Legal Ethics Compilation 1 PDF

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1
SECOND DIVISION
[Resolution. March 18, 1954.]
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of

Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN
ET AL., petitioners.
Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile

Inton for petitioners.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION; RELATION TO COURT AND PUBLIC.

— By its declared objective, Republic Act No. 972 is contrary to public interest
because it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate
preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this
Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of the
legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as
legal problems evolved by the times become more difficult.
2.ID.; ID.; A JUDICIAL FUNCTION. — In the judicial system from which
ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys-at-law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility.
Because of this attribute, its continuous and zealous possession and exercise
by the judicial power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles."
3.ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO REPEAL, ALTER OR SUPPLEMENT
RULES. — The Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal
equal responsibilities governing the admission to the practice of law. The
primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes, continue
to reside in this court. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules
promulgated by this court, but the authority and responsibility over the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and
their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS AND THAT OF SUPREME COURT
MAY BE HARMONIZED. — Being coordinate and independent branches the
power to promulgate and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law
and the concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and
should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving
careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries
without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being found in
that the legislature may and should examine if the existing rules on the
admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest requires of
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a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training and responsibility. The
legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment or supplemental rules, fill up
any deficiency that it may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent
responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice and the
supervision of the practice of the legal profession, should consider these
reforms as the minimum standards for the elevation of the profession, and
see to it that with these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the
exercise of its traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys-at-law is realized. They are powers which, exercise
within their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar that
would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the administration
of justice.
5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CLASS LEGISLATION. — Republic Act No. 972 is
a class legislation. There is no actual nor reasonable basis to classify
unsuccessful bar candidates by years nor to exclude those of other years.
6. ID.; TITLE OF LAW MUST EMBRACE ALL ITS PROVISIONS. - Article 2 of
Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what
the Constitution enjoins. Being inseparable from the provisions of article 1,
the entire law is void.
7.ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972, PART OF SECTION 1 DECLARED TO BE IN
FORCE. — There being no unanimity in the eight Justices who constitute the
majority of the court in this case, that part of article 1 Republic Act No. 972
which refers to the examinations of 1953 to 1955 shall continue in force.
DECISION
DIOKNO, J : p
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public

interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar
Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing admission to the
bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be deemed to
have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14, Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the
varying difficulties of the different bar examinations held since 1946 and the
varying degree of strictness with which the examination papers were graded,
this court passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained
an average of only 72 per cent was raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those

reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having been
discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R.A. No. 972), unsuccessful
candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage
of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others, reduced the passing general
average in bar examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946. The President
requested the views of this court on the bill. Complying with that request,
seven members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments
adverse thereto, and shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did
not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill No. 371, embodying
substantially the provisions of the vetoed bill. Although the members of this
court reiterated their unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed
the bill to become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law,
which incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972.
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING NINETEEN
HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1.Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule
numbered on hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar
candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any bar
examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to the
August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-one
per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations; seventy-
two per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar examinations;
seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-four bar
examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-five
bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade below fifty per
cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided,
however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of
a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next
whole number.
SEC. 2.Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per
cent in any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen
hundred and forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or
subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3.This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed
petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others motions
for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked
the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others
who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however,
invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the
court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or
not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found
no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must
be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied
equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or not. A complete
list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by this decision, as well as a
more detailed account of the history of Republic Act No. 972, are appended to
this decision as Annexes I and II. And to realize more readily the effects of the
law, the following statistical data are set forth:
(1)The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section 1
of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:
1946 (August)20612118
1946 (November)47722843
19477493400
194889940911
19491,218532164
19501,31689326
19512,0688791964
19522,7381,033426
19532,555986284
Total12,2305,4211,168.
Of the aforesaid 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent
examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to the bar
pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for reconsideration.
(2)In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be
benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each taken
from two to five different examinations, but failed to obtain a passing average
in any of them. Consolidating, however, their highest grades in different
subjects in previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be
sufficient to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act 972.
(3)The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts

is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604
petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented motions
for reconsideration which were denied, while 125 unsuccessful candidates of
1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar motions, which ar still pending
because they could be favorably affected by Republic Act No. 972, - although
as has been already stated, this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to
reconsider their grades.
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972.
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the
practice of the legal profession and the administration of justice, and because
some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court set the hearing
of the afore-mentioned petitions for admission on the sole question of
whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant
assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally and in
writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be gleaned. The
valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J. Francisco, Vicente
Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the validity of the law, and
of the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor General, Messrs. Arturo A.
Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente
del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor, Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta
against it, aside from memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M.
Aruego, M.H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of
petitioners Cabrera, Macasaet and Galema, themselves, has greatly helped us
in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all
in this task. The legal researchers of the court have exhausted almost all
Philippine and American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been
the object of intense deliberation for along time by the Tribunal, and finally,
after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned to a
new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all suspicion of
prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit
to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading
materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the Explanatory
Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator Pablo Angeles David
stated:
"The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is
the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately
after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency
of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students
who took up law soon after the liberation."
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952,
5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be
admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from
"insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for
the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal in the
aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem
evolved by the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is
one of the vital requisites for the practice of law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the
protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of
those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a
delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover, the statement
that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly
exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of this court alone in
mimeographed copies were made available to the public during those years
and private enterprises had also published them in monthly magazines and
annual digests. The Official Gazette has been published continuously. Books
and magazines published abroad have entered without restriction since 1945.
Many law books, some even with revised and enlarged editions have been
printed locally during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to
be published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the addition
of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be
enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of
view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would have
been easier had an identical case of similar background been picked out from
the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any precedent in the long Anglo-
Saxon legal history, from which has been directly derived the judicial system
established where with its lofty ideals by the Congress of the United States,
and which we have preserved and attempted to improve, or in our
contemporaneous juridical history of more than half a century? From the
citations of those defending the law, we can not find a case in which the
validity of a similar law had been sustained, while those against its validity
cite, among others, the cases of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State
vs. Cannon, 240 NW, 441), the opinion of the President which is expressed in
his vote of the original bill and which the proponent of the contested law
respects.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other
countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared them
without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to
uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the
case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law — that of
Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked the
decision of the Supreme Court of that State, denying the petition of Cooper to
be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a statute concerning
the school of law of Columbia College promulgated on April 7, 1860, which
was declared by the Court of Appeals to be consistent with the Constitution of
the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
"They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public
trust. All votes for either of them for any elective office except that of the
Court of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void.
They shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any
male citizen of the age of twenty- one years, of good moral character,
and who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall
be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State." (p. 93)
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional
precept is as follows:
"Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of
appointing them had previously rested with the judges, and this was the
principal appointing power which they possessed. The convention was
evidently dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been
exercised, and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon
admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the section
quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of the
provision respecting the admission of attorneys, in its particular section
of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the object of
this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of confidence in the
courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of their power over this
subject, unless the Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from
the use of the word 'admission' in the action referred to. It is urged that
the admission spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to
grant leave, and that the power of granting necessarily implies the power
of refusing, and of course the right of determining whether the applicant
possesses the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
"These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity
of the act." (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to
indicate that it provided that the possession of a diploma of the school of law
of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws was evidence
of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of applicants for
admission to the Bar. The decision does not however quote the text of the law,
which we cannot find in any public or accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the
Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the law:
"The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia
College being an institution of established reputation, and having a law
department under the charge of able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study
before being entitled to a diploma as graduates, the Legislature evidently,
and no doubt justly, considered this examination together with the
preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a test of legal
requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court; and as rendering
the latter examination, to which no definite period of preliminary study
was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
"The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and
ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the
examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It
could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be
given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature designed
entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements of the
Constitution; and the act contains nothing whatever to indicate an
intention that the authorities of the college should inquire as to the age,
citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a diploma. The only
rational interpretation of which the act admits is, that it was intended to
make the college diploma competent evidence as to the legal attainments
of the applicant, and nothing else. To this extent alone it operates as a
modification of pre-existing statutes, and it is to be read in connection
with these statutes and with the Constitution itself in order to determine
the present condition of the law on the subject." (p. 89)
xxx xxx xxx

"The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over
the question of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be
competent evidence in certain cases upon that question." (p. 93)
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper
with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following
distinctions:
(1)The law of New York does not require that any candidate of Columbia
College who failed in the bar examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
(2)The law of New York according to the very decision of Cooper, has not
taken from the court its jurisdiction over the question of admission of attorney
at law; in effect, it does not decree the admission of any lawyer.
(3)The Constitution of New York at the time and that of the Philippines
are entirely different on the matter of admission to the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice
of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial
function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its continuous and
zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power have been demonstrated
during more than six centuries, which certainly "constitutes the most solid of
titles." Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to
repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding
the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment the proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law is a
legislative function, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable. The
function requires (1) previously established rules and principles, (2) concrete
facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals. and (3)
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and principles; in
effect, a judicial function of the highest degree. And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial resolutions on the
petitions of these same individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been
derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys
at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. A comprehensive
and conscientious study of this matter had been undertaken in the case of
State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in which the validity of a legislative
enactment providing that Cannon be permitted to practice before the courts
was discussed. From the text of this decision we quote the following
paragraphs:
"This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without
parallel in the history of the English speaking people so far as we have
been able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent
of the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of
attorneys at law, but in England and in every state of the Union the act of
admitting an attorney at law has been expressly committed to the courts,
and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial function.
This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law, and in this
respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative power. (p. 444)
"No greater responsibility rests upon this court than that of
preserving in form and substance the exact form of government set up
by the people. (p. 444)
"Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate
and Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing of
qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the
Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up and
prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
"But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which
in its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude, is
the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
"Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are
distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the government.
Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty, but each is supreme
in that branch of sovereignty which properly belongs to its department.
Neither department should so act as to embarrass the other in the
discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme and thought
of the people setting upon the form of government under which we exist.
State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex rel. Bashford vs.
Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
"The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane
upon which the administration of justice is maintained. Its responsibility in
this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of the powers of
sovereignty to the judicial department of our state government, under a
scheme which it was supposed rendered it immune from embarrassment
or interference by any other department of government, the courts
cannot escape responsibility for the manner in which the powers of
sovereignty thus committed to the judicial department are exercised. (p.
445)
"The relation of the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate
relationship. The bar is an attaché of the courts. The quality of justice
dispensed by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity of
its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to the
administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into disrepute.
(p. 445)
"Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe
supervision over their bars, at least in the English speaking countries." (p.
445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
"Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six
centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of England,
concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of 1688, had
exercised the right of determining who should be admitted to the practice
of law, which, as was said in Matter of the Sergeants at Law, 6 Bingham's
New Cases 235, 'constitutes the most solid of all titles.' If the courts and
the judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to determine who
should be admitted to practice law is a constituent element of that entity.
It may be difficult to isolate that element and say with assurance that it is
either a part of the inherent power of the court, or an essential element
of the judicial power exercised by the court, but that it is a power
belonging to the judicial entity cannot be denied. Our people borrowed
from England this judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign
institution, but made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch
of the government. They took this institution along with the power
traditionally exercised to determine who should constitute its attorneys at
law. There is no express provision in the Constitution which indicates an
intent that this traditional power of the judicial department should in any
manner be subject to legislative control. Perhaps the dominant thought of
the framers of our constitution was to make the three great departments
of government separate and independent of one another. The idea that
the Legislature might embarrass the judicial department by prescribing
inadequate qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the
dominant purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence of
express constitutional provision. While the Legislature may legislate with
respect to the qualifications of attorneys, its power in that respect does
not rest upon any power possessed by it to deal exclusively with the
subject of the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to its
general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest. When it
does legislate fixing a standard of qualifications required of attorneys at
law in order that public interests may be protected, such qualifications
constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class from which the
court must make its selection. Such legislative qualifications do not
constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond which the court cannot go in
fixing additional qualifications deemed necessary by the course for the
proper administration of judicial functions. There is no legislative power to
compel courts to admit to their bars persons deemed by them unfit to
exercise the prerogatives of an attorney at law." (p. 450)
"Furthermore it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of
appointment. It is quite likely true that the Legislature may exercise the
power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative functions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to admit
attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the states,
except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N. J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far as our
investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to practice law
by their admission as members of the bar of the court so admitting. Cor.
Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L. Ed. 565; Ex parte Garland,
4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall. 52, 19 L. Ed. 285;
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843, 115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A. 519; Danforth vs.
Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021, 130 Am. St. Rep. 1030, 20 Ann. Cas.
413.
"The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been
perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held that
the act of a court in admitting an attorney to practice is the judgment for
the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the Legislature to confer
such right upon any one being most exceedingly uncommon, it seems
clear that the licensing of an attorney is and always has been a purely
judicial function, no matter where the power to determine the
qualifications may reside." (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in

answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
"It is indispensable to the administration of justice and to
interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient
ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from the
need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining authority
over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the public be
protected from incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose opportunity
for doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C. L., in People ex rel.
Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N. Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N. E. 487, 489, 60 A. L. R.
851: 'Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with conditions.' One is
admitted to the bar 'for something more than private gain.' He becomes
'an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency
to advance the ends of justice. His cooperation with the court is due
'whenever justice would be imperiled if cooperation was withheld."
Without such attorneys at law the judicial department of government
would be hampered in the performance of its duties. That has been the
history of attorneys under the common law, both in this country and in
England. Admission to practice as an attorney at law is almost without
exception conceded to be a judicial function. Petition to that end is filed in
courts, as are other proceedings invoking judicial action. Admission to the
bar is accomplish and made open and notorious by a decision of the
court entered upon its records. The establishment by the Constitution of
the judicial department conferred authority necessary to the exercise of
its powers as a coordinate department of government. It is an inherent
power of such a department of government ultimately to determine the
qualifications of those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for
assisting in its work, and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit,
those lacking in sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral
character. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex
parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, 'It has been well settled, by
the rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively
with the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers,
as an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed.'" (p. 727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure
license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re Day, 54
NE 646), the court said in part:
"In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the
court, holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional,
explained the nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers
of the court, admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their
possessing sufficient legal learning and fair private character. It has
always been the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence
by an examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission
of such officers in the highest court of the states to which they,
respectively, belong, for three years preceding their application, is
regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal
learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission sufficient
evidence that their private and professional character is fair. The order of
admission is the judgment of the court that the parties possess the
requisite qualifications as attorneys and counselors, and are entitled to
appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its entry the parties
become officers of the court, and are responsible to it for professional
misconduct. They hold their office during good behavior, and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by the judgment
of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded. Ex parte
Hoyfron, 7 How. (Miss. 127; Fletcher vs. Daingerfield, 20 Cal. 430. Their
admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial
power. It is the exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in
numerous cases. It was so held by the court of appeals of New York in
the matter of the application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y.
81. 'Attorneys and Counsellors,' said that court, 'are not only officers of
the court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to
proceedings of a judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with
propriety, be intrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty,
may very justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their
appropriate judicial functions." (pp. 650- 651).
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
"Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded
everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion need
not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice have
also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of the
court." — Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
"Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial
function, and is an inherent power of the court." — A. C. Brydonjack, vs.
State Bar of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of
Legislature respecting admission to bar, 65, A. L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the
functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.
"The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the
judicial departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish
rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights
and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or conditions
that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction
is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change either by legislative
action or by judicial decrees.
"The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by
either of the other departments of the government." — 16 C. J. S.,
Constitutional Law, p. 229.
"If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the
courts by requiring of them construction of the law according to its own
views, it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their
judgments, compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge of
offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the progress
of a judicial inquiry." — Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 192.
In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations
of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50
per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the
disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those
promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year affecting the bar
candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these
judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that only this
Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may be so. Any
attempt on the part of any of these departments would be a clear usurpation
of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning the
admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13, article VIII
of the Constitution provides:
"Section 13.The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade and shall not diminish increase or modify substantive
rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and procedure are hereby
repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the
power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress
shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines." — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and
this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the practice of
law. The primary power and responsibility which the Constitution recognizes
continue to reside in this Court. Had Congress found that this Court has not
promulgated any rule on the matter, it would have nothing over which to
exercise the power granted to it. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement
the rules promulgated by this Court, but the authority and responsibility over
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law
and their supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to
repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that
Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its
primary power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that
Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at law, or
a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its power is limited
to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on the matter, if according
to its judgment the need for a better service of the legal profession requires it.
But this power does not relieve this Court of its responsibility to admit,
suspend, disbar and reinstate attorneys at law and supervise the practice of
the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate
and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the concurrent
power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and should be exercised with
the respect that each owes to the other, giving careful consideration to the
responsibility which the nature of each department requires. These powers
have existed together for centuries without diminution on each part; the
harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature may and should
examine if the existing rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the
demands which public interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues,
culture, training and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal,
amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and
the judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of the
legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for
the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these reforms the lofty
objective that is desired in the exercise of its traditional duty of admitting,
suspending, disbarring and reinstating attorneys at law is realized. They are
powers which, exercised within their proper constitutional limits, are not
repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in attaining the
establishment of a Bar that would respond to the increasing and exacting
necessities of the administration of justice.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion. Guariña
took the examination and failed by a few points to obtain the general
average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had been appointed to
the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice of law without a
previous examination. The Government appointed Guariña and he discharged
the duties of Fiscal in a remote province. This Tribunal refused to give his
license without previous examinations. The court said:
"Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the
applicant in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the
prescribed examination, on the ground that he holds the office of
provincial fiscal for the Province of Batanes. Section 2 of Act No. 1597,
enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
"SEC. 2.Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One
Hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act providing a Code of Procedure in Civil
Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands,' is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"1.Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of
the Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and
are in good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any
person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter,
shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of
justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or
judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the
Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General,
Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the
Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, assistant
prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila,
assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro
Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed to
practice law in the courts of the Philippines Islands without an
examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing
such fact to the satisfaction of said court."
"The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this
appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The report
of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he received
an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal learning
upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of the
required percentage of 75. We would be delinquent in the performance of
our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in the face of this affirmative
indication of the deficiency of the applicant in the required qualifications of
learning in the law at the time when he presented his former application
for admission to the bar, we should grant him a license to practice law in
the courts of these Islands, without first satisfying ourselves that despite
his failure to pass the examination on that occasion, he now 'possesses
the necessary qualifications of learning and ability.'
"But it is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited
statute the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar
without taking the prescribed examination 'upon motion before the
Supreme Court' accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and
now holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is
urged that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently
sought to attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier
statute, and in view of the context generally and especially of the fact
that the amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the
original Act which specifically provides for the admission of certain
candidates without examination, the clause may be licensed to practice
law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without any examination.' It is
contended that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in
order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the
candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised."
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the
United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to 16 of Act
190, the Court continued:
"Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the
commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited
and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word 'may,' as used in the above citation from
Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive effect. But any act
of the commission which has the effect of setting at naught in whole or in
part the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress
prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the
commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its rightful
limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to
the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of
Guariña, the Court held:
"In the various cases wherein applications for admission to the bar
under the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore, we
have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of
those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been
practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
"In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears
that the applicant was not and never had been practicing attorney in this
or any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial
fiscal, and it further affirmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission to
the bar.
"In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that
occasion, we do not think that his appointment to the office of provincial
fiscal is in itself satisfactory proof of his possession of the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this
application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines, should
be denied.
"In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he
fell only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a
license to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has
held the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon
and presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance
of the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the
Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal, we
think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act No.
1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by
general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency in
a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the court
upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he desires
so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations
prescribed by general rule." — (In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in question, like those in the Case of Day and Cannon, has been
found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that
if it has intended to make a classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the
Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the
practice of law to those students who began studying before November 4,
1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued by a
school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and would pass an
examination, or to those who had studied for three years if they commenced
their studies after the aforementioned date. The Supreme Court declared that
this law was unconstitutional being, among others, a class legislation. The
Court said:
"This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this
state by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The
act of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application
is made, is entitled 'An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to
revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors,' approved March
28, 1894, in force July 1, 1874.' The amendment, as far as it appears in
the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the
following: 'And every applicant for a license who shall comply with the
rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at
the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law office
or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act
notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules'." — In re Day et
al, 54 N. Y., p. 646.
. . . "After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of
which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license of
admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued by
any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state, whose
regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an attendance
by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years, and showing
that the student began the study of law prior to November 4, 1897, and
accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral character. The other
branch of the proviso is that any student who has studied law for two
years in a law office, or part of such time in a law office, 'and part in the
aforesaid law school,' and whose course of study began prior to
November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory examination by
the examining board in the branches now required by the rules of this
court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the proviso,
which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges upon the
persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative creation for
their admission to the bar." (p. 647.)
"Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a

special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If
the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts
and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be received by the court as
conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice law,
it could only be done by a general law, and not by granting special and
exclusive privileges to certain persons or classes of persons. Const. art
4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for that
purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon him
the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees
therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and
arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring such
privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in
framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as
the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable relation
to the end sought. There must be some difference which furnishes a
reasonable basis for different legislation as to the different classes, and
not a purely arbitrary one, having no just relation to the subject of the
legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 III. 66, 35 N. E. 62; Ritchie
vs. People, 155 III. 98, 40 N. E. 454; Railroad Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150,
17 Sup. Ct. 255.
"The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired
by experience, may furnish a basis for classification (Williams vs. People
121 Ill. 48, II N. E. 881); but the place where such physician has resided
and practiced his profession cannot furnish such basis, and is an
arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based upon it void (State
vs. Pennyeor, 65 N. E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the legislature undertakes
to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the profession of the law
and plainly, any classification must have some reference to learning,
character, or ability to engage in such practice. The proviso is limited,
first, to a class of persons who began the study of law prior to
November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two classes - First, those
presenting diplomas issued by any law school of this state before
December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied law for the period
of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a law school and part in
a law office, who are to be admitted upon examination in the subjects
specified in the present rules of this court, and as to this latter
subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for making application for
admission. As to both classes, the conditions of the rules are dispensed
with, and as between the two different conditions and limits of time are
fixed. No course of study is prescribed for the law school, but a diploma
granted upon the completion of any sort of course its managers may
prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can there be anything with relation to the
qualifications or fitness of persons to practice law resting upon the mere
date of November 4, 1897, which will furnish a basis of classification.
Plainly not. Those who began the study of law November 4th could
qualify themselves to practice in two years as well as those who began on
the 3rd. The classes named in the proviso need spend only two years in
study, while those who commenced the next day must spend three
years, although they would complete two years before the time limit. The
one who commenced on the 3d. If possessed of a diploma, is to be
admitted without examination before December 31, 1899, and without
any prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed
course must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such
classification cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just
relation to the subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for
the sole purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons.
(pp. 647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N. W. 441,
where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the practice of
law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a class legislation:
"But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that
the legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the
qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying as
attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which will
apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of the right
of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to pursue
chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West Virginia, 129
U. S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: 'It is undoubtedly
the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any lawful calling,
business or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions
as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and condition. This right
may in many respects be considered as a distinguishing feature of our
republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every one on like
conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood, some requiring
years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The
interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the 'estate' acquired in them - that
is, the right to continue their prosecution - is often of great value to the
possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken from them, any more than
their real or personal property can be thus taken. It is fundamental under
our system of government that all similarly situated and possessing equal
qualifications shall enjoy equal opportunities. Even statutes regulating the
practice of medicine, requiring examinations to establish the possession
on the part of the application of his proper qualifications before he may
be licensed to practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously
considered whether the exemption from such examinations of those
practicing in the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered
such law unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general
principle. State vs. Thomas Call, 121 N. C. 643, 28 S. E. 517; see, also,
The State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N. W. 345;
State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468.
"This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him
the right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a
mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had
once established his right to practice law and that one time he possessed
the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him to that right.
That fact in no manner affect the power of the Legislature to select from
the great body of the public an individual upon whom it would confer its
favors.
"A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424)
commanded the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without
examination, all who had 'serve in the military or naval forces of the
United States during the World War and received an honorable discharge
therefrom and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview
of the Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as 'World War
Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent
thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held
unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality clauses
of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W.
Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N. W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is
explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
"The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that
a classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between
the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore, must be
based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes avoided
the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real
differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial once. Therefore,
any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only must be
based on some substantial difference between the situation of that class
and other individuals to which it does not apply and must rest on some
reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there must be such
a difference between the situation and circumstances of all the members
of the class and the situation and circumstances of all other members of
the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as
presents a just and natural reason for the difference made in their
liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not
general because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a
substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class only, and not
generally on all." (12 Am Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50
per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per cent in
the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952, 71.5 per cent in
1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and 73.5 per cent in 1955,
will be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as
members of the Bar, notwithstanding that the rules require a minimum
general average of 75 per cent, which has been invariably followed since
1950. Is there any motive of the nature indicated by the abovementioned
authorities, for this classification? If there is none, and none has been given,
then the classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before,
with the general average indicated, were not included because the Tribunal
has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not
justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from
1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither is the exclusion of those who
failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this
Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no
one concerned may prove by some other means his right to an equal
consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on

account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in such
form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure? Only from
1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal permitted admission to
the bar of candidates who did not obtain the general average of 75 per cent:
in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per cent; in the 1947 and those who had
69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70 per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in
1950 to 1953, those who obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the
Court as equivalent to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of
circumstances deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the
passing averages during those years were all that could be objected to or
criticized. Now, is it desired to undo what had been done — cancel the license
that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75 per cent?
Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do so. Concededly,
it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What Congress lamented is
that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent obtained by those candidates
who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to qualify them to practice law.
Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of judgment of the Court that is being
cured, and to complete the cure of this infirmity, the effectivity of the
disputed law is being extended up to the years 1953, 1954 and 1955,
increasing each year the general average by one per cent, with the order that
said candidates be admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law,
is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the
rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply
taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have done
during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the
power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which
continue in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this
power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress,
because it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to
the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations,
at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not take
into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary, and when a
candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that the existing laws
and jurisprudence are already different, seriously affecting in this manner his
usefulness. The system that the said law prescribes was used in the first bar
examinations of this country, but was abandoned for this and other
disadvantages. In this case, however, the fatal defect is that the article is not
expressed in the title of the Act. While this law according to its title will have
temporary effect only from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21(1),
article VI of the Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely;
and because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity affects
the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the following grounds: first, because they
are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress has
exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish arbitrary
methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and third, because
their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its basic principles. As has
already been seen, the contested law suffers from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic Act
No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor
effect for the following reasons, to wit:
1.Because its declared purpose is to admit 810 candidates who failed in
the bar examinations of 1946-1952, and who, it admits, are certainly
inadequately prepared to practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in
the aforesaid years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they are at present
already prepared to become members of the Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to
perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a
perform something contrary to reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a
manifest encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme
Court.
2.Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of this
Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without having examined
their respective examination papers, and although it is admitted that this
Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for justifiable reasons,
only this Court and no other may revise and after them. In attempting to do it
directly Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.
3.By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative power to
repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to the Bar. Such
additional or amendatory rules are, as they ought to be, intended to regulate
acts subsequent to its promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate
the practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as minimum
norms towards that end in the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers to the Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists
immensely in the daily performance of judicial functions and is essential to a
worthy administration of justice. It is therefore the primary and inherent
prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may
be admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to existing
rules.
4.The reason advanced for the pretended classification of candidates,
which the law makes, is contrary to facts which are of general knowledge and
does not justify the admission to the Bar of law students inadequately
prepared. The pretended classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class
legislation.
5.Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law,
contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the
provisions of article 1, the entire law is void..
6.Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that part of article 1
referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955, said part of article 1, insofar as
it concerns the examinations in those years, shall continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of the
magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by our Chief
Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the members of the
Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of two of our beloved
colleagues who since the beginning have announced their decision not to take
part in voting, we, the eight members of the Court who subscribe to this
decision have voted and resolved, and have decided for the Court, and under
the authority of the same:
1.That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the
examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of said law are
unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2.That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1
which refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law, that
is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in
conformity with section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates
who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied, and (2)
all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of
71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below 50 per cent in any
subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for
admission or not. After this decision has become final, they shall be permitted
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar
on the date or dates that the Chief Justice may set. So ordered..
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.
ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
A resume of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations
of 1946 to 1953 inclusive follows:
August, 1946 1
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo

Florendo, Atty. Bernardino Guerrero, Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin
Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Jose Perez
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates206
Number of candidates whose grades were raised12
73's6
72's6
Number of candidates who passed85
Number of candidates who failed121
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 97218
Percentage of success(per cent)41.62
Percentage of failure(per cent)58.74
Passing grade(per cent)72
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except
Hon. Jose Teodoro who was substituted by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
(72 per cent and above but below 73 per cent —

Minutes of March 31, 1947).

Passing grade(per cent)72.
(By resolution of the Court).
October, 1947
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon.
Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto
de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Federico
Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members.

70.55 per cent with 2 subjects below 50 per cent1

69 per cent40
68 per cent2

Number of those affected by Rep. Act No. 972972
Passing grade(per cent)69.
NOTE. — In passing the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and
68.1 per cent respectively, the Court found out that they were not
benefited at all by the bonus of 12 points given by the Examiner in
Civil Law.
August, 1948
Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman
Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty.
Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon.
Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
71's29
70's35
Number of those affected by Rep. Act No. 97211
(By Resolution of the Court).
August, 1949
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando
Jugo, 1 Hon. Enrique Filamor, Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M.
Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon. Mariano H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe
Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Rarcelon, Members.
Number of candidates1,218
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's)55
Passing grades(per cent)74
August, 1950
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, 1 Chairman, Hon.
Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty.
Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon.
Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and
authority of the examiner in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado).
August, 1951
Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor

M. Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon,
Alfonso Felix, Members.
Number of candidates who passed1,189
August, 1952
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio
Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty.
Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
Number of candidates who failed1,033
August, 1953
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Endencia, Atty. Enrique Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio
Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Hon. Felipe Natividad,
Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members.
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972,
grouped by the years in which they took the bar examinations, with
annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration which were
denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for reconsideration without
invoking said law, which are still pending, follows:
PETITIONERS UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW
Civ.LandMerc.Int.Pol.Crim.Rem.Leg.Gen. Av.
MRD-1.Agunod, Filemon L667161768083737571.4
MRD-2.Cunanan, Albino767274757070657271.45
3.Mejia, Flaviano V.646465688374688069.85
1948
MRD-4.Orlina, Soledad R.716866756375708869.9
MRD-5.Vivero, Antonio Lu.757373656366658069.95
MRD-6.Gatchalian, Salud72667175786865 5069.65
1949
7.Abaya, Jesus A.697975757189557570.8
MRD-8.Advincula, David D.768062868172606570.5
9.Agraviador, Alfredo L.638570778081658071.8
10.Alacar, Pascual C.616383797185658072.05
11.Amog, Pedro M.756676788174558572.2
12.Apolinario, Miguel S.758478787070607571.95
13.Aquino, Maximo G.827771777677607573.15
14.Asinas, Candido D.758369808183558572.65
15.Baldivino, Jose B.756572828269608071.95
16.Balintona, Bernardo758064787467657070
17.Banawa, Angel L.787070758183606072.3
18.Bandala, Anacleto A.668066719372557069.6
19.Bandon, Alawadin L.747969779173608073.35
20.Baquero, Benjamin767964778572657572.5
21.Blanco, Jose757570757776609072.5
22.Buenaluz, Victoriano T.757172786782607570.85
23.Canda, Benjamin S.757275827677657573.55
24.Canon, Guillermo778667887569708573.9
25.Carlos, Estela S.758181797273657073.8
26.Cerezo, Gregorio O.697676797180558070.4
27.Clarin, Manuel L.758276817369707573.95
28.Claudio, Conrado O.766278777372607071.4
29.Condevillamar, Antonio V.686574808575607571.6
MRD-30.Cornejo, Crisanto R.727569828379658073.4
31.Corona, Olvido D.687673818172607571.15
32.Dizon, Marcial C.768669837574658073.1
33.Enriquez, Agustin P.757770818177658073.75
34.Espiritu, Ireneo E..808869757677657573.8
35.Fernandez, Macario J.638276758184657572.95
36.Gallardo, Amando C.787967777675606570.95
37.Garcia, Freidrich M.768066757270607569.7
38.Garcia, Julian L.647768828977657572.15
39.Garcia, Leon Mo.778671806082657571.85
40.Garcia, Pedro V.768273817483608573.6
41.Garcia, Santiago C.629179757275658071.8
42.Genoves, Pedro758370788776558072.7
43.Gonzales, Amado P.757171758675607572.65
44.Guia, Odon R. de777666817476607570.9
45.Fernandez, Simeon626871807490657570.85
46.Jakosalem, Filoteo828373826187657073.6
47.Jesus, Felipe D. de758367797885607572.45
48.Jocom, Jacobo M.777774777464558570.65
49.Juares, Nicolas778456767382608570
50.Kalalang, Remegio657574807070658570.3
51.Layumas, Vicente L.678465758966608070.3
52.Leyson, Amancio F.698375768175657573.15
53.Libanan, Marcelino718361778081658571.75
54.Lim, Jose E.777772767264657071.15
55.Lim, Jose F.707562838071658070.4
56.Linao, Mariano M.668476788075607571.75
57.Lopez, Angelo P.678175727981558071
58.Lopez, Eliezar M.777560757785607570.7
59.Lopez, Nicanor S.727170787784607571.55
60.Manoleto, Proceso D.727065788190608071.95
61.Mancao, Alfredo P.676471837676658070.95
62.Manera, Mariano A.757875756879606571
63.Mercado, Arsenio N.676471837676658070.95
64.Miranda, Benjamin G.768167827477658072.55
65.Manad, Andres B.777568826972657571.15
1949
66.Orosco, Casimiro P.728469817082657571.9
67.Padua, Manuel C.767668807979507570.1
68.Palang, Basilio S.717582715587557569.6
69.Palma, Cuadrato627569938079558069.5
70.Pañganiban, Jose V.678361819174607570.6
71.Pareja, Felipe667175816774607068.75
72.Patalinjug, Eriberto737778737871557571.25
73.Paulin, Jose C.666971778382657572.1
4.Pido, Serafin C.727863807185708072.05
75.Pimentel, Luis P.777576817668558071.6
76.Plantilla, Rodrigo C.727868897981658573.55
77.Regalario, Benito B.728064807581558069.55
78.Robis, Casto P.627774736880708070.9
79.Rodil, Francisco C.686970817675657570.75
80.Rodriguez, Mariano I.807569807280658073.35
81.Romero, Crispulo P.787566777683657572.85
82.Saez, Porfirio D.757572816977607571
83.Saliguma, Crisogono D.797974786965657071.8
84.Samano, Fortunato A.758472777082607571.9
85.Santos, Faustina C.716868767585557569.5
86.Santos, Josefina R.686976717782657572.3
87.Seludo, Ananias G.758069797782657573.25
88.Semilia, Rafael I.688555838979658071.25
89.Telan, Gaudencio777970757075607570.85
90.Tesorero, Leocadio T.757163758262656369.65
91.Torre, Valentin S. de la858171766965557070.4
92.Torres, Ariston L.787172816184558570.4
93.Veyra, Zosimo C. de707571796580658070.65
94.Viado, Jose677074757590558070.7
95.Villacarlos, Delfin A.738771826970758573.85
96.Villamil, Leonor S.738176868673558573.6
97.Zabala, Amando A.767067757676607570.6
1950
MRD-98.Cruz, Filomeno de la707178817672649673.4
99.Española, Pablo S.717855768569659370.2
100.Foronda, Clarencio J.607868798488629371.9
101.Hechanova, Vicente597675756968759671.3
MRD-102.Peñalosa, Osias R.807861766177668570.2
103.Sarmiento, Floro A. 658663828972607270.15
MRD-104.Torre, Catalino P.758568786967656970.25

105.Ungson, Fernando S.618775705785838272.8
1951
106.Abasolo, Romulo777064657670766471.7
107.Adeva, Daniel G.755974656951786770.4
108.Aguilar, Vicente Z.736368757069757571.25
109.Amodia, Juan T.757666757660777672.35
MRD-110.Añosa, Pablo S.767863757461757971.6
111.Antiola, Anastacio R. 687675707170816673.05
112.Aquino, S. Rey A.707171607462767771.1
113.Atienza, Manuel G.7868808651827573.85
114.Avanceña, Alfonso717165757072788071.8
MRD-115.Balacuit, Camilo N.757375707265757673.25
116.Barinaga, Jeremias L.686973707450807971.2
MRD-117.Barrientos, Ambrosio D.766067557463776270.25
MRD-118.Benitez, Tomas P.677575607372757872.2
119.Biason, Sixto F.738267656672776871.25
MRD-120. Briñas, Isagani, A.716974707652797271.95
121. Buela, Arcadio P.727761707158797169.75
122.Cabilao, Leonardo S.735075757560717971.25
123.Cabrera, Ireneo M.75667065728170792.4
124.Cacacho, Emilio V.
125.Calilung, Soledad C.647373807357755969.65
MRD-126.Calimlim, Jose B.647373807357755969.65
127.Calimlim, Pedro B.668269606952837570
128.Camello, Sotero H.707763657566846471.55
129.Campos, Juan A.718870756469716270.15
130.Castillo, Antonio del787870607967697672.65
MRD-131.Castillo, Dominador Ad.756172757471676671.1
MRD-132.Castro, Jesus B.728672756575767172.85
133.Casuga, Bienvenido B.757272706961756070.95
134.Cabangbang, Santiago B. 776761807359837672.2
135.Cruz, Federico S. 697475756865767071.65
136.Dacanay, Eufemio P.707362757269857172.05
137.Deysolong, Felisberto666272757062836270.85
MRD-138.Dimaano, Jr., Jose N.787963757375815973.5
139.Espinosa, Domingo L.786358707067876371.6
MRD-140.Farol, Evencia C.807866758172627372.25
141.Felix, Conrado S.717175657058756970.75
142.Fernan, Pablo L.678866857368787572.35
143.Gandioco, Salvador G.645866657670897572.1
144.Gastardo, Crispin B.706968757866867273.9
145.Genson, Angelo B.755773656754785669.55
146.Guiani, Guinaid M.686075657467757771.5
147.Guina, Graciano P.666967607852836169.6
MRD-148.Homeres, Praxedes P.747475757169757173.35
149.Ibarra, Venancio M.607574707470807571.9
150.Imperial, Monico L.727875757256827773.7
MRD-151.Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M717063857160855370.85
152.Inandan, Fortunato C.777767557375795772.5
153.Jimenez, Florencio C.757070757261757872.05
154.Kintanar, Woodrow M.708372657673756972.95
155.Languido, Cesar V.637163857061857970.55
156.Lavilles, Cesar L.61975557363757870.55
157.Llenos, Francisco U.647065607265927571.75
158.Leon, Marcelo D. de 637360857575907072.75
159.Llanto, Priscilla 72 68 657667846871.35
160.Macachor, Oscar 68597870757757570.15
MRD-161.Magsino, Encarnacion 776670707671756172.25
MRD-162.Maligaya, Demetrio M.706175657550915172.3
163.Manio, Gregorio676769807167757570.65
164.Puzon, Eduardo S.728260606970687268.05
MRD-165.Marcial, Meynardo R.667574707567817573.15
166.Martin, Benjamin S.687263756963846270.1
MRD-167.Monterroyo, Catalina S708075807666825173.95
MRD-168.Montero, Leodegario C.736766808165817573.75
169.Monzon, Candido T.707274756770776972.05
170.Natividad, Alberto M.737968657369757972.2
MRD-171.Navallo, Capistrano C.707268858166717472.1
172.Nisce, Camilo Z.666675657968856273.5
MRD-173.Ocampo, Antonio F. de 758176657467756973.75
174.Olaviar, Jose O.727069556670777570.5
MRD-175.Perez, Cesario Z.757666807263826972.95
176.Pogado, Causin O.706665707564757069.95
177.Ramos-Balmori, Manuela757362657859756670.2
178.Cecinto, Ireneo I.737668757468805372.3
MRD-179.Redor, Fransisco, K.627773756964766970
MRD-180.Regis, Deogracias A.767468656565887573.35
181.Rigor, Estelita C.677861807177796570.9
MRD-182.Rimorin-Gordo, Estela707262608866677970.15
183.Rosario, Prisco del706470707273855772.65
184.Rosario, Vicente D. del759165756868796272.2
185.Saavedra, Felipe738063757673686270.35
186.Salazar, Alfredo N.667273756768776970.85
187.Salem, Romulo R.778172657360767573
188.Foz, Julita A.757275756570766472.5
189.Santa Ana, Candido T.776965758175707573
190.Santos, Aquilino726669656870817171.7
191.Santos, Valeriano V.7672756862767973.1
192.Suico, Samuel737972757159846573.3
193.Suson, Teodorico746866806659796770.35
194.Tado, Florentino P.647667657672765369.7
195.Tapayan, Domingo A.697269707673827973.75
MRD-196.Tiausas, Miguel V.676071757967846072.7
197.Torres, Carlos P.687171707063827171.6
198.Tria, Hipolito 697275606954786670.05
199.Velasco, Avelino A.657275757167787672.1
200.Villa, Francisco C.658073756879657570.2
201.Villagonzalo, Job R.786774657251697170.25
202.Villarama, Jr., Pedro75747555566677571.45
1952
203.Abacon, Pablo757278817872645572.7
MRP-204.Abad, Agapito737673857563627570.95
MRP-205.Abella, Ludovico B.708176817066775872.7
MRP-206.Abellera, Geronimo F.7579798776516370717
MRP-207.Abenojar, Agapito N.7278847075697072.9
208.Alandy, Doroteo R.648393916859606071.2
209.Alano, Fabian T.708361837287727071.9
MRP-210.Alcantara, Pablo V.717980817370726273.65
211.Arcangel, Agustin Ag.758571737665686571.85
212.Acosta, Dionisio N.758178875665777072.8
MRP-213.Abinguna, Agapito C.668580847558767573.65
214.Adove, Nehemias C.768678776678696273.55
215.Adrias, Inocencio C.758361887667797573.4
216.Aglugub, Andres R.758373887262726272.65
217.Andrada, Mariano L.768566876377757773
MRP-218.Almeda, Serafin V.72 7275816167736570.75
219.Almonte-Peralta, Felicidad737172917567655370.7
MRP-220.Almodia, Juan T.757968856264757871.4
MRP-221.Antonio, Felino A.717681837952727073.3
MRP-222.Antonio, Jose S.759290686564686073.75
223.Añonuevo, Ramos B.718778816463747672.7
224.Aquino, S. Rey A.677757786970698067.7
225.Arteche, Filomeno D.788350897677707070.8
MRP-226.Arribas, Isaac M.757870817370677872.2
MRP-227.Azucena, Ceferino D.726778897267776573.95
228.Atienza, Ricardo728770796655757570.85
229.Balacuit, Camilo N.757889757054667573.3
MRP-230.Baclig, Cayetano S.778483806970616573
231.Balcita, Oscar C.757779906460675070.65
232.Barilea, Dominador Z.716782776461658070.5
MRP-233.Banta, Jose Y.758077817563717573.95
MRP-234. Barrientos, Ambrosio D.767067806765708170.7
235.Batucan, Jose M.667678886276677871.2
236.Bautista, Atilano C.708284855861716271.25
237.Bautista, Celso J.716863878067807072.75
238.Belderon, Jose 768176927066676272.65
MRP-239.Belo, Victor B.767764737571767672.85
MRP-240.Bejec, Conseso D.798073826377755073.15
MRP-241.Beltran, Gervasio M.727581737557758073.95
MRP-242.Benaojan, Robustiano O.748477847563686272.85
MRP-243.Beriña, Roger C.708079796872647871.85
MRP-244.Bihis, Marcelo M.758665926464847573.45
MRP-245.Binaoro, Vicente M.736978837359708272.75
MRP-246.Bobila, Rosalio B.768676836859717873.05
247.Buenafe, Avelina R.788075757055728072.75
248.Bueno, Anastacio F.737871787167716071.15
249.Borres, Maximino L.678562917263768070.9
MRP-250.Cabegin, Cesar V.727176757470716072.2
MRP-251.Cabello, Melecio F.727878895870677170.5
MRP-252.Cabrera, Irineo M.798853917185757673.3
253.Cabreros, Paulino N.7179 83846062715070.85
254.Calayag, Florentino R.697966886975687670.6
MRP-255.Calzada, Cesar de la767280676271666270.85
256.Canabal, Isabel708281777851757573.7
MRP-257.Cabugao, Pablo N.768769805864787571.8
258.Calañgi, Mateo C.739371877066696271.8
259.Canda, Benjamin S.727177906275668271.95260.Cantoria,
Euologio718071897055727571
261.Capacio, Jr., Conrado677871906575726070.65
262.Capitulo, Alejandro P.757053877863769171.2
MRP-263.Calupitan, Jr., Alfredo 759381766475685673.15
MRP-264.Caluya, Arsenio V.758670877752778273.9
MRP-265.Campanilla, Mariano B. ...807578777371637673.65
MRP-266.Campos, Juan A. ...668583846761805773.25
267.Cardoso, Angelita G. ...787173767956696071.8
268.Cartagena, Herminio R. ....717265896473807071.65
MRP-269.Castro, Daniel T.657577768560756973.15
270.Cauntay, Gaudencio V.707872737769648071.2
271.Castro, Pedro L. de706869877675727072.35
272.Cerio, Juan A.758275866054767571.75
273.Colorado, Alfonso R.687580747766678072.6
274.Chavez, Doroteo M.736579847369668473.1
275.Chavez, Honorato A.777679867453717573.65
MRP-276.Cobangbang, Orlando B.698174827661788073.85
277.Cortez, Armando R.786088866066696473.1
278.Crisostomo, Jesus L.768774766255766671.45
MRP-279.Cornejo, Crisanto R.688778867950806073.7
MRP-280.Cruz, Raymundo 758179857257687572.95
MRP-281.Cunanan, Jose C.789263837672686572.4
282.Cunanan, Salvador F.708264926775737671.45
283.Cimafranca, Agustin B.717676807071757173.35
284.Crisol, Getulio R.709178856855715070.8
MRP-285.Dusi, Felicisimo R.768269826662807172.85

MRP-286.Datu, Alfredo J.707572868055687971.5
287.Dacuma, Luis B.716787837150657071.25
MRP-288.Degamo, Pedro R.738082748067675773.65
289.Delgado, Vicente N.708482847752735072.65
MRP-290.Diolazo, Ernesto A.758386735454757572.25
291.Dionisio, Jr., Guillermo738464897178756672.8
MRP-292.Dichoso, Alberto M.717771816975807073.65
MRP-293.Dipasupil, Claudio R.707682737970725673.9
MRP-294.Delgado, Abner758463676460707268.35
MRP-295.Domingo, Dominador T.706981826863717572.2
296.Ducusin, Agapito B.7078 53887577627668.05
MRP-297.Duque, Antonio S.757778867672647573.9
298.Duque, Castulo758073836667656670.65
299.Ebbah, Percival B.708085766663767573.95
300.Edisa, Sulpicio657775897562756572
301.Edradan, Rosa C.707584847159698673.4
MRP-302.Enage, Jacinto N.667088937267657573.2
MRP-303.Encarnacion, Alfonso B.758673816377697572.65
304.Encarnacion, Cesar657858686664757867.1
305.Estoista, Agustin A.7876748658677707671.7
MRP-306.Fabros, Jose B.667580828071677073.05
MRP-307.Fajardo, Balbino P776982836560757573.9
308.Fajardo, Genaro P.707977797950737572.5
309.Evangelita, Felicidad P.757572876363777072.15
310.Familara, Raymundo Z.687587836465686571.85
311.Fariñas, Dionisio707889666575705072.75
312.Favila, Hilario B.718474707567735972.2
MRP-313.Feliciano, Alberto I.716970856981727072.25
MRP-314.Fernando, Lope F.737786797076645073
MRP-315.Flores, Dionisio S.787277836760687372.05
MRP-316. Fortich, Benjamin B.708270707865647570.35
MRP-317.Fuente, Jose S. de la768872746071797973.55
318.Fohmantes, Nazario S.727971776861766070.9
MRP-319.Fuggan, Lorenzo B.768174697171736072.85
320.Gabuya, Jesus S.708382837063756573.75
321.Galang, Victor N.698384767057716071.95
322.Gaerlan, Manuel L.738777906761727573.15
323.Galem, Nestor R.727986786061757073.05
324.Gallardo, Jose Pe B.758875756370706571.85
MRP-325.Gallos, Cirilo B.707884918051657072.85
326.Galindo, Eulalio D.708987657871626273.4
327.Galman, Patrocino G.727280857156705371.15
328.Gamalinda, Carlos S.767981866763695572.55
329.Gamboa, Antonio G.716770727660756870.95
330.Gannod, Jose A.698075816862736871.25
MRP-331.Garcia, Matias N.677874907959766572.8
MRP-332.Ganete, Carmelo758777827457688173.3
333.Gilbang, Gaudioso R.756780826757647070.5
334.Gofredo, Claro C.687872867852707670.9
335.Gomez, Jose S.717671817663696270.85
MRP-336.Gosiaoco, Lorenzo V.689385786469705472.35
MRP-337.Gonzales, Rafael C.777571895570706070.05
MRP-338.Gracia, Eulalia L. de666890847759696573.3
339.Grageda, Jose M. A.708572677060737370.75
340.Guzman, Juan de758669846479757673.6
MRP-341.Guzman, Mateo de767979737269688073.9
342.Guzman, Salvador B. 716174726166787570.75
343.Guzman, Salvador T. de 758464817461785871.75
344.Habelito, Geronimo E.717671877360675569.65
345.Hedriana, Naterno G.756884766658766072.9
346.Hernandez, Quintin B.677572817272667670.6
1952
347.Homeres, Agustin R.738465867077637670.7
348.Ines, Leonilo F.658871887773617070.55
349.Jamer, Alipio S.687583898061655072
MRP-350.Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano M.756568857670835473.8
MRP-351.Jardinico, Jr., Emilio738672788267676472.8
MRP-352.Jaen, Justiniano F.767578847166707773.85
353. Jaring, Antonio S.727779707257715070.75
MRP-354.Javier, Aquilino M.758479787761666673.05
355.Jomuad, Francisco7575728878587674
356.Jose, Nestor L.786164736876648069.7
357.La O, Jose M.757175727067815973.5
358.Leon, Brigido C. de677578927851728072.55
359.Leones, Constante B.688179847360776073
360.Liboro, Horacio T.726980877362706172.4
361.Llanera, Cesar L.778180786459756373
362.Lomontod, Jose P.757669707376747573.2
363.Luna, Lucito707569835953747568.4
MRP-364.Luz, Lauro L.769078886458757773.95
MRP-365.Macasaet, Tomas S.738172836675727072.5
366.Magbiray, Godofredo V.806784767062656873.05
367.Majarias, Rodolfo P706264828875717972.85
MRP-368.Makabenta, Eduardo759077835971727873.3
MRP-369.Malapit, Justiniano S.748374895860727671.1
370.Maloles, Iluminado M.708773767750767672.3
371.Maniquis, Daniel R.758073916971657072.1
372.Maraña, Arsenio657960727351758667.9
373.Marasigan, Napoleon757183756962697072.75
MRP-374.Marco, Jaime P.756774766475755771.9
MRP-375.Martir, Osmundo P.708676787271755372.95
MRP-376.Masancay, Amando E.738775777250788073.2
MRP-377.Mati-ong, Ignacio T.628772797376697771.3
378.Mara, Guillermo L.707878897567666572.35
MRP-379.Mercado, Felipe A.737782827852698573.9
MRP-380.Miculob, Eugenio P.708273867752796572.8
381.Mison, Rafael M. Jr.,797873757168695371.95
MRP-382.Monponbanua, Antonio D.797968886478698373.1
MRP-383.Montero, Leodegario C.728969897068707572.15
384.Morada, Servillano S.757667716566757670.9
385.Morocco, Generoso788478846073687073
MRP-386.Mosquera, Estanislao L.757875857255776673.15
387.Motus, Rodentor P.807870947275705773.75
388.Macario, Pedro R.706774867863726672.15
MRP-389.Nadela, Geredion T.726464817350757569.15
MRP-390.Nazareno, Romeo P.677071767679755772.05
391.Nieto, Benedicto S.697977777262767672.9
MRP-392.Noguera, Raymundo718681807356727073.15
MRP-393.Nodado, Domiciano R. 707069735737647263.6
394.Nono, Pacifico G.677778677559717671.35
MRP-395.Nuval, Manuel R.787267907268786773.65
396.Ocampo, Augusto759077726955656760.7
397.Oliveros, Amado A.727568728450757971.9
398.Opiña, Jr., Pedro767774677366687071.85
MRP-399. Olaviar, Jose O.706285817450687971.8
MRP-400.Olandesca, Per O.709176877266707973.45
401.Orden, Apolonio J.726584866650726871.45
402.Ortiz, Melencio T.717578816667707872.1
MRP-403.Pablo, Fedelino S.726476867261767572.95
404.Pacifico, Vicente V.767969807652728071.95
MRP-405.Paderna, Perfecto D.756972757858757072.6
406.Padlan, Crispin M.716676796867746671.65
407.Padilla, Jose C.706567827875787573.3
408.Padilla, Jr., Estanislao E.718878865975785072.95
MRP-409.Palma, Bartolome678180827175697573.25
MRP-410.Papa, Angel A.757285857759637173.45
MRP-411.Parayno, Mario V.718874896966767373.65
412.Pariña, Santos L.708785776467637671.85
MRP-413.Pasion, Anastacio638068818279765872.55
414.Pastrana, Rizal R.697671766863778371.65
MRP-415.Paulin, Jose O.706680877550658070.9
MRP-416.Pelaez, Jr., Vicente C.798773836971686573.2
417.Peña, Jesus757575627570606670.4
418.Perez, Toribio R.716481926958677071.25
419.Pestaño, Melquiades778174875968767573.2
MRP-420. Pido, Serafin C.778172826971607571.15
421.Pinlac, Filemon677674866579657270.55
422.Poblete, Celso B.727982766664745072.15
MRP-423.Piza, Luz68707587746647570.8
424.Puzon, Eduardo S.728081697253677071.05
425.Quetulio, Josefina D.759060936478768372.9
MRP-426.QuÃpanes, Melchor V.698879826562716671.55
MRP-427.Quietson, Bayani R.737576777081715372.85
428.Racho, Macario D.687581827853665470.55
429.Ramirez, Sabas P. 718073876262758071.65
MRP-430.Raffiñan, Jose A.808379796272686573.25
MRP-431.Ramos, Patricio S.758776757272617572.25
MRP-432.Ramos-Balmori, Manuela788476904875806573.45
MRP-433.Raro, Celso758176677577557771.4
MRP-434.Rayos, Victor S.758679917167677073.9
435.Revilla, Mariano S.757881907054698173.35
436.Reyes, Abdon L.726481787673695372.85
437.Reyes, Domingo B.728778837275627072.7
38.Reyes, Francisco M.758584687571685073.9
439Reyes, Lozano M.805778797865647973.35
MRP-440.Reyes, Oscar R.757582827664686073.65
441.Rigonan, Cesar V.718565867570767072.7
442. Rivera, Honorio715670907165757171.2
MRP-443. Rivero, Buenaventura A.728872946873668072.6
MRP-444. Robles, Enrique757775778264697073.7
445.Rodriguez, Orestes Arellano767576636977657872.25
446.Roldan, Jose V.678079837371757073.9
447.Rosario, Adelaida R. del807565706872807073.15
48.Rosario, Restituto F. del757579906865666372.1
MRP-449.Sabelino, Conrado S.718169757771757072.95
450.San Juan, Damaso778672895976657271.6
451.Sañiel, Felix L.729376806775666272.1
452.Samaniego, Jesus B.758076726067687070.6
MRP-453.Sandoval, Emmanuel M.758370837767776073.95
MRP-454.Sanidad, Emmanuel Q.717581906264766872.95
455.Santiago, Jr., Cristobal757684936365597071.8
456.Santillan, Juanito Ll768983836358655271.25
MRP-457.Santos, Rodolfo C.757578827376667073.7
MRP-458.Santos, Ruperto M.675469766364716066.75
MRP-459.Santos, Aquilino C.727173797379718573.8
MRP-460.Santos, Rufino A.758179857472665473.3
461.Suanding, Bantas756767927959767673.1
MRP-462.Sulit, Feliz M.767976787275686773.5
463.Songco, Felicisimo, G.706882846069766573.35
464.Soriano, Aniceto S.647977808053706570.7
465.Suarez, Pablo D.738570877670647071.9
MRP-466.Sybico, Jesus L.797070727575726073.05

467.Tabaque, Benjamin R.696877797468726071.85
MRP-468. Tan Kiang, Clarita817972806275738073.95
MRP-469.Tando, Amado T.718278837161716072
470.Tasico, Severo E.716975897075676371.65
471.Tiburcio, Ismael P.738272937657685471.15
MRP-472.Tiongson, Federico T.707076847775755073.45
MRP-473.Tolentino, Jesus C.758963848573735073.4
474.Torrijas, Alfredo A.776667836875716371.3
MRP-475.Tobias, Artemio M.695874817155655767.55
MRP-476.Trillana, Jr., Apolonio 768676867068755073.8
MRP-477.Trinidad, Manuel O.669183756366676570.8
478.Trinidad, Pedro O.667878857851647570.3
MRP-479.Urdarbe, Flavio J.808277826756687572.6
480.Umali, Osmundo C.687581807169686071.7
481.Umayam, Juanito C.77758785565666 6071
MRP-482.Usita, Gelacio U.7572757473 76717073.55
483.Valino, Francisco M.728180846278717573.7
484.Varela, Dominador M.677581867257817073.85
485.Vega, Macairog L. de786279877070716573.8
MRP-486. Velasco, Emmanuel D.718074856066767671.85
487.Velez, Maria E.737089805650726771.05
MRP-488.Venal, Artemio V.789158677655757373.65
489.Venus, Conrado B.698174856266727777.05
MRP-490.Verzoza, Federico B.757972887668745973.7
MRP-491.Villafuerte, Eduardo V.758370766464756571.2
MRP-492.Villanueva, Cecilio C.758579886677677073.95
493.Villar, Custodio R.736970887666695070.75
MRP-494.Villaseñor, Leonidas F.808567776275767373.15
495.Viterbo, Jose H.807765937065656570.65
496.Yaranon, Pedro707776857250757571.85
MRP-497.Yasay, Mariano R.757572766377706071.1
MRP-498.Ygay, Venancio M.738083846259727772.65
499.Yulo, Jr., Teodoro738278756081757673.95
500.Zamora, Alberto706576796277698271.3
501.Rigonan, Felipe C.707969897662716471.2
A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in
subjects passed in previous examinations, showing the years in which they
took the examinations together with their grades and averages, and those
who had filed motions for reconsideration which were denied, indicated by the
initials MRD, follows:
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Civ.LandMerc.Int.Pol.Crim.Rem.Leg.Gen.Ave.
1.Amao, Sulpicio M.
194668677676737349 5066.5
1950598067776280715767.4
2.Baldo, Olegario Ga.
1951657658555963757264.9
1952656875847259735769.75
1953577468687652717666.7
3.Blanco ,Jose B.
MRD-1949757570757776609072.15
1951647158656870757166.95
4.Condeno, Mateo
1950718062757581559269.3
195170606165776764678167.85
5.Ducusin, Agapito B.
MRD-1949697076737671556068.65
1950607155676775568963.1
6.Garcia, Manuel N.
MRD-1949607082797069608069.25
1950576551695485568460.3
7.Luna, Lucito A.
1946635369767576576966.55
1952707569835953747568.4
8.Maraña, Arsenio S.
1949726868757572607569.35
1952657960727351758667.9
9.Montano, Manuel M.1951616058607063756464.8
1952707765796652705066.4
1953786466688150717870.65
10.Peña, Jesus S.
1950257545754552467146.2
1951746162656965755768.2
1952757575627570606670.4
11.Placido, Sr., Isidro
1950687870756970586967.75
1951656275607357757166.8
12.Rementizo, Filemon S.
1949657572756075558566.65
1951685748609166557564.05
1952685368675856756465.7
13.Rivera, Eulogio J.1952678051696977735366.35
1953656778747562698070.9
14.Rodulfa, Juan T.
1951676070656856756667.75
1952707167786775717070.1
15.Sanchez, Juan J.
1948396982757672555063.5
MRD-1949675669757277607568
1951705955606857786765.8
16.Santos, Constantino
1952627654827277666566.65
1953737170657864657870.4
17.Santos, Salvador H.
1951606455706852707562.85
1952756470817655617569.11953707179657254668070
18.Sevilla, Macario C.
MRD-1948506476666669605263.1
MRD-1949476678647186658568
1950356540756357247945
MRD-1951685972556965757569.3
1953707374708156697171.05.
Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some
candidates — 85 in all — presented motions for reconsideration of their
grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of those
candidates separating those who filed mere motions for reconsideration (56)
from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic Act, is as follows:
1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION.
Civ.LandMerc.Int.Pol.Crim.Rem.Leg.
1.Acenas, Calixto R.737068628251677773.45
2.Alcantara, Pedro N.677075858754718072.8
3.Alejandro, Exequiel677271758076757773.4
4.Andres, Gregorio M.707386587950717872.7
5.Arnaiz, Antonio E.668076587968778173.4
6.Asis, Floriano U. de667875817755736971.25
7.Bacaiso, Celestino M.716576687650757070.95
8.Bala, Florencio F.648247708258758267
9.Baldo, Olegario A.67746868765277666.7
10.Barrios, Benjamin O.657176758062837373.95
11.Buhay, Eduardo L.737671917661747873.35
12.Burgos, Dominador C.728089616637696870.05
13.Cariño, Eldo J.798160757474767473
14.Casar, Dimapuro 677384797761717473.35
15.Castañeda, Gregorio707380717570737873.95
16.Estrellado, Benjamin R.677964738262717470.2
17.Fabunan, Edilberto C.707268697760767471.1
18.Feril, Domingo B.757184657060657071.6
19.Fernandez, Alejandro G.657587808163618072.8
20.Gapus, Rosita S. (Miss) 768086776474666973.9
21.Garcia, Rafael B.708670757363737571.65
22.Gracia, Miguel L. de736875598051727171
23.Gungon, Armando G.687676847757778373.6
24.Gutierrez, Antonio S.687766707259717469.1
25.Ilejay, Abraham I.777076778162706873.7
26.Leon, Benjamin La. de666675707755718270.35
27.Lugtu, Felipe L.627078657856698169.9
28.Lukman, Abdul-Hamid766467697359737570.45
29.Maloles, Jr., Benjamin G.777668687151757870.85
30.Maloles, Julius G.777160717962687269.75
31.Mandi, Santiago P.657670617968757271.1
32.Margete, Rufino C.707666758573717572.75
33.Melocoton, Nestorio B.708173788352727572.35
34.Molina, Manuel C.757870617563668570.95
35.Muñoz, Mariano A.758086677457687673.75
36.Navarro, Buenaventura M.807565758355737973
37.Nodado, Domiciano R.606767507050567561.7
38.Papas, Sisenando B.656271617056666766
39.Pagulayan-Sy, Fernando637571628367707270.4
40.Padula, Benjamin C.707754627478756869.05
41.Pasno, Enrique M.787266547158727869.85
42.Peña, Jr., Narciso709581786766677372.55
43.Peralta, Rodolfo P.707052816863596963.7
44.Pigar, Leopoldo R.767578617272717973.75
45.Publico, Paciano L.686976767059746770.6
46.Radaza, Leovigildo757876617750718672.2
47.Ramos, Bernardo M.646275938152668070.1
48.Rabaino, Andres D.687275737855697670.65
49.Ravanera, Oscar N. 707780718262697873.6
50.Renovilla, Jose M.657580687952627869.5
51.Sabaot, Solomon B.697380698269697973.85
52.Sumaway, Ricardo S.667669767456726869.1
53.Torrefiel, Sofronio O.707774757350687269.55
54.Vera, Federico V. de606147776950677760.9
55.Viray, Venancio Bustos 656767527364716567.15
56.Ylaya, Angela P. (Miss) 637056756854707764.5
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT. NO. 972
1.Ala, Narciso707173597374817773.5
2.Alcantara, Pedro N.677075858754718072.8
3.Arellano, Antonio L.746673607863787272.9
4.Buhay, Eduardo L.737671917661747873.35
5.Calautit, Celestino R.717884757561687273.2
6.Casuncad, Sulvio P.617382698168718473.05
7.Enriquez, Pelagio y Coñcepcion846976758250587972.05
8.Estonina, Severino807464898156688272.4
9.Fernandez, Alejandro Q.657587808163618072.8
10.Fernandez, Luis N.707577757867727373.35
11.Figueroa, Alfredo A.707587787550686872.3
12.Formilleza, Pedro657589688351707573.25
13.Garcia, Manuel M.696883837362627071
14.Grospe, Vicente E.686578667961698271.6
15.Galema, Nestor R. (1952)727986786061757073.05
16.Jacobo, Rafael F.767675747650727672.3
17.Macalindong, Reinerio L.677779797472687772.75
18Mangubat, Antonio M.707078618074627071.45
19.Montano, Manuel M.786466688150717870.65
20.Plomantes, Marcos736774586870767171.6
21.Ramos, Eugenio R.708076677269727972.6
22.Reyes, Juan R.717377768159727473.2
23.Reyes, Santiago R.657883607675707072.9
24.Rivera, Eulogio J. 656778747562698070.9
25.Santos, Constantino P.737170657864657870.4
26.Santos, Salvador H.707179657254668070
27.Sevilla, Macario C.707374708156697171.05
28.Villavicencio, Jose A. ..... 787570676977647773.2
29.Viray, Ruperto G.767376738058688373.25
These are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by
this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who have not presented any petition,
they reach a total of 1,094.
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the
passing general average in the bar examination of August and November of
1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per cent in 1949;
maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but raising to 75 per cent
those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This caused the introduction in
1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill No. 12 which was intended to
amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court,
concerning the admission of attorneys-at-law to the practice of the profession.
The amendments embrace many interesting matters, but those referring to
sections 14 and 16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as
follows:
"SEC. 14.Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be

deemed to have passed the examinations successfully, he must have
obtained a general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per
cent in any subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects
shall be given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land
Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent;
Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law, 5
per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises,
5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent.
Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another
examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating of 70 per
cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in determining
their general average in any subsequent examinations: Provided,
however, That if the candidate fails to get a general average of 70 per
cent in his third examination, he shall lose the benefit of having already
passed some subjects and shall be required to the examination in all the
subjects.
"SEC. 16.Admission and oath of successful applicants. — Any
applicant who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all
subjects without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held after
the 4th day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled
to admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the
Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.(Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No.
12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the
matter before us being:
"It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar
examinations should be compelled to repeat even those subjects which
they have previously passed. This is not the case in any other
government examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been
amended in this measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject
which he has previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951,
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951,
the President requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on the
same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose to refrain
from making any and one took no part. With regards to the matter that
interests us, the Court said:
"The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this
amendment provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or higher
in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he need not be
examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of passing
the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or three subjects
at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that although it makes
it easier and more convenient for the candidate because he may in an
examination prepare himself on only one or two subjects so as to insure
passing them, by the time that he has passed the last required subject,
which may be several years away from the time that he reviewed and
passed the first subjects, he shall have forgotten the principles and
theories contained in those subjects and remembers only those of the
one or two subjects that he had last reviewed and passed. This is highly
possible because there is nothing in the law which requires a candidate to
continue taking the Bar examinations every year in succession. The only
condition imposed is that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the
examination in no more than three installments; but there is no limitation
as to the time or number of years intervening between each examination
taken. This would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and
the Court in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is
so admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses
the knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law
subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able to
practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal service
required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects
eight years ago, another three subjects one year later, and the last two
subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of
requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade in
any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It
requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal subjects at
the time of admission to the practice of law.
xxx xxx xxx.
"We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule
127. This amendment provides that any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per
cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July,
1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70 per
cent in any examination since the year 1946 without failing below 50 per
cent in any subject, despite their non-admission to the Bar by the
Supreme Court because they failed to obtain a passing general average in
any of those years, will be admitted to the Bar. This provision is not only
prospective but retroactive in its effects.
"We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding
amendment that we are not exactly in favor of reducing the passing
general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the
future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after every
bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a
passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present
amendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and revoking
the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of
those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or more but less
than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is clear that this
question involves legal implications, and this phase of the amendment if
finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test. As one member
of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a court renders a
decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the basis of and in
accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the subsequent
amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not affect the final
decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in the sense of
revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.
"Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that
members of the bar are officers of the courts, including the Supreme
Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court
impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its
officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to a
candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general
average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that year in order
to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and
declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to be
its officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the reduction of
the passing general average runs counter to all these acts and
resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says that a
candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its officer
because he was unprepared, undeserving and unqualified, nevertheless
and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this Court to serve as
its officer. We repeat, that this is another important aspect of the
question to be carefully and seriously considered."
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
"I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to
elevate the standard of the legal profession and maintain it on a high level.
This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely a special
class who have failed in the bar examination. Moreover, the bill contains
provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.
"Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent in
any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946, shall
be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office. This
provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does specifically one
group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates in the 1946,
1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
"The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final
resolutions of the Supreme Court made in accordance with the law then
in force. It should be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme
Court passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar
those who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The
provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the
Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those
who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year.
Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would be
morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed in the
examinations for admission to other professions such as medicine,
engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy."
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines,
but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by section 20,
article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was presented in the
Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM

1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1.Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of
70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August
1951 bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per
cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1964 bar
examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations without a candidate
obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to
take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the
Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That 75 per cent passing general
average shall be restored in all succeeding examinations; and Provided,
finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-half or more of a
fraction, shall be considered as one and included as part of the next
whole number.
SEC. 2.Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in
any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed to
have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall
be included in computing the passing general average that said candidate
may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3.This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
"This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and
to afford another opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated
by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would
otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so
considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The
Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to 74
in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing grades
and to give satisfaction to all parties concerned, it is proposed in this bill a
gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar examinations
as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per cent; for 1952 bar
examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination, 72 per cent; for
1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar examination, 74 per
cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be restored with the condition
that the candidate shall not obtain in any subject a grade of below 50 per
cent. The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade, is
the tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately
after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency
of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students
who took up law soon after the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the
preparation of our students as well as the available reading materials will
be under normal conditions, if not improved from those years preceding
the last world war.
In this bill we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme
Court assumed the supervision as well as the administration of the study
of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar Bill of 1951.
"The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his
objections that the bill would admit to the practice of law 'a special class
who failed in the bar examination'. He considered the bill a class
legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct
because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court
have already established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent
the passing mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These
bar candidates for whom this bill should be enacted, considered
themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the
established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of the
insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were unavoidably
placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could not have been
altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without giving due
consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the bar
candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not yet
altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being inconsistent with
the principles of their previous resolutions.
"If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple
curative act or corrective statute which Congress has the power to
enact. The requirement of a 'valid classification' as against class
legislation, is very expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
"'A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the
class, all who possess a common disability, attribute, or classification, and
there must be a "natural" and substantial differentiation between those
included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class is
accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then have
the dissevered factions of the original unit designated with different rules
established for each.'" (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier, 199 Ind. 95, N. E.
465 (1926).
"Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides
brings new conditions which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes
the new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting
statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a few.
If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The
constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It permits
them when there are special evils with which the general laws are
incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the special
form. *** The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative policy, with a
wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers. Only in the case of
plain abuse will there be revision by the court. (In Williams vs. Mayor and
City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 71 L. Ed. 1015, 63 Sup. Ct. 431).
(1932).
"This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always
retroact to the extent of the care or correction only as in this case from
1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per cent
in the Rules of Court.
"For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly
recommended.
(Sgd.) "PABLO ANGELES DAVID
"Senator"
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above
transcribed. The President again asked the comments of this Court, which
endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive
Secretary, Manila, with the information that, with respect to Senate Bill No.
371, the members of the Court are taking the same views they
expressed on Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951,
contained in the first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951,
to the Assistant Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARAS.
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed
to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21,
1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times erroneously
cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and
that both the President and the author of the Bill were candidates for re-
election, together, however, they lost in the polls.
Separate Opinions
LABRADOR J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the
exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the Court
and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission thereto in the
interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The power to admit is
judicial in the sense that discretion is used in its exercise. This power should be
distinguished from the power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It
is only this power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in
the Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit or
not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examination, the qualifications
of applicants, the passing grades, etc, are within the scope of the legislative
power. But the power to determine when a candidate has made or has not
made the required grade is judicial, and lies completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial
function, and lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of
amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general average of
72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in 1955 should be
2 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]
RENATO L. CAYETANO , petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON.

JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and
Management , respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
DECISION
PARAS J :
PARAS, p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only
legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a
profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1(1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six
Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the
time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section 1(1), Article XII-C of the 1973
Constitution which similarly provides:
"There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age
and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the
Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for al least ten years." (Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice
of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office. cdphil
Black defines "practice of law" as:

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal
principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation,
but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients
and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney
engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be
an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling
clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending
litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate."
(Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.).
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and
Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he:
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms,
associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a
representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective,
before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or
defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their
rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court
or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law." (State ex.
rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, (105 Phil. 173, 176-
177) stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
(Emphasis supplied)
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings
in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these
transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are
always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great
capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary
functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the
question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the
lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice
and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the
public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons
possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at
all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.], p. 665-666,
citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new
lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as
advocacy, counseling and public service.
"One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the
profession. If what he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for
attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and he follows some
one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law
within the meaning of the statute." (Barr D. Cardell, 155 NW 312).
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law,
legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23).
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a
liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law." cdrep
"MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I
forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May
I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
"THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
"MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section 1
is that 'They must be Members of the Philippine Bar' — I am quoting from the
provision — 'who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' "
"To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the
Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to
make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of
the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the
COA. We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are
employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission
on Audit.
"This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and
Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this
interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the
qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice
of law for at least ten years is taken up.
"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
"MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on the
Commission on Audit?"
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
"MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is
equivalent to the practice of law.
"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

"MR. OPLE. Thank you."
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the
Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be
certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or members
of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous
with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it
is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke,
Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois), 1986], p. 15]).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly
understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering
legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole practitioners."
Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the
firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the
members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologies, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do.
(Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593).
The practice of law is defined as "the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank &
Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A. 2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne,
128 Conn. 325, 22 A. 2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function
known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be
too global to be workable. (Wolfram, op. cit.)
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly
familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers
spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without
litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self-perception of the
legal profession. (Ibid.). LibLex
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not
reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander Sycip, a corporate lawyer, once
articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today,
there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries
cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such
as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal
work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who
do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find
themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely describe[d] as business
counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner,
the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law,
as in medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner will engage in a number of
legal tasks, each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal
institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in
specialized practice will usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as
representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the
relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else.
Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional
lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective
for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is
constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of
the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is
that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature
of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform
that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and
government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging
trends in corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of
law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary
transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups,
in particular those members participating in various legal-policy decisional
contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation
law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an

accurate understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law
research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal
policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional
contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting

and weighing of significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the
necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses of action, and the
need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted
the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational
analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive
component of the policy-making process, wherein a model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative courses of
action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and
projecting the trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received
relatively little organized and formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing
corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal
research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained

primarily in the law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-
variable decisional contexts and the various approaches for handling such
problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in
business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of
decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical
techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of
complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require
the services of an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that
arise from each and every necessary step in securing and maintaining the
business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the

"abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with
a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain
what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys
employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of the
corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal
problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain
matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal
problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal
affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter
alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary
(in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies
(including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities
which require an ability to deal with the law.
LLjur

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal
affairs of the business of the corporation he is representing. These include such
matters as determining policy and becoming involved in management. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the
action, or not understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the
organization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of
his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune
to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a
multinational corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few
opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies
and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as
glamorous, this is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however,
the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice,"
May 25, 1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance.
To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad
lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the
difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to
speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of
confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities Code but
an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of
learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular
significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary
skills applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared
area linking them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it
forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role.
For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including
the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are
required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's strategy at multiple
levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental
units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each
other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the
corporation is rapidly changing. The modern corporate lawyer has gained a new
role as a stockholder — in some cases participating in the organization and
operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-
making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. (Emphasis supplied).
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies

toward the promotion and management of technology. New collaborative
arrangements for promoting specific technologies or competitiveness more
generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries.
In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel
comprises a distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of
organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary groups within
organizations has been found to be related to identifiable factors in the group-
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the
environment, coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of
team performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-
vis the managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is
seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures and to
understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations.
(emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an
effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing
immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory
levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems
— physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming
techniques now make the systems dynamics principles more accessible to
managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied).
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions
involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be
used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement,
and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases.
(Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be
used directly by parties and mediators in all kinds of negotiations. All integrated
set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation support, including
hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international
joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function,
concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that

comprise a major part of the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from
those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with minimizing the
risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that
time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made. llcd
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are

undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal consequences attach. It
needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate
today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy
work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general
counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the
legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the
firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing
improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees,
managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with
public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not
enough to make one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full
sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not to understand all of the law's effects on corporate
activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the
management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution" or make-up of the modern corporation. "Business Star, The
Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a
passing knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet,
many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What
transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit
ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure?
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jar. 11, 1989, p. 4).LLpr
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the

position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same
day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment
of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar
examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying
his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo).
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-
1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries,
negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and
since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic
consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National
Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the
field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and
engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform
bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee
on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the
Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile
government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list
system for the House of Representative." (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a
member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which
is adequately constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a
negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal
officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise
the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for
Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down
the law as far as the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan
Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1)
business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13)
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring
program. For aside from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal
advising, they score national development policies as key factors in maintaining
their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager,
regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for International Development,
during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan World
Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on
August 26-31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied).
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely re
negotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and
agreement drafting and in re negotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may
work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation
of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such
a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed
only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the
Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of
Law, 1987, p. 321). (Emphasis supplied).
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of
terms and conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to
perform one or more elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only
define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open
to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a complete debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis
is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements — an adherence to the rule of law in
domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: 'They carry no banners, they beat no drums;
but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet
genius and serene mastery.' (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in
Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and
4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly
the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction
intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod s past work experiences as a
lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-
negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court
said: prcd
"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the

officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being
that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does,
then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better
qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide."
(emphasis supplied).
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission,
171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
"It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the
other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to
attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Law. The
Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that
another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority
to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An
appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is
vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law." (Emphasis supplied).
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4)
stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3)
issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on
Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v.
Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-
Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:
"The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years
without re appointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office
for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years,
without re appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity."
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished
from the modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's
definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practiced two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written
opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the
definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law."
True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that
the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations,
most individuals, in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are
actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that
Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practicing law for
over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practicing law, without first
becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of
the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I
greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought against the
President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on
Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary
qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the
exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon
a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly
shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there
is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less
a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown. llcd
Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the
Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment?
Clearly, the answer is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has
confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress)
decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme
Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that —
"No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins."
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron
rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This
blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside
herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging
on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood
ow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of
the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ ., concur.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurs in the result.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.).
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., took no part.

3
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 553 . June 17, 1993.]
MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.,

respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW, MEANING AND EXTENT OF.
— Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of
the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to
the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured,
although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. In the practice of
his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal
types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and
appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority
to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to
assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. When a person
participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then
takes the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in
court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.
2. ID.; ID.; LEGAL SUPPORT SERVICES IN CASE AT BAR CONSTITUTE PRACTICE
OF LAW. — The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and
out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree
with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations
that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law." The
contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither
be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's
own description of the services it has been offering, to wit: . . . While some of the
services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs
for the efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research
aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal
information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-
advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information,
for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoptation, it strains
the credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is
look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were
merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily
have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on
the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice,
as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but
extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. The
aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the
January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine
Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main
purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales: . . .
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARALEGAL OR LEGAL ASSISTANT; CONCEPT IN THE UNITED
STATES. — Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted
by respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and
degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. As the
concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the
major standards or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association
which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are
also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and
the American Paralegal Association.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT IN THE PHILIPPINES. — In the Philippines, we still
have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to
practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of another
or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and
extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor.
(Illustrations: . . .)
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL POLICY ON PARALEGAL. — We have to
necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the
United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but
be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action,
and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. . . . Accordingly, we have adopted
the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory
authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice
law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice
of law. That policy should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are
unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from
persons licensed to practice law in the state.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW IN CASE AT BAR CANNOT BE
PERFORMED BY PARALEGALS; REASON. — It should be noted that in our
jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which constitute
practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted
as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is
entitled to practice law. . . .
7. ID.; ADVERTISEMENT BY LAWYER; RULE. — Anent the issue on the validity of
the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services. Nor shall he pay or give something of value to representatives of the
mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.
Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect
advertisements for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring
newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in connection
with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance
of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHARACTER AND CONDUCT AS BEST ADVERTISEMENT. — We
repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing
itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome
result of propaganda.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISEMENT OF TALENT OR SKILL. — The
standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise
his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods.
The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal
business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a
profession. . . .
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — The first of such exceptions is the
publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such
data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone
numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and
admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and
other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented." . . . The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the
law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special
branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or
office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable.
He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR LAW LIST. — The law list must be a
reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not
properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name
to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the
dignity or standing of the profession.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Verily, taking into consideration the
nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is being taken
to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent
corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do
not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION IN BATES, ET AL. vs. STATE BAR OF
ARIZONA (433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691) AS TO PUBLICATION OF
LEGAL FEES, NOT APPLICABLE; REASONS. — The ruling in the case of Bates, et al.
vs. State Bar of Arizona, which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at
bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly
allows a lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against advertisements by
lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial consultation or the
availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee
to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or
the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule
in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in
that state." This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that
being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if and when the canons
expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in
the case at bar. It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about
lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion
dropped significantly with respect to these characteristics of lawyers: . . .
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and
judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by
respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under
attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is
of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at
times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to
RESOLUTION
REGALADO, J : p
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from
issuing advertisements similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes À' and
`B' (of said petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from making
advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those
allowed by law." cdrep
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A
SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE Please call: 521-0767,

LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
7-Flr. Victoria Bldg. UN Ave., Mla.
Annex B
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through

The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232521-7251
522-2041; 521-0767
It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are
champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar and
that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by the
said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before
quoted. cdphil
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said
advertisements at its instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of
law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with the
use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent further argues
that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of
John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by
the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised
herein, we required the (1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine
Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers' Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Women
Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines
(WLAP), and (6) Federation International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their
respective position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda.
3 The said bar associations readily responded and extended their valuable
services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with appreciation and
gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the
services offered by respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it
constitutes practice of law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be
the subject of the advertisements herein complained of. cdphil
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem
it proper and enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective
position papers adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:
xxx xxx xxx
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to
distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal
services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are
essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that
document search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies
like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining
documents like clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitute
practice of law?
xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue
with respondent's foreign citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has
made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes the view
espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise
one's legal services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to
respondent's act of establishing a "legal clinic" and of concomitantly
advertising the same through newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this
Honorable Court to perpetually restrain respondent from undertaking
highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as aforedescribed 4 .
xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it renders
legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the
public, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply assumes
this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect
that the advertisements have on the reading public.
The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced,

first of all, to the very name being used by respondent — "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes the
rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More importantly, the
term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical clinic connotes
doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements
subject of the present case, appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which
all the more reinforces the impression that it is being operated by
members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name of a person
being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and this practically removes
whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or
services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal
support services" as claimed by it, or whether it offers legal services as
any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal
support services," as the respondent would have it. The advertisements
in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the reading public
that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance

of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in
question are only meant to inform the general public of the services being
offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize a Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is
only one instance when a foreign divorce, is recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . .
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage
as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law
for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject
to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relation during the marriage within the limits provided by
this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the
message being conveyed is that Filipinos can avoid the legal
consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but
encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice, where
certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At
worst, this is outright malpractice. LibLex
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities

aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such

as that shown in Annex "A" of the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a
motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret
marriage," makes light of the "special contract of permanent union," the
inviolable social institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this
particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in
secrecy, which is suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a
marriage license. LLpr
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be

concluded that the above impressions one may gather from the
advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply
because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place
where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the "legal support services"
respondent offers do not constitute legal services as commonly
understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers
legal services, as earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is
that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader, members of the bar
themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which
are contrary to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby
destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
xxx xxx xxx
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from
causing the publication of the advertisements in question, or any other
advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent
should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the
services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from offering such
services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research,
electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms,
investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly
benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead
encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-
members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be
no choice but to prohibit such business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better
performed by specialists in other fields, such as computer experts, who
by reason of their having devoted time and effort exclusively to such field
cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To
prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the
profession of the great benefits and advantages of modern technology.
Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using
a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or
tolerate the illegal practice of law in any form, not only for the protection
of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for the protection
of the public. Technological development in the profession may be
encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of, illegal
practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform
all of its services, but only if such services are made available exclusively
to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult
task of carefully distinguishing between which service may be offered to
the public in general and which should be made available exclusively to
members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services

ought to be prohibited outright, such as acts which tend to suggest or
induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise
illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding such matters,
it must be required to include, in the information given, a disclaimer that it
is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be
illegal under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering
a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be consulted before deciding on
which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend any
particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed

exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear and unmistakable
disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services. cdrep
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But

nobody should be allowed to represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit,
without such term being clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without
any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law
practice in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal
profession, but before allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation's Articles of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to each
and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Rules of Court 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but
engaged in giving legal support services to lawyers and laymen, through
experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent's acts of holding out itself to the public under the trade name
"The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment for its enumerated
services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the
regulatory powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is
merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch credulity. Respondent's
own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don
Perkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering
legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that the
practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes
drawing of deeds, incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients
as to their legal rights and then take them to an attorney and ask the
latter to look after their case in court (See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics,
1948 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of
law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by a corporation employing
competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or
device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle
for deception, especially so when the public cannot ventilate any
grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the
limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as
members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act
for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a
profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to
another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who
have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are
the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues
stated herein, are, to wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical,
but also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress

and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate officers for its
unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and
immoral advertising.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It claims
that it merely renders "legal support services" to lawyers, litigants and the
general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose Clause of its
Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment).
But its advertised services, as enumerated above, clearly and
convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice, albeit outside
the court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons
and Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces,
annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration
problems; the Investment Law of the Philippines and such other related
laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the

aforesaid laws, the legal principles and procedures related thereto, the
legal advises based thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case,
the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what
lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:
In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount

consideration should be given to the protection of the general public from
the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities who may
be engaged in the practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year

course of study on top of a four-year bachelor of arts or sciences course
and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer
qualified to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions as an aid
to the administration of justice, there are in those jurisdictions, courses of
study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal with
the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to
establish these courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that
at present, these do not exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this
Honorable Court may decide to take measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general
public in the guise of being "paralegals" without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the
dangers which may be brought about by advertising of legal services.
While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case
that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity
staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the
general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services
without being qualified to offer such services." 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however,
seems to give the impression that information regarding validity of
marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in
essence, legal matters, will be given to them if they avail of its services.
The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters.
It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed,
staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the misleading impression that
there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in
any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic,
Inc.
Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its
President and majority stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on
the structure and main purpose of Respondent corporation in the
aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit
cases for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above
cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility
of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to
solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold letters it announces that the
Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a secret
marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid
marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages in the
Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the
law. And to employ an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is
not necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the
trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable
people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal services for their
particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the
subject matter of this petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even
by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law has yet to be
amended so that such as act could become justifiable. LLphil
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that

secret marriages and divorce are possible in this country for a fee, when
in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go
about having a secret marriage here, when it cannot nor should ever be
attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country there is
none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines.
It is also against good morals and is deceitful because it falsely
represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws cannot
be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done. LLjur
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that
solicitation for clients by an attorney by circulars of advertisements, is
unprofessional and offenses of this character justify permanent
elimination from the Bar. 10
6. Federacion International de Abogadas:

xxx xxx xxx
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as
management consultancy firms or travel agencies, whether run by
lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the business of
respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the practice
of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make
respondent guilty of unlawful practice of law.
". . . Of necessity, no one . . . acting as a consultant can

render effective service unless he is familiar with such statutes and
regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct
which the law forbids. It seems . . . clear that (the consultant's)
knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as a factor in
determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute
the practice of law . . .. It is not only presumed that all men know
the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with the broad features of the law . . .. Our
knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate — moulds our
conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we
are serving others. Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally
possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching their
particular business or profession. A good example is the architect,
who must be familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention
codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans
and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not practicing
law.
"But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire

tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the industrial
relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he
recommends, a decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are
they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not, provided no
separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the
legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal
problem.
"It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
"If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his

land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in respect
to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed
this function would probably be considered to be trespassing on
territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial
relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a
lawyer always at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not
the case. The most important body of industrial relations experts
are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of
them are lawyers. Among the larger corporate employers, it has
been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility
in employee matters to a management group chosen for their
practical knowledge and skill in such matters, and without regard to
legal training or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendant have tendered to the smaller employers the same
service that the larger employers get from their own specialized
staff.
"The handling of industrial relations is growing into a

recognized profession for which appropriate courses are offered
by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious
about declaring [that] a widespread, well-established method of
conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class of
men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to
do so, or that the technical education given by our schools cannot
be used by the graduates in their business.
"In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should

consider his work for any particular client or customer, as a whole.
I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the
law defining his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the
practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me.
Defendant's primary efforts are along economic and psychological
lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must work,
just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the architect may
plan. The incidental legal advice or information defendant may give,
does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me
add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed
services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he
would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees' wills.
"Another branch of defendant's work is the representation of

the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in collective
bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the
practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may
select an agent particularly skilled in the subject under discussion,
and the person appointed is free to accept the employment
whether or not he is a member of the bar. Here, however, there
may be an exception where the business turns on a question of
law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not
lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a disputed right-of-
way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the
probable outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party
to the same opinion, then it may be that only a lawyer can accept
the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his
men grows from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a
statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I
need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not
presented by the proofs. cdphil
"Defendant also appears to represent the employer before

administrative agencies of the federal government, especially
before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An
agency of the federal government, acting by virtue of an authority
granted by the Congress, may regulate the representation of
parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without
power to interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits.
The rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the
right to appear ìn person, or by counsel, or by other
representative.' Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S.
203.31. `Counsel' here means a licensed attorney, and òther
representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even
arguing questions purely legal." (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp.
154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful
calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the
practice of law provided that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major

non-legal problem;
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to

members of the bar;
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or

information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular
client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of
Professional Responsibility succinctly states the rule of conduct:
"Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession

or occupation concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear
to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity."
1.10. In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding
services (See Annex "A", Petition). Services on routine, straightforward
marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if
the problem is as complicated as that described in Rx for Legal Problems"
on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such
as the Legal Clinic, renders such services, then it is engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce,

absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See Annexes "A" and "B",
Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute practice
of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer
buys materials on the subject and determines by himself what courses of
action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving

information, the Legal Clinic's paralegals may apply the law to the
particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would
constitute unauthorized practice of law.
"It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which

purports to say what the law is amounts to legal practice. And the
mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be
accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does
not affect this. . . . Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of
these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how
the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of
law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted
texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no
personal contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor
does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary
to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF
LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A
PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the
book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and
does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem
peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport `to give personal advice
on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation — in the publication and sale of the
kits, such publication and sale did not constitute the unlawful
practice of law . . .. There being no legal impediment under the
statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the
injunction against defendant maintaining an office for the purpose
of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or
separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest
in any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and
against his having any personal contact with any prospective
purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that
for the charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal
advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of
the purchaser's asserted matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of
other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary
documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference to the
giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce,
separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and should
be affirmed." (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in
Statsky, supra at p. 101.)
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory." It is not controverted, however, that if the
services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would constitute
practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits
that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the judicious disposition of
this case.
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the
impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that there is a secret
marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites of
marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage
can be secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second

paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily related to the first paragraph)
fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services" or "legal support
services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes

exigent for a proper determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On
this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has long been the subject of
judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down general
principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of
which we now take into account. LLjur
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of
the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of
service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal
advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by
which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending
in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in
three principal types of professional activity: legal advice and instructions to
clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of
documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power
and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law,
inorder to assist in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in
the practice of law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their
legal rights and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the later to look
after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for compensation
regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent,
practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several
cases, we laid down the test to determine whether certain acts constitute
"practice of law," thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of
legal principles and technique to serve the interest of another with his
consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in
the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing,
the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal
advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law."
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land
Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A
person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of

advising persons, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there,
in such representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under
the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the
practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)."
This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105
Phil. 173, 176-177), stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or
litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of, such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected
with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in
bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small

part of work performed outside of any court and having no
immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of
subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and
other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and
great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations.
These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear
an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts.
No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the
order, can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer
which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance
to the welfare of the public that these manifold customary
functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate
learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times
under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all
attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973
ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194
N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144)."
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of
court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the
perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar associations that the
activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can
neither be seriously considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by
respondent's own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
"Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by
trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are strictly non-
diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and
modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and communication, such
as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document
search; evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact
finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of basic
institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like
birth, marriage, property, or business registrations; educational or
employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation like
clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about
laws of other countries that they may find useful, like foreign divorce,
marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory to
emigration to that foreign country, and other matters that do not involve
representation of clients in court; designing and installing computer
systems, programs, or software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts, and other entities engaged
in dispensing or administering legal services." 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely

involve mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer
systems and programs for the efficient management of law offices, or the
computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice to justify an
exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information
to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-advisory and
non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example,
about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the credulity of
this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a
bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to
explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the
proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is
what its advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact
that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice,
as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but
extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the
January 13, 1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine
Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the structure, main
purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic,
with offices on the seventh floor of the Victoria Building along U.N.
Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and even if it is as
complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales
and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are "specialists" in various
fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation
and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law.
These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors
and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the
medical field toward specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford
the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "When they come, we
start by analyzing the problem. That's what doctors do also. They ask
you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the symptoms, and so on. That's how
we operate, too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it's
referred to one of our specialists."
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or
follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic disposes of in a matter of
minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss
can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital, the residents
or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while you wait
basis. Again, kung baga sa ospital, out-patient, hindi kailangang ma-
confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which require more extensive "treatment" are dealt with
accordingly. "If you had a rich realtive who died and named you her sole
heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property, we would
refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your relative is even
taxed by the state for the right to transfer her property, and only a
specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with that problem.
Now, if there were other heirs contesting your rich relative's will, then you
would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the problem for
presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case." 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not
controlling. What is important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by
virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the
ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which it has
caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding. prcd
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said
reported facts sufficiently establish that the main purpose of respondent is to
serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client may
avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the
domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in
the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private
respondent which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals.
Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals
found duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on
the lawyers is an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails
to maintain proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The purpose is to
protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary
control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction where from respondent
would wish to draw support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the
practice of law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and have been
admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically so provide. 25 The
practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only
those persons are allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments
previously acquired through education and study, have been recognized by the
courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to
advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or liabilities of their
clients, with respect to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of
law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of law those not admitted
to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from competition, but in the
protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can
exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the
concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the
law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits,
respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial
rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by
respondent, there are schools and universities there which offer studies and
degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. 28 As the
concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the
major standards, or guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association
which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs
(1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are
also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and
the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of
what may be considered, as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited
representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable
services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of
constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an
attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be
hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person
into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal
assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give
something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned
that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring
his photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer
has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and
all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise
his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. 37
The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal
business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs vs. Estanislao R.
Bavot 38 an advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in
the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute improper advertising or
solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation
by the respondent of the ethics of his profession, it being a brazen
solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly
provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law
for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession
and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his
services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles
the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of
old defiled the temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the establishment
of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust.
This cannot be forced but must be the outcome of character and
conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible
for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing
itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome
result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of
the profession enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or
solicitation and define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The
exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner
consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief
biographical and informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may
include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his professional
associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with
dates of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-
public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it
cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or
periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a
lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the
bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may
contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is
connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced.
The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of
changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his
name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special
branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements
for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of
the fees charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find
and so hold that the time definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any
of the above-mentioned exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is
repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is
obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception
to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of
legal fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged for the specific services.
No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in our former
Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the
exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is
implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This goes to show that an
exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an
exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.LLpr
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association

after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after
viewing television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped
significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and
judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by
respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been under
attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is
of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at
times, to adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond
reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to
disciplinary action, to advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to
aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio
P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in
this proceeding will be dealt with more severely.
While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of
the purpose/s for which the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon
and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an obiter on that
aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present
proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative
that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and
forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation
forum, since, under the present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation
cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this country. This
interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted
by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support
services. llcd
The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the
concern and province of the Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding
quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual background and
basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative
misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent,
The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of
any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor and purpose
as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or
indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of
Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in accordance herewith.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, 5. A facsimile of the scales of justice is printed together with and on the left
side of "The Legal Clinic, Inc." in both advertisements which were published in a
newspaper of general circulation.
2. 433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed 2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691.
3. Resolution dated January 15, 1991, Rollo, 60; Resolution dated December 10, 1991,
Rollo, 328.
4. Position Paper prepared by Atty. Basilio H. Alo, IBP Director for Legal Affairs, 1, 10;
Rollo, 209, 218.
5. Memorandum prepared by Atty. Jose A. Grapilon, Chairman, Committee on Bar

Discipline, and Atty. Kenny H. Tantuico, 16-18, 27-29; Rollo 414-416, 425-427.
6. Position Paper prepared by Atty. Rafael D. Abiera, Jr., Chairman, Committee on

Lawyers' Rights and Legal Ethics, and Atty. Arturo M. del Rosario, President, 5-
6; Rollo, 241-242.
7. Position Paper prepared by Atty. Lorenzo Sumulong, President, and Atty. Mariano
M. Magsalin, Vice-President, 2, 4-5; Rollo, 93, 95-96.
8. Position Paper prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 1-2; Rollo, 105-106.
9. Memorandum prepared by Atty. Victoria C. de los Reyes, 10-11; Rollo, 370-371.
10. Position Paper prepared by Atty. Leticia E. Sablan, Officer-in-Charge, WLAP Free
Legal Aid Clinic, 1-2; Rollo, 169-170.
4 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-23815. June 28, 1974.]
LEDESMA petitioner, vs. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO,

ADELINO H. LEDESMA,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros
City respondent.
Occidental, Branch I, Silay City,
Adelino E. Ledesma in his own behalf.

Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.
DECISION
FERNANDO , J : pp
What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a

motion filed by petitioner to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the
grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his appointment as Election
Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to
the defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea,
notwithstanding the conformity of the defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to
delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had already rested and that
petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being
precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be
plausibly asserted that such failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could
ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari. There is,
however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must be taken
seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one
of them. What is easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with
the responsibilities incumbent on the counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption
that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to be very much less at
present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of
the bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly
without merit.
According to the undisputed facts, petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed
Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and
there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he was counsel de parte for one of the
accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to withdraw
as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him
counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner
filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, premised on the
policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on the volume
or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the
defense. Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said
motion. A motion for reconsideration having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari
proceeding. 3
As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.
1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to
withdraw as counsel de oficio speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was
allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the proceedings having started in the
municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his order of
October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the
motion for postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused
cannot continue appearing in this case without the express authority of the Commission
on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two witnesses who are
ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for
postponement is denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election
Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since October 2, 1964 that the trial would be
resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status of counsel
for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense
obtained postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28,
1963, November 27, 1963, February 11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964, July 26, 1964,
and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to another order of February 11,
1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the continuation
of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 3, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The
defense is reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8)
times, and that the government witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5
After which, it was noted in such order that there was no incompatibility between the duty
of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an
election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be
served by allowing and requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the
prosecution has already rested its case." 6
2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his
obligation as counsel de oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that for some lawyers, especially the
neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore. For
those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of
eminence welcome such an opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a
profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a mere trade. It is understandable then
why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent statement
of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary
proceeding to lay stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries
with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a
trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in the performance of one
of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration
thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de oficio. The fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not
occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that
other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has his practice to attend
to. That circumstance possesses, high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live;
certainly he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is
incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio must be fulfilled." 8
So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de
oficio counsel, the opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should
exact from its officers and subordinates the most scrupulous performance of their official
duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties necessarily results
in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases . . ." 1 0 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia
1 1 reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But
we do say that as such counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one
employed and paid by defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the latter, he must
exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned to his
care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due
diligence, not mere perfunctory representation. . . . For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard
in the bastion of justice is expected to have a bigger dose of social conscience and a little
less of self-interest." 1 2
The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.
3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the
apprehension that considering the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill
his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be prejudiced. His right to counsel could in
effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief Justice Moran
in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless
the accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would
be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most
intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules
of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be
assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right and
it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court to
apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he
desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio
for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to procure an
attorney of his own." 1 3 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 1 4 The present
Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel," 1 5 there is this new provision: "Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat,
intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 1 6
Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an
accused. Such a consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for
the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his responsibility
as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now.
There is not likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his
time. It may likewise be assumed, considering what has been set forth above, that
petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as defense counsel with
competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member
of the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the
ranks of legal practitioners that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court
and to client takes precedence over the promptings of self-interest.

5
EN BANC
[Bar Matter No. 7 1 2 . March 19, 1997.]
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
SYLLABUS
1.LEGAL ETHICS; POWER OF THE COURT TO REGULATE THE ADMISSION TO THE

PRACTICE OF LAW. — The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess
the strict intellectual and moral quali cations required of lawyers who are instruments in
the effective and ef cient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not
only to "weed our" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law
but, also of equal importance, to prevent "mis ts" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby
further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly
become less than irreproachable.
2.ID.; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; LAWYER'S OATH; NOT A MERE CEREMONY OR
FORMALITY FOR PRACTICING LAW; EVERY LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES WEIGH HIS
ACTIONS ACCORDING TO THE LAWYER'S OATH AND THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY. — After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow
petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and
practice the legal profession with the following, admonition: In allowing Mr. Argosino to
take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral ber. On the contrary, the various certi cations show that he is a devout Catholic
with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr.
Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared
to give him the bene t of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth
to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath
is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES
weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's
oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be
faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr.
Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a
lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society.
RESOLUTION
PADILLA J :
PADILLA, p
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court
however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner's conviction, arose from the death of a
neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and
seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight
(8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993
imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four
(4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994
submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation.
On 14 April 1994, petitioner led before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that
he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character
imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fteen (15)
certi cations/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, ve (5) trial court
judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence
that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing
victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to
comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a.He still believes that the in iction of severe physical injuries which led to the
death of his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was
not only homicide but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's
helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength
and treachery.
b.He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused
and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas
day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging
for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the
accused had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the
incident.
c.As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his
son. However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would
succeed him in his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and
the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d.He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally t for admission
to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual
and moral quali cations required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and
ef cient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out"
lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal
importance, to prevent "mis ts" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing
the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons
for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless
beatings in icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral tness
required for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and
uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
". . . participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes
impossible a nding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of
good moral character." 1
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo
the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious de ciency in moral
character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The
suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due
to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third
parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the
cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused
is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the
circumstances in this cases, to find room for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is
now morally fit to be a lawyer. cdasia
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer' s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino
is not inherently of bad moral ber. On the contrary, the various certi cations show that he
is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of
Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the bene t of the doubt, taking judicial notice
of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn
promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves
strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been
giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and
other services to the more unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the
lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter,
to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
1.Resolution, p. 8.

6 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 77691. August 8, 1988.]
CANLAS petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and

PATERNO R. CANLAS,
HERRERA respondents.
FRANCISCO HERRERA,
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.

Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JUDGMENT; ANNULMENT; BASED ON EXTRINSIC FRAUD; CASE AT

BAR. — Annulment of judgment, we have had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground:
extrinsic fraud. What "extrinsic fraud" means is explained in Macabingkil v. People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation: It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished
from intrinsic fraud, however, that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment.
Fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where it
is one the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest, or from
presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to
the judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act
of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case,
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. A perusal of the petition of therein
private respondent Herrera pending before the respondent Court reveals no cause of
action for annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein petitioner Canlas
correctly points out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but rather, the orders merely
implementing it. Secondly, there is no showing that extrinsic fraud, as Makabingkil defines
it, indeed vitiated the proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On the contrary,
Herrera's petition in the respondent court will show that he was privy to the incidents he
complains of, and in fact, had entered timely oppositions and motions to defeat Atty.
Canlas' claims under the compromise agreement.
2. ID.; ID.; EXECUTION; NOT APPEALABLE; EXCEPTION. — Certiorari presupposes the
absence of an appeal and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies
in case of irregular implementation of the writ. In the case at bar, there is no irregular
execution to speak of. As a rule, "irregular execution" means the failure of the writ to
conform to the decree of the decision executed. In the instant case, respondent Herrera's
charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his motions for temporary
restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor had acted hastily (". . .
that respondent court/judge took only one [1] day to resolve petitioner's motion for
issuance of [a] [restraining] order . . .") in denying his twofold motions, do not make out a
case for irregular execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the letter of the
judgment approving the parties' compromise agreement.
3. ID.; CONSTRUCTION; OBJECT OF PROCEDURAL RULES. — Procedural rules, after all,
have for their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." If procedure were to be an impediment to
such an objective, "it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy." It was almost eight decades ago that the Court held: . . . A
litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in
the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is, rather, a
contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in
issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and
technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike
duels, are not to be won by the a rapier's thrust . . ." It is a ruling that almost eight decades
after it was rendered, holds true as ever.
4. LEGAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW; NOT A COMMERCIAL ENTERPRISE. — The Court
finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers
are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of judicial notice, eluded
not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a "shakedown" of his own
client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of his fealty to his oath
to "delay no man for money." It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of
the fact that the practice of law is not a commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish
an excuse for plain lust for material wealth, more so at the expense of another. Law
advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple
rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits
which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from government interference, is impressed with a
public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; ATTORNEY'S FEES; SECTION 24, RULE 138, RULES OF COURT;
DETERMINATION THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — Anent attorney's fees, section 24, of Rule
138, of the Rules, provides in part as follows: SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys,
agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no
more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of
the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. . . A written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable. So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as
follows: Art. 2208 . . . In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be
reasonable. We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of
P100,000.00 reasonable. We do not believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the
Rules. The extent of the services he had rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the
records will yield, is not impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan amount. The
case itself moreover did not involve complex questions of fact or law that would have
required substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to warrant his
demands. The fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices
in the market should not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case.
We are not likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; REDEMPTION OF REAL PROPERTY SOLD; SECTION 29, RULE 39,
RULES OF COURT; DOES NOT APPLY TO AN ATTORNEY'S LIEN; CASE AT BAR. — It is futile
to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation similar to that
vested upon redemptioners. To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result of
execution in satisfaction of judgment. In this case, however, redemption was decreed by
agreement (on compromise) between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the
petitioner any right to the properties themselves, much less the right of redemption,
although provisions for his compensation were purportedly provided. It did not make him
a redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not named one in the amicable settlement.
To this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil Case No. 40066,
recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right, independent of the questioned deed of sale and
transfer which was executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject realty
from the L & R Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court."
Whatever right he had, it was, arguably, with respect alone to his remuneration. It did not
extend to the lands. Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in
proportion to the "just fees and disbursements" due him. It is still subject to the tempering
hand of this Court.
7. CIVIL LAW; SALES; ART. 1491, CIVIL CODE; PROHIBITION ON ACQUISITION BY
ATTORNEYS OF THINGS IN LITIGATION; NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT BAR. — This
brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the petitioner is
subject to the ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code state as follows: Art. 1491. The following persons cannot
acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, either in person or through the
mediation of another: (5) Justice, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and
inferior courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court
within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they
may take part by virtue of their profession. In the instant case, the Court observes that the
"Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem" was
executed following the finality of the decision approving the compromise agreement. It is
actually a new contract — not one in pursuance of what had been agreed upon on
compromise — in which, as we said, the petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights
over the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue
of such a subsequent agreement, the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the
object of any litigation." The transfer, therefore, is not subject to the injunction of Article
1491 of the Civil Code.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; WRIT OF POSSESSION; GENERALLY, CANNOT BE PROPERLY
AVAILED OF TO EJECT ANOTHER IN POSSESSION; EXCEPTION. — Parenthetically, the
Court states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from possession
unless sought in connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided
that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution
sales. It is noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ
pursuant to the deed of sale between him and the private respondent and not the
judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of execution on the
compromise agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same enforced.
The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the compromise.)
The writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific performance.
9. CIVIL LAW; VOIDABLE CONTRACTS; GROUNDS FOR ANNULMENT THEREOF;

INVALIDATION OF THE CONTRACT IN THE CASE AT BAR. — But like all voidable contracts,
it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake, fraud, or undue influence, which is in turn
subject to the right of innocent purchasers for value. For this reason, we invalidate the
transfer in question specifically for undue influence as earlier detailed. While the
respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this is the clear tenor of his
petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however, that the properties
have been conveyed to third persons whom we presume to be innocent purchasers for
value, the petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of actual damages,
for such a loss of properties.
10. REMEDIAL LAW; CONSTRUCTION; RIGIDITY OF PROCEDURAL RULES WILL NOT BE
APPLIED IF IT WOULD DEFEAT THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. — Let the Court further
say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a matter of general
policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to dispense justice. At
the outset, we have made clear that from a technical vantage point, certiorari, arguably, lies,
but as we have likewise stated, the resolution of the case rests not only on the mandate of
technical rules, but if the decision is to have any real meaning, on the merits too. This is not
the first time we would have done so; in many cases we have eschewed the rigidity of the
Rules of Court if it would establish a barrier upon the administration of justice. It is
especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and counter-suit appears imminent,
and for which it is high time that we have the final say. We likewise cannot, as the overseer
of good conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go unpunished what convinces us as
serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.
DECISION
SARMIENTO , J : p
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own client,
more often than not, in the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have
his petition decided on pure questions of procedure, yet, the Court cannot let pass
unnoticed the murkier face of the controversy, wherein the law is corrupted to promote a
lawyer's self-seeking ends, and the law profession, debased into a simple business
dealing. Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only of the questions raised by the
petitioner pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious ethical implications, on its
merits as well. prcd
We turn to the facts.

The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the petitioner)
parcels of land located in Quezon City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various
loans from the L & R Corporation, a financing institution, in various sums totalling
P420,000.00 As security therefor, he executed deeds of mortgage in favor of the
corporation over the parcels aforesaid. On August 28, 1979, and upon the maturing of said
loans, the firm caused an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following his failure to pay,
as a consequence of which, the said eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land
were disposed of at public auction, and in which L & R Corporation was itself the highest
bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L & R
Corporation, to enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining
preliminary injunctive relief. He was represented by the petitioner.
Two years later, and with no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties entered into
a compromise agreement whereby L & R Corporation accorded the private respondent
another year to redeem the foreclosed properties subject to payment of P600,000.00, with
interest thereon at one per cent per month. They likewise stipulated that the petitioner
shall be entitled to attorney's fees of P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the court 3
approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits — a fact the petitioner
himself concedes 4 — for which reason he failed to acquire the funding to repay the loans
in question, let alone the sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by the
petitioner. That notwithstanding, the petitioner moved for execution insofar as his fees
were concerned. The court granted execution, although it does not appear that the sum
was actually collected. 5
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for
the latter with respect to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his
obligation to the petitioner on the other. The petitioner contends that the private
respondent "earnestly implored" 6 him to redeem the said properties; the private
respondent maintains that it was the petitioner himself who "offered to advance the
money," 7 provided that he, the private respondent, executed a "transfer of mortgage" 8
over the properties in his favor. Who implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we
shall see shortly, we are inclined to agree with the private respondent's version,
considering primarily the petitioner's moral ascendancy over his client and the private
respondent's increasing desperation. cdrep
The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed
of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled
the petitioner, first, to redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to register the same in
his name. The private respondent alleges that he subsequently filed loan applications with
the Family Savings Bank to finance a wet market project upon the subject premises, to
find, according to him, and to his dismay, the properties already registered in the name of
the petitioner. He likewise contends that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of
Redemption and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds (for Quezon City) had
been falsified as follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) I, FRANCISCO
HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas, any and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem from the
Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at
public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above
Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q-30679 . . . 9
whereas it originally reads:

WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in
the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO
HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas, any and all my rights of equity of redemption and/or to redeem from the
Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at
public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above
Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q-30679 . . . 1 0
As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon
the respective certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the
petitioner moved for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of
possession. The court granted both motions. The private respondent countered with a
motion for a temporary restraining order and later, a motion to recall the writ of
possession. He likewise alleges that he commenced disbarment proceedings before this
Court against the petitioner 1 1 as well as various criminal complaints for estafa,
falsification, and "betrayal of trust" 1 2 with the Department of Justice. On December 1,
1983, finally, he instituted an action for reconveyance and reformation of document, 1 3
praying that the certificates of title issued in the name of the petitioner be cancelled and
that "the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem
dated May 3, 1983 . . . be reformed to reflect the true agreement of Francisco Herrera and
Paterno R. Canlas, of a mortgage." 1 4 He vehemently maintains that the petitioner's
"agreement with [him] was that the latter would lend the money to the former for a year, so
that [petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for the wet market which [the petitioner]
intended to put up on said property." 1 5 Predictably, the petitioner moved for dismissal. LLphil
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the alteration
complained of did not change the meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the
petitioner's] rights" 1 6 "to protect and insure his interest of P654,000.00 which is the
redemption price he has paid;" 1 7 secondly, that the petitioner himself had acquired an
interest in the properties subject of reconveyance based on the compromise agreement
approved by Judge Castro in the injunction case, pursuant to Section 29(b), of Rule 39, of
the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment creditor in his own right;
thirdly, that the private respondent had lost all rights over the same arising from his failure
to redeem them from L & R Corporation within the extended period; and finally, that the
petitioner cannot be said to have violated the ban against sales of properties in custodia
legis to lawyers by their clients pendente lite, since the sale in question took place after
judgment in the injunction case abovesaid had attained finality. The complaint was
consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually attained a character of finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of
Judgment" 1 8 in the respondent Court of Appeals, 1 9 praying that the orders of Judge
Castro: (1) granting execution over the portion of the compromise agreement obliging the
private respondent to pay the petitioner P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; (2) denying the
private respondent's prayer for a restraining order directed against the execution; and (3)
denying the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to dismiss.
On December 8, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its
challenged resolutions, denying the motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the Appellate
Court denied reconsideration. 2 0
Hence, the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper
procedure. Specifically, he assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT

DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED OUT OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE
GIVEN DUE COURSE.

II.
DISMISSING AC G.R. NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA.
III.
CONSIDERING AC G. R. 07860 AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE
PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE
THE FILING OF THIS SUIT.
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND
THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED THEREIN ARE BUT REHASH OF THE
ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE PETITION. 2 1
The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a
petition for certiorari," 2 2 disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment and that in
such a case, it faces alleged legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly
two years from the issuance of the assailed orders, and (2) It was not preceded by a
motion for reconsideration. He adds that assuming annulment of judgment were proper,
no judgment allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two orders being in the nature of
interlocutory issuances. prcd
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of

judgment, we have had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What
"extrinsic fraud" means is explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation: 2 3
xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud,
however, that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has
been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where it is
one the effect of which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest, or
from presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters
pertaining, not to the judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured
so that there is not a fair submission of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic
fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is
committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent. 2 4
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the
respondent Court reveals no cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first place,
and as herein petitioner Canlas correctly points out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but
rather, the orders merely implementing it. Secondly, there is no showing that extrinsic
fraud, as Makabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the proceedings presided over by Judge
Castro. On the contrary, Herrera's petition in the respondent court will show that he was
privy to the incidents he complains of, and in fact, had entered timely oppositions and
motions to defeat Atty. Canlas' claims under the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to
expedite the former's collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had deliberately,
and with malevolent designs, postponed execution to force him (Herrera) to agree to sell
the properties in controversy to him (Atty. Canlas) subject to redemption. (". . . [I]t was
understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas did not implement the writ of
execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that petitioner would sign the
questioned documents. This was the clincher of the plan of respondent Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas to divest petitioner of his properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that respondent
Atty. Paterno R. Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court judge to achieve his
plan." 2 5 ) Aside from being plain speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment.
Clearly, it does not amount to extrinsic fraud as the term is defined in law. LexLib
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the
absence of an appeal 2 6 and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal
lies in case of irregular implementation of the writ. 2 7 In the case at bar, there is no
irregular execution to speak of. As a rule, "irregular execution" means the failure of the writ
to conform to the decree of the decision executed. 2 8 In the instant case, respondent
Herrera's charges, to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his motions for
temporary restraining order and to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor had acted
hastily (". . . that respondent court/judge took only one [1] day to resolve petitioner's
motion for issuance of [a] [restraining] order . . ." 2 9 ) in denying his twofold motions, do
not make out a case for irregular execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the
letter of the judgment approving the parties' compromise agreement.
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid to
hold on to his lands amid constraints of economic privation have not been lost on us. It is
obvious that he is uneasy about the judgment on compromise itself, as well as the
subsequent contract between him and his lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038 of the Civil
Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence
intimidation, undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions
of article 1330 of this Code.
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:

Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence,
intimidation, undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of contracts. 3 0 The court notes that he had,
for this purpose, gone to the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in
which the decision had become final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position — on matters of procedure — for the
enlightenment solely of the bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his
petition. As we have intimated, we cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding,
in which a member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural law to score a
"technical knockout" over his own client, of all people. Procedural rules, after all, have for
their object assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding." 3 1 If procedure were to be an impediment
to such an objective, "it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy." 3 2 It was almost eight decades ago that the Court held:
. . . A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply
schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and
destroys the other. It is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully
and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as
wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of
procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels,
are not to be won by the a rapier's thrust . . . 3 3
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever. prLL
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no
financing entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price
of his mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the
Compromise Judgment," 3 4 a development that should have tempered his demand for his
fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his client, in
opposition to his oath to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer . . . with all good fidelity . . . to [his]
clients." 3 5 The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking
venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of
judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a
"shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak
well of his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money." 3 6
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of
law is not a commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for
material wealth, more so at the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not
capital that yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service
rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of
freedom from government interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is
subject to State regulation. 3 7 Anent attorney's fees, section 24, of Rule 138, of the Rules,
provides in part as follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. — An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. . . A written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00
reasonable. We do not believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The
extent of the services he had rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records
will yield, is not impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan amount. The case itself
moreover did not involve complex questions of fact or law that would have required
substantial effort as to research or leg work for the petitioner to warrant his demands. The
fact that the properties subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices in the market
should not be a measure of the importance or non-importance of the case. We are not
likewise persuaded that the petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to
P20,000.00.
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation
similar to that vested upon redemptioners. 3 8 To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold
as a result of execution in satisfaction of judgment. In this case, however, redemption was
decreed by agreement (on compromise) between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It did
not give the petitioner any right to the properties themselves, much less the right of
redemption, although provisions for his compensation were purportedly provided. It did
not make him a redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not named one in the
amicable settlement. To this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil Case
No. 40066, recognizing Atty. Canlas' "legal right, independent of the questioned deed of
sale and transfer which was executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject
realty from the L & R Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 3 9
Whatever right he had, it was, arguably, with respect alone to his remuneration. It did not
extend to the lands.
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the "just fees
and disbursements" 4 0 due him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of this Court.
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise
agreement and subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to himself. As we have
observed, in spite of the issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear that the
petitioner took pains to implement it. We find this perplexing, given his passionate and
persistent pleas that he was entitled to the proceeds. There can indeed be no plausible
explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace" against the private respondent that
led, finally, to the conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be sure, he would have us
believe that by redeeming the same from the mortgagee and by in fact parting with his
own money he had actually done the private respondent a favor, but this is to assume that
he did not get anything out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to the
properties have been issued to the new owners long before the filing of private
respondents [sic] petition for annulment." 4 1 To say that he did not profit therefrom is to
take either this Court or the petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is not prepared to
accept under the circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the private
respondent sign the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or
to Redeem," a pre-prepared document apparently, that allowed him (the petitioner) to
exercise the right of redemption over the properties and to all intents and purposes,
acquire ownership thereof. As we have earlier averred, the private respondent, by reason of
bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his counsel's moral influence and ascendancy.
We are hard put to believe that it was the private respondent who "earnestly implored" 4 2
him to undertake the redemption amid the former's obstinate attempts to keep his lands
that have indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner now complains of, apart from the
fact that the latter himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to
above. We are of the opinion that in ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent
had intended merely to forestall the total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the
understanding that his counsel shall acquire the same and keep them therefore within
reach, subject to redemption by his client under easier terms and conditions. Surely, the
petitioner himself would maintain that he agreed to make the redemption "in order that [he]
may already be paid the P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him in the Compromise
Agreement," 4 3 and if his sole concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the
properties in their entirety. prLL
The Court simply cannot fall for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the
properties as a gesture of magnanimity and altruism. He denies, of course, having made
money from it, but what he cannot dispute is the fact that he did resell the properties. 4 4
But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword the
conveyance document executed by the private respondent? It shall be recalled that the
deed, as originally drafted, provided for conveyance of the private respondent's "rights of
equity of redemption and/or redeem" 4 5 the properties in his favor, whereas the instrument
registered with the Register of Deeds purported to transfer "any and all my rights of the
real properties and/or to redeem," 4 6 in his favor. He admits having entered the
intercalations in question but argues that he did so "to facilitate the registration of the
questioned deed with the Register of Deeds," 4 7 and that it did not change the meaning of
the paper, for which Judge Santiago acquitted him of any falsification charges. 4 8 To start
with, the Court is at a loss how such an alteration could "facilitate" registration. Moreover, if
it did not change the tenor of the deed, why was it necessary then? And why did he not
inform his client? At any rate, the agreement is clearly a contract of adhesion. Its
provisions should be read against the party who prepared it.
But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification — this is not the proper
occasion for it — we condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no
falsehood." 4 9 This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor
of the petitioner is subject to the ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The
pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state as follows:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public
or judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
(2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been
intrusted to them, unless the consent of the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under
administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any
subdivision thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or
institution, the administration of which has been intrusted to them; this provision
shall apply to judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever,
take part in the sale;
(5) Justice, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior
courts, and other officers and employees connected with the administration of
justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions;
this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law. *
In Rubias v. Batiller, 5 0 we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409,

paragraph (7), of the Civil Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v.
Ababa, 5 1 however, we said that the prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts, in
which the conveyance takes place after judgment, so that the property can no longer be
said to be "subject of litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of
Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of the
decision approving the compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract — not one in
pursuance of what had been agreed upon on compromise — in which, as we said, the
petitioner purportedly assumed redemption rights over the disputed properties (but in
reality, acquired absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a subsequent agreement,
the lands had ceased to be properties which are "the object of any litigation."
Parenthetically, the Court states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another
from possession unless sought in connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding; (2)
an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of
property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened;
and (4) in execution sales. 5 2 It is noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the
issuance of the writ pursuant to the deed of sale between him and the private respondent
and not the judgment on compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of execution on
the compromise agreement but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same
enforced. The sale agreement between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the
compromise.) The writ does not lie in such a case. His remedy is specific performance. prcd
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the
Civil Code. But like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake,
fraud, or undue influence, 5 3 which is in turn subject to the right of innocent purchasers for
value. 5 4
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as
earlier detailed. While the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation,
this is the clear tenor of his petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing,
however, that the properties have been conveyed to third persons whom we presume to be
innocent purchasers for value, the petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by
way of actual damages, for such a loss of properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In
condemning Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private
respondent has not settled his liability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas
alone liable for damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The
parties must then set off their obligations against the other. To obviate debate as the
actual amounts owing by one to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera, the private
respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas, the petitioner, in the sum of P654,000.00
representing the redemption price of the properties, 5 5 in addition to the sum of
P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees. We order Atty. Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent
Herrera the amount of P1,000,000.00, the sum he earned from the resale thereof, 5 6 such
that he shall, after proper adjustments, be indebted to his client in the sum of P326,000.00
as and for damages.
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking
cognizance of the petition below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the final
arbiter of justiciable cases and in the highest interests of justice, to write finis to the
controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets of the inferior courts.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a
matter of general policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to
dispense justice. At the outset, we have made clear that from a technical vantage point,
certiorari, arguably, lies, but as we have likewise stated, the resolution of the case rests not
only on the mandate of technical rules, but if the decision is to have any real meaning, on
the merits too. This is not the first time we would have done so; in many cases we have
eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a barrier upon the
administration of justice. It is especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and
counter-suit appears imminent, and for which it is high time that we have the final say. We
likewise cannot, as the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go
unpunished what convinces us as serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer. LibLex
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.

1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, to pay to the private respondent,
Francisco Herrera, the sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages;
2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be
imposed on him for violation of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after
which the same will be consolidated with AC No. 2625;
3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals for execution; and
4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera and Medialdea, ** JJ., concur.
Paras and Padilla, JJ., took no part, due to past personal relations with petitioner.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, 3, 186.
2. Id., 186.
3. Civil Case No. 30679, former Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, Hon.
Jose P. Castro, Presiding Judge.
4. Rollo, id., 6.
5. Id., 7.
6. Id.
7. Id., 188.
8. Id.
9. Id., 191; emphasis in the original.
10. Id.; emphasis in the original.
11. Francisco Herrera v. Paterno R. Canlas, AC No. 2625.
12. Rollo, id., 195.

7
EN BANC
[G.R. No. X92-1. July 30, 1979.]
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM

NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO."
LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P, FELICIANO, BENILDO G.
HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN,
JUAN C. REYES, JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H.
CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ,
ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO

CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE
LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M.
DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA. REYES, JESUS S. J.
SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J : p
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of
Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners
of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be
allowed to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners
who had passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both
Petitions were ordered consolidated. prLL
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business
under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article
1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the
last paragraph that:
"The use by the person or partnership continuing the business of the
partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner as part thereof ,
shall not of itself make the individual property of the deceased partner
liable for any debts contracted by such person or partnership." 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the

legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as
to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the
legislative authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy —
a profession requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of
clients as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and
use a trade name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is
offended by the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has
acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of
the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that:
". . . The continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner
when permissible by local custom, is not unethical, but care should be
taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. . . ." 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their

respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were
connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and
international law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners'
deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a
professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at
least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm
necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted
practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this
Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Dean case) continued its practice of
including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter
was resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their
firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston, "who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-
11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The
law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before
acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would
like to be informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E.
A. Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm
of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those
now being raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name
"Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved:
"After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys Alfonso
Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of the name of the
deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no reason to depart from the
policy it adopted in June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen
and Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm
designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes
that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the relations
between attorney and client and the high standards demanded in the
canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even
in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said
attorneys are accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their
firm name."
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated
by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta,
Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their
partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article
1815 of the Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name, which
may or may not include the name of one or more of the partners.
"Those who, not being members of the partnership include their names in
the firm name, shall be subject to the liability of a partner."
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a

partnership must either be those of living partners and, in the case of non-
partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article
1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from including his name in the
firm name under pain of assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a
deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old members to the
creditors of a firm particularly where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics "prohibits all agreement for the payment to the
widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the
fees received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because such
payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of the recipient."
Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for transactions
entered into after the death of their lawyer-predecessor. There being no benefits
accruing, there can be no corresponding liability. LLpr
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law
firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of
an old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the
practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make
a name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an
old firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased
partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title
IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals
with the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the
individual property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or
partnership which continues the business using the partnership name or the
name of the deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates
therein is a hold-over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will
to protect rather than of a professionalpartnership, with no saleable good will but
whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual
members. Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a
commercial partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting
of lawyers. 9
"As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial partnership the
succeeding partners or parties have the right to carry on the business
under the old name, in the absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince
the name of a commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable
from the good will of the firm . . .." (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115)
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand,

". . . a professional partnership the reputation of which depends on the
individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of attorneys or
physicians, has no good will to be distributed us a firm asset on its
dissolution, however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may
be, especially where there is no provision in the partnership agreement
relating to good will as an asset. . . ." (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis
supplied).
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed

by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy
specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of
accountancy. 10
"A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship
or association for a particular purpose. . . . It is not a partnership formed for the
purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has
been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law
practice is improper." 12
"The usual reason given for different standards of conduct being
applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining to business is that
the law is a 'profession.' . . .
"Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the Survey of the

Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5)
defines a profession as 'a group of men pursuing a learned art as a
common calling in the spirit of public service, — no less a public service
because it may incidentally be a means of livelihood.'
xxx xxx xxx
"Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from

business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and
in which one may attain the highest eminence without making much
money.
2. A relation as an 'officer of court' to the administration of justice

involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness,
and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising
and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients."
13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the
nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right
does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and
attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and
partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association 17 in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership
when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, identify the more active and/or
more senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the
firms of petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their
firm names have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of
the partnership changed.
"The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or more of the
partners designated by it is proper only where sustained by local custom
and not where by custom this purports to identify the active members. . .
.
"There would seem to be a question, under the working of the Canon, as

to the propriety of adding the name of a new partner and at the same
time retaining that of a deceased partner who was never a partner with
the new one." (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207-208) (Emphasis
supplied)
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the
name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in
search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished
name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently avowed the continued use
of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so
because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733)
which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York
Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if
none of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the
practice was sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or
legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the parties The Court stated
therein:
"The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of custom and
offends no statutory provision or legislative policy. Canon 33 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics of both the American Bar Association and
the New York State Bar Association provides in part as follows: 'The
continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when
permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that
no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.' There is no
question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the names of
deceased members with the approval of other attorneys, bar associations
and the courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has
considered the matter and reached the conclusion that such practice
should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx

"Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the practice in
question. The use of the firm name herein is also sustainable by reason of
agreement between the partners." 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the
practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of
acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved
as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right
cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of
the existence of a local custom. and of the elements requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of practice
does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a
juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The
former can supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such
statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the
legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued
its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased
partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no
custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to
speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the
death of any partner. 23 Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public
policy shall not be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of
justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade."
". . . It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a spirit of
public service. 'A trade' . . . 'aims primarily at personal gain; a profession
at the exercise of powers beneficial to mankind.' If, as in the era of wide
free opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as the
highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely
competing with their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as
much of the world's good as he may within the limits allowed him by law.
But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in
competition with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his
services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of his skill and
learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn. There should be no such thing
as a lawyers or physicians' strike. The best service of the professional
man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it is
his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his profession even if
done with no expectation of reward. This spirit of public service in which
the profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of
sound administration of justice according to law. The other two elements
of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of a learned art have
their justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit." 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the identity of their firms in the eyes of
the public must bow to legal and ethical impediments.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to
drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those
names may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been
partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such. prLL
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J, and Abad-Santos, J., took no part.
CERTIFICATION
FERNANDO, C.J. : p
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of
the .Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of
Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned
did not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip,
Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior
partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother-in-law. For the record, the
undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of
petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the
listing of individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years
during which they served as such." It represents a happy compromise.

8
Bar Matter No. 1153

! (/docs/provision/77746) "
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated
March 9, 2010
"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in
the Bar Examinations Through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court).
- The Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments to Sections 5 and
6 of Rule 138, to wit:
SEC. 5.Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All applicants for

admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall,
before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have
successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of
Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law school or university o!cially recognized
by the Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign
jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction

shall be admitted to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily
completed the following course in a law school or university duly recognized by
the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public
and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation,
medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.
A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to
the bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of
certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to the degree of
Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of
the law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all the fourth year
subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly
recognized by the Philippine Government.
SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall
present a certificate issued by the proper government agency that, before
commencing the study of law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily
completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for
admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course
of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws
degree or its equivalent in a foreign law school must present proof of having
completed a separate bachelor's degree course.
The Clerk of Court, through the O!ce of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed
to CIRCULARIZE this resolution among all law schools in the country."
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9 THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997.]
SOPHIA ALAWI , complainant, vs . ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court

City respondent.
VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City,
SYLLABUS
1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC

SERVICE (R.A. 6713); ENUNCIATES THE CONDUCT REQUIRED OF A PUBLIC SERVANT. —
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713)
inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials
and employees . . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . . refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and
public interest." More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior
of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from
the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among
others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for
the judiciary.
2. ID.; ATTORNEY; WHEN USE OF SUCH TITLE CAN BE CONSIDERED PROPER. — As
regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both
be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully take the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; COURT PERSONNEL; A JUDICIAL EMPLOYEE IS EXPECTED
TO ACCORD RESPECT TO A PERSON AND THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS AT ALL TIMES. — Now,
it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public
policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed —
however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action
against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without
malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith." Righteous
indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers.
As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
respect for the person and the right of others at all times, and that his every act and word
should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly
held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
DECISION
NARVASA C .J :
NARVASA, p
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B.
Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M.
Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in
Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on
installments by Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm
(hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also
granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter
to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the
company. He wrote:
". . . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent
to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company,
as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your
company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my
consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void
ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and
unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to
my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the
"grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea
that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you
that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not
have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against
my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul
the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post,
bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee,
the words, "Free Postage — PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-
President, Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract
with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection
therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month.
Among other things, he said:
" . . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel,
rescind and voided, the 'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales agent/coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and
against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of
the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation,
fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting
of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real
facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the
anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996,
April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he
insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his
salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M.
Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance
Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to
stop deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with
Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage, and . . . the refund of . . . (his)
payments." c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed
with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a
copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words,
"Free Postage — PD 26." 1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds
through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established
reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the

Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator,

etc." without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth,"
denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled
with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with
Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya
"be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) . . ."
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with
established usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of
the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P.
Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2
Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of

Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him,
not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court," but only
to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion
that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty.
Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was
envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial
Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ." 4
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even
obsequious tones, 5 Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in
order that he might comment thereon. 6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were
done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent
of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan
contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended
that it was he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded
feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of
P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary. 7 He declared that there was no basis for
the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his
rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus
transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters;
that the words: "Free Postage — PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other
person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as
Annex J); 8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the
money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official
mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. 9
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden
to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man
unduly prejudiced and injured." 1 0 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in
Alawi, a classmate and friend. 1 1 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's
assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but
she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not
know where the property — subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal,
Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 1 2 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife,
and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several
months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi
forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment,
clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever
saw. 1 3
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the
dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and
baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands,
her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court
Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both
dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" — in his
Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY
M. ALAUYA." cda
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report
and recommendation. 1 4
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and
libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and
established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized
acts . . . prejudicial to . . . (his) rights and interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had
fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse
of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with
Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan
without . . . (his) authority and against . . . (his) will," and "concealed the
real facts . . ."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in
defense of his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold
financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been
deducted from his salary. 1 5
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713)
inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. 1 6 Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic
officials and employees . . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . . refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public
safety and public interest." 1 7 More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct
and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among
others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for
the judiciary." 1 8
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public
policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed —
however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action
against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without
malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good
morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." 19 Righteous
indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or
downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is
subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers.
As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word
should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly
held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to
declare that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. 21 While one who has
been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully
taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to
practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in
his region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that
given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination
to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record
contains no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial
officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other
impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
a. Annexes B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya's Comment dated June 5, 1996.

b. Annexes F and G, Id.
c. Annex C-2, Id.
10 EN BANC
[B.M. NO. 1678. December 17, 2007.]
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW , BENJAMIN

DACANAY petitioner.
M. DACANAY,
RESOLUTION
CORONA J :
CORONA, p
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
resume the practice of law.
Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free medical aid
program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he
took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in
Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his
law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his
membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004.
Thus, this petition.
In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Of ce of the Bar Con dant cites Section 2, Rule
138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every
applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the
Philippines,
Philippines at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a
resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him,
involving moral turpitude, have been led or are pending in any court in the
Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Of ce of the Bar Con dant opines that, by virtue of his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
quali cations and has none of the disquali cations for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
conditioned on his retaking the lawyer's oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
We approve the recommendation of the Of ce of the Bar Con dant with certain
modifications.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. 2 It is so delicately affected
with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to
control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. 3
Adherence to rigid standards of mental tness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a
lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and con dence which
the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional
privilege. 4
Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the
provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law.
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance
with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to
practice law.
Admission to the bar requires certain quali cations. The Rules of Court mandates that an
applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years
of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines. 5 He must also produce
before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges
against him, involving moral turpitude, have been led or are pending in any court in the
Philippines. 6
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory
proof of educational, moral and other quali cations; 7 passing the bar examinations; 8
taking the lawyer's oath 9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of
court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 1 0
The second requisite for the practice of law — membership in good standing — is a
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment
of annual membership dues in the IBP; 1 1 payment of the annual professional tax; 1 2
compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 1 3 faithful
observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to
judicial disciplinary control. 1 4
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in
the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. 1 5 Since Filipino citizenship is a
requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the
Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other
words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners. 1 6
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]." 1 7 Therefore, a Filipino
lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225 . Although he is
also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic
right to resume law practice accrues.
Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and
he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the
proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 1 8 Stated otherwise,
before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his
law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the
IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
education; this is specially signi cant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner's knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of
legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his
duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an of cer of the Court,
but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
Philippine bar.
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to
compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance
to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., is on leave.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1. As evidence thereof, he submitted a copy of his Identi cation Certi cate No. 07-16912 duly
signed by Immigration Commissioner Marcelino C. Libanan.
2. In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Deliquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon , A.C. No.
1928, 19 December 1980, 101 SCRA 612.
3. Heck v. Santos, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 329.
4. In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, A.C. No. 1928, 03 August 1978, 84 SCRA 554.
5. Section 2, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

11 EN BANC
[B.M. No. 2112. July 24, 2012.]
IN RE: PETITION TO RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE

LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,
PHILIPPINES
MUNESES petitioner.
EPIFANIO B. MUNESES,
RESOLUTION
REYES J :
REYES, p
On June 8, 2009, a petition was led by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the O ce of
the Bar Con dant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.
The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a
citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that on September 15,
2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or
the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance
as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that
he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.
Attached to the petition were several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere
photocopies thereof, to wit:
1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General
Domingo P. Nolasco;
2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date; DCScaT
3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date;

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership
dues with the IBP;
5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE).
In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a similar
petition led by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to resume his
practice of law after availing the bene ts of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was admitted to the
Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to Canada to seek medical
attention for his ailments and eventually became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July
14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after
taking his oath of allegiance before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
He returned to the Philippines and intended to resume his practice of law.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and
is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means
termination of the petitioner's membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage in
the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are
deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance
to the Republic. 1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and
later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of
the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is
not automatic. 2 R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his
profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to
engage in such practice. 3
It can not be overstressed that:
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately
affected with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State
(through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare.
Adherence to rigid standards of mental tness, maintenance of the highest

degree of morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with
the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions
required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege
to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him
unworthy of the trust and con dence which the courts and clients repose in him
for the continued exercise of his professional privilege. 4
Thus, in pursuance to the quali cations laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the
OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certi ed true copies of the
following documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certi cation from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual
membership dues; DSCIEa
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and

8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;

4. Certi cate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship
issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certi cation dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter
attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment
of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certi cate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance
period; and
8. Certi cation dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos,
Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law
attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.
The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the
MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and nding that the
petitioner has met all the quali cations and none of the disquali cations for membership
in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of
law.
Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no
bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines.
WHEREFORE , the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED,
GRANTED subject
to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and
subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
Furthermore, the O ce of the Bar Con dant is directed to draft the necessary guidelines
for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the guidance of the
Bench and Bar.
SO ORDERED.
ORDERED
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama,
Jr., Perez, Sereno and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Brion * Mendoza, JJ., are on leave.
Footnotes
*On Leave per Special Order No. 1257 dated July 19, 2012.
1.Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural born citizens of the Philippines by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine
citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I ________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept
the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
12 EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003.]
DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE , complainant, vs . EDWIN L. RANA,

RANA
respondent.
Percival D. Castillo for complainant.

Raul Tito A. Estrella for respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant charged respondent for unauthorized practice of law, violation of law, grave
misconduct and grave misrepresentation. The Court referred the case to the Office of the
Bar Confidant ("OBC").
The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers and filed various pleadings without
license to do so. Respondent called himself "counsel," knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority
to practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine
Bar. The Court however, ruled, that the two other charges of violation of law and grave
misconduct were not supported by evidence. HCacTI
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; PRACTICE OF LAW; RIGHT TO PRACTICE LAW IS NOT

A NATURAL OR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT BUT IS A PRIVILEGE. — The right to practice law
is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of
this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate
does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The
practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.
2. ID.; ID.; ADMISSION TO THE BAR; REQUISITES THEREOF. — Respondent here passed
the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer's oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll
of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed
the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become
an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a
lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. TEDAHI
DECISION
CARPIO , J : p
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity
for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater
importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed
only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot practice law even if he
passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana ("respondent") was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar
examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
("complainant") filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct,
violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the
scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center.
However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the
resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer's oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers
("MBEC") of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the
MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading,
respondent represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan ("Bunan").
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate.
As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses
respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan ("Bunan")
without the latter engaging respondent's services. Complainant claims that respondent
filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty
candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyer's
oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the
charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on
the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to
represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that "he decided to assist and advice
Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Respondent admits signing the
19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He
explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as
an "attorney" in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he
submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same
date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated
28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre
Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of
Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondent's Comment and refuted the
claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific
assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao
("Estipona-Hao") filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor.
Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent
appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two
grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of
the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondent's Comment) reiterating his claim that
the instant administrative case is "motivated mainly by political vendetta."
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant ("OBC") for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
OBC's Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in
the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent
actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent
appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyer's oath on 22 May 2001.
The OBC believes that respondent's misconduct casts a serious doubt on his moral fitness
to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent's unauthorized practice
of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore
recommends that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent
allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government
employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise,
respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before the MBEC.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that
respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took
the lawyer's oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001,
respondent signed as "counsel for George Bunan." In the first paragraph of the same
pleading respondent stated that he was the "(U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of
Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN." Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May
2001 that he had "authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him" before
the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also "retained" respondent as
her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that "Atty.
Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party
and the candidate of the said party." Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001
that he was entering his "appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-
Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC." On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of
Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyer's oath. Clearly, respondent
engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, 1 the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf
of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics
supplied) . . .
In Cayetano v. Monsod, 2 the Court held that "practice of law" means any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any
kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called
himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar. Having held
himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. 3
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited
to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal
knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust 4 since a lawyer is an officer of
the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who
has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law
without a license. 5
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, 6 a
candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of
Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission
to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who engages in
the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. 7
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer's oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged
lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the
bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. 8 Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his
lawyer's oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. 9
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow
respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since
respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the
acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May
2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning "effective upon your acceptance." 1 0 Vice-
Mayor Relox accepted respondent's resignation effective 11 May 2001. 1 1 Thus, the
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while
serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan
indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and
similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no
authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. 105 Phil. 173 (1959).
2. G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210.

3. Yap Tan v. Sabandal, 211 Phil. 252 (1983).
4. In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name Ozaeta,
Romulo, etc., 30 July 1979, 92 SCRA 1.
5. Ui v. Bonifacio, Administrative Case No. 3319, 8 June 2000, 333 SCRA 38.
6. Bar Matter No. 139, 28 March 1983, 121 SCRA 217.
7. People v. Santocildes, Jr., G.R. No. 109149, 21 December 1999, 321 SCRA 310.
13
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE

HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI'A
MELENDREZ petitioner.
BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ,
RESOLUTION
TINGA J :
TINGA, p
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe
while the other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) led with the Of ce of the Bar
Con dant (OBC) a Petition 1 to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002
Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member
of the Philippine Shari'a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the
2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Nos. 15685 and 15686,
both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical
Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of
media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez' wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not
a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that
Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Court's Resolution 2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with
the OBC.
In his Answer, 3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases led against
him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised
him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case
would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their
former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually
arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as "closed and terminated."
Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve
moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications
really contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the of ce
clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation 4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the
charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases led against him in his
petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that
only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor
a law professor. In fact, the cases led against Meling are still pending.
Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is
still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and
should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is
his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as
distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the
place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one
which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and
professional integrity is not satis ed by such conduct as it merely enables
a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character
includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases led against him makes him
also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement
or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to
the bar." 5
As regards Meling's use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the
explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the
Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have
typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the
fact is, he is signing his communications as "Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully
well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the
unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for
indirect contempt of court. 6
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer's
Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations.
Further, it recommended that Meling's membership in the Shari'a Bar be suspended until
further orders from the Court. 7
We fully concur with the ndings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did
not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to
prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and
academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate
sanctions upon him as a member of the Shari'a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be
acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari'a Court, is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who
are also known to possess good moral character. 8 The requirement of good moral
character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. 9
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations requires the applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any
act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a scal, judge, of cer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any
offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against
him/her." Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has
three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under
oath at that. IaDcTC
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is

satisfactory evidence of good moral character of the applicant. 1 0 The nature of whatever
cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is
endowed with the moral tness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of
such cases, the applicant then unks the test of tness even if the cases are ultimately
proven to be unwarranted or insuf cient to impugn or affect the good moral character of
the applicant.
Meling's concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against
him speaks of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of
the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari'a Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to
its use, cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya, 1 1 the Court had the occasion to discuss
the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of the Shari'a Bar who are not
likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court
of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several
correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his
private capacity. The Court declared that:
. . . persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full- edged members of the
Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who
has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The
title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in
the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in
good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction. 1 2
The judiciary has no place for dishonest of cers of the court, such as Meling in this case.
The solemn task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part
of service therein, from the highest of cial to the lowliest employee, must not only be
competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and
integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary
and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
I n Leda v. Tabang, supra , the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his
application to take the Bar examinations and made con icting submissions before the
Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly un t and unworthy to continue in the
practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate

sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari'a Bar. Accordingly, the
membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari'a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until
further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the
Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the
Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari'a Courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr. and Azcuna, JJ .,
concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 2–25, with Annexes.
2. Id. at 27.
3. Id. at 28–32.
4. Supra, note 1 at 34–38.
5. Id. at 35–36, citing Bar Matter 1209, Petition to take the Lawyer's Oath of Caesar Distrito and
Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859.
6. Id. at 36–37, citing Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court and Bar Matter 1209,
supra.
7. Id. at 38.
8. Tan v. Sabandal, Bar Matter No. 44, February 24, 1992, 206 SCRA 473.
9. Leda v. Tabang, Adm. Case No. 2505, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 395.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997
14 BAR MATTER NO. 730 June 13, 1997
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 10, 1997.
IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-A BE ACTUALLY
SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730).
The issue in this Consulta is whether a law student who appears before the court under the Law
Student Practice Rule (Rule 138-A) should be accompanied by a member of the bar during the trial.
This issue was raised by retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio P. Barredo, counsel for the
defendant in Civil Case No. BCV-92-11 entitled Irene A. Caliwara v. Roger T. Catbagan filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite.
The records show that the plaintiff in civil Case No. BCV-92-11 was represented by Mr. Cornelio
Carmona, Jr., an intern at the Office of Legal Aid, UP-College of Law (UP-OLA). Mr. Carmona
conducted hearings and completed the presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the
presence of a supervising lawyer. Justice Barredo questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona
during the hearing because the latter was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. On
December 15, 1994, Presiding Judge Edelwina Pastoral issued an Order requiring Mr. Carmona to
be accompanied by a supervising lawyer on the next hearing. In compliance with said Order, UP-
OLA and the Secretary of Justice executed a Memorandum of Agreement directing Atty. Catubao
and Atty. Legayada of the Public Attorney's Office to supervise Mr. Carmona during the subsequent
hearings.
Justice Barredo asserts that a law student appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A should
be accompanied by a supervising lawyer. 1 On the other hand, UP-OLA, through its Director, Atty. Alfredo F. Tadiar, submits that "the
matter of allowing a law intern to appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound discretion of the court after
having made at least one supervised appearance." 2
For the guidance of the bench and bar, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be
accompanied by a supervising lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides.
Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct supervision and control of a member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be
signed the by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
The phrase "direct supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer during the hearing. This is in accordance with
the threefold rationale behind the Law Student Practice Rule, to wit: 3
1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or inexperience of law students, who, not having
as yet passed the test of professional competence, are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own;
2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect itself from any potential vicarious liability
arising from some culpable action by their law students; and
3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a particular profession without
possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by law.
The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge.
The rule clearly states that the appearance of the law student shall be under the direct control and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines duly accredited by law schools. The rule must be strictly construed because public policy demands that legal work should be entrusted only to those
who possess tested qualifications, are sworn to observe the rules and ethics of the legal profession and subject to judicial disciplinary control. 4 We said in
Bulacan v. Torcino: 5
Court procedures are often technical and may prove like snares to the ignorant or the unwary. In the past, our law has allowed non-lawyers to appear
for party litigants in places where duly authorized members of the bar are not available (U.S. vs. Bacansas, 6 Phil. 539). For relatively simple litigation
before municipal courts, the Rules still allow a more educated or capable person in behalf of a litigant who cannot get a lawyer. But for the protection
of the parties and in the interest of justice, the requirement for appearances in regional trial courts and higher courts is more stringent.
The Law Student Practice Rule is only an exception to the rule. Hence, the presiding judge should see to it that the law student appearing before the court is
properly guided and supervised by a member of the bar.
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law
student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides;
Section 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by
aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that a law student appearing before the Regional Trial Court under the authority of Rule 138-A must be under the direct control
and supervision of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school and that said law student must be accompanied by a
supervising lawyer in all his appearance.
Padilla and Francisco, J.J., on leave.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) LUZVIMINDA D. PUNO
Clerk of court
Footnotes
1 Consulta, p. 2.
2 Comment, p. 9.
3 Comment, p. 5.
4 Agpalo, Legal Ethics (Fourth Edition, 1989), pp. 39-40.
5 134 SCRA 252 (1985).
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

15 THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003.]
MADERADA complainant, vs . Judge ERNESTO H.

IMELDA Y. MADERADA,
MEDIODEA, 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Cabatuan and
Maasin, Iloilo , respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant charged the respondent judge with gross ignorance of the law amounting to
grave misconduct for failing to observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
relative to her action for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary injunction, temporary
restraining order and damages before the MCTC-Br. 12 of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo.
Complainant, clerk of court in the aforesaid sala, appeared as counsel for herself and on
behalf of her co-plaintiff. The respondent judge averred that the delay in the resolution of
the case cannot be attributed to him, considering that the law mandated him and the rules
of procedure to pass upon every motion presented before him. Besides, complainant
allegedly failed to present evidence necessary for the immediate resolution of her prayer
for preliminary injunction. According to the respondent judge, the issuance of the
preliminary injunction should first be resolved before the judgment should be rendered in
the principal action.
The Supreme Court found the respondent judge guilty of gross inefficiency in failing to
observe the reglementary periods in deciding cases, and was fined in the amount of
P10,000.00. Time and again, the Court has impressed upon judges the need to decide,
promptly, and judiciously, cases and other matters pending before their courts. Their
failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction on them. Here, the Court noted that both the motion for
preliminary injunction and the main case remained unresolved even after four months had
lapsed since the filing of the original Complaint for forcible entry. Although the respondent
judge is mandated to rule on every motion, he, however, cannot use this excuse to evade
the clear command of the rule that cases should be decided within the prescribed period.
The Court reminded the respondent judge that in order to meet the deadlines set for
deciding cases, he should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in his sala,
and should not be at the mercy of the whims of lawyers and parties. Furthermore, the
respondent judge should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30
days from its filing. He should have known that since a prayer for preliminary injunction is
merely a provisional remedy in an action for forcible entry, it should lend itself to the
summary nature of the main case.
On the other hand, the Court reprimanded the complainant for appearing as counsel on
behalf of a co-plaintiff without court authority. According to the Court, persons who are not
lawyers by profession are allowed by law to litigate their own case in court. Here, the right
of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from her. However,
appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff subjects her to administrative liability.
SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL
DETAINER; GOVERNED BY THE RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; TECHNICALITIES OR
DETAILS OF PROCEDURE THAT MAY CAUSE UNNECESSARY DELAYS SHOULD BE
AVOIDED. — The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered,
shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. These actions are summary in
nature, because they involve the disturbance of the social order, which should be restored
as promptly as possible. Designed as special civil actions, they are governed by the Rules
on Summary Procedure to disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of ordinary
actions. Accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure that may cause unnecessary
delays should be carefully avoided. The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are
designed to provide expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. Both are "time procedures" designed to bring
immediate relief. TASCEc
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTIES ARE ENTITLED TO PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; PRAYER FOR
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION SHOULD FIRST BE RESOLVED BEFORE THE MAIN CASE IS
DECIDED. — Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in an action for forcible entry,
parties are entitled to the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. A preliminary
injunction is an order granted at any stage of court actions or proceedings prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from
doing a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or
acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Since this remedy is
granted prior to the judgment or final order, we agree with both the OCA and respondent
that the prayer for preliminary injunction should first be resolved before the main case of
forcible entry is decided. CSIcHA
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IN FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE
SHOULD BE RESOLVED WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM ITS FILING. — However, respondent
should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30 days from its filing.
There can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court . . . . Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the provision uses the word
"shall" to evince its mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the belief of respondent
that since there was a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the main case for
forcible entry would have to wait until after he shall have decided the injunction plea, no
matter how long it took. If that were so, then the main case would lose its summary nature.
Respondent should have known that since a prayer for preliminary injunction is merely a
provisional remedy in an action for forcible entry, it should lend itself to the summary
nature of the main case. This is the very reason why the Rules of Court mandate that a
preliminary injunction in a forcible entry case be decided within 30 days from its filing.
Preliminary injunctions and TROs are extraordinary remedies provided by law for the
speedy adjudication of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed party from
further damage during the pendency of the original action. DSATCI
4. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; ENJOINED TO DECIDE CASES WITH DISPATCH. — Time

and time again, this Court has impressed upon judges the need to decide, promptly and
judiciously, cases and other matters pending before their courts. To a large extent, the
public's faith and confidence in the judicial system is boosted by the judicious and prompt
disposition of cases and undermined by any delay thereof. Judges are thus enjoined to
decide cases with dispatch. Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and
warrants the imposition of administrative sanction on them. TcSCEa

5. ID.; ID.; INABILITY THEREOF TO DECIDE CASE WITHIN THE REQUIRED PERIOD
CONSTITUTES GROSS INEFFICIENCY. — Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
specifically obliges judges to dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods. Often have we ruled that their inability to decide a case within
the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. To avoid sanction,
they should ask this Court for an extension and give their reasons for the delay. CHDAEc
6. ID.; ID.; SHOULD AT ALL TIMES REMAIN IN FULL CONTROL OF THE PROCEEDINGS
IN THEIR SALA. — Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the deadlines set for
deciding cases, judges should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in their
sala. They should not be at the mercy of the whims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the
latter's convenience that should be the primordial consideration, but the administration of
justice. DaTHAc
7. ID.; ID.; BOUND TO DISPOSE OF THE COURT'S BUSINESS PROMPTLY. — To reiterate,

judges are bound to dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide cases within
the required period. They are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the
performance of their judicial functions and duties. As held by this Court in Gallego v. Acting
Judge Doronila: "We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge especially at a time
when the clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary whose present
leadership has launched an all-out program to minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket
congestion and undue delay in the disposition of cases. Judges are called upon to observe
utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and duties."
EIcTAD
8. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO DECIDE CASES WITHIN REGLEMENTARY PERIOD

CONSTITUTES GROSS INEFFICIENCY; IMPOSABLE PENALTY. — We have often held that
failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross
inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against erring judges.
Given the facts of this case, a fine of P10,000 is appropriate pursuant to current
jurisprudence and Rule 140. TSIDEa
9. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; COURT PERSONNEL; CLERK OF COURT; PROHIBITION

FROM ENGAGING IN PRIVATE PRACTICE; PERSON APPEARING ON HIS OWN BEHALF IN
COURT NOT CONSIDERED TO BE IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW. — Since complainant was
charged with engaging in a private vocation or profession when she appeared on her own
behalf in court, the necessary implication was that she was in the practice of law. We
clarify. A party's right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by law. Section 34 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: . . . . This provision means that in a litigation,
parties may personally do everything during its progress - from its commencement to its
termination. When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are restricted to the
same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise,
ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long been permitted to
manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not
considered to be in the practice of law. "One does not practice law by acting for himself
any more than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself." EIaDHS
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRIVATE PRACTICE, DEFINED; RESPONDENT WAS NOT IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW WHEN SHE APPEARED FOR HERSELF. — The practice of law, though
impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually for
gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by rendering
legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows: ". . . .
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition
for judges and other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the
Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. . . . . " Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or
habitually holding herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding
payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law. HTSIEa
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONS WHO ARE NOT LAWYERS BY PROFESSION ARE
ALLOWED TO LITIGATE THEIR OWN CASE IN COURT. — Black's Law Dictionary defines
profession in the collective sense as referring to "the members of such a vocation." In turn,
vocation is defined as "a person's regular calling or business; one's occupation or
profession." The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate their
own case in court. The right of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken
away from her. Her being an employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the right
to proceedings in propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise
of a right cannot make one administratively liable. Thus, we need not go into a discussion
of the Court's ruling in Cayetano v. Monsod regarding the extent of the practice of law. TcDIaA
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LITIGANTS ARE ALLOWED TO REPRESENT THEMSELVES IN
COURT; RULE WILL NOT APPLY WHEN A PERSON APPEARS FOR ANOTHER PARTY; CASE
AT BAR. — However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on
behalf of her co-plaintiff in the case below, for which act the former cannot be completely
exonerated. Representing oneself is different from appearing on behalf of someone else.
The raison d'etre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court will not apply when
a person is already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she was already
defending the rights of another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be
argued that complainant was merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be
interrelated will not give complainant authority to appear in court. The undeniable fact
remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be
impairing the efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter without
permission from this Court. ACTIcS
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVERYONE CONNECTED WITH AN OFFICE CHARGED WITH
DISPENSATION OF JUSTICE CARRIES A HEAVY BURDEN OF RESPONSIBILITY. — We
cannot countenance any act that would undermine the people's faith and confidence in the
judiciary, even if we consider that this was the first time complainant appeared in court,
that she appeared for her own sister, and that there was no showing she did so for a fee.
Again we should be reminded that everyone connected with an office that is charged with
the dispensation of justice carries a heavy burden of responsibility. Given these
circumstances, the penalty of reprimand is sufficient. TcaAID
14. ID,; ID,; COURT WILL NOT HESITATE TO SHIELD THE INNOCENT COURT
EMPLOYEES FROM ANY GROUNDLESS ACCUSATION THAT TRIFLES WITH JUDICIAL
PROCESSES. — This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any conduct, act
or omission that falls short of the exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of
those expected to preserve the image of the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from its
responsibility of imposing discipline upon its employees in order not to diminish the
people's faith in our justice system. But when the charge has no basis, it will not hesitate to
shield the innocent court employee from any groundless accusation that trifles with
judicial processes, and that serves only to disrupt rather than promote the orderly
administration of justice.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN J :
PANGANIBAN, p
Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court may — without having to
resign from their posts — conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for and
on their own behalf as plaintiffs or defendants. However, appearing as counsel on behalf of
a co-plaintiff subjects the employee to administrative liability.
The Case and the Facts
A Complaint 1 dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda Y. Maderada against Judge
Ernesto H. Mediodea of the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan and
Maasin, Iloilo. In the Complaint, the judge was charged with "gross ignorance of the law
amounting to grave misconduct" for failing "to observe and apply the Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure" in Civil Case No. 252. 2
On September 7, 2001, complainant filed before the 12th MCTC of Cabatuan and Maasin,
Iloilo — presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol — an action for forcible entry with a prayer
for preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages 3 covered by the
Rule on Summary Procedure. Because complainant was the clerk of court in the aforesaid
sala, Judge Tersol inhibited herself from the case. Thus, Executive Judge Tito Gustilo
designated respondent judge to hear and decide the case.
In an Order 4 dated September 13, 2001, respondent required the defendants in the civil
case to show cause why the preliminary injunction should not be granted. Respondent
judge scheduled the hearing on September 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a
Manifestation 5 on September 17, 2001, praying that they be given an additional period of
ten days to file an answer. After the September 21 hearing, respondent reset the hearing to
September 28, 2001. 6 Meanwhile, the defendants filed their Opposition 7 to complainant's
prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO. The September 28 hearing was held in abeyance
after the defendants' lawyer questioned the authority of complainant to appear on behalf
of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff. 8 Respondent gave the defendants ten days 9 to file a
motion to disqualify complainant from appearing as counsel and thereafter to complainant
to file her opposition thereto.
In his Order 1 0 dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied the defendants' Motion 1 1 to
disqualify complainant from appearing on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.
Complainant filed a total of three Motions 1 2 praying for judgment to be rendered on the
civil case. In an Order 1 3 dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied complainant's
Motions because of the pending hearing for the issuance of a restraining order and an
injunction. He likewise denied the defendants' Motion for extension of time to file an
answer. 1 4 Complainant did not ask for a reconsideration of the denial of her Motion for
Rendition of Judgment.
In his Comment 1 5 on the Complaint, respondent contends that complainant filed a Petition
for his inhibition after filing two administrative cases against him. He argues that the mere
filing of administrative charges against judges is not a ground for disqualifying them from
hearing cases. In the exercise of their discretion, however, they may voluntarily disqualify
themselves. It is worth noting that respondent later inhibited himself from Civil Case No.
252. The case was then reassigned to Judge Loida Maputol of the 14th MCTC, San Miguel-
Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.
Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of the case cannot be attributed to him,
considering that he was mandated by law and the rules of procedure to pass upon every
motion presented before him. 1 6 Besides, complainant allegedly failed to present evidence
necessary for the immediate resolution of her prayer for preliminary injunction. 1 7
Moreover, she supposedly failed to exhaust the remedies available to her to question the
validity of his Orders. Instead, she tried to compel him to render a decision on the case. 1 8
Respondent likewise refutes complainant's assertion that she appeared as counsel on her
own behalf because she could not afford the services of a lawyer. Such claim was
allegedly without basis, since her compensation and other benefits as clerk of court were
more than enough to pay for the services of counsel. 1 9 He further alleges that she did not
secure authority from this Court to appear as counsel, and that she failed to file her leave
of absence every time she appeared in court. 2 0
Evaluation and Recommendation of the Court Administrator
The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for
in the Complaint should first be resolved before judgment should be rendered in the
principal action. However, it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunction should have
been decided within 30 days from the filing thereof. It noted that both the motion for
preliminary injunction and the principal action for forcible entry remained unresolved even
after four months had already lapsed since the filing of Civil Case No. 252.
Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of
P1,000 with a stern warning that a similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more
severely. 2 1
It did not, however, find complainant completely faultless. It therefore undertook another
round of investigation, the subject of which was complainant's appearance in court as
counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff without court authority. cdtai
According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must devote their full time
to government service to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice.
Although they are not absolutely prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a profession,
they should do so only with prior approval of this Court. The OCA added that "[e]ngaging in
any private business, vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court is
tantamount to moonlighting, which amounts to malfeasance in office." 2 2
Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in the amount of P1,000 for
appearing as counsel without authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any
similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely. The OCA also
recommended that she be directed to file her application for leaves of absence on the
days she had appeared in court to litigate her case.
The Court's Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, but modify the penalty to
conform to the rules.
Administrative Liability
The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer,
regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. 2 3 These actions are summary in nature,
because they involve the disturbance of the social order, which should be restored as
promptly as possible. 2 4 Designed as special civil actions, they are governed by the Rules
on Summary Procedure to disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of ordinary
actions. 2 5 Accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure that may cause unnecessary
delays should be carefully avoided. 2 6 The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer
are designed to provide expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to
possession of the property involved. Both are "time procedures" designed to bring
immediate relief. 2 7
Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in an action for forcible entry, parties are
entitled to the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.
A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of court actions or proceedings
prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to
refrain from doing a particular act or acts. 2 8 It may also require the performance of a
particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. 2 9
Since this remedy is granted prior to the judgment or final order, we agree with both the
OCA and respondent that the prayer for preliminary injunction should first be resolved
before the main case of forcible entry is decided.
However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30
days from its filing. There can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 15 of Rule 70
of the Rules of Court, which reads:
"Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction. — The court may grant preliminary
injunction, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the
defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the plaintiff.
"A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful

detainer may, within five (5) days from the filing of the complaint, present a
motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The
court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof."
(Italics ours)
Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the provision uses the word "shall" to
evince its mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the belief of respondent that since
there was a prayer for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the main case for forcible
entry would have to wait until after he shall have decided the injunction plea, no matter how
long it took. If that were so, then the main case would lose its summary nature.
Respondent should have known that since a prayer for preliminary injunction is merely a
provisional remedy in an action for forcible entry, it should lend itself to the summary
nature of the main case. This is the very reason why the Rules of Court mandate that a
preliminary injunction in a forcible entry case be decided within 30 days from its filing.
Preliminary injunctions and TROs are extraordinary remedies provided by law for the
speedy adjudication of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed party from
further damage during the pendency of the original action.
Time and time again, this Court has impressed upon judges the need to decide, promptly
and judiciously, cases and other matters pending before their courts. 3 0 To a large extent,
the public's faith and confidence in the judicial system is boosted by the judicious and
prompt disposition of cases and undermined by any delay thereof. 3 1 Judges are thus
enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.
Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of
administrative sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically
obliges judges to dispose of the court's business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods. Often have we ruled that their inability to decide a case within the
required period is not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency. 3 2 To avoid sanction,
they should ask this Court for an extension and give their reasons for the delay.
Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is mandated to rule on every motion, he
cannot use this excuse to evade the clear command of the rule that cases should be
decided within the prescribed period. This Court notes with concern the plethora of
motions and pleadings filed in this case, which should have been tried under the Rules of
Summary Procedure. Yet, even after four months had lapsed since the filing of the original
Complaint for forcible entry, the prayer for preliminary injunction and the main case
remained unresolved.
Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the deadlines set for deciding cases, judges
should at all times remain in full control of the proceedings in their sala. 3 3 They should not
be at the mercy of the whims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the latter's convenience
that should be the primordial consideration, but the administration of justice. 3 4
To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of the court's business promptly and to decide
cases within the required period. They are called upon to observe utmost diligence and
dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and duties. As held by this Court in
Gallego v. Acting Judge Doronila. 3 5
"We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge especially at a time when
the clogging of court dockets is still the bane of the judiciary whose present
leadership has launched an all-out program to minimize, if not totally eradicate,
docket congestion and undue delay in the disposition of cases. Judges are called
upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their
judicial functions and duties." 3 6
The prompt disposition of cases becomes even more pronounced when a municipal trial
court is called upon to decide a case governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure. As
eloquently put by Justice Jose C. Vitug, speaking for the Court in Cruz Jr. v. Judge Joven:
37
". . .. Being the paradigm of justice in the first instance, a municipal trial court
judge, more than any other colleague on the bench, is the immediate embodiment
of how that trust is carried out. In the evolvement of the public perception on the
judiciary, there can likely be no greater empirical data that influences it than the
prompt and proper disposition of cases before the courts." 3 8
We have often held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary
period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanctions against erring judges. Given the facts of this case, a fine of P10,000 is
appropriate pursuant to current jurisprudence 3 9 and Rule 140. 4 0
As to Complainant Maderada, the OCA recommended that she be fined in the amount of
P1,000 for supposedly engaging in a private vocation or profession without prior approval
of the Court. The Office of the Court Administrator held that her appearance as counsel for
herself and on behalf of her co-plaintiff was tantamount to moonlighting, a species of
malfeasance in office.
Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private vocation or profession when
she appeared on her own behalf in court, the necessary implication was that she was in the
practice of law. We clarify. A party's right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by
law. Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the
peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney,
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of
the bar."
This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its
progress — from its commencement to its termination. 4 1 When they, however, act as their
own attorneys, they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those
qualified to practice law; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. 4 2
Individuals have long been permitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions;
and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the practice of law. 4 3 "One does not
practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine by rendering first
aid to himself." 4 4
The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a
profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative
capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. 4 5 Private practice has been
defined by this Court as follows:
". . .. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute
[referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees of the
superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private
practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out
to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. . . .." 4 6
(Citations omitted) AcCTaD
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding
herself out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such
services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines profession in the collective sense as referring to "the
members of such a vocation." 4 7 In turn, vocation is defined as "a person's regular calling or
business; one's occupation or profession." 4 8
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate their own case in
court. The right of complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from
her. Her being an employee of the judiciary does not remove from her the right to
proceedings in propria persona or to self-representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of
a right cannot make one administratively liable. Thus, we need not go into a discussion of
the Court's ruling in Cayetano v. Monsod 4 9 regarding the extent of the practice of law.
However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on behalf of her
co-plaintiff in the case below, for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated.
Representing oneself is different from appearing on behalf of someone else.
The raison d'etre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court will not apply when
a person is already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she was already
defending the rights of another person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be
argued that complainant was merely protecting her rights. That their rights may be
interrelated will not give complainant authority to appear in court. The undeniable fact
remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The former may be
impairing the efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter without
permission from this Court.
We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the people's faith and confidence in
the judiciary, even if we consider that this was the first time complainant appeared in court,
that she appeared for her own sister, and that there was no showing she did so for a fee.
Again we should be reminded that everyone connected with an office that is charged with
the dispensation of justice carries a heavy burden of responsibility. 5 0 Given these
circumstances, the penalty of reprimand 5 1 is sufficient.
This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that
falls short of the exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of those expected
to preserve the image of the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from its responsibility of
imposing discipline upon its employees in order not to diminish the people's faith in our
justice system. But when the charge has no basis, it will not hesitate to shield the innocent
court employee from any groundless accusation that trifles with judicial processes, 5 2 and
that serves only to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice. 5 3
WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea is hereby found GUILTY of gross
inefficiency in failing to observe the reglementary periods in deciding cases, and is FINED
in the amount of P10,000 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or of a similar
act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, Imelda Y. Maderada
is hereby REPRIMANDED for appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without court
authority and is likewise warned that a future similar act shall be sanctioned more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio Morales, JJ ., concur.
Corona, J ., is on leave.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 2–11.

2. Entitled "Imelda Maderada et al. v. Lilia Malones et al."
3. Complaint dated September 7, 2001; rollo, pp. 12–16.
4. Rollo, p. 105.
5. Manifestation dated September 17, 2001; rollo, pp. 25–26.

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1

[Resolution. March 18, 1954.]

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of

Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and Antonio Enrile

1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION; RELATION TO COURT AND PUBLIC.

In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public

Believing themselves as fully qualiﬁed to practice law as those

(3)The total number of candidates to be beneﬁted by this Republic Acts

xxx xxx xxx

In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in

"Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a

To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on

Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo

(72 per cent and above but below 73 per cent —

Number of candidates who passed249

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

70.55 per cent with 2 subjects below 50 per cent1

Number of candidates who passed409

Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor

Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M.

MRD-104.Torre, Catalino P.758568786967656970.25

MRP-285.Dusi, Felicisimo R.768269826662807172.85

MRP-466.Sybico, Jesus L.797070727575726073.05

"SEC. 14.Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be

AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM

[G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.]

RENATO L. CAYETANO , petitioner, vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

"MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

"MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the

"Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the

Additionally, consider the following:

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

[B.M. No. 553 . June 17, 1993.]

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner, vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.,

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

THE Please call: 521-0767,

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced,

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed