10 Pagaduan Vs Ocuma g.r.176308
10 Pagaduan Vs Ocuma g.r.176308
10 Pagaduan Vs Ocuma g.r.176308
FULL TEXT:
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioners Angel N. Pagaduan, Amelia P. Tucci, Teresita P. del Monte, Orlita P. Gadin,
Perla P. Espiritu, Elisa P. Dunn, Lorna P. Kimble, Edito N. Pagaduan and Leo N.
Pagaduan are all heirs of the late Agaton Pagaduan. Respondents are the spouses
Estanislao Ocuma and Fe Posadas Ocuma.
The subject lot used to be part of a big parcel of land that originally belonged to Nicolas
Cleto as evidenced by Certificate of Title (C.T.) No. 14. The big parcel of land was the
subject of two separate lines of dispositions. The first line of dispositions began with the
sale by Cleto to Antonio Cereso on May 11, 1925. Cereso in turn sold the land to the
siblings with the surname Antipolo on September 23, 1943. The Antipolos sold the
property to Agaton Pagaduan, father of petitioners, on March 24, 1961. All the
dispositions in this line were not registered and did not result in the issuance of new
certificates of title in the name of the purchasers.
The second line of dispositions started on January 30, 1954, after Cleto’s death, when
his widow Ruperta Asuncion as his sole heir and new owner of the entire tract, sold the
same to Eugenia Reyes. This resulted in the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-1221 in the name of Eugenia Reyes in lieu of TCT No. T-1220 in the name
of Ruperta Asuncion.
On November 26, 1961, Eugenia Reyes executed a unilateral deed of sale where she
sold the northern portion with an area of 32,325 square meters to respondents for
₱1,500.00 and the southern portion consisting of 8,754 square meters to Agaton
Pagaduan for ₱500.00. Later, on June 5, 1962, Eugenia executed another deed of sale,
this time conveying the entire parcel of land, including the southern portion, in
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respondent’s favor. Thus, TCT No. T-1221 was cancelled and in lieu thereof TCT No. T-
5425 was issued in the name of respondents. On June 27, 1989, respondents
subdivided the land into two lots. The subdivision resulted in the cancellation of TCT No.
T-5425 and the issuance of TCT Nos. T-37165 covering a portion with 31,418 square
meters and T-37166 covering the remaining portion with 9,661 square meters.
On July 26, 1989, petitioners instituted a complaint for reconveyance of the southern
portion with an area of 8,754 square meters, with damages, against respondents before
the RTC of Olongapo City.
On June 25, 2002, the trial court rendered a decision in petitioners’ favor. Ruling that a
constructive trust over the property was created in petitioners’ favor, the court below
ordered respondents to reconvey the disputed southern portion and to pay attorney’s
fees as well as litigation expenses to petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:
SO ORDERED.5
Dissatisfied with the decision, respondents appealed it to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court; with the
dispositive portion of the decision reading, thus:
SO ORDERED.6
The Court of Appeals ruled that while the registration of the southern portion in the
name of respondents had created an implied trust in favor of Agaton Pagaduan,
petitioners, however, failed to show that they had taken possession of the said portion.
Hence, the appellate court concluded that prescription had set in, thereby precluding
petitioners’ recovery of the disputed portion.
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Unperturbed by the reversal of the trial court’s decision, the petitioners come to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari.7 They assert that the Civil Code provision on
double sale is controlling. They submit further that since the incontrovertible evidence
on record is that they are in possession of the southern portion, the ten (10)-year
prescriptive period for actions for reconveyance should not apply to
them.8 Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the action for reconveyance has
prescribed since the ten (10)-year period, which according to them has to be reckoned
from the issuance of the title in their name in 1962, has elapsed long ago.9
The Court of Appeals decision must be reversed and set aside, hence the petition
succeeds.
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by
force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes. (Emphasis supplied)
The property in question did not come from the petitioners. In fact that property came
from Eugenia Reyes. The title of the Ocumas can be traced back from Eugenia Reyes
to Ruperta Asuncion to the original owner Nicolas Cleto. Thus, if the respondents are
holding the property in trust for anyone, it would be Eugenia Reyes and not the
petitioners.1a v v p h i 1
This lack of a trust relationship does not inure to the benefit of the respondents. Despite
a host of jurisprudence that states a certificate of title is indefeasible, unassailable and
binding against the whole world, it merely confirms or records title already existing and
vested, and it cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be
used for the perpetration of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the
expense of others.11
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Rather, after a thorough scrutiny of the records of the instant case, the Court finds that
this is a case of double sale under article 1544 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first possession thereof in good faith, if
it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good
faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof; to the person who presents
the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
Otherwise stated, where it is an immovable property that is the subject of a double sale,
ownership shall be transferred: (1) to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof, to the person who in good
faith was first in possession; and (3) in default thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith. The requirement of the law then is two-fold:
acquisition in good faith and registration in good faith.12
In this case there was a first sale by Eugenia Reyes to Agaton Pagaduan and a second
sale by Eugenia Reyes to the respondents. 13 For a second buyer like the respondents to
successfully invoke the second paragraph, Article 1544 of the Civil Code, it must
possess good faith from the time of the sale in its favor until the registration of the same.
Respondents sorely failed to meet this requirement of good faith since they had actual
knowledge of Eugenia’s prior sale of the southern portion property to the petitioners, a
fact antithetical to good faith. This cannot be denied by respondents since in the same
deed of sale that Eugenia sold them the northern portion to the respondents for
₱1,500.00, Eugenia also sold the southern portion of the land to Agaton Pagaduan for
₱500.00.14
It is to be emphasized that the Agaton Pagaduan never parted with the ownership and
possession of that portion of Lot No. 785 which he had purchased from Eugenia Santos.
Hence, the registration of the deed of sale by respondents was ineffectual and vested
upon them no preferential rights to the property in derogation of the rights of the
petitioners.
Respondents had prior knowledge of the sale of the questioned portion to Agaton
Pagaduan as the same deed of sale that conveyed the northern portion to them,
conveyed the southern portion to Agaton Pagaduan.15 Thus the subsequent issuance of
TCT No. T-5425, to the extent that it affects the Pagaduan’s portion, conferred no better
right than the registration which was the source of the authority to issue the said title.
Knowledge gained by respondents of the first sale defeats their rights even if they were
first to register the second sale. Knowledge of the first sale blackens this prior
registration with bad faith.16 Good faith must concur with the registration.17 Therefore,
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As the respondents gained no rights over the land, it is petitioners who are the rightful
owners, having established that their successor-in-interest Agaton Pagaduan had
purchased the property from Eugenia Reyes on November 26, 1961 and in fact took
possession of the said property. The action to recover the immovable is not barred by
prescription, as it was filed a little over 27 years after the title was registered in bad faith
by the Ocumas as per Article 1141 of the Civil Code.18
SO ORDERED.
CASE DIGEST:
Facts:
De Leon sold 3 parcels of land to Ong. The properties were mortgaged to Real Savings and Loan
Association. The parties executed a notarized deed of absolute sale with assumption of
mortgage. The deed of Assumption of mortgage shall be executed in favor of Ong after the
payment of 415K. Ong complied with it. De Leon handed the keys of to Ong and informed the
loan company that the mortgage has been assumed by Ong. Ong made some improvements in
the property. After sometime, Ong learned that the properties were sold to Viloria and changed
the locks to it. Ong went to the mortgage company and learned that the mortgage was already
paid and the titles were given to Viloria. Ong filed a complaint for the nullity of second sale and
damages. De Leon contended that Ong does not have a cause of action against him because the
sale was subject to a condition which requires the approval of the loan company and that he
and Ong only entered a contract to sell.
Issue:
Ruling:
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Yes, the parties entered into a contract of sale. In a contract of sale, the seller conveys
ownership of the property to the buyer upon the perfection of the contract. The non-payment
of the price is a negative resolutory condition. Contract to sell is subject to a positive suspensive
condition. The buyer does not acquire ownership of the property until he fully pays the
purchase price. In the present case, the deed executed by the parties did not show that the
owner intends to reserve ownership of the properties. The terms and conditions affected only
the manner of payment and not the immediate transfer of ownership. It was clear that the
owner intended a sale because he unqualifiedly delivered and transferred ownership of the
properties to the respondent