law schools grade its students. Law
schools are even required to submit their grading system and a complete explanation
thereof before the LEB.

To further illustrate how the LEB meddles with the right of the law schools to determine
their own grading system, Section 59(a) specifies certain factors that must be
considered by the law school professor in determining the student's final grade, i.e.,
"[p]articipation in class through recitation, exchange of ideas, presentation of reports,
and group discussion."

Under Section 59(b), law schools are forced to drop students who incur absences
totaling 20% of the total number of contact hours or required hours (units) for the
subject. Worse, law schools are required to inscribe the entry "FA" (Failed due to
Absences) in the student's official transcript of records.

Section 59(d), on the other hand, interferes with the law schools' management of their
respective apprenticeship programs. Under the said provision, when apprenticeship is
required by the law school and the student does not complete the mandated number of
apprenticeship hours, or the person supervising the apprenticeship program deems the
performance of the student unsatisfactory, the law school dean is forced to "require of
the student such number of hours more in apprenticeship as will fulfill the purposes of
the apprenticeship program."

Also, under Section 59(e), when a program requires the submission and defense of a
thesis, in a situation where a student fails to submit or receives a failing grade, the
issuance directs law schools to allow students to "improve, correct or change the thesis
and present it anew for the evaluation of the law school, through its dean or the
professor assigned to direct thesis-writing." It is readily apparent that the very manner
by which legal education institutions conduct their thesis program is interfered with.

Beyond LEBMO No. 1-2011, various rules and regulations that interfere in the legal
education institutions' right to determine their manner of teaching are likewise found in
LEBMO No. 2-2013.

In the said issuance, the LEB imposes several restrictions as to the allowable load of
students in the law schools. As previously discussed, under Section 4 of LEBMO No. 2-
2013, students are not permitted to take any advanced subject until passing
prerequisite subjects. Further, under Section 5, the LEB sets the maximum number of
academic units in excess of the normal load that may be allowed for graduating
students, i.e., six units. Under Sections 6 and 8, the requirements for the cross
enrollment and transfer of students from one law school to another, respectively, are
imposed.

Several impositions are also made even on the most miniscule of details
regarding the request, transfer, and release of school records and transfer
credentials.77 Interestingly, even the format of the school records is forced
upon the law schools, as found in Section 7 78 of the issuance. Under Section
12, the rules on denial of final examinations, withholding of grades, and
refusal to re-enroll are likewise dictated upon the legal education institutions.

Under Section 14 of LEBMO No. 2-2013, which mirrors Section 59(b) of LEBMO No. 1-
2011, the LEB requires that professors fail students who incur absences of more than
20% of the prescribed number of class hours. This provision is a clear example of how
the LEB directly interferes with the law professors' freedom to manage their respective
classes.

LEBMO No. 2-2013 even imposes upon the legal education institutions the manner by
which they should conduct their respective apprenticeship programs, determining the
list of specific activities that should be required for students undergoing the
apprenticeship programs.79

As regards the law schools' right to determine which of their students are eligible to
graduate, Section 16 of the issuance imposes residency requirements for graduation,
establishing the rule that no student shall be allowed to graduate from any law school
where he or she has not established academic residency for at least the two last
semesters of his or her course of study. In fact, to further underscore the high level of
interference and overreach exercised by the LEB, LEBMO No. 2-2013 even imposes
upon the law schools certain rules on determining which students may participate in the
commencement exercise of the law schools.80

The interference of the LEB with the manner by which law schools implement their
curriculum is so pervasive that, under LEBMO No. 2-2013, in order for a law school to
open another branch81 or hold extension classes,82 prior approval of the LEB is
required.83

Aside from the foregoing provisions of the LEBMO, I invite the Court's attention to
Article III of the said issuance, which imposes numerous restrictions on the power of
law schools to maintain discipline and to determine the manner by which they conduct
administrative proceedings.

For example, under Section 20, the LEB forces upon law schools certain rules on when
and how they can preventively suspend, suspend, expel, and not readmit their
students.

The law school may only preventively suspend a student "when the evidence of guilt is
strong and the Dean is morally convinced that the continued stay of the student
pending investigation would cause sufficient distraction to the normal operations of the
law school, or would pose real or imminent threat or danger to persons and property
inside the law school's premises."84

If the law school decides to suspend a student, its action constrained to denying the
erring student from attending classes for a period not exceeding 20% of the prescribed
total class days for the school term.85

With respect to the penalty of non-readmission, when m ting out the said penalty, the
law school is forced to allow the student to complete the current school term when the
resolution for non-readmission was promulgated. The law school is likewise mandated
to issue the transfer credentials of the erring student upon promulgation. 86

As regards the penalty of exclusion, the LEB allows the law schools to mete out such
penalty "for acts or offenses such as dishonesty, hazing that involves physical, moral or
psychological violence that does not result in death of a student, carrying deadly
weapons, immorality, selling and/or possession of prohibited drugs, drug dependency,
drunkenness, hooliganism, vandalism and other offenses analogous to the foregoing." 87

The said issuance also confines the power of law schools to expel a student. Under
LEBMO No. 2-2013, the permissible instances when law schools can expel a student are
limited to (a) participation of a student as a principal in a fraternity hazing that results
in the death of a law student; (b) unlawful physical assault of higher education
institution officials inside the school campus; and (c) commission of an offense with an
imposable minimum penalty of more than 12 years. 88 Hence, based on this provision, if
a student participates in a fraternity hazing wherein the death of a non-law student
occurs, absurdly, the law school has no power to expel a student.

Further, in cases wherein the administrative charge filed against a student amounts to
a criminal offense, Section 22 of the LEBMO requires law schools to proceed with the
administrative proceedings until termination even if the criminal case has not yet been
decided by the court.

Notably, under Section 19 of LEBMO No. 2-2013, if the law school imposes a sanction of
expulsion against a student, the student may appeal the disciplinary action meted out
by the school before the LEB. The latter is empowered under the LEBMO
to reverse and set aside the school's decision to expel the student.  Without a
shred of doubt, this is a clear derogation of the law school's right to discipline its
students.

It must be emphasized that the right of the school to discipline its students is an
integral aspect of the academic freedom of how to teach. 89 Because the schools' power
to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their academic freedom, the Court
has generally adopted a stance of deference and non-interference, declining to meddle
with the right of schools to impose disciplinary sanctions, which includes the power to
dismiss or expel, students who violate disciplinary rules. 90 In fact, the power of schools
to discipline their students is so established and recognized that, in our jurisprudence,
even the power to impose disciplinary measures has extended to schools even after
graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto.91

Hence, the various rules imposed by the LEB that control and unduly restrict
the law schools' determination of the manner by which they discipline their
students undoubtedly amount to a serious breach of their academic freedom
to determine how to teach.

Another exemplar of the LEB's unwarranted and undue interference in the law schools'
prerogative to control the manner of instruction is LEB Memorandum Order No. 10,
Series of 2017 (LEBMO No. 10-2017), which imposes guidelines on the adoption of the
academic/school calendar. While the said LEBMO allows law schools to establish their
own academic/school calendars and set their own opening dates, it nevertheless
restrictively confines the academic/school calendar to no less than 36 weeks, wherein
the total number of days shall not be less than 200 per calendar year. Moreover, the
issuance requires law schools to set the start of their school calendar not earlier than
the last week of May, but not later than the last day of August. The law schools'
discretion to determine the amount of weeks and days in their academic/school
calendars, as well as the period of commencement of the academic year, is clipped.

The aforementioned issuances and their provisions are but examples of how the LEB
has exercised the power of control - not supervision - over the legal education
institutions' rights to determine the manner by which law courses are taught and how
such institutions manage their internal affairs.
iv. Who may be admitted

With respect to the academic freedom aspect of who may be admitted to the schools, I
reiterate my position that the ponencia is correct in holding that the PhiLSAT is violative
of academic freedom. Mandating legal education institutions to reject examinees who
failed to obtain the prescribed passing score amounts to a complete transfer of
control over student admissions from the law schools to the LEB. To emphasize, the
permissible power of the State over institutions of higher learning is limited to
supervision and regulation, not control.

Beyond the PhiLSAT, however, the LEB has imposed other restrictions that similarly
interfere with the law school's right to determine who to admit and teach.

Under LEBMO No. 1-2011, where the applicant for admission into a law school is a
graduate of a foreign institution, instead of allowing the law schools to determine for
themselves whether to admit the student or not, the matter is referred exclusively to
the LEB, who shall determine the eligibility of the candidate for admission to law
school.92 Hence, under the LEBMO, the LEB is given complete control and discretion as
to the admissions of foreign graduates. This is a clear derogation of the right of law
schools to determine who to admit.

Further, under Section 16 of the same LEBMO, the LEB forces law schools to reject
applicants for admission to the LLB or JD program of studies who failed to earn at least
18 units in English, 6 units in Mathematics, and 18 units of social science
subjects. Such requirement has no basis under the Rules of Court or under any
law. The aforesaid requirement is purely the creation of the LEB. The same may be
said with respect to the rules on the prerequisites for admission to graduate programs
in law imposed under Section 17.

B. Other Issues Under the LEE Law

i. LEB's power to accredit is too broad and unreasonable

Beyond the four essential aspects of academic freedom, several other issuances of the
LEB may also be classified as unreasonable.

Under R.A. 7662, the LEB is empowered to supervise and regulate law schools or legal
educational institutions through accreditation.93 Without encroaching upon the schools'
academic freedom, the LEB shall set the standards of accreditation, taking into account,
among others, "the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty,
the library and other facilities."94 Educational institutions may only operate a law school
upon accreditation by the LEB.95 Should the law school fail to maintain these standards,
the LEB may withdraw or downgrade its accreditation. 96 To implement the provisions of
R.A. 7662, the LEB issued LEBMO No. 1-2011 entitled Policies and Standards of Legal
Education and Manual of Regulations for Law Schools.

Under LEBMO No. 1-2011, accreditation is either mandatory or voluntary.97 With

mandatory accreditation, a law school is authorized and recognized by the LEB to
operate and to endorse its graduates for the Bar Examinations. 98 On the other hand,
voluntary accreditation "refers to the processes that may be devised by private
accrediting agencies, recognized by [the LEB], that confer marks of distinction on law
schools that surpass the minimum requirements and standards" under LEBMO No. 1-
2011.99 Mandatory accreditation consists of two stages: Permit Stage and
Recognition Stage.100 A Permit status, which must be obtained before each academic
year, allows the law school to open and offer subjects of the first year of the law
curriculum.101 Meanwhile, a Recognition status constitutes full mandatory accreditation
which allows the law school's students to graduate, to be conferred.degrees and to be
endorsed to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the Bar Examinations. 102

R.A. 7662 provides that the grant, denial, withdrawal and downgrading of a school's
accreditation must be subject to the standards to be set by the· LEB. Under LEBMO No.
1-2011, some of these standards are that a law, school: (a) shall be headed by a
properly qualified dean;103 (b) shall maintain a corps of professors drawn from the ranks
of leading and acknowledged practitioners as well as academics and legal scholars or
experts in juridical science;104 (c) shall be properly equipped with the necessities of
legal education, particularly library facilities, including reliable internet access, as well
as suitable classrooms and a Moot Court room;105 (d) shall have a faculty lounge for the
convenience of members of the faculty;106 and (e) shall publish a research journal.107 A.
private higher education institution applying for Permit status to open a law school must
include in its application, among others, the present library holdings, as well as the
name and qualifications of the law librarian, and pictures of the classrooms, moot court,
library, dean's office, and faculty lounge. 108

Verily, I find these standards to be unreasonable impositions on law schools, if not a

patent violation of their academic freedom, as previously discussed.

Moreover, some of the provisions in LEBMO No. 1-2011 lack legal basis in R.A. 7662
and can be classified as arbitrary. Consider the following: (a) the LEB shall assure
accessibility of legal education by seeing to the proportional distribution of law schools
throughout the country;109 (b) in the exercise of LEB's "sound discretion," it may deny
an application to open another law school "if x x x there is/are existing law school/s
which adequately serve/s the legal education needs" in a given area; 110 and (c) it may
also deny an application if it determines based on the records that a law school is
"substandard in the quality of its operation or when surrounding circumstances make it
very difficult for it to form a suitable faculty, or for any valid and weighty reasons," it
could not deliver quality legal education.111 Further, in spite of the serious consequences
of the denial of recognition, i.e., closure or phase out of the law school, there is no
provision on grounds for such denial.112

Lastly, LEBMO No. 1-2011 also provides that the LEB shall take "cognizance of all
matters involving acts or omissions" in relation to R.A. 7662, related laws and issuances
and it may impose administrative sanctions.113 While these sanctions are not defined in
the said issuance, it may be inferred that it refers to a denial, withdrawal or
downgrading of a law school's accreditation.

The above provisions show that the LEB's discretion to grant, deny, withdraw
or downgrade a school's accreditation is too broad and overreaching, contrary
to the constitutional provisions on reasonable supervision and regulation and
on academic freedom.
Other issuances of the LEB which are seemingly void for being either unreasonable or
issued ultra vires are as follows:

1. LEB Resolution No. 7, Series of 2010 (LEB Resolution No. 7-2010), Declaring a 3-
Year Moratorium on the Opening of New Law Schools - The Whereas Clauses
stated that: (a) based on LEB's opinion, the 128 law schools as of that time are
more than enough; (b) the proliferation of law schools has been identified as one
of the causes: of the poor quality of legal education; and (c) the LEB needs a 3-
year period to inspect and monitor the performances of existing law schools and
"to focus on the introduction of reform measures in our legal education system."
Thus, the LEB declared a 3 year moratorium on opening of new law schools.

This unilateral declaration, which is merely based on the LEB's opinion,

seems to have been undertaken without consultation with stakeholders,
specifically the law schools, which the LEB plans to inspect and monitor.

2. LEB Resolution No. 16, Series of 2011 (LEB Resolution 16-2011) The LEB
considers a small student population in a law school as not financially viable and
would result in "substandard legal education," unless subsidized by the
management. Thus, a law school with less than 15 students in the first semester
of the first level or with a school population of less than 60 students is required
to explain in writing why it should be allowed to continue its operations or what
remedial measures it shall undertake to address the low enrollment.

It seems that the LEB has arbitrarily determined that a law school with a school
population of less than 60 students is not financially viable unless subsidized by
the management. As stated in the Whereas Clause, the basis for LEB's
conclusion that the cost of legal education determines its quality is
merely stated as "experience, observation and information." To my mind,
the LEB cannot dictate to a law school whether or not it is financially viable to
continue its operation as the latter can, and should make its own business
decisions.

3. LEB Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 2-'2017),

Submission of Schedule of Tuition and Other School Fees - All law schools are
reminded to follow section/paragraph 13 of LEB Memorandum Order No.8, Series
of 2016 (LEBMO No. 8-2016), i.e., to submit to the LEB the approved schedule of
tuition and other school fees for S.Y. 2015-2016 and S.Y. 2016-2017. This
Circular also provides that failure to seasonably submit the said schedule will bar
the non-compliant law school from increasing its tuition and other school fees in
S.Y. 2017-2018.

This Circular's provision on barring a non-compliant law school from

increasing its tuition and other fees has no legal basis and constitutes
undue interference with the law school's management and operations.

4. LEB Memorandum Circular No, 4, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 4-2017), Reminder
to Submit Duly Accomplished LSIR Form - The LEB reminded the law schools to
submit the Law School Information Report (LSIR) Form for the second semester
of AY 2016-2017 as required under LEB Memorandum Order No. 6, Series of
 2016, (LEBMO No. 6-2016). This Circular also served as a "warning" that "non-
compliant law schools shall be subject to appropriate administrative sanctions,
including the imposition of fine up to P10,000."

It is not clear what these "appropriate administrative sanctions" are. Moreover, it

is also unclear what the legal basis is for the said administrative sanctions and
for the imposition of fine up to P10,000.00.

5. LEB. Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 2017 (LEBMC No. 6-2017),

Applications for LEB Certification Numbers - This Circular provides that, in lieu of
Special Orders issued by the CHED, legal education institutions are required
under LEB Resolution No. 2012-02 to secure LEB Certification Numbers for
graduating students of law programs. This issuance also provides that "LEIs that
graduate students without LEB Certification Numbers due to late submission of
applications" shall be imposed the appropriate sanctions.

Similar to the previous issuances above, it is not clear what these sanctions are.
In addition, the LEBMC unduly interferes with the management of the law
schools regarding their graduating students.

6. LEB Memorandum Order No. 16, Series of 2018 (LEBMO No. 16-2018), Policies,
Standards, and Guidelines for the Academic Law Libraries of Law Schools -
Pursuant to LEB Resolution No. 2018-207, this issuance contains detailed
requirements for the operation of a law library, such as: (a) its size should
"adequately contain the entire law collection and seat comfortably fifteen percent
(15%)" of the entire law school population; (b) there should be an exclusive
reading area for faculty members; (c) the operating hours shall not be less than
6 hours a day; (d) qualifications and development training of the librarian; (e)
required number of copies and kinds of books, as well as foreign and
online/digital sources; (f) if wireless internet connection is not available to
students, the required number of internet workstations shall be increased to
such number equivalent to the ratio of 1 for every 50 students; (g) transitory
provisions which states that non-compliant law schools shall be given three (3)
months to meet this issuance requirements; and (h) failure to meet any of the
requirements shall constitute non-compliance with the prescribed minimum
standards for the law program and shall be subject to the appropriate
administrative sanctions under Nos. 1 and 2 of the said issuance,

While the objectives of providing for a good law library is laudable, the stringent
requirements and its corresponding costs may strain the law school's
resources, or worse, unduly burden the students with increased fees
simply to allow the law school to immediately comply with the
provisions of the said issuance.

7. LEB Memorandum Order No. 18, Series of 2018 (LEBMO No. 18-2018),
Guidelines on Cancellation or Suspension of Classes in All Law Schools - Pursuant
to LEB Resolution No. 2018-344, this LEBMO provides that there will be
automatic national suspension of classes upon declaration of the Office of the
President or when Signal No. 3 is raised by Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical
and Astronomical Services Administration. Without these conditions, the
suspension shall depend on Local Government Unit declaration.
 Since this issuance merely provides for guidelines on cancellation or suspension
of classes in law schools, it is bemusing that there is a clause therein which
states that failure to comply with any of its provisions shall be subject to
appropriate administrative sanctions under Nos. 1 and 2 of the said issuance.

These issuances by the LEB can evidently be classified as unreasonable and unduly
burdensome to the operations of the law schools - which clearly go beyond its mandate.
The LEB ought to be reminded that under administrative law, "administrative
authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and
regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly
adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be
invalid."114

ii. R.A. 7662's provision on law practice internship

With regard to the provision in R.A. 7662 empowering the LEB to impose an internship
requirement as a prerequisite to take the Bar examinations, I agree with the ponencia's
ruling115 that the said provision of law is unconstitutional on its face. Section 7(g) of
R.A. 7662 provides that the LEB is granted the power:
g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law
student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or
legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the
Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose,
the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of
the Bar.
To my mind, the ponencia correctly holds that the aforequoted provision encroaches on
the power of the Supreme Court to prescribe the requirement for admission to the Bar
as provided under Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every applicant for
admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-
one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and
that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending
in any court in the Philippines.
In his Amicus Brief, Dean Candelaria also noted that some of the provisions of R.A.
7662 are in apparent conflict with the power of the Court to promulgate rules and that
law practice internship and mandatory continuing legal education are both subjects of
Court rules and issuances.116

From the foregoing, it is my view that the ponencia was justified in striking down the
particular provision of R.A. 7662 for being unconstitutional.

Conclusion

To end, I reiterate my agreement with the ponencia's conclusions for the reasons I

have already discussed above.
Verily, after a meticulous review of the circulars, memorandum orders and other
issuances of the LEB, it has become apparent that the LEB has committed acts of
overreach, clearly going beyond mere supervision of law schools. A careful analysis of
how the LEB exercised and continues to exercise its powers readily reveals that the LEB
is already unduly interfering and meddling with the law schools' right to determine who
may teach, what may be taught, how to teach and who may be admitted to study. As
illustrated above, the exercise of the LEB's powers are evidently
beyond reasonable supervision and regulation by the State.

Perhaps, if the various LEB rules and regulations cited here were merely
recommendatory in nature or were mere guidelines (following the intent of the
Constitutional Commissioners), then the exercise of the LEB's power could possibly pass
constitutional muster. However, this is not the case. As seen from the discussion
above, the many issuances of the LEB were imposed on the law schools under pain of
administrative sanctions - which include the closing down of the law school for non-
compliance. The questionable issuances cited here show that the LEB is
exercising the power to control, manage, dictate, overrule, prohibit and
dominate the law schools - in absolute disregard of the Constitutional
guarantee of academic freedom. As such, the Court is called upon in this case to
curb the abuse, and to strike down these issuances for being violative of the
Constitutional right of the law schools to exercise academic freedom.

In view of the foregoing, I concur with the ponencia in PARTLY GRANTING the

petitions and in declaring the following:
The jurisdiction of the Legal Education Board over legal education is UPHELD.

The Court further declares:

As CONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the
power to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account,
among others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty without
encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning; and

2. Section 7(e) of. R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the
power to prescribe the minimum requirements for admission to legal education
and minimum qualifications of faculty members without encroaching upon the
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for encroaching upon the power of the Court:

1. Section 2, par. 2 of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it unduly includes "continuing legal
education" as an aspect of legal education which is made subject to State
supervision and control;

2. Section 3(a)(2) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the
objective of legal education to increase awareness among members of the legal
profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
 3. Section 7(g) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as
it gives the Legal Education Board the power to establish a law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the Bar; and

4. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 and Section 11(h) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as
it gives the Legal Education Board the power to adopt a system of mandatory
continuing legal education and to provide for the mandatory attendance of
practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as it may deem
necessary.

As UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:

1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of excluding, restricting, and
qualifying admissions to law schools in violation of the institutional academic
freedom on who to admit, particularly:
a. Paragraph 9 of LEBMO No. 7-2016 which provides that all college
graduates or graduating students applying for admission to the basic law
course shall be required to pass the PhiLSAT as a requirement for
admission to any law school in the Philippines and that no applicant shall
be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses
leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless
he/she has passed the PhiLSAT taken within 2 years before the start of
studies for the basic law course;

b. LEBMC No. 18-2018 which prescribes the taking and passing of the
PhiLSAT as a prerequisite for admission to law schools.

Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on March 12, 2019

enjoining the Legal Education Board from implementing LEBMC No. 18-
2018 is made PERMANENT. The regular admission of students who were
conditionally admitted and enrolled is left to the discretion of the law
schools in the exercise of their academic freedom; and

c. Sections 15; 16, 17 of LEBMO No. 1-2011[.]

2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications
and classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law
in violation of institutional academic freedom on who may teach, particularly:
a. Sections 41.2(d), 50, 51, and 52 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

b. Resolution No. 2014-02;

c. Sections 31(2), 33, 34, and 35 of LEBMO No. 2; [and]

d. LEBMO No. 17, Series of 2018; and (sic)

 3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the
establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs in violation
of institutional academic freedom on what to teach, particularly:
a. Resolution No. 2015-08;

b. Sections 24(c) of LEBMO No. 2; and

c. Sections 59(d) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.117

Additionally, after reviewing the various issuances of the LEB beyond those covering the
PhiLSAT, I also vote to declare the following as UNCONSTITUTIONAL for violating the
institutional academic freedom of the law schools as well as the individual academic
freedom of the law faculty:

1. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the qualifications
and classification of faculty members, dean, and dean of graduate schools of law
in violation of institutional and individual academic freedom on who may teach,
particularly:
a. Sections 33.1(4), 33.1 (5), 34(d), 35(1) and 35(3) of LEBMO No. 1-2011.

2. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the policies on the
establishment of legal apprenticeship and legal internship programs, as well as
its unreasonable intrusion into the formulation of the law schools' curricula, in
violation of institutional academic freedom on what to teach, particularly:
a. Sections 3 and 4 of LEBMO No. 2-2013;

b. Sections 33(6), 53, 54, 55 and 58 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

c. LEBMO No. 5-2016; and

d. LEBMO No. 14-2018.

3. The act and practice of the Legal Education Board of dictating the manner by
which legal education institutions and law school professors conduct the teaching
of law courses, in violation of institutional and individual academic freedom
on how to teach, particularly:
a. Sections 18(a), 18(c) 18(d), 20, 41.2, 58 and 59 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

b. Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26 and 27 of
LEBMO No. 2-2013; and

c. LEBMO No. 10-2017.

 4. Other issuances of the Legal Education Board which are arbitrary, unreasonable,
or issued ultra vires, i.e.:
a. Sections 20, 21, 24, 33.1, 34, 37, 43 of LEBMO No. 1-2011;

b. LEBMO No. 23-2019;

c. LEBMO No. 16-2018;

d. LEBMO No. 18-2018;

e. LEB Resolution No. 7-2010;

f. LEB Resolution No. 16-2011;

g. LEBMC No. 2-2017;

h. LEBMC No. 4-2017; and

i. LEBMC No. 6-2017.

Endnotes:

1
 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR THE
PURPOSE A LEGAL EDUCATION BOARD, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

2
 R.A. 7662, Sec. 7, par. (g).

3
 Id. at par. (h).

4
 Advisory, p. 3.

5
 391 Phil. 84 (2000).

6
 Id. at 107-108.

7
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 455-456 (2000).

8
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, 160-A Phil.
929, 944 (1975).

9
 Art. XV, Sec. 8, par. (1).

10
 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 56-57.

11
 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 441.

12
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 1: "Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall
take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial
extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality,
the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure
of time, and the geographical divisions." (Underscoring supplied)

13
Amicus Brief, p. 6.

14
 CONSTITUTION, (1987), Art. XIV, Sec. 5, par. (2).

15
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 8.

16
 Id.

17
 Id. at 943.

18
 LEB Memorandum Order No. 1, Series of 2011 (LEBMO No. 1-2011), Section
31.1. A PERMIT entitles a law school to open and to offer the subjects of the first year
of the law curriculum. A permit must be obtained before each academic year to enable
the law school to operate on the succeeding academic year.

19
 Id. at Sec. 33.1, par. (4). See also Section 20 of the same LEBMO, which states that
"The law school shall be headed by a properly qualified dean, maintain a corps of
professors drawn from the ranks of leading and acknowledged practitioners as well as
academics and legal scholars or experts in juridical science, properly equipped with the
necessities of legal education, particularly library facilities including reliable internet
access as well as suitable classrooms and a Moot Court room. There shall likewise be
provided a faculty lounge for the convenience of members of the faculty."

20
 Id. at par. (5); underscoring supplied.

21
 Id. at par. (7); underscoring supplied.

22
 Id. at par. (8); underscoring supplied.

23
 Id. at Sec. 34.
24
 Id. at par. (d); underscoring supplied.

25
 Id. at Sec. 35, par. (3).

26
 Id. at Sec. 31.2. "A RECOGNITION constitutes full mandatory accreditation. It
allows the law school to graduate its students, to confer upon them their degrees and
titles and to endorse them to the Office of the Bar Confidant for the Bar Examinations."

27
 Id. at Sec. 35, par. (1).

28
 Id. at Sec. 37.

29
 Sec. 31, par. (2), which defines that "[a]s indicated, among others, by the fact that
most of the members are neophytes in the teaching of law or their ratings in the
students' and deans' evaluations are below 75% or its equivalent in other scoring
system;" underscoring supplied.

30
 Id.

31
 Id.

32
 Id.

33
 Id.

34
 Id. at par. (1).

35
 Id.

36
 Sec. 8.

37
 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (1983), provides:

SEC. 15. Qualifications. - No persons shall be appointed Regional Trial Judge unless he

is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, at least thirty-five years of age, and, for at
least ten years has been engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or has held a
public office in the Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an
indispensable requisite.

xxxx

SEC. 26. Qualifications. - No person shall be appointed judge of a Metropolitan Trial

Court, Municipal Trial Court, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court unless he is a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines, at least 30 years of age, and, for at least five years, has been
engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines, or has held a public office in the
Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.
(Underscoring supplied)

38
Amicus Brief, p. 7.
39
 TSN, March 5, 2019, pp. 102-103.

40
 Id. at 173-175.

41
 LEBMO No. 2-2013, Sec. 33-35. See also LEB Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of
2018 (LEBMC No. 14-2018).

42
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 8.

43
Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, 754 Phil. 590, 655
(2015).

44
 R.A. 7662, Sec. 7, par. (f).

45
 Sec. 33, par (6) and 53.
46
 Id. at Sec. 54.

47
 Id. at Sec. 55.

48
 Id. at Sec. 58.

49
 Sec. 3.

50
 LEBMO No. 1-2011, Sec. 55.2.

51
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note 8.

52
 LEBMO No. 1-2011, Sec. 58.1 and 58.2, Second Year, First Semester, 2-unit subject,
described as "A study of Presidential Decree No. 27, the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program and related laws and regulations, and the Special Security Act and the.
Government Service Insurance Act."

53
 Id. at Sec. 58.2, Second Year, Second Semester, 2-unit subject described as "This is
an elective subject that allows for more concentrated study on any of the following
possible areas of international law: a. International Criminal Law: that should be taken
with reference to R.A. 9851; b. The Law of the Sea: which should be of special interest
to the Philippines because we are an archipelagic state; and c. International Trade Law:
particularly the regime of the World Trade Organization."

54
 Id. at Sec. 58, Second Year, Second Semester, 2-unit subject described as "Study
focused on the aspects of protecting, defending and seeking redress for violations of
human rights in the Philippines."

55
 Id.

56
 Id.

57
 Par. (3).
58
 Id. at par. (7).

59
 LEB Memorandum Order No. 5, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 5-2016), par. (4).

60
 Id. at par. (1).

61
 Id.

62
 Id.

63
 Id.

64
 Id.

65
Amicus Brief, p. 7.
66
 TSN, March 5, 2019, pp. 106-107.

67
 R.A. 7722, Sec. 13.

68
 Id.

69
 POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR BACHELOR IN JOURNALISM (B
JOURNALISM) AND BACHELOR OF ARTS IN JOURNALISM (BA JOURNALISM)
PROGRAMS, May 12, 2017.

70
 POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN
COMPUTER ENGINEERING (BSCPE) EFFECTIVE (AY) 2018-2019, CHED Memorandum
Order No. 087-17, December 4, 2017.

71
 POLICIES AND STANDARDS FOR THE BACHELOR OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
(BA POS) PROGRAM, CHED Memorandum Order No. 051-17, May 31, 2017.

72
 REVISED POLICIES, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES (PSGS) FOR BACHELOR OF ARTS
IN COMMUNICATION (BA COMM) PROGRAM, CHED Memorandum Order No. 035-17,
May 11, 2017.

73
 REVISED POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, CHED Memorandum Order No. 017-17, May 9, 2017.

74
 POLICIES, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES FOR THE BACHELOR OF SCIENCE IN
STATISTICS (BS STAT) PROGRAM, CHED Memorandum Order No. 042-17, May 17,
2017.

75
 POLICIES, STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES FOR BACHELOR OF SECONDARY
EDUCATION (BSED), CHED Memorandum Order No. 075-17, November 2, 2017.

76
 IV RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 77 (August 29, 1986).

77
 LEBMO No. 2-2013, Sec. 7-11,

78
Section 7. School Records of a Student. The school record of every student shall
contain the final rating in each subject with the corresponding credits, and the action
thereon preferably indicated by "passed" or "failed". No final record may contain any
suspensive mark such as "Inc.". The student must either be given a passing or a failing
grade in the final record.

79
 Sec. 24.

80
 Id. at Sec. 15.

81
 Id. at Sec. 25.

82
 Id. at Sec. 26.
83
 Id. at Sec. 27.

84
 Id. at Sec. 20, par. (a).

85
 Id. at Sec. 20, par. (b)(1).

86
 Id. at Sec. 20, par. (b)(2).

87
 Id. at Sec. 20, par. (b)(3).

88
 Id. at Sec. 20, par. (b)(4).

89
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 7.

90
Cudia v. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy, supra note 43, at
655-656.

91
 Id. at 657-658, citing University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,
372 Phil. 287, 306-308 (1999).

92
 Sec. 15.

93
 R.A. 7662, Sec. 7, par. (d).

94
 Id. at par. (c).

95
 Id. at Sec. 8.

96
 Id. at Sec. 9.

97
 Sec. 30.

98
 Id.

99
 Id.

100
 Id. at Sec. 31.

101
 Id. at Sec. 31.1.
 
102
 Id. at Sec. 31.2.
 
103
 Id. at Sec. 20.
 
104
 Id.

105
 Id.

106
 Id.
107
 Id. at Sec. 24. In LEB Memorandum Order No. 23, Series of 2019 (LEBMO No.
23-2019), the LEB saw fit, under pain of administrative sanctions, to regulate
the establishment of Law Journals, including the composition, position, and
powers of the Editorial Board, the frequency of publication, and even a Law
Journal's format and style.

108
 Id. at Sec. 33.1.

109
 Id. at Sec. 21.

110
 Id. at Sec. 34, par. (d).

111
 Id.

112
 Id. at Sec. 37.

113
 Id. at Sec. 43.

114
Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 243 Phil. 993, 1005 (1988).

115
Ponencia, p. 102.

116
Amicus Brief, p. 4.

117
Ponencia, pp. 101-103.

CONCURRING OPINION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

The question in the instant case is simple - may the State, under the guise of
improving the quality of legal education forbid its own citizens from pursuing
a course in law?

In the instant consolidated Petitions for Prohibition, and Certiorari and Prohibition,

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners seek to declare as unconstitutional
RA No. 7662, or the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993. They principally target Legal
Education Board Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 ("LEBMO NO. 7"), which
established the Philippine Law School Admission Test ("PhilSAT"), and the subsequent
Legal Education Board Memorandum Orders and Circulars issued in relation thereto,
particularly Legal Education Board Memorandum Order No. 11, Series of 2017 ("LEBMO
No. 11") which supplies transitional provisions for LEBMO No. 7 and Legal Education
Board Memorandum Circular No. 18 ("LEBMC No. 18"), which enumerates the PhilSAT
eligibility requirements for freshmen law students for academic year 2018-2019. 1

The ponencia focused its scrutiny on LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, LEBMO No. 11,
Series of 2017, and LEBMO No. 18, which were all declared to be unconstitutional. This
examination was based on the assumption that the objection against the PhilSAT lies at
the core of all the Petitions.2

I agree with the ponencia in striking as unconstitutional LEBMO No. 7, and all

its adjunct orders. I further concede that they must be struck down on the basis of
police power, and for being violative of the institutions' and students' academic
freedom. In addition, I wish to highlight certain important matters that were not
mentioned in the ponencia.

The Importance of Education in the Philippine Setting

Education is a continuing concern that is impressed with public interest. The importance
of education in our country is apparent from the numerous Constitutional provisions
highlighting the obligation of the State to nurture and protect our educational
systems, viz.:

"ARTICLE II. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES PRINCIPLES

Article II, Section 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress, and promote total human liberation and development.

ARTICLE XIV. EDUCATION

Article XIV, Section 1. The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all.

Article XIV, Section 2. The State shall:

1. Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of

education relevant to the needs of the people and society;

2. Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and high
school levels. Without limiting the natural rights of parents to rear their children,
elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age;

3. Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs,

subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both
public and private schools, especially to the underprivileged;

4. Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning systems, as well as self-

learning, independent, and out-of-school study programs particularly those that
respond to community needs; and

5. Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics,
vocational efficiency, and other skills.

Article XIV, Section 4. The State recognizes the complementary roles of public and
private institutions in the educational system and shall exercise reasonable supervision
and regulation of all educational institutions."
The common thread that runs through these Constitutional provisions is the State's
priority towards education. This stems from the reality that "education and total human
development [are] the gateway not only to intellectual and moral development but also
to economic advancement and the cultivation of the yearning for freedom and
justice."3 It leads to the promotion of "total human liberation and development." 4

In view of the importance of education, the State is bound to protect and promote the
right of all citizens to quality education, and to undertake steps to make it accessible
and affordable for all.5 Added to this, all systems of education must be relevant to the
needs of the people and the society.6

Pursuant thereto, on December 23, 1999, Congress passed Republic Act No. 7662 or
the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993. The law was created to fulfill the State's policy
to uplift the standards of legal education to prepare law students for advocacy,
counseling, problem solving, and decision-making; to infuse in them the ethics of the
legal profession and impress on them the importance and dignity of the legal profession
as an equal and indispensable partner of the Bench. 7 To achieve these ends, the
lawmakers created a Legal Education Board ("LEB"), to pursue the following objectives,
to wit:
(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with
the provisions of this Act;

(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions
as herein enumerated;

(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among
others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the
library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning;

(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum

qualifications and compensation of faculty members;

(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements
for admission to the Bar, law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses
of study as may be prescribed by the law schools and colleges under the different levels
of accreditation status;

(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a
law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or
legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a specific period that the
Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose,
the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of
the Bar.
(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may
provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for
such duration as the Board may deem necessary; and

(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary
for the attainment of the policies and objectives of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Latching on to its power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission, on
December 29, 2016, the LEB released LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, which provides for
the implementation of a nationwide uniform law school admission test - the PhilSAT. It
is an aptitude exam that is designed to "measure the academic potential of the
examinee to pursue the study of law," through a series of questions that gauge his/her
proficiencies in communications, language, critical thinking, and verbal and quantitative
reasoning.8

Under LEBMO No. 7, the PhilSAT shall be administered once a year on or before April 16
in Metro Manila, Baguio City, Legazpi City, Cebu City, Iloilo City, Davao City, and
Cagayan de Oro City. A prospective test taker must pay a testing fee of Php 1,500.00
(later reduced to Php 1,000).9

Basically, the PhilSAT intends to predict the capacity of the test taker to survive in a
challenging legal education program. It is surmised that if the examinee obtains a
grade of 55 and above, then he/she can surely endure the rigors of law school.

In addition, it is assumed that those who graduated with honors and have been granted
a professional civil service eligibility possess the basic competencies to thrive in law
school. As such, they are exempt from the requirement of taking the PhilSAT, provided
that they enroll in a law school within two years from their college graduation, and
obtain a Certificate of Exemption from the LEB.

On the part of the law schools, they are strictly enjoined from admitting an applicant
who failed to obtain the minimum required score, or an honor graduate who neglected
to submit the Certificate of Exemption. Any law school who violates this rule shall be
subjected to administrative sanctions, ranging :from the termination or phasing-out of
its lw program; provisional cancellation of its government recognition and placing of its
law program under Permit Status, and/or paying a fine of not less than Php
10,000.00.10

Meanwhile, the LEB issued LEBMO No. 11, which provided for transitional provisions to
LEBMO No. 7, allowing conditional admission and enrollment to those who failed to take
the PhilSAT last April 16, 2017. The test takers' conditional enrollment was premised on
an undertaking that they will take the next scheduled PhilSAT, and obtain the required
minimum score, otherwise, their conditional admission shall be revoked. In addition,
they must file a notarized application with the Chairman of the LEB, and pay an
application fee of Php 300.00.

Thereafter, on June 8, 2018, LEB Chairperson Aquende issued LEBMC No. 18, putting
an end to the conditional admission of students who failed to present a Certificate of
Eligibility.

For sure, the LEB was properly vested with the power to prescribe minimum standards
for law admission. However, this right is not unbridled, and is limited by the
Constitutional admonition that said right must be exercised in a reasonable
manner.11 This means that the extent of State supervision and regulation may not
transgress the cherished freedoms granted under the Constitution.

The PhilSAT is Violative of the Law Schools' Academic Freedom

Inasmuch as the State possesses the right to supervise and regulate educational
institutions, the Constitution craftily ensures that the exercise thereof will not spiral into
tyranny. To avoid any form of despotism in the regulation of institutions, the
Constitution adds a layer of protection in favor of the academic institutions by ensuring
that notwithstanding the possibility of state interference in their affairs, "[a]cademic
freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." 12 Law schools, as
institutions of higher education, are the recipients of this boon. 13

This institutional autonomy granted unto universities has been in existence as early as
the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.14 Despite being strongly entrenched in our
fundamental law, surprisingly, the body of jurisprudence on the matter of academic
freedom is scarce. Noted Constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ theorizes that the
scarcity stems from either a positive aspect - where occasions for litigation and
controversy surrounding the matter are rare due to the unhampered freedom enjoyed
by the academic world, or, in a negative aspect - due to a general ignorance or naivety
regarding its meaning, purpose, and utility. 15 The instant case is one of the rare
occasions where the issue of academic freedom comes to fore, and thus, presents an
opportunity for the Court to further elucidate its meaning.

Interestingly, academic freedom is an amorphous concept that eludes exact definition.

The framers of the Constitution intended it to remain as expansive and dynamic, in a
desire to give the courts a wide latitude to develop its meaning further, viz.:
In anticipation of the question as to whether and what aspects of academic freedom are
included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since academic
freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially
in education, therefore, we shall leave it to the courts to develop further the
parameters of academic freedom."

More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of
the sentence 'academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,'
do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?" Azcuna
replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . . ." Gascon finished off the broken thought,
"the faculty and the students." Azcuna replied: "Yes."16
In Philippine jurisprudence, one of the earliest definitions of this term emerged from the
case of Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of
Theology where the Court held that "the internal conditions for academic freedom in a
university are that the academic staff should have de facto control of the following
functions: (i) admission and examination of students; (ii) the curricula for courses of
study; (iii) the appointment and tenure of office of academic staff and (iv) the allocation
of income among the different categories of expenditure." 17

In the cases that followed, the parameters of academic freedom were simplified to
pertain to a general liberty to decide (i) who may teach; (ii) who may be taught; (iii)
how lessons shall be taught; and (iv) who may be admitted to study. 18 Certainly, "[i]t is
the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to
speculation, experiment and creation; x x x an atmosphere in which there prevail the
'four essential freedoms' of a university."19

Accordingly, insofar as the academic institution is concerned, it possesses the general

right to determine not only the subject matter, or manner of teaching, but likewise has
a free reign to select its own students. This liberty was described in Garcia20 as "a wide
sphere of autonomy."21 Thus, the school has the .right to decide its admission criteria
for itself, in accordance with "its aims and objectives, and how best to attain them -
free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
welfare calls for some restraint". 22 Moreover, the Court nips in the bud any attempts to
curtail or limit this freedom, warning that "[t]his constitutional provision [academic
freedom] is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That
would be to frustrate its purposes and nullify its intent." 23

Similarly, in Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,24 the Court went further by

characterizing the right of the schools to choose their own students as "inherent,"
explaining that,
"educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to
establish their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or
pressure. In the Frankfurter formulation, this is articulated in the areas of: (1) what
shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study." 25
Indeed, institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish
their own policies - academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or
pressure. This includes the creation of their own distinct policies, standards or criteria in
the selection of their students, in accordance with their vision-mission and objectives.
Remarkably, this prerogative is essential to their very functioning and identity. For
sure, the schools' body politic serves as a representation of their standards, an
embodiment of their vision, and a reflection of their ideals.

Equally important, in University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,26 the Court

stressed that concomitant to the right of the schools to pursue their academic freedom,
are the duties to ensure that this freedom is not jeopardized, 27 and to staunchly avert
any possible encroachments thereto. They must zealously guard their liberty against
the State. Correlatively, on the part of the State, it should only interfere in instances
where the public welfare necessitates its intrusion.

This idea was likewise evinced by the framers of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
MR. GASCON: When we speak of state regulation and supervision, that does not mean
dictation, because we have already defined what education is. Hence, in the pursuit of
knowledge in schools we should provide the educational institution as much academic
freedom it needs. When we speak of regulation, we speak of guidelines and others. We
do not believe that the State has any right to impose its ideas on the educational
institution because that would already be a violation of their constitutional rights.

There is no conflict between our perspectives. When we speak of regulations, we speak

of providing guidelines and cooperation in as far as defining curricular et cetera, but
that does not give any mandate to the State to impose its ideas ·on the educational
institution. That is what academic freedom is all about. 28
In fact, even the legislative and executive branches of government protect this liberty.
Particularly, under Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 232, as amended, the State affirms the
objective of establishing and maintaining a complete, adequate and integrated system
of education relevant to the goals of national development. 29 Further, Section 13(2) of
B.P. Blg. 232 recognizes that to achieve this goal, the determination of admission
standards should be left to the schools, and not to the State, viz.:
Sec. 13. Rights of Schools. - In addition to their rights provided for by law, school
shall enjoy the following:

1. The right of their governing boards or lawful authorities to provide for the proper
governance of the school and to adopt and enforce administrative or management
systems.

2. The right for institutions of higher learning to determine on academic grounds who

shall be admitted to study, who may teach, and what shall be the subjects of the
study and research. (Emphasis supplied)
Of course, this is not to relegate the State to being an impotent commander or a mere
passive guardian. The State may set minimum admission requirements, provided that
these are reasonable and equitable in their application, both for the school and the
applicant.30 Said standards must never transgress upon Constitutional rights.

Judged against these parameters, it becomes all too apparent that LEBMO No. 7,
insofar as it imposes the PhilSAT, is a constricting regulation that binds the hands of the
schools from choosing who to admit in their law program. The LEB thrusts upon the law
schools a pre-selected roster of applicants, and effectively deprives them of the right to
select their own students on the basis of factors and criteria of their own choosing.
Consequently, the law schools are left with no choice but to elect from this limited pool.
Worse, they are forbidden from admitting those who failed to comply with the LEB's
requirements, under pain of administrative sanctions.

Undoubtedly, the imposition of the PhilSAT is an oppressive and arbitrary measure. The
LEB is bereft of power to substitute its own judgment for that of the universities.
Rather, the universities should be free to consider other criteria (aside from the
PhilSAT) in determining their prospective students' aptitude and ability to survive in law
school. In fact, during the Oral Arguments held on March 5, 2019, amicus curiae Dean
Sedfrey Candelaria revealed that passing the law entrance exam is not a guarantee that
the student will survive through law school:
JUSTICE A. REYES:
All right. But then you would always state that it is not a guarantee that a student will
pass law school because he passed the law entrance exam?

DEAN CANDELARIA:
I agree, Your Honor, in fact in my conversations with Father Bernas who has a longer
stay with me in the law school, I think he has even said that any students catch up, let
[sic] say, people who may have studied in other regions, they easily catch up once they
go to Manila, at least in the Ateneo when he was Dean and I've observed this also
during my tenure that there are people who have caught up with the rest come second
year. . ."31
Concededly, although the PhilSAT measures a person's aptitude or ability to cope with
the rigors of law school, this is but a one-sided assessment. It fails to consider the
person's diligence, drive or zeal - which are equally important in successfully obtaining
a degree in law. Surely, one who may not be as proficient in language or reasoning, but
is filled with a passion and a desire to learn, may perform as well as another who is
innately intelligent, but who is apathetic and indifferent. There are certainly other
extraneous factors, traits or characteristics that make a good student, which the law
school must be allowed to consider, should it so desire.

The PhilSAT is Violative of the Students' Academic Freedom and Right to

Acquire Knowledge

Article XIV, Section 5(3) of the 1987 Constitution declares that "[e]very citizen has a
right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements."

Certainly, the right to pursue a course of higher learning is supported, no less by the
State. It must endeavor to ensure a becoming respect for every citizen's right to select
his/her course of study. To expand one's knowledge, to obtain a degree, or to advance
one's professional growth are liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. Although these
rights are not absolute, they may only be curbed by standards that are "fair,
reasonable, and equitable."32

Although the Constitution fails to specifically mention that academic freedom is equally
enjoyed by students, this lacuna was supplied by the Court in Ateneo de Manila
University v. Judge Capulong,33 where for the first time, the Court affirmed that
academic freedom is equally enjoyed by the students. 34

Interestingly, the modem concept of academic freedom as it applies to students has its
immediate origin from a nineteenth century German term known as "lernfreiheit." 35 This
term meant that students were "'free to roam from place to place, sampling academic
wares,' 'free to determine the choice and sequence of course,' 'responsible to no one for
regular attendance,' and 'exempted from all tests save the final examinations.'" 36 In a
sense, it is an untrammeled freedom to satiate one's thirst for knowledge. Albeit a
radical sense of freedom, in our jurisdiction, this so-called thirst may be curbed by
reasonable standards.

Remarkably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution supported the idea of academic
freedom as a "spirit of free inquiry," 37 which includes the pursuit of truth and
advocacy.38 Moreover, they believed that academic freedom is essential to create an
environment that will "encourage creative and critical thinking." 39 In turn, this free flow
of ideas will promote the full and wholistic development of the students. Also, more
than the promotion of the students' welfare, the framers even went further by saying
that this freedom of thought may even lead to the country's improvement - "so far as
this [academic freedom is allowed full play in the academic institutions or in the
institutions of higher learning, I think we will end up the better as people." 40

Consequently, the framers stressed the need to protect this cherished freedom. They
emphasized that the right to learn and discover, "should be protected as long as the
activities fall within the canons of scholarship, and subjected as it were to the forces of
the market place of ideas."41 They believed that if the State encourages critical and
creative thinking, it will naturally protect it. 42
In addition, the law affirms the right of students to select their own course of study.
This is evident from Section 9(2) of B.P. Blg. 232, otherwise known as the Education
Act of 1982, as amended:
SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School. - In addition to other rights, and subject to the
limitations prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall
enjoy the following rights:

1. The right to receive, primarily through competent instruction, relevant qualify

education in line with national goals and conducive to their full development as person
with human dignity.

2. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula
and to continue their course therein up to graduation, except in cases of
academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations. 43 (Emphasis
supplied)
More so, as adverted to by the ponencia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
affirms that "[e]veryone has a right to education. Technical and professional education
shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all
on the basis of merit."44

Significantly, the Constitution, the law, and international conventions. are one in
affirming the students' right to apply to a school of their own, choosing, and
correspondingly, select their own course of study. Although said right of the students is
subject to their compliance with the criteria dictated by the school, it must be stressed
however that the student and the school are free to negotiate between themselves,
without the interference of the State. This scenario should be likened to a free
marketplace where the school showcases its product- its curricula, professors,
environment, while a student, in turn, flaunts his/her own capabilities, skills, and
talents. The parties should be left to freely decide for themselves whether they are a fit
for each other. The State should not meddle, unless absolutely necessary for the
public's safety and welfare. Should it decide to intervene, its power is in no way
almighty, but must be circumscribed within the bounds of reasonableness.

The Right to Study law is an Adjunct of One's Fundamental Right to Acquire

Knowledge. In the Same Vein, the Manner Through Which the Law School
Decides to Teach the Law is an Exercise of its Freedom of Expression

This concept was broached during the deliberations for the 1973 Constitution. Delegate
Vicente G. Sinco intimated that the freedom of the teacher and of the student may be
anchored on the basic Constitutional guarantees of freedom, in addition to the specific
guarantee of academic freedom:45
by expressly guaranteeing academic freedom the new provision implicitly distinguishes
academic freedom from a citizen's political right of free expression. Litigation on this
new freedom, therefore will force the courts to search for standards of adjudication,
standards not necessarily identical with those that have already been established for
the general freedom of expression. Academic freedom is freedom not just in the
context of a political freedom but also in the context of a narrower academic
community. The implication of this distinction must be explored. The search for
standards for academic freedom must take into consideration not just the general
theory of freedom of expression but also the functions of a university. 46
More so, beyond the Philippine laws and Constitution, the right to knowledge is a
universal human right, protected no less by the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICPR").

Specifically, Article 19 of the ICPR, affirms that:

Article 19

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions,
but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (order public), or of public
health or morals.47
Indeed, freedom of expression, which includes the right to receive information and
ideas of all kinds, is a civil and political right. It is an inalienable right that stems from a
person's inherent dignity. It is likewise the foundation of freedom, justice and peace. in
the world.48 As such, this essential guarantee may only be restricted insofar as it
violates the rights and reputation of others, or if absolutely necessary to protect
national security and public order.49

Moreover, knowledge cannot be passed without a medium. Thus, the right of the law
school to teach, the information it shares, and its manner of teaching are
representations of its freedom of expression. The State should only step in, should it
find that "the means or methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient,
impractical, or riddled with corruption." 50

Furthermore, I wish to underscore that a distinction exists between the right to study
law and the privilege to practice it. Although these two activities may be related, they
are not one and the same. The study of law does not ipso facto lead to the practice
thereof. This was a point that I stressed during the Oral Arguments on March 5, 2019:
"JUSTICE A. REYES: But you are not in the pursuit of the study of law not in the
pursuit of being a lawyer. Is there a need for an entrance exam if he just wants to
study the law itself as a person?

xxxx

He doesn't want to become a lawyer, he just wants to be a student of the law. He has a
lot of time on his hands, he has all the money. He just wants to study law, is there
anything wrong with that?" 51
Lest it be forgotten, the law is not only a profession, but it is first and foremost, a field
of study. It is an interesting and practical science, that proves useful for everyday life,
and for one's personal growth and career. For instance, the Law on Obligations and
Contracts is practical for one engaged in business; Constitutional Law piques the
interest of one desirous to learn about the workings of the government and the citizen's
fundamental rights; and Criminal Law, inflames one curious about society's penal laws
and systems. For others, obtaining a Bachelor's Degree or a Juris Doctor in Law serves
as a gateway to promotion. These are but a few examples of a myriad of realities
pertaining to the law's importance as an academic field.

Certainly, the State has no legitimate interest in preventing such individuals who want
to learn about the law, who have free time on their hands, and who possess resources
to fund a legal education. Neither does it have the right to prevent a law school that is
willing and capable of teaching such persons from admitting them in their program. 52

This concern was likewise echoed by the eminent magistrate, Justice Antonio T. Carpio,
when he said:
Preventing anyone from going to law school who can afford to go to school pay for his
own tuition fees, that's unreasonable. Even if he scores only one percent (1%), if the
school is willing to accept him, he is willing to pay, you cannot stop him. 53
Also, as eloquently articulated by Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen,
Considering, Chair, that this affects a freedom and a primordial freedom at that,
freedom of expression, academic freedom, the way we teach our, as Justice Andy Reyes
pointed out, the way we teach law to our citizens and therefore, to me, the level of
scrutiny should not be cursory. The level of scrutiny must be deep and I would think it
would apply strict scrutiny in this regard. Therefore, if there was no study that
supported it, then perhaps, it may be stricken down as unreasonable, and therefore,
grave abuse of discretion. x x x54
It is therefore apparent that an individual's right to knowledge and the manner by
which such knowledge is pursued, are entitled to a high degree of protection by the
State and its agencies. Our State is in no way autocratic. It is not repressive, and
should not prevent its citizens from gaining knowledge that will promote their personal
growth.55 These are simple realities that cannot be ignored. To deprive a person of his
right to knowledge, which is an adjunct of one's freedom of expression, may not be
done under flimsy and vague pretexts. This Constitutional protection to freedom of
expression enjoys an exalted place in the spectrum of rights, and is certainly entitled to
the highest level of scrutiny.

A Legitimate Objective Will not in Itself Justify State Intrusion if the Means
Employed Pursuant Thereto are Unreasonable and Oppressive

There is no doubt that the ultimate goal of attaining quality legal education is a
legitimate and lofty objective. For sure, no country would negligently allow degenerate
institutions that fail to properly educate students to persist to the detriment of the
community. However, the issue is not as simple. It must be noted that the test for a
valid exercise of police power is two-pronged. The presence of a legitimate State
objective must be balanced alongside a reasonable means for achieving such goal: One
cannot exist without the other.

Remarkably, in Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,56 the Court struck down the regulation

issued by the Professional Regulatory' Commission which prohibited those taking the
accountancy licensure examinations from attending review classes, conferences and
receiving hand-outs, review materials, or tips three days immediately preceeding the
examination day. The Court stressed that although the measure was backed by a noble
objective, this will not serve as a justification to violate constitutional freedoms, to wit:
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable
purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations."
However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its
face, it can be readily seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot
even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center
or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions."57 (Emphasis in the original)
Indeed, the level of supervision and regulation granted unto the State must be
reasonable. This "reasonableness" in no way grants a warrant for the State to exercise
oppressive control over the schools. In the case of the PhilSAT, in addition to being
arbitrary and oppressive, the LEB likewise failed to establish that the means employed
will serve its purpose of improving the quality of legal education.

In fact, during the oral arguments, Chairperson Aquende admitted that the LEB
issuances imposing the PhilSAT were bereft of statistical basis. 58 This presents an even
greater challenge against the PhilSAT. It appears that the LEB merely operates on the
hunch that the PhilSAT will improve the quality of legal education. Although I agree with
the point made by Justice Alfredo Benjamin Caguioa that the schools (or the LEB) are
not required to conduct statistical research regarding the effectiveness of the PhilSAT.
This is only to underscore the absence of any factual basis proving the LEB's
contention.

Worse, the PhilSAT renders nugatory the Constitutional provision mandating that
education should be made accessible to all by limiting a legal degree to an elite few.
Students who desire to obtain a degree in law are immediately barred from this pursuit,
simply on their purported inanity, as determined by the PhilSAT. In effect, the State
punishes the students instead of encouraging them to learn, thereby making the law a
restrictive subject that is only available to an exclusive few who possess the required
aptitude and wealth.

All told, this case is riddled with paradoxes. The LEB, in its desire to achieve quality
legal education, bullheadedly pursued such end and trampled upon the right to
accessible education. It must be stressed that quality education may not be
accomplished by excluding a segment of the population from learning. Access to
education should never be sacrificed to achieve this end. Rather, these two goals should
go hand-in-hand. Barring the citizens from pursuing further studies and learning more
about the law, lead to stripping them of their fundamental right to knowledge. There is
nothing more stifling to our democracy than repressing our own citizens' pursuit for
personal growth. For sure, there are other Constitutionally permissible ways of
achieving this end.

As a final note, the law is personified by Lady Justice, whose eyes are covered with a
blindfold as an assurance that she will always dispense justice objectively to her suitors,
regardless of their wealth and power; her scales of justice are perfectly balanced, for
she delicately weighs all circumstances before her; her sword is scathing, proving that
her justice is swift and firm - this is the symbol of law and justice. Ironically, however,
with the PhilSAT, entry to the study of law (a field that will train one to imbibe justice
and fairness) is far from objective arid just. In this oppressive scenario, Lady Justice's
eyes are opened wide as she peremptorily judges prospective students, barring the
inane from learning the law; her scales are tilted in favor of an elite few; and her sword
is sharp and piercing against those who failed to reach her criteria. This is not the law,
and it should never be. Thus, I vote to declare as unconstitutional LEBMO No. 7,
and all its adjunct orders.

Endnotes:

1
 Petition, p. 1148.

2
 Main Decision, p. 15.

3
 Deliberations for the I 987 Constitution, Volume IV, p. 170; Bernas, p. 91.

4
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article II, Sec. 17.

5
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Sec. 2(3).

6
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Sec. 2(1).

7
 REPUBLIC ACT No. 7662 - An Act Providing for Reforms in the Legal Education,
Creating for the Purpose, A Legal Education Board and For Other Purposes.

8
 LEBMO No. 7.

9
 Id.

10
 LEBMO No. 7; LEBMO No. 2-2013, Section 32.

11
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Section 4(1).
12
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Section 5(2).

13
The PTA of St. Mathew Christian Academy, et al. v. The Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Co., 627 Phil. 669, 683 (2010).

14
University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 287, 306-307
(1999).

15
 Bernas, p. 1294.

16
Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, 294 Phil. 654, 674 (1993).

17
 160-A Phil. 929, 944 (1975).

18
Mercado, et al. v. AMA Computer College-Parañaque City, Inc., 632 Phil. 228, 251
(2010), citing Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 401 Phil. 431, 455-
456 (2000).

19
The PTA of St. Mathew Christian Academy, et al. v. The Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Co, supra note 13.

20
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, supra note
17.

21
 Id. at 943.

22
 Id.

23
University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 300 Phil. 819, 833 (1994).

24
Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong, supra note 16.

25
 Id. at 673.

26
 Supra note 23.

27
 Id. at 833 citing Licup, et al. v. University of San Carlos (USC), et al., 258-A Phil.
417, 423-424 (1989).

28
 Deliberations for the 1987 Constitution, Volume IV, p. 441.

29
 Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, Sec. 3. Declaration of Basic Policy.

30
 Bernas, p. 1306.

31
 Transcript of Oral Arguments held on March 5, 2019, p. 122.

32
 1987 CONSTITUTION, Article XIV, Section 5(3).

33
 Supra note 16.
34
 Id.

35
 Bernas, p. 1295.

36
 Id.

37
 Deliberations for the 1987 Constitution, Volume IV, p. 438.

38
 Id. at 439.

39
 Id. at 438.

40
 Id.

41
 Id.
42
 Id. at 439.

43
University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 23 at 832-833.

44
 Article 26, Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

45
 Bernas, pp. 1298-1299.

46
 Bernas, p. 1301.

47
 Article 19, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

48
 Preamble, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

49
 Article 12, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

50
Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 243 Phil. 993, 1006 (1988).

51
 Transcript of Oral Arguments, March 5, 2019, p. 123.

52
 Id.

53
 Transcript of Oral Arguments, March 5, 2019, p. 184.

54
 Transcript, Oral Arguments, March 5, 2019, p. 173.

55
Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, supra note 50 at 1005.

56
 Id.

57
 Id. at 1004-1005.

58
 Transcript of Oral Arguments, March 5, 2019, p. 172.

SEPARATE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

GESMUNDO, J.:

Before this Court are two consolidated petitions in G.R. No. 230642, it seeks to nullify
Republic Act No. 7662 and abolish the Legal Education Board (LEB); and in G.R. No.
242954, to annul and set aside LEB Memorandum Order Nos. 7-2016 and 11-2017,
dated December 29, 2016 and April 20, 2017, respectively, and LEB Memorandum
Circular No. 18-2018, dated October 5, 2018.

I vote to partly grant the consolidated petitions.

There is a stereotype that the study of law is a precursor for the practice of law.
However, the study of law is not that simple. There may be instances when a person
studies law for its philosophy, wisdom, and concepts; and choose not to take the bar
examinations as he or she is not interested in becoming a lawyer. Thus, the study of
law does not always result into the practice of law. Nonetheless, even after hurdling the
bar, lawyers and judges are still mandated to continue the study of law. It is a well-
settled rule that the study of law is a never-ending and ceaseless process. 1

The study of the law is not an exact science with definite fields of black and white and
unbending rules and rigid dogmas. The beauty of this discipline in the words of Justice
Holmes, is the "penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to another," that gives
rise to those honest differences of opinion among the brotherhood as to its correct
interpretation. Honest differences are allowed and, indeed, inevitable, but we certainly
must frown on stilted readings to suit one's motives, especially if they are less than
noble. The law does not permit this, and much less, for that matter, does equity. 2

Academic Freedom of Institutions of Higher Learning

It is clear that the study of law is within the domain of academic freedom. In Ateneo de
Manila University v. Judge Capulong,3 the Court stated that the term "academic
freedom", which has evolved to describe the emerging rights related to intellectual
liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression
and the press; in other words, it has been identified with the right of individuals in
universities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue,
discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it
may lead," free from internal and external interference or pressure. Obviously, its
optimum impact is best realized where this freedom is exercised judiciously and does
not degenerate into unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic
freedom have stressed the need for assuring to such individuals a measure of
independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. 4

Academic freedom has long been recognized by our organic laws. Section 5, Article XIV,
of the 1935 Constitution states that universities established by the State shall enjoy
academic freedom. Likewise, Section 8, Article XV, of the 1973 Constitution states that
all institutions of higher learning shall enjoy academic freedom. Under the present
Constitution, Section 5, Article XIV, states that academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning. Verily, institutions of higher learning, such as schools,
colleges, and universities offering a degree program in law, all have constitutionally
enshrined academic freedom.

Academic freedom of institutions of higher learning have the following essential

freedoms: (1) who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; and
(4) who may be admitted to study.5 This was first discussed in the Supreme Court of
the United States (SCOTUS) case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire.6 In that case, Paul
Sweezy, who was an economist and lecturer in the University of New Hampshire, was
subpoenaed by the State Attorney General to answer several questions, which included
inquiries regarding his lectures on Socialism at the university. Paul Sweezy refused to
answer particular questions and was declared in contempt of court. The SCOTUS
reversed the contempt charge on the basis of violation of academic freedom and stated
that:

The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-

evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by
those who guide and train our youth. To impose any straitjacket upon the intellectual
leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field
of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be
made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are
accepted as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise, our civilization will
stagnate and die.7
In the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter, he explained the importance of
academic freedom in a university, viz:
"In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A university
ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or any
sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its ideal
being the ideal of Socrates-'to follow the argument where it leads.' This implies the
right to examine, question, modify or reject traditional ideas and beliefs. Dogma and
hypothesis are incompatible, and the concept of an immutable doctrine is repugnant to
the spirit of a university. The concern of its scholars is not merely to add and revise
facts in relation to an accepted framework, but to be ever examining and modifying the
framework itself.

....

"Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis of observation and
experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific knowledge. A
sense of freedom is also necessary for creative work in the arts which, equally with
scientific research, is the concern of the university.

....

". . . It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most

conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there
prevail 'the four essential freedoms' of a university-to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study."8 (emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents,9 the SCOTUS held that a law
cannot force teachers to sign an oath stating they are not members of certain
communist parties pursuant to their academic freedom and because the law is
overbreadth, to wit:
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us, and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate
laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools." The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas
which discovers truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of
authoritative selection."
On the other hand, in University of California Regents v. Bakke,10 the SCOTUS tackled
the legality of the university policy which requires a particular number of minorities for
admission. It grounded its analysis on academic freedom and stated that "the
university's use of race in its admission may use for the attainment of a diverse student
body. Nothing less than the nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this United States. In
seeking the right to select those students who will contribute the most to the
'robust exchange of ideas,' a university seeks to achieve a goal that is of
paramount importance in the fulfillment of its mission. Both tradition and
experience lend support to the view that the contribution of diversity is
substantial."11 Nevertheless, while race may be considered as one of the several factors
for admission, the SCOTUS ruled that the specific or fixed number of minorities for
university admission is too unreasonable. The ruling in University of California Regents
v. Bakke was affirmed in Grutter v. Bollinger,12 regarding admission in the University of
Michigan Law School, Gratz v. Bollinger,13 regarding the point system admission policy
of the University of Michigan, and Fisher v. University of Texas.14

Academic Freedom in Philippine Jurisdiction

The four essential freedoms constituting academic freedom have also been discussed by
our jurisprudence. In University of the Phils. v. Civil Service Commission,15 the Court
discussed institutions of higher learning's freedom to determine "who may teach." In
that case, a professor was on leave of absence without pay for four (4) years.
Nevertheless, the university therein still accepted the professor back to work even
though the Civil Service Commission had terminated his services. The Court ruled that
the university has the academic freedom to determine who shall teach. This freedom
encompasses the autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant therewith,
who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other academic personnel. 16 It was
also stated therein that "since academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to
expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall leave it to
the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom." 17

Jurisprudence has also recognized that institutions of higher learning have the
enshrined freedom to determine "who may be admitted to study." In Garcia v. The
Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology,18 it involved a student who
wanted to compel the Loyola School of Theology to accept her in their Master of Arts in
Theology program. The respondent therein invoked its academic freedom to admit
students in its program. The Court denied the petition and held that the respondent
indeed had the academic freedom to determine who would be admitted to their school.
It was highlighted that colleges and universities should not be looked upon as public
utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or reject Education, especially
higher education, belongs to a different, and certainly higher category. 19

In Ateneo de Manila University v. Judge Capulong,20 the law students involved in the

hazing incident argued that the school imposed arbitrary rules and penalties regarding
its admission policy. The Court held that the law school, which is an institute of higher
learning, had the academic freedom to determine who may be admitted, including the
power to promulgate rules concerning student discipline. The establishment of rules
governing university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of
the institution, but to its very survival.21

In Licup v. University of San Carlos,22 the students involved committed demonstrations

in the university that were far from peaceful and the school administration imposed the
penalty of non-admission. The Court affirmed the penalty imposed by the school. While
it is true that students are entitled to the right to pursue their education, the school is
likewise entitled to academic freedom and has the concomitant right to see to it that
this freedom is not jeopardized. The Court underscored that an institution of learning
has a contractual obligation to afford its students a fair opportunity to complete the
course they seek to pursue. However, when a student commits a serious breach of
discipline or fails to maintain the required academic standard, he forfeits that
contractual right; and the Court should not review the discretion of university
authorities.23

However, academic freedom of institutions of higher learning is not absolute; rather, it

is subject to the limitation of reasonability and that it should not be arbitrarily
exercised. In Isabelo, Jr. v. Perpetual Help College of Rizal, Inc.,24 the student therein,
who questioned the tuition fee hike of the school, was expelled because he allegedly
had Citizen's Military Training (CMT) deficiencies. The Court held that the school cannot
invoke academic freedom to immediately expel its student based on mere deficiencies
in the CMT. The Court held that "[w]hile we ordinarily would not delve into the exercise
of sound judgment, we will not, however, hesitate to act when we perceive taints of
arbitrariness in the process. The punishment of expulsion appears to us rather
disproportionate to his having had some unit deficiencies in his CMT course. Indeed, the
DECS itself is conceding to the grant of the instant petition. The circumstances lend
truth to the petitioner's claim that the private respondent has strongly been influenced
by his active participation in questioning PHCR's application for tuition fee increase." 25

On the other hand, in Morales v. The Board of Regents of the University of the
Phils.,26 the Court emphasized that the discretion of schools of learning to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of graduation forms part of
academic freedom. And such discretion may not be disturbed much less controlled by
the courts, unless there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. 27

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that institutions of higher learning are granted
academic freedom by the Constitution, which includes that freedom to determine who
may be admitted to study. The academic freedom of these institutions, however, are
not unbridled and subject to the test of reasonableness.

LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular unreasonably restrict academic freedom

LEB Memorandum Order No. 7-2016 instituted the PhilSAT, which is an aptitude test
that measures the academic potential of an examinee. Only those who pass with a 55%
score on the examination shall be allowed admission in law schools. LEB Memorandum
Order No, 11-2017, states that those who failed the first PhilSAT may be conditionally
admitted to law schools in the first semester of school year 2017 to 2018 provided they
take the next scheduled PhilSAT. On the other hand, LEB Memorandum Circular No. 18-
2018 discontinued the conditional admission of students. Thus, the LEB requires the
mandatory taking of the PhilSAT before being admitted to any law school; and, a
student shall not be admitted if he or she fails the said examination. In other words,
PhilSAT is exclusionary and those that do not pass the said test shall not be admitted in
the study of law. The respondents argue that LEB's institution of the PhilSAT is within
the State's power to regulate all educational institutions.

I concur with the ponencia that the LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular, requiring
the PhilSAT as mandatory and exclusionary, are unconstitutional.

Institutes of higher learning have academic freedom, under the Constitution, and this
includes the freedom to determine who may be admitted to study. Such freedom may
only be limited by the State based on the test of reasonability. In this case, however,
the assailed LEB Memorandum Orders fail to provide a reasonable justification for
restraining the admission of students to law schools based on the following reasons:

First, by making the PhilSAT mandatory and exclusionary, the LEB significantly restricts
the freedom of law schools to determine who shall be admitted as law students. Only
those who pass the said examination shall be considered for admission to these
institutions of higher learning. Consequently, the LEB, through the PhilSAT, first
chooses the potential law students, and only afterwards, shall the law schools be
allowed to choose their students from the limited pool of student-passers. The said
institutes of higher learning are barred from considering those students who failed the
examinations, regardless of their previous academic grades and achievements.

Second, the LEB does not give any justification for the required passing score of 55%
and the format of the examinations. The studies cited by the LEB were conducted by
different organizations, for different professions, and for foreign jurisdictions. Indeed,
no concrete study conducted in the Philippines for the legal profession was provided to
substantiate the passing score and the test format. It is not even clear whether the
consensus of the law schools in the country was secured before the LEB imposed the
PhilSAT. Without any concrete basis for the conduct of the examination, it would be
unreasonable to impose the same mandatorily and without exemption to the institutes
of higher learning.

Third, law schools are given no option other than to follow the LEB Memorandum
Orders and Circular. Failure to comply with these shall result in administrative
sanctions, ranging from closure of the law school, phase-out of the law program,
provision cancellation of its recognition and/or liability to pay a fine of P10,000.00 for
each infraction. Even without a valid reason, for the imposition of the PhilSAT
requirement, the LEB completely restricts the law schools from accepting students who
did not pass the said examination. The schools' exercise of academic freedom to choose
their students is restricted by the threat of administrative and pecuniary sanctions.

Assuming arguendo that the LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular were issued under
the exercise of police power of the State to regulate the rights of certain institutions, it
does not justify the unreasonable restriction on the academic freedom of institutes of
higher learning. Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its
own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily
or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further
private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. 28

Here, the LEB failed to establish the reasonable means to limit the academic freedom of
the institutes of higher learning. Again, there is no valid explanation provided on the
mandatory and exclusionary requirement of the PhilSAT, its passing grade, and format
of examinations. Manifestly, to impose a penalty on law schools based on an
unreasonable policy that restricts academic freedom would be an invalid exercise of
police power.

PhilSAT is different from the NMAT and LSAT

One of the arguments of the LEB is that the PhilSAT is comparable to the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT), which was upheld by the Court in Tablarin v. Judge
Gutierrez,29 and the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) in the United States.

I disagree.

There are too many differences between the PhilSAT and the NMAT that they cannot be
treated in the same vein. One of the most notable differences is that in the NMAT, there
is actually no passing or failing grade; rather, the examinees are merely given a
percentile score. Medical schools have the discretion to determine the acceptable
percentile score of their potential students. Thus, even with the NMAT, medical schools
have full freedom and control of students they intend to admit. They have the sole
discretion to impose the required percentile score in the NMAT, whether high or low, as
a requirement for admission. In fact, some medical schools are even allowed to
conditionally accept students who have not yet taken their NMAT.

Unlike the NMAT, the PhilSAT provides for a strict passing score of 55%. This passing
score was provided by the LEB and not decided by the law schools themselves. These
law schools have no option in adjusting the passing score and they can only accept
students who pass the said test. Stated differently, law schools have no discretion to
determine which students they will admit insofar as the PhilSAT requirement is
concerned.

On the other hand, the LSAT is a nationwide admission. test for law · schools in the
United States. The said test is administered by the Law School Admission Council
(LSAC), which is a non-profit corporation comprised of more than 200 law schools in
the United States and Canada. The institutes of higher learning themselves participate,
prepare, and conduct the LSAT, and not their government. 30 Nonetheless, even if there
is the LSAT in the United States, the said examination is not an absolute requirement
for law school admission. The American Bar Association Standards and Rules of
Procedure merely require each student-applicant to take a valid and reliable admission
test and it is not only confined to the LSAT.31 Thus, law schools in the United States are
allowed to require other admission tests provided that these are valid and reliable.
Indeed, the LSAT requirement in the United States does not unreasonably restrict the
academic freedom of the law schools therein.

With the PhilSAT, however, the examination is mandatory and exclusionary, and local
law schools have no discretion to choose a different admission test. The law schools are
only confined to choosing those students who pass the PhilSAT, which does not provide
any valid justification for restricting academic freedom.

Evidently, both the NMAT and the LSAT are different from the PhilSAT. The former
respect and consider the academic freedom of institutes of higher learning in their
liberty of choosing their students; while with the latter, law schools are unreasonably
constrained in determining the students it may accept for enrollment.

Uniform Admission Examination instituted by Foreign Law Schools

I firmly believe that PhilSAT should be set aside; instead, the law schools in
the Philippines, through the Philippine Association of Law Schools (PALS), and
under the mere supervision of LEB, should establish a unified, standardized,
and acceptable law admission examination. Said examination must be
unrestrictive of academic freedom, cost-efficient, accessible, and an effective tool in
assessing incoming law students. At the onset, I will discuss the constitutional viability
of a unified law admission examination, spearheaded by the law schools, pursuant to
their right to academic freedom.

There was a time when law schools could follow the advice of Wigmore, who believed
that "the way to find out whether a boy [or girl] has the makings of a competent lawyer
is to see what he [or she] can do in a first year of law studies." 32 In those days there
were enough spaces to admit every applicant who met minimal credentials, and they all
could be given the opportunity to prove themselves in law school. But by the 1920's
many law schools found that they could not admit all minimally qualified applicants, and
a selection process began. The pressure to use some kind of admissions test mounted,
and a number of schools instituted them.33

In the United States, the LSAT was formulated by the LSAC. The idea of LSAT began on
May 17, 1945, when Frank Bowles, Admission Director at Columbia Law School, wrote
to the President of College Entrance Examination Board (CEEB) suggesting the creation
of a law capacity test to be used in admission decisions. It was discussed that the
validity of the LSAT would be linked to its correlation with grades in the first year of law
study. Consequently, correlation with success in taking the bar examination was
rejected because candidates often take the bar exam several times and everybody
passes them sooner or later. It was also highlighted that the more law schools
participating in the LSAT, the greater the numbers for testing validity and the more
widely the costs would be spread.34

On August 15, 1947, representatives of Columbia, Yale and Harvard law schools met
with the representatives of the CEEB. The representative of Harvard opined, that the
LSAT would help make decisions on "those borderline on college record and those from
unknown colleges."35It was also agreed upon to invite more law schools to
participate and that the creation of the test would also create a new
organization of law schools. As of 2000, the LSAC now consists of a total 198 law
schools.36

On November 10, 1947, the initial LSAT was discussed and the law schools from
Rutgers, Northwestern, Syracuse, Stanford, Cornell, the University of Southern
California, New York University, the University of Pennsylvania, Yale, and Harvard also
participated.37The founders of the test were adamant that it could not and must
not be the only criterion for admission.

Further, the LSAT has played an important role in opening the legal profession at all
levels to men and women whose ancestors had been the object of merciless prejudice
and overt discrimination. This does not mean that the test is a foolproof gauge of merit.
It is merely what it was designed to be a tool to aid in the admissions decision. It was
not designed as a pass or fail grading system. 38 The entire rationale for the test was the
need to supplement the information supplied by the undergraduate record. The scores
on the test were to be used along with pre[-]law grades, recommendations, and other
information as an aid in admissions. 39

In his Dissenting Opinion in DeFunis v. Odegaard,40 Justice Douglas of the SCOTUS

opined that when the Law School Admission Committees consider the LSAT,
undergraduate grades, and prior achievement of the, applicants, it does not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, to wit:
The Equal Protection Clause did not enact a requirement that law schools
employ as the sole criterion for admissions a formula based upon the LSAT and
undergraduate grades, nor does it prohibit law schools from evaluating an
applicant's prior achievements in light of the barriers that he had to
overcome. A black applicant who pulled himself out of the ghetto into a junior college
may thereby demonstrate a level of motivation, perseverance, and ability that would
lead a fairminded admissions committee to conclude that he shows more promise for
law study than the son of a rich alumnus who achieved better grades at Harvard. That
applicant would be offered admission not because he is black, but because as an
individual he has shown he has the potential, while the Harvard man may have taken
less advantage of the vastly superior opportunities offered him. Because of the weight
of the prior handicaps, that black applicant may not realize his full potential in the first
year of law school, or even in the full three years, but in the long pull of a legal career
his achievements may far outstrip those of his classmates whose earlier records
appeared superior by conventional criteria. There is currently no test available to the
Admissions Committee that can predict such possibilities with assurance, but the
Committee may nevertheless seek to gauge it as best it can, and weigh this factor in its
decisions. Such a policy would not be limited to blacks, or Chicanos or Filipinos,
or American Indians, although undoubtedly groups such as these may in
practice be the principal beneficiaries of it. But a poor Appalachian white, or a
second generation Chinese in San Francisco, or some other American whose lineage is
so diverse as to defy ethnic labels, may demonstrate similar potential and thus be
accorded favorable consideration by the Committee 41 (emphases supplied)
On the other hand, in the United Kingdom (UK), there is a National Admissions Test for
Law (LNAT), which was adopted in 2004.42 It is the only aptitude test currently used in
the UK for the selection of people to the legal profession. 43 It was established by a
consortium of Universities, comprised of the following: University of Bristol, Durham
University, University of Nottingham and University of Oxford, King's College London,
LSE London School of Economics and Political Science, and University College
London.44 The LNAT consists of a multiple choice test and a written essay and is
designed to measure the following verbal reasoning skills: comprehension,
interpretation, analysis, synthesis, induction, and deduction. The test is used by
participating UK law schools to aid in the selection of law students. 45

Similar to the LSAT in the US, the LNAT is not a substitute for undergraduate
grades,46 applications, personal statements or interviews but is used by each university
in the way that best suits its own admissions policy. Different universities place
different emphasis on the multiple choice score and the essay question. 47

Likewise, in India, there is also a centralized law admission test for National Law
Schools, called the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT). Before CLAT, each university
running Bachelor of Laws courses conducted its own admission test. As a result,
students aspiring for good legal education had to write a number of admission tests;
and this multiplicity of admission tests caused tremendous hardship, both physically
and financially, to candidates. In 2006, this issue was raised in a Writ Petition filed by
Varun Bhagat against the Union of India and the various National Law Schools in the
Supreme Court of India. In the course of hearing, the Chief Justice of India directed the
Union of India to consult with the National Law Schools with a view to evolving a
scheme for a common admission test.48

The common admission test required the consensus of all National Law Schools. The
University Grants Commission of India brought all seven National Law Schools, namely:
National Law School of India University, National Academy of Legal Studies and
Research, National Law Institute University, National University of Juridical Sciences,
National Law University, Hidayatullah National Law University, and Gujarat National Law
University and they finalized the guidelines for the CLAT. It is expected that other
national law schools will join in due course.49 As of 2015, sixteen (16) national law
universities in India participate in the CLAT.50

Law Admission Test administered by law schools in the Philippines

Accordingly, I dissent with the ponencia that it should still be the LEB who shall lead,
control, and regulate the unified admission examinations for law schools.

While a standardized admission test for law schools is constitutionally and legally viable,
it must not be the LEB spearheading the admission test. Instead, it must be initiated
and organized by the law schools themselves, pursuant to their constitutionally
enshrined academic freedom.

Currently, there is an organization of law schools in the country. The PALS, established
in 1967, is a non-stock corporation composed of 112 law schools nationwide. It seeks
to be a primary driving force in uplifting the standards of legal education in the
Philippines to both meeting global standards of excellence and at the same time serve
as catalyst for both the economic and human development in Philippine Society. 51

As there is an available avenue, law schools in this jurisdiction could certainly organize
a standardized admission test pursuant to their academic freedom to determine whom
they will admit as their students. As discussed earlier, a unified admission test for law
schools proves to be one of the effective mechanisms in determining who among the
applicants are mostly likely to succeed in the first year of law study. And, more
importantly, this unified admission examination is conducted and organized by the law
schools' themselves through their academic freedom. Manifestly, this system of unified
law admission examination, conducted by the law schools themselves, has been
observed and successfully implemented in the United States, U.K. and India.
The flaws in the LEB Memoranda and Orders will not be followed if the law schools will
organize this unified admission test. A standardized admission examination must not be
the sole measure in determining whether an applicant wilt be accepted in law school.
The answers a student can give in an admission examination is limited by the creativity
and intelligence of the test-maker. A student with a better or more original
understanding of the problem than the test-maker may realize that none of the
alternative answers are any good, but there is no way for that student to demonstrate
his or her understanding. If a student is strong-minded, nonconformist, unusual,
original, or creative, that student must stifle his or her impulses and conform to the
norms that the test-maker established. The more profoundly gifted the candidate is, the
more his or her resentment will rise against the mental strait jacket into which the
testers would force his or her mind.52 Stated differently, the unified admission test
should not be exclusionary.

Accordingly, the law admission test should not be the sole basis for admission in law
schools. As discussed earlier, there are other relevant factors, such as undergraduate
achievements, motivation, or cultural backgrounds that the admission test cannot
measure. Besides the admission test, the law school must still be given discretion to
determine on its own, based on its academic freedom, the decision of whom to admit as
students. Thus, the proposed standardized admission test should only be one of many
criteria for admission to any law school. It would be the decision of each law school
whether to accept or deny admission of a potential law student under their academic
freedom which would not be curtailed by the unified law entrance examination since it
would only be one of several factors for admission.

At the end of the day, the decision of creating a standardized admission test for law
schools rests upon the law schools in the country. These institutions of higher learning
may come together, through the PALS, and initiate for the creation and implementation
of a standardized admission test. It would be the culmination of the collective effort of
law schools in their exercise of academic freedom.

In the event that the law schools pursue drafting, creating and organizing a
standardized admission test for legal studies in the, Philippines, the LEB would not be
entirely set aside in this endeavor. Under R.A. No. 7662, one of the powers of the LEB
is to supervise the law schools in the country. 53

The power of supervision is defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from
the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter.54 An officer in control lays down the rules in the
doing of an act. It they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone
or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does
not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the
rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe
his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to
see to it that the rules are followed.55
Consequently, the LEB may only supervise the proposed standardized admission test of
the law schools. It cannot substitute its own judgment with respect to said test
organized by the law schools; otherwise, it would violate the academic
freedom of institutions of higher learning. The LEB may only oversee whether the
policies set forth by the law schools in the admission test are reasonable and just. It
cannot, however, ultimately override the collective decisions of the law schools in the
admission test for law students. In that manner, the LEB serves its purpose in the
supervision of legal education and, at the same time, the academic freedom of law
schools is respected.

Further, to ensure the success of the law admission test initiated by the law schools in
the Philippines and supervised by the LEB, concrete studies on the effectiveness of this
test must be conducted. There must be an effective monitoring system for the
examination. It must be determined, before and after the admission test, whether said
examination actually predicts and helps the success of law students, at the very least,
in their first year of legal study. The admission examination should not be conducted for
the sake of merely having one. It must have some tangible and definite benefit for the
law schools and potential law students. To achieve this quality-control mechanism, the
law schools, through PALS, and the LEB must thoroughly coordinate with each other to
determine the most effective manner in conducting the admission examinations. It is
only through constant cooperation and consultation with the stakeholders that the
success of any admission examination will be guaranteed.

While the State has the power to regulate the education of its citizens, the 1987
Constitution expressly grants academic freedom in all institutions of higher learning,
including law schools. Thus, the right to determine whom shall be admitted to law
school should rest solely in these institutions. The State cannot absolutely control this
important pillar of academic freedom of institutes of higher learning. I genuinely believe
that it is only through the combined efforts of the law schools in the country that the
envisioned unified admission test for law schools can achieve fruition based on the
Constitution, the laws, and its practical implementation. Again, the LEB should only
supervise the said unified admission examination conducted by the law schools.

Existing problems of the PhilSAT

If the law schools in the Philippines ultimately decide to conduct a unified and
standardized law admission examination, as supervised by the LEB, then it must
address the existing problems created by the PhilSAT. The problems were created
precisely because the admission examination was solely conducted by the LEB, through
its regulatory power. The law schools had no concrete voice in the formulation of the
PhilSAT and their academic freedom is disrespected. Thus, it created several problems,
particularly, financial burden and accessibility.

Under the PhilSAT, the LEB initially imposed a testing fee of P1,500.00 per examination,
which was subsequently lowered to P1,000.00;56 and there are only seven (7) testing
centers across the entire country - Baguio City, Metro Manila, Legazpi City, Iloilo City,
Cebu City, Davao City and Cagayan de Oro City.57 Also, the LEB failed to explain why it
had to impose said fee for a mere written examination. The sum collected by the LEB
for the examination could amount to millions of pesos considering that there are
thousands of students taking the PhilSAT. Glaringly, the LEB did not give any sufficient
basis to justify the imposition of a P1,000.00 fee for an entrance examination.

Further, the LEB also failed to consider the transportation and logistical expenses that
would be incurred by an examinee coming from the far-flung areas to take the
examination in the limited seven (7) testing centers. A student from the province
explained the immense difficulty of taking the PhilSAT, viz:
6. Q: What personal experience do you have with the PhilSAT exam?
A: I first took the PhilSAT exam last April 2018.
7. Q: Where did you take the exam?
A: Cebu City.
8 Q: Are you a permanent resident of Cebu?
A: No.
9. Q: Where is your permanent residence?
A: I am from Maasin City, Leyte.
10. Q: If you are from Leyte, why did you take the exam in Cebu City?
A: The LEB offers the exam in only seven (7) testing centers across the country, Cebu
being one of them.
11. Q: What effect did this limited number of available testing centers have on your PhilSAT
experience?
A: Since the exam would not be conducted in our area, I was compelled to travel from
Leyte to Cebu City. We had to travel the day after my graduation in order for me to
arrive in Cebu on time to take the exam. During the registration period, we also had to
travel to another town around five (5) hours away just to deposit the testing fee since the
bank in our locality did not accept checkbook as a mode of payment.58
Thus, the unified admission test in the future, spearheaded by the law schools, must
impose only reasonable fees to the examinees. It should not be a money-making
venture. The fees of the examination should only be for the exact expense in
conducting the admission test; nothing more, nothing less. There should be no
additional and unnecessary financial burden imposed on the examinees.

Likewise, the admission test should be accessible to all aspiring law students, especially
those from the distant regions. The unified admission test should be conducted in
numerous and strategic testing sites spread throughout the country. The law schools
must avoid the situation where only those privileged students living in the capital cities
will have access to the said unified examination. Moreover, considering that the
examination shall now be conducted by the law schools in the Philippines, then they
may consider conducting the said test in their own school at a unified time and
date with the rest of the law schools in the country to guarantee the
examination's accessibility.

It must be underscored that the study of law should not be hindered by financial and
geographical hardships; rather, it must be reasonable and accessible to the examinees.
Otherwise, it would defeat the purpose of a unified admission examination - to ensure
that those intellectually capable to become law students, regardless of social status,
shall be admitted to the study of law.

The Supreme Court and the study of law

The ponencia states that the Court's rule-making power covers only the practice of law
and cannot be unduly widened to cover the study of law. Nonetheless, it declares that
the State, though statutes enacted by Congress and administrative regulations issued
by the executive, consistently exercise police power over legal education. Hence,
admissions, being an area of legal education, necessarily fall within the scope of the
State's police power.

I dissent.

It is impossible to completely separate the interests of the Supreme Court and the law
schools and the other branches of government with respect to legal education. There
are several reasons that the study of law is affected, one way or another, by the Court's
rule-making power.

First, the Court has the exclusive power to promulgate rules for admission to the
practice of law. Thus, the Court prescribe specific subjects that a law school must offer
before its students can be admitted for the bar examinations. Section 5 of Rule 138
states:
Sec. 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. - All applicants for admission
other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted
to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all the
prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law
school or university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper
authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.

No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be
admitted to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the
following course in a law school or university duly recognized by the government civil
law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law,
political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation, legal ethics,
and clinical legal education program.

A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar
examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a)
completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent
degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and
(c) completion of all fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a
law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government. 59
Section 5 provides several requirements for the admission to the bar. Nevertheless,
these requirements also affect the curriculum offered by law school. In effect, for a law
school to successfully field bar examinees, it must offer all the prescribed courses for
the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree. Thus, it cannot simply offer a
two (2)-year short course on law.

More importantly, Section 5 provides for the specific courses that must be completed in
a law school before a student may be allowed to take the bar examinations, to wit: civil
law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law,
political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation, legal ethics,
and clinical legal education program. Pursuant to this provision, a law school is
mandated to offer these courses; otherwise, it will not be able to produce law graduates
qualified to take the bar examinations. Stated simply, Section 5 provides for the
minimum courses that a law school must offer to its law students. This is one of the
direct provisions of the Rules of Court that the Court itself participate in the legal
education of law students.

Second, even before a student begins his study of law, the Supreme Court already
provides the requirements for his or her pre-law studies. Section 6 of Rule 138 states:
Sec. 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted
unless he presents a ce1iificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that,
before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an
authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the
completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for
a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or
field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.
The above-quoted provision provides that any potential law student must have a four-
year high school course and a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences. If a law school
admits students without these completed courses, then it will not be able to produce
bar examinees. Verily, this rule affects the admission policy of the institutes of higher
learning with respect to law students.

Third, the precursor of Republic Act No. 7662, which is DECS Order No. 27, also
recognizes that the Supreme Court contributes to the requirements for admission in law
courses, to wit:
Article VIII
Admission, Residence and Other Requirements

Section 1. No applicant shall be enrolled in the law course unless he complies with
specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, for which purpose he must present to the
registrar the necessary credentials before the end of the enrolment period.
Lastly, even after earning a law degree, the Supreme Court continues to participate in
the study of law. Bar Matter No. 850, which was adopted by the Court on August 22,
2000, provides for the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirement for members
of the Bar. Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law
and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of
the practice of law.60

Similarly, the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), initially created by the Supreme
Court on March 12, 1996 through the issuance of Administrative Order No. 35-96, is a
separate but component unit of the Supreme Court. It is an all-important factor in the
promotion of judicial education in the Philippines. It receives full patronage and support
from the Court which guarantees the participation of judges and court personnel in its
programs and activities. PHILJA was institutionalized as a training school for justices,
judges, court personnel, lawyers, and aspirants to judicial posts. 61
Coordination and cooperation with the various stakeholders in legal education

The Supreme Court, either directly or indirectly, affects the legal education
administered by the law schools as institutes of higher learning. The Court's authority
over legal education is primarily observed in the bar examinations. Nevertheless, such
authority or influence of the Court over legal education should be viewed in a
coordinated and cooperative manner; and not as a limitation or restriction.

For more an a century, the bar examinations conducted by the Court have been the
centerpiece of every law student's plight. The preparation, success and defeat of bar
examinees are annual recurrences. The low passing percentage of the bar examinations
proves it as one of the most difficult tests in the country. There are on-going initiatives
to remedy this predicament and improve the legal education.

However, it must be stressed that the bar examination is not the sole and penultimate
goal of the study of law. There is no clear evidence that grades and other evaluators of
law school performance, and even the bar examination, are particularly good predictors
of competence or success as a lawyer.62 The legal education is a wide spectrum of
discipline, ranging from the traditional subjects of political, civil, and remedial laws, to
the liberal and. innovative subjects of media, sports, and competition laws. It is not
confined to litigation practice, court hearings, and drafting pleadings and other legal
documents. The study of law is a dynamic concept that seeks to analyze, comprehend
and apply the effects and interrelationships of the Constitution, laws, rules, and
regulations, in view of a just and humane society.

Thus, instead of restricting the study of law only to the bar examinations, the Court
must endeavor to promote its liberalization. The bar-centric mindset of law schools
must be amended. It must be emphasized that legal education should not confine law
students to the syllabi for bar examinations. Instead, law schools must encourage their
students to freely take elective subjects that spark their interests; participate in legal
aid clinics to render free legal service; experience debate and moot court competitions;
and publish law journal articles for their respective schools. These liberalizations of legal
education must be accomplished for the enrichment of the law student's knowledge. In
order to implement these innovative measures, various stakeholders in the entire
country must be consulted and conferred with to ensure active, wide, and effective
participation.

Notably, the Court has recently issued A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC, 63 otherwise known as the
Revised Law Student Practice Rule, which liberalizes the Law Student Practice. It was
issued to ensure access to justice for the marginalized sectors, to enhance learning
opportunities of law students, to instill among them the value of legal professional
social responsibility, and to prepare them for the practice of law. Further, the
completion of clinical legal education courses was made a prerequisite of the bar
examinations to produce practice-ready lawyers. Thus, the Court recognizes that, aside
from the written bar examination, the practical aspect of legal education is an essential
component in the formation of competent and able lawyers.

Again, while the Supreme Court has some authority over the legal education, this
should be channeled in cooperation and coordination with different law schools of the
country and even with the legislative and executive branch of the government, through
the LEB. At best, the Court should only provide the minimum course requirements for
the purpose of the bar examinations and should not be considered as a hindrance the
study of law. Beyond that, law schools are directed to promote the innovative measures
in legal education in furtherance of their academic freedom. Through a comprehensive
and novel approach, the goal of improving the legal education is definitely within reach.

Constitutionality of R.A. No. 7662

One of the issues raised by the parties is that R.A. No. 7662 is unconstitutional because
it infringes on the power of the Court to supervise the bar examination and legal
education.

With respect to that issue, the Court must emphasize the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance. The doctrine states that this Court may choose to ignore or side-step a
constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which the case can be
disposed of.64 To remain true to its democratic moorings, judicial involvement must
remain guided by a framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This same
principle underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory
opinions. Specifically as regards this Court, only constitutional issues that are narrowly
framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be entertained. 65 In other words, if the
determination of the constitutionality of a particular statute can be avoided based on
some other ground, then the Court will not touch upon the issue of unconstitutionality.

Here, the powers of the LEB enumerated under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7662 are assailed
because they contradict the judicial power of the Court. Section 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution states:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall
be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall
remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Some of the powers of the LEB under R.A. No. 7662 can be harmonized with the
Constitution. For instance, Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 states:
Section 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of
this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among
others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the
library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning[.] (emphasis supplied)
Said provision states that the LEB has the power to set the standards of accreditation
for law schools. However, it also provides for a reasonable limitation on the exercise of
such power: it should not encroach the academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning. With this, the law schools are safeguarded that the LEB will not arbitrarily
exercise its power to set the standards of accreditation because of the reasonable
limitation of academic freedom. This reasonable limitation should also be read together
with the, other powers provided by R.A. No. 7662 so that the LEB will not encroach
upon the constitutional rights of law schools. Pursuant to this interpretation, majority of
the powers of the LEB listed under the law will conform to the organic law and the Court
will not be required to pass upon the constitutionality of these statutory provisions.

However, under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7662, there is a provision that is inescapably
unconstitutional. No amount of judicial interpretation can evade the inevitable
conclusion that this provision violates the Constitution. Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662
states:
Section 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this
Act, the Board shall have the following powers and functions:

xxxx

(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may
provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for
such duration as the Board may deem necessary[.] (emphasis supplied)
The provision clearly covers the continuing legal education of practicing lawyers.
However, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution states that the Supreme Court
has the exclusive judicial power to: "[p]romulgate rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts,
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
under-privileged." Accordingly, only the Court has the power to prescribe rules with
respect to the continuing practice of lawyers.

Pursuant to this judicial power, the Court issued Bar Matter No. 850 dated August 22,
2000, adopting the rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education for members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Continuing legal education is required of
members of the IBP to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law
and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of
the practice of law.66

Here, Section 7(h) covers the continuing legal education of practicing lawyers.
Evidently, this encroaches upon the power of the Court to promulgate rules on the
practice of lawyers. The objective of R.A. No. 7662 is only to effect reforms in the
Philippine legal education, not in the legal profession. In his Explanatory Note in B.M.
No. 979-B, Associate Justice Jose C. Vitug stated that the concept of continuing legal
education encompasses not only law students but also the members of the legal
profession. The inclusion of the continuing legal education under R.A. No. 7662 implies
that the LEB has jurisdiction over the education of persons who have finished the law
course and are already licensed to practice law. In other words, this particular power,
directly involves members of the legal profession, which is outside the realm of R.A. No.
7662. Undeniably, Section 7(h) of R.A. No. 7662 is unconstitutional because it violates
Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution.
Fate of the Legal Education Board

The ponencia states that LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular regarding the PhilSAT
are unconstitutional because these do not meet the fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements. Nevertheless, it states that Section 7(e) of R.A.
No. 7662 is constitutional insofar as it gives the LEB, an agency of the executive
branch, the power to prescribe the minimum requisites for admission to legal education.

I concur.

Although PhilSAT is declared unconstitutional for employing unreasonable means for the
admission of students to law schools, the LEB still has numerous powers and
responsibilities under its charter. As stated above, one of its vital functions is its power
to accredit and set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account,
among others, the size of enrollment, the qualifications of the members of the faculty,
the library and other facilities.67 If a law school is underperforming, the LEB may
withdraw or downgrade the accreditation status of such law school, especially if it fails
to maintain the required standards. This is an important role in ensuring that law
schools keep an adequate, satisfactory, and respectable curriculum program for its law
students.

Likewise, I agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that the powers and functions
of the LEB should be read in accordance with its mandate to guide law students and law
schools.68 R.A. No. 7662 should not be interpreted to include matters that are already
within the exclusive jurisdiction of Court, such as the bar examinations, law student
practice, and the practice of law.

In addition, the powers and functions of the LEB should always be interpreted in light of
the institutes of higher learning's academic freedom. Thus, the LEB should consider the
academic freedom of law schools when it issues orders, circulars, and regulations under
its power of supervision. The Constitution bestows institutes of higher learning
academic freedom, which is fu1iher compromised of several freedoms. These freedoms
may only be subjected to reasonable limitations. Anything beyond reasonable, or
arbitrary, shall be considered an infringement of such freedoms.

The importance of LEB's role in improving the legal education in our country cannot be
overemphasized. It can bridge the gap between the different law schools from the
capital cities to the far-flung areas in the provinces. It can conduct studies and give
recommendations on how to improve the state of legal education. It can also promote
the innovative approaches in the holistic study of law. This can be achieved if the LEB is
open and willing to coordinate, through consultations and meetings, with the various
stakeholders, law schools, government agencies, and the Supreme Court.

However, the LEB should be strictly warned that it should not gravely abuse its
discretion. Otherwise, the Court will not think twice in striking down any arbitrary
exercise of power, including those that violate the fundamental rights of institutions of
higher learning under their academic freedom.

Conclusion
I sincerely believe that it is now high time to develop, innovate, modernize, and
improve the legal education system in our country. The petitions at bench are valuable
opportunities for the esteemed members of the Court to discuss and examine the
current and future state of legal education in the country. The different stakeholders
must assess and recommend innovations and improvements in the country's state of
legal education in view of the changes brought about by the developments in law, the
needs of the people, and technological innovations. Verily, the stakeholders should be
concerned in remodeling legal education because it is an indisputable fact that legal
education is the very foundation upon which the exercise of the law profession rests.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the practice of law is imbued with public
interest, and that a lawyer owes substantial duties, not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the public, and takes part in the
administration of justice, one of the most important functions of the State, as an officer
of the court. Accordingly, lawyers are bound to maintain, not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. 69

This goal of remodeling legal education will be realized through a multi-sectoral

approach of cooperation, initiative, and the promotion of freethinking. The outdated,
obsolete, and unproductive aspects in legal education that cause disadvantageous
effects to the study of law should definitely be set aside. It must be underscored that
the purpose of the study of law is not only to successfully hurdle the bar examinations,
but also to produce competent and noble lawyers who shall represent and stand up for
justice, truth, and equity for the benefit and welfare of the Filipino people.

I vote to PARTLY GRANT the consolidated petitions. The PhilSAT should be SET

ASIDE. It must be the law schools of the Philippines, through the Philippine Association
of Law Schools, under the supervision of the Legal Education Board, which should
formulate the unified and standardized law admission examination, carrying only
reasonable fees and accessible to all aspiring law students.

Endnotes:

1
Heirs of Piedad v. Exec. Judge Estrera, 623 Phil. 178, 188 (2009).

2
Royal Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 570, 575 (1986).

3
 294 Phil. 654 (1993).

4
 Id. at 672-673.

5
 Id. at 673.

6
 354 U.S. 234 (1957).

7
 Id.

8
 Id.
9
 385 U.S. 589 (1967).

10
 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

11
 Id.

12
 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

13
 539 U.S. 244 (2003).

14
 570 U.S. 297 (2013).

15
 408 Phil. 132 (2001).

16
 Id. at 145.

17
 Id. at 145-146.

18
 I60-A Phil. 929 (1975).

19
 Id. at 945.

20
 Supra note 3.

21
 Id. at 675.

22
 258-A Phil. 417 (1989).

23
 Id. at 423.

24
 298 Phil. 382 (1993).

25
 Id. at 388.
26
 487 Phil. 449 (2004).

27
 Id. at 466.

28
Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Hon. Drilon, 246 Phil. 393, 399
(1988).

29
 236 Phil. 768 (1987).

30
See Developing and Assembling the Law School Admission Test, Ronald Armstrong,
Dmitry Belov, Alexander Weissman, Interfaces, Vol. 35, No. 2, March - April 2005, p.
141.

31
See Standard 503, Chapter 5, Admission and Student Services, 2017-2018 American
Bar Association Standards and Rules of Procedure.
32
 Wigmore, Juristic Psychopoyemetrology-Or, How to Find Out Whether a Boy Has the
Makings of a Lawyer, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 454, 463-464 (1929).

33
 Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice William O. Douglas in DeFunis v. Odegaard,
416 U.S. 312 (1974).

34
 WILLIAM P. LAPIANA, A History of the Law School Admission Council and the LSAT,
Keynote Address, 1998 LSAC Annual Meeting.

35
 Id. at 5-6.

36
 Id.

37
 Id. at 6 & 8.

38
 Id. at 10.

39
 Id. at 8.

40
 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The ponencia therein denied the petition questioning the
Admission Policy of University of Washington Law School in treating minorities
differently in their admission to law school. It was essentially denied because the
petitioner therein will already complete his law school studies, hence, the petition was
moot.

41
 Id.

42
 New entry test for law students, BBC News, February 2, 2014,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/3451897.stm [last accessed September
3, 2019].

43
 Aptitude Testing and the Legal Profession, Dr. Chris Dewberry, Birkbeck, University of
London, June 6, 2011, p. 61, (2011).
44
 WHY JOIN LNAT?, LNAT National Admission Test for Law, https://lnat.ac.uk/why-join-
lnat/ [last accessed September 3, 2019].

45
 Supra note 43 at 61-62.

46
 In the UK, undergraduate grades are measured through A-Levels and General
Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE).

47
 Supra note 44.

48
 The Pearson Guide to the LLB Entrance Examinations, Edgar Thorpe and Showick
Thorpe, Pearson Education India, p. 22, 2008.

49
 Id.
50
 NLUs enter into new CLAT MoU, ensuring full participation of all 16 NLUs (except NLU
Delhi), Shrivastava, Prachi, Legally India, https://www.legallyindia.com/pre-law/all-16-
nlus-can-now-conduct-clatunlike-earlier-7-20141103-5262 [last accessed September 3,
2019].

51
 PALS reelect UE Dean Valdez, University of the East News, March 16, 2012,
[https://www.ue.edu.ph/news/?p=2786 last accessed August 15, 2019].

52
See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice William O. Douglas in DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), citing B. Hoffmann, The Tyranny of Testing 91-92
(1962).

53
See Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 7662.

54
Bito-onon v. Hon. Yap Fernandez, 403 Phil. 693, 702 (2001).

55
Hon. Drilon v. Mayor Lim, 305 Phil. 146, 152 (1994).

56
 Memorandum of petitioner in G.R. No. 245954, p. 33.

57
 Sec. 5, LEB Memorandum Order No. 7, series of 2016.

58
 Judicial Affidavit of petitioner Gretchen M. Vasquez, Annex F of Memorandum of
Abayata, et al., p. 3.

59
 As amended by A.M. 19-03-24-SC, Amendment of Rule 138, Section 5 in relation to
the Revision of Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, July 23, 2019.

60
 Section 1, Bar Matter No. 850.

61
 History of PHILJA, http://philja.judiciary.gov.ph/history.html [last accessed: June 6,
2019].

62
See Dissenting Opinion of Associate Justice William O. Douglas in DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974); citing Rosen, Equalizing Access to Legal Education:
Special Programs for Law Students Who Are Not Admissible by Tradlitional Criteria,
1970 U. Tol. L. Rev. 321, 332-333.

63
 Dated June 25, 2019.

64
See Dissenting Opinion of Justice Del Castillo, Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
Elections, 782 Phil. 292, 357-363 (2016).

65
David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, 795 Phil. 529, 575 (2016).

66
 Section 1, Bar Matter No. 850.

67
 Section 7(c) & (d).

68
See Memorandum of the Office of the Solicitor General, pp. 38-39.
69
Atty. Villonco v. Atty. Roxas, A.C. No. 9186, April 11, 2018.

CONCURRING and DISSENTING OPINION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

 
We all have different competencies. Some of us are intellectually gifted, some
of us athletically gifted, some of us are great listeners. Everyone has a
different level of what they can do. 1
 
 
 
Don't take on things you don't believe in and that you yourself are not good at.
Learn to say no. Effective leaders match the objective needs of their company
with the subjective competencies. As a result, they get an enormous amount
of things done fast.2

PREFATORY

The pursuit of excellence has never been a bad thing. From our ranks, we
shower accolades to the best, brightest, most efficient, most innovative - the
cut above the rest. Soon, the Court will again be recognizing excellence of
execution among our judges and clerks of court, conferring on them the
judicial excellence awards. These awards do not come cheap. They are laden
with perks and advantages that are sorely denied others. Yet this is not
discrimination. The differential treatment is not based on something like the
color of one's skin or the circumstances regarding one's birth-the differential
treatment arises not from an unchanging and unchangeable characteristics
and traits, but from circumstances largely within the awardees' control and
efforts. Exclusion necessarily comes with quality.

To strive for excellence and to require others to also trail this path in matters
of privilege is not usurping that other's role in this regard. This is the case
where the requirer of excellence shares the same goal of excellence as
the required. More in point to the present cases, who would not want
something more from a law student whose answer to the following question is
as follows -
Teacher: Q - What are fruits as they relate to our study of Obligations &
Contracts?
Student - "The Obligations and contracts is very beneficial to our life. The fruit
I relate is Banana. This fruit have a vitamins and it gave the beneficial like
became taller."3
Each of us has distinct competencies. Some run quicker than others. A few
love to ruminate. There are fifteen (15) Justices in the Court, and in a room
full of lawyers and judges, this is as exclusive as it can get. Of the several
hundreds who take the Bar, not everyone gets over the hurdle. In any World
Cup, there are only a number of aspirants. The top-tier law schools cannot
accommodate a slew of the applicants. It is not society's fault that not every
Army officer comes from the Philippine Military Academy, or a lawyer can
claim blue, maroon, red, yellow, or green as the color of his or her scholastic
pedigree. The right of each citizen to select a course of study is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.

If we are agreed that quality and excellence and their resulting exclusionary
effect are valid objectives in any institution of higher learning like law schools,
we next ask, who decides whom to accept in such institutions, like law
schools? We should also be concerned with things like curriculum, faculty;
internal administration, library, laboratory class and other facilities. 4 This is
because when we speak of quality education we have in mind such matters,
among others, as curriculum development, development of learning resources
and instructional materials, upgrading of library and laboratory facilities,
innovations in educational technology and teaching methodologies,
improvement of research quality, and others.5 Who speaks for these
requisites?

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

To resolve the cases here, it is important to understand the relationship of the

intersecting constitutional rights and interests as visually reflected below:

 
State: shall exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational
institutions; protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education
at all levels and shall take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all.
    
Institutions of Higher Learning: academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all
institutions of higher learning.
 
Citizens: right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.

(See image)

Not one of these rights and interests is superior to any of the others. Each has
an impact on any of the others in terms of meaning and application. It is the
Court's duty to weigh and balance these rights and interests according to the
circumstances of each case.

In the exercise of the State's power to reasonably supervise and regulate all

educational institutions, the State is mandated to protect and promote not just
any access to education but access to quality education. So the State is
expected to initiate, innovate, and implement measures to achieve this
objective.

It is established that "the duty of providing quality education entails the duty

of screening those who seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is
required in order to merit quality education goes up as one goes higher in the
educational ladder of progression. . . . As already seen, however, there is also
recognition of the right of the school to impose admission standards. The State
itself may also set admission standards." 6

Which of the State agencies is responsible for this task? The Court has already
recognized that -
. . . . the Constitution indeed mandates the State to provide quality education,
the determination of what constitutes quality education is best left with the
political departments who have the necessary knowledge, expertise, and
resources to determine the same. The deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission again are very instructive:

Now, Madam President, we have added the word "quality" before "education"
to send appropriate signals to the government that, in the exercise of its
supervisory and regulatory powers, it should first set satisfactory minimum
requirements in all areas: curriculum, faculty, internal administration, library,
laboratory class and other facilities, et cetera, and it should see to it that
satisfactory minimum requirements are met by all educational institutions,
both public and private. When we speak of quality education we have in mind
such matters, among others, as curriculum development, development of
learning resources and instructional materials, upgrading of library and
laboratory facilities, innovations in educational technology and teaching
methodologies, improvement of research quality, and others.

Here and in many other provisions on education, the principal focus of

attention and concern is the students. I would like to say that in my view there
is a slogan when we speak of quality of education that I feel we should be
aware of, which is, "Better than ever is not enough." In other words, even if
the quality of education is good now, we should attempt to keep on improving
it.7 (emphasis added)
A citizen - not any individual but a citizen - has the right to select a profession
or a course of study leading to that chosen profession; however, the citizen is
not guaranteed admission to the profession or to the course of study and
school of his or her choosing. The right given to every citizen is to select - a
profession or course of study. BUT this right does not necessarily give rise to
and guarantee a right to pursue, and engage in, the chosen profession of the
citizen or a right to be admitted to the course of study and school of the
citizen's choosing. The citizen must have to consider the State's duty to
regulate and supervise reasonably educational institutions, which would have
to include measures to assure the citizen's access to quality education, as well
as the express limitation inherent in every citizen's right to select a profession
or course of study, i.e. - - - fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and
academic requirements.
As the intersecting rights and interests show, the State has a stake in the
determination and imposition of the fair, reasonable, and equitable admission
and academic requirements through the duty of the political departments of
the State to reasonably regulate and supervise educational
institutions towards, among others, assuring the citizen of access
to quality education.

In addition, the Constitution also recognizes the important role that academic

freedom plays in providing quality education. Institutions of higher learning
including law schools enjoy academic freedom in the highest legal order
possible. Written in jurisprudence are the substance and parameters of this
constitutional privilege and duty which entitles its holders to determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall
be taught, and who may be admitted to study. Subsumed under this
entitlement is the capacity of institutions of higher learning to determine and
impose fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.

Both the State through its political departments and the institutions of higher

learning have roles to play in providing our citizens access
to quality education. It is our duty to balance the academic freedom of
institutions of higher learning and the State's exercise of reasonable
supervision and regulation. Academic freedom is not absolute.

The foregoing rights and interests of the State, the citizen, and the institutions
of higher learning interplay in the present cases. These rights and interests
very strongly suggest that these cases are not and have never been
about a willy-nilly and free-wheeling intellectual inquiry of individuals on the
nature of the law or its relevance to everyday life and its application to real
life situations, or about those individuals whose only interest in obtaining
legal education is to get qualified for some higher civil service postings.

Individuals are not forbidden from learning the law for whatever motives or

purposes they may each have. Every individual has the freedom of intellectual
and non-intellectual inquiry, a cognate of each one's freedom of thought,
expression, and speech that is not in any way restricted by the discussion and
ruling which follows.

It is important that we see through the distinction between intellectual inquiry

within the narrow confines of educational institutions like law schools and a
citizen's political right of free expression. In this light, academic freedom and
the State's power of reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational
institutions bear upon the context of the narrower academic community.8 This
is different from an individual's freedom of expression which encompasses his
or her freedom of intellectual inquiry for whatever purposes it may serve him
or her.

For clarity and emphasis, what we are dealing with here is different from
merely wanting to study law for its own sake or for immediate career
advancement which a law degree carries in the civil service. Our endeavour
here is a distinct proposition that has a life of its own. In the words of the
Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admissions Committee,9 "[i]t is equally difficult to
yield conformity to the approach taken that colleges and universities should be
looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to whom to admit or
reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a different, and
certainly, higher category."

Here, the issues are defined by the education of and learning by citizens

within the confines of an educational institution whose existence and
operation are imbued with public concern, to pursue a course of study subject
to reasonable regulation and supervision by both the State and the law school,
as to access, quality and admission, and academic requirements, where
the citizen if successful gets entitled to qualify for and engage
in a profession that we all admit to be noble and suffused with public interest.

I understand that some eager students would have their dreams of becoming
law students scuttled. To this situation, I have only to stress the advice
reflected in my chosen epigraphs above -
We all have different competencies. Some of us are intellectually gifted, some
of us athletically gifted, some of us are great listeners. Everyone has a
different level of what they can do.

Don't take on things you don't believe in and that you yourself are not good at.
Learn to say no. Effective leaders match the objective needs of their company
with the subjective competencies. As a result, they get an enormous amount
of things done fast.
In the context of the Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT), whose
validity as a screening mechanism I stand by as my resolution to this
Opinion's second issue. Indeed, nothing can be more liberating than taking the
epigraphs to heart and to bear on one's aspirations in life.

Our task is to consider carefully, weigh and balance the rights and interests of
these stakeholders. Each is equally important, compelling, and relevant as the
next right and interest. Not one is superior to another, though one may qualify
the other. When considered, weighed, and balanced properly, these rights and
interests will form the tapestry against which we will be able to judge the
validity of the assailed statutory provisions and the relevant founding
regulation. I now endeavour to do this and more.

THOUGHTFUL RUMINATIONS

First. I have been confronted with the idea that as regards education in

institutions of higher learning, the State's supervisory and regulatory power is
only an auxiliary power in relation to educational institutions, be it basic,
secondary, or higher education. It has been said that this must be necessarily
so because the right and duty to educate, being part and parcel of youth-
rearing, does not inure to the State at the first instance. Rather, it belongs
essentially and naturally to the parents who surrender it by delegation to the
educational institutions.
I beg to differ. It is well-taken if this idea were referring only to pre-
school or elementary school students. But the cases here are not about the
education of young and impressionable children. They are about the education
which molds an individual into a legal professional, the one whom another
would meet to seek help about his or her life, liberty, or property. Nor are the
cases here about nurturing generally socially acceptable values.

They are about piecing together building blocks to develop focused core
values essential to professions, including the legal profession. With respect to
the latter, regardless of how a potential student of law has been reared by his
or her or its natural or surrogate parents, he or she must learn focused core
values that the confluence of private and public communities relevant to the
legal profession has judged to be important. In fact, some of these focused
core values may be different from the basic values which the potential student
of law may have been taught at home.

For example:

Home Values
Lawyer's Values
1. Be Honest 1. Duty of Confidentiality 2. Defend Only The Good Ones 2. Right
to Counsel and Duty of Loyalty to Client 3. Love and Defend Your Family 3.
Avoid Conflict of Interest in the Performance of Lawyer's Duties
To stress, the duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening
those who seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order
to merit quality education goes up as one goes higher in the educational
ladder of progression . . . ."10

The State's supervisory and regulatory power in relation to prescribing the

minimum admission requirements has been said to be a component of police
power, which as explained in Tablarin v. Gutierrez,11 "is
the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to
secure and promote all the important interests and needs - in a word, the
public order - of the general community." Hence, the State's supervisory and
regulatory power over institutions of higher learning  cannot be
characterized as a mere auxiliary power in the ordinary sense of being just a
spare, substitute, or supplementary power.

Second. There are three (3) issues to be resolved here:

1. Which State agent - the Supreme Court or the Legal Education Board or both
- is responsible for exercising reasonable regulation and supervision of all
educational institutions? In this regard, is the reasonable regulation and
supervision of legal education within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court? If
it is, what is the exact jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the reasonable
regulation and supervision of legal education? May this jurisdiction be
assigned or delegated to or shared with the Legal Education Board created
under RA 7662?

2. Do Subsection 7(e) of RA 766212 and Legal Education Board Memorandum

Order No. 7, series of 2016, (LEBMO No. 7) fall within the constitutionally-
permissible supervision and regulation?

3. Are Subsections 7(g) and (h) of RA 7662 13ultra vires for encroaching into
the constitutional powers of the Supreme Court.

Let me address these issues sequentially.

Which State agent - the Supreme Court or Congress and the Legal Education
Board or both - is responsible for exercising reasonable regulation and
supervision of all educational institutions? In this regard, is the reasonable
regulation and supervision of legal education within the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court? If it is, what is the exact jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
over the reasonable regulation and supervision of legal education? May this
jurisdiction be assigned or delegated to or shared with Congress and the Legal
Education Board created under RA 7662? I accept the Decision's ruling
that Congress and the Legal Education Board have primary and direct
jurisdiction to exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of legal
education and the law schools providing them. The Supreme Court has no
primary and direct jurisdiction over legal education and law schools.

The Supreme Court, however, is not entirely irrelevant when it comes to legal
education. Although the primary and direct responsibility rests with Congress
and the Legal Education Board to reasonably supervise and regulate legal
education and law schools, the Supreme Court can and will intervene when a
justiciable controversy hounds the discharge of the Legal Education Board's
duties. The Supreme Court will also have to intervene when its power to
administer admission to the Bar is infringed. Admission to law school is far
different from admission to the Bar. As the Decision has aptly
discussed, historically, textually, practicably, and legally, there has
been no demonstrable assignment of the function to supervise and regulate
legal education to the Supreme Court.

Textual. The confusion regarding the Supreme Court's supervisory and

regulatory role stems from Subsection 5(5) of Article VIII of
the Constitution which enunciates the power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law.

Admission to the practice of law, however, is not the same as law school
admission, which is part and parcel of legal education regulation and
supervision. The former presupposes the completion of a law degree and the
submission of an application for the Bar examinations, among others. In terms
of proximity to membership in the Bar, admission to the practice of
law is already far deep into the process, the outcome of legal education plus
compliance with so many more criteria.14 On the other hand, law
admission signals only the start of the long and arduous process of legal
education. It is therefore speculative and somehow presumptuous to consider
an applicant for law admission as already a candidate for admission to the
practice of law.

Clearly, Subsection 5(5) of Article VIII cannot be the source of power of the

Supreme Court to exercise reasonable supervision and regulation of legal
education and law schools as a primary and direct jurisdiction.

Historical. The Supreme Court has not played a primary and direct role in

regulating and supervising legal education and law schools. Legal education
and law schools have been consistently placed for supervision and regulation
under the jurisdiction of the legislature, and in turn, the country's education
departments.

For instance, it was the University of the Philippines College of Law which

pioneered the legal education curriculum in the Philippines. On the basis of
statutory authority, the Bureau of Private Schools acted as supervisor of law
schools and national coordinator of law deans. Thereafter, the Bureau of
Higher Education regulated law schools. Still further later, DECS Order No. 27-
1989, series of 1989 outlined the policies and standards for legal education,
qualifications, and functions of a law dean, and qualifications, compensation
and conditions of employment of law faculty, formulated a law curriculum, and
imposed law admission standards.

Impracticable. The Supreme Court has no office and staff dedicated to the task

of supervising and regulating legal education and law schools. It also has no
expertise as educators of these tertiary students. It has no budget item for
this purpose.

Legal. Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution 15prohibits members of the

Supreme Court from being designated to any agency (which includes
functions) performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. The spirit of
this prohibition precludes the Court from exercising reasonable supervision
and regulation of legal education and law schools. The reason is that this task
involves administrative functions - "those which involve the regulation and
control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and
the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence."16

Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co. 17 has emphasized that the

Supreme Court should only exercise judicial power and should not assume any
duty which does not pertain to the administering of judicial functions. In that
case, a petition was filed requesting the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms and the compensation to be
paid to Manila Electric Company for the use of right of way. The Court held that
it would be improper and illegal for the members of the Supreme Court, sitting
as a board of arbitrators, whose decision shall be final, to act on the petition of
Manila Electric Company. The Court explained:
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or as members of
the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, exercise administrative
or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to fall within the
jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would
presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any
other construction would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the
award a nullity. But if this be the proper construction, we would then have the
anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the
Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its
members acting as arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions
performed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that
would result in the performance of duties which the members of the Supreme
Court could not lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present
petition also furnishes an apt illustration of another anomaly, for we find the
Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of the court may
be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all.

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three
divisions of power in our government. It is judicial power and judicial power
only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just as the Supreme Court, as
the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any
other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own
sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it
by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its members should not and cannot
be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any
duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial
functions. (emphasis added)
Imposing regulatory and supervisory functions upon the members of the Court
constitutes judicial overreach by usurping and performing executive
functions. In resolving the first issue, we are duty bound not to overstep the
Court's boundaries by taking over the functions of an administrative agency.
We should abstain from exercising any function which is not strictly judicial in
character and is not clearly conferred on the Court by the Constitution. 18 To
stress, "the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and
cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume
any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial
functions."19Do Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662 and Legal Education Board
Memorandum Order No. 7, series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7) fall within the
constitutionally permissible supervision and regulation? I submit that both
Subsection 7(e) of RA7662 and LEBMO No. 7, series of 2016, as a minimum
standard for admission to a law school, fall within the constitutionally-
permissible reasonable supervision and regulation by the State over all
educational institutions.

Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662 states "[f]or the purpose of achieving the

objectives of this Act, the Board shall have the following powers and
functions . . . (e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and
minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members . . . ."

On the other hand, LEBMO No. 7 imposes as an admission requirement to a

law school passing (defined as obtaining a 55% cut-off score20) the "one-day
aptitude test that can measure the academic potential of the examinee to
pursue the study of law [by testing] communications and language
proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative
reasoning."21 This one-day test is the Philippine Law School Admission Test
(PhiLSAT).

PhiLSAT is offered at least once a year,22 recently, twice a year, and an

applicant can take PhiLSAT as many times as one would want if unsuccessful
in the attempt.23 A law school may prescribe admission requirements, but
these must be in addition to passing the PhiLSAT.24

There is no doubt that Subsection 7(e) of RA7662 and LEBMO No. 7 are
measures to regulate and supervise law schools. The issue: are these
measures reasonable?

I appreciate the Decision's ruling that the State can. conduct the PhiLSAT. But
I do not agree with its ruling that passing the PhiLSAT cannot be a minimum
requirement for admission to a law school. This is a ruling that takes with its
left hand, what it gives with the right. After stating that PhiLSAT is within the
State's reasonable supervisory and regulatory power to design and provide or
conduct as a minimum standard for admission to a law school,
the Decision then disempowers the State of such power and authority, when it
gave discretion to the law schools to ignore PhiLSAT completely.

The Decision accepts that PhiLSAT is a minimum standard for law school

admission and is therefore valid under the State's power to regulate and
supervise education in a reasonable manner. Since PhiLSAT is valid, though it
may infringe a portion of a law school's academic freedom, then it cannot be
set aside. It is a contradiction in terms to say that PhiLSAT is a valid regulation
but that it can be ignored.

Reasonableness is the standard endorsed by

the Constitution. Reasonableness requires deference. It is the stark
opposite of the search for the correct measure of regulation and supervision,
which means there can only be one proper means of regulating and
supervising educational institutions. Where the power, however, refers to the
exercise of reasonable regulation or supervision, a reviewing court cannot
substitute its own appreciation of the appropriate solution; rather it must
determine if the outcome falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes
which are defensible in respect of the facts and law. 25

Where the standard is reasonableness, there could be more than one solution,

so long as each of them is reasonable. If the process and the solution fit
comfortably with the principles of justification (i.e., existence of a rational
basis for the action), transparency, and intelligibility (i.e., the adequacy of the
explanation of that rational basis), it is not open to a reviewing court to
substitute its own view of the preferable solution.

Conversely, where a regulation or supervision is determined to

be unreasonable, it means that while there could have been many appropriate
measures to regulate or supervise, the particular regulation or
supervision which was adopted is not reasonable.
The existence of justification or whether there exists a rational basis to
support the regulation, lies at the core of the definition of reasonableness.
The test of justification is a test of proportionality.26 Accordingly:

First, the objective of the regulation must be pressing and substantial, in

order to justify a limit on a right. This is a threshold requirement, which is
analyzed without yet considering the scope of the infringement made by the
regulation, the means employed, or the effects of the measure. The integrity
of the justification analysis requires that the objective of the regulation be
properly stated. The relevant objective is the very objective of the infringing
measure, not the objective of the broader provision upon which the regulation
hinges.

Second, the means by which the objective is furthered must be proportionate.

The proportionality inquiry comprises three (3) components: (i) rational
connection to the objective, (ii) minimal impairment of the right, and
(iii) proportionality between the effects of the measure (a balancing of its
salutary and deleterious effects) and the stated objective of the regulation.
The proportionality inquiry is both normative and contextual, and requires that
a court balances the interests of society with the interests of individuals and
groups.

The question at the first step of the proportionality inquiry is whether the

measure that has been adopted is rationally connected to this objective. This
can be proved by evidence of the harm that the regulation is meant to address.
In cases where such a causal connection is not scientifically measurable, the
rational connection can be made out on the basis of reason or logic.

The second component of the proportionality test requires evidence that the

regulation at issue impairs the right as little as reasonably possible. This can
be shown by what the regulation seeks to achieve, what the effects of the
regulation could be (i.e., if they are overinclusive or underinclusive) or how
the regulation is tailored to respond to a specific problem.

At the final stage of the proportionality analysis, it must be asked whether

there is proportionality between the overall effects of the infringing regulation
and the objective. This involves weighing the salutary effects of the
objectives and the deleterious effects of the regulation. Are the benefits of the
impugned regulation illusory and speculative? Or are these benefits real? Is it
clear how the objectives are enhanced by the regulation? Are the deleterious
effects on affected rights holders serious? What are these deleterious effects?
What is the harm inflicted on these rights holders?

Let me deal first with Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662.

Existence of Justification. Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662 states:

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum
qualifications and compensation of faculty members . . . .
The State objectives in the enactment of Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662 are found
in Sections 2 and 3 of the same statute:
Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the
State to uplift the standards of legal education in order to prepare law
students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving, and decision-making, to
infuse in them the ethics of the legal profession; to impress on them the
importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal and
indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice and to
develop social competence. Towards this end, the State shall undertake
appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require proper selection of
law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal
apprenticeship and continuing legal education.

Section 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. - (a) Legal

education in the Philippines is geared to attain the following objectives:

(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;

(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the
needs of the poor, deprived and oppressed sectors of society;
(3) to train persons for leadership;
(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the
improvement of its administration, the legal system and legal institutions in
the light of the historical and contemporary development of law in the
Philippines and in other countries.

(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:

(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various
fields and of legal institutions;
(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze,
articulate and apply the law effectively, as well as to allow them to have a
holistic approach to legal problems and issues;
(3) to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving and
decision-making, and to develop their ability to deal with recognized legal
problems of the present and the future;
(4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful
employment or sufficient as a foundation for future training beyond the basic
professional degree, and to develop in them the desire and capacity for
continuing study and self-improvement;
(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal
profession; and
(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their
profession and to fully adhere to its ethical norms. (emphasis added)
The objectives of Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662 are pressing and substantial.
This is because they arise from, or at least relate to, the objective of
achieving quality of education (including of course legal education), which
the Constitution has seen proper to elevate as a normative obligation.

The foregoing objectives justify a limitation on a citizen's right to select a

profession and course of study because they fall under the express limit to this
right, "subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. " As well, the oversearching power of the State to exercise
reasonable supervision and regulation of all educational institutions justifies
this qualification. The objectives also justify a limitation on the academic
freedom of every law school as an institution of higher learning
because quality legal education is a constitutional obligation of the State to
protect and promote.

In real terms, why would we not want law students who have the basic
abilities to communicate clearly and concisely, analyze fact situations and the
legal rules that apply to them, and understand the texts assigned to them for
reading and discussion? Why should we be content with just legal education
when the Constitution no less and our practical wisdom demand that we
conjoin education with quality?

As the assailed measures prescribe mere minimum standards for law

admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty members,
Subsection 7(e) of RA7662 and LEBMO No. 7 are proportionate to the
foregoing objectives.

Minimum  law admission and minimum  faculty competence and

compensation requirements are rationally connected to quality legal education
and to each of the objectives mentioned in sections 2 and 3 above quoted.
This rational connection is intuitive, logical, and common-sensical. Prescribing
these minimum standards can lead to and accomplish the objectives of
Subsection 7(e) as they favorably affect the quality of students that a law
school admits as well as the quality of law faculty who in turn mentors the
students whose aptitude for law studies has been tested. In the words of
Professor Bernas, paraphrasing the Constitutional Commission:
. . . . the duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening
those who seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order
to merit quality education goes up as one goes higher in the educational
ladder of progression . . . . However, as already seen, there is also recognition
of the right of school to impose admission standards. The state itself may also
set admission standards. 27
Subsection 7(e) impairs the right of a citizen to select a profession and a
course of study and the academic freedom of every law school only as little as
reasonably possible. For Subsection 7(e) prescribes only minimum standards
of law admission and faculty competence and compensation.

This provision is not overinclusive or underinclusive as

the minimum standards do not impact on aspects of a citizen's right to select a
profession or course of study or the academic freedom of a law school other
than the admission of students into a law degree program of a law school.

Subsection 7(e) is tailor-fit to the objective of fostering law student success in

law school and ensuring competent law faculty to teach these students.

It is reasonable to assume that every self-respecting law school would see

Subsection 7(e)'s requirements of minimum standards for law
admission and faculty compensation and competence as necessary
ingredients of quality legal education, and that these minimum requisites
would coincide with each law school's good practices in administering legal
education.

At the final stage of the proportionality analysis, there is proportionality

between the overall salutary effects of the objectives of Subsection 7(e) and
the deleterious impact of prescribing minimum standards for admission of
students in law schools and minimum qualifications and compensation for the
law faculty.

The benefits obtained from achieving the objectives are obvious. No one can

argue against students who are academically competent and have
a personality ready for the rigors of legal education. It will spare both the law
student and the law school of the waste of time, expense, and trauma of not
being able to fit in and succeed. Minimum standards for law admission and law
faculty competence and compensation are base-line predictors of success in
law school and quality of the legal education it offers. Professor Bernas and
the Constitutional Commission, as quoted above, shared this observation. 28

On the other hand, the deleterious effect of the imposition of such minimum

standards is speculative

In the first place, petitioners offered no evidence of

the oppressive or discriminatory nature and other evils that could be
attributed to the prescription of such minimum standards. In fact, the
converse is true - easily more than half of the applicants passed the first
versions of PhiLSAT.
YEAR, MONTH
PASSING RATE
2017, April
81.43%
2017, September
57.76%
2018, April
61.39%
2018, September
56.78%
2019, April
Unreleased29
Accepting that quality legal education is a pressing and substantial objective,
the screening of law students and the provision of minimum levels of
competency and compensation standards for law faculty are logical necessary
steps towards achieving this objective.

Existence of Transparency and Intelligibility. It cannot be denied that

Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662 was adopted by Congress after deliberations.
These deliberations articulate the reasons behind the enactment of Subsection
7(e). The policy declaration and the list of objectives mentioned in RA 7662
also adequately explain the basis for Subsection 7(e).
Action as being within a range of possible, acceptable, and defensible
outcomes. The Congress enacted Subsection 7 (e) as one of several
measures to achieve the constitutional objective of quality education, which
includes quality legal education. Prescribing minimum enforceable
standards upon the admission of law students and the compensation and
qualifications of law faculty is one of these courses of action. Actually, it
is difficult to imagine how the narrative of quality legal education could not
lead to the imposition of standards referred to in Subsection 7(e).
This intuitive justification for these measures was not lost on the
Constitutional Commission who believed that the duty to provide and
promote quality education demanded the screening of students for base-line
competencies:
[T]he duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening those
who seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order to
merit quality education goes up as one goes higher in the educational ladder
of progression . . . . However, as already seen, there is also recognition of the
right of school to impose admission standards. The state itself may also set
admission standards.30
I now apply the proportionality test to determine the reasonableness of
LEBMO No. 7.

LEBMO No. 7, series of 2016, governs not only the mechanics but also

the regulatory and supervisory aspects of PhiLSAT.

Like Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662, the general objective of PhiLSAT is to

improve the quality of legal education. LEBMO No. 7's particular objective is to
measure the academic potential of an examinee to pursue the study of law.

The means to these objectives is PhiLSAT's one-day testing of communications

and language proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative
reasoning.

To enforce compliance, admission to a law degree program and a law

school requires or is dependent upon obtaining the cut-off score of 55°/o
correct answers in PhiLSAT.

As stated, PhiLSAT is offered at least once a year,31 recently, twice a year, and

an applicant can take PhiLSAT as many times as one would want if
unsuccessful in any of the attempts.32

There is also a penalty for non-compliance by a law school, that is, if it admits
students flunking the PhiLSAT.33

Law schools may impose other admission requirements such as but not limited

to a score higher than 55% from an examinee.

I have already established above that protecting and promoting quality legal

education (including legal education) as an objective is pressing and
substantial.
Part and parcel of the objective of quality legal education is
the objective of being able to screen students for the purpose of ascertaining
their academic competencies and personal readiness to pursue legal
education. As quoted above:
[T]he duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening those
who seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order to
merit quality education goes up as one goes higher in the educational ladder
of progression . . . . However, as already seen, there is also recognition of the
right of school to impose admission standards. The state itself may also set
admission standards.34
PhiLSAT as devised is proportionate to PhiLSAT's objectives. The following
proportionality inquiry proves this conclusion.

PhiLSAT is rationally connected to quality legal education and

the measurement of one's academic potential to pursue the study of law. To
repeat, "the duty of providing quality education entails the duty of screening
those who seek education. Necessarily too, the talent that is required in order
to merit quality education goes up as one goes higher in the educational
ladder of progression . . . . However, as already seen, there is also recognition
of the right of school to impose admission standards. The state itself may also
set admission standards."35

PhiLSAT helps determine if an examinee has the basic skills to be able to

complete successfully the law school coursework.

It is true that PhiLSAT limits both the right of a citizen to select a profession

and a course of study and the academic freedom of every institution of higher
learning. But it does so only as little as reasonably possible.

In the first place, the right of a citizen to select a profession and a course of

study has an internal limitation. The Constitution expressly limits this right
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. This right therefore is not absolute, and PhiLSAT as an
admission requirement falls within the limitation to this right.

In fact, as it measures only the basic competencies necessary to survive the

coursework in a law school, PhiLSAT enhances a law school applicant's sense
of dignity and self-worth as it prevents potential unmet expectations and
wastage of time, resources and efforts.

If an applicant does not obtain a score of at least 55% in this test involving

the most basic of skills required in a law school, despite the unlimited chances
to write PhiLSAT, then the applicant's aptitude must lie somewhere else.

Secondly, it is inconceivable to think of a university program without any

admission criteria whatsoever. A self-respecting law school - a law school that
abhors being referred to as a diploma mill - subscribes to some means to
measure the academic and personal readiness of its students, and as a badge
of honor and pride, to distinguish its students from the rest. And, if a law
school can impose standards, the State can also do in accordance with its
powers and duties under the Constitution.

The impact of PhiLSAT on the right of law schools as an institution of higher

learning to select their respective students must be reconciled with the State's
power to protect and promote quality education and to exercise reasonable
supervision and regulation of all educational institutions.

Verily, the impact of PhiLSAT on academic freedom is for sure, minimal.

The analysis takes us first to Nos. 1 and 2 of LEBMO No. 7, which state the
"Policy and Rationale" of the "administration of a nationwide uniform law
school admission test for applicants to the basic law courses in all law schools
in the country." Thus:
1. Policy and Rationale. - To improve the quality of legal education, all those
seeking admission to the basic law courses leading to either a Bachelor of
Laws or Juris Doctor degree shall be required to take the Philippine Law
School Admission Test (PhiLSAT), a nationwide uniform admission test to be
administered under the control and supervision of the [Legal Education
Board].

2. Test Design. - The PhiLSAT shall be designed as a one-day aptitude test that
can measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of
law. It shall test communications and language proficiency, critical thinking
skills, and verbal and quantitative reasoning. (emphasis added)
No. 1 of LEBMO No. 7 states the animating purpose, to improve the quality of
legal education, for requiring the taking of the PhiLSAT by applicants for
admission to a law school.

No. 2 of LEBMO No. 7 provides the mechanism for achieving No. 1.

Nos. 7 and 9 of LEBMO No. 7 further clarify how PhiLSAT would be used to

measure the academic potential of an applicant to a law school:
7. Passing Score - The cut off or passing score for the PhilSAT shall be FIFTY-
FIVE PERCENT (55%) correct answers, or such percentile score as may be
prescribed by the LEB.

8. Test Results - Every examinee who passed the PhilSAT shall be issued by
the testing administrator a CERTIFICATE OF LEGIBILITY (COE), which shall
contains the examinees test score/rating and general average to the
bachelor's degree completed. Examinees who fail to meet the cut-off or
passing score shall by issued a Certificate of Grade containing his/her test
score/rating. The COE shall be valid for two (2) years and shall be submitted
to the admitting law school by the applicant.

9. Admission Requirement - All college graduates or graduating

students applying for admission to the basic law course shall be required to
pass the PhilSAT as a requirement for admission to any law School in the
Philippines. Upon the affectivity of this memorandum order, no applicant shall
be admitted for enrollment as a first year student in the basic law courses
leading to a degree of either Bachelor of Laws or Juris Doctor unless he/she
has passed the PhilSAT taken within 2 years before the start of studies for the
basic law course and presents a valid COE as proof thereof. (emphasis added)
This stage of the analysis requires us to refer to Nos. 10 and 11 of LEBMO No.
7:
10. Exemption. - Honor graduates granted professional civil service
professional eligibility pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 907 who are
enrolling within two (2) years from their college graduation are exempted
from taking and passing the PhiLSAT from for purposes of admission to the
basic law course.

11. Institutional Admission Requirements. - The PhiLSAT shall be without

prejudice to the right of a law school in the exercise of its academic freedom
to prescribe or impose additional requirements for admission, such as but not
limited to:

a. A score in the PhiLSAT higher than the cut-off or passing score set by the
LEB;

b. Additional or supplemental admission tests to measure the competencies

and/or personality of the applicant; and

c. Personal interview of the applicant (emphasis added)

No. 11 of LEBMO No. 7 itself expressly recognizes the right of law
schools to impose screening measures in addition
to the taking or writing of PhiLSAT, such as but not limited to a PhiLSAT score
of higher than 55%, additional admission tests, and personal interview of
the applicant.

The law school may also opt to rely solely on the result of the PhiLSAT in
accepting students.

The additional requirements that a law school may impose would have to be of

the same kind as a PhiLSAT score of higher than 55%, additional admission
tests, or a personal interview of the applicant - the defining characteristic of
the specie in the enumeration is the ability to measure the competencies
and/or personality of the applicant relevant to and indicative of an applicant's
success in law school - an applicant's communications or language
proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative reasoning, and
personality fit for success in law school. So any screening module that makes
such measurements could be imposed as an additional measure.

On the other hand, No. 10 of LEBMO No. 7 provides for an exemption from

both writing and passing PhiLSAT. This, however, does not exempt an
applicant from the other admission requirements of a law school if one has
been imposed.

Thus, the scheme under LEBMO No. 7 can be summarized as follows:

1. Objective: to measure the academic potential of an applicant to a law school

to pursue a law degree in terms of baseline competencies in communications
or language proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative
reasoning.

2. Means: (a) writing the one-day aptitude test on communications or

language proficiency, critical thinking skills, and verbal and quantitative
reasoning, and passing this test with a score of 55% of correct answers;
(b) non-admission of applicants who score less than 55% in PhiLSAT
and imposition of administrative fine against law schools admitting law
students who did not write or pass PhiLSAT; and (c) law school admission
requirements in addition to writing and passing PhiLSAT, if any.

3. Exemption: as stated in No. 10 of LEBMO No. 7.

PhiLSAT as an admission requirement is reasonable because it is minimally

impairing of academic freedom.

The scope of the area measured by PhiLSAT is limited to academic

potential - communications or language proficiency, critical thinking skills,
and verbal and quantitative reasoning - and does not extend to an applicant's
personality or emotional quotient.

PhiLSAT competencies are the most basic of skills needed to survive

as and gain something from being, a law student. There is nothing fancy,
whimsical or arbitrary about these competencies. PhiLSAT does not
intrude into a law school's decision to prescribe other admission
requirements covering other sets of skills.

Further, PhiLSAT's passing score is minimal - 55%. If an applicant cannot even

obtain a score of at least 55% in this test involving the most basic of skills
required in a law school, then the applicant's aptitude must lie somewhere
else.

A snapshot or sample of PhiLSAT questions bears this out:

TEST A. COMMUNICATION AND LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY 

 
Section 1. Identifying Sentence Errors

Directions: Read each sentence carefully but quickly, paying attention to the
underlined word or phrase. Each sentence contains either a single error or no
error at all. If the sentence contains an error, select the underlined word or
phrase that must be changed to make the sentence correct. If the sentence is
correct, select option D.
  
In choosing your answers, follow the requirements of standard written
English.

1. I was paying my bill in a restaurant when my childhood best

friend suddenly come to
                  A                                                                                          B              
    have a short chitchat with me. No error
                        C                           D

2. Marco and Alea had been close friends for more than a decade, but people
who knew them
                                                                                      A
    thought that her relationship was something beyond friendship. No error
         B                        C                                                               D

3. The manager said that John needed to change his ways because he often

came late,
                                                                    A
    failed to complete his tasks on time, and his enthusiasm was not
evident. No error
                         B                                                              C                        D

4. Most of my cousins wanted to be a teacher, except Santino who wanted to

be an engineer.
                   A                                 B                                                           C
    No error
         D

5. The supervisor and me would always discuss if we need to check the
items so that
                     A                                                                      B
    we could avoid unexpected circumstances. No error
                C                                                    D

6. We believe that it is you who has committed a grave mistake for which a

sincere apology
           A                                B                                                  C
    should be extended. No error
                                      D

7. While the Middle Ages produced many great writers, Dante Alighieri, the

iconic author of
                                          A
    the Divine Comedy, is more celebrated than any writer from that period. No
error
                                                B                        C                                    D

8. At the forum, the candidate said that he/she did not have nothing to offer

but a promise to
                                                            A                              B
    produce more employment opportunities in the country. No error
                                                   C                                     D

9. Matthew's potential to be an eloquent speaker was evident in his speech

which won the
               A                                                                                                     B
   admiration of not a few of his batchmates. No error
                                               C                     D

10. A mother who knows the original value of an item can't

help questioning the price of
                            A                                                                      B
     the same product when advertised on television. No error
                                                        C                      D

11. Some students today readily post their opinions and statuses on facebook,
twitter,
                                                                                                        A
     or instagram; but others, for diverse reasons, choose to post using
viber. No error
               B                               C                                                                  D

12. The voters think Lovely would have won the election if she hasn't

become haughty.
                    A                             B                                            C
      No error
           D

13. While attending the University, I used to have three roommates - one was
an engineer,
                                                               A                                                 B
      the second was one who wrote for the local dailies, and the third was a
teacher. No error
                           C                                                                                               D

14. Two days before my father's death, he complained that he could not hardly

breathe, so
                        A                                                                         B
      we had to take him to the hospital. No error
            C                                               D

Section 2. Sentence Completion

Directions: Choose the word or phrase that, when inserted in the sentence,
best fits the meaning of the sentence as a whole.
23.
Cecilia's mother _________________ from Switzerland 30 years ago, and she
found a haven in the Philippines.

(A) emigrated

(B) immigrated
(C) has emigrated

(D) has immigrated

24.
After seeing the movie, Andrea took her eyeglasses off and put them
_________________ her lap.

(A) to

(B) on

(C) in

(D) at

25.
Contemporary Manila, with its images of urbanization and poverty, is
_________________ from Old Manila, once romantically described as the
Queen City of the Pacific.

(A) a far cry

(B) a grain of salt

(C) the last straw

(D) the wrong tree

26.
_________________ the presenter had rehearsed the, part she thought the
most difficult, the pa1ticipants did not appreciate her effort and went home
unhappy.

(A) Since

(B) Because

(C) If only

(D) Even though

27.
Yosef presented to the team _________________ than what the company
purchased three years ago.

(A) a powerfuller device

(B) the powerfuller device

(C) a more powerful device

(D) the more powerful device

28.
She was answering her assignment on historical background of a short story
_________________ she discovered she was in the wrong page.

(A) after

(B) but

(C) and

(D) when

29.
After a tight and exhausting schedule yesterday, Ramon _________________
in bed since early this morning.

(A) lay

(B) lying

(C) has lain

(D) had lied

30.
The passengers are informed that they have the next four hours
_________________ leisure, and can go wherever they wish.
(A) at

(B) by

(C) on

(D) as

31.
Because the problem is rather insoluble, even those who initially wanted to
take it up have now dropped it like a _________________.

(A) penny for your thoughts

(B) piece of cake

(C) spilt milk

(D) hot potato

32.
We are expected to _________________ our outputs on or before Thursday
next week.

(A) turn to

(B) turn off

(C) turn in

(D) turn into

33.
She was (the) _________________ among the researchers in this institution,
despite her formidable credentials.

(A) humbler

(B) humblest

(C) more humble

(D) most humble

LEBMO No. 7 also respects the academic freedom of law schools to impose

additional admission measures as they see fit. It is only this minimal
requirement of writing and passing PhiLSAT at the very reasonable score of
55% on multiple choice questions that reflects an applicant's capacity for
reading, writing, computing and analyzing individual questions and fact
scenarios, which the State demands of every law school to factor in as an
admission requirement.

More, a law school may admit as students those who have not written and

passed PhiLSAT but have obtained professional civil service eligibility within
two years from the date of their graduation in college.

In addition, a law school desirous of proving the propriety of another

exemption from taking and passing PhiLSAT can very well petition the Legal
Education Board for this purpose.

To repeat, While LEBMO No. 7 impacts on a law school's academic freedom,

the impairment is minimal and based on rational considerations.

As regards individual applicants to law school, the demand and effect of

PhiLSAT upon them thoughtfully account for their dignity as individuals. This is
because PhiLSAT relieves an applicant of the potential pain and agony of
unmet expectations and wastage of time, resources and efforts. Unsuccessful
PhiLSAT examinees may have their aptitude in something else.

In any event, the scheme under LEBMO No. 7 is also very accommodating of

applicants who fail the test. PhiLSAT is now offered twice a year, and an
applicant can write it as many times as he or she is willing to take.

To stress anew, PhiLSAT as envisioned in LEBMO No. 7 minimally impairs the

limited right of a citizen to select a profession or a course of study and a law
school's academic freedom, is consistent with the State's power of reasonable
regulation and supervision of all educational institutions, and is
therefore reasonable.

I conclude, therefore, that there is proportionality between the overall

salutary effects of the objectives of PhiLSAT and the deleterious effect of
passing PhiLSAT as an admission requirement.

As in the case for Subsection 7(e), the benefits obtained from achieving the
objectives are obvious - no one can argue against students who have been
measured to have the necessary skills in communications and language,
critical thinking, and verbal and quantitative reasoning. On the other hand,
the deleterious effect of the imposition of PhiLSAT to stress anew
is speculative. There is in fact no evidence of the evils that could be attributed
to this minimal admission requirement. It has not been shown that PhiLSAT
questions are arbitrary, the test results are oppressive to the examinees (in
fact, as shown above, easily more than half  of the applicants have passed the
first versions of PhiLSAT), or the scope of PhiLSAT has occupied the entire
field of admission standards and has left nothing for law schools to prescribe.
These allegations have not been proven to be true.

Existence of Transparency and Intelligibility. PhiLSAT has had a long history of

validation and re-validation that both the Decision and the Memorandum of
the Office of the Solicitor General have been able to recount succinctly.
The bases for which PhiLSAT was conceived and required for applicants to law
school have thus been made transparent and intelligible. One can therefore
concede that PhiLSAT was not the result of an arbitrary and capricious
exercise of wisdom by its authors.

Action as being within a range of possible, acceptable and defensible

outcomes. It is open to the Legal Education Board to impose PhiLSAT as one of
several measures to achieve the constitutional objective of quality education.
In fact, a mandatory law school admission test was one of the reform agenda
to improve the quality of the instruction given by law schools as recommended
by the Court's Special Study group on Bar Examination Reforms, and later, by
the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters and the Court's Bar Matter
No. 1161.

To reiterate, both Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662 and LEBMO Order No. 7 on

PhiLSAT are reasonable forms of State regulation and supervision of law
schools.

I also reflect on some of the Decision's ratio.

I refer to the presumption that the legislature intended to enact a valid,

sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. In a word, Subsection
7(e) and LEBMO No. 7 are presumed to be reasonable.

As reasonableness is a fact-heavy determination, absent evidence of

unreasonableness from petitioners, it would be speculative to jump to the
conclusion that PhiLSAT is in fact unreasonable. Petitioners need to prove
facts to disprove the presumption.36

I agree that the subject of PhiLSAT is to improve the quality of legal education,
which falls squarely within the scope of police power.

But I do not agree that PhiLSAT is irrelevant to such purpose and that it is
further arbitrary and oppressive. In the first place, I do not share the view
that there is an apparent discord between the purpose of improving legal
education and prescribing a qualifying and restrictive examination because the
design of the PhiLSAT itself appears to be disconnected with the aptitude for
law that it seeks to measure. The discussions above should prove that PhiLSAT
is not only relevant to the objectives set out by the Constitution and RA
7662 but is also proportionate as a means to these objectives.

Notably, petitioners presented no evidence on these factual issues. Hence, it

cannot be said that the ratio in the Decision is based on facts and
circumstances. There is not even a discussion in the Decision on the structure
and contents of the PhiLSAT tests that have been administered thus far. To be
sure, the absence of an evidentiary record makes the Decision's conclusions at
best speculative.

An evidentiary record is important because the Decision itself recognizes the

presumption that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate
the specific purpose of the law. Yet, although petitioners adduced no contrary
evidence, the Decision goes on to conclude that the presumption of validity
has been rebutted.

If there is any evidence on record here, it is to the effect that LEBMO No. 7's

PhiLSAT actually measures a potential law student's aptitude for law. As
the Decision itself acknowledges, the PhiLSAT is essentially an aptitude test
measuring the examinee's communications and language proficiency, critical
thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning, and that i was designed to
measure the academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law.

There is no denying that the ability to read a large volume of material in

English and write, think and argue in English are important indicators of one's
ability to complete a law degree. While PhiLSAT is not an exact predictor of
success in law school, it is its undeniable role in measuring a student's strong
potentials for success that must be taken into account.

Further, as the Decision itself notes, the Court, through Resolution dated

September 4, 2001, approved the recommendations of our own Committee on
Legal Education and Bar Matters, including "d) to prescribe minimum
standards for admission to law schools including a system of law aptitude
examination[.]" The Court could not have recommended a measure that would
have been an unreasonable imposition on potential students of law or on
academic freedom.

Some law schools are already imposing strict admission standards. That is
true. But this fact does not automatically render PhiLSAT irrelevant or
unreasonable.

PhiLSAT would not have come into being had there been no legitimate
concerns about improving the state of our legal education. The top law schools
are precisely top law schools because of strict admission standards they have
in place.

These law schools, however, are not the only law schools in the Philippines.
They do not have the monopoly of law students in the country. In fact, they
are only a minority. There are so many more law schools and law students out
there, whose state of competencies LEBMO No. 7 seeks to capture.

It is also a contradiction in terms that we land the best admission standards

and practices of some law schools, yet reject the passing of PhiLSAT as a
requirement for law school admission. Their standards and practices
indubitably prove a reasonable connection between the regulation of
admissions to legal education and in ensuring that those allowed to study law
and eventually allowed to practice law are competent, knowledgeable or
morally upright.

But these law schools are not the reason why we are debating about how to
improve legal education standards. If every law school has exercised
responsibly their role in ensuring that admission standards and practices are
up to par with quality legal education, we would not be talking about requiring
PhiLSAT anymore.

The indubitable social and legislative facts prove that . a screening mechanism
like PhiLSAT is necessary. If we are again going; the way of making such
screening mechanism an optional device for law school admission, as
the Decision does, then the Court is not just overhauling the undeniable social
and legislative facts upon which Subsection 7(e) of RA 7662 was based,
the Decision is also turning its back to the problems that have long beset our
legal education.

Common sense dictates that the absence of filters would clog sooner than

later the pipeline of knowledge. PhiLSAT acts as that filter which removes
students whose capacity, values, forbearance and aptitude may not be for the
study of law. This is true for aspiring law students (there must be a State-
imposed method to determine an entry level student's aptitude, capacity,
forbearance and values for law study) as it is true for those who want to be
appointed to the Bench (where the battery of tests administered by the JBC
presumably makes not only for a fair selection process but also for a pool of
competent aspirants).

I do not agree that the imposition of the PhiLSAT cut off score was made
without the benefit of a prior scientific study, thereby making it arbitrary. To
my mind, this is a reversal of the onus of who proves what. Since the Decision
admits the existence of the presumption that the legislature intended to enact
a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be
necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law, it is up to the
petitioners to establish that Congress - both the House and the Senate - and
the Legal Education Board acted arbitrarily. Petitioners did not adduce
evidence to this effect.

On the contrary, the other Branches of Government have tests validating

PhiLSAT. It is not for these Branches of Government to explain the relevance
and validity of these studies if, on their face, these studies appear to be
relevant. The actions of these Branches of Government are entitled to
deference not only because of the presumption above-mentioned but also due
to their status as agents of sovereignty. Again, the burden is on petitioners to
prove by evidence their claim that PhiLSAT is arbitrary for having been
imposed without prior scientific study, or that petitioners' own studies
disprove the presumption.
I also do not think that it is arbitrary and harsh to impose penalties upon law
schools that do not make PhiLSAT a requirement for law school admission.

Again, petitioners have not adduced evidence that unduly oppressiveness will

be the case. In any event, there is nothing oppressive about penalizing an
entity that does not comply with regulations. This setup of regulatory and
even criminal penalties has been done so often to deter violations and enforce
obedience. This is especially true where the regulation involved is intended
towards a socially positive and uplifting goal, but compliance is not assured.

In addition, whether to attach a penalty to a measure is a policy and not a

legal decision. The decision to impose a penalty speaks to the utility and
wisdom or desirability of the manner by which breach of the regulation is
deterred, and compliance, maximized.

There is, too, further nothing abusive about the scoring methodology in LEBMO
No. 7. It is common among law schools that examinations are graded based on
a minimum percentage of correct answers and not on a percentile score.
The Supreme Court's Bar examinations are scored on the basis of correct and
wrong answers, and passers are those who reach the minimum required
scores.

The ruling in Tablarin37 is relevant. This case law focused on the validity of the
National Medical Admissions Test (NMAT) as a valid and reasonable police
power measure as an admission standard into medical schools. Tablarin held
that NMAT is an educational regulatory tool related to one of the legitimate
objectives of police power - public order, specifically, securing of the health
and physical safety and wellbeing of the population. Tablarin also recognized
that though NMAT is at the most initial and lowest rung of the requisites to
attain this police power objective, NMAT is nonetheless an essential part of the
police power objective. Tablarin confirmed that NMAT serves as a gate-
keeping measure to weed out misfits in the sense of those whose aptitude and
inclinations are not for the field of medicine. The fact that NMAT was described
by the Court as a factor in becoming better doctors (or medical practitioners)
does not detract from the ruling in Tablarin that NMAT is first and foremost a
legitimate screening device for those wishing to be admitted to medical
schools.

Hence, NMAT serves the same function as that of PhiLSAT. Because PhiLSAT is

the NMAT equivalent in essential respects, the ruling in Tablarin justifying
NMAT as a legitimate police power exercise should also apply to the cases-at-
bar about PhiLSAT.

PhiLSAT serves an equivalent function as the LSAT. LSAT is a standardised test

designed to identify individuals who are likely to succeed in first year law
school. Unlike in PhiLSAT which is a State-sponsored measure, all law schools
in North America require applicants to take LSAT. LSAT is administered by a
non-profit corporation located in the United States.

LSAT, like PhiLSAT, is a screening device for entry into the great learning of
the law. The theory behind both LSAT and PhiLSAT is that law schools seek
students who have substantial promise for success in law school, and as a
result, a strong likelihood of succeeding in the practice of law as shown by
their preliminary aptitude for law.

To be sure, we cannot distance or segregate law school experience from the

practice of law because the former should ideally segue to the latter. Law
schools do not exist exclusively just to teach law students; law schools are
also there to transform their students into lawyers. It is unrealistic to say
otherwise.

If law schools were to simply exist to teach without regard to whether their

students become lawyers, law school education would lose both its clientele
and its relevance in the real world - this is the common sensical and obvious
context of the educative process. Despite the division of authority as between
legal education and practice of law and the obvious difference between them,
in reality, one bridges to the other as one cannot be dissociated from the
other.

The difference between LSAT and PhiLSAT is not conceptual but operational -
that is, how much weight is to be given by institutions of higher learning - the
law schools - to the scores obtained by an examinee. They also differ in the
scoring system - LSAT is percentile-based while PhiLSAT as now envisioned is
raw score-based.

Most law schools in common law countries have several streams about how an

applicant is to be admitted as a law student. The most common if not the only
stream is through high LSAT scores and grade point averages. So it is a
common goal for those asp1nng to enter law schools in those countries to take
LSAT and aim for high LSAT percentiles and GPAs.

Among these law schools, there may be other streams of admission those
who have achieved extensive relevant experiences abroad or in-country and
those who would bring interesting diversity to the law school student
population. But the number of these students vis-a-vis the entire population of
law students in a law school is miniscule. The students admitted through these
other streams constitute a very small minority of the entire population of law
students.

The majority are still required to show competence through LSAT

scores. The lower scores an applicant has, the lower the chance the applicant
can get to enroll in a law school - IF THEY HAVE ANY CHANCE AT ALL.

In any event, LSAT is not anchored on a State sponsored measure. Why the
countries under LSAT regimes do not require State supervision and regulation
could be attributed to their perception that their law societies (the equivalent
of our Integrated Bar) and law schools are mature enough to self regulate.

If we had no concerns about law schools which have no proportionate

standards to the nobility of legal education, then perhaps we can adopt as
liberal a policy as the countries utilizing LSAT and having different admission
streams. But obviously, our experiences are not the same as their experiences;
our situation is not similar to their situations.

In any case, PhiLSAT tries to mirror the admission practices where LSAT is the

screening device. If LSAT can be waived in exceptional circumstances, this
exceptional stream where LSAT is waived is akin, in the case of PhiLSAT, to
recall from above, to the exemption under No. 10 of LEBMO No. 7 for honor
graduates.

PhiLSAT as embodied in LEBMO No. 7 is not objectionable for being

unreasonable. Having been imposed by a law that carries the presumption of
validity and reasonableness that has not been disproven by contrary evidence
from petitioners' end, PhiLSAT cannot be ignored or set aside as this has been
imposed by the State through an administrative regulation-LEBMO No. 7 -
which finds its basis in RA 7662.

I agree with the Decision that the reasonable supervision and regulation

clause is not a stand-alone provision but must be read in conjunction with the
other constitutional provisions which include, in particular, the clause on
academic freedom. I agree as well that institutions of higher learning has a
wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students.

Yet, this sphere of autonomy is not absolute or limitless. Autonomy cannot

result in arbitrary or discriminatory admission policies. If autonomy were to
have such a result, restrictive police power can curb such actuality or
tendency. Autonomy too cannot disregard the constitutional power of the
State to exercise reasonable regulation and supervision of all educational
institutions. Thus, I agree with the Decision that affirmative police power can
be legitimately exercised in the regulation and supervision of institutions of
higher learning. The Decision aptly ruled that institutions of higher learning
enjoy ample discretion to decide for itself who to admit, being part of their
academic freedom, but the State, in the exercise of its reasonable supervision
and regulation over education, can impose minimum regulations. This is what
RA 7662 and LEBMO No. 7 have done.

The issue is not whether the State can intervene in the admission

requirements of law schools or any other institution of higher learning - the
rule of law has already said the State can. The issue is whether the degree and
breadth of the intervention that the State can legally do is reasonable
supervision and regulation.

In this light, I do not agree that the PhiLSAT cut off score is a direct intrusion
into the law school's essential freedom to choose who may be admitted to
study. I maintain that PhiLSAT plays a viable and vital role in determining an
entry law student's aptitude for law. The ability to read a large volume of
materials in English and write in English are important indicators of the ability
to complete a law degree. Again, while the PhiLSAT is not an exact predictor of
success in law school, it is a factor that must be taken into account.
For the reasons I have stated, I disagree with the Decision that in mandating
that only students who scored at least 55% correct answers shall be admitted
to any law school, PhiLSAT usurps the right and duty of the law school to
determine for itself the criteria for the admission of students and thereafter,
to apply such criteria on a case to case basis. There is a way to read reason
into LEBMO Order No. 7 that is neither strained nor unwarranted. I have
shown this in the foregoing disquisition.

Another. I disagree with the Decision that the law schools are left with
absolutely no discretion to choose its students in accordance with its own
policies, but are dictated to surrender such discretion in favor of a State--
determined pool of applicants. This is a hyperbole that finds no basis in fact
and law. It is highly speculative that the complexion of the student body and
the number of students a law school admits will be different just because
PhiLSAT was put in place. There is no evidence of that in the records. In any
case, the State is also a stakeholder in our educational institutions. The State
cannot lightly be disregarded when it comes to reasonable minimal regulation
and supervision.

I therefore do not concur with the ruling that the requirement of passing the
PhiLSAT insofar as admission to law school is concerned should be struck
down not only for being unreasonable but also for encroaching upon the law
school's exercise of discretion as to who to admit in its law program.

In practical terms, PhiLSAT is the default means by which one could become a
law student. Hence, one desirous of becoming a law student would want to
take and pass PhiLSAT. If he or she fails the first time, he or she can. try again
and again and again. Then perhaps if one still fails PhiLSAT, legal education is
not for his or her aptitude. It is not of course the end of the world. It is the
door that opens to other fitting opportunities for self-improvement if not self-
aggrandizement.

Accordingly, I vote to affirm the constitutionality in full of Subsection 7(e) and

LEBMO Order No. 7, series of 2016.
Are Subsections 7(g) and (h) of RA 7662 ultra vires for encroaching into the
constitutional powers of the Supreme Court.
These provisions read:
(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar
which a law student shall undergo with any duly accredited private or public
law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law course for a
specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve
(12) months. For this purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary
guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such internship
which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.

(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the
Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary.
We can opt to read these provisions niggardly or reasonably, the first resulting
in an obvious conflict with the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the practice
or procedure before our courts and other decision-making bodies and over
members of the Bar, while the second seeks a middle way that does not strain
the wording of these provisions.38I opt to read these provisions with respect
and deference to the legislative intent not to violate the constitutional powers
of the Supreme Court. This is consistent with enshrined principles of statutory
construction.

A rule of statutory construction long cherished by the Court is that law should

not be construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law,
and that a statute should be construed whenever possible in a manner that
will avoid conflict with the Constitution.39

Each part or section of a rule should be construed in connection with every

other part or section as to produce a harmonious whole. 40

More, the "meaning of a word or a phrase used in a statute is qualified by the

purpose which induced the legislature to enact the statute. In construing a
word or phrase, the court should adopt that interpretation that accords best
with the manifest purpose of the statute or promotes or realizes its object."41

A "statute must always be construed as a whole, and the particular meaning

to be attached to any word or phrase is usually to be ascertained from the
context, the nature of the subject treated and the purpose or intention of the
body which enacted or framed the statute."42 In other words, the rule's
purpose or context must be the controlling guide in interpreting every
provision thereof.43

Accordingly, I read Subsections 7(g) and (h) with the caveat that the Legal
Education Board's exercise of power over these matters is neither final, direct,
primary nor exclusive for the simple reason that the subject-matters of
Subsections 7(g) and (h) are no longer about promoting the quality of legal
education.

Law practice internship or articling as it is called elsewhere already involves

the practice of law. It calls for putting one's legal education to apply to real
life situations. Continuing legal education covers lawyers, not law students. It
is part and parcel of ensuring a lawyer's competence, not a law student's
aptitude for legal education. Clearly, the Legal Education Board cannot decide
on these matters primarily, directly, and much less, exclusively.

Subsections 7(g) and (h) so as not to render them unconstitutional or illegal,

must be read consistent with the objective of RA 7662: is to focus on
enhancing the quality of legal education, and these provisions cannot be given
effect beyond that objective.

Here, the Legal Education Board may establish a law practice internship or

adopt a continuing legal education program for lawyers, as any service
provider can, but these programs must be consistent with the rules already
promulgated and vetted by the Court.
In other words, the law practice internship would have to be vetted and
sanctioned by the Supreme Court - nothing of this sort moves without the
imprimatur of the Court. This requirement of Supreme Court regulation and
control is deemed written into Subsection 7(g). This arises from the rule
that statutes and regulations are inferior to the Constitution, and that statutes
and regulations are presumed to have been intended to be valid and thus must
be read in a way that upholds the Constitution.

Continuing legal education may also be provided by the Legal Education Board
as a service provider. It may innovate means to serve the Supreme Court's
mandatory continuing legal education program. But like the law practice
internship, the continuing legal education program the Legal Education Board
will have to be vetted and sanctioned by the Court. As in the case of
Subsection 7(g), the requirement of vetting and sanctioning by the Court
is deemed written into Subsection 7(h) of RA 7662.

As a result, I vote to affirm the constitutionality of Subsections 7 (g) and (h)

of RA 7662.

CONCLUSION

With due respect to the majority, the dispositive portion of the Decision is
quite ambivalent, and if I may so, engages in circular reasoning. It reads in
part:
The Court further declares:

As CONSTITUTIONAL:
Section 7(c) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the
power to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into
account, among others, the qualifications of the members of the faculty
without encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions. of higher
learning; and

Section 7(e) of R.A. No. 7662 insofar as it gives the Legal Education Board the
power to prescribe the minimum requirements for admission to legal
education and minimum qualifications of faculty members without
encroaching upon the academic freedom of institutions of higher learning.
Pray tell, what can the LEB do now without encroaching on the academic
freedom of law schools - if it is unconstitutional for LEB to require a qualifying
examination such as PhiLSAT, when LEB can only recommend but not impose?
Where does the exercise of regulation and supervision in this kind of ruling
come in? Truly, the Decision takes with its left hand what it gives with its
right. We are back to square one.

Endnotes:

1
 A to Z Quotes at
https://www.azquotes.com/quotes/topics/competencies.htm (last accessed
July 23, 2019), attributed to Michelle Bachmann.
2
 A to Z Quotes at
https://www.azquotes.com/quotes/topics/competencies.htm (last accessed
July 23, 2019), attributed to Peter Drucker.

3
 Quoted with permission, name of school, teacher, and student purposely
withheld.

4
Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v.
Secretary of Education, G.R No. 216930, October 9, 2018.

5
 Ibid.

6
 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-
260, 414-418.

7
Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines,
Supra note 4.

8
 Id. at 1251-1252.

9
 G.R. No. L-40779, November 28, 1975.

10
 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, citing IV RECORD 258-260.

11
 G.R. No. 78164, July 31, 1987.

12
 The Subsection read: "(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law
admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty
members . . . ."

13
 The Subsections read: "(g) to establish a law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo with any
duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group
anytime during the law course for a specific period that the Board may decide,
but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this purpose, the Board
shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the
specifications of such internship which shall include the actual work of a new
member of the Bar.(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For
this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory attendance of
practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may
deem necessary."

14
 Rules of Court, Rule 138, Secs. 2, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 19.

15
 The provision reads: "The Members of the Supreme Court and of other
courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions."
16
 In Re: Designation of Judge Manzano as Member of the Ilocos Norte
Provincial Committee on Justice, 248 Phil. 487 (1988).

17
 57 Phil. 600 (1932).

18
 Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co., Id.

19
 Noblejas v. Teehankee, 131 Phil. 931 (1968).

20
 Nos. 7 and 9, LEBMO No. 7.

21
 No. 2, LEBMO No. 7.

22
 No. 5, LEBMO No. 7.

23
 No. 3, LEBMO No. 7.

24
 No. 11, LEBMO No. 7.

25
 Manila Memorial Park Inc. v. Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development, G.R. No. 175356. December 3, 2013: Because all laws enjoy
the presumption of constitutionality, courts will uphold a law's validity if any
set of facts may be conceived to sustain it. On its face, we find that there are
at least two conceivable bases to sustain the subject regulation's
validity absent clear and convincing proof that it is unreasonable, oppressive
or confiscatory. Congress may have legitimately concluded that business
establishments have the capacity to absorb a decrease in profits or
income/gross sales due to the 20% discount without substantially affecting
the reasonable rate of return on their investments considering (1) not all
customers of a business establishment are senior citizens and (2) the level of
its profit margins on goods and services offered to the general public.
Concurrently, Congress may have, likewise, legitimately concluded that the
establishments, which will be required to extend the 20% discount, have the
capacity to revise their pricing strategy so that whatever reduction in profits
or income/gross sales that they may sustain because of sales to senior
citizens, can be recouped through higher mark-ups or from other products not
subject of discounts. As a result, the discounts resulting from sales to senior
citizens will not be confiscatory or unduly oppressive. (emphasis added).

26
 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 (1957).

27
 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-
260, 414-418.

28
 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-
260, 414-418.

29
 The list of names of passers for the April 2019 PhiLSAT exam has been
released. However, the passing rate has not been released by either the
official PhiLSAT website or any other media outlet, article, or post.

30
 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-
260, 414-418.

31
 No. 5, LEBMO No. 7.

32
 No. 3, LEBMO No. 7.

33
 No. 15, LEBMO No. 7.

34
 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-
260, 414-418.

35
 Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (2003) at 1228, 1256, citing IV RECORD 258-
260, 414-418.

36
 Emita-Malate Motel and Hotel Operators Association Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967: "Primarily what calls for a reversal of
such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of
validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of
validity . . . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be
lightly set aside . . . ." It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a
presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is unavoidable,
unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which is not the case here.
The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American
Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the
matter thus: 'The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within
the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground
that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence
deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact
may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual
foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.' No such factual foundation
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the
pleadings and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail
and the judgment against the ordinance set aside." (emphasis added)

37
 236 Phil. 768, (1987).

38
 Uy Ha v. City Mayor of Manila, 108 Phil. 400 (1960): "A law should not be
construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law."
Philippine long Distance Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674
(1952): ". . . a statute should be construed whenever possible in a manner
that will avoid conflict with the Constitution."

39
 Uy Ha v. City Mayor of Manila, 108 Phil. 400 (1960): "A law should not be
construed as to allow the doing of an act which is prohibited by law;"
Philippine long Distance Co. v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil. 674
(1952): ". . . a statute should be construed whenever possible in a manner
that will avoid conflict with the Constitution."

40
 Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1995) 196-197, citing
Tamayo v. Gsell, 35 Phil. 953 (1916).

41
 Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1995) 148, Supra note 40,
citing Luzon Stevedoring Co. v. Natividad, 43 Phil. 803 (1922), Molina v.
Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167 (1918).

42
 Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1995) 198, Supra note 40,
citing Sotto v. Sotto, 43 Phil. 688 (1922), Araneta v. Concepcion, 99 Phil. 709
(1956).

43
 Ruben E. Agpalo, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1995) 198, Supra note 40

[B.M. NO. 2112 - July 24, 2012]

IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE

PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

REYES, J.:

On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the Office
of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines.

The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he
became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on
September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking
his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to
resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition were several documents in support
of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof, to wit:
ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P.
Nolasco;

2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;

3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the IBP;

5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).

chanrobles virtual law library

In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a
similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to
resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was
admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to
Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian
citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine
Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and intended to
resume his practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar
and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means
termination of the petitioner s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage
in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to
be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume
the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends
to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice. 3 ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

It can not be overstressed that: ςrαlαω

The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected

with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court)
to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of

morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a
lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence
which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege.4 ςrνll

chanrobles virtual law library

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law,
the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true copies of
the following documents in relation to his petition: ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;

5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;

6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership dues;

7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

chanrobles virtual law library

In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following: ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);

3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau

of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his
good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;

6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;

7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and cralawlibrary

8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator,

UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with
the MCLE.
chanrobles virtual law library

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the
MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the
petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume
his practice of law.

Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees
no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED,
subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by
the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary
guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the
guidance of the Bench and Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

*
 On Leave per Special Order No. 1257 dated July 19, 2012.

**
 On Leave.

1
 Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural born citizens of the Philippines by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r† Ï…αl  lαω  lιbrαrà ¿

"I ______, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
chanrobles virtual law library

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath.

2
 Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay, Petitioner, B.M. No.
1678, December 17, 2007.

3
 R.A. No. 9225, Section 5.

4
 Supra note 2.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 138437 : November 14, 2008]

RAMON J. QUISUMBING, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIFTH DIVISION),

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHILIPPINE JOURNALIST, INC.,
 represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Via petition for certiorari, Ramon J. Quisumbing (petitioner) assails the Sandiganbayan

Resolutions of November 13, 19981 and March 16, 19992 in Civil Case No. 0172.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

By virtue of a Writ of Sequestration3 dated April 22, 1986 it issued, the Presidential

Commission on Good Government (PCGG) filed on July 13, 1987 a complaint before the
Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0035, 4 "Republic v. Benjamin 'Kokoy'
Romualdez," for recovery, conveyance and accounting of various properties and assets
of Benjamin Romualdez, deposed President Ferdinand Marcos, former First lady Imelda
Romualdez Marcos, and their alleged dummies and cohorts, on the ground that those
constitute ill-gotten wealth. Among the properties subject of the complaint are those of
the Philippine Journalist Inc. (PJI) including untitled parcels of land measuring around 7,
087 square meters situated in Mabini, Batangas (Mabini lots).

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 0035, the then PCGG-appointed members of the
PJI Board of Directors, namely Jaime Cura, Johnny Araneta, Angel Sepidoza and Renato
Paras, executed a Contract of Sale5 dated June 5, 1991 and a Deed of Absolute
Conveyance6 dated June 25, 1991 covering the Mabini lots in favor of petitioner, acting
as trustee of the Doy Development Corporation. The contracts, called management
contracts, were deemed confirmed by PJI Board Resolution No. 91-30 7 dated July 1,
1991.

The Sandiganbayan, acting on the "Urgent Motion to Enjoin PCGG - Appointed Board of
Directors from Effecting Sale of PJI Real Properties" filed by PJI stockholder Rosario
Olivares, nullified the management contracts, by Resolution8 of February 25, 1992, on
the ground that they were entered into by the abovementioned PJI members of the
Board without the Sandiganbayan's prior approval and consent of the PCGG.

Jaime Cura, then President of the PJI who was the signatory to the contracts, assailed
via certiorari the Sandiganbayan February 22, 1992 Resolution before this Court in G.R.
No. 106209. By Resolution9 of October 5, 1993, this Court sustained the
Sandiganbayan, it holding that PJI is a sequestered corporation and all its properties
and assets are considered as under custodia legis.

PCGG and PJI thereupon filed before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint 10 against
petitioner and the PCGG-appointed PJI members of the Board, docketed as Civil Case
No. 0172, for reconveyance of the Mabini lots, the subject of the present petition.

To the complaint, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action on the part of the PCGG and the Republic. Petitioner contended that the Mabini
lots were never sequestered nor placed in custodia legis, hence, the prior authorization
of the Sandiganbayan and the consent of PCGG were not necessary; that the
Sequestration Order dated April 22, 1996 covered only the shares of Benjamin
Romualdez, his relatives, agents and nominees, and not the assets and properties of
PJI which is a corporation having a separate and distinct personality from its
stockholders; and that the said Order was issued without proper authority, having been
signed by only one Commissioner, in violation of Sec. 3 of the PCGG Rules requiring at
least two Commissioners to sign any order.

Petitioner maintained that the Republic has no cause of action as it is not a real party in
interest, the Mabini lots being exclusively owned by PJI before they were sold and,
therefore, the Republic's interest, at most, would only be that of a stockholder of the
PJI.

In its Opposition,11 the Republic maintained that PJI's assets were in custodia legis and
their disposition required prior approval or confirmation from the Sandiganbayan and
the PCGG, following this Court's Resolution sustaining that of the Sandiganbayan that
PJI is a sequestered corporation.

Petitioner countered that the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan and this Court did not
bind him because he was not a party to the proceedings therein and that the
Resolutions merely assumed, but did not actually find, that the Mabini lots were
sequestered.

By Supplemental Motion to Dismiss12 dated September 2, 1998, petitioner reiterated

that the Sequestration Order is null and void in view of the lack of signature of a second
Commissioner, citing the then recent decision of this Court in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan.13

The Republic submitted, however, a certified true copy of a Writ of Sequestration dated
February 19, 1987 bearing the signatures of Commissioners Ramon A. Diaz and Raul
Daza, and a certified true copy of the Sequestration Order dated April 22, 1986 signed
by Commissioners Mary Concepcion Bautista and Ramon A. Diaz.

Petitioner assailed the authenticity of the certified copy of the Sequestration Order
which he claimed to be a mere fabrication. And he questioned the Writ of Sequestration
on the ground that it did not authorize the sequestration of the Mabini lots, but only the
shares of stocks held in the PJI by Benjamin Romualdez and his relatives or assignees.

By Resolution of November 4, 1998, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to

Dismiss for lack of merit. It held that assuming that there was "inconsistency" in the
reproduction of the Sequestration Order which could affect its authenticity, the same
had become immaterial owing to the "recently found Writ of Sequestration dated
February 19, 1987" bearing the signatures of two Commissioners, which writ
superseded the former to thus cure whatever defect it had.

On the issue of whether the Republic is a real party in interest, the Sandiganbayan held
that since PJI is a corporation under sequestration by the PCGG representing the
government or the Republic in its efforts to recover ill-gotten properties and assets
pertaining to former President Marcos et al., it is the Republic which is the party which
stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of the case.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, the present petition was
filed. This time, petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan solely for its finding that the
Republic is a real party in interest.

In its Comment,14 the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintains
that the assailed Resolutions denying the motion to dismiss are interlocutory, hence,
they cannot be the proper subject of a petition for certiorari .

On the merits, the Republic asserts that it is a real party in interest as it stands to be
benefited or injured by the outcome of the case.

In a Supplement15 dated October 22, 2002, petitioner alleges that this Court, in G.R.
No. 108552, "Asset Privatization Trust v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division) and Rosario
Olivarez,"16 had already overturned its ruling in G.R. 106209 that PJI is a sequestered
corporation. To petitioner, the Court's ruling in said case validates his position that PJI
is not a sequestered corporation.

Still in another Manifestation dated January 13, 2005. 17 petitioner invokes the ruling of
this Court in G.R. No. 138598, "Asset Privatization Trust v.
Sandiganbayan (5th Division ) and Rosario Olivarez,"18 directing the Asset Privatization
Trust (APT) to turn-over the management and control of PJI to its former stockholders
upon payment of their outstanding obligations to PJI. And he pleads that this Court take
judicial notice of an article19 in the December 22, 2004 issue of the Philippine Daily
Inquirer stating that PJI's former stockholders had already deposited a check
for P33,364,889.19 with the Sandiganbayan on December 21, 2004 and that the formal
turn-over of PJI by the APT to its former stockholders was implemented soon
thereafter. Hence, petitioner avers that the Republic, through the APT, has lost all
rights or interests it claims to have over the PJI.

Petitioner concludes that these recent developments confirm that the government's
ownership and control over PJI was on account of PJI's former stockholders' assignment
of the controlling shares of stock to APT as security for PJI's loan obligations to APT.

The Court notes that, indeed, the assailed Resolutions denying petitioner's motion to
dismiss are interlocutory, hence, not the proper subject of a petition for certiorari .

An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates

nor finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the
case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of
a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action
for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment. Neither can the denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject
of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In order to justify
the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss
must have been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.20 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary

In order, however, to put the issue to rest given the length of time that the case has
been pending, the Court resolves to set aside technicalities.
The petition is without merit.

Sec. 2 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Parties in interest. -  A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.

"Interest" within the meaning of the immediately-quoted Rule means material interest
or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest
in the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Otherwise stated, the Rule refers
to a real or present substantial interest as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. As a general rule, one who
has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court as a party-
plaintiff in an action;21 if he does, the suit is dismissible on the ground of lack of cause
of action.22

Prescinding from these precepts, the Court holds that, contrary to petitioner's
assertion, the Republic is a real party in interest in Civil Case No. 0172. A cursory
perusal of Executive Order (EO) No. 2, "Regarding [sic] the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and
Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos,
Mrs. Imelda Romualdez marcos, their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business
Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees," issued on March 12, 1986 by then
President Aquino, shows that it is for and in behalf of the Republic and the Filipino
people that the recovery of the so-called ill-gotten wealth is being undertaken. Thus,
the pertinent portion of the EO reads:

xxx

WHEREAS, the Government of the Philippines is in possession of evidence showing that

there are assets and properties purportedly pertaining to former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives,
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or
were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or
illegal use of funds or property owned by the Government of the Philippines  or any
of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by
taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or
relationships, resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damages and
prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines;

x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) cralawlibrary

Evidently, the purpose of going after the assets and properties of the deposed President
et al. is to protect the interests of the Filipino people and the Government, on the
premise that those assets and properties were illegally acquired with the use of public
funds or government resources or by taking advantage of their power. Hence, in filing
the action for reconveyance, the Republic, through the PCGG, is protecting its interests
in the Mabini lots owned by PJI which, as earlier determined by this Court, is a
sequestered corporation. As this Court cautioned in Meralco v. Sandiganbayan,23 the
deterioration and disappearance of sequestered assets "cannot be allowed to happen,
unless there is a final adjudication and disposition of the issue of whether they are ill-
gotten or not, since they may result in damage or prejudice to the Republic."

Petitioner's reliance on the ruling in G.R. No. 108552 is misplaced. Contrary to

petitioner's assertion, said case did not overturn the ruling in G.R. 106209. What was
involved in G.R. No. 108552 was, inter alia, the assignment of the shares of
PJI's former stockholders to the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) in
settlement of a loan PJI contracted before its sequestration, hence, the
pronouncement therein that only a minority of stockholders' shares were
sequestered. To recall, Civil Case No. 0172 - subject of the present case is for
reconveyance and recovery of possession only of the Mabini lots.

Petitioner's reliance on the ruling in G.R. No. 138598 is likewise misplaced. That case
involved the computation of the former PJI stockholders' outstanding obligations to the
APT to which DBP assigned the same. Petitioner's plea for the Court to take judicial
notice of the news article on the supposed turn-over of PJI to its stockholders thus fails.

Finally, petitioner's arguments that the Republic's failure to pray for the reconveyance
to it of the Mabini lots reflects its not being a real party in interest, and that since PJI is
already represented by the PCGG, it is superfluous for the Republic to be a co-plaintiff
fail. At most, like its misplaced reliance on rulings of this Court in G.R. NOS.
108552 and 138598, these are feeble attempts to invoke technicalities to further
delay the proceedings in the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Endnotes:

*
 Acting Chairperson in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing who took no part.

**
 Additional member per Raffle dated January 30, 2008 and pursuant to Administrative
Circular No. 84-2007, in lieu of Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing. who took no part.

1
 Annex "A" of the Petition, rollo, pp. 16-27; penned by then Associate Justice and
Chairman of the Fifth Division, Hon. Minita V. Chico-Nazario (now an Associate Justice
of this Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr., and
Godofredo L. Legaspi.

2
 Annex "B" of the Petition, rollo, pp. 28-31; penned by then Associate Justice Hon.
Minita V. Chico-Nazario and concurred in by Associate Justices Anacleto D. Badoy, Jr.,
and Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada.
3
 Rollo, p. 41.

4
 Id. at 42-80.

5
 Id. at 137.

6
 Id. at 140.

7
 Vide Minutes of the Regular Meeting of the Board of Directors of Philippine Journalists,
Inc., dated July 1, 1991, id. at 143-150.

8
 Id. at 151-160; penned by Associate Justice Romeo Escareal, Chairman of the Second
Division and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose S. Balajadia and Nathanael M.
Grospe.

9
 Id. at 161-173.

10
 Id. at 32-40.

11
 Annex "E" of the Petition, id. at 192-197.

12
 Id. at 188-191.

13
 355 Phil. 181 (1998).

14
 Rollo, p. 245.

15
 Id. at 278-288.

16
 G.R. No. 108552, October 2, 2000, 341 SCRA 551.

17
 Rollo, pp. 346-353.

18
 G.R. No. 138598, June 29, 2001, 360 SCRA 437.

19
 Annex "B" of Supplement, rollo, p. 360.

20
 Lu Ym v. Nabua, G.R. No. 161309, February 23, 2005, 452 SCRA 298, 305-306,
citing Bernardo v. CA, 388 Phil 793.

21
 Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 152574, November 17, 2004, 442
SCRA 507.

22
 Pascual v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115925, August 15, 2003, 409 SCRA 105.

23
 232 SCRA 644 (1994).
Application of Adriano M. Hernandez to take the 1993 Bar Examination 225 SCRA (July
27, 1993)

It's easy to love justice but law, not so much. I am an average person with a big heart for justice. Journey
with me as I walk through the long and narrow road of law school and through the Bar. An advocate for
justice and service does not always begin when we get the title, the character of a lawyer started when
we begin dreaming. Let's help each other!

Case Digest: US v. De Guzman Case No. 297 G.R. No. L-9144 (March
27, 1915) Chapter III, Page 94, Footnote No.95
October 20, 2017mylawsomeLeave a comment

FACTS:

Defendant De Guzman, along with Pedro and Serapio Macarling, was convicted of asesinato
(murder) and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, on the day and at place mentioned in the
information, De Guzman who was walking through a field with Pedro and Serapio Macarling
and Rufino Garin, deceased, struck the latter on the head, knocked him down and held him on
the ground while Pedro Macarling stabbed him to death. Information was duly filed charging De
Guzman, jointly with the two Macarlings, with the murder of Guzman entered into an agreement
with the fiscal under the terms of which he promised to appear and testify as a witness for the
Government at the trial of his coaccused, and to tell the truth as to all that occurred, provided the
information was dismissed as to him and he himself was not brought to trial. With the consent of
the court, and in pursuance of this agreement, he was not arraigned nor brought to trial, and the
information was dismissed as to him. One of his coaccused pleaded guilty and the other not
guilty, and thereafter the case came on for trial. after several witnesses had been called, De
Guzman was placed on the witness stand, and denied all knowledge of the murder. He denied
that he had ever said anything implicating his coaccused, and swore that a statement made by
him before a justice of the peace was false, and that it had been made through fear of certain
police officer.

The Solicitor General relying on provisions of General orders recommends the discharge of the
appellant.

Section 34, 35, and 36 of General orders No. 58, upon which counsel for defense and the
SolicitorGeneral rely, are as follows:

SEC. 34. When two or more persons shall be included in the same charge, the court, at any time
before the defendants have entered upon their defense or upon the application of the counsel of
the Government, may direct any defendant to be discharged, that he may be a witness for the
United States.

SEC. 35. When two or more persons shall be included in the same charge, and the court shall be
of opinion in respect to a particular defendant that there is not sufficient evidence to put him on
his defense, it must order him to be discharged before the evidence is closed, that he may be a
witness for his codefendant.

SEC. 36. The order indicated in sections thirtyfour and thirtyfive shall amount to an acquittal of
the defendant discharged, and shall be a bar to future prosecution for the same offense.

The question raised on this appeal being his right to exemption from prosecution for the crime
thus committed, on the ground that a former information, charging the same offense, had been
dismissed as to him in order that he might testify as a witness for the prosecution.

ISSUE: Should the defendant be discharged from prosecution even if he did not faithfully
comply as to the sworn agreement made prior the trial which entitled him immunity as witness
for the States

HELD:

No, the defendant should not be discharged.

General rule of statutory construction that courts may take judicial notice of the original and
history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of the facts
which affect their derivation, validity and operation. Looking at the legislative history of the
statute under the old system of criminal procedure with a system borrowed on large part from
English and American precedents, it can be gleaned that faithful performance is necessary to
avail of the bar to criminal prosecution. Failure of the Defendant in the case at bar to faithfully
and honestly carry out his undertaking to appear as witness and to tell the truth at the trial of his
co-accused deprived him of the right to plead his formal dismissal as a bar to his prosecution.

Posted in Case Digests

Case Digest: In Re: Application of Adriano Hernandez to take the 1993

Bar Examination 225 SCRA, July 27, 1993
October 20, 2017mylawsomeLeave a comment
Facts: Adriano Hernandez, a Filipino citizen, a degree holder of Juris Doctor from Columbia
Law School in New York and a bar passer in NY in year 1990 took bar subjects in Ateneo Law
School and 5-month bar review course there. He sought the Supreme Court and prayed to allow
him to take the bar exam in the Philippines

Issue; Whether or not Hernandez should be allowed to take the bar examination even if he is
umable to present requirements under Sec. 5 and 6 of Rule 138

Held: The Supreme Court ruled to allow the applicant to take the 1993 Bar Examinations with
high regard of Filipinos with same case in which the court allowed to take the bar examination.
Non-graduates of Philippine law schools have also been allowed to take the bar examination.
However, the court held in this resolution that in the following year, all applicants for the bar
must comply with the requirements stipulated in Sec. 5 and 6 of Rule 138 including the
completion to studying law in any of the Philippine law schools.

B.M. Nos. 979 and 986           December 10, 2002

RE: 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS,

MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar Examinations. Like many others he was
directed "to submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty
(60) days from the last day of the examinations."

Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations. But in a Resolution dated 13 April 2000 the Court
disqualified him from becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and declared his examinations null
and void on two (2) grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of completion of
the pre-bar review course under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar Examinations;
and (b) He committed a serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a member of
the Philippine Bar when he made it appear in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations that he
took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School (PLS) when, as certified by Acting
Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not offered such course since 1967.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the 13 April 2000 Resolution but his motion was denied.

On 29 October 2001, retired Regional Trial Court Judge Amante P. Purisima, father of petitioner,
filed a Petition to Reopen Bar Matter 986. However, the Court in its Resolution of 27 November 2001
"noted without action" the said petition and further resolved "that no further pleadings will be
entertained."

On 2 July 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Due Process stating, among others, his reasons why in
his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations it was stated that he was enrolled in and regularly
attending the pre-bar review course at the PLS and not at the University of Santo Tomas (UST)
where he in fact took the said course as evidenced by the Certification dated 22 July 1999 of Dean
Amado L. Damayuga of the UST Faculty of Civil Law.

Petitioner claimed that the statement in paragraph 8 of his Petition that "he x x x enrolled in and
passed the regular fourth year (law) review classes at the Phil. Law School x x x x" was a "self-
evident clerical error and a mere result of an oversight which is not tantamount to a deliberate and
willful declaration of a falsehood."

Petitioner explained that upon obtaining a "ready-made form" of the Petition and affixing his
signature on the space provided therefor, he requested his schoolmate/friend Ms. Lilian A. Felipe to
fill up the form, have it notarized and then to file it for him with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC).
Being "consumed with his preparations for the upcoming bar examinations," petitioner admitted that
he did not have the opportunity to check the veracity of the information supplied by Ms. Felipe. Had
he done this he could have readily seen that Ms. Felipe had erroneously typed "Philippine Law
School," instead of UST, on the space provided for the school where petitioner attended his pre-bar
review course.

Petitioner further averred that on 26 July 1999, a week after the filing of the Petition to take the bar,
he (thru Ms. Felipe) submitted the Certification of Completion of the Pre-Bar Review as Annex "D" of
his Petition to prove that he actually enrolled and attended the pre-bar review course in UST.

To corroborate his enrollment in UST, petitioner submitted (a) the Official Receipt of his payment of
tuition fee for the course; (b) his identification card for the course; (c) car pass to the UST campus;
(d) individual affidavits of classmates in the pre-bar review course in UST that petitioner was their
classmate and that he attended the review course; (e) separate affidavits of five (5) UST
students/acquaintances of petitioner that they saw him regularly attending the review lectures; (f)
affidavit of Professor Abelardo T. Domondon attesting to the attendance of petitioner in his review
classes and lectures in Taxation and Bar Review Methods at the UST Faculty of Civil Law; (g)
affidavit of Ms. Gloria L. Fernandez, maintenance staff at the UST Law Department that she knew
petitioner very well as he was among those who would arrive early and request her to open the
reading area and turn on the airconditioning before classes started; and, (h) affidavit of Ms. Melicia
Jane Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty Civil Law, that Dean Dimayuga issued the Certification
dated 22 July 1999 to the effect that petitioner was officially enrolled in and had completed the pre-
bar review course in UST which started on 14 April 1999 and ended 24 September 1999.

Petitioner also explained that he did not submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar
review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations because he thought that it
was already unnecessary in view of the Certification of Completion (Annex "D" of his Petition) issued
by Dean Dimayuga which not only attested to his enrollment in UST but also his completion of the
pre-bar review course.

In a letter dated 17 September 2002, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., thru Senior
Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, who took over as Chairman of the 1995 Committee on Bar
Examinations, retired Judge Purisima expressed his concern for his son and stated that his son took
the pre-bar review course in UST and that he entry in his son’s Petition that he took it in PLS is a
"self-evident clerical error." He then poised the question that if there was really a falsehood and
forgery in paragraph 8 and Annex "D" of the Petition, which would have been a fatal defect, why then
was his son issued permit to take the 1999 Bar examinations?

Pursuant to the Court Resolution of 1 October 2002, the OBC conducted a summary hearing on 30
October 2002 during which the Bar Confidant asked clarificatory questions from petitioner who
appeared together with his father, retired Judge Purisima, and Ms. Lilian Felipe.

On 7 November 2002 the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation the pertinent portions of
which are quoted hereunder:

"Considering petitioner’s explanation fortified by unquestionably genuine documents in support

thereof, we respectfully submit that petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt.

The Resolution of the Court dated April 2, 2002, in Bar Matter 890, may be cited. In the said case,
Victor Rey T. Gingoyon was given the benefit of the doubt and allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath.

In said case, Mr. Gingoyon stated in his Petition to take the 1998 Bar that the charge of Grave
Threats (Criminal Case No. 9693) against him was still pending before the Municipal Trial Courts in
Cities, Mandaue City, Branch 3, when in fact, in the decision of MTC dated April 8, 1998, he was
already convicted. But the Court believed his explanation that he had no actual knowledge of his
conviction.

In allowing Mr. Gingoyon to take the Lawyer’s Oath, the Court stated, thus:

‘It had been two (2) years past since he first filed the petition to take the lawyer’s oath. Hopefully, this
period of time of being deprived the privilege had been long enough for him to do some
introspection.’

In his letter, petitioner’s father also pleaded that the three (3) years denial of his son’s request for
oath-taking should be enough penalty, if there may be any wrong that his son may have unwittingly
committed.

It is submitted that the same kindness and compassion extended to Mr. Gingoyon in Bar Matter 890
be given to petitioner. Three years deprivation of the privilege to practice law may be considered an
ample penalty, not to mention that petitioner has not been convicted of any crime.

As regards petitioner’s failure to submit within sixty days the required certification of completion of
the pre-bar review course, his explanation that there was no need for him to submit another
certification because the July 22, 1999 Certification of Dean Dimayuga certified not only his
enrollment but also his completion of the course, is impressed with truth.

Let it be also noted that, in the Resolution dated April 13, 2000, in this Bar Matter 986, the Court
declared DISQUALIFIED from the 1999 Bar examinations not only Purisima but also Josenio
Marquez Reoma, Ma. Salvacion Sucgang Revilla and Victor Estell Tesorero for their failure to submit
within sixty days from the last day of the examinations the certification of completion of the pre-bar
review course. However, the Court, in its Resolution dated June 20, 2000, acting on the separate
motions for reconsideration of the Court Resolution dated April 13, 2000 filed by Reoma and Revilla,
both were allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath.
In the case of Reoma, his explanation that his failure to submit the required certification was due to
his honest belief and assumption that the UP College of Law, where he took his review course, had
filed the required certification together with other required documents, was accepted.

In the case of Revilla, her claim that her failure to submit the required certification within the 60-day
period was due to her erroneous impression that only the certification of enrollment and attendance
was arequired, was likewise accepted.

The Court also allowed Mr. Tesorero to take his oath, as he stated that his f ailure to submit within
the 60-day period was due to his honest and mistaken belief that he had substantially complied with
the requirements for admission to the Bar Examinations because he thought that the required
certificate of compleltition of the pre-bar review course is the same as the certificate of enrollment
and attendance in the said course.

The OBS respectfully submits that pertitioner’s explanation should also be given credit just like his
three co-examinees.

Let it be finally cited that in Bar Matter No. 832, in the Matter of Admission to the Bar of Blas Antonio
M. Tuliao, the Court also favorably considered the report of the Committee on Legal Education which
recommended the admission to the Bar of Mr. Tuliao on grounds of fairness, equal treatment and
protection, considering that his co-accused in a criminal case have been allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath. This Court stated, in its Resolution dated November 27, 2001, that there was no reason to
accord a different treatment to Mr. Tuliao, and that the dispensation of justice should be even-
handed and consistent."

The recommendation is well taken.

The foremost question to be resolved is whether petitioner did enrol in and complete his pre-bar
review course in UST as he herein avows.

The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30 October 2002 hearing that the subject
Certification of Dean Dimayuga was duly submitted to the OBC a week after the filing of the Petition
to take the bar appears to be credible. It is supported by documentary evidence showing that
petitioner actually enrolled and completed the required course in UST.

Granting that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga was defective as it certified completion of the pre-
bar review course which was still on-going, this defect should not be attributed to petitioner
considering that he had no participation in the preparation thereof. Whatever it is, the fact remains
that there is such a certification issued by the UST which appears to be genuine. This finding is
backed by the affidavit of Ms. Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty of Civil Law, that she was the
one who released the Certification to petitioner on 26 July 1999.

Indeed, it must be stressed that there is nothing on record which impugns the authenticity of the
subject Certification as well as that of the other documentary evidence proferred by petitioner to
establish that he was duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review course in UST, not in PLS. As to the
argument that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga did not include the "taking and completion" of the
pre-bar review course, the realities of our bar reviews render it difficult to record the attendance
religiously of the reviewees every single day for several months.

Considering petitioner’s explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents, at the very least,
petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt and be allowed to take his oath.
The Court is well aware of instances in the past when ,as a measure of compassion and kindness, it
has acted favorably on similar petitions. In his letter petitioner’s father pleaded that "the denial of
permission for Mark to take his oath for about three (3) years now should be enough penalty." It is
time to move on.

At this juncture it may be well to note the Court’s growing concern over the apparent laxity of law
schools in the conduct of their pre-bar review classes. Specifically, it has been observed that the
attendance of reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some reviewees are able to comply with
the requisite with minimal attendance. Enrollment and completion of pre-bar review course is an
additional requirement under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for those who failed the bar
examinations for three (3) or more times.

For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally asking for the moon but it can be done.
We just have to bear in mind that this requirement is not an empty or idle ceremony; it is intended to
ensure the quality and preparedness of those applying for admission to the bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, as recommended by the Office of the Bar Confidant in its

Report and Recommendation dated 7 November 2002, the prayer in Bar Matters Nos. 979 and 986
is granted and examinee MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA who passed the 1999 Bar Examinations is
now allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and be admitted to the Philippine Bar. He is further allowed
to sign the Roll of Attorneys upon payment of the required fees.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., in the result.

B.M. No. 1222, April 24, 2009 ]

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, PETITIONER,

RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by petitioner Danilo de
Guzman.  He prays that this Honorable Court "in the exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioner's plea for
judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar."[1]

To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the dispositive portion of which
reads in part:

WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to —

(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION;

xxxx

The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar Examinations. 
Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners,
Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations.  The Court had adopted the
findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded the test
questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in the Philippine
Bar.  In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the relevant portions of
which we quote hereunder:

Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his father's childhood dream to become one.  This
task was not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay tribute to his
parents.

Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the duty of rendering service to his
fellowmen.  At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service when he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang
Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects benefiting the youth
in their barangay.

Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and eventually pursuing
Bachelor of Laws.  In his second year in law school, he was elected as the President of the Student Council of the
Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU).  Here, he spearheaded various activities including the conduct of
seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees.

Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still managed to excel in his
studies.  Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.

Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government service as a Legal Officer
assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate
residents of Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.

In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law Offices.  It was
during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and developed.  Despite having entered private
practice, he continued to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños.

Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner's flourishing career was cut short as he was stripped of
his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.

Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather unavoidable consequences
of his disbarment.

On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken as a consultant by the City
Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a member of the Secretariat of the People's Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service.

Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately, compromised the integrity of the
bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation
conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions.  Also, he has offered his sincerest apologies to Atty.
Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his
actions.

Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said humbling experience to make
him a better person.

Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials and endorsements of various
individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral character:
1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo G. De Guzman in
his Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to be Reinstated as a
Member of the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes" dated 4 June 2007 of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, City of Taguig;

2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast People's Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA)
kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong
Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang
Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Southeast People's Village Homeowners Association, Inc.
(SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig;

3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo
G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-
susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado"
dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan,
City of Taguig;

4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng
Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya
ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita
(PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;

5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman as to
Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine Bar"
dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices;

6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be Truly Deserving
of Judicial Clemency and Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest,
Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;

7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far Eastern
 University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU);

8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G.
De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong
sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 8
July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);

9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution Recognizing the Contributions of Danilo G.
De Guzman to the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) - Taguig City, Attesting to his Utmost
Dedication and Commitment to the Call of Civic and Social Duty and for Other Purposes" dated 11
July 2008 of the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB);

10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor of Danilo G. De
Guzman" dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor, College of Law, San Sebastian
College - Recoletos;

11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De
Guzman" dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of
Columbus and President, General Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National High School, Lower
Bicutan, Taguig City;

12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President, Taguig Lawyers
League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;

13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding Judge, Regional Trail
Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; and

14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former Justice, Court of
Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University (FEU).

Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the same kindness and compassion
in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future may not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had
the occasion to say:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands.
Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent,
was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was
sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days ofprision correccional. On
appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.

xxxx

When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully
and reluctantly.On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed
over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so
promising a career may not be utterly ruined.

Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and solemnly pledged to exert all efforts
to atone for his misdeeds.

There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.

In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer's Oath (Bar Matter 712), which may be applied in
the instant case, the Court said:

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for
civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.

xxxx

Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative Case No. 2984), the
Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated:

The Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time that has
elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law for five (5) years when he was
disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt that petitioner had a promising future ahead of him where it not for
the decision of the Court stripping off his license.

Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his disbarment, as attested to
overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as people of known probity in the community and society.

Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his intense desire to render public
service as evidenced by his active involvement and participation in several social and civic projects and activities.
Likewise, even during and after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a debilitating circumstance,
petitioner still managed to continue extending his assistance to others in whatever means possible. This only proves
petitioner's strength of character and positive moral fiber.
However, still, it is of no question that petitioner's act in copying the examination questions from Atty. Balgos'
computer without the latter's knowledge and consent, and which questions later turned out to be the bar examinations
questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we do believe that
petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly
compromising the integrity of the bar examinations as well as of this Court.

We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected on his transgressions.
Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now
be commuted to suspension. Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already been disbarred for more than
five (5) years, the same may be considered as proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be
allowed to resume practice of law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant Petition for Judicial
Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be GRANTED.
Petitioner's disbarment is now commuted to suspension, which suspension is considered as served in view of the
petitioner's five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to resume practice of law.

The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part.  We deem petitioner worthy of clemency
to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5)
years he has already served his disbarment.

Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.[2]  While the Court is ever mindful
of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has
already served its purpose.[3]

In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we
have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer[4] and the conduct of his public life during his years
outside of the bar.[5]  For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:

However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of
his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once
again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court. During
respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been persistent
in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show that
he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and unblemished record as an
elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions,
public officials and members of the judiciary.[6]

And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,[7] we noted:

Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia's disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that
Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has
endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes
cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to
him, and he has shown remorse.Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has
lasted long enough. x x x

Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of his transgressions. 
Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards public service, particularly with
the People's Law Enforcement Board.  The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other esteemed
members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario
Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul
Balagtas testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.

Petitioner's subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he were to reacquire
membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to the general good and more than
mitigate the stain on his record.  Compassion to the petitioner is warranted.  Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him
the following stern warning:

"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws.  He is their sworn servant; and
for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic."[8]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN
PART.  The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7)
YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Leonardo-De
Castro, Brion, Peralta, and Bersamin, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on official leave.
Tinga, J., No part. Family friend of a party.

[1]
 Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion (hereinafter, Petition), p. 26.

[2]
  Bernardo v. Mejia, A.C. No. 2984, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 639.

[3]
  Id.

[4]
 See Adez Realty, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100643, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 201.

[5]
 A.C. No. 1302, 1391, 1543, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 503.

[6]
 Id. at 515.

[7]
 Supra note 2 at 643.

[8]
  Barrios v. Martinez, A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 324, 341.

Leticia A. Arienda vs. Evelyn A. Monilla A.M. No. P11-2980 (June 10, 2013)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. P-11-2980               June 10, 2013

(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-3016-P)
LETICIA A. ARIENDA, Complainant,
vs.
EVELYN A. MONILLA, COURT STENOGRAPHER III, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 4,
LEGAZPI CITY, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint for conduct unbecoming a court employee and abuse of authority
filed by complainant Leticia A. Arienda against respondent Evelyn A. Monilla, Court Stenographer Ill
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4 of Legazpi City.

In her letter-complaint1 dated October 8, 2008, complainant alleged that respondent and Atty. Zaldy
Monilla (Atty. Monilla), respondent's husband (together referred to as the spouses Monilla), went to
complainant’s house on January 13, 2002 and offered their services in settling the estate of
complainant’s deceased mother. According to the spouses Monilla, they would prepare an
extrajudicial settlement for complainant and the latter’s siblings, while respondent’s brother,
Engineer Matias A. Arquero (Engr. Arquero), would conduct the survey of the estate. Everytime the
spouses Monilla went to complainant’s house, they would ask for partial payment. Six Temporary
Receipts show that complainant had paid the spouses Monilla a total of ₱49,800.00. Complainant
repeatedly requested from the spouses Monilla the approved survey plan prepared by Engr.
Arquero, but the spouses Monilla demanded that complainant first pay the ₱20,000.00 she still owed
them before they give her the approved survey plan and extrajudicial settlement of estate.
Complainant subsequently learned that the spouses Monilla had no authority to settle her deceased
mother’s estate as Atty. Monilla was currently employed at the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) and respondent was not even a lawyer but an ordinary court employee.

In her comment2 dated May 23, 2009, respondent denied that it was she and her husband who
offered complainant their services in settling the estate of complainant’s deceased mother.
Respondent averred that it was complainant and her sister, Ester, who came to respondent’s house
sometime in December 2000 and requested respondent to convince her brother Engr. Arquero, a
geodetic engineer, to partition the four lots left by complainant’s parents situated in Bigaa, Legazpi
City. Respondent was initially hesitant to accede to complainant’s request because of complainant’s
reputation in their locality as a troublemaker. However, respondent’s husband, upon learning that
complainant was a relative, urged respondent to assist the complainant.

Respondent alleged that she was not privy to the agreement between Engr. Arquero and
complainant. Complainant scheduled the survey of one of the lots, Lot No. 5489, on January 13,
2001. After Engr. Arquero conducted the survey, complainant was nowhere to be found and
respondent had to shoulder the expenses for the same.

Respondent further narrated that without her knowledge, complainant and her siblings filed a case
for partition of estate before the RTC, Branch 7 of Legazpi City, on May 24, 2001. When their case
was dismissed by the RTC, complainant and her siblings argued at the Hall of Justice, thus,
disrupting court proceedings. Knowing that respondent was a court employee, complainant
approached and asked respondent to intervene. Respondent, during her lunch break, met with
complainant and the latter’s siblings at respondent’s residence located near the Hall of Justice.
Complainant and her siblings, already wishing to partition their deceased parents’ estate out of court,
pleaded that respondent prepare an extrajudicial settlement. Respondent declined to get involved at
first because complainant and her siblings were represented by a lawyer in the partition case before
the RTC, but complainant and her siblings said that they had no more money to pay for the
continued services of their lawyer. Respondent understood the predicament of complainant and her
siblings, so respondent agreed to help them. Respondent called her brother, Engr. Arquero, and
requested him to bring the sketch plan of Lot No. 5489 he had previously prepared. In the presence
of Engr. Arquero, complainant and her siblings chose their respective shares in the property.
Respondent prepared and finalized the extrajudicial settlement and handed the said document to
complainant and her siblings. After a year, complainant, her sister Ester, and a buyer of their shares
in Lot No. 5489, Marlyn Dominguez (Dominguez), again approached respondent. Complainant
asked that Engr. Arquero continue with the partition of Lot No. 5489 as Dominguez advanced the
money to pay for the expenses, including the preparation of the lot plan. Engr. Arquero, despite his
misgivings and persuaded by respondent, conducted the survey, but complainant did not show up
and respondent had to shoulder the expenses once more.

Respondent went on to recount that on January 20, 2003, complainant, Ester, and a sales agent
came to respondent’s house, asking respondent to again convince her brother Engr. Arquero to re-
survey Lot No. 5489 because the boundaries were no longer visible. According to complainant, the
new buyer, Galahad O. Rubio (Rubio), wanted to see the exact location and the boundaries of the
lot. Respondent refused and told complainant to directly negotiate with Engr. Arquero. When
complainant and her companions returned in the afternoon, complainant tendered ₱9,000.00 to
respondent’s husband, Atty. Monilla, as partial payment for the latter’s services. The following day,
complainant and her companions came back and complainant handed over another ₱9,000.00 as
partial payment for the services of respondent’s brother, Engr. Arquero.

Respondent admitted receiving from complainant payments amounting to ₱49,800.00, all made at
respondent’s residence in Rawis, not at complainant’s house in Bigaa. The ₱25,000.00 was for the
preparation by Atty. Monilla of the following documents: (a) four deeds of sale to different buyers; (b)
two copies of extrajudicial settlement; (c) two contracts to sell; (d) two authorities to sell; and (e) one
demand letter. The remaining ₱24,800.00 was for Engr. Arquero’s services in subdividing Lot No.
5489 into 13 lots.

Respondent asserted that she had already turned over to complainant on March 30, 2003 the
notarized extrajudicial settlement for Lot No. 5489, the blueprint of the subdivision plan for the said
lot, and the deed of sale between complainant and Rubio. The subdivision plan was not approved by
the Bureau of Lands because of complainant’s failure to submit other requirements. Because of
complainant’s broken promises, respondent and her husband, Atty. Monilla, no longer prepared the
other documents complainant was requesting for, and respondent’s brother, Engr. Arquero,
discontinued his services as a surveyor.

Lastly, respondent maintained that complainant knew that Atty. Monilla was a DAR employee.
Complainant and her siblings had often consulted Atty. Monilla regarding the properties left by their
parents, as well as their ongoing family feud. Complainant was likewise aware that respondent was
not a lawyer and was a mere court stenographer since complainant and respondent are neighbors
and they are related to one another. Respondent had already filed for early retirement effective April
23, 2007, and she claimed that her former co-employees at the RTC, Branch 4 of Legazpi City
conspired and confederated with one another to induce complainant to file the instant complaint
against her.

In a Resolution3 dated June 23, 2010, the Court referred the instant administrative matter to Vice
Executive Judge Pedro R. Soriao (Investigating Judge Soriao) of RTC, Branch 5 of Legazpi City, for
investigation, report, and recommendation.

In his report4 dated September 22, 2010, Investigating Judge Soriao made the following findings and
recommendations:
Substantial evidence appearing of record demonstrates that Evelyn A. Monilla committed a simple
misconduct unbecoming of court personnel while she was a court stenographer. The imposition
upon her of an administrative penalty of fine equivalent to two months of the salary that she was
receiving when she resigned to be deducted from her retirement benefits is hereby recommended.

Finally, it is submitted that Evelyn A. Monilla’s liability over the amount of 49,800 pesos that she
received from Leticia Arienda is a legal matter that can be properly ventilated in a separate
appropriate judicial proceeding.5

After evaluation of Investigating Judge Sariao’s report, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
submitted to the Court its Memorandum6 dated July 14, 2011, likewise recommending that
respondent be found guilty of simple misconduct but that the amount of fine imposed against her be
increased to four months salary, to be deducted from her retirement benefits.

In her Manifestation7 dated May 2, 2012, respondent informed the Court that Dominguez filed a case
against complainant for a sum of money and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 5287, before the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2 of Legazpi City. Dominguez wanted to recover the
partial payments she had made on Lot No. 5489, plus other damages, after complainant sold the
very same property to someone else. In a Decision dated July 7, 2006, the MTCC ruled in
Dominguez’s favor. Respondent wanted this Court to note that neither complainant nor Dominguez
mentioned in Civil Case No. 5287 the participation of respondent or her brother in the transaction
involving Lot No. 5489.

It bears to note that respondent admitted in her comment that she prepared and finalized the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of complainant’s deceased mother. The preparation of an
extrajudicial settlement of estate constitutes practice of law as defined in Cayetano v. Monsod, 8 to
wit:

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render
any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." x x x.

Not being a lawyer, respondent had no authority to prepare and finalize an extrajudicial settlement of
estate. Worse, respondent also admitted receiving money from complainant for her services. Being a
court employee, respondent ought to have known that it was improper for her to prepare and finalize
the extrajudicial settlement of estate, a service only a lawyer is authorized to perform, and to receive
money therefor.

It is true that respondent prepared and finalized the extrajudicial settlement of estate pursuant to a
private agreement between her and complainant. However, respondent is an employee of the court
whose conduct must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility as to let her be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. She is expected to
exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance of her official duties
but also in her personal and private dealings with other people to preserve the court’s good name
and standing.9

Respondent’s behavior and conduct, which led other people to believe that she had the authority
and capability to prepare and finalize an extrajudicial settlement of estate even when she is not a
lawyer, clearly fall short of the exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court
employees.
Respondent’s mention of Civil Case No. 5287 before the MTCC does not help her defense.  That 1âwphi1

case is irrelevant herein for it is between complainant and Dominguez.

Misconduct generally means wrongful, unlawful conduct, motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or

intentional purpose. Thus, any transgression or deviation from the established norm, whether it be
work-related or not, amounts to misconduct.10 In preparing and finalizing the extrajudicial settlement
of estate and receiving compensation for the same even when she is not a lawyer, respondent is
guilty of simple misconduct, punishable under Section 52(B)(2) of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service with suspension for one month and one day to six months.
Considering that this is respondent's first offense and that she had served the judiciary for almost 16
years, a suspension of four months would have been proper. Since respondent had already retired,
the Court instead imposes the penalty of a fine equivalent to her salary for four months, to be
deducted from her retirement benefits.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds respondent Evelyn Monilia, retired
Stenographer III of RTC, Branch 4 of Legazpi City, GUILTY of simple misconduct and imposes upon
said respondent a FINE equivalent to four months salary to be deducted from her retirement
benefits.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
Footnotes

1
 Rollo, pp. 3-4.

2
 Id. at 22-27.

3
 Id. at 88-89.

4
 Id. at 91-94.

5
 Id. at 94.

6
 Id. at 207-213.

7
 Id. at 217-218.

8
 278 Phil. 235, 243 (1991).

9
 Spouses Tiples, Jr. v. Montoyo, 523 Phil. 404, 407 (2006).

10
 Hernando v. Bengson, A.M. No. P-09-2686, March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA 7, II.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 5377               June 30, 2014

VICTOR C. LINGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY P. BALIGA, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

This court has the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law. When this court orders a
lawyer suspended from the practice of law, the lawyer must desist from performing all functions
requiring the application of legal knowledge within the period of suspension. This includes desisting
from holding a position in government requiring the authority to practice law.

For our resolution is respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension from the
practice of law.
1

In the resolution  dated June 15, 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P.
2

Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility  and of the
3

Lawyer's Oath.  Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize documents in their stead, in
4

violation of Sections 245  and 246  of the Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the
5 6

practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from
reappointment as notaries public for two years.

Complainant Victor C. Lingan filed his motion for reconsideration,  praying that respondents be
7

disbarred, not merely suspended from the practice of law. In the resolution  dated September 6,
8

2006, this court denied complainant Lingan's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

On March 22, 2007, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights
Regional Office for Region II, filed the undated ex parte clarificatory pleading with leave of court.9

In his ex parte clarificatory pleading, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006, complainant Lingan
wrote the Commission on Human Rights. Lingan requested the Commission to investigate Atty.
Baliga following the latter's suspension from the practice of law.

After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human
Rights En Banc issued the resolution  dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position as
10

Director/Attorney VI of the. Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for Region II. According to
the Commission on Human Rights En Banc, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law
"prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the
meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended." 11

Atty. Baliga · argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the
practice of law did not include his suspension from public office. He prayed for clarification of this
court's resolution dated June 15, 2006 "to prevent further injury and prejudice to [his] rights."
12

This court noted without action Atty. Baliga's ex parte clarificatory pleading as this court does not
render advisory opinions. 13

On May 8, 2009, this court received ·a letter from complainant Lingan. In his letter  dated May 4,
14

2009, Lingan alleged that Atty. Baliga continued practicing law and discharging his functions as
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director, in violation of this court's order of suspension.

Complainant Lingan allegedly received a copy of the Commission on Human Rights En Banc 's
resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director. On Atty. Baliga's motion, the ommission
reconsidered Atty. Baliga's suspension and instead admonished him for "[violating] the conditions of
his commission as a notary public."  According to complainant Lingan, he was not served a copy of
15

Atty. Baliga's motion for reconsideration. 16

Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A Commission on Human Rights Regional
Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court suspended
Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer . . . and [was]
disqualified to hold the position of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the order of
suspension]."  The Commission on Human Rights, according to complainant Lingan, should have
17

ordered Atty. Baliga to desist from performing his functions as Regional Director. Complainant
Lingan prayed that this court give "favorable attention and action on the matter." 18

This court endorsed complainant Lingan's letter to the Office of the Bar Confidant for report and
recommendation. 19

In its report and recommendation  dated June 29, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that
20

the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed. It recommended that
respondents be required to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension with certifications
from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Executive Judge of the court where they might
appear as counsel and state that they desisted from practicing law during the period of suspension.

On the claim that the Commission on Human Rights allowed Atty. Baliga to perform his functions as
Regional Director during the period of suspension, the Office of the Bar Confidant said that the
Commission "deliberate[ly] disregard[ed]"  this court's order of suspension. According to the Office
21

of the Bar Confidant, the Commission on Human Rights had no power to "[alter, modify, or set aside
any of this court's resolutions] which [have] become final and executory. " 22

Thus, with respect to Atty. Baliga, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that this court
require him to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he desisted
from performing his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of
law.23

The Office of the Bar Confidant further recommended that Atty. Baliga and the Commission .on
Human Rights be required to comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that Atty. Baliga
continued to perform his functions as Regional Director while he was suspended from the practice of
law.

On July 17, 2009, Atty. Baliga filed a manifestation,  arguing that his suspension from the practice of
24

law did not include his suspension from public office. Atty. Baliga said, "[t]o stretch the coverage of
[his suspension from the practice of law] to [his] public office would be tantamount to [violating] his
constitutional rights [sic] to due process and to the statutory principle in law that what is not included
is deemed excluded." 25

In the resolution  dated September 23, 2009, this court required respondents to file their respective
26

motions to lift order of suspension considering the lapse of the period of suspension. This court
further ordered Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights to comment on complainant
Lingari's allegation that Atty. Baliga continued performing his functions as Regional Director while he
was suspended from the practice of law. The resolution dated September 23, 2009 provides:

Considering that the period of suspension from the practice of law and disqualification from being
commissioned as notary public imposed on respondents have [sic] already elapsed, this Court
resolves:

(1) to require both respondents, within ten (10) days from notice, to FILE their respective
motions to lift relative to their suspension and disqualification from being commissioned as
notary public and SUBMIT certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
Executive Judge of the Court where they may appear as counsel, stating that respondents
 have actually ceased and desisted from the practice of law during the entire period of their
suspension and disqualification, unless already complied with in the meantime;

(2) to require Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga to SUBMIT a certification from the Commission on
Human Rights [CHR] stating that he has been suspended from office and has stopped from
the performance of his functions for the period stated in the order of suspension and
disqualification, within ten (10) days from notice hereof;

(3) to require respondent Atty. Baliga and the CHR to COMMENT on the allegations of
complainant against them, both within ten (10) days from receipt of notice
hereof; ...  (Emphasis in the original)
27

In compliance with this court's order, Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions to
lift order of suspension.  Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on complainant Lingan's allegation that
28

he continued performing his functions as Regional Director during his suspension from the practice
of law.

In his comment  dated November 13, 2009, Atty. Baliga alleged that as Regional Director, he
29

"perform[ed], generally, managerial functions,"  which did not require the practice of law. These
30

managerial functions allegedly included ."[supervising] ... the day to day operations of the regional
office and its personnel";  "monitoring progress of investigations conducted by the [Commission on
31

Human Rights] Investigation Unit";  "monitoring the implementation of all other services and
32

assistance programs of the [Commission on Human Rights] by the different units at the regional
level";  and "[supervising] . . . the budgetary requirement preparation and disbursement of funds and
33

expenditure of the [Regional Office]."  The Commission allegedly has its own "legal services unit
34

which takes care of the legal services matters of the [Commission]." 35

Stating that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga
claimed thaf he "faithful[ly] [complied] with [this court's resolution suspending him from the practice
of law]." 36

The Commission on Human Rights filed its comment  dated November 27, 2009. It argued that "the
37

penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any penalty
that may be imposed upon him as a public official for the same acts."  According to the Commission,
38

Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law is a "bar matter"  while the imposition of penalty
39

upon a Commission on Human Rights official "is an entirely different thing, falling as it does within
the exclusive authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body." 40

Nevertheless, the Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the issue
and would "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives at on [the] matter. "  In reply  to
41 42

Atty. Baliga's comment, complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga again disobeyed this. court.
Atty. Baliga failed to submit a certification from the Commission on Human Rights stating that he
was suspended from office and desisted from performing his functions as Regional Director.

As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director
and only performed generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga
admitted to defying the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a
"lawyer-manager,"  which under the landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod  constituted practice of
43 44

law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the
officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing."  Moreover, as admitted by Atty. Baliga, he had
45

supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga
practiced law while he held his position as Regional Director.
With respect to Atty. Baliga's claim that he was in good faith in reassuming his position as Regional
Director, complainant Lingan countered that if Atty. Baliga were really in good faith, he should have
followed the initial resolution of the Commission on Human Rights suspending him from office. Atty.
Baliga did not even furnish this court a copy of his motion for reconsideration of the Commission on
Human Right's resolution suspending him from office. By "playing ignorant on what is 'practice of
law', twisting facts and philosophizing,"  complainant Lingan argued that Atty. Baliga "[no longer has
46

that] moral vitality imperative to the title of an attorney."  Compfainant Lingan prayed that Atty.
47

Baliga be disbarred.

On February 17, 2010, this court lifted the order of suspension of Atty. Calubaquib.  He was allowed
48

to resume his practice of law and perform notarial acts subject to compliance with the requirements
for issuance of a notarial commission.

On the other hand, this court referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report, and
recommendation Atty. Baliga's motion to lift one-year suspension and the respective comments of
Atty. Baliga and the Commission on Human Rights. 49

In its report and recommendation  dated October 18, 2010, the Office of the Bar Confidant stated
50

that Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to perform his functions, duties, and responsibilities
[as Regional Director] which [required acts constituting] practice .of law."  Considering that Atty.
51

Baliga claimed that he did not perform his functions as Regional Director which required the practice
of law, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the Commission on Human Rights be
required to comment on this claim. The Office of the Bar Confidant also recommended holding in
abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's motion to lift suspension "pending [the Commission on
Human Right's filing of comment]." 52

In the resolution  dated January 12, 2011, this court held in abeyance the resolution of Atty. Baliga's
53

motion to lift one-year suspension. The Commission on Human Rights was ordered to comment on
Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director.

In its comment  dated April 6, 2011, the Commission on Human Rights reiterated that the penalty
54

imposed on Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate from the penalty that might be imposed
on him as Regional Director. The Commission added that it is "of honest belief that the position of
[Regional Director] is managerial and does not [require the practice of law]."  It again manifested
55

that it will "abide by whatever ruling or decision [this court] arrives on [the] matter."
56

The issue for our resolution is whether Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be
granted.

We find that Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. We, therefore, suspend him further
from the practice of law for six months.

Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience."  It includes "[performing] acts which are
57

characteristics of the [legal] profession"  or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use
58

in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 59

Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice. of law. In
Cayetano v. Monsod,  this court cited the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission and
60

agreed that work rendered by lawyers in the Commission on Audit requiring "[the use of] legal
knowledge or legal talent"  is practice of law.
61
The Commission on Human Rights is an independent office created under the Constitution with
power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights[.]"  It is
62

divided into regional offices with each office having primary responsibility to investigate human rights
violations in its territorial jurisdiction.  Each regional office is headed by the Regional Director who is
63

given the position of Attorney VI.

Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights
Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance,  the Regional Director has the
64

following powers and functions:

a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights]

matters;" 65

b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices; 66

c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the

absence of the legal officer or investigator; 67

d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss "immediate

courses of action and protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an
alternative dispute resolution"; 68

e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations,

orders, or subpoenas within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office;  and
69

f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal
officer. 70

These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are
usually performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public  - officers who are necessarily
71

members of the bar.  Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the
72

Commission's legal officer.  Discussing immediate courses of action and protection remedies and
73

reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer require
the use of extensive legal knowledge.

The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in
good standing and authorized to practice law.  When the Regional Director loses this authority, such
74

as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a
necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must
desist from holding the position of Regional Director.

This court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law for one year on June 15, 2006, "effective
immediately."  From the time Atty. Baliga received the court's order of suspension on July 5,
75

2006,  he has been without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary qualification to his
76

position as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/ Attorney VI. As the Commission on
Human Rights correctly resolved in its resolution dated January 16, 2007:

WHEREAS, this suspension under ethical standards, in effect, prevents Atty. Baliga from assuming
his post, for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended. This is
without prejudice to the investigation to be conducted to the practice of law of Atty. Baliga, which in
the case of all Regional Human Rights Directors is not generally allowed by the Commission;

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Commission on Human Rights of the Philippines
resolved to put into effect and implement the legal implications of the SC decision by decreeing the
suspension of Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga in the discharge of his functions and responsibilities as
Director/Attorney VI of CHRP-Region II in Tuguegarao City for the period for which the Supreme
Court Resolution is in effect.  (Emphasis in the original)
77

In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on Human
Rights did not violate Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only suspended after:
investigation by the Commission on Human Rights Legal and Investigation Office.  Second, the
78

Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he filed his motion for
reconsideration.

Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It was
also immaterial.  He held the position of Commission on Human Rights Regional Director because of
1âwphi1

his authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty. Baliga was disqualified to hold that position.

All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director constituted
practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as Regional Director.

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, willful disobedience to any lawful order of a
superior court is a ground for disbarment or suspension from the practice of law:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason
of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

In Molina v. Atty. Magat,  this court suspended further Atty. Ceferino R. Magat from the practice of
79

law for six months for practicing his profession despite this court's previous order of suspension.

We impose the same penalty on Atty. Baliga for holding his position as Regional Director despite
lack.of authority to practice law. 1âwphi1

We note that the Commission on Human Rights En Banc issued the resolution dated April 13, 2007,
reconsidering its first resolution suspending Atty. Baliga as Regional Director/ Attorney VI. Instead,
the Commission admonished Atty. Baliga and sternly warned him that repeating the same offense
will cause his dismissal from the service. The resolution with CHR (III) No. A2007-045 dated April
13, 2007 reads:

In his Motion for Reconsideration dated March 15, 2007, respondent Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga prays
before the Honorable Commission to recall and annul his suspension as Regional Director/ Attorney
VI of the Commission on Human Rights - Regional Office No. II, per 16 January 2007 Commission
en Banc Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.
The grounds relied upon the motion are not sufficient to convince the Commission that Atty. Jimmy
P. Baliga is totally blameless and should not suffer the appropriate penalty for breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and his Lawyer's oath.

The Commission, in the exercise of its authority to discipline, is concerned with the transgression by
Atty. Baliga of his oath of office as government employee. As records have it, the Commission
granted Atty. Baliga authority to secure a commission as a notary public. With this, he is mandated
to act as a notary public in accordance with the rules and regulations, to include the conditions
expressly set forth by the Commission.

With the findings clearly enunciated in the Supreme Court resolution in SC Administrative Case No.
5277 dated 15 June 2006, the Commission cannot close its eyes to the act of Atty. Baliga that is
clearly repugnant to the conduct of an officer reposed with public trust.

This is enough just cause to have this piece of word, short of being enraged, and censure Atty.
Baliga for having contravened the conditions of his commission as a notary public. What was
granted to Atty. Baliga is merely a privilege, the exercise of which requires such high esteem to be in
equal footing with the constitutional mandate of the Commission. Clearly, Atty. Baliga should keep in
mind that the Commission exacts commensurate solicitude from whatever privilege the Commission
grants of every official and employee.

The Commission notes that by now Atty. Baliga is serving the one year suspension imposed on him
pursuant to the Supreme Court resolution. The Commission believes that the further suspension of
Atty. Baliga from the office may be too harsh in the meantime that the Supreme Court penalty is
being served. This Commission is prevailed upon that the admonition of Atty. Baliga as above
expressed is sufficient to complete the cycle of penalizing an erring public officer.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby modifies its ruling in Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013
and imposes the penalty of admonition with a stem warning that a repetition of the same will merit a
penalty of dismissal from the service.  (Emphasis in the original)
80

The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution dated April 13, 2007. This
resolution caused Atty. Baliga to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite
lack of authority to practice law.

We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the
practice of law.  The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy
81

this court's orders of suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human
Rights has the power to appoint its officers and employees,  it can only retain those with the
82

necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.

As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with
conditions."  To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards
83

of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of
[the] legal profession."
84

WHEREFORE, we further SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga from the practice of law for six ( 6)
months. Atty. Baliga shall serve a total of one (1) year and six (6) months of suspension from the
practice of law, effective upon service on Atty. Baliga of a copy of this resolution.
SERVE copies of this resolution to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar
Confidant, and the Commission on Human Rights.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.** JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES***
Associate Justice

Footnotes

* Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta was designated as Acting Chairperson of the Third
Division per Special Order No. 1707 dated June 17, 2o'1t1, vice Associate Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr., in view of the latter's official trip to Nairobi, Kenya on June 22 to 25, 2014 and
to South Africa on June 26 to 29, 2014.

** Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. was designated as Acting Member per Special
Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014, in view of the vacancy in the Third Division.

*** Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes was designated as Acting Member of the Third
Division per Special Order No. 1704 dated June 17, 2014, vice Associate Justice Presbitero
J. Velasco, Jr., in view of the latter's official trip to Nairobi, Kenya on June 22 to 25, 2014 and
to South Africa on June 26 to 29, 2014.

1
 Rollo, pp. 558-566. This motion is dated November 16, 2009.

2
 Id. at 240-;2.55.

3
 CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY' Canon 1, Rule 1.01 states:

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.

 "I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will
4

support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not
wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God."

 REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917, book 1, title IV, chap. 11, art. V, sec. 245
5

states:

SECTION 245. Notarial register. - Every notary public shall keep a register to be
known as the notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as
notary; and he shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any part thereof, to any
person applying for it and paying the legal fees therefor.

 REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917, book I, title IV, chap. 11, art. V, sec. 246
6

states:

SECTION 246. Matters to be entered therein - The notary public shall enter in such
register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the
instrument, the witnesses, if any, to the signature, the date of the execution, oath, or
acknowledgment of the instrument, the fees collected by hint for his services as
notary in connection therewith. and when the instrument is a contract, he shall keep
a co1Tect copy thereof as part of his records, and shall likewise enter in said records
a brief description of the substance thereof and shall give to each entry a
consecutive number, beginning with number one in each calendar year. The notary
shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him a
number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the
instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank
line shall be left between entries.

When a notary public shall protest any draft, bill of exchange, or promissory note, he
shall make a full and true record in his notarial register of all his proceedings in
relation thereto, and shall note therein whether the demand or the sum of money
therein mentioned was made, of whom, when, and where; whether he presented
such draft, bill, or note: whether notices were given, to whom, and in what manner;
where the same was made, and when, and to whom, and where directed: and of
every other fact touching the same.

At the end of each week the notary shall certify in his register the number of
instruments executed, sworn to, acknowledged, or protested before him; or if none
such, certificate shall show this fact.

7
 Rollo, pp. 256-293.

8
 Id. at 295 ..

9
 Id. at 296-343.

10
 Id. at 322-325, Resolution CHR (III) No. A2007-013.

11
 Id. at 323.
  Id. at 307.
12

 Id. at 346, Resolution dated July 16, 2007.

13

 Id at 397-413.
14

 Id. at 407, Resolution CHR (Ill) No. A2007-045 dated April 13, 2007.
15

 Id. at 398.
16

 Id.
17

 Id. at 400.
18

 Id. at 396, 1st Indorsement dated May 13, 2009.

19

 Id. at 415-420.
20

 Id. at 418.
21

 Id.
22

 Id. at 420.
23

 Id. at 422-471.
24

 Id. at 426.
25

 Id. at 473-474.
26

 Id. at 473.
27

 Id. at 478-482 and 558-566.

28

 Id. at 543-556.
29

 Id. at 544.
30

 Id. at 544-545.
31

 Id. at 545.
32

 Id.
33

 Id.
34

 Id.
35

 Id.
36
  Id. at 487-542.
37

 Id. at 490
38

 Id.
39

 Id.
40

 Id. at 491.
41

 Id. at 587-S92.
42

 Id. at 589.
43

 278 Phil. 235 (1991) [Per J. Paras, En Banc].

44

 Rollo, p. 589.
45

 Id. at 590.
46

 Id. at 591.
47

 Id. at 569-570.
48

 Id. at 570.
49

 Id. at 594-600.
50

 Id. at 600.
51

 Id.
52

 Id. at 602-603.
53

 ld.at612-617.
54

 ld.at615.
55

 Id.
56

 Cayetano v. Monsod, 278 Phil. 235, 243 (1991) [Per J. Paras, En Banc].
57

 Id.
58

 Id.
59

 278 Phil. 235 (1991) [Per J. Paras, En Banc].

60

 Id. at 244.
61
  CONST!., art. XIII, sec. 18 (1); Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, G.R. No. 96681,
62

December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 483, 494 [Per J. Narvasa, En Banc].

 GUIDEUNES AND PROCEDURES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND MONITORING OF

63

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES, AND THE PROVISION OF CHR

ASSISTANCE, rule 4, sec. 7.

 This set of guidelines was approved in April 2012. Available at

64

<http://www.chr.gov.ph/MAIN%20PAGES/about%20us/PDF/FINAL APPROVED
8.31.2012.pdt> (visited March 21, 2014).

 GUIDEUNES AND PROCEDURES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND MONITORING OF

65

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES, AND THE PROVISION OF

CHRASSISTANCE, rule 3, sec. l(n)

 GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND MONITORING OF

66

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES, AND THE PROVISION OF CHR

ASSISTANCE, rule 3, sec. 4.

 GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND MONITORING OF

67

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES, AND THE PROVISION OF CHR

ASSISTANCE, rule 4, sec. 6.

 GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND MONITORING OF

68

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES, AND THE PROVISION OF CHR

ASSISTANCE, rule 4, sec. 9.

 GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND MONITORING OF

69

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES, AND THE PROVISION OF

CHRASSISTANCE, rule 4, sec. 11.

 GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND MONITORING OF

70

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES, AND THE PROVISION OF CH R

ASSISTANCE, rule 4, sec. 17.

 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, book I, chap. I 0, sec. 41.

71

 CONSTI., Art. VIII, sec. 7; REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1917, book I, title IV,
72

chap. II, art. I, sec. 233.

 GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND MONITORING OF

73

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES, AND THE PROVISION OF CHR

ASSISTANCE, rule 4, sec. 6.

 RULES OF COURT, rule 138, sec. 1.

74

 Rollo, p. 254.
75

 Id. at 418.
76

 Id. at 323.
77
  Id. at 298.
78

 A.C. No. 1900, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA I [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
79

 Rollo, pp. 407408.

80

 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5 (5).

81

 CONST., art. XIII, sec. 18 (I 0).

82

 Foronda v. Atty. Guerrero, 516 Phil. I, 3 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
83

 Id.
84

Bar Matter No. 1153

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated
March 9, 2010
"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar
Examinations Through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). - The Court
Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to
wit:
SEC. 5.Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All applicants for admission
other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to
the examination, satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all the
prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law
school or university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper
authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be
admitted to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the
following course in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil
law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law,
political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal
ethics.
A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar
examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a)
completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent
degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and
(c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program
in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.
SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a
certificate issued by the proper government agency that, before commencing the study
of law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a
four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's
degree in arts or sciences.
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree or its
equivalent in a foreign law school must present proof of having completed a separate
bachelor's degree course.
The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed to
CIRCULARIZE this resolution among all law schools in the country."